[
  {
    "Case No.": "11707",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVIS1NDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 829 = 2015 SLD 829 = (2015) 112 TAX 12 = 2015 PTD 2241",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(l),39(3),28(i),24(5),34(5),111(1)(d),122(4),122(5),122(9),153,172(2),174(2),177,214C,120\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(l),39(3),28(i),24(5),34(5),111(1)(d),122(4),122(5),122(9),153,172(2),174(2),177,214C,120\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 2221/LB/2014 (Tax year 2012), decision dated: 10-12-2014. I.T.A. No. 2062/LB/2014 (Tax year 2012).",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI CHAIRMAN AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11708",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVIS1NTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2120 = 2008 SLD 2120 = 2008 TAX 218 = 2006 ITR 15",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE (APPEAL) NO. 2454 OF 2006, OCTOBER 27, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "P.D. DINAKARAN AND P.P.S., JANARTHANA RAJA, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax, Madurai \nvs\nSouthern Roadways Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11709",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVITFF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 1150 = 2003 SLD 1150 = 2003 TAX 395",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=13(1)(aa),59B,65,65(1)(c),63,143(3),62,59(3),59(1),156,59A,80B,80C,80CC\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=13(1)(aa),59B,65,65(1)(c),63,143(3),62,59(3),59(1),156,59A,80B,80C,80CC\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 3831/KB of 1993-94 (Assessment year 1989-90), decision dated: 2-4-2002, hearing DATE : 31-10-2001",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11710",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVITFF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 1151 = 2003 SLD 1151 = 2003 TAX 580",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=24(ff),50,24(c),72,81,53,52\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=24(ff),50,24(c),72,81,53,52\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 331/IB of 2001-2002 (Assessment year 2000-2001), decision dated: 08-03-2003, hearing DATE : 08-03-2003 I.T.A. No. 406/IB of 2001-2002 (Assessment year 2000-2001), decision dated: 8-3-2003",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED AQEEL ZAFAR UL HASAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SYED MASOOD UL HASSAN SHAH, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11711",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQ1JDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 1722 = 2002 SLD 1722 = (2002) 85 TAX 286 = (2000) 245 ITR 18",
    "Key Words:": "Section 7 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, read with rule 1BB of the Wealth-tax Rules, 1957 - Valuation of assets - Immovable property - Assessment year 1983-84 - Whether if rule 1BB is applicable to a property, then its market value has to be determined in accordance with provisions contained in that rule and other methods stand excluded - Held, yes - Whether a mere difference in two values, however large, cannot be a reason for taking view that it is impracticable to apply rule and in any case, if Assessing Officer wants to resort to sub-rule (5) of rule 1BB, it is mandatory for him to specify reasons in writing in assessment order or otherwise why he considers it not practicable to apply provisions of rule 1BB - Held, yes\nF ACTS\nThe assessee declared the value of his house property by determining the same by applying a multiplier of 20 to its annual letting value. The Assessing Officer noticed that the said property was sold for Rs. 3 lakhs on 28-2-1984, while the valuation date for the year under consideration was 31-3-1983. The Assessing Officer treated the sale price as the market value of the property, and rejected the assessee's contention that value should be determined by applying rule 1BB. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that rule 1BB was applicable and directed that the value declared by the assessee be adopted. On further appeal, the Tribunal reversed the Commissioner (Appeals)'s order by restoring the Assessing Officer's order and held that because of sub-rule (5) of rule 1BB, the value should be determined in the manner adopted by the Assessing Officer.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nSection 7 which provides for the method of the valuation for assessment begins with the words 'subject to any rules made in this behalf'. It means that the value has to be determined according to the rules. Various rules have been made under section 7 which are contained in the Wealth-tax Rules, 1958, for the purpose of determination of the market value of various types of properties. If rule 1BB is applicable to a property, then its market value has to be determined in accordance with the provisions contained in that rule and other methods stand excluded. In that view of the matter, there could be no dispute that in the instant case rule 1BB was applicable. The impracticability of the rule conceived by the Tribunal appeared to arise because of the vast difference in the value of the property as determined under rule 1BB and as determined by taking the subsequent sale as an exemplar. [Para 5]\nA mere difference in the two values, however large, cannot be a reason for taking the view that it is impracticable to apply the rule and in any case, if the Assessing Officer wants to resort to sub-rule (5) of rule 1BB, it is mandatory for him to specify the reasons in writing in the assessment order or otherwise why he considers it not practicable to apply the provisions of rule 1BB. No such reasons had been stated in the assessment order and there was no mention that the Assessing Officer who was an IAC found it impracticable to apply rule 1BB. [Para 9]\nLastly, the Assessing Officer mechanically adopted the sale price in respect of the sale that took place on 28-2-1984, as the market value of the property on 31-3-1983. There was a sufficient gap between the valuation date and the date of sale and the Assessing Officer did not even bother to verify whether vacant possession of the property was given when it was actually sold. On the valuation date, the property was probably not vacant and that would bring about a material change in the circumstances that would affect the market value of the property. [Para 10]\nTherefore, the Tribunal was not right in setting aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and restoring the order of the Assessing Officer and in invoking the provisions of sub-rule (5) of rule 1BB. [Para 11]\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCWT v. Ganga Pershad Kedia [1990] 185 ITR 30 (Delhi) [Para 6] and Bharat Hari Singhania v. CWT [1994] 207 ITR 1/ 73 Taxman 3 (SC) [Para 6].",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957=27(1),7\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Act, 1957=27(1),7\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Rules, 1957=1BB(5)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "WT REFERENCE NO. 187 OF 1991 SEPTEMBER 24, 1999",
    "Judge Name:": "M.C. AGARWAL AND R.K. AGRAWAL, JJ",
    "": "Dr. Rajendra Kumar Agrawal\nvs\nCommissioner of Wealth Tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11712",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQ1JDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 1723 = 2002 SLD 1723 = (2002) 85 TAX 294 = (2000) 245 ITR 147",
    "Key Words:": "Section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Penalty - For late filing of return - Assessment year 1973-74 - For assessment year in question, ITO levied penalty under section 271(1)(a) on assessee-firm for late filing of return - On appeals, AAC as well as Tribunal held that in view of fact that tax had been deducted at source in excess, there was no case for levy of penalty - Whether since tax deducted at source was in excess of tax determined and calculated, there was no amount on which penalty could be calculated under section 271(1)(a) and, therefore, penalty could not be levied - Held, yes - Whether consequently Tribunal was correct in cancelling penalty - Held, yes\nFACTS\nFor the assessment year in question, the assessee-firm filed its return belatedly. The ITO levied penalty under section 271(1)(a). On appeal, the AAC found that since the tax had been deducted at source in excess, there was no case for levy of penalty for the delay in furnishing the return. On further appeal, the Tribunal upheld the order of the AAC.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nSince the tax deducted at source was in excess of the tax determined and calculated, there was no amount on which penalty could be calculated under section 271(1)(a) and, hence, the penalty could not be levied. Therefore, the Tribunal was correct in cancelling the penalty.\nNote: Case was decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASE REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Fomra Bros. [1980] 122 ITR 312 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=256(2),271(2),271(1)(a)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256(2),271(2),271(1)(a)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE NO. 1984 (REFERENCE NO. 1433 OF 1984) DECEMBER 24, 1997",
    "Judge Name:": "N.V. BALASUBRAMANIAN AND P. THANGAVEL, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nN. Srinivasan"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11713",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQ1J5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 1723 = 2002 SLD 1723 = (2002) 85 TAX 278 = (2000) 245 ITR 10",
    "Key Words:": "Section 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Deductions - Exporters - Assessment year 1994-95 - Assessee was disallowed deduction on grounds that foreign remittance had not been received within six months and that application for extending time limit was not made before expiry of that period - Whether application for extension of time could be made even after expiry of prescribed period of six months - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee filed its return of income for the assessment year 1994-95 claiming deduction under section 80HHC in respect of the export turnover. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the money was not received within the statutory period of six months and that no application seeking extension was filed. The assessee, however, claimed that no such application was required to be made and that it was the function of the Commissioner to grant the deduction claimed. However, the assessee did make an application to the Commissioner for extension of time in 1998 which was rejected by the Commissioner on the ground that it was filed beyond the time-limit of six months.\nOn writ:\nHELD\nA party ought to be able to make the application after the expiry of the period of six months. Rather, in the normal course, the occasion for making such an application could arise only when the period of time had already expired. The approach of the Commissioner was not correct and since the application could have been filed even after the expiry of the period of six months, the Commissioner should have independently decided the application on merits. As a result, the writ was allowed.\nCASE REFERRED TO\nAjad Tobacco Factory (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1996] 85 Taxman 281 (All.).",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=80HHC,80HHC(2)(a)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=80HHC,80HHC(2)(a)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 901 OF 2000, APRIL 25, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "ARUN KUMAR AND D.K., JAIN, JJ",
    "": "Narinder Kumar Arora\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11714",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQ1J5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 599 = 2009 SLD 599 = 2009 CLC 1148",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance (IV of 1979)-------S. 15---Chief Administrator Auqaf---Status, duty and functions---Status of Chief Administrator Auqaf. and his subordinates is that of Mutwalli whose authority is circumscribed by the provisions of Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979, and rules framed thereunder---Chief Administrator Auqaf is vested with administration, control, management and maintenance of Waqf properties and is authorized to prepare a scheme for administration and development of such Waqf properties but such authority is neither absolute nor unfettered---Discretion in such behalf is strictly structured by law and is always justifiable---Chief Administrator is required to give effect to wishes of person dedicating Waqf to the extent that such wishes can be ascertained and reasonably be given effect to. \n \n(b) Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance (IV of 1979)---\n \n----Ss. 15 & 17---Waqf property, use of---Preparation of scheme---Scheme to use waqf property should be prepared in a manner that property is used for the purpose for which it was dedicated or for the purpose for which it was used prior to its being taken over by Auqaf Department---Only where such wishes of dedicators are not ascertainable or impossible to give effect thereto, Waqf property may be used for any purpose recognized by Islam as religious, pious or charitable---If property is being used for a particular purpose and the same is recognized as religious, pious or charitable by Islam, every effort must necessarily be made to ensure that it is continued to be used for that purpose. \n \n(c) Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance (IV of 1979)---\n \n----S. 7---Waqf property---Scope---Not only immovable property but also moveable property such as stock, shares and cash can also form subject matter of waqf. \n \n(d) Punjab Waqf Properties (Administration) Rules, 2002---\n \n----Rr. 5 & 7---Waqf land---Lease period---Principle---Waqf land can be, for reasons to be recorded, leased out for a period longer than three years by Chief Administrator Auqaf, with prior approval of Government of Punjab---Financial advantage can be a reason for grant of such lease. \n \n(e) Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance (IV of 1979)---\n \n---Ss. 15 & 17---Punjab Waqf Properties (Administration) Rules, 2002, Rr.5 & 7---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition--- Waqf land---Lease beyond three years--Extending of lease period---Petitioner was the highest bidder, therefore, lease of land in question was granted in his favour for a period of ten years, which was later on extended to thirty years---Petitioner has started installing petrol pump over land in question which was resisted by respondents on the ground that land belonged to Darbar and could not be used for any purpose other than the use by Darbar---Validity---Chief Administrator Auqaf had issued summary without taking into consideration the provisions of Ss.15 (2) and 17 of Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979, which was found by High Court to be regrettable---High Court also noticed that after auction had been held, the period of lease was subsequently extended to thirty years upon a note of Chief Administrator Auqaf, which was approved by Chief Minister---Such course of action was strange as in advertisement, only a ten years lease was offered, if lease of thirty years had been offered, there was a possibility that other participants of public auction might have offered a higher consideration---High Court remanded the matter to Chief Administrator Auqaf so that he could revisit the issue, conduct the inquiry so as to determine whether land in question, had been used since time immemorial for a purpose recognized as religious, pious or charitable and whether or not establishment of petrol station would interfere with the performance of rites and rituals at Darbar in question---Petition was disposed of accordingly. \n \nMuhammad Sadiq and 15 others v. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan, Lahore and others PLD 1972 Lah. 780; Sheikh Inayat Ullah and others v. M.A. Khan and others PLD 1964 SC 126 and Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab, Lahore v. Mian Abdul Majid and 7 others 1980 CLC 651 ref.\n \nMian Asrar-ul-Haq for Petitioner.\n \nMalik Zafar Iqbal Awan, Addl. A.-G. and Sh. Anwarul Haq for Respondents Nos.1, 2 and 3.\n \nSardar Khurram Latif Khan Khosa for Respondent No.4.\n \nDate of hearing: 23rd December, 2008.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance (IV of 1979)=15,7,16,17,25,15(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rPunjab Waqf Properties Ordinance (IV of 1979)=15,7,16,17,25,15(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rPunjab Waqf Properties (Administration) Rules, 2002=5,7\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.13749 of 2006 and 14161 of 2008, decision dated: 15-01-2009",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED, J",
    "": "Messrs NOOR SHAH FILLING STATION (REGD.) through Manager (Administration)\nvs\nAUQAF DEPARTMENT through Secretary/Chief Administrator Auqaf, Punjab and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11715",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQ1J5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 1724 = 2002 SLD 1724 = (2002) 85 TAX 290 = (2000) 245 ITR 126",
    "Key Words:": "Section 32A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Investment allowance - Whether in order to be eligible for investment allowance, assessee had to prove that conditions were fulfilled with reference to factual background, and there being no discussion in orders of Commissioner (Appeals) as well as Tribunal with regard to factual aspects of assessee's claim, matter had to be remanded - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee-company was engaged in the business of growing tea, rubber, cardamom, etc., and also executing engineering contract works. It claimed investment allowance on computers installed in the estate offices. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that those machines were office equipments. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee's claim. On appeal by the revenue, the Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).\nOn reference :\nHELD\nWhether a particular machine is liable for deduction or not would depend upon the prescriptions in the relevant provisions and the factual position of the case. In order to be eligible, the stipulations as laid down in section 32A have to be satisfied. The assessee has to prove that the conditions are fulfilled with reference to the factual background. On a reading of the orders passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, no discussion was found with regard to the factual aspect and only with reference to the decisions rendered by the High Courts, the matter was disposed of. Whether those decisions were applicable to the facts of the case, had not been analysed.\nThe matter was, accordingly, remanded back to the Tribunal.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. I.B.M. World Trade Corpn. [1981] 130 ITR 739 /[1979] 2 Taxman 356 (Bom.) and CIT v. Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. [1993] 201 ITR 17/ 70 Taxman 126 (Cal.).",
    "Court Name:": "Kerala High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=256(1),32A,32A(2)(b)(iii)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256(1),32A,32A(2)(b)(iii)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 7 OF 1996, SEPTEMBER 28, 1999",
    "Judge Name:": "ARIJIT PASAYAT, C.J. AND K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nHarisons Malayalam Ltd."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11716",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQ1J5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 1726 = 2002 SLD 1726 = (2002) 85 TAX 245",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Section 156 -- Rectification of mistake -- Application for -- Maintainability - Interest income on non-performing of loan -- Taxability -- Provisions for bad debts, depreciation on computers and expenses on account of diminution in value of Tradable securities -- Disallowance -- Validity -- Whether issue which did not arise out of order of CIT(A) could be considered by Tribunal unless it was decided by CIT(A) -- Held no -- Whether interest on sticky loans transferred to suspense account by banks in compliance with prudential regulations was not liable to tax as it was only actual recoveries out of same which shall be liable to tax whenever received -- Held yes -- Whether it was bank who could decide as to what part of its loan had become bad and under what circumstances he had to write it off -- Held yes -- Whether in fact, in this case Tribunal had allowed bad debts and its provision for other years after discussing in detail that its in fact was not provision but actually writing off as per law -- Held yes -- Whether computer by all means was plant and machinery and it fully covered under provisions of third schedule of ordinance for purposes of initial depreciation -- Held yes -- Whether if purpose of these securities was only earning profit therefrom and not its purchase and sale then it was not stock in trade -- Held yes -- Whether assessee without selling securities could not be allowed to reduce its income by decrease in value of such securities -- Held yes -- Whether even if these securities were treated as stock in trade decrease in its value was neither expense incurred nor loss in actuality -- Held yes -- Whether expenses claimed which had neither accrued nor expanded on account of diminution in value of tradable securities was not expenditure, thus its disallowance was justified -- Held yes",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=156\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=156\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. Nos. 400/LB and 3432/LB of 2000 and 92/LB of 2001 (Assessment years 1995-96, 1998-99 and 1999-2000), decision dated: 10-12-2001, hearing DATE ; 08-11-2001",
    "Judge Name:": "KHAWAJA FAROOQ SAEED, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMTIAZ ANJUM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11717",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQ1NDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 1727 = 2002 SLD 1727 = (2002) 85 TAX 331",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Rebate on super tax -- Rate of rebate -- Remand of case for fresh decision in light of decision of Supreme Court -- Pre- Conditionalities -- Question of -- Whether after having gone through Form \"\"A\"\" issued by Registrar Joint Stock Companies, if it is found that prior to dissolution of PIDB by Govt. of Punjab vide Notification dated January 1, 1998 less than 50% shares of company were not in name of Govt. of Punjab, but it were in name of Board then appellants shall not be entitled for 5% rebate on super tax in view of of Supreme Court and in such situation appellants shall be bound to pay super tax without claiming rebate and they will also be estopped to agitate their grievance in this behalf in any other manner -- Held yes -- Whether in view of matter, assessee was not entitled to 5% rebate on super tax -- Held yes -",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=156\\n\\r\\n\\rCompanies Ordinance, 1984=156\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. Nos. 9194/LB of 1992-93, and 2468/LB to 2471/LB of 1998 (Assessment years 1992-93 to 1994-95 and 1996-97), decision dated: 31-12-2001, hearing DATE : 22-12-2001",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TAUQIR AFZAL MALIK, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND, JAVED TAHIR BUTT, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11718",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVERFFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2265 = 2001 SLD 2265 = (2001) 84 TAX 449 = (2000) 243 ITR 867",
    "Key Words:": "Section 254, read with section 256, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Appellate Tribunal - Powers of - Whether out of Tribunal's action considering miscellaneous application of assessee and rectifying its original order beyond time-limit prescribed under section 254(2), any question of law would arise warranting reference - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe Tribunal passed an order on 12-6-1978, with reference to the assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76 disallowing unabsorbed depreciation and development rebate claimed by the assessee. Subsequently, the assessee filed an application under section 254(2) relying upon the of the Supreme Court in Rajapalayam Mills Ltd. v. CIT [1978] 115 ITR 777/[1979] 1 Taxman 40 and contended that the earlier decision of the Tribunal should be modified in view of the ratio of the of the Supreme Court in the later case. That contention was accepted and the Tribunal passed an order on 27-6-1983, changing the earlier order by granting the benefit of development rebate and depreciation claimed by the assessee.\nThe revenue, aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal sought to have the questions referred to the High Court. The High Court had dismissed the application on the only ground that there was a mistake apparent on the face of the order of the Tribunal passed earlier in 1978 and the question of time-limit in passing the later order did not arise out of the order of the Tribunal.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD\nQuestions raised by the revenue were the questions of law which were required to be considered by the High Court on reference. The question whether the Tribunal's earlier order of 1978 suffered from a mistake apparent when it followed the of the Supreme Court in Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1978] 113 ITR 84, which was ruling the field at the time, was definitely a matter to be considered by the High Court.\nIn the result, the order of the High Court was set aside. The Tribunal was directed to send a statement of the case to the High Court setting out the questions for consideration by the High Court. The appeals were allowed accordingly.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1978] 113 ITR 84 (SC) and Rajapalayam Mills Ltd. v. CIT [1978] 115 ITR 777 /[1979] 1 Taxman 40 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=254,256\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=254,256\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1768 TO 1771 OF 1992, FEBRUARY 3, 1999",
    "Judge Name:": "M. SRINIVASAN AND U.C. BANERJEE, JJ.",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nHindustan Zinc Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11719",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVERFFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2266 = 2001 SLD 2266 = (2001) 84 TAX 451 = (2000) 243 ITR 181",
    "Key Words:": "Section 33, read with section 256, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Development rebate - Assessment years 1965-66 to 1972-73 - Whether consequent to conversion of assessee's proprietary business into a partnership firm, development rebate, which was already allowed, was to be withdrawn - Held, yes\nCASE REVIEW\nJudgment of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. Vijaya Productions (P.) Ltd. [1985] 152 ITR 613 reversed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nSunil Siddharthbhai v. CIT [1985] 156 ITR 509/23 Taxman 14W (SC) and CIT v. Vijaya Productions (P.) Ltd. [1985] 152 ITR 613 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=33,256\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=33,256\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.A. NOS. 256 TO 261, 3464 TO 3467 OF 1984, JANUARY 15, 1998",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR AND S.S.M. QUADRI, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nVijaya Production (P.) Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11720",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2267 = 2001 SLD 2267 = (2001) 83 TAX 75 = (2000) 242 ITR 48",
    "Key Words:": "Section 9, read with section 163, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Income - Deemed to accrue or arise in India - Assessment years 1979-80 and 1981-82 to 1983-84 - Assessee-company entered into collaboration agreement with foreign company on 16-12-1975 agreeing to lump sum payment of royalty to said foreign company - Central Government approved said agreement on 24-8-1976 with modification of quantum of royalty payable - Whether Tribunal's finding that said agreement was pre-April 1976 was finding of fact which could not be interfered within reference as it was based on material evidence and was not perverse - Held, yes - Whether date of Central Government approval of said agreement was irrelevant as long as agreement was entered into before 1-4-1976 and, therefore, proviso to section 9(1)(vi) being applicable income could not be said to have arisen or accrued to foreign company and as such, it was not taxable thereunder - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee-company entered into a collaboration agreement with American companies on 16-12-1975 agreeing to pay a lump sum amount in consideration of providing technical know-how, etc., for expeller unit. The terms of the agreement were modified on 20-9-1976 at the instance of the Central Government which had approved the said agreement on 24-8-1976. The Assessing Officer by an order treated the assessee as an agent of one American company under section 163 whereupon in pursuance of notice issued under section 148 a nil income return was filed for the assessment year 1979-80. The Assessing Officer holding that the assessee was not entitled to any exemption under proviso to section 9(1)(vi) or Explanation thereunder as the agreement was approved by the Government of India after 1-4-1976, brought to tax 40 per cent of the lump sum payable to said American company. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the agreement dated 20-9-1976 was not a new agreement but only modified from of earlier agreement dated 16-12-1975 and, thus, the collaboration agreement having been entered into before 1-4-1976, provisions of section 9(1)(vi) were not applicable. He, accordingly, held that income payable could not be deemed to accrue or arise in India and the said income was not assessable in the hands of the assessee. For the assessment years 1981-82 to 1983-84 while the Assessing Officer treated the assessee as an agent of the non-resident company, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the collaboration agreement could not be treated as giving rise to a business connection with a non-resident and followed his own order for the assessment year 1979-80. On the revenue's appeal, the Tribunal agreed with the views of the Commissioner (Appeals).\nOn reference:\nHELD\nRelevant correspondence indicated that there was a suggestion by the Central Government as far as quantum of the royalty payable to the foreign company was concerned. The said suggestion was accepted and it was incorporated in the agreement dated 16-12-1975. The said agreement was approved by the Central Government on 24-8-1976. In other words, the Central Government had approved all the terms of the agreement dated 16-12-1975 and after the modification suggested by them, it was incorporated in the said agreement. Further, the Commissioner as well as the Tribunal found on a consideration of the correspondence exchanged between the Central Government and the assessee that the agreement was pre-April 1976. The revenue had not challenged this finding on the ground that the finding was not based on any evidence or that the finding was perverse. Hence, in a reference the said finding of fact could not be interfered with though the question was framed for opinion. Further, the finding could not be challenged as it was based on material evidence and was not perverse. If an agreement is entered into prior to 1-4-1976, the Royalty payable under the agreement is not liable to be taxed under clause (vi) of section 9(1) irrespective of the date on which the agreement is approved by the Central Government. The fact that the approval of the Central Government was given subsequent to 1-4-1976, namely, on 24-8-1976, was irrelevant as long as the agreement was entered into before the 1-4-1976. In view of the finding arrived at by the Tribunal which confirmed the finding of the Commissioner that the agreement was entered into prior to 1-4-1976, the proviso to section 9(1)(vi) was applicable though it was approved by the Central Government on 24-8-1976, i.e., subsequent to 1-4-1976, and it could not be said that the income had arisen or accrued to the foreign company. In view of the 1st proviso to section 9(1)(vi ), the royalty payable by the assessee to the foreign company was not covered by section 9(1)(vi) and the said section was not attracted to the royalty payable by the assessee-company to the foreign company.\nThe first Explanation to the proviso to section 9(1)(vi) contemplates an agreement entered into after 1-4-1976 but the proposals were approved by the Central Government, prior to 1-4-1976 and it should also satisfy the conditions mentioned therein. On the facts of the present case, it was not a case where the agreement was entered into after 1-4-1976. Therefore, the question of applicability of the said Explanation did not arise.\nHence, the assessee was not liable also under Explanation 1 to the proviso under section 9(1)(vi).\nCASE REFERRED TO\nMeteor Satellite Ltd. v. ITO [1980] 121 ITR 311 (Guj.).",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=9,163\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=9,163\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CASE REFERRED NO. 180 OF 1990, JULY 26, 1999",
    "Judge Name:": "MS. S.V. MARUTHI AND S. ANANDA REDDY, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nSri Krishna Oil Complex Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11721",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2268 = 2001 SLD 2268 = (2001) 83 TAX 164 = (2000) 243 ITR 5",
    "Key Words:": "Section 35B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Export markets development allowance - Whether export markets development allowance would be allowable under section 35B(1)(b) in respect of expenditure incurred for foreign indenting business where services in this connection were rendered in India - Held, no\nFACTS\nThe Tribunal held that the assessee-company was entitled to export markets development allowance under section 35B(1)(b) in respect of expenditure incurred for foreign indenting business even though the services in this connection were rendered in India. On reference, the High Court upheld the Tribunal's views.\nOn special leave petition:\nHELD\nIn CIT v. Stepwell Industries Ltd. [1997] 228 ITR 171/ 94 Taxman 280 ( SC), it was held that weighted deduction under section 35B could not be allowed on commission paid to a party in India with regard to the sales made outside India. The principle enunciated in the said decision was clearly applicable in the instant case. Therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in allowing weighted deduction to the assessee.\nDecision of the Bombay High Court reversed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Prakash Cotton Mills (P.) Ltd. [1991] 188 ITR 713/ 64 Taxman 145 (Bom.) and CIT v. Stepwell Industries Ltd. [1997] 228 ITR 171/ 94 Taxman 280 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=35B,35(B)(1)(b)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=35B,35(B)(1)(b)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.A. NO. 3178 OF 1999, MAY 14, 1999",
    "Judge Name:": "B.N. KIRPAL AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nChika Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11722",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2269 = 2001 SLD 2269 = (2001) 83 TAX 166 = (2000) 243 ITR 6",
    "Key Words:": "Section 37(1), read with section 256, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Business expenditure - Allowable as - Tribunal held that payment on account of technical know-how was allowable as revenue expenditure - Whether a referable question of law arose from Tribunal's order - Held, yes",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=37(1),256\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=37(1),256\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.A. NO. 4424 OF 1999, AUGUST 9, 1999",
    "Judge Name:": "B.N. KIRPAL AND S. RAJENDRA BABU, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nKrupp Industries India Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11723",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2270 = 2001 SLD 2270 = (2001) 83 TAX 132 = 2000 PTD 3788",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Sections 13(1)(a) to 13(1)(c) -- Addition -- Exercise of jurisdiction without approval of I.A.C. -- Validity -- Income Tax officer picked up unexplained credit in the books of accounts of company -- Such credit did not in fact existed in books of accounts of assessee -- Income Tax Officer made addition without taking prior approval of I.A.C. -- Whether addition was lawful -- Question of law -- Approval of I.A.C. -- Whether addition was lawful -- Question of law -- Approval of I.A.C. -- Natur of -- Whether approval by I.A.C. was not procedural but condition precedent for exercise of jurisdiction to make addition -- Held yes -- Whether addition made by Income Tax Officer was lawful and Tribunal was justified to confirm same -- Held no --\nAddition -- Company -- Credit in personal account of Director of the Company in the books of account of company -- Addition -- Validity -- Books wherefrom the alleged unexplained credit was picked being not the books of account of the assessee, Section 13(1)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 was not attracted --\nAddition -- Approval by Inspecting Additional Commissioner -- Nature -- Approval by Inspecting Additional Commissioner as contemplated in proviso to Section 13 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 was not procedural but a condition precedent for exercise of jurisdiction to make addition under Section 13(1)(aa) to (e) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 --\nAddition -- Assessee, Director of a company -- Credit in personal account of assessee in the books of account of the Company -- Addition made under Section 13(1)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 without approval of Inspecting Additional Commissioner -- Validity -- Assessee's case being not covered by sub-clause (a) of Section 13(1), Assessing Officer could have treated the unexplained credit in any of the other sub-clauses including sub-clause (aa) or even (b) of Section 13(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 which were subject to approval of Inspecting Additional Commissioner -- Addition made under Section 13(1)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 being not in accordance with law, Tribunal was not justified to confirm the same --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=13(1)(a),13(1)(b),13(1)(C)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=13(1)(a),13(1)(b),13(1)(C)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.T.R. No. 34 of 1988, heard on 2-10-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "SYED MAHMOOD SHAH\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, CENTRAL ZONE, LAHORE and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11724",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2000 624 = 2000 SLD 624 = (2000) 82 TAX 1 = 2000 PTD 2193 = 2001 PTCL 43",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)----Ss. 156, 65, 62, 86, 88, 80C, 143-B, 50(4), 52 & 52A---Rectification of mistake---Additional assessment---Deduction of tax at source---Failure of--¬Liability of persons failing to deduct or pay tax---Recovery from the person from whom tax was not deducted or collected ---Assessee, a contractor filer: statement under S.143-B of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 wherein are amount of Rs.23.00.000 received on account of construction work was declared to the statement ---Assessing Officer reopened the assessment un&° S.65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and created a demand and charge.: additional tax under S.88 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 on the ground that the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, with reference to proviso to S.50(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, were applicable where tax had not been deducted or collected under S. 50(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and found that provisions of S.65 were also applicable ---Assessee assailed the jurisdiction of Assessing Officer in respect of reopening of assessment under S.65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 pertaining to the income covered under presumptive tax regime---First Appellate Authority and Appellate Tribunal repelled the objection of the assessee---Validity---Held, there was a mechanism contained in the scheme of presumptive tax regime and if any deemed income under ,presumptive tax regime escaped deduction of tax, the revenue could be retrieved by recourse to the provisions contained in Ss.52 & 86 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and now by recourse to the provisions contained in S.52A inserted by Finance Act,. 1999 which was retrospective in effect being procedural in nature---Section 65 caters the requirements of normal tax regime where total income was assessed/determined after filing of returns while under the presumptive tax regime neither return of Income vas required to be filed nor any total income was assessed/determined---Non-compliance of requirement of law pertaining to presumptive tax regime shall not have the effect of taking the case to the normal tax regime---Once it was found that any transaction was covered under the presumptive tax regime then all subsequent actions were to be taken pertaining to the presumptive tax regime and no provisions relating to the normal tax regime shall be attracted until and unless provided for to be otherwise in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Section 52 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 provides that where any person fails to deduct or collect or having deducted or collected, failed to pay the tax, he shall be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax and all the provisions relating to recovery of tax from the assessee shall be applicable---Section 52A specifically provided that if tax had not been deducted or collected all the provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 relating to recover; of tax shall play.. Finding of Appellate Tribunal to the effect that if the tax was not deducted or collected in respect of a deemed income under S.80C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, Assessing Officer could resort to the provisions contained in S.65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 was mistake of law apparent on record were recalled and it was held that the alleged receipts in the hands of the assessee were admittedly covered under the presumptive tax regime, therefore, the Assessing officer had no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment under S.65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and call upon the assesses to file return of income in clear contravention and violation of the provisions contained in S.80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to issue notice under S.65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 which was illegal and of no legal effect---Entire proceedings in pursuance of notice under S.65 were without jurisdiction, illegal and void---Application under S.156 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 for rectification of mistake and appeal were allowed in circumstances.\n \n1997 PTD (Trib.) 1143; 1998 PTD 121; I.T.A. No.473/KB of 1999-2000 I. T. A. No.1416/1417/KB of 1999-2000 and Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Limiteds case PLD 1997 SC 582 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=56,65,62,86,88,80C,143B,50(4),52,52A\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=56,65,62,86,88,80C,143B,50(4),52,52A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "M.A. (R) 82 (IB) in I.T.A. No. 201/IB and M. A. (R) No. 50(IB) of 1999-2000, decision dated: 7-03-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUJIBULLAH SIDDIQUI, CHAIRMAN, SYED MASOOD UL HASSAN SHAH, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD DAUD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11725",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 743 = 2008 SLD 743 = 2008 CLC 644",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)------Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Petitioner had conceded that petition had been invoked in respect of contractual obligation which involved factual controversy---Petitioner, however had submitted that if he was blacklisted or coercive' measures were taken against him, tit would suffer irreparable loss, he submitted that if the coercive action against him was stayed, till the date, he could approach civil court, which was alternate remedy, he would not press the petition---High Court allowed the petitioner to institute suit within six weeks, failing which authorities could initiate coercive measures. \n \nSalahuddin and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd., Takht Bhai and 10 others PLD 1975 SC 244 rel.\n \nSardar Muhammad Sarfraz Dogar for Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.525 of 2008, decision dated: 22-02-2008",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "Messrs NISHAN ENGINEERING (PVT.) LIMITED through Director\nvs\nBAHA-UDDIN ZAKARIAYA UNIVERSITY through Vice Chancellor, Multan and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11726",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 744 = 2008 SLD 744 = 2008 CLC 645",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XII, R.6---Judgment on admissions---Principle---Suit can be decreed on admissions at any stage of proceedings---Not necessary that issues be framed before such request is made to court---Admission must be clear, unambiguous, unqualified and unequivocal, failing which it would be incumbent upon the court to frame issues and decide the case. \n \nShaikh Mehmood Ahmed v. Dr. Ghait Pharaon 1987 CLC 2131; H. Gharibullah v. Mumtaz Begum 1990 CLC 1609; Macdonald Layton & Company Pakistan Ltd. v. Uzin Export-Import Foreign Trade Company 1996 SCMR 696 and Qatar Airways v. Genyis International (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 MLD 1615 rel.\n \n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----Ss. 42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XII, R.6---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---Intra-Court appeal---Admissions---Scope---Possession of plot allotted to plaintiff could not be given due to illegal encroachments---Provincial Ombudsman directed the authorities to allot alternate plot to the plaintiff---Authorities had admitted the averments made in the plaint in suit filed by plaintiff, but only inability was shown for the grant of alternate plot because of imposition of ban by government--High Court (Single Judge), in the light of admission made by authorities, decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff---Validity---Admission made by authorities was subject to the ban, which controversy should have been decided by Single Judge, although it might be only a legal one---Single Judge had merely observed that ban in question would not apply as it was independent of the issues involved in the suit---Only issue in the suit was whether the rights acquired by plaintiff in respect of plot in question as far back as in year, 1965 could be postponed/affected by virtue of ban---Division Bench of High Court set aside the passed by Single Judge and remanded the case for decision afresh on the issue framed---Intra-court appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \nAli Muhammad v. Muhammad Hayat 1982 SCMR 816; Anjuman Tajran v. Chief Administrator Auqaf 2001 CLC 136; Nathu Singh v. Chuttan and others AIR 1999 Lah. 830; Ghulam Muhammad v. Bank of Bahawalpur 1971 SCMR 148 and Sultan Wasi Jan v. Sultan Saeed Jan 1983 SCMR 1265 ref.\n \nManzoor Ahmed for Appellants.\n \nKhalid Javed Khan for Respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,56\\n\\r\\n\\rSpecific Relief Act, 1877=42,56\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.XXXIX,r.1,2,O.XII,r.6\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.87 of 2006, decision dated: 26-05-2006",
    "Judge Name:": "SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY AND MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED, JJ",
    "": "CITY DISTRICT GOVERNMENT, KARACHI through District Coordination Officer, through Authorized Officer District (HRM), C.D.G.K. and 3 others\nvs\nFAQIR MUHAMMAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11727",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2271 = 2001 SLD 2271 = (2001) 83 TAX 234 = 2001 PTD 1981",
    "Key Words:": "Wealth Tax Act, 1963 -- Section 5, Second Schedule Part-I clause 12(1) -- Wealth Tax Rules, 1963 -- Rule 8(3) -- C.B.R. Circular No. 4 of 1994, dated 13th February, 1994 -- C.B.R. Circular No. 11 of 1994, dated 17th July, 1994 -- Exemption -- Assessee holding 1/2 share in property -- Dissallowance of exemption in respect of asset being residential house for self occupation -- Decision upheld in appeal by CIT(A) -- Validity -- Option to claim exemption by either of spouses -- Exercise of -- Whether sub-clause (1) of clause 12 of Second Schedule clearly indicated that exemption to assessee was available in respect of one residential house owned and occupied by assessee for purpose of his own residence -- Held yes -- Whether through proviso to sub-clause (1) of clause 12 of Second Schedule restriction had been laid down for exercising of option with claim of exemption by either of spouses -- Held yes -- Whether exemption under said provisions of law had been allowed to assessee in respect of asset which was residential house and not on basis of property/unit -- Held yes --\nValue of Property -- Assessment by Assessing Officer on basis of value of land and cost of construction -- Assessment set aside by CIT(A) with directions to Assessing Officer to accept declared valuation on basis of GALV -- Validity -- Departmental appeal -- Approval of Commissioner -- Whether mandatory -- Question of Law -- Whether determination of GALV without approval of Commissioner was sustainable -- Held yes -- Whether CIT(A) was justified to set aside valuation of property without - recorded basis of valuation and cost of construction -- Held yes --\nValuation of lands and buildings -- Rented property, valuation of -- Value of rented out property was adopted higher than the Gross Annual Letting Value by the Department on the plea that property could fetch more rent than the one declared -- Validity -- Appellate Tribunal remanded the case back to the Assessing Office for de novo assessment with the direction that the valuation of the property in question be made on the basis of Gross Annual Letting Value of the property according to the provisions of Rule 8(3) of the Wealth Tax Rules, 1963 -- Order of the Assessing Officer was set aside by the Appellate Tribunal accordingly --\nExemption -- One house half share of each spouse -- Exemption was claimed both by the husband and wife for their respective shares in the Returns being self-occupied - Department allowed the exemption to one of the spouses of his share and rejected the other on the ground that option could be exercised either of the spouses under the proviso of Clause 12(1) of Part I of the Second Schedule of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 -- Assessee contended that it was the option which was to be exercised by either of the spouses which did not mean that the exemption was not available to the other spouse being co-owner in respect of self-occupied residential house -- Validity -- Appellate Tribunal found that exemption under Clause 12(1) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 was available to one of the assessees in the case of co-owners of self-occupied housing the husband and wife --\nExemption -- Co-ownership of one self-occupied house other than husband and wife-Exemption of respect shares separately -- Contention was that provision of law as apparently not rational and was discriminatory because in the case of co-owners of self-occupied house other than the husband and wife, the exemption under Clause 12(1) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 could be claimed by both of the owners -- Held, adjudication upon the vires of the provisions of the statute was beyond the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal --\nValuation of lands and buildings -- Value of half share in house was adopted on the basis of cost of construction and value of land fixed by the District Collector for the purpose of stamp duty -- First Appellate Authority set aside the assessment on account that separate valuation of plot and building was improper -- Validity -- Appellate Tribunal upheld the order of the First Appellate Authority with the direction that the valuation of the property be adopted stricty in accordance with Rule 8(3) of Wealth Tax Rules, 1963 --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Karachi",
    "Law and Sections:": "Wealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=5,Second SchedulePart-Iclause12(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=5,Second SchedulePart-Iclause12(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Rules, 1963=8(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.T.A. No. 991/LB of 1996, 679/LB and 680/LB of 1998. decided on 23-12-2000, hearing DATE : 2-5-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID WAHEED, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MAHMOOD AHMED MALIK, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11728",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 745 = 2008 SLD 745 = 2008 CLC 650",
    "Key Words:": "(a) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)-------S. 2(c)---Word \"\"landlord\"\"---Scope---Word \"\"landlord\"\" as contained in S.2(c) of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, is very wide and encompasses any person who has a right to receive rent and is not restricted only to a person, who is owner of the property---Definition of word \"\"landlord\"\" is further expanded to include beneficiary, guardian, receiver, executor, administrator or any other person; it even includes a tenant who sublets the property and also includes every person who derives title from landlord---Definition of word \"\"landlord\"\" as contained in S.2(c) of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, has to be interpreted in a very wide sense and use of word \"\"include\"\" enlarges its scope further. \n \nMalik Saleem and another v. Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division, Rawalpindi and 3 others PLD 1976 SC 1233; Usmania glass sheet Factory Limited, Chittagong v. Sales Tax Officer, Chittagong PLD 1971 SC 205; Shah Mardan Shah and 3 others v. Chief Land Commissioner, Sindh and 2 others PLD 1974 Kar. 375 and Commissioner of Income Tax/Sales Tax v. Lever Brothers (Pakistan) Limited 1986 PTD 29 rel.\n \n(b) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)---\n \n----Ss. 2(c) & 13---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.10 & 16---Ejectment of tenant---Execution of eviction order---New owner of premises---Locus standi---After passing of eviction order, owner of the premises sold it to another person---Execution petition, instead of being filed by new owner, was filed by the pervious owner---Tenant filed objection against execution petition on the ground that the pervious owner had no locus standi to file the same but both the courts below concurrently dismissed the objection---Validity---Definition of landlord encompassed \"\"every person from time to time deriving title under \"\"landlord\"\" included a person who had purchased the property---Definition was in fact not to put embargo upon landlord's unfettered right to sell property during any legal proceedings and it was not repulsive to the rule of natural justice and equity---New owner had a locus standi and cause to continue with execution proceedings in the name of previous owner---High Court declined to interfere with the orders passed by both the courts below as those were unexceptionable---Revision was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nMuhammad Yasin v. Sheikh Ghulam Murtaza and another PLD 1988 SC 163; Syed Iftikhar-ud-Din Haider Gardezi and 9 others v. Central Bank of India Ltd. Lahore and 2 others 1996 SCMR 669; Muhammad Bashir and another v. Province of Punjab through Collector of District Gujrat and others 2003 SCMR 83 and Muhammad Saleem Ullah and another v. Additional District Judge, Gujranwala and others 2003 YLR 998 ref. \n \nAnwar Sultana Malik v. Rent Controller/Civil Judge First Class and 2 others 1999 MLD 3360 rel.\n \nMushtaq Mehdi Akhtar for Appellant.\n \nMalik Amjad Pervez for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 8th February, 2008.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)=2(c)\\n\\r\\n\\rWest Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)=2(c)\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.XXI,r.10,16\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.838 of 2007, decision dated: 20-02-2008",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, J",
    "": "Mst. HUMERA SAJID\nvs\nMUQARRAB KHAN PUNI and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11729",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2273 = 2001 SLD 2273 = (2001) 83 TAX 241 = 2001 PTD 1551",
    "Key Words:": "Wealth Tax Rules, 1963 -- Rule 8(3) first proviso --\nValuation of house property -- Assessment higher than ten times of G.A.R.V. -- Confirmation by CWT(A) in appeal -- Validity -- Discretion to make assessment higher than ten times of GARV of property -- Exercise of -- Whether proviso to sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 did not permit Assessing Officer, under any circumstances to assess value of house properties on any basis other than their gross annual rental Value -- Held yes -- Whether only exception allowed to make assessment other than ten time of GARV was with prior approval of Commissioner -- Held yes -- Whether it was settled principle that while exercising such discretion reasons were to be recorded -- Held yes -- Whether assessment order was not sustainable in law -- Held yes --\nValuation of rented out property -- Value of property was declared @ 10 times of gross annual letting value -- Previous two years were assessed on the same basis -- Assessee himself declared higher value of its property in the income tax record on the basis of revaluation of such property by the valuer and surplus amount was included in the books of accounts as \"\"surplus on revaluation of fixed assets\"\" -- Assessing Officer assessed/adopted the higher value for wealth tax purposes of the said property as declared in the Income Tax record that the ten times of the gross annual letting value of such property under Rules 8(3) of the Wealth Tax Rules, 1963 which was upheld by the First Appellate Authority -- Contentions of the assessee were that property was 80 years old and actually let out, that property should be assessed @ 10 times of its gross annual letting value in accordance with first proviso to Rule 8(3) of the Wealth Tax Rules, 1963 and that professional revaluation done by the valuer was purely notional and property was occupied by tenants which did not warrant the Assessing Officer to determine its value at a sum higher that ten times of its gross annual letting value -- Validity -- First Proviso to Rule 8(3) of Wealth Tax Rules, 1963 did not permit the Assessing Officer to assess the value of house property on any basis other than their gross annual rental value -- Exception allowed in the first proviso to Rule 8(3), Wealth Tax Rules, 1963 was the option to assess the value at more than ten times of the gross annual rental value with the prior approval of the Commissioner and while exercising such discretion reasons were to be recorded in writing -- First Appellate Authority misdirected itself in upholding the assessment which in circumstances was not sustainable in law -- Order was set aside by the Appellate Tribunal with the directions to assess the value of property de novo keeping in view the ratio of decision by the Appellate Tribunal --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Karachi",
    "Law and Sections:": "Wealth Tax Rules, 1963=8(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Rules, 1963=8(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.T.A. No. 224/KB of 1997-98, (Assessment year 1996-97), decision dated: 26-6-1999, hearing DATE : 6-6-1998.",
    "Judge Name:": "S.M. SIBTAIN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND TAHSEEN AHMAD BHATTI, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11730",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 746 = 2008 SLD 746 = 2008 CLC 654",
    "Key Words:": "Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)-------S.17---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Custody of minors---Both the Trial. Court and Appellate Court having given the custody of minors to the mother, father of minors had challenged said concurrent s in constitutional petition---Validity---Prime consideration for determination of custody of minors being their welfare, the court had to consider the same before handing over their custody to their mother or father---For the purpose of consideration of the welfare of the minors, evidence available on record was to be considered by the court---Father of the minors was residing in a rented house in a joint family system; he was running electric shop used to remain outside the house in connection with his work and his parents were not surviving and he was residing with his two married brothers, which had shown that at his house no one was available to look after the minors properly as they could be looked after and maintained by real mother of the minors---Said evidence on record had shown that welfare of the minors lay with their mother who being natural guardian, could maintain her minors with love and affection in comparison to the others---Maintenance of the minors was the bounden and primary duty of the father of the minors till the age of his majority in the case of his son and till the marriage in case of daughter---Non-availability of funds or paucity of the mother to maintain her minor children, in circumstances could not be treated as disqualification of mother to refuse her the custody of her children---Consent of minors to reside with father, was of not much significance while determining the facts of their welfare---Consent of minor was only to be considered, if the minor was old enough to form his preference, but in the present case age of minor girl was not more than 10 years, whereas minor boy was not more than 8 years---Both were not old enough so as to give any preference to their consent---Mere assumption and presumption that education of minors would be disturbed, custody of minors could not be refused to their mother---Judgments passed by the courts below did not suffer from any illegality so as to declare them as ultra vires the Constitution---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nSughra Bibi v. Akhtar Hussain 2007 CLC 474 rel.\n \nRaja Aftab Ahmed Khan for Petitioner.\n \nRespondent No.1 in person.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rGuardians and Wards Act, 1890=17(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.S-555 and C.M.A. No.3566 of 2007, decision dated: 25-02-2008",
    "Judge Name:": "ARSHAD NOOR KHAN, J",
    "": "YAQOOB AHMED\nvs\nMst. SHAISTA and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11731",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2274 = 2001 SLD 2274 = (2001) 83 TAX 282 = 2001 PTD 2957",
    "Key Words:": "Wealth Tax Act, 1963 -- Second Schedule, Part I, Clause (7) --\nExemption -- Disallowance -- Excessive valuation of agricultural property -- Validity -- Assessee created assets out of foreign currency and encashment of Dollar Bearer Certificates remitted through official banking channel -- C.I.T.(A) confirmed disallowance on ground that assets were created out of sale of Dollar Bearer Certificates in secondary market and not through proper banking channel -- Declared value of agricultural property as per produced index also rejected -- Challenge to -- Whether Dollar Bearer Certificates were held to had been properly surrendered to office to issue and relevant provision as contained in Rule 7 of Wealth Tax Rules issued under S.R.O. 140(I)/91, dated 25-2-1991 were held to had properly been complied with by assessee -- Held yes -- Whether rupee proceeds having been realised by office of issue and credited to accounts of assessee was held to had constituted sufficient evidence of encashment of Dollar Bearer Certificates -- Held yes -- Whether rupee value realised on conversion of Dollar Bearer Certificates was held to be liable for exemption in terms of provision of clause (7)(ii) of Second Schedule -- Held yes -- Whether entire agricultural land was not irrigated it would be therefore, proper if valuation was made after applying corret index as applicable -- Held yes --\nExemption -- Dollar Bearer Certificate -- Encashment of -- Exemption was not allowed on the ground that asset were created out of sale of Dollar Bearer Certificate in the secondary market and not through proper banking channel in spite of encashment certificate issued by the Bank -- Validity -- Dollar Bearer Certificate were properly surrendered to the office of issue and the relevant provision as contained in Rule 7 of the rules issued under S.R.O. 140(I)/91, dated 25-02-1991 was properly complied with by the assessee -- Rupee proceeds having been realised by the officer of issue and credited to the accounts of the assesse constituted a sufficient evidence of encashment of such certificates -- Rupee value realised on conversion of Dollar Bearer Certificates was to be exempted in terms of provision of Clause 7(ii) of the Second Schedule to the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 -- Disallowance by the Assessing Officer was deleted by the Tribunal",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Karachi",
    "Law and Sections:": "Wealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=Second Schedule,PartI,Clause(7)\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=Second Schedule,PartI,Clause(7)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.T.A. Nos. 239/KB to 242/KB of 1999-2000 (Assessment years 1994-95 to 1997-98), decision dated: 9-8-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUJIBULLAH SIDDIQUI, CHAIRMAN AND MUHAMMAD MAHBOOB ALAM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11732",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 747 = 2008 SLD 747 = 2008 CLC 659",
    "Key Words:": "Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)-------Ss. 52 & 57---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.199 & 225---Constitutional petition---Repolling at polling stations---Petitioner/candidate, had challenged the validity and legality of order of Election Commission whereby an order was passed for re-polling of two polling stations---Statements of votes were compiled and prepared with respect to said two polling stations on hand written Form-XIV, instead of the form prescribed by law---Further allegation by the petitioner was that according to the result, he was unofficially declared returned candidate, however contesting candidate raised an objection that the result had been compiled on hand written form instead of prescribed Form-XIV---Factual controversy of forging result on simple paper being involved in the case, an alternate and efficacious remedy was available to the petitioner for the redressal of his grievance by filing an election petition before the Election Tribunal, constituted under S.57 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976---Jurisdiction of High Court was excluded under S.52 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 read with Art.225 of the Constitution---Constitutional petition was dismissed and interim order issued withholding the result of re-polling of said two polling stations, was vacated. \n \nElection Commission of Pakistan through Secretary v. Javed Hashmi PLD 1989 SC 396 ref.\n \nBarrister Masood Kausar and Kamran Murtaza for Petitioner.\n \nSalahuddin Khan, Dy. Attorney-General for Respondents Nos.1 to 3 along with Respondent No.3 in person and Sharifullah, Assistant Election Commissioner, on behalf of Respondents Nos.1 and 2.\n \nRespondents Nos.6, 7 and 8 in person.\n \nQazi Muhammad Anwar for Respondent No.9.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Representation of the People Act, 1976=52,38(9),57\\n\\r\\n\\rRepresentation of the People Act, 1976=52,38(9),57\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=225\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.211 of 2008, decision dated: 7-03-2008",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALAM KHAN AND SHAH-JI-RAHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Maulana ABDUL MALIK WAZIR\nvs\nELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD through Secretary and 13 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11733",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQVNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2275 = 2001 SLD 2275 = (2001) 83 TAX 156",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 - Article 199 - Imported vehicle - Payment of duty and Bill of Entry proved - Detention of vehicle by Custom Authorities - Validity - Documentary evidence produced by petitioner proved genuine import - Department-not releasing vehicle - Constitutional petition - Detention memo - Nature of - Detention of vehicle without evidence of smuggling - Legality - Whether on face of genuine documents and in absence of evidence enabling Customs Department to detain vehicle, detention memo was legal- Held no\nThe bill of entry and further documents produced by the petitioner were also sent for verification. As per report dated 6-4-2000 of Principal Appraiser Custom House. Karachi. It has been verified that the said vehicle has been imported after payment of duty and bill of entry produce by the petitioner is a genuine document.\nIt is provide that the respondents are not in possession of any evidence whatsoever enabling them to detain the vehicle in question any further. Accordingly, the detention memo dated 24-5-2000 being illegal is set aside.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 619 of 2000, decision dated: 09-05-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "- SHAIKH ABDUR RAZZAQ, J",
    "": "AURANGZEB ABBASI\nVs\nCENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11734",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQlJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2653 = 2001 SLD 2653 = (2001) 83 TAX 178 = (2000) 243 ITR 143",
    "Key Words:": "Section 17 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Salary - Profits in lieu of salary - Whether receipts on account of CCA, HRA and DA are in nature of income forming part and parcel of salary entailing tax liability - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe question that arose for consideration was whether the receipts on account of CCA, HRA and DA are in the nature of income entailing tax liability.\nHELD\nIn view of the amendment of clause (24 ) of section 2, it was conceded that the amount received as CCA or HRA would be covered by the inclusive definition of the word 'income'. Thus, the only question that would survive is - whether it is taxable under the head 'Salary'.\nThe Act is a self-contained Code and the taxability of the receipt of any amount or allowance is to be determined on the basis of meaning given to the words or phrases in the Act. Section 2(24) gives wide inclusive definition to the word 'income'. Similarly, for levying tax on salary income, exhaustive definition is given under section 17, which includes perquisites and profits in lieu of salary. Only exclusion provided under clause (3) of section 17 is \"\"any payment referable to in clause (10), clause (10A), clause (10B), clause (11), clause (12), clause (13) or clause (13A) of section 10\"\". In view of this specific inclusion and exclusion in the meaning of the words 'income' and 'salary', it is rightly submitted that payment received by the assessee has no connection with the profits of the employer. The word 'profits' is used only to convey any 'advantage' or 'gain' by receipt of any payment by the employee.\nApplying the general meaning of the word 'profit', as given in Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary and considering the dictionary meaning given to it under section 17(1)(iv ) and 17(3)( ii), it can be said that 'advantage' in terms of payment of money received by the employee from the employer in relation to or in addition to any salary or wages would be covered by the inclusive definition of the word 'salary'. Because of the inclusive meaning given to the phrase 'profits in lieu of salary' it would include 'any payment' due to or received by an assessee from an employer, even though it has no connection with the profits of the employer. It is true that the Legislature might have avoided giving inclusive meaning to the word 'salary' by stating that any payment received by the employee from an employer would be considered to be salary except the payments which are excluded by section 17(3 )(ii), i.e., clauses (10), (10A), (10B), (11 ), (12), (13) or (13A ) of section 10. However, it is for the Legislature to decide the same. This would not mean that by giving exhaustive and inclusive meaning, the word 'profits' can be given a meaning only when it pertains to sharing of profits by the employer. For the assessee, the receipt of such amount would be a profit, gain or advantage in addition to salary, even though it is not named as salary. Therefore, the word 'profits' in the context is required to be understood as gain or advantage to the assessee. Hence, it is not possible to accept the contention of the employees that as the CCA amount is paid to meet the additional expenditure as contemplated by the statutory Service Rules, it cannot be said to be profit, gain or additional salary. Under the Act, such receipt of the amount as conceded is covered by the definition of the word 'income' and as provided it would be in addition to salary. Hence, it would be part and parcel of income by way of salary, which would be taxable one. May be, that it is true to the extent that Government or statutory corporations do pay something less than what is required to be reimbursed and the receipt of CCA cannot be termed as 'profit' in common parlance. However, for 'income', 'salary' and its taxability under the Act, the dictionary meaning given by the Legislature is to be taken into consideration as for that purpose, it is a complete code. Income-tax is attracted at the point when the income is earned. Taxation of income is not dependent upon its destination or the manner of its utilisation. Therefore, there is no question of referring to the Fundamental Rules framed by the Central Government or by the statutory authorities for payment of CCA, HRA or other such allowance for reimbursing the expenditure incurred by the employees. Further, equity or hardship would hardly be relevant ground for interpretation of tax law. It is for the Government or the statutory bodies to do the needful. However, equitable it may be that CCA cannot be held to be 'profit' in the hands of the assessee or it is not share out of profit, yet it cannot be helped in view of inclusive and exclusive meaning given under the Act.\nIn the result, it has to be held that DA, CCA and HRA would be taxable income.\nCASE REVIEW\n1.Judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Syndicate Bank Officers' Association v. Union of India [1988] 41 Taxman 96 (Cal.) reversed.\n2.Judgment of the Calcutta High Court in CIT v. R.R. Bajoria [1988] 169 ITR 162/[1987] 35 Taxman 83 reversed.\n3. Judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Karamchari Union v. Union of India affirmed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. D.R. Phatak [1975] 99 ITR 14 (Bom.), Bishambar Dayal v. CIT [1976] 103 ITR 813 (MP), CIT v. S.G. Pgnatale [1980] 124 ITR 391/ 4 Taxman 79 (Guj.), Syndicate Bank Officer's Association v. Union of India [1988] 41 Taxman 96 (Cal.), CIT v. R.R. Bajoria [1988] 169 ITR 162 /[1987]35 Taxman 83 (Cal.), Pondicherry Railway Co. Ltd. v. CIT AIR 1931 PC 165, Gresham Life Assurance Society v. Styles [1892] AC 309, Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corpn. v. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X Saldana & Sons AIR 1992 SC 129 and Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd. v. CIT [1997] 6 SCC 117.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=2(24),17,17(1)(iv),17(3)(ii)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=2(24),17,17(1)(iv),17(3)(ii)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1843 OF 1989 CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1784-86 OF 1988, 6054 OF 1994, C.A. NOS. 1853-1856 OF 2000, SLP (C) NOS. 15477-80 OF 1988 AND C.A. NO. 6058 OF 1994, FEBRUARY 29, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "D.P. WADHWA AND M.B. SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Karamchari Union\nvs\nUnion of India"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11735",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQlJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2276 = 2001 SLD 2276 = (2001) 83 TAX 167 = (2000) 243 ITR 7",
    "Key Words:": "Section 4, read with section 25(2), of the Wealth-tax Act, 1961 - Deemed Wealth - Tribunal held that value of stock-in-trade does not require to be included in net wealth for purpose of determining wealth-tax liability of assessee-company - Whether any referable question of law arose from Tribunal's order - Held, yes\nCASE REVIEW\nJudgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. London Star Diamond Co. (I) (P.) Ltd. [WT Appeal Nos. 1, 2 and 114 of 1998, dated 27-3-1998] reversed.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Wealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=4,25(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=4,25(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.A. NOS. 4465 TO 4467 OF 1999, AUGUST 13, 1999",
    "Judge Name:": "B.N. KIRPAL AND S. RAJENDRA BABU, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of Wealth Tax\nvs\nLondon Star Diamond Co. (I) (P.) Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11736",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQlJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2277 = 2001 SLD 2277 = (2001) 83 TAX 168 = (2000) 243 ITR 26",
    "Key Words:": "Section 80HH, read with sections 80AA and 80AB, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Deductions - Profits and gains from hotels/industries in backward areas - Assessment years 1979-80 and 1980-81 - Whether section 80AB was enacted to declare law as it always stood in relation to deductions to be made in respect of income specified under head 'C' of Chapter VI-A - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, special deduction under section 80HH is allowable on net income and not on gross income - Held, yes\nFACTS\nFor the assessment years 1979-80 and 1980-81, the assessee claimed relief under section 80HH in respect of its liquid section which was newly set up in a backward area on the gross income and not on the net income. The Tribunal held that the assessee was not entitled to deduction on the gross profit. The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal.\nOn appeal:\nHELD\nAfter the decision in Cloth Traders (P.) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT [1979] 118 ITR 243 (SC) in which it was held that deduction under section 80M was to be allowed on the gross total income, two sections 80AA and 80AB were introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1980. While section 80AA was to have retrospective effect with effect from 1-4-1968, section 80AB was to have operation with effect from 1-4-1981. Section 80AA had the effect of effacing the decision in Cloth Traders (P.) Ltd.'s case (supra) which had interpreted section 80M. Section 80AB was made applicable to all the sections in Chapter VI-A except section 80M. In Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India [1985] 155 ITR 120/ 22 Taxman 49 (SC), however, the Court specifically overturned its earlier decision in Cloth Traders (P.) Ltd.'s case (supra) and held that deduction was to be allowed only on the net income and not on the gross income. With reference to section 80AB, the Supreme Court said it is merely of a clarificatory nature and the decision in Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd.'s case (supra) was, thus, irrespective of section 80AB. The High Court, therefore, relying on the decision in Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd.'s case (supra), answered the question in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.\nThe assessee submitted that even though Cloth Traders (P.) Ltd.'s case (supra) was overruled in Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd.'s case (supra ), both the cases pertained to section 80M only and the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the application of section 80AB with reference to section 80HH. It said section 80AB was specifically introduced with effect from 1-4-1981, and it would have no application to the assessment years 1979-80 and 1980-81 which were involved in the instant case. The effect of section 80AB is that deduction would have to be made from the net income and not from the gross income. But then, in H.H. Sir Rama Varma v. CIT [1994] 205 ITR 433/[1993] 71 Taxman 237 , the Apex Court observed that on a parity of reasoning with section 80AA as given in Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd.'s case (supra ) it must be held that section 80AB was enacted to declare the law as it always stood in relation to the deductions to be made in respect of the income specified under the head 'C' of Chapter VI-A. That being the position, the of the High Court was affirmed and the appeals were dismissed.\nCASE REVIEW\nDecision of the Delhi High Court in Motilal Pesticides (I) (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1994] 207 ITR 636 affirmed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nMotilal Pesticides (I) (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1994] 207 ITR 636 (Delhi), Cloth Traders (P.) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT [1979] 118 ITR 243 (SC), Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India [1985] 155 ITR 120/ 22 Taxman 49 (SC) and H.H. Sir Rama Varma v. CIT [1994] 205 ITR 433/[1993] 71 Taxman 237(SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=80HH,80AA,80AB\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=80HH,80AA,80AB\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.A. NOS. 186 AND 187 OF 1995, FEBRUARY 15, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "D.P. WADHWA AND N. SANTOSH HEGDE, JJ",
    "": "Motilal Pesticides (I) (P.) Ltd\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11737",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVEQlJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2278 = 2001 SLD 2278 = (2001) 83 TAX 171 = (2000) 243 ITR 48",
    "Key Words:": "Section 143 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Assessment - Additional tax - Assessment year 1989-90 - Assessee had received certain amount by way of cash compensatory support but did not include same in its return filed on 29-12-1989 - Subsequently in 1990, clause (iiib) came to be inserted in section 28 treating cash compensatory support as profits and gains of business or profession with retrospective effect from 1-4-1967 - Assessing Officer treated said amount as additional income under section 143(1A) and levied additional tax - Whether, in view of fact that when assessee had filed its, return of income, it was correct as per law on date of filing of return, levy of additional tax was not warranted - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee had received in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1988-89 certain amount by way of cash compensatory support. It did not include this income in its return which was filed on 29-12-1989. The Assessing Officer treated cash compensatory support receipt as additional income under section 143(1A) in view of insertion of clause (iiib) to section 28 by the Finance Act, 1990 with retrospective effect from 1-4-1967, and levied tax at higher rate and also charged interest under section 234. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee's appeal partly. The Tribunal, however, held that no additional tax could be levied in respect of amount of cash compensatory support and no interest under section 234 could be levied. The High Court also favoured the assessee.\nOn revenue's appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD\nOne has to see the law on the date of filing the return. To attract penal provisions, there has to be some element of lack of bona fides unless the law specifically provides otherwise.\nThe instant case did not represent even a bona fide mistake. In fact it was not a case where under some mistaken belief the assessee did not disclose the cash compensatory support received by it which it could offer to tax. It is true that income by way of cash compensatory support became taxable retrospectively with effect from 1-4-1967 but that was by amendment of section 28 by the Finance Act, 1990 which amendment could not have been known before the Finance Act came into force. Levy of additional tax bears all the characteristics of penalty. Additional tax was levied as the assessee did not in its return show the income by way of cash compensatory support. The Assessing Officer on that account levied additional income-tax. No additional tax would have been leviable on the cash compensatory support if the Finance Act, 1990 had not so provided even though retrospectively. The assessee could not have suffered additional tax but for the Finance Act, 1990. After it had filed its return of income, which was correct as per law on the date of filing of the return, it was thereafter that the cash compensatory support also came within the sway of section 28. When additional tax has imprint of penalty, the revenue cannot be heard saying that levy of additional tax is automatic under section 143(1A). If additional tax could be levied in such circumstances, it would be punishing the assessee for no fault of it. That cannot ever be the legislative intent. It shocks the very conscience if in the circumstances section 143(1A) could be invoked to levy the additional tax. In the circumstances of the case, levy of additional tax taking into account the income by way of cash compensatory support was not warranted.\nCASE REVIEW\nJudgment of the M.P. High Court in CIT v. Hindustan Electro Graphites Ltd. [1998] 229 ITR 16/ 96 Taxman 108 affirmed.\nJudgment of the Calcutta High Court in Modern Fibotex India Ltd. v. Deputy CIT [1995] 212 ITR 496 approved.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nModern Fibotex India Ltd. v. Deputy CIT [1995] 212 ITR 496 (Cal.), Cement Marketing Co. of India Ltd. v. Assistant CST [1980] 124 ITR 15/ 4 Taxman 44 (SC), CIT v. Onkar Saran & Sons [1992] 195 ITR 1/ 62 Taxman 440 (SC) and Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India [1957] 31 ITR 565(SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=143,143(1A),234\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=143,143(1A),234\\n\\r\\n\\rFinance Act, 1990=28\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2454 OF 1998, MARCH 27, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "D.P. WADHWA AND MRS. RUMA PAL, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nHindustan Electro Graphites Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11738",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVMS1F5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1679 = 2015 SLD 1679 = 2015 PTD 570 = 2015 PTCL 107 = (2015) 111 TAX 344",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---Ss. 17, 156, 193, 194-A & 196---Detention and confiscation of vehicles---Reference to High Court---In the present case, vehicles were either smuggled ones or their certificate of registration, and bill of entry were suspected to be forged---Such vehicles were detained and were got examined through Forensic Science Laboratory---Chemical Examiner's report had confirmed that original chassis of the vehicles had been cut at the site of the chassis number, and another metallic piece had been welded---In view of said report, vehicles were detained and confiscated---Appeals filed against said confiscation, was dismissed by Appellate Authority---Appellate Tribunal upheld the order of confiscation---High Court declined interference and answered the Reference in negative.\n \n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss. 6, 7 & 17---Provincial Motor Vehicles Ordinance (XIX of 1965), S.33---Detention and confiscation of vehicle having tampered chassis number---Procedure---Manipulation of the chassis number of the vehicle, including the cutting of chassis plate, the removal thereof and welding another piece having the chassis number thereon was confirmed by the Forensic Science Laboratory and amounted to \"\"tampering\"\", especially, when owner was unable to explain and justify the said manipulation of the chassis number---Revenue, was only authorized to seize and confiscate the vehicles, which were non-duty paid---Presumption of truth was attached to the report of Forensic Science Laboratory being a result of an official act---In case serious infirmities appeared on record, which cast reasonable doubt on the presumption of truth attached to Forensic Science Laboratory report, evidence could be recorded of the official, who carried out the Forensic Science Examination---Law did not require the \"\"Maker\"\" of the report to be summoned and cross-examined by the owner of vehicle---Tampering of chassis number as a result of an accident of vehicle, could only be a valid ground, if same was reported and confirmed by Motor Vehicles Authority under S.33 of the Provincial Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965---Public auction of vehicles with tampered chassis, was prohibited, and were liable to be confiscated---Confiscated vehicles, with tampered chassis numbers, were allowed for the use by Government Departments on payment of nominal/token prices---Sections 6 and 7 of Customs Act, 1969 provided for all officers of Central Excise, Police and Civil, Armed Forces, to assist the Customs Officers for carrying out their functions under Customs Act, 1969.\n \n Muhammad Aftab Khan's case Civil Petition No.1809/L of 2002; Zarshad's case 2006 SCMR 973; Fahim Khan's case Civil Petition No.117 of 2006; Ch. Maqbool Ahmad's case 2009 SCMR 226; Muhammad Jamal Rizvi's case 2012 SCMR 169; Saleh Jan's case Civil Appeal No.58-P of 2010 and Khalil Muhammad's case Civil Petition No.1788 of 2012 ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 189---Decision of Supreme Court---Binding force---Scope---Courts not to follow contrary view to the Supreme Court, in view of the command and mandate of Art.189 of the Constitution.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=6,7,17,156,193,194-A,196\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Act, 1969=6,7,17,156,193,194-A,196\\n\\r\\n\\rProvincial Motor Vehicles Ordinance (XIX of 1965)=33\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Custom Reference No.26 of 2010, decision dated: 20-11-2014, hearing DATE : 20-11-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "YAHYA AFRIDI AND HAIDER ALI KHAN, JJ",
    "": "SULTAN MUHAMMAD\nVs.\nCOLLECTOR CUSTOMS and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11739",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVMS1JTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1441 = 2015 SLD 1441 = 2015 PTD 472 = (2015) 111 TAX 336 = 2015 PTCL 442",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes----Prospective effect---Scope---Legislation is prospective unless it expressly or impliedly provides the same to have retrospective effect.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes----Fiscal statute---Imposing of taxes---Principles---Charging provisions imposing taxes are to be strictly construed in favour of taxpayer, so that if there is a doubt or two interpretations, then it has to be resolved in favour of taxpayer---Provisions which provide for the machinery by which taxes are assessed and recovered are to be liberally construed in favour of the Revenue, in order to ensure that realization of proper taxes is made possible.\n \n Eli Lilly's case 2009 SCMR 1279 rel.\n \n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)----Ss.120, 122(2) as inserted by Finance Act (I of 2009) & 133(1)---Assessment order, reopening of---Amendment in law---Retrospective effect---Scope---Income Tax authorities reopened assessment orders on the basis of amendment made in S. 122(2) in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, through Finance Act, 2009---Appellate Tribunal declared the amendment as prospective in nature---Validity---Time period of reopening of assessment order was extended under S. 122(2) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and the amendment had no retrospective effect and would apply to cases in which assessment orders were passed after the date of legislation in question---Assessment orders which were passed or deemed to be passed under enabling provisions of S. 120 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, prior to 1-7-2009, the same would be 'closed and past transactions' 'qua' applicability of amended provisions, as valuable rights in favour of taxpayer had accrued---Amendment extending time period to amend assessment orders, in which 'rights' had matured into 'vested rights' could not be amended under extended period provided under S. 122(2) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, introduced through Finance Act, 2009---High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Appellate Tribunal---Reference was declined in circumstances.\n \nAdnan Afzal's case PLD 1969 SC 187 and Eastern Federal Insurance Company's case PLD 1982 SC 247 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,122(2),133(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,122(2),133(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income Tax Reference Application No.39-P of 2012, decision dated: 18-06-2014, hearing DATE : 18-06-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "YAHYA AFRIDI AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE Zone-II, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR\nVs.\nROOHULAMIN, UNIVERSITY BOOK AGENCY, BANK ROAD, MARDAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11740",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVMS1JTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1445 = 2015 SLD 1445 = 2015 PTD 515 = 2015 PTCL 540 = (2014) 110 TAX 381",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)----Ss. 132, 133 & 221---Reference to High Court---Limitation---Order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue was assailed by authorities beyond the period of 90 days---Effect---Authorities had assailed the order rejecting application filed under S. 221 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and not the one from the order under S. 132 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Reference was required under S. 133(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to be filed within 90 days from communication of order under S. 132(7) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Appellate Tribunal was bound to communicate its order under S.132(7) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to taxpayer and Commissioner---No reference could be filed on question arising from order passed under S. 132 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Question was answered in negative in circumstances.\n \n Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Khan CNG and Filling Station and others 2013 PTD 884; Commissioner of Income Tax Company's II, Karachi v. Messrs National Food Laboratories 1992 PTD 570; Commissioner of Income-Tax Companies No.1, Karachi v. Messrs Hassan Associates (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi 1994 PTD 1256; The Lungla (Sylhet) Tea Co. Ltd., Sylhet v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Dacca Circle, Dacca 1970 SCMR 872; The Commissioner of Income Tax v. Messrs Smith, Kline and French of Pakistan Ltd. and others 1991 PTD 999 and 1991 SCMR 2374 ref.\n \n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----S.133---Reference to High Court---Jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---High Court has to decide reference application on fact and circumstances founded by Appellate Tribunal, which is the last fact finding forum---High Court cannot change finding of facts arrived at by Appellate Tribunal---Opinion of High Court under S. 133 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, is binding on it.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=132,132(7),133,133(1),133(5),221\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=132,132(7),133,133(1),133(5),221\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.R. No.15 of 2013, decision dated: 6-05-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAMOON RASHID SHEIKH AND SHAHID, JAMIL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVs.\nMessrs MACCA CNG GAS ENTERPRISES and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11741",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVMS1JTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1447 = 2015 SLD 1447 = 2015 CLC 632 = 2015 PLJ 7",
    "Key Words:": "(a) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-------S. 5, Sched. & S.17---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Suit for recovery of dowry articles---Family Court could follow any procedure to regulate its proceedings unless a clear prohibition was found in the law---Mere fact that party had not formally proved a document was of no legal consequence---Evidence adduced before the Family Court could not be evaluated and appraised in a manner as was appreciated in the cases presented under Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Wife produced list of dowry articles which had been rightly relied upon by the Family Court while excluding the gold ornaments---Solitary statement of wife was sufficient to prove the claim of dowry articles---Wife was not required to prove the case in terms of requirements of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 while making the claim for dowry articles---West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 was a special law and provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 had been excluded---Appeal filed by the husband before the Appellate Court was barred by time---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Mst. Shakeela Bibi v. Muhammad Israr and of others 2012 MLD 756 rel.\n \n(b) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---\n \n----S. 14---West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, R.22---Appeal---Limitation---Appeal under S.14 of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 should be preferred within 30 days of passing of decree or a decision excluding the time consumed for obtaining the copies however Appellate Court, for sufficient cause, could extend such period.\n \n(c) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---\n \n----S. 17---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Preamble---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Preamble---Applicability---Provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 were not applicable in stricto sensu to the proceedings before the Family Court and family Court had to regulate its own proceedings in accordance with West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964.\n \n(d) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---\n \n---Preamble---Object---Purpose for enacting the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 was to advance justice and to avoid technicalities which were hindrance in providing ultimate justice to the parties---West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 had been promulgated for expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes with regard to marriage and other family affairs and special procedure had been provided to achieve such object.\n \n(e) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n---Art. 199--- Constitutional jurisdiction--- Scope--- Constitutional jurisdiction could not be invoked unless order of the court below was illegal, perverse or defective in terms of exercise of jurisdiction---Fact that through an evidence a different conclusion was possible was no ground for invocation of constitutional jurisdiction---High Court not to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below while exercising constitutional jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.9462 of 2014, decision dated: 9-07-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "M. SOHAIL IQBAL BHATTI, J",
    "": "AMIR SHAHZAD \nVs \nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, MULTAN and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11742",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUVMTFFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1512 = 2015 SLD 1512 = (2015) 111 TAX 29 = 2015 PTD 630 = 2015 PTCL 604",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 2(70A), 113(1), 113(3), 153, 153(1)(a) 153(7)(v)(c), 133, 205 - Reference to High Court - Failure to pay tax collected or deducted - payments for goods, services and contracts - Non deduction of tax at source as withholding agent - Initiation of proceedings against taxpayer u/s 161 read with section 153 - CIR(A), in appeal, annulled assessment and held that Taxation Officer has grossly erred in treating Taxpayer as withholding agent - Revenue went in appeal before Appellate Tribunal which was accepted - Validity - revenue argued that amendment introduced in section 153 would be governing law - Petitioner asserted that amendment, being prospective, would not be applicable for tax year 2010 and 2011 - Legality aspect determined - Whether amendment introduced in section 153 is to be applied prospectively for reason that Finance Act, 2011 does not expressly provide amendment to have retrospective effect and also for the reason that amendment expands scope of prescribed person as withholding agent to collect advance tax on payment made - Held yes - Whether amendment introduced in Ordinance, vide Finance Act, 2011 being prospective would take legal effect from 1-07-2011 and thus would not apply to lax years in question as same ended on 30-06-2010 and 30-06- 2011 - Held yes - Whether withholding agent and liability accruing for failure thereof cannot be retrospectively saddled upon petitioner taxpayer for any period before 01-07-2011 for provision so introduced vide amendment having prospective effect - Held yes - Whether petitioner, taxpayer carried on business of execution of contract and had paid minimum tax on entire gross receipts arising out of its contracts - Held yes - Whether anomaly in law prompted revenue to introduce amendment vide Finance Act, 2011 whereby special provisions were introduced defining turnover in relation to prescribed person in section 153 - Held yes- Whether orders of Commissioner are maintained being in accordance with law and that of Tribunal are declared to be against law and thus both tax references are answered in positive in terms of opinion rendered - Held Yes.\nTo appreciate and correctly determine the questions of law raised in the instant references, first it is crucial to first decide whether the amendment introduced in section 153 of the Ordinance vide Finance Act, 2011 (\"\"Amendment\"\") applies to the two Tax Years under consideration or otherwise. \nThe Amendment introduced in Section 153 of the Ordinance is to be applied prospectively for the following reasons: \nFirstly, it is by now a settled principle of law that unless the legislature expressly provides a taxing or a penal provision to be retrospective, the same would apply prospectively. The Finance Act, 2011 does not expressly provide the Amendment to have retrospective effect. Hence, the same would be\napplicable prospectively.\nSecondly, the Amendment expands the scope of a \"\"prescribed person\"\", as a \"\"withholding agent\"\", to collect advance tax on payments made. The Amendment, therefore, not only imposes an additional obligation upon the taxpayer to act as a \"\"withholding agent\"\" of collecting advance tax but it also imposes a pecuniary liability on him for failing to act and collect the same. Surely, in such circumstances the Amendment would not have retrospective effect. The Amendment introduced in the Ordinance, vide Finance Act 2011, being prospective would take legal effect on 1-7-2011 and thus would not apply to the Tax Years in question as the same ended on 30-6-2010 and 30-6-2011. \nSurely, sub-clause (c) of clause (v) of Section 153(7) introduced through the Finance Act 2011 has clarified the term \"\"turnover\"\" by, \"\"inter alia\"\", incorporating fifty million rupees of the gross receipts from the execution of contracts. However, this provision would not be attracted to the Tax Years under consideration as found in the present references. as the same ended on 30-6-2010 and 30-6-2011, while the said provision would be applicable prospectively from 1-7-2011. This Court has been informed that the petitioner taxpayer has since 1-7-2011 duly acting as a \"\"withholding agent\"\" and deducting tax at source at the time of payments. This role of \"\"withholding agent\"\" and the liability accruing for failure thereof cannot be retrospectively saddled upon the petitioner taxpayer for any period before 1-7-2011 for the provision so introduced vide the Amendment having a prospective effect. \nThe bare reading of the aforementioned provision clearly provides a prescribed person\"\" to act as a \"\"withholding agent\"\" by deducting tax from the gross amount payable at the time of making its payments on execution of a contract, as was the case of the present petitioner-taxpayer. However, the term prescribed person\"\" explained in sub-section-9 of section 153 (\"\"supra\"\") refers to an AOP having a \"\"turnover\"\" of over fifty million rupees. The term \"\"turnover\"\" has not been expressly explained or defined in the said subsection, as has been done in the Amendment introduced vide Finance Act, 2011. In circumstances, when the term \"\"turnover\"\" was not explained or defined in section 153 ibid, we are to take refuge from the general definition of the said term provided in the Ordinance and if the same is not defined therein, then the common ordinary dictionary meaning would have to be considered. In the present case, the term \"\"turnover\"\" was then defined under sub-section 70A of section-2 of the Ordinance, hence would be applicable.\nRelevant to the present tax references, is clause (c) of sub-section (3) of section 113, \"\"ibid\"\", as it relates to execution of contract. The reading thereof, clearly provides that all the gross receipts from the execution of contracts would come within the purview of the term \"\"turnover\"\" except those which were covered by final discharge paid or payable by the taxpayer.\nIn the present references, the petitioner taxpayer carried on the business of execution of contract and had paid Minimum Tax on the entire gross receipts arising out of its contracts. Hence, no part of the gross receipt was left uncovered from charge of tax liability and which had not been paid by the present petitioner. In such circumstances, there existed no \"\"turnover\"\" of the petitioner-taxpayer to come within the mischief of a prescribed person\"\" envisaged under section 153 of the Ordinance. \nThis Court is of the view that the above anomaly in the law prompted the Revenue to introduce the Amendment vide Finance Act 2011 whereby special provisions were introduced defining \"\"turnover\"\" in relation to a prescribed person\"\" in section 153 of the Ordinance.\nAccordingly, for the reasons stated hereinabove, the orders of the Commissioner are maintained being in accordance with law and that of the Tribunal dated are declared to be against the law, and thus both the tax references are answered in the Positive in terms of the opinion rendered. Office is directed to send a copy of the under the seal of the Court to the Worthy Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar Bench, Peshawar.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(70A),113(1),113(3),153,153(1)(a),153(7)(v)(c),133,161,205\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(70A),113(1),113(3),153,153(1)(a),153(7)(v)(c),133,161,205\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 10-P/2014, decided 25-9-2014, hearing DATE : 25-9-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "YAHYA AFRIDI AND MUSARRAT HILALI, J.",
    "": "SHAUKAT KHAN & CO\nVs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11743",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1FpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1607 = 2015 SLD 1607 = 2015 PTD 279 = 2015 PTCL 689",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-------S.138---Frustrated cargo, dealing of---Principle---Term 'frustrated cargo' is applied if either (a) goods are brought into customs-station by reason of inadvertence or misdirection; or (b) having been brought into a customs-station, the consignee is untraceable---Inadvertence or misdirection relevant for the purposes of S. 138 of Customs Act, 1969, must relate to bringing of goods into a customs-station---If inadvertence or misdirection relates to any other matter, that is not relevant for the purposes of S. 138 of Customs Act, 1969.\n \n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----S. 138---Customs Rules, 2001, Rr. 86, 87, 88 & 89---Suit for declaration and injunction---Frustrated cargo---Permission to re-export---Plaintiff was a foreign company and goods in question were shipped to Pakistan for onward transmission to Afghanistan under Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Treaty against bill of lading in the name of Pakistani company---Original importer backed out and there was a new importer willing to import goods to Afghanistan but Customs authorities did not permit and directed to auction the goods---Plea raised by plaintiff was that goods in question had become \"\"frustrated cargo\"\" and plaintiff was to be allowed to re-export them without payment of any duties and taxes etc.---Validity---Manifest error was made by authorities and actual exercise as required by law (i.e. under S. 138 of Customs Act, 1969 and Rr. 86 to 89 of Customs Rules, 2001) was not carried out---Focus remained exclusively on IGM and in effect, subsequent bills were disregarded---Relevant documents were not examined from correct statutory perspective and the exercise must be carried out in accordance with law so that a proper determination was made as to whether or not the goods could be re-exported---Such exercise could not be carried out by High Court as civil court, as it was statutory duty of Collector of Customs---High Court directed Collector of Customs to carry out such exercise, as it had already not undertaken by him---High Court further directed Collector of Customs to give a hearing to plaintiff and after taking into consideration the IGM as well as all relevant \"\"other documents\"\" (which must include two subsequently issued bills and documents relating to transactions regarding the goods) and to decide whether they were \"\"frustrated cargo\"\" within the meaning of S. 138 of Customs Act, 1969, by reason of consignee being untraceable and if he would so conclude, then goods were to be allowed to be re-exported without payment of any taxes and duties etc.---Suit was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=138\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Act, 1969=138\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Rules, 2001=86,87,88,89\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1090 and C.M.As. Nos. 9174 and 14478 of 2013, decision dated: 22-04-2014. dates of hearing: 14th February and 10-03-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "Messrs PT. SYNERGY OIL NUSANTARA through Duly Constituted Attorney, Karachi \nVs \nMessrs EVERGREEN MARINE CORPORATION (TAIWAN) LTD., and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11744",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1FpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1608 = 2015 SLD 1608 = 2015 PTD 289",
    "Key Words:": "Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000)-------S. 10---Federal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act (XIV of 2013), S.11---Complaint---Manufacturing of Cement---Interim relief, grant of---Complainant had sought indulgence of the Ombudsman against a letter, issued by Deputy Collector (Exports); whereby the Private Manufacturing Bond Warehouse Licence, had been amended by deleting shredded tyre scrap (cut into pieces) from manufacturing bond licence---Contention was that shredded tyres were used as fuel; and it was not an input material for manufacturing of cement to be used as input material---Complainant being aggrieved by said letter filed complaint to the ombudsman, along with application for grant of interim relief by suspending the operation of impugned letter, whereby facility of manufacturing bond, was withdrawn---Documents available on record, prima facie, supported the plea of the complainant---Circumstances, explained by the complainant, reflected that, if the clearance of shredded tyres was withheld, the complainant would face irreparable loss---Interim injunction was granted in favour of the complaint by suspending the operation of impugned letter in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman",
    "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013=11\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Complaint No.319/KHI/Cust(59)1143 of 2014, decision dated: 17-09-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUR RAUF CHAUDHRY, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN",
    "": "Messrs LUCKY CEMENT LTD. KARACHI \nVs \nSECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11745",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1FpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1609 = 2015 SLD 1609 = 2015 PTD 292 = (2015) 111 TAX 205",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-------Ss. 120, 122 & 131---Amendment of assessment---Assessee, a Sugar Mill---Assessing Authority by taking average rate of three Sugar Mills on the basis of being parallel cases, applied sugarcane purchase-rate against the declared rate by the assessee and made addition---Taxpayer had contended that Assessing Authority had failed to mention the provision under which it had applied average rate of sugarcane purchased by said three sugar mills---Assessing Authority repeatedly mentioned in its best order that taxpayer had failed to furnish complete books of account and supporting evidences to substantiate his claim---Appellate Authority upheld stance of Assessing Authority on the basis of non-production of books of accounts and relevant record---Assessing Authority, though had made comparison of sugarcane purchase price of three parallel cases, but failed to confront the taxpayer with the names, NTN/names, area/locality of these sugar mills; and had not fulfilled its legal obligation, and norms of natural justice---Matter was remanded to Assessing Authority, with the directions that after obtaining complete books of accounts, and relevant documentary evidence, taxpayer be confronted with the discrepancies; and ask to submit specific reasons of increased rate of input---Complete names/NTN and locality of said three mills operating, in the area, to be communicated to taxpayer---Taxpayer was directed to co-operate with the department, and provide all relevant records including evidence of payment to the growers made through proper Banking Channel---Matter could be adjudicated according to the facts and circumstances of the case---Appeal on that ground was disposed of by the Tribunal accordingly.\n \n 2013 PTD 1274; 1975 PTD 58 and 2011 PTD 2161 ref.\n \n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 5, 6, 7, 8, Proviso, 11, 39(5), 56, 131 & 169(3)---Taxation of dividend Income---Confirmation of---Contention of taxpayer was that action of Appellate Authority below of confirming the taxation of dividend income separately and not allowing adjustment of the same against business loss, was against the expressed provision of law---Assessing Authority, charged income tax 10% as a separate block of income, and did not set off business losses against such income---Appellate Authority confirmed the treatment given by Assessing Authority---Claim of taxpayer was that as a result of insertion of Proviso in S.8 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, dividend income was not a separate block of income; that according to S.8, tax deduction under Ss.5, 6, 7 of the Ordinance would be final tax on income on which it was deducted, while company had been specifically excluded from the purview of the final tax by virtue of said Proviso which clearly would mean that tax deducted in respect of dividend income of a company, would not be final tax with effect from 1-7-2007; that S.169(3) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, also excluded dividend income of a company; that dividend income, fell under S.39 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 under the head "Income from other sources" and that taxpayer had correctly set off the loss against dividend Income in accordance with the provisions of S.56(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Main question involved in the case was as to whether dividend Income, chargeable to tax under S.5 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, fell under the head "Income from other sources"---Held, that taxpayer had admitted that dividends received by the company were chargeable to tax under S.5 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, but had contended that such dividends fell under the head "Income from other sources"---Contention of the taxpayer was not tenable in view of provisions of S.39(5) of the Ordinance---Reliance of taxpayer on the provisions of S.8(c)(ii) of the Ordinance was misplaced because it pertained to the cases falling under "final tax regime"---Appellate Authority had observed in the order that S.56(1) of the Ordinance allowed set off of losses amongst heads of income as specified in S.11 of the Ordinance---Dividend income, was a separate block of income chargeable to tax under S.5 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001; and did not fall in any head of income as provided in S.11 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Set off losses from other heads or vice versa, could not be allowed under S.56 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Appellate Authority, in circumstances had rightly confirmed the action of the Assessing Authority, which needed no interference on the issue in appeal before Tribunal.\n \n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 5, 6, 7, 8, Proviso, 39(5), 56 & 131---Restriction of tax credit on dividend income---Taxpayer, had contended that restriction of tax credit on dividend income to the extent of Rs.106,400 against claimed at Rs.223,285 without confronting him, was illegal and unjustified---Assessing Authority, disallowed the amount of tax withheld with observations that tax on dividend income of Rs.1,064,000 at the rate of 10% worked out to Rs.106,400; whereas taxpayer had claimed tax deducted at Rs.223,285---Adjudicating Authority, disallowed the difference, Rs.116,885 and Appellate Authority, confirmed that disallowance---Validity---Contention of taxpayer was that dividend income had been disclosed in the accounts for the period from 1-1-2008 to 30-9-2009, whereas tax deduction had been claimed for the period from 1-7-2009 to 30-6-2010---Difference arose on timing---Taxpayer had further claimed that said issue had already been decided in his favour in his own case in assessment years 2000-2001, 2001-2002 and 2002-2003---Issue involved in the case having already been decided by the Tribunal in favour of the taxpayer in its own case, there was no reason to interfere with the earlier decision---Appeal was allowed---Adjudicating Authority was directed to allow the credit of Rs.223,285 after necessary verifications.\n \n(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.39(3) & 131---Income from other sources---Addition under S.39(3) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Appeal to Appellate Tribunal---Taxpayer (company) received loans from Directors/Key Management amounting to Rs.72,736,000---Adjudicating Authority inferred that no evidence was provided that payments were made through proper Banking Channel, and authority proceeded to disallow the amount under S.39(3) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001; as the taxpayer had failed to furnish any reply---Appellate Authority confirmed the treatment meted out by the Adjudicating Authority---Plea of taxpayer was that Adjudicating Authority was requested to allow submission of evidence, which was rejected and best order was framed without honouring request for adjournment---Taxpayer, explained that the income under review, consisted of Rs.69,691,000 which was outstanding against provident fund and salaries payable---Balance amount of Rs.3,045,000 was received through the proper Banking Channel---Matter had not been properly adjudicated by the authorities below; and addition had been made in a slipshod manner---Case was remanded to Assessing Officer for de novo consideration in accordance with the law for fresh adjudication---Order accordingly.\n \n(e) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 21(c), 149, 165 & 131---Deduction in computing income under head "Income from business"---Addition under S.21(c) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Taxpayer, had claimed that addition of Rs.5,529,612 under S.21(c) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, in respect of the payments made to the Directors was illegal and unjustified as tax was duly deducted and deposited into Government Treasury, whenever applicable---Adjudicating Authority in its order had observed that the taxpayer had shown huge payments on account of salaries and perquisites to Directors and executives, for the relevant period which were not reflected in the annual statement of withholding taxes filed under Ss.149/165 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Adjudicating Authority added the difference of perquisites and benefits; on which tax was not withheld by the taxpayer for the year under consideration---Said treatment was confirmed by Appellate Authority---Submission of taxpayer was that the difference in figures appearing in the accounts and the statement filed under S.149 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was on account of time difference of the accounting period of taxpayer i.e. between 1-10-2008 to 30-9-2009 and the period for which statement had been filed from 1-7-2009 to 30-6-2010---Taxpayer also added that present issue had been decided in its favour in its own case in assessment years 2001-2002 and 2002-2003---Validity---Present issue was based on fact, rather than legal one and had neither been properly examined by the Assessing Officer, nor adjudicated by Appellate Authority---Case was remanded to Assessing Officer for de novo consideration in accordance with law; with direction that after obtaining necessary statement under Ss.149/165 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, complete analysis would be made as per relevant provisions of law---Order accordingly.\n \n(f) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 111 & 131---Unexplained income or assets---Inclusion in the income chargeable to tax---Adjudicating Authority, had taken the amounts of tax paid as appearing in the cash flow statement and as claimed in the return of income, and added back the difference under S.111 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Taxpayer, explained that the additions were made by ignoring his written submission---Contentions of taxpayer was that break-up of income tax paid as shown in cash flow statement and as claimed in the return of tax year 2010, was due to difference between the tax paid shown in the cash flow statement, and tax deductions claimed in the return of income; that Adjudicating Authority had made addition under S.111 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without even mentioning the specific provision of law, which was not tenable---Validity---Even if there was alleged difference in figure, same could not be equated with "concealment of income", until and unless the department had proved beyond any doubt that the nature and source of such amounts were unexplained and attracted the provisions of S.111 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Adjudicating Authority, had made a huge addition, without going into the legal as well factual realities of the case---Burden of proof rested on the department to prove that any wrong-doing had been done---Said burden having not been properly discharged by Adjudicating Authority, case was remanded for de novo consideration, according to the facts and circumstances of the case---Order accordingly.\n \n 2012 PTD 1775 (Trib.) and 2006 PTD 2828 ref.\n \n(g) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 23 & 131---Initial depreciation---Disallowance of---Assessee, a company running sugar Mill---Adjudicating Authority, disallowed initial depreciation, claimed by the taxpayer in his return, being not in accordance with the provisions of S.23 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 with observations that no addition in assets had been made during the year, rather various parts of the existing plant and machinery were replaced---Appellate Authority, confirmed action of Adjudicating Authority---Contentions of taxpayer was that initial depreciation had been disallowed by Adjudicating Authority, with the observations that no new plant and machinery was added; that both authorities below had ignored the fact that every year, in sugar industry, complete overhauling of plants and machinery was carried out to bring same in serviceable condition and that Adjudicating Authority had failed to allow normal depreciation on the assets against which the initial allowance had been disallowed---Validity---Adjudicating Authority had made additions without specifying any instance---In absence of specific description, it could not be ascertained as to whether new plant and machinery was added, or addition in the existing plant and machinery were made---Case was remanded for de novo consideration, with the direction that disallowance on account of initial depreciation, would be examined as per law and after ascertaining facts, normal depreciation to the company could be allowed.\n \n(h) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 21(c)(m), 131, 149 & 165---Additions made under S.21(c)(m) of the Ordinance---Appeal to Appellate Tribunal---Taxpayer had alleged that Adjudicating Authority had made the combined addition under S.21(c)(m) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which itself was illegal ab initio void; that issue related to time difference was not properly adjudicated by Adjudicating Authority, without any specific default and that Appellate Authority had failed to give findings on the issue, despite the fact that said ground was raised before the Authority---Validity---Appellate Authority, having not adjudicated the issue although the taxpayer had raised that ground at the first appellate stage, case was remanded to the said Authority to adjudicate the matter on the issue, and give clearcut findings after providing an opportunity of hearing to both the sides---Order accordingly.\n \n(i) Income Tax Rules, 2002---\n \n----R. 231---Apportionment of expenses between local and export sales---Taxpayer, had contended that Adjudicating Authority, had wrongly apportioned expenses between local and export sales by ignoring the relevant provisions of law and circulars issued by the FBR in that regard; that Appellate Authority was not justified to confirm the addition of amount and that Adjudicating Authority, allocated amount of expenses from normal income to the export proceeds, and action of Adjudicating Authority, was confirmed by Appellate Authority---Validity---Controversy related to the ratio for allocation of expenses, between the normal sales and the exports---Rule 231 of Income Tax Rules, 2002 dealt with the computation of export profits and tax attributable to export sales---Said Rule had clearly stated that the export sales were taken on F.O.B. price of the goods exported for apportionment purpose---Contention of taxpayer that the identifiable expenses were required to be excluded from the export proceeds, while apportioning common expenses, was not correct in the face of express provisions of R.231 of Income Tax Rules, 2002---Adjudicating Officer, had rightly apportioned expenses on the ratio of normal sales and exports by excluding the identifiable expenses---Interference with the findings of the authorities below on issue in question was declined by Tribunal.\n \n(j) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----S. 57(1)(4)---Set off of brought forward and unabsorbed depreciation---Adjudicating Authority, while computing the total income, did not set off brought forward business losses and unabsorbed depreciation against the income from other sources according to the provisions of S.57(4) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Adjudicating Authority, was of the view that S.57(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, referred to business loss, and could only be offset against business income---Appellate Authority had confirmed said treatment of Adjudicating Authority---Validity---Held, that taxpayer was entitled to set off the assessed income against brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation---Adjudicating Authority, was directed to allow effect of unabsorbed depreciation and brought forward business loss after necessary verification---Matter was accordingly remitted to Assessing Officer for de novo consideration.\n \n 1996 PTD (Trib.) 292 and 2003 PTD (Trib.) 1464 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=5,6,7,8,21(c),21(c)(m),23,Proviso,11,39(3),39(5),56,56(1),57(1)(4),111,131,169(3),120,122,149,165,231\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=5,6,7,8,21(c),21(c)(m),23,Proviso,11,39(3),39(5),56,56(1),57(1)(4),111,131,169(3),120,122,149,165,231\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No.1355/LB of 2013, decision dated: 16-04-2014, hearing DATE : 25-02-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SIKANDAR ASLAM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs CRESCENT COTTON MILLS LTD., FAISALABAD \nVs \nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, Zone-III, LARGE TAXPAYER UNIT, LAHORE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11746",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1FpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1610 = 2015 SLD 1610 = 2015 PTD 319",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005)-------Ss.3, 2(23), 8, 12(2), 14, & First Sched: Entry No.13---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Ss.122(5A), 18(2), 39 & 2(46)---Federal Excise Rules, 2005, Rr.40A(4) & 43C---S.R.O. No. 550(I)/2006 dated 5-6-2006---Duties specified in the First Schedule of Federal Excise Act, 2005 to be levied---Stock broker---Brokerage service---Commission---Late charges---Levy of Excise Duty on late charges was being ancillary service---First Appellate Authority had found that stock brokers were required to pay Federal Excise Duty on their brokerage services only in respect of purchase or sale of share in Stock Exchange and the \"\"Late Charges\"\" earned for the arrangement of financing facilities were distinctly different from the brokerage and commission in respect of purchase or sale of shares in a Stock Exchange; that other income i.e. \"\"Late Charges\"\" will not attract Federal Excise Duty in sales tax mode; that if mark up on financial services were covered even then the same will not attract Federal Excise Duty in sales tax mode as the same were exempt from Federal Excise Duty under R.40A(4) of the Federal Excise Rules, 2005 meaning thereby that services rendered by the taxpayer did not fall under the services rendered by stock brokers as provided under R.43C of the Federal Excise Rules, 2005---Revenue contended that under S.12(2) of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 were taxable which included all the services provided in the brokerage house; that mark-up paid on loan to banks (reflecting in liability side of balance sheet as loan against equity requirement and trading of shares) and on asset side as debtor to various customers and mark-up received on the said facility was actually ancillary service to the commission earned from the customers; that it was a service receipt and excisable item; and entire income was commission service or ancillary services as was evident from audited accounts; that late payment charges were the nature of services provided in the brokerage house; that all services in brokerage house were excisable in nature; that considering the late payment charges as mark-up within the meaning of Sub-rule (4) of R.40A and claiming itself as the financial institution or the banking company was against the factual position; and that taxpayer received only the late payment charges and those were ancillary to brokerage house services i.e. commission---Validity---Department had accepted the contention of the taxpayer that late payment receipts did not form part of gross commission earned from sale and purchase of shares for the purpose of Federal Excise and Income Tax vide order under S.14 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 and under S.122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Late payment charges was not earned as part of such systematic or organized course of activity or conduct with a set purpose the said receipt was rightly assessed under S.39 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as income from other sources and not as income from business under S.18(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Once the department had accepted the stance of the taxpayer while proceeding under S.122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 by the Senior Officer in rank and also in the subsequent Federal Excise proceedings, a different view altogether taken by the department was nullity in the eye of law and the taxpayer by any stretch of imagination could not be burdened with the Federal Excise Duty and the department could not blow hot and cold in the same breath to ignore favour to taxpayer---Kaleidoscopic assessments were being made by the Revenue Department without knowing or analyzing the exact nature of business and nature and status of receipt (late payment receipt)---Late payment charges was not \"\"income from business\"\" and not part of commission income/brokerage income when the department itself treated the same as late payment (mark-up) income from other sources---Subsequent revenue was not the part of Gross Commission and Federal Excise Duty was not to be levied.\n \n Messrs Gear Hobbings Ltd.'s case 2003 PTD 739; 2004 PTD (Trib.) 2352; Civil Appeals Nos. 1866/1996, 1262/1999, 1288/2000, 1293, 1294, 1296 and 1306 of 2001; CIT Karachi v. Gelcaps (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi 2009 PTD 331; Advance Law Lexicon 3rd Edition pages 886-887; Harihar Raw Cotton Pressing Factory v. CIT (1960) 39 ITR 594, 610; I.T.As. Nos.923/924/KB of 2012 dated 7-10-2013; 2012 PTD (Trib.) 954; Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1921) 12 Tax Cas. 358; CIT Balkrishna Malhotra's case 81 ITR 759 at 762; 1989 SCMR 353; PLD 1970 SC 453; 2003 PLC (C.S.) 1222 and PLD 1965 SC 412 rel.\n \n(b) Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005)---\n \n----S.31(3)---Power of adjudication---Limitation---Agreed date of show cause notice was 30-9-2011---Date of Order-in-Original was 15-6-2012---167 days were consumed---Taxpayer contended that officer was bound to pass the order within 120 days---Provisions of S.31(3) of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 permitted further extensions of 60 days for reason to be recorded in writing and 30 days in case the adjournments availed by the taxpayer---Total number of 210 days were available to the officer to pass an Order-in-Original---Record revealed that case was heard on 7-10-2011, 25-11-2011, 22-2-2012 and 28-2-2012---Hearing and factual grant of opportunities and adjournments fully justified the officer to step in the additional time limits, which was beyond 120 days and also construed valid reason---Order-in-Original was within days of statutory time limit.\n \n(c) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Departmental practice---Where departmental practice had followed a particular course in implementation of some rule, whether right or wrong, it would be extremely unfair to make a departure from it and thereby disturb rights that have been settled by a long and consistent course of practice.\n \n(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----S.11---Heads of income---Determination of---It was not open either to the Revenue or to the taxpayer to claim that an income which clearly fell under one head should be dealt with under a different head for the purpose of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---For determining under which head an income will fall, its commercial character was a relevant factor---Time or method of book-keeping by the taxpayer was not relevant consideration---This is decided from the nature of the income by applying practical notions and not by reference to treatment by the taxpayer in his books of account---In income wrongly included by the Officer of Inland Revenue under one head could be taken out from that head, and included under the correct head, in appeal proceedings.\n \n(e) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----S.10---\"\"Total income\"\"---Scope---Section 10 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 provide scope of total income with reference to residential status of the person---Where a person was resident, its total world income (Pakistan source as well as foreign source) was chargeable to tax---In case of non-resident person, only Pakistan source income was taxable under the Ordinance---Where an income was Pakistan source was to be tested on the criteria given in S.10 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n \n(f) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n----S.15---Heads of income---Section 15 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 showed that, the sole criterion to classify the income under S.15 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, in ordinary course, was the source and/or the nature of activity and conduct wherefrom and/or whereby the particular income was being generated---As long as the sources could be factually found, circumstances seldom had any bearing on the characteristic of income.\n \n CIT Karachi v. Gelcaps (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi 2009 PTD 331 rel.\n \n(g) Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005)---\n \n----S. 3---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 77---Federal Excise duties specified in the First Schedule of the Act to be levied---No tax could be levied or collected except under the constitutional authority---Principle.\n \n(h) Federal Excise Rules, 2005---\n \n----R.43C---Special procedure for services provided by stockbrokers---Scope---Federal Excise Duty was applicable on the commission earned from clients in respect of purchase or sale of shares in a stock exchange---Words used in R. 34C \"\"purchase or sale of shares\"\" have significant value, which restrict the activity to the sale and purchase of shares and not other activities.\n \n(i) Federal Excise Rules, 2005---\n \n----R.43C---S.R.O. No.550(I)/2006 dated 5-6-2006---Special procedure for services provided by stockbrokers---Notification No.S.R.O. No. 550(I)/2006 dated 5-6-2006 read with R.43C of the Federal Excise Rules, 2005 revealed that the stock brokers were required to charge and pay Federal Excise Duty on their Gross Commission services only in respect of purchase or sale of share in a Stock Exchange.\n \n Advance Law Lexicon 3rd Edition Page 886-887 rel.\n \n(j) Taxation---\n \n----Taxes are the life-blood of any government---Principles.\n \n(k) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----\"\"Principles of consistency and certainty\"\" occupy a very prominent position in the law of precedent which has to be adhered to by the government departments in order to maintain discipline in the administration of justice.\n \n(l) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Fiscal statutes---Taxation, doctrine of---Principles.\n \n(m) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Taxing statute must be construed strictly---Implication---True implication of the principle that \"\"taxing statute must be construed strictly\"\" is often misunderstood and the principle is unjustifiably extended beyond the legitimate field of its operation.\n \n(n) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Principles that \"\"there is no equity about a tax\"\" and \"\"there is no presumption as to a tax\"\"---Explained---There is no equity about a tax in the sense that a provision, by which a tax is imposed, has to be construed strictly, regardless of the hardship that such a construction may cause either to the treasury or to the tax-payer---If the subject falls squarely within the letter of law, he must be taxed, howsoever inequitable the consequences may appear to the judicial mind---If the revenue seeking to tax cannot bring the subject within the letter of law, the subject is free, no matter that such a construction may cause serious prejudice to the revenue---In other words, though what is called equitable construction may be admissible in relation to other statutes or other provisions of a taxing statute, such a construction is not admissible in the interpretation of a charging or taxing provision of a taxing statute---Subject is not to be taxed unless the charging provision clearly imposes the obligation.\n \n(o) Precedent---\n \n----Conflict of precedent---Duty of judge---Proposition that a judge, faced with a conflict of precedent, should abdicate his and accept the view, which is favourable to the taxpayer was wrong---Where, however, a judge finds that two equally reasonable views are possible and he is unable to decide which is the better view, that he may adopt the rule of interpretation that the view favourable to the taxpayer might be accepted---Taxing provision must receive a strict construction at the hands of the courts and if there is any ambiguity, the benefit of that ambiguity must go to the taxpayer, but this is not the same thing as the saying that a taxing provision should not receive a reasonable construction---Judge's duty is to consider which is the more reasonable view and accept the one which is more reasonable---Where a judge finds that both the views were equally reasonable there he may resort to the rule of interpretation favouring the taxpayer.\n \n(p) Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005)---\n \n----Ss.3, 2(23), 8, 12(2), 14, & First Sched: Entry No.13---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Ss.122(5A), 18(2), 39 & 2(46)---Federal Excise Rules, 2005, Rr.40A(4) & 43C---S.R.O. No.550(I)/2006 dated 5-6-2006---Duties specified in the First Schedule to be levied---Stock brokers---Brokerage services---Late payment charges---Levy of Excise Duty---Legality---Summary of findings of Appellate Tribunal---Business i.e. commission income will continue to accrue if the facility of arranging finances haults---Late payment charges are not earned where the borrower complied with terms of repayment but commission is duly earned on normal sale/purchase transaction---As a stock broker, the remuneration consists solely on commission and taxpayer may not be interested in the profits or losses made by its clients/customers---Two activities i.e. commission on sale/purchase of shares and late payment charges are capable of performance independently from each other---Taxpayer as a stock broker does not owe any liability to lenders but he owes duty of care and skill to its clients in respect of sale and purchase of shares---Late payment receipt did not spring or emanate from main business activity earning and deriving \"\"commission\"\" on purchase and sales of shares---Inland Revenue department accepted such distinction in taxpayer's own case in its order under S.122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for tax year 2010 and 2011---Late payment charges/receipt is not earned as a part of such \"\"Systematic or organized course of main business activity or conduct with a set purpose\"\"---Said receipt [Late Payment charges] rightly assessed under S. 39 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as \"\"Income from other Sources\"\" and not as \"\"Income from business\"\" under S.18(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Where taxpayer is stock member/broker mainly earning commission on purchase and sale of shares, receipt on \"\"late payment charges\"\" was not in his capacity as stock broker on purchase and sale of shares but as guarantor discharging altogether different nature it cannot be treated as \"\"Commission income on sale and purchase of shares\"\" hence, not to be treated as \"\"business income\"\"---Late payment receipt irrespective of the head under which such receipt/income falls is not liable to levy of Federal Excise Duty being outside purview of excisable services on purchase and sale of shares by stock broker---Inland Revenue department accepted the contention of the taxpayer by passing order under S.14 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 for the period ended on 30-6-2011 which still hold ground---Held, subject was not be taxed unless the charging provision clearly imposed the obligation with valid legislative letter of law.\n \n Messrs Gear Hobbings Ltd.'s case 2003 PTD 739; 2004 PTD (Trib.) 2352; Civil Appeals Nos. 1866 of 1996, 1262/1999, 1288/2000, 1293, 1294, 1296 and 1306 of 2001; CIT Karachi v. Gelcaps (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi 2009 PTD 331; Advance Law Lexicon 3rd Edition Pages 886-887; Harihar Raw Cotton Pressing Factory v. CIT (1960) 39 ITR 594, 610; I.T.As. Nos.923/924/KB of 2012 dated 7-10-2013; 2012 PTD (Trib.) 954; Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1921) 12 Tax Cas. 358; CIT Balkrishna Malhotra's case 81 ITR 759 at 762; 1989 SCMR 353; PLD 1970 SC 453; 2003 PLC (S.C.) 1222 and PLD 1965 SC 412 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=3,2(23),8,12(2),14,&FirstSched.EntryNo.13\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Excise Act, 2005=3,2(23),8,12(2),14,&FirstSched.EntryNo.13\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A),18(2),39,2(46)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "F.E.A. No.77/KB of 2012, decision dated: 5-11-2013, hearing DATE : 8-10-2013",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND FAHEEMUL HAQ KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "C.I.R., Zone-IV, LTU, KARACHI \nVs \nMessrs PEARL SECURITIES (PVT.) LTD. KARACHI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11747",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1FpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 2 = 2015 SLD 2 = 2015 PTD 349 = (2015) 111 TAX 389 = 2015 PTCL 418 = 2016 PTD 365",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-------S.203---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.249-A, 265-K & 561-A---Superintendence of High Court over subordinate courts---Inherent jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Quashing of proceedings---Principles---High Court is responsible for entire administration of justice and being charged with responsibility of supervising all Courts subordinate to it, High Court is competent to take all appropriate measures for preventing mal-administration of justice and abuse of process of law in appropriate cases---When case is of no evidence or registration of case is proved to be mala fide or case is of purely civil nature or when there is unexceptional delay in disposal of case causing deplorable mental, physical and financial torture to person proceeded against, High Court is competent to take cognizance of the matter and by exercising inherent powers under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. to correct a wrong by ordering quashing of F.I.R. and proceedings emanating therefrom---Powers vested in High Court under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. are co-extensive with powers vested in Trial Court under Ss. 249-A & 265-K, Cr.P.C. and in appropriate cases can be invoked directly without resorting to decision by Trial Court under Ss. 249-A & 265-K, Cr.P.C. to avoid abuse of process of Court.\n \n The State v. Asif Ali Zardari and another 1994 SCMR 798; Muhammad Khalid Mukhtar v. The State through Deputy Director, FIA (CBA), Lahore PLD 1997 SC 275; Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmed 2000 SCMR 122; Maqbool Rehman v. The State and others 2002 SCMR 1076; Mian Munir Ahmad v. The State 1985 SCMR 257; Raees Ahmad Khan v. The State 1991 PCr.LJ 1381; Ch. Pervez Ellahi v. The Federation of Pakistan 1995 MLD 615 and Muhammad Hassan v. Manzoor Ahmad and another 1991 PCr.LJ 2177 rel.\n \n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----Ss.14 & 33---Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005), Ss.13 & 19---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Quashing of F.I.R.---Action without jurisdiction---Petitioner was not a registered person whether under S. 13 of Federal Excise Act, 2005, or under S.14 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, nor petitioner had any history of being assessed to pay duty under Federal Excise Act, 2005---In the present case, before raid at the premises of petitioner, seizing goods and sealing premises, petitioner was neither issued with any show cause notice nor any opportunity was provided by authorities to petitioner to explain his position with regard to allegations as contained in F.I.R.---Validity---F.I.R. and proceedings emanating therefrom were without lawful authority---Authorities acted without jurisdiction and in violation of express provisions of law---High Court while exercising inherent jurisdiction vested in it and in order to avoid abuse of process of law quashed F.I.R. and proceedings pending before Trial Court since 2012 without any useful progress---Petition was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Shah Nawaz and 2 others v. Birjlal and others 2011 MLD 956; Sadaqat Ali Khan through L.Rs. and others v. Collector Land Acquisition and others PLD 2010 SC 878; Muhammad Amin v. Master Bashir Ahmed and others 2006 SCMR 969; Shah Muhammad v. Haq Nawaz and another PLD 1970 SC 470; Muhammad Ashraf v. Faiz Ali and 11 others PLD 1975 SC 556; Abdul Razzaq v. S.H.O. and others 2008 PCr.LJ 812; Abdul Rashid and another v. The State 1983 PCr.LJ 42; Senator Asif Ali Zardari and another v. The State PLD 2008 Kar. 381; Khursheed Ahmed v. The State 2011 YLR 2368; Muhammad Aslam Baig v. The State 1993 MLD 567 and Quaid Johar v. Murtaza Ali and another PLD 2008 Kar. 342 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=203\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=203\\n\\r\\n\\rCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=249-A,265-K,561-A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-3337 of 2013, decision dated: 11-06-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JJ",
    "": "ZAHEER AHMED \nVs \nDIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIONIR and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11748",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1FpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 5 = 2015 SLD 5 = 2015 PTD 313 = 2015 PTCL 464",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-------Ss. 73 & 47---Transactions not admissible---Interpretation and scope of S. 73 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Reference to High Court---Department had found that personal bank account of taxpayer, who was the sole proprietor of the assessed firm, could not be taken as a business account and transactions therein could not be allowed for adjustment---Held, that personal bank account of owner of sole proprietorship was taken as a business account at the time of registration under the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Transactions were made through banking channels, therefore adjustment of input tax could not have been denied merely on technicalities---Perusal of order-in-original showed that input adjustments (of payments to supplier) made through the business account were allowed, however such payments made through personal bank account were not allowed---Perusal of taxpayer's profile with the Department, revealed that column of bank account was left blank which meant that no account in name of the business was available with the Department---Mere fact that account registered with department was not in name of business was not sufficient to invoke penal provisions of S. 73 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---In order to enforce provisions of S. 73 of the Sales Tax Act 1990, business account must be the one registered with the Department in due course---Intent of Legislature was that all transactions taxable under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 must reflect from one account in order to minimize opportunities for non-compliance and misdeclaration and all transactions from one account were also necessary to trace chain of taxable supplies which ensured proper taxation and adjustment till taxable goods reach the consumer who bears burden of such tax---Taxpayer, in the present case, had given unrebutted and plausible explanation for making payments from his personal account therefore decision of Appellate Tribunal was correct---Reference was answered accordingly.\n \n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----Ss. 3(1), 2(33) & 2(46)---Taxable activity---\"\"Supply\"\", and \"\"value of supply\"\"---Freight, loading and unloading charges---Scope of tax---Question before High Court was whether Appellate Tribunal was justified to hold that carriage loading/unloading charges and commission were not part of the value of supply within the meaning of S.2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Held, that before construing any transaction as taxable activity; value addition or taxable supply; the Department had to arrive at the true nature of the transaction based on correct determination of facts---Payment of freight, loading and unloading charges were not in furtherance of business carried out for consideration; rather was an ancillary service provided to the consumer; that too on an occasional basis---Two incidents of making payments for freight, loading and unloading charges could not make all transactions as taxable in the relevant period---Under S. 3(1)(a) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990; sales tax was to be levied on the value of the taxable supply made by a registered person in course or furtherance of any activity carried out by such person---Payment of freight loading and unloading charges made occasionally and recovered from consumer/customer could not be termed as taxable activity and were therefore not taxable---Reference was answered accordingly.\n \n Collector Sales Tax and Central Excise, Rawalpindi v. Messrs Wah Nobel Chemical Ltd., Wah Cantt. 2008 PTD 1693 rel.\n \n(c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----S. 47---Appeal to High Court---Framing of questions---Words \"\"whether or not\"\"---Connotation---Use of the words \"\"whether or not\"\" would not serve the purpose, if answered in \"\"yes\"\" or \"\"no\"\".",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(33),2(46),3(1),3(1)(a),47,47(5),73\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(33),2(46),3(1),3(1)(a),47,47(5),73\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.R. No.1 of 2011, heard on 23rd September, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AMEER BHATTI, JUSTICE, SHAHID, JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE",
    "": "er: COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE \nVS \nM/S GUL ENTERPRISES AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11749",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1FpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1611 = 2015 SLD 1611 = 2015 PTD 374 = 2015 PTCL 66 = (2015) 111 TAX 371",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-------Ss. 177, 114 & 122---Selection for audit---Criteria---Filing of revised returns after initiation of audit---Effect---Competent authority to initiate audit of a person under S. 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was the Commissioner, and such audit not only related to the income tax returns filed by the person but also related to such person's \"\"entire income tax affairs\"\"---Determination criteria for selection for audit of a person was not restricted to returns filed by the said person but it may include the person's history of compliance or non-compliance with the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001; the amount of tax payable, the class of business conducted and any other matter, which in the opinion of the Commissioner, was material for the determination of the person's correct income---Conduct of the audit comprised of the income tax affairs, including examination of accounts and record, inquiry into expenditure, assets and liability of the person under audit---Scope of audit, thus, was not restricted to just returns filed by the person who was under audit---If the audit was based solely on particulars stated in the tax return filed, and the taxpayer filed revised tax return for the said tax year under S. 114 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and if the same clarified all the issues raised in the audit notice; then said audit would conclude, and the revised tax returns so filed would have to be accepted, and amended assessment order would be passed under S. 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---If the revised tax return only clarified a part of the issues raised in the notice of audit, and not all, under such circumstances, when all issues raised in the notice for audit were not clarified, then the audit would proceed and appropriate amended assessment order was to be passed under S. 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n \n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)----Ss. 177 & 122---Selection and conduct of audit---Amendment of assessment---Competent authority to initiate and conduct audit---Express delegation of authority---Scope---Competent authority to initiate proceedings under Ss. 122 & 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was the Commissioner; who could delegate authority to another officer to proceed; however the same was required to be done through an express delegation.\n \n(c) Administration of justice---\n \n----When the foundation lacked legal mandate, the entire super-structure built thereon would surely fall.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21,111(2),114,114(6),120(1),122,122(1),122(3),122(4),122(9),128(5),177,177(4),177(4)(d)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=21,111(2),114,114(6),120(1),122,122(1),122(3),122(4),122(9),128(5),177,177(4),177(4)(d)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income Tax Reference Applications Nos. 26-P and 27 of 2013, decision dated: 21st October, 2014, hearing DATE : 13-11-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "YAHYA AFRIDI AND M. YOUNIS THAHEEM, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE Zone-II, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR\nVs\nMessrs SAYDON PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD., INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, JAMRUD ROAD, PESHAWAR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11750",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1FpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1612 = 2015 SLD 1612 = 2015 PTD 394 = (2015) 111 TAX 51",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)-------S. 53---Advance tax---Scope---Concept of advance tax is that it is collected before determining its payability through assessment for any assessment/tax year and is adjusted against payable tax---Advance tax, paid if found in excess of payable tax, the differential amount becomes refundable and if found short of tax payable, the differential amount is to be deposited by assessee/taxpayer---Payment of advance tax being a statutory obligation, therefore, on default it entails payment of additional tax for defaulted period.\n \n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n----Ss. 53, 86, 87, 129, 136 & 156---Advance tax---Additional tax, charging of---Payment in instalments---Assessee paid advance tax in instalments but defaulted in payment of instalments in time, therefore, authorities imposed additional tax on assessee---Validity---Provision of S. 86 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, was simply a charging section providing without giving any procedure for determining facts through an order---Such findings were supported by provisions of S. 129 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, whereunder appeals were filed before Commissioner (Appeals)---No appeal was provided against order under S. 87 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, as the same was not mentioned in S. 129 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, which had specified sections under which order passed could be assailed and it carried a mechanism for passing order under it---No order could have been passed under S. 86 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, independently---Income Tax Appellate Tribunal rightly treated the same to have been passed under S. 156 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, by implication---If the order under S. 87 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, was held nullity in the eye of law, the same would also be an order sustainable in the eye of law---Appeal was decided accordingly.\n \n Messrs Pakistan Mobile Communication (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone, Islamabad (Civil Appeals No.1091-1092 of 2009) and Chairman, Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 3 others v. Messrs Pak-Saudi Fertilizer Ltd., and another 2001 SCMR 777 ref.\n \n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n----S.136---Reference to High Court---Question, framing of---Principles---In a question proposed for opinion of High Court, words like \"\"to hold against statutory provision\"\" should not be used---Only findings on a law point by Income Tax Appellate Tribunal should be proposed in a question, answer of which in 'Yes' or 'No' would suffice the purpose.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=53,86,87,129,136,136(6),156\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=53,86,87,129,136,136(6),156\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income Tax Appeal No.242 of 2000, heard on 19-08-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TARIQ ABBASI AND SHAHID, JAMIL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAWALPINDI \nVs \nMessrs SETHI FLOUR MILLS, HASSANABDAL"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11751",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1FpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1613 = 2015 SLD 1613 = 2015 PTD 371 = 2014 PTCL 24",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-------Ss.10, 7(1), 2(14) & 2(22A)(e)---Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act (XII of 2011), S.26---Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000), S.2(3)---Refund of input tax---Revenue failed to settle sales tax refund filed on account of input adjustment---Revenue contended that sales tax paid to Sindh Revenue Board under Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 was claimed as an input tax and the same was deferred by the STARR system for non-verifiability; that 'provincial sales tax' meant Sindh Sales Tax Ordinance, 2000 and not Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011; and that until and unless necessary amendment was introduced in the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by substituting Sindh Sales Tax Ordinance, 2000 with Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 and proper linkage was established between Federal Board of Revenue database and Sindh Revenue Board portal, adjustment of sales tax input could not be allowed to the taxpayer---Validity---Powers to collect sales tax on services were delegated to the provinces under the Constitution---Federal Board of Revenue was required to have allowed adjustment/refund to the taxpayer in lieu of sales tax collected on services by the Sindh Revenue Board---Both the Sindh Revenue Board and Federal Board of Revenue, in order to provide access to their respective databases for the purpose of verification of input adjusted, had already issued such authorization---Federal Board of Revenue had categorically stated that input adjustment of sale tax would be allowed at the time of filing return in accordance with S.7(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---As Federal Board of Revenue had failed to workout appropriate modus operandi for input tax adjustment in respect of provincial sales tax on services collected by the service providers assessed with Sindh Revenue Board, this had led to inordinate delay, neglect, inattention and inefficiency in the administration of discharge of duties and responsibility on the part of Federal Board of Revenue which being systemic one needed to be addressed on priority basis---Inordinate delay on the part of Federal Board of Revenue to devise modalities for settling sales tax adjustment claims of the taxpayers was tantamount to mal-administration in terms of S.2(3) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000---Federal Tax Ombudsman recommended that Federal Board of Revenue to (i) provide database linkage as mutually agreed between Sindh Revenue Board and Federal Board of Revenue so as to resolve the systemic issue and (ii) direct the Chief Commissioner concerned to process and settle the complainant's claims; as per law.",
    "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=10,7(1),2(14),2(22A)(e)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=10,7(1),2(14),2(22A)(e)\\n\\r\\n\\rSindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=26\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Complaint No.280/KHI/ST(132)/1002/2013, decision dated: 5-08-2013",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUR RAUF CHAUDHARY, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN",
    "": "Messrs MIMA KNIT (PVT.) LTD., KARACHI \nVs \nSECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11752",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1F5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1614 = 2015 SLD 1614 = 2015 PTD 386 = (2014) 109 TAX 261",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-------Ss. 18(1) (d) & 122(5A)---Income from business---Interest free cash loan from directors---Taxation of the benefit availed by the company---Taxation Officer as well as First Appellate Authority based their orders on that if the taxpayer would have obtained loan from unrelated parties, it would have required to bear the brunt of financial cost by payment of mark-up at market rates; and creditors who had advanced loans to the taxpayer would have received mark up/profit which would have been included in their taxable income and would have been an engine for increase in their tax liability; that provisions deal with benefit in an economic sense and not from point of view of tax benefit; and that addition made by the Taxation Officer was upheld by the First Appellate Authority being patently in accordance with provisions of law---Taxpayer contended that it was mandatorily required under the principles of accounting and law to charge interest on borrowed money, the interest would have paid being allowable/admissible expense will resultantly reduce the taxable income as well as tax liability of the taxpayer; and the treatment given by the assessing officer to the transactions was against the principles of basic accountancy and provisions of law---Validity---Clause (d) of Sub-S.(1) of S.18 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 provided that the fair market value of any benefit or perquisite, whether convertible into money or not arising in the course of, or by virtue of a past, present or prospective business relationship shall be income from business and was chargeable to tax in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Both the officers below fell in grave error in misconceiving the accounting principles and relevant law on the issue and as such \"\"deemed income\"\" was wrongly charged to tax by invoking provision of S.18(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Observations made by the Taxation Officer reflected lack of understanding on the facts as well as law \"\"the provisions dealt with benefit in an economic sense and not from the point of view of tax benefit\"\"---Interest/mark-up if not paid by the taxpayer was a financial benefit at one part while on the other part it was quite obvious that the taxpayer must charge the same amount in its accounts as expenditure and under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 the revenue would allow the same as an admissible deduction---In actual fact it was a benefit/income in shape of not claiming/charging the expenses/liability under the head mark-up on interest free loans---Deemed mark-up again was a double jeopardy by taxing one thing twice---If revenue preferred to treat said deemed interest/markup as taxable business income under S.18(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 then it would also be a lawful right of the taxpayer to reduce its business income by claiming/deducting same amount---Was not the choice of pick and choose by treating the same as business income and charged to tax separately in isolation without realizing the basic accounting principles that at the same time it was also a deductible admissible allowance in the hands of taxpayer---Order passed was patently illegal and violative of the law, especially express provisions and spirit of the law, which order if allowed to stay would intact would tantamount to and caused prejudice and serious breach of legal rights of taxpayers/citizens---Orders passed by authorities below were perverse, erroneous, factually incorrect and had resulted in great miscarriage of justice and were squarely in conflict with statutory stipulation and fatally flawed, which must be struck down decisively---Addition made was patently illegal and nullity in the eyes of law---Section 18(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 had no application whatsoever to the present case, where interest free loan was received by the taxpayer---Orders passed by the authorities below were cancelled by the Appellate Tribunal.\n \n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----S.21(c)---Deductions not allowed---Un-paid Workers Profit Participation Fund---Addition of---Accrual basis accounts---Taxpayer contended that amount of workers profit participation fund was payable as on 30th June was paid in the next financial year; that provision was made by the auditors at the time of finalization of account in the month of September/October; that accounts were prepared on accrual basis and an expense was charged to the relevant year as per International Accounting Standard; and that in case of addition under S.21(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, even after passing of any adverse order against the taxpayer, if any payer (claimant of expenditures) subsequently deposited the amount of withholding income tax, before the completion of assessment proceedings then resultant addition of S.21(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 could not be made and the claim should have been allowed in full in accordance with the provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Since the case of the taxpayer had not been considered on said two points judiciously by the assessing authority who was the basic fact finding authority under the law, assessing authority was directed by the Appellate Tribunal to start the proceedings afresh subject to all due exceptions after giving proper opportunity of being heard to the taxpayer, who stated that he had all the necessary proof of payments and evidence which may be verified properly and then pass a judicious order---Taxpayer was also directed to cooperate with the assessing authority for finalization of re-assessment proceedings on said score and provide all data/proof of payments made on account of Workers Profit Participation Fund and income tax deduction with respect of the addition made under S.21(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=18(1)(d),21(c),122(5A)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=18(1)(d),21(c),122(5A)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.As. Nos. 1510, 1511/LB of 2013, decision dated: 7-01-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. SHAHID IQBAL DHILLON, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAJJAD ALI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11753",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1F5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1615 = 2015 SLD 1615 = 2015 PTD 360",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-------Ss. 11(2), 11(3), 2(37), 3, 6, 7, 8, 8A, 23, 26, 33, 34 & 73---S.R.O. No.283(I)/2011 dated 1-4-2011---S.R.O. No.1012(I)/2011 dated 4-11-2011---S. R. O. No. 1058(I)/2011 dated 23-11-2011---S. R. O. No. 1125(I)/2011 dated 31-12-2011---Assessment of tax---Commercial importer and wholeseller---Discrepancies reported through CREST---Combined show-cause notice under Ss.11(2) & 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for recovery of tax---Validity---Both the provisions i.e. Ss.11(2) & 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 were distinct in nature---Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 would only apply where person had not paid the tax due on supplies made by him and S.11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 only be invoked on a registered person in case of his \"\"collusion\"\" with the tax officials or due to a \"\"deliberate act\"\"---Show-Cause Notice was completely silent in regards to \"\"collusion\"\" or \"\"deliberate act\"\" on the part of taxpayer---Very basis for acquiring the jurisdiction by issuing a combined notice under two different sections was fatal---Combined notice issued under Ss.11(2) & 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was liable to be declared null and void---Provision of Ss.11(2) & 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 were even otherwise different and independent in their application and intention of legislature in this regard could also be verified from the fact that after filing a monthly sales tax return claimed input tax credit or refund which was not admissible under S.11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 the Inland Revenue Officer shall issue the Show-Cause Notice whereas in S.11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 revealed that no specific charge \"\"collusion or deliberate act\"\" was levelled in the subject Show-Cause Notice---In absence of any detail or proper allegation regarding \"\"collusion or deliberate act\"\"; it could not be said that the notice had been issued under S.11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Whole procedure regarding application of both provisions was provided separately and independently by the legislature---Simultaneous application of Ss.11(2) 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was liable to be declared illegal and void ab initio---Both the orders and Show-Cause Notice of the authorities below were declared to be illegal, void and without lawful authority and legal impropriety and the same was set aside by the Appellate Tribunal.\n \n 2009 PTD 281; 2011 PTD 346; 2012 PTD 1016; 2005 SCMR 492; 1997 SCMR 641; 2011 PTD (Trib.) 770 and Fasih-ud-Din Khan's case 2010 SCMR 1778 rel.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Where a statute affects a substantive right, it operates prospectively unless by express enactment or necessary intendment retrospective operation had been given---Statute, which was procedural in nature, operates retrospectively unless it affects an existing right on the date of promulgation or causes injustice or prejudice to a substantive right.\n \n(c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----S.11(5), proviso---Assessment of tax---Limitation, extension of---Proviso to S.11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 reflected the aspect that plain words and patent meanings of law were to be applied and interpreted as they were and not latent meanings were to be attached to the patent words which convey the plain and obvious meaning---Commissioner can extend time limit of the Show-Cause Notice within the parameters as provided in the proviso but admittedly in the present case, at no stage of the proceedings, he applied his independent consideration and passed a speaking order---Show-Cause Notice being void ab initio and order passed was unlawful on the face of it.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),3,6,7,8,8A,11(2),11(3),11(5),23,26,33,34,34(1),33(11)(a)(c),73\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),3,6,7,8,8A,11(2),11(3),11(5),23,26,33,34,34(1),33(11)(a)(c),73\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No.99/LB of 2014, decision dated: 14-02-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs WAJAHAT TEXTILES, FAISALABAD \nVs \nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (APPEALS), R.T.O., FAISALABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11754",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1F5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 3 = 2015 SLD 3 = 2015 PTD 401 = 2015 PTCL 432",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-------Arts. 189 & 201---Judgments of superior Courts---Applicability---In terms of Art.201 of the Constitution, subject to Art. 189 of the Constitution, decision of High Court, to the extent it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, is binding on all Courts, subordinate to it, including Tribunals and Authorities etc. performing their functions within its territorial jurisdiction.\n \n(b) Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance (XXXVI of 1971)---\n \n----Ss.2 & 4 [as amended by Finance Act (III of 2006) and Finance Act (I of 2008)]---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Ss.2(i)(l), 133(1) & 221(1)---Workers' Welfare Fund---Charging of such fund from net profit---Grievance of authorities was that Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue wrongly held that Workers' Welfare Fund was not chargeable in taxpayer's case on Net Profit declared for the year in view of clause 2(i)(l) of Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971---Validity---Order passed by Commissioner (Appeals) as well as by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue suffered from factual and legal error and the same were set aside---Both the forums below failed to take cognizance of amendments introduced through Finance Act, 2006 and Finance Act, 2008, respectively in Ss. 2 & 4 of Workers' Welfare Funds Ordinance, 1971---High Court declined to dilate upon merits of case while exercising reference jurisdiction in terms of S. 133 (1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, as the time was restricted to the extent of deciding a question of law which could arise from the order of Appellate Tribunal---High Court remanded the matter to Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue to decide the controversy afresh after providing opportunity of hearing to both the parties keeping in view the observations made by High Court and after taking cognizance of amendments in law of Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971, or amendments in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Reference was disposed of accordingly.\n \n Commissioner of Income Tax v. Messrs Kamran Model Factory 2002 PTD 14; Messrs E.P.C.T. (Pvt.) Ltd.'s case 2011 PTD 2643; Shahbaz Garments (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan PLD 2013 Sindh 449 and Messrs Mutual Funds Association of Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan 2010 PTD 306 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=189,201\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=189,201\\n\\r\\n\\rWorkers Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971=2,2(i)(1),4\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.R.A. No.76 of 2013, decision dated: 6-05-2014, hearing DATE : 16-04-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND ZAFAR AHMED RAJPUT, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE Zone-I, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, KARACHI \nVs \nMessrs LAKHANI SECURITIES (PVT.) LTD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11755",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1F5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1 = 2015 SLD 1 = 2015 PTD 462 = 2015 PTCL 406",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Jurisdiction-------Exercise of---Principle---Exercise of jurisdiction by authority is a mandatory requirement and its non-fulfilment entails entire proceedings to be coram non-judice---When statute specifically provides and vests jurisdiction in a particular Court, forum or authority, an attempt by any other Court, forum or authority to take cognizance of the matter or to initiate any proceedings would render such proceedings non-est in the eyes of law, void ab-initio and of no legal effect---All authorities performing functions under any statute must conduct themselves strictly within the domain and jurisdiction vested in them under the law and not otherwise---All such actions which have been initiated on the basis of such defective jurisdiction cannot be sustained and all subsequent actions taken purportedly on the basis of such defective jurisdiction are also liable to be declared illegal, void ab-initio as if the same were never initiated.\n \n Mansab Ali v. Amir and 3 others PLD 1971 SC 124 rel.\n \n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----Ss.11-A & 48(1)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Disputed amount---Recovery from bank account---Grievance of assessee company was that authorities had issued notice of attachment of its bank account and recovered disputed amount in exercise of powers under S. 11-A of Sales Tax Act, 1990, on the plea of short payment of tax---Validity---If a registered person had filed its return and indicated any amount in that return as payable and then failed to pay said amount of tax which was due on the basis of the return itself, action under S. 11-A of Sales Tax Act, 1990, could be initiated by authorities---Assessee was disputing amount being claimed by authorities as due, as according to assessee it had already paid and discharged liability of tax due at the time of import and was not required to pay any further tax at the stage of sale and supply of goods imported by it---Return of sales tax of assessee did not disclose any amount which was due and had not been paid, hence the case of assessee did not fall within the ambit of S. 11-A of Sales Tax Act, 1990---Action taken by authorities by issuing attachment notice under S.48(1) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, and recovery of amount in question was illegal and without any lawful authority and jurisdiction---High Court directed the authorities to refund to the assessee the amount recovered unlawfully---Petition was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11-A,30(1),31,48(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=11-A,30(1),31,48(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Excise Act, 2005=29(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-2728 of 2014, heard on 22-09-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ADVANCE TELECOM \nVs \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11756",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1F5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1298 = 2015 SLD 1298 = 2015 PTD 424 = 2014 PTCL 608 = (2014) 110 TAX 298",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-------S. 133(1)---Reference to High Court---Principle---Law point was neither raised nor decided by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, therefore, High Court declined to decide the reference.\n \n Messrs Nida-i-Millat (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Zone No.1, Lahore 2006 SCMR 526 rel.\n \n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.120(2), 122(2) [as amended by Finance Act (I of 2009)] & 133(1)--General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.6(1)(c)---Income tax return, finality of---Limitation---Amendment in law---Retrospective effect---Plea raised by income tax authorities was that amendment brought in S. 122(2) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, in year 2009 had retrospective effect and it was applicable to assessment for Tax Year, 2004---Validity---Limitation as it stood at the time of filing of return would apply---Even procedural law could not take away vested and existing rights by applying it retrospectively unless such intention of legislation was expressed in unequivocal terms---Reference was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Messrs Fawad Textiles Mills Ltd. through Director, Lahore v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and 3 others 2005 PTD 14 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Dharamchand Dalchand 1 ITC 264 (Nagpur) rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1),120(2),122(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1),120(2),122(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=6(1)(c)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.R. No.1 of 2013, heard on 25-03-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUSTICE, SHAHID, JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE \nVS \nMAJ. GEN. (R) DR. C.M. ANWAR AND 2 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11757",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1F5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1616 = 2015 SLD 1616 = 2015 PTD 428",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-------Ss.21(2) & 73---Sales Tax Rules, 2006, R.12---Sales Tax General Order No.35/2012, dated 30-6-2012 Cl. \"\"N\"\", R.32---S.R.O. No.1125(I)/2011 dated 31-12-2011, Cl. (vii)---De-registration, blacklisting and suspension of registration---Sales tax registration was suspended on the ground that requisite certificates from banks was not provided---Taxpayer contended that registration was suspended without issuing the Show-Cause Notice and order was contrary to the provisions of law; that notice dated 30-10-2013 regarding \"\"bank certificate\"\" was received on 31-10-2013 afternoon, which was the last working day before \"\"Eid-holidays\"\" for compliance on 4-11-2013, which was the first working day after \"\"Eid-holidays\"\"; that sales tax registration could be suspended only on the basis of criteria as specified in R.32 of Cl. \"\"N\"\" of Sales Tax General Order No. 35/2012 dated 30-6-2012 that none of the conditions, as contemplated in S.R.O. 1125(I)/2011 dated 31-12-2011 had ever been violated by the taxpayer and that all the transactions with the buyers were in accordance with the conditions, as enumerated in S.R.O. 1125(I)/2011 dated 31-12-2011; that buyers of the taxpayer were registered under the sales tax law as \"\"manufacturer\"\"/ \"\"Importers\"\" \"\"exporters\"\"/\"\"wholesalers/service provider\"\" and all were \"\"Active Tax Payer\"\" on Federal Board of Revenue web-portal, even on the date of order; and that the buyers of the taxpayer had duly declared the purchases in their monthly sales tax returns for the respective months---Validity---Provisions of S.R.O. 1125(I)/2011 dated 31-12-2011 required to charge sales tax at the rate of \"\"five\"\" percent, if the supply of finished product was sold to the \"\"retailer\"\"---Sales tax was not chargeable on the supplies of goods to the registered persons of five zero-rated sectors up to \"\"wholesale stage\"\" as contained in Cl. (vii) of the S.R.O. 1125(I)/2011 dated 31-12-2011---Buyers of the taxpayer were registered under the sales tax law as \"\"manufacturer\"\"/ \"\"importers\"\"/\"\"exporter\"\"/\"\"wholesaler\"\"/Services provider\"\" and all were \"\"Active Tax Payers\"\" on Federal Board of Revenue web-portal, even on the date of order, which was duly evident from the copies of \"\"online verification\"\" provided by the taxpayer---Taxpayer as well as buyers of the taxpayer had duly declared all the transactions in their monthly sales tax returns for the respective tax periods---No mechanism was available to the taxpayer under the sales tax law, which could be helpful to foresee the status of its buyers subsequent to the transaction and to check and control the activities of the buyers---Buyers and suppliers will not be held responsible for the acts and other transaction for each others---No one could be made responsible for the act of others---Order in appeal was vacated and the order in original was annulled by the Appellate Tribunal.\n \n 2004 PTD 868; 2011 PTD 2090 and Writ Petition No.17185 of 2013 ref.\n \n 2011 PTD 1883 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2),73\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=21(2),73\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Rules, 2006=R.12\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No.1122/LB of 2013, decision dated: 28-03-2014, hearing DATE : 18-03-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND FAHEEM UL HAQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "ACRO SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS LTD. LAHORE \nVs \nC.I.R., SPECIAL ZONERTO, MULTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11758",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1F5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1617 = 2015 SLD 1617 = 2015 PTD 416",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-------Ss.4(c) & 3(1)---S.R.O. 283(I)/2011 dated 1-4-2011---S.R.O. 1058(I)/2011 dated 23-11-2011---S.R.O. 1125(I)/2011 dated 31-12-2011--Tax period 15-3-2011 to 30-6-2012---Zero rating - Surgical goods---Application of standard rate of tax---Taxpayer contended that despite zero-rating of sales tax on surgical instruments being notified goods by the Federal Government under S.4(c) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, Officer of Inland Revenue was bent upon to adjudge sales tax liability at standard rate of sales tax of 16% or as the case may be, 17% under S.3(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 without any lawful excuse and an adverse order had been passed---Validity---Surgical goods remained zero rated unconditionally without any restriction thereon till inception of Notification No.S.R.O. 283(I)/2011 dated 1-4-2011 made applicable retrospectively on 15-4-2011, wherein zero rating facility had been restricted to registered persons only and in case supply of notified goods was made to unregistered person, sales tax shall be charged at the rate of 6% thereon, which had been revised to 4% under Notification No.S.R.O. 1058(I)/2011 dated 23-11-2011 and again had been revised to 5% under Notification No. S.R.O. 1125(I)/2011 dated 31-12-2011---By virtue of all such statutory regulatory amendments, the applicable rate of sales tax on surgical goods for the period from 15-3-2011 to 30-6-2012 was six percent, four percent and five percent respectively and in no way, standard rate of sales tax of sixteen percent or as the case may be, seventeen percent could be applied on its supply made in that very period---Provisions of S.3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 were, no doubt, charging provisions for the purposes of sales tax on which whole edifice of value added general sales tax was built, same had nothing to do with the goods falling under S.4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which started with a non-obstante clause, \"\"Notwithstanding the provisions of S. 3\"\"---Section 4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 had an overriding effect on the provisions of S.3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Non-obstante clause was usually used in a provision to indicate that the provision should prevail despite anything to the contrary in the provision mentioned in such a non-obstante clause---When there was any inconsistency between non-obstante clause and another provision, one of the objects of such a clause was to indicate that it was a non-obstante clause, which would prevail over the other clause---Since the goods in question had been specified as zero rated goods by virtue of various notifications under S.4(c) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, provisions of S.3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for chargeability of sales tax at standard or any other rate on all such notified goods would never come into play due to existence of non-obstante clause in the Preamble of S.4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Provisions of S.4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 would prevail on the provisions of S.3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Sales tax on surgical goods shall be charged and levied at the rate of zero-percent as specified in S.4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 providing complete ouster to standard or any other rate of sales tax specified in S.3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Appeal was accepted by way of vacating the orders passed by both authorities below being devoid of legal substance.\n \n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----Ss.11(3) & 36(1)---S.R.O. 621(I)/2005 dated 17-6-2005---Assessment of tax and recovery of tax not levied or short-levied or erroneously refunded---Tax period July, 2009 to June, 2012---Taxpayer contended that recovery of sales tax not levied and not charged for the period from 1st July, 2009 to 30th June, 2012 had been adjudged by invoking provisions of S.11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 whereas, it had to be adjudged under S.36(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 as the provisions of S.11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 had been inserted in the Statute Book with effect from 1st July, 2012 by the Finance Act, 2012; and these provisions were not applicable retrospectively as no saving clause for protection of provisions of S.36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 had been found given therein and in absence of such provision recovery of sales tax, short levied, not levied or amount erroneously refunded could not be adjudged under S.11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Validity---Provision of S.36(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 or as the case may be, S.36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 would come into play in all old cases of recovery for the period prior to 1st July, 2012---Provisions of S.4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 being \"\"non-obstante clause\"\" had an overriding effect over the provisions of S.3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Due to said non-obstante clause under S.4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 on the goods notified in its Sub-Clause (c) by the Federal Government was chargeable at zero percent---'Surgical goods' had been put to zero-rating sales tax regime on 6-6-2005 by virtue of Notification No. S.R.O. 621(I)/2005 dated 17-6-2005 and remained effective to sales tax at zero percent up to 14-3-2011---Recovery of sales tax not levied and not charged on supply of goods made during July-2009 to June-2012 in the Show-Cause Notice and consequent adjudication order had been adjudged under S.11 (3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 which came into being w.e.f., 1st July, 2012 by virtue of Finance Act, 2012---Provisions of said section had not been made applicable retrospectively by the legislature as the provisions of S.36(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 providing limitation of five years and S.36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 providing limitation of three years respectively for issuance of Show-Cause Notice in different tax situations had been kept intact for all recovery cases for the period prior to 1st July, 2012 on account of sales tax short levied, not levied or any amount erroneously refunded---Despite deletion of S.36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 from the Statute Book, one could find its existence in S.25(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for audit purposes and in S.45B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for appeal before the Commissioner Inland Revenue, in all such old recovery cases pertaining to the period before its deletion---No saving clause for cases of S.36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 particularly the cases falling under S.36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 had been provided in S.11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---In all old cases, recovery of sales tax had to be adjudged under S.36(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 or as the case may be, under S.36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Even otherwise, provisions of S.11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 were not deemed to be curative, remedial and beneficial in nature as it curtailed right of a registered person not to be called upon to Show-Cause Notice after expiry of time limitation under S.36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by impeding him with tax liabilities beyond three years in case of inadvertence, error and misconstruction as well; and could not be made applicable retrospectively on this general principle of law---Adjudicating authority had erred in invoking provisions of S.11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for recovery of sales tax for the period prior to its insertion in all cases squarely falling under S.36(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 or as the case may be under S.36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n \n 2009 PTD (Trib.) 654; 2009 PTD 1314 and PLD 1991 SC 258 rel.\n \n(c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----S. 33---S.R.O. 494(I)/2013 dated 10-6-2013---Offences and penalties---Amnesty Scheme---Taxpayer contended that sales tax liability for the period from 15-3-2011 to 30-6-2012 had been discharged through cash payment by availing amnesty scheme; and whole principal amount of sales tax had been paid before 30-6-2013 during currency of amnesty scheme; and recovery on account of default surcharge and penalties shall remained abated---Validity---Since taxpayer had discharged his sales tax liabilities by way of depositing principal amount of sales tax within the time frame given under amnesty scheme granted by the Federal Government through a notification duly published in the official gazette, nothing remained payable as an additional amount on account of any default surcharge and penalty.\n \n(d) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----S.33(2), (5), (7), (8) & (13)---Offences and penalties---Heavy penalties had been imposed and adjudged in the adjudication order, whereas no such penalties under the provisions of any of subsections of S.33 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 had been cited and confronted in the Show-Cause Notice---Validity---No penalty under any subsections (2), (5), (7), (8) & (13) of S.33 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 could be imposed and adjudged against a taxpayer through an adjudication order until and unless each and every subsection was specifically confronted in the Show Cause Notice and if any penalty was imposed without confronting the relevant provisions as contained in any subsections of S.33 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, it would definitely fall beyond the scope of Show-Cause Notice which would render the same illegal, unlawful and void ab initio.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=4(c),3(1),11(3),36(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=4(c),3(1),11(3),36(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No.1203/LB of 2013, decision dated: 1st July, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIR AHMAD, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs ASGHAR SURGICAL WORKS, DASKA \nVs \nC.I.R., Zone-I, R.T.O., SIALKOT"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11759",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1F5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1618 = 2015 SLD 1618 = 2015 PTD 438 = 2015 PTCL 627",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000)-------S. 32---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Natural justice, principles of---Applicability---Personal hearing by the President---Scope---Petitioner was aggrieved of order passed by the President as appellate authority under Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000---Plea raised by petitioner was that the President did not give personal hearing to him and decide appeal---Validity---Requirement of law was not that a person was to be given personal hearing by the President in such matters while deciding representation filed by authorities in terms of S. 32 of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000---Principle of natural justice i.e. 'no one shall be condemned unheard' which was to be applied in judicial, quasi-judicial and even in administrative proceedings, an opportunity of filing comments or objections before the President under S. 32 of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, would meet requirements of \"\"sufficient opportunity\"\"---Requirements of natural justice were not violated in matters, wherein aggrieved party was provided with an opportunity of filing its objections/comments on a representation filed under S.32 of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, in writing before the President---High Court declined to interfere in order passed by the President as the same was correct in law and did not warrant exercise of any discretionary relief and interference by High Court in Constitutional jurisdiction---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan v. Muhammad Tariq Pirzada 1999 SCMR 2189; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan v. Muhammad Tariq Pirzada 1999 SCMR 2744; Messrs Siddiqsons Weaving Mills (Put) Limited, v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2005 Kar. 656; Commissioner of Income Tax, Faisalabad Zone, Faisalabad and another v. Akhlaq Cloth House, Faisalabad and another 2008 PTD 965; Federation of Pakistan v. Professor Dr. Anwar and 2 others 2006 SCMR 382; Collector of Customs, Lahore v. Universal Gateway Trading Corporation and another 2005 SCMR 37; Impartial Paints and Varnish Works v. The Federal Government and 2 others PLD 1996 Kar. 550 and SF Engineering Services v. Federation of Pakistan and 4 others PLD 2014 Sindh 378 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Competent forum, order of---Constitutional jurisdiction can not be exercised against order of an authority which has otherwise been passed by competent forum having jurisdiction---High Court cannot sit in appeal to examine veracity of any such order and or material which requires factual ascertainment of allegations, as the same is beyond the scope of Art. 199 of the Constitution---Relief sought under Constitutional jurisdiction is discretionary in nature, therefore, the same cannot be exercised in matters which involve disputed facts and require further probe and investigation.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=32\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=32\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-488 of 2006, decision dated: 6-12-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JJ",
    "": "RAZA FECTO TRACTORS (PVT.) LTD \nVs \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11760",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1F5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 7 = 2015 SLD 7 = 2015 PTD 448 = 2015 PTCL 486",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Alternate remedy---Jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution was limited to the extent provided thereunder---Where there was an alternate remedy available, it was the mandate of the Constitution that the High Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution.\n \n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 131(5), 133 & 132(7)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Petitioner impugning order of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal---Alternate remedy of Reference under S. 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 available---Interpretation of S. 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Petitioner/assessee impugned order of Appellate Tribunal whereby appeal of petitioner/assessee was disposed of---Contention of the petitioner was that the impugned order had not been passed by the Tribunal under S. 132(7) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, but instead under S. 131(5) of the Ordinance therefore, the case of the petitioner did not fall within the purview of S. 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for filing of reference against the impugned order; thus the alternate remedy of reference was not available to the petitioner and the Constitutional petition was maintainable---Held, that contention that the Tribunal had passed an order under S. 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was misconceived and said section started with a non-obstante clause and specifically provided that mere filing of an appeal before the Tribunal could not be construed as suspension of recovery proceedings, unless the said recovery had been stayed by the Tribunal while the appeal before it was pending---Section 131(5) made it mandatory that if the Tribunal refused to stay recovery proceedings, tax shall be payable in accordance with the assessment made in the case---No ambiguity existed in the language of S.131(5) and provisos thereto; and it merely related to the powers of the Tribunal to grant or refuse stay of the recovery of tax, while the main appeal was pending---In the present case, the petitioner's/assessee's main appeal had been disposed of by the Tribunal, therefore the only statutory course available to the petitioner in such circumstances was to file a reference under S.133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 against order of Tribunal---High Court was duty bound to enforce provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and to give effect to its legislative intent; and since the alternate remedy of filing of reference under S.133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was available to the petitioner, therefore, the impugned order was not amenable to the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n Messrs Zarghoon Zarai Corporation v. Collector of Customs 2006 PTD 534; Z. N. Exports (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax 2003 PTD 1746; Messer Aidy Vee and Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director v. Taxation Officer of Income Tax, Lahore and 2 others 2009 PTD 1715; and Dawood Textile Printing Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division, and others 2009 PTD 1220 distinguished.\n \n(c) Administration of justice---\n \n----When the law required an act to be done in a particular way; it had to be done in that manner alone, and such dictate of law could not be termed technical.\n \n Muhammad Anwar and others v. Mst. Ilyas Begum and others PLD 2013 SC 255 rel.\n \n(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 133 & 132(7)----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court over an order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under S. 132(7) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Availability of alternate remedy of filing of Reference under S. 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Maintainability of Constitutional petition---High Court, by exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution would defeat the legislative intent behind S. 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and give rise to an anomaly that when the statute provided for a reference to be filed against order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, restricting it to a question of law arising out of the said order, and to be heard by a Bench of at least two Judges of the High Court, the exercise of the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 would defeat the legislative intent and thereby render the statutory provisions as redundant.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),122(5),127,131(5),132(7),133,\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3869 of 2014, decision dated: 1st September, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ATHAR MINALLAH, J",
    "": "ARSLAN POULTRY (PVT.) LTD \nVs\nOFFICER INLAND REVENUE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11761",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1F5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1619 = 2015 SLD 1619 = 2015 PTD 452",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-------S. 39---Income from other sources---Compensation on delayed refund---Taxation of---Taxpayer contended that First Appellate Authority was not justified to observe that compensation on delayed refund was of revenue nature and was assessable under S.39 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001; and that outstanding refunds were balance sheet items appearing on assets side and compensation received from the department on delayed payment of refund was capital receipt and not taxable; and additions made under Cl.(cc) of subsection (1) of S.39 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was not applicable for the tax years 2009 and 2010 as the said clause was inserted through Finance Act, 2012---Revenue contended that compensation on account of delayed refund was not capital receipt instead the same was revenue receipt and constituted income of the taxpayer liable to be included in the taxpayer's income---Validity---Compensation paid by the department on the delayed payment of refund to the taxpayer was just like the interest or mark-up which was paid to compensate a person for raising inflation/interest and such compensation was in the revenue nature and liable to be assessed under the amended provisions of S.39 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Since Cl.(cc) of subsection (1) of S.39 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was inserted in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through Finance Act, 2012, being charging provision the same was not applicable retrospectively to the tax years 2009 and 2010---Assessing authority was not justified to charge tax under the said provision of law for the tax years 2009 and 2010---Appeals of the taxpayer were accepted on legal premises for both the years and orders passed by the authorities below were vacated by the Appellate Tribunal.\n \n 1978 PTD 328 and 2006 PTD 2456 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=39,39(1)(cc),122(5A),171\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=39,39(1)(cc),122(5A),171\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.As. Nos. 1297/LB and 1298/LB of 2012, decision dated: 14-03-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH.ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs PROGRESSIVE LEARNING (PVT.) LTD., FAISALABAD \nVs \nC.I.R. (APPEALS) R.T.O., FAISALABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11762",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1JDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1620 = 2015 SLD 1620 = 2015 PTD 455",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-------S.81(1)(2)(4)---Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000), Ss. 2(3), 9 & 10(4)---Provisional Assessment---Finality of---Entitlement of the complainant for refund of differential amount---Complainant/importer, had sought refund of customs duty and allied taxes allegedly recovered illegally by the department against the security deposited by the complainant for release of his goods under Provisional Assessment order---Contention of complainant was that department having failed to finalize the Provisional Assessment within period of one year, as prescribed under S.81(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, the value declared by the complainant had attained finality; and complainant was entitled for refund of differential amount deposited by him for release of goods, which was illegally recovered by the department---Validity---After Provisional Assessment, the complainant did not pursue the matter, and no evidence was produced by him to support his declared value and that prescribed period of one year had expired---After expiry of prescribed period, Provisional Assessment, which included the declared value, as well amount secured, had attained finality under S.81(4) of Customs Act, 1969---Recovery of amount secured through PDC, could not be termed as illegal and no case for refund of the same, was made out---Compliant was rejected.",
    "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=81(1)(2)(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Act, 1969=81(1)(2)(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3),9,10(4)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Complaint No.290/Khi/Cust/(98)/1031 of 2013, decision dated: 14-09-2013",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUR RAUF CHAUDHRY, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN",
    "": "HAMSONS INDUSTRIES \nVs \nSECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION ISLAMABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11763",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1JDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 4 = 2015 SLD 4 = 2015 PTD 458 = 2015 PTCL 450",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-------Ss.139 & 140---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Notice of recovery of tax---Persons holding money on behalf of taxpayer---Petitioner assailed notice of recovery of tax issued by income tax authorities on the ground that taxpayer company was still in existence---Validity---Tax had to be \"\"any tax due by a taxpayer\"\" and notice should have disclosed how the tax was due---If the tax was being recovered from another person i.e. who was held \"\"liable for payment of the tax\"\" then notice should also disclose how the other person was made liable for payment of the tax---No proceedings were undertaken to show that tax was not recoverable from the company and to hold petitioner as liable to pay tax under S. 139 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, after confronting and providing opportunity of being heard---Petitioner's right of \"\"due process\"\" and \"\"fair trial\"\" was found to have been violated---High Court declared notice under S. 140 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, issued by authorities as void---Petition was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Sarfraz Saleem v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2014 SC 232 and Babar Hussain Shah and another v. Mujeed Ahmed Khan and another 2012 SCMR 1235 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=139,140\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=139,140\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1604 of 2014, decision dated: 17-06-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID, JAMIL KHAN, J",
    "": "SULTAN MUHAMMAD KHAN \nVs \nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11764",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQ1JDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1621 = 2015 SLD 1621 = 2015 SCMR 456 = 2015 PLJ 216",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 184(3)---Constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court---Scope---Vires of an enactment---Supreme Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution could examine the vires of an enactment either on its own or on an application or petition filed by a party.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 184(3) & Part II, Ch. I [Arts.8 to 28]---Constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court---Scope---Question of public importance---Requirement of Art. 184(3) of the Constitution was that if the Supreme Court considered that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution was involved, it had the jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders notwithstanding that there might be an alternate remedy---Word 'consider' used in the Art.184(3) of the Constitution related to subjective assessment of the Supreme Court---Supreme Court was the final authority upon the matters affecting judicial determination on the scope of Constitutional provisions, thus, once the Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion that a question of public importance having nexus with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution had been raised, the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art.184(3) could not be objected to either by the Government or by any other party.\n \n(c) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)---\n \n----Chapter II [Ss.3 to 22]--- Constitution of Pakistan, Ch. I, Part. II [Arts.8 to 28] & Art. 184(3)--- Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), S.3---Civil service---Legislation effecting rights of a civil servant---Civil servant filing constitutional petition before the Supreme Court---Maintainability---Civil Servant, being a citizen of Pakistan, equally enjoyed the fundamental rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution---When an impugned legislative instrument was violative of the Constitution and the fundamental rights of the civil servant, and issues raised in the constitutional petition were of public importance having far reaching effects on service structure, the petition under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution would be maintainable---Perception that a civil servant could only seek redressal of his grievance from the Service Tribunal or from any other forum provided by the Civil Servants Act, 1973 was thus not correct. [p. 500] C\n \nWatan Party and others v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 292 and Tariq Aziz-ud-Din and others's case 2010 SCMR 1301 ref.\n \n(d) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974---\n \n----Rr. 3(2), 4, 6, 8 & 9(1)---Sindh Civil Servants Act (XIV of 1973), Ss. 5 & 8---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Review petition---Absorption of 'government officers' from different departments into the Provincial Government as 'civil servants'---Legality---Question as to whether the Chief Minister/competent authority was empowered under R. 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974 to absorb the beneficiaries from different organizations to Provincial Service or cadre or post---Rule 9(1) of Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion And Transfer) Rules, 1974 spoke of appointment by transfer to be made from amongst the persons holding appointments on regular basis mentioned in column 2 of the Table given under the said Rule---Word \"\"person\"\" as used in said R. 9(1) would, therefore, relate to the officers, who were civil servants and mentioned in column 2 of the Table given under the said Rule---Word \"\"person\"\" could not be given an ordinary meaning beyond the scheme of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974---Rule 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, did not empower the Government or selection authority to appoint a civil servant or any other person by transfer to any other cadre, service or post without his eligibility, qualifications and the conditions laid down under Rr. 3(2), 4, 6 & 8 of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974---Section 8 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 made a class of civil servants for proper administration and such class was not interchangeable at the whims of the selection authorities and/or the Government to extend favours to their blue eyed---No discretion was given under S. 5 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, to appoint any person in civil service against a civil post in the manner other than prescribed by the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974---Rule 9(1) of Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, did not confer permanent status on civil servant on his appointment by transfer nor it contemplated his absorption in the transferee department as a consequence of his appointment---Neither any procedure nor any mechanism was provided under the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 or the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, to treat appointment by transfer as absorption in the transferee department---Neither a person could be absorbed under the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, nor a civil servant/non-civil servant/deputationist could be allowed to travel horizontally outside his cadre to penetrate into a different cadre, service or post through an appointment by transfer---Rule 9(1) of Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, could not be used as a tool to allow horizontal movement of a civil servant from his original cadre to another cadre against scheme of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974---Any appointment by transfer under R.9(1) of Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, had to be for a fixed term, and, on completion of such term, the civil servant had to join back his parent department---Concept of absorption of a civil servant and/or Government servant was foreign to the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, as well as R. 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974---Said Rule did not permit transfer of non-civil servant to a non-cadre post or to a cadre post---Review petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(e) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974---\n \n----Rr. 3(2) & 9-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Review petition---Civil servant rendered surplus---Appointment to any post in any department or office of Government---Scope---Rule 9-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, had been introduced with the object to accommodate the persons who were rendered surplus by abolition of their posts or the organization in which they were working had been taken over by the Provincial Government---Said Rule could not be used as a tool to accommodate a person by abolishing his post with an object to appoint him by transfer to a cadre or service or post in deviation of R. 3(2) of Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, which was a condition precedent for appointment to such post---In order to exercise powers under R.9-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, there had to be some justification for abolition of the post against which such person was working---Such justification should come from the Department and/or organization which shall be in consultation with the Services and General Administration Department and approved by the competent authority---Rule 9-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, did not permit appointment by transfer of a non-civil servant to any other Department and/or organization controlled by the Government to a post which restricted the transfer under R. 3(2) of the said Rules---Person could only be appointed by transfer under R. 9-A of Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, if he had the eligibility, matching qualifications, expertise coupled with the conditions laid down under R. 3(2) of the said Rules for appointment to such post---Rule 9-A did not permit transfer of a non-civil servant to a cadre, service or post meant for a civil servant, recruited in the cadre or service or post after competitive process---Such an appointment by transfer in the nature of absorption would only be permissible, if the pre-conditions laid under R. 9-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, were met---Review petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(f) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974---\n \n----R. 9(1)---Sindh Councils (Unified Grades) Service Rules, 1982, R.12(5)--- Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 9 & 188---Review petition---Non-civil servants from different departments of Provincial government---Absorption of such non-civil servants into the Provincial government as 'civil servants'---Legality---Contention of non-civil servants/petitioners that they were absorbed from different organizations to Sindh Councils (Unified Grades) Service under R. 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, read with R. 12(5) of the Sindh Councils (Unified Grades) Service Rules, 1982--- Validity---Power to appoint by transfer under R.9(1) of Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, would only extend to a civil servant---Petitioners who were not members of the Unified Services and were wrongly absorbed in the Service of Unified Group, in deviation of the Sindh Councils (Unified Grades) Service Rules, 1982, could not be allowed to continue in the Unified Services Group---Provincial Chief Minister or the relevant Selection Board could not induct any stranger in the service of Unified Group either by exercising powers under R. 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, or under R. 12(5) of the Sindh Councils (Unified Grades) Service Rules, 1982---Such act on the part of the Chief Minister or the Selection Board had circumvented the very framework of the Sindh Councils (Unified Grades) Service Rules, 1982, by introducing a parallel system based on discrimination and favourtism, which the law did not recognize---Any such induction was against the recognized norms of service law and, therefore, such inductees/petitioners were liable to be repatriated to their parent departments forthwith---Absorption of the petitioners under the garb of 'appointment by transfer' in the Unified Services Group had directly affected the rights of the employees in the service, guaranteed under Arts. 4 & 9 of the Constitution---Review petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(g) Words and phrases---\n \n----\"\"Gallantry\"\"---Meaning.\n \n(h) Sindh Civil Servants Act (XIV of 1973)---\n \n----S. 9A---Civil servant exhibiting act of gallantry while performing his duties---Reward---Out of turn promotion---Scope and applicability---Police personnel---Word \"\"gallantry\"\" as used in S. 9-A of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, could only apply to police personnel and award and reward on their gallantry performance should be conferred upon them and not to other species of civil servants---Such award or reward, however, should be given under a transparent process after objective assessment of their valour by a committee, in a just manner under the prescribed rules.\n \n(i) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Arts. 184 & 185---Law declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court---Effect---Right/obligation/benefit under such law---Scope---No right or obligation could accrue under an unconstitutional law---Once the Supreme Court had declared a legislative instrument as being unconstitutional, the effect of such declaration was that such legislative instrument became void ab initio, devoid of any force of law, neither could it impose any obligation, nor could it expose anyone to any liability---Benefits accrued or extended to persons through legislation which was declared as unconstitutional would stand withdrawn as if they were never extended to them.\n \nIn re: Pensionary Benefits of the Judges of Superior Courts PLD 2013 SC 829 distinguished.\n \n(j) Mala fide---\n \n----Legislature--- Mala fide could not be attributed to the legislature.\n \n(k) Sindh Civil Servants Act (XIV of 1973)---\n \n----S. 24---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Review petition---Civil servant---Power of Provincial Government to deal with case of any civil servant in a just and equitable manner---Scope---Hardship cases---Absorption of the civil servants/government servants/employees of government bodies and corporations---Grant of back-dated seniority---Out of turn promotion---Competent Authority by resorting to S. 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, passed orders of absorption of civil servants/government servants/employees of autonomous bodies, semi-autonomous bodies and corporations, and granted them back-dated seniority besides out of turn promotions---Legality---Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, was an enabling provision and conferred residuary powers upon the competent authority, to redress the grievance of an individual in a hardship case---Competent Authority under S. 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, could grant benefit to an individual if it considered it just and equitable, without offending and impairing the statutory rights of other civil servants/employees---Competent Authority could exercise powers under S. 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, by relaxing rules, if there was a vacuum in law, but such powers could not be exercised under the garb of the term \"\"Relaxation of Rules\"\" with the intent to bye-pass the mandate of law for extending favours to a person or an individual, offending and impairing the statutory rights of other civil servants---Competent Authority, by an executive order, could not frame Rules in exercise of powers under S. 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973---Authority conferred under S. 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, was confined to hardship cases, without negating the vested rights of the other civil servants and/or causing prejudice to their interests---Exercise of powers under S. 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, by the Competent Authority, in the present case, travelled beyond the scheme of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973---Review petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(l) Sindh Civil Servants Act (XIV of 1973)---\n \n----S. 9---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Review petition---Civil service ---\"\"Upgradation of a post\"\"---Scope and pre-conditions---For justifying the upgradation (of a post), the Government was required to establish that the department needed restructuring, reform or that it was to meet the exigency of service in public interest---In the absence of such pre-conditions, upgradation was not permissible---Upgradation could not be made to benefit a particular individual in terms of promoting him to a higher post or further providing him with the avenues of lateral appointment or transfer or posting---Some of the civil servants, in the present case, had been promoted to higher posts against the tenural limitations, without qualifying the requisite departmental examinations/trainings under the garb of upgradation---Such civil servants were not promoted in accordance with law and needed to be reverted to their substantive ranks/posts which they were holding immediately before their upgradation and their seniority should be determined along with their batch-mates---Review petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(m) Sindh Civil Servants Act (XIV of 1973)---\n \n----Preamble---Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, Rr. 3(2) & 8---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.188---Review petition---Civil service---\"\"Abolition of post\"\"---Scope and pre-conditions---Term 'abolition' had not been defined in the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973---Department could only abolish a post with the concurrence of the Services and General Administration Department (S&GAD)---Abolition of a post was permissible in case, if the department required restructuring, reform or to meet exigency of service in public interest---Department could abolish a post for justiciable reason---Provincial Government, in the present case, had abolished some posts in individual cases with the object to accommodate a civil servant or government servant to appoint him by transfer to a post, service or cadre contrary to the restrictions contained in Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974---Supreme Court directed that in future when a post had to be abolished within the Department and/or within the statutory body or organization controlled by the Provincial Government, the Department shall seek concurrence from the Services and General Administration Department (S&GAD) coupled with the reasons justifying abolition---Review petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(n) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---\n \n----S. 3(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 175, 188, 199, 212 & 240---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 9---Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance (II of 1962), S. 7---Civil servant---Matter relating to terms and conditions of service of civil servant---Ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts and High Courts---Question as to whether a civil servant could approach the (Sindh) High Court in a suit or in a constitutional petition in relation to the terms and conditions of his service---Civil and constitutional jurisdictions would not lie in respect of the suits or petitions filed with regard to the terms and conditions of civil servants---Section 3(2) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 provided that the Tribunal shall have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants, including the disciplinary matters---Jurisdiction of all other courts was barred by the provisions of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, read with Art. 212 of the Constitution---All civil courts, including a Judge (in Chambers) of High Court of Sindh, exercising jurisdiction on the original side as a civil court under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, could not entertain a civil suit of a civil servant relating to the terms and conditions of his service---Article 212 of the Constitution ousted the jurisdiction of High Courts and civil courts in respect of the matters pertaining to terms and conditions of civil servants---Provisions of Art. 212 of the Constitution did not confer a concurrent jurisdiction to civil courts, High Courts and Tribunals---Ouster of jurisdiction contemplated under the Art. 212 of the Constitution was a constitutional command, and, therefore, of necessity restricted the jurisdiction of civil courts and High Courts on the subject, which squarely fell within the exclusive domain of Service Tribunals---Exercise of jurisdiction by way of suit and constitutional petition filed by a civil servant with regard to his terms and conditions of service was violative of Arts. 175, 212 & 240 of the Constitution and the law---Review petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(o) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 242--- Civil servant, appointment of--- Public Service Commission---Transparency and meritocracy---Article 242 of the Constitution provided the mechanism for appointment of a civil servant through Public Service Commission---Article 242 of the Constitution was a safety valve which ensured the transparent process of induction in the civil service, and it provided appointment by Public Service Commission with the sole object that meritorious candidates joined the civil service---Government through executive or legislative instruments could not withdraw any post from the purview of the Public Service Commission.\n \n(p) Civil service---\n \n----Civil servant, status of---Scope---Non-civil servant could not be conferred the status of a civil servant.\n \n(q) West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964--\n \n----R. 5(4)(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Review petition---Recruitment or nomination to post of Assistant Commissioner---Discretion of Chief Minister---Scope---Provincial Chief Minister had the sole discretion to recruit/nominate an employee to the post of Assistant Commissioner in exercise of powers under R. 5(4)(b) of the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964---Discretion to exercise such powers needed to be structured by framing policy, which should encourage merit---West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964, were not meant to ignore transparency in nomination, as said appointments were made by bypassing the regular procedure provided for appointment of a civil servant in BS-17---Provincial Government, in the present case, had framed no policy for appointments under the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964, and it was the sole discretion of the Provincial Chief Minster---Absence of policy for nomination to the post of Assistant Commissioner meant that blue eyed of the highups would get such jobs---Supreme Court directed the Provincial Government to frame a transparent policy for nomination of officials under the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964, which could ensure that meritorious employees of the Departments mentioned in the said Rules, could be nominated on merits, after proper scrutiny---Review petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(r) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---\n \n----S. 3(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 199 & 212---Civil service---Terms and conditions of service---Ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts and High Courts---Scope---High Court should not entertain a suit or petition filed by a civil servant relating to his terms and conditions of service, in view of the bar contained under Art. 212 of the Constitution--- Once a civil servant has exhausted all his legal remedies (up to the Supreme Court), he could not initiate a second round of litigation by filing a constitutional petition or suit on the same subject---Civil servant could not raise any issue which pertained to terms and conditions of his service, particularly, when such issue had finally been decided by the Supreme Court.\n \n(s) Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973---\n \n----R. 12A---Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), S. 3(2)---Civil service---Date of birth, alteration in---Forum---Service Tribunal, jurisdiction of---Mode of correction in the date of birth of a civil servant was provided under R. 12A of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, which was part of the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant---Correction in date of birth by a civil servant could not be done through a civil suit (in view of the bar contained under Art. 212 of the Constitution)--- Civil servant had to approach the Service Tribunal for alteration in his date of birth.\n \nDr. Muhammad Aslam Baloach v. Government of Balochistan 2014 SCMR 1723 ref.\n \n(t) Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973---\n \n----R. 12A---Civil servant---Date of birth, alteration in---Scope---Civil Servant could not seek alteration in his date of birth at the verge of his retirement.\n \nDr. Muhammad Aslam Baloach v. Government of Balochistan 2014 SCMR 1723 ref.\n \n(u) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)---\n \n----S. 22--- Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), S. 4(1)(a)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 9, 10A, 25, 184(3) & 188---Review petition---Civil service---Expeditious remedy from the Service Tribunal, hindrance to---Civil servant could not approach the Service Tribunal unless he exhausted the remedy of departmental appeal/representation under S. 22 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973---Section 4(1)(a) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, provided that a civil servant could approach the Service Tribunal, subject to his exhausting remedy under S. 22 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, after lapse of 90 days from the date on which such appeal/application was so preferred---Civil Servant aggrieved by an order of the department had to file a representation or appeal within 30 days of passing of such order and if the said authority did not decide his appeal/representation within 90 days, he could prefer an appeal before the Tribunal, after lapse of time as contained under S.4(1)(a) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973---Supreme Court observed that provisions of S. 22 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and S. 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, were required to be re-examined after insertion of Art. 10A in the Constitution, as it restricted a civil servant from seeking expeditious remedy from the Service Tribunal which was constituted under the command of the Constitution; that after the promulgation of Art. 10-A of the Constitution, it was imperative to re-examine the existing law which apparently barred the filing of appeal in the Service Tribunal before the passage of mandatory 90 days, but practically for 120 days; that in certain situations a civil servant may face wrath and vendetta of his superiors, if he refused to carry out their illegal orders, and in such a situation, his representation etc. to the concerned authority to seek redressal of the wrong committed against him may be ignored or outright rejected by the authorities under political influence or for ulterior motives, leaving him with no option but to wait for mandatory period of 120 days to enable him to file an appeal etc. before the Service Tribunal; that in view of such problems faced by the civil servants due to lengthy process of filing appeal in the Tribunal and availing of relief, it was imperative to provide an efficacious and expeditious alternate remedy to civil servants by way of allowing them to approach the Service Tribunal, Federal or Provincial, without waiting for a period of 90 days, as contained under S.4(1)(a) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 by preferring an appeal against the orders; that at touchstone of Art. 10-A of the Constitution, the issues that were required to be answered were whether S. 4(1)(a) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, restricting a civil servant from filing appeal to the Tribunal after lapse of 90 days was violative of the spirit and command of Art. 10-A of the Constitution, and whether time frame provided by S. 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 debarring an aggrieved civil servant to approach the Service Tribunal amounted to denial of the relief to him in terms of Arts. 4, 9 & 25 of the Constitution---Supreme Court further observed that it was necessary to take up said issues in its suo motu jurisdiction under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution in a separate proceedings---Review petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(v) Public functionary---\n \n----\"\"Good governance\"\"---Scope---Illegal orders of higher authorities---Public functionaries had to reinforce good governance, observe rules strictly and adhere to rule of law in public service---Public functionaries were not obliged to follow illegal orders of higher authorities.\n \n Syed Mehmood Akhter Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2013 SC 195 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=184(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=184(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Review Petitions Nos.193, 194, 199, 203, 204, 392, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 393, 394, 396, 397, 399, 400.......",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR-UL-MULK, C.J., AMIR HANI MUSLIM AND IJAZ AHMED CHAUDHRY, JJ",
    "": "ALI AZHAR KHAN BALOCH and others/ \nVs\nPROVINCE OF SINDH and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11765",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQVJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1664 = 2015 SLD 1664 = (2015) 112 TAX 295 = 2016 PTD 643",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 (Vll of 1990) - Sections: 3, 6, 11, 26(1), 33, 34 - Monthly return - Non-filing of - Show Cause Notice - Imposition of penalty by Asst. Commissioner - Acceptance of appeal by CIR(A) on the ground that there was no justification for imposition of penalty treating appellant as non-filer, especially when there was no loss of revenue as appellant's supply was zero rated - Appeal before Appellate Tribunal filed by department, was however, dismissed - Whether penalty u/s 33 & 34 of Act cannot be imposed where supply is zero rated - Question of - Sales tax Reference to High Court - Synopsis - Whether putting both texts of section 26 of Act in juxta position, exposes that before substitution, registered person was required to furnish monthly return indicating purchases and supplies made during the tax period and tax paid in respect of that period - Held yes - Whether substitution/addition of \"\"tax due and paid\"\" and \"\"such other information\"\" shows intention of legislature that if tax is paid return shall be filed showing tax due and paid coupled with any other information and if no tax is paid then return shall be filed mentioning such other information for non-payment of tax may it be zero rated supply - Held yes - Whether Appellate Tribunal was not justified to dismiss appeals of department/ applicant by upholding finding of Commissioner that since no loss of revenue was caused, therefore, registered person may be treated non-filer because of zero rated supply - Held yes - Whether it is mandatory for registered person to file return u/s 26 of Act even in case of zero rated supply and non- submission of same would hold him liable under provisions of section 33 of Act, therefore, it is resolved that provisions of section 3, 6, and 26(1) remain operative and functional and do not become redundant even in cases of zero rated supply, that Appellate Tribunal was not justified in upholding order of CIR(A) and ATIR was not justified to uphold order of CIR(A) that penalty u/s 33, 7, 34 cannot be imposed where supply is zero rated - Held Yes.",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,6,11,26(1),33,34\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=3,6,11,26(1),33,34\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No. 04 of 2013, decision dated: 25-5-2015, hearing DATE : 8-4-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAFARULLAH KHAN KHAKWANI AND ARIT MAHMOOD, JJ.",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVs\nMADINA COTTON GINNERS & OIL MILLS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11766",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzQlFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1275 = 2015 SLD 1275 = (2015) 112 TAX 332 = 2016 PTD 589",
    "Key Words:": "(A) Punjab Professions & Trades Tax Rules, 1977 - Rule: 4, 4(3) & 4(4) - General Clauses Act, 1897, Section, 24A Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Articles 4, 7 & 5 - Constitutional petitions - Companies required to furnish relevant documentary evidence and pay professional tax - Creation of demand through demand notices by Excise & Taxation Officer (Professional Tax)/Respondent No. 3 - Petitioners condemned unheard - Validity - Whether under Rule: 4(4) of Punjab professional and Trades Tax Rules, 1977, respondent authority is under legal obligation to provide opportunity of being heard to assessee - Held yes - Whether since no appealable order has been passed within contemplation of Rule 4 of Rules ibid, appeal cannot be filed against impugned notices - Held yes - Whether suffice it to say that even said notices cannot be treated as orders within contemplation of provisions of section 24A of General clauses Act, 1897 read with Arts. 4 & 5 of Constitution of Pakistan for reason that order required to be passed under Rule 4 of Rules, 1977 must contain reasons and it should be objective and not merely subjective in nature - Held yes - Whether is every case in which or revision lies, authority passing order is required to record findings and discuss material available on record or is there any misreading or non-reading of evidence, or any material fact available on record has been ignored causing miscarriage of justice - Held yes - Whether before issuing impugned demand notices, mandatory, provisions of Rule 4 have not been complied with by respondents, demand notices are declared illegal and without lawful authority and matter is referred back to Respondent No. 3 with direction to decide the same through speaking order and fulfilling all legal requirements - Held Yes.\n(B) Administration of justice - Act to be done in particular manner - Concept of - Whether it is well settled principle of law that where law requires act to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner alone and such dictate of law could not be termed as technicality - Held Yes.\nCases referred to:\nMuhammad Jameel Das (W. Gopal Das) and another v. The Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Communication, Government of Pakistan and others (1999 CLC 541); Federation of Pakistan and others v. Shaukat Ali Mian and others (PLD 1999 SC 1026); Hazara (Hill Tract) Improvement Trust and others v. Mst. Qaisra Elahi and others (2005 SCMR 678); Province of the Punjab through Collector District Khushab, Jauharabad and others v. Haji Yaqoob Khan and others (2007 SCMR 554); Overseas Pakistanis Foundation and others v. Sqn. Ldr. (Retd.) Syed Mukhtar Ali Shah and another (2007 SCMR 569); Muhammad Sharif v. Settlement Commissioner and others (2007 SCMR 707); Masai Khan and another v. The State (2010 SCMR 1399); Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. v. Collector (Appeals) Customs Sales Tax And Federal Excise, Karachi and another (PTD 2010 Karachi 251); Section Officer, Government of Punjab, Finance Department and others v. Ghulam Shabbir (2010 SCMR 1425); Province of Punjab v. Sargodha Textile Mills etc. (PLD 2005 SC 988); Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax, Faisalabad and others v. Messers Punjab Beverages Company (Pvt.) Ltd. (2007) 96 Tax 9 (S.C. Pak.); Muhammad Anwar and others v. Mst. Ilyas Begum and others (PLD 2013 SC 255); Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The Province of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 272); Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller, Import and Export and 2 others (PLD 1970 SC 158); Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1970 SC 173); Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Secretary, Ministry of Labour and others (1984 SCMR 1014) Al-Hadayat Textile through Proprietor v. Soneri Bank Limited (2003 CLD 105); Waqar Alam Saeed v. District Coordination Officer/Chariman and 3 others (2005 YLR 1742); Muhammad Irfan v. Tariq Mehmood (2011 CLC 1610), Muhammad Maqsood v. Kausar Nisar (2000 YLR 1698); Evacuee Trust Property Board v. Sheikh Abdul Sattar and another (2009 SCMR 1223) and Nazir Ahmad Panhwar v. Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary, Sindh (2005 SCMR 1814).",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Professions & Trades Tax Rules, 1977=4,4(3),4(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=24A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.P. No.7397 of 2012, decision dated: 26-8-2015.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.",
    "": "SHV ENERGY PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD.\nVs\nPROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB etc."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11767",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzR1JTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1277 = 2015 SLD 1277 = (2015) 112 TAX 395 = 2016 PTD 377 = 2017 PTCL 373",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XL1X of 2001) - Sections: 114, 115, 122, 153(1 )(b), 153(9), 169(3), 170, 170(2), 170(4), 170(5), 177 & 234(5) - Circular No. 11 of 1991 - Reference to High Court -\nIncome Tax Rules, 2002, Rule: 71 - Payment for goods, services and contract - Filing of returns by assessee under normal law for tax years 2003 to 2004 - Tax withheld was found in excess of chargeable tax - Filing of application for refund - Rejection by taxation officer u/s 170(4) treating withheld lax as final discharge of tax liability - Acceptance of appeal by CIR(A) - Appellate Tribunal held that Taxation officer has no jurisdiction u/s 170 of Income Tax Ordinance 2001 to determine proper amount chargeable to tax and thus dismissed departmental appeal - Validity - Whether while examining Appellate Tribunal's order, it transpired that first set of questions has already been answered by Division Bench of Lahore High Court in case reported as (2008) 98 Tax 114 and that Tribunal's order is based on said - Held yes - Whether conclusion and opinion arrived at by DB of High Court in Rehman Enterprises case is agreed, therefore, first set of questions is answered in same terms i.e. against department\n-\nHeld yes - Whether rule 71 of Income Tax Rules, 2002 provides that application for refund of tax shall be in proforma specified in Part VI of First Schedule to rules - Held yes - Whether taxpayer has to disclose in application, (i) total income of relevant tax year, computed in accordance with provisions of Ordinance, (ii) Tax chargeable in respect of total income and (iii) amount of tax paid - Held yes - Whether on these declarations, in prescribed application, Commissioner or Taxation officer assumes jurisdiction u/s 170 - Held yes - Whether while exercising this jurisdiction, he is required to see first, whether requirements of sub-section (2) of section 170 are met - Secondly, under sub¬section (3) he has to satisfy himself, through probe into supportive documents, that tax is over paid - Held yes - Whether after being so satisfied, remaining portion of overpaid tax is to be refunded - Held yes - Whether order of refund or its refusal or reduction is to be passed within 45 days under subsection (4) of section 170 - Held yes - Whether if amount was paid in excess of chargeable tax, as determined in assessment order, it can be claimed as refund under sub-section (1) of section 170 - Held yes - Whether only course available to Commissioner (if in his opinion tax deducted was to be treated as final tax) was to assume jurisdiction u/s 122 by issuing show cause notice, proposing amendment of assessment order - Held yes - Whether in case assessment order was amended in accordance with law, he could refuse to process application for refund because the very basis of refund application i.e. assessment order would not have been in field - Held yes - Whether question No. 2, in second set of questions is argumentative in nature, therefore, it is declined to offer - Held yes - Whether, however, question No. 1 clinches proposition and answer to this question is in affirmative i.e. against applicant - Held Yes.\nCases referred to:\nCommissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax, Multan Zone, Multan v. Rehman Enterprises [(2008) 98 Tax 114 (H.C. Lah.)].",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114,115,122,153(1)(b),153(9),169(3),170,170(2),170(4),170(5),177,234(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=114,115,122,153(1)(b),153(9),169(3),170,170(2),170(4),170(5),177,234(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Rules, 2002=71\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Case No: PTR No. 328 of 2009, decision dated: 14-9-2015, hearing DATE : 14-9-2015.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID, JAMIL KHAN AND MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JJ.",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVs\nMUHAMMAD ALI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11768",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzR1JTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 880 = 2015 SLD 880 = (2015) 111 TAX 94 = 2015 PTD 2644",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 200] (XLIX of 2001 ) - Sections 21(c), 122(5), 122(5A), 122(9) & 221 - Income Tax Rules, 2002, Rule 13 - Amendment of assessments - Show Cause Notice - Addition u/s 21(c) and proration of common expenses - On filing appeal before CIR(A), the taxpayer was allowed relief by deleting additions made on account of proration of expenses under Rule 13 and provision for gratuity - Further more while computing tax liability, appeal effect was also directed to be given - However, addition made u/s 21(c) was maintained - Validity - Taxpayer as well as Deptt, both have come up in appeals before Appellate Tribunal - Based on grounds of appeal, Tribunal took up following issues for decision- (i) admissibility or otherwise of rebate amounting to Rs.5.388 million allowed by taxpayer to M/s McDonalds Pakistan- (ii) lawfulness of apportionment of expenses carried out by Taxation officer between two streams of income, and (iii) admissibility or otherwise of rebate/discount amounting to Rs.76.097 million allowed by taxpayer to M/s CCBPL - Taxpayer vehemently contended that authorities below grossly erred in not following earlier decision of Appellate Tribunal dated 03-12-2009 treating the same as per incurium although tribunal, after through deliberations rightfully determined nature of subject amount as royalty does not attract any incidence of withholding under provisions of Ordinance - Department strongly opposed arguments of taxpayer and submitted that both taxation officer as well as first appellate authority rightly refused to follow order 03-12-2009 as same contained serious errors and omission and thus could not have been followed under principles of stare decisis, that amount could not be treated as royalty, proposition determined by Tribunal in said order, and clearly amount constituted consideration for services attracting withholding tax, which having not been deducted by Taxpayer authorities below rightly treated amount inadmissible - Challenge to - Whether these is no reason to subscribe to contradictory orders and Revenue itself has invoked provisions of section 124A in succeeding years, therefore, Appellate Tribunal vacated order of First Appellate Authority on this point and modified order of taxation Officer dated 31-01-2011 in as much as that issue would be treated to have been settled and decided in favour of taxpayer by Taxation officer in terms of provisions of section 124A - Held yes.- Whether First Appellate Authority has rightly followed earlier decision of Appellate Tribunal dated 31-12-2009 which is full of reasoning and logic - Held yes - Whether Appellate Tribunal, following its earlier decision, dismissed Departmental appeal on this point and upheld order of First Appellate Authority - Held yes - Whether admissibility of rebate/discount to M/s CCBPL was never confronted to taxpayer although it is trite law that no adverse inference could sustain if proper opportunity of being heard is not allowed to accused - Held yes - Whether there is no ambiguity that rebate is reduction against sale consideration and hence could not be equated with consideration for services simply for reason that buyers of goods do not render any service to seller - Held yes - Whether there is no logical or sustainable basis to treat reduction against sale price as consideration for services - Held yes - Whether there is no iota of doubt that provisions of section 153(1)(b) were not applicable to instant transaction and as such First Appellate Authority rightly deleted disallowance - Held yes - Whether Appellate Tribunal upheld order of First Appellate Authority and dismissed appeal being bereft and devoid of any merit - Held yes - Whether practice of declaring order of Appellate Authorities per incurium by taxation Authorities is creating .serious judicial indiscipline, thus tax authorities have no lawful mandate to do so as such practice not only tantamount to flout orders of higher appellate forums, but also does not let proceedings come to an end - Held Yes. \nIn the background that Revenue has itself followed the earlier decision of this Tribunal dated 03-12-2009 in tax year 2007, there is no justification for contradictory and inconsistent treatments, notwithstanding the fact that even otherwise we have observed nothing illegal or unlawful in our earlier order dated 03-12-2009 and as such the same constitutes a valid and a binding precedent for us. In our view, the position determined by this Tribunal vis-a-vis the peculiar facts is absolutely correct and rational. Be that as it may, since we do not subscribe to contradictory orders and the Revenue has itself invoked provisions of section 124A of the Ordinance in succeeding years, therefore, we have no hesitation in vacating the order of the first appellate authority on this point and modifying the order of the taxation officer dated 31-01-2011 in as much as that the issue would be treated to have been settled and decided in favour of the taxpayer by the taxation officer in terms of provisions of section 124A of the Ordinance. Ordered accordingly.\nThe learned first appellate authority has rightly followed the earlier decision of this Tribunal dated 03-12-2009 in ITA No. 361/LB/09 which is full of reasoning and logic. No exception could be taken there from. Accordingly, by following our earlier decision, referred supra and for the reasons recorded therein, we dismiss the departmental appeal on this point and uphold the order of the learned first appellate authority.\nDisallowance made by the taxation officer is not sustainable for two reasons. Firstly, even a cursory look at the amendment order dated 31-01-2011 transpires that the aggregate rebate amounting to Rs.81.485 million was disallowed by the taxation officer considering the same to have been made to M/s McDonalds Pakistan whereas the amount claimed on account of rebate to M/s McDonalds Pakistan aggregated to Rs.5.388 million. This follows that the admissibility of rebate/discount to M/s CCBPL was never confronted to the taxpayer. It is a trite law that no adverse inference could sustain if a proper opportunity of being heard is not allowed to the accused. On this basis alone there is no justification to disturb the order of the learned first appellate authority. The matter having not been confronted to the taxpayer is simply unlawful. Secondly and more importantly, the amendment order even otherwise does not spell out any basis for treating a rebate allowed to buyer of goods as consideration or services. There is no ambiguity that the rebate is a reduction against sale consideration and hence could not be equated with consideration for services simply for the reason that buyers of goods do not render any service to the seller. Regardless of the contents of show cause notice or the amendment order, there is no logical or sustainable basis to treat reduction against sale price as consideration for services. There is not any iota of doubt that provisions of section 153(1)(b) were not applicable to instant transaction and as such learned first appellate authority rightly deleted the disallowance. Accordingly, we uphold the order of the first appellate authority and dismiss the appeal on this point, being bereft and devoid of any merit.\nPractice of declaring order of Appellate Authorities per incurium by Taxation authorities is creating serious judicial indiscipline. The Tax authorities have no lawful mandate to do so as such practice not only tantamount to flout with orders of higher appellate forums but also does not let the proceedings come to an end. If this is allowed to happen, it would mean that no proceeding would ever come to closure and tax authorities would stick to their version and repeat the same action by treating appellate orders per incurium on the basis of their own whims and motions. It is only the mandate of higher appellate forums to undertake judicial scrutiny of orders and to either approve or disapprove the same. The office is directed to send a copy of this order to the Honourable Chairman FBR, Member Inland Revenue, Member (Admn.) and Member (Legal) with the suggestion to direct the Field Formations dealing with the assessment work to follow the orders of appellate authorities in letter and spirit Instead of commenting upon the same.\nThe subject appeals stand disposed of in the manner and to the extent stated above.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(c),21(e),122(5),122(5A),122(9),124A,153(1)(B),221\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(c),21(e),122(5),122(5A),122(9),124A,153(1)(B),221\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Rules, 2002=13\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No.1006/LB/2011 (Tax year 2006), decision dated: 2-9-2014. ITA Nos.1035/LB/2011 and I.T.A. No. 792/LB/2012 (Tax Year 2006)",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIR AHMAD, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11769",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzR1JTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1669 = 2015 SLD 1669 = (2015) 111 TAX 104 = 2015 PTD 589",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 111, 111(4)(b), 122, 122(2), 174(1), 174(3) & 237, Income Tax Rules, 2002, Rule 29(4) - Amendment of assessments - Return of income fled by Taxpayer deemed to be assessment order passed by Commissioner u/s 120 - DCIR found suppression of unexplained deposits - Initiation of proceedings u/s 122(1)(5) - Show Cause Notice - Objection of taxpayer that proposed action is time barred, repelled by DCIR - Disallowance of P&L account - Additions - Validity - Whether bare reading of sub-section (2 ) of section 122 of Ord. pre and post amendment reveals that limitation period of five years remains unchanged and only beginning of limitation has been changed from date of issuance of order to end of financial year relevant to issuance of such order - Held yes - Whether limitation period is reckoned and computed with reference to the day return is furnished - Held yes - Whether action u/s 122 and 111(1)(b) by taxation officer in this case is barred by time and taxpayer is clothed with vested rights which could not be impaired or waived of - Held yes - Whether sub-section (2) of section 122 substituted by Finance Act, 2009 is enforceable from 1st day of July, 2009 and applicable to deemed order issued or passed on and after that date and not applicable to deemed order already passed before substitution of this subsection and cannot affect limitation period which has already started many years earlier and terminal end is fixed at that time - Held yes - Whether after lapse of limitation period of 5 years on 29-06-2011 taxpayer is clothed with vested statutory right of non-retaining and furnishing such records before tax authorities - Held yes - Whether invoking of section 122 for tax year 2006 by DCIR is barred by time and subsequent proceedings, order dated 29-06-2012 and addition u/s 111(1)(b) and impugned order of CIR(A) dated 17-10-2012 is void ab initio, illegal and without lawful authority - Held Yes. \nThe bare reading of the above subsection (2) of section 122 of the Ordinance pre and post amendment reveals that the limitation period of five years remains unchanged and only beginning of the limitation has been changed from the date of issuance of order to end of financial year relevant to the issuance of such order. It is not a direct case of enlargement of limitation period by extending the terminal end but a change in the commencement of limitation period from the date of issuance of order to the end of financial year in which such order is issued. It is to be noted that in term of section 120(1) return filed by the taxpayer is taken for all purposes of the Ordinance to be an assessment order issued by the Commissioner to the taxpayer on the day the return was furnished. Therefore the limitation period is reckoned and computed with reference to the day the return is furnished. The identical issue came for adjudication before the Honourable Supreme court of Pakistan in the supra Nagina Silk Mills case where the word \"\"year\"\" was defined by Finance Ordinance 1960 and due to which commencement of limitation was changed from P day of April to P day of July. The honorable court after considering various authorities and thorough examining the facts of the case quashed the order being passed holding to be without jurisdiction and laid down the following principles; \n1. The limitation in this case under subsection(2)of section 34 of the act has started running on the P day of April 1956,and that fixed the terminal date of the period of four years as the 31st March 1960,with certainly under the law as it then stood.\n2. It is a well recognized principle of law of limitation that once time begins to run from a specified date it cannot be interrupted or extended unless the Legislature intervenes and makes express provision to the contrary. \n3. The new definition contains no words such as could operate to extend a period which had already commenced to run many years earlier, according to a fixed measure of time, namely, a year of twelve months.\n4. The courts must lean against giving a statute retrospective operation on the presumption that the Legislature does not intend what is unjust. \n5. Even if two interpretations are equally possible, the one that saves vested rights would be adopted in the interest of justice, specially, where we are dealing with a taxing statute.\nThe return has been filed on 30-09-2006 for the tax year under consideration and the said return deemed to be assessment order issued to the taxpayer by the Commissioner on that date i.e. 30-09-2006, the day return was furnished u/s 120(1) of the Ordinance and the limitation period of five years for amendment of assessment started running from that date i.e. 30-09-2006 and terminal end is fixed at 29-09-2011 in term of sub section (2) of section 122, relevant to tax year 2006 as it then stood. The limitation period started running from 30-09-2006 could not be interrupted because the substituted section do not contain any word which could extend period which had already commenced to run many year earlier according to fixed measure of time. Therefore, the ratio laid down in the supra of Nagina Silk case is squarely applicable to the fact of the case of the taxpayer and binding in term of article 189 of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the subordinate courts. \nWe, therefore, hold that the action u/s 122 and 111(1)(b) by the Taxation Officer in this case is barred by time and the taxpayer is clothed with the vested rights which could not be impaired or waived off. The question of extension of limitation of opening of assessment u/s 122 of the Ordinance has also been dealt with for interpretation before the Honourable Supreme Court in the supra Eli Lilly case. The Department before the Honourable Supreme Court contended that the section 122 is a machinery provision and procedural in nature and apply retrospectively in the pending cases. The honorable Supreme Court after examining various authorities on the subject repelled the contentions of the department and ultimately laid down the following principles; \ni. Where the procedural provision is impregnated with the essential attributes which effects an accrued right of the assessee or taxpayer that after afflux of a certain period of time his assessment would not be opened or amended. The section cannot be applied retrospectively unless the Legislature has by express Word or necessary implication intended to give it retrospective effect.\nii. Where the procedural provision is woven with the attributes or characteristics of having potential of adding to the liability of the taxpayer, the provision is not a mere matter of procedure and is substantive in nature.\niii. Where rights and procedure are dealt with together, the intention of the Legislature may well be that the old rights are to be determined by the old procedure, and that only the new rights under the substituted section are to be dealt with by the new procedure.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The examination of sub section (2) of section 122, 174(3) and 111(4)(b) reveals that these sections deal with limitation period and the right is accrued to the taxpayer at the start of limitation period that after the afflux of certain period of time specified therein his assessment cannot be opened or amended, addition u/s 111 could not be made and prescribed record u/s 174 and rule 29 would not be called. Therefore, the amendments in these provisions affect the accrued rights and are substantive in nature and not mere matter of procedure and have not been given retrospective effect by the Legislature. Therefore, according to the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the supra , the old rights shall be governed by old procedure and new rights shall be governed by the substituted section dealing with the new procedure. These sections also have the potential of adding to the tax liability of the taxpayer, therefore, could not be applied retrospectively unless clear words have been used by the Legislature for retrospective effect and no such words are found in the supra amendments. Sub section (2) of section 122 substituted by Finance Act, 2009 is enforceable from lst day of July, 2009 and applicable to the deemed order issued or passed on and after that date and not applicable to the deemed order already passed before the substitution of this sub section and cannot effect the limitation period which has already started many years earlier and terminal end is fixed at that time. Moreover, no express word of Legislature found in the substituted section for giving retrospective application to the said substituted provision. Rather the word \"\"shall\"\" have been used in the substituted section which conveys the intention of the Legislature that it is prospective. The preamble and sub section (3) of section 1 of the Finance Act, 2009 also shows that the amendment brought in the income Tax Ordinance are enforceable from July 01, 2009 and financial proposal of the Federal Government are for the year beginning on July 01, 2009. It is also worth mentioning that under rule 29(4) of the Income Tax Rules 2002 the taxpayer still have been given the right to retain books of accounts prescribed under Chapter VII of the Income Tax Rules 2002 for a period of five years after the end of tax year to which they relate. Therefore, calling of record for the tax year 2006 from the taxpayer after the expiration of limitation period of five years on 29-06-2011 is also barred by time. After the lapse of limitation period of five years on 29-06-2011 the taxpayer has clothed with a vested statutory right of non-retaining and furnishing such records before the tax authorities. The right so accrued cannot be taken away or even waived off by the affected party i.e. the taxpayer held in the case reported as (1982) 138 ITR 462). The rule prescribed by the FBR in the exercise of powers vested u/s 237 read with 174(1) of the Ordinance has a statutory force and be read as the part of the statute which confers the power of its enactment and where right is claimed on the basis of such rules then the rules cannot be dispensed with. Reference may be made to the decision reported as PLD 1961 SC 105, 2003 YLR 1555, (2011) 103 Tax 1 (Trib.)=2010 PTD 2302 and 1986 SCMR 1917. In fiscal statute where two provisions are dealing with the situation simultaneously, one section is imposing higher burden than the other, then the provision imposing lower burden shall be applicable.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Under the new scheme of Income Tax f Ordinance 2001 applicable amendments are supplied to the taxpayer in advance at the start of tax year usually effective on 1st day of July so that they can arrange their affairs accordingly and can make proper provision for tax liability. Under the repealed Ordinance, applicable amendments were made available to the taxpayer after the close of the income year and that mischief has been suppressed in the new scheme. Therefore, in accordance with the object and purpose of the new scheme of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 amendment brought by the Finance Acts from time to time should be given prospective effect to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief. Moreover, the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is a fiscal statute and whenever the Legislature intends to give retrospective effect to any amendment it is expressly provided therein. For example, amendments made in sections 113, 153 and First Schedule reproduced hereinafter. Therefore, giving retrospective effect to supra amendments in this fiscal legislation is inconsistent with the j object of the scheme and practice of the Legislature. ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "A-Section 113(1)",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "This section shall apply to a resident company, [an individual having turnover of fifty million rupees or above in the tax year 2009 or any subsequent tax year] and any association of persons [having turnover of fifty million rupees or above in the tax year 2007 or any subsequent tax year] where, for any reason whatsoever allowed under this ordinance, including any other law for the time being in force -",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(Brackets inserted by Finance Act, 2010)",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "B-Section 153(g)",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "An association of persons, having turnover of fifty million rupees or above in the tax year 2007 or any subsequent tax year.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(Clause (g) inserted by Finance Act, 2008)",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "C-First Schedule, Part 1, Division I, Clause I, Proviso",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Provided further that internally displaced persons tax (IDPT), treated as income tax, on the tax payable on the taxable income of one million rupees or more, shall be levied at the rate of 5% of such tax, for tax year 2009.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(Proviso inserted by Finance Act, 2009)",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "D-First Sched, Part, I Division IB",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The rate of tax imposed on the taxable of Association of persons for the tax year 2010 and onward shall be 25% (Division IB inserted by Finance Act, 2010). ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Keeping in view the delicacy of the limitation matter under consideration, in view of the facts of the case, cited provisions of law, binding s of the Honourable Apex Courts, findings and reasons recorded above, the invoking of section 122 of the Ordinance for the tax year 2006 by the DCIR is barred by time and the subsequent proceedings, order dated 29-06-2012 and addition u/s 111(l)(b) and impugned order of the learned CIR(A) dated 17-10-2012 is void ab initio, illegal and without lawful authority. ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Cases Referred to:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(1963) 7 Tax 442 (S.C. Pak.) Nagina Silk Mills, Layalpur v. Income tax Officer Lyalpur, (2009) 100 Tax 81 (S.C.Pak.) CIT v. Eli Lilly Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and PLD 1964 266 SC Pak. Saeed Ahmad v. The State; 2005 PTD 259 (Kar. H.C), (2008) 97 Tax 453; (1982) 138 ITR 462); PLD 1961 SC 105; 2003 YLR 1555; (2011) 103 Tax 1 (Trib.) and 1986 SCMR 1917.\"",
    "URL Link:": "I.T.A. No.851/IB/2012 (Tax year 2006) decided on 20-6-2013. ITA No.992/IB/2012 (Tax year 2006) hearing DATE : 20-6-2013.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,111(4)(b),111(4)(b),120,122,122(2),174(1),174(3),237\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,111(4)(b),111(4)(b),120,122,122(2),174(1),174(3),237\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Rules, 2002=29(4)\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI CHAIRPERSON AND SAJJAD HAIDER KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "Court Name:": "Mohammad Naeem Aziz Advocate, Applicant for the Taxpayers. Ihsanullah Khan, DR, Respondent for the Department.",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11770",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzSFFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1011 = 2015 SLD 1011 = (2015) 112 TAX 318 = 2016 PTD 152 = 2016 PTCL 490",
    "Key Words:": "(A) Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) - Sections: 2(3), 2(25), 3, 7, 7A, 7A(1), 7A(2), 8(g), 14 & 71 -Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 19P - Rules: 2006, rule: 4(c) - Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007, Rule: 58, 58-B, 58-B(i), 58-B(iii), 58 C(i) - SRO No.678(1)72007, 06-07-2007 - SRO No. 480(1)72007, 09-06-2007 & SRO No. 367(1)72013, 08-05- 2012 - Constitutional petition - Levy and Collection of tax on specified goods on value addition - Provision of intercity passenger Transport services across the country - Import of buses, spare parts, lubricants, wet towels and other goods for self consumption - Show Cause Notice on basis of report of internal audit department - Demand of value addition tax at the rate of 10% - Validity - Stance of petitioner - Company was that it was not liable to pay value addition tax sought to be levied and recovered - On filing representation by petitioner - Company with Chief (Inland Revenue) F.B.R Lahore, respondent No. 4 allowed goods to be cleared without payment of value addition tax under rule 58-B of Chapter X of Rules, 2007 issued vide SRO No. 480(1)72007, 09-06-2007, in addition to Sales Tax payable u7s 3 of Act, 1990 - Petitioner - Company upon receipt of clarification once again made representation to Secretary (Law and Procedure) of F.B.R requesting reconsideration of its earlier clarification - Meanwhile Respondent No. 1 issued series of recovery notices for payment of value addition tax from petitioner - Company - FBR once again turned down representation and affirmed its earlier view - Similar effort foundered once again and FBR through its second summary showed its inability to accept request of petitioner - Counsel for petitioner company contended that petitioner is not liable for payment of value addition tax as this tax is payable by only such importers who make value addition to goods supplied to other persons - According to him, scheme of section 7(A) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and Special Procedure for payment of Sales Tax by importers when read in conjunction with each other, leave it in manner of doubt that manufactures importing goods for in- house Consumption are not covered by registered persons liable for payment of value addition tax - He referred to subsequent amendment brought about by Notification No. SRO 367(1 )/2013, 08-05-2012 by which Clause (iii) to proviso of rule 58-B was added and it was clarified that registered service providers importing goods for their in-house business use shall not be liable to payment of value addition tax - On the contrary, according to counsel for respondents, petitioner- Company is covered by provisions of Section 7(A) of Act, 1990 and Special Procedure for payment of Sales Tax by importers and cannot be heard to lay claim to any exemption in this regard unless exemption is specially granted by Federal Government - Synopsis - Whether Clause (iii) to proviso of rule 58-B was added on 08-05-2012 and is an event which took place subsequent to filing of instant petition - Held yes - Whether in case of petitioner-company, no value addition is made and goods which are being imported are self consumed and those goods are neither supplied nor sold in any part of market - Held yes - Whether clarifications issued by FBR do not bring forth clearly reasons which have compelled F.B.R to hold that Petitioner-company is liable for payment of value addition tax - Held yes - Whether Federal Govt, has specified minimum value addition required to be declared by importers by Notification SRO 678(1)72007 and this minimum value addition has been referred to as value addition tax - Held yes - Whether there has to be \"\"value addition\"\" and \"\"Supply of goods\"\" in order to attract levy under Section 7-A of Act, 1990, and twin conditions must be satisfied - Held yes - Whether if registered person is not supplying any goods after value addition, he is not covered by mischief of section 7-A of Act, 1990 - Held yes - Whether Tax u/s 7-A of Act, 1990, like any other tax, has three elements (1) nature of Tax, (2) measure of Tax, and (3) machinery of its collection - Held yes - Whether Section 7A is Taxing provision and in construing it, we are guided by foundational principle that such provisions must be strictly construed, that is to say if there be any ambiguity, it shall be resolved in favour of Tax payer - Held yes - Whether proposition that levy of value addition tax does not extend to imports meant for in-house consumption is lent credence by consideration of sub-rule 2 of rule 58-B and 58-C(l) of Rules, 2007 - Held yes - Whether combined reading of these provisions makes it clear that these relate to allowance of tax credit to registered person - Held yes - Whether while petitioner-company shall be paying value addition tax yet will not be able to claim tax credit in terms of Section 7 of Act, 1990, read with rules - Held yes - Whether petitioner- Company shall be barred from doing so in terms of Section 8(g) of Act, 1990, as being goods and services acquired for personal or non-business consumption - Held yes - Whether counsel for parties are not in dissention with each other on fact that after addition of clause (iii) of Rule 58-B, Rules, 2007, petitioner-company is not being required to pay value addition tax - Held yes - Whether petition is accepted and impugned notices issued by respondents in respect of payment of value addition tax are declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect - Held yes - Whether demand for payment of value addition tax vide demand Show Cause Notices is also set aside - Held yes.\n(B) Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) - Section: 7A - Imposition of minimum value addition tax - Genesis of Sales Tax Act, 1990 - Sweep & Scope - Whether Act, 1990 is amalgam of retail Sales Tax and whole sale and manufacturing single stage taxes on one hand and regime of value-added tax on other - Held yes - Whether value-added tax originated in France in 1955 and was perceived by member-countries of European Union as ideal means to \"\"promote neutrality and uniformity of tax burden and to provide incentives for increased productivity and industrialization \"\" - Held yes - Whether it has often been described as quintessential modern tax in backdrop of economic and technological changes of second half of century - Held yes - Whether V.A.T can be looked upon as multistage tax which produces yield equivalent to that of single stage retail sales tax - Held yes - Whether in short VAT is first consumption tax which has successfully integrated Taxation on services with Taxation of goods - Held yes.\nCases referred to\nMuhammad Younas v. Central Board of Revenue (PLD 1964 SC 113); Pakistan through Secretary Finance and another v. Kohat Cement Company and others (PLD 1995 SC 659); (Wilde C.J. in Goshing v. Velry (1850) 12 QB 328 Reg v. Richmond (1992) 2 AC 48, 67; FMC United Private Limited v. Federation of Pakistan & 3 others (PTCL 2011 CL 640) and Amreli Steels (Pvt.) Ltd. And others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PTCL 2005 CL 347).",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(3),2(25),2(10),3,7,7A,7A(1),7A(2),8(g),14,71\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(3),2(25),2(10),3,7,7A,7A(1),7A(2),8(g),14,71\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007=58,58-B,58-B(i),58-B(iii),58C(i)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=19P\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.P No. 11888/2010, decision dated: 22-6-2015, hearing DATE : 22-6-2015.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID KARIM, J.",
    "": "DAEWOO PAKISTAN\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11771",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUUzSFJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1670 = 2015 SLD 1670 = (2015) 112 TAX 125",
    "Key Words:": "As per Mr Nazir Ahmad, Judicial Member (Contra)\n(A)\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (Vll of 1990) - Sections: 2, 2(25), 11(3), 14, 23, 25, 36(1) & 36(2) - Sales Tax Rules, 2006, Rule: 6 - Assessment of tax and recovery of tax not levied or erroneously refunded - Appellant is unregistered person - Making taxable supplies of sugar and not paying sales tax - Show cause Notice - Assessment passed by DCIR for the recovery of sales tax along with default surcharge and penalty\n-\nCIR(A) remanded case to DCIR for recalculation of tax on the basis of complete detail of supplies to be provided by appellant for year 2008-09 - Validity - Appellant is person making retail sale of sugar and no sales tax shall be charged by him because sales tax has already been paid at primary manufacturing stage on value fixed by Board and if department is bent upon to levy sales tax again on same goods, it would amount to double taxation - Held Yes.\nAs Per Muhammad Pervez Alam, Accountant Member and Muhammad Waseem Choudhary.\n(B)\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) - Sections: 2, 2(25), 11(3), 14, 23, 25, 36(1) & 36(2) - Income Tax Rules: 2006, Rule: 6 & 4 - Assessment of tax and recovery of tax not levied or short levied or erroneously refunded - Taxable supplies by unregistered person - Failure to pay tax - Show Cause Notice\n-\nPassing of assessment order by DCIR - Recovery of tax with default surcharge and penalty - remand of case by CIR(A) for re-calculation of tax in appeal - Whether department is legally bound to compulsory register appellant before creating tax demand or requiring him to pay Sales Tax not withheld under Rule 6 of Sales Tax Rules, 2006 - Question of - Whether appellant and their supplier company being registered persons under Sales Tax Act, 1990, supplier is required to issue sales tax invoices u/s 23 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 - Held yes - Whether under section 23 department has correctly treated appellant as registered person in view of Paragraph-1 as well as section 2(25) of Sales Tax Act - Held yes - Whether sales tax invoice can be issued u/s 23 by specified persons only - Held yes. (4) Whether person not registered under Sales Tax Act, 1990 cannot issue sales tax invoice u/s 23 of Act - Held yes - Whether if person is not registered, but is required or liable to be registered, Rule 6(1) of Sales Tax Rules, 2006 comes into operation and concerned authority can issue and compulsorily register such person under Sales Tax Act after following procedure prescribed there under - Held yes - Whether person who is liable to be registered but not actually registered cannot issue sales tax invoice and withhold tax thereon - Held yes - Whether where person is required to be registered under Sales Tax Act, 1990 as envisaged u/s 14 of the Act is under obligation to apply for registration and in case of failure, departmental authorities shall issue notice to such person and after allowing him opportunity of being heard shall pass order- whether or not such person is liable to be registered compulsorily or not - Held Yes.\nCases Referred to:\nXen Shahpur Division v. Collector Sales Tax (Appeals) Collectorate of Customs, Federal Excise and Sales Tax, Faisalabad and 2 others reported as (2009) 99 Tax 35 (H.C. Lah.); Seven-up Bottling Company (Pvt.) Limited v. Lahore Development Authority (L.D.A) Lahore through Managing Director reported as [2003 CLC 513] and Innovative Impex, Karachi v. Collector of Customs, Sales tax and Federal Excise (Appeals), Karachi reported as [2010 PTD (Trib.) 1010].",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2,2(25),11(3),14,23,25,25(3),36(1),36(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2,2(25),11(3),14,23,25,25(3),36(1),36(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Rules, 2006=6\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No.92/PB/2013, decision dated: 01-10-2014, hearing DATE : 01-10-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIR AHMAD, JUDICIAL MEMBER, MUHAMMAD PERVAIZ ALAM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD SASEEM CHAUDHARY, JUDICIAL MEMBER.",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11772",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1FTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 9 = 2015 SLD 9 = 2015 PTCL 374 = 2015 PTD 1030",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=73(2),73(2)(a),73(2)(b),73(2)(c),73(2)(d),73(2)(e),73(2)(f),73(2)(g)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=73(2),73(2)(a),73(2)(b),73(2)(c),73(2)(d),73(2)(e),73(2)(f),73(2)(g)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=165,165(1),165A,176\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 19821 of 2013, announced on 26-12-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN.",
    "": "Soneri Bank Limited\nVs\nFederation of Pakistan etc"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11773",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1F5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2024 = 2014 SLD 2024 = 2014 PCRLJ 1378 = (2014) 110 TAX 399",
    "Key Words:": "(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---\n \n----S. 19---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), Ss. 25 & 37---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Summoning of record---Registered persons, rights of---National Accountability Bureau issued notices to petitioners directing them to produce their sales tax record---Plea raised by petitioners was that such record could only be requisitioned by sales tax department---Validity---Notices in question did not depict that petitioners had knowingly and fraudulently made false statements, false declarations, false representations, false personifications, gave any false information or had issued or used false documents which were forged or false---Proceedings of National Accountability Bureau under S.19 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, in oppressive manner, were against Fundamental Rights of 'registered persons' as guaranteed under the Constitution---Such misuse of powers could not be overlooked or ignored by High Court being custodian of the Constitution---High Court was under legal duty to defend, preserve and enforce rights of people and their Constitutional guarantees---National Accountability Bureau authorities under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, in respect of their functions, use of power by them in unbridled manner for prosecution of innocent registered persons in disregard to their Constitutional guarantees, rights, liabilities and duties, could not be allowed such oppressive use of penal law through such demonstration---Purported initiation of action under S.19 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, was a series of moves initiated by National Accountability Bureau to pressurize petitioners over their legal rights, which could be invoked and settled through Inland Revenue Authorities---No legal sanctity was attached to the notices as under the garb of S.19 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, petitioners could not be compelled to produce record of sales tax/income tax---High Court quashed notices under S.19 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, issued to petitioners, being coram non judice---Petition was allowed accordingly.\n \n Ghulam Hussain Baloch and another v. Chairman NAB, Islamabad and others PLD 2007 Kar. 469; Dr. Arslan Iftikhar v. Malik Riaz Hussain and others PLD 2012 SC 903; M. Yousuf Arain v. Chairman NAB and another 2008 MLD 1431; Niaz Ahmed Baloch v. Chairman NAB and 4 others 2008 MLD 1451 and Raja M. Zarat Khan and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Cabinet Division and 2 others PLD 2007 Kar. 597 rel.\n \n(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---\n \n----S.19---Call up notice---Requisition of information---Pre-condition---There should be specific mention of required information, in respect of offence alleged or any matter which can suggest that provision of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, rule or order made thereunder had been contravened---Was not possible for the person to whom notice was issued, due to his ignorance of allegations or offence or facts on which information was to be provided, that person would be in a position to fulfil the demand of National Accountability Bureau.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25,37\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=25,37\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-692, D-617, D-998, D-1070, D-1035, D-1037, D-1036, D-996, D-995, D-997, D-1081 and D-1264 of 2013, decision dated: 21st April, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "AHMED ALI M. SHEIKH AND SYED MUHAMMAD FAROOQ SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MEMON MOTORS PRIVATE LIMITED through GENERAL Manager\nVs\nNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU through Chairman and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11774",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1JDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1672 = 2015 SLD 1672 = 2015 PCRLJ 1413",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 540-A---Exemption to an accused from personal appearance during trial---Scope---Section 540-A, Cr.P.C. implicitly dealt with a situation where there were two or more accused in court facing inquiry or trial and subsequently had become incapable of remaining before the court---Plain meaning of the words (of S. 540-A, Cr.P.C.) indicted that accused had to be physically present before the Court, and subsequently, if he had become incapable of remaining before the Court, exemption (from appearance) could be granted for reasons to be recorded---Normally, the accused had to be physically present in the Court for claiming exemption and if the Court was satisfied about his incapacity for claiming exemption, it may grant exemption---Exemption from appearance could be granted in absence of accused in extremely exceptional cases such as his ailment rendering difficulty in movement.\n \n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 540-A---Criminal trial---Exemption to an accused from personal appearance--- Medical reasons---Exemption from appearance granted in absence of accused---Scope---Exemption from appearance before court could be granted to accused in his absence in extremely exceptional cases such as his ailment rendering difficulty in movement---Accused-applicant, in the present case, was suffering from serious ailment (prolapsed intervertebral disc and spinal stenosis) and was unable to attend court--- Medical record of accused showed that the doctor had advised him complete bed rest, and if he travelled or moved on stairs, then such carelessness would be dangerous and result in paralysis of lower part of his body---High Court directed that in such circumstances, the attendance of the accused before Trial Court was dispensed with and he was allowed to appear through his pleader on each date---Application was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED SAEEDUDDIN NASIR, J",
    "": "HIZBULLAH---Applicant\nvs\nJUDICIAL MAGISTRATEI, ROHRI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11775",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1JpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2025 = 2014 SLD 2025 = 2014 PLD 320 = 2015 CLD 25 = (2014) 110 TAX 347",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. I, R.10(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Import Policy Order, 2009, R. 20---Constitutional petition---Public interest litigation---Necessary and proper party---Scope---Impleadment of a party to such litigation---Principles---Petitioner filed a constitutional petition impugning the import of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) from India through Wahga Border under R.20 of Import Policy Order, 2009 and contended that there were concerns with respect to storage facilities, testing laboratory and transportation facilities at Wahga Border; that Carbon Dioxide being imported from India was of substandard quality and would affect the public health and lives of citizens---Applicants contended that they should be impleaded as respondents to the constitutional petition on account of being necessary and proper party since all of them were users of Carbon Dioxide either as direct importers or purchasers or as consumers; that since their right with respect to permits given for import would be adjudicated upon in the constitutional petition, and that their rights could be seriously prejudiced---Validity---Constitutional petition in question was on a matter of public importance---For cases involving issues of public interest litigation, more liberal stance was needed to be taken by the courts for impleadment of parties to such litigation, to enable it to hear all the parties concerned, who were likely to be affected by any in such proceedings---When matters were of public importance then it was not only proper but necessary to make a person a party, whose interest was at stake in the constitutional petition and who could render proper assistance to the court about technical aspects of the issue involved---Application was accepted and applicants were allowed to join proceeding in the constitutional petition.\n \n2014 SCMR 531 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.I,R.10(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.10702 of 2013, decision dated: 29-05-2013",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. AYESHA A. MALIK, J",
    "": "COLONY SUGAR MILLS LTD.\nVs\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11776",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1JpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2061 = 2002 SLD 2061 = 2002 CLC 1956",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------S.12 & 42---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.54---Qanun-e­Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117 & 120---Oral sale---Onus to prove--­Non-appearance of owner of property in witness-box---Evidence of the owner through attorney---Plaintiff sought declaration of the suit property on the basis of oral sale made by the owner of the property in favour of the plaintiff and possession was also delivered to him---Defendant denied the sale and produced his attorney in the Trial Court in his place--­Validity---Incumbent upon the owner of the property in such transaction to have appeared in person and denied not only that he had transacted any sale in favour of the plaintiff but should have also denied the receipt of sale consideration and factum of handing over of possession to the buyer, which was not done by him---Attorney could not affirm or deny about the oral transaction which took place between the parties because he was not present at the time when the owner orally sold the land in dispute to the plaintiff---High Court did not accept the reason for non-.appearance of the owner of the property on account of his ailment. as no efforts were made to get the statement of the owner through Local Commission---Oral sale was proved in circumstances.\n \n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----Ss. 12 & 42---Declaration to title of property---Oral sale agreement--­Plaintiff -asserted that the defendant had orally agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff, whole consideration amount was received by the defendant and possession of the property was also handed over to him--­Plaintiff after having the possession, raised huge construction on the suit property---Neither any objection was ever raised by the defendant nor the plaintiff paid any rent of the property---Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff and he was declared to be the owner of the suit property---Appellate Court modified the and decree and reduced the area of the property to the extent of the area admitted by the plaintiff and he was declared as the owner to the extent of admitted area---Validity---No declaration could be granted on the basis of agreement because agreement did not by itself create any right or interest or any charge on the property---Agreement having been proved, the plaintiff was entitled to decree for specific performance of agreement to sell-Decree for specific performance was granted in circumstances.\n \nMukhtar Baig and others v. Sardar Baig and others 2000 SCMR 45 ref.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XX, R.12---Mesne profits---Recovery---Plaintiff was owner of land measuring 50 Marlas and the defendant was in possession of the same on the basis of oral agreement to sell---Plaintiff claimed mesne profits of the land measuring 50 Marlas---Record proved that 30 Marlas of land was orally sold to the defendant and remaining 20 Marlas was in the ownership of the plaintiff ---Effect--­Plaintiff was entitled to recover mesne profits only 'to the extent of 20 Marlas in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision Nb.129 of 1995, decision dated: la-07-2002",
    "Judge Name:": "TALAAT QAYUM QURESHI, J",
    "": "Mst. FARHAT BEGUM and others \nvs \nSAID AHMAD SHAH and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11777",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1JpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2026 = 2014 SLD 2026 = (2014) 110 TAX 241",
    "Key Words:": "Applicability of Further Tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nThe petitioners, who are manufacturers and sellers of flour, challenged the demand for further tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, on account of non-registration. They contended that they were not required to obtain registration since they did not make any taxable supplies and were exempt under Section 13 read with Item No. 19 of the Sixth Schedule of the Act. Consequently, they argued that Section 3(1A) was inapplicable to them and they were not liable to pay further tax.\nHeld:\n1.\nThe purpose of Section 3(1A) is to broaden the tax net by incentivizing registration. This is achieved by imposing a disincentive (further tax at 1% of the value of taxable supplies) on unregistered persons.\n2.\nPetitioners, being manufacturers and sellers of flour, are exempt from sales tax under Section 13 read with Item No. 19 of the Sixth Schedule.\n3.\nSince petitioners do not make taxable supplies, they are under no legal obligation to register under the Act.\n4.\nSection 3(1A) does not apply to the petitioners, as they fall outside the scope of taxable supplies under Section 2(41).\n5.\nThe petitioners, having paid further tax during litigation, are entitled to a refund or adjustment.\n6.\nThe Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) shall devise a mechanism to provide relief to petitioners who fall outside the ambit of Section 3(1A). Petitioners may apply to FBR for refund/adjustment, which must be decided within two months.\nCitations:\n•\nRial Barriers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2000 PTD 485)\n•\nTandlianwala Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2001) 83 Tax 249 (S.C. Pak.)\n•\nThe Central Board of Revenue v. Sheikh Spinning Mills Ltd. (1999) 80 Tax 79 (S.C. Pak.)",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(41),3(1A),13,8(6)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(41),3(1A),13\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Rules, 2006=19of6thSchedule,14,Rule4\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.P. 27097/2013, decision dated: 5-5-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, J.",
    "": "ZIA BROTHERS\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN etc"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11778",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1J5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2280 = 2001 SLD 2280 = 2001 CLC 57",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-------Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope--Matter raised by petitioner in Constitutional petition was a contractual matter which had arisen out of an agreement executed between parties of their own sweet­will---Jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of Constitution of Pakistan (1973), would not be attracted.\n \nMumtaz Masood's case 1994 SCMR 2287; The Chandpur Mills Ltd. v. The District Magistrate, Tippera and others PLD 1958 SC 267; Messrs Momin Motor Company v. The Regional Transport Authority, Dacca and others PLD 1962 SC 108 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--\n \n----Arts. 199 & 203-G---Constitutional petition---Charge of interest--­Validity---Charge of interest was though not only a violation of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah, but was also against of Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court, High Court, in view of Art. 203-G of Constitution of Pakistan (1973) had no authority under law to determine the matter--­Interest/Riba no doubt had been declared un-Islamic by Supreme Court but past and closed transactions were not to be re-opened.\n \nPLD 1992 FSC l and Muhammad Aslam Khaki's case PLD 2000 SC 225 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.8532 of 2000, decision dated: 15-05-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "Mst. AISAN \nvs \nMANAGER, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN, CHUNIAN, DISTRICT KASUR and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11779",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1J5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2029 = 2014 SLD 2029 = (2014) 110 TAX 174",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Section 21(c) & 122(5) - Amendment of assessment - Management Consultancy Services - Deduction not allowed - Addition u/s 21(c) made by A.O. confirmed by CIR(A) - Validity - Whether addition u/s 21(c) has wrongly has been wrongly been made which is ordered to be deleted as addition made does not come under ambit of section 21(c) and is also not maintainable as same was not specifically confronted to appellant and has been made without referring any definite any definite information - Held yes.\nAddition under section 21(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. He however, could not substantiate that expenses claimed on account of stationery & office supplies, repair & maintenance, selling expenses & other expenses attract the provision of section 21(c) of Income Tax Ordinance 2001. We have heard the learned Representatives from both the sides and have also perused the impugned orders of the officers below, case law referred and the available record of the case. After hearing both the parties and perusing the assessment record available before us and considering the arguments and case laws referred supra, we are of the view that addition under section 21(c) of Income Tax Ordinance 2001 has wrongly been made which is ordered to be deleted as the addition made do not come under the ambit of section 21(c) of Income Tax Ordinance 2001. The addition under section 21(0) of Income Tax Ordinance 2001 is also not maintainable as the same was not specifically confronted to the appellant and has been made without referring any definite information. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decisions of the Hon'ble High Courts reported as (2013) 107 Tax 41 (H.C. Lah)=2013 PTD 884 (Lahore High Court), (2010) 101 Tax 293 (Sindh High Court) and decision of this Tribunal dated 23-01-2010 in ITA No.1468/LB/2009 discussed above. Hence orders of the authorities below are hereby cancelled. \nCases referred to:\n(2013) 107 Tax 41 (HC. Lah) and (2010) 101 Tax 293 (H.C. Kar.)",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(c),122(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(c),122(5)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 751/IB of 2013, (Tax Year 2009), decision dated: 5-8-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAVAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "": "Qadeer Ahmad, ITP, for the . Shafqat Mahmood, DR., for the"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11780",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1J5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2030 = 2014 SLD 2030 = (2014) 110 TAX 180 = 2015 PTD 678",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 122, 122(1), 122(5), 122(5)(i), 122(9) - Amendment of assessments - Show Cause Notice - Time barred amendment by DC( IR ) - Dismissal of appeal by CIR(A) for lack of prosecution - Validity - Whether admittedly, deemed assessment was completed on 30-09-2007 while notice u/s 122(1) read with section 122(5)&(9) was issued on 05-11-2012, although A.O was bound to amend deemed assessment on or before 30-09-2012 - Held yes - Whether even otherwise proceedings for amending deemed assessment was also initiated by issuing s/tow cause notice on 05-11-2012 which is also after prescribed time limit - Held yes - Whether amended assessment order is time barred, hence not maintainable in eye of law, therefore, order passed by CIR(A) is vacated and amended assessment order dated 30-06-2013 is cancelled - Held yes.\nAdmittedly, the deemed assessment in this case was completed on 30-09-2007 while notice under section 122(1) read with section 122(5) & (9) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was issued on 05-11-2012. As per law the assessing officer was bound to amend the deemed assessment on or before 30-9-2012 in which he failed to do so and amended assessment was 30-09-2013. Even otherwise the proceedings for amending deemed assessment was also initiated by issuing show cause notice on 05-11-2012 which is also after the prescribed time limit.\nThe amended assessment order is time barred, hence not maintainable in the eye of law. Therefore, the order passed by the learned CIR(A) is hereby vacated and the amended assessment order dated, 30-06-2013 is cancelled.\n \nCases referred to:\n[(2013) 107 Tax 141 (Trib)].",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122,122(1),122(5),122(5)(i),122(9)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=122,122(1),122(5),122(5)(i),122(9)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 447/LB of 2014, (Tax Year 2007), decision dated: 7-4-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD MAJID QURESHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11781",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1NDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2031 = 2014 SLD 2031 = (2014) 110 TAX 183 = 2015 PTD 1847",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections: 161 & 174(3) 205 - Failure to pay tax collected or deducted - Withholding obligation set out revealed that appellant was in default to the extent of profit on debt, Communication charges, Rent of operating lease and others - Ad of tax liability u/s 161 read with section 205 First appellate authority allowed partial relief to appellant in the sense that orders u/s 161 read with section 205 were set aside and matter was remanded back to for adjudication afresh - Validity - Whether proceedings for tax years 2003, 2004, 2005, & 2006 are hit by limitation, as Court held onus to be discharged by Revenue to undertake proceedings beyond time limitations specified in section 174(3) has not been discharged - Held yes - Whether Taxation Officer that remained outside purview of section 21(c) regarding which default had already been identified in audit proceedings, then, once first appellate authority conceded to this fact, there was no necessity to remand matter - Held yes - Whether directions of first appellate authority to remand matter were unlawful and, therefore, disapproved - Held yes - Whether not only taxation officer transgressed lawful mandate in concluding proceedings u/s 161, but also first appellate authority fell in grave error by remanding matter for adjudication afresh - Held yes - Whether Orders of both authority below are thus vacated being unlawful and unjustified - Held yes.\nIn the orders passed by the taxation officer on 28-06-2012, not a single word has been written to proceed with adjudication at a belated time and beyond the limitation specified in section 174(3) of the Ordinance. That being the case, we have no hesitation to conclude that for tax years 2003, 2004, 2005 & 2006, the proceedings were time barred and hence ab-initio void and illegal. \nThe orders of the authorities below for these years are also not sustainable on another count. In this regard, we are fortified with the submissions of the learned counsel that in this case there was no valid and lawful reason for remand in the circumstances applicable in these years. That is so because firstly, remand in a casual manner has always been deprecated by superior judiciary on the grounds that this tantamount to provide tax authorities with an opportunity to fill in legal lacunas and deficiencies which is not lawful and thus should be avoided unless exceptional circumstances warrant a remand order. Secondly, and more importantly, in this case when admittedly there was no head picked up by the taxation officer that remained outside the purview of section 21(c) of the Ordinance regarding which default had already been identified in audit proceedings, then, once the first appellate authority conceded to this fact, there was no necessity to remand the matter. The only logical outcome after this admission was to vacate the orders. That being the case, we have no hesitation to conclude that directions of the first appellate authority to remand the matter were unlawful and therefore, we disapprove these. \nIn connection with the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants vis-a-vis the manner in which the proceedings have been concluded by the taxation officer i.e., without identification of transactions and parties, no exception could be taken from the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel during the appeal proceedings. We are in full agreement with the ratio decidendi of these s that in the absence of this exercise, the proceedings concluded by the taxation officer would always lack substance and lawful mandate. On this point also, the appeals for all the years including those referred to in paragraph above are liable to be accepted.\nThe upshot of the above discussion is that not only the taxation officer transgressed the lawful mandate in concluding proceedings under section l6l of the Ordinance, but also the first appellate authority fell in grave error by remanding the matter for adjudication afresh. The orders of both the authorities below are thus vacated being unlawful and unjustified.\nCases referred to:\nHabib Bank Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2013) 108 Tax 294 (H. C. Kara); (2012) 105 Tax 489 (Trib), (b) ((2014) 109 Tax 1 (Trib)], (2014) 109 Tax 51 (Trib.); ((2014) 109 Tax 385 (Trib).",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(c),131,161,161(1)(A),162,174(3),177,205\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(c),131,161,161(1)(A),162,174(3),177,205\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. Nos. 375/LB to 379/LB of 2013, (Tax years 2003 to 2006 and 2011), decision dated: 12-6-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAVAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11782",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1NDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2031 = 2014 SLD 2031 = (2014) 110 TAX 194",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001 - Sections: 4A, 4K, 113 & 221 - Rectification of mistakes - Appellant fled false and misleading statement in return of income - Minimum Tax charged on his income and also surcharge on minimum tax liability by assessing officer - Confirmation of treatment by CIR(A) in appeal - Validity - Appellant disclosed gross profit as per accounts of more than 300 million - Errors found after examining its deemed assessments - Show Cause Notice issued by DCIR - Reply to show cause notice on account of non - application of section 113, due to gross loss, found incorrect - Order passed u/s 221 - Tax charged u/s 113 on declared turn over together with surcharge on minimum tax liability - Appeals rejected by CIR(A) - Challenge to - Whether failure of application of any provision of law falls under purview of rectification - Held yes - Whether scope of rectification cannot be limited to arithmetical error and any mistake of law which is glaring and floating on surface can be rectified - Held yes - Whether departmental action to invoke provisions of section 221 was correct treatment and findings of CIR(A) on issue in reference to case laws relied upon by taxpayer are endorsed and consequently appeals on this issue fail in both years - Held yes - Whether standard from classification of various heads of expenses and their respective placement not only possess strength of As, GAAP, IFRs but Companies Ordinance, Income Tax Ordinance and other enactments of state led compliance institutions relying on financial statements - Held yes - Whether taxpayer is trade and as such not involved in any manufacturing activity, so expense of depreciation would be indirect in his case, but on contrary it claims depreciation as direct expense - Held yes - Whether term gross refers to total amount received as result of some activity whereas bet refers to amount left over after all deductions are made - Held yes - Whether declaration of debtors / creditors / inventory etc. fortify findings of two officers below that taxpayer is trade and not commission Agent, therefore, for levy of minimum tax, turnover of taxpayer should be same as is defined vide section 113(3) of ordinance - Held yes - Whether since levy u/s 113 is being upheld, charge of tax u/s 4K is also endorsed and no exception can be taken and appeal fails - Held yes.\nWe are of the calculated view that failure of application of any provision, of law falls under the purview of rectification. Scope of rectification cannot be limited to arithmetical error and any mistake of law which is glaring and floating on the surface can be rectified. Taxpayer cannot take refuge to avoid application of law merely complicating or protracting the legal issue. Neither documents were called nor fishing enquiries were made prior to the impugned orders u/s. 221. The accounting records accompanying the return were consulted to apply the relevant legal provisions. Hence in our view, the departmental action to invoke the provisions of Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was the correct treatment. The findings of CIR(A) on the issue in reference to case laws relied upon by the taxpayer are endorsed in both the years. Consequently, the appeals on this issue fail in both the years. \nAs per our understanding gross profit and net profit are segregated and earlier two stages of profit. Same is the case with loss. The entire economic activity during a specific period is delineated through a standard form presentation and necessarily make any of the following sequence depending upon the relative weight of the value put in it\nHEAD \n\n\n\n\n\n\nAmount in Rs. \nGross Income\n\n\n\n\n\n____________\nLess Direct Expenses\n_____________\nGross Profit or loss\n\n\n\n\n____________\nIndirect Expenses\n_____________\n\nNet Loss profit or loss\n\n\n\n\n____________\nA standard form classification of various heads of expenses and their respective placement not only possess the strength of IAS, GAAP, IFRS but Companies Ordinance, Income Tax Ordinance and other Enactments of state led compliance Institutions relying on financial statements.\nWhen we talk of gross profit, it means gross income as reduced by all the expenses to acquire, produce, procure, convert, manufacture, import or even the input of human services or machine hours. After producing and possessing (including constructive possession), its further delivery for the purpose of earning would involve indirect expenses. So the base line to identify an expenses as direct or indirect would be that all expenses would be direct till a product is capable of selling and all indirect expenses would be incurred for the purpose of selling till the product reaches the consumer or buyer. To our understanding, the same principle is applied to distinguish and charge carriage inward (direct) carriage outward (indirect), wages (direct), salaries (indirect), import expenses (direct), Export freight (indirect), depreciation on production machines (direct), depreciation on selling machines (fork lift) (indirect) and so on.\nThe proviso to Section 113(1) is concessional in nature and takes into account the cases of hardship i.e. suffering from losses and accordingly grants exemption from minimum tax liability. Now gross loss means loss in business at earlier stage; Before depreciation means that depreciation (direct) will further increase the loss and inadmissible expenses to be ignored out-rightly. So if business sustains loss at earlier stage, subsequent additions in the shape of depreciation (direct) or others indirect expense would further increase the losses and net loss be a higher amount. So we consider the concession for entities who suffer from gross loss (earlier stage) than net loss (later stage). This is not the case of present taxpayer as it did not sustain loss at earlier stage. \n \nIn the instant case, taxpayer is a trader and as such not involved in any manufacturing activity. So the expense of depreciation would be indirect in his case. On the contrary, it claims depreciation as a direct expense. If the interpretation of tax payer to avail the exemption from Section 113 is followed an amazing account presentation emerges.\nThe learned AR wanted that his indirect expense be adjusted to arrive at gross loss as marked above. Practically, he pleaded that gross loss will absorb all sort of expenses except the two expenses i.e. depreciation and inadmissible expenses. Since inadmissible expenses would not be worth consideration or legal sanction behind the claim, further deduction of depreciation would instantly work out the net loss or loss sustained from the entire business operation. Had this been the purpose, then instead of \"\"gross loss\"\", \"\"net loss\"\" or \"\"loss\"\" would have been expressed in the statute. To us, the term gross refers to the total amount received as result of some activity whereas net refers to the amount left over after all deductions are made. Once net value is attained, nothing further is subtracted. The net value is not allowed to be made lower. \nWe may refer to standards as financial statements are prepared in accordance with the approved accounting standard as applicable in Pakistan which include International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the International Accounting Standards Board as or notified under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. Format of IAS 1 ordains 3 stages of calculating profit and income for the presentation of financial statement:\ni. Gross Profit/Gross Loss i.e. revenue less direction expenses.\nii. Operational profit i.e. profit before financial expenses.\niii. Net profit before taxation i.e. less all expenses except to be charged tax.\nAccounts are not made for the purposes of taxation only. There are other direct indirect and connected stakeholders to whom the taxpayer owes the duty of cafe and skill besides complete and correct reporting.\nAnother difference of opinion between the two authorities below and the taxpayer had been Accounting gross profit or taxation gross profit. We are of the opinion that in some areas, taxpayer adjusts his gross profit and net profits in the context of legal admissibility or inadmissibility. This is usually done by submitting an adjustment sheet which is read with the original accounts. In other words, the adjustment sheet is a bridge between accounting version and taxable income. This also ensures the sustenance of accounting presentation as per standard for the use of other concerned parties besides flexing it for the purpose of taxation. We hold that in order to apply the law both the declaration would be worth consideration. However, in the instant case there is no material difference between accounting gross profit/tax gross profit or accounting net loss/tax net loss. So any further discussion at this stage would not be relevant. However, we are fully agreed with the treatment meted out by the CIR(A) on this in his orders for both the years.\n(Trading or Commission) We have examined the orders of authorities below meticulously and heard the argument of both AR of the taxpayer and DR of the department. We are of the opinion that the business of the taxpayer is of trading nature involving purchase and sale of the pharmaceutical products with all risks and rewards vested in the taxpayer that is the main criteria to differentiate between an agent and independent business entity. The declaration of debtors/creditors/inventory etc. fortify the findings of two officers below that taxpayer is a trader and not a commission agent. Therefore, for the purpose of levy of minimum tax, turnover of the taxpayer should be the same as is defined vide Section 113(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nIn the instant case turnover has not be worked out by the assessing officer:-He just relied on what was declared in S. No. 160 of the prescribed return. Therefore, the ground of appeal before CIR(A) and this Tribunal that gross profit (difference between net sales and cost of sales) be considered for the purpose levy of tax under Section 113 merits rejection. The department has just to the taxpayer by allowing 80% relief from the minimum tax rate of 1% in the light of SRO No. 69(1)/2010 dated 03-02-2010. Here we endorse the detailed findings of CIR(A) in this behalf in both the tax years under appeal.\nLastly we also endorse the findings of CIR(A) on various case laws cited by the taxpayer and thoroughly discussed in the body of order. No exception can be taken.\nSince the levy u/s 113 is being upheld, we further endorse the charge of tax u/s 4K for the tax year 2011. No exception can be taken in this context and the appeal fails on this ground as well.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4A,4K,113,113(1),113(3),221\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=4A,4K,113,113(1),113(3),221\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 282/KB of 2013, (Tax years 2010 and 2011), decision dated: 31-10-2013",
    "Judge Name:": "FAHEEMUL HAQ KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND, JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11783",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1NTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2032 = 2014 SLD 2032 = (2014) 110 TAX 41",
    "Key Words:": "(A) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001)......Section 39 & 111(1)(b) Income from other sources......Completion of assessment......Taxing huge amount as deemed income solely by misapplying provisions of Ordinance by Department......Legality......Whether plain reading of order passed by IRAO makes it abundantly clear that completion of assessment by officer is not an oversight or mistake, but it is result of thought process by which officer has been guided and conducted proceedings in arbitrary manner......Held yes......Whether such like attitude of tax Department to show muscles neither serves public exchequer nor economy of country......Held yes......Whether without considering clearly worded order issued by High Court huge amount has been taxed as deemed income solely by misapplying provisions of ordinance which is patently illegal......Held yes.\nA plain reading of the order passed by IRAO makes it abundantly clear that the completion of assessment by the officer is not an oversight or mistake but it is the result of the thought process by which the officer has been guided and conducted the proceedings in an arbitrary manner. Taxpayer is not to be put under fear that he has to remember scenario of each and every entry at the end of year. Rather he has to work freely and concentrate upon his business to earn money. If he will earn something, he will pay to government exchequer because in corporate sector taxpayers each and every unit is in-fact a partner of the exchequer for 35% of their profits. Such like attitude of Tax department to show the muscle neither serves the public exchequer nor the economy of the country. Strange enough that without considering the clearly worded order issued by the Hon'ble High Court a huge amount of Rs.81,684,612/- has been taxed as deemed income solely by misapplying the provisions of the Ordinance which is patently illegal.\n(B) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001)......Sections 111(1)(2), 111(1)(b), 177 & 122(1)......Amendment of assessments......Selection of case for audit......Unexplained income or assets......Addition by taxation officer......deletion by C1R(A)......Validity......(1) Whether it is quite strange that Deptt. has contested deletion to extent of Rs. 307,238/- while CIR(A) deleted whole addition of Rs.5,427,258/- made by IRAO meaning thereby that department itself confessed illegal intervention by Inland Revenue Assessing officer......Held yes -Whether other addition in income u/s 111(1)(b) also appears to be act of mal-administration of justice at part of IRAO, who intentionally molded fact against legal and factual position,,.Held yes......Whether IRAO intentionally ignored basic fact which goes to roots of case and wrongly invoked provisions of section 111(1 )(b)......Held yes......Whether additions u/s 111 made by IRAO are not only vindictive, Capricious, biased, but also patently illegal and nullity in eyes of law, therefore, Intervention by CIR(A) to delete same is in accordance with applicable law on issue......Held yes.\nIn case of addition u/s 111(1)(a) when all of the parties/creditors are registered taxpayers under the Ordinance as well as under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and all payments have been routed through cross-cheques in accordance with the provisions of section 73 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and the taxpayer had also provided complete documentation/record relevant to the purchases and payments made to the creditors including ledgers accounts of the parties, which clearly shows that payments to the creditors against the outstanding balances shown in the ledgers as on June 30, 2010, there is no justification for the addition u/s 111. It is quite strange that deptt. has contested the deletion to the extent of Rs.307,238/- while the learned CIR(A) deleted the whole addition of Rs.5,427,258/- made by the IRAO meaning thereby department itself confessed the illegal intervention by the IRAO.\nOther addition in income for Rs.81,684,612/- u/s 111(1)(b) of the Ordinance also appears to be an act of mal-administration of justice at the part of IRAO, who intentionally molded the fact against the legal and factual position, It is inevitable to reproduce the relevant provisions of the law:\nUnexplained income or assets.......(1) Where -\n(a) any amount is credited in a person's books of account;\n(b) a person has made any investment or is the owner of any money or valuable article.\nThe IRAO added the difference of liability recorded by the taxpayer in the books of accounts and as communicated by the bank, however, the IRAO miserably failed to identify the nature of investment or valuable article before making huge addition u/s 111(1)(b) of the Ordinance in the hands of taxpayer company. The law on the issue is very much clear, where a person has made any investment or is the owner of any money or valuable article and the person offers no explanation about the nature and source of the investment, valuable article, or the explanation offered by the person is not, in the Commissioner's opinion, satisfactory, value of the investment/article, shall be included in the person's income chargeable to tax under head \"\"Income from Other Sources\"\" to the extent it is not adequately explained. In this case the IRAO intentionally ignored the basic fact which goes to the roots of the case and wrongly invoked the provisions of section 111(1)(b) of the Ordinance.\nIRAO by misconstruing the law has proceeded to add the said amount into taxable income u/s 111(1)(b), holding the taxpayer as owner of investment or valuable article is devoid of any legal sanction behind it but also it is a transgression which cannot be approved and stand the test of appeal. This bent of mind at the part of IRAO reflects poor appreciation of law and facts which being based on surmises and stock phrases does not find place in the Ordinance. Even the IRAO does not know the basic accounting principles that it is not only compulsory condition that against each and every liability there must be some investment or asset. Expenditures viz a viz assets both can be financed through a liability, however, it appears the IRAQ has his own accounting principles and interpretation of fiscal laws like Ordinance. Additions u/s 111 made by the IRAO are not only vindictive, capricious, biased but also patently illegal and nullity in the eyes of law, therefore, intervention by the CIR(A) to delete the same is in accordance with the applicable law on the issue.\nThese legal flaws in the assessment are in addition to the facts mentioned in the order of CIR(A) which is clear and unequivocal. The respondent taxpayer has explained, all the factual issues and the so called discrepancies pointed out by the IRAO in assessment order, to the satisfaction of the CIR(A) against which no mentionable argument has been advanced before us by the department. In addition thereof the assessment is not in strict compliance of the provisions of the law, the deletions, therefore, are unexceptionable.\nThe upshot of the above discussion is that IRAO has arbitrarily and contrary to the provisions of law, ignored the facts and completed the assessment blindly. The order of the learned CIR(A) is reasoned one since he has decided the case purely in view of documentary evidence provided by the taxpayer not only before the IRAO but also in appeal proceedings which was also duly cross examined in the presence of IRAO who is the author of the order. The learned D.R. has failed to rebut the assertions made by the A.R as well as observations made by the learned CIR(A) in his order. Keeping all these facts in view, we are of the opinion that the learned CIR(A) was amply justified in deleting the additions u/s 111 of the Ordinance, thus no interference is required in the impugned order which is hereby maintained.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=39,111(1)(a),111(1)(b),111(1)(2),177,122(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=39,111(1)(a),111(1)(b),111(1)(2),177,122(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 154/LB/2014 (Tax Year 2010), decision dated: 16-4-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. SHAHID IQBAL DHILLON, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD RAZA BAQIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11784",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1NTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2033 = 2014 SLD 2033 = (2014) 110 TAX 65",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001)......Sections 161 & 236(1)(b)(3)......Sale and proclamation of sales......Business of public call office......Non deduction of tax from telephone users......Show Cause notice......Respondent/Taxpayer held personally liable to pay tax......Appeal dismissed by CIR(A)......Taxpayer succeeded before Tribunal......Reference application to High Court......Whether section 236 of Ordinance clearly spells out that liability of advance tax shall be collected on amount of prepaid cards for telephones -Held yes......Whether in year 2004-2005, liability to deduct advance tax was restricted to pay phone companies dealing in sale of prepaid cards only......Held yes......Whether in year 2004-2005, section 236(1) was not applicable to case of payphones dealing with sale of units, therefore, tax reference is decided against department......Held yes.\nThe above section clearly spells out that the liability of the advance tax shall be collected on the amount of Prepaid Cards for telephones. Admittedly the respondent taxpayer does not sell any prepaid cards, but in fact sells units, which are consumed by the consumers. The difference between the business of payphone company dealing with prepaid cards and the company dealing with units becomes clear when an amendment was introduced in the year 2010 in Section 236 (1) (c) and (3A), which read as under:\n\"\"236. Telephone users.-\n(1) (c) sale of units through any electronic medium or whatever form.\n* [The word \"\"mobile\"\" was omitted by Finance Ordinance 2002]\n(3A) The person issuing or selling units through any electronic medium or whatever form shall collect advance tax under sub-section (1) from the purchaser at the time of issuance or sale of units.\nFrom the above, it is clear that in the year 2004-2005 the liability to deduct the advance tax was restricted to pay phone companies dealing in sale of prepaid cards only. Business of selling prepaid cards is different from selling of units as has been highlighted by the legislature through the amendment brought about in Section 236 (1) (c) and (3A).\nWe, therefore, hold that in the year 2004-2005 dealing Section 236 (1) was not applicable to the case of payphones with the sale of units. Our answers to both the questions of law raised in this reference are in affirmative. This tax reference, is therefore, decided against the department accordingly.\nCases referred to:\nCall Tell (Pvt.) Ltd., and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others [(2005) 91 Tax 1]; Union Cosmic Communications (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi v. Central Board of Revenue and another [(2006) 94 Tax 207] and Naseer A. Sheikh and 4 others v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax (Investigation), Lahore and others (PLD 1992 SC 276).",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,236(1)(b)(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,236(1)(b)(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 35/2011, dated 25-3-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID, JAMIL KHAN AND SYED MANSOOR ALL SHAH, JJ.",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF Income Tax (LEGAL)\nVs\nBEEPS & BELLS COMMUNICATION (PVT.) LTD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11785",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1NTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2297 = 2001 SLD 2297 = 2001 CLC 63",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--------Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Purchase of plots in auction--­Cancellation of plots---Failure to issue allotment order---Petitioner was successful bidder and had paid 50% of the occupancy value in accordance with the terms of auction---Authorities did not issue the allotment order and the petitioner failed to pay the balance price within specified time---Plots were cancelled from the name of the petitioner without any show-cause notice---Validity---Value of the plots was tremendously increased and it was not fair to tie down the Authorities to deliver possession on the basis of terms agreed several years ago because of negligence of their officers--­Petitioner having agreed to pay Rs.1,00,000 over and above the occupancy value of the plots. Authorities were directed by High Court to deliver allotment order and possession of plots upon payment of Rs.1,00,000 to the petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.1146 and Miscellaneous No.2443 of 1998, decision dated: 16-05-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED, J",
    "": "NAJEEB AHMED \nvs \nGOVERNMENT OF SINDH through Secretary Local Bodies Housing and Town Planning, Karachi and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11786",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1NTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2298 = 2001 SLD 2298 = 2001 CLC 81",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958)-------S. 10---Permanent transfer deed, issuance of---Powers of Settlement Authorities to interfere in allotment---Subsequent to issuance of title documents---Extent---After the issuance of title documents i.e. Permanent transfer Deed, the property absolutely vests in the transferee and the Settlement Authorities become functus officio, subject to fraud or forgery.\n \n(b) Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act (XIV of 1975)---\n \n----S. 2(2)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition ---Re-opening of matter---Permanent Transfer Deed was issued in favour of the petitioner on 24-4-1962---Settlement Authorities in the garb of application for inspection of the premises prepared a report, dated 24-9-1997, whereby the premises were stated to be owned by the Settlement Department and not transferred to the petitioner--- Validity---Authorities did not act in accordance with law in re-opening of the matter on the basis of such application---Report prepared by the Settlement Authorities was without lawful authority.\n \nMuhammad Ali Hassan and others v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner and others 1991 CLC Note 66 at p.50; Province of Punjab and others v. Mufti Abdul Ghani PLD 1985 SC 1; Ali Muhammad v. Haji Hussain and 2 others PLD 1975 Kar. 971; S. Anwar Hussain Sani v. Sarfraz Ahmad and 2 others PLD 1971 SC 669; Mst. Hajiani Fatima Bai and 6 ethers v. Ibrahim and 13 others PLD 1972 Kar. 610; Sh. Fazal-ur-Rehman v. Pakistan through The Secretary, Ministry of Works and Rehabilitation, Islamabad 1987 SCMR 1036; Bilqis Begum and others v. Fazal Muhammad and others 1987 SCMR 1441; Khawaja Bashir Ahmad v. The Additional Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others 1991 SCMR 1604 and Dost Muhammad v. Member, Board of Revenue (Settlement and Rehabilitation Wing) and others 1991 SCMR 84 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.217/R of 1997, heard on 11th September 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "JAMALUDDIN \nvs\nMEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11787",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1NTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2034 = 2014 SLD 2034 = (2014) 110 TAX 49 = 2015 PTD 626",
    "Key Words:": "Income fax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001)......Sections 111(1)(b) & 121(1)......Unexplained income or assets......Notice -Failure to submit documentary evidence by taxpayer with regard to encashment of foreign remittance through scheduled bank for the purchase of shop......Best assessment......Addition -Validity......Whether provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (4) of section HI are not attracted as taxpayer has explainable sources to make investment......Held yes......Whether availability of sources was satisfactorily proved by taxpayer through documentary evidence and thus order of CIR(A) who has rightly deleted addition made u/s 111(1)(b) maintained and departmental appeal is dismissed......Held yes\nThe provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (4) of section 111 are not attracted in this instant case as the taxpayer has explainable sources to make investment. The availability of sources was satisfactorily proved by the taxpayer through documentary (evidence) submitted before me. Under such circumstances, I find no reason to disturb the order of the learned CIR(A) who has rightly deleted the addition made u/s 111(1)(b). Order of the learned CIR(A) is accordingly maintained and appeal of the department is dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b),121(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b),121(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1439/LB of 2012, (Tax Year 2006), decision dated: 27-3-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR-UL-HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11788",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6Q1NTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2299 = 2001 SLD 2299 = 2001 CLC 69",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S. 27---Restraint of trade---Sale of goodwill---Contract having tendency to such restriant---Powers of Courts to consider restraint of trade---Scope and principles---Courts are empowered to consider restraint of trade upon the touchstone of reasonableness---Broad principles on reasonable restraint where good-will is sold are that the restraint sought to be imposed must be in the interest of the parties and such restraint should be justified in the public interest.\n \n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----Ss. 42 & 54---Contract Act (IX of 1872) S.27---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Interim injunction, grant of---Good-will, selling of---Dispute regarding restraint on business of photography---Plaintiff purchased shop owned by the defendant alongwith its equipment, fixtures and good-will---Agreement executed between the parties imposed restrain upon the defendant to carry on the similar business not only in that city but in the whole Province---Defendant denied such agreement and relied upon another agreement which was a novation of the agreement produced by the plaintiff---Contention by the plaintiff was that the defendant could not be allowed to do the same business in whole of the Province---Validity---Where the defendant was a skilled photographer, it would be unfair to deny his expertise to the residents of the city as the same would not be in the public interest---Placing of just, reasonable and fair restraint on the defendant both in terms of space and time was possible but vide restraint as contemplated by the agreement relied upon by the plaintiff could not be justified---Defendant was restrained from doing the same business in certain areas specified by the High Court for a period of five years---Application was allowed accordingly.\n \nH.B.F.C. v. Shahinshah Humayun House Building Cooperative Housing Society, Ltd. 1992 SCMR 19; Khatoon Begum v. Hyesons Corporation 1980 CLC 1666; Commentaries on the Contract Act by S. Sanjive Rao and Dr. Avtar Singh; Connors Brothers Ltd. v. Bernard Connors AIR 1941 PC 75; Mulluk Chand v. Surendra Nath AIR 1957 Cal. 217; Trego v. Hunt (1896) AC 7; Mc Ellistrim v. Ballymaclligot (1919) AC 548 and Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harpers Garage (Stourport) Limited (1968) AC 781 ref.\n \nNordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Co. (1894) AC 535; Jenkins v. Reid (1984) IAER 471; Routh v. James (1947) IAER 758; Unichmichem Corporation v. Abdullah Ismail 1992 MLD 2374; Submiimanian v. Kizhakaru Poduval AIR 1922 Mad. 519; District Board v. Hari Chand AIR 1934 Lah. 474; Amba Parsad v. Jugal Kishore AIR 1936 Allah. 112 and Ramamurthy v. Nandi Ramwalmma AIR 1940 Mad. 558 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 115 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No.507 of 2000, decision dated: 19-06-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY, J",
    "": "Syed SHABIH HAIDER ZAIDI----Plaintiff \nvs \nShaikh MUHAMMAD ZAHOOR UDDIN--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11789",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2300 = 2001 SLD 2300 = 2001 CLC 78",
    "Key Words:": "West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-------S. 5---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 --- Constitutional petition---Maintenance allowances, claimed by wife and minor daughter--­Appropriateness---Suit filed by wife and minor daughter was decreed by Family Court---Lower Appellate Court modified the decree and fixed a sum of Rs.2,000 and Rs.1,000 per month as maintenance for wife and minor daughter respectively---Validity---Where monthly income of the petitioner was Rs.6,000 per month, Lower Appellate Court had correctly fixed the maintenance which was proper considering the financial position of the petitioner--No illegality having been committed by the Lower Appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction, Constitutional petition was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 10933 of 1999, heard on 14-09-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "DR. MUNIR AHMAD MUGHAL, J",
    "": "Syed NAJMUL HASSAN \nvs \nMst. NABEELA TABASSUM and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11790",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2301 = 2001 SLD 2301 = 2001 CLC 87",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits an Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 15 & 21---Payment of decretal amount in instalments as provided in 5.15 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Scope---Banking Court, prior to exercise of powers with regard to the repayment of decretal amount by way of instalments had to obtain the detailed and reasoned opinion of the concerned banking companies in writing for such purpose---Where no ground for instalment was placed before the High Court, no such opinion or consent of the bank was called for by the High Court---Appeal was dismissed in limine.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S. 9---Contract Act (IX of 1872) Ss. 127 & 128---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Liability of guarantors---Scope---Where the borrower had committed default in payment of loan to the bank the guarantors were liable jointly and severally for such loan under the provisions of Ss. 127 & 128 of Contract Act, 1872.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No.360 of 1998, decision dated: 16-11-1999",
    "Judge Name:": "HUMID ALI MIRZA AND AHMAD ZAHEER, JAMALI, JJ",
    "": "KOHINOOR FIBRES LIMITED and 2 others \nvs \nFIRST U.D.L. MODARABA and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11791",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2035 = 2014 SLD 2035 = (2014) 110 TAX 69 = 2015 PTD 882",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ord. 2001 (XLIX of 2001)......Sections 177 & 122(1)......Amendment of assessments......Selection of case for audit CIR(A) held that selection of case for audit is unconstitutional, illegal and without lawful authority......Validity......Whether CIR(A) has discussed matter at length regarding selection of case for audit u/s 177 of Ordinance in view of directions in of Lahore High Court, therefore, order of CIR(A) is upheld and appeal filed by Deptt. is dismissed......Held yes.\nCIR(A)) has discussed the matter at length regarding the selection of case for audit under section 177 of the Income, Tax Ordinance, 2001 in view of directions in of Lahore High Court Therefore, I find no interference with the impugned order of the learned CIR(A) which is upheld, hence the appeal filed by the department is dismissed.\nCases referred to:\n2012 PTD 1815 (Lah, H.C.) and 2013 PTD 1552 (Pesh. H.C.).",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177,122(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=177,122(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No 524/KB of 2013 (Tax Year-2011, decision dated: 30-5-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ANWAR GORAYA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11792",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2301 = 2001 SLD 2301 = 2001 CLC 97",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Lunacy Act (IV of 1912)-------S. 3(5)---\"\"Lunatic\"\"---Connotation---Person of unsound mind as well as incapable of managing himself and his affairs was a \"\"lunatic\"\".\n \n(b) Lunacy Act (IV of 1912)---\n \n----S. 3(5)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.100---Second appeal--- Plea of lunacy---Suit was filed assailing alienation of suit property on the ground that the appellant was lunatic and any transaction on behalf of the appellant was void transaction---Trial Court decreed the suit-where--- As Lower Appellate Court dismissed the same as to the Court, the appellant was not a lunatic and guardian of appellant was appointed in oblivion of the provisions of Lunacy Act, 1912---Validity---Where the appellant appeared in Trial Court voluntarily as a witness, the of Lower Appellate Court was not open to interference.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular Second Appeal No.552 of 1971, decision dated: 20-12-1999",
    "Judge Name:": "FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HANIF \nvs \nRaja MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11793",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2036 = 2014 SLD 2036 = (2014) 110 TAX 71",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990)......Sections 2(14), 2(37), 4, 7, 8, 8A, 10, 11, 22, 26, 33, 34, 36(1) 73......Assessment of tax and recovery of tax not levied or short levied or erroneously refunded......Deptt. observed that taxpayer has illegally claimed/received refund of input tax against invoices of supplier who has been declared blacklisted by Deptt.......Show Cause notice confronting sales tax liability was issued and taxpayer was charged with contravention of provisions of sales tax act and was asked as to why refunded amount of sales tea may not be recovered along with default surcharge and penalty......Taxpayer's written submissions did not find any favour and adjudication proceedings culminated against him......CIR(A) vacated demand of sales tax in appeal......Validity......Whether since order of black listing of supplier has been set aside and not holding field any more, therefore, recovery of already sanctioned amount of sales tax against his invoices is illegal, unlawful and unjustified......Held yes......Whether at time of business transactions, status of supplier unit was operative, its subsequent inclusion as black listed/suspected one through executive order cannot be operated retrospectively......Held yes -Whether order of CIR(A) does not suffer from any irregularity, illegality and infirmity which does not warrant any interference by Tribunal and same is accordingly confirmed and upheld......Held yes\n \nSince, the order of black-listing Messrs Adeel Packages, Faisalabad has been set aside not holding the field anymore therefore, recovery of already sanctioned amount of sales tax against his invoices is illegal, unlawful and unjustified. It is contended by the AR that the blacklisting order of Messrs Adeel Packages ceases.\nWe must add here that the transactions of the taxpayer took place, during August, 2002 to March, 2003 when the alleged supplier was enjoying his status as 'operative person' and was not included in the list of black-listed units and his subsequent inclusion in that very list in the surpassing years i.e. 29-12-2007 cannot be made applicable retrospectively. Since at the time of business transactions, the status of the supplier unit was operative, its subsequent inclusion as black listed/ suspected one through an executive order cannot be operated.\nIn view of what has been stated hereinabove, we reached at the irresistible conclusion that the grounds of appeal agitated by the revenue-department against the impugned order of the learned CIR(A) are not tenable in the eye of law. Since, the order of the learned CIR(A) impugned before us does not suffer from any irregularity, illegality and infirmity which does not warrant any interference by this Tribunal and the same is accordingly confirmed and upheld.\nCases referred to:\n(2012 PTD (Trib.) 754), (2012 PTD (Trib.) 946; 2012 PTD (Trib.) 1736; 2011 PTD (Trib.) 791 and 2010 PTD (Trib.) 1675.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(14),2(37),4,7,8,8A,10,11,22,26,33,34,36(1)73\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(14),2(37),4,7,8,8A,10,11,22,26,33,34,36(1)73\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 186/LB OF 2010, decision dated: 23-9-2013, hearing DATE : 19-9-2013",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SOHAIL AFZAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Muhammad Asif, D.R. for the . Khubaib Ahmad Taunsvi, for the"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11794",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2037 = 2014 SLD 2037 = (2014) 110 TAX 145 = 2014 PTD 2016 = 2014 SCMR 1630",
    "Key Words:": "Gas Infrastructure Development 'cess' Act, 2011 - Sections: 4 & 4(1) - Sales Tax Act, 1990, section 2(4) - Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Articles 73, 73(1), 73(2), 77, 80(2), 160(3), 160(2)(4) - Federal Legislative List, Entry 49, 51, 52 & 53 - First and Second Schedule - Collection of 'cess' for construction of pipelines for importing natural gas and equalization of gas prices -Power of Federal Govt. of barring amendment in First and Second Schedule - Introduction of \"\"Cess\"\" through Money Bill Art. 73 of Constitution - Validity - Whether particular levy has been subject matter of long line s of Courts in Pakistan as well as India have decided this question upon examining facts and circumstances of each case keeping in mind criteria for holding levy fee or tax - Held yes - Whether \"\"Cess\"\" has been defined as \"\"tax\"\" which is raised as revenue to be applied for specific purpose - Held yes - Whether before referring test applied by our Courts for drawing distinction between \"\"tax\"\" and fee\"\" two s, one by Indian Supreme Court and other from Australian High Court need to be examined - Held yes - Whether first case laid down principle of equivalence in determining whether particular levy is fee - Held yes - Whether in this case Court held that this principle was converse of principle of ability to pay and main basis of fee or compensatory tax was quantifiable and measurable benefit - Held yes - Whether this was not followed by Supreme Court in case of Vijayalakshmi Rice Mills and Other v Commercial Tax officers Palakot wherein it was held that Jindal Stainless Ltd.'s Case cannot be interpreted to mean that the change which has taken place in concept of \"\"fee\"\" has vanished and by this decision old concept of fee has been restored and now it has to be established that particular individual from whom fee\"\" is realized must be rendered some specific service - Held yes - Whether upon examining case law from our own and other jurisdictions it emerges that \"\"Cess\"\" is levied for particular purpose, it can either be \"\"tax\"\" or fee\"\" depending upon nature of levy - Held yes - Whether both are compulsory exaction of money by public authorities, whereas tax is common burden for raising revenue and upon collection becomes part of public revenue and state fee is exacted for specific purpose and for rendering services or providing privilege to particular individuals for a class or community or specific area - Held yes - Whether 'cess' collected is to be utilized for specific purposes, namely, development of infrastructure of Iran Pakistan pipelines project - Held yes - Whether as reflected in annual budget, GIDC is not tax and was to be excluded from divisible pool under National Finance Commission Award - Held yes - Whether above determination is sufficient to hold that being Yee\"\" same could not have been imposed through money bill and on this score levy was liable to struck down - Held yes - Whether since \"\"GIDC\"\" is not \"\"tax\"\" same could not have been introduced as money bill under Art. 73 of Constitution - Held yes - Whether admittedly, natural gas is subject to levy of Sales Tax and GIDC Act, 2011 does not appear to suggest that it is another instance of Sales Tax levied by parliament on supply of natural gas as double Taxation can be imposed only by clear and specific language and not by implication - Held yes - Whether authorities clearly lay down, with reference to Entry 52 and other entries in Part I of Federal Legislature List, that tax cannot be levied under said Entry if goods or activity has already been subjected to tax or duty under any other Entry - Held yes - Whether clause (4) of Art. 160(2) of constitution binds president to pass order in accordance with recommendations by National Finance Commission - Held yes - Whether Violation of Art. 160 Constitution for not including \"\"Cess\"\" in divisible pool cannot be made touchstone for declaring very levy unconstitutional - Held yes - Whether to conclude that GIDC is \"\"fee\"\" and not \"\"tax\"\" in alternative is not covered by any entry relating to imposition or levy of tax under Part I of Federal Legislative List - Held yes - Whether on either counts \"\"Cess\"\" could not have been introduced through money bill under Art. 73 of Constitution, therefore, same was not validity levied in accordance with Constitution - Held yes. \nThe question whether a particular levy is a tax or a fee has been the subject matter of long line s of the Courts in Pakistan as well as in India. The Courts have decided this question upon examining the facts and circumstances of each case keeping in mind the criteria for holding the levy a fee or tax. 'cess' has been defined as a tax, which raises revenue to be applied for a specific purpose. Nomenclature, however, would not be relevant and whether the imposition of a particular 'cess' can be termed as a tax or fee would depend upon the nature of a levy. \nBefore referring to the test applied by our Courts for drawing distinction between tax and fee, two s, one by the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Jindal Stainless Ltd. Etc. v. State of Haryana & Others (supra) and the other from Australian High Court in the case of Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Limited v. Common Wealth (ibid), need to be examined. The first case, reliance upon which was placed by Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC, had laid down the principle of equivalence in determining whether a particular levy is a fee. The Court held that this principle was converse of the principle of ability to pay and that the main basis of a fee or a compensatory tax was the quantifiable and measurable benefit. That under the principle of equivalence there is indication of quantifiable data namely the benefit which is measurable. This however was not followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Vijayalakshmi Rice Mill and Others v. Commercial Tax Officers Palakol (ibid) wherein it was held that Jindal Stainless Ltd.'s case (supra) cannot be interpreted to mean that the sea change which has taken place in the concept of fee has vanished and that by this decision the old concept of fee has been restored and now it has to be established that a particular individual from whom the fee is realized must be rendered some specific service. The Court went on to hold that the principle laid down in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shivalik Agro Poly Products (AIR 2004 SC 4393) still holds the field regarding the nature of fee.\nUpon examining the case law from our own and other jurisdictions it emerges that the 'cess' is levied for a particular purpose. It can either be tax or fee depending upon the nature of the levy. Both are compulsory exaction of money by public authorities. Whereas tax is a common burden for raising revenue and upon collection becomes part of public revenue of the State, fee is exacted for a specific purpose and for rendering services or providing privilege to particular individuals or a class or a community or a specific area. However, the benefit so accrued may not be measurable in exactitude. So long as the levy is to the advantage of the payers, consequential benefit to the community at large would not render the levy a 'tax'. In the light of this statement of law it is to be examined whether the GIDC is a 'tax' or a 'fee'.\nTo recapitulate the 'cess' collected is to be utilized for specific purposes, namely, development of infrastructure of Iran Pakistan Pipeline Project, Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) Pipeline Project, LNG or other projects or for price equalization of other imported alternative fuels including LPG. An annual report regarding utilization of the amount so collected is to be regularly placed before the House after three months of the end of each fiscal year (See S.4 of GIDC Act). The levy therefore is to be utilized only for the purposes mentioned in the GIDC Act. The same is not a common burden for raising revenue generally. The money so collected from the levy is to be utilized for a specific purpose for the advantage and benefit of the consumers of gas. The 'cess' is basically to be levied on all consumers of gas with certain exemptions, mainly for domestic consumers. This exemption is by way of relief to such consumers. Even otherwise the data so provided to us regarding consumption of gas by different sectors shows that the domestic sector consumes only 20.3% of the total gas whereas 76% of the total gas is consumed by those from whom the 'cess' is collected (see Pakistan Energy Year Book, 2012). The latter sector has invested in development of the infrastructure for utilization of gas for their respective concerns. As envisaged in Section 4 of GIDC Act, the 'cess' is mainly to be utilized for development of the pipelines from other countries and other similar projects in order to ensure continuous and increased supply of gas to this sector. Undoubtedly other consumers or country as a whole would also benefit from such Projects but the same is inconsequential compared to the advantage that will accrue to the payers.\nThus on the Governments own showing, as reflected in the Annual Budget, GIDC is not a tax. No argument has been advanced on behalf of the appellants to explain away the categorization of GIDC as Non-Tax Revenue by the Government in the Annual Budget. This is not a mere accounting procedure as urged by Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC, who in this context had relied upon Sheikh Muhammad Ismail & Co. v Chief Cotton Inspector Council (supra), but were part of the Annual Budget Statements. As submitted by Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC, the possible reason why the levy has been reflected as Non-Tax Revenue in the Budget was to exclude it from the divisible pool under the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award. The above determination is sufficient to hold that being a fee the same could not have been imposed through a money bill and on this score the levy was liable to be struck down. \nIt follows from the above that GIDC is not a tax but a fee. Having held so, the same could not have been introduced as money bill under Article 73 of the Constitution. However, we now take up the other contentious issue between the parties, namely whether GIDC can be considered a tax under one or more of Entries 49, 51 and 52 of Part-1 of the Federal Legislative List and if so would it not offend the provisions of Article 160 of the Constitution providing for distribution of taxes by the order of the President of Pakistan on the recommendations of the NFC between the Federal and Provinces.\nOutside tool cannot be taken into account for interpreting a Constitutional provision, Even if the opinion given therein is correct to the extent of the activity carried out in the PAEC it does not conclusively establishes that mineral oil and natural gas are nowhere used for the generation of nuclear energy or that there is no possibility of their such use in future. After all the Constitution is a living document which caters for future development and progress, Thus Entry 51 can only be accorded its natural meaning and the same shall be read conjunctively. Similarly the Last Antecedent Rule is of no help to the appellants when the plain reading does not admit of any other interpretation but that only such items mentioned therein can be subjected to tax that are used in the generation of nuclear energy. \nBoth the learned counsel are correct in their respective submissions as the following passage from the above referred authority shows:\n\"\"It is, thus, clear that unless there is any prohibition or restriction imposed on the power of Legislature to impose a tax twice on the same subject matter double taxation though a heavy burden and seemingly oppressive and inequitable cannot be declared to be void or beyond the powers of the Legislature. It may, however, be noted that double taxation can be imposed by clear and specific language to that eject. Where the language is not clear or specific by implication such levy cannot be permitted. \nThere could be double taxation if the Legislature distinctly enacted it, but upon general words of taxation, and when you have to interpret a taxing hands of the assessee on the basis of the first receipt may be subjected income-tax more than once which unless specifically provided in a clear unambiguous language, is disapproved\"\".\nAdmittedly 'natural gas' is subject to levy of Sales Tax and GIDC Act does not appear to suggest that it is another instance of Sales Tax levied by the Parliament on the supply of natural gas. As held in the above cited , double taxation can be imposed only by clear and specific language and not by implication. The Federations own stand in the case of Engineer Iqbal Zafar Jhagra & Senator Rukhsana Zuberi v. Federation of Pakistan (supra) was that the 'cess' was not a Sales Tax. \nUpon the above clear position taken by the Federation the Court in Paragraph N036 of the declared and held that:\n\"\"(ix) As far as recovery of the gas development charges GIDC is concerned, it falls within the definition of section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and no order is required to be passed in this behalf. Thus under Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 the 'cess' is one of the cost added to the price of the product for the calculation of sales tax. It cannot therefore be termed as another Sales Tax.\nThe above authorities clearly lay down, with reference to Entry 52 and other Entries in Part-1 of the Federal Legislative List, that tax cannot be levied under the said Entry if the goods or activity has already been subjected to tax or duty under any other Entry. It follows that the GIDC is not covered by either of the three Entries, i.e. 49, 51 or 52 of Part-I of the Federal Legislative List. It was admitted on behalf of the appellant that for a tax to fall under the said Federal Legislative List it must be covered by Entries No. 43 to 53. Apart from the said three no other Entries were pressed in service on behalf of the appellants for declaring the 'Cess' as 'tax'. On this count too the 'cess' could not have been introduced through a money bill under Article 73 of the Constitution.\nThe next contentious issue raised on behalf of the respondents is based on Article 160 of the Constitution, which inter alia provides distribution of taxes between the Federation and the Provinces. Clause (2)(a) of Article 160 of the Constitution provides:\n160. (2) It shall be the duty of the National Finance Commission to make recommendations to the President as to: \n(a) the distribution between the Federal and the Provinces of the net proceeds of the taxes mentioned in clause (3);\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Clause (3) of the said Article provides details of the taxes to be form part of the divisible pool, which reads:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "\"(3) The taxes referred to in paragraph (a) of clause (2) are the following taxes raised under the authority of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), namely:-\n(i)\ntaxes on income, including corporation tax but not including taxes on income consisting of remuneration paid out of the Federal Consolidated Fund;\n(ii)\ntaxes on the sales and purchases of goods imported, exported, produced, maniq\"\" acturea or consumed;\n(iii)\nexport duties on cotton, and such other export duties as may be specified by the President;\n(iv)\nsuch duties of excise as may be specified by the President; and\n(v)\nsuch other taxes as may be specified by the President\"\".\nClause (4) of the said Article binds the President to pass an order in accordance with the recommendations made by the National Finance Commission (NFC). The NFC consists of Minister of Finance of the Federal Government, the Ministers of Finance of the Provincial Governments and such other persons as may be appointed by the President after consultation with the Governors of the Provinces.\nIt was pointed out on behalf of the respondents that the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources was of the view that the issue of levy of the 'cess' may be placed for its approval before the Council of Commons Interest, which represents all the federating units. Similar was the opinion expressed by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs. This fact was expressly averred in the Constitution Petitions filed before the Peshawar High Court and was not denied by the Federal Government. True that such an advice or opinion or non-reference of the matter to the Council of Common Interest would not render the levy illegal or invalid, nevertheless it would have been appropriate had the federating units been taken into confidence, particularly in the context of Article 160 (3) of the Constitution.\nViolation of Article 160 of the Constitution for not including the 'cess' in the divisible pool cannot be made the touchstone for declaring the very levy as unconstitutional. On this point we would refer to the principle laid down in the case of Jaora Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (ibid) where it was held: \n\"\"The validity of the Act must be judged in the light of the legislative competence of the Legislature which passes the Act and in certain cases, by reference to the question as to whether fundamental rights of citizens have been improperly contravened, or other considerations which may be relevant in that behalf Normally, it would not be appropriate or legitimate to hold an enquiry into the manner in which the funds raised by an Act would be dealt with, when the Court is considering the question about the validity of the Act itself Validity of Section 3 of the 'cess' Act cannot, therefore, be questioned on the ground that the 'cess' es recovered under it are not dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Art, 266 of the Constitution.\nTo conclude the GIDC is a fee and not a tax, in the alternative it is not covered by any Entry relating to imposition or levy of tax under Part-I of the Federal Legislative List. On either counts the 'cess' could not have been introduced through a money hill under Article 73 of the Constitution. The same was, therefore, not validly levied in accordance with the Constitution. 46. For the forgoing reasons, the impugned s are not liable to be reversed. The appeals are therefore dismissed.\nCases referred to:\nSheikh Muhammad Ismail & Co. v. Chief Cotton Inspector Council (PLD 1966 SC 388); Hirjin Salt Chemicals (Pak.) Ltd. v. Union Council & Others (PLJ 1982 SC 295; Noor Sugar Mills v. Market Committee (PLD 1989 SC 449); Collector of Customs and others v. Sheikh Spinning Mills and others (1999 SCMR 1402); Sanofi Aventis v. Province of Sindh (PLD 2009 Karachi 69); Soneri Bank Limited v. Federation of Pakistan & Others 2013 PLC (LC) 134]; Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thirtha (AIR 1954 SC 282 ); Hingir Rampur Coal Co. v. State of Orissa (AIR 1961 SC 459); Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1983 SC 1246), Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. M/s. Shrey Mercantile Pvt. Ltd (AIR 2005 SC 1879); Pakcom Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 44); Shinde Brothers v. Deputy Commissioner Raichur (AIR 1967 SC 1512; Jindal Stainless Ltd. Etc. v. State of Haryana & Others (AIR 2006 SC 2550); Vijayalashmi Rice Mill and Others v. Commercial Tax Officers Palakol [2006] 6 SCC 763; Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Limited v. Common Wealth of Australia [1993] 176 CIR 480; Shahtaj Sugar Mills v. Province of Punjab (1998 CLC 1912); Shahtaj Sugar Mills v. Province of Punjab (1998 SCMR 2492); Quetta Textile Mills v. Province of Sindh (PLD 2005 Kar. 55 ), Kunwar Ram Nath & Others v. The Municipal Board, Pilibhit (AIR 1983 SC 930); Dewan Chand Builders v. Union of India [2012 (1) SCC 101]; Mohan Meakin Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others [2009 (3) SCC 157]; M. Chandru v. Member-Secretary, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority and another [2009 (4) SCC 72]; State of Himachal Pradesh v. M/s Shivalik Agro Poly Products (AIR 2004 SC 4393); Luton v. Lessels [2002] HCA 13; Roy Morgan Research Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation [2011] HCA 35); The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Henderson Brothers [1888 (13) A.C. 595]; Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy Slate Company Limited [1928 (I) K.B. 561]; Joint Director of Mines Safety v. M/s. Tandur & Nayandgi Stone Quarries (P.) Ltd. (AIR 1987 SC 1253 ); Gujrat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd. (AIR 2008 SC 1921); M. Arn v. District and Sessions Judge, Sialkot (2011 SCMR 1591); Khadim Hussain v. Additional District Judge (PLD 1990 SC 632); Abdul Razak v. Karachi Building Control Authority (PLD 1994 SC 512); Abdur Rauf Khan v. Land Acquisition Collector (1991 SCMR 2164); Ellahi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (1997) 76 Tax 5 ( S. C. Pak.); Kerala State Electricity Board v. Commissioner of Central Excise [2008 (1) SCC 780]; Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. v. State of UP [2005 (2) SCC 5151; Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Pakistan, through Secretary Ministry of Finance (1992 SCMR 891), Iqbal Zafar Jhagra & Senator Rukhsana Zuberi v. Federation of Pakistan (2013) 108 Tax 1 (S.C. Pak.); Kohinoor Industries Ltd., Faisalabad v. Government of Pakistan (1989 MLD 1); Central Board of Revenue v. Seven-Up Bottling Company (Pvt.) Ltd. (1996) 74 Tax 1 (S.C. Pak.); Jaora Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1966 SC 416).",
    "URL Link:": "Civil Appeal Nos. 1540-1599 of 2013 and Civil Appeal No. 21 of 2014, decision dated: 19-6-2013, hearing DATE : 12,14,17 to 19-2-2014 & 04 and 5-3-2014.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Gas Infrastructure Development Cess Act, 2011=4,4(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rGas Infrastructure Development Cess Act, 2011=4,4(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(4)\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "NASIR-UI-MULK, JUSTICE, AMIR HANI MUSLIM, JUSTICE, MUHAMMAD ATHER SAEED, JUSTICE",
    "Court Name:": "Mr. Salman Aslam Butt, AGP. Mr. Muhammad Waqar Rana, ASC. Assisted by: Sardar Dil Nawaz Cheema, Advocate. Mr. Nazir Malik, Director( Law ) M/o Petroleum. Mr. Hassan Mehmood, Director (Gas), AND Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC. Assisted by: For Respondent No. 4. (in CA 1540/13). For Respondent-5. (in CA 1540/13). For Respondents 4-29 (in CA 1541/13). For Respondent-1. (in CAs 1542, 1544, 1551, 1558, 1565,1567,1568, 1570, 1577/13 and For Respondent-2. \nin CA 1568 &1592/13) For Respondent-1,2. In CA 1546/13. For Respondent-1. (in CAs 1552,1559/13 & For Respondents 1,4-13 in CA 1591/13 & For Respondent-7. In CA 1592/13) For Respondent-1. 1549, 1563-1571, In CAs 1555,1580 and 1587/13 &\nFor Respondents-2. In CAs 1553/13 & For Respondents-1,2 In CAS 1554/13 & For Respondents 6,15 In CAs 1560/13 &\nFor Respondents 1-5 In CAS 1562/13 & Mr. Husnain Arshad, Mr. Bilal Bashir, Ms. Zainab Qureshi, Neshay Aqueel, and\nMr. Muhammad Shakeel Mughal, Advocates Mr. Abid S. Zuberi, ASC. Assisted by: Mr. Ayan Memon and M. Munir Khan, Advocates. Mr. Ahmed Nawaz Chaudhry, AOR/ASC Syed Iftikhtar Hussain Gillani, Sr. ASC. Assisted by Mr. Saad Buttar,\nAdvocate Mr. Athar Minallah, ASC. Mr. Atif Ali Khan, ASC. Mr. Haroon-ur-Rashid, ASC. Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC.\nAssisted by: Mr. Khurram Hashmi, Mr. Umair Malik, Mr. Saad Hashmi, Mr. Tanveer Niaz, For Respondents 1-15 In CAS 1569/13 & For Respondent-2. In CAs1581, 1585/13 & For Respondents-2-7. In CAs 1588/13 & For Res-1,2,3,7,9,10 In CA 1597/13. For Respondent-1. CA 1556-1557/13. For Respondent-7,8, Respondents 12-14,18 in CA 1560/13. For Respondent-1. in CAs1572/13 & For Respondent-1,3. in CA 1592/13 For Respondent-1. in CA 1576/13. For Respondent-6. (in CA 592/13)\nFor the Respondents. (in CAs 1543, 1545, 1547, 1548,155O,1561, 1562, 1566, 1569, 1573-1575, 1578, 1579, 1582-1584, 1586, 1589-1590, 1593-1596, 1598, 1599/13 & 21/14) CMAS 970-972/14 in CA 1540/13. CMA 1066/14. CMA 1091/14. and\nMr. Nader Mehboob, Mr. Zarnab & Shoaib, Advocates. Sardar Muhammad Ghazi, ASC. Mr. Ijaz Anwar, ASC. Mr. Tasleem Hussain, AOR/ASC. Mr. Tariq Mahmood, Sr. ASC. Syed Arshad Ali, ASC. N.R. Mr. Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, ASC. Mr. Issac Ali Qazi, ASC. Mr. Ali Ahmed Khan Rana, ASC.",
    "Law and Sections:": "FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY M/S. PETROLEUM & NATURAL RESOURCES & ANOTHER\nVS\nDURRANI CERAMICS AND OTHERS",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11795",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2038 = 2014 SLD 2038 = (2014) 110 TAX 184",
    "Key Words:": "Workers Welfare Fund Ord. 1971 - Sections 2(i), 4(1), 4(7), 6, 6(a) & (b) - Income Tax Ord. 2001, Chapter-IX - Payment of contribution towards WWF. by industrial establishments - Amendment of section 4 through money bills - Total income - Contentious amendments - Main purpose of fund - Whether section 4 has been subject of controversy as contentious amendments introduced through money bills have amended said section of Ordinance - Held yes - Whether every industrial establishment, whose income was not less than Rs. 100,000 was liable to contribute to fund a sum equal to 2% of total income assessable under Income Tax Ord. 2001 - Held yes - Whether first amendment in Ordinance was brought through Finance Act, 2006 whereby term total income was altered - Held yes - Whether term \"\"total income\"\" for purpose of ordinance was deemed to be declared income before taxation or any benefit of depreciation or brought forward losses of Industrial Establishment - Held yes - Whether next impugned amendments were brought about to section 4 of ordinance by virtue of section 8(2) of Finance Act, 2008 - Held yes - Whether main purpose of fund is welfare of workers of Industrial Establishment - Held yes. Workers Welfare fund Ord. 1971 - Section 4 - Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 - Art, 70, 73 & 73(2) - Amendment of section 4 through Money Bill - Introduction of money bill - Stages of passage of money bill - Procedure of legislation - Contribution towards W.W.F. Judgments of Sindh and Lahore High Court with reference to Indian jurisdiction - Levy of contribution introduced in Ordinance through Finance Act, 1996 and 2009 - Lacking mandate to be introduced and passed through money bill - Whether impugned amendments in Ordinance could be brought through money bill - Question of - declared to be ultra vires - Prayer for - Whether Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Constitution) 1973 envisages federal legislation to be initiated by introduction of \"\"Bill\"\" in respect of any matter enumerated in Federal and concurrent Legislative List in either of two Houses, National Assembly or Senate and in case \"\"Bill\"\" is passed by one House, it is transmitted to other House and in \"\"Bill\"\" is passed without any amendment by said House, it is to be presented to president of Pakistan for assent - Held yes - Whether special procedure is provided for express fiscal and monetary matters enumerated in sub - Art. (2) of Art. 73 of constitution and \"\"Bill\"\" which carries said proposed legislation is known as \"\"Money Bill\"\". Held yes - Whether Federation and Revenue insisted contribution to fund is \"\"tax\"\" while industrial establishments claimed same to be otherwise, emphasizing it to be \"\"fee\"\" rather than \"\"tax\"\" - Held yes - Whether Sindh High Court has adjudged impugned levy to be tax, hence validating introduction and passage thereof through \"\"Money Bill\"\" - Held yes - Whether Lahore High Court in its reported as (2012) 105 Tax 81 (H.C. Lah.)=2011 PTD 2643 and later as PLD 2013 Lahore 282 has declared impugned levy to be \"\"fee\"\" and not tax and thus struck down legislation to be ultra vires - Held yes - Whether Indian supreme Court held in case reported as AIT 1954 SC 400 and later in another case reported as AIR 1963 SC 1966 held that one of distinguishing essential features of a \"\"fee\"\" was that it did not require to be merged in general Revenue of state to be spent for general public purposes - Held yes - Whether mere fact that impugned levy is not \"\"fee\"\" would not render it to be tax under constitution to be introduced and finally passed through Money Bill - Held yes - Whether recently Supreme Court of Indian in case reported as 2008 SCR 117, wherein challenge was made to validity of \"\"Cess\"\" as it lacked legislative competence on ground that \"\"Cess\"\" was \"\"tax\"\" made for public purpose, without reference to any special benefit for payer of said \"\"Cess\"\" hence correlation between payer of \"\"Cess\"\" and services rendered did not exist and therefore, levy was in fact \"\"tax\"\" - Held yes - Whether Keeping in view \"\" ratio decidendi\"\" of s of Pakistan and Indian jurisdiction, it is time to move \"\"forward from traditional view of requiring strict \"\"quid pro quo\"\" between payer of levy and special benefits accruing therefrom - Held yes - Whether all petitions are accepted in terms that impugned levy of contribution introduced in Ordinance through Finance Act of 1996 and 2009, lacks essential mandate to be introduced and passed through Money Bill under constitution, hence are declared ultra vires - Held yes.\nCases referred to:\n(2012) 105 Tax 81 (HC. Lah,); Azgard nine Ltd. v. Pakistan through Secretary and others (2014) 109 Tax 57 (H.C. Lah.); AIR 1963 SC 1966; 2008 SCR 117; (2010) 102 Tax 132 (H.C. Kar.); (2013) 107 Tax 89 (H.C. Kar); Mutual Funds Association of Pakistan (MUFAB) v. Federation of Pakistan (2010 PLC 306); Shahbaz Garments (PA) Ltd. and others v. Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Revenue Division Islamabad and others (2013) 107 Tax 89 (H.C. Kar); (PLD 1966 SC 388); (1999 SCMR 1402); Australia in Mathews v. Chicory Marketing Board (1960 CIR 263); Sohail Jute Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan; Nishat Textile Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan; (1973)1 SCC 162);(A1R 1961 SC 459); Mir I Muhammad Idriss case (PLD 2011 SC 213); (PLD 2009 SC 879); East Pakistan Chrome Tannery (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others. (2012) 105 Tax 81 (H.C. Lah.)=(2011 PTD 2643); (PLD 1960 Dacca 502); (1992 SCMR 750), (AIR 1971 Supreme Court 344); Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das. v. State of Orissa, 1954 SCR 1046=(A1R 1954 SC 400); H. H. Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar, 1963 Supp (2) SCR 302=(AIR 1963 SC 966); (1965) 2 SCR 477; (AIR 1965 SC 1107); and (AIR 1985 SC 756).",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971=2(i),4,4(1),4(7),6,6(a),(b)\\n\\r\\n\\rWorkers Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971=2(i),4,4(1),4(7),6,6(a),(b)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=Chapter-IX\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions No. 1425/2010, decision dated: 29-5-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "YAHYA AFRIDI, AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ.",
    "": "ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES LIMITED, AMANGARH INDUSTRIAL AREA, NOWSHERA and others\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN for the"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11796",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2316 = 2001 SLD 2316 = 2001 CLC 148",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-------Art. 163---Imposing of taxes in respect of professions etc. ---Provincial Assembly, powers of---Scope---Provincial Assembly, under the provision of Art.163 of the Constitution, has been given powers to impose taxes in respect of professions etc., subject to limitations, which may be fixed by an Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) on any person engaged' in any profession, trade, calling and employment---Power exercisable by Provincial Assembly in imposing such tax is subject to limitations contained in an Act of Parliament, that is to say a Federal Statute.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statute---\n \n----Newly enacted statute violating or infringing upon any provision of existing statute---Such provision of newly enacted statute would be void to the extent which offended or violated any provision of existing statute.\n \n(c) Interpretation of Constitution---\n \n---- Conflict between a statute and any provision of Constitution---Where there is a conflict between the two, then the provision of the Constitution is to prevail as the same is the Supreme Law of Land and all other laws whether Federal or Provincial are subservient to the same.\n \n(d) West Pakistan Finance Act (XXXIV of 1964)--\n \n----S. 11 [as amended by Sindh Finance Acts, 1975 and 1994]---Professions Tax Limitation Act (XX of 1941), S.2---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 163 & 199---Constitutional petition ---Vires of S.11 of West Pakistan Finance Act, 1964, as amended by Sindh Finance Acts (XX of 1975) and (XIII of 1994)-----Professional tax---Imposing of tax by Provincial Assembly on various categories of persons engaged in professions, trades, callings and employments as mentioned in Art.163 of the Constitution---Provincial Assembly enhanced the Professional tax on such category of persons over and above Rs.50 per annum---Validity---Where amendments were made in S.11 of West Pakistan Finance Act, 1964, by Sindh Finance Acts, 1975 and 1994 empowering the Provincial Government to impose such tax without putting any limitation on the rate or amount of tax, amendment so made was illegal, ultra vires, without lawful authority and of no legal effect as the same were incomplete disregard and violation of Art.163 of the Constitution and S.2 of Professions Tax Limitations Act, 1941---Amendments enhancing the rate of professional tax at more than Rs.50 per annum could not be sustained, same being null and void and of no legal effect---Amendments made in S.11 of West Pakistan. Finance Act, 1964, by Sindh Finance Acts, 1975 and 1994 were set aside in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-1183 of 1999, 209, 252, 741, 742, 802, 901 to 913, 1691, 2040, 2126 to 2128 of 1995, 250, 332, 1031, 1032 of 1996, 835 of 1997, 669 and 670 of 1999, decision dated: 27-04-2000.hearing DATE : 2-02-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD AND ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs BROOKE BOND PAKISTAN LIMITED through Chief Executive \nvs \nPROVINCE OF SINDH through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Sindh and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11797",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2317 = 2001 SLD 2317 = 2001 CLC 155",
    "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------S. 42---Qunan-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.85(5)---Suit for declaration--­Defendants who were cousins of plaintiff and were cultivating his land, on basis of forged and fabricated agreement to sell and power of attorney in collusion with another defendant got land owned by plaintiff mutated in their favour in absence of plaintiff---Plaintiff in his suit denied execution of agreement of sale in favour of defendants and execution of power of attorney in favour of other defendant and sought declaration that said documents be declared to be illegal and void and that plaintiff was owner of land in dispute and had not sold land to the defendants---Suit was decreed by Trial Court, but on filing appeal Appellate Court dismissed the suit---Validity---Power of attorney on basis of which land of plaintiff was got mutated in names of defendants and execution of which was denied by plaintiff, was not even produced on record and no explanation for the omission, was given by defendants---Defendants had claimed that power of attorney being registered one was a public document and its certified copy was admissible in evidence--Contention was repelled because under Art.85(5) of Qanun-e-­Shahadat, 1984 only such registered document could be a public document, execution whereof was not disputed, whereas plaintiff had totally denied the execution of the power of attorney---No evidence whatsoever had been led by defendants to prove proceedings of mutation---Appellate Court below was not justified to hold that since mutation stood incorporated in Revenue Record same enjoyed a presumption of correctness and need not be proved--­If mutation was incorporated in Revenue Record, defendants claiming benefit thereunder were not absolved of their obligation to prove the same as a fact---Judgment and decree passed by Appellate Court being not based on any evidence and having been passed in. exercise of jurisdiction not vesting in it, could not sustain---High Court set aside of Appellate Court and restored the and decree of Trial Court in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Ibrahim v. Mst. Basri and others 1988 SCMR 96; Muhammad and others v. Sardul PLD 1965 Lah. (W.P.) 472; Abdul Majeed and 6 others v. M. Subhan and 2 others 1999 SCMR 1245 and Allah Dino and 2 others v. Muhammad Umar and others 1974 SCMR 411 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.485-D of 1996, heard on 7-04-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASLAM\nvs\nABDUL WAHID and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11798",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2039 = 2014 SLD 2039 = (2014) 110 TAX 209",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of I 990) - Sections 11, 11A, 25, 48 - Assessment of tax and recovery of tax not levied or short levied or erroneously refunded - Amount of tax fully paid by appellant as indicated in its monthly returns - Show Cause notice issued by Department it/s A for recovery of short paid amount of tax on the ground that amount of Sales Tax to be charged by appellant from its consumers under Sales tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007 has been incorrectly reflected in Sales Tax returns - It is contended by Deptt. that Sales Tax reflected in electricity bills issued by appellant to its consumers constitute output tax of steel sector units and is not subject to input tax adjustment by appellant under above Rules, therefore, as a result of said deductions, appellant has made short payment of tax, liable to be recovered from it - Validity - Scope and interpretation of section 11A - Whether section II provides for assessment of tax where taxpayer fails to file return, or pays amount which is less than amount of tax due or has made short payment or has claimed input tax credit or refund which is not admissible - Held yes - Whether section 11A proceeds on assumption that self assessed tax due indicated in Sales Tax return by taxpayer is correct and final, therefore, in case of failure to pay or make short payment of same, recovery of differential amount is initiated without further ado and requirement of due process through issuance of show cause notice is dispensed with - Held yes (3) Whether once self-assessed tax due is considered to be correct and final u/s 11A of Act, natural corollary is that all information in return including annexures which lead to self-assessed amount of tax due, is also correct and final - Held yes (4) Whether though tax payer is under legal obligation to file return and correct return, any alleged violation of same can only be resolved through adjudicatory process provided u/s 11 of the Act subject to selection of case of taxpayer under the Act and not through mechanism of section 11A which is purely recovery provision - Held yes (5) Whether only in case of failure to deposit indicated amount of tax due or in case of short payment, recovery proceedings can be initiated against taxpayer u/s 11A - Held yes.\nSales Tax is premised on a self-assessment paradigm, Where the tax due is self-assessed by a taxpayer and deposited along with the monthly sales tax return. Supervision and monitoring of the self-assessment regime is through the process of audit provided under sections 25 of the Act. Once the taxpayer is selected through audit and the department is of the view that the taxpayer has an outstanding tax liability, the case undergoes assessment of tax through the process of adjudication under section 11 of the Act. Therefore, the self-assessed amount of tax due by the taxpayer in its sales tax return can only be altered through fresh assessment of tax under the section 11 of the Act, subject to the process of selection of a taxpayer though audit, Section 11 provides for assessment of tax where a taxpayer fails to file a return, or pays an amount which is less than the amount of tax due or has made short payment or has claimed input tax credit or refund which is not admissible. The section further provides that where by reason of collusion or deliberate act any tax has not been levied or has been short levied or has been erroneously refunded, or by reason of inadvertence, error or misconstruction any tax has not been levied or short levied or has been erroneously refunded, the Officer of Inland Revenue passes an assessment order along with penalty and default surcharge. Section 11 is the only provision under the Act which provides for assessment of tax through adjudication in case the self-assessed tax of the taxpayer, according to the department is unpaid or short paid for the above reasons. Post assessment if the taxpayer fails to pay the tax assessed, recovery can be initiated against the taxpayer under section 48 of the Act.\nSection 11A on the other hand is neither a dispute settlement provision nor a provision that deals with assessment of tax but is in fact a special recovery provision akin to Section 48. It proceeds on the assumption that the self-assessed tax due indicated in the sales tax return by the taxpayer is correct and final. Therefore, in case of failure to pay or make short payment of the same, recovery of the differential amount is initiated without further ado and the requirement of due process through issuance of a show cause notice is dispensed with. \nThe amount of tax due has to be indicated in the return, which is defined under Section 2 (29) to mean any return required to be furnished under Chapter-V of the Act. Under Section 26 every registered person is required to furnish a true and correct return in the prescribed form. Rule 14 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 (\"\"Rules\"\") specifies that return has to be in form STR-7 along with all its annexures. \nTherefore, the amount of tax due indicated in the return cannot be equated with the amount of output tax reflected in the domestic sales invoices (i.e. electricity bills of the consumer). Additionally, once the self-assessed tax due is considered to be correct and final under Section 11A of the Act, natural corollary is that all the information in the return including the annexures which leads to the self-assessed amount of tax due, is also correct and final, In the present case, the amount of tax due indicated in the return is being disputed by the department, therefore, in such an eventuality, statutory assessment is required under section 11 of the Act and section 11A has no application to the case of the appellant. \nWe are afraid, the view expressed in the impugned that verification of electricity bills, placed on the website of the appellant, is permissible and reliance can be placed on any other extraneous information other than the amount of tax due indicated in the sales tax return under section 11A, is not the correct legal position. For section 11A to come into operation, only the amount of tax due indicated by the taxpayer in the sales tax return is to be considered. We may add for the sake of completeness that even though the taxpayer is under a legal obligation to file a true and correct return, any alleged violation of the same can only be resolved through adjudicatory process provided under section 11 of the Act subject to the selection of the case of the taxpayer under the Act and not through the mechanism of section 11A which is purely a recovery provision.\nUnder section 11A the amount of tax due indicated by the taxpayer in the sales tax return is considered to be correct and final. It is then used as a benchmark to see whether the taxpayer has deposited the said amount of tax due along with the sales tax return. In case of failure to deposit the indicated amount of tax due or in case of short payment, recovery proceedings can be initiated against the taxpayer under section 11A. \nEven otherwise, Section 11A has practically lost its efficacy after the new e-filing system has been enforced. The new system does not entertain any electronic return if the amount of tax deposited by the taxpayer is less than the amount of tax due indicated in the return. Reference is made to Rule 18 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006. \nFor the above reasons instant appeal, as well as, connected appeals and writ petitions are allowed and impugned Notices dated 28.10.2013 issued under section 11A of the Act and subsequent recovery thereunder are declared illegal and without lawful authority and are, therefore, set aside.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,11A,25,48\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=11,11A,25,48\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.C.A. No. 79/2014, dated 22-5-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED MANSOOR AND ATIR MAHMOOD, JJ.",
    "": "LAHORE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LTD.\nVs\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, etc"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11799",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2318 = 2001 SLD 2318 = 2001 CLC 145",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S. 100---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Second appeal---Delay condonation of---Appeal which was to be filed within stipulated period o: ninety days, was filed after 527 days---Appellant had sought condonation of the delay contending that he was suffering from asthma and in support of his claim had annexed a photostat copy of medical certificate of a Doctor-­Appellant had not annexed any other document to prove that he was unable to approach his counsel for filing the appeal---Validity---Delay of each and every day in filing appeal had to be explained by appellant, but he had failed to do so---Appellant having failed to prove that he was prevented by any sufficient cause to file appeal within stipulated period of ninety days application for condonation of delay was devoid of any force and appeal was liable to be dismissed being barred by time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular Second Appeal No. 128 of 1973, heard on 7-10-1999",
    "Judge Name:": "SHEIKH ABDUR RAZZAQ, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RAFI \nvs \nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11800",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2319 = 2001 SLD 2319 = 2001 CLC 153",
    "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------S. 42---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XIII, R.2---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Suit for declaration--­Production of additional evidence---Case remained pending for full nineteen years and parties adduced their evidence which was closed but application for production of additional evidence was filed, by plaintiffs when case was fixed for final arguments which was dismissed by Trial Court as well as by revisional Court---Application for production of additional evidence was rightly dismissed concurrently by Courts below---Plaintiff having failed to point out any illegality or infirmity in orders of Courts below, same could not be interfered with by High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction.\n \nMuhammad Khan and 6 others v. Mst. Ghulam Fatima and 12 others 1991 SCMR970 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3670 of 2000, decision dated: 29-05-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "GHULAM MAHMOOD QURESHI, J",
    "": "ALI MUHAMMAD and others \nvs \nMUHAMMAD TUFAIL and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11801",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2040 = 2014 SLD 2040 = (2014) 110 TAX 99",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ord. 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 39, 39(1)(cc), 171 & 122(5A) - Amendment of assessments - Income from other sources - Addl. Payment for delayed refunds - Composite audit - Receipt of compensation by taxpayer on account of delayed issuance of income tax refunds, but not included in return of income for tax years 2009 & 2010, even in revised return for tax year 2009 filed on 28-12-2010 - Show Cause Notice - Reply to show cause notice not found satisfactory, hence rejected and amendment made u/s 122(5A) - Inclusion of amount of compensation in total income of assessee by AO - Appeal filed by assessee before CIR(A ) - Validity - Whether compensation paid by Deptt. on delayed payment of refund to taxpayer is just like interest or mark-up which is paid to compensate person for rising inflation/interest and such compensation is revenue in nature and therefore, liable to be assessed under amended provisions of section 39 of Income Tax Ord. 2001 - Held yes - Whether since clause (cc) of sub-section (1) of section 39 was inserted in Income Tax Ord. 2001 through Finance Act, 2012, therefore, being charging provision same is not applicable retrospectively to tax years 2009 & 2010 - Held yes - Whether A.O. was not justified to charge tax under said provision of law for tax year 2009 & 2010 - Held yes - Whether on legal premises, appeals of taxpayer are accepted for both years and orders passed by authorities below are vacated - Held yes.\nThe compensation paid by the department on the delayed payment of refund to the taxpayer is just like the interest or mark-up which is paid to compensate a person for raising inflation/interest and such compensation is in the revenue nature and, therefore, liable to be assessed under the amended provisions of section 3 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. However, since the clause (cc) of sub-section (1) of section 39 was inserted in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, through Finance Act, 2012, therefore, being charging provision the same is not applicable retrospectively to the tax years 2009 & 2010. Under such circumstances, I hold that the assessing authority was not justified to charge tax under the said provision of law for the tax years 2009 & 2010. Accordingly, on legal premises the appeals of the taxpayer are accepted for both the years and orders passed by the authorities below are vacated.\nCases referred to:\n(1979) 39 Tax 21 (H. C. Kar); 2006 PTD 2456 (S. C. Pak).",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=39,39(1)(cc),171,122(5A)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=39,39(1)(cc),171,122(5A)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. Nos. 1297, 1298/LB of 2012, (Tax Years 2009 and 2010), decision dated: 14-3-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11802",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2320 = 2001 SLD 2320 = 2001 CLC 165",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Pre-emption Act (I of 1913)-------Ss. 21 & 30---Suit for pre-emption filed by minor collateral of vendor--­Maintainability of---Suit filed by minor daughter of vendor through her mother as her next friend was objected to by vendees alleging that plaintiff being minor daughter of vendor, it would be presumed that suit was filed for benefit of vendor---Validity---Law had given right of pre-emption to collaterals of vendor and it could never be presumed that suit filed by minor daughter of vendor or even wife of vendor was collusive or for benefit of vendor even if proved that litigation was financed by vendor especially in absence of any evidence to the effect that suit had not been filed for benefit of minor daughter---Suit, being bona fide filed, was maintainable.\n \nImam Ali Shah v. Muhammad Sharif Khan 1976 SCMR 362; Ruqaya Bibi and others v. Abdul Majid 1986 MLD 534 and Lal Din v. Allah Ditta PLD 1967 Lah. 703 ref.\n \n(b) Punjab pre-emption Act (I of 1913)---\n \n----S. 30---Pre-emption suit---Limitation---Suit filed within one year of attestation of mutation was not barred by time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular Second Appeal No.58 of 1984, decision dated: 8-05-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "ABDUL MAJEED and another\nvs\nMst. MOMINA SYEDA FATIMA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11803",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2321 = 2001 SLD 2321 = 2001 CLC 158",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------Ss. 9 & 15---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.203-G---Suit for recovery of loan--Defendant/borrower had contended that S.15 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 relating to mark-up, was against the Injunctions of Islam---Contention was repelled having no force by virtue of Art.203-G, Constitution of Pakistan (1973) qua relief with regard to mark-up as defendant had alternate remedy to agitate matter before Federal Shariat Court ---Interest/Riba though was un-Islamic in view of Supreme Court verdict but past and closed transactions were not to be opened because agreement was executed between parties before the said verdict of Supreme Court which had prospective and not retrospective effect.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss. 4 & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3--­Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to defend suit---Defendant who obtained loan from plaintiff-Bank, having failed to discharge his liability in terms of agreement, suit filed by plaintiff-Bank was decreed and application to defend suit filed by defendant was dismissed which was challenged by him in appeal---Legality----Defendant, who utilised facility of loan, had accepted his liabilities---Suit was based on statement of accounts attached with plaint which was duly verified by Bank Authorities in accordance with Bankers' Book Evidence Act, 1881 and was not rebutted by defendant---Such statement having presumption of truth by virtue of S.4 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 suit was rightly decreed and Court had rightly concluded that defendant had failed to make out any plausible case for grant of leave to defend suit.\n \nUnited Bank Limited v. Central Cotton Mills Limited and others 1999 CLC 1374; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Novelty Enterprises Ltd. and others PLD 1998 Kar. 199; Ghulam Rasool's case PLD 1971 SC 376 and Munir Ahmad Autos v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 497 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.64, of 1999, decision dated: 18-04-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MUHAMMAD ZAFAR YASIN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RAMZAN \nvs \nCITIBANK N.A."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11804",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2041 = 2014 SLD 2041 = (2014) 110 TAX 102",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ord. 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 111(1)(b), 120, 122(1) - Amendment of assessments - Return filed by assesse deemed to be assessment u/s 120 - Purchase of property by taxpayer - Definite information - Issuance of notice to explain source of investment - Deemed assessment amended u/s 122(1) - Addition in income of assessee - Directions to DIR by CIR(A) to verify documentary evidence regarding foreign remittance from concerned bank - Validity - Whether assessing authority has rightly made addition u/s 111(1)(b) in tax year 2005 as property in question was purchased by taxpayer on 06-06-2005, and first notice was issued on 24-11-2010, when relevant law i.e. section 111(2) was changed by substitution of words \"\"immediately preceding the financial year\"\" with words \"\"to which such amount relates\"\" through Finance Act, 2010 - Held yes - Whether taxpayer has failed to bring on record relevant documentary evidence at any stage i.e. ownership of agricultural land, payment of agricultural tax etc. to substantiate his claim that he earned some kind of agricultural income - Held yes - Whether issue of availability of sources through sale of jewellery is remanded back for denovo decision and order of CIR(A) in this behalf vacated while rest of order of CIR(A) being in accordance with law is hereby maintained - Held yes.\nAs far as the taxpayer's legal objection that the addition was not made in the relevant tax year, 1 find that the assessing authority has rightly made the addition u/s 111(1)(b) in the tax year 2005 as the propeity in question was purchased by the taxpayer on 6-6-2005. The assessment in the instant case was completed on 16-6-2011, and first notice was issued in the case on 24-11-2010, when the relevant law i.e. section 111(2) was changed by substitution of the Words \"\"immediately preceding the financial year\"\" with the words \"\"to which such amount relates\"\" through Finance Act, 2010. Since the law as it existed on the relevant date of initiation of proceedings and completion of assessment stood changed and the said changes made in law shall prevail and shall be applicable. Therefore, I find no weight in the contention of the AR and hold that the addition u/s 111(1)(b) has rightly been made in the tax year 2005 and the case law relied upon by the AR is not strictly relevant to the facts and circumstances of the case, hence, the same is ignored.\nThe taxpayer has failed to bring on record relevant documentary evidences at any stage i.e. ownership of agricultural land, payment of agricultural tax etc., to substantiate his claim that he earned some kind of agricultural income. Similarly, under the law, there is no concept of allowing credit of cash/hand remittance. Therefore, the learned CIR(A) rightly confirmed the addition under this head. However, the issue of alleged availability of sources through sale of gold jewellery is remanded back for verification. \nThe assessing officer is directed to make fresh inquiry by summoning the Jeweller and the taxpayer be allowed to cross examine him. Accordingly, the issue of availability of sources through sale of jewellery amounting to Rs. 401,326 is remanded back for denovo decision and order of the learned CIR(A) in this behalf is vacated while rest of the order of the learned CIR(A) being in accordance with law is hereby maintained.\nCases referred to:\n2012 PTD (Trib) 1978 and (2011) 103 Tax 6 (Trib).",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b),111(2),120,122(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b),111(2),120,122(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1690/LB of 2012, (Tax Year 2005), decision dated: 17-4-2014, hearing DATE 14-3-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11805",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2330 = 2001 SLD 2330 = 2001 CLC 185 = (2001) 83 TAX 397",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-------Art. 19---Constitutional petition--Maintainability---Principle of approbate and reprobate---In presence of arbitration clause in the agreement executed between the parties, Constitutional petition was not maintainable--­Constitutional petition was also not maintainable on principle of approbate and reprobate.\n \nZia Ullah Khan's case PLD 1989 Lah. 554; Muhammad Ansar and others v. Administrator, Town Committee, Kabirwala, District Khanewal and 4 others 1999 YLR 950; Bismillah & Co. v. Secretary, Government of the Punjab and others 1997 PTD 747; Adam Khan Mirza v. Muhammad Sultan PLJ 1975 SC 21; Ali Sher v. The State 1994 SCMR 1884; Murad Ali & Company's case 1999 SCMR 121 and Ghulam Rasool's case PLD 1971 SC 376 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Agreement arrived at between parties could not be enforced through Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court as petitioner would have alternative remedies either to file a civil suit or to invoke arbitration clause contained in the agreement.\n \nShameer v. Board of Revenue 1981 SCMR 604; Pakistan Mineral Development Authority v. Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority PLD 1986 Quetta 181; The Chandpur Mills Ltd.'s case PLD 1958 SC 267; Messrs Momin Motor Company v. The Regional Transport Authority PLD 1962 SC 108; Bismillah & Co. v. Secretary Finance, Government of Pakistan 1997 PTD 747; Rehman Corporation, Hyderabad v. The Income-tax Officer 1985 PTD 787; Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Central Board of Revenue 1989 PTD 1048; Idara-e-Kissan v. Registrar of Trade Unions and others NLR 1995 Tax (Lahore) 51 = 1995 PTD 493; Muhammad Younus v. Chairman, Municipal Committee, Sahiwal PLD 1984 Lah. 345; Messrs Sardarpur Tex Zahur Textile Mills, Mandiwalla Mauser Messrs Sh. Spinning Mills and another v. Federation of Pakistan 1997 PTD 70; Muhammad Ansar's case 1999 YLR 950; Pir Muhammad v. Government of Sindh 1990 MLD 869; Writ Petition No. 16358 of 1997; Khairullah's case 1997 SCMR 906; Miss Benzair Bhutto's case PLD 1988 SC 416; Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar's case PLD 1989 SC 26 and Muhammad Ismail's case PLD 1996 SC 246 ref.\n \n(c) Precedent---\n \n---- Binding effect---Previous decision of High Court to be accepted by said High Court as binding.\n \nMuhammad Muzaffar Khan v. Muhammad Yousaf Khan PLD 1959 S C (Pak.) 9 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=19,199\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=19,199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 19770, 23488, 21918, of 1997, 26432 of 1998, 12635, 2692, 974, 975, 1383, 1384, 12003 and 16882 of 1999, heard on 4-04-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "AMIR NAWAZ KHAN and 2 others \nvs \nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Finance, Islamabad and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11806",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2042 = 2014 SLD 2042 = (2014) 110 TAX 12",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 153, 153(6)(iii) & 171 - F.T.O. ordinance, 2000, section 2(3)(ii) - Payments for goods, services and contracts - Refund claim - Delay in issuance by Department - Maladministration - Complaint against - Whether refund pertaining to tax years 2007 to 2009 was issued by Department on 17-08-2012 and prima facie, same is delayed which was required to be processed within timeframe stipulated in statute after deemed assessment made u/s 120(1) of Ordinance - Held yes - Whether refund due for tax years 2007 to 2009 was not determined by Department within stipulated time period of 45 days from date of deemed assessment in each year that delay had occurred and compensation u/s 171 of Ordinance was therefore payable - Held yes - Whether compensation amount is to be reckoned from date of deemed assessment and not from date of any order for issuance of refund passed belatedly by Department - Held yes.\n5. Refund pertaining to Tax Years 2007 to 2009 was issued by the Deptt. on 17.08.2012. Prima facie, the same is delayed. As explained in ATIR : (2009) 100 Tax 178=2010 PTD (Trib) 519, a refund claim was required to be processed within the time frame stipulated in the statute after the deemed assessment made under section 120(l) of the Ordinance. In Tax Year 2009, the time limit was 45 days after the return was admitted and acknowledgment issued to the taxpayer. As the refund due for Tax Years 2007 to 2009 was not determined by the Deptt. within the stipulated time period of 45 days from the date of deemed assessment in each year, a delay had occurred and compensation under Section 171 of the Ordinance was therefore payable. As per law, the compensation amount is to be reckoned from the date of deemed assessment and not from the date of any order for issuance of refund passed belatedly by the Deptt. So far as deposit of deducted tax is concerned, the Complainant did not produce original payment challans to establish the alleged incorrect deposit of tax pertaining to Tax Period 2008-2009 in Tax Year 2010. \nThe delay in issuance of refund tantamounts to maladministration under Section 2(3)(ii) of the FTO Ordinance. The delay also creates the right to receive compensation under Section 171 of the Ordinance.\nRecommendations:\nFBR to direct the Chief Commissioner to -\n(i) issue compensation due as per law: and\n(ii) report compliance within 30 days.\nCases referred to:\n(2009) 100 Tax 178.",
    "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153,153(6)(iii),171\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=153,153(6)(iii),171\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3)(ii)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Complaint No 837/LHR/IT(608)/1473/2012, decided on-4-2-2013",
    "Judge Name:": "DR. MUHAMMAD SHOAIB SUDDLE, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN",
    "": "IQ STUDIO (PVT) LTD\nVS\nSECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11807",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2346 = 2001 SLD 2346 = 2001 CLC 367",
    "Key Words:": "Federal Public Service Commission Rules for Competitive Examination, 1999-------. 7(viii)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Vires of R.7(viii) of Federal Public Service Commission Rules for Competitive Examination, 1999---Re-evaluation of marks obtained in examination by the candidate---Candidate being dissatisfied with the result wanted to have his papers re-evaluated---Federal Public Service Commission turned down the demand of the candidate in view of R.7(viii) of the Federal Public Service Commission Rules for Competitive Examination, 1999--­Validity---Provision for re-evaluation or prohibition on re-evaluation in Calendars and Rules of Educational Institutions was not ultra vires of any law.\n \nAvadhani Meena and others v. Board of Secondary Education KLR 1982 CC 300; Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore v. Mst. Salina Afroz and 2 others PLD 1992 SC 263; Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore v. Sauna Azad 1996 SCMR 676 and Tahir Saeed Qureshi v. Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Sargodha and 3 others 1996 SCMR 1872 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 1522, 1538 and 1685 of 2000, decision dated: 22-08-2000. dates of hearing: 21st and 22-08-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ABU BAKAR AFTAB QURESHI \nvs \nFEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION through Chairman, Islamabad and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11808",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1993 910 = 1993 SLD 910 = 1993 CLC 867",
    "Key Words:": "Law Reports Act (XVIII of 1875)---\n \n----S. 6 [as amended by Law Reports (Amendment) Act 1989 (II of 1990)--­Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.203-D---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam ---Vires of S.6, Law Reports Act, 1875 (as amended) on the touchstone of Injunctions of Islam---Provision of S.6, Law Reports Act, 1875, has conferred discretion to a Court or Tribunal to approve any or order to be published or not: it, however, does not put any restriction on publication of law but permits publication of orders/ s which enunciate a principle of law or question of law which is of first impression or distinguishes one with permission of Court or Tribunal---Such determination undisputedly could be better made by Authority, Court or Tribunal which had pronounced such or order---Petitioner having not been able to point out repugnancy of S.6, Law Reports Act, 18751, Injunctions of Islam, petition was dismissed.\n \nPLD 1980 SC 160 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Federal Shariat Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "FIDA MUHAMMAD KHAN, MIR HAZAR KHAN KHOSO AND NAZIR AHMAD BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "Dr. ABDUL MALIK IRFANI\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11809",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1993 911 = 1993 SLD 911 = 1993 CLC 876",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Displaced Persons (Compensations and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958)---\n \n----S. 20---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Disposal of revision by Settlement Commissioner---Validity---Revision petition disposed of by Settlement Commissioner was not in accordance with law---Settlement Commissioner was required to have recorded a definite finding with regard to the nature of property and for that purpose he could have recorded evidence that was to be produced by the parties in support of their respective contentions---Settlement Commissioner could have remanded the case for deciding the controversial question of fact after recording of evidence---Order passed by Settlement Commissioner showed that he had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under the law and had just brushed aside the controversy raised before him---Order passed by Settlement Commissioner in revisional jursidiction was thus, illegal, without lawful authority and void. \n \nMir Salah-ud-Din v. Qazi Zaheer-ud-Din PLD 1988 SC 221; PLD 1975 Lah. 833 and Pakistan Post Office v. Settlement Commissioner and others 1987 SCMR 1119 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)\n \n----Art. 199---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 3---Delay in filing Constitutional petition should not be seen with the same rigours as bar of limitation provided under the Limitation Act, 1908, particularly when impugned order was void and unjust---Delay in filing Constitutional petition having been sufficiently explained was not per se fatal to the Constitutional petition---Impugned order being illegal, void and unjust was set aside and case remanded to the Officer for recording a definite finding on controversial questions of fact after giving opportunity to both parties to produce evidence if they so desired.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. MUSHTAQ AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "ALI BAKHSH and 3 others\nvs\nGHULAM MUHAMMAD (deceased) and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11810",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1993 912 = 1993 SLD 912 = 1993 CLC 872",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958)---\n \n----Ss. 10 & 11---Resumption of property for non-payment of dues--­Petitioners were neither served with any notice for payment of dues nor any notice was ever issued before passing order of cancellation of allotment--­Report of process server was fishy inasmuch as no time and place was mentioned therein---Substituted service could not have been resorted to in circumstances---Service of registered letter was also not proved---Resumption order had been passed without judicious application of mind and without issuing a show-cause notice to petitioner---Order of cancellation of allotment being patently illegal and void ab initio, subsequent disposal of property in favour of respondent was also void. [pp. 874, 875] A, B & C\n \nSyed lqbal Hussain v. Mst. Sarwari Begum PLD 1967 Lah. 1138; Fazal Dad v. Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab PLD 1977 Lah. 264 and Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and 2 others PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 104 rel.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction ---Laches---Effect---Constitutional petition having been filed against void, unfair and unjust order was not barred by the principle of laches.---[Laches].\n \nS. Sharif Alimad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore and another 1978 SCMR 367 rel.\n \n(c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---\n \n----S.3---Laches---Principle of laches was not ` as rigorous as the law of limitation.---[Laches].\n \nPakistan Post Office v. Settlement Commissioner 1987 SCMR 1119 and Muhammad Ismail Qureshi through his Legal Heirs v. Gulab Din and others 1988 SCMR 1001 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. MUSHTAQ AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "Sh. MUHAMMAD ARIF and 3 others\nvs\nDEPUTY SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11811",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1993 913 = 1993 SLD 913 = 1993 CLC 882",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--\n \n----OXXXM R. 4 & O.IX, R. 9---Court to be guided by the substance of the application---Interim order was confirmed in the absence of defendant and his counsel, there being no appearance by or on behalf of defendant---Defendants' application under O.XXXIX, R.4 for cancellation of order passed in their absence---Effect---Court would be guided by the substance of the application and not by the provisions that were quoted under which such application was filed---Merely because O.XXXIX, R. 4, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 was quoted would not take away jurisdiction of Court to treat the application as one filed under O.IX, R.9, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and adjudicate the same. \n \nPLD 1977 Kar. 101 ref.\n \n(b) Practice and Procedure---\n \n---- Court would be guided by the substance of the application (made before it) and not by the provisions that were quoted under which the application was filed. \n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 2 (14)---Order passed by judicial authority---Essentials---Any order passed by a judicial authority to which -Civil Procedure Code, 1908, applies should not ordinarily make it an order, without basing it on intelligible grounds or reasons---Where no such data was given for the passing of such order, or same was lacking from the order itself, then the same would cease to be a formal expression of a decision which was the primordial garb to clothe the mandate of a Court with the badge of an order. \n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--\n \n----O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Grant of ad interim injunction ---Duration--­Procedural norms prescribed in O.XXXIX, Rr.l and 2, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, which would entail grant of temporary or ad interim injunction by the Court either until the disposal of the suit or till further orders--­Where temporary injunction was granted till the disposal of the suit that by itself indicated that there was a hearing on the subject-matter and both parties were before the Court at or about the time when such, order was passed.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXXIX, R. 4---Interim order passed by Court being not based on any ground and being non-speaking could be challenged under provision of O.XXXIX, R.4, Civil Procedure Code, 1908. \n \nPLD 1977 Kar. 101; Govinda Ramanuja Das Cowasmi v. (Appeal) Vijiaramarja and another AIR 1929 Mad. 803 and Karachi Development Authority, Karachi v. Taj Muhammad and 3 others PLD 1977 Kar.108 ref.\n \n(f) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S. 126---Obligations arising under bank guarantees---Performance guarantees, performance bonds, bank guarantees and letters of credit impose an absolute obligation on the bank to pay irrespective of any dispute which may arise between parties on the question whether parties had fulfilled their part of the contract or not.\n \nR.D. Harbottle v. National Westminster Bank (1972) 2 AIE 862; Edward Owen Engineering Company Ltd. v. Barclays Bank International Ltd. 1978 QB 159; (1977) 3 WLR 764; 1978 (1) AER 976; United City Merchants (Investment) Ltd. and Glass Fibres and Equipments Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada 1982 (2) LLR 1; Bolivinter Oil SA. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, Commercial Bank of Syria; General Company of Homs Refinery (1984) 1 LLR 251; Discount Records Ltd. v. Brclays Bank Ltd. and others (1975) 1 WLR 315; Sztejn v. J. Henry Schrodu Banking Corporation (1941) 31 N.Y.S. 2nd Edition, page 631; Sirafi Trading Establishment v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. 1984 CLC 381; Koh-i-Noor Trading (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Mangani Trading Company 1987 CLC 1533 and Tarapore and Company, Madras v. Tractor-export, Moscow AIR 1970 SC 891 and AIR 1981 SC 1426; (1978) OB 146 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAIDER ALI PIRZADA, J",
    "": "PAKISTAN ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS--Plaintiff\nvs\nPAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORP. & BCCI and others----Defendants\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nvs\nTARIQ MEHMOOD etc"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11812",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2043 = 2014 SLD 2043 = (2014) 110 TAX 328",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 122, 132, 133, & 221 - Rectification of mistakes - Dismissal of appeal by Tribunal against order of CIR(A) - Rectification application and another application on different grounds also dismissed - reference application - Maintainability - Whether Commissioner (Appeals) or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to rectify any mistake apparent from record on its own motion or if brought to its notice by taxpayer or Commissioner - Held yes - Whether collective reading of provisions of Section 133 & 221 unequivocally spell out that Reference Application, u/s 133, can be filed only against order passed u/s 132 of ordinance - Held yes - Whether if no change/rectification is made in order u/s 132, order passed under section 221 shall stand alone and independent, against which, reference application is not allowed - Held yes - Whether parameters provided for exercise of jurisdiction u/s 133 by High Court, shall apply with full force i.e. any question of law arises out of changed order, reference application shall be maintainable - Held yes - Whether since Appellate Tribunal has refused to rectify order u/s 132, therefore, this reference application proposing questions from order u/s 221 is not entertainable, hence, High Court declined to exercise jurisdiction u/s 133 - Held Yes.\nJurisdiction under section 221 of the Ordinance is independent. Commissioner, Commissioner (Appeals) or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to rectify any mistake apparent from record on its own motion or if brought to its notice by taxpayer or Commissioner.\nCollective reading of the provisions (reproduced and discussed above) unequivocally spell out that Reference Application, under section 133, can be filed only against an order passed under section, 132 of the Ordinance, As per principles laid down in Messrs Hong Kong Chinese Restaurant Case (supra); on exercise of jurisdiction under section 122, if the order under section 132 is rectified in a way that the consequent change affects rights of either Commissioner or Taxpayer, then Reference Application can be filed. The doctrine of merger shall apply i.e., the order under section 221 of the Ordinance of 2001 to the extent of rectification/change, shall merge into the order under section 132. As the cause of action shall accrue on the date of rectification order, therefore, period of ninety days shall restart from this point. Conversely, if no change/rectification is made in the order under section 132, the order passed under section 221 shall stand alone and independent, against which, Reference Application is not allowed. \nFollowing the dictum in reproduced part of Messrs Hong Kong Chinese Restaurant Case (supra), provisions of the Ordinance of 2001 are analyzed; limitation provided under section 221 is four years; whereas limitation provided for filing Reference Application before this Court, under section 133, is ninety days. Their lordships were rightly skeptical in their view; if reference is allowed to be filed out of an order under section 221, it can be misused for extending the period of limitation provided under section 133 of the Ordinance. Yet, a person aggrieved by a change in order under section 132 cannot be deprived of the remedy provided under the Statute. It may be explained that parameters provided for exercise of jurisdiction under section 133, by this Court, shall apply with full force i.e., if any question of law arises out of the changed order, reference application shall be maintainable. This opinion is supported by their lordships observation in following paragraph from Messrs Hong Kong Chinese Restaurant Case:-\n\"\"12. In our view the provisions of section 136 both before and after the amendment in the year, 1997 and then in the year 2000 are sufficiently clear to reject the contention of the learned counsel. The provisions of section 136 continue to make a specific reference to the order of the Tribunal under section 135 which could possibly give rise to a question of law to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. By making a specific reference to section 135 the Legislature has clearly restricted the scope of appeal or reference only to the questions of law which arise out of that order and none else. As noted earlier the Tribunal is competent to rectify its order under section 156 in exercise of that jurisdiction. However, it is only an order recorded on a successful application for rectification which can be read to be a part of the original order and covered by the provisions of section 135 if it goes to change the same to the prejudice of either the assessee or the Revenue. If an order on the application under section 156 simply refuses to rectify the original order, as observed earlier, it stands alone and remains a different order independent of the one originally recorded under section 135 of the Ordinance. Even where the Tribunal acts suo motu and rectifies the original order but such rectification does not change the order under section 135 to the prejudice of any of the parties, again such an order stands on its own and does not enter into the original order to give rise to a question of law to be considered by this Court. The order of rectification can be read as part of the rectified order and, therefore, subject to appellate or reference jurisdiction of this Court only if the change resulting therefrom disturbs the existing situation of liability of the assessee or the entitlement of the Revenue.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Since Appellate Tribunal has refused to rectify the order under section 132 the Ordinance, therefore, this Reference Application, proposing questions from order under section 221 is not entertainable hence, we decline to exercise jurisdiction under section 133 of the Ordinance.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Reference Application is decided against the appellant department.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Cases referred to:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Commissioner of Income Tax Wealth Tax, Faisalabad Zone, Faisalabad v. Muhammad Sharp [(2009) 100 Tax 174] and Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi v. Mst, Shakeela Bano [(2003) 87 Tax 304] and Hong Kong Chinese Restaurant Mian Boulevard Gulberg, Lahore v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 6 Lahore and another (2002 PTD 1878).\"",
    "URL Link:": "Case No: I.T.R. 79/2012, decision dated: 19~8-2014",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122,132,133,221\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=122,132,133,221\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "MUHAMMAD TARIQ ABBASI AND SHAHID, JAMIL KHAN, JJ.",
    "Court Name:": "Muhammad Irshad Chaudhry, Advocate along with Tahir Mehmood Bharti, Inland Revenue Officer, Legal-I, Zone-1, Regional Tax Office, Rawalpindi, for the Petitioner. Hafiz Muhammad Idrees, Advocate for respondent No. 1",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11813",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2351 = 2001 SLD 2351 = 2001 CLC 375",
    "Key Words:": "(a) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)---------Ss. 44, 45 & 172(vi)---Allotment of land---Jurisdiction of Civil Court to issue directions to Revenue functionaries---Extent---Directions could be issued by Civil Court to Revenue' functionaries to give effect to any determination made by it in respect of title, right, interest of an individual in some property.\n \n(b) Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act (XLVII of 1958)---\n \n----Ss. 4.& 10---Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act (XIV of 1975); S.2---Repeal of Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958---Effect- --Jurisdiction of Settlement Authority---Settlement Authority could not interfere after repeal of Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 except in cases which were instituted before 1-7-1974 or which had been remanded by Supreme Court or a High Court---Allotment obtained on the basis of forged or fabricated orders was total nullity in the eyes of law and should be ignored as non-existent and land should be treated as still available for disposal.\n \nPLD 1991 SC 691 ref.\n \n(c) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)---\n \n----S. 164---Revisional jurisdiction, exercise of---Concurrent findings of Authorities below not suffering from any legal lacuna, could not be interfered with in revision.",
    "Court Name:": "Board of Revenue, Punjab",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.O.R. No.2469 of 1995, decision dated: 18-07-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHZAD HASSAN PERVEZ, MEMBER (JUDICIALI)",
    "": "SHAUKAT ALI and 26 others\nvs\nPROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB through Secretary (Revenue), Punjab, Lahore"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11814",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2352 = 2001 SLD 2352 = 2001 CLC 414",
    "Key Words:": "Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Shariah) Regulation (II of 1994)-------Ss. 7 & 11---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 5.115---Revision--­Failure to adopt new procedure---Suit was filed by the respondent under the provisions of North-West Frontier. Province Regulation (I of 1975)--­Procedure was changed and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (Nifaz-e­Nizam-e-Shariah) Regulation, 1994 was enforced during the pendency of suit---Trial Court did not follow the new procedure and dismissed the suit according to the repealed law---Lower Appellate Court allowed the appeal and remanded the case for retrial---Validity---Trial Court was obliged to adopt the new procedure in order to proceed further in the matter or would have sought the consent of the parties regarding adopting the evidence and proceedings already taken under the repealed law---Where the Trial Court did not follow the same, the manner and method of trial was effected---Order of the Lower Appellate Court was in consonance with the spirit/theme of the North-West Frontier Province Regulation (II of 1994) and had rightly remanded the case back to the Trial Court for decision afresh to accordance with the new law---Judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court was maintained in circumstances. \n \nAbdul Samad and others v. Painda Muhammad and others PLD 1997 Pesh. 35 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.402 of 1996, heard on 25-09-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "QAZI EHSANULLAH QURESHI, J",
    "": "GHULAM RAHIM and 11 others \nvs \nNAUROZ and 39 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11815",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2353 = 2001 SLD 2353 = 2001 CLC 424",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Local Government Ordinance (VI of 1979)-------Ss. 153, 156 & 157---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199--­Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Adequate remedy, availability of---Model Schedule---Validity---General superintendence over the affairs of Local Council was vested in Provincial Government under the provisions of S.153, Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, whereas the Government had been vested with the powers under S.157 of the Ordinance to issue direction from time to time-to the Local Council---Sections 153 & 157 of the Ordinance had not provided any remedy, and the same could not be termed as alternate adequate remedy available to aggrieved person barring the maintainability of Constitutional petition. \n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Failure of petitioner to mention pendency of civil suit in the petition ---Effect---Mala fide on the part of petitioner---Where the scope of the suit was different and the same was based on independent cause of action, such omission in the petition would not have adverse effect on the bona fides of the petitioner or on its merits---High Court refused to exercise discretion to dismiss the petition in circumstances. \n \n(c) Estoppel---\n \n----No estoppel against law. \n \n(d) Words and phrases---\n \n......Produce\"\"---Meaning. \n \nWords and Phrases legally defined by Johan B. Saunders, 2nd Edn., Vo1.4, p.87; English Dictionary; Black's Law Dictionary and Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary ref.\n \n(e) Punjab Zila Councils (Export Tax) Rules, 1990---\n \n----R. 5---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Export Tax, recovery of---Expression \"\"produced\"\" as appearing in 8.5(1) of Punjab Zila Councils (Export Tax) Rules, 1990---Applicability--­Petitioner was excavating stone from leased area situated within the limits of Town Committee and after the same being crushed had to pass through the territorial limits of District Council---While leaving the limits of the District Council, Export Tax was charged from the petitioner---Contention by the petitioner was that as no production was carried out within the limits of District Council he was not liable to pay the Export Tax ---Validity--­Production of stone was deemed to have taken place when the same was excavated from the leased hill/quarry and the leased area was situated within the limits of Town Committee and not in the territorial limits of the District Council as such the stone was not produced within the limits of the District Council---No Export Tax, thus, could be levied on transportation of the stone to a place outside the limits of District Council, though the same passed through the limits of District Council---Recovery of Export Tax by District Council for the excavation of stone within the territorial limits of Town Committee was without lawful authority and had no legal effect---High Court directed the concerned Authorities to return the tax already recovered from the petitioner. \n \nAl-Ahram Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal 1993 SCMR 29; Wealth Tax Officer and another v. Shaukat Afzal and 4 others 1993 SCMR 1810; Nur Muhammad v. Deputy Commissioner/ Controlling Authority, D.G. Khan and others 1992 PLC (C.S.) 368; Superintendent to Central Excise, Lyallpur v. Ch. Faqir Muhammad PLD 1959 SC 103; Pakistan v. Muhammad Aqil PLD 1960 SC 4; Colony Sarhad Textile Mills Ltd. v. Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs and another PLD 1969. Lah. 228; Federation of Pakistan v. Messrs Noori Trading Corporation (Private) Limited and 14 others 1992 SCMR 710; Messrs Sethi Straw Board Mills Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance and 3 others 1994 SCMR 1872; Hilal Tanneries Ltd,. v. Zila Council, Gujrat and others 1994 MLD 2366 and Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. v. The Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs, Hyderabad and another PLD 1971 Kar. 221 ref.\n \n(f) Punjab Zila Councils (Export Tax) Rules, 1990---\n \n----R. 5(1)---Expression \"\"produced\"\"---Connotation---Stone crushing--­Breaking of stones through crushing to smaller pieces of stone does not conic within the meaning of \"\"produced\"\" as envisaged under 8.5(1) of Punjab Zila Councils (Export Tax) Rules. 1990---Export Tax is levied on stone. Bajri, Chalk Mitti, sand, earth and brick Pacca of all kinds irrespective of its size and not on the act of crushing of the stone---Crushing of stone does not come within the meaning of \"\"produced\"\" as mentioned in 8.5(1), Punjab Zila Councils (Export Tax) Rules, 1990. \n \nNoori Trading Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1989 Quetta 74 rel.\nFederation of Pakistan v. Messrs Noori Trading Corporation (Private) Limited and 14 others 1992 SCMR 710 distinguished.\n \n(g) Punjab Local Government Ordinance (VI of 1979)--\n \n----Ss. 137, 138 & 139-=-Punjab Local Councils (Taxation) Rules, 1980, R.10---Model Schedule---Object---Goods Exit Tax Model Schedule is issued by the Provincial Government to serve as guideline for Zila Council and the same does not absolve the Zila Councils of their responsibilities to observe all formalities prior to imposing the Export Tax though Ziia Council could recover the Export Tax at the rates mentioned in the Schedule sanctioned- and issued by itself. \n \nZila Council, Sheikhupura through its Chairman v. Messrs Mian Tyre and Rubber Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore Cantt. and others PLD 1994 SC 212 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.6754 of 1994, decision dated: 12-01-1995",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHEIKH, J",
    "": "DAEWOO CORPORATION through Director Contract & FollowUp \nvs \nPROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB through Secretary, Local Government and Rural Development, Lahore and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11816",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 1034 = 2014 SLD 1034 = (2014) 110 TAX 336",
    "Key Words:": "Wealth Tax Act, 1963 - Section 2(1)(10), 8, 16(3), 27(1) - Appeals - Assessment made u/s 16(3) by Assessing officer - On being assailed before Appellate Addl. Commissioner appeals were partly allowed - Cross appeals were filed before tribunal who preferred to decide appeals against appellant department on technical ground of jurisdiction - It was held that Assistant Commissioner (assessing officer) was neither arrayed as Authority u/s 8, nor was included in definition of Dy. Commissioner u/s 2(1)(10) - Assessment annulled for reason that AC is not authority to make assessment - Validity - Whether examination of definition given in section 2(1)(10) shows that \"\"Deputy Commissioner\"\" meant \"\"person appointed to act as Deputy Commissioner which could be Wealth Tax Officer, a special Officer and Tax Recovery Officer - Held yes - Whether since Assistant Commissioner was appointed to act as Dy. Commissioner, therefore, assessment order passed by him u/s 16(3) was valid - Held yes - Whether any concession or erroneous interpretation of law shall not operate as estoppel, as there is no estoppel against law - Held yes - Whether Appellate Tribunal had not decided appeals on merit, therefore, appeals shall be deemed pending before it for decision afresh - Held yes.\nOn perusal of the order in Tax Appeal No. 56 of 2006 it is revealed that question answered in that appeal is not identical to the legal proposition in this case; benefit of the section 45A of the Act was given by holding that typographical mistake of Writing Taxation Officer in place of Special Officer could not vitiate the proceedings. The re-framed question (supra), is on different premise. \nUnder section 16 of the Act, assessment could be made by Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner was arrayed as one of the Wealth Tax Authorities, followed by Wealth Tax Inspectors, in section 8 of the Act. Assistant Commissioner was not listed as Authority in this section. \nUnder sub-section (1) of the section 2, meanings assigned to the word \"\"Deputy Commissioner\"\" were to be read in Section 16 (for making assessments) and in section 8 of the Act, Examination of the definition, ibid, shows that it meant a person appointed to act as Deputy Commissioner which could be a Wealth Tax Officer, a Special Officer and a Tax Recovery Officer. It is important to note that designations, mentioned in the definition, are not arrayed in the list of Authorities under section Wealth Tax Officer, as used in the definition, has a wider connotation and includes Assistant Commissioner in its fold. Principle of ejusdem generis if used as a tool of interpretation would also allow to read Assistant Commissioner in the definition of Deputy Commissioner, In operative part of the definition clause, the phrase; a person appointed to act as Deputy Commissioner also clarifies the confusions. As Assistant Commissioner was appointed to act as Deputy Commissioner, therefore, assessment order passed by him under section 16(3) of the Act was valid. \nFinding of Appellate Tribunal, in order under question, lacks collective reading of relevant provisions. The word Deputy Commissioner was read in isolation and was misconstrued as a designation simplicator. Despite reproducing the definition of Deputy Commissioner in its order, Appellate Tribunal was swayed\nby the fact that Assistant Commissioner was not listed section 8 of the Act. \nAny concession on erroneous interpretation of law shall not operate as estoppel, as there is no estoppel against law. \nFor the above reasons, our answer to the legal proposition, in shape of reframed question, is in negative. The appeals are decided in favour of appellant department. \nAs Appellate Tribunal had not decided the appeals on merits, therefore, the appeals shall be deemed pending before it for decision afresh. \nCases referred to:\nCommissioner of Income Tax Company's II, Karachi v. National Food Laboratories (1992) 65 Tax 257 (S.C. Pak.).",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Wealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=2(1),2(10),8,16(3),27(1),27(5),45A\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=2(1),2(10),8,16(3),27(1),27(5),45A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Case No: I.T.A. 54/1999, decision dated: 18-8-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TARIQ ABBASI, JUSTICE SHAHID, JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE",
    "": "er: COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, RAWALPINDI\nVS\nHAFIZ S.A. REHMAN, ADVOCATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11817",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2354 = 2001 SLD 2354 = 2001 CLC 408",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss. 42 & 55---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.14---Suit for declaration and mandatory injunction---Limitation---Exclusion of period spent in proceedings before Wafaqi Mohtasib---Claim of plaintiff having been repudiated by defendant, plaintiff filed complaint with the Wafaqi Mohtasib which was rejected and plaintiff filed suit after about two years of rejection of the complaint---Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib being not a Court, proceedings before Wafaqi Mohatasib would not be deemed to be the proceedings in the wrong Court---Benefit of S.14 of Limitation Act, 1908, in circumstances, would not be attracted to the case of plaintiff. \n \nMasud Ahmad and 2 others v.. United Bank Ltd. 1992 SCMR 424; Said Ahmad Khan v. Syed Altaf Hussain 1986 MLD 2283 and Muhammad Sharif Khan v. Mst. Manzooran Begum 1992 CLC 22 ref.\n \n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---\n \n----S. 19 & Art.86---Computation of limitation period---Where on acknowledgement of liability in respect of property or right had been made in writing by the party against whom said property or right was claimed, a fresh period of limitation would be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed. \n \n(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----Ss. 42 & 55---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.86---Suit for declaration and mandatory injunction---Limitation---Defendant in its evidence had nowhere stated that the suit was hit by limitation nor it was on file of the Court that as to when the claim of the plaintiff was lastly refused by defendant---Effect---Incumbent on the defendant to establish on record the date when the claim of the plaintiff was refused---Onus to prove that suit was barred by limitation, was on the defendant but he had failed to discharge the onus by producing sufficient and convincing evidence---Presumption, thus, would go against the defendant---Suits, in circumstances, were rightly decreed by Courts below.\n \n(d) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----Ss. 42, & 55---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.86---Suit for declaration and mandatory injunction---Limitation---Date of death of insured person (deceased husband of plaintiff) though was the starting point for running limitation under Art.86(a) of Limitation Act, 1908, but where the insurer (defendant) had acknowledged liability to the sum insured by a letter refusing to pay, limitation would start from the date of signing such letter. \n \nMessrs State Life Insurance Corporation v. Mst. Kausar Jehan Begum 1982 CLC 1658 ref.\n \n(e) Proof---\n \n----Onus---He who alleges, must prove and in case he fails to prove the issue, the presumption goes against him. \n \nMuhammad Zaman Khan v. Sher Afzal Khan PLD 1984 Azad J&K 138 ref.\n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 100---Appellate jurisdiction, exercise of---Appellants had . failed to point out any illegality and material irregularity in s and decrees passed by Courts below---Appeals against s and decrees were dismissed by High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Nos.23 and 24 of 1993, heard on 5th October 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR, J",
    "": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Chairman and 3 others \nvs \nSAFIA BEGUM"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11818",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 1035 = 2014 SLD 1035 = (2014) 110 TAX 359 = 2015 PTD 313 = 2015 PTCL 464",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) - Sections: 47 & 73 - Reference to High Court - Audit - Respondent No. I found to have paid loading and unloading charges in addition to price of cement - Declared Taxable by T.O - Input adjustment found inadmissible for non-compliance of section 73 - Show Cause Notice - Directions to deposit Sales Tax along with default surcharge and penalty- Tribunal found that personal account of owner was taken as business account at time of registration - Input adjustments made through business Bank Account were allowed whereas payments made through personal account not allowed - Validity - Whether mere fact that account registered with Deptt. was not in the name of business, was not sufficient to invoke penal provisions of Section 73 - held yes - Whether since respondent had given unrebutted plausible explanation for making payments from personal account, therefore, decision by Tribunal was correct - Held yes - Whether payment of freight, loading and unloading charges was not in furtherance of business carried out for consideration, was ancillary service provided to consumer, that too on occasional basis and recovered from consumer/customer could not be termed as taxable activity, hence not taxable - Held yes - Whether tax period to which controversy of levying tax relates, is prior to 01- 07-2008, therefore, definition relied upon by Tribunal was not applicable as it did not contain words furtherance of business. \"\"yet these words are available in Section 3(1)(a) of Act of 1990 - Held yes - Whether absence of said words from definition at relevant time would not change finding given by Tribunal - Held yes.\nMere fact that account registered with the department was not in the name of business, was not sufficient to invoke penal provisions of Section 73. To enforce the provisions under this section, the business account must be the one registered with department in due course. Intent of legislature is that all transactions taxable under the Act of 1990, must reflect from one account, for minimizing the opportunities of non or mis-declaration. All transactions from one account are also necessary to trace the chain of taxable supplies, which ensures proper taxation and adjustment, till taxable goods reach the consumer, who bears the burden of this tax. Since respondent had given an un-rebutted plausible explanation for making payments from personal account, therefore, decision by Appellate Tribunal was correct, under the facts and circumstances. \nWhile giving its decision on the issue of non-payment of sales tax on value addition, Appellate Tribunal interpreted the definition of \"\"supply\"\" [Section 2(33)] and \"\"value of supply\"\" [Section 2(46)] to hold that payment of freight, loading and unloading charges was merely a service, not covered within the definition of \"\"supply\"\". It was held that payment of loading and unloading charges was not in furtherance of business.\nFindings by taxation officer that payments of freight, loading and unloading charges are admittedly paid by respondent No. 1, therefore, it amounted to value addition, were rightly discarded by Appellate Tribunal. It may be observed that before construing any transaction as taxable activity; value addition or taxable supply; the department had to arrive at true nature of the transaction based on correct determination of facts. We are in agreement with the findings by Appellate Tribunal that the payment of freight, loading and unloading charges was not in furtherance of business carried out for consideration; rather was an ancillary service provided to the consumer, that too on occasional basis. Two incidents of making payments of freight, loading and unloading charges cannot make all transactions as taxable in relevant period. Under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act of 1990 (charging section), sales tax is levied on the value of taxable supply made by a registered person in the course or furtherance of any activity carried out by him. As found (ibid), payment of freight, loading and unloading charges, made occasionally and recovered from the consumer/customer could not he termed as a taxable activity, hence was not taxable. The , in Messrs Wah Nobel Chemical Ltd., (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for respondent No.1 is also on the same preposition where similar conclusion was drawn. \nDefinition of word \"\"supply\"\" was substituted under Section 2(33) of the Act of 1990 by Finance Act, 2008 whereas tax period relevant to this case is May, 2001 to May, 2006. Contention of learned counsel for the applicant/department is correct that the tax period to which the controversy of levying tax relates, is prior to 1-7-2008, therefore, the definition relied upon by Appellate Tribunal was not applicable as it did not contain the words furtherance of business\"\", yet these words are available in Section 3(1)(a) of the Act of 1990 (charging section). Absence of said words from definition at relevant time would not change the finding given by Appellate Tribunal above. Answer to this question is also in affirmative (against the applicant department). \nCases referred to:\nCollector Sales Tax and Central Excise, Rawalpindi v. Wah Nobel Chemical Ltd., Wah Cantt. (2008 PTD 1693).",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(33),2(46),3(1)(a),47,47(5),73\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(33),2(46),3(1)(a),47,47(5),73\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 01/2011, decision dated: 23-9-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AMEER BHATTI, JUSTICE, SHAHID, JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE",
    "": "er: COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVS\nM/S GUL ENTERPRISES ETC."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11819",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1993 2355 = 1993 SLD 2355 = 1993 CLC 864",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (M.L.R 115)---\n \n----Para. 25 (7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115---Power of revision by Board of Revenue---Nature---Revision provided in para. 25(7) eras not hedged in by restrictions mentioned in S.115, C.P.C.\n \nSub-para (7) of para. 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation conferred revisory powers on the Board of Revenue to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the proceedings or orders made by the authorities subordinate to it. In the process of opinion making on the correctness., legality or propriety of the proceedings or orders sought to be revised the Bard was obliged to examine the material available to it like a Civil .Court. Member, neither adverted to oral evidence nor addressed himself to the revenue records and yet he reversed the decision of Additional Commissioner and restored that of the Collector with observations consisting of few lines. He may have looked into the record but his did not indicate so. A party bringing is cause to the Court for adjudication was entitled to know the reasons how is cause was dealt with. Brief and sketchy did not meet the requirements of law and also failed to satisfy the searching mind of a litigant. Revision para. 25 was not hedged in by restrictions mentioned in section 115 ,f Civil Procedure Code. \n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court under Art 199 is prohibitive of substitution of opinion.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "GUL ZARIN KIANI, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SALEEM KHAN and another\nvs\nMEMBER, BOARD OF (REVENUE), PUNJAB LAHORE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11820",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2356 = 2001 SLD 2356 = 2001 CLC 433",
    "Key Words:": "Calendar of the University of the Punjab------- Regln. 37---Constitution of . Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Educational institution---Grace marks, grant of---Candidate was short of 4 marks in aggregate of Part I and Part II of M.A. Examination--­University officials refused to extend benefit of Regln.37 of Calendar of the University of the Punjab without any decision of Board of Examiners--­Validity---Matter of grace marks could only be decided by the Board of Examiners and not any other functionary from the University---Refusal of grace marks by the University officials was without lawful authority and of no legal effect---High Court directed the University to place the case of the candidate before Board of Examiners who would proceed to decide the claim in accordance with law---Petition was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 14993 of 2000, heard on 22-09-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "KARAMAT NAZIR BHANDARI, J",
    "": "SAJID BIN NAWAZ \nvs \nPUNJAB UNIVERSITY"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11821",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2357 = 2001 SLD 2357 = 2001 CLC 435",
    "Key Words:": "West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-------S. 42(7)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Entries in Record of Rights---Consolidation Officer, jurisdiction of---Change in long-standing entries in Revenue Record---Disputed mutation was entered by the Consolidation Officer without giving any opportunity of hearing to the respondents---Such change in the Record of Rights was set aside by the Board of Revenue---Validity---Change in the share of the petitioners in the disputed Khata was neither declared by any Court of competent jurisdiction nor the Consolidation Officer had changed the long­standing entries in the Record of Rights after providing opportunity of hearing to the respondents---Order passed by the Board of Revenue was neither void nor without lawful authority.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 10979 and 11962 of 1997, decision dated: 27-09-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ZAFAR YASIN, J",
    "": "WALAYAT SHAH and another \nvs \nBOOTAY SHAH and 11 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11822",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2044 = 2014 SLD 2044 = (2014) 110 TAX 371 = 2015 PTD 877 = 2015 PTCL 802",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act, 1969 Section. 168 - OGRA Ordinance, 2002, Section: 21(c) - Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199 - Seizure of things liable to confiscation - Import of Pyrolysis Gasoline instead of Motor Gasoline - Allegation against petitioner - Detention of vessel and cargo by Customs Authorities - Constitutional Petition - Whether respondent agreed to withdraw impugned detention notice and release Motor Gasoline (Pyrolysis Gasoline) imported by petitioner in respect of which tests have been conducted and reports regarding quantity of benzene have already been received which show that Benzene contents in gasoline stored in tanks is below 5% - Held yes - Whether Customs Deptt. present in court candidly stated that petitioner will be dealt with strictly in accordance with law and no harassment shall be caused to petitioner while processing GDS which may be filed by petitioner in respect of disputed gasoline presently stored in tanks-Held yes,- Whether by consent of both parties, instant petition was disposed of by High Court along with listed application in above terms-Held Yes.\nIt has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that in view of hereinabove facts and the legal position, as stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the ratio of the case laws as referred to hereinabove, the respondents are not inclined to justify the impugned action of the detention of vessel and the cargo (i.e. Motor Gasoline/Pyrolysis Gasoline) imported by the petitioner, however, submits that petitioner is still required to the GD along with requisite documents, which will be processed in accordance with law by the respondents. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that instant petition may be disposed of by consent, whereas the respondent will withdraw the impugned detention notice and release the Motor Gasoline (Pyrolysis Gasoline) imported by the petitioner, which is presently stored in four tanks in the bonded warehouse, in respect of which, tests have been conducted and reports regarding quantity of benzene have already been received, which show that benzene contents in the gasoline stored in such tanks is below 5%. It has been further contended that petitioner may be directed to file the GDs which will be processed by the respondents in accordance with law, without being influenced with the proceedings initiated by the respondents in this regard.\n \nLearned counsel for the petitioner does not oppose the disposal of instant petition in the aforesaid terms, however, requests that the respondents may be directed not to cause any harassment or to create undue hindrance at the time of processing of the GDS, whereas, proper opportunity may be given to the petitioner, in case of any dispute or shortfall in the documents as may be required at the time of processing of such GD. \nThe concerned officers of Customs Department, who are present in Court, have candidly stated that the petitioner will be dealt strictly in accordance with law and no harassment shall be caused to the petitioner, while processing the GDS, which may be filed by the petitioner in respect of the disputed Gasoline presently stored in the four tanks Nos. 1, 5, 11 and 12.\nAccordingly, by consent of both the parties, instant petition is being disposed of along with listed application in the above terms. Respondents are directed to comply with the order of this Court in letter and spirit without further loss of time, whereas, nazir of this Court is directed to return the cheque to the petitioner, which was deposited pursuant to order of this Court dated 26-8-2014, after proper verification and identification. \nCases referred to:\nMst. Ummatullah v. Province of Sindh PLD 2010 Karachi 236; Government of Sindh v. Messrs Khan Ginners (Private) Limited PLD 2011 Supreme Court 347; Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Messrs N.K. Enterprises PLD 2013 Sindh 264; Salahuddin Dharaj v. Province of Sindh PLD 2013 Sindh 236 and Tehsil Municipal Administration and others v. Noman Azam and others 2009 SCMR 1070 and Collector of Customs and others v. S.M. Young\"\" reported as 1973 SCMR 411.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=79,168,169\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Act, 1969=79,168,169\\n\\r\\n\\rOil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002=21(c)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Const. Petition No. D-4385 of 2014, decision dated: 5-9-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JJ",
    "": "HASCOL PETROLEUM LIMITED\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & ANOTHER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11823",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2358 = 2001 SLD 2358 = 2001 CLC 444",
    "Key Words:": "Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-------Arts. 144 & 145---Putting question to witness---Initiating legal proceedings against counsel---Counsel of plaintiff while cross-examining defendant witness, put certain questions to said witness whereby his credibility was allegedly impeached---Said questions were put to witness by counsel on instructions of his client and not on his own nor to defame or disgrace the witness---Such action of the counsel stood protected under Art.144 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 against initiating legal proceedings against him.\n \nM. Moosa v. Mahomed and others PLD 1954 Sindh 70; Azam Beg Mirza v. Tajammal Hussain and another 1983 PCr.LJ 1476 and Malik Ghias­ud-Din v. Muhammad Saeed PLD 1993 Lah. 509 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 151 of 1990, heard on 13-11-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "SHEIKH ABDUR RAZZAQ, J",
    "": "Malik MUHAMMAD ASLAM, ADVOCATE \nvs \nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGEII, BAHAWALPUR and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11824",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2359 = 2001 SLD 2359 = 2001 CLC 438",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-------S. 5---Attestation of rent agreement---Rent agreement executed before coming into force of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 would not require any attestation by the Rent Controller or the First Class Magistrate. \n \n(b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVIQ of 1979)---\n \n----Ss. 19 & 20---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.1---Applicability of Civil Procedure Code---Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to cases under Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 on all fours. \n \nHabib Bux v. Zahoor-ul-Hassan 1986 CLC 1119 ref.\n \n(c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVB of 1979)---\n \n----S. 15(2)---Ejectment application---Maintainability---Procedure---If verification of ejectment application was not duly attested, such omission was a mere irregularity and could be cured at any stage by directing the party to get the formality observed---Application could not be held as not maintainable for such an omission. \n \nAlif Din v. Khadim HAssain 1980 SCMR 767; Muhammad Akbar v. Shaikh Nasiruddin 1991 MLD 1338; Shafique Ahmad v. Abdul Rehman 1987 MLD 2243; Allauddin v. Ghazanfar Ali and another 1988 CLC 1343; Messrs Aziz Flour Mills and 2 others v. The Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 1990 CLC 1473 and Muhammad Munshi and another v. Mst. Rakiya Bi 1990 CLC 301 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Rent Appeal No.494 of 1998, decision dated: 15-11-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, J",
    "": "Mrs. SULTANA BEGUM \nvs \nMANSOOR JAVEED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11825",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2045 = 2014 SLD 2045 = (2014) 110 TAX 379",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Rules, 2002 - Rule: 44(4) - Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art, 199 - Constitutional Petition- Directions to petitioner to furnish information - Show Cause Notice - Assailing through writ petition - Maintainability - Whether petitioner has only been asked to furnish required information and the statement of petitioner that these are proceedings u/s 161 of Income Tax Ord. 2001 is incorrect as there has been no determination for purpose of section: 161- Held yes - Whether respondents have stipulated clearly different heads in which information is sought and amounts paid in terms thereof- Held yes - Whether no illegality is made out and petition is dismissed being not maintainable - Held yes. In terms of the said rule, the Petitioner has only been asked to furnish required information. At this stage, the statement of the Petitioner that these are proceedings under Section 161 of the 2001 Ordinance is incorrect. There has been no determination for the purposes of Section 161 of the 2001 Ordinance. Even otherwise, a review of the notice shows that the Petitioner has been asked to submit reconciliation of all payments mentioned in the annual statement along with the payments made against trading and P&L account mentioned in the income tax return and Audited accounts.\n \nThe Respondents have stipulated clearly the different heads in which the information is sought and the amounts paid in terms thereof. As such no illegality is made out. This petition is dismissed being not maintainable.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.P. No. 9866 of 2014, decision dated: 12-5-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AYESHA A. MALIK, J",
    "": "AKHTAR SAEED MEDICAL & DENTAL COLLEGE\nvs\nFOP etc"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11826",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2360 = 2001 SLD 2360 = 2001 CLC 453",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S. 9 & O. VII, R.10---North-West Frontier Province Public Properties (Removal of Encroachment) Act (V of 1977), Ss.2, 11 & 13---Return of plaint---Plaintiff claimed that property in dispute was a private property whereas claim of defendant was that it was a public property---Dispute between the parties was with regard to lease of said property also---Only forum to decide matter was Special Tribunal created under North-West Frontier Province Public Properties (Removal of Encroachment) Act, 1977 and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was totally barred---Court had rightly returned the plaint in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Revision Petition No.83-A of 1998, decision dated: 31st October, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD QAIM, JAN KHAN, J",
    "": "AMAN ULLAH KHAN \nvs \nGOVERNMENT OF N.W.F.P. through Secretary, Local Government and Rural Development Department, Peshawar and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11827",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2361 = 2001 SLD 2361 = 2001 CLC 446",
    "Key Words:": "(a) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-------S. 45---Islamic Law---Inheritance---Mutation---Correction of---Suit-land was gifted to the plaintiff on account of murder of his father as a Diyat--­Revenue Authorities mutated the suit-land in favour of the brothers of the deceased---Plaintiff assailed the disputed mutation before Civil Court---Suit was dismissed by the Trial Court, but the Lower Appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit---Validity---Defendants were not the legal heirs of the deceased and the donor had denied to have gifted the suit-land to them---Judgment of the Lower Appellate Court did not suffer from any illegality and the High Court refused to interfere in the same---Plaintiff being not the only heir of the deceased, High Court modified. the and decree of the Lower Appellate Court and directed the Revenue Authorities to also include the names of the other legal heirs in the mutation of suit-land according to their respective shares. \n \n(b) Islamic Law---\n \n----Inheritance---Distribution of shares among legal heirs---Regulations about inheritance recorded. \n \nHoly Qur'an: IV: 7 ref.\n \n(c) Islamic Law---\n \n---- Inheritance---Tarka (legacy), distribution of---Procedure discussed. \n \nHoly Qur'an: IV: 11 to 14 ref.\n \n(d) Islamic Law--\n \n---- Diyat, payment of---Guidelines. \n \nThe Holy Qur'an:II: 178 and 179; XVII: 33 and XVII: 34 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.633/D of 1999, heard on 27-09-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "DR. MUNIR AHMAD MUGHAL, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and another \nvs \nFAISAL MASOOD and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11828",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2362 = 2001 SLD 2362 = 2001 CLC 518",
    "Key Words:": "(a) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-------S. 45---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.11---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition ---Res judicata, principle of---Applicability---Mutation on the basis of decree passed by Civil Courts--­Matter was finally settled between the parties up to High Court in favour of the petitioners and the order of High Court was not assailed before Supreme Court---Revenue Authorities did not implement the decree passed by Civil Court which had attained finality---Validity---Where order passed by High Court was not challenged before Supreme Court such order of High Court had attained finality and on the basis of principle of res judicata, the same was binding between the parties. \n \nPir Bakhsh v. Chairman, Allotment Committee and others PLD 1987 SC 145 and Ali Ahmad and another's case 1972 SCMR 322 ref.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Act of public functionary---Nobody should be penalized by the act of public functionary. \n \nAbdul Latif's case PLD 1994 Lah. 3 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Write Petition No.6147 of 1989, heard 9th October,2000",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "KHALIQ DAD and 31 others \nvs \nMEMBER (COLONIES) BOARD OD REVENUE PINJAB, LAHORE and 12 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11829",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2363 = 2001 SLD 2363 = 2001 CLC 462",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-------Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Judgment \"\"in personam\"\"---Scope--­Order of Authority concerning the parties and the subject-matter which gave rise to Constitutional petition decided by High Court was a \"\"in personam\"\" whereby the parties were bound and the matter could not be later reopened nor its efficacy eroded.\n \nPir Bakhsh and others v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee and others PLD 1987 SC 145 ref.\n \n(b) West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance (VI of 1960)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Constitution. of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition- --Consolidation proceedings---Judgment \"\"in pprsonam\"\"---Scope--­Grievance of landowners was against the Consolidation Scheme confirmed by the Board of Revenue---In earlier round of litigation, the matter was decided finally by the High Court and the order attained finality---Revenue Authorities finalized scheme which was confirmed by the High Court earlier but the same was disturbed by the Board of Revenue---Petitioners filed a review petition before the Board of Revenue which was also dismissed--­Validity---Judgment rendered by the High Court in earlier petition inter se the parties was \"\"in personam\"\" and the same was binding on the parties which had attained finality---Efficacy of the could not be eroded through subsequent order passed by the Board of Revenue---Parties were bound by the order of the High Court and they could not be allowed to reopen and reagitate the matter over and again---Order passed by Board of Revenue subsequently could not sustain in law and the same was illegal and of no legal effect.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.928 of 1986, decision dated: 19th. October, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "SOHANRA and 4 others \nvs \nMEMBER (CONSOLIDATION), BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, LAHORE and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11830",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2046 = 2014 SLD 2046 = (2014) 110 TAX 340",
    "Key Words:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 - Sections 32(2), 52 61, 63, Rule: 32(2) - Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art, 199 - Constitution of Pakistan - Tax liability - Income of petitioner is based on net ocean freight amount of cost and freight - Intention of respondents to charge entire amount of income of petitioner although not falling within charge of Sindh Sales Tax on Services nor covered under Rule 32 of Act - Show Cause Notice - Apprehension of charging Sales Tax from petitioner on their gross income with surcharge and penalty - Maintainability of constitutional petition - Question of - Whether if petitioner is aggrieved by any adverse decision by respondent in this regard, remedy as provided under law in terms of section 57 of Act, can be availed by filing appeal before Commissioner (Appeal) Sindh Revenue Board - Held yes - Whether since no final adjudication on proposed show cause notice has been made so far by respondent and merely show cause notice has been issued, therefore, petition is pre-mature, whereas no cause of action has accrued to petitioner which may justify filing of petition - Held yes.\nIf the petitioner is aggrieved by any adverse decision by the respondent in this regard, a remedy as provided under the law in terms of Section 57 of Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 can be availed by filling an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) Sindh Revenue Board. Similarly an appeal is also provided against the order of CIT (Appeals) in terms of Section 61 before the Appellate Tribunal, whereas, after the order of Appellate Tribunal, a Reference can also be filed before this Court in terms of Section 63 of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 in respect of questions of law which may arise from the order of the Tribunal. Since in the instant case, no final adjudication on the proposed Show Cause Notice has been made so far by the respondent and merely a Show Cause Notice has been issued, therefore, we are of the view that instant petition is pre-mature, whereas no cause of action has accrued to the petitioner which may justify the filing of instant petition. \nThe instant petition is misconceived in law and facts, which is hereby dismissed in limine alongwith listed applications. \nCases referred to:\nRoche Pakistan Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and others (2001) 84 Tax 302 (H.C. Kar.); Sitara Chemical Industries Ltd. and another v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax (2003) 88 Tax 200 (H. C. Kar.).",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=32(2),52,57,61,63\\n\\r\\n\\rSindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=32(2),52,57,61,63\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-769 of 2014, decision dated: 24-4-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, AND ZAFAR AHMED RAJPUT, JJ",
    "": "MARITIME AGENCIES (PRIVATE) LTD\nVS\nTHE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER-II OF SRB"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11831",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2364 = 2001 SLD 2364 = 2001 CLC 460",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S. 21(5)---Appeal against interlocutory order of Special Court--­Maintainability---Order passed by Special Court was neither suffering from any illegality or impropriety nor was passed without jurisdiction---Appeal against said order being not maintainable under S.21(5) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Civil Appeal No.3 of 2000, decision dated: 7-11-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ROSHAN ESSANI AND MUHAMMAD ASHRAF LEGHARI, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED \nvs \nABDUL HAMID and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11832",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2365 = 2001 SLD 2365 = 2001 CLC 466",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 1986-------R. 15---Priority---Rule .of first come first served ---Applicability--­Authorities have discretion to ignore the rule under the provision of R.15 of Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 1986. \n \nMessrs Kohinoor Aluminium v. Province of East Pakistan and others PLD 1969 Dacca 293 and Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and another v. Zamir Ahmed Khan PLD 1975 SC 667 ref.\n \n(b) Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 1986---\n \n----S. 15---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Priority in grant of licence---Rule of first come first served--­Applicability---Grievance of the petitioner was that she had applied earlier but ignoring her application the licence of disputed mines was given to the respondents---Validity---Authorities had reason to ignore the rule of priority and preferential treatment---Licence was granted to public sector organization fully equipped to undertake the requisite prospecting/developing work who had ambitious plan for the purpose---Where the non-grant of the licence to the petitioner had valid foundation, as such the same was not arbitrary or unreasonable in any way---Petitioner could neither compel the Authorities for grant of the licence, nor any direction could be issued---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 12285 of 1996, heard on 1st December, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "Mrs. AZRA SUALEH \nvs \nGOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB IN MINERAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT through Secretary, Industries and Mineral Development, Civil Secretariat, Lahore and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11833",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2047 = 2014 SLD 2047 = (2014) 110 TAX 242",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance: 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 114, 120, 36, 122(5A) & 122(9) - Amendment of assessments - Return filed by appellant was deemed as assessment Order u/s 120 - ACIR (Audit) disagreed with deemed assessment order & issued notice u/s 122(9) read with Section 122(5A) claiming that appellant/Tax payer has erred in claiming certain expenses - Reply to notice found unsatisfactory and amended order issued by ACIR making additions and creating demand of large amount of Tax - C1R(A) partially remanded case and partially confirmed order of ACIR - In appeal - Challenge - Whether ACIR issued multiple notices to appellant for production of books of accounts and CIR(A) has not adjudicated on this on this issue - Held yes - Whether Section 122(5A) does not empower revisional authority to suggest on evidence and call for books of accounts, documents and evidence Held yes - Whether power to make or cause to be made enquiries u/s 122(5A) provided through Finance Act, 2012 is not retrospective and is not applicable to tax year 2012 - Held yes (3) Whether as regards, matter of \"\"Deferred Participation Fee\"\" it is again quite disturbing that ACIR has added to income amount of advance fee in one year, whereas it relates to Services to be provided over period of 25 years and same has been disclosed properly in audited financial statements - Held yes - Whether appeal is accepted to extent and in manner referred above and impugned orders of both authorities below are annulled - Held yes. \nThe ACIR launched a fishing expedition to dig evidence through use of revisional jurisdiction of section 122(5A) of the Ordinance. We agree with the Learned AR that to move under section 122(5A), the assessment should be erroneous and should be in result prejudicial to interest of revenue. Erroneousness must speak at the assessment order level rather needing detailed books of account to suggest that the order is erroneous. This Tribunal has already held in case reported at (2013) 108 Tax 108 (Trib.)=2013PTD 1557 as under:\n\"\"Unfortunately in the order of Additional Commissioner before us, not only multiple notices on the same issues were issued but the learned officer has been insisting on production of books of account, documents and evidences to establish erroneousness and prejudice to the interest of revenue. The learned CIR(A) has not adjudicated on this issue, though argued before him. We are of the considered opinion that section 122(5A) does not empower the revision authority to suggest an evidence and call for books of accounts, documents and evidence.\"\" \nIt has further been observed that despite receiving explanation in response to the queries raised in his notices under section 122(5A), the Additional Commissioner issued four show cause notices pressing for production of books of accounts record, documents and evidences which is not permissible in the proceedings section 122(5A)- The learned CIR(A) has not adjudicated on this issue, though argued before him. In our view action of the Additional Commissioner was patently illegal and void so far as issuance of multiple notice is concerned as law does not provide for issuance of multiple notices on the same issue.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Further this Tribunal has also already held in its decisions in I.T.As. nos. 448/KB of 2008 dated 23-6-2009 reported as 2010 PTD 111 that repeated issuance of notices on the same issue constitutes fishing inquiries. Relevant para is reproduced hereunder:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "\"We have found that the taxation officer through second notice, date 15-11-2007 has claimed to have elaborately highlighted error that caused prejudice to revenue, We are of the view that this second notice is an admission on the part of the Taxation Officer that he could not point out any errors in his first notice under section 122(9) dated 22-10-2007 to invoke section 122(5A) which has been reproduced above. The Taxation officer has also not mentioned as to under what legal provision the second notice was issued. The Taxation Officer issued another notice under section 122(9) dated 10-12-2007 and the third notice was again sent to the taxpayer which shows that first two notices were deficient on legal grounds.) We have found that the Taxation Officer has repeatedly issued notices on the same issue which shows that he was not sure on the issue which were confronted to the assessee through first notice under section 122(9). We are of the view that this type of fishy inquiries cannot be approved to make basis for invocation of section 122(5A) as this type of approach, if allowed, would result in gross misuse of the provisions of law. Mere suspicions cannot be allowed to be a basis to invoke section 122(5A).\"",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "We also agree with Learned AR that the power to make or cause to be made enquires under section 122(5A) provided through Finance Act, 2012 is not retrospective and is not applicable to tax year 2012. In this regard, this Tribunal has already held that this very amendment is not applicable retrospectively, in its reported at 109 Tax 85.We quote relevant Para from this as under:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "\"We are of the considered opinion that a substantive change has been made by the legislature in section 122(5A) by adding the words \"\"after making, or causing to be made, such inquiries as he may deem necessary\"\" and it is settled that if a substantive provision inserted enlarging or extending the scope of existing provision it hall not have retrospective effect until and unless specifically specified by the legislature Making inquiries or\nseeking information, details, documents and record from the tax payer is against the spirit of section 122(5A) even after the amendment by Finance Act 2012.\"",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "\"As regards the addition of Rs.4,041,857,000 on account of Unearned Development Revenue, the audited accounts produced before us clearly mentions that the ACIR misled himself in making this addition on the basis of incorrect correlation. He also ignored the fact that this represents the development charges installments received over the years and is only recognized on percentage of completion and charging the same in one year is illegal and the ACIR has issued 'sine qua non' order on this count, which is illegal.\nAs regards, the matter of 'Deferred Participation Fee', it is again quite disturbing for us that the ACIR has added to income an amount of advance fee in one year, whereas it relates to the services to be provided over a period of 25 years @ Rs.180,000,000 per annum and the same has been disclosed properly in audited financial statements. It is also illegal to recognize the income on cash basis in a company and recognize cost as and when incur, which certainly would give distorting results. We also feel that there was no need of remanding the same for denovo consideration, as it required the Learned CIR(A-I) to firstly see whether the addition make any sense under the provisions of the law and only if yes, he has the right to call further information and cause inquires to arrive at any decision rather than remanding it back.\nCorning to the matter of addition of Rs.8,228,407,000 'advance from JV Project', we are surprised that ACIR added the same without even correctly understanding the transaction, detail of which has been provided in audited accounts filed along with the return. We agree with the Learned AR that by obtaining such facility from JV Project, the appellant was able to repay its heavy bank loans which had a burden on the income and thus was beneficial to the revenue. However, even from the other perspective, we are of the view that even if this amount is recognized as income in this year, no benefit of tax credit could be obtained under section 88A and would lead to absurd results. The share from income of an AOP (IV) can only be recognized by the taxpayer after it is declared/offered/appropriated by the AOP (JV). Therefore we feel that the addition is illegal on this count as well. \nCases referred to:\nGlaxo Laboratories Ltd v. Inspecting A.C J992) 65 Tax 115 (H.C. Kar.)=PLD 1992 SC 549; CIT v. Nusrat Corporation reported at 2006 PTD 2660; (2013) 108 Tax 108 (Trib.); 2010 PTD 111 and (2000) 81 Tax 83 (H. C. Lah.).",
    "URL Link:": "ITA No. 431/IB/14, Tax year 2012, decision dated: 22-8-2014, hearing dates 22-5-2014",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=49,114,120,36,122(5A),122(9)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=49,114,120,36,122(5A),122(9)\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRPERSON AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "Court Name:": "Syed Tauqeer Bukhari, Advocate, Syed Tanseer Bukhari, Advocate & Muddassar Khalid, ACA, for the Appellant. Said Munaf DR, for the Respondent",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11834",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2366 = 2001 SLD 2366 = 2001 CLC 468",
    "Key Words:": "Evidence------- Shifting of evidence of one case to the other---Validity---Evidence of one case could not be shifted verbatim to the other case for decision for such procedure was unknown to the Civil Procedure Code---Consent of parties could not change prescribed procedure because law would not permit the change of procedure through consent. \n \nMuhammad Younas v. The Crown PLD 1953 Lah. 321; Shabbir and 2 others v. Mst. Ghulam Fatima 1987 CLC 1407; Sheikh Abdul Hamid v. Muhammad Siddique PLD 1981 Lah. 42 and Malik Aman v. Haji Muhammad Tufail PLD 1976 Lah. 1446 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.2033 of 2000, decision dated: 14-09-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJA MUHAMMAD SABIR, J",
    "": "NAZIR AHMAD \nvs \nMst. GHAZALA BASHIR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11835",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2367 = 2001 SLD 2367 = 2001 CLC 471",
    "Key Words:": "(a) West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance (VI of 1960)-------Ss. 9, 10, 11 & 13---Consolidation of holdings---Prerequisites and procedure for the preparation of scheme stated.\n \nThe Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960 provides for the prerequisites and procedure for consolidation to be followed by the Consolidation Officer who prepares the scheme, if agreed to by the landowners or to prepare a scheme by himself in view of section 9 of the Ordinance. Before approving the scheme, he has, however, to publish the same for objections by any person interested and after considering such objections the scheme is to be confirmed under section 10(3) of the Ordinance. The aggrieved parties then are left to avail remedies of appeal or revision provided by sections 11 and 13 of the Ordinance. The scheme of the law indicates the importance of consent and consensus of the landowners.\n \n(b) West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance (VI of 1960)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Consolidation of holdings---Preparation of scheme---Interference of Chief Minister's Secretariat---Scheme was prepared by the Authorities under the direction of the Chief Minister's Secretariat as Member of Provincial Assembly required the same to be done---Validity---Statutory functionaries alone were competent to pass order in respect of consolidation schemes, under the provisions of Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960---Minister for consolidation had not been conferred with any authority in that regard and he was not permitted to interfere either directly or indirectly in judicial/quasi-judicial proceedings finalized by the Competent Authorities under the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960--­Consolidation proceedings initiated on the directive issued by Chief Minister's Secretariat had no lawful authority and were illegal as the same could not be regarded as fair and independent exercise of statutory powers--­High Court directed the petitioners to apply for consolidation in accordance with law and the Authorities were ordered to process the proceedings in a just and fair manner uninfluenced by any extraneous interference or pressure.\n \n \nBashir Ahmad and others v. Malik Jehangir Khan, Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue and others 1992 MLD 1566; Ahmad Khan v. Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and others PLD 1990 SC 1070 and Ghulam Rasul v. Mahmood Ahmad and 42 others 1992 SCMR 136 ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 4---Constitutional guarantees---Violation of---Interference of elected representatives into the field reserved for statutory functionaries ---Effect--­Such interference is violation of the Constitutional right of citizens to be treated in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3145 of 1990, decision dated: 17-11-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "Mst. AYESHA BIBI \nvs \nMst. NAJAMUNNISA and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11836",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2368 = 2001 SLD 2368 = 2001 CLC 477",
    "Key Words:": "West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-------S. 5 & Sched.---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Dissolution of marriage on ground of Khula'---Wife filed suit for dissolution of marriage on ground of option of puberty, but Court declined to grant dissolution of marriage on the said ground as the same was not established and instead ordered dissolution of marriage on ground of Khula'---Validity---Ground of Khula' was though not agitated by wife in the plaint, but Court in view of the conduct of parties concluded that parties could not live within the limits of God; that there was no use to order the continuation of hateful union of the parties and that it was in the interest of the parties that they should be separated so as to lead their independent and amicable life---High Court declined interference in the of Trial Court. \n \nMuhammad Abbasi v. Mst. Sarnia Abbasi 1992 CLC 937; Syed Dilshad Ahmad v. Mst. Sarwat Bi PLD 1990 Kar. 239 and Bashir Ahmad v. Mst. Nasreen and another 1991 CLC 1234 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3022 of 2000/BWP, heard on 26-09-2000",
    "Judge Name:": "SHEIKH ABDUR RAZZAQ, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RASHID \nvs \nJUDGE, FAMILY COURT, CHISHTIAN, DISTRICT BAHAWALNAGAR and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11837",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RFNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2048 = 2014 SLD 2048 = (2014) 110 TAX 259",
    "Key Words:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Rules, 2011 - Rule 22(1) - Input tax adjustment, claim of - Show Cause Notice - Period from 120 days to 180 days not extended from 120 days to 180 days for claiming input adjustment - Show Cause notice is unconstitutional, unlawful and illegal, void ab initio - Declaration Prayer for - Whether show cause notices have been issued to petitioners, whereby opportunity of being provided by the petitioners nor any demand has been Created so fur by the respondents, which may prejudice the right and interest of the petitioners. On the Contrary, show Cause notices have been issued to the petitioners, whereby, an opportunity of being heard has been provided by the respondents to explain their position with regard to the claim of input adjustment of tax in the case of petitioners in terms of Rule 22(1) of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Rules, 2011. Petitioners have duly responded to such Show Cause Notices by submitting written reply, hence surrendered to the jurisdiction of the respondents department. There is no objection or dispute with regard to jurisdiction of the respondent department over the case of the petitioners nor there seem any error or legal bar to issue such Show Cause Notice to the petitioners, The petitioners have expressed their grievance only to the extent of proposed treatment by the respondents to the claim of input adjustment by the petitioners in terms of Rule 22(1) of Sindh Sales Tax Rules, 2011, whereas, the respondents have not finally decided the legal issue nor passed any final order in this regard, hence the petitioners are still at liberty to make their submissions, which shall be decided by the respondents strictly in accordance with law and applying the relevant Rules. Since the impugned Show Cause Notices do not suffer from any jurisdictional error nor the petitioners have been able to point out any patent illegality in the impugned Show Cause Notices, whereby, an opportunity of being heard has been provided to the petitioners, therefore, the petitions filed by the petitioners appear to be pre-mature and tantamount to preempting the decision on the subject controversy.\nIn view of hereinabove facts, and by applying the ratio of aforesaid decision to the facts of instant petitions, we are of the opinion that both the petitions besides being misconceived in law and facts, are pre-mature, hence not maintainable and were accordingly dismissed vide our short order dated 16-6-2014 and these are the reasons for such short order.\nThe petitioners shall be at liberty to raise all such legal objections, which have been raised through instant petition before the respondents department (Sindh Revenue Board), who shall provide complete opportunity of being heard to the petitioners and shall pass a well-reasoned order strictly in accordance with law and with particular reference to the relevant Rules i.e. Rule 22(1) of Sindh Sales Tax on Services Rules, 2011, as referred to hereinabove.\nCase referred to:\nRoche Pakistan Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and other (2001) 84 Tax 302 (H.C. Kar.); Sitara Chemical Industries Ltd. and another v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2003) 88 Tax 200 (H.C. Kar.).",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=22(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rSindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=22(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Const. Petitions D-2948, D-3042 of 2014, decision dated: 16-6-2914",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JJ",
    "": "PAKISTAN MOBILE COMMUNICATION LTD. and others\nVS\nSINDH REVENUE BOARD AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11838",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6QVFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1670 = 2015 SLD 1670 = (2015) 111 TAX 193",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113,122,133\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=113,122,133\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=80D\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Case No: PTR No. 147 of 2012, decided 19-11-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID, JAMIL KHAN, JJ.",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVs\nIMPERIAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (PVT.) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11839",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6QlF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1681 = 2015 SLD 1681 = (2015) 111 TAX 333 = 2015 PTD 1625",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177(4)(d),122(1),122(5)(i),177(4)(d)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=177(4)(d),122(1),122(5)(i),177(4)(d)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A, No. 2652/LB/2013, decision dated: 16-04-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID IQBAL DHILLAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD RAZA BAQIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "GOHAR RICE MILLS, VILLAGE BADWAL, SHAKARGARRH\nVS.\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, SIALKOT."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11840",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6R1J5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 865 = 2015 SLD 865 = (2015) 111 TAX 388 = 2015 PTD 2545",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(14),11(2),7,8,8A,22,26,33,34,36(1),45B(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(14),11(2),7,8,8A,22,26,33,34,36(1),45B(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "STA No. 1058/LB/13, decision dated: 07-05-2014, hearing DATE : 7-5-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MOHAMMAD RAZA BAQIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "M/S. EXIM ENTERPRISES, S.M. IKHLAS ROAD, FAISALABAD AND OTHERS\nVS\nC.I.R., R.T.O. FAISALABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11841",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cUV6RlJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1998 1173 = 1998 SLD 1173 = 1998 CLC 2019 = (1998) 78 TAX 3",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-------S. 25(b), Scheds. First & Second---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Notification No.S.R.O: KE/98, dated 14-2-1998---Fixation of value for import and export---Goods were imported by the petitioner---Value of the goods specified in First and Second Scheds. of the Customs Act, 1969 was fixed by the Customs Authorities on the basis of notification issued by the Central Board of Revenue---Such valuation was challenged on the ground that value of the goods would be price prevailing in the country of origin and that the valuation determined by the Authorities was arbitrary and unreasonable---Held, under S.25(b), Customs Act, 1969, the Central Board of Revenue had statutory right of fixing the value of goods specified in the First and Second Scheds. of the Customs Act, 1969 by notification at such rates as it might deem fit and where such rates were fixed, they were taken into account for the purpose of calculating the value of imported and exported goods for the purpose.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Customs Act (IV of 1969), S.25(b)---Constitutional jurisdiction--­Factual controversy---Fixation of price of such goods being a question, which needed factual inquiry could not be adjudicated in Constitutional jurisdiction by the High Court.\n \nMessrs Latif Brothers v. Deputy Collector Customs, Lahore 1992 SCMR 1083 and Messrs A.G.E. Electric Co. v. Government of Pakistan and another 1994 CLC 420 ref.\n \n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--\n \n----S. 25(b)---Notification No.S.R.O. KE/98, dated 14-2-1998---Presumption was in favour of the notification being valid, unless proved otherwise---Fixation of value of goods imported and exported---Notification for fixation of rate of various goods under S.25(b), Customs Act, 1969, was issued before opening of Letter of Credit---Validity---While importing goods and dealing with foreign exporters, importer should have kept in consideration the valuation already notified by the Authority---If the importer opted to proceed with the import on a different price, he could not possibly grumble at his own act nor after importing the goods he would be entitled to challenge the validity of the rate notified by the Authority.\n \n(d) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----S. 25(b)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Adequate remedy---Availability---Petitioner had remedy to challenge the orders of Adjudicating Officer before Appellate Forum and appeal was also provided before the Tribunal and third appeal before High Court---Held, petition was not maintainable in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25(b),First Schedule,Second Schedule\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Act, 1969=25(b),First Schedule,Second Schedule\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.6613, 6328, 6540, 6612, 6762, 7511, 7877, 7512, 7513, 7510 and 7500 of 1998, decision dated: 4-05-1998",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED NAJAMULHASSAN KAZMI, J",
    "": "MADINA TRADERS\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11842",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVYQVFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1683 = 2015 SLD 1683 = (2015) 111 TAX 359",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections. 2(16), 80(2)(b)(v), 113, 221, 221 (2) - Rectification of mistakes - Tribunal issued Show Cause Notice u/s 221 to Taxpayer pertaining to tax years 2004, 2005, and 2006 as to why earlier order passed by Tribunal in ITA No.1319 to 1321/LB/2009 (Tax Year 2004 to 2006) may not be rectified in terms of subsection (2) of section 221 - Nobody turned up and matter was thus decided in absence of taxpayer exparte after hearing DR - Facts in brief are that taxpayer filed returns of income for tax years 2004, 2005 and 2006 declaring business loss which were deemed to be treated as assessment in terms of section 120 - Assessing officer found that taxpayer has failed to pay liability of minimum tax u/s 113 and rectified deemed assessments charging minimum Tax in year 2004, 2005 and 2006 - Taxpayer preferred appeal before CIR(A) and assailed action of assessing officer on ground that taxpayer being institution registered under societies Registration Act, 1980, is not Company within meaning of Section 80, therefore, taxpayer was not liable to minimum tax u/s 113 - CIR(A) deleted minimum tax in all years under appeal - Department challenged order of CIR(A) before Tribunal on ground that CIR(A) was not justified to delete levy of minimum tax which was levied in accordance with law -Tribunal being convinced with finding of CIR(A) rejected appeals of Revenue recorded in ITA No. 1319 to 1321/LB/2009 (Tax Years 2004 to 2006) which is now subject matter of rectification u/s 221 through present application for rectification - During hearing of application for rectification, DR contended that Tribunal erred in law while rejecting appeal of taxpayer as taxpayer is company within meaning of section 80(2)(b(v and is this under obligation to pay minimum tax u/s 113 - Validity - Whether while dealing appeals of Deptt. Tribunal confirmed impugned order of CIR(A) whereby she deleted levy of tax u/s 113 relying upon reported as 2014 PTD 420 and considered it as operative part of of Apex Court, which is dealing with provisions of \n80(2)(b)(v) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, is liable to pay minimum tax u/s 113. Therefore, the minimum tax charged by the assessing officer through orders passed u/s 221 in tax years 2004 to 2006 respectively; being in accordance with law is hereby upheld. Consequently, the consolidated order passed by the learned CIR (A) dated 22.04.2009 is vacated and appeals of the department are accepted. Order of this Tribunal dated 10.02.2010 recorded ITA Nos. 1319 to 1321/LB/2009 (Tax Years 2004 to 2006), is accordingly modified/ rectified to the above extent. \nCases referred to:\nCIR v. Lahore Cantt. Cooperative Housing Society and 7\nothers, reported as 2009 PTD 799 and CIR (Legal Division),\nMultan v. Messrs Multan Educational Trust, Multan, (2014) 109 Tax 7 (H.C. Lah.).",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(16),80(2)(b)(v),113,221,221(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(16),80(2)(b)(v),113,221,221(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=16(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "M.A. (R) [Suo Moto] No. 92 to 94/LB/2014 in ITA Nos. 1319 to 1321/LB/2009 (Tax Years 2004 to 2006) decided 2-7-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND ABDUL NASIR BUTT, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11843",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUR1J5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1996 1549 = 1996 SLD 1549 = 1996 CLC 1863 = 1996 PTCL 594",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 230 & 233---Object, scope and import of Ss.230 & 233, Companies Ordinance, 1984---Failure to comply with provisions of Ss. 230 & 233 of the Ordinance---Effect---Object of Ss. 230 & 233, Companies Ordinance is to enable Directors at any time to obtain, by inspection of books, true view of the state of affairs of company---Object of S.230, Companies Ordinance 1984, would be defeated where company had failed to keep uptodate accounts---Company would not be absolved from complying with provisions of S.230 of the Ordinance even if it claimed to have complied with provisions of S. 233 of the Ordinance.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 305---Winding up of company on just and equitable grounds---Company would be wound up on just and equitable grounds where company was family concern analogous to partnership firm and respondents (Directors) had committed several acts of commission and omission rendering the company liable under various provisions of S. 305, Companies Ordinance; where partners were excluded from the management of company; and there was complete dead lock among the parties.\n \nLadli Parasad Jaiswal v. The Karnal Distilletry Co. Ltd. PLD 1965 SC 221; Nagina Films Ltd. v. Usman Hussain 1987 CLC 2263 and Iqbal Alain v. Plasticrafters (Pvt.) Ltd. 1991 CLC 589 ref.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 290---Prerequisites for making order under S.290, Companies Ordinance, 1984---Conditions to be satisfied for making order in terms of S.290, Companies Ordinance, 1984, were that Company's affairs were conducted or were likely to be conducted in manner specified in S.290 (1) of the Ordinance; and that winding up of company would unfairly prejudice members or creditors.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=86,290,230,233,305\\n\\r\\n\\rCompanies Ordinance, 1984=86,290,230,233,305\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous No.4 of 1989, decision dated: 2-11-1995. dates of hearing: 20th, 23rd, 29th and 30-05-1995",
    "Judge Name:": "G.H. MALIK, J",
    "": "Mst. KHURSHEED ISMAIL and others \nvs \nUNICHEM CORPORATION (PVT.) LIMITED, and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11844",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVURVFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1995 995 = 1995 SLD 995 = (1995) 72 TAX 31 = (1994) 205 ITR 205",
    "Key Words:": "Section 187 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Firm - Registration - Change in constitution of- Assessment year 1976-77 - During assessment year in question two minors admitted to benefits of partnership retired and remaining two partners executed a new deed of partnership - Before Tribunal it was not disputed that there was reconstitution of firm in terms of section 187(2), but question was whether two separate assessments in respect of broken periods were called for - However, Tribunal held that two assessments had to be made for pre-change and post-change periods - Whether Tribunal was justified in holding so - Held, no\nFACTS\nThe assessee-firm had four partners during the assessment year 1976-77. The minor partners admitted to the partnership retired from the firm with effect from 30-9-1975. The remaining 2 partners executed a new deed of partnership with effect from 1-10-1975. The assessee claimed that two separate assessments were to be made in respect of two broken periods, i.e., one from the period 1-4-1975 to 30-9-1975 and the other for the period 1-10-1975 to 31-3-1976, and accordingly filed two sets of returns for the respective periods and separate accounts. The ITO held that it was a mere change in the constitution of the firm and made one assessment for the period before and after the reconstitution. On appeal, the AAC upheld the claim of the assessee. On second appeal, it was not in dispute before the Tribunal that there was reconstitution of the firm in terms of section 187(2), and the question was whether two separate assessments in respect of the broken periods were called for. The Tribunal held that two separate assessments had to be made for the broken periods.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nIn view of the in Vishwanath Seth v. CIT [1984] 146 ITR 249 where in the midst of an accounting year, there is a change in the constitution of the firm in terms of section 187(2 ), the assessment is to be made as required by section 187(1) on the firm as constituted at the time of making the assessment. In the cases falling under section 187, a single assessment is required to be made in respect of the income for the entire previous year, clubbing the income of both pre-and post-change periods at one place. The assessee had pointed out that its case before appellate authorities was that it was a case of succession and not a case of reconstitution, inasmuch as, reconstitution was preceded by a dissolution of the firm. However, no such plea was put forward before the Tribunal on behalf of the assessee. The question that fell for consideration before the Tribunal was that there being reconstitution of the firm, in terms of section 187(2) , whether two assessments in respect of the broken periods were called for. It was on that basis that the Tribunal had decided the issue in favour of the assessee. However, in the cases falling under section 187 a single assessment is required to be made in respect of the income for the entire previous year, clubbing the income of both pre-and post-change periods at one place.\nThe order of the Tribunal was, therefore, set aside.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v . Shiv Shanker Lal Ram Nath [1977] 106 ITR 342 (All.), Badri Narain Kashi Prasad v. Addl. CIT [1978] 115 ITR 858 (All.)(FB) and Vishwanaih Sethv. CIT [1984] 146 ITR 249 (All.) (FB).",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=256(1),187\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256(1),187\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 131 OF 1980, SEPTEMBER 30, 1992",
    "Judge Name:": "OM PARKASH AND R.K. GULATI, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nRamesh Biscuit Factory"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11845",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVURVFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1995 996 = 1995 SLD 996 = (1995) 72 TAX 40 = (1994) 205 ITR 225",
    "Key Words:": "Section 256 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Reference to High Court - Question of fact - Assessee had made entries in diary seized in course of raid, showing certain receipts - While three receipts had been duly accounted for and had also been offered by assessee for assessment, there was an omission to furnish particulars in respect of entry of Rs 30,000 - It was seen from bank account that assessee had received sum of Rs. 30,000, and had deposited it in his account with bank - Whether Tribunal was right in concluding that omission on part of assessee to disclose sum of Rs. 30,000 for purposes of assessment was not accidental - Held, yes - Whether any referable question of law arose out of order of Tribunal - Held, no\nFACTS\nThe assessee had made certain entries in the diary, seized in the course of the raid, showing receipt from producers. While the three receipts had been duly accounted for and had also been offered by the assessee for assessment, there was an omission to furnish particulars in respect of the entry of Rs. 30,000. In the course of the assessment proceedings, the assessee was called upon to produce the bank account with the bank which, however, was not done. On second appeal, the Tribunal held that the omission on part of the assessee to disclose the amount of Rs. 30,000 in the first instance, while filing details of the receipts, could not be characterised as accidental, though, it might be that in the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee had readily agreed to the addition of the amount of Rs. 30,000 for the purpose of assessment. The material available on record clearly shows that though the assessee was aware of the receipt of the cheque for Rs. 30,000 and also other amounts, there had been an omission to offer the receipt of Rs. 30,000 for purposes of assessment. The reference application of the assessee was also rejected.\nOn an application under section 252(2):\nHELD\nIt was extremely difficult to believe that there was any accidental omission on the part of the assessee to disclose the particulars of the receipt of Rs. 30,000. Further, before the Tribunal, the representatives of the assessee as well as the department were requested to produce a copy of the account of the assessee with the bank and ultimately a copy of that account was produced by the department through the inspector and it was seen therefrom that the assessee had deposited the cheque also for Rs. 30,000 and that had been brought into his account. The bank account, thus, constituted relevant evidence to show that though the assessee had received the sum of Rs. 30,000 and had deposited it in his account with the bank, he had not disclosed it. On the basis of the material available on record, the Tribunal was right in concluding that the omission on the part of the assessee to disclose the sum of Rs. 30,000 for purpose of assessment was not accidental Thus, no referable question of law arose out of the order of the Tribunal.",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=256(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "T.C.P. NO. 829 OF 1991, AUGUST 19, 1992",
    "Judge Name:": "RATNAM AND SOMASUNDRAM, JJ",
    "": "Prem Nazir\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11846",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVURVFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1995 997 = 1995 SLD 997 = (1995) 72 TAX 105 = (1991) 188 ITR 575",
    "Key Words:": "Section 28(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Business income - Chargeable as - Assessment year 1969-70 - Assessee-firm maintained accounts on mercantile basis - For past few years it was collecting sales tax and making a provision for sales tax but was actually paying a lesser amount to sales tax department - For relevant assessment year, ITO added difference between amount of sales tax collected and amount of sales tax actually paid on ground that said amount was not paid to sales tax department - Whether addition of said difference amount to assessee's income was not proper and deserved to be deleted - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee-firm maintained accounts on mercantile basis. For the past few years, it was collecting sales tax and making a provision for sales tax but was actually paying a lesser amount to the sales tax department. Since the assessee was maintaining its account on mercantile basis and since the tax liability was already there, the difference amount was not added to its income. For the assessment year 1969-70, the ITO added the difference amount in the assessee's income on the ground that it was not paid to the sales tax department. The Tribunal deleted the addition in question holding that since the liability was there and also because the assessee was maintaining its accounts on mercantile basis, the addition of the said difference amount was not warranted.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nWhere the assessee is maintaining accounts on mercantile basis, the basis of deduction is the accrual of liability and once the liability accrues it has to be allowed irrespective of the fact whether the amount is actually paid in that year or not. Since the assessee herein was maintaining the accounts on mercantile basis, the addition of difference amount was not proper and the Tribunal was, therefore, right in deleting the said addition.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nChowringhee Sales Bureau (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1973] 87 ITR 542 (SC), P.M.A.P. Ayyamperumal Nadar v. CIT [1974] 97 ITR 161 (Mad.) and Chowringhee Sales Bureau (P.) Ltd. v. CIT' [1977] 110 ITR 385 (Cal.).",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=256(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 1027 OF 1978, NOVEMBER 20, 1990",
    "Judge Name:": "B.P., JEEVAN REDDY, C.J. AND V.N. MEHROTRA, J",
    "": "Additional Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nDurga Prasad Kamta Prasad"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11847",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVURVFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1995 998 = 1995 SLD 998 = (1995) 72 TAX 113 = (1994) 205 ITR 191",
    "Key Words:": "Section 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Income - Assessable as - Assessment year 1964-65 - Assessee was manufacturing wide hessian cloth which was exported to USA through one BG - For exporting wide hessian, assessee used steel cores for winding said wide hessian into rolls - Assessee claimed that steel cores were just packing material and should be considered as sold along with rolls - ITO held that cores would have to be treated as capital assets and their cost debited to account would have to be added back as capital expenditure - Accordingly, ITO added value of new cores issued during year and value of old cores re-issued - Tribunal upheld ITO's order of observing that contracts for exports made by the assessee made it clear that the subject-matter of sale also included steel cores - Whether Tribunal was justified - Held, yes\nFACTS\nDuring the assessment year 1964-65, the assessee-company carried on the business of manufacture and sale of the jute fabrics. B. Co. were the managing agents of the assessee-company as also of the two other jute mills and also of another company known as BG. BG acted as an export house for the export of wide hessian manufactured by the assessee-company and the other aforesaid two jute companies to the USA through its agent, namely, W. For exporting the wide hessian, the assessee used steel cores for winding the said wide hessian into rolls. During the assessment proceedings, the ITO came to the conclusion that the steel cores always remained the property of the assessee-company and that the case set up by the assessee that the cores constituted just packing materials and should be considered as sold along with the rolls was not correct. The ITO further held that the cores would have to be treated as capital assets and their costs debited to the account would have to be added back as capital expenditure and, accordingly, he added the value of the new cores issued during the year and the value of old cores reissued. The ITO also further added the amount on account of amounts of deposits by customers in the USA which were forfeited due to the non-return of steel cores. On appeal, the AAC and the Tribunal upheld the ITO's order observing that the contracts between the assessee and BG made it clear that the subject-matter of the sales also included the steel cores and the assessee was not able to point out the so-called documentary or oral evidence in regard to the steel cores or the contracts between the assessee and BG in that behalf.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nThe specimen contracts produced did not render any help or assistance to the assessee. The tax authorities were justified in treating the assessee-mill as the real owner of the steel cores and the expenditure for purchasing the new steel cores in the year under consideration as capital expenditure. The finding of the Tribunal did not call for interference. The decision of the Tribunal that the assessee-company was the real owner of the steel cores was based on the facts and evidence and it could not be said that the Tribunal committed any error. The finding of the Tribunal to the effect that the expenditure incurred for purchasing steel cores was a capital expenditure was also justified.\nCASE REFERRED TO\nKinnison Jute Mills Co. Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 628 (Cal.) of 1972-73, dated 5-9-1978].",
    "Court Name:": "Calcutta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=256(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 214 OF 1987 APRIL 30 1991",
    "Judge Name:": "AJIT K. SENGUPTA AND SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN, JJ",
    "": "Auckland Jute Co. Ltd\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11848",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1132 = 1994 SLD 1132",
    "Key Words:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-------Ss. 15(2)(vii) & 20---Personal bona fide need of landlord ---Ejectment application filed by landlord on ground of personal bona fide need in respect of shop in dispute, was resisted by tenant on ground that adjacent shop which was got vacated by landlord earlier through an ejectment application was kept under lock and was not used by landlord for purpose of starting business for which same was got vacated---Landlord who hart stated that adjacent shop which was got vacated for residential/commercial purposes was properly being utilized for residential purposes, had filed application under S. 20 for spot inspection to ascertain that shop got vacated by him was being used for residential purposes as drawing room, but that application was not disposed of by Rent Controller---Rent Controller was to determine the actual situation with regard to that other shop which was got vacated by landlord for which a site inspection could have been necessary---With consent of tenant, case was remanded with direction that Rent Controller should first decide application for site inspection and then pass necessary and proper order\n \nKhalid Riaz for Appellant.\n \n S.M. Abbas for Respondent.\n \nDate of hearing: 11th January, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Rent Appeal No. 539 of 1992, decision dated: 11-01-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL RAHIM KAZI, J",
    "": "Mst. ZUBAIDA KHANUM---Appellant\nvs\nS.A.J. KAZMI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11849",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1133 = 1994 SLD 1133",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-------S.13---Demand of pre-emption ---Making of Talab-i-Muwathibat and Talab-i-Ishhad, was essential for enforcement of right of pre-emption.\n \nSaid Kamal's case PLD 1986 SC 360 and Sundri Bai v. Ghulam Hussain 1982 CLC 2441 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Exercise of---Argument that law was not correctly laid down in case, could not be examined by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.\n \nSaleem Mehmood Chehal for Petitioner.\n \nDate of hearing: 30th March, 1993.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 1639 of 1993, heard on 30-03-1993",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN NAZIR AKHTAR, J",
    "": "HABIBURREHMAN-\nvs\nHaji MUHAMMAD SALEEM and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11850",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1134 = 1994 SLD 1134",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)------O.XIV, R. 1 & S. 115---Specific issue was framed to determine whether plaintiff was lessee of the property in question---Plaintiff failed to prove that he was a lessee and as such his lease could not be terminated---Plaintiff having failed to prove the factum of lease in his favour, finding of two Courts below that plaintiff was not a lessee and had no locus standi to file the suit did not suffer from any illegality.\n \n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----S. 42---Suit for declaration simpliciter---Plaintiff being not in possession of property in question, should have prayed for possession as an alternate relief--­Such relief though could be granted to plaintiff at the stage of appeal also but such relief could not be granted as the same would have the effect of adversely affecting valuable rights created in favour of defendant to whom possession was transferred by the Government on ownership basis---Grant of relief of possession would amount to interference with the rights created in favour of defendant by a third party (Gov4nment) which had not been impleaded in suit, therefore, such prayer could not be granted--­Plaintiff's suit for, declaration simpliciter was rightly dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMalik Muhammad Nawaz for Appellant.\n \n Dr. M. Mohy-ud-Din Qazi for Respondent No. 1.\n \n Malik Allah Yar Khan for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.\n \nDate of hearing: 16th February, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular Second Appeal No. 424 of 1979, heard on 16-02-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHAIKH, .J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASLAM\nvs\nMUNICIPAL COMMITTEE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11851",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1135 = 1994 SLD 1135",
    "Key Words:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-------Ss. 2(f)(j) & 15--Relationship of landlord and, tenant---Landlord claimed that he had purchased premises in dispute from its original owner---Tenant on the other hand contended that premises in question was purchased by his mother-in-law and he lived with her alongwith his family throughout---On basis of such assertion he denied his relationship of being a tenant of landlord--­Burden heavily lay on tenant to have proved title of premises in question, but tenant failed to discharge that burden by whatever evidence---Landlord having succeeded to prove his title in respect of premises in dispute by producing agreement of sale executed between him and original owner thereof, Rent Controller rightly concluded that relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties.\n \n1085 CLC 2085; 1983 SCMR 1064; 1986 CLC 1577; PLD 1985 SC 1; 1983 SCMR 1064;1990 CLC 1937 and PLD 1991 SC 242 ref.\n \nS. Safdar Hussain for Appellants.\n \nMalik M. Saeed for Respondent.\n \nDate of hearing: 21st October, 1992.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Rent Appeal No. 691 of 1991, decision dated: 21st October, 1992",
    "Judge Name:": "IMAM ALI G. KAZI, J",
    "": "IQBAL SHAH and 3 others vs\nMst. ABIDA BI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11852",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1136 = 1994 SLD 1136",
    "Key Words:": "\\(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.VIl, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---In order to determine whether plaint did disclose cause of action, averments in plaint are only to be taken into consideration. \n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.VII, R. 11 & S. 115---Rejection of plaint ---Revisional jurisdiction---\nExercise of---Courts below in rejecting plaint had declined to exercise jurisdiction vested in them under law---Rejection order concurrently passed by Courts below was set aside by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.\n \nAbdul Wahid Chaudhry for Petitioners.\n \nKh. Z.H. Tahir for Respondent No.l. ,\n \nNemo for Respondent No. 2.\n \nDate of hearing: 22nd November, 1993.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 1026/13 of 1993, heard on 22-11-1993",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHAIKH, J",
    "": "Mst. HAMEEDA BEGUM and others\nvs\nHaji ABDUL GHANI and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11853",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1137 = 1994 SLD 1137",
    "Key Words:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-------Ss. 15 & 19(2)---Ex parte ejectment order---Setting aside of---Tenant against whom ejectment application was filed, having failed to file written statement despite several adjournments, ex parte ejectment order was passed against him---Tenant alongwith application for setting aside ex parte ejectment order had filed unrebutted affidavit of his counsel in which it was stated by him that due to rush of work file of case was misplaced and because of that he could not file written statement within time---Ex parte order passed by Rent Controller could be recalled, if it was found that notice was not properly served on tenant or that he could not file written statement because of some plausible ground---Plausible ground having been shown by tenant for not filing written statement in time by filing unrebutted affidavit of his counsel, Rent Controller ought to have allowed tenant to file written statement---Even otherwise equity and natural justice demanded that no one should he condemned unheard---Ex parte order passed against tenant by Rent Controller for his failure to file written statement was set aside and case was remanded by Appellate Court for proceeding on merits on basis of pleadings of parties. [p. 1875] A\n \nMuhammad Rafiq Gazdar v. Additional Commissioner, Karachi PLD 1972 Kar. 119; Jamal Shah v. Azad Government of Jummu and Kashmir 1991­MLD 1243; Mashlakhuddin v. Syed Ali Haider 1982 CLC 644; Wasi Haider v. Qamar Muhammad Khan 1984 CLC 1755; Mir Zaman Khan v. Muhammad Yaqoob and others 1986 CLC 2471; Muhammad Shaft v. M/s. Bambino Limited and another 1983 CLC 985; Muhammad Jahangir v. Choudhary Muhammad Niazuddin and another 1984 CLC 2114; M/s. Siddiq Tailors v. State Life Insurance Corporation 1988 CLC 2332 and Mir Zaman Khan v. Muhammad Yaqoob and others 1986 CLC 2471 ref.\n \n \n \nRao M. Shakir Naqshbandi for Appellant.\n \n KA. Wahab for Respondent.\n \nDates of hearing: 16th and 23rd January, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Rent Appeal No. 364 of 1993, decision dated: 6-03-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "AHMED YAR KHAN, J",
    "": "Mst. RUKHSANA SHAHEEN --Appellant\nvs\nMEHMOOD ZAFAR MALIK"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11854",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1138 = 1994 SLD 1138",
    "Key Words:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-------S. 14---Bona fide personal requirement of landlord---On having become widow, landlady served upon tenant notice under S. 14(1) of Ordinance requiring him to vacate premises---Landlady, being widow was well within her rights to seek eviction of tenant, especially when tenant had failed to prove that any property in locality other than the one occupied by tenant, was in occupation of landlady. \n \nCLC 1986; 1983 CLC 468; 1988 SCMR4819; 1989 CLC 46; 1989 CLC 247;1989 CLC 620;1989 CLC 714 and 1989 CLC 1096 rel.\n \nHafiz Abdul Baqi for Appellant.\n \n Manohar Lal for Respondent.\n \nDate of hearing: 25th May, 1992,",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Rent Appeal No. 81 of 1991, decision dated: 15-06-1992",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASLAM ARAIN, J",
    "": "MA. AYUB\nvs\nMst. KHURSHIDBEGUM --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11855",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1139 = 1994 SLD 1139",
    "Key Words:": "Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act (V of 1912)-------S. 10---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Horse breeding tenancy---Eligibility for re-allotment of tenancy after death of original tenant--­Dispute between heirs of original tenant---Deputy Commissioner recommending respondent for allotment of land in question, on the ground that he had been assisting his father (original tenant) during his lifetime in maintenance of mare and the land---Deputy Commissioner's recommendations were maintained by the Revenue hierarchy up to the Board of Revenue--­Validity---Matter of allotment of land after the death of original tenant, was within the exclusive domain of Revenue Authorities and if any factual enquiry was to be made, it could be done by the Revenue Authorities and not by the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction---Deputy Commissioner was the primary man, who had visited the tenancy, and on making contact with all concerned, including respectables of the village, had formed impression that amongst the main contestants, respondent was better qualified for the allotment of land (leased out) for animal breeding---High Court, in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction did not find any valid premises for interfering with the order of Deputy Commissioner (Collector), upheld by the Commissioner and Board of Revenue---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nSh. Zia-ud-Din Ahmad for Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1992 of 1994, decision dated: 7-05-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN GHULAM AHMAD, J",
    "": "BARKAT ALI \nvs\nMEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, Lahore High Court\nand 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11856",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1140 = 1994 SLD 1140",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Tort------- Negligence ---Carelessness---Effect---Duty to take care ---Essentials--­Negligence in the sense of mere carelessness, would not give rise to any cause of action---Carelessness, however, would assume legal quality of negligence where there was duty to take care and where failure in that duty had caused damage---Duty to take care was, thus, essential ingredient of tort of negligence---Unless such duty was established, no case of actionable negligence could arise---\"\"Duty\"\" connotes relationship between one person and another, imposing on the one an obligation for the benefit of that other to take reasonable care in all circumstances.---[Words and phrases]. \n \nDonoghue v. Stevenson 1932 AC 562 and Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. v. M'Mullen 1933 AC, 1 rel.\n \n(b) Tort-.\n \n----Negligence---Death by electrocution---Defendant's liability for negligence--­Test of foreseeability---Defendant being manufacturer, supplier and distributor of electricity ought to have foreseen, as a reasonable man would do that if the overhead electric wires were not maintained properly and sufficient safeguards were not provided and further steps were not taken in the event of wire breaking, to ensure that it should not remain live, injury or even death, would be caused to persons at any place where they had a right to be either for business or for pleasure\n \nBuckland v. Guildford Gas Light & Coke Co. (1949) IKB, 410 and Halsbury's Laws of English, Vol. 34, 4th Edn., para. 54 rel.\n \n(c) Tort---\n \n---- Negligence ---Death caused by electrocution of live wire---Claim for damages---Proof---Plaintiff had proved that deceased died as a result of electrocution by a line of electric wire which was broken and was lying on road unguarded and unattended---Death in such circumstances pointed prima facie to failure on the part of defendant to take care because overhead wires if properly maintained, were not ordinarily expected to break down---Burden of proof, therefore, shifted to defendant to show that it had taken all reasonable precautions to avoid the injury complained of---Defendant had failed to discharge that burden and was, thus liable for damages.\n \n \n(d) Tort---\n \n ----Negligence---Death caused by electrocution of live wire---Maxim: \"\"Res ipso loquiture\"\"---Principle of---Doctrine of res ipso loquitur (thing speaks for itself) would be applicable when the things that inflicted the damage was under the sole management and control of defendant; occurrence was such that it would not have happened without negligence; and there must be no evidence as to how or why the occurrence took place.--[Maxim]\n \nPakistan Steel Mills Corporation v. Abdul Habib 1993 SCMR 848 rel.\n \n(e) Fatal Accidents Act (XIII of 1855)---\n \n----S. 1---Death caused by electrocution---Claim for damages ---Computation--­Expectancy of life span of beneficiary---Life span of beneficiary was assumed to be 70 years and he was entitled to claim damages for that life span--­Plaintiff's age being 45 years he had been deprived by the death of deceased, of pecuniary benefits for a period of 25 years---Personal expenses of deceased were deducted from his gross income and plaintiff was found entitled to specified amount which was worked out by Court and decreed in favour of plaintiff with interest thereon from the date of suit till payment and costs of suit.\n \n(f) Words and phrases---\n \n---- Word \"\"duty\"\" connotes relationship between one person and another, imposing on the one an obligation, for the benefit of that other, to take reasonable care in all circumstances.\n \nNasir Maqsood for Plaintiff.\n \n Habibur Rashid for Defendant.\n \nDate of hearing: 26th August, 1993.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 726 of 1988, decision dated: 26-08-1993",
    "Judge Name:": "G.H MALIK, J",
    "": "S. IQBAL HUSSAIN JAFFERY--Plaintiff\nvs\nKarachi High Court ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11857",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1141 = 1994 SLD 1141",
    "Key Words:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-------S. 15(2)(ii)---Default in payment of rent---Default was alleged for eight months---Tenant had contended that his nephew paid rent for six months to the son of landlord, but he had not given receipt for that---Tenant also claimed that rent of two months was sent to landlord through money order, but it was refused by landlord---Nephew of tenant who allegedly paid rent of six months to the son of landlord was not examined to prove that payment, while the son of landlord appeared and denied such payment---Tenant also failed to prove tender of rent for two months to landlord through money order---Rent Controller in circumstances, rightly found that tenant had failed to prove payment of rent for disputed period of eight months.\n \nMuhammad Arif v. Ch. Gulzar Ahmad 1991 CLC 1850 and Fasahat Ali v. Mst. Noor Jehan Begum 1991 CLC 1902 ref.\n \nMuhammad Amin Lakhani for Appellant.\n \nKhalilur Rehman for Respohdent.\n \nDate of hearing: 16th September, 1992.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Rent Appeal No. 623 of 1987, decision dated: 1st November, 1992",
    "Judge Name:": "SALAHUDDIN MIRZA, J",
    "": "EDOO --Appellant\nvs\nFIDA HUSSAIN TAPAL"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11858",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1142 = 1994 SLD 1142",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S. 12(2)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Setting aside decree tin ground of fraud and misrepresentation---Application for---Constitutional jurisdiction---Exercise of---Judgment-debtor made application for setting aside decree passed against him alleging fraud and misrepresentation ---Decree-­holder contended that application was made by him for getting signatures of certain 'persons compared with specimen signatures which application was concurrently dismissed by Courts below---Application filed by ­-debtor for setting aside decree against him was pending adjudication and had not been finally decided---High Court, in circumstances, declined to interfere in concurrent order of Courts below in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction. \n \nNemo for Petitioner.\n \nNemo for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n \nManzoor Hussain Basra for Respondent No. 3.\n \nDate of hearing: 8th December, 1993.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3940 of 1992, decision dated: 8-12-1993",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHAIKH, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RAFIQ KHAN-\nvs\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11859",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1143 = 1994 SLD 1143",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S. 12(2)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Setting aside decree tin ground of fraud and misrepresentation---Application for---Constitutional jurisdiction---Exercise of---Judgment-debtor made application for setting aside decree passed against him alleging fraud and misrepresentation ---Decree-­holder contended that application was made by him for getting signatures of certain 'persons compared with specimen signatures which application was concurrently dismissed by Courts below---Application filed by ­-debtor for setting aside decree against him was pending adjudication and had not been finally decided---High Court, in circumstances, declined to interfere in concurrent order of Courts below in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction. \n \nNemo for Petitioner.\n \nNemo for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n \nManzoor Hussain Basra for Respondent No. 3.\n \nDate of hearing: 8th December, 1993.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3940 of 1992, decision dated: 8-12-1993",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHAIKH, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RAFIQ KHAN-\nvs\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11860",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1144 = 1994 SLD 1144",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XVI, R. 1---List of witnesses---Presentation of---Provisions of O. XVI, R. 1, C.P.C. which permits a party to call with permission of Court witness not included in list of witnesses, has to be liberally construed to enable parties to produce their evidence and to save them from technical knock-out.---[Witness]. \n \nMalimood Khan for Petitioner.\n \nCh. Ahmad Din Farooq for Respondent No. 1.\n \nDate of hearing: 29th June, 1993.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3627 of 1993, decision dated: 29-06-1993",
    "Judge Name:": "MAIN NAZIR AKHTAR, J",
    "": "BASHIR AHMAD-\nvs\nFAZAL DIN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11861",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1145 = 1994 SLD 1145",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Custom (Punjab)------- Existence of special custom---No special custom existed, to the effect that a sonless widow could only get property for maintenance. \n \n(b) Custom (Punjab)--\n \n----Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 114---Estoppel, principle of--­Applicability---Plaintiff as daughter of deceased landowner inheriting her share in land in question---Mutation to that effect in plaintiff's favour remained unchallenged---Defendants got mutated plaintiff's share in their favour by way of gift which was set aside as being disowned by plaintiff---Defendants could not, therefore, turn round and allege that plaintiff was not entitled to inherit any share in the property owned by her father---Mere fact that defendants claimed ownership right in land inherited by plaintiff through gift from' her was sufficient for holding that they had accepted her as owner having inherited property in question, from her father, for if she could not inherit such property under custom as alleged, there was no question of making any gift of the same by her as its owner---Alleged donees (defendants) were, thus, estopped from alleging that under custom plaintiff could not inherit any share in the land owned by her father.\n \nM. Mohi-ud-Din Qazi for Appellant.\n \nNemo for Respondents Nos. 1 and 3. f\n \nRespondent No.2 (deceased) through his sons.\n \nMobeen -ud-Din for Respondents Nos. 4 to 6. .\n \nDate of hearing: 3rd April, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular Second Appeal No. 140 of 1972, heard on 3rd April, 1994",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHAIKH, J",
    "": "Mst. FATIMA \nvs\nSAID MUHAMMAD and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11862",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1146 = 1994 SLD 1146",
    "Key Words:": "Calendar Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Sargodha---A--Chap. V, R. 15---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Evaluating answer book of examinee ---Roving enquiry in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction---Competency---Petitioner alleging evaluating his papers in a mala fide manner in vague and general terms without there being any specification---Once any answer book was evaluated and duly marked by the examiner, no interference was justified in Constitutional jurisdiction by the High Court especially when Authorities in accordance with requirement of law had re-checked petitioner's papers and found no mistake therein---Petitioner having not made all those examinees as party who had secured higher marks than him and against whom relief was claimed, his Constitutional petition was not competent on that score also---Roving enquiry in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction could not be undertaken to make out a case of re-checking for the petitioner---Petitioner was not entitled to relief in circumstances.\n \nFederation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmad Khan and others PLD 1974 SC 151; Aman Ullah Khan and others v. The Federal Government of Pakistan etc. PLD 1990 SC 1092 and Ali Mir v. Province of Punjab etc. PLD 1983 Lah. 262 rei.\n \nMuhammad Hussain Awan for Petitioner.\n \n Dr. M. Mohi-ud-Din Qazi for Respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 14535 of 1993, decision dated: 12-01-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "TANVIR AHMED KHAN, J",
    "": "TAHIR SAEED QURESHI\nvs\nBOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, \nSARGODHA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11863",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1147 = 1994 SLD 1147",
    "Key Words:": "Karachi Development Authority Order (5 of 1957)-------Art. 4---Allotment of land---Cancellation of---Respondents were allotted plot, but because Authority was unable to effectuate its allotment, alternative plot in the same area was, allotted by Authority to respondents ---Last ­mentioned plot being under encroachment, Authority again failed to deliver possession of that plot to the respondents---Several efforts were made by respondents/allottees to obtain possession of last-mentioned plot, for about 27 years, but with no effect---High Court on basis of evidence on record found that another plot in the same area was available which could validly be allotted to respondents-allottees in lieu of plot which was earlier allotted to allottees but possession thereof was not delivered to respondents---Order of High Court appointing Commissioner to have transfer of such plot to respondents, was eminently just and could not be interfered with in High Court Appeal. \n \nKhailur Rehman and S.H. Kazilbash for Appellant.\n \nAmanullah Khan for Respondents.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 163 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1098 of 1992, decision dated: 11-02-1993",
    "Judge Name:": "WAJIHUDDIN AHMED AND MUHAMMAD, HUSSAIN ADIL KHATRI, JJ",
    "": "Karachi High Court DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY--Applicant vs\nSHA13BIR AHMED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11864",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1148 = 1994 SLD 1148",
    "Key Words:": "Calendar of the University of the Punjab------- Part 111, Chap. 1, Regln. 4---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199-­With holding of petitioner's BA. Examination result---Validity---Petitioner had appeared in B.Sc. Examination but failed in 1991---Petitioner, thereafter, submitted Admission Form for BA. Examination held in 1992 without disclosing his earlier attempt in B.Sc. Examination---Petitioner had admittedly suppressed factum of his appearance in B.Se. Examination of 1991---Petitioner could not have appeared in the BA. Examination within next two years in accordance with prohibition contained in Regln. 4, Chap. 1, Part 111, Calendar of the University of the Punjab---Petitioner's result had been rightly withheld on account of irregularities committed by him---Constitutional petition was not maintainable in circumstances. [p. 1922] A\n \nMaqbool Ahmad Shah Akhtar for Petitioner.\n \n Shamshir Iqbal Chughtai for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 16th February, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2643/BWP of 1993, decision dated: 16-02-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "AUSAF ALI KHAN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD IQBAL\nvs\nVice Chancellor, ISLAMIA UNIVERSITY, BAHAWALPUR\nand another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11865",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1149 = 1994 SLD 1149",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.VIII, Rr. 9 & 10---Non-filing of written statement---Effect---Defendant failed to file written statement despite many dates were given to him by Court to file written statement---Some dates were fixed by Court in routine whereas, others were given to defendant on his own request---On last date of hearing defendant failed to appear and file written statement despite case was kept in waiting---Defendant having failed to, comply with order of Court according to which he was directed to file written statement, Court was justified to struck off defence of defendant for such non-compliance even without recording evidence as facts of case were almost admitted. \n \nAbdul Rahman v. Ghulam Nabi 1987 SCMR 1656; Fazal Ellahi and 5 others v. Alam Din PLD 1979 SC (AJ&K) 109; Ghulam Nabi v. Messrs Lufthansa German Airlines, Lahore 1982 CLC 387; Sh. Abdul Malik v. Sh. Mehboobur Rehman 1988 CLC 56 and Mst. Hakumat Bibi v. Imam Din and others PLD 1987 SC 22 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Exercise of---Revision was admitted by High Court for regular hearing with stay order in favour of petitioner subject to furnish security for decretal amount, but petitioner had failed to furnish required security in terms of order passed by Court---Non-deposit of security in compliance with term of stay order, would disentitle petitioner to exercise revisional jurisdiction of High Court which otherwise was of discretionary nature\n \nShaukat Hussain Syed for Petitioner.\n \n Syed Fayyaz Ahmad Ch. for Respondent.\n \nDate of hearing: 24th November, 1992.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 1321 of 1992, decision dated: 24-11-1992",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. MUSHTAQ AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SALIM \nvs\nABDUL SHAKOOR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11866",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1150 = 1994 SLD 1150",
    "Key Words:": "Municipal Administration Ordinance (X of 1960)-------S. 122---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition regarding contractual matter---Maintainability---Dispute relating to collection of Tehbazari fee---Questions involved in Constitutional petition were mostly related to determination of the terms and conditions of agreement (between the parties) which included right of collection of Tehbazari inside the walled city and quantum of pecuniary loss suffered by petitioner, if any---Such question involving contractual rights and obligations could best be determined by Civil Court after recording evidence and not by the High Court in Constitutional jurisdiction---Direction was, however, issued to respondents to comply with the terms and conditions of agreement enabling petitioner to complete remaining period of Tehbazari---Petitioner was also directed to fulfil his part of the obligation---Constitutional petition was, however, not maintainable.\n \nPakistan National Shipping Corporation v. Rent Controller, Lahore and 2 others PLD 1992 Lah. 305 rel.\n \nShamshir Iqbal Chughtai and Qamar Hameed Hashmi for Petitioner.\n \n Masood Ashra(Sheikh for Respondents.\n \nDates of hearing: 9th and 12th February, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2444 of 1993/BWP, decision dated: 12-02-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "AUSAF ALI KHAN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD TARIQ vs\nMUNICIPAL CORPORATION, BAHAWALPUR, through its Administrator and 3\nothers"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11867",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1151 = 1994 SLD 1151",
    "Key Words:": "Punjab Local Councils (Election Petitions) Rules, 1979-------Rr. 8, 12, 13 & 14---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Rejection of votes---Election Tribunal excluded votes from count on the ground that voters had not marked specific symbol but had marked on more than one symbols, thus, voter's intention could not be gathered---Election Tribunal, hold, acted lawfully and no interference in the decision was merited.\n \nSher Afghan v. Aamir Hayat 1987 SCMR 1987 rel.\n \nRiaz-ul-Hassan Gillani for Petitioner.\n \n Muhammad Saleem Khan Khichi for Respondent.\n \nDate of hearing: 22nd June, 1993. .",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3741 of 1992, decision dated: 2-11-1993",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. RIAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD BASHIR\nvs\nBADARUZ-ZAMAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11868",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1152 = 1994 SLD 1152",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Custom (Punjab)------- West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S. 42---Succession under custom---Purported condition mentioned in specific column of mutation to the effect that after termination of widow's estate on her death or re-marriage, land in question, would revert to male collaterals of deceased land-owner--­Proof relating to existence of such condition and its validity---Order passed by Revenue Officer sanctioning said mutation did not mention any of such condition---Such condition mentioned in a specific column of mutation had no sanction behind it as the same had not been shown to have been signed by any competent officer---Entry in question, appeared to have been incorporated later on through interpolation and did not have any sanctity behind it---Entry in question, therefore, was unauthorised and did not carry any evidentiary value in circumstances.\n \n(b) Custom (Punjab)---\n \n---- West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V of 1962), S. 2---Termination of liminted estate---Mode of succession---After death of limited owner, property in question would revert to original owner/allottee and was to be inherited lie his heirs.\n \n(c) Muhammadan Law---\n \n----Sect---Presumption relating to sect of deceased---Every Muslim was presumed to be Sunni by faith unless it was proved through cogent evidence that he was a Shia.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 100---Concurrent finding of fact could be assailed only if the same had been shown to have suffered from a misapprehension or was condemnable on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 100, C.P.C: -Finding of fact did not appear to have been either misread or misconstrued so as to justify interference in second appeal.\n \nJaved Buttar for Appellants.\n \n Jari Ullah Khan for Respondent.\n \nDate of hearing: 18th December, 1993.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular Second Appeals Nos. 257 and 399 of 1974, heard on 18-12-1993",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHAIKH, J",
    "": "ALLAH BAKHSH and others\nvs\nMst. BHAGAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11869",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1153 = 1994 SLD 1153",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Maxim-------\"\"Audi alteram partem\"\" principle of---Land originally allotted to petitioner and subsequently confirmed in his name could not be cancelled from his name without issuing any notice to him or giving him reasonable opportunity of being heard. \n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----0. VII, R.il---Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act (XLVII of 1958), S. 25---Maxim: \"\"Audi alteram partem\"\", principle of---Applicability---Rejection of plaint by Appellate Court---Validity---Civil Court's jurisdiction to examine order passed by Settlement Authorities---Extent---Plaint filed by plaintiff disclosed cause of action as also explanation regarding delay in filing suit---If averments of plaint were accepted as true, then suit was within time---Such question, however, could be finally determined after recording evidence of parties--=Principles of audi alterm partem being a part of every statute, Civil Court was fully competent to examine whether Settlement Authorities had passed orders after complying with said principle of law---Appellate Court grossly erred in holding that Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter--­Orders passed by Settlement Authorities in absence of plaintiff were not secrosanct and could be legitimately challenged in Civil Court---Question whether land in question, was evacuee trust property and could not be allotted to plaintiff could appropriately be decided by Civil Court after recording, evidence---Order of rejection of plaint passed by Appellate Court was set aside in circumstances---Case was remanded to Trial Court for disposal in accordance with law.\n \nAnwar Hussain v. DSC etc. 1983 CLC 851 and Abdul Sattar v. Settlement Commissioner etc. PLD 1981 Kar. 413 rel.\n \nSh. Muhammad Hanif for Petitioner.\n \n Nemo for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n \n Sharif Hussain Bokhari for Respondent No.3\n \nCh. M.Z. Khalil for Respondents Nos.4 to 6.\n \nDates of hearing: 19th October; 13th December, 1993 and 11th January, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1910 of 1993, decision dated: 6-04-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN NAZIR AKHTAR, J",
    "": "KARAM HUSSAIN \nvs\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, GUJRANWALA\nand others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11870",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1154 = 1994 SLD 1154",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S. 115 & O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Temporary injunction---Grant of--­Revisional jurisdiction---Exercise of---Both Courts below dismissed application filed by petitioner for grant of temporary injunction holding that applicant seeking temporary injunction had not been able to show existence of prima facie case apart from the fact that he had not been able to show that he would suffer irreparable loss in case temporary injunction was not issued---Two Courts below having not committed any material irregularity or illegality in exercise of jurisdiction vested in them under law so far as dismissal of application for temporary injunction was concerned, concurrent order of Courts below could not be interfered with by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.\n \nShahzad Shaukat for Petitioner.\n \n Mian Ashiq Hussain for Respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 1030 of 1994, decision dated: 26-04-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHAIKH, J",
    "": "MUNIR AHMED \nvs\nRICE EXPORT CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through\nChairman and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11871",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1155 = 1994 SLD 1155 = 1994 CLC 2041",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970--------S.51---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S. 42---Appeal to Supreme Court ---1\"\"Ton-compliance with the provisions of the Ordinance [Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970], while drafting and lodging election petition---Such plea raised for the first time during arguments before Supreme Court ---Effect--­Election Tribunal had noted in its that said plea was not pressed--­Such finding of Election Tribunal has neither challenged before High Court nor had been dealt with in the of the High Court---Objection being raised during arguments before Supreme Court was not included in the petition for leave to appeal---Such objection could not be allowed to be raised for the first time before Supreme Court during arguments.\n \n(b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970---\n \n-----S.51 (b)---Word \"\"parties\"\" as contained in S. 51 (b) of the Ordinance, 1970--­Connotation---Word \"\"parties\"\" occurring in S. 51 (b), Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970, refers to parties to election petition and could not be construed to mean a person other than a party to the election petition.---[Words and phrases].\n \n(c) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970---\n \n-----. 2 (ii)---Word \"\"candidate\"\" as used in S. 2 (ii), Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970, was comprehensive and included not only contesting candidates but also a person who was proposed as a candidate but subsequently withdrew from the contest or whose nomination papers were rejected after scrutiny.---words and phrases.\n \n(d) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970---\n \n----Ss. 64, 65 & 66---Declaring election to be void by Election Tribunal--­Limitations---Election Tribunal was empowered to declare election of a candidate to be void and also to declare another contesting candidate to be duly elected---Such power was, however, restricted only to a situation in which election of a returned candidate was declared to be void under provision of S.64 and did not extend to a situation where election as a whole was declared as void under S. 66, Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970.\n \nParmatma Singh v. Sri Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav AIR 1975 Pat. 267; Chandrashekhar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh AIR 1961 Pat. 189; Abrar Muhiuddin Ahmed v. Zuhair Akram Nadeem 1986 MLD 2245 and Sher Bahadur Khan v. Abdul Samad Khan PLD 1975 Pesh.124 ref.\n \n(e) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970)---\n \n----S. 63(3)---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S. 42---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 100---Election petition--­High Court was empowered to hear appeal against decision of Election Tribunal, on any of the grounds enumerated in S. 100, Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Interference by Supreme Court---Justification---Decision of High Court was although clothed with finality, yet Supreme Court was empowered to grant leave to appeal against such decision of High Court.\n \nSher Bahadur Khan v. Abdul Samad Khan PLD 1975 Pesh. 124; Words and Phrases Vol. 38, pp. 363, 371; Seago v. Newyor Sent. R.CO 164 SW 2d 336, 341, 349, M.O. 1249 p. 363; Texax Indem. Ins. Co. v. Hollowy Tex 30 S.W. 2d 921, 928; Syed Saeed Hassan v. Pyar Ali and others PLD 1976 SC 6; Muhammad Saeed v. Election Tribunal PLD 1957 SC 91; Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed AIR 1975 SC 290; MA. Muthiah Chettiar v. Sa Ganesan AIR 1960 Mad. 85; Shiv Charan Singh v. Maharaj Kumar Shri Prijendra Pal AIR 1976 SC 785; M. Narayana Rao v. G. Venkata Reddy AIR 1977 SC 208; Narendra Madivalapa Kheni v. Manikrao Patil AIR 1977 SC 2171; Mian Shah Jehan v. Haji Lal Karif 1993 CLC 929; Ghani-ur-Rehman v. Muhammad Farid Mufakkir 1993 CLC 1964; Pir Matook Ali v. Rias Muhammad Usufi 1986 CLC 1329; Muhammad Amin v. Shujat Ali Khan PLD 1986 Jour. 66; Jamaluddin Shah v. Abdul Sattar PLD 1986 Jour. 146; K.B. Khan v. Chief Secretary PLD 1983 SC (AJ&K) 199; Sri Harasingh Charan Mohanty v. Surendra Mohanty AIR 1974 SC 47; Shafiqur Rehman v. M.S. Mian, Additional Deputy Commissioner (Rev.) and Election Tribunal, Chittagong PLD 1968 Dacca 332; Lakshmi Raman Acharya v. Chandan Singh AIR 1977 SC 587; D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan AIR 1976 SC 1599; Kanhaiyalal v. Mannalal AIR 1976 SC 1886; Bharat Bhushan v. Ved Prakash AIR 1978 Delhi 199; Haji Misal Khan v. Maulana Gohar Rehman 1987 MLD 1321; Ch. Muhammad Sarwar Jaura v. Mian Abdul Rashid Pagganwala 1987 MLD 1309; Muhammad Farid Mufakkir v. Haji Muhammad Usman Khan 1987 MLD 2744; Syed Zaffar Ali Shah v. Muhammad Nawaz Khokhar PLD 1986 Jour. 160; Rais Haji Ghulam Mustafa v. Haji Ghulam Hussain 1986 CLC 2663; Abrar Muhiuddin Ahmed v. Zuhair Akram Nadeem 1986 MLD 2245; Brij Mohan v. Mange Ram AIR 1985 SC 887; Laxminarayan v. Returning Officer AIR 1974 SC 66; Rehmatullah Khan v. Dilawar Khan 1987 MLD 1395; S.M. Ayub v. Syed Yusuf Shah PLD 1967 SC 486; Dr. Haji Misal Khan v. Maulana Gohar Rehman 1987 MLD 1321; Khadim Hussain Khan v. Dr. Akbar Hussain Khan PLD 1,986 SC (A.J&K) 145; S. Raghbir Singh Gill v. S. Gurcharan Singh Tohra AIR 1980 SC 1362; Narbada Prasad v. Chhaganlal AIR 1969 SC 395; Sheodan Singh v. Mohan Lal Gautam AIR 1969 SC 1024; Nizamuddin Ahmed v. Narbada Prasad AIR 1975 SC 1909; Avtar Singh Brar v. Tej Singh AIR 1984 SC 619; Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra AIR 1960 SC 1217; Vatal Nagaraj v. R. Dayanand Sagar AIR 1975 SC 349 and Prabhu Narayan v. A K. Srivastava AIR 1975 SC. 968 ref.\n \n(f) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance 1970---\n \n----Ss. 64 & 66---Declaring election to be void by Election Tribunal---Essentials---Where Election Tribunal was satisfied about the existence of any grounds enumerated in Ss. 64 & 66, Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance; 1970, it would declare the election to be void---Word \"\"satisfaction\"\" means the existence of a state of mental persuasion much higher than mere opinion and when used in the context of judicial proceedings has to be arrived at with the prescribed statutory provisions---To be satisfied means to be honestly convinced.\n \n(g) Words and phrases---\n \n----\"\"Satisfaction\"\"---Connotation---\"\"Satisfaction\"\" means the existence of a state of mental persuasion much higher than mere opinion---Word \"\"satisfaction\"\" when used in the context of judicial proceedings has to be arrived at with the prescribed statutory provisions---To be satisfied means to be honestly covinced.\n \nSyed Saeed Hussan v. Pyar Ali PLD 1976 SC 6 rel.\n \n(h) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970)---\n \n----Ss.64 & 66---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VI---Proceedings before Election Tribunal---Nature---Proceedings before Election Tribunal are akin to civil proceedings---Filing of election petition and written statement and setting of issues are salient features of an election petition---Election proceedings conducted by Election Tribunal were, thus neither criminal nor quasi-criminal---Civil Procedure Code was applicable although partly, yet election proceedings were essentially civil in nature.\n \n(i) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance 1970---\n \n----Ss. 64 & 66---Election petition---Powers of Election Tribunal---Election Tribunal not being bound to strict technicalities, can declare an election to be void on proved facts with modification or moulding of relief---Where any allegation was levelled in accordance with the prescribed procedure, it was not necessary that it must be proved in its totality, and that otherwise it would fail.\n \n(j) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)---\n \n----S. 42---Appeal to Supreme Court---Findings of fact---Scope of interference---Reappraisal of evidence arising out of s of Civil and Criminal Court subordinate to High Court was not the function of Supreme Court---Supreme Court however, would vacate a finding of fact if it was found that same was based on inadmissible evidence or was the result of such misreading or non-reading of evidence that such finding stood vitiated--­Supreme Court would not set aside a finding merely on the ground that a different view of evidence was possible.\n \n(k) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970---\n \n----Ss. 64 & 65---Heavy number of votes polled in favour of returned candidate---Effect---Where in certain polling booths heavy number of votes were cast in favour of returned candidate (98.2 per cent. of registered voters), Election Tribunal was right in holding that many persons must have died since the last Election when electoral lists were prepared and that possibility of false and bogus polling could not be ruled out---Such conclusion drawn by Election Tribunal was upheld by the High Court---Nothing was pointed out to show that conclusions as drawn by Election Tribunal and affirmed by High Court were either perverse or vitiated due to any misreading 'or non-reading of evidence such conclusions were maintained by Supreme Court.\n \n(1) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970---\n \n----Ss. 64 & 66---Corrupt and illegal practices---Polling of more votes than the total number of registered voters by returned candidates at specified polling stations amounted to corrupt and illegal practices---Polling at such polling stations was thus, violative of law and invalid.\n \nAbdus Sattar Rana v. S.M. Zaidi PLD 1968 SC 331; Abdul Aziz Kabiraj v. SA Chowdhury PLD 1966 Dacca 561; Muhammad Shat v. Election Tribunal PLD 1966 Lah. 755; Nasir Mahmood Mughal v. Muhammad Azam 1987 MLD 2526; Abrar Muhiuddin Ahmed v. Zuhair. Akram Nadeem 1986 MLD 2245 and Inayatullah Khan v. Haji Ghafoor Jadoon 1992 MLD 2540 ref.\n \n(m) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970---\n \n-----. 24---Repolling---Essentials---No polling was held at specified polling stations due to disturbances created by returned candidate and his supporters---Re-polling was the proper remedy in such a situation.\n \n(n) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Election) Ordinance, 1970)---\n \n----Ss. 24-A & 66---Fresh poll---Power available under S. 24-A of the Ordinance was exercisable in a case Where fresh poll would not affect result of election---Where, however, Election Tribunal had found that election had been materially affected such case would fall under provision of S. 66 (a) of the Ordinance in so far as it had transpired that election had been procured by corrupt or illegal practices.\n \n(o) Evidence Act (I of 1872)---\n \n----S. 76---Documents presented in Court containing only the stamps, signatures and dates and nothing beyond it---In absence of showing that such document was a true copy of the original, same would not be admissible in evidence.\n \nRaja Muhammad Hanif Khan and Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, Advocates for Appellant.\n \nCh. Ibrahim Zia and Farooq Hussain Kashmiri, Advocates for Respondent No.l.\n \nDates of hearing: 15th, 16th and 17th May, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court (AJ&K)",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1994, decision dated: 29-06-1994 (On appeal from the judgr0ent of the High Court dated 7-5-1994, in Election Tribunal Appeal No. 99 of 1993)",
    "Judge Name:": "SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J. AND BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J",
    "": "Raja ABDUL QAYYUM --Appellant\nvs\nCh. LATIF AKBAR, ADVOCATE and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11872",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1156 = 1994 SLD 1156",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-------Ss. 6 & 13---Right of pre-emption, vesting of---Requirement of Talbs and their fulfilment---Retention of right of pre-emption ---Pre-emptor was required to retain right of pre-emption viz. Shafi Sharik; Shafi Khalit; and Shafi Jar at the date of sale; date of institution of suit and the date of final of Trial Court---As regards requirement of Talabs and their fulfilment, same were not the qualification on which right of pre-emption rested but they were substantive part of that right only for the purpose of its enforcement---Law does not require that Talabs should also be made again and again on all the three relevant dates i.e. date of sale; date of institution of suit; and the date of final of Trial Court.\n \nHaji Rana Muhammad Shabbir Ahmad Khan v. Government of the Punjab PLD 1994 SC 1 ref. ,\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.VII, R. 11---Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991), S. 13---Suit for pre-emption---Application for rejection of plaint---Dismissal---Validity--Ground urged in such application was that according to averments in plaint requirements of law as regards Talb-i-Muwathibat had not been fulfilled, therefore, plaint was liable to be rejected---Talabs according to law required to be made prior to the institution of suit and not thereafter---Once plaint satisfied requirements of law, same was not adversely affected by declaration of Supreme Court in PLD 1994 SC 1 to the effect that S. 13(3), Punjab Pre­emption Act, 1991 (which provided that in such suits there was no necessity to fulfil requirements as regards Talb-i-Muwathibat in case requirement as to Talb-i-Ishhad had been fulfilled, right of pre-emption could be enforced and suit was maintainable) had been declared repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and would cease to be the law with effect from 31-12-1993---Said declaration would be applicable to the suits instituted thereafter---Suit having been filed before the target date i.e. 31-12-1993, would be maintainable even though requirement of law as regards Talb-Muwathibat had not been fulfllled-­Application for rejection of plaint on that count was rightly dismissed by Trial Court.\n \nAbdul Ghaffar and 2 others v. Malik Muhammad 1993 CLC 2437; Mst. Safia Begum v. Muhammad Ibrahim and 4 others 1993 MLD 2096 and Ahmad Hussain v. Muhammad Hussain PLD 1993 Lah. 44 ref.\n \nCh. Muhammad Ashraf Azeem for Petitioners.\n \nCh. Zafar Iqbal Naeem for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 19th April, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision Nos. 970 and 971 of 1994, heard on 19-04-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIRA. SHAIKH, J",
    "": "JAMAL DIN and anothers\nvs\nALLAH BAKHSH and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11873",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1157 = 1994 SLD 1157",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (v of 1908)---OIII R. 1 & S. 96---Appeal through attorney---Competency to file--­Person holding general power of attorney filing appeal on behalf of plaintiff who had appointed him for managing his agricultural land situated in District \"\"M\"\" and for instituting and pursuing cases in Courts, from inception to highest level---Precise objection against competency of attorney to file appeal was that land in question, relating to which general attorney had filed appeal was in District \"\"V\"\" and same had not yet become a part of the proprietorship of plaintiff and that power of attorney was general and not special---Validity---If at all objection could be raised against authority of general attorney, it was plaintiff who had executed the instrument in favour of general attorney who could have raised it--=If general attorney had misused power of attorney or travelled beyond his domain, he could have been stopped from doing it by executant (plaintiff)---Defendants had nothing to do with the power of attorney and no prejudice had admittedly been caused to them by reason of a defect or drawback, if any, inherent in such instrument---If there was some minor defect in general power of attorney executoin favour of such attorney, same must be treated to be a mere irregularity which could not have any adverse effect on the right of plaintiff to institute suit; and by reason of such defect defendants had not been prejudiced in any manner, and no valuable right had accrued to them on that count---Such objection, however, having not been raised before First Appellate Court same could not be allowed to be raised at such belated stage before High Court in second appeal. \n \nLiaquat Hayat and others v. Muhammad Sarwar and others 1985 SCMR 1386; Ismail and another v. Mst. Razia Begum and 3 otliers 1981 SCMR 687 and Qazi Altaf Hussain and another v_ . Ashfaq Hussain 1986 SCMR 1427 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XLI, R. 1---First appeal violative of the provisions of OXLI, R. 1, Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Such objection claimed to have been raised by counsel of appellant but same was not adverted to by the Court---Counsel might have just in passing and feebly urged such point and same possibly might have escaped notice of the Court---Court having dealt with more formidable contention raised before it, by counsel of parties, could also have examined such objection and determined its effect on the course and result of appeal had such objection been diligently raised and stressed---Proceedings which took place in the Appellate Court below, from beginning to end must be held to be sacrosanct---Such objection raised by counsel in the form of affidavit would not have any weight of any material consequence.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.VII, R. 11---Plaint---Deficient court-fee---Effect---Plaint would be liable to rejection on account of deficient court-fee only when plaintiff fails to make good the deficiency, even on having been allowed an opportunity for that object by the Court---Where a suit was instituted in time, on payment of even deficient court-fee, and deficiency was made good afterwards, suit could not be treated as having been barred by time.\n \n1990 SCMR 968; Walayat Khatoon's case PLD 1979 SC 821; Mst. Parveen v. Jamshaid Begum PLD 1983 SC 227 and Siddique Khan v. Shakoor Khan PLD 1984 SC 289 rel.\n \n(d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--\n \n----Art. 129, illus. (e)---Order passed by Court on regular date of hearing when counsel for parties were in attendance in Court---Order in question was passed in their presence---Presumption would be that counsel for defendant had been heard in regard to the plaintiffs prayer in question, which had culminated into order passed by the Court.\n \n(e) Jurisdiction---\n \n---- Trial Court reversing order of its predecessor---Validity---Trial Court was not competent to alter or undo the order passed by its predecessor, only a higher Court could do so in appeal or revision.\n \n(f) Punjab Pre-emotion Act (I of 1913)---\n \n----S. 23(4)---Zar-i-Panjam---Provision of S. 23(4), Punjab Pre-emotion Act, 1913, does not set forth any grounds on which order of payment of Zar-e­Panjam could be varied or substituted.\n \nMuhammad Hussain v. ADJ, Kasur and others 1982 CLC 1211 and Khuda Bakhsh v. Sultan Mahmood 1985 SCMR 192 rel.\n \nCh. Khurshid Ahmad and Malik Iqbal Rasool for Appellants.\n \nMirza Manzoor Ahmad for Respondent.\n \nDates of hearing: 29th January; 29th March; 11th and 19th April, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular Second Appeal No. 134 of 1984, decision dated: 20-04-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN GHULAM AHMAD, J",
    "": "QADIR BAKHSH and others\nvs\nKhawaja GHULAM MOEEN-UD-DIN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11874",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1158 = 1994 SLD 1158",
    "Key Words:": "Muhammadan Law-------Inheritance---Appellants who were legal heirs of deceased daughter of original owner of land in dispute had claimed that said daughter of original owner died after death of original owner whereas claim of respondents was that she died much earlier than the death of original owner and thus heirs of predeceased daughter could not inherit property of original owner under Islamic law---Courts below on basis of evidence on record had concluded that daughter had died much earlier to death of original owner---Concurrent findings of fact of Courts below based on evidence on record and not suffering from any illegality such as misreading or non-reading or misconstruction of any material piece of evidence, could not be interfered with.\n \nSardar v. Mst. Nehmat Bi and 8 others 1992 SCMR 82 ref.\n \nTaki Ahmad Khan for Appellant.\n \nCA. Rehman for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 20th February, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular Second Appeal No. 1112 of 1969, heard on 20-02-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIRA. SHAIKH, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ARSHAD and 2 others\nvs\nMUHAMMAD ASLAM and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11875",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1159 = 1994 SLD 1159",
    "Key Words:": "West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V of 1962)-------Ss. 2-A, 3 & 5 [as amended by Punjab. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat.) Application Act (Amendment) Ordinance (XIII of 1983)]---Person holding the entire land as last male owner under Custom since 1927 was to be deemed to be the absolute owner under S. 2-A---Plea that proviso to S. 5 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 entitled the female to inherit the share under the Sharia, in circumstances, was not relevant as S. 5 of the Act would come into play where the life estate terminated under S.5 ---Where life estate of female terminated on her death which took place on 18th March, 1923, the property by virtue of S. 2-A vested absolutely in the last male owner who was predecessor-in-interest and suit against such male owner as such in the presence of Section 2-A was not maintainable.\n \nIn the present case \"\"M\"\" held the entire land as last male owner under custom since 1927 and as such under section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 was deemed to be the absolute owner. The plea that proviso to section 5 of the Act of 1962 entitled the female to inherit the share under the Sharia in the present context was not relevant as section 5 came into play where the life estate terminated under section 3. Section 3 provides for termination of life estate with effect from 31st December, 1962. In the present case the life estate of Mst. K admittedly terminated on her death which took place on 18th March, 1923. The property by virtue of section 2-A of the Act vested absolutely in M, predecessor-in-­interest of the defendant and the suit as such in the presence of section 2rA was not maintainable.\n \nAbdul Ghafoor v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1985 SC 407 ref.\n \nSuba v. Mst. Fatima Bibi 1992 SCMR 1721; Muhammad Malak v. Mst. Rabia Bibi 1987 CLC 1201 and Abdullah v. Mst. Bakhto Mai PLD 1956 SC (Pak.) 321 distinguished.\n \nRana Muhammad Sarwar for Petitioners.\n \nCh. Hamid-ud-Din for Respondent No.3.\n \nAzmat Saeed for Respondents Nos. 4, 6 to 9.\n \nJahangir A. Jhoja for Respondents Nos. 10 to 15.\n \nRespondent No.5 in person.\n \nDates of hearing: 5th and 6th June, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 73 of 1994, decision dated: 15-06-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALIL-UR-REHMAN KHAN, J",
    "": "Malik FAQIR MUHAMMAD and others\nvs\nCh. GHULAM NABI and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11876",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1160 = 1994 SLD 1160",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Pre-emption Act (I of 1913)-------S. 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 149---Determination of quantum of court-fees payable on plaint, in a suit for pre-emption ---Duty of Court---Trial Court must determine the precise amount of court-fee payable on plaint in a suit for pre-emption and allow opportunity to defaulting party to make good discovered deficiency by a time specified for the purpose and in default take recourse to punitive provision of law in that behalf Determination of quantum of court-fee payable on a document could not be entrusted by the Court to a litigant party---Determination of quantum of Court fee being a necessary part of adjudicatory process, must be performed by the Court itself and such function could not be abdicated in favour of a litigant--­Where Trial Court had merely called upon plaintiff to pay the court-fee and it did not disclose its mind on the amount of court-fee payable by plaintiff, such direction was defective and not warranted by law---Whenever Court felt that assessment of suit for purposes of court-fee was incorrect, it was bound to determine it judicially for a mandate to plaintiff for meeting the discovered deficiency by a specified date---Without proper determination of quantum of Court-fee and time for its payment, no litigant could be penalized.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----Ss. 149 & 151---Extension of time for payment of court-fee---Trial Court without determining quantum of court-fee directing plaintiff to make up deficiency by specified date---Plaintiff on specified date submitting application for extension of time and depositing maximum amount of court-fee (Rs.15,000) in Court---Trial Court dismissing application for extension of time but observing that plaintiff having deposited the maximum amount of court-fee, such fact would be taken into consideration at the time of final arguments--­Validity---Mandatory for Court to grant time to plaintiff to supply the deficient court-fee .after it is determined by the Court---Contumacious disregard of Court's order after such determination of court-fee and extension of time allowed by Court, would attract penal provisions as to rejection of plaint--­Rejection of application for extension of time4or payment of court-fee was not justified in circumstances---Trial Court was required to give its verdict on quantum of court-fee and proceed further with the case.\n \nSardar Roshan Ali Sindhu for Petitioners.\n \nMuhammad Rashid Chughtai for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 7th February, 1994.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 1211 of 1993, decision dated: 7-02-1994",
    "Judge Name:": "GUL ZARIN KIANI, J",
    "": "ALLAH RAKHA and anothers\nvs\nMUHAMMAD BOOTA and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11877",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVUTFNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1161 = 1994 SLD 1161",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Tourism Development Corporation Punjab Service Rules, 1989-------R. 9(iv)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), OXXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2--­Termination of service of employee of Tourism Development Corporation--­Employee filing a suit against his termination---Pending suit employee filed application for suspending the operation of order of termination--­Maintainability---Tourism Development Corporation, Punjab being a public limited company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, service in the Corporation was not regulated by statutory rules and law of master and servant would regulate and govern the service of its employees---Infringement of R.9(iv) at the most gave cause to employee on termination of his service to sue the Corporation for damages for his alleged termination from service--­Right to claim reinstatement of service by such employee was not, beyond dispute and existence of balance of convenience in his favour and irreparable loss was also open to exception---Employee, therefore, had no prima facie case in his. favour for grant of order suspending order of termination of his service---For decision of the application for temporary injunction for relief of reinstatement as a measure of interim relief during the pendency of the civil suit, the point raised on the application for rule of natural justice and a show­cause notice would not have much merit---Such application would receive proper consideration at the trial---Exercise of discretion by the Trial Court granting interim relief, in circumstances, was rightly corrected in appeal by \"\"the District Judge by dismissing the application for temporary injunction.--­[Master and Servant--Natural justice, Principles of].\n \nRiazuddin v. Chairman, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and 2 others PLD 1992 SC 531; Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another PLD 1970 SC 139; Ahmad Din and others v. Faiz Ali and others PLD 1954 Lah. 414 and Mrs. Anisa Rehman's case Civil Appeal No. 238-K of 1992 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----OXXXIX, R.1---Status quo order---Scope and extent---Status quo can be maintained between the parties in accordance with the situation as it obtains at the time of institution of the suit and not to a point of time prior thereto.\n \nShahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another PLD 1970 SC 139 ref.\n \nMian Mahmood Hussain for Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=OXXXIX,Rr.1,2\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=OXXXIX,Rr.1,2\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 2127 of 1994, decision dated: 1st June, 1994",
    "Judge Name:": "GUL ZARIN KIANI, J",
    "": "TAHIR MAHMOOD RANA\nvs\nTHE TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF PUNJAB, Lahore High Court and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11878",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmQ1FpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1994 1205 = 1994 SLD 1205 = 1994 CLC 2197 = 1994 PTCL 136",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S. 290---Object, purpose and scope of S. 290, Companies Ordinance, 1984--­Purpose of S. 290, Companies Ordinance, 1984 is to avoid winding up of company, if possible---Winding up of company would unfairly prejudice not only the shareholders but also the creditors---Taking over the business of the company by specified Modarba companies who were financially and professionally sound parties by floating Modarba Management Company was, thus, the only viable proposal. \n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 290---Court's directions to Joint Registrar of Companies---Court directed that in the interest of justice the amount received as profit/interest by depositors be adjusted against the principal amount of deposit and after adjusting the amount so received, if an) amount remained payable out of the principal amount, same would be paid pro rata depending on the total amount realised, out of the assets of the Company in question and its subsidiary Companies. \n \nAta Muhammad Khan. Joint Registrar of Companies.\n \nMuhammad Nazar Khan, Advocate.\n \n Haji Muhammad Yousaf, Affectee/Depositor",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=290\\n\\r\\n\\rCompanies Ordinance, 1984=290\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Miscellaneous No. 717 of 1993 in Civil Original No. 45 of 1990, decision dated: 22-09-1993",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALIL-UR-REHMAN KHAN, J",
    "": "In re: TAJ COMPANY LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11879",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmQ1NDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1984 337 = 1984 SLD 337 = 1984 SCMR 32 = 1984 PTCL 190",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Duty – Additional Customs Duty on Plant and Machinery – Exemption under Notification\nDetails:\nThe issue concerns the levying of a 5% additional customs duty surcharge on the value of plant and machinery under Section 2 of the Finance Ordinance, 1982. The case arose in the context of a Notification dated 26th June 1980, which had exempted the import of plant and machinery intended to be installed in exempt areas (such as Noshehra) from the additional customs duty surcharge. The question for consideration was whether the surcharge could be levied despite this exemption.\nHeld:\nLeave to appeal was granted to consider the question of whether the 5% additional customs duty surcharge could be levied on such machinery, specifically in light of the aforementioned Notification under Section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969.\nThe interim order previously passed was confirmed, but the interest payable on the bank guarantee would remain deposited in the bank until the final decision of the appeal.\nThe appeal will be heard early and the parties are permitted to file additional documents, if necessary.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=19\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 498-R of 1983, decision dated: 18-10-1983. Date of hearing: 18th October, 1983.\n(On appeal from the judgment and order, dated 27-04-1983 of the Lahore High Court, passed in Writ Petition No. 313 of 1983)",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD HALEEM, ACTG. C.J. AND MIAN BURHANUDDIN KHAN, J",
    "": "SOHAIL JUTE MILLS LTD.\nVs.\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11880",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmQVNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1984 548 = 1984 SLD 548 = 1984 SCMR 522 = 1983 PTCL 422",
    "Key Words:": "Excise Duty – Double Taxation – Leave to Appeal Granted\nDetails:\nThe Federal Government challenged a short order issued by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan dated 18-11-1976. The High Court had held that excise duty could not simultaneously be imposed on the manufacture of man-made fibre yarn using machinery already assessed to production capacity tax for manufacturing cotton yarn. The Court considered such dual imposition to amount to double taxation on the same plant or machinery, which it deemed impermissible—even under the Central Board of Revenue’s own formula.\nThe Deputy Attorney-General, representing the petitioner, submitted that the High Court’s interpretation was flawed and raised a significant legal question about the correct application of tax laws and notifications under the relevant excise duty framework.\nDespite the unavailability of the High Court’s detailed reasons, the Supreme Court recognized that the matter involved a substantial question of law of public importance. Accordingly, the petition for leave to appeal was allowed.\nHeld:\nLeave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court. The operation of the High Court’s impugned order was suspended. A request was directed to be made to the High Court for a copy of the detailed reasons to facilitate the appeal's disposal in the upcoming Karachi session (March 1978).\nCitations:\nExcise Duty Law – Double Taxation Doctrine\nCentral Board of Revenue's formula (not specifically cited, but referenced)\nConstitution of Pakistan – Leave to Appeal Jurisdiction",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. K-8 of 1978, decision dated: 25-01-1978",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWARUL HAQ, C.J., WAHEEDUDDIN AHMAD AND DORAB PATEL, JJ",
    "": "SECRETARY, CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE\nVs.\nDEWAN TEXTILE MILLS LTD., Karachi High Court---Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11881",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmRVJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 301 = 1977 SLD 301 = (1977) 36 TAX 1 = 1977 PTD 437",
    "Key Words:": "Sales-tax Act, 1951 -- Sections 3, 28, 30, 30(1) -- Rectification of mistake-- Mistake apparent on the face of record -- Order not merely erroneous but manifestly or obviously wrong -- Whether comes within the mischief of section 30 -- Held yes -- Rectification of mistake -- Assessee unauthorisedly collecting sales-tax from customers -- Sales-tax so collected deposited with Government -- Subsequently refund allowed accepting assessee's proposition that it was entitled to the tax paid as the customers were not liable to sales-tax -- Proposition whether erroneous and mistake in order of refund whether a mistake within the meaning of section 30 -- Held yes -- Whether Sales-tax Officer entitled to reopen the case under section 28 demanding redeposit of the amount with Government -- Held yes -- Sales tax -- Levy and refund -- Sales tax collected by petitioner from its customers on sales effected in Tribal areas and deposited with Government, allegedly under protest -- Refund sought on ground of Act III of 1951, not being extended to Tribal areas, Government not entitled to collect such amount -- Held: Government even though not entitled to levy tax in Tribal areas yet could ratify petitioner's action on some misunderstanding of law as led petitioner to collect it from its customers -- Nothing, hence, turns on applicability of Act to Tribal areas and real question involved one of terms on which tax collected by petitioner -- Evidence as to such fact being in petitioner's exclusive possession but withheld, adverse inference to be drawn against petitioners of tax having been collected by petitioner as agent of Government -- Petitioner not claiming to have collected tax for its own benefit, tax collected either as agent of Government or as agent of customers but customers not seeking refund -- Agency ended on deposit of amount with Government and amount collected by petitioner not belonging to him, refund of same, held, not permissible -- Word \"\"correction\"\" -- Expression \"\"apparent on face of the record\"\" -- Order subject to correction under S. 30 -- Must suffer from a \"\"mistake apparent on face of the record\"\" -- Order manifestly or obviously wrong and mistakes capable of being established without any elaborate arguments -- Fall within mischief of S. 30 --",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sacks Tax Act, (III of 1951)=3,28,30,30(1),17,10\\n\\r\\n\\rSacks Tax Act, (III of 1951)=3,28,30,30(1),17,10\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=14(c)Schedule2\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CPSLA No. 870 of 1976. December 13, 1976",
    "Judge Name:": "S. ANWAR-UL-HAQ AND DORAB PATEL, JJ",
    "": "SAjj CourtAD NABI DAR & CO\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF Income Tax RAWALPINDI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11882",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmRlNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 302 = 1977 SLD 302 = (1977) 36 TAX 1 = 1977 PTD 43",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 16(1)(b) read with clause (iii) of proviso to Para A of Part I of the First Schedule to the Finance Act, 1973 -- Ceiling of the tax -- Overall restriction of 70 per cent of total income prescribed in clause (iii) of the proviso -- Whether only super tax should be taken account for applying the overall restriction of 70 per cent -- Held yes -- Whether surcharge excluded from the purview of the clause -- Held yes -- Apportionment of super tax paid by the firm -- Ratio of super tax laid down in clause (iii) -- Statutes -- Interpretation of taxing statutes -- Whether express language of the law maker and not the intendment should be looked into -- Held yes -- Whether no addition to or omission therefrom is permissible -- Held yes -- Assessment of firm -- Determination of ratio of super-tax -- Correct formula laid down (By majority) -- Taxing statute -- No room for discovering intendment of Legislature -- Construction of any provision of a taxing statute -- Cannot be controlled by consequence that may follow where language is clear and capable of only one meaning -- Duty of Court to see that as far as possible no anomalies arise as a result of interpretation --\nCorresponding Sections:\nIncome-tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Section 69(4) --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=16(1)(b),23(1),15,15AA,16,23\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=16(1)(b),23(1),15,15AA,16,23\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 2210 of 1973-74 (Assessment year 1973-74), decision dated: 03-12-1976",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MAZHAR ALI, JUDICIAL MEMBER, M. M. AKBAR AND A. A. ZUBAIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBERS",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11883",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 788 = 2015 SLD 788 = (2015) 111 TAX 221 = 2015 PTD 1665 = 2016 PTCL 34",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=36,36(3),47\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=36,36(3),47\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.R No.14 of 2008, decided 12-2-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID KARIM, JJ",
    "": "HASEEB WAQAS SUGAR MILLS LTD\nvs\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN etc"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11884",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 612 = 2013 SLD 612 = 2013 SCMR 678",
    "Key Words:": "(a) State Bank of Pakistan Act (XXXIII of 1956)---\n \n----S. 9A---State Bank of Pakistan---Purpose and functions---State Bank of Pakistan in its capacity as the premier regulatory authority of the Government of Pakistan in the financial sector acted as a watchdog over the Government in order to secure monetary stability and soundness of the financial system---Main function of State Bank of Pakistan was to ensure and secure stability of the financial system in the country and for such purpose it issued guidelines and advices from time to time in the shape of Banking Control Department (BCD) Circulars.\n \n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S. 25---State Bank of Pakistan Act (XXXIII of 1956), Preamble---Banking Control Department (BCD) Circulars issued by State Bank of Pakistan--- Binding effect--- Scope--- Such Circulars/ Instructions issued by State Bank of Pakistan were binding upon all concerned.\n \n Hashwani Hotels Limited v. Federal of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 315 ref.\n \n(c) State Bank of Pakistan Act (XXXIII of 1956)---\n \n----S. 9A---Banking Control Department (BCD) Circulars issued by State Bank of Pakistan---Scope---Such Circulars, which could be termed as delegated legislation/directives/orders, could not displace legislative instruments such as Acts of Parliament.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 29---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S. 15 [since repealed]--- State Bank of Pakistan Act (XXXIII of 1956), S. 9A---Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S. 39---State Bank of Pakistan, BCD Circular No. 13 dated 20-6-1984---State Bank of Pakistan, BCD Circular No. 32 dated 26-11-1984---Interest-bearing loan---Compound interest, grant of---Power of State Bank of Pakistan in relation to recovery of interest-bearing loans---Scope---Claim of Bank (respondent) was allowed with simple interest---Bank filed appeal before High Court contending that as per agreement between parties compound interest was to be allowed--- High Court allowed compound interest to the Bank---Contention that in view of BCD Circular No.13 dated 20-6-1984, and BCD Circular No.32 dated 26-11-1984, Bank could not charge compound interest on loans given by it after 1-1-1985, and that Bank had unlawfully amalgamated three loans into one and started charging compound interest---Validity---Powers and functions given to State Bank of Pakistan were entirely divorced from the laws enacted from time to time for recovery of outstanding loans by the Banks and other development financial institutions, hence it could not be said that after 1-1-1985 no loans previously given by any company/development financial institutions on the old interest bearing system could not be recovered as such---Section 15 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (since repealed) provided that both interest and mark-up could be recovered and the same was reflected in S.29 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Parties had voluntarily agreed to amalgamation of loans through the agreement, which provided for 12% compounded interest---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nQamaruzaaman Khan v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and others 2009 CLD 460 and Mushtaq Ahmed Vohra v. Crescent Investment Bank Limited 2005 CLD 444 distinguished.\n \nMessrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Ltd. and 6 others v. National Development Finance Corporation, Karachi PLD 2002 SC 500 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956=9-A,Preamble\\n\\r\\n\\rState Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956=9-A,Preamble\\n\\r\\n\\rBanking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997=15\\n\\r\\n\\rBanking Companies Ordinance, 1962=25\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.17-K of 2011, decision dated: 27-02-2013.(Against the judgment dated 11-2-2011 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in H.C.A. No.109 of 2004)",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY AND GULZAR AHMED, JJ",
    "": "AZAM WAZIR KHAN\nvs\nMessrs INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11885",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 611 = 2013 SLD 611 = 2013 SCMR 669",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 497(2)---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), Ss.9(c), 13 & 15---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 38---Possession and trafficking of narcotics, aiding, abetment or association in narcotic offences---Bail, grant of---further inquiry---Accused implicated for the offence on the statement of co-accused made before the police---Such statement of co-accused could not be used as evidence against the accused in view of Art. 38 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Plea of Anti-Narcotic Force that accused was involved in other narcotic cases similar to the present one was not relevant in circumstances---Case against accused was one of further inquiry---Accused was granted bail accordingly.\n \n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 497---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 38---Bail---Scope---Accused implicated for the offence on the statement of a co-accused made before the police---Under Art.38 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, admission of co-accused before police could not be used as evidence against the accused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2),497\\n\\r\\n\\rCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2),497\\n\\r\\n\\rControl of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997=9(c),13,15\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.303 of 2012, decision dated: 7-09-2012.(On appeal from the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 1-8-2012 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No.789-P of 2012)",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR-UL-MULK AND IJAZ AHMED CHAUDHRY, JJ",
    "": "Raja MUHAMMAD YOUNAS\nvs\nThe STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11886",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 610 = 2013 SLD 610 = 2013 SCMR 670",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Enforceability of a provision in a statute---Plea was that enforceability of the provision caused inconvenience---Validity---Such plea was no ground for rendering a provision on the statute book to be unenforceable--- Individual inconvenience could not be a ground for giving the law a different interpretation.\n \n(b) Public interest litigation---\n \n----Order passed in public interest litigation---Nature---Such order would operate in rem---Court was not required to issue notices to every individual who was likely to be affected by the order.\n \n(c) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Principles---Interpretation of law was not founded on a single circumstance, particularly when such circumstance was very individualistic---Court was not expected to go into individual cases while dealing with interpretation of law.\n \n(d) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Principles---Hardship of few (individuals) could not be the basis for determining the validity of any statute---Law must be interpreted and applied on its plain language.\n \nSaurabh Chaudri and others v. Union of India and others AIR 2004 SC 361 : 2003 AIR SCW 6392 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I.As. Nos.4, 5, I.As. Nos.6-8, I.As. Nos.9-11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.265 of 2011, decision dated: 3rd August, 2012",
    "Judge Name:": "A.K. PATNAIK AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ",
    "": "AVISHEK GOENKA\nvs\nUNION OF INDIA and anther"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11887",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2728 = 2007 SLD 2728 = 2007 SCMR 1120",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------S. 42---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.43---Suit for declaration---Sale through registered deed of 169 Kanals of land by defendant believing same to have been. inherited from his mother---Defendant according to Revenue Record found to be owning 87 Kanals land as allotment of his mother was reduced from 479 Kanals to 218 Kanals---Defendant later on inherited 58 Kanals land from his issueless brother---Plaintiff sought attestation of mutation of sale in his favour regarding 87 Kanals of land and additional 58 Kanals of land inherited by him---Refusal of Revenue Authority to attest mutation of 58 Kanals of land on the ground that defendant had become its owner subsequent to sale-deed---Plaintiff's suit for declaration regarding 58 Kanals of land was decreed by Trial Court and Appellate Court, but dismissed by High Court as defendant had not misrepresented quantum of his ownership--Validity-Plaintiff's knowledge of defendant's actual holding had not been proved---Defendant was unaware of the true extent of his ownership and was suffering from a mistake of fact and his misrepresentation that he owned 169 Kanals was erroneous---Property sold by defendant and suit property inherited subsequently, was part and parcel of same property originally allotted to his mother---Upon reduction of allotment of defendant's mother, he became entitled to sell only 87 Kanals of land---Part of property sold by defendant unauthorizedly included share of his brother---Defendant had, thus, acquired interest in suit property within meaning of S.43 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882---Equity would favour plaintiff, who had paid price for 169 Kanals of land, while he was transferred 87 Kanals and transfer of suit-land of 58 Kanals would not be sufficient to make up deficiency---Supreme Court set aside of High Court and restored that of Trial Court. \n \nKrishnadhan Chandra v. Kanailal Ghosp and another AIR 1973 Cal. 422; Mohan Singh and others v. Pandit Sewa Ram and others AIR 1924 Oudh 209; Ganga Prasad v. Mt. Raghubansa AIR 1937 Oudh 127; Mst.. Fazal Bibi and others v. Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1983 SC 163; Shamoon and others v. Ahmad and others 1986 SCMR 888 and Ziauddin Rafi v. Muhammad Khan and others PLD 1962 (W.P.) Lah. 321 ref.\n \nRamaswamy Pattamali and others v. Lakshmi and others AIR 1962 Kerala 313; Jagat Narain v. Laljee AIR 1965 All. 504 and Jan Muhammad v. Karm Chand PLD 1947 PC 62 rel.\n \n(b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)---\n \n----S. 43---Provision of S.43 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, applicability of---Principle stated.\n \nSection 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 comes into play when the representation made by the transferor is either fraudulent or erroneous. The erroneous representation may be innocent and would cover a situation where the transferee is not even aware of lack of his authority to transfer the immovable property. The two words \"\"fraudulent\"\" and \"\"erroneously\"\" have been used in the alternative and the latter is not to be confused with misrepresentation. Misrepresentation is to give a 'misleading account of facts, often intentionally, whereas \"\"erroneously\"\" means mistakenly. The use of the two words \"\"fraudulently\"\" and \"\"erroneously\"\" is to cover deliberate as well as mistaken incorrect presentation. \n \nThe transferee of property seeking benefit of section 43 is not bound to establish misrepresentation by transferor. \n \nRamaswamy Pattamali and others v. Lakshmi and others AIR 1962 Kerala 313 and Jagat Narain v. Laljee AIR 1965 All. 504 ref.\n \nGul Zarin Kiyani, Advocate Supreme Court and Arshad Ali Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\n \nTafazul Hussain Rizvi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 7th March, 2007.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.1214 of 2004, decision dated: 2-04-2007 (On appeal from the judgment, of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 24-5-2001 passed in Civil Revision No.1007 of 1988)",
    "Judge Name:": "JAVED IQBAL AND NASIR-UL-MULK, JJ",
    "": "RAB NAWAZ and others\nvs\nMUHAMMAD ALI through Legal RepresentativE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11888",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 608 = 2013 SLD 608 = 2013 SCMR 634",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 184(3)--- Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000), Ss. 2(3), 9(1) & 11(1)---Suo motu case under Art.184(3) of the Constitution regarding pilferage of ISAF-NATO containers under the garb of Afghan Transit Trade---Duty and tax evasion---Loss to public exchequer---Recovery of such loss by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR)---Report containing findings and recommendations of Federal Tax Ombudsman---Said report indicated the quantum of the loss caused to the public exchequer was approximately Rs.55 billion, however the Federal Board of Revenue to-date had only recovered Rs.5,602,754 which for all intents and purposes was insignificant, when examined in juxtaposition, with the loss to the public exchequer---Performance of the Federal Board of Revenue, was far from satisfactory---Despite elapse of almost one and a half year since the report was compiled by the Federal Tax Ombudsman, no progress worth mentioning had been made for the recovery of the loss identified---Federal Board of Revenue did not bring on record as to how far the recommendations made by the Federal Tax Ombudsman in his report had been implemented despite the fact that a time frame in such behalf, had specifically been mentioned in S.11(1) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000---Supreme Court directed that Federal Tax Ombudsman as well as Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue should file reports identifying the extent of the implementation of the recommendations of the Federal Tax Ombudsman by the Department (FBR) and further such reports should also identify the modus operandi proposed and required to be undertaken to efficiently and expeditiously effect the recovery of the loss caused to the public exchequer.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=184(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=184(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3),9(1),11(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.M.As. Nos. 2243 and 3683 of 2012 in S.M.C. No.16 of 2010, decision dated: 4-03-2013",
    "Judge Name:": "IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J., GULZAR AHMED AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE: In re"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11889",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 609 = 2013 SLD 609 = 2013 SCMR 642",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Reorganization and Conversion) Ordinance (LX of 2002)---\n \n----S. 6---Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited Staff Regulations, 2005---Agricultural Development Bank (Staff Service) Regulations, 1961---Promotion Policy, 1999---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Legislation by reference---Scope---Bank employee---Promotion of employees in service of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Bank) prior to the promulgation of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Reorganization and Conversion) Ordinance, 2002---Promotion Committee of Bank not recommending promotion of such employees on the basis that they failed to meet the threshold required for promotion under the applicable Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited Staff Regulations, 2005, and that their promotion was not governed by the Agricultural Development Bank (Staff Service) Regulations, 1961 or by Promotion Policy, 1999---Employees challenged recommendations of Promotion Committee by filing constitutional petition before High Court claiming that their promotion was governed by Agricultural Development Bank (Staff Service) Regulations, 1961 and Promotion Policy, 1999 and not by the Regulations of 2005---Maintainability---Contention of Bank was that even if employees in question were governed by Agricultural Development Bank (Staff Service) Regulations, 1961 and Promotion Policy, 1999, the same were non-statutory, therefore, constitutional petition would not be maintainable---Validity---Section 6 of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Reorganization and Conversion) Ordinance, 2002 provided two fold security to employees who were in service of the Bank prior to the promulgation of the said Ordinance: Firstly the employees of the Bank, prior to promulgation of said Ordinance, stood transferred and became employees of the Company, and secondly they were made subject to the same rules and regulations as were applicable to them before the promulgation of the said Ordinance---On account of S.6 of the said Ordinance, the previous Regulations relating to promotion of employees in question, i.e. Agricultural Development Bank (Staff Service) Regulations, 1961 and Promotion Policy, 1999, which were non-statutory, stood incorporated by way of legislative reference and thereby acquired a statutory status under the new dispensation and the employees acquired a legal right for their enforcement---Constitutional petition before High Court, filed against recommendations of Promotion Committee, would be maintainable in such circumstances---Appeal filed by Bank was dismissed accordingly.\n \n Masood Ahmed Bhatti v. Federation of Pakistan 2012 SCMR 152; Muhammad Tariq Badr and others v. National Bank of Pakistan Civil Appeals Nos.1416, 1417 of 2009 and Civil Petition No.176-Q of 2009 and Muhammad Amin v. President Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. 2010 PLC (C.S.) 710 rel.\n \n Principal, Cadet College, Kohat v. Muhammad Shoab PLD 1984 SC 170; Zia Ghafoor Piracha v. Chairman, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education 2004 SCMR 35 and Asad Bashir v. Chairman Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore and others 2006 PLC (C.S.) 110 distinguished.\n \n Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602; Muhammad Idrees v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan PLD 2007 SC 681; Anwar Hussain v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1112; Masood Ahmad Bhatti v. Federation of Pakistan 2012 SCMR 152; Muhammad Amin v. President Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. 2010 PLC (C.S.) 710; Executive Council Allama Iqbal Open University v. Muhammad Tufail Hashmi 2010 SCMR 1484; and Wood's Estate case [1886] 31 Ch D 607 ref.\n \n(b) Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Reorganization and Conversion) Ordinance (LX of 2002)---\n \n----S. 6---Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited Staff Regulations, 2005, Para. 14(h)---Agricultural Development Bank (Staff Service) Regulations, 1961---Promotion Policy, 1999---Promotion of employees in service of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Bank) prior to the promulgation of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Reorganization and Conversion) Ordinance, 2002---Promotion Committee of Bank not recommending promotion of such employees on the basis that they failed to meet the threshold required for promotion under the Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited Staff Regulations, 2005---Employees challenged recommendations of Promotion Committee by filing constitutional petition before High Court claiming that their promotion was not governed by the Regulations of 2005 but by the Agricultural Development Bank (Staff Service) Regulations, 1961 and Promotion Policy, 1999---High Court allowed the constitutional petition holding that promotion of employees was not governed by the procedure provided in the Regulations of 2005 and directed the Bank to send cases of employees to the Promotion Committee for consideration afresh in accordance with the same rules and regulations which were applicable to them prior to the promulgation of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Reorganization and Conversion) Ordinance, 2002---Bank contended that Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited Staff Regulations, 2005 were voluntarily and consciously adopted by the employees who took all the monetary benefits under it, and after sitting/participating in the competitive process for promotion as contemplated by Paragraph 14(h) of the Regulations of 2005 and after failing to meet the threshold required for promotion, the employees were estopped by their own conduct from turning around and claiming promotion on the basis of the previously applicable Agricultural Development Bank (Staff Service) Regulations, 1961 or Promotion Policy, 1999---Validity---By virtue of S.6 of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Reorganization and Conversion) Ordinance, 2002, employees in question acquired a statutory right to be considered for promotion in accordance with the same rules and regulations which were applicable to them before the promulgation of said Ordinance---Employees in question, therefore, were to be considered for promotion in terms of Agricultural Development Bank (Staff Service) Regulations, 1961 and Promotion Policy, 1999, which admittedly was not done by the Promotion Committee in the present case---Contention of Bank that employees in question having derived all monetary benefits under Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited Staff Regulations, 2005 were estopped from claiming promotion under previously applicable rules and regulations, was not tenable, Firstly because there was no estoppel against law; secondly, no document had been placed on record to indicate that the option (of monetary benefits) was exercised voluntary and even if it was, it would not prevent employees from seeking enforcement of the procedure laid down in Regulations for promotions which were in vogue prior to the promulgation of Ordinance of 2002; thirdly, employees challenged the entire impugned process at the earliest before formal orders could take effect, and fourthly the monetary benefits received by the employees could be adjusted by the Bank if so advised---Appeal filed by Bank was dismissed accordingly.\n \n Rajya v. Gopikabai AIR 1979 SC 79 ref.\n \n(c) Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Reorganization and Conversion) Ordinance (LX of 2002)---\n \n----S. 6--- Legislation by reference--- Scope--- Section 6 of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Reorganization and Conversion) Ordinance, 2002 was an instance of legislation by reference.\n \n(d) Legislation---\n \n----Legislation by reference---Scope---Legislation by referential incorporation fell into two categories; first, where a statute by specific reference incorporated the provisions of another statute as of the time of adoption; second, where a statute incorporated by general reference the law concerning a particular subject as a genus---In the case of former category, the subsequent amendment made in the referred statute could not automatically be read into the adoption statute---In the case of latter category, it might be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also made from time to time in the general law on the subject adopted by general reference.\n \n Wood's Estate case [1886] 31 Ch D 607 and Rajya v. Gopikabai AIR 1979 SC 79 ref.\n \n(e) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Legislation by reference---Scope---Statute which referred to law of a subject generally adopted the law on the subject as of the time the law was invoked; and this would include all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent to the time the reference/statute was enacted.\n \n Rajya v. Gopikabai AIR 1979 SC 79 ref.\n \n(f) Delegated legislation---\n \n----Rules and regulations framed under an Act by statutory bodies---Scope---Rules and regulations framed under any Act were meant to regulate and limit the statutory authority---All statutory authorities or bodies derived their powers from statutes which created them and from the rules or regulations framed thereunder---Any order passed or action taken which was in derogation or in excess of the powers of statutory authority or body, could be assailed as ultra vires---Statutory bodies were invariably authorized under the Act to make or adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with the Act, with respect to such matters which fell within their lawful domain to carry out the purposes of the Act.\n \n(g) Delegated legislation---\n \n----Reasons justifying need for delegated legislation---Firstly, there is pressure on parliamentary time; secondly, the technicality of subject matter necessitates prior consultation and expert advice on interests concerned, and thirdly, the need for flexibility is established because it is not possible to foresee every administrative difficulty that may arise to make adjustment that may be called for after the statute has begun to operate.\n \n Sukhdev Singh and others v. Bhegat Ram and others AIR 1975 SC 1331 ref.\n \n(h) Delegated legislation---\n \n----Statutory rules or regulations---Salient characteristics.\n \n Following are the salient characteristics of statutory rules or regulations:--\n \n(i) Rules or Regulations are framed by statutory or public body;\n \n(ii) they are framed under the authority or powers conferred in the statute; and\n \n(iii) they have statutory Governmental approval or statutory sanction.\n \n(i) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 199--- Constitutional Jurisdiction of High Court--- Scope---Employee of statutory/public authority governed by statutory rules---Statutory authority passing order relating to the employee in violation of statutory rules---Interference by High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Statutory rules created certain rights for employees and imposed obligations on the statutory authorities---Statutory authorities and functionaries could not deviate or act in derogation to such rules or regulations---Any order passed or action taken by a public authority which was in conflict with such statutory rules could be challenged under Art. 199 of the Constitution.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Re-Organization And Conversion) Ordinance, 2002=6\\n\\r\\n\\rAgricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Re-Organization And Conversion) Ordinance, 2002=6\\n\\r\\n\\rZarai Taraqiati Bank Limited Staff Regulations, 2005=Para.14(h)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos.269 to 275, 1047, 1048 of 2011 and Civil Petition No.657 of 2012, decision dated: 15-02-2013",
    "Judge Name:": "TASSADUQ HUSSAIN, JILLANI, MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY, JJ",
    "": "ZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED and others/ers\nvs\nSAID REHMAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11890",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 163 = 2014 SLD 163 = 2014 SCMR 1741",
    "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 200---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Dispute regarding property---Civil proceedings, initiation of--- Stay of criminal proceedings---Scope---Where both parties had filed suits regarding disputed property, and the same were pending, the criminal court would obviously stay its hands in entering upon the dispute, as deciding the dispute with regard to properties squarely fell within the domain of the civil court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=200\\n\\r\\n\\rCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=200\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.85-K of 2014, decision dated: 12-08-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR HANI MUSLIM, GULZAR AHMED AND MUHAMMAD ATHER SAEED, JJ",
    "": "SAjj CourtAD HUSSAIN MUKHI\nvs\nThe STATE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11891",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 164 = 2014 SLD 164 = 2014 SCMR 1833 = 2015 PLJ 82",
    "Key Words:": "Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act (XVII of 1996)---\n \n----Ss. 41(6) & 58---Industrial Relations Act (IX of 2012), Ss. 1, 87 & 88--- General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 8---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 17(1)---Officers and employees of the National Telecommunication Corporation---Non-application of Industrial Relations Act, 2012---Industrial Relations Act, 2012 would not apply to the officers and employees of the National Telecommunication Corporation---Reference to Art. 17(1) of the Constitution would not help attract application of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, to the officers and employees of the National Telecommunication Corporation notwithstanding it would not restrict their right to form associations or unions to voice their grievance and negotiate with their employers for better terms of their employment.\n \nCivil Aviation Authority, Islamabad and others v. Union of Civil Aviation Employees and another PLD 1997 SC 781 ref.\n \nNoor Muhammad v. The State PLD 1991 SC 150; Brig. Sher Ali Baz and another v. The Secretary, Establishment Division and others PLD 1991 Sc 143 and Amjad Qadoos v. The Chairman National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Islamabad and others Civil Petition No.669 of 2014 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996=41(6),58\\n\\r\\n\\rPakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996=41(6),58\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=17(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIndustrial Relations Act, 2012=1,87,88\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.A. No. 283 of 2014 and Criminal O.P. No.32 of 2014, decision dated: 20-08-2014, hearing DATE : 17-07-2014 (Judgment Reserved). (On appeal from the judgment dated 19-12-2013 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in W.P. No.467 of 2012)",
    "Judge Name:": "EJAZ AFZAL KHAN AND IQBAL HAMEEDUR RAHMAN, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION CORPORATION through Chairman/er\nvs\nNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION through Chairman and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11892",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 161 = 2014 SLD 161 = 2014 SCMR 1147",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Arts. 193, 197 & 184(3)---Constitutional petition under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution regarding inter se seniority of the Judges of the (Lahore) High Court---Inter se seniority of Judges of the High Court---Principles---Inter se seniority of Judges of a High Court shall reckon from the order and date of their appointment as Additional Judges of that Court---Inter se seniority of Additional Judges of a High Court appointed vide the same order and date shall reckon from their seniority in age---If appointment of two or more service candidates was simultaneously made with that of the candidates from the Bar, the Judges from service shall retain their existing seniority in the department regardless of their age, though that would be the determining factor in respect of their seniority vis-a-vis the candidates from the Bar---Supreme Court observed that such principle had consistently been followed without exception ever-since the establishment of the High Courts in the country and was even otherwise in accord with the equitable dispensation of justice---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=193,197,184(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=193,197,184(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=184(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.9 of 2014, decision dated: 6-05-2014. (Constitution Petition under Article 184 of the Constitution regarding seniority of the Judges of Lahore High Court, Lahore)",
    "Judge Name:": "TASSADUQ HUSSAIN, JILLANI, C.J., NASIR-UL-MULK, ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, ASIF SAEED KHAN KHOSA AND EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASLAM AWAN, ADVOCATE SUPREME COURT\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11893",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 162 = 2014 SLD 162 = 2014 SCMR 1222",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, Rr. 89(1)(a) & (b) & S. 148---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.166---Application by owner of property to set aside sale in execution of decree---Pre-requisites---Limitation period for filing such an application as well as the deposit in court---Rule 89 of O. XXI, C.P.C. required that two primary conditions relating to deposit must be fulfilled---Applicant must deposit in the court 5 % of the purchase money for payment to auction purchaser; he must also deposit amount specified in the proclamation of sale, less any amount received by the decree holder since date of proclamation of sale, for payment to the decree holder---Article 166 of the Limitation Act, 1908, required such an application as well as the deposit thereunder, both to be made within the period of 30 days from the date of sale---Deposit was a condition precedent to the entertainment of the application and the court could not extend time for deposit of the amounts under S.148, C.P.C.---Date of sale as used in R.89, O. XXI, C.P.C. related to the date on which property was knocked out to the highest bidder and not the date of confirmation---Where application under R.89(1)(a) & (b), of O.XXI, C.P.C. was made within 30 days from the date of sale but no deposit (in terms of the said rule) was made, which was a condition precedent to the entertainment of such an application, the Executing Court would neither be competent to entertain such an application nor empowered to extend time for depositing the amount specified under R.89, O. XXI, C.P.C.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, Rr. 89(1)(a) & (b)---Application to set aside sale on deposit--- Deposit to be made in court by -debtor---Permission of Court---Applicant for depositing such amount did not need permission of the court as such amount was known to the -debtor and was required to be deposited to establish his bona fide.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.XXI,Rr.89(1)(a),(b),148\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.XXI,Rr.89(1)(a),(b),148\\n\\r\\n\\rLimitation Act, 1908=166\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.449-L of 2013, decision dated: 13-03-2014.(On appeal against the judgment dated 15-9-2010 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in E.F.A. No.351 of 2008)",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR-UL-MULK, AMIR HANI MUSLIM AND MUHAMMAD ATHER SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Mst. ANWAR SULTANA through L.Rs.\nvs\nBANK ALFALAH LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11894",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2729 = 2007 SLD 2729 = 2007 SCMR 1105 = 2008 PLJ 16",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-------S. 13(1) (a & b)---Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad---Object and scope---Requirement of first demand i.e. Talb-i-Muwathibat being immediate is to ensure that potential pre-emptor genuinely and bona fide wishes to purchase land sought to be pre-empted---First demand does not envisage presence or knowledge of vendee---Second demand i.e. Talb-i-Ishhad is the only Talb, which postulates putting vendee on notice about pre-emptor's desire to purchase---Law mandates that Talb-i-Ishhad has to be sent through registered post acknowledgement due. \n \n(b) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)---\n \n----S. 13(1)(b)---Talb-i-Ishhad---Sending notice in writing under registered cover acknowledgement due---Object---Requirement of \"\"sending a notice in writing\"\" is followed by a rider i.e. \"\"under registered cover acknowledgement due\"\", which signifies that intention of law is not merely a formal notice on the part of pre-emptor conveying his intention to pre-empt but a notice served on addressee to apprise him about his intention to pre-empt---If mere \"\"sending of notice\"\" was enough, it would make the expression \"\"acknowledgement due\"\" redundant---Service of addressee, as prescribed in law; therefore, is imperative---If acknowledgement card carries an endorsement of \"\"refusal\"\" or \"\"not accepted\"\", a presumption of service would arise unless rebutted. \n \nThammiah, b. v. Election Officer (1980) 1q Kant L. 19 rel.\n \n(c) Punjab Pre-emption Act (1X of 1991)---\n \n----S. 13(1)(b)---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.27---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.129 (e)---Talb-i-Ishhad notice---Service to addressee---Presumption---Onus to prove, shifting of---In terms of Art.129 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, read with S.27 of General Clauses Act, 1897, a presumption of service does arise if a notice sent through registered cover acknowledgement due is received back with endorsement of \"\"refused\"\" by postal authorities---If addressee appears in court and makes a statement on oath disowning receipt of notice, presumption under the provision of Art.129 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, stands rebutted and onus is on the party which is relying on such endorsement to prove the same by producing postman who made the endorsement---Onus to prove service of notice continues to be on the party relying on such notice unless there is other evidence to indicate that denial of service by addressee i5 against the record. \n \nKhair Muhammad v. Akhtar Hussain 1983 CLC 302; Bashir Ahmad v. Mumtaz Khan PLD 1965 Lah. 126; Nazir-ud-Din v. Muhammad Ali 1980 CLC 203; Pridino v. Khurshid Begum 1989 SCMR 880; Gulzar Begum v. Mst. Sairah Bibi 1972 SCMR 251; Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma AIR 1990 SC 1215; Tekchand Devidas v. Gulab Chand Chandan Mal AIR 1957 Madhya Bharat 151; Fateh Muhammad v. Gul Sher 2000 CLC 409; Muhammad Rafiq v. Ghulam Murtaza 1998 MLD 292; Qaiser Zamani v. Rasheeda Begum 1985 CLC 596 and Amroz Khan v. Arbab Muhammad Ghalib PLD 1980 Pesh. 163 ref.\n \n(d) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)---\n \n----S. 12(1)(b)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.129(e)---Notice of Talb-i-Ishhad---Service to addressee---Proof---Endorsement of refusal on acknowledgement due receipt--Failure to produce postman as witness---Suit. for possession through pre-emption was decreed by Trial Court in favour of pre-emptor---Lower Appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit on the ground that service of notice of Talb-i-Ishhad to vendees was not proved by pre-emptor---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside the and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court and restored that of Trial Court---Validity---There was no personal notice and mere endorsement of \"\"refusal\"\" did not constitute service, as vendees had denied service not only in written statement but also on oath while appearing as witness in Trial Court---Presumption, if any, in terms of Art.129 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, stood rebutted and it was for the pre-emptor to prove service by producing postman who allegedly made the endorsement which had not been done---Pre-emptor failed to prove service of Talb-i-Ishhad by leading evidence tenable in law---In reversing the of Lower Appellate Court, High Court did not advert to such factual aspect and law declared in such regard---Supreme Court set aside the and decree passed by High Court and dismissed the suit filed by pre-emptor---Appeal was allowed. \n \nBegum Humayun Zulfiqar Ismail v. Begum Hamida Saadat Ali 1968 SCMR 828; Gulzar Begum v. Mst. Sairah Bibi 1972 SCMR 251; Amir Din v. Muhammad Siddique 1982 SCMR 354; Water and Power Development Authority v. Saeed Badar PLD 1991 SC 660; Messrs Journalist Publication (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Mst. Mumtaz Begum alias Mustari Begum 2004 SCMR 1773; Haji Muhammad Ayub Khan Afridi v. Special Appellate Court, Peshawar 2006 SCMR 1275; Haji Lal Shah v. Abdul Khaliq 2004 SCMR 409; Hayat Muhammad v. Mazhar Hussain 2006 SCMR 1410; Sher Afzal v. Mohal Lal AIR 1926 Lah. 520; Atar Ali v. Abed Ali PLD 1954 Dacca 158; Sultan Ahmed alias Ladu Mia v. Syed Ahmad PLD 1967 Dacca 392; Muhammad Sharif v. Maqbul Ahmad 1974 SCMR 136 and Har Charan Singh v. Shiv Rani AIR 1981 SC 1284 ref.\n \nMalik Muhammad Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court and M.S. Khattak, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\n \nMalik Muhammad Qayyum, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.\n \nDate of hearing: 13th February, 2007.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991=13(1)(a),13(1)(b)\\n\\r\\n\\rPunjab Pre-emption Act, 1991=13(1)(a),13(1)(b)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.872 of 2005, decision dated: 23rd February, 2007 (Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 28-6-2005 passed in R.S.A. No.6 of 2003)",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR, FALAK SHER AND TASSADUQ HUSSAIN, JILLANI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD BASHIR and others\nvs\nABBAS ALI SHAH"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11895",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVmS1FTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 160 = 2014 SLD 160 = 2014 SCMR 1149",
    "Key Words:": "Sindh Civil Service (Regularization of Ad hoc Appointments) Act (XIX of 1994)---\n \n----S. 3---Sindh Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1990, R.5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Review of Supreme Court ---Regularization of ad hoc appointments---Determination---Review petitioners claimed that they were initially regularly appointed in year, 1991, whereas respondents were appointed in year, 1992---Validity---Finding and observation of Supreme Court in its under review should not have been given without examining notifications of appointments of review petitioners issued in year, 1991 and relevant provisions of Sindh Civil Service (Regularization of Ad hoc Appointments) Act, 1994---To arrive at valid conclusion that appointment order of year, 1991, could not be considered ad hoc appointments of respondents were regularized in year, 1994---Procedure prescribed in Sindh Civil Service (Regularization of Ad hoc Appointments) Act, 1994, also led to the conclusion that a procedure was prescribed therein for regularization of ad hoc employees which had to be followed and only thereafter ad hoc employees could be regularized---No such procedure was followed in cases of review petitioners to regularize their service and, therefore, assumption was that competent authority might have considered them to be regular employees from year, 1991---Supreme Court recalled its earlier and fixed main petition for rehearing---Review petition was allowed.\n \n Dr. Azim-ur-Rehman Khan Meo v. Government of Sindh and another 2004 SCMR 1299; Ajmal Hassan Khan and another v. Government of Sindh and others 2012 SCMR 860; Nazeer Ahmed Dhoon v. Government of Sindh and others 1996 SCMR 1547; Munawar Khan v. Niaz Muhammad and 7 others 1993 SCMR 1287; Syed Saghir Ahmad Naqvi v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, S&GAD, Karachi and another 1996 SCMR 1165 and Mushtaq Ahmad Mohal and others v. The Honourable Lahore High Court, Lahore and others 1997 SCMR 1043 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Civil Servants (Regularization of Ad hoc Appointments) Act, (XIX of 1994)=3\\n\\r\\n\\rSindh Civil Servants (Regularization of Ad hoc Appointments) Act, (XIX of 1994)=3\\n\\r\\n\\rSindh Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1990=5\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Review Petitions Nos.17-K, 18-K and 19-K of 2012, decision dated: 7-02-2014, hearing DATE : 2-01-2014 (For review of the judgment dated 14-6-2012 of this Court passed in Civil Petition No.769-K of 2011)",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, GULZAR AHMED AND MUHAMMAD ATHER SAEED, JJ",
    "": "AKHTAR GHORI and others\nvs\nPROVINCE OF SINDH and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11896",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVViQ1FpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 2807 = 2015 SLD 2807 = 2015 CLD 297 = (2015) 111 TAX 39",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 199---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S. 3---Intra-Court appeal---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Private company---Appellant was a private company and aggrieved of order passed by Single Judge of High Court whereby demand made by the company to respondent was declared illegal---Validity---Appellant was a private company and could not be regarded as a person performing functions in connection with affairs of Federation or Province---No writ in exercise of powers of Art. 199 of the Constitution could be issued against the company---Division Bench of High Court set aside passed by Single Judge---Intra-Court appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Salahuddin and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. Tokht Bhai and 10 others PLD 1975 SC 1974 and Abdul Wahab and others v. Habib Bank Ltd. and others 2014 PLC (C.S.) 393 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rLaw Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.C.A. No. 918 of 2010 in W.P. No. 8786 of 2006, decision dated: 1st October, 2014, hearing DATE : 1st October, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ UL AHSAN AND FAISAL ZAMAN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MILLAT TRACTORS LTD. through Deputy General Manager Administration and Purchases\nVs\nMUHAMMAD MUNIR AHMAD and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11897",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVViRFFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 789 = 2015 SLD 789 = (2015) 111 TAX 233 = 2015 PCTLR 393",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections: 122(1), 122(5), 122(9) - Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199 - Second constitutional petition - Amendment of assessments - Show Cause Notice - Challenge to - Earlier writ petition dismissed for reason that impugned assessment order had already been passed and petitioner was advised to approach appellate forum available under law - Filing of second writ petition by petitioner - Maintainability - Assessment order passed u/s 122(1) & 122(5) of Act was earlier assailed and was dismissed - Counsel for petitioner argued before High Court that second writ petition is not prevented by earlier decision because Single Bench had directed to challenge assessment order in accordance with law and that petitioner was denied fair trial as proper opportunity of being heard was not provided - It is further contended that impugned order is tainted with malafide on facts as no order was passed on second application for adjournment - On the other hand in reply to arguments of counsel for petitioner it has been stated by rival counsel that after passing of an assessment order, appropriate remedy is before statutory appellate forum and writ petition is not maintainable - Validity - Whether paragraph 3 of earlier writ petition reveals that grounds taken in second petition were also taken in earlier writ petition, but it was urged in earlier writ petition, that Deptt. had acted with undue haste in passing impugned assessment order and petitioner was condemned unheard despite written application for grant of adjournments - Held yes - Whether after recording submissions, Judge in chamber also noted fact of seeking adjournments during proceedings before Taxation officer and dismissed petition after observing that final assessment order has already been passed and Show Cause Notice had become infructuous - Held yes - Whether collective reading of order in earlier petition shows that argument for enforcement of fundamental right was not entertained, hence it cannot be re-agitated before same Court by filing second writ petition - Held yes - Whether relied upon by counsel for petitioner does not require any deliberation and second petition on same grounds is misconceived, therefore, dismissed - Held Yes. Perusal of order dated 29-12-2014 in earlier petition (W. P. No. 34358 of 2014) confirms the facts, as argued by learned counsel for the petitioner, however, its paragraph No.3 reveals that grounds taken in this petition were also taken in earlier writ petition. It was urged, in the earlier writ petition, that department had acted with undue haste in passing the impugned assessment order and the petitioner was condemned unheard despite written applications for grant of adjournments. The in Zubiqar Ali's Case (supra) was also relied upon in the earlier to submit that department was bound to give reasonable time to the assessee to place his point of view on record before passing of any assessment order. It was also argued that the impugned assessment order was passed in violation of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 10A of the Constitution. After recording these submissions, learned Judge in Chamber also noted the fact of seeking adjournments during proceedings before Taxation Officer in paragraph No.4. Thereafter, the petition was dismissed with following observations:-\n\"\"5. In view of the fact that a final assessment order dated 24- 12-2014 has already been passed, this constitutional petition, which challenges an earlier show cause notice dated 08-12- 2014 has become infructuous. However, the petitioner has not been left without a remedy. Appellate remedies against the final assessment order are available under the law. The petitioner may (if so advised) challenge the final assessment order in accordance with law before the competent forum taking all legal, procedural and factual grounds that may be available to it under the law. \n6. In view of the foregoing, this petition cannot proceed. It is accordingly dismissed.\"\" \nThere is no doubt that the petition was dismissed after considering the submissions, which are made in the instant petition and petitioner was advised to avail appellate remedies in accordance with law. The argument by learned counsel, that order in earlier petition does not prevent the second petition, is without force. A collective reading of the order dated 29-12-2014 in earlier petition shows that the argument for enforcement of fundamental right was not entertained, hence it cannot be re-agitated before the same Court by filing second writ petition. The Apex Court in Ghulam Akbar Lang v. Dewan Ashiq Hussain Bukhari and others (2012 SCMR 366) has held; finding of High Court in earlier Constitutional Petition is not set aside, subsequent petition on the same issue would be barred on the principle of constructive res judicata. Strength, for this view, is drawn also from Messrs M.K.B. Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Chairman, Area Electricity Board, WAPDA, (Peshawar Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.) (PESCO), Peshawar and others (2005 SCMR 699) and Muhammad Saleem Ullah and others v. Additional District Judge, Gujranwala and others (PLD 2005 S.C. 511). The referred by Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Khan, Advocate in M/s Chappal Builders' Case (supra) also supports the order dated 29-12-2014 passed in earlier writ petition. Since the case is decided on different premise, therefore, s relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner do not require any deliberation.\nThe second petition on the same grounds is misconceived, therefore, is dismissed.\n \nCases referred to:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Division, Bahawalpur v. Zulfiqar Ali (2012) 106 Tax 76 (H.C. Lah)=(2012 PTD 964) and Muhammad Aftab Sultan through Authorized Agent v. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance through Secretary Finance & 7 others (2014 PTD 1959); Syed Allah Dost v. Haji Muhammad Alam and 12 others (PLD I 987 Quetta 235); Income-Tax Officer and another v. M/s Chappal Builders (1993) 68 Tax 1(S.C. Pak.); Commissioner of Income Tax v. Messrs Eli Lilly Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. (2009) 100 Tax 81 (S.C.Pak.); Ghulam Akbar Lang v. Dewan Ashiq Hussain Bukhari and others (2012 SCMR 366); M.K.B. Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Chairman, Area Electricity Board, WAPDA, (Peshawar Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.) (PESCO), Peshawar and others (2005 SCMR 699) and Muhammad Saleem Ullah and others v. Additional District Judge, Gujranwala and others (PLD 2005 S.C. 511).",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),122(5),122(9)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),122(5),122(9)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A,199,199(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.P. No. 72 of 2015, decided 5-1-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, J",
    "": "PEPSI COLA INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LIMITED\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN etc"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11898",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVViRFFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 249 = 2015 SLD 249 = 2015 CLD 764",
    "Key Words:": "Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Protection) Ordinance (V of 1970)---\n \n----Ss. 21, 2(m), 19 & 20---Power of Monopoly Control Authority to call for information relating to undertakings---Scope---Appellant undertaking had impugned the order of the Monopoly Control Authority (\"\"Authority\"\") whereby the appellant was fined with a direction to provide information regarding its business---Contention of appellant inter alia was that it had provided the required information and that the provisions of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Protection) Ordinance, 1970 were not applicable to the appellant---Held, that the Authority per S. 21 of the Ordinance was empowered to requisition certain information as asked from the appellant undertaking and said provision was applicable to the appellant, as admittedly the appellant was an undertaking however, instead of providing the requisite information, the appellant kept pressing a rigid and unlawful stance that the provisions of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Protection) Ordinance, 1970 were not applicable to the appellant---Reasonable opportunity was provided to the appellant for complying with directions of the Authority and the legal position was also clarified by the Authority to the appellant---No illegality existed in impugned order and Authority had acted in accordance with law---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nKohat Cement Company Ltd. v. Monopoly Control Authority, Islamabad and others 2004 CLD 868 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970=21,2(m),19,20\\n\\r\\n\\rMonopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970=21,2(m),19,20\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 71 of 2007, heard on 12-11-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAUKAT AZIZ SIDDIQUI, J",
    "": "Messrs POLYFINE CHEMPHARMA (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive\nvs\nMONOPOLY CONTROL AUTHORITY, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Registrar"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11899",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVViRFFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 248 = 2015 SLD 248 = 2015 CLD 754",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)---\n \n----Ss. 99(4) & 156---Depositing premium by Insurance Agent after adjusting his outstanding commission from the company and same was admitted by the company---Default of S. 99(4) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, having been established, penalty as provided under S.156 of the Ordinance, could be imposed on the company---Securities and Exchange Commission, took a lenient view and condoned the company because the company ensured that such practice would not be repeated in future and that no policy holder was hurt by such adjustment and company had shown its willingness to adopt the provisions of S.99(4) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 in letter and spirit---Company was issued a stern warning that in case of similar non-compliance in future, a strong action against the company would be taken.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=99(4),156\\n\\r\\n\\rInsurance Ordinance, 2000=99(4),156\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice dated 13-08-2013, decision dated: 1st January, 2014, hearing DATE : 28-10-2013",
    "Judge Name:": "TARIQ HUSSAIN, DIRECTOR (INSURANCE)",
    "": "The UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11900",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVViRFFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 247 = 2015 SLD 247 = 2015 CLD 738",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)---\n \n----Ss. 6(1) & 22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, R.8---Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001, Rr.3, 4 & 7---Irregularities in calculation of 'Net Capital Balance' (N.C.B.)---Inspection team after inspecting books and record required to be maintained by the brokers, submitted its report, in which irregularities in calculation of 'Net Capital Balance' (N.C.B.) were observed---N.C.B. was not in accordance with the Third Schedule of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971---Said report had further highlighted that the broker company was involved in imposition of late payment charges to its clients---Broker company, had failed to perform its responsibilities by not maintaining proper books of account, and not preparing the 'N.C.B.' certificate in accordance with Rules---Was pivotal for maintenance of investors' confidence that the broker companies should follow the Rules, regulations and procedures formulated by the Commission in full spirit---Broker company should be perceived as professional with high integrity that was beyond reproach; and it should perform its functions in a fair, proficient and impartial manner---Violation of the Rules and Regulations was a serious matter---Commission taking lenient view in the matter, imposed on broker company a penalty of Rs.25,000---Company was further directed to: (a) comply with the Rules, 1971, and the guidelines issued in letter and spirit; (b) discontinue the practice of imposing late payment charges immediately; (c) maintain proper books of account to record for the proprietary and clients' investments and (d) ensure segregation of clients' assets and maintain separate bank account for the clients' funds.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969=6(1),22\\n\\r\\n\\rSecurities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969=6(1),22\\n\\r\\n\\rBrokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001=8\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No. 1(10) SMD/MSRD/C&IW/2013 dated 4-12-2013, decision dated: 8-01-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "CREATIVE CAPITAL SECURITIES (PVT.) LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11901",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVViRFFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 246 = 2015 SLD 246 = 2015 CLD 303",
    "Key Words:": "Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)---\n \n----S. 7---Appeal---Execution of decree---Disbursement of amount---Execution of decree was allowed by High Court directing Court official to disburse amount lying with him to decree holder---Plea raised by appellants was that order was passed in execution without hearing them---Validity---High Court committed no error or illegality while allowing execution application and had rightly ordered disbursement of amount to decree-holder, keeping in view bank rate and such order did not call for any interference by High Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Amber Ahmed Khan v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi PLD 2003 Kar. 405; Jewan Lal Daga and another v. Nilmani Chaudhuri AIR 1928 (Privy Council) 80; (Gudimalla) Narasinham and another v. (Paidimarri) Venkata Subbayya and another AIR 1933 (Madras) 171 and Soneri Bank Limited v. Idrees Ahmed Siddiqui and another 2005 CLD 1003 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)=7\\n\\r\\n\\rAdmiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)=7\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Admiralty Appeal No. 2 of 2012, decision dated: 15-07-2014, hearing DATE : 20-05-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND ABDUL MAALIK GADDI, JJ",
    "": "S.S. EAGLE CAPE and another\nvs\nHUSSAIN CAN COMPANY (PVT.) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11902",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVViRFFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 245 = 2015 SLD 245 = 2015 CLD 795",
    "Key Words:": "Competition Act (XIX of 2010)---\n \n----Ss. 2(1)(2), 3(3)(a), 30 & 37---Dominant position, abuse of---Enquiry Committee, duly constituted, submitted its enquiry report, wherein it was stated that company held a substantial market share, and enjoyed economic power in the 1300cc segment of car market; which enabled it to behave independent of its competitors and customers; thereby making it a dominant player in the relevant market of cars---Under the circumstances buyer of the company's product, was in a weaker bargaining position---\"\"Provisional Booking order\"\" issued by the company to its potential buyers, had given the company the sole right to (i) change the price; (ii) design/specification; (iii) delivery schedule without any notice to the buyer; (iv) a conclusive right to interpret the terms of the contract; and (iv) to decide the dispute between a buyer and the company---Such terms created a significant imbalance to the disadvantage of buyer's rights and obligations arising under the contract---Such terms of \"\"Provisional Booking order\"\" being unfair to the buyers, were in contravention of S.3(3)(a) of Competition Act, 2010---Subsequently, the company revised and rectified the draft of \"\"Provisional Booking order\"\"; and such rectification, had put the consumer at equal footing---Initially company had sole and absolute discretion to accept or reject the request of cancellation by the employer; and company had sole right to alter some or all terms and conditions of \"\"Provisional Booking order\"\", and also the right to interpret them conclusively---Such clause in the contract could be used to force the buyer to accept increased cost, or reduced benefits, which was unfair---Such clause had been completely removed from the revised draft of Provisional Booking order---Other condition, whereby any dispute between the customer and the company was to be conclusively decided by the Managing Director of the company, had been amended to refer such dispute to an arbitrator to solve and settle the matter under the Arbitration Act, 1940, giving fair and equal right to both parties i.e. the buyer and the company---Initially the company held sole right to change the design, construction and specification without notice to buyers---Such claim gave power to the company to substitute something different for what it had actually agreed to apply---After rectification, \"\"Provisional Booking order\"\" was revised, which specifically mentioned that company could make minor alteration to the design and construction specification of the vehicle, and make such alteration in the vehicle as required by any Federal or Provincial Legislation--- Initially the company had the sole right to change price of the vehicle without notice to the buyer at the time of delivery---Said lacuna had been removed by explicity mentioning in the revised draft of \"\"Provisional Booking order\"\" that the revision of price would only be subject to a change, if any in Government Levies/taxes or currency fluctuation---\"\"Provisional Booking order\"\" had been amended and rectified to address the competition concerns raised in terms of S.3(3)(a) of Competition Act, 2010---Subject to incorporation of revised terms and conditions, proceedings stood disposed of.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=2(1)(2),3(3)(a),30,37\\n\\r\\n\\rCompetition Act, 2010=2(1)(2),3(3)(a),30,37\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No. 15 dated 13-03-2013, decision dated: 8-11-2013. dates of hearing: 9th April and 19-09-2013",
    "Judge Name:": "DR., JOSEPH WILSON, CHAIRMAN AND DR. SHAHZAD ANSAR, MEMBER",
    "": "MESSRS INDUS MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11903",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVViSFFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1469 = 2005 SLD 1469 = 2005 SCMR 1730 = (2005) 91 TAX 42",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-------Art. 185(3)---Administration of justice---Recalling of order---Supreme Court after hearing counsel for the parties allowed the petitions by converting them into appeals but when detailed order was checked, it was noticed by the Supreme Court that some of the petitioners were un¬represented---Effect---Supreme Court, in the interest of justice, recalled its earlier order of allowing petitions by converting them into appeal and leave to appeal was granted.\n \n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----S. 3---S.R.O. No.877(I)/1994--Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)---Leave to appeal was granted by Supreme Court to consider whether High Court had disposed of the Constitutional petitions filed by the respondents after remand, in accordance with the observations made by Supreme Court in its earlier .",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=3\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 694-L to 698-L of 2002, decision dated: 19-02-2003, hearing DATE : 19-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY AND FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, JJ",
    "": "COLLECTOR OF SALES TAX AND CENTRAL, EXCISE, Lahore High Court\nVs.\nMessrs MANDIAL PAPER MILLS LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11904",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVViSFFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1480 = 2005 SLD 1480 = 2005 SCMR 1767 = 2005 PLJ 24",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)-------S. 4---Pakistan Army Act (XXXIX of 1952), Ss.2(1)(c), 7 & 8(1)---Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973), S.2(1)(c)---Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, Rr.5 & 6---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 212(3)---Appeal ---Dismissal from service---Misconduct, charge of---Lower Division Clerk in Special Communication Organization (a component of Pakistan Army)---Service Tribunal reinstated respondent in service on the ground that he was a civil servant; and that minor offences would be governed by Pakistan Army Act, 1952, while major offences would be dealt with under provisions of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973---Supreme Court in view of such contradiction in impugned granted leave to appeal to consider as to whether respondent was a civil servant and was liable to be dealt with under provisions of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 or he was to be dealt with under Pakistan Army, Act, 1952 for the purpose of disciplinary action.\n \nMuhammad Yousaf v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence 1997 PLC (C.S.).852 and Federation of Pakistan v. Khurshid Ahmad 1999 SCMR 664 rel.\n \n(b) Pakistan Army Act (XXXIX of 1952)---\n \n----Ss. 2(1)(c), 7 & 8(1)---Expression \"\"on active service\"\" as used in S.2(1)(c), 7 & 8(1) of Pakistan Army Act, 1952---Connotation---Applicability of Pakistan Army Act, 1952 to non-combatant civilian employees of an organization of Pakistan Army---Essential conditions---Term \"\"active\"\" would mean in action---Term \"\"service\"\" in meaning of employment would be civil service, military service or public service---Expression \"\"on active service\"\" in relation to military services would mean a person engaged in any military operation as defined in S.8(1) of Pakistan Army Act, 1952---Person, if member of military service and subject to Pakistan Army Act, 1952, would be deemed on active service---Civilian employee in a Defence organization, if attached with an active force engaged in any military operation, would be deemed to be on active service---Active service in terms of Notification under S.7 of Pakistan. Army Act, 1952 was not distinct and different to active service mentioned in S.8(1) thereof---Active service under S.8(1) of Pakistan Army Act, 1952 would mean as applying to all such persons, who were subject to Pakistan Army Act, 1952 and attached to or formed part of a force engaged in military operation---Persons not otherwise subject to military laws and not directly falling within ambit of Pakistan Army Act, 1952 would be deemed to be on active service and would become subject to Pakistan Army Act, 1952, if they were employed by or in service or were followers . of or accompanying any portion of regular army on active service in camp or on the march or at any frontier post specified by Federal Government in Notification under S.7 thereof---Principles..\n \nThe term \"\"active\"\" means in action, and the term \"\"service\"\" in the meaning of employment is civil service, military service or public service, and expression \"\"on active service\"\" in relation to the military services means a person, who is engaged in any military operation as defined in section 8(1) of Pakistan Army Act, 1952.\n \nIn the light of above definition of \"\"on active service\"\", a person, who is member of military service and is subject to Pakistan Army Act, 1952, is deemed to be on active service, but a person, who is not otherwise subject to this Act and is a civilian employee in an Organization of Army, is considered to be on active service at the time during which he is attached or forms part of the force in the manner as described in subsection (1) of section 8 of Act, 1952, and thus, a civilian employee in Defence Organization, while attached with the force, which is an active force being engaged in any military operation, will be deemed to be on active service. The Federal Government with reference to an area in which any person or class of persons may be serving or with reference to any provision of Act, 1952 or other Law for the time being in force in exercise of its powers under section 7 of Act, 1952,. may, by Notification, direct that such persons are on active service, and the active service in terms of Notification under section 7 of Act, 1952, is not distinct and different to the active service mentioned in subsection (1) of section 8 of Act, 1952. Section 7 of Act, 1952 provides that the Federal Government may, by a Notification with reference to an area or any provision of Act, 1952 or any other law for the time being in force, direct that any person or class of persons subject to Act, 1952 shall be deemed to be on active service, and active service under section 8(1) means as applied to all those persons subject to Act, 1952, who being attached to or form part of the force or are attached with force, which is engaged in military operation. There is complete harmony of section 8(1) with section 7.\n \nThe plaint reading of sections 2(1)(c), 7 & 8(1) of Act,, 1952, may, without any conflict, lead to an inference that only a person, who is subject to Act, 1952 and engaged in any military operation, is on active service. The expression \"\"active service\"\" has been used in these provisions with reference to the persons subject to Act, 1952 and section thereof, wherein it is provided that Federal Government may direct, by issuing a Notification, that a person or class of persons subject to Act, 1952 with reference to any area in which they may be serving or with reference to all or any of, the provisions of Act, 1952 or any other Law for the time being in force, shall be deemed to be on active service within the meaning of Act, 1952 notwithstanding anything contained in section 8(1) of Act, 1952, would create no distinction. It is, therefore, quite clear that for the purpose of section 7 of the Act, 1952, a person who is subject to the Act, even if not engaged in any of the military operations, would be treated on active service, if the Federal Government by Notification directs that such persons or class of persons will be deemed to be on active service in the area in which they are serving or with reference to any provision of Act, 1952 or any other Law for the time being in force. The effect of the issue of Notification under section 7 of Act, 1952 is that all those persons, who are mentioned in section 2(a)(b)(bb) and are subject to Act, 1952 serving anywhere are deemed to be on active service within the meaning of Act, 1952 and any other persons, who is serving with a person on active service, would also be deemed to be on active service within the meaning of section 2(1)(c) read with section 7 of Act, 1952. The expression \"\"active service\"\" has been used in the different provisions of Act, 1952 with reference to a person, who is in military service in terms of section 2(a)(b)(bb) thereof and is subject thereto. The careful examination of section 2(1)(c) would convey the meaning that a person not otherwise subject to Act, 1952, if is accompanying a portion of Army or a person on active service, would be deemed to be on active service and a person, who is on active service is deemed to be subject to Act, 1952. The result is that the civilian employees in any Defence Organization, which is attached with a force, which is on active service while engaged in military operation, would be deemed to be on active service. The interpretation of the expression \"\"subject to this Act\"\" with reference to section 2(l)(c) will be read in respect of a person, who is not otherwise subject to Act, 1952, when he is attached with a person or persons on active service, who are engaged in military operation. The intention was to bring all those persons within the ambit of Act, 1952, who being not otherwise subject to Army Law have been directly and indirectly formed part of the force, because of their attachment with the person or class of persons, who while engaged in military operations were no active service. The intention and purpose behind section 2(1)(c) of Act, 1952 in the light of above discussion, is to be collected from the cause and necessity of the enactment of this provision. The Notification under section 7 of Act, 1952 issued by the Federal Government in the following manner on 3-1-1975 is still holding the field:--\n \n\"\"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 (XXXIX of 1952) and in suppression of this Ministry's Notification No.4852/325/PSIA/4484/D-2(A)/71, direct that persons subject to the said Act, shall, with reference to any area in or outside Pakistan in which they may be serving and with reference to all the provisions of the said Act, and of any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to be on -active service within the meaning of that Act.\"\".\n \nThe expression \"\"active service\"\" was used in this Notification in the context to the persons, who are subject to Act, 1952, and from reading of this Notification in the light of the provisions of section 2(1)(c) read with sections 7 and 8(1) of Act, 1952, it would be clear that all those persons, who are not otherwise subject to the Military Laws and do not directly fall within the ambit of Act, 1952, would be deemed to be on active service, who are employed by or in service or followers of or accompanying any portion of the regular Army on active service in camp or on the march or at any frontier post specified by the Federal Government under section 7 of Act, 1952.\n \nThe non-combatant civilian employees of an Organization or an establishment of Pakistan Army, which is part of the Defence, who are not subject to Act, 1952 cannot be ordinarily brought within the purview of this Act, but the persons, who are not otherwise subject to Act, 1952 while in the employment or in the service of an Organization of Pakistan Army, which is engaged in any military operation and is on active service, would be deemed to be on active service and would become subject to Act, 1952. The civilian employees in Defence are generally excluded from the purview of Act, 1952, but the civilian employees attached with a portion of Pakistan Army on active service being engaged in military operation would become subject to Act, 1952 by virtue of section 2(1)(c) read with section 7 thereof and the Notification issued thereunder.\n \nMuhammad Yousaf v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence 1997 PLC C.S.) 852 and Federation of Pakistan v. Khurshid Ahmad 1999 SCMR 664 rel.\n \n(c) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---\n \n----S. 4---Pakistan Army Act (XXXIX of 1952),. S.2(1)(c), 7 & 8(1)---Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973), S.2(1)(c)---Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, Rr.5 & 6---Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art.212(3)---Appeal ---Lower Division Clerk in Special Communication Organization (Defence)---Dismissal from service---Misconduct, charge of--Imposition of penalty without issuing charge-sheet and providing opportunity of hearing to respondent---Reinstatement in service by Service Tribunal treating respondent to be a civil servant---Validity---Such Organization was an integral part of Pakistan Army and was on active service---Respondent, though not being a regular member of Armed Forces, but was serving in such Organization attached with the force on active service engaged in military operation---Respondent would be deemed to be on active service by virtue of S.2(1)(c) read with S.8(1) and Notification dated 3-1-1975 issued under S.7 of Pakistan Army Act, 1952---Jurisdiction of Tribunal was confined to matters relating to terms and conditions of civil servants, governed by service laws---Respondent being subject to Pakistan Army Act, 1952 was not a civil servant at relevant time thus, could not avail remedy of appeal before Service Tribunal---Supreme Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned , .\n \nMuhammad Yousaf v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence 1997 PLC C.S.) 852 and Federation of Pakistan v. Khurshid Ahmad 1999 SCMR 664 rel.\n \nM. Munir Peracha, Advocate Supreme Court with Lt.-Col. Iqbal Hashmi, Assistant J.A.G., GHQ for Appellants.\n \nSh. Riazul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court and M.A. Zaidi, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent.\n \nDate of hearing: 22nd March, 2005.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Service Tribunals Act, 1973=4\\n\\r\\n\\rService Tribunals Act, 1973=4\\n\\r\\n\\rGovernment Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973=5,6\\n\\r\\n\\rPakistan Army Act, 1952=2(1)(c),7,8(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1521 of 2001, decision dated: 22-03-2005",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, MIAN SHAKIRULLAH, JAN AND M. JAVED BUTTAR, JJ",
    "": "SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE and another\nVs.\nZAHOOR AHMAD JAVED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11905",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQVJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 792 = 2015 SLD 792 = (2015) 111 TAX 272 = 2015 PTD 2335",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=50(4)(a),53,72,81,153(1)(a),133,161,205\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=50(4)(a),53,72,81,153(1)(a),133,161,205\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "PTR No. 338 of 2013, decided 25-2-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID KARIM, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nvs\nM/S ISLAM STEEL MILLS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11906",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 303 = 1977 SLD 303 = (1977) 36 TAX 7 = 1977 PTD 288 = 1977 PLD 479 = 1977 SCC 442",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 3 -- Individual -- Association of persons -- Co-operative Society -- Word \"\" individual \"\" in Section 3 -- Whether means a natural person and not a legal entity such as co-operative society -- Held yes -- Co-operative Society, whether assessable as an Association of Persons and not as an Individual -- Held yes -- Association, assessment of -- Word \"\"individual\"\" in S. 3 -- Means a natural person and not a legal entity such as co-operative society -- Society, accordingly, held, to be assessed as an association of persons and not as an individual -",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=3\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=3\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1975, decision dated: 6-4-1977, hearing DATE : 6-4-1977. (On appeal from the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 16-2-1965 in W.P. No. 1810 of 1964.)",
    "Judge Name:": "BEOFREMUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, CHIEF, JUSTICE, QAISER KHAN AND MUHAMMAD HALEEM, JUSTICE",
    "": "JULLUNDUR TRANSPORT CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED\nv.\nIncome Tax OFFICER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11907",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 19 = 1961 SLD 19 = (1961) 40 ITR 490",
    "Key Words:": "Section 14 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 - Exemptions of a general nature - Assessment year 1950-51 - Appellant/assessee was a private limited company which was incorporated in year 1945 in former Kotah State - Income-tax authorities sought to tax its profits and income for assessment year in question - Appellant claimed exemption under section 14(2)(c) of 1922 Act, as it stood before amendment in year 1953 - Their contention was that section 14(2)(c) of 1922 Act, as it stood on 1-4-1950, granted exemption and that exemption was not affected by amendment of said provisions in 1953 even though amendment was retrospective from 1-4-1950 - High Court rejected appellant's contention - Whether having regard to fact that Indian Finance Act of 1950 made 1922 Act applicable to whole of India Rajasthan then became, from 1-4-1950, a taxable territory, and therefore, High Court rightly rejected appellant's contention - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe appellant was a private limited company which was incorporated in year 1945 in the favour of Kotah State. The income-tax authorities sought to tax its profits and income for the assessment year 1950-51. The appellant claimed exemption under section 14(2)(c) of the 1922 Act, as it stood before the amendment in 1953. Their contention was that section 14(2)(c) of the 1922 Act, as it stood on 1-4-1950, granted an exemption, and that this exemption was not affected by the amendment of the said provision in 1953 even though the amendment was retrospective from 1-4-1950, unless the Finance Act, 1950, which applied the Income-tax Act to this area was also amended. This contention was not accepted by the High Court which dismissed the petition under article 226 of the Constitution.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court :\nHELD\nThe Indian Finance Act, 1950 made the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, applicable to the whole of India, except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and suitably amended the Indian Income-tax Act. Rajasthan then, became, from 1-4-1950, a taxable territory.\nThe application of the Indian Income-tax Act made Rajasthan a taxable territory subject to the Indian Income-tax law, and Parliament was competent to enact a new law for the area, just as it did for whole of the rest of India. The fiction in the amendment made the exemption to disappear as if it had never been granted, and unless there was a saving, the amendment must operate to obliterate the exemption. In fact, the whole purpose and intent of the amendment was to reach this result from the assessment year 1950-51 onwards, and there could be no saving.\nThe Indian Finance Act, 1950, was concerned with the application of the Indian Income-tax Act to this area, which it did by amending the definition of \"\"taxable territories\"\" in the Indian Income-tax Act, and by applying that Act to the territory. Thereafter, the Indian Parliament could amend the Income-tax Act retrospectively, and the amendment would apply also to the new taxable territory.\nTherefore, the appeal failed and was to be dismissed.\nNote : Decision was against the appellant/assessee.\nCASE REFERRED TO\nUnion of India v. Madan Gopal Kabra [1954] 25 ITR 58 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "S.K. DAS, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ",
    "": "Rajputana Mining Agencies Ltd.\nv.\nUnion of India"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11908",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1963 37 = 1963 SLD 37 = (1963) 49 ITR 515",
    "Key Words:": "Section 185 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Firm - Position prior to 1-4-1993 - Assessment years 1952-53 to 1956-57 - Originally, assessee-firm consisting of five partners, was for a period of 10 years commencing from September 1948 - Under partnership deed if any partner retires or dies, other partners have option to purchase share of that partner - Profits and losses were decided to be shared in proportion to their capital contribution - In 1950, three of partners decided to retire from partnership firm and other two partners, which were limited companies, agreed to purchase their shares and decided to continue business of assessee - There was no division and allocation of loss incurred form July 1950 to June 1955 - There was no fresh deed of partnership executed between two surviving partners - Whether, on facts, it could be said that there was no dissolution of firm but only continuance of old firm - Held, yes - Whether assessee was entitled to registration for assessment years 1952-53 to 1955-56 - Held, no - Whether assessee was entitled to registration for assessment year 1956-57 - Held, yes\nSection 24 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 - Losses - Carry forward and set off of business losses - Assessment years 1952-53 to 1956-57 - Whether in view of facts stated under head \"\"Firm - Position prior to 1-4-1993\"\", assessee was entitled to set off losses carried forward for years 1950-51 to 1952-53 against income of assessment year 1956-57 - Held, no\nFACTS\nOriginally the assessee-firm, consisting of five partners, was for a fixed term of 10 years commencing from September, 1948. Clause 5 of the partnership instrument provided that the net profits of the partnership shall belong to and be divisible amongst the partners in the shares belonging to them in the ratio of the share capital contributed by the respective partners. The losses were also to be divided in like proportion. Clause 18 prevented the dissolution of the firm which would normally occur in the event of death of a partner or in the event of the liquidation of one the partners which was a limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act. The right of the other partners of the firm who remained, after the death of any one of the partners or after the winding up of any one of the partners of the firm, to purchase the shares of the deceased partners or the extinct partner when availed of would result in a reconstitution of the firm. In September, 1950, three of the partners decided to retire from the partnership. The terms and conditions of this arrangement were embodied in a document styled as a deed of dissolution dated 21-9-1950. Under the deed of dissolution the continuing partners, two limited companies, decided to continue the business and agreed to pay certain amount to retiring partners. There was no division and allocation of the loss incurred for the five years from 1-7-1950 to 30-6-1955. The losses commencing from 1950-51 were carried forward from year to year and it was only after the closing of the books for the year ended 30-6-1955, there was a division of profits between the two limited companies in the proposition of 51 per cent and 49 per cent. For the assessment year 1952-53, two applications for registration of the firm were filed under section 26A of the 1922 Act. One was a renewal application in respect of the profits up to 21-9-1950, the date of the alleged dissolution signed by the five partners and the other was an application for registration for the period thereafter signed only by the two partners, the limited companies. For the subsequent assessment applications for renewal of registration filed were signed by the two limited companies, quite properly as even if there was a reconstitution of the firm. The ITO refused to register the firm on the grounds that there was no distribution of the losses in the individual folios of the partners in the partners accounts and the original partnership, though for a period of ten years from 5-11-1948, was dissolved on the execution of the document dated 21-9-1950, and that there was no fresh instrument of partnership between the two limited companies and that the basic requirement of the applicability of section 26A of the 1922 Act, namely, the existence of a written instrument, was absent. On second appeal the Tribunal held that there was in fact a dissolution, that the terms of the deed of dissolution could not be construed as bringing about an arrangement by way of reconstruction of the firm, that that instrument could not be treated or construed as an instrument of partnership between the two limited companies and that registration should be refused on the short ground that the partnership sought to be registered was not evidenced by an instrument in writing.\nOn reference :\nHELD\nThe dissolution and reconstitution of a partnership are two different legal concepts. The dissolution puts an end to the partnership, but reconstitution keeps it subsisting, though in another from. A dissolution followed by some of the erstwhile partners taking over the assets and liabilities of the dissolved partnership and forming themselves into a partnership is not reconstitution of the original partnership. The partnership formed after the dissolution is a new partnership and not a continuation of the old partnership, for it would be a contradiction in terms to say that what ceased to exist was continued. A reconstitution of a firm partnership necessarily implies that the firm never became extinct. What it denotes is a structural alteration of the membership of the firm, by addition or reduction of members, and an incidental redistribution of the shares of the partners.\nThe test of the pudding is in the eating and the true scope of the instrument can readily be ascertained from what actually happened instead of merely depending upon expressions which the parties might have under same mistake notion loosely used.\nSome partners group went out of the partnership. They received consideration for their retirement and that consideration consisted not merely of lump sum payments, but also of some amounts which may on the happening of a contingency be made payable to them. The two limited companies who bought out the shares of the outgoing partners took over all the assets and liabilities of the firm, and carried on the business with no change except that the partnership which originally consisted of five members became a partnership of two members. Even the profit-sharing ratio of the surviving partners was not in any way changed after the instrument dated 21-9-1950. Their shares were in the ratio of their capital investment. It was true that their shares increased from 26 and 25 per cent to 51 and 49 per cent, but that was because of the increase of capital contributed by them respectively. The integrity of the business as it was under the previous instrument of partnership dated 5-11-1948, was in no way broken on 21-9-1950, and it was impossible to say that there was a dissolution in fact of the entire partnership. Clause 1 of the document dated 21-9-1950, was indeed significant when it recited that the partnership was dissolved so far as the retiring partners were concerned. A full and complete dissolution of the partnership between all the partners would certainly had not been described in this manner if in fact such a dissolution was intended by the parties. The clause that provides for the continuance of the business of the surviving partners and which enables the outgoing partners to a share of profits which the firm may earn in future after 21-9-1950, till 4-11-1958, after adjustment of the previous year's losses including such commission quite significantly emphasise the intention of the parties that there was to be no dissolution of the firm. No member of a dissolved firm can insist as a term of dissolution that the quondam partnership business should be carried on by the other members for his benefit also. Such a stipulation was wholly repugnant to dissolution. Now there cannot be both a dissolution and a continuance. But in the case of a retirement of a partner it is open to the outgoing partner to bargain for a share in the future profits of the firm after his retirement as consideration for his retirement. A clause of this description (clause 3 in the deed dated 21-9-1950) was so much against the grain of dissolution and was so harmonious with retirement of partners resulting in reconstitution that it should be taken as a circumstance indicating reconstitution. The absence of any fresh deed of partnership between the two surviving partners also indicated not a dissolution but a continuance of the old firm. It could not be said that the provisions of this document as having effectuated a dissolution and that document merely embodied the arrangement by which three of the partners retired from the firm.\nThe profit-sharing ratio of the partners was apparent ex-facie on the two documents referred to. In respect of the first four years 1952-53, 1953-54, 1954-55 and 1955-56, the application for registration could not be sustained as admittedly there was no distribution and division of profits or losses as required by the rule. It followed that the assessee would be entitled to registration for the assessment year 1956-57. As regards the set of losses, as there had been a change in the constitution of the firm and it followed that in regard to the two years the assessee could be entitled to relief by way of carrying forward the losses attributable to the shares of the continuing partners.\nIn respect of the loss of the assessment years 1951-52, sought to be set off in the assessment year 1955-56, assessee would not be entitled to any relief in view of what had been pointed out by the Tribunal in its order.\nThe assessee was clearly disentitled to have the losses of 1950-51 and 1951-52 set off against the income of the assessment year 1955-56 for the above reason set out by the Tribunal.\nNote: The case has been decided partly in favour of the revenue and partly in favour of the assessee.\nCASE REFERRED TO\nSurajmall v. CIT [1961] 43 ITR 491 (Mad.)",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE NO. 20 OF 1960, JULY 17, 1962",
    "Judge Name:": "JAGADISAN AND SRINIVASAN, JJ.",
    "": "Tyresoles (India)\nv.\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11909",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1982 703 = 1982 SLD 703 = (1982) 45 TAX 182",
    "Key Words:": "On Civil Review petition from the and order dated 30-11-1978 passed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in Civil Appellate Division, in Civil Appeal No. 108 of 1978, Martial Law Regulation No. 32 of 1969, read with M.L.R. Circulars Nos. 1 and 3 of 1969 and Sections 29, 45 and 46 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 Excess income declared by assessee processed and charged to tax in 1969-Part payment made by assessee before 1971 -Balance tax whether debt due to the Government of Pakistan-Held yes-Emergence of the People's Republic of Bangladesh on 26-3-1971-Amount due to the Government of Pakistan, whether can be realised by the Government of Bangladesh on or after 26-3-1971-Held yes.\nIt was in pursuance of MLR 32 promulgated by the Government of Pakistan that the assessment had been made and demand Notice issued. This assessment had attained finality and there was no appeal' against such assessment. The Administrative Review does not lie as mentioned above because it does not fall under paragraph 15(d). Therefore, the amount was due to Government of Pakistan (Expl. 2, Section 46.).\nAny debt due to any Government that functioned within the territories comprised now in Bangladesh is also debt to the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The assessment that was made final by issuance of notice of demand under Section 29 read with Section 45 has become a debt due to the Government under Section 46 of the Income Tax Act. The assessee had made part payment only. Since fresh notice of demand was issued to, pay and the assessee failed to do so he will be deemed to be in default and Section 46 provides for the recovery of debt due to the Government. By the amendment of the definition in General Clauses Act, this debt due to the Government of Pakistan has become a debt to the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. This leads to the conclusion that the legislative amendment in the General Clauses Act by President's Order No. 147 of 1972 was not considered in its perspective. Mr. T.H. Khan is perfectly correct that had the true import been taken into consideration the would have been otherwise. It is irrelevant to consider as to how this debt was created. The validity of MLR 32 is not an issue nor can it be made an issue, because, the tax assessed by operation of law already became a debt to the Government of Pakistan by 15-1-71 and the appellant Firm accepting the assessment as final made part payments. This debt is now being realised by the Government of Bangladesh. So, the demand made by respondent No. 1 of payment of outstanding tax does not suffer from want of legal authority.\nCase referred to:\nDoorga Prasad V. Secretary of State 13 ITR 285",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Bangladesh",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Review Petition No. 3 of 1980, decision dated: 2-2-1981",
    "Judge Name:": "KEMALUDDIN HOSSAIN, C.J., FAZLE MUNIM, RUHUL ISLAM AND BADRUL HAIDER CHOWDHURY, JJ.",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF TAXES AND ANOTHER\nVs\nMALLICK BROTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11910",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1981 1424 = 1981 SLD 1424 = (1981) 43 TAX 26",
    "Key Words:": "A, Firm-Partnership-Capital contribution-Claim that young sans were partners of the firm -Neither of them had any capital of their own nor were in a position to make any contribution worth the name in the business of the firm--Na other evidence produced in support of the claim-Whether young sons admitted to partnership-Held no.\nB. Registration Act, 1908(XVI of 1908)-Sections 17(b), 49Registration-Immovable property-Partnership-Immovable property belonging to one partner brought into the common stock of the firm, by means of a deed, to became the property of all the partners--Registration of the deed whether necessary-Held yes-\nDeed merely acknowledging the existing rights into immovable property- Whether compulsorily registerable-Held no Provisions of Section 14 and 46 of the Partnership Act-Whether overrides the mandatory provisions of Section 17(b) of the Registration Act- Held no.\nCases referred to:\nSunder Singh Majithia v. Commissioner of Income tax (AIR 1938 All. 452) 5 S. Rao and another v. C. Venkatratnam and others(AIR 1925 Mad. 945) and Bageshawari Charan Singh v. Thakurain Jagarnath Kuari and another AIR 1932 PC 55.\nCase dessented from:-\nPremraj Brahmin v. Bhaniram Brahmin (49 CWN 794).\nC. Registration Act, 1908(XVI of 1908)-Section 17(b)--Registration-Immovable property Dissolution deed not registered as required by the Registration Act-Deed whether effective for release of property--Held no-Whether can be looked into for the purpose of determining the nature of possession-Held yes.\nCase referred to:-\nVarada Pillay v. Jeevarathnamal(ILR 43 Mad. 244).\nD. Limitation Act, 1908(IX of 1908)-Article 144-Immovable property-Question of adverse possession-Whether a question of fact -Held yes-What constitutes adverse possession, explained.\nE. Partnership-Dissolution-Suit for accounts and share of profits of the dissolved partnership-Whether should be brought within three years of the date of dissolution-Held yes.\nCase referred to:-\nIsmail v. Tyeballi Essaji 24 SLR 81.\nF. Court Fees Act, 1870(VII of 1870)-Schedule II, Art. 17(vi)- Immovable property-Joint possession of property not borne out by evidence-Suit for partition alleging joint possession --Court a fees in such circumstances.\nCase referred to:-\nPermananda v. Dhirendra Nath Ganguly and others(AIR 1950).",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1011 of 1955, decision dated: 2-10-1961, dates of hearing: 24-11-1960; 6-12-1960; 21-12-1960; 5-1-1961; 6-1-1961; 20-1-1961 and 9-9-1961.",
    "Judge Name:": "2 A.S. FARUQUI, J.",
    "": "ZAINAB BAI\nVs\nIBRAHIMJI AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11911",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1988 372 = 1988 SLD 372 = 1988 SCMR 505",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code( XLV of 1860)-----S.302--Appeal against acquittal--Appreciation of evidence--Claim of eye-witnesses to have seen occurrence not free from doubt--Evidence of dying declaration coming from such witnesses, held, would not deserve any better treatment.\n \n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1880)--\n \n---S.302--Appreciation of evidence--Dying declaration--Medical Officer testified that \"\"it was possible that due to injury on the brain, deceased may not have been capable to talk after receipt of said Injuries\"\"--­Testimony of witnesses of dying declaration found to be doubtful as eye-witnesses of occurrence--Basing conviction on strength of such dying declaration, was, held, to be highly unsafe in circumstances.\n \nAgha Aziz Ahmed Khan, Advocate Supreme Court Instructed by Rao Muhammad Yousaf Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\n \nM. Aslam Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1 (absent).\n \nK.E. Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for the State:.\n \nDate of hearing: 10th December, 1984.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.106-R of 1983, decision dated: 10-12-1984 (From the judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated 30-10-1983 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1981)",
    "Judge Name:": "SMUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, NASIM HASAN SHAH AND M. S H . QURAISHI,, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD BANARAB\nVs.\nSHAH FAKHAR ZAMAN and others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11912",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1983 476 = 1983 SLD 476 = (1984) 49 TAX 130 = (1982) 135 ITR 620 = 1983 PTD 210 = 1982 SCC 97",
    "Key Words:": "Section 25(4) of the Indian Income-tax act, 1922-Assessment-Relief in case of new firm Succeeding to old business-Assessee-firm taxed on business income under the 1918 act- Constitution of firm undergone several changes in the past-Firm again reconstituted on 18-5-1953 when deed of partnership was executed between H, B, A and R for a term of six years-Later M was also taken as partner-H and B retired on 31-3-1958 and 31-3-1959, respectively, when goodwill and capital of firm devolved on A, R and M in certain shares-Partnership between M (retiring partner) and A and R (continuing partners) was dissolved by mutual consent on 1-4-1959-M released his share of goodwill and assets of firm in favour of continuing partners who continued to carry on business-Whether new firm entitled to relief under section 25(4)-Held, on facts, yes\nFacts\nThe assessee-firm, being admittedly an assessee under the 1918 Act, had undergone several changes in the past. The firm was again reconstituted on 18-5-1953 when a new deed of partnership was executed between H, B, A and R. The partnership was to be continued for a term of six years from 1-4-1953 to 31-3-1959. By a deed of variation 7-4-1955, one M was admitted as partner of the firm. H retired on 31-3-1958 and B on 31-3-1959. On 30-3-1959 a deed was executed by and between M, describing himself as the retiring partner, and A and R jointly describing themselves as continuing partners, whereby it was provided that the partnership business of the assessee-firm subsisting between them shall be deemed to have been dissolved by mutual consent as from 1-4-1959 and that thereafter the said business with its assets and goodwill shall belong to and be carried on by the continuing partners whose shares were defined. The retiring partner released all his claims to his share of goodwill and assets of the firm in favour of the continuing partners while the continuing partners in their turn absolved and indemnified the retiring partner from any liability of the firm. The business was then carried on by A and R on terms and conditions recorded in a deed of partnership executed by them on 29-6-1959. During the assessment year 1959-60, the assessee claimed relief under section 25(4). The ITO, however, took the view that there was no dissolution of the firm and what had actually taken place on 1-4-1959 was merely a change in the constitution of the firm. According to him, the entire assets and liabilities of the old partnership were taken over by the new firm as on 1-4-1959 and there was no cessation of the business within the meaning of section 25(4). He, therefore, dismissed the assessee's claim for relief under section 25(4). The AAC, on appeal, sustained the ITO's order. On second appeal, the Tribunal found that the relevant account books clearly indicated that, the old firm stood dissolved and its assets and liabilities were taken over by the new firm of the two continuing partners. It upheld the assessee's claim. On reference, the High Court sustained the Tribunal's order.\nOn appeal:\nHeld\nIt is trite to say that upon a dissolution of a firm succession to the old business by another person would only arise if a solitary partner takes over assets and liabilities and carries on the business as a sole proprietor thereof or if some of the erstwhile partners along with some strangers take over the assets and liabilities of the old firm and carry on the business. The aforesaid two instances are undoubtedly clear cases of succession to the old business by another person or entity but succession to the old business contemplated under section 25(4) need not be and cannot be confined to the said instances. It is quite conceivable that in cases of dissolution of the firm brought about by a notice under section 43 of the Partnership Act or by an order of the court under section 44 of the said Act, some of the erstwhile partners may take over the assets and liabilities and carry on the same business by constituting a new firm and even such cases would be cases of succession to the old business within the meaning of section 25( 4). The question whether there has been a dissolution of the firm and upon such dissolution a new firm has succeeded to the business of the old firm is a question which depends upon the intention of the parties to be gathered from the document or documents, if any, executed by and between the partners and other facts and surrounding circumstances of the case. Having regard to the facts of the instant case, the old firm was dissolved on 1-4-1959 and it was the case of a new firm succeeding to the old business and, therefore, the assessee was entitled to the relief claimed under section 25( 4).\nCase referred to\nCIT v. A.W. Figgies & Co. [1953] 24 ITR 405 (SC).\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1553(T) OF 1973.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=25(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=25(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rPartnership Act, 1932=40,43,44\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1553 of 1973. April 13, 1982",
    "Judge Name:": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR, R. S. PATHAK AND A. N. SEN, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, WEST BENGALIII\nvs\nPIGOT CHAPMAN & CO"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11913",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1983 477 = 1983 SLD 477 = (1983) 48 TAX 100 = (1982) 138 ITR 19 = 1983 PTD 438",
    "Key Words:": "Section 2(31) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Body of Individuals - Assessable as - Business bequeathed by testator to his widow and minor sons, was carried on by widow even after sons attained majority - Whether assessment on widow and sons in status of boi justified - Held, on facts, yes - Whether the terms aop and boi are interchangeable or synonymous - Held, no - Whether before a group of persons can be treated as boi, it is necessary that they should have a common intention and a common activity to produce taxable income - Held, no\nSection 253 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Appellate Tribunal - Appeal to - Whether in view of facts mentioned under the head 'body of individuals - assessable as' tribunal could entertain revenue's plea, being raised first time before it, that assessee, if not assessable as aop, could be assessed as BOI - Held, yes\nWords and phrases - 'Association of persons' and 'body of individuals' occurring in section 2(31) of the income-tax act, 1961\nFACTS\nBusiness bequeathed by the testator to his widow and four sons, was carried on by his widow as all the sons were minors at the relevant time. This position, however, continued even after the sons attained majority. The ITO treated the widow and her sons as an AOP. On second appeal, the Tribunal entertained the department's new plea that even if the widow could not be treated as an AOP, they could still be regarded as BOI and held that the widow and her sons were assessable as a BOI.\nOn reference :\nHELD\nIt is true that in section 2(31)(v), BOI is placed cheek by jowl with AOP in the classified list of persons, but that is no reason to regard the two terms as interchangeable or synonymous. To hold that a BOI must be equated to an AOP would be to disregard the stage-by-stage evolution of the statutory classification of the different kinds of taxpayers under section 2(31).\nThe difference between an 'association' and a 'body' is too pronounced to be slurred over. While an 'association might well connote an active element of combining or association, a 'body' would include even a comparatively inert mass of people or institution. The only essential attributes of a BOI are that there should be a plurality of individuals and they must, in the gross, have a nexus to a source of income. The conception at once excludes the crucial characteristics which is associated with an AOP, such, for instance, as a common intention and a common activity to produce taxable income. In other words, persons who do nothing but stand and wait may not be an AOP ; but they may yet be a BOI, if they stand together, and wait for something to be shared between them.\nIt would be a matter for the income-tax authorities as well as the Tribunal and the Courts to consider the facts in each case to find out if any given group of people are to be regarded as a BOI or not. The individuals concerned may have something or other in common which brings them together with reference to an income or its source. It may be common intention, it may be common holding out or it may be a sharing of common spoils. The list is not exhaustive. Nor is it necessary that all these characteristics must be present in every case. Much might depend on the relations inter se between the individual concerned and their relationship in the gross to the income or to the income yielding asset in question.\nIn the instant case, there was no evidence on record that the widow was at any time aided by any of her sons even after they attained majority in the conduct of the business. But they always had the choice of demanding their share, which if conceded, would have resulted either in the disruption of the business or in its disposal. Nothing of this kind, however, happened in this group. In fact, the integrity of the business continued with not one of them wishing to take his or her share and depart. This fact was itself a clear indication that mother and children who had fallen in line at the death of the testator were still keeping in step as a BOI. The absence of arrangement between them would only make them into something less than an AOP but they had nevertheless to be treated as BOI in spite of, or perhaps because of, the accident of a family relationship between them and the accident of a testamentary disposition in their favour, particularly since they continued that relationship even though they had a choice of putting an end to it. Hence, the assessment of the widow and her four sons in the status of BOI was justified.\nIn view of the Supreme Court decision in Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. CIT [1967] 63 ITR 232the Tribunal was justified in entertaining the department's new plea that even if the assessee could not be treated as an AOP, they could yet be regarded as a BOI.\nCASE REVIEW\nHukumchand Mills Ltd. v. CIT[1967] 63 ITR 232 (SC)followed & relied upon.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Edward Keventer (Successors) (P.) Ltd. [1980] 123 ITR 200 (Delhi), CIT v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co.[1978] 111 ITR 529 (Bom.), CIT v. Indira Balkrishna [1960] 39 ITR 546 (SC), CIT v. Madras Industrial Investment Corpn. Ltd. [1980] 124 ITR 454 (Mad.), D.M. Netrwalla v. CIT [1980] 122 ITR 880 (Bom.) andHukumchand Mills Ltd. v. CIT [1967] 63 ITR 232 (SC).\nTAX CASE NOS. 801 TO 805 OF 1976.",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Indian Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963=27\\n\\r\\n\\rIndian Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963=27\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=33(4),2(31)(v)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Case No. 801 to 805 of 1976. January 11, 1982",
    "Judge Name:": "V. RAMASWAMI AND V. BALASUBRAHMANYAN, JJ",
    "": "N. P. SARASWATHI AMMAL AND OTHERS\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11914",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1982 704 = 1982 SLD 704 = (1982) 46 TAX 70 = 1982 PTD 336 = (1981) 133 ITR 338",
    "Key Words:": "Section 253 of the income-tax Act, 1961 Appeals to tribunal IAC imposed on 21-12-1966 penalties under section 271(1)(c) ITO issued consequential demand notices Assessee erroneously filed appeals before AAC, as mentioned in demand notices, within stipulated time On detecting mistake on 4-12-1967, assessee transferred appeals to tribunal Tribunal dismissed appeal as time-barred attributing delay to professional incompetence and negligence Whether tribunal justified in declining condonation Held, on facts, no\nFacts\nFor the assessment years 1955-56 and 1957-58, the IAC passed orders on 21-12-1966 under section 271(1)(c) imposing penalties of Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 4,000, respectively. In pursuance of these orders, the ITO issued notices of demand on the same date and these were duly served. In the demand notices, it was mentioned that, if the assessee felt aggrieved by these penally orders, he could file appeals before the of the AAC of the Range within the stipulated time limit. The assessee subsequently filed appeals before the AAC within the stipulated period in the forms prescribed under section 249(1). When the appeals came up for hearing on 4-12-1967, it was pointed out that these appeals had to be preferred not to the AAC but to the Tribunal. The assessee, thereafter, obtained the memorandum of appeal filed before the AAC on 5-12-1967 and presented the appeals before the Tribunal on 5-12-1967 itself with applications for condonation of delay, which was due to sufficient cause. The Tribunal, however, declined to condone the delay by its orders dated 29-04-1969, holding that the delay was on account of professional incompetence and negligence. It, therefore, dismissed the appeals as barred by time.\nOn reference :\nHeld\n1. The Tribunal erred in rejecting the appeal on the general ground of the counsel's negligence. All the relevant facts had to be appreciated in the context of which the delay occurred in the present case. Although a reference to section 271(1)(c) was made in the demand notices, it nevertheless required the assessee to prefer an appeal to the AAC without adverting to the new provisions which prescribed an appeal against the IAC's order to the Tribunal. Having regard to the changes in law and terms of the demand notices, it was perhaps explicable that the assessee should have filed the appeals before the AAC. There was, of course, a certain amount of inadvertance on his part. However, the bona fides of the assessee were shown by the fact that he filed appeals before the AAC within time and that, as soon as the mistake was realised, the appeals before the Tribunal were filed without further delay. The delay in the filing of the appeals should have, accordingly, been condoned, by the Tribunal, since there was sufficient cause.\n2. Although there was some force in the revenue's contention that since the assessee had not cared to appear and prosecute the reference, the reference should be returned unanswered. Although the Court had a discretion to do so, the question in this reference was a very short one and, in the interest of justice, it would not be correct to return the same unanswered.\nCase Review\nConcord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Nirmala Devi [1979] 118 ITR 507 (SC) and State of Kerala v. Krishna Kurun Madhuva Kurun AIR 1971 Ker. 211 followed.\nCases referred to\nConcord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Nirmala Devi [1979] 118 ITR 507, Highton v. Treherne [1878] 39 LT 411, Surendra Mohan Rai Choudhuryv. Mohendra Nath Banerjee AIR 1932 Cal. 589, Bijuboo v. Rajabally Tayaballi [1929] AIR 1929 Bom. 393 and State of Kerala v. Krishna Kurup Madhava Kurup [1971] AIR 1971 Ker. 211.",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=256(1),271(1)(c),249(1),216,274(2),253(1)(b)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256(1),271(1)(c),249(1),216,274(2),253(1)(b)\\n\\r\\n\\rLimitation Act, 1963=5\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 57 of 1971. November 14, 1979",
    "Judge Name:": "S. RANGANATHAN AND D. R. KHANNA, JJ",
    "": "AVTAR KRISHAN DASS\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11915",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1981 1425 = 1981 SLD 1425 = (1981) 43 TAX 165 = (1979) 120 ITR 1 = 1979 SCC 294",
    "Key Words:": "Section 271(1)(c) of the income-tax act, 1961 [as amended by the finance act, 1968 with effect from 1-4-1968]-Penalty-For concealment of particulars of income-Assessment year 1964-65-Return filed on 24-4-1968-Share income from one firm not disclosed-IAC levied penalty by to the extent of \"\"concealed income\"\" applying provision as amended-Tribunal upheld levy of penalty but reduced penalty because concealed income reduced-Whether tribunal was right in law in applying amended provisions-Held, yes\nFacts\nThe assessee is a partner in two firms, namely, ABC and XYZ. He filed a return of his total income for the assessment year 1964-65 on 24-4-1968. While he disclosed his share income of Rs. 460 in ABC, no share income from XYZ was shown. The assessee's default in complying with a notice under section 143(2) entailed a best assessment under section 144 on a total income of Rs. 12,118 including share income of Rs. 1,462 from ABC and Rs. 3,456 from XYZ. The ITO also instituted penalty proceedings under section271(1)(iii) [as it stood after amendment by the Finance Act, 1968 with effect from 1-4-1968]. On appeal, the AAC determined the concealed income at Rs. 7,357. The IAC imposed a penalty in the like sum of Rs. 7,357. On appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that the amended provision could not be invoked as the law, as it stood in the assessment year 1964-65, was operative. While rejecting this contention, the Tribunal reduced the penalty to Rs. 2,955 taking the view that the assessee was guilty of concealing share income from XYZ. On direct reference by the Tribunal, in view of conflicting judicial opinions, under section 257.\nHeld\n1.The assessment of the total income and the computation of tax liability is a proceeding which, for that purpose, is governed by entirely different considerations from a proceeding for penalty imposed for concealment of income. And this is so notwithstanding that the income concealed is the income assessed to tax. In the case of assessment of income and the determination of consequent tax liability, the relevant law is the law which rules during the assessment year in respect of which the total income is assessed and the tax liability determined. The rate of tax is determined by the relevant Finance Act. The penalty is, however, imposed on account of the commission of a wrongful act, and would be determined by law operating on the date on which such wrongful act is committed. Where penalty is imposed for concealment of particulars of income, it is the law ruling on the date when the act of concealment takes place, which is relevant. It is wholly immaterial that the income concealed was to be assessed in relation to an assessment year in the past.\n2.Under section 139, although the statute itself prescribes the date for filing the return, power has been conferred on the ITO to extend this date. A return filed within the extended period is a good return in the sense that the ITO is bound to take it into consideration. But nowhere section 139 declares that where a return is filed within the extended period, it will be deemed to have been filed within the period originally prescribed by the statute. On the contrary, the section contains a pro vision for payment of interest where the return is filed beyond the prescribed date even though within the extended period. That is evidence of the fact that the return filed during the extended period is not regarded by the statute as filed within the time originally prescribed.\n3.Section 271(1)(iii), as substituted by the Finance Act, 1968 with effect from 1-4-1968, would, therefore, govern the penalty imposed in this case.\nCases referred to\nHajee K. Assainar v. CIT [1971] 81 ITR 423 (Ker.) and Saeed Ahmad v. IAC [1971] 79 ITR 28 (All.).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=271(1)(iii),257,143(2),144,139\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=271(1)(iii),257,143(2),144,139\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference Case No. 15 of 1975. August 3, 1979",
    "Judge Name:": "P. N. BHAGWATI AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ",
    "": "BRIJ MOHAN\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, NEW DELHI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11916",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1986 1202 = 1986 SLD 1202 = (1986) 53 TAX 56 = 1987 PTCL 21",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Sections 50(4), 53, 87 -- Additional tax -- Assessee charged additional tax for failure to pay advance tax -- Appeal filed before Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) dismissed -- Assessee's plea before Tribunal that he had paid advance tax under sub-section (4) of Section 50 -- Whether Section 53 applicable to income from capital gains, salary and interest on securities -- Held no -- Whether any advance tax was payable by the assessee after adjustment of Rs. 10473/- out of Rs. 19041/- paid as advance tax -- Held no -- No additional tax is chargeable where the assessee liable to pay advance tax failed to pay the same as his tax was deducted at source which was more than advance tax payable --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=53,50(4),87,59,59A,60,62,63,65,27,156\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=53,50(4),87,59,59A,60,62,63,65,27,156\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 441(IB) of 1983-84 (Assessment year 1980-81), decision dated: 26-2-1985",
    "Judge Name:": "SIKANDAR HAYAT KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11917",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1986 1203 = 1986 SLD 1203 = (1986) 53 TAX 47 = 1985 PTCL 134",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1956 Articles 112, Constitution of Pakistan, 1962 Article 137 and Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 Article 165 -- Income-tax -- Charge of -- Business or trade carried on by Provincial Government -- Whether income from trade exempt from income-tax -- Held yes -- Sind Industrial Trading Estate Ltd, incorporated under resolution of Sind Government -- Company registered under Companies Act limited by guarantee whose whole of working capital came from Sind Government in shape of Government grants possessed area of land on which the Trading Estate was developed by this company -- Nominees of the Provincial Government -- Any resolution of the Board of Directors of the company was liable to be suspended on a reference to the Provincial Govt. -- Provincial Govt. could order that the resolution shall have effect with such modifications of Association of the Company -- Income and property of the company treated to be appointed solely towards the promotion of the objects of company and no portion thereof could be paid or transferred directly or indirectly by way of dividend or bonds or otherwise by way of profits to the members of the company -- Upon winding up or dissolution of the company, any property which remains after satisfaction of debts and liabilities transferable to the Provincial Government or its nominee only, or was to be applied in such manner as the Provincial Government would direct -- Company was carrying on function of Industrial Development and trade and business connected therewith for and on behalf of the Govt. And truth is that lifting of evil, it revealed that for relevant purposes it was doing so just like (sic) a department of the Government, notwithstanding the incorporation, which as explained earlier will not make any difference regarding the relevant Constitutional Provisions on exemption from Federal Taxation -- Whether respondent was liable to pay tax - Held no -- Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 -- Article 185(3) -- Leave to appeal -- Whether the profits of the Sind Industrial Trading Estate Limited were to be regarded as income of the Provincial Government and thus exempt from tax under the provision of the Constitution -- Held yes -- Profits of Sind Industrial Trading Estate Limited are to be regarded as income of the Provincial Government and thus not liable to income tax under the provision of the Constitution --\nApart from the property of a Provincial Government its income from trade or business has been exempt from Federal Taxation provided it is within that province -- Where leave to appeal not granted on a question, counsel not permitted to argue the point -- Power of Parliament to impose tax on the income of certain corporation, etc -- Corresponding Sections:",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=23B,4(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=23B,4(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=OrderVII,Rule11\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 45-K of 1974. August 29, 1984, hearing DATE : 28-8-1984, & 29-8-1984. On appeal from judgment of Sind & Baluchistan High Court, dated 20-12-1973 in Petition No. 240 of 1968",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD HALEEM.A. C.J., MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, SHAFIUR REHMAN AND MIAN BURHANUDDIN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE\nvs\nSIND INDUSTRIAL TRADING ESTATE LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11918",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 839 = 1985 SLD 839 = (1985) 51 TAX 157",
    "Key Words:": "Recovery of tax -- Demand notice -- Assessment made against the father of the petitioner during his life time -- Assessee died -- No demand notice issued to his legal heirs -- Recovery certificate issued by the I.T.O to Deputy Commissioner for recovery of tax from assessee (deceased) through his only son/petitioner -- Revision petition rejected by C.I.T. filed by the petitioner being hopelessly time barred -- Whether Income-tax Authorities can proceed against one of the legal heirs for recovery of tax -- Held no -- Whether recovery certificate could be issued without serving demand notices on all the legal heirs -- Held no -- I.T.O.'s action, whether illegal? -- Held yes -- Writ -- Whether an alternate remedy available to the petition, except invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court -- Held no --",
    "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=16(2),45(2),23(4),33A,46(2),29,45A,24B,30,2(2),64(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=16(2),45(2),23(4),33A,46(2),29,45A,24B,30,2(2),64(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=3(39)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=138(c),94,85,89,145A,74(4),129\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition Nos. 7 and 8 of 1984 decided on 17-02-1985",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM, KHAN, J",
    "": "SYED GHULAM ABBASS SHAH\nvs\nIncome Tax OFFICER MIRPUR AND 3 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11919",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1984 324 = 1984 SLD 324 = (1984) 49 TAX 166 = 1984 PTD 164",
    "Key Words:": "Valuation -- Valuation of Property -- Wealth Tax Officer adopting valuation of house property at Rs. 48000 i.e. 20 times of the gross annual letting value without obtaining prior approval of Inspecting Assistant Commissioner -- Tribunal while setting aside the order fixed the annual rental value of the property as it deemed fit -- Whether legal and proper -- Held yes --",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Wealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=27(1),24(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=27(1),24(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Rules, 1963=8(2)(3)(3A)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8),(9)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Wealth Tax case No. 23 of 1973, decision dated: 27-10-1983",
    "Judge Name:": "SALEEM AKHTAR AND FAKHRDDIN H. SHAIKH., JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX\nvs\nS. H. MOHAMMAD AHMED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11920",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 304 = 1977 SLD 304 = (1977) 36 TAX 7 = 1977 PTD 42",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 23 read with Section 4 -- Income -- Film Exhibitor -- Complimentary passes issued to guests -- No gate money charged but Government dues in shape of excise duty realised in respect of such passes -- Value of complementary passes, whether liable to tax -- Held no -- Assessee, a Film Exhibitor -- Addition for value of complimentary passes -- Department failing to establish that no complimentary passes were issued and that "gate money" was being suppressed under grab of complimentary passes -- Order of Appellate Assistant Commissioner deleting addition on account of value of such passes confirmed --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=4,23,4(i)(b)(i)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=4,23,4(i)(b)(i)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 499 (KB) of 1975-76, decision dated: 6-10-1976",
    "Judge Name:": "A. A. ZUBERI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD MAZHAR ALI, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11921",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 78 = 1977 SLD 78 = (1977) 36 TAX 8 = 1977 PTD 183 = 1977 PLD 797",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 2(6C), 2(14), 6, 18A, 28, 45A, 51(1A) -- Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 -- Articles 13, 199 -- Writ -- Provisions of the Income-tax, whether can be challenged on constitutional grounds inspite of alternate remedies -- Held yes -- Status -- Interpretation of statutes -- principles governing interpretation of financial liabilities -- Explained\nStatutes -- Interpretation of statutes -- Inapt and inaccurate phraseology of draftsman -- Whether can nullify a provision made by Legislature which is consistent with the existing legal norms -- Held no -- Additional amount of tax -- Whether an imposition of tax -- Held no -- Whether an additional liability for non-payment or short payment of tax contrary to law -- Held yes -- Provision of Sections 18A and 45A, whether invalid for lack of legislative competence or in the conflict with provisions of Article 13 of the (1973) Constitution of Pakistan -- Held no -- Expression "No person shall be prosecuted or punished for the some offence more than once" in Article 13 of Constitution, explained -- Demand of "additional amount of tax" -- Held, not an imposition of "tax" but only an additional liability for non-compliance with relevant provisions of Act -- Provisions of Sections 18-A and 45-A neither invalid for lack of legislative competence nor in conflict with relevant constitutional provisions -- Zeenat Textile Mills (East Pakistan) Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Dacca Zone and another -- Writ -- Alternate remedy -- No right of appeal against impugned orders available -- Provisions of Income-tax Act challenged on constitutional grounds -- Petitioner, held, has right to challenge same by means of petition under Constitution -- Contention that Court interpreting Constitution finally is an appropriate forum to raise such questions -- Held, sustainable -- Principles of taxation in constitutional system of Great Britain Examined -- \nPrinciples governing interpretation of financial liabilities -- Legislature not imposing a tax -- Subject not to be liable to pay or suffer any consequence for non-payment -- Inapt and inaccurate phraseology of draftsman -- Cannot and should not nullify a provision made by Legislature which is consistent with existing legal forms -- Genesis of provision of Article 13 traced --\nLaw relating to imposition of tax -- To be construed strictly -- Interpretation favourable to tax-payer should be adopted -- Particular intention other than that clearly conveyed by words used in statute not to be assumed -- History of legislation of Section 18-A --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=2(6C),2(14),6,18A,28,45A,51(1A),23,23B,18(3),(3A),(3B),(3BB),(3C),(3E),22A,33-A,66,3\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=2(6C),2(14),6,18A,28,45A,51(1A),23,23B,18(3),(3A),(3B),(3BB),(3C),(3E),22A,33-A,66,3\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=13\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1953 of 1973, decision dated: 19-1-1976. dates of hearing: 14th, 15th and 16-01-1976.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH AND ABDUL SHAKURUL SALAM, JJ",
    "": "HIGHWAY PETROLEUM SERVICES (REGD.), Lahore High Court\nvs\nISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11922",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1969 292 = 1969 SLD 292 = (1969) 72 ITR 807",
    "Key Words:": "Section 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Income - Chargeable as - Assessment year 1945-46 - Assessee, who was assessed in status of resident and ordinarily resident in British India, received certain amount by three demand drafts remitted from outside British India - It was not plea of assessee that demand drafts represented income, which was either wholly or in part not chargeable to tax - Besides, it was not even attempted to be argued that source of income affected its eligibility to tax - Whether, in aforesaid circumstances, it could be concluded that Tribunal rightly recorded finding that amount in question remitted from outside British India during year of account constituted income from some undisclosed source - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was assessed by the ITO to tax in the assessment year 1945-46 in the status of individual resident and ordinarily resident in British India. In proceedings for reassessment of the income of the assessee, the ITO added to the total income of the assessee for the assessment year 1945-46 an amount of Rs. 2,20,000 remitted from Nawalgarh in Rajasthan - then without British India-by three demand drafts to Calcutta in the months of February and March, 1944. The plea of the assessee that the three demand drafts represented the assessee's cash balance which was sent from Calcutta in November, 1941, and was brought back in the months of February and March, 1944, was disbelieved. The order of the ITO was affirmed by the AAC and by the ITAT. The High Court on reference did not agree with finding of the Tribunal that the said sum of Rs. 2,20,000 remitted from Nawalgarh to Calcutta during the year of account constituted income from some undisclosed sources.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court :\nHELD\nThe Tribunal did not record a finding that the income was \"\"from some undisclosed business activity in British India of the assessee.\"\" The assumption made by the High Court that the Tribunal held that the income was from undisclosed business activity in British India was not warranted.\nAgain, the total income of the assessee was liable to be charged to tax at the rates in force under the appropriate Finance Act. According to the Income-tax Act then in force, the total income of the previous year of an assessee, who was resident in British India, included all income, profits and gains during such year which accrued or arose or were deemed to accrue or arise to him in British India during such year. The assessee was resident and ordinarily resident in British India in the relevant previous year, and the income brought to tax had accrued or arisen to him in British India. That was so found by all the authorities and the High Court also agreed with that view. If the amount of Rs. 2,20,000 represented income of the assessee of the previous year, it was liable to be included in the total income of the assessee, and an enquiry whether for the purpose of bringing the amount to tax the income was from a business activity or from other source was not relevant. The principle laid down by this Court in CIT v. M. Ganapathi Mudaliar [1964] 53 ITR 623 that \"\"once it is found that\"\" a receipt by the assessee \"\"was income of the assessee it was not necessary for the revenue to locate its exact source\"\" applied alike to cases in which an entry was found in the books of account of the assessee, and to cases in which no such entry was found. It was not the plea of the assessee that the demand drafts represented income, which was either wholly or in part not chargeable to tax: if he intended to rely upon that plea it was for him to prove such a plea. It was not even attempted to be argued before the Tribunal that the source of the income affected its eligibility to tax. In such circumstances, it could be concluded that there was evidence on record to sustain the finding of the Tribunal that sum of Rs. 2.20 lakhs remitted from Nawalgarh to Calcutta during the year of account constituted income from some undisclosed sources.\nNote : Decision was against the assessee.\nCASE REFERRED TO\nCIT v. M. Ganapathi Mudaliar [1964] 53 ITR 623 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 740 of 1966, August 22, 1968",
    "Judge Name:": "J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, WEST BENGAL\nvs\nDURGA PRASAD MORE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11923",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1978 296 = 1978 SLD 296 = (1977) 107 ITR 556 = (1978) 38 TAX 85",
    "Key Words:": "Section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(vii) of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Depreciation - Allowance of - Assessment year 1961-62 - Whether where assets of proprietary concern of assessee had been converted into assets of partnership concern of which assessee had become partner, such conversion would not constitute 'sale' within scope of section 10(2)(vii) of 1922 Act and, therefore, depreciation granted to assessee on such assets in earlier years could not be taken away - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee as an individual was running four proprietary businesses of playing lorries, running an oil mill, running a rice mill and running a cinema house. The assessee converted these business into partnership concern of which he had become a partner. The assets of the business thrown into the partnership included certain buildings and plant and machinery such as cinema, machinery, lorry, car and sundry machinery on which depreciation was allowed to the assessee as the proprietor of these businesses in his earlier assessment years 1950-51 to 1959-60. The ITO took back the depreciation allowed to the assessee in the earlier years of building, plant and machinery and added this sum to the assessee's income for the assessment year 1961-62, relying on the provisions of the proviso to section 10(2)(vii) of the 1922 Act. The AAC dismissed the assessee's appeal but the Tribunal reversed the decision of the ITO.\nOn reference :\nHELD\nFrom the language of section 10(2)(vii ) of the 1922 Act, two things are clear that the statutory provision applies only if there had been a sale of the building, machinery and plant or its scrap value. The very idea of sale involves that the sale must be for a particular price. As far as the instant case was concerned, all that had happened was that the assets which were the assets of the proprietary concern had been converted into assets of the partnership concern of which the assessee had become a partner. Such a conversion or utilisation of the plant and machinery would not constitute 'sale' within the scope of section 10(2)(vii) of the 1922 Act.\nOnce it was held that there was no sale, there was no question of invoking the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii) of the 1922 Act. Apart from the above, the second requirement of fixing and payment of price thereof which is involved in the conception of 'sale' was also absent in the instant case.\nTherefore, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the amount of depreciation allowed in the earlier years was not includible in the total income under the provisions of the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii ) of the 1922 Act.\nNote : The case was decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nN. Hyath Batcha Sahib v. CIT [1969] 72 ITR 528 (Mad.), D. Kanniah Pillaiv. CIT [1976] 104 ITR 520 (Mad.) and Subbiah Nadar v. CIT [1976] 104 ITR 564 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(vii)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(vii)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Case No. 437 of 1970. June 24, 1976",
    "Judge Name:": "ISMAIL AND SETHURAMAN, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nV.M. Thangavel Chettiar"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11924",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1978 297 = 1978 SLD 297 = (1978) 38 TAX 29 = (1977) 107 ITR 101 = 1977 SCC 330",
    "Key Words:": "Section 73 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 24 of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Losses - In speculation business - Assessment year 1957-58 - Whether hedging loss in respect of banned contract under Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 cannot be set off against profits of other business of previous year - Held, yes - Whether speculation loss in commodity banned under statutory provisions cannot be carried forward for set off in following year - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was carrying on business by running an oil mill, and also doing business in sales and purchase of groundnuts, groundnut seeds and oil; speculation business in groundnuts, groundnut oil and groundnut seeds; and speculation business in cotton, erranda, etc. While determining the income of the assessee the ITO disallowed loss in forward contracts in groundnut oil, groundnuts and groundnut seeds on the ground that it arose out of illegal contracts on account of the same being banned under section 15(4) of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952.\nThe AAC affirmed the order of the ITO.\nOn a second appeal, the Tribunal held that notwithstanding the illegality of the transactions the loss could be set off and carried forward in accordance with the provisions of section 24(1) and 24(2) respectively of the 1922 Act. The Tribunal, accordingly, directed that the loss in hedging transactions of forward business in the banned contracts should be set off against the other profits of the assessee for the relevant accounting year under section 24(1) of the 1922 Act and that the balance loss relating to the speculative transaction in the banned contracts should be carried forward to the following year under section 24(2) of 1922 Act to be set off against profits of the following year from speculative business.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nThe hedging loss being in respect of a banned contract under section 15(4) of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952, could not be set off against the profits of other business of the previous year.\nIt was also admitted that the contract for speculation in the commodity in question was banned under the 1952 Act. It also appeared that the said loss could not be set off in the previous year against profit in the same business in that year. To allow such a claim was to permit a benefit of adjustment of loss from an illegal business to spill over and continue in the following year even in a lawful speculative business. A speculative business which is carried on in the following year must be a business of lawful speculation pertaining to lawful and enforceable contracts. The assessee carrying on a lawful speculative business in the following year cannot derive benefit by carrying forward and setting off a loss from an illegal speculative business of the earlier year. Law will assume an illegal business to die out of existence with all its losses to the assessee in the year of loss itself. The assessee can derive no benefit on account of the unlawful business in the following year. The matter will be different if a lawful speculative business after incurring loss is discontinued and loss therefrom is carried forward for set off against any other lawful speculative business in the following year. This is the true legal effect of section 24(2)(i) of the 1922 Act.\nIt is inconceivable that law can permit an illegal activity to be carried on from which a benefit could be obtained. The concept of carry forward is not the same thing as the setting off of loss in a particular illegal business against profit of that illegal business in a particular year. The two concepts have to be kept distinctly separate even in a taxing statute. There is no express warrant for the submission either under section 24(2) of the 1922 Act, or under any other provision of the Act, far less on general principles.\nIt is true that by earning income from illegal trading activity the income does not get tainted so far as exigibility to tax is concerned. While computing income from illegal activity in a particular year all losses incurred in earning that particular income are also taken into account for computation of real profits even in the illegal business. That does not mean that fines imposed on the illegal activities detected, prosecuted and punished or otherwise penalised, will be taken into account for ascertainment of real profits. There is, therefore, a marked distinction between computation of a particular year's profit from illegal trading activity and carry forward of a loss to set it off against income in subsequent years even assuming that such illegal activity is continued against the provisions of law. No illegal activity can be perpetuated under any provisions of law nor benefit out of it. Law will miss its paramount object if it is not consistent with morality and any interpretation by courts cannot lead to a result where continuation of illegal activity or benefit attached to it is given recognition.\nTherefore, the assessee was not entitled to carry forward the speculation loss to the next year.\nNote : The case was decided against the assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. S.C. Kothari [1971] 82 ITR 794 (SC) and CIT v. S.C. Kothari [1968]69 ITR 1 (Guj.).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),24(2),24(1),10(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),24(2),24(1),10(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rForward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952=15(4)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 580 of 1972. February 18, 1977",
    "Judge Name:": "P. K. GOSWAMI AND, JASWANT SINGH, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, GUJARAT-III\nvs\nKURJI JINABHAI KOTECHA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11925",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 394 = 1975 SLD 394 = (1975) 31 TAX 245 = 1973 PTD 101 = (1970) 75 ITR 1",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),24(2),10(2)(vi),10(2),24(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),24(2),10(2)(vi),10(2),24(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I. T. Case No. 9 of 1967, January 23, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "S. K. KAPUR AND, JAGJIT SINGH, JJ",
    "": "RAJ NARAIN AGARWALA\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11926",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 329 = 1974 SLD 329 = (1974) 30 TAX 79 = 1973 PTD 83 = (1969) 74 ITR 67",
    "Key Words:": "Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 28(1)(c) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Penalty - For concealment of income - Assessment year 1948-49 - Whether if there is re-constitution of firm by virtue of section 26 of 1922 Act, ITO in imposing penalty will proceed against firm - Held, yes - Whether if there is discontinuance of business, penalty will be imposed against partners of firm - Held, yes\nSection 189 of the Income-tax act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 44 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Firm - Assessment after dissolution - Assessment year 1948-49 - Whether section 44 of 1922 Act applied only to cases in which there had been discontinuance of business and not to cases where business continued after re-constitution of firm, or there was succession to business - Held, yes\nSection 256 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 66of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - High Court - Reference to - Assessment year 1948-49 - Whether in a reference only question, which was either raised or argued before Tribunal, may be answered even if language of question framed by Tribunal may apparently include an enquiry into other matters which could have been, but were not raised or argued - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe firm which carried on the business during the calendar year 1947 was dissolved on 7-7-1951, when one of the partners, died. The business of the firm was continued with effect from 8-7-1951, by the new firm as successor to the business of the old firm. The terms of the partnership were the same as set out in the deed dated 17-10-1949, and the partners and their shares were also the same except that one 'B' took the place of deceased partner. With effect from 28-4-1952, the business was carried on by a partnership constituted by 'B' and 'K' under an instrument dated 27-8-1952. There was no dissolution of the firm, which was carrying on the business; there was only a change in the constitution of the old firm. In determining the taxable income of the respondent-firm for the assessment year 1948-49 the ITO added certain amount to the income-returned as \"\"undisclosed receipts\"\". The ITO also commenced a proceeding for the levy of penalty and in exercise of the power under section 28(1)(c)of the 1922 Act, he directed the respondent-firm to pay penalty. The Tribunal rejected the contention of the respondent that the order imposing penalty upon the firm after the original firm was dissolved was without jurisdiction. On reference, the High Court held that penalty could be legally levied only upon the original firm constituted in the account year relevant to the assessment year 1948-49 and not upon the new firm constituted under the deed dated 27-4-1952.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD\nSection 44 of the 1922 Act, only applied to those cases in which there had been discontinuance of the business and not to cases in the business continued after re-constitution of the firm, or there was succession to the business. Cases of re-constitution of the firm or succession to the business of the firm are covered by section 26(1) and (2) of the 1922 Act.\n\"\"Assessment\"\" in Chapter IV includes a proceeding for imposition of penalty. Section 28 of the 1922 Act authorises the ITO, if satisfied, in the course of any proceeding under the Act that any person has, inter alia, concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, to direct that such person shall pay by way of penalty, a sum of money not exceeding the amount specified therein in addition to the income-tax and super-tax payable by such person. The expression \"\"person\"\" includes, for the purpose of section 28 of the 1922 Act, a firm registered or unregistered. If there is re-constitution of the firm, by virtue of section 26 of the 1922 Act, the ITO, will, in imposing the penalty, proceed against the firm. If there is discontinuance of the business, penalty will be imposed against the partners of the firm.\nIn the instant case, before the Tribunal and the High Court, the case was argued on the footing that section 44 of the 1922 Act, alone was applicable. Whether under the terms of section 26, read with section 28 of the 1922 Act, penalty may be imposed upon the new partners for the failure of the partners of the firm constituted in the year of account relevant to the assessment year 1948-49 was never investigated. The question raised by the Tribunal was in terms sufficiently comprehensive to embrace an enquiry whether partners of the firm in existence on 30-7-1954, were liable to be assessed to penalty as successors in interest of the partners of the original firm in existence in the year of account relating to the assessment year 1948-49. But in a reference under section 66 of the 1922 Act, only the question which was either raised or argued before the Tribunal may be answered, even if the language of the question framed by the Tribunal may apparently include an enquiry into other matters which could have been, but were not, raised or argued. The appeal was dismissed accordingly.\nNote - The case has been decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nC.A. Abraham v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 425 ; [1961] 2 SCR 765, CIT v. S.V Angidi Chettiar [1962] 44 ITR 739 (SC), S.M.S. Karuppiah Pillai v. CIT[1941] 9 ITR 1 (Mad.) (FB) and Shivram Poddar v. ITO [1964] 51 ITR 823 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=28(1)(c),44,25(1),26(1),25,66\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=28(1)(c),44,25(1),26(1),25,66\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 2456 of 1966. March 12, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "J. C. SHAH AND A. N. GROVER, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, BIHAR AND ORISSA\nvs\nKIRKEND COAL CO"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11927",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 330 = 1974 SLD 330 = (1974) 30 TAX 84 = (1969) 74 ITR 41 = 1973 PTD 66",
    "Key Words:": "Section 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 33(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922], read with rule 24 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946 - Appellate Tribunal - powers of - Assessment year 1956-57 - Whether Tribunal is bound to give proper decision on question of fact as well as law on merits and it cannot dismiss an appeal owing to default of appearance - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, rule 24 of 1946 Rules which provides to dismissals of appeal for failure of appellant to appear is ultra vires as it being in conflict with provisions of section 33(4) of 1922 Act - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee owned certain share in two companies. The assessee was a joint managing director of one of the companies along with one 'A'. During accounting year relevant to assessment year in question, the assessee sold entire holdings in two companies to 'A' and earned certain profits. The ITO assessed these amounts to tax for the assessment year 1956-57 under section 10(5A) of the 1922 Act as compensation earned for parting with the effective power of management. The assessment was upheld by the AAC. On second appeal, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal for default of non-appearance of assessee. Five weeks after the disposal of the appeal the assessee filed a petition before the Tribunal praying for its restoration. The Tribunal did not consider that there was sufficient cause for restoration and rejected the petition. On reference, the High Court held that section 33(4)of the 1922 Act obliges the Tribunal to decide an appeal after giving an opportunity to the parties to put forward their case ; that the giving of the opportunity only emphasises the character of the quasi-judicial function performed by the Tribunal ; that the fact that opportunity is not availed of in a particular case, will not entitle the Tribunal not to decide the case and that there can be no decision of the case on its merits if the matter is to be disposed of for default of appearance of the parties. It further held that rule 24, therefore, to be consistent with section 33(4) of the 1922 Act, could only empower the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal on its merits whether there be an appearance of the party before it or not, that the rule in its present form, as amended in the year 1948, in so far as it enables the dismissal of an appeal before the Tribunal for default of appearance of the appellant, will, therefore, be ultra vires, as being in conflict with the provisions of section 33(4) of the 1922 Act\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court :\nHELD\nThe scheme of the provisions of the Act relating to the Tribunal apparently is that it has to dispose of an appeal by making such orders as it thinks fit on the merits. It follows from the language of section 33(4) of the 1922 Act and in particular the use of the word \"\"thereon\"\" that the Tribunal has to go into the correctness or otherwise of the points decided by the departmental authorities in the light of the submissions made by the appellant. This can only be done by giving a decision on the merits on questions of fact and law and not by merely disposing of the appeal on the ground that the party concerned has failed to appear. The provisions contained in section 66 of the 1922 Act about making a reference on questions of law to the High Court will be rendered nugatory if any such power is attributed to the Tribunal by which it can dismiss an appeal, which has otherwise been properly filed, for default, without making any order thereon in accordance with section 33(4) of the 1922 Act. The position becomes quite simple when it is remembered that the assessee or the Commissioner if aggrieved by the orders of the Tribunal, can have resort only to the provisions of section 66 of the 1922 Act. So far as the questions of fact are concerned the decision of the Tribunal is final and reference can be sought to the High Court only on questions of law. The High Court exercises purely advisory jurisdiction and has no appellate or revisional powers. The advisory jurisdiction can be exercised on a proper reference being made and that cannot be done unless the Tribunal itself has passed proper order under section 33(4) of the 1922 Act. It follows from all this that the Tribunal is bound to give a proper decision on questions of fact as well as law which can only be done if the appeal is disposed of on the merits and not dismissed owing to the absence of the appellant.\nThus, looking at the substantive provisions of the Act there is no escape from the conclusion that under section 33(4) of the 1922 Act the Tribunal has to dispose of the appeal on the merits and cannot short-circuits the same by dismissing it for default of appearance. It is true that the Tribunal's powers in dealing with appeals are of the widest amplitude and have in some cases, been held similar to, and identical with, the powers of an appellate court under the Civil Procedure Code. Assuming that for the aforesaid reasons the Tribunal is competent to set aside an order dismissing an appeal for default in exercise of its inherent power there are serious difficulties in upholding the validity of rule 24. It clearly comes into conflict with sub-section (4) of section 33 of the 1922 Act and in the event of repugnancy between the substantive provisions of the Act and a rule it is the rule which must give way to the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, the decision of the High Court was affirmed.\nNote - The case has been decided in favour of the assessee\nCASE REVIEW\nDecision of the Madras High Court in S. Chenniappa Mudaliar v. CIT [1964]53 ITR 323, affirmed, Shri Bhagwan Radha Kishen v . CIT [1952] 27 ITR and Ravula Subba Rao v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 164 overruled.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Arunachalam Chettiar [1953] 23 ITR 180 (SC),CIT v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. [1961] 42 ITR 589 (SC), Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. CIT[1967] 63 ITR 232 (SC), Mangat Ram Kuthiala v. CIT [1960] 38 ITR 1 (Punj.), S. Chenniappa Mudaliar v. CIT [1964] 53 ITR 323 (Mad.), Shri Bhagwan Radha Kishen v. CIT [1952] 22 ITR 104 (All.) and Ravula Subba Rao v. CIT [1957] 27 ITR 164 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=33,10(5A),66(1),66(2),5A(8),33(4),66A,31\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=33,10(5A),66(1),66(2),5A(8),33(4),66A,31\\n\\r\\n\\rAppellate Tribunal Rules, 1946=24\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1015 of 1968. February 24, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nS. Chenniappa Mudaliar"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11928",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 331 = 1974 SLD 331 = (1974) 30 TAX 52 = (1969) 74 ITR 26 = 1973 PTD 53",
    "Key Words:": "(I) Section 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Income - Chargeable as - Assessment years 1949-50 and 1950-51 - Whether where assessees-company, carrying on coal mining business, obtained a licence of colliery and after prospecting for coal, sold it on profit, amount of profit was assessable as income in hands of assessee - Held, yes\n(II) Section 71 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 24 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Losses - Set off of from one head against income from other - Assessment year 1950-51 - Assessee-company sold its factory in October 1948 but price was finally settled in December, 1949 - In settlement assessee suffered loss - Whether until price was settled, loss did not accrue or arise to company and thus loss was suffered in account year 1949-50 and could be allowed to be set off against income of that year under section 24(1) of 1922 Act - Held, yes\nFACTS (I)\nThe appellant-company carried on business as managing agents, dealers in share and stocks, stores and spare parts of machinery and acts as insurance agents and manufacturers of carbon dioxide. It also worked certain coal mines. The company obtained a prospecting licence from the State for the colliery and after prospecting for coal sold the colliery, and thereby earned a profit. The ITO brought the profits arising out of the sale of the colliery to tax as business profits. The order was confirmed in appeal by the AAC and the Tribunal. On reference, the High Court held that the sale of colliery was a part of the trading activities of the assessee and such activity could not gathered from the surrounding circumstances as also from the manner in which it was sold, that is, within a very short time after its acquisition and after it was made fit for obtaining a reasonably higher price at the sale and thus, the profits that acquired could not be treated as a capital asset.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nFACTS (II)\nThe assessee had an ice-factory which was sold in 1948 but the price was finally settled in December, 1949. In the settlement, the company suffered a loss. The Tribunal disallowed the loss in the assessment of income for the year 1950-51 holding that the business of the ice factory was not carried on in the year of account and on that account the loss was not admissible as a permissible deduction in computing the taxable income of the company for the assessment year 1950-51. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD (I)\nWhere a person disposed of part or the whole of his assets, the general rule is that the mere change or realisation of an investment does not attract liability to income-tax, but where such a realisation is an act which in itself is a trading transaction, profit earned by sale or conversion is taxable.\nIn determining whether the gain is realisation of mere enhancement of value or is a gain made in an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit-making, no uniform rule can be evolved. A transaction of sale may, in a given case, be isolated; in another, it may be intimately related to the normal business of the taxpayer. In the latter class profit arising from the transaction will probably arise out of the taxpayer's business and will be assessable as business profit.\nIn the instant case, the Tribunal had found that the company was carrying on the business of coal mining and prospecting of coal was a part of the coal mining business and on that account the transaction of prospecting, developing and selling the colliery was a transaction in the nature of a business. On the findings recorded by the Tribunal it followed that the prospecting for coal being a part of the coal mining business, the income was properly regarded as taxable. The findings of the High Court were upheld.\nHELD (II)\nBy Sub-section (1) of section 24 of the 1922 Act, the loss of profits or gains suffered under any head in any year was liable to be set off against the income, profits or gains under any other head, and by sub-section (2) where the loss suffered in any business, profession or vocation could not be wholly set off under sub-section (1), the loss not so set off had to be carried forward to the following year and set off against the profits and gains of the same business in the subsequent years. The Tribunal and the High court applied sub-section (2) of section 24 of the 1922 Act in computing the taxable income of the company for the assessment year 1950-51. But in so proceeding, they were in error. The business of ice factory was sold in October, 1948. It would be assumed that the Ice factory was a separate business of the company and was not a part of the other business carried on by the company. But the price for which the business was sold was settled in December, 1949. Until the price was settled, loss did not accrue or arise to the company. The loss was suffered in the account year 1949-50 and could be allowed against the income of that year under section 24(1) of the 1922 Act the assumption that the loss was suffered is the previous year i.e., 1948-49, was not warranted. The case was plainly governed by sub-section (1) of section 24 of the 1922 Act.\nNote - The case has been decided partly in favour of the assessee and partly in favour of the revenue.\nCASES REFEREED TO\nCalifornian Copper Syndicate v. Harris [1904] 5 TC 159 Commissioner of taxes v. Melbourne Trust Ltd. [1914] AC 1001 (PC), Gloucester Railway Carriage and Wagon Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1925] 12 TC 720 (HL), Janki Ram Bahadur Ram v. CIT [1965] 57 19 ITR 21 (SC) and Imperial Tobacco Co. v Kelly [1943] 25 TC 292 (CA)",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),24,24(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),24,24(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1594 and 1595 of 1968. February 20, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ",
    "": "KARAM CHAND THAPAR AND BROS. P. LTD\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF Income Tax (CENTRAL), CALCUTTA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11929",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 332 = 1974 SLD 332 = (1974) 30 TAX 47 = 1973 PTD 78 = (1969) 74 ITR 62",
    "Key Words:": "Section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 13 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Method of accounting - Valuation of stock - Assessment years 1949-50 and 1950-51 - Assessee - company was dealing in shares - Its method of valuation at opening and closing of stocks was to value shares at cost - Assessee held certain shares of company which issued bonus shares - Bonus shares rank pari passu with old shares - Subsequently, it sold original shares as well as bonus shares - Whether method to be adopted in valuation of bonus shares was to take cost of original shares and to spread it over original shares and bonus shares collectively and to find out average price of all shares - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee-company was a dealer in shares. Its method of valuation at the opening and closing of the stocks was to value shares at the cost in the assessment year 1949-50. The assessee held certain shares of a company which issued bonus shares in June 1948. The bonus shares were to rank pari passuwith the old shares. The original shares were purchased by assessee at Rs. 85 per share. In August 1949, the assessee sold the original share at Rs. 29 per share and bonus shares at Rs. 25 per share. The bonus shares when they were issued were included in the trading account. According to the assessee-company the bonus shares had fetched as profit less the face value of the shares. This profit was set off against the loss on the original shares. The ITO did not accept the mode of calculation. He find out the profit by taking the cost of bonus shares as nil which was upheld by the Tribunal. On reference, the High Court following the decision of the Patna High Court in Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd.v. CIT [1961] 41 ITR 705 decided the case in favour of the assessee.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD\nIn the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd.[1964] 52 ITR 567 (SC), four methods of calculation were considered. The first method was to take the cost as equivalent to the face value of the bonus shares This method was followed by the assessee-company. The second method was to take the cost of the bonus shares at nil, a method adopted by the ITO. The third method was to take the cost of the original shares and to spread it over the original shares and the bonus shares taken collectively, and a fourth method was to find out the fall in the price of the original shares at the stock exchange and the attribute this to the bonus shares. After considering all the four methods, the Supreme Court held that the correct method to apply in cases where bonus shares rank pari passi is to follow the third method, namely, to take the cost of the original shares and to spread it over all the original as well as the bonus shares and to find out the average price of all the shares.\nThe method followed in Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd.'s (supra ) was the correct method. Accordingly, the third method was accepted.\nThe appeal was allowed accordingly.\nNote : The case has been decided in favour of the revenue.\nCASE REVIEW\nDecision in CIT v. Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd. [1964] 52 ITR 567 (SC), approved.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nEmerald and Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1959] 36 ITR 257 (SC), CIT v. Gold Mohore Investment Co. Ltd. [1968] 68 ITR 213 (SC), Dalmia Investment Co.Ltd. v.CIT [1961] 41 ITR 705 (Pat.) and CIT v. Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd. [1964]52 ITR 567 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1236 and 1237 of 1967, April 3, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "M. HIDAYATULLAH C.J., J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI, G. K. MITTER AND A. N. GROVER, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, CENTRAL, CALCUTTA\nvs\nGOLD MOHORE INVESTMENT CO. LTD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11930",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 333 = 1974 SLD 333 = (1975) 31 TAX 243 = (1974) 30 TAX 10 = 1973 PTD 145 = 1974 PTD 180",
    "Key Words:": "Section 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Income - Chargeable as - Assessment year 1945-46 - Assessee, who was assessed in status of resident and ordinarily resident in British India, received certain amount by three demand drafts remitted from outside British India - It was not plea of assessee that demand drafts represented income, which was either wholly or in part not chargeable to tax - Besides, it was not even attempted to be argued that source of income affected its eligibility to tax - Whether, in aforesaid circumstances, it could be concluded that Tribunal rightly recorded finding that amount in question remitted from outside British India during year of account constituted income from some undisclosed source - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was assessed by the ITO to tax in the assessment year 1945-46 in the status of individual resident and ordinarily resident in British India. In proceedings for reassessment of the income of the assessee, the ITO added to the total income of the assessee for the assessment year 1945-46 an amount of Rs. 2,20,000 remitted from Nawalgarh in Rajasthan - then without British India-by three demand drafts to Calcutta in the months of February and March, 1944. The plea of the assessee that the three demand drafts represented the assessee's cash balance which was sent from Calcutta in November, 1941, and was brought back in the months of February and March, 1944, was disbelieved. The order of the ITO was affirmed by the AAC and by the ITAT. The High Court on reference did not agree with finding of the Tribunal that the said sum of Rs. 2,20,000 remitted from Nawalgarh to Calcutta during the year of account constituted income from some undisclosed sources.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court :\nHELD\nThe Tribunal did not record a finding that the income was \"\"from some undisclosed business activity in British India of the assessee.\"\" The assumption made by the High Court that the Tribunal held that the income was from undisclosed business activity in British India was not warranted.\nAgain, the total income of the assessee was liable to be charged to tax at the rates in force under the appropriate Finance Act. According to the Income-tax Act then in force, the total income of the previous year of an assessee, who was resident in British India, included all income, profits and gains during such year which accrued or arose or were deemed to accrue or arise to him in British India during such year. The assessee was resident and ordinarily resident in British India in the relevant previous year, and the income brought to tax had accrued or arisen to him in British India. That was so found by all the authorities and the High Court also agreed with that view. If the amount of Rs. 2,20,000 represented income of the assessee of the previous year, it was liable to be included in the total income of the assessee, and an enquiry whether for the purpose of bringing the amount to tax the income was from a business activity or from other source was not relevant. The principle laid down by this Court in CIT v. M. Ganapathi Mudaliar [1964] 53 ITR 623 that \"\"once it is found that\"\" a receipt by the assessee \"\"was income of the assessee it was not necessary for the revenue to locate its exact source\"\" applied alike to cases in which an entry was found in the books of account of the assessee, and to cases in which no such entry was found. It was not the plea of the assessee that the demand drafts represented income, which was either wholly or in part not chargeable to tax: if he intended to rely upon that plea it was for him to prove such a plea. It was not even attempted to be argued before the Tribunal that the source of the income affected its eligibility to tax. In such circumstances, it could be concluded that there was evidence on record to sustain the finding of the Tribunal that sum of Rs. 2.20 lakhs remitted from Nawalgarh to Calcutta during the year of account constituted income from some undisclosed sources.\nNote : Decision was against the assessee.\nCASE REFERRED TO\nCIT v. M. Ganapathi Mudaliar [1964] 53 ITR 623 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 740 of 1966. August 22, 1968",
    "Judge Name:": "J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, WEST BENGAL\nvs\nDURGA PRASAD MORE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11931",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 334 = 1974 SLD 334 = (1974) 30 TAX 62 = (1969) 74 ITR 17 = 1973 PTD 44",
    "Key Words:": "Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Business expenditure - Allowability of - Assessment years 1949-50 to 1952-53 - 'C' was a foreign company - Assessee-company was subsidiary of 'C' - Company ICI was also subsidiary of 'C' - ICI terminated sole selling agency of four companies and appointed assessee as its sole selling agents - ICI agreed to pay certain compensation to aforesaid companies against termination of agency to be adjusted against commission payable to assessee - Whether since no agreement between assessee and ICI had been proved, it could be said that amount paid as compensation to ex-agents was expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for purposes of business of assessee under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act - Held, yes - Whether payment of compensation by assessee to ex-agents was not by an overriding title created either by act of parties or by operation of law - Held, yes\nSection 256 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - High Court - Reference to - Assessment years 1949-50 to 1952-53 - Whether High Court is not court of appeal in reference and it is not open it to embark upon reappraisal of evidence and to arrive at findings of fact contrary to those of Tribunal - Held, yes - Whether\nFACTS\nThe assessee company was a subsidiary of a foreign company namely, 'C', which held entire share capital of assessee. The business of the assessee consisted mainly of acting as selling agents in India for a large variety of goods such as chemicals, dye, explosives, etc., manufactured or purchased by its foreign principals and sold in India. ICI was another subsidiary of 'C'. The ICI had appointed four companies as their selling agents in India. In April 1948, the ICI terminated the services of the aforesaid selling agents and appointed the assessee to its sole selling agent. The ICI had agreed to pay to the former selling agents compensation at the rate of two-fifths, two-fifths and one and one-fifths of the commission earned by the assessee for the three years from 1-4-1948. The compensation was paid to the four companies through the accounts of the assessee. For the relevant assessment years the assessee showed the net amounts of commission earned on the selling agencies by the ICI adding a foot note that the amounts were arrived at after deducting the amount of compensation payable to the outgoing agents. By his order dated 28-1-1957 for the assessment year 1951-52, the ITO held that the deductions were not permissible. The Tribunal held that there was no agreement between the assessee and the ICI and if there was one it was not acted upon. It was further held that the payment of compensation was not because of an overriding title created either by the act of parties or by operation of law. On reference, the High Court held that the inclusion of the amount of compensation in the total income of the assessee for the relevant assessment years was not justified.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court :\nHELD\nIt is well established that the High Court is not a court of appeal in a reference under section 66(1) of the 1922 Act and it is not open to the High Court in such a reference to embark upon a reappraisal of the evidence and to arrive at findings of fact contrary to those of the Tribunal. It is the duty of the High Court while hearing the reference to confine itself to the facts as found by the Tribunal and to answer the question of law in the context of those facts. It is true that the finding of fact will be defective in law if there is no evidence to support it or if the finding is perverse. But in the hearing of a reference under section 66(1) of the 1922 Act, it is not open to the assessee to challenge such a finding of fact unless he has applied for the reference of the specific question under section 66(1) of the 1922 Act In the instant case, the assessee had in his application under section 66(1) of the 1922 Act expressly raised the question about the validity of the finding of the Tribunal as regards the agreement but the question was not referred by the Tribunal to the High Court and the contention of the assessee with regard to the question must be deemed to have been rejected. The assessee did not thereafter move the High Court under section 66(2) of the 1922 Act, requiring it to call for a statement of the case on that specific question. Therefore, the High Court was in error in embarking upon a reappraisal of the evidence before the Tribunal and setting aside the finding of the Tribunal that \"\"there was no agreement as alleged in the affidavits \"\" and \"\"If there was such an agreement, it was not acted upon\"\".\nThe Tribunal had found that no agreement between the assessee and the ICI had been proved. In the absence of proof of the exact terms and conditions of the agreement it was not possible to accept the argument of the assessee that the amount paid as compensation to the ex-agents was an \"\"expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business\"\" under section 10(2)(xv).of the 1922 Act.\nThe true test for the application of the rule of diversion of income by an overriding title is whether the amount sought to be deducted in truth never reached the assessee as his income.\nThe finding of the Tribunal that the precise terms of the agreement between the assessee and the ICI had not been established. In any event, even on the basis of the affidavits the payment of compensation to the ex-agents was apparently made by the assesses for and on behalf of the ICI. The assessee's documents suggested that the payment of compensation was the exclusive liability of the ICI and the assessee was not under a legal obligation to pay the amount of compensation to the outgoing agents. It was not established that the payment of compensation was by an overriding title created either by the act of the parties or by the operation of law. An obligation to apply the income in a particular way before it was received by the assessee or before it had accrued or arisen to the assessee resulted in the diversion of income. An obligation to apply income accrued, arisen or received amounted merely to the apportionment of income and the income so applied was not deductible.\nIn view of the above, it was held that the payment of compensation by the assessee to the ex-agents was not by an overriding title created either by act of the parties or by operation of law.\nThe of the High Court was set aside. The appeal was allowed accordingly\nNote: The Case has been decided in favour of the revenue.\nCASE REVIEW\nDecision of the Calcutta High Court in Imperial Chemical Industries (India) (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1965] 58 ITR 649 , reversed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nIndia Cements Ltd. v. CIT [1966] 60 ITR 52 (SC), CIT v. Shri Meenakshi Mills Ltd. [1967] 63 ITR 609 (SC), CIT v. Greaves Cotton and Co. Ltd. [1968] 68 ITR 200 (SC), Raja Bejoy Singh Dudhuria v. CIT [1933] 1 ITR 135 (PC), P.C Mullick v. CIT [1938] 6 ITR. 206 (PC), CIT v. Sitaldas Tirathdas [1961] 41 ITR 367 (SC) and Imperial Chemical Industries (India) (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1965] 58 ITR 649 (Cal.).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),10(2)(xv)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),10(2)(xv)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1549 to 1552 of 1968. February 20, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, WEST BENGAL III\nvs\nIMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES (INDIA) (P.) LTD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11932",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 335 = 1974 SLD 335 = (1974) 30 TAX 58 = (1969) 74 ITR 57 = 1973 PTD 74",
    "Key Words:": "Section 28(i) of Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Business income - Chargeable as - Assessment years 1955-56 and 1956-57 - Whether share of profits received by a partner from firm is business income and being business income expenditure incurred for purpose of earning that income and appropriate allowances are deductible therefrom in determining taxable income of partner - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe respondent-assessee declared certain amount as his share of profits from four firms and he claimed deduction of amount paid as salary, and bonus to staff, expenses for maintenance and depreciation of motor-car, travelling expenses and interest. The ITO allowed the claim for interest as a permissible deduction and disallowed the rest. The ITO held that since the respondent did not carry on any independent business, the amounts, except interest, were not claimable by the respondent on his own account; if at all, the amounts should have been claimed as business expenses incurred; in the accounts of the four firms. The Tribunal set aside the orders passed by the ITO and remanded the cases for examination of the nature of expenditure claimed to have been incurred by the respondent. In the view of the Tribunal, share of the profits received by the respondent from the firms was taxable as business income, and appropriate deductions admissible under section 10(2), were allowable in computing the taxable income of the respondent. On reference, the High Court upheld the order of the Tribunal.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD\nWhere a person carries on business by himself or in partnership with others, profits and gains earned by him are income liable to be taxed under section 10 of the 1922 Act. Share in the profits of a partnership received by a partner is \"\"profits and gains of business\"\" carried on by him and is on that account liable to be computed under section 10 of the 1922 Act, and it is a matter of no moment that the total profits of the partnership were computed in the manner provided by section 10 of the 1922 Act and allowances admissible to the partnership in the computation of the profits and gains were taken into account. Income of the partnership carrying on business is computed as business income. The share of the partner in the taxable profits of the registered firms liable to be included under section 23(5)(a)(ii ) of the 1922 Act in his total income is still received as income from business carried on by him. The Commissioner accepted, that the share of the respondent from the profits of the firms was income from business carried on by the partner. Business carried on by a firm is business carried on by the partners. Profits of the firm are profits earned by all the partners in carrying on the business. In the individual assessment of the partner, his share from the firm's business is liable to be taken into account under section 10(1) of the 1922 Act Being income from business, allowances appropriate under section 10(2) of the 1922 Act are admissible before the taxable income is determined.\nSection 23(5)(a)( ii) of the 1922 Act provides that the share of the partner in the profits and gains of a registered firm shall be included in the total income of the partner; and section 16(1)(b) of the 1922 Act requires that salary, interest, commission or other remuneration payable by the firm besides the share in the balance of profit is to be taken into account in determining the total income. But it is not thereby implied that expenditure properly allowable in earning the profits, salary, interest, commission or other remuneration is not to be allowed in determining the taxable total income of the partner. The receipt by the partner is business income for the purpose of section 10(1), of the 1922 Act and being business income, expenditure necessary for the purpose of earning that income and appropriate allowances are deductible therefrom in determining the taxable income of the partner.\nThe appeal failed and was dismissed.\nNote : The case has been decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\nDecision of the Calcutta High Court in Ishwardas Subhkara v. CIT [Income-tax Reference No. 38 of 1952 decided on June 2, 1953] overruled. Decision of the Patna High Court in CIT v. Ramnik Lal Kothari [1964] 54 ITR 232, affirmed.\nDecision of Bombay High Court in Shantikumar Narottam Morarji v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 69 and of Madras High Court in Basantlal Gupta v. CIT [1963]50 ITR 541 approved.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nJitmal Bhuramal v. CIT [1959] 37 ITR 528 (Pat.), Jitmal Bhuramal v. CIT [1962] 44 ITR 887 (SC), Ishwardas Subhkaran v. CIT [IT Reference No. 38 of 1952 dated 2-6-1953], CIT v. Ramnik Lal Kothari [1964] 54 ITR 232 (Pat.), Shautikumar Narottam Morarji v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 69 (Bom.) and Basantlal Gupta v. CIT [1963] 50 ITR 541 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2),66(1),10,23(5)(a)(ii),16(1)(b)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10(2),66(1),10,23(5)(a)(ii),16(1)(b)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 575 and 576 of 1966. March 7, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "J. C. SHAH AND A. N. GROVER, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, BIHAR\nvs\nRAMNIKLAL KOTHARI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11933",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1972 70 = 1972 SLD 70 = (1972) 84 ITR 685",
    "Key Words:": "Section 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Hindu undivided family - Assessable as - Assessment years 1949-50 and 1950-51 - Till assessment year 1948-49, assessee filed his return of income as an individual, but for assessment years in question assessee filed his return of income showing status of family as HUF consisting of himself and his sons - Assessing authority did not accept statement of declaration of assessee and assessed him as an individual - Whether there was an unequivocal declaration on part of assessee giving up or abandoning his interests in self-acquired property and throwing it in common stock, thus impressing it with character of coparcenary property and when once that was done, it ceased to be separate or self-acquired property and acquired character of joint family property - Held, yes - Whether fact that ITO did not accept his statement was absolutely of no consequence, because it was conduct of assessee that mattered and so long as he, out of his own volition, declared impressing self-acquired property belonging to him with character of coparcenary property, no other formality is required - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was carrying on business in rice and cashewnuts. Till the assessment year 1948-49, the assessee filed his return as an individual but for the assessment years in question the assessee filed his return showing the status of the family as HUF with two major sons. The Assessing authority did not accept the statement or declaration of the assessee and assessed him as an individual.\nOn appeal :\nHELD\nThe statement made by the assessee was not an isolated one or made for any one single year. The statement that it was a Hindu undivided family was repeated by him when he submitted the returns for the next year also. Ever since the assessee became a major, he was carrying on business in rice and cashewnuts started a rice mill and submitted the income-tax returns as evidenced by the several returns filed by him from 1924 onwards. It was not a case where the declaration made by the assessee was upon ignorance of the true position or with the sole object of evading payment of higher income-tax for he had paid the income-tax showing the status of the assessee as an individual from 1924 till 1948. If it was a question of gaining some benefit or advantage for himself, he would have certainly resorted to the method of making an untrue declaration much earlier than 1948. Further, no explanation had been offered by him as to why he had to make such a declaration not once, but in two years, if he did not really intend to impress the property, viz., the rice mill business, with the character of the joint family or coparcenary property. If the assessee had no intention of abandoning his rights in the self-acquired property, viz., the rice mill, there was absolutely no need for him to make a declaration in the manner he did in the income-tax returns. The fact that the ITO did not accept his statement was absolutely of no consequences, because it was the conduct of the assessee that matters and so long as he, out of his own volition, declared impressing the self-acquired property belonging to him with the character of coparcenary property, no other formality was required. The fact that he made a feeble attempt to deny fifteen years later, that too in his evidence unable to find any other answer, made believe that he abandoned his separate rights in the rice mill, the income from which was being assessed to tax. When once the self-acquired property is impressed with the character of coparcenary property, it ceases to be a separate or self-acquired property. He cannot undo what has been once done, namely, impressing the self-acquired property with the character of coparcenary property. Each case has to be judged having regard to the facts and surrounding circumstances of that case, whether the assessee intended to abandon his rights and make an unequivocal declaration, had to be inferred from the facts and surroundings circumstances of the case. It was not the case of the assessee that he made the declarations with a view to gain any advantage or for the reason that he was ignorant of the true position of law. Nothing prevented him from putting forth such a defence. Therefore, it was manifest from his own conduct and in the absence of any explanation that it was a statement deliberately made out of his own volition abandoning or giving up his interests in the self-acquired property, and impressing it with the character of joint family property. In the instant case, the facts were sufficient to establish that there was an unequivocal declaration on the part of the assessee giving up or abandoning his interests in the self-acquired property and throwing it in the common stock, thus impressing it with the character of coparcenary property and when once that was done, it ceased to be the separate or self-acquired property and acquired the character of joint family property. Whatever rights he had in rice mills till the date he made declarations, in the returns filed for the relevant assessment years he surrendered those rights in that separate or self-acquired property and impressed it, by the exercise of his volition, with the character of joint family property and the character of the property did not change thereafter even if he chose to repudiate the same. Therefore, the order of ITO was of no consequence.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nGoli Eswariah v. CGT [1970] 76 ITR 675 (SC), Govind Narain Mathur v. Mohini Devi [1960] ILR 10 Raj. 1219, Kanakarathanammav. Loganatha Mudaliar AIR 1965 SC 271, Madan Lal v. Controller of Estate Duty [1969] 74 ITR 84 (Raj.), Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai v. Desai Mallapa AIR 1961 SC 1260, G. Narayana Raju v. Chamaraju AIR 1968 SC 1276, Pearey Lal v. Nanak Chand AIR 1948 PC 108, Rukhmabai v. Laxminarayan AIR 1960 SC 335 and Subramania Iyer v. CIT [1955] 28 ITR 352 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "OBUL REDDI AND VENKATESWARA RAO, JJ.",
    "": "Gundlapalli Mohan Rao\nv.\nGundlapalli Satyanarayana"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11934",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1972 71 = 1972 SLD 71 = (1972) 84 ITR 720",
    "Key Words:": "Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Revision - Of other orders - Whether where a revision application was disposed of by Commissioner after taking into consideration written submission of assessee but no date was fixed for hearing either party or his counsel, order passed by Commissioner was bad in law and same was liable to be quashed - Held, yes\nFACTS\nA letter was sent to the petitioner assessee by the respondent Commissioner requesting him to make written submissions in support of the grounds taken by him in the revision application. The petitioner did not respond to that letter. A second letter was, therefore, sent to him calling upon him to support his grounds by written submissions. The petitioner sent written submissions in a letter. The Commissioner disposed of the revision application after having taken into consideration the written submissions, but no date was fixed for hearing either the party or his advocate.\nOn writ :\nHELD\nA written submission cannot be substituted for an oral argument before the Commissioner who should have fixed a date for hearing and given an opportunity to the party to say what he had got to say through his counsel. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dwarka Nath v. ITO [1965] 57 ITR 349 , it was held that the Commissioner should have fixed a date for hearing of the case. It is always open to the parties to present their case through a counsel. As this opportunity had not been given, the impugned order of the Commissioner could not be supported. The order of the Commissioner was quashed and remanded the case to him for disposal.\nThe writ petition was accordingly allowed.\nNote : The case has been decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nVenilal Dwarkadas Mehta v. CIT [1972] 84 ITR 722 (Ori.) and Amilal Agrawalla v. CIT [1972] 84 ITR 723 (Ori.).",
    "Court Name:": "Orissa High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "G.K. MISRA, C.J. AND B.C. DAS, J.",
    "": "Dulal Chand Pramanick\nv.\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11935",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1972 72 = 1972 SLD 72 = (1972) 84 ITR 811",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "H.R. KHANNA, CJ AND P.N. KHANNA, J.",
    "": "Associated Cement Companies Ltd.\nv.\nDirector of Inspection, Customs and Central Excise"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11936",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1972 73 = 1972 SLD 73 = (1972) 84 ITR 722",
    "Key Words:": "Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 33A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Revision - Of other orders - Assessee filed revisions against orders imposing penalty under section 46(1) of 1922 Act, for non-payment of tax which were disposed of by Commissioner under section 33A(2) without hearing assessee - Whether in view of decision of Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath v. ITO [1965] 57 ITR 349, order of Commissioner was to be quashed and a writ of mandamus was to be issued commanding Commissioner to hear assessee in revisions - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee filed revisions against the orders imposing penalty under section 46(1) of the 1922 Act, for non-payment of tax which were disposed of under section 33A(2) of 1922 Act without hearing the assessee. The assessee accordingly filed a review application asking for the hearing of the revisions in his presence which was disposed of after giving a hearing to the assessee on the question whether he was entitled to hearing in the revisions. Hence the assessee filed application for quashing the aforesaid orders refusing to give the assessee an opportunity of being heard in the revisions.\nHELD\nThere was some controversy with regard to the right of the assessee to be heard at the revisional state. The Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath v. ITO [1965] 57 ITR 349 expressed the view that an order assailed before the Commissioner in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 33A(2) of 1922 Act affects the rights of the assessee and the jurisdiction conferred under that section is a judicial one. In that view of the matter, the assessee is entitled to a hearing in revision. In view of the Supreme Court decision, the orders refusing to give the assessee an opportunity of being heard in the revisions was to be quashed and a writ of mandamus was issued commanding the Commissioner to hear the assessee in the revisions. The writ application was allowed.\nThe case was decided in favour of the assessee.",
    "Court Name:": "Orissa High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "G.K. MISRA, C.J. AND R.N. MISRA, J.",
    "": "Venilal Dwarkadas Mehta\nv.\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11937",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1963 38 = 1963 SLD 38 = (1963) 49 ITR 687 = (1964) 8 TAX 138",
    "Key Words:": "Section 64 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 16(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Transfer of assets - For benefit of spouse etc. - Assessment year 1958-59 - Assessee was partner in a firm which consisted of assessee, his two minor married daughters and their husbands - Whether assessee's married minor daughters could not fall within category of 'wife' under section 16(3)(a)(i) of 1922 Act and they could only be admitted to benefits of partnership - Held, yes - Whether therefore, share income of minor married daughters from firm was assessable in hands of assessee - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was one of the partners of a firm consisting of himself, his two minor married daughters namely 'R' and 'M', and their husbands. The department included the income of the married minor daughters from the firm in computing total income of the assessee. The assessee's contention that the said inclusion was not warranted by section 16(3) of the 1922 Act, was rejected by the Tribunal.\nOn reference :\nHELD\nIt is evident from sub-clause (i ) of clause (a) of section 16(3) of the 1922 Act that the wife contemplated by that sub-clause is a wife capable of being a member of a partnership. 'R' and 'M' being minors could not fall within that category. The Indian Partnership Act, 1932, makes it quite clear that in order to become a partner the person concerned must be a major according to the law to which the person is subject, and that a minor can only be admitted to the benefits of a partnership\nAccording to section 2(6B) of the 1922 Act, the expression \"\"firm\"\", \"\"partner\"\" and \"\"partnership\"\" when used in that Act will have-unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context \"\"the same meaning respectively as in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, (IX of 1932) : Provided that the expression 'partner' includes any person who being a minor has been admitted to the benefits of partnership\"\". It is significant that the expression \"\"partner\"\" is not used in connection with the wife in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 16(3) of the 1922 Act. If it had been used, it would have been possible to contend that the proviso is attracted and that the expression \"\"partner\"\" includes also minor wives like 'R' and 'M' who had been admitted to the benefits of partnership.\nThe Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that the assessment of the shares income of the minor married daughters in the hands of the their father, the assessee, invoking the provisions of section 16(3)(a )(ii) of the 1922 Act was legal.\nNote: The case has been decided in favour of the revenue.",
    "Court Name:": "Kerala High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=64\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=64\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=16(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE CASE NO. 1 OF 1961, SEPTEMBER 24, 1962",
    "Judge Name:": "M.S. MENON, C.J. AND P. GOVINDAN NAIR, J.",
    "": "Kumaraswamy Reddiar\nv.\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11938",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1963 39 = 1963 SLD 39 = (1963) 49 ITR 671 = (1964) 8 TAX 142",
    "Key Words:": "Section 64 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 16(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Transfer of assets for benefit of spouse, etc. - Assessment year 1958-59 - Whether share income of minor child can be included in income of individual only when minor child has been admitted to benefits of partnership - Held, yes - Assessee's wife was partner in a firm - She died intestate leaving behind assessee and her minor daughter as her heirs - A fresh agreement between assessee acting for himself and as guardian of his minor daughter and other two partners was entered into - Minor was treated as partner in aforesaid firm and it was nowhere stated in partnership deed that she was admitted only to benefits of partnership - Firm was not granted registration by ITO but was assessed under section 23(5)(b) of 1922 Act - Total income of firm was allocated among partners - Whether, on facts, share income of minor could be included in income of assessee under section 16(3)(a)(ii) of 1922 Act - Held, no\nFACTS\nThe assessee's wife was the lessee of a cinema theatre. She entered into partnership with 'P' for running of the said theatre. She died intestate leaving assessee and her minor daughter as her heirs. The assessee acting for himself and as guardian of minor daughter, entered into a fresh agreement with 'P' and only other person and filed an application for renewal of registration of firm. The renewal of registration was rejected on the ground that the aforesaid new firm was never granted any registration. Later the assessment of the firm was made under section 23(3) read with section 23(5)(b) of the 1922 Act, and the total income of the firm was allocated amongst the partners as shown. The assessment order showed that the minor daughter of the assessee was shown as a partner in the firm. Thereafter, in the individual assessment of the assessee, the share income of the minor daughter from the aforesaid firm was included as the income of the assessee. The appeals of the assessee before the AAC and the Tribunal failed.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nThe partners are individually assessable where a registered firm is assessed under the provisions of section 23(5)(a) of the 1922 Act. The partners of the unregistered firm are also individually assessable on their share in the total income of the firm when the ITO treats the unregistered firm as a registered firm under clause (b) of sub-section (5) of section 23. In the instant case, the ITO had refused the renewal of registration, but had treated the firm as a registered firm under clause (b) of section 23(5). Now, the appeal that is contemplated under the second proviso to section 30(1) of the 1922 Act is against the determination of the amount of total income or loss of the firm and apportionment thereof between the several partners. Admittedly, the assessee who had been treated as a partner of this firm had not appealed under the second proviso, though he had a right of appeal either against the determination of the total income of the firm, or apportionment of that income amongst the partners. That being the position, even if it was assumed that there was no validly constituted firm under the aforesaid deed, assessee would be precluded from contending that no firm was constituted under the deed of 27-3-1957. The assessee would also be precluded from challenging the determination of the total income of that firm, and he would also be precluded from challenging the allocation of the total income of the firm as amongst its four partners.\nTo enable the ITO to include the income of a minor child in the income of an individual, it must first be established that the individual is a partner in a partnership firm, and that the minor has been admitted to the benefits of that partnership. In the view taken, the assessee was precluded from contending that he was not a partner in the partnership firm; but that did not preclude him from agitating that the income of his minor daughter, could not be included in his own income because the minor daughter had not been admitted to the benefits of partnership. The question had not been decided by the Tribunal.\nIt was clear from the statement of the case that the application for renewal of registration was signed on behalf of minor. It was also clear that in the application the minor had been shown as a partner and not as a person admitted to the benefits of partnership.\nThe finding of the ITO was that the minor was also a partner along with the assessee in the said firm and it was on this basis that her income had been included in the income of the assessee.\nIt was indeed true that the share income of the minor child could be included in the income of the individual only when the minor child had been admitted to the benefits of the partnership. But it was difficult to infer from that that when the ITO included the share income of a minor child in the income of the individual, one must in that order read a finding recorded by the ITO to the effect that, in his opinion, the minor child had been admitted to the benefits of partnership.\nThe provisions of section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, showed that the minor is not a party to the agreement of formation of the partnership. The agreement for the formation of the partnership is between adult members, and when all these adult members consent, a minor gets admitted to the benefits of partnership. When he is admitted to the benefits of partnership, he is entitled to a share in the profits. His share, as agreed to by the major partners, is liable for the acts of the firm, but there is no personal liability on him for the acts of the firm.\nThe agreement was between the assessee acting for himself and as natural guardian of his minor daughter, party of one part, and 'P' as parties of the other part.\nThis deed had been signed by the assessee for himself and also for the minor in his capacity as father and natural guardian. The deed also was signed by other partners. In view of the circumstances that the deed nowhere said that the minor had been admitted only to the benefits of partnership, the assessee acting both on his own behalf and on behalf of his minor daughter, showing both of them as parties to the instrument, as signing the instrument on behalf of both as other partners had the distribution of profits to the minor as to any other partner, and absence of any saying clause in respect of the liability of the minor for loss, it was not possible, on a true construction of the instrument, to hold that the minor had been admitted only to the benefits of partnership and had not been admitted as a partner. Thus, the minor not having been admitted to the benefits of partnership, it was difficult to uphold the orders of the income-tax authorities and of the Tribunal including her share income in the income of the assessee under section 16(3)(a)( ii) of the 1922 Act.\nNote: The case has been decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Dwarkadas Khetan & Co. [1961] 41 ITR 528 (SC), CIT v. Khetan & Co. [1962] 45 ITR 170 (Cal.), M.P. Davis v. Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax [1959] 35 ITR 803 (SC), Pt. Deo Sharma v. CIT [1961] 41 ITR 235 (All.).",
    "Court Name:": "Bombay High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=64\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=64\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 53 OF 1961, OCTOBER 11, 1962",
    "Judge Name:": "Y.S. TAMBE, AG., C.J. AND V.S. DESAI, J.",
    "": "Cursetji J. Dubash\nv.\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11939",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 336 = 1974 SLD 336 = (1974) 30 TAX 118 = (1969) 73 ITR 634 = 1974 PTD 99",
    "Key Words:": "Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Business expenditure - Allowability of - Assessment year 1945-46 - Assessee-company appointed a firm managed by two group of families as its managing agent - Under management agency agreement remuneration was payable for services rendered by managing agents for promotion of assessee-company and for rendering services to company - However subsequently there was dispute between two groups of families in said firm which had been appointed as assessee's managing agent - Assessee terminated management agency of said firm for which it had to pay compensation to them - Said compensation paid was claimed as deduction under section 10(2)(xv) which was disallowed by ITO, AAC and also by Tribunal - Before Tribunal assessee failed to produce any evidence regarding any services provided by managing agents - Assessee also made no effort to state that how its business would have suffered by quarrels between two group of families - Whether expenditure incurred for remunerating persons who had promoted company was not in law a revenue expenditure admissible under section 10(2)(xv) of Act 1922 and if no services were rendered by managing agents, remuneration must be regarded as exclusively payable for services rendered by managing agents in promotion of company - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, expenditure could not, in circumstances, be said to be incurred wholly and exclusively in interest of business of company - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe shares of the Assessee-company were held in equal moities by members of two families, 'S' and 'G',. Under a deed S and G formed a partnership to carry on, in the name of 'BK', several businesses including the business of secretaries, treasurers and agents of the company. By agreement the company appointed the firm 'BK' as its managing agents. Under the articles of association of the company appointed two ex-officio directors nominated by \"\"BK\"\" under the managing agency agreement provided for remuneration and period for which said agreement would remain in force and their removal thereafter etc.\nDisputes arose between the family 'S' and 'G' in regard to the management of the various businesses in which they were interested. These disputes were referred for adjudication of Arbitrator. Under the award the arbitrator allotted certain businesses exclusively to S and the rest to G. In regard to the managing agency of the company, the award directed that the 'S' group do withdraw from the company and the shares held by them be given to the G.\nIn these circumstances the shareholders of the company at their meeting also passed a resolution that the managing agents be dismissed from the office and the managing agency agreement be terminated.\nThereafter the members representing the 'S' claimed compensation from the company for wrongful termination of the managing agency. The G also made a claim for compensation and threatened to bring an action against the company. By agreement, the disputes between the company and the firm 'BK' were referred to the arbitration.\nThe Arbitrator held that that the termination of the managing agency 'BK' and their removal from the office of managing agents of the company, was wrongful awarded compensation to the firm \"\"BK\"\".\nPayment was thereafter made by the company in pursuance of this award and certain were disbursed as expenses of arbitration.\nThe ITO rejected the claim of the company to treat as a permissible allowance under section 10(2)(xv) of Act, 1922, the amount paid as compensation and expenses of arbitration. He held that the expenditure incurred was not connected with the business of the company and in any event it was capital expenditure. The order of ITO has upheld by the AAC.\nOn further appeal the Tribunal rejected the claim of the assessee-company for treating the compensation paid to the managing agents and legal expenses in relation thereto as a permissible deduction in the computation of its total income.\nThe company submitted an application under section 66(1) of Act, 1922 to the Tribunal for submitting a statement of case and prayed. The Tribunal rejected the application holding that no question of law arose out of its order. The company then moved an application in the High Court requesting that the Tribunal be directed to state a case.\nThe High Court directed the Tribunal to state a case on questions of law arising out of its order. Pursuant to that order, the Tribunal on referred questions to the High Court.\nThe company was apparently dissatisfied with the question referred by the Tribunal and filed a petition in the High Court praying that certain questions set out in the application be decided along with the question already referred and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal be directed to amend the statement of case and to refer the additional questions also to the High Court for decision. The High Court, in purported exercise of the powers under section 66(4) of Act, 1922 called upon the Tribunal to submit another statement of case. Accordingly the Tribunal submitted another statement of case.\nThe High Court held that the expenditure in question was not made wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the company's business and was by way of distribution of profits, and being wholly gratuitous of \"\"for some improper or oblique purpose outside the course of business management\"\", it could not be treated as a permissible deduction.\nOn appeal to Supreme Court.\nHELD\nAs to the question whether the High Court acted with jurisdiction in calling for a second statement of case on question which were not incorporated in the applications under sections 66(1) and (2) of the Act after the Tribunal had submitted a statement of case in response to the order under section 66(2); Under section 66(1) the assessee or the Commissioner may by application in the prescribed form within the period provided require the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order and the Tribunal is enjoined by law to draw up a statement of case and refer it to the High Court. If on any application made under sub-section (1) the appellate Tribunal refuses to the state a case on the ground that no question of law arises, the assessee or the Commissioner may, if he is not satisfied with the correctness of the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, make an application to the High Court to require the Appellate Tribunal to state the case and to refer it to the High Court and on receipt of any such requisition the Tribunal shall state the case and refer it. If the High Court is not satisfied with the statement of case referred under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 66 and the facts are not sufficient to enable determination of the question raised thereby, the Court may, in exercise of the power under sub-section (4), refer the case back to the Appellate Tribunal to make such additions thereto or alterations therein as the court may direct in that behalf. Under sub-section (5) of section 66 the High Court upon hearing any such case shall decide the question of law raised thereby.\nIt is also well settled that in an application under section 66(2) of Act 1922 the High Court cannot order that a case be stated on question which were not included in the application submitted under section 66(1).\nThe High Court was, therefore, incompetent to call upon the Tribunal to submit a statement of case on questions of fact or questions which were not incorporated in the application under section 66(1).\nThe company in its application under section 66(2) requested that a statement of case be called for in respect of only two questions. Thereafter the company applied to the High Court for an order that other question which were neither incorporated in the application under section 66(1) nor in the application under section 66(2) be submitted to the High Court. The High Court had no power, to grant that application.\nThe power under section 66(4) may be exercised when the High Court is not satisfied that the statements in a case referred are sufficient to determine the question referred thereby; it cannot be exercised for calling for another statement on questions not referred by the Tribunal. The procedure followed by the High Court in calling for, in exercise of the power under section 66(4), an additional statement of the case on questions which were not incorporated in the applications under sections 66(1) and (2) was, irregular.\nCorrectness of an order of the High Court calling for a statement of case may be challenged at the hearing of the reference and the court may decline to answer the question referred pursuant to the direction of the High Court, if it did not arise out of the order of the Tribunal, or is a question of fact or is academic or could not have been raised because it was not incorporated in the application under section 66(1);\nIt could not be held that the finding of the Tribunal that no services were rendered by the managing agents was based on 'surmises and conjectures', or that it was based on no evidence. The burden of proving that services were rendered by the managing agents for earning the remuneration lay upon the assessee-company, and if no reliable evidence was forthcoming, the Tribunal was competent to reach the conclusion it did.\nThe recitals in the agency agreement which authorised the managing agents to do certain acts could not be a substitute for evidence that those acts were done by the managing agents. The assessee had made no effort to enlighten the Tribunal on how the business of the company would have suffered by the quarrels between the family 'G' and 'S'. Even prior to the termination of the contract of the managing agents of the company, the family 'S' had no effective voice in the management of the firm. No representative of the 'S' was on the board of directors prior to the termination of the contract. If in that state of evidence the Tribunal concluded that quarrels between the family 'G' and 'S' could in no way harm or put hindrance in the normal day to day working of the company, the finding could not be again said to be based on surmises the conjectures.\nIt was not suggested that the affairs of the company were mismanaged. The management of the company was conducted after termination of management agency in the same manner and by the same directors as it was originally conducted. A futile threat about appointment of recover by court could not reasonably be taken into consideration, and was not apparently taken into account, for determining the managing agency agreement. That plea was apparently not even suggested before the Tribunal.\nThe burden of proving that the expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business lay upon the company and no evidence was led and not even an attempt was made to explain how the affairs of the company would have been prejudiced by the disputes pending between the family 'S' and 'G'.\nThe remuneration payable under the managing agency agreement was for a two-fold consideration - (1) the services rendered by the managing agents in the promotion of the company; and (2) for rendering services to the company. Expenditure incurred for remunerating the persons who had promoted the company was not in law a revenue expenditure admissible under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act 1922 and if no services were rendered by the managing agents, the remuneration must be regarded as exclusively payable for the services rendered by the managing agents in the promotion of the company. The expenditure could not, in the circumstances, be said to be made wholly and exclusively in the interest of the business of the company.\nThe Tribunal had stated in its order that under the award of the adjudicator each party had to pay the other large sums, and a device was adopted to provide funds in the hands of the parties at the expense of the company for settling their individual accounts; and that 'in preparing the scheme the authors had made an effort to reduce the tax liability of the company by claiming the amount as a revenue deduction'. The Tribunal appeared to have reached this conclusion from the terms of the award of the adjudicator the settlement between S and G of the Civil Suit by consent decree by a supplementary award which provided for distribution of compensation which it was expected 'would be receivable' for determination of the managing agency, and the ultimate award of Arbitrator which contained a mere bald decision and no reasons in support thereof. The question raised by the Tribunal for the decision of the High Court, was whether there was any material on which the conclusion of the Tribunal could be justified, and, there was ample material on which the conclusion could be founded. The answer recorded by the High Court was, on the question referred by the Tribunal by their statement was right. The High Court was also right in declining to record formal answer on the other questions.\nNote : The appeal was dismissed.\nDecision was against the assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\nDecision in Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT [1966] 61 ITR 744 -was affirmed.\nN.V. Khandvala v. CIT [1946] 14 ITR 635 (Bom.) - approved.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. [1961] 42 ITR 589 (SC) and CIT v. New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. [1959] 37 ITR 11 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(xv),66(2),66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(xv),66(2),66(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 2139 of 1966. September 3, 1968",
    "Judge Name:": "J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ",
    "": "LAKSHMIRATAN COTTON MILLS CO. LTD\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, U. P"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11940",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 337 = 1974 SLD 337 = (1974) 31 TAX 1 = (1966) 59 ITR 767 = 1989 PTD 93",
    "Key Words:": "Section 7 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 - Valuation of assets - Immovable properties - Assessment year 1957-58 - For assessment year 1957-58, assessee-company had made a revaluation of its assets and shown in balance sheet appreciated value on revaluation of assets introducing a certain sum in capital reserve surplus - WTO accepted said valuation of fixed assets under section 7(2) rejecting plea of assessee that assets should be valued at market rate under section 7(1) - Whether since there was nothing on record to disclose why figures showed in balance-sheet did not represent correct value of assets, WTO was justified in accepting said valuation of fixed assets - Held, yes\nSection 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 - Net wealth - Debt owed - Assessment year 1957-58 - Directors of assessee-company showed in profit and loss account for relevant assessment year a sum as dividend proposed to be distributed for that year and declared said amount as dividend at general body meeting of company - Whether since directors could not distribute dividends but could only recommend to general body of company quantum of divided to be distributed and as on valuation date nothing had happened than a mere recommendations by directors as to amount of dividend to be distributed, it could not be said that there was any debt owed by assessee to shareholders on valuation date - Held, yes\nSection 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 - Net wealth - Debt owed - Assessment year 1957-58 - Whether liability to pay income-tax is a debt within meaning of section 2(m) and, therefore, deductible in computing net wealth of an assessee - Held, yes\nFACTS\nDuring the year ended 31-3-1957, the assessee-company had made a revaluation of its assets. The balance-sheet as on 31-3-1957, showed the appreciated value on revaluation of the assets at Rs. 2,60,52,357 and a certain sum, was introduced in capital reserve surplus: representing the increase in the value of the assets. Further the directors of the assessee-company showed in the profit and loss account for the said year a sum of Rs. 15,29,855 was shown as the amount of dividend proposed to be distributed for that year. The said amount was declared as dividend at the general body meeting of the company held on 27-1-1957. The said balance-sheet as on 31-3-1957, also showed a provision for taxation amounting to Rs. 1,03,69,009 and as against the said amount a sum of Rs. 84,76,690 was shown as the taxes paid during the said accounting year.\nIn computing the net wealth, the WTO accepted the said valuation of the fixed assets under section 7(2), rejecting the plea of the assessee that each item of the assets should be valued at the market rate under section 7(1) thereof. He also disallowed the claim of the assessee in respect of the proposed dividend and estimated income-tax and super-tax on the ground that the said items were not debts on the valuation date, i.e., 31-3-1957, within the meaning of section 2(m). On appeal, the AAC confirmed the order of the WTO except to the extent of outstanding demand of income-tax for Rs. 30,305. On further appeals, the Appellate Tribunal, not only disallowed the claims of the assessee but also the demand of income-tax of Rs. 30,305. On reference the High Court upheld the order of the Tribunal.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court, the assessee contended that the revaluation was done for other purposes, that it did not represent the real value of the assets and that that fact was also reflected by the amount representing the difference being shown as a capital surplus.\nHELD\nUnder section 7 in the case of an assessee carrying on business the WTO may determine the net value of the assets of the business as a whole having regard to the balance-sheet of the business as on the valuation date. The balance-sheet as on 31-3-1957, showed the appreciated value on revaluation of the assets at Rs. 2,60,52,357 and a certain sum, was introduced in capital reserve surplus: representing the increase in the value of the assets. The revaluation was done for other purposes, that it did not represent the real value of the assets and that that fact was also reflected by the amount representing the difference being shown as a capital surplus. There was nothing on the record to disclose why the figure showed in the balance-sheet did not represent the correct value of the assets. The fact that the said increase was shown as capital surplus would not detract from the correctness of the valuation, for the corresponding balancing figure had to be introduced in the balance-sheet. Under section 211 of the Companies Act, 1956, every balance-sheet of a company must give a true and fair view of the state of its affairs as at the end of the financial year. When the assessee himself had shown the net value of the assets at a figure, the WTO, rightly accepted it, as no one could know better the value of the assets than the assessee himself. It was open to the assessee to convince the authorities that the said figure was inflated for acceptable reasons; but it did not make any such attempt. It was also open to the WTO to reject the figure given by the assessee and to substitute in its place another figure, if he was, for sufficient reasons, satisfied that the figure given by the assessee was wrong. But he did not find any such reasons to do so. When he accepted the figure shown by the assessee himself, he did the right thing and there was nothing to complain about the High Court was right in holding that the tribunal was justified in taking the value of the assets of the assessee as shown in its balance sheet on the valuation date.\nAs regards question of deductibility of proposed dividend; under section 2(m), \"\"net wealth\"\" means the amount by which the aggregate value computed in accordance with the provisions of the said Act of all the assets of the assessee on the valuation date is in excess of the aggregate value of all the debts owed by the assessee on the said date.\nThe directors cannot distribute dividends but they can only recommend to the general body of the company the quantum of dividend to be distributed. Under section 217 of the Indian Companies Act, there shall be attached to every balance-sheet laid before a company in general meeting a report by its Board of directors with respect to, inter alia, the amount, if any, which it recommends to be paid by way of dividend. Till the company in its general body meeting accepts the recommendation and declares the dividend, the report of the directors in that regard is only a recommendation which may be withdrawn or modified as the case may be. As on the valuation date nothing further happened than a mere recommendation by the directors as to the amount that might be distributed as dividend, it is not possible to hold that there was any debt owed by the assessee to the shareholders on the valuation date.\nAs regards third question of deductibility of provisions of taxation raised a serious controversy between the parties. On this question the High Court held that although the assessee was liable income-tax on the valuation date, the actual amount of the liability was not ascertained until sometime after the passing of the Finance Act and determination made by the income-tax authorities and, therefore, no debt was owed by the assessee on the valuation date.\nA few facts relevant to this question might be recapitulated. Under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, the WTO valued the net wealth of the assessee as on March 31, 1957, which was the valuation date as defined under the said Act. The Finance Act came into force on April 1, 1957. The question was whether the liability to pay income-tax and super-tax became a debt owed by the assessee on March 31, 1957, or on April 1, 1957 : if it was a debt on the latter date, it could not be deducted from the gross assets of the assessee to arrive at the net wealth ; if it was on the former date, it could be.\nUnder section 3 of the Wealth-tax Act, the net wealth of the assessee was assessable as on the valuation date, i.e., 31-3-1957, at the rate or rates specified in the Schedule to the said Act. \"\"Net wealth\"\" is the amount by which the aggregate value of the assets of the assessee as on the said date is in excess of the aggregate value of the debts owed by it on the said date. Under section 3 of the Income-tax Act, the assessee was liable to pay income-tax and super-tax on its income ascertained during the accounting year ending with 31-3-1957, at the rates prescribed under the Finance Bill or the previous Finance Act whichever was less, as the Finance Act of 1957 was passed only in September, 1957. On those facts, the question is whether the liability of the assessee to pay income-tax and super-tax arose on the valuation date, i.e., 31-3-1957, the last day of the accounting year, or subsequently during the assessment year,i.e., during the period 1-4-1957 to 31-3-1958.\nLooking at the problem from the standpoint of a businessman or looking at the question from a commonsense view, one will reasonably hold that the net wealth of an assessee during the accounting year is the income earned by him minus the tax payable by him in respect of that income. If a person earns Rs. 1,00,000 during the accounting year and has to pay Rs. 60,000 as tax in respect of that income, it will be incongruous to suggest that his wealth at the end of that year is Rs. 1,00,000. A reasonable man will say that his income is only Rs. 40,000, which represents his wealth at the end of the year. But it is said that what is just is not always legal. This court has, on more than one occasion, emphasized the fact that the real income of an assessee has to be ascertained on commercial principles subject to the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The problem presented can satisfactorily be solved by answering two questions, namely, (1) what does the expression \"\"debt owed\"\" mean ? and (2) when does the liability to pay income-tax and super-tax under the Income-tax Act become a debt owed within the meaning of that expression ?\nThere was no conflict on the definition of the word \"\"debt\"\". All the decisions agree that the meaning of the expression \"\"debt\"\" may take colour from the provisions of the concerned Act: it may have different shades of meaning. But the following definition is unanimously accepted :\n\"\"A debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in future by reason of a present obligation, debitum in praesenti, solvendum in futuro.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The said decisions also accept the legal position that a liability depending upon a contingency is not a debt in praesenti or in futuro till the contingency happened. But if there is a debt the fact that the amount is to be ascertained does not make it any the less a debt if the liability is certain and what remains is only the quantification of the amount. In short, a debt owed within the meaning of section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act can be defined as a liability to pay in praesenti or in futuro an ascertainable sum of money.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Under section 3 of the Income-tax Act, where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, the said Act. The expression \"\"charged\"\" is used both in the case of the Central Act, i.e., the Finance Act, and the Income-tax Act. It could not have been the intention of the legislature to charge the income to income-tax under two Acts. Necessarily, therefore, they are used in two different senses. The tax is to be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to, the provisions of the Income-tax Act, but the said charge will be in accordance with the rates prescribed under the Finance Act. This construction will harmonize the apparent conflict between the two Acts. When you look at section 2 of the Finance Act, it shows that income-tax shall be charged at the rates specified in Part I of the First Schedule, and super-tax, for purposes of section 55 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, shall be charged at the rates specified in Part II of the First Schedule. The primary object of the Finance Act is only to prescribe the rates so that the tax can be charged under the Income-tax Act. The Income-tax Act is a permanent Act, whereas the Finance Act is passed every year and its main purpose is to fix the rates to be charged under the Income-tax Act for that year. That should be the construction is also made clear by section 55 of the Income-tax Act, whereunder super-tax shall be charged for any year in respect of the total income of the previous year of any individual, HUF, company, etc., at the rate or rates laid down for that year by a Central Act. This section brings out the distinction between a tax charged and the rate at which it is charged. This construction is also emphasized by section 67B of the Income-tax Act, whereunder if, on the 1st day of April in any year, provision has not yet been made by a Central Act for the charging of income-tax for that year, the Income-tax Act shall nevertheless have effect until such provision is so made as if the provision in force in the preceding year or the provision proposed in the Bill then before Parliament, whichever is more favourable to the assessee, was actually in force. This shows that the charging section is only section 3 of the Income-tax Act, and that section 2 of the Finance Act only gives the rate for quantifying the tax; for, this section gives an alternative for quantification in the contingency of the Finance Act not having been made on the 1st day of April, of that year. Even if such an Act was made, the charge under the Income-tax Act could be imposed and worked out only in terms of the provisions of the Income-tax Act. If that be the construction, the conclusion will flow that the tax liability at the latest will arise on the last day of the accounting year.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "A debt is a present obligation to pay an ascertainable sum of money, whether the amount is payable in praesenti or in futuro : debitum in praesenti, solvendum in futuro. But a sum payable upon a contingency does not become a debt until the said contingency has happened. A liability to pay income-tax is a present liability though it becomes payable after it is quantified in accordance with ascertainable data. There is a perfected debt at any rate on the last day of the accounting year and not a contingent liability. The rate is always easily ascertainable. If the Finance Act is passed, it is the rate fixed by that Act ; if the Finance Act has not yet been passed, it is the rate proposed in the Finance Bill pending before Parliament or the rate in force in the preceding year, whichever is more favourable to the assessee. All the ingredients of a \"\"debt\"\" are present. It is a present liability of an ascertainable amount.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Looking from a practical standpoint also, there cannot possibly be any difficulty in ascertaining the liability. As the actual assessment will invariably be made subsequent to the close of the accounting year, the rate would certainly be available to the authorities concerned for the purpose of quantification.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "It was, therefore, held that the liability to pay income-tax is a debt within the meaning of section 2(m) and it arises on the valuation date during the accounting year.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Dissenting View - As Per Shah J.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The Wealth-tax Act, 1957, was brought into force on April 1, 1957. Section 3 of the Act imposes a charge for every financial year commencing on and from the first day of April, 1957, for tax in respect of the net wealth on the corresponding valuation date of every individual, HUF and company at the rate or rates specified in the Schedule. The expression \"\"valuation date\"\" by section 2(q) means in relation to any year for which an assessment is to be made the last day of the previous year as defined in clause (11) of section 2 of the Income-tax Act if an assessment were to be made under that Act for that year. \"\"Net wealth\"\" as defined in section 2(m ) at the relevant time meant the amount by which the aggregate value computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act of all the assets, wherever located, belonging to the assessee on the valuation date, including assets required to be included in the net wealth as on that date under the Act, is in excess of the aggregate value of all the debts owed by the assessee on the valuation date other than Charge of the wealth-tax under the Act is, it is plain, on the terms of section 3 imposed on the net wealth of the assessee computed on the valuation date after adjusting the debts owed by the assessee on that date and permitted to be taken into account. Unlike the Income-tax Act, the Wealth-tax Act prescribes the rate of tax, and prima facie by section 3 of the Act liability to pay wealth-tax gets crystallized on the valuation date, and not on the first day of the year of assessment.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The company claimed that in determining liability for wealth-tax, income-tax which would become payable on the income, profits or gains for the assessment year may be deemed a debt owed in the previous year, and liable to be adjusted in determining the aggregate value of debts for the purpose of section 2(m). The expression \"\"debt\"\" is a sum of money due from one person to another : it involves an obligation to satisfy liability to pay a sum of money. The liability must be an existing liability but not necessarily enforceable in praesenti : an existing liability to pay a sum of money even in future is a debt, but the expression does not include liability to pay unliquidated damages nor obligations which are inchoate or contingent. A debt, involves a present obligation incurred by the debtor and a liability to pay a sum of money in present or in future. The liability must, however, be to pay a sum of money, i.e., to pay an amount which is determined or determinable in the light of factors existing at the date when the nature of the liability has to be ascertained.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The Income-tax Act is the basic and permanent statute. Tax under that Act is directed to be charged in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Act in respect of the income of the previous year of the assessable entities, but the charge imposed by the Income-tax Act is an inchoate or incomplete charge. Until the annual Finance Act is passed, imposition of the charge of income-tax does not, on the plain words used in section 3, become complete or effective, for, income-tax is to be charged in accordance with the Income-tax Act, when the Finance Act for the year enacts that the tax shall be charged at the rate or rates prescribed thereby. Liability to be taxed is therefore declared by the Income-tax Act, but the liability does not give rise to a present obligation to pay a sum of money until the Finance Act becomes operative. It may be recalled that the liability to pay wealth-tax becomes crystallized on the valuation date though the tax is levied for the assessment year, and on the valuation date there is normally no completed or effective charge for income-tax payable for the assessment year.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Section 67B, inserted in the Act by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1940 (12 of 1940), on which reliance is placed by the company was enacted merely to maintain continuity of the levy of tax. It operates only on the first day of the assessment year, i.e., after the valuation date and not before. If on the first day of the financial year the Finance Act for charging income-tax for that year has not been enacted, the basic provisions of section 3 of the Act read with the provisions in force in the preceding year or with the provision then introduced in the Bill before Parliament whichever is more favourable to the assessee applies. The existence on the statute book of section 67B does not, convert what is an inchoate liability on the valuation date, i.e., on the last day of the previous year, into a completed or effective liability to pay tax.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "On the terms used in section 3 of the Income-tax Act, liability to be taxed becomes effective not later than the last day of the year of account. But the liability to pay tax arises only when the Finance Act becomes operative on the first day of April of the assessment year either by enactment of an Act or by virtue of section 67B of the Income-tax Act.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The company sought to deduct in its balance-sheet an estimated amount as the probable amount of tax which it would have to pay in the year of assessment. Out of this amount advance tax was deducted. In Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co. Ltd. 59 ITR 685 (SC) the Supreme Court held that liability to pay advance tax arises when a demand notice is issued under section 18A of the Act. For the balance taken into account in the balance-sheet there was no liability arising in the previous year which could be regarded as a debt owed by the company. Liability to be assessed to tax may and does arise under section 3 on the last day of the year of account. But that liability to tax did not give rise to any obligation to pay a sum of money either determined or determinable in the light of factors existing on that date. The liability at the earliest arises on the first day of April, 1957, but that under the Wealth-tax Act is not the valuation date.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "It is not, open to the court to put a strained construction upon the Act merely because a businessman may regard a liability to be taxed on the income of the previous year, as liability to pay tax on that income. To a commercial man the distinction between liability which arises immediately and a liability to arise in future may be blurred : but that in law is a real distinction, and a liability which arises in the year of assessment may not be projected into the account of the previous year. The provisions of the statute cannot be ignored on what are called \"\"business considerations\"\" and existence of a liability to pay a debt which has not in law arisen cannot be assumed. It is true that the company did earn profits in the previous year, and for the purpose of its balance-sheet it could make an estimate but that estimate had no relevance in ascertaining whether tax payable in the assessment year would be regarded as a debt owed on the valuation date. Liability to pay tax arose not from the estimate, but from the Finance Act: it arose when the Finance Act became operative and not earlier than that.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "By the section 7(1) the WTO is authorised to estimate, for the purpose of determining the value of any asset, the price which it would fetch, if sold in the open market on the valuation date. But this rule in the case of a running business may often be inconvenient and may not yield a true estimate of the net value of the total assets of the business. The legislature has therefore provided in sub-section (2)(a) that where the assessee is carrying on a business for which accounts are maintained by him regularly, the WTO may determine the net value of the assets of the business as a whole, having regard to the balance-sheet of such business as on the valuation date and make such adjustments therein as the circumstances of the case may require. But the power conferred upon the tax officer by section 7(2) is to arrive at a valuation of the assets, and not to arrive at the net wealth of the assessee. Section 7(2) merely provides machinery in certain special cases for valuation of assets, and it is from the aggregate valuation of assets that the net wealth chargeable to tax may be ascertained. The power conferred upon the tax officer to make adjustments as the circumstances of the case may require is also for the purpose of arriving at the true value of the assets of the business. Sub-section (2)(a ) of section 7 contemplates the determination of the net value of the assets having regard to the balance-sheet and after making such adjustments as the circumstances of the case may require. It does not contemplate determination of the net wealth, because net wealth can only be determined from the net value of the assets by making appropriate deductions for debts owed by the assessee. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 7 also does not support the contention of the assessee that, for the purposes of the Act, the net value of the assets of an assessee carrying on business is the same as his net wealth. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) contemplates cases where a company not resident in India is carrying on business and it is not possible to make a computation in accordance with clause (a), because of the absence of a separate balance-sheet of the company. The WTO is then entitled to take the net value of the assets of the business as a whole and to find the net value of the assets in India by multiplying the total value of the business with that fraction which the income arising from the business in India during the year ending on the valuation date bears to the aggregate income from the business wherever arising during the year. This is an artificial rule adopted with a view to avoid investigation of a mass of evidence which it would be difficult to secure or, if secured, may require prolonged investigation. The adoption of an artificial rule in clause (b) of section 7(2) is also for determination of the net value of assets and not for determination of the net wealth of the foreign company. It is true that clause (a) expressly confers power upon the tax officer to make adjustments in the valuation of assets in the balance-sheet, and in clause (b) no such power is conferred. But it must be remembered that under clause (b) the tax officer's powers in determining the income of a foreign company arising from the business in India and the aggregate income from the business wherever arising are not subject to any artificial rule. Neither clause (a) nor clause (b) of section 7(2) is directed towards the determination of the net wealth, and it would be impossible to hold that the legislature intended that the net wealth for the purpose of the charge to tax under section 3 should be the net value of the assets as determined under sub-section (2) of section 7.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Note : The case was decided partly in favour of assessee and partly in favour of revenue.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "CASE REVIEW",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The   of High Court of Calcutta in Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax [1963] 48 ITR 31 partly affirmed.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The   in Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Standard Mills Co. Ltd. [1963] 50 ITR 267 and CWT v. Travancore Rayons Ltd. [1964] 54 ITR 332overruled.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The   in CWT v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1964] 52 ITR 482 approved.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "CASE REFERRED TO",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "CWT v. Raipur Manufacturing Company Limited [1964] 52 ITR 482 (Guj.), CWT v. Standard Mills Co. Ltd. [1963] 50 ITR 267 (Bom.), CWT v.Travancore Rayons Limited [1964] 54 ITR 332 (Ker.), Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CWT [1963] 48 ITR 31 (Cal.), Banchharam Majumdar v. Adyanath Bhattacharjee [1909] ILR 36 Cal. 936 (FB), British Transport Commission v. Gourley [1956] A.C. 185, Chatturam v. CIT [1947] 15 ITR 302 (FC),CWT v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co. Ltd. [1966] 59 ITR 685 (SC), Dawson v. Preston [1955] 3 All E.R. 314, Doorga Prosad v. Secretary of State [1945]13 ITR 285 (PC), Doraisami Padayachi v. Vaithilinga Padayachi [1917] ILR 40 Mad. 31, Dunlop & Ranken Ltd. v. Hendall Steel Structures Ltd. [1957] 1 W.L.R. 1102, Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Bagnall Ltd. [1944] 1 All E.R. 204, Jabed Sheikh v. Taker Mallik [1940] 45 C.W.N. 519, Maharaja of Pithapuram v. CIT [1945] 13 ITR 221 (PC), O'Driscoll v. Manchester Insurance Committee [1915] 3 K.B. 499, People v. Arguello [1869] 37 Calif. 524,Sabju Sahib v. Noordin Sahib [1899] ILR 22 Mad. 139 (SB), Seabrook Estate Co. Ltd. v. Ford [1949] 2 All E.R. 94 and Webb v. Stenton [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 518.\"",
    "URL Link:": "Civil Appeal No. 539 of 1964. November 24, 1964",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957=7(2),7(1),2(m),27,7(2)(a)\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Act, 1957=7(2),7(1),2(m),27,7(2)(a)\\n\\r\\n\\rCompanies Act, 1956=211,217\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ",
    "Court Name:": "N. A. Palkhivala and S. T. Desai, Senior Advocates (R. K. Chaudhury, S. Murthi and B. P. Maheshwari with them), for the appellant. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Senior Advocate (N. D. Karkhanis, R. N. Sachthey, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. H. Dhebar with him), for the respondent",
    "Law and Sections:": "KESORAM INDUSTRIES AND COTTON MILLS LTD\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF Wealth Tax (CENTRAL), CALCUTTA",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11941",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 338 = 1974 SLD 338 = (1974) 30 TAX 158 = 1975 PTD 15 = 1975 PLD 260",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 2(4) -- Business -- Horse-racing and betting activities carried on for a number of years and yielding substantial profits -- Whether constitutes "business" within the meaning of sub-section (4) of Sec. 2 -- Held no -- Word "business", meaning of -- Interpretation of statutes -- Word " includes '' in interpretation clauses -- Connotation -- Words and phrases -- word "business" occurring in Section 2(4) -- Definition and connotation --",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(2),2(4),4(3)(vii),66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(2),2(4),4(3)(vii),66(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 30 of 1968, decision dated: 25-1-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "NOORUL ARFINN AND Z.A. CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX\nvs\nNEW CHINA GLASSWARE COMPANY"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11942",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 339 = 1974 SLD 339 = (1974) 30 TAX 146",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 18(3BB), 59 -- Income-tax Rules -- Rule 50 (as substituted by Notification No. S.R.O. 163(I)/72, dated 30-3-1972) -- Rule not prescribing any method or manner for calculating the amount of advance tax but providing ad-hoc deductions from the payments made to the assessee -- Whether ultra vires of the powers of the Central Board of Revenue under Section 18(3BB) read with Section 59 of the Income-tax Act -- Held yes --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Interim Constitution Act, of 1974=201\\n\\r\\n\\rInterim Constitution Act, of 1974=201\\n\\r\\n\\rGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=23\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome-tax Rules, 1950=50\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 787 of 1972, decision dated: 23-4-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD IQBAL C.J. AND MUHAMMAD AKRAM, J",
    "": "SH. ABDUL GHANI AND SONS AND OTHERS\nvs\nCENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11943",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 340 = 1974 SLD 340 = (1974) 30 TAX 111 = 1974 PTD 222",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Rules -- Rule 40 -- Business expenditure -- Insurance Company -- Engaged in non-life insurance business -- Expenses actually incurred -- Whether permissible deduction even if in excess or the expenditure permissible under or not authorised by Insurance Act or the rule made thereunder -- Held yes -- Insurance Company not engaged in life insurance business -- Assessing profits and gains of such assessee, Income-tax Officer not bound by provisions of Insurance Act, 1938 and Rules framed thereunder -- Income-tax Officer could allow business expenditure under S. 10 of Income-tax Act even if such expenditure be in excess and not permissible under Sections 40 and 40-C of Insurance Act or rule 40 of Insurance Rules -- Contravention of provision of Section 40-C -- Controller after promulgation of Ordinance XXXIII of 1961, not precluded or prohibited from condoning transaction which had taken place prior to promulgation of amending Ordinance XXXIII of 1961 --",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10,66,10(2)(xvi),Rule6(1) ofFirst Schedule,66(1),8,9,12,18,10(7)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10,66,10(2)(xvi),Rule6(1) ofFirst Schedule,66(1),8,9,12,18,10(7)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income-tax Reference No. 40 of 1968, decision dated: 22-2-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "NOORUL ARFIN AND Z.A. CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IANCOME TAX\nvs\nCRESCENT STAR INSURANCE CO, LTD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11944",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 341 = 1974 SLD 341 = (1974) 30 TAX 27 = 1974 PTD 200",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 13 proviso -- Rejection of accounts -- Manufacturer of bars, etc. -- Stock register and day-to-day manufacturing register not maintained as in the past, being neither feasible nor practicable -- Low profit rate as compared to preceding year -- Profit rate deductible from the method of accounting adopted -- Account books, whether liable to be rejected -- Held no -- Word "Opinion", meaning of -- Admission of new documentary evidence -- Statement prepared from account books already produced before Assessing Officer -- Does not constitute fresh material for purposes of S. 31(2-B) --\nStock books -- Material in transit -- Not material actual in hand and therefore cannot be properly included in stock in hand -- Opinion of Income-tax Officer -- Proviso does not give Income-tax Officer arbitrary, unguided, uncontrolled or naked power -- Line of business of assessee such that it was not practicable to maintain regular stock register or a manufacturing account -- Assessing authorities in previous year accepting method of accounting adopted by assessee and had found it possible to deduce and determine rate of profit of assessee -- Assessee's method of accounting in subsequent year cannot be rejected -- Mere fact that assessee chose to charge a low rate of profit -- No ground for rejecting profit as stated in return filed by assessee -- Nor absence of stock register (when assessee never used a stock register) any ground justifying assumption of Income-tax Officer that profits cannot be properly deduced from the return submitted --",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=13,proviso,66,31(2B)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=13,proviso,66,31(2B)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income-tax Reference No. 26 of 1968, decision dated: 8-3-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "NOORUL ARFIN AND Z.A. CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "STAR ROLLING MILLS\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11945",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 342 = 1974 SLD 342 = (1974) 30 TAX 16 = 1974 PTD 38",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 26A(1) (after amendment in 1965) Partnership deed -- Signature of partners, whether condition precedent for claiming registration -- Held yes -- Failure of partners to sign the deed -- Whether defect of technical nature -- Held no -- Whether renders the deed inoperative and invalid in law -- Held yes -- Carbon copy of the deed bearing signatures of partners at places meant for witnesses -- Whether ineffective -- Held yes -- Word \"\" Instrument '', meaning of --\nCorresponding Sections:\nIncome-tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Section 68(1) --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=26A(1),2(14),2(6B)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=26A(1),2(14),2(6B)\\n\\r\\n\\rPartnership Act, 1932=30(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 130/KB of 1972-73 (Assessment year 1971-72), decision dated: 28.12.1973",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MAZHAR ALI, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND K. SALAHUDDIN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11946",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 343 = 1974 SLD 343 = (1974) 30 TAX 6 = 1974 PTD 31",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 28, 34 -- Penalty -- Concealment of income -- Penalty proceedings initiated by one officer -- Order imposing penalty passed by successor -- Whether valid in law -- Held yes -- Penalty -- Concealment -- Approval to levy penalty -- Income-tax Officer proposing imposition of penalty after affording proper opportunity to the appellant and going through his explanation -- Inspecting Assistant Commissioner after satisfying himself by applying his mind referred the matter to Central Board of Revenue for administrative approval -- Penalty imposed by Income-tax Officer as approved by the Central Board of Revenue -- Order whether sustainable in law -- Held yes -- Penalty -- Proceedings started in the course of making original assessment -- Imposition of penalty in re-assessment proceedings -- Whether valid in law -- Held yes -- Penalty -- Concealment -- Burden of proof -- Explanation of assessee rejected as not satisfactory -- Burden of proof, whether, on the department -- Held yes -- Sufficient evidence on record to prove factum of concealment -- Imposition of penalty -- Whether sustainable in law -- Held yes -- Penalty -- Concealment -- Quantum of penalty -- Penalty imposed on firm -- Change in constitution during relevant period -- Entity which had no connection with the concealment -- Whether affected -- Held no -- Quantum of penalty in such event --\nWord \"\"he\"\" used in S. 28 -- Contention that \"\"he\"\" used in S. 28 refers to very Income-tax Officer who is satisfied during course of assessment proceedings about concealment and no other officer and that satisfaction of succeeding officer cannot be substituted for the original officer -- Held, subsequent officer in law could continue with proceedings and could impose penalty on facts about which his predecessor-in-office was satisfied --\nCorresponding Sections:\nIncome-tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Section 65 -",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=28,34,28(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=28,34,28(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A Nos. 44 and 1770 of 1962-63 (Assessment year 1954-55), decision dated: 4.4.1974",
    "Judge Name:": "M. T. SIDDIQUI, PRESIDENT AND M. M. AKBAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11947",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 62 = 1974 SLD 62 = (1974) 29 TAX 247",
    "Key Words:": "Sales-tax Act, 1951 -- Section 17(7) -- Reference to High Court -- Request for stay of recovery proceedings pending decision in the reference -- Grounds that recovery would impose unbearable financial burden and put enterprise into serious jeopardy -- Whether maintainable -- Held no --",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=17(7)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=17(7)\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=151\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal Nos. 392, 393 and 394 of 1972, decision dated: 10-7-1973",
    "Judge Name:": "HAMOODUR RAHMAN C.J., SALAHUDDIN AHMAD AND MUHAMMAD GUL, JJ",
    "": "GOVERNMENT JALLO & TURPENTINE FACTORY, Lahore High Court\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11948",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 61 = 1974 SLD 61 = (1974) 29 TAX 221",
    "Key Words:": "Sales-tax Act. 1951 -- Section 7 read with Notification No. 9 dated 27-6-1951 as amended by Notification No. 3 dated 16-3-1952 Section 17 -- Exemption -- Metal utensil exempt from sales tax -- Words "Metal utensil", whether means a receptacle or vessel made of metal commonly used in a household, specially in kitchen -- Held yes -- "Utensil", meaning of -- Statutes -- Rule of interpretation -- Provisions granting exemption -- Whether should be construed strictly -- Held yes -- Entitlement for such exemption -- Whether onus is on the claimant to prove -- Held yes -- Terms and phrases used in an statute of the Parliament -- Whether prima facie should be construed in their popular sense -- Held yes -- Reference to High Court -- Finding of fact -- Finding giving rise to ascertainment of true interpretation and scope of exemption allowed -- Whether gives rise to question of law -- Held yes-",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=7,17(1),3(1)(a)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=7,17(1),3(1)(a)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "P.T.R. No. 225 of 1972 (Tax Reference No. 222 of 1972), decision dated: 11-5-1973",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM AND MUHAMMAD AFZAL CHEEMA, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, RAWALPINDI ZONE, RAWALPINDI\nvs\nRASHID BURNER, SIALKOT"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11949",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 58 = 1974 SLD 58 = (1974) 29 TAX 125 = 1974 PTD 50 = 1974 PLD 98 = 1974 PLD 58",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 5(7A), 5(8) -- Jurisdiction -- Transfer of cases from one Income-tax Officer to another Income-tax Officer -- Jurisdiction of Central Board of Revenue and Commissioner of Income-tax -- Whether concurrent -- Held yes -- Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Section 24 -- Jurisdiction -- Transfer of case from one Income-tax Officer to another -- Exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (7A) -- Whether should be based on cogent and proper reasons -- Held yes -- Order of transfer of case for purposes foreign to Income-tax Act -- Whether maintainable -- Held no -- Provision of sub-section (8) -- Whether should be read with other provisions of Income-tax Act, including sub-section (7A) of Sec. 5 -- Held yes --\nTransfer of case from one Income-tax Officer to another -- Central Board of Revenue and Commissioner of Income-tax both have concurrent jurisdiction -- Notwithstanding earlier order of transfer by Central Board of Revenue, Commissioner of Income-tax competent to transfer case to another Income-tax Officer -- Central Board of Revenue, and Commissioner of Income-tax should, however, interfere as little as possible with each other's jurisdiction --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=5(7A),5(8),23(4),34(2B)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=5(7A),5(8),23(4),34(2B)\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=24\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income-tax reference No.12 of 1968, decision dated: 5-10-1973",
    "Judge Name:": "NOORUL ARFIN AND Z.A. CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "MUSTAFA R.C.C. PIPE WORKS, Karachi High Court\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, Karachi High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11950",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 59 = 1974 SLD 59 = (1974) 29 TAX 129 = 1974 PTD 41 = 1974 PLD 100",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 4(3)(vii), 66(1) -- Exemption -- Casual and non-recurring income -- Practicing Advocate -- Legal practice main source of income -- remuneration received for translation of religious books into English -- No claim or right to expect its recurrence -- Remuneration, whether casual and non-recurring and exempt from tax -- Held yes --\nReference to High Court -- Question of law or fact -- Tribunal's finding that the receipt in the hands of the assessee was of casual and non-recurring nature -- Finding based on appraisal of proved facts -- Tribunal's finding, whether gives rise to question of law -- Held no -- Mixed question of law and fact -- Whether can be raised for the first time before the High Court -- Held no - \nWords "Casual and non-recurring" -- Meaning -- In order that receipt may be "recurring receipt" there must be claim or right in assessee to expect its recurrence -- Voluntary payment (meager as compared to work done) made by a religious society to the assessee (an Advocate by profession) for translating a few religious books at instance of High Command of the sect -- Held, payment received by assessee was of casual and non-recurring nature despite fact that in past too the assessee had been receiving such payment for similar work done --\nFinding by Tribunal that the receipt in hands of assessee was "casual and non-recurring" in nature within meaning of S. 4(3)(vii) -- Finding, held, was a conclusion of fact drawn by Tribunal from proved facts before it and therefore did not raise any question of law --\nNew point -- Mixed question of law and fact raised for first time -- Not allowed --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=4(3)(vii),66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=4(3)(vii),66(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Reference/Tax Reference No.49 of 1967, decision dated: 22-10-1973",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM AND M.S.H. QURESHI, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NORTH ZONE (WEST PAKISTAN) Lahore High Court\nvs\nQAZI ABDUL HAMID, ADVOCATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11951",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 57 = 1974 SLD 57 = (1974) 29 TAX 123 = 1974 PTD 47 = 1974 PLD 101",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 15B(7) -- Industrial undertaking -- Exemption -- Textile mill -- Weaving machinery plant installed in the same premises where spinning plant was working -- Weaving section, whether independent, separate and different industrial undertaking -- Held yes -- Whether entitled to exemption independent of spinning section -- Held yes -- "Industrial undertaking" -- Question whether each and every addition to an industrial undertaking would itself amount to an "industrial undertaking" entitled to relief under S. 15-B {Quaere} -- Company, engaged in manufacture of textile goods, at first setting up plant for manufacture of cotton yarns -- Later a weaving section set up for manufacture of cloth from cotton yarns -- Company, in circumstances, entitled to relief separately under S. 15-B with respect to weaving section --",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=15B(7),15B(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=15B(7),15B(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income-tax Reference No.14 of 1968, decision dated: 5-10-1973",
    "Judge Name:": "NOORUL ARFIN AND Z.A.CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax\nvs\nDAWOOD COTTON MILLS LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11952",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 59 = 1974 SLD 59 = (1974) 29 TAX 120 = 1974 PTD 45 = 1974 PLD 99 = 1974 PLD 59",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 13 proviso -- Rejection of accounts -- Method of accounting employed and book results accepted -- Some of the cash sales and expenses not verifiable or vouched -- No attempt made by assessing officer or Tribunal to determine the proportion of unverified or unvouched cash sales and expenses to the total cash sales and expenses, respectively -- Whether book results liable to be rejected on these grounds -- Held no --\nRejection of accounts -- Whether can be based on mere guess and suspicion -- Held no -- Low figure of profits or even failure to maintain stock register -- Whether sufficient ground for rejection of book version -- Held no -- Method of accounting -- Income-tax authorities accepting method of accounting employed by assessee as well as results shown by assessee's books of accounts -- Authorities dissatisfied only with some cash sales which were not verifiable and some expenses which were not vouched for or verifiable -- Unless proportions of unvouched for and unverified expenses substantial so as to create doubts with regard to genuineness of assessee's accounts, it is not ordinarily proper to reject outright the result of books of accounts with regard to unverified cash sales or unvouched for or unverified cash expenses -- Something more than suspicion necessary to justify rejection of book version of assessee's business --",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=13,66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=13,66(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income-tax Reference No.10 of 1968, decision dated: 28-9-1973",
    "Judge Name:": "NOORUL ARFIN AND Z.A. CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "S. M. YOUSUF AND BROTHERS\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11953",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1973 273 = 1973 SLD 273 = (1973) 28 TAX 168 = 1988 PTD 157",
    "Key Words:": "Sales-tax Act, 1951 -- Section 7(1) -- Exemption -- \"\"Hot-patches\"\"-- Words \"\"Cycle accessories\"\" used in item No. 9 of Notification No. 9, dated 27-6-1951 -- Whether include \"\"hot-patches\"\" -- Held yes -- Hot-patches, whether exempt from sales-tax -- Held yes -- Words \"\"Component\"\" and \"\"Accessories\"\", meaning of -- Statutes -- Provisions granting exemptions -- Whether onus is on the claimant to prove that his case falls strictly within the scope of the exemption -- Held yes --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=7(1),17(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=7(1),17(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 60 of 1967, decision dated: 15-5-1973",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM AND MUHAMMAD AFZAL CHEEMA, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, Lahore High Court\nvs\nLUFTI & COMPANY (PAKISTAN), Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11954",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1973 274 = 1973 SLD 274 = (1973) 28 TAX 109 = 1973 PTD 221",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1951 -- Section 7(1) read with Notification No S.R.O./05-07(R)/64, dated 01-07-1964 (as amended by Notification No S.R.O./05-07(K)/66, dated 12-05-1966] --\nMattresses -- Furniture -- Wooden furniture -- Word \"\"furniture\"\" in Notification No. S.R.O. 57(R)/64, dated 26-6-1964 -- Whether includes \"\"mattresses\"\" -- Held yes -- Words \"\"Wooden furniture\"\" substituted for \"\"furniture\"\" by Notification No. 507(K)/66, dated 12-5-1966 -- Whether still include \"\"mattresses\"\" -- Held no -- \"\"Furniture\"\", meaning of -- Explanation from tax -- Word \"\"furniture\"\" \"\"matresses\"\" --\"\"Matresses\"\" -- Not \"\"wooden furniture\"\" --",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=7\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=7\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. 215 of 1972, decision dated: 1-3-1973, hearing DATE : 15-2-1973",
    "Judge Name:": "TUFAIL ALI A. RAHMAN, C.J. AND FAKHRUDDIN G, EBRAHIM, J",
    "": "H. GHULAM MUHAMMAD & BROS. LTD., Karachi High Court\nvs\nCENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, Islamabad High Court High Court AND ANOTHER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11955",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1973 275 = 1973 SLD 275 = (1973) 28 TAX 22 = 1974 PTD 3",
    "Key Words:": "Sales-tax Act, 1951 -- Sections 2(11), 3(1)(aa), 3(3)(1), 3(6)(c) (After amendment in 1970) -- Manufacturer or producer -- Goldsmith manufacturing ornaments to order with materials supplied by customer -- Whether a manufacturer -- Held yes -- Goods made wholly or partly of gold or silver where raw material is supplied by customer -- Value of such goods, whether liable to sales-tax with effect from 29-7-1970 under Sales-tax Notification No. 163(I)/70, dated 29-7-1970 and not from 1-7-1970 -- Held yes -- Method of valuation of such goods laid down in Sales-tax Notification No. S.R.O. 165(I)/70, dated 29-7-1970 -- Whether fair and proper -- Held yes -- Sale of gold ornaments liable to sales tax -- Amendments of Ss. 2(11) & 3(aa) by Finance Ordinance, 1970 effective from 29-7-70 -- Charging of sales tax in light of amendment on sales of ornaments from 1-7-70 not justified -- Amendments of S. 2(11) by Finance Ordinance XV of 1970 -- Effect -- Amendment merely extends definition of manufacturers so as to include within its ambit dealers of ornaments etc -- Gold belonging to customer and assessee doing work on it only on labour basis -- Sales Tax Authorities Competent, in circumstances, to assess value of goods at ten times mazdoori receipts --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=2(11),3(aa),3(3)(i),3(6)(c)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=2(11),3(aa),3(3)(i),3(6)(c)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A No. 495 of 1971-72 (Assessment year 1970-71, decision dated: 15-5-1973",
    "Judge Name:": "M. T. SIDDIQUI, PRESIDENT, SHAH ABDUR RASHID, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND HAFIZ ABDUR RASHID, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11956",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 840 = 1985 SLD 840 = 1985 SCMR 971",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-----Art. 203-F(2-B)--Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979), S.10(2)--Conviction for offence of Zina--Based on four eye-witnesses coupled with circumstantial evidence and admission of petitioner regarding his having been injured in complainant's house-­Contention that non-production of Police Officer and recovery memo had prejudiced petitioner's case, not accepted--Such Police Officer having doubtful conduct in favouring petitioner, his evidence not essential for decision of case--Defence version highly improbable and belied by medical as well as circumstantial evidence--No justification for interference--Leave to appeal refused.\n \nHaji Muhammad Anwar Buttar, Senior Advocate Supreme Court with Ch Akhtar Ali,\n \nAdvocate-on- Record for Petitioner.\n \nNemo for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 18th February, 1985.",
    "Court Name:": "Shariat Appellate Bench",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No.2-R(S) of 1984, decision dated: 18-02-1985 (From the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, at Lahore, dated 13-12-1984 in Cr. Appeal No.42/L of 1984)",
    "Judge Name:": "JUSTICE MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, CHAIRMAN, JUSTICES PIR MUHAMMAD KARAM SHAH AND AULANA MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, MEMBERS",
    "": "LIAQA T ALI\nVs.\nTHE STATE and another--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11957",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1973 276 = 1973 SLD 276 = (1973) 27 TAX 224",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1951 -- Section 7(1) -- Exemption -- Seat sticks -- Manufacture of seat sticks known as sports sticks -- Seat sticks not the instruments of sports and not necessary for any particular sports but their use associated with sports generally -- Seat sticks, whether exempt from sales-tax -- Held yes -- Notification No. S.R.O. 57(R), dated 28-6-1964 -- Item 12 --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=7(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=7(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "T. R. No. 11 of 1967, decision dated: 11-5-1972",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAFI-UR-RAHMAN AND MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "M. S. MUHAMMAD ALI, SIALKOT\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NORTH ZONE (WEST PAKISTAN), Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11958",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1973 277 = 1973 SLD 277 = (1973) 27 TAX 99 = 1973 PTD 19",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1951 -- Sections 7(1), 12(1) -- Exemption from sales tax -- "Concrete building components (including beams, columns, roofing, cement blocks, doors, windows, excluding pipes" -- Wooden doors and windows used in construction of building -- Whether exempt from sales-tax -- Held yes -- "Means", "Including", meaning of -- Sales Tax Notification No. 7 dated 27-6-1951, as amended by Notification No. 5, dated 18-12-1953 -- Item No. 40 -- Word and phrases -- Words "means" and "includes" -- Meaning -- Word "includes" is for purpose of enlargement of the scope and bringing in species not otherwise covered --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 135 of 1972 (P.T.R. No. 75 of 1972), decision dated: 25-5-1972, hearing DATE : 2-4-1980.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN AND S. RAHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Muhammad Afzal Lone, for the --Appellant. S. M. Zafar, for the --Respondent\nCOMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, RAWALPINDI ZONE, RAWALPINDI\nvs"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11959",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 395 = 1975 SLD 395 = (1975) 31 TAX 71 = 1975 PTD 61",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 10(2A), 10(2)(xvi), 18A(6), 23B --Trading liability -- Assessee's account books showing certain outstanding liabilities including cash loan against sister concern -- Amount representing cash loan -- Whether can be treated as trading liability -- Held no --\nTrading liability -- Assessee's account books for accounting year relevant to assessment year 1972-73 showing certain outstanding trading liabilities since 1961 -- Whether liable to tax under sub-section (2A) of Sec. 10, as amended by Finance Ordinance, 1972 -- Held yes -\nPenal interest -- Advance Tax -- Provisional assessment under Sec. 23B for the year 1964-65 made on income below Rs. 25,000 -- Levy of penal interest for non-payment of advance-tax on the basis of earlier year's assessment made on income exceeding Rs. 25,000 -- Whether sustainable -- Held no --\nTrading loss -- Consignment of goods to East Pakistan -- Consignment losses due to trouble in that Wing -- Whether trading loss -- Held yes -- Cash loans to sister concern -- Not trading liabilities -- Retrospective operation of provisions of section 10(2A) as amended by Finance Ordinance of 1972 --\nCorresponding Sections:\nIncome-tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Sections 25, 60, 87(2), 23(1)(xvii)",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2A),10(2)(xvi),18A(6),23B\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10(2A),10(2)(xvi),18A(6),23B\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. Nos. 1821(KB) of 1972-73 and 3779(KB) of 1973-74 (Assessment years 1969-70 and 1972-73), decision dated: 19-11-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "M. T. SIDDIQUI, PRESIDENT, K. SALAUDDIN, M. Z. FARUKH, ACCOUNTANT MEMBERS AND A. A. DARESHANI, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11960",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1972 74 = 1972 SLD 74 = (1972) 84 ITR 764",
    "Key Words:": "Section 184 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Firm - Position prior to 1-4-1993 - Assessment year 1963-64 - Whether continuation of registration of assessee firm could not be refused on ground that there was no ascertainment or distribution of profits amongst partners for assessment year in question - Held, yes - Whether change in constitution of firm would come in only when there is change in its partners - Held, yes - Whether ITO has no right to refuse registration for subsequent years where assessee firm has satisfied statutory requirements of sub-section (7) of section 184 - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was a registered partnership firm consisting of five partners - During the accounting year relevant to the assessment year in question, the assessee along with the return of income filed a declaration in Form No. 12 stating that there was no change in the constitution of the firm or the shares of the partners for the assessment year in question. The ITO, on scrutiny of the accounts maintained by the firm, found no profit and loss account and the ascertainment and distribution of the profits amongst the parties. Hence, he refused to grant the certificate under section 185(4) for that year. On second appeal the Tribunal held that it was entitled for the grant of renewal of registration notwithstanding the fact that there was no ascertainment or division of the profits of the business amongst the partners.\nOn reference :\nHELD\nA combined reading of sections 184 and 185 and the rules made thereunder manifest that it is incumbent on the ITO to register a firm if the application made by it furnishes the requisite particulars prescribed therefore, provided the existence of a genuine firm with the constitution so specified in the instrument of partnership is established. The discretion vested in the income-tax authorities under sections 184 and 185 a judicial one and, therefore, the applications for the original registration or continuation of registration for subsequent years under the Act cannot be refused on suspicion or speculation. The ITO has jurisdiction to reject the application of the firm for registration only if it is not in conformity with the rules and the provisions of sections 184 and 185 and when the firm is proved to be a bogus one, not genuine or has no legal existence, but not otherwise. He is empowered to enquire into the truth or otherwise of the requisite facts stated by the partners of the firm in the declarations and the applications made to him after due notice and opportunity to the assessee, and refuse registration or continuation of registration for subsequent years is the firm was not genuine or the declarations made are not true. Where the original registration has been granted under section 185(1) or the certificate for continuation of registration under sub-section (7) of section 184 read with sub-section (4) of section 185 is granted for the subsequent years of assessment, the ITO may cancel the same if, in his opinion, in the previous year no genuine firm was in existence. He has to exercise the power of cancellation of registration under section 186 only after due notice and opportunity to the assessee-firm and after obtaining requisite sanction of the IAC. The registration of a firm under the Act is not a matter of course but the assessee-firm is entitled for registration if the requisite conditions for the same are satisfied.\nIn the instant case the ITO had found the declaration made by the assessee-firm to the effect that there was no change in the constitution of the firm or in the shares of the partners, as true. The only ground on which the continuation of registration had been refused was that there was no ascertainment or distribution of profits amongst the partners for the assessment year in question.\nChange in the constitution of a firm would come in only when there is change in its partners. The original partnership may contain four partners. Subsequently, if the number of partners is increased or decreased, it must be stated that there was a change in the constitution of the firm. As long as the four partners who originally constituted the firm continued to exist, in the subsequent years, it cannot be said that there was any change in the constitution of the firm. Where the shares of the partners are changed in the subsequent years, however small the change may be, it must be stated that there was a change. In both the aforesaid contingencies, the provisions of section 184(8) would come into play. The firm has to make a fresh application for the grant of registration as required by sub-section (8) of section 184. There is a clear distinction between a change in the shares of the partners and the failure or absence of ascertainment and distribution of the profits of the firm amongst its partners. The ascertainment and distribution of profits, no doubt, will have to be made according to the shares of the partners as evidenced in the deed of partnership. Whether there was ascertainment and distribution of profits or not, is a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The distinction between the failure or absence of ascertainment and distribution of profits amongst the partners of a firm and the distribution of profits being not according to the shares specified in the deed of partnership may be noticed. Whether the allocation or distribution of profits was made in a manner different from the shares evidenced by the instrument of partnership, it may amount to change in the shares of the partners, but in the normal course, it cannot be said that there was a change in the shares of the partners. It may at the most be stated in such a case that there was a postponement of distribution of the profits earned by the firm amongst its partners. Hence, that itself cannot be held to amount to a change in the shares of the partners when compared with the shares specified in the instrument of partnership which was sought to be registered. Where the share income has been received by the partners, the further question of its application has no relevancy to the grant or refusal of the registration under the Act. It is now well-settled that the firm is entitled to grant of registration under the Act even though one of the partners is a benam. The Income-tax Officer has no right to refuse registration for the subsequent years where the assessee-firm has satisfied the statutory requirements of sub-section (7) of section 184. Where a declaration has been made in Form No. 12 for continuation of the registration for any subsequent year of assessment, the Income-tax Officer, in the course of the enquiry, if he comes to the conclusion that the firm itself was not genuine, may not grant the certificate under section 185(4) immediately until he completes the enquiry. He may refuse continuation of registration if the provisions of section 184(7) are not satisfied. In case he was satisfied at that time with that and granted registration, the ITO is entitled to cancel the registration under section 186(1) where the firm is found to be not genuine. For these reasons, it was held that the assessee was entitled for the continuation of registration under the Act for the relevant assessment year and the ITO was not entitled to refuse the same.\nThe Tribunal was therefore justified in allowing continuation of registration to the assessee firm.\nNote : The case has been decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASE REFERRED TO\nCIT v. A. Abdul Rahim & Co. [1965] 55 ITR 651 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "KONDAIAH AND SRIRAMULU, JJ.",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nv.\nVoleti Veerabhadra Rao & Sons"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11961",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIQlNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 305 = 1977 SLD 305 = (1977) 36 TAX 210 = 1978 PTD 145 = 1978 PLD 374",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 10(2A), 10(2)(vii) second proviso Trading liability -- Cessation -- Liability standing in the accounts foregone or unclaimed -- Amount appropriated by assessee -- Whether amount includible in the total income of assessee -- Held yes -- Business income -- Sale of machinery or plant -- Machinery or plant not used in business in the relevant accounting year -- Sale of machinery or plant -- Excess realised over written down value -- Whether liable to tax -- Held no -\nRemission of liability-- Income-tax Appellate Tribunal already deciding question involved against petitioner in his own earlier case and petitioner-assessee taking no action against such decision -- Whether assessee deemed to have accepted principle of decision and estopped from challenging such principle in subsequent assessment -- Remission of liability -- Assessee having to pay certain dues to certain creditors but writing off and appropriating such amount himself -- Contention that such amounts became part of his income and hence liable to be included in has taxable income -- Held, correct --\nRemission of liability -- Old machinery etc. being not used in business during years under consideration, amount left with assessee in form of difference between written down value and price received in form of profit of sale of unused assets-- Income-tax Tribunal, held not justified in holding such amounts liable to tax under second proviso to Section 10(2)(vii) --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2A),10(2)(vii)secondproviso\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10(2A),10(2)(vii)secondproviso\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference no. 181 of 1971, decision dated: 4-7-1977, hearing DATE : 27-6-1977 and 4-7-1977",
    "Judge Name:": "KARAM ELAHI CHAUHAN AND SALEEM MAZHAR, JJ",
    "": "DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAWALPINDI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11962",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 306 = 1977 SLD 306 = (1977) 36 TAX 117 = 1977 PLD 1121",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 4(3)(i), 66 -- Trust -- Religious or charitable trust -- Exemption -- Return -- Income claimed to be exempt from tax -- Submission of return whether essential -- Held yes -- Requirement of provision of Section 4(3)(i) -- Trust -- Religious or charitable trust -- Trustees empowered to apply trust fund in their discretion outside Pakistan -- Income from trust whether exempt from tax -- Held no -- Trust -- Religious or charitable trust -- Question whether or not a trust is charitable -- Whether a question of law to be decided by the Court of Law -- Held yes -- Power of subjective selection of beneficiaries conferred on persons administering the fund -- Trust whether charitable -- Held no -- Trust -- Religious or charitable trust -- Whether trust should be beneficial to the public at large or to a section of the public -- Held yes -- Whether should have charity as its basis and not benevolence -- Held yes -- "Charity", "Charitable purposes", meaning of -- Trust -- Religious or charitable trust -- Objects of assessee-society viz. social cultural and moral as important as religious, charitable and spiritual -- Society whether established for religious or charitable purposes -- Held no -- Trust -- Religious or charitable trust -- Trust for advancement of education among members of Ahmedia community -- Object not for the public or a section of the public -- Trust whether charitable -- Held no -- Trust -- Religious or charitable trust -- Memorandum of Association giving wide powers to persons administering the fund -- Administrators may ignore the poor without breach of trust and devote the whole fund for social or cultural activities -- Objects described as "charitable and deserving" or "charitable and benevolent" -- Deserving persons may not necessarily be poor -- Trust whether charitable -- Held no -- Charitable Trust -- Poverty whether essential ingredient of a charitable Trust -- Held yes -- Some of the objects of the assessee-society though apparently educational but not charitable -- Object to support activities of members of the Ahmedia community and others in the advancement of literature - Whether charitable -- Held no --\nTrust -- Religious or charitable trust -- Charitable purpose -- Gift whether charity notwithstanding achievement of objects, which are charitable, incidentally promote other objects which are not charitable -- Held yes --\nTrust -- Religious or charitable trust -- Charitable purposes -- Objects of the assessee-society including grant of pension, allowances, gratuities and bonus to employees, improvement of economic life of members of the community and others, undertaking commercial enterprises, etc. -- Whether not incidental but independent of the main purposes -- Held yes -- Whether charitable -- Held no --\nTrust -- Religious or charitable trust -- Dividend income arising to assessee-society out of shares held by it -- Some of the objects of the society not religious or charitable -- Entire income from dividend kept as a composite block -- What part of dividend income applied for religious or charitable purposes not ascertainable -- Dividend income whether exempt from tax -- Held no --\nFirst proviso -- Trust -- Religious or charitable trust -- Assessee-society deriving income from business of brock-kiln, cotton ginning or sale or purchase of cotton -- All the purposes of the Assessee-society not charitable in nature -- No evidence that income from business was solely applied in Pakistan for religious or charitable purposes -- Business not carried on in the course of carrying out religious or charitable purposes of the society -- Business not carried on mainly by the beneficiaries of the society -- Business income whether exempt from tax -- Held no --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=4(3)(i),66,34,2B,66(2),3(4)(ii)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=4(3)(i),66,34,2B,66(2),3(4)(ii)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "T.R.No. 19 of 1967, decision dated: 28-2-1977, hearing DATE : 24-1-1977, 26-1-1977, 27-1-1977, 2-2-1977",
    "Judge Name:": "GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN AND SHAMEEM HUSSAIN QADRI, JJ",
    "": "SADAR ANJUMNA-IAHMEDIA, RABWA\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAWALPINDI ZONE, RAWALPINDI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11963",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 80 = 1977 SLD 80 = (1977) 36 TAX 79 = 1977 PTD 296 = 1977 PLD 1168",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 45A (inserted by Finance Act, 1963)--- Additional tax for delayed payments -- Provision of Section 45A introduced as from 01-07-1963 -- Whether retrospective in nature -- Held no -- Whether applicable prospectively to the demands created after the provision was enacted -- Held yes -- Additional tax -- Provision of Section 45-A to be applied prospectively to demands created after date of its enactment -- No choice left for Department to substitute a date of its own liking --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=45A\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=45A\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1962=98\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1340 of 1964, heard on 5-7-1976",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAFI-UR-REHMAN, J",
    "": "MAIN HAMEED AHMAD (OF PREMIER CLOTH MILLS LTD., Lahore High Court)\nvs\nIncome Tax OFFICER (INVESTIGATION II), Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11964",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1963 40 = 1963 SLD 40 = (1963) 48 ITR 973",
    "Key Words:": "Section 28(1) of the Income-tax, Act 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Business income - Chargeable as - Assessment year 1957-58 - Assessee carried on money lending business and was also an agriculturist - In course of money lending business, assessee acquired certain agricultural properties on account of default committed by debtors in payments of debts - Subsequently, assessee sold some of properties so acquired - ITO estimated profits on sale and brought it to tax - On appeals, AAC as well as Tribunal found that expenditure incurred for agricultural properties was debited and income received from agricultural properties was credited to capital account of assessee, but, capital account of assessee was not separate capital account rather it was capital account of all businesses - Revenue authorities, thus, concluded that agricultural properties were stock-in-trade of assessee and profits on sale of those properties were rightly brought to tax - Whether findings of lower authorities being findings of fact, were not open to challenge - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, profits in question could be considered income liable to be assessed - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee, inter alia, did the business of money-lending, general merchant, and was also an agriculturist. The assessee maintained two sets of accounts separately one for his general business and the other for money-lending. But for inter connecting the two sets of accounts, there was a current account. During the course of money-lending business, the assessee acquired certain agricultural properties. After the acquisition of those properties in lieu of debt, the account of the debtor in money- lending business was closed, and the agricultural property account in the other set of books, was debited in the amount of debt due from the debtor. In the account pertaining to the agricultural properties, the day-to-day expenses for agricultural operations and the income derived by the sale of agricultural produce were entered. At the close of the year, the balance in this account was taken to the capital account of the assessee. The said agricultural properties were sold from time-to-time between the assessment year 1947-48 to 1958-59. The sales of these agricultural properties in the years 1947-48, 1951-52, 1952-53 and 1956-57 were treated as stock-in-trade and the profits derived by the assessee thereon were brought to tax. The assessee, during any of these years had raised no objection thereto. During the year relevant to the assessment year 1957-58 on the sale of said agricultural properties for a consideration of Rs. 68,702. The ITO estimated the profits at Rs. 10,305 and had brought them to tax. On appeal, the contention of the assessee before the AAC was that these lands were held by him as his capital assets. He had not acquired these lands with the intention to sell them, but he was only forced to sell them on account of tenancy legislation; the profit derived by the assessee thereon, therefore, could not be brought to tax as income. The AAC rejected the contention and held that the lands were his stock-in-trade and, therefore, the profits derived on the sale of those lands were taxable. Further, appeal taken by the assessee to the Tribunal failed.\nOn reference :\nHELD\nIt is indeed true that the mere fact that landed property was acquired in the course of money-lending business is not sufficient to hold that it is the stock-in-trade of the money-lender. But, it is equally true that whether a particular landed property acquired by a money-lender is his capital asset or a trading asset is always a question of fact to be determined on the facts of each case, depending on the manner in which the money-lender deals with the property after acquiring it in course of money-lending. If the income of the property acquired during the course of the business is used for the purposes of the business, then it is stock-in-trade of the business and not a capital asset of the assessee.\nIn the instant case, the income-tax authorities had found that the books, through maintained in two sets, essentially formed only one set by reason of the existence of the inter-branch current account, and the absence of separate capital account for each section.\nIn these books of account the, expenditure incurred for the agricultural property was debited; similarly, the income received from the agricultural property was credited. The balance ascertained at the end of the year then was taken to the capital account of the assessee. But, on the facts found, the capital account of the assessee was not any separate capital account of the assessee as such, but it was the capital account of all the business therefore, the Income-tax authorities and the Tribunal had evidence before them on which they could reasonably reach a conclusion that these properties were the stock-in-trade of the assessee. This finding of fact, therefore, was not open to challenge. Therefore, the amount in question could be considered income liable to be assessed.\nNote: The case was decided against the assessee.",
    "Court Name:": "Bombay High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 66 OF 1960, JULY 19, 1962",
    "Judge Name:": "Y.S. TAMBE AND V.S. DESAI, JJ",
    "": "Bansilal Gangaram\nv.\nCommissioner of Income tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11965",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 307 = 1977 SLD 307 = (1977) 36 TAX 74 = 1977 PTD 405 = 1977 PLD 1225",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1951 -- Sections 7(1), 8(2) read with item 51 of Notification No. S.R.O.475 (K)/65, dated 14-6-1965 -- Rule 4(1)(c)(i) -- Distinction between the provisions of Section 7(1) and 8(2), explained -- Words \"\"taxability '' and \"\"playability\"\", meaning of Vires of the Rule -- Rule 4(1) made under section 39(4) of the Sales-tax Act -- Whether immune from challenge on ground that it is beyond the scope of Act or in conflict with any provision thereof -- Held yes -- Whether rule 4(I) can be struck down if the conditions laid down therein go beyond the scope of section 8(2) of the Sales-tax Act -- Held no -- Whether should be constructed to have expanded the scope of Section 8 of the Act -- Held yes --\nElectric fans exempted from sales-tax -- Excise duty on electric fans enhanced by exactly the same amount previously recoverable under the Sales-tax Act -- Plea that sales-tax continued to be levied in the garb of excise duty -- Whether sustainable in law -- Held no -- Statutes -- Interpretation -- Budget Speech -- Whether has any effect on legal consequences of the relevant enactments, rules made thereunder or the notifications issued in pursuance thereof -- Held no --\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973 -- Article 199 -- Writ -- Doctrine of laches -- Inordinate delay in seeking discretionary relief under Article 199 of the Constitution -- Whether hit by laches -- Held yes - \nExemption from tax -- Distinction between provisions of Section 7(1) and Section 8(2) -- Exemption granted under Section 7(1) in respect of certain manufactured goods affects all persons connected therewith -- Exemption granted to sellers alone can have no bearing on liability of manufacturers -- Electric fans manufactured by assessee-Company already exempted from tax -- Assessee, held, comes squarely under purview of clause (c)(i) of rule. 4(1) and is not entitled to a licence under Section 8 nor to exemption from tax on raw material or partly manufactured goods -- Rules apparently beyond scope of parent Act -- To be deemed to have expanded scope thereof -- Conflict between a rule and a section of Act -- To be resolved as if such conflict is between one section and another of same Act --\nWrit -- Laches -- Petitioner found to be negligent in seeking discretionary relief and petition hit by laches -- Fact that wrong sought to be redressed is a continuing one -- Cannot detract from effect of laches -- Grant of relief can be refused by Court in circumstances of case --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=7(1),8(1),39(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=7(1),8(1),39(4)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 771 of 1974, decision dated: 4-5-1977, dates of hearing: 8-10-1976 and 5-4-1977",
    "Judge Name:": "K. M.A. SAMDANI, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD DIN & SONS LTD. (SHAHDARA MILLS, Lahore High Court)\nvs\nSALES TAX OFFICER, SPECIAL CIRCLE 1, Lahore High Court, ETC"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11966",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 308 = 1977 SLD 308 = (1977) 35 TAX 82 = 1977 PTD 289 = 1977 PLD 1161",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 28(1A), 66, 23 read with Penalty -- Assessee doing business on commission basis and on own account -- Concealment of income from business on own account -- Penal provisions of Section 28(1A) whether attracted -- Held yes\nQuestion of fact -- Question of law Application of law to proven facts -- Cannot be said to relate to domain of facts because it falls properly within ambit of question of law -- Imposition of penalty -- Increase in income made on account of concealment and misrepresentation made by assessee -- Section 28(1-A), held, squarely attracted to facts of case and imposition of penalty justified -- Amount of penalty, however, reduced in circumstances of case --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=28(1A),66,28(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=28(1A),66,28(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference No.23 of 1968, heard on 11-3-1976",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN AND GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAWALPINDI ZONE RAWALPINDI\nvs\nIBRAHIM KHAN MIR WAIS KHAN, HAZRO"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11967",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 309 = 1977 SLD 309 = (1977) 35 TAX 6",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 23(2), 34 -- Martial Law Regulation No. 32 of 1969 -- Paragraphs 2 -- Paragraph 6(1) -- Declaration of excess income -- Assessment under normal law -- Central Board of Revenue Circulars Nos. 1 and 3 not in conformity with paragraphs 2 and 6(1) of Martial Law Regulation No. 32 of 1969 -- Normal assessment under Sec. 34 of the Income-tax Act in pursuance of these Circulars in respect of excess income declared but unprocessed due to disagreement under Martial Law Regulation No. 32 -- Whether valid in law -- Held no -- Interim Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 280(3) -- Constitution of Pakistan, 1973\nNotice -- Exparte assessment -- Re-assessment proceedings ignoring return already filed -- Whether valid in law - Held no - \nSection 23(2) and 34 read with Income-tax (Correction of returns and False Declarations) Regulation, 1969 (M. L. R. No. 32) para, 2 -- Return filed in respect of assessment years 1960-61 to 1968-69 filed under provisions of Income-tax Act and waiting consideration by assessing officer -- Action under section 34 as laid down in para 2 of M.L.R. No. 32 -- Assessments based on such action annulled --\nCorresponding Sections:\nIncome-tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Section 65 --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=23(2),34,23(4),22(4),34(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=23(2),34,23(4),22(4),34(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. Nos. 3673 (PB) to 3683 (PB) of 1973-74 (Assessment years 1960-61 to 1970-71), decision dated: 18-6-1976",
    "Judge Name:": "A. KARIM FAROOQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUKTADA KARIM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11968",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1976 129 = 1976 SLD 129 = (1976) 34 TAX 148 = 1976 PTD 1364 = 1986 PTCL 306",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax – Limitation for Filing Appeal – Incomplete Memorandum\nDetails:\nThe case relates to Messrs Climax Engineering Co. Ltd., Gujranwala, engaged in manufacturing both taxable (e.g., fans, fuse units) and non-taxable items (e.g., transformers, electric motors). The assessee claimed that excess sales tax was charged and sought a refund. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the plea and ordered a refund.\nThe Sales Tax Officer (Investigation Circle V, Lahore) filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The assessee objected that the appeal was barred by limitation, since the complete and verified memorandum of appeal was submitted only on 18 May 1964, beyond the prescribed limitation period. The department contended the appeal was initially filed on 28 March 1964 (within time), and though it was incomplete (unsigned and unverified), it was resubmitted with signatures and verification within three days after return by the Registrar.\nThe Tribunal rejected the departmental plea and dismissed the appeal in limine as barred by time. The department then sought a reference to the High Court.\nLegal Question Referred:\nWhether the Tribunal was justified in refusing to condone the delay and dismissing the appeal in limine despite initial presentation within time?\nHeld:\nThe Lahore High Court held that:\nEven an unsigned or unverified memorandum of appeal, if presented in time, cannot be dismissed as time-barred merely for procedural defects.\nRelying on Sajawal Khan v. Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha ([PLD 1968 Lah. 527]), such procedural defects do not vitiate the filing date.\nAdditionally, under Section 33(2-A) of the Sales Tax Act, the Tribunal had the power to condone delay if sufficient cause existed.\nIn this case, the appeal was initially filed timely, and the minor defect was rectified promptly after return.\nThe High Court answered the reference in the negative, i.e., the Tribunal was not justified in refusing to condone the delay.\nCitations:\nSajawal Khan v. Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha [PLD 1968 Lah. 527]\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal's dismissal was erroneous. Case remanded back to the Tribunal for decision on merits.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=33(2A)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=33(2A)\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=OrderVI,rules14,15\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 53 of 1967, decision dated: 9-3-1976, hearing DATE : 9-03-1976",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN AND GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, Lahore High Court\nvs\nCLIMAX ENGINEERING CO. LTD., GUJRANWALA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11969",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1976 130 = 1976 SLD 130 = (1976) 34 TAX 151 = 1976 PTD 246 = 1976 PLD 1030",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 45, 45A -- Additional Tax -- Whether in the nature of penalty for delayed payment of Tax -- Held yes -- Whether governed by the Finance Act -- Held no -- Additional Tax -- Retrospective operation of the provision -- Assessments relating to earlier years completed and demand notices issued much before Section 45A became part of the Act -- Failure to pay tax due by the specified date -- Whether additional Tax leviable -- Held yes -- Question of retrospective operation of the provisions of Section 45A -- Whether arises -- Held no -- Additional Tax -- Fails to pay the Tax due from him' -- Word due', whether implies continuity of the liability from past -- Held no -- Statutes -- Fiscal statutes -- Whether should be strictly construed and no addition to or omission therefrom permissible -- Held yes --\nAdditional tax -- Notices of demand issued much after insertion of Section 45-A -- Failure of assessee to pay tax due from him occurring after Section 45-A, held, does not arise in circumstances of case -- Assessee, held, liable to additional tax envisaged by Section 45-A --\nFiscal statute -- portions of such statute to be strictly construed and no additions to or omissions therefrom permissible Word "due" -- Held, does not have an implication of liability continuing from past --",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=45,45A,66(1),34,26A,3,18A,23\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=45,45A,66(1),34,26A,3,18A,23\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Reference Case No. 11 of 1969, decision dated: 16-4-1976, hearing DATE : 8-04-1976",
    "Judge Name:": "I. MAHAMMUD AND Z. A. CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "TAIMUR SHAH\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11970",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1976 131 = 1976 SLD 131 = (1976) 34 TAX 15 = 1976 PTD 62",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 4, 4(1), 15BB, 15BB(4AA), 18A, 23, 33 -- Income -- Accrual of income -- Commission -- Company -- Managing agents -- Commission on annual net profits -- Mercantile system of accounting -- Whether commission assessable on accrual basis and not on receipt basis -- Held yes -- Income -- Commission -- Managing agents of company -- Commission received out of exempted income of managed company -- Exemption subsequently withdrawn with retrospective effect -- Commission, whether liable to tax -- Held yes -- Commission, whether liable to tax even if profits of managed company stood exempt from tax -- Held yes -- Dividend -- Company -- Managing agents -- Dividend received out of exempted profits of managed company -- Whether exempt from tax -- Held no -- Penal interest -- Failure to pay installments of advance tax on the basis of last completed assessment -- Claim that interest proportionate to dividends out of 15BB profits made liable to tax with retrospective effect should not be charged -- Whether sustainable -- Held no -- Penal interest, whether leviable -- Held yes --\nManaging Agency Commission -- Determination and inclusion in income -- Method of accounting relevant -- Assessee following mercantile system and during previous years assessment made on accrual basis -- Such basis, held, to be adopted in year under assessment --\nManaging Agency Commission -- Right to receive -- Held, essence of accrual -- Right to receive commission accruing to assessee in 1968 -- Inclusion of such commission in total income in assessment for 1972-73 -- Held, wrong and directed to be deleted Profits out of which assessee received managing agency commission liable to tax -- Such commission also, held, liable to tax -- Dividend income -- Dividend distributed out of profits exempt under section 15BB -- Held, liable to tax in hands of shareholders -- Income from textile unit of power-looms -- Rejection of account of production and gross profit rate -- Working out short fall on \"\"efficiency formula\"\" basis -- Assessing Officer not finding any fault in accounts -- Matter requiring re-examination --Assessment directed to be made de novo -- Bank interest charged to profit and loss account -- Assessing officer finding that large amounts advanced as loan to Director of Company and taking stand that had there been no such advances no need of borrowing from Bank would have arisen and, therefore, interest in fact paid for money utilized by Directors for their personal use -- Disallowance of such interest, held, not maintainable in circumstances of case -- Case remanded for fresh assessment --\nAppeal to Tribunal Order levying additional tax under section 45A -- Held, not appealable --\nCorresponding Sections:\nIncome-tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Section 11(1) --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=4(1),15BB,15BB(4AA),18A,45A,4(1)(a)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=4(1),15BB,15BB(4AA),18A,45A,4(1)(a)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 5189 of 1973-74 (Assessment year 1972-73), decision dated: 31-03-1976",
    "Judge Name:": "SALAUDDIN CHAUDHRI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND A. KARIM FAROOQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11971",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 310 = 1977 SLD 310 = (1977) 36 TAX 10 = 1977 PTD 39",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 23A(1), 23(2), 23(b) read with Paragraph D(2) of Part 1 to the Third Schedule of the Finance Ordinance, 1971 -- Private limited company -- Undistributed income -- Dividend declared by company falling short of the prescribed 60 per cent -- Such part of total income as represents undistributed income -- Whether liable to tax -- Held yes -- Method of calculation of \"\"net income\"\" and \"\"undistributed income\"\", explained -- \"\"Net income\"\", \"\"undistributed income\"\" -- undistributed income deemed to have accrued under section 23-A -- To be subjected to income tax at rates specified in paras, C(2) and D(2) of Third Schedule to ordinance irrespective of charge or exemption under paras C(1) and D(1) -",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=23A,23A(2)(b),23(3),24,23A(I)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=23A,23A(2)(b),23(3),24,23A(I)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 90 (KB) of 1975-76, decision dated: 25-8-1976",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MAZHAR ALI, JUDICIAL MEMBER, A. A. ZUBERI AND M. KARIM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Saleem, ITP, for the --Appellant, Miss Razia Bano, D. R., for the --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11972",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 396 = 1975 SLD 396 = (1975) 32 TAX 299 = 1975 PTD 230 = 1975 PLD 896",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 26A -- Registration -- Geniuses of partnership -- Partnership between husband, wife and their children including minor children -- Existence of the firm and distribution of profits in terms of the instrument of partnership not disputed -- No extrinsic evidence to show that firm was not genuine -- Genuineness of partnership whether can be doubted by mere reference to the terms of the partnership deed -- Held no -- Registration of firm -- Tribunal holding applicant firm bogus by mere reference to terms of partnership deed -- No extrinsic evidence on record to show firm not genuine -- Balance-sheet showing credit of profits to account of partners -- Shares of two married daughters allegedly spurious and shown in order to evade tax being only 1/24 each -- Shares of such daughters being nominal no incidence of evasion of tax -- Major partner holding 16 shares out of 24 being those of his wife and four minor children liable to pay tax on entire profits as an individual -- Circumstance, held, negatived any impression of partnership deed being not genuine -- Income-tax Act (XI of 1922) section 66(2) .",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=26A,66(2),66(1),16(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=26A,66(2),66(1),16(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income-tax Reference No. 18 of 1968, decision dated: 20-5-1975, hearing DATE : 20th May 1975",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD HALEEM AND ZAKAULLAH LODHI, JJ",
    "": "BUXLY PAINT HOUSE\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, (EAST) Karachi High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11973",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 96 = 1975 SLD 96 = (1975) 32 TAX 282 = 1976 PTD 128 = 1976 PLD 243",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1951 -- Sections 2(6), 2(11), 2(12), 7 read with Notification No. 9 dated 27-06-1951, Item No. 43 -- Exemption -- Cotton waste -- Delinted Cotton -- Whether manufactured goods within the meaning of sub-section (6) -- Held yes -- Whether liable to sales-tax -- Held yes -- Whether partly manufactured goods and exempt from tax, when the end product is taxable -- Held yes -- Words \"\"Goods\"\" \"\"Partly manufactured goods\"\", meaning of -- Manufacture-Process of ginning -- Transformation in the material to be commonly known as another and different article from raw material -- Whether constitute manufacture -- Held no -- Material changed or modified by man's art or industry to make it capable of being sold in accepted form to satisfy some want, desire or fancy or taste of man--Whether constitute manufacture--Held yes--process of ginning-- Whether gives rise to manufacture and production -- Held yes -- World \"\"Include\"\", meaning of -- Interpretation of statutes -- Word \"\"include\"\" -- Construction -- \"\"Delinted cotton\"\" and \"\"inferior-fibre cotton\"\" not utilized in manufacture of licensed taxable end-product but sold away independently -- Held, \"\"manufactured goods\"\" on which assessee bound to pay tax -- \"\"Delinted coition \"\" -- Whether \"\"goods manufactured\"\" --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=2(6),2(11),2(12),7,3,4\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=2(6),2(11),2(12),7,3,4\\n\\r\\n\\rCentral Excise and Salt Act, (I of 1944)=6\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 125 of 1971, and P.T.R. No. 209 of 1971, decision dated: 5-12-1974, dates of hearing: 5 & 7-11-1974 and 2-12-1974.",
    "Judge Name:": "KARAM ELAHEE CHUHAN AND MUNAWAR ELAHEE RANA, JJ",
    "": "COLONY TEXTILE MILLS LTD\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, Lahore High Court ZONE, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11974",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 397 = 1975 SLD 397 = (1975) 32 TAX 239",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 10(2)(xvi) -- Business expenditure -- Bank -- Foreign employees -- Provision made for tax payable on the accumulated Provident Fund balances of retired employees -- No evidence to support the presumption that the provision so made could be on account of commercial expediency -- Amount paid -- Whether permissible deduction -- Held no --",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(xvi),66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(xvi),66(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 32 of 1968, decision dated: 16-5-1975",
    "Judge Name:": "DORAB PATEL AND, JAMALUDDIN H. AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX\nvs\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11975",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 398 = 1975 SLD 398 = (1975) 32 TAX 219 = 1975 PTD 219 = 1975 PLD 924",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 3, 4, 10 -- P.I.A.C. Act, Section 26 -- Income of Capital -- Pakistan International Air Lines Corporation -- In terms of S. 26 of P.I.A.C. Act. 1956 Central Government made good the losses sustained by the Corporation within three years of its incorporation -- Amount paid whether income of the Corporation liable to tax in its hands -- Held yes -- Amount paid by Government to Pakistan International Airlines Corporation to make good loss sustained by Corporation -- Falls within income receipts, liable to tax under Income-tax Act, 1922",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=3,4,10,66(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=3,4,10,66(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rPakistan International Airlines Corporation Act, 1956=26\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 27 of 1968, decision dated: 24-6-1975",
    "Judge Name:": "DORAB F. PATEL AND, JAMALUDDIN H. AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11976",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 399 = 1975 SLD 399 = (1975) 32 TAX 219 = 1975 PTD 126 = 1975 PLD 1317",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 22(4), 23(2), 23(4) -- Ex-parte assessment -- Statutory notices of hearing and for production of accounts issued and served for a date specified in the notice -- Assessee defaulting on the date of hearing -- Factum of default brought on record -- Ex-parte assessment on a date subsequent to the date of hearing without issue of fresh notice -- Whether proper and valid -- Held yes -- Ex-parte assessment -- Notice of hearing to assessee for a date specified in the notice -- Records not indicating that proceedings were taken up on the specified date of hearing and the assessee actually defaulted -- Ex-parte assessment for default of notice sustainable in law -- Held no -- Nothing on record to show that case was actually called and taken up for hearing by I.T.O. on 26-6-71 the date specified in notices -- I.T.O. thereafter making ex parte assessment under section 23(4) on 28-6-71 -- Held, if assessee does not appear or produce his evidence on specified date, I.T.O. should bring default on record and thereafter he could resort to action under section 23(4) and complete ex parte assessment afterwards without any further notice to assessee: but in absence of anything on record to show that assessee was absent on specified date, I.T.O. not justified in completing ex parte assessment against him on a subsequent date --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=22(4),23(2),23(4),66(1),22(2),34,22(4)A,29,37\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=22(4),23(2),23(4),66(1),22(2),34,22(4)A,29,37\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference. No. 203 of 1972, decision dated: 19-2-1975, dates of hearing: 26-11-1974 and 27-11-1974.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM AND MUNAWAR ELAHEE RANA, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, Lahore High Court ZONE, Lahore High Court\nvs\nM. B. QURESHI, GULBERGS, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11977",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 400 = 1975 SLD 400 = (1975) 32 TAX 176 = 1975 PTD 61 = 1975 PLD 212",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 33 -- Appellate Tribunal -- Scope of inherent powers -- Dismissal of appeal ex-parte for default of appearance -- Whether Tribunal competent to set aside its order of dismissal on sufficient ground shown -- Held yes -- Article 130 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962 -- Whether creates estoppel -- Held no -- Statutes -- Inherent jurisdiction of Courts -- Absence of provision in statute for unforeseen events arising in a case -- Whether Courts have inherent jurisdiction to decide the issue in the interest of orderly dispensation of justice -- Held yes -- Proof of fraud and forgery -- Fells to ground even solemn transactions -- Appellate Tribunal -- Inherent power -- Dismissal for default -- setting aside order of -- Appellant duly served but unable to appear on date fixed for hearing on account of sickness -- Appellate Tribunal rejecting prayer for adjournment and dismissing appeal for default of appearance -- Order of dismissal passed ex parte, could be set aside by Tribunal under its inherent powers if Tribunal satisfied as to non-appearance being due to unavoidable circumstance -- Setting aside of -- Inherent power of Courts and Tribunals to set aside ex parte order on sufficient cause shown -- Article 130, Constitution of Pakistan (1962) no bar --",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=33(4),66(1),66(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=33(4),66(1),66(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1962=130\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Reference Application No. 101 of 1971 decided on 18-2-1975, hearing DATE : 18-02-1975",
    "Judge Name:": "GHULAM SAFDAR SHAH C.J. AND SHAH ZAMAN BABAR, J",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, RAWALPINDI\nvs\nWOLF GANG MATZKE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11978",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 401 = 1975 SLD 401 = (1975) 32 TAX 171 = 1975 PTD 58 = 1975 PLD 893",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 22(4), 23(2), 23(4) -- Ex-parte assessment -- Statutory notices duly served -- Failure to appear on a date fixed for hearing -- factum of non-appearance recorded in the order sheet -- Whether Income-tax Officer competent to make ex-parte assessment on a date sub-sequent to the date of default -- Held yes -- Notices issued under Ss.22(4) & 23(2) for 28-8-71 duly served but assessee failing to appear on 28-8-71 -- Income-tax Officer thereafter on 30-8-71 passing ex-parte assessment order under section 23(4) -- Contention that ex parte order of assessment passed on 30-8-71 not having been passed on 28-8-71 i.e., the date of default of appearance, was illegal without a fresh notice -- contention, held, not valid --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=22(4),23(2),23(4),66(1),63\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=22(4),23(2),23(4),66(1),63\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "P.T. R. No. 381 of 1972, decision dated: 19-2-1975, dates of hearing: 26th November and 16-12-1974.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM AND MUNAWAR ELAHEE RANA, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax, Lahore High Court ZONE, Lahore High Court\nvs\nPOPULAR ENGINEERING WORKS, BUREWALA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11979",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 402 = 1975 SLD 402 = (1975) 32 TAX 15 = 1975 PTD 67",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 10(2A) (as amended by Finance Ordinance, 1972) -- Trading liabilities -- Liabilities incurred in 1949 -- Remained outstanding till 1970 -- Charged to tax under sub-section (2A) as amended by Finance Ordinance, 1972 -- Whether valid in law -- Held yes -- Provisions of sub-section (2A) explained -- Amendments made in section 10(2A) by Finance Ordinance, 1955; Finance Ordinance 1966 and Finance Ordinance, 1972 -- Cumulative effect -- After amendment introduced by Finance Ordinance, 1972 taxability of trading liability has been extended to a limitless period --\nCorresponding Sections:\nIncome-tax Ordinance, 1979 -- Section 25 --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2A)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10(2A)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1742/KB of 1972-73 (Assessment year 1970-71), decision dated: 19-11-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "M. T. SIDDIQUI, PRESIDENT, K. SALAHUDDIN AND M. Z. FARRUKH, ACCOUNTANT MEMBERS AND A. A. DARESHANI, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11980",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 848 = 1985 SLD 848 = 1985 SCMR 1080",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Supreme Court Rules, 1980-----O.XXVI, r.l--Review--Plea that entire record not being available to Supreme Court, petitioner was seriously prejudiced, repelled--Order granting leave to appeal clearly indicating that appeal was to be made ready on present record, neither any grievance was made of this fact earlier nor petitioner felt any difficulty in explaining his case at appeal stage--Contention regarding confusion in identity of suit property not sustained as point had been specifically dealt with and resolved earlier-­No justification being made out for review, petition dismissed.\n \n(b) Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXXVIII of 1958)--\n \n---S.10--Transfer of property--Joint possession--Preference--Contesting parties being in possession of different portion of same residential premises--Respondents being claimant displaced persons given preference over petitioner who was non-claimant--Petitioner also being guilty of serious laches in pursuing matter, transfer order upheld by Supreme Court.\n \nS.M. Almas Ali, Advocate and Syed Ali Imam Naqvi, Advocate-­on-Record for Petitioner.\n \nNemo for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 10th November, 1979.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Review Petition No.26/R of 1975, decision dated: 10th November 1979 (On review from the judgment and order of this Court dated 3-12-1974 in Civil Appeal No.35 of 1973)",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWARUL HAQ, C.J., DORAB PAUL, KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH AND SHAFIUR RAHMAN, JJ",
    "": "NASIRUDDIN KHAN\nVs.\nRAFIQUDDIN and others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11981",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 403 = 1975 SLD 403 = (1975) 32 TAX 57 = 1975 PTD 272 = 1975 PLD 1181",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 10(2)(xiva), (xvi) -- Business expenditure -- Expenditure on educational institutions for the education of children and dependents of employees for the education of children and dependents of employees -- Admittedly not admissible deduction under clause (xiva) -- Whether can be allowed as business expenditure under clause (xvi) -- Held no -- True construction of Section 10(2) and scheme of various clauses enumerated thereunder -- Clauses alternative and mutually exclusive in their scope and effect Clause (xiv-a) in its relation to clause (xvi) -- Assessee-Company incurring expenses in connection with education of the dependents of its employees -- Misuse by employees of the concession allowed to them and company, therefore, charging nominal fees from its employees -- Assessee-Company claiming deduction on account of the educational expenses incurred -- Income-tax Officer refusing deduction under clause (xiv-a) on ground that assessee was charging fees and was therefore not entitled to deduction as provided by proviso to clause (xiv-a) -- Appellate Tribunal, however, allowing deduction holding that even if deduction could not be allowed under proviso to clause (xiv-a), circumstances of case required application of more beneficial provision under clause (xiv) -- Held: Tribunal was not justified in holding that deduction could be allowed under Section 10(2)(xiv) even if expenses incurred where inadmissible under Section 10(2)(xiv-a) -- Generalia specialibus non derogant (general words do not derogate from special) -- Enunciation of rule --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),10(2)(xvi),23(3),22(4),10(2)(xiva),23(2),23(4),10(2)(x)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),10(2)(xvi),23(3),22(4),10(2)(xiva),23(2),23(4),10(2)(x)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "P.T.R. No. 185 (TR 179 of 1973), decision dated: 22-04-1975, hearing DATE : 5, 6-12-1974.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM AND MUNAWAR ELAHEE RANA, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAWALPINDI\nvs\nATTOCK OIL COMPANY LIMITED, RAWALPINDI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11982",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 380 = 1975 SLD 380 = (1975) 31 TAX 164 = 1975 PTD 50 = 1975 PLD 443",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 34 -- Reassessment -- Income escaping assessment -- Notice to assessee -- Intimation to assessee regarding nature of alleged escapement and factum of approval from superiors and providing opportunity of hearing before initiation of proceedings -- Whether condition precedent -- Held no -- Escaped income -- Notice under section 34 -- Income-tax Officer no required by section 34 to intimate nature of alleged escapement nor factum that he has obtained approval from his superiors of initiating proceedings --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=34\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=34\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=201\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 823 of 1972, decision dated: 21-10-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAMEEM HUSSAIN KADRI, J",
    "": "ESCORTS LIMITED\nvs\nIncome Tax OFFICER, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11983",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 404 = 1975 SLD 404 = (1975) 31 TAX 151 = 1975 PTD 56",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 23, 28(1B) -- Penalty -- Penalty proceedings initiated after completion of assessment under Sec. 23 -- Whether valid in law -- Held no -- Order of Income-tax Officer -- Not signed -- Has no force of a valid order -- Income-tax Officer can initiate action for penalty only in course of any proceedings in connection with assessment under Section 23 and not afterwards --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=18A,28(3),28(IB),23\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=18A,28(3),28(IB),23\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 215 of 1971, decision dated: 21-10-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN AND MUNAWAR ELAHEE RANA, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, ALHORE\nvs\nFREEZIT, Lahore High Court AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11984",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 405 = 1975 SLD 405 = (1975) 31 TAX 82",
    "Key Words:": "Sales-tax Act, 1951 -- Section 5(1) -- Sales Tax Officer -- Examining Officer -- Person appointed as \"\"Examining Officer\"\" under Section 2(7) of the Income Tax Act -- Whether a \"\"Sales Tax Officer\"\" under the Sales Tax Act - Held yes --",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=17,5(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=17,5(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=2(7)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 101-D of 1970. November 21, 1970. (On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of East Pakistan, Dacca, dated the 20-02-1970 in Reference Case No. 24 of 1968)",
    "Judge Name:": "HAMOODUR RAHMAN C.J. AND M. R. KHAN, J",
    "": "HAJI NAZIMUDDIN MUHAMMAD AMANULLAH AND OTHERS\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, DACCA ZONE, DACCA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11985",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 406 = 1975 SLD 406 = (1975) 31 TAX 85",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1951 -- Section 7 -- Exemption -- Writ petition to High Court -- Application for Special Leave to appeal to Supreme Court -- Assessee claiming immunity from sales-tax in respect of surgical bandages and absorbent cotton on ground that these goods fell within the description of \"\"surgical instruments \"\" -- High Court rejecting claim by short order \"\"we do not see way to agree with learned counsel\"\" -- Whether a fit case for grant of Special Leave to appeal -- Held yes --",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. K-131 of 1967. February 14, 1968.(On appeal from the judgment and orders of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, Karachi, dated the 10-08-1967, in Petition No. 310 of 1967)",
    "Judge Name:": "A. R. CORNELIUS, C.J. AND FAZLE-AKBAR, J",
    "": "SHAIKH YUSUFALI SONS LTD\nvs\nSALES TAX OFFICER AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11986",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 407 = 1975 SLD 407 = (1975) 31 TAX 86 = 1969 PTD 490",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1951 -- Section 27(2) -- Refund -- Sales Tax realised from customers deposited by assessee in Government Treasury -- Amount in excess of the sales tax due from the assessee -- Amount over-paid whether refundable to assessee -- Held yes -- Taxing department can only insist on realising from assessee demand raised by it and no more -- Amount deposited in treasury found on assessment to be in excess to extent of about Rs. 3,000 -- Amount overpaid by assessee cannot be retained by taxing authority on ground that excess payment represented collection from customers and as such not refundable --",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=17(1),12(1),27(2),27\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=17(1),12(1),27(2),27\\n\\r\\n\\rPakistan Penal Code, 1860=406,409\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 426 of 1968. April 4, 1969, hearing DATE : 4th April 1969. (On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, dated the 19th September 1968, in Civil Reference No. 15 of 1964)",
    "Judge Name:": "HAMOODUR RAHMAN C.J. AND M. R. KHAN, J",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, Lahore High Court\nvs\nASSOCIATED HOTELS (INDIA) LTD, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11987",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 408 = 1975 SLD 408 = (1975) 31 TAX 89",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1951 -- Section 28 -- Re-assessment -- Sales Tax assessment originally made on cotton seed -- Assessing Officer did not appeal his mind to question of assessability of cotton seed oil at the time of making original assessment -- Re-assessment proceedings pertaining to turnover of cotton seed oil -- Whether proper and valid -- Held yes --",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=28\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=28\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=23(1),34\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal Nos. 96 and 128 of 1968. October 30, 1968",
    "Judge Name:": "HAMOODUR RAHMAN, MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, JJ",
    "": "PAKISTAN OIL MILLS\nvs\nTHE SALES TAX OFFICER, -ËœA-„¢ WARD, MULTAN\nSH. MOHAMMAD SHARIF MOHAMMAD ASGHAR\nvs\nSALES TAX OFFICER, -ËœA-„¢ WARD, MULTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11988",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 409 = 1975 SLD 409 = (1975) 31 TAX 69",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Act, 1922 -- Section 26A, 66 -- Reference to High Court -- Question of law arising out of Tribunal's order -- Finding that the partnership deed on the basis of which registration was claimed was a made up document and that it exhibited no contractual relationship -- Finding based upon evidence -- Whether give rise to a question of law -- Held no --",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(2),26,66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(2),26,66(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 179 of 1968, decision dated: 17-10-1968.(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, dated the 16-01-1968, in Civil Miscellaneous No. 3159 of 1967)",
    "Judge Name:": "HAMOODUR REHMAN, MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI AND ABDUS SATTAR, JJ",
    "": "SHAH NAWAZ KHAN AND CO., MULTAN\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RNORTH ZONE, WEST PAKISTAN, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11989",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1974 344 = 1974 SLD 344 = (1974) 30 TAX 14 = (1969) 72 ITR 796",
    "Key Words:": "Section 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Income - Chargeable as - Assessment year 1947-48 - Assessee had taken certain premises on lease for 99 years on a monthly rent - Later assessee entered into a lease agreement with certain person to convert said building into a cinema - By said lease building in question was demised to lessees for a period of 30 years - Lessees agreed to pay under indenture of lease Rs. 55,200 to lessor towards cost of eracting said cinema - ITO treated sum of Rs. 55,200 received by assessee as his income in spite of claim of assessee that aforesaid sum should be treated as capital receipt - Tribunal held that receipt of said sum was in nature of advance rent since assessee was short of funds at time lease was entered into and that lease was for a short term - High Court on reference justified finding of Tribunal - Whether since lease by which cinema house was demised did not contain any condition or stipulation from which it could be said that aforesaid amount had been paid as advance rent, High Court erred in holding that sum of Rs. 55,200 was a revenue receipt liable to be taxed - Held, yes\nFACTS\nOn 19-7-1945, the assessee took on lease certain premises for a term of 99 years on a monthly rental of Rs. 750. It was stipulated, inter alia, that the lessee could assign the lease with the consent of the lessor. He could alter the structure on the premises so as to convert it into a cinema if necessary. After expending Rs. 35,000 on some alterations to the premises the assessee felt the necessity of having some more money in order to convert the building into a cinema. He, entered into a lease on 23-2-1946, with three persons. This lease, the building in question was demised to the lessees for a period of 30 years. The lessees agreed to pay under the indenture of lease Rs. 55,200 to the lessor towards the cost of erecting the said cinema. The rent which was agreed to be paid was Rs. 2,400 per month. It was payable with effect from 1-6-1946.\nAfter the cinema house had been completed the lessees entered into possession and started exhibition shows there. For the assessment year 1947-48, the corresponding accounting year being the financial year ending 31-3-1947, the ITO sought to treat the sum of Rs. 55,200 received by the assessee as his income. The contention of the assessee was that the aforesaid amount should be treated as capital receipt. Alternatively, if it was to be treated as salami (premium) and was to be taxed as a revenue receipt, it should be distributed evenly over the entire term of the lease, i.e., 30 years. The ITO did not accept either of the contentions of the assessee. It was held by him that the lease was not permanent but was temporary and that the salami had been fixed as an advance payment of rent and not as payment for transfer of the lease-hold interest. According to him the system of accountancy for this source of income being on cash basis, the whole of the receipt of salami was liable to be taxed as one year's income in the year of the receipt. The assessee appealed to the AAC agreed with the ITO. In his view the lessees were under no legal obligation to contribute towards the cost of construction of the cinema house and the sum of Rs. 55,200 constituted payment of advance rent. The assessee appealed to the Tribunal which held that the receipt of the aforesaid amount was in the nature of advance payment of rent since the assessee was short of funds at the time the lease was entered into and that the lease was for a short term and that the amount in question represented consolidated rent for thirty years paid in advance. The High Court decided the matter against the assessee. According to the High Court the only object of the payment of the sum of Rs. 55,200 could be to advance the cost of construction or to meet the existing liabilities of the assessee for completing the cinema house.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court :\nHELD\nIt seemed that the departmental authorities as well as the High Court were in error in treating the amount of Rs. 55,200 as advance payment of rent. The lease by which the cinema house was demised did not contain any condition or stipulation from which it could be inferred that the aforesaid amount had been paid by way of advance rent. The transaction embodied in the indenture of lease was clearly business-like. The lessees wanted the building for running it as a cinema house and the lessor agreed to give it to them but apparently represented that he did not have enough money to complete it in accordance with the suggestion and requirement of the lessees. The lessees agreed to pay him the aforesaid amount by way of a lump sum without making any provision for its adjustment towards the rent or repayment by the lessor. The essential question, however, was whether, on the terms of the lease and in the absence of any other material or evident, it could be held that the sum of Rs. 55,200 was paid by way of advance rental The view which had been expressed by the Tribunal as also the High Court that the lease was for a comparatively short period of thirty years and that the aforesaid amount had to be spread over that period by way of rent in addition to a rental of Rs. 2,100 per month could not be sustained as no foundation was laid for it by any cogent evidence. The departmental authorities could well be said to have based their decision on mere conjectures as there was nothing whatsoever to substantiate the suggestion that the real rental value of the cinema house was in the region of Rs. 2,250 per month and not Rs. 2,100 which was the agreed rent. It could equally well be said that the payment of the amount in question to the appellant was in the nature of a premium (salami).\nIt is true that the question whether premium is a capital or a revenue receipt cannot be decided as a pure question of law. Its decision necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It would not, however, be wrong to say that prima facie premium or salami was not income and it would be for the income-tax authorities to show that facts exist which would make it a revenue receipt. There was another factor which was of substantial importance in the instant case. According to the terms of the lease the payment of rent was to commence not from the date of the lease which was 23-2-1946, but with effect from 1-6-1946. It was also not disputed that the lessees entered into possession after the cinema house had been completed which was subsequent to the date of the lease. These facts coupled with the payment of a lump sum which was of a non-recurring nature showed that the amount in question had all the characteristics of a capital payment and was not revenue.\nIn view of aforesaid, instant appeal was to be allowed.\nNote : Decision was in favour of assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\nThe decision of Calcutta High Court in Durga Das Khanna v. CIT 64 ITR 544 - reversed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Shaw Wallance and Co. [1932] ILR 59 Cal. 1343, CIT v. Visweshwar Singh [1939] 7 ITR 536 (Pat.), Durga Das Khanna v. CIT [1967] 64 ITR 544 (Cal.), Henriksen v. Grafton Hotel Ltd. [1943] 11 ITR (Supp.) 10 (CA) and Member for the Board of Agricultural Income-tax v. Sindhurani Chaudhurani [1957] 32 ITR 169 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882=105\\n\\r\\n\\rTransfer of Property Act, 1882=105\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO. 873 OF 1966, JANUARY 30, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "J.C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A.N. GROVER, JJ",
    "": "Durga Das Khanna\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11990",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 410 = 1975 SLD 410 = (1975) 31 TAX 62 = 1971 PTD 1075",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Rules -- Rule 8(2) --Depreciation allowance -- Additional depreciation -- Partnership firm converted into private limited company -- Machinery originally purchased by the firm absorbed in the share capital of the new company -- Additional depreciation on machinery, whether permissible in the hands of the company -- Held yes --\nDepreciation allowance -- Re-adjustment made by partners of registered firm to carry on thenceforward business as limited company -- Machinery also absorbed in share capital of new company -- Machinery thus standing transferred could not be second hand and depreciation allowance already allowed in respect of such machinery could not be disallowed on ground that old machinery was transferred to the Company -\nVeerappa Transports v. C.I.T Madras (1963) 50 I.T.R. 442 and C.I.T. v. Bufco Tanneries Ltd. P.L.D (1966) Lahore 244; (1966) 13 TAX 185.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),66(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),66(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. K.29 of 1971, decision dated: 23-8-1971.(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, Karachi, dated the 20-01-1971, in Income-tax case No. 64 of 1966)",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI AND WAHEEDUDDIN AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF Income Tax Karachi High Court EAST, Karachi High Court\nvs\nAMSONS DAIRIES LIMITED, Karachi High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11991",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1FpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 411 = 1975 SLD 411 = (1975) 31 TAX 51 = 1975 PTD 27",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 23 -- Assessment -- Summary assessment -- Omnibus sort of printed assessment form -- Assessment made by filling in a few blanks in printed form -- Whether an order in the eye of law -- Held no -- Circular -- Central Board of Revenue Circular instructions in the matter of assessment -- Whether enforceable, if in contravention of the provisions of law -- Held no -- Assessment of individual -- Income-tax Officer disposing of case by filling in 3 blanks in a printed form without disclosing what sort of business or profession assessee followed nor disclosing source of his income -- Held: Method followed by I. T. O. was extraordinary, highly objectionable and illegal -- Order set aside and fresh assessment in accordance with law directed --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=23(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=23(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1230 (HB) of 1973-74 (Assessment year 1973-74), decision dated: 31-12-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "A. A. DARESHANI, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11992",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1F5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 412 = 1975 SLD 412 = (1975) 31 TAX 53 = 1975 PTD 44",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 2(2), 7, 18(7), 30(1) -- Appeal -- Assessment made on employee adding to his total income the amount representing overseas pension fund contributed by employer on behalf of employee -- Failure to pay tax by employee -- Letter written to employer to pay tax due from the employee -- Whether entitles the employer to prefer appeal against the assessment order made on employee -- Held no -- Expressions, \"\"Assessee in default, \"\"Denying his liability to be assessed\"\" and \"\"Assessed under Act\"\", meaning of -- A deemed \"\"assessee in default\"\" under section 18(7) is not an \"\"assessee\"\" for all purposes of Act and is not entitled to file appeal under section 30(1) -- No specific provision in Act which confers right of appeal on employer who does not deduct or after deducting fails to pay tax as required under section 18 when called upon to do so under section 18(7) -- Deeming clause -- Interpretation of -",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=23(3),23(4),34,22(4),2(2),18(7),30,66(1),30(1),18,18(3A),(3B),(3BB),(3C),29,45,46,46A,6,40(2),40(1),7(1),3\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=23(3),23(4),34,22(4),2(2),18(7),30,66(1),30(1),18,18(3A),(3B),(3BB),(3C),29,45,46,46A,6,40(2),40(1),7(1),3\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 2788 (KB)/1973-74 (Assessment year 1962-63), decision dated: 20-6-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "K. SALAHUDDIN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD MAZHAR ALI, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11993",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1F5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 413 = 1975 SLD 413 = (1975) 31 TAX 245 = (1970) 75 ITR 1",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),24(2),10(2)(vi)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),24(2),10(2)(vi)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "INCOME-TAX CASE NO. 9 OF 1967, JANUARY 23, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "S.K. KAPUR AND, JAGJIT SINGH, JJ",
    "": "Raj Narain Agarwala\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11994",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1F5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 414 = 1975 SLD 414 = (1975) 31 TAX 253 = (1970) 75 ITR 40",
    "Key Words:": "Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Corresponding to section 28(1)(c) of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) - Penalty - For concealment of income - Assessment year 1952-53 - Whether though findings arrived at in assessment proceedings constitute relevant and admissible materials in penalty proceedings, yet they do not operate as res judicata as considerations relevant in penalty proceedings are different from those in assessment proceedings. - Held, yes - Whether merely disbelieving assessee's explanation about sources of certain amounts entered in his books that they did not belong to him and taxing amounts in hands of assessee will not per se justify an imposition of penalty as department must do something more and establish that amounts constituted assessee's taxable income and he was guilty of defaults specified in section 28 of 1922 Act - Held, yes\nFACTS\nFor the assessment year 1952-53, the assessee enjoyed over-draft facilities by furnishing as security three deposits in the names of 'L', 'G' and 'P'. The ITO, and, on appeal, the AAC came to the conclusion that the said three deposits represented assesse's undisclosed income and therefore, taxed the same in his hands.\nThe Tribunal dismissed the appeal with the observation that the department had succeeded beyond reasonable doubt in establishing that the assessee itself brought in the security moneys in the shape of those fixed deposits in the names of various persons who were totally at its influence or were obliged. The addition was, thus, upheld. Following this, the ITO levied penalty under section 28(1)(c) of 1922 Act.\nOn second appeal, the Tribunal cancelled the penalty, holding that no mens rea had been established by the department to warrant levy of penalty; that the reason for the additions being made in regard to these deposits in the quantum assessment could at best amount to the assessee's explanation being not satisfactory; that there was no material in it to support its conclusion that the fixed deposits represented the secret moneys of the assessee-firm and that no link had been established between the assessee's moneys and the deposits in question.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nAs regards imposition of penalty under section 28(1)(c) of 1922 Act, principles which emerge from various decisions may be summarised as: (1) though the findings arrived at in the assessment proceedings constitute relevant and admissible materials in penalty proceedings, yet they do not operate as res judicata as the considerations relevant in penalty proceedings are different from those in the assessment proceedings; (2) Merely disbelieving the assessee's explanation about the sources of certain amounts entered in his books that they did not belong to him and taxing the amounts in the hands of the assessee will not per se justify an imposition of penalty. The department must do something more and establish that the amounts constituted the assessee's taxable income and he was guilty of defaults specified in section 28 of 1922 Act; (3) only conscious and deliberate concealment on the part of the assessee can attract penalty; (4) each case has to be decided on its own facts bearing in mind the aforementioned principles.\nIn the instant case, the Tribunal, while dealing with the penalty appeal, came to the conclusion that at best the reason for the additions being made in the quantum assessment was the unsatisfactory nature of the assessee's explanation.\nThe Tribunal's view on facts was a possible one, namely, that the moneys were taxed in the hands of the assessee on the footing that his explanation was not correct. Therefore, the penalty was not leviable under section 28(1)(c) of 1922 Act.\nNote: The case was decided in favour of assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Gokuldas Harivallabhdas [1958] 34 ITR 98 (Bom.), CIT v. Anwar Ali [1967] 65 ITR 95 (Cal.), CIT v. L.H. Vora [1965] 56 ITR 126 (Guj.), Lal Chand Gopal Das v. CIT [1963] 48 ITR. 324(All.), Haji Abdul Rahman Abdul Qayum v. CIT [1965] 56 ITR 172 (All.) and Moman Ram Ram Kumar v. CIT [1966] 59 ITR 135 (All.).",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=28(1)(c),66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=28(1)(c),66(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 14 OF 1967, JANUARY 29, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "S.K. KAPUR AND P.N. KHANNA, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nAzad Bharat Finance Co"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11995",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1F5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 415 = 1975 SLD 415 = (1975) 31 TAX 51 = 1975 PTD 27",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 23 -- Assessment -- Summary assessment -- Omnibus sort of printed assessment form -- Assessment made by filling in a few blanks in printed form -- Whether an order in the eye of law -- Held no -- Circular -- Central Board of Revenue Circular instructions in the matter of assessment -- Whether enforceable, if in contravention of the provisions of law -- Held no -- Assessment of individual -- Income-tax Officer disposing of case by filling in 3 blanks in a printed form without disclosing what sort of business or profession assessee followed nor disclosing source of his income -- Held: Method followed by I. T. O. was extraordinary, highly objectionable and illegal -- Order set aside and fresh assessment in accordance with law directed --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=23(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=23(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1230(HB) of 1973-74 (Assessment year 1973-74), decision dated: 31-12-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "A. A. DARESHANI, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11996",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1F5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 416 = 1975 SLD 416 = (1975) 31 TAX 1 = 1975 PTD 1",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 3, 5(8), 26A, 26A(5), 35 -- Central Board of Revenue -- Circular instructions -- Provisions of Sec. 5(8) enjoying upon Income-tax Officer employed in the execution of Income-tax Act to abide by orders and instructions issued by Central Board of Revenue -- Instructions issued by Central Board of Revenue in excess of the authority or contrary to the legal provisions -- Whether binding on the Income-tax Officer -- Held no -- Registration -- Application for registration -- Absence of fulfillment of statutory provisions contained in Sec. 26A(5) -- Instructions issued by Central Board of Revenue waiving compliance with those statutory provisions -- Whether binding on the assessing officer -- Held no -- Central Board of Revenue letter C. No. 2(29)1-3/69 dated 2-6-1970 --\nRectification of mistake -- Registration refused for non-fulfillment of the requirement of Sec. 26A(5) -- Refusal suffering from no mistake or error either of fact or law -- Application for rectification of mistake on the basis of instructions issued by Central Board of Revenue waiving fulfillment of statutory provisions -- Instructions contrary to legal provisions -- Income-tax Officer refusing to rectify original order -- Whether valid and proper -- Held yes -- Registration of firms -- Application for renewal should be treated as one for registration -- Only legal and valid orders or instructions of Central Board of Revenue could be abided by under section 5(8) -- Fulfillment of conditions, laid down in section 26A(5), one of essential ingredients for claiming registration of firm -- Legal requirements waived by Central Board of Revenue vide their instructions Circular No. 2 (29) 1-3/69 dated 2-6-70 -- Income-tax Officer not bound to accept or abide by same -- Order passed by Income-tax Officer ignoring instruction -- Held, did not suffer from any mistake or error either of fact or law and no application as such competent under section 35 --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=23(3),26A,26A(5),5(8),35,26A(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=23(3),26A,26A(5),5(8),35,26A(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. Nos. 5051, 2690 and 2691 of 1973-74 (Assessment years 1969-70 and 1972-73), decision dated: 30-9-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "M. T. SIDDIQUI, PRESIDENT AND M. M. AKBAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11997",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1F5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 417 = 1975 SLD 417 = (1975) 31 TAX 7 = 1975 PTD 6",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 3, 4, 10 -- Income-tax or capital -- Purchase and sale of land -- No dominant intention at the time of acquisition or disposal to make profits -- Surplus arising out of land -- Whether venture in the nature of trade -- Held no -- Whether casual and non-recurring - Held yes --\nPurchase of plot of land by a manufacturing concern for setting up installation of a sewing machine factory -- Health department refusing permission for installation of factory -- Concern finding money thus blocked up and finding no ready purchaser, disposing of land piecemeal in order to retrieve and recoup investment -- Any gain made under circumstances would either be casual gain or capital gain -- Disposal of land in such circumstances could not be treated as adventure in nature of trade or business -- To bring case within extended definition of \"\"business\"\" by way of adventure in nature of trade, intentions at time of acquisition and at time of disposal -- Necessary elements --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. Nos. 3610, 3611, 3612 and 6872 of 1973-74 (Assessment year 1970-71 to 1973-74), decision dated: 24-10-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "M. T. SIDDIQUI, PRESIDENT AND M. M. AKBAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11998",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1F5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 418 = 1975 SLD 418 = (1975) 31 TAX 11 = 1975 PTD 16",
    "Key Words:": "Wealth-tax Act, 1963 -- Section 5(1)(vi) -- Exemption -- Car -- Articles for personal or household use of assessee exempt from wealth tax -- Car being personal property of assessee intended for his personal or household use -- Whether exempt from wealth tax -- Held yes -- Words \"\"and other articles..... intended for personal or household use\"\" -- Include motor car meant for personal and household use -- Claim for exemption in respect of such asset -- Accepted --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Wealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=5(1)(vi)\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=5(1)(vi)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.T.A. No. 176 and 177 of 1973-74 (Assessment years 1971-72 and 1972-73), decision dated: 15-10-1974",
    "Judge Name:": "M. T. SIDDIQUI PRESIDENT AND M. M. AKBAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11999",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1F5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 419 = 1975 SLD 419 = (1975) 31 TAX 232 = (1969) 74 ITR 143",
    "Key Words:": "Section 247, read with section 268, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 30, read with section 67A, of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Appeal by partner - Assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59 - Both 'B' and 'M' were partners in a firm on which assessment was made At first, 'B' filed an appeal - While said appeal was pending another appeal was filed by 'M' - Whether appeal filed by 'M' was competent under second proviso to section 30(1) of 1922 Act - Held, yes - Whether period spent by 'M' in obtaining copy of assessment order was to be excluded and after excluding such period, holding appeal of 'M' was within period of limitation - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThere existed a firm consisting of four partners including 'B' and 'M'. For the assessment year 1957-58 and 1958-59, the firm was assessed. An appeal was filed by 'B'. That appeal was disposed of by the AAC on 28-7-1962. In the meanwhile, 'M' filed an independent appeal on 5-5-1962. The appeal of 'M' was dismissed by AAC on the ground that the appeal was barred by time, and that in view of the prior appeal filed by 'B' another appeal by 'M' was not maintainable. On further appeal by 'M', the Tribunal held that a appeal of 'm' within time, and was maintainable in spite of the fact that another appeal had been previously filed by 'B'\nOn reference:\nHELD\nIn the instant case 'B' and 'M' were both partners of the dissolved firm. They both had a right of appeal under the second proviso to section 30(1).of the 1922 Act Ordinarily, there should be no difficulty in consolidating such appeals filed by two different partners of a dissolved firm, some difficulty may arise if a partner files an appeal after the decision of an appeal by another partner. But no such difficulty arose in the instant case. At first 'B' filed his appeal. Subsequently, 'M' filed his appeal on 5-5-1962. The two connected appeals were pending before the AAC in May, 1962. 'B' appeal was not disposed of till 28-7-1962. There was thus no difficulty in consolidating the two appeals and disposing of them by one order at any time between 5-5-1962 and 28-7-1962.\nThe Tribunal was justified in holding that 'M's appeal was competent under the second proviso to section 30(1) of the 1922 Act.\nThe language of section 67A of the 1922 Act is plain. It is expressly mentioned in the section that the period spent in obtaining a copy of the impugned order shall excluded. Such exclusion is not subject to any condition that it should be obligatory to file a copy of the impugned order with the memorandum of appeal. The Tribunal in the instant case was, therefore, justified in excluding the time taken by 'M' in obtaining a copy of the assessment order. After excluding such period, his appeal was within limitation.\nNote: The case has been decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nPunjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Offi. Liq. Punjab Cotton Press Co. Ltd. AIR 1941 Lah 257 (FB) and T.N. Swami & Co. v. CIT [1952] 21 ITR 407 (Punj.).",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=30,23,67A,66\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=30,23,67A,66\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 14 OF 1965, OCTOBER 17, 1968",
    "Judge Name:": "V.G. OAK, C.J. AND T.P. MUKHERJEE, J",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nBabu Ram Chandra Bhan"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12000",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1F5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 420 = 1975 SLD 420 = (1975) 31 TAX 170 = (1970) 75 ITR 147",
    "Key Words:": "Section 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (corresponding to section 3 of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) - Income - Chargeable as - Assessment year 1960-61 - By an agreement with a Delhi-company, assessee-company undertook to lend certain amount to that company in order to erect a flour milling plant at Madras - Borrowing was to carry interest plus commission of one per cent on all sales at Madras - Agreement was subsequently cancelled due to some differences as a result of which assessee-company was paid back amount lent with interest as well as compensation for deprivation of commission which it could earn for seven years - Whether amount of compensation received was a capital receipt and, thus, it was not liable to tax as business income of assessee - Held, yes\nFACTS\nBy an agreement with a Delhi company, the assessee-company undertook to lend certain sum to that company in order to erect a flour miling plant at Madras, and the borrowing was to carry interest plus a commission of 1 per cent on all sales at Madras. The agreement was subsequently cancelled due to some difference, as a result of which the assessee-company was paid back the amount lent so far with interest, as well as a compensation amount, whereupon the Delhi Company was released of all its obligations under the agreement. For the assessment year 1950-51, the assessee-company claimed the compensation amount as a capital receipt and not income. The ITO held that the compensation was for services rendered by the assessee-company contemporaneous with the advancement of the loan for finding a site to the Delhi company for erection of their factory and also for loss of profit on account of the termination of the agreement and therefore was of opinion that it was a business profit and included the same in the company's assessment.\nOn second appeal, the Tribunal was of the view that the assessee ventured to invest a large sum with the Delhi company for a particular purpose, in return the assessee was to get 1 per cent, as commission on the selling price of all the products to be manufactured by the Delhi company; such a commission was to be paid for a continuous period of 7 years and the assessee therefore secured an enduring benefit or at least was assured of the same as a result of the arrangement which was reflected in the agreement, and by the cancellation of the agreement the assessee had to give up what virtually happened to be a sharing in the business of that other company which was the source of income for the assessee. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the receipt was for the destruction of a capital asset and was therefore of a capital nature. They deleted the addition to the business income of the assessee for the assessment year.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nThough, no doubt, the agreement by itself reflected only a financial arrangement between the parties, yet the compensation that was agreed to be paid on its cancellation was more for the reason that the assessee was deprived of the commission which it could earn for a period of 7 years irrespective of the repayment of the advance earlier or at the stipulated time. This defeasance of the commission which was a certain event in case the agreement worked itself out was a deprivation of the benefit which was enduring to the assessee-company. It was not a casual receipt nor could it be termed to be a business income.\nWhenever an assessee enters into an agreement, not in his usual course of business but independent thereof, and secures rights and incurs contractual liabilities and if, while implementing the same, the very source of the bargain as contemplated in the agreement is removed and in lieu thereof on such an unexpected snapping of the chain of events and the plugging of the hole in the source, he is compensated, then such a compensation is deemed to be for the very drying up of the source and, as is commonly said, for the destruction of the profit earning apparatus. In such a case the compensation received would be a capital receipt. In the instant case the assessee forged an apparatus in the shape of a commercial agreement and intended that it should give the profits. Besides interest on investment, the assessee expected to earn commission at 1 per cent. for a period of 7 years on the total sales of wheat products to be manufactured by the Delhi company. This involved the assessee setting up as it were a miniature organisation which was obviously different in concept and working of a flour mill, which was the assessee's business. The enterprise envisaged in the agreement is neither directly or indirectly connected with its business. The activity which was thus totally dissociated with the business of the company could not be characterised as one undertaken in the course of its business and much less in the ordinary course of its business. The rights and liabilities under the agreement projected a picture which was unique and fundamental by itself and had no relation to the principal business of the assessee. The aggregation of those rights reflected in the agreement was a capital asset and any compensation received in exchange for the cessation of such rights ought to be considered as a capital receipt.\nIn the instant case, the mills engaged themselves in an activity which was not akin to or related to their usual business. They set up for themselves an apparatus to earn profits. This had to be shelved and thus the totality of the new undertaking had to be given up in consideration of a lump sum payment. The magnitude of the receipt was an irrelevant consideration. The sum and substance of the transaction was that the profit-making apparatus had been compulsorily dissolved. The entire congeries of rights in the integrated series of activities of the assessee reflected that the ultimate receipt by him was a capital one.\nFor the above reasons, the compensation amount received by the assessee-company was not income assessable to income-tax.\nNote: The case was decided in favour of assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji [1959] 35 ITR 148 (SC); P.H. Divecha v. CIT [1963] 48 ITR (SC) 222; Godrej & Co. v. CIT [1959]37 ITR 381 (SC); Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1964] 53 ITR 261 (SC); P.L.M. Firm v. CIT [1968] 68 ITR 856 (Mad.) andVan den Berghs Ltd. v. Clark (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) [1935] 3 ITR (Eng. Cas.) 17 (H.L.)",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE NO. 205 OF 1965 (REFERENCE NO. 104 OF 1965), MARCH 7, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "VEERASWAMI AND RAMAPRASADA RAO, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nSouth India Flour Mills (P.) Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12001",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1F5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 421 = 1975 SLD 421 = (1975) 31 TAX 216 = (1969) 73 ITR 592",
    "Key Words:": "Section 10 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 - Gifts whenever made where doner not entirely excluded - Deceased donated house properties to his sons and daughters - Deceased had not taken any steps to mutate those properties in favour of donees - Deceased prior to his death and after making of gift was also living in that house and gifted property remained in his name - Income from those house properties were utilised for purpose of family including deceased, donor - Whether in such circumstances it could be held that donees had not immediately assumed possession of properties and thenceforward retained same to entire exclusion of deceased and, consequently, provisions of section 10 were attracted - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe applicant who was a son of the deceased, submitted a statement of account before the Assistant Controller, declaring the principal value of the estate of the deceased. It was claimed before the Assistant Controller that the deceased had transferred six house properties to his sons and daughters by oral gift known as hiba under Mohammadan law, more than two years before the death of the deceased and as such the properties should not be included in the estate passing on the death of the deceased. The Assistant controller held that there was no delivery of possession of the properties gifted so as to make the gifts valid as hiba. It was also stated that there were no accounts to show how the rents realised from the house properties were actually utilised. The Assistant Controller further held that, even assuming that all these properties were validly gifted by the deceased, the properties should be deemed to pass on the death of the deceased under the provisions of section 10, since the deceased could not be said to have been entirely excluded from the benefits from the properties gifted by him. He, accordingly, included those properties in the estate of the deceased. On appeal, the Board, while holding that the gift was valid as it had been completed two years prior to the death of the deceased, and as such the properties gifted were outside the scope of section 9, came to the conclusion that the donees did not enjoy the properties to the entire exclusion of the deceased, and that, therefore, the provisions of section 10 applied to those properties.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nIt would be observed that while the accountable person had stated in his deposition, that the rents after paying the municipal taxes were being utilised for the family expenses including that of the father, he tried to resile from that statement and stated that no part of the rental income was utilised to meet the expense of his late father. It was clear, however, that, the children to whom the gift was made by the donor did not enjoy the property to the entire exclusion of the donor which was also one of the requirements under section 10 for excluding the gifted properties from the estate of the deceased.\nA reading of section 10 would show that not only that the bona fide possession and enjoyment of it was not retained by the deceased should be established, but that from the date of the gift, it was enjoyed to the entire exclusion of the donor or of any benefit to him by the donee. If any of these requirements are not fulfilled the estate would be deemed to be the estate of the deceased. All the authorities, while holding that the gift was a valid gift under the Mohammadan law, held that the donees did not enjoy exclusive benefit. Apart from this, it was also apparent that, even though the gift was alleged to have been made as early as 1954 or 1955, no steps were taken to mutate the properties in favour of the donees. The house property gifted being still in the name of the donor, the donor living in the same house along with his sons as also the income from it being utilised for the purpose of the family including that of the donor would cumulatively show that not only did the donor enjoy the possession of the properties but also the donees did not have exclusive enjoyment thereto.\nTherefore, it had to be held that the estate duty authorities had material to come to the conclusion that the donees had not immediately assumed possession of the properties and thenceforward retained the same to the entire exclusion of the deceased and that the provisions of section 10 were attracted.\nNote: The case was decided against the accountable person.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nGeorge Da Costa v. CED [1967] 63 ITR 497 (SC) and Mohammad Bhai v. CED [1968] 69 ITR 770 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "Estate Duty Act, 1953=10,9\\n\\r\\n\\rEstate Duty Act, 1953=10,9\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CASE REFERRED NO. 47 OF 1964, NOVEMBER 20, 1968",
    "Judge Name:": "P., JAGANMOHAN REDDY, C.J. AND RAMACHANDRA RAO, J",
    "": "Mumtaz Ahmed Khan\nvs\nController of Estate Duty"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12002",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 422 = 1975 SLD 422 = (1975) 31 TAX 219 = (1970) 75 ITR 133",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=147(a),148\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=147(a),148\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=16(3),22,34\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "WRIT PETITION NOS. 1042 TO 1045 OF 1964, MARCH 7, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "P., JAGANMOHAN REDDY, C.J. AND SAMBASIVA RAO, J",
    "": "Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur, H.E.H\nvs\nIncome Tax Officer"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12003",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 423 = 1975 SLD 423 = (1975) 31 TAX 166 = (1970) 75 ITR 157",
    "Key Words:": "Section 147, read with section 256 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 34, read with section 66, of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Income escaping assessment - Position prior to 1-4-1989 - Assessment year 1945-46 - Assessee being a minor at relevant time, his father disclosed, in return, only minor's share income from a firm but not minor's income by way of interest derived from another firm in which certain sum bequeathed to him by his mother was invested - Thus, share income alone was assessed in assessee's hands while interest was shown in his father's return - Later, High Court in a reference for an earlier assessment year, held that interest could not be assessed in father's hands - ITO accordingly made reassessment under section 34(1)(a) of 1922 Act by including interest income in assessee's hands - Tribunal held that assessee's father had not discharged his duty as minor's guardian to include interest income in assessee's return, and that provisions of section 34(1)(a) applied - High Court, on reference, held that assessment made under section 34(1)(a) of 1922 Act was not justified in absence of evidence to support Tribunal's finding that ITO had reason to believe that there was omission on assessee's part to disclose fully and truly all material facts - Whether in absence of a question whether Tribunal's finding was based on no evidence or that it was perverse, High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in examining for itself materials in support of Tribunal's finding and acting as a court of appeal - Held, yes - Whether High Court was, thus, in error in reappraising evidence before Tribunal and in interfering with its finding - Held, yes - Whether, consequently, assessment made under section 34(1)(a) of 1922 Act was to be regarded as justified in law - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe father of the assessee, who was a minor at the relevant time, had, in the return, for the assessment year 1945-46, disclosed only the minor's share income from a firm but not the income by way of interest derived from another firm in which certain sum bequeathed to him by his mother was invested. Thus, the share income alone was assessed in the assessee's hands. Subsequently, following the High Court's in the reference for the assessment year 1940-41, the ITO made reassessment under section 34(1)(a) by including interest income in the assessee's hands.\nOn second appeal, the Tribunal held that the assessee had not discharged his duty of returning his income at the proper time and so the provisions of section 34(1)(a) of 1922 Act applied.\nOn reference, the High Court held that the assessment made under section 34(1)(a) of 1922 Act was not justified in law, as there was no evidence to support the Tribunal's finding that the ITO had reason to believe that there was omission on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD\nThere was justification for the revenue's argument that in the absence of a question whether the finding of the Tribunal was based on no evidence or that it was perverse, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in examining for itself the materials in support of the Tribunal's finding and acting as a court of appeal.\nIt is well established that the High Court is not a court of appeal in a reference under section 66 of 1922 Act and it is not open to the High Court in such a reference to embark upon a reappraisal of the evidence and to arrive at findings of fact contrary to those of the Tribunal. It is the duty of the High Court to confine itself to the facts as found by the Tribunal and answer the question of law in the setting and context of those facts. The finding of fact will be defective in law if there is no evidence to support it or if the finding is unreasonable or perverse. But in the hearing of a reference under section 66 of 1922 Act it is not open to the assessee to challenge such a finding of fact unless he has applied for a reference of the specific question under section 66(1) of 1922 Act.\nTherefore, the High Court was in error in reappraising the evidence before the Tribunal and in interfering with its finding that the ITO had no reason to believe that there was an omission on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for the assessment.\nFor these reasons, the of the High Court was set aside.\nHence, the assessment made under section 34(1)(a) of 1922 Act was justified in law.\nNote: The case was decided against assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\nKamal Singh Rampuria v. CIT [1970] 75 ITR 162 (Cal.) (Appendix) - reversed.\nCASES REFERED TO\nCIT v. Sri Meenakshi Mills Ltd. [1967] 63 ITR 609 (SC), India Cements Ltd. v. CIT [1966] 60 ITR 52 (SC) and Kamal Singh Rampuriv. CIT [1970] 75 ITR 162 (Cal.).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=16(3)(i),66(1),34\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=16(3)(i),66(1),34\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO. 734 OF 1968, FEBRUARY 12, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "J.C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A.N. GROVER, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nKamal Singh Rampuria"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12004",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 424 = 1975 SLD 424 = (1975) 31 TAX 146 = (1970) 78 ITR 272 = (1973) 27 TAX 76",
    "Key Words:": "Section 72, read with section 143 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - (Corresponding to section 24 read with section 23(2) and (3) of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) - Losses - Carry forward and set off of business losses - Assessment year 1955-56 - Assessee filed loss return beyond time - ITO issued notice under section 23(2) of 1922 Act, examined accounts and passed order saying that loss returned was out of time and same was therefore filed - Whether in view of fact that ITO had power to grant further time for filing return, his acting under section 23(2) of 1922 Act was consistent only with inference that he had impliedly condoned delay in filing return - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, ITO had to complete assessment and compute loss to be carried forward and set off against income of assessee for assessment year 1959-60 - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was a registered firm. Without being noticed under section 22(2) of the 1922 Act, even though it was a regular assessee on the file of the department, it filed a voluntary return showing a loss. The ITO, thereafter issued to the assessee a notice under section 23(2) of 1922 Act, examined its accounts a number of times and passed an order in the order sheet saying: 'The loss returned is out of time. The same, is therefore, filed.'\nThe AAC allowed the assessee's appeal holding that having condoned the delay in filing the return by the assessee by the issue of notice under section 23(2), of 1922 Act, the ITO should proceed on the basis of the return and compute the correct amount of loss according to law. Pursuant to the aforesaid order of the AAC the ITO computed the loss but took a view that as the loss return was not filed in time by virtue of the provisions of section 22(2A) of the 1922 Act, the assessee was not entitled to the carry forward of the loss.\nThe assessee again appealed against the order of the ITO. The AAC held that once the order of the AAC had not been challenged, it was to be implemented and that the order of the ITO refusing to carry forward the loss, was, therefore, contrary to the order of the AAC and could not stand. The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nThe ITO has the power to allow further time, and this further time may be allowed expressly or by implication. There being no express order granting further time, one should have to see whether further time had been allowed by implication. In the instant case, if the return were not to be considered because it had been filed late, the ITO could have initially summarily rejected it on that ground. But, instead of doing that, he issued a notice to the assessee to produce or cause to be then produced before him evidence in support of the return. The only inference, therefore, was that the ITO was not prepared to reject the return as filed beyond time, but was prepared to consider it on merits on the footing that the delay was liable to be condoned. In our opinion, in view of the fact that the ITO had power to grant further time under section 22(2A) of the 1922 Act, his acting under section 23(2) of 1922 Act was consistent and consistent only with the inference that he was impliedly granting to the assessee further time for the filing of the return by condoning the delay in its late filing. If this inference were not permissible, one would be accusing the ITO of wasting his time in a useless exercise of examining the account books of the assessee in support of a return which was to serve no useful purpose, even if found true on its examination.\nThe matter might also be looked in another manner. The ITO had, for reasons best known to him, filed the return as presented out of time after issuing notice to the assessee under section 23(2) of the 1922 Act and after examining the account books of the assessee a few times. On appeal, the AAC set aside the aforesaid order and, in view of the decision in another case, remanded the case to the ITO 'to proceed on the basis of the return and compute the correct amount of loss according to law'. In the case referred to in the order, the direction of the Tribunal to the ITO was to complete the assessment and compute the loss to be carried forward. No doubt, the order of the Tribunal in the case referred was more specific and exact; but, even so, there is no reason to impute to the AAC that, having held that the ITO should be deemed to have condoned the delay when he issued a notice to the assessee under section 23(2) of the Act, he intended to nullify the effect of his order by not directing the ITO to compute the assessment for the purpose of carrying forward the loss to be set off against the income of the subsequent years, the only purpose for which the return of loss was filed by the assessee. The effect of the order of the AAC was: (a) That he was holding that by issuing a notice under section 23(2) of the 1922 Act the ITO should be deemed to have granted further time for the filing of the return ; (b) that as, in his view, the ITO had granted further time to the assessee for the filing of the return, his (the ITO's) order filing the return as filed out of time was to be set aside ; (c) that as the enquiry on the return had not been completed, it had to be completed ; and (d) that as the only purpose of the loss return filed by the assessee was to get the loss computed by the ITO for the purpose of carrying forward, the loss determined by the ITO was to be carried forward to be set off against the income for subsequent years.\nIt is true that the order of the AAC was rather inapt, but that its purpose was what has been held to be its import and meaning by the AAC ; and the Tribunal could not be gainsaid ; and as long as that order stood and as it had not been challenged in appeal, its effect was that the ITO had to complete the assessment and carry forward the loss to be set off against the income of the assessee for the year 1959-60.\nTherefore, the assessee was entitled to have its loss for the assessment year 1955-56 carried forward and set off against the income for 1959-60.\nNote: The case was decided in favour of the assessee.",
    "Court Name:": "Madhya Pradesh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66,22(2),23(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66,22(2),23(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "MISC. CIVIL CASE NO. 204 OF 1967, APRIL 1, 1970",
    "Judge Name:": "T.P. NAIK AND S.P. BHARGAVA, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nKamla Oil Mills"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12005",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 425 = 1975 SLD 425 = (1975) 31 TAX 136 = (1970) 78 ITR 256",
    "Key Words:": "Section 251 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 31(3) of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Commissioner (Appeals) - Powers of - Assessment years 1950-51 to 1952-53- Pending suit for dissolution of assessee-firm, one partner carried on business of firm - ITO assessed firm in assessment years in question in status of 'association of persons' - AAC annulled assessments and directed ITO to assess income as income of partner's family - Tribunal set aside direction of AAC holding that partner was stranger to assessment proceedings - High Court held that order of AAC directing assessment of partner's family was unwarranted and could relate only to partner in his individual capacity - Whether when question referred to High Court only related to assessment of income in hands of partner after annulling assessment of firm, High Court exercising advisory jurisdiction was incompetent to make inquiry into power of AAC to make impugned direction - Held, yes\nFACTS\n'B', 'D' and 'J' were partners in a firm. 'J' filed suit for dissolution of the firm. During pendency of the suit 'B' severed his connection with the business and thereafter the business was carried on by 'D' alone. 'D' filed returns in different capacities. The ITO assessed firm in the three years of assessment in the status of 'an association of persons'. The AAC directed that the income in the three assessment years be assessed in the hands of the family of 'D', apparently in the view that 'D' represented the HUF of which he was a member. The Tribunal set aside the direction to assess the income of the firm in the hands of 'D' personally, for in their view 'D' was a stranger to the proceeding for assessment. The High Court held that the order of the AAC directing assessment of 'the family of 'D' was clearly unwarranted and could relate only to 'D' in his individual capacity.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD\n'D' had submitted the returns, and 'D' appealed against the order of assessment. He could, in the circumstances of the case, not be called a stranger to the assessment. The income earned by the assessee was assessed to tax as income of an association of persons, of which on the finding of the ITO, 'D' was a member. In making a direction against 'D' the Tribunal did not exercise his powers qua stranger to the assessment proceeding.\nThe High Court exercising advisory jurisdiction was incompetent to amend the order of the AAC. But on the question referred to the High Court, no inquiry into the power of the AAC to make the impugned direction was competent. The question only related to the assessment of the income in the hands of 'D' after annulling the assessment of the firm. It was not contended before the Tribunal that the income of the firm could not be assessed in the hands of the family of 'D'. The competence of the AAC to make the direction was not and could not be referred to the High Court.\nNote: The case was decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\nCIT v. Ambala Flour Mills [1970] 78 ITR 262 (Punj. & Har.) affirmed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Kanpur Coal Syndicate [1964] 53 ITR 225 ; [1964] 6 SCR 41 (SC), ITO v. A-Ward, Sitapur v. Murlidhar Bhagwandas [1964]52 ITR 335; [1964] 8 SCR 85 (SC) and SC Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas [1963] 49 ITR (SC); 1 [1964] 1 SCR 29 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=31,23,28,33,66,27,34\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=31,23,28,33,66,27,34\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1277 TO 1279 AND 1280 TO 1282 OF 1966, APRIL 27, 1970",
    "Judge Name:": "J.C. SHAH, K.S. HEGDE AND A.N. GROVER, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nAmbala Flour Mills"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12006",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 841 = 1985 SLD 841 = 1985 SCMR 1212",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-----Art. 185(3)--Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.148 & 302/149--Acquittal of petitioners challenged--Contentions raised already considered and repelled by High Court in well-reasoned --Not open to inter­ference--Leave refused.\n \nKhawaja Muhammad Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court and Rana Maqbool Ahmad Qadri, Advocate-on-Record (absent) for Appellant.\n \nMian Nusratullah, Advocate Supreme Court for the State.\n \nDate of hearing: 11 February, 1985.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Petition for Special leave to Appeal No.318 of 1980, decision dated: 11-02-1985",
    "Judge Name:": "ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN, MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH AND MIAN BURHANUDDIN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "WARRIS ALI--Appellant\nVs.\nNAZIR and 4 others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12007",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 842 = 1985 SLD 842 = 1985 SCMR 1216",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-­---Art. 185(3)--Punjab Pre-emption Act (I of 1913), S. 21--Suit for pre-emption--Petitioner claiming to have purchased suit land on strength of a receipt, seeking possession--Purchase of land not disclosed in pre-emption proceedings--Suit for possession dismissed on ground that sale was not proved--Concurrent finding of two Courts upheld-Conduct of petitioner and vendor in not disclosing sale in proper proceeding at proper time making sale transaction shady--Petition being devoid of merits, dismissed.\n \nIftikharul Haq Khan, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by S. Abid Nawaz, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\n \nTanvir Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1.\n \nDate of hearing: 24th February, 1985.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1001 of 1979, decision dated: 24-02-1985 (On appeal from the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 24-9-1979 in R.S.A. No. 151 of 19.78)",
    "Judge Name:": "ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN AND SHAFIUR RAHMAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD BAKHSH and others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12008",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 426 = 1975 SLD 426 = (1975) 32 TAX 260 = (1965) 56 ITR 574",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),34,22(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),34,22(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CASE REFERRED NO. 46 OF 1962, APRIL 14, 1964",
    "Judge Name:": "P. CHANDRA REDDY, C.J. AND KUMARAYYA, J",
    "": "Adinarayana Murthy\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12009",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 427 = 1975 SLD 427 = (1975) 32 TAX 252 = (1964) 51 ITR 204",
    "Key Words:": "Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Income-escaping assessment - Position prior to 1-4-1989 - Assessment years 1948-49 to 1951-52 - Assessee was a karta of HUF which was partitioned in April, 1947 - Assessee, and his four sons constituted a partnership firm - Minor son of assessee was also admitted to benefits of partnership - Share income of minor was assessed in hands of his mother - Thereafter, ITO realized that share income of minor son should have been included in total income of assessee under section 16(3)(a) of 1922 Act - Whether in view of facts that while dealing with original assessments of assessee, income derived by minor son was not before ITO, it could be said that income in question had escaped assessment - Held, yes - Whether reopening of assessment in instant case could be clearly brought within scope of clause (b) of section 34(1) as information was gathered from records of original assessment itself did not make it anytheless information which led ITO to believe that income had escaped assessment - Held, yes - Whether therefore, reopening of assessment was justified by section 34(1)(b) of 1922 Act - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was the karta of a HUF. The family was partitioned on 1-4-1947. Following this partition, which was accepted by an order under section 25A, the assessee and his four major sons constituted themselves into a partnership and to the benefits of this partnership a minor son was admitted. This partnership was also registered under section 26A. For the assessment years 1948-49 to 1951-52, individual assessments were made in respect of the share income of the minor on returns filed by his mother 'K', as his guardian. The assessee, the erstwhile karta of the family, was also assessed individually in respect of his income. In or about 1952, the ITO realized that under section 16(3)(a), the income of the minor son from the partnership should have been included in the total income of the father and that had not been done in the assessment of the assessee, the father. In that view, therefore, that the income of the father had escaped assessment, proceedings were started under section 34.\nThe assessee submitted that it was not a case where any income had escaped assessment and that at best it could only be stated that his own income had been under-assessed. The ITO however made fresh assessments under section 23(1) read with section 34.\nOn appeal, the AAC took the view that since the minor son had been admitted to the benefits of the partnership in which the father was a partner, section 16(3)(a)(ii) applied, and that, in computing the total income of the father, the income of the minor son from the partnership had to be included. He thought that, since under the provisions of the Act the assessee was under a duty to disclose his total income, which total income by reason of section 16(3)(a)(ii) would take in the income of the minor son admitted to the benefits of the partnership, the assessee had failed to disclose that part of the income for the purpose of assessment.\nOn further appeal, the Tribunal held that it was not a case for invoking provisions of section 34(1).\nOn reference:\nHELD\nIn the instant case, there was no doubt whatsoever that while the ITO was dealing with the original assessment of this assessee, the income derived by the minor son from the partnership was not before him. That there were other connected proceedings under section 25A or section 26A or individual assessment proceedings of the minor before him could not be taken to establish that this part of the income of the minor son was considered by the ITO in making the assessment upon the father. Factually, he did not so consider this income. It was not in dispute that the return of the father did not display this income. It could not be, therefore, said that the ITO had come to a conclusion that the income of the son was not includible and for that reason he left it out.\nIt was held that the reopening of the assessment in the present case could be clearly brought within the scope of clause (b) of section 34(1). Even assuming that there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee, the information that any part of the income had escaped assessment was clearly received subsequent to the assessment. That that information was gathered from the records of the original assessment itself did not make it any the less information which led the ITO to believe that the income had escaped assessment.\nNote: The case has been decided in favour of the revenue.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. K.M.S. Lakshmana Iyer [1945] 13 ITR 242 (Mad.), CIT v. Mahomed Yusuf Ismail [1944] 12 ITR 8 (Bom.), Dhanwate v. CIT[1961] 42 ITR 253 (Bom.), Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. CIT [1959] 35 ITR 1 (SC), Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameswar Singh v. State of Bihar [1959] 37 ITR 388 (SC) and Raghavalu Naidu & Sons v. CIT [1945] 13 ITR 194 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),26A,25,16(3)(a),34\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),26A,25,16(3)(a),34\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CASE REFERRED NO. 68 OF 1957, OCTOBER 16, 1962",
    "Judge Name:": "JAGADISAN AND SRINIVASAN, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nRathinasabapathy Mudaliar"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12010",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 428 = 1975 SLD 428 = (1975) 32 TAX 111 = (1965) 56 ITR 605",
    "Key Words:": "Section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 13 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Method of accounting - Estimation of profit - Assessment years 1950-51 to 1952-53 - Assessee was a dealer in snake skins which found market only abroad - During relevant assessment years, assessee claimed that 15 percent of skins were not up to standard and, thus, they were to be rejected - ITO, however, opined that rejection of 15 percent of skins was excessive - He, thus, allowed rejection up to 5 percent only - Thereupon, ITO estimated gross profits on excess number of skins rejected and made additions to assessee's income - On appeals, amount of addition was reduced - Whether since assessee found that goods (i.e., snake skins) would not be accepted by buyers in foreign market, he had no alternative but to reject them - Held, yes - Whether, morever, in view of fact that assessee had not disposed of rejected skins, it could not be said that profits should have been calculated at notional sale value of skins rejected and added to taxable income - Held, yes - Whether consequently, impugned additions made by authorities below were to be set aside - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was a dealer in snake skins. For the relevant assessment years certain additions had been made to his income. The basis for these additions was that the department refused to accept the assessee's contention that he had to reject a certain quantity of the tanned skins as unsuitable for sale. It was common ground that these snake skins find a market only abroad. The assessee claimed that, after he had tanned his skins, he found certain of the skins were not up to the standard. He therefore rejected them. The ITO thought that the rejections were excessive. These rejections had been variously described in the orders of the officers below as shortages or wastages. But it was not denied by the department at this stage that they represented rejections of unsaleable skins which were found to be not up to the standard. It was also not in dispute that, in spite of these rejections, the assessee's gross profit return was not low and, indeed, compared favourably with the returns of similar dealers. In dealing with the claim of the assessee on this head, the ITO thought that the rejections came to 15 per cent, which was excessive. According to him, in another case, such rejections were found to be only 2.2 per cent. He was prepared to allow rejections up to 5 per cent. The excess number of skins were valued by the ITO at Rs. 2,18,000 upon which he estimated a gross profit of 121/2 per cent and added back such estimated profit to the taxable income for 1950-51. Similar additions were made for the other years. In assessee's appeal before the AAC, the appellate authority found that there was a case for addition, but reduced the addition.\nFurther appeals to the Tribunal resulted in the assessee obtaining a greater relief in this regard, but the Tribunal still maintained the additions at certain figures.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nThis was clearly a case of a trader dealing in a particular line of business, which commanded only a foreign market, attempting to maintain a certain standard in the goods which he exported in order to retain his market. A person dependent on foreign trade has to see that, by reason of the supply of sub-standard goods, his business is not affected. If, therefore, he finds that these goods will not be accepted by his buyers, he has no alternative but to reject them. Whether these goods will be ultimately destroyed or will find local sales is a different matter altogether. Before the department can bring to tax any amount, it must be established that the assessee has sold the goods and made any income thereby. When that circumstance was totally absent in this case, the assessee could not be taxed on a notional income. Where the skins were there, not having been disposed of by the assessee, it was unreasonable to say that upon the notional sale value of those skins, profit could or should have been derived which should be brought in as taxable income. The orders of the authorities below did not say that the assessee had dealt with these rejections at all, and, in the face of that irrefutable circumstance, there could in law be no addition on this head.\nIn view of aforesaid, it was opined that there was no justification what so ever for making the impugned additions in respect of the relevant assessment years.\nNote: The case was decided in favour of the assessee.",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE NO. 42 OF 1962 (REFERENCE NO. 21 OF 1962), JULY 16, 1964",
    "Judge Name:": "S. RAMACHANDRA IYER, C.J. AND SRINIVASAN, J",
    "": "K.M. Adam\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12011",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 429 = 1975 SLD 429 = (1975) 32 TAX 97 = (1965) 56 ITR 463",
    "Key Words:": "Section 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2) (xi) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Bad debts - Assessment year 1958-59 - Assessee was a partnership firm which was constituted with five partners - In assessment for year 1956-57, assessee's claim for bad debts was disallowed on ground of premature written off - In assessment for year 1958-59, assessee again claimed to set off said bad debt - ITO rejected assessee's claim holding that constitution of firm had been changed and it become a new firm with nine partners - Tribunal upheld ITO's order - Whether since partnership is result of mutual agreement between parties, it is open to partners to adjust their rights and liabilities in any manner they please - Held, yes - Whether, since in instant case, as per terms of partnership deed with introduction of new partners, no new partnership had come into existence but it was only a reconstitution of existing partnership, Tribunal was not justified in disallowing assessee's claim in respect of bad debts - Held, yes.\nFACTS\nThe assessee was a partnership which was constituted with five partners. The business of the firm was that of dealing in kapok, cotton, yarn and cloth. The firm supplied cotton to A Mills Limited, and on that account a sum of Rs. 20,598 was owing to the assessee. During the assessment year ending 14-11-1955, the assessee wrote off this amount as irrecoverable. In the assessment for the year 1956-57, the claim to treat this sum as a bad debt in the computation of the income was negatived by the ITO on the ground that it had been prematurely written off. In the following assessment year, the claim was not apparently raised. In the assessment for the year 1958-59, the assessee claimed to set off this bad debt. The ITO rejected the claim for this assessment year. His reasons were that the bad debt had been written off by the firm consisting of five partners in the account year ending with 14-11-1955. On the very next day, the constitution of the firm had been changed and it became one with nine partners. He accordingly thought that the new firm had not taken over the asset in question, that is, the claim against A Mills since it had already been written off.\nThe matter was taken up in appeal to the AAC. He took the view that the ITO had not correctly understood the position. He pointed out that there was no dispute that the claim was not genuine or the debt had not really become bad. He held that the firm consisting of nine partners was only a continuation of the firm consisting of five partners, and that from the recitals in the partnership deed, it could be seen that the business continued uninterrupted. When the debt was written off in the account year ending on 14-11-1955, the assessee could not foresee that the claim would be rejected as premature. By merely writing off, the assessee did not give up its rights to recover the amount if it could possibly be done. It bidded its time and renewed the claim when it was established that no part of the amount could be recovered.\nHe accordingly upheld the claim of the assessee. The department took the matter in appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the order of the AAC and restored that of the ITO.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nAt the outset it might be stated that there was no dispute that the amount has become incapable of realisation. Nor did the court find anything in the orders of the departmental officers or the Tribunal to show that it had become bad at any point of time not relevant to the present assessment year. If the fundamental obstacle which the Tribunal refered to, namely, that the debt was not that of this assessee but that of a different firm consisting of a different set of persons, did not exist, then it was common ground that the set-off should be available in the present case. It had therefore to be seen how far the view taken by the ITO, which had been upheld by the Tribunal on this aspect of the matter, was sound in law.\nThe Tribunal had not appreciated the effect of the various provisions of the Partnership Act and in particular the relevant clauses of the deeds of partnership governing the assessee-firm. Whether or not a partnership stands dissolved would be the result of the specific undertaking or agreement between the partners. Section 17 of the Indian partnership Act, 1932 states that, subject to contract between the partners, where a change occurs in the constitution of a firm, the mutual rights and duties of the partners in the reconstituted firm remain the same as they were immediately before the change as far as may be. That postulates that the introduction of a new member or a change in the constitution of the firm does not put an end to the firm. What is clear from all of these provisions is that, since a partnership is the creature of a contract, it is open to the partners to agree that the firm shall not stand dissolved on the occurrence of any particular contingency which, without such a safeguard, would in law result in the dissolution of the firm. If, therefore, the partners have agreed to that effect, viz., that the firm shall not stand dissolved by the taking of new partners, the firm as an entity, in so far as the Income-tax Act is concerned, must necessarily be regarded as continuing for the purposes of that Act.\nAs to the partnership agreements which were on record, the partnership, was commenced on the 19-10-1952, with five persons. It contained a clause that the retirement, insolvency or death of any of the partners, for the time being, of the firm, would not dissolve the firm. On the 15-11-1955, the five partners, along with four others, executed another deed of partnership.\nThe clauses of partnership deed clearly showed that it was by an agreement between the existing partners that four more partners were brought in for the purpose of continuing the already existing business. While it might be that for purposes of obtaining registration of the firm under section 26A and the assessment of the individual members of the partnership as a rusult of such registration, the introduction of the new partners might have different consequences, the court was unable to see how it could be said that, in the light of the agreement specifically embodied in the deed of partnership, the rights and liabilities of the firm of five partners did not become the rights and liabilities of the enlarged firm with nine partners. The business, as the unit, continued unbroken. It was only the interest of the partners that altered. It was therefore impossible to accept the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that the firm was a new entity to which the asset in the shape of the outstanding realisable from A Mills did not stand transferred. In fact, neither in the appellate order nor in the statement of the case by the Tribunal did the court find any reference to these recitals that were found in the partnership deed.\nThe other ground advanced by the Tribunal that if the write-off was to be allowed at the present time, it would enure to the benefit of the nine partners, and that the new four partners having lost nothing to entitle them to the benefit of the write-off, the write-off should not be allowed, seemed to be wholly irrelevant. Since a partnership is the result of a mutual agreement between the parties, it is open to the partners to adjust their rights and liabilities in any manner they please. That can have no impact upon the right to set off a bad debt. If the bad debt was one which was a liability of this assessee and not that of any other assessee, as the Tribunal assumed, without carefully examining the position, then the write-off could not be refused.\nIt is clear that in so far as the rights and obligations are concerned, it is a matter of contract between the partners themselves and it is only in so far as its effect on third parties is concerned that different consequences may follow. It is entirely for the partners of the firm as reconstituted to agree with regard to the rights and obligations of what may be called the old firm. It is only in cases where the interests of third parties are concerned that the old and the new partnership can be distinguished, but, as among the partners, the new partnership by reason of the contract can take over the rights and liabilities of the old partnership. For such purposes, it is not a new partnership that has come into existence, but only a reconstitution of an existing partnership.\nIt was, therefore, held that the Tribunal was not justified in disallowing the claim of the assessee in the circumstances of the case.\nNote: The case was decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO:\nCIT v. A.W. Figgies & Co. [1953] 24 ITR 405 (SC), Sait Nagjee Purushottam & Co. v. CIT [1964] 51 ITR 849 (SC) and Shivram Poddar v. ITO, Calcutta [1964] 51 ITR 823 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(xi),25(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(xi),25(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rPartnership Act, 1932=4,17(a),5,2\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE NO. 37 OF 1962 (REFERENCE NO 16 OF 1962), APRIL 10, 1964",
    "Judge Name:": "S. RAMACHANDRA IYER, C.J. AND SRINIVASAN, J",
    "": "R. Hanumanthappa and Sons\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12012",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 430 = 1975 SLD 430 = (1975) 32 TAX 40 = (1970) 75 ITR 38",
    "Key Words:": "Section 28(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(1) of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Business loss/deduction - Allowable as - Assessment year 1953-54 - Assessee-firm was carrying on country craft route agency business which had been discontinued and a petroleum agency business which was not discontinued - Whether assessee's claim for set off of a sum paid in discharge of decree in respect of its country craft route agency business could not be allowed against profits of its petroleum agency business under section 10(1) of 1922 Act - Held, yes\nFACTS\nFor the assessment year 1953-54, the assessee, a partnership firm, claimed a set-off of a sum paid in discharge of a decree in respect of its country craft route agency business which had been discontinued against the profits of its petroleum agency business which had not been discontinued. The revenue as well as the Tribunal concurrently took the view that the two business carried on by the assessee and one of which was discontinued had nothing to do with each other and there was no interdependence between them, so that the expenditure referable to the agency business was not one incurred in respect of any agency business carried on during the assessment year, and that the expenditure incurred could not be deducted from or taken into account in ascertaining the profits of the other business.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nThough the head may be one, namely, business, where its components are different as in the case of several businesses run, each of a distinct nature, each has got to be taken as a separate unit for purposes of ascertainment of profits. Expenditure under section 10(1) of 1922 Act is allowed not as a deduction or as allowance but as the component inherent in the process of ascertaining the profits, namely, arriving at the net result of credits and debits referable to a particular independent activity of business. The expenditure should partake of the very source of profit, namely, the particular business activity and it is taken into account as an outgoing in ascertaining the profits. The aggregation of the profits derived from several independent business activities can make no difference to this particular phenomenon involved in the process of ascertaining the profits from each business activity.\nTherefore, the assessee-firm was not entitled to the deduction of the amount in question as an admissible expenditure, outgoing or loss in the computation of its business income under section 10 of 1922 Act.\nNote: The case was decided against assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nI.M. Chhabda & Sons v. CIT [1967] 65 ITR. 638 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE NO. 180 OF 1965 (REFERENCE NO. 92 OF 1965), FEBRUARY 24, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "VEERASWAMI AND RAMAPRASADA RAO, JJ",
    "": "I.S. & C. Machado\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12013",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 431 = 1975 SLD 431 = (1975) 101 ITR 94",
    "Key Words:": "Section 147 of the Income tax Act, 1961 - Income escaping assessment - Information - Position prior to 1-4-1989 - Assessee was director in a company - In assessment of company Assessing Officer disallowed certain expenditure incurred in respect of assessee - Thereafter, Assessing Officer reopened assessment of assessee under section 147(b) to include said expenditure as perquisite in assessee's income as that aspect had not been considered by Assessing Officer in original assessment of assessee - Whether Assessing officer was within his jurisdiction in invoking powers under section 147(b) - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was director of a private limited company. In the assessment of the company, the ITO disallowed certain expenditure as incurred in respect of directors. Thereafter the ITO issued notice under section 148 proposing to reopen the original assessment completed on the assessee under section 147 to include the said expenditure as perquisites which had escaped assessment in the hand of the assessee. On appeal, the AAC upheld the legality of the assessment proceedings as well as the assessment of that expenditure as taxable perquisites. On further appeal, the Tribunal also held that reassessment proceedings were legally and validly taken.\nOn reference, the assessee contended that the assessment of the company was completed by the same ITO, long prior to the original assessment on the assessee, and that the ITO could not be said to have come into possession of any information subsequent to the original assessment which would have formed a reason for him to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.\nHELD\nUnless the ITO had originally considered that question and the reopening of the assessment could be characterised as amounting to a change of his view, the jurisdiction of the ITO to invoke the powers under section 147(b ) could not be questioned. Therefore, in the instant case the ITO was within his jurisdiction in invoking his powers under section 147(b ).\nNote: The case was decided against the assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Holck Larsen [1972] 85 ITR 467 (Bom.), CIT v. A. Raman & Co. [1968] 67 ITR 11 (SC), Salem Provident Fund Society v. CIT [1961] 42 ITR 547 (Mad.), Sankaralinga Nadar v. CIT [1963] 48 ITR 314 (Mad.) and Vairavan Chettiar v. CIT [1973] 92 ITR 474 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=148,147,256(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=148,147,256(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=34\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE NO. 84 OF 1969 (REFERENCE NO. 5 OF 1969) OCTOBER 1, 1974",
    "Judge Name:": "G. RAMANUJAM AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ",
    "": "S. Srinivasan\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12014",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1975 432 = 1975 SLD 432 = (1975) 32 TAX 42 = (1970) 75 ITR 23",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),17(1),23(3),34\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),17(1),23(3),34\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE NO. 41 OF 1966 (REFERENCE NO. 20 OF 1966), MAY 2, 1969",
    "Judge Name:": "K. VEERASWAMI, C.J. AND T. RAMAPRASADA RAO, J",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nK.L. Varadarajan"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12015",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 844 = 1985 SLD 844 = 1985 SCMR 1309",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)----Art. 185(3)--Displaces) Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958), Ss. 10 a 2(4), proviso-Transfer of residential evacuee house consisting of several units occupied by different persons--Could not be transferred merely to one of occupants--Case remanded to determine questions of divisibility and for transfer of different units to respective undisputed occupants--Order impugned--Leave to appeal granted on ground that leave had already been granted in another case against same --On hearing joint appeals, leave granting order rescinded and appeal arising therefrom dismissed.\n \nAbdul Majeed v. Chief Settlement Commissioner PLD 1968 S C 164 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--\n \n--Art. 185(3)--Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958), S.10--Transfer of evacuee property on basis of \"\"negotiation\"\"--Consisting of several units occupied by different persons--Transfer of a portion by Settlement Authorities by \"\"negotia­tion\"\"--No power to transfer on basis of \"\"negotiation\"\" existing under Act, transfer, held, illegal--Leave granting order against holding transfer manifestly illegal and not possible under law, rescinded--Appeal arising therefrom dismissed.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--\n \n---Art. 185(3)--Leave granting order--Recalled--Leave to appeal granted on ground that leave had already been granted in another case against same --Impugned order being with regard to transfer of property which was manifestly illegal and not possible under law--Supreme Court being of view that leave to appeal could not be granted, recalled order granting leave and dismissed appeals arising therefrom.\n \nKhalid M. Ishaque, Senior Advocate Supreme Court with Nizam Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record (in C.A.No. K-32 of 1975) and Akhtar Mahmud, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. K-112 and K-113 of 1976) for Appellants.\n \nKhalilur Rahman, Advocate-on-Record (in all Appeals) for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 23rd September, 1984.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. K-32 of 1975 (also Nos. K-112 and K-113 of 1976), decision dated: 23rd September, 1984",
    "Judge Name:": "ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN, NASIM HASAN SHAH, ABDUL KADIR SHEIKH AND M.S.H. QURAISHI, JJ",
    "": "BADRUL HASSAN WASTI and another--Appellants\nVs.\nSHUJAATULLAH and others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12016",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 897 = 1977 SLD 897 = (1977) 36 TAX 301 = (1977) 109 ITR 333",
    "Key Words:": "Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) - Business expenditure - Allowability of - Assessee private limited company was established in 1959 mainly to carry on business of manufacturing and selling spare parts and accessories of motor vehicles - Assessee company went into production in 1960 - It claimed deduction of certain expenses in purchase and sale of automobile parts resulting in net loss for period ending 31-12-1959 but was disallowed by ITO on ground that said loss was not due to business activities of assessee company - Whether since memorandum of association of company empowered it to manufacture items in which it was permitted to deal in and all business activities of assessee were related to same business, disallowance of part of expenses was not justified - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee private limited company was established mainly to carry on the business of manufacturing and selling spare parts and accessories of motor vehicles. Clause 10 of the memorandum of association permitted the company to buy, sell, import, export, manufacture, manipulate, treat, prepare and deal in merchandise, products, substances, commodities, articles and things of all kinds, and clause 26 permitted the company to manufacture and deal in all such stock-in-trade, goods, chattels, etc. The company went into production in 1960. In 1959, the balance-sheet shows that fixed assets were installed. There was no manufacture of spare parts in the account year. The company, however, purchased and sold automobile parts. In the profit and loss account for the period ended 31-12-1959, on the credit side, apart from the sales aforementioned, there was an item of interest. The net deficit in the profit and loss account was returned as the loss for the material assessment.\nThe ITO, however, held that the said loss was not due to the business activities of the company, and the total income was computed at nil. The assessee carried the matter to the AAC who upheld the conclusion of the ITO and dismissed the appeal. The assessee, thereafter, came in appeal before the Tribunal contending that the whole of the expenses should have been allowed. The Tribunal accepted the contention that, since the company had commenced business, it was entitled to deduct all expenses which would ordinarily be regarded as on revenue account, even if some of the expenses did not relate to the particular business activity carried on in the account year. After scrutinising the details of the expenses the Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee in full.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nBoth the Tribunal's approach and conclusion were substantially unexceptionable. It had been observed by the Tribunal that there was no dispute that business activities had actually been commenced in the account year, and that there was also no dispute that the interest and the bulk of the other expenses were not incurred for the business of buying and selling spare parts. The Tribunal was of view that the question however was, when once business was started, any allocation of the expenses incurred by the company on items which would ordinarily be regarded as on revenue account, was justified. There was no justification for such a view on the facts of instant case. If separate business activities were carried on by the company involving the maintenance of separate sets of accounts, and preparation of separate profit and loss accounts, the income of each business income under section 10. But, when only one set of account was maintained for all the business activities carried on, it was difficult to see how the assessee's business income could be computed business-wise. Separate computation of income and expenditure would be justified only when several distinct businesses were carried on, which was not the case in the instant case. Judged by any test, all the business activities of the assessee during the account year could be regarded as only relating to the same business, and the disallowance of a part of the expenses was not justified.\nIf one turned to clauses 10 and 26 of the memorandum of association of the assessee company it was clear that clause 26 empowers the company to manufacture the items in which it was permitted under clause 10 to deal in merchandise, products, substances, commodities, articles and things of all kinds, and apart from the test regarding common management, common control, etc., it was essentially the same type of business, the two activities being two separate stages of the same business.\nNote: The case was decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Prithvi Insurance Co. Ltd. [1967] 63 ITR 632 (SC), Produce Exchange Corpn. Ltd. v. CIT [1970] 77 ITR 739 (SC) and Scalesv. George Thompson & Co. Ltd. [1927] 13 TC 83 (KB).",
    "Court Name:": "Bombay High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),24(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),24(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 34 OF 1966, DECEMBER 9, 1975",
    "Judge Name:": "VIMADALAL AND S.K. DESAI, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nKothari Auto Parts Manufacturers (P.) Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12017",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 898 = 1977 SLD 898 = (1977) 36 TAX 305 = (1977) 109 ITR 337",
    "Key Words:": "Section 64 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Transfer of assets - For benefit of spouse etc. - Assessment years 1968-69 to 1970-71 - Income from house property standing in name of assessee's wife was brought to tax in hands of assessee holding him as real owner of said property - Whether since assessee failed to establish that his wife had assets sufficient to provide consideration money for acquisition of said property, assessee had purchased that property out of his own funds and income from house property was assessable in hands of assessee - Held, yes\nFACTS\nIn the course of assessment proceedings, the ITO found that the assessee had acquired a house, in the name of his wife. The said house was reconstructed in the year 1962, and a portion thereof had been rented out to a company. The ITO further found that the assessee had purchased another plot of land, also in the name of his wife and had constructed a house thereon in 1965 and was occupying the same for residential purposes from 1969. The ITO found that the assessee was being assessed as the karta of a HUF until the assessment year 1966-67. When the assessee was called upon to explain the source from where the two acquisitions had been made, the assessee stated that the residential house was acquired out of the rental income received from the company. The ITO found that the expenditure for construction as disclosed was low and added a sum to the expenditure disclosed. He came to hold that though the house property stood in the name of the assessee's wife in the municipal records. In the absence of satisfactory explanation for the source of acquisition of money, the assessee should be treated as the real owner and the assessee's wife as a name-lender. Accordingly, the ITO proceeded to assess the income from house property in the hands of the assessee.\nThe first appellate authority upheld the assessments and dismissed the appeals. In appeals to the Tribunal, the assessee maintained that the burden lay on the revenue to prove that the apparent was not the real and the assessee and not his wife was the owner of the property. But the Tribunal, held that the assessee had purchased the properties in question out of this own funds. Accordingly, the Tribunal dismissed the appeals and upheld the assessments.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nUndoubtedly, law assumes the apparent to be real and a person who asserts to the contrary has the burden to establish that the apparent does not represent the real state. On the basis of these propositions when the house property stood in the name of the wife and she seemed to be the ostensible owner, it was for the revenue to establish that the assessee and not his wife who was the recorded owner was the real owner.\nIn the instant case, the ITO examined a very material aspect, namely, whether the assessee's wife, the ostensible owner, and any source for paying the consideration for the acquisition. Since that was a matter within the special knowledge of the assessee or his wife, the ITO gave an opportunity to the assessee to substantiate his stand by showing that his wife was possessed of assets to provide the consideration for the acquisition and the assessee having failed to establish the same, final decision had been taken against the assessee's stand. In the instant case, it was found that the Tribunal had examined all aspects of the matter and had come to hold that the assessee had failed to establish that his wife had assets sufficient to provide the consideration money for the acquisition. Merely on the technical ground that the revenue had not established the nature of the property by leading evidence, a different view should not be taken and the fact found by the Tribunal should not be reversed. The Tribunal, as a final forum of fact, had come, to the correct conclusion on the materials placed before it and a finding of fact had been reached. No question of law did emerge on the basis of which the conclusion could be disturbed.\nNote: The case was decided against the assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Durga Prasad More [1971] 82 ITR 540 (SC) and Ramkinkar Banerji v. CIT [1936] 4 ITR 108 (Pat.).",
    "Court Name:": "Orissa High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=256(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "SPECIAL JURISDICTION CASE NOS. 100 TO 102 OF 1974, JUNE 22, 1976",
    "Judge Name:": "R.N. MISRA AND N.K. DAS, JJ",
    "": "Dhadi Sahu\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12018",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 899 = 1977 SLD 899 = (1977) 36 TAX 308 = (1977) 109 ITR 416",
    "Key Words:": "Section 4, read with section 45, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Association of persons - Assessable as - Assessment year 1965-66 - Two persons under Mohammedan Law succeeded to properties of their deceased father in definite shares - On sale of such properties ITO assessed capital gain in hands of two persons as association of persons - Whether since there was no concerted action on part of two persons to earn capital gains - Capital gain arising out of sale transaction could not be brought to tax in their hands in status of association of persons - Held, yes\nFACTS\nOne 'M' died intstate the hires of the deceased inherited his properties under the Mohammedan law. Three of the heirs executed a deed of release relating their rights, title and interest in the properties left by 'M' in favour of two persons who thus became entitled to half share each in the properties left behind by 'M' out of the properties so left behind by 'M' was property No. 11, and a half share in certain land in Baroda State. The said land in Baroda State was held by 'M' himself along with certain third parties. The two brothers sold property No. 11 on 28-2-1964. The said two persons along with the other owners of land in Baroda State sold the same on 12-10-1964. The two sales resulted in certain capital gains. A sum was ascertained as capital gains arising out of the sale of those properties and the said capital gains was assessed by the ITO in the hands of the two persons as association of persons. On appeal, the AAC went into the question and held that the capital gains could not be assessed in the hands of the two persons as association of persons and had to be assessed half each in their individual hands on revenue's appeal, the Tribunal confirmed the order of the AAC holding that there was no material to hold that there was concerted action with a view to earn capital gains.\nHELD\nIf the statements of the Tribunal were correct, admittedly, the department had to fail because it was conceded that it was the department that had to make out a case that the two holders constituted an association of persons for earning this capital gains. It was not disputed that under the Mohammedan law, the two brothers succeeded to the property of their father in definite shares, and they became tenants in common in respect of their respective shares. In such circumstances, it was not disputed that they were the co-owners of the property, and they did not constitute an association of persons for owning the property.\nIt could not be said that the two brothers had no divided the properties between them, and therefore, they were carrying on the construction work jointly in respect of the property and with reference to that construction work, they were in need of funds. If that statement was accepted it would lead to the position that co-owners will always have to be assessed as an association of persons, unless they divided the properties as between themselves by metes and bounds. Even the sale deed did not show that the assessees were the co-owners and they were jointly carrying on the construction work in respect of both the items, and with reference to that joint construction work they were in need of funds. Even the department did not claim that the two individuals owned both the property jointly as association of persons.\nOne other aspect present in the case would definitely be against the case of the department. The capital gains was sought to be levied in respect of the sale of property No. 11, that took place on 28-2-1964, and the sale of property situate in Baroda State that took place on 12-10-1964. But the property situate in Baroda State, was owned by 'M' along with others and those other people also jointed the two individuals in executing that sale deed. Therefore with reference to that sale deed, at any rate, it could not be contended that those two persons constituted an association of persons. The department itself not making a distinction between the sale deed dated 28-2-1964, and the sale deed dated 12-10-1964, in arriving at and imposing tax on the capital gains, it could not be contended that those two individuals alone constituted an association of persons in respect of the capital gains arising as a result of the two sales while admittedly one sale deed had been executed by those two persons along with certain third parties. Under those circumstances, it was held that the conclusion of the Tribunal that there was no material to hold that there was a concerted action with a view to earn capital gains in question on the part of the two individuals concerned was correct.\nNote: The case was decided in favour of the assessee.",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=256(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE NO. 320 OF 1970 (REFERENCE NO. 96 OF 1970), APRIL 5, 1976",
    "Judge Name:": "ISMAIL AND SETHURAMAN, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nDeghamwala Estates"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12019",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 900 = 1977 SLD 900 = (1977) 36 TAX 292 = (1977) 109 ITR 517",
    "Key Words:": "Section 41(2), read with section 256 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (corresponding to section 10(2)(iii) read with section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) - Balancing charge - Assessment year 1957-58 - Whether principle relating to res judicata do not apply to income-tax proceedings - Held, yes - Whether where Tribunal on basis of its earlier order held that transfer of mining rights by assessee was not in course of a venture in nature of trade, Tribunal had not properly applied its mind and had misdirected itself in law on merits of case - Held, yes (matter remanded back)\nFACTS\nThe assessee-company made a profit transferring certain machinery and plants to five newly floated 100 per cent subsidiary companies of the assessee and also made a profit of another sum by selling certain mining rights, buildings and other plants and machinery to those subsidiaries. The assessee did not disclose transactions in the assessment year and accordingly they were not taken into consideration by the tax officer and from his assessment order the assessee filed an appeal on some other grounds.\nWhile that appeal was pending, the Commissioner caused a show-cause notice under section 33B of the 1922 Act to be served on the assessee. Instead of appearing before the Commissioner and without making out any case whatsoever on the merits, the assessee wrote two letters to the Commissioner, who on passed an ex parte order under section 33B of 1922 Act by cancelling the said assessment order and directing the tax officer to make a fresh assessment after serving the statutory notice on the assessee and giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard on those transactions.\nOn appeal, the Tribunal set aside the said order of the Commissioner holding that the transfer of the mining rights was not in the course of a venture in the nature of trade or in the course of trading transaction (having regard to the circumstances under which the formation of the subsidiary companies had to be brought about and that no profit was earned by the assessee as a result of the transfer.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nIn view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. B.M. Kharwar [1969] 72 ITR 603 it was held that the Tribunal was not right in holding that there was no profit under section 10(2)(vii).\nThere was no dispute that the Tribunal had disposed of the merits of the case by simply following the earlier order, passed by an earlier Tribunal, in which the instant assessee was the appellant and its subject-matter was the order of the AAC dismissing the appeal filed by the assessee from the assessment order for the assessment year 1958-59.\nIt is well-settled that the principles relating to res judicata do not apply to the income-tax proceedings. Similarly, the facts found by the tax officer in the assessment year 1958-59 could not be taken into consideration inasmuch as the said order of the tax officer did not form part of the statement of the case of the reference before the Court.\nIn its earlier order the Tribunal had expressly recorded that the tax officer had discussed 'a lot of materials' and the Tribunal gave no reasons whatsoever for excluding those facts found by the tax officer and relied only on the circumstances under which the subsidiary companies were formed but, again, these circumstances could not alone determine this issue. The Tribunal, had not property applied its mind and had misdirected itself in law on the merits of the case. The Tribunal had not stated all the facts in the statement of the case nor had discussed them in its order. In those circumstances the matter had to be sent back to the Tribunal for its decision on the merits of the case on additional evidence might be adduced by the revenue and the assessee. The Tribunal would also decide whether the realisations could be brought to tax either as revenue receipts or as capital gains as contended on behalf of the revenue, including the questions as to whether the transfer of mining rights was a transfer of capital asset and as such could not be brought to tax as contended of the assessee.\nMatter remanded back\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. George Henderson & Co. Ltd. [1967] 66 ITR 622 (SC), Raghunath Prasad Poddar v. CIT [1973] 90 ITR 140 (SC), Khan Bahadur Ahmed Alladin & Sons v. CIT [1968] 68 ITR 573 (SC), CIT v. Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. [1973] 91 ITR 8 (SC), CIT v.Chrestian Mica Industries Ltd. [1977] 109 ITR 324 (Cal.), CIT v. A. K. Das [1970] 77 ITR 31 (Cal.), CIT v. Indian Woollen Textiles Mills [1964] 51 ITR 291 (SC), CIT v. Kamal Singh Rampuria [1970] 75 ITR 157 (SC), CIT v. B. M. Kharwar [1969] 72 ITR 603(SC), CIT v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. [1963] 47 ITR 565 (Cal.), CIT v. Rajasthan Mines Ltd. [1970] 78 ITR 45 (SC), Hooghly Trust(P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1969] 73 ITR 685 (SC), India Cements Ltd. v. CIT [1966] 60 ITR 52 (SC), Jankiram Bahadur Ram v. CIT [1965] 57 ITR 21 (SC), Raja Bahadur Kamakhya Narain Singh v. CIT [1970] 77 ITR 253 (SC), Karam Chand Thapar & Bros. (P.) Ltd. v. CIT[1971] 80 ITR 167 (SC), Karnani Properties Ltd. v. CIT [1971] 82 ITR 547 (SC), Rogers & Co v. CIT [1958] 34 ITR 336 (Bom.) andG. Venkataswami Naidu & Co. v. CIT [1959] 35 ITR 594 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Calcutta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),10(2)(vii),33B,2(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),10(2)(vii),33B,2(4)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 108 OF 1968, JULY 4, 1975",
    "Judge Name:": "S.C. DEB AND PYNE, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nChrestian Mica Industries Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12020",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 901 = 1977 SLD 901 = (1977) 36 TAX 284 = (1977) 109 ITR 360",
    "Key Words:": "Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Cash Credits - Assessment year 1963-64 - Assessee claimed that peak credit of certain amount said to be hundi loan which was not capable of verification should be set off against intangible additions on account of earlier years - ITO rejected assessee's claim holding that assessee had not linked intangible additions of past years with appearance of credits and unless assessee proved that hundi credits were introduced out of profits made in trading account outside books, it was not possible to telescope two additions, with the result, he assessed that amount as income from other sources - Whether once assessee had shown credits as having emanated from certain named persons and when he failed to establish same, it was not open to him to fall back on a claim that those unexplained cash credits must be taken to have come out of additions made in earlier years - Held, yes - Whether even if it was open to him to put forward such a case; it was for him to prove positively that though credits stood in names of certain third parties, still it was his money which was brought into account in name of third parties and money, itself came from additions made in his earlier assessments which would incidentally involve his explaining why he brought his own money into accounts in names of third parties - Held, yes - Whether it would be question of fact in each case as to whether there was evidence to find that such additions were source of subsequent credits and since in instant case assessee had failed to establish same, ITO was right in making additions - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee returned an income under 'business', At the time of hearing before the ITO the assessee submitted that the proviso to section 145(1) was applicable and that the assessee had no objection to the estimate of gross profit as in the preceding year. That resulted in an addition to the disclosed trading results. There were also some hundi transactions during the previous year and the assessee filed a peak credit statement showing a peak credit of Rs. 31,000. By his letter, the assessee's representative admitted that a sum of Rs. 31,000 said to be hundi loans was not capable of verification and, therefore, may be treated as having been admitted under section 'F' of the return of income. It was also claimed by the assessee that a part of sum of the total amount of Rs. 31,000 pertained to the previous year and that it should be deducted. It was further claimed that the said sum of Rs. 31,000 should be set off against the intangible additions of the earlier years. The ITO declined to comply with that request of the assessee. He held that the assessee had not linked the intangible additions of the past years with the appearance of the credits and unless the assessee proved that the hundi credits were introduced out of profits made in the trading account outside the books, it was not possible to telescope the two additions, with the result, he assessed a sum of Rs. 31,000 as income from other sources.\nOn appeal, the AAC sustained the order of the ITO. On second appeal, the Tribunal held that the decision of the High court in S.Kuppuswami Mudaliar v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1964] 51 ITR 757 (Mad.) applied to the facts of instant case, with the result, the Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and allowed the assessee what it called the benefit of set-off of gross profit additions of the past years against the unexplained cash credits in question and directed the deletion of Rs. 31,000 as income from 'other sources'.\nHELD\nOnce the assessee had originally shown the credits as having emanated from certain named individuals and when he failed to establish the same, it was not open to him to fall back on a claim that those explained credits must be taken to have come out of the additions made in the earlier years. Even if it was open to him to put forward such a case, it was for him to prove positively that though the credits stood in the names of third parties, still it was his money which was brought into account in the names of third parties and the money itself came from the additions made to his assessments in the previous years. Incidentally, that would involve his explaining why he brought his own money into the accounts in the names of third parties. The assessee in the instant case had not proved any such thing. It was exactly that position which the ITO in his order pointed out while making the additions. The Tribunal without considering any of these facts proceeded as if the decision of the High court in S. Kuppuswami Mudaliar v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1964] 51 ITR 757 (Mad.) laid down a universal proposition of law that whenever an assessee failed to explain the credits found in his books of account, it was open to him to claim a set-off of those credits as against the additions made to his income in the previous years' assessments. No such proposition had been laid down by the court in the referred decision. As a matter of fact, apart from removing the misconception arising from the inaccurate and misleading use of the expression 'intangible additions', no such general proposition of law was laid down, as if the additions made to the income returned by an assessee, by the department, constitute his last refuge whenever he finds himself in a tight corner not being able to explain the credits found in his accounts. The truth is that such additions are as real an income, at any rate as far as the department is concerned, as the income returned by the assessee, and one can as much as the other constitute the source to explain the credits in the accounts in the subsequent years. Therefore, the decision did not invest such additions with any special significance as a source to explain the credits in the subsequent years. In any case, it will be a question of fact whether there was evidence to find that such additions were the source of the subsequent credits and in this behalf there is no difference between this source and any other source, apart from the position that with regard to the income assessed in the earlier years, its existence as a possible source of the credits will be a matter of record with the department while with regard to other sources, their existence may be a matter to be proved.\nTherefore, the Tribunal completely erred in relying upon the decision of the High Court in S. Kuppuswami Mudaliar's case (supra) as an authority for deleting the addition of Rs. 31,000 made by the ITO and affirmed by the AAC in the instant case.\nNote: The case was decided against the assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nS. Kuppuswami Mudaliar v. CIT [1964] 51 ITR 757 (Mad.), CIT v. Devi Prasad Vishwanath Prasad [1969] 72 ITR 194 (SC) and CITv. Ram Sanehi Gian Chand [1972] 86 ITR 724 (Punj.).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=254(1),145(1),66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=254(1),145(1),66(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE NO. 17 OF 1971 (REFERENCE NO. 16 OF 1971), JULY 27, 1976",
    "Judge Name:": "ISMAIL AND SETHURAMAN, JJ.",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nBanarsilal Dhawan"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12021",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 845 = 1985 SLD 845 = 1985 SCMR 1358",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-----Art. 185(3)--Thal Development (Punjab Amendment) Act (XLVI of 1975)--Thal Development (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance (XIX of 1975)-­Ouster of jurisdiction with retrospective effect--Competency of appeal-­Appeal against dismissal of suit instituted in 1966--Whether governed by law as existing before ouster of jurisdiction promulgated in 1975-­Leave to appeal granted to consider this question.--[Jurisdiction].\n \nNusrat Waheed v. Administrator Thal 1960 C L C 334 ref.\n \nA.R. Shaukat, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Abdul Karim, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\n \nDate of hearing: 23rd May, 1984.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 412 of 1976, decision dated: 23rd May, 1984 (Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 20-11-1975 passed in R.S.A. No. 693/1975)",
    "Judge Name:": "ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN AND NASIM HASAN SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHARIF and others\nVs.\nADMINISTRATOR THAL and others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12022",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 902 = 1977 SLD 902 = (1977) 36 TAX 206 = (1977) 108 ITR 616",
    "Key Words:": "Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (corresponding to section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) - Income escaping assessment - Assessment year 1956-57 to 1957-58 - In 1923 assessee's further settled certain properties in a trust, in which a provision was also made for assessee - He died in 1927 and assessee's husband 'F' was appointed as a trustee - 'F' purchased a plot of land and constructed a building on it with funds borrowed from trust - In 1953 'F' conveyed aforesaid property in favour of his sons - One of daughters of 'F', filed a suit and a consent decree had been made in year 1960 - Whether since property in question had belonged to 'F' till settlement with his daughter, it could not be said that income from aforesaid property was assessable in hands of assessee which escaped assessment - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, proceedings initiated by ITO under section 34(1)(a) of 1922 Act for relevant assessment years were rightly set aside by Tribunal - Held, yes.\nFACTS\nIn 1923 the assessee's father settled certain properties in trust. The trustees were directed to collect all the rents and profits and to pay therefrom all the costs, incidental to the collection thereof and to pay the net income to the settlor for and during his lifetime and up to his death. Clauses 5 and 6 of the deed of settlement in fact made provision for the two daughters-The assessee and her sister. After his death, by a deed, dated 23-1-1928, the assessee's husband was appointed as trustee of the trust. The assessee's husband, 'F' purchased a property from one 'N' by a deed dated 10-4-1931. By another document dated 19-4-1933, the said 'F' took on assignment a piece of land from the Bombay Municipal Corporation which was adjacent to the property purchased by him from 'N'. F had also purchased a property from the trustees some time in the year 1932, but the conveyance was not immediately executed and it was executed only on 15-12-1949, by the then trustees of the trust. By the time this conveyance was executed, 'F' had already put up a building on the plot taken on assignment from the Municipal Corporation as also on that taken on assignment from the trustees. The cost of the building had been substantially met by 'F' by borrowing amount from the trust. On 15-12-1949, 'F' executed a deed of mortgage in favour of one 'K' and one of the securities given under the said deed of mortgage was the 'F' Mansion. Additional loans were also subsequently taken. Ultimately, on 18-7-1953, the mortgagee released 'F' Mansion from the mortgage in consideration of 'F' giving other properties in substitution as security. On 19-7-1953, 'F' conveyed the said building to his two sons. The income from this property not 'F' Mansion, was, being assessed, in the hands of the assessee up to the assessment year 1949-50. It was contended that this was on account of a misunderstanding on the part of 'F' that only one assessment was to be made on the income of the husband and the wife and there was also a mistake on the part of the ITO and the assessee.\nIn 1954, a suit was filed by the married daughter of the assessee and a consent decree was passed on 11-4-1960. Thereafter, the ITO concerned took the view that this consent decree had made it clear that the transfer of the properties including 'F' Mansion was void and inoperative and the same had been cancelled and the breaches committed by the trustees had been condoned. Accordingly, he concluded that the property always belonged to the assessee and the income from the same was liable to be assessed in the hands of the assessee. He considered this income as having escaped assessment and for the two years in question he invoked the provisions of section 34(1)(a) of 1922 Act.\nOn second appeal, the Tribunal held that the 'F' was the owner of the property till it was declared as trust property by the consent decree dated 11-4-1960\"\". It went on to state that there was not a tittle of evidence to show that the trust was the owner of the property. According to the Tribunal, there was also nothing to indicate that 'F' was a benamidar of the trust and that the findings of the departmental officers on this aspect of the matter were based on mere conjectures and on wrong premises based upon no materials. Thus, the Tribunal opined that the action under section 34(1)(a) of 1922 Act was clearly unjustified.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nIn view of the clear finding given by the Tribunal as to ownership of the property which had been categorically and unequivocally declared to have belonged to 'F' till the date of the settlement, it was impossible to hold that the view taken by the Tribunal of the effect of the consent terms was erroneous or improper or illegal. Bearing in mind the several clauses of the consent terms, which need not be gone into in detail, the background of the litigation, the relationship of the contesting parties in the suit and the opinion expressed by the Tribunal of its order that all these proceedings were bona fide, it appeared that there was a compromise and not a declaration of a clear, patent and obvious legal position. In view of this compromise 'F' agreed with his daughter and wife that what was his would thenceforth belong to and be deemed to be the property of the trust. Once that position was realised, it would have to be agreed that the effect of the settlement would be only prospective and not retrospective.\nIt was, therefore, held that 'F' Mansion was actually constructed and owned by 'F', the assessee could not be assessed in respect of the income thereof for the relevant accounting years.\nNote: The case has been decided in favour of the assessee.",
    "Court Name:": "Bombay High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),34(1)(a)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),34(1)(a)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 40 OF 1967, DECEMBER 7, 1976",
    "Judge Name:": "TULZAPURKAR AND DESAI, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nSmt. Maltida Ferreira"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12023",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 846 = 1985 SLD 846 = (1985) 198 SCMR 846",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-----Art. 185(3)--Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act (VIII of 1973)--Punjab Housing Facilities for Non-Proprietors in Rural Areas Ordinance (IX of 1974), S. 3, proviso--Acquisition of land--Housing scheme for non-proprietors--Order impugned--Plea that most of non­-proprietors in area had already built houses, on village Shamlat land or land in Abadi Deh not sustained--Petition dismissed with observation that petitioner shall be given 1/3rd of land acquired, in accordance with rules subsequently framed by Government under Act VIII of 1973.\n \nCh. Qadir Bakhsh, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nS.M. Zubair, Asstt.A.G., for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 3rd March, 1985.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 434 of 1977, decision dated: 3rd March, 1985 (Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 8-4-1977, passed in Writ Petition No. 2561/76)",
    "Judge Name:": "ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN AND SHAFIUR RAHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Haji NAWAZISH ALI KHAN\nVs.\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SAHIWAL and another--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12024",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 903 = 1977 SLD 903 = (1977) 36 TAX 132 = (1977) 107 ITR 9",
    "Key Words:": "Section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Charitable or religious trust - Exemption of income from property held under - Assessment years 1956-57 and 1957-58 - Testator by Will dedicated as debutter his entire estate to his Maker and Thakoor obligating managers of debutter with responsibility to discharge certain secular but secondary behests - Various directions in will were mostly either religious or philanthropic but not so remote as to be incongruous with dedication to an idol or creation of a debutter - Will also provided for payment of certain fixed allowances to trustees, their widows, maintenance of horse drawn carriages and motor cars for use of trustees and their families, medical aids and expenses on account of sraddha ceremony of ancestors of trustees - Whether idol was legal owner of whole estate and was liable to be assessed as such - Held, yes - Whether since shebaits first got income from debutter properties and then applied it in conformity with directives given in Will, there was no diversion of income at source - Held, yes - Whether, however, all income earmarked for charitable purposes conforming to section 4(3)(i) read with section 4(3) of 1922 Act would not be included in total income of assessee - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe testator having enormous estates, lavish charity, and large family, executed his will by which, he dedicated and made debutter his estate in the name and for the worship of God. The will provided that after making such payments and deductions from the income of the debutter property the shebaits or the trustees were to pay there out the cost of performing the various worships, pujas and ceremonies specified in the will and such other additional acts of worship, puja, sraddhas and ceremonies as the shebaits and the trustees would think necessary, also the cost of feeding the poor. The Will also provided for payment of certain fixed allowances to the shebaits and the widows of the deceased shebaits, maintenance of horse drawn carriages and motor cars for the use of the shebaits, medical aids to the shebaits and their family members, expenses on account of sraddha ceremony of the ancestors of the shebaits and other private charities. Before the ITO, the assessee claimed that the remuneration of the trustees and the allowances to the widows of the deceased trustees as provided in the Will created a charge on the income of the trust estate and should, therefore, be treated as diversion of the income of the trust before it accrued in the hands of the trustees. The ITO rejected that contention. He held that reading the Will as a whole it was clear that the remuneration to the shebaits and the allowances to the widows were merely applications of the trust income and as such not deductible. According to the ITO, under the Will, the shebaits and trustees were to collect the income of the whole debutter property in the first instance and after paying the Government revenues and taxes and rates and other outgoings, perform the puja and the other ceremonies for the worship of the family deity and, therefore, spend amounts on charitable and public purposes and, lastly, to pay the remuneration, allowances and private donations. The ITO, therefore, determined the income of the trust estate under sections 9 and 12 of the 1922 Act. From the above, he deducted the amounts spent on charitable objects such as feeding of the poor, maintenance of art gallery and menagerie for birds and non-carnivorous animals. The AAC dismissed the assessee's appeal. On appeal to the Tribunal, while the revenue won substantially, some items more were held exempt on the holding that the direction contained in the Will for the expenditure on the performance of Sraddha and other ceremonies for the spiritual benefit of the testator and his ancestors must also be held to be obligations created by the testator which the trustees or the shebaits were obliged to discharge before applying the income for the benefit of the deity.\nOn reference, the High Court held that the assessee deity was not the owner of the properties and, therefore, the only income which could be subjected to income-tax in the hands of the assessee would be the beneficial interest of the said deity under the Will, which would be expenses incurred for the seva puja of the deity and for the various religious ceremonies connected with the said deity and the value of the residence of the deity in the temple.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD\nThe maker of the Will, dedicated as debutter to his Maker and Thakoor the entire estate, saddling the human agents or shebaits with duty to apply the income for godly and near-godly uses and for reward of the shebaits and for their happy living. Of course, he had horses and carriages and other items to make life enjoyable. Naturally, his behest covered the obligation to keep these costly things in good condition and regular use. The impact on the mind, if one read the provisions reclining in a chair and lapsing into the mood of the maker of the will, was that he gave all he had to his Thakoor, as he unmincingly said, and thus dedicated to create an absolute debutter. The various directions were mostly either religious or philanthropic but not so remote as to be incongruous with dedication to an idol or creation of a debutter. The quantum of expenditure on the various items was not so decisive of the character of the debutter as absolute or partial as the accent on and subjective importance of the purposes, in the setting of the totality of commands and cherishments. His soulful wishes were for the religious and charitable objects and the other directions were secondary in his estimate. Not counting numbers nor computing expenses, marginally relevant though they were, but feeling the pulse of his passion to do godly good and promote public delight, that belighted the spirit of his testament. Essentially, the testator gave away his estate to his Thakoor and created an absolute debutter. He obligated the managers of the debutter with responsibility to discharge certain secular but secondary behests including benefit to family members, their residence and transportation.\nThe magnitude of the expenditure on the items, secular and sacred, might vaguely affect the conclusion but could not conclusively decide the issue. The religious uses related to Sree Jagannathji, the Lord of the Universe, could not be narrowly restricted to rituals but must be spread out to embrace universal good, especially when one read the mind of a Hindu highly evolved and committed to a religion whose sweep is vasudhaiva kutumbakam.\nIf, on a consideration of the totality of terms, on sifting the more essential from the less essential purposes, on sounding the depth of the donor's wishes to find whether his family or his deity were the primary beneficiaries and on taking note of the language used, if the vesting was in the idol an absolute debutter could be spelt out. So considered, if the grant was to the heirs with a charge on the income for the performance of pujas, the opposite inference was inevitable. There was no dispute between the heirs and the idol. The point mooted was about the creation of an English trust, an unconventional legal step where the dedication was to a deity. On a full study of the will as a whole, this benignant Bangalee's testament, drapped though in Victorian verbal haberdashery, had, on legal auscultation, the Indian heartbeats of Hindu religious culuture, and so scanned, his will intended vesting the properties in absolute debutter. The idol was, therefore, the legal owner of the whole and liable to be assessed as such.\nThe directions in the Will did not divert the income at the source but merely commanded the shebaits to apply the income received from the debutter properties for specified purposes. So the shebaits first got the income and then applied it in conformity with the directives given in the will.\nHowever, all the income earmarked for religious and charitable purposes conforming to section 4(3)(i) read with the Explanation to section 4(3) of the 1922 Act would not be included in the total income.\nNote: The case was decided against the assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\nDecision of the Calcutta High Court in Sri Sri Jagannath Jew v. CIT [1971] 81 ITR 353 reversed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nAshutosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterjee ILR 5 Cal. 438 (PC), Raja Bejoy Singh Dhundhuria v. CIT [1933] 1 ITR 135 (PC), Binod Behari v. Manmatha [1915] 21 CLJ 42 (Cal.), Chandi Charan Das v. Dulal Paik AIR 1926 Cal. 1083, CIT v. Sitaldas Tirathdas [1961]41 ITR 367 (SC), Dasaratharami Reddy v. Subba Rao [1957] SCR 1122 (SC), Har Narayan v. Surja Kunwari AIR 1921 PC 20, Jadu Nath Singh v. Thakur Sita Ramji [1917] LR 44 IA 187 (PC), Jogendra Nath Naskar v. CIT [1969] 74 ITR 33 (SC), Manohar Mukherjeev. Bhupendra Nath Mukherjee AIR 1932 Cal. 791 (FB), P.C. Mullick v. CIT [1938] 6 ITR 206 (PC), Sonatun Bysack v. Juggutsoondree Dossee [1859] 8 MIA 66 (PC), State of Bihar v. Charusila Dasi [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 601 (SC) and Sri Sri Jagannath Jew v. CIT [1971] 81 ITR 353 (Cal.).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=22(2),4(3)(i),9,12,66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=22(2),4(3)(i),9,12,66(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1682-1683 OF 1971, DECEMBER 17, 1976",
    "Judge Name:": "H.R. KHANNA AND V.R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nSri Jagannath Jew"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12025",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 904 = 1977 SLD 904 = (1977) 36 TAX 104 = (1977) 108 ITR 380",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Calcutta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66\\n\\r\\n\\rLand Acquisition Act, 1894=34\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 5 OF 1967, JANUARY 9, 1973",
    "Judge Name:": "A.N. SEN AND T.K. BASU, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nHindusthan Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12026",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 905 = 1977 SLD 905 = (1977) 36 TAX 97 = (1977) 108 ITR 372",
    "Key Words:": "Section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (corresponding to section 23(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) - Best assessment - Assessment year 1960-61 - Assessee was running a rice mill - It purchased paddy from local suppliers - ITO accepted quantity of paddy purchased but did not accept purchase, price and made additions after estimating average cost price - On appeal, AAC significantly reduced amount of addition - On revenue's appeal, Tribunal again enhanced amount of addition - Whether since Tribunal had not given any basis of its own estimate, order passed by it could be regarded as arbitrary - Held, yes\n- [Matter remanded to Tribunal for disposal afresh in accordance with law]\nFACTS\nThe assessee had owned and run a rice mill. During relevant accounting year, the assessee purchased paddy from local suppliers, viz,'byaparis' and also from the cultivators. In the assessment for the assessment year 1960-61, the ITO noted that the purchases of paddy were supported only by the assessee's own documents being bills containing signatures and thumb impressions of the sellers. The ITO also took note that the average cost price of paddy so purchased was Rs. 13.44 per maund. The cost of rice obtained from such paddy including the manufacturing and other expenses came to Rs. 22.17 per maund but the same rice was sold at a lower rate viz., Rs. 21.84 per maund.\nThe ITO accepted the sale figures of the assessee inasmuch as the same were vouched and were found to have been made at the prevailing market rate. It also appeared that the ITO accepted the quantity of paddy purchased by the assessee, maunds, during the said assessment year. But he did not accept the purchase price of the paddy on the ground that by reason of the aforesaid defects in the supporting documents there was a great possibility of inflating such price. Accordingly, he estimated the average cost price of such paddy at Rs. 12 per maund. On that basis he added a sum of Rs. 6.33 lakhs to the accounts.\nOn appeal, the AAC accepted most of the contentions of the assessee and reduced the addition to a sum of Rs. 5,000 in respect of paddy purchased by the assessee.\nOn revenue's appeal, the Tribunal concluded that an addition of Rs. 55 thousand would meet the ends of justice.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nIn the instant case, the Tribunal had not given any basis of its own estimate. It was also not clear whether this amount of Rs. 55,000 added on estimate was in respect of the entire transactions in paddy in the year. If so, then the other facts and particulars which were before the AAC and on the basis of which the AAC made his order did not appear to have been considered by the Tribunal at all. The Tribunal, it was to be noted, did not reject the findings of the AAC on any point except that the final estimate of the AAC was rejected.\nThus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was not possible to discover any basis rational or otherwise from the order of the Tribunal and this order was apparently arbitrary. Hence, the matter was to be remitted to the Tribunal for disposal afresh in accordance with law.\n(-Matter remitted)\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCST v. Esufali [1973] 90 ITR 271 (SC) and State of Kerala v. C. Velukutty [1966] 60 ITR 239 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Calcutta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=256(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 420 OF 1970, JUNE 8, 1976",
    "Judge Name:": "S.C. DEB AND DIPAK KUMAR SEN, JJ",
    "": "Anand Rice & Oil Mills\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12027",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 906 = 1977 SLD 906 = (1977) 36 TAX 88 = (1977) 108 ITR 335",
    "Key Words:": "Section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (corresponding to section 42 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) - Income - Deemed to accrue or arise in India - Assessment year 1957-58 - Assessee, a foreign company, entered into an agreement with an Indian company for supply of technical know-how and providing Indian company with a resident factory manager for starting plant and superintending its operations during its initial production stages, as also other technical personnel necessary for operation of plant - In view of these services, assessee was to receive from Indian company a fee equal to 3 per cent of net sale proceeds - During relevant assessment year, assessee received certain amount from Indian company as its service fee - A good slab of it was deducted at source on account of income-tax and super-tax payable on said sum - Assessee-company filed return with application for refund of entire tax deducted at source - ITO taking view that only 5 per cent of technical fee paid to assessee-company was earned by it in India, directed refund of major portion of tax deducted at source - Tribunal confirmed ITO's order - High Court, however, held that technical fee in excess of 5 per cent received by assessee-company from Indian company had accrued or arisen in India - On instant appeal, it was seen that foreign company had made services of foreign personnel available to Indian company outside taxable territory - Indian company took them as their employees, paid their salary and they worked under direct control of Indian company - Whether, in aforesaid circumstances, it could be said that service rendered by assessee in that connection was wholly and solely rendered in foreign territory - Held, yes - Whether even assuming however, that there was any business connection between earning of income in shape of technical fee by assessee and affairs of Indian company, yet no part of activity or operation could be said to have been carried on by assessee company in India - Held, yes - Whether, in aforesaid circumstances, provisions of section 42(1) or 42(3) of 1922 Act were not attracted at all - Held, yes - Whether, consequently, it could be concluded, that technical service fee received by assessee-company from Indian company during relevant assessment year did not accrue or arise in India nor could it be deemed to have accrued or arisen in India -Held, yes - Whether, in aforesaid circumstances, assessee's claim was to be allowed - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee, a foreign company, entered into an agreement with an Indian company, for providing technical know-how such as furnishing of technical information and know-how with respect to the manufacture of bonded abrasive and coated abrasive products; providing technical management including factory design and lay-out, plant and equipment production, purchase of materials, manufacturing specifications and quality of product, etc., providing Indian company with a resident factory manager for starting plant and superintending its operations during its initial production stages, as also other technical personnel necessary for operation of the plant.\nIn lieu of all the services aforesaid, as per the agreement, the assessee was to receive from the Indian company an annual service fee equal to 3 per centum on the net sale proceeds of the products manufactured by the latter each year.\nDuring the relevant assessment year, the assessee received certain amount from the Indian company as its service fee. A good slab of it was deducted at source by the Indian company on account of income-tax and super-tax payable on the said sum. The foreign company filed a return of income for the year in question with an application for refund of the entire tax deducted at source. The ITO held that five percent of the technical fee paid to the assessee was earned by it in India and only that small amount was assessable to income-tax. Consequently, he directed the refund of a major portion of the tax deducted at source to the assessee. The Commissioner, in exercise of his power under section 33B of 1922 Act, revised the order of the ITO and took the view that at least 75 percent of the technical fee earned by the assessee during the year of account had accrued or arisen in India. In the main, the basis of his order was that even though the technical information was supplied by the assessee from outside India, the information received by the Indian company was put to use only in the taxable territory and the technical fee paid by it was mainly on account of such use. The Tribunal set aside the said order and restored that of the ITO.\nOn reference, the High Court again held that technical fee in excess of 5 per cent received by the assessee-company from the Indian company had accrued or arisen in India.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD\nThe income assessable to income-tax, is of two kinds, viz., (i) accruing or arising in the taxable territories; and (ii) deemed to accrue or arise to the non-resident in the taxable territory. The concept of actual accrual or arising of income in the taxable territories, although not dependent upon the receipt of the income in the taxable territories, is quite distinct and apart from the notion of deemed accrual or arising of the income. The High Court did not appear to have kept this distinction in view and mixed the one with the other while deciding the reference in question. Section 42 of the 1922 Act concerns itself with a deemed accrual or arising of the income within the taxable territiories.\nOn a plain reading of sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 42 of 1922 Act, it would appear that income accruing or arising from any business connection in the taxable territories-even though the income may accrue or arise outside the taxable territories-will be deemed to be income accruing or arising in such territory provided operations in connection with such business, either all or a part, are carried out in the taxable territories. If all such operations are carried out in the taxable territories, sub-section (1) would apply and the entire income accruing or arising outside the taxable territories but as a result of the operations in connection with the business giving rise to the income would be deemed to accrue or arise in the taxable territories. If, however, all the operations are not carried out in the taxable territories the profits and gains of the business deemed to accrue or arise in the taxable territories shall be only such profits and gains as are reasonably attributable to that part of the operations carried out in the taxable territories.\nThe High Court was wrong in its view that activities of the foreign personnel lent or deputed by the assessee company amounted to a business activity carried on by that company in the taxable territory. The assessee had made the services of the foreign personnel available to the Indian company outside the taxable territory. The latter took them as their employees, paid their salary and they worked under the direct control of the Indian company. The service rendered by the assessee in that connection was wholly and solely rendered in the foreign territory. Even assuming however, that there was any business connection between the earning of the income in the shape of the technical fee by the assessee and the affairs of the Indian company, yet no part of the activity or operation could be said to have been carried on by the assessee in India. And in the absence of such a sustainable finding by the High Court the provisions of section 42 of 1922 Act, either of sub-section (1) or of sub-section (3), were not attracted at all.\nFor the aforesaid reasons, it was to be held that the technical service fee received by the assessee-from the Indian company during the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1957-58 did not accrue or arise in India nor could it be deemed to have accrued or arisen in India.\nBut since 5 per sent of the technical service fee was brought to tax by the ITO and no appeal was filed against it on behalf of the assessee-company, the court could not interfere with the addition of this 5% but it must be held that the technical fee in excess of 5 per cent was not taxable.\nNote: The case has been decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\nDecision of the Madras High Court in CIT v. Carborandum Co. [1973] 92 ITR 411, reversed.\nCIT v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. [1974] 94 ITR 85 (Bom.) - approved",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),2(5A),33B,42,4,40\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),2(5A),33B,42,4,40\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=9(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO. 89 OF 1975, APRIL 11, 1977",
    "Judge Name:": "P.N. BHAGWATI, N.L. UNTWALIA AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ",
    "": "Carborandum Co\nvs\nCommissioner of Income tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12028",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 907 = 1977 SLD 907 = (1977) 36 TAX 67 = (1976) 103 ITR 777",
    "Key Words:": "Section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Charitable or religious trust- Exemption of income from property held under - Whether if one of objects of trust deed is not of religious or charitable nature and trust deed confers full discretion on trustees to spend trust funds for an object other than of religious or charitable nature, exemption under section 4(3)(i) of 1922 Act would not available to said trust - Held, yes - Appellant trust was created for religious and charitable purpose - For purpose of carrying out said religious and charitable objects, trust deed empowered trustees to establish any business, undertaking or industry - Income-tax authorities found that said industrial and commercial concerns were not started in furtherance of objects of trust but for purpose of earning profits which were to be distributed to shareholders who had invested share money in those concerns - Whether on facts, appellant was not entitled to exemption under section 4(3)(i) of 1922 Act - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe appellant trust was created for religious and charitable purposes. For the purposes of carrying out the said religious or charitable objects, the trust deed empowered the trustees to establish any business, undertaking or industry and to purchase, acquire or undertaking the whole or any part of property and liabilities of any person, firm or company. The appellant contended that the income derived from such commercial concern was to be spent wholly for the religious and charitable purposes and, therefore, exemption under section 4(3)(i) of the 1922 Act was permissible. The revenue denied the claim for exemption on the ground that some objects were non-charitable and the trustees were given an unfettered discretion with regard to the utilisation of the income. The revenue also held that the appellant trust was not a genuine charitable trust but its creation and existence were a camouflage and were meant only as a device for the benefit of the settlor and the industrial and the industrial and commercial concerns controlled by him. On reference, the High Court held that the appellant was not entitled to exemption under section 4(3)(i) of the 1922 Act.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD\nWhere there are several objects of a trust, some of which are charitable and some non-charitable, and the trustees in their discretion are to apply the income to any of the objects, the whole trust fails and no part of the income is exempt from tax. Where the objects are distributive, each and every one of the objects must be charitable in order that the trust might be upheld as a valid charity. If no definite part of the property or its income is allocated to charitable purposes and it would be open to the trustees to apply the whole income to any of the non-charitable objects, no exemption can be claimed.\nIn order to claim the benefit of the exemption under section 4(3)(i) of 1922 the Act the property must be held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes. The only relaxation which may arise in some cases is that all the primary objects of the trust must be of a religious and charitable nature and the existence of any ancillary or secondary object which is not of a religious or charitable nature but which is intended to subserve the religious and charitable objects may not prevent the grant of an exemption. This is because such an ancillary or secondary object, even though not of a religious or charitable nature, is intended to effectuate the main and primary objects of the trust.\nIf the primary or dominant purpose of a trust is charitable, another object which by itself may not be charitable but which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose would not prevent the trust from being a valid charity. A clear distinction must be drawn between the object of a trust and the powers conferred upon the trustees as incidental to the carrying out of the object. If the only object of a trust is the construction and maintenance of a swimming bath which is a purpose of general public utility, the fact that the trustees are given the power to supply or sell refreshments to persons who resort to the bath would not make the trust any the less charitable. Mere application of income to charity on the other hand will not avail to secure exemption if under the terms of the will or deed the income is applicable in the first instance to non-charitable objects and only the residue will go to charity.\nIn the instant case, the income-tax authorities found that the various industrial and commercial concerns were not started by 'R' in furtherance of the objects of the trusts. The concerns were started for the purpose of earning profits which were to be distributed to the shareholders who had invested share money in those concerns.\nThe test is that if one of the objects of the trust deed is not of a religious or charitable nature and the trust deed confers full discretion on the trustees to spend the trust funds for an object other than of a religious or charitable nature, the exemption under section 4(3)(i) of the 1922 Act is not available to the assessee.\nFor these reasons the appeals were dismissed.\nNote: The case was decided in favour of the revenue\nCASE REVIEW\nDecision of the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Jaipur Charitable Trust [1971] 81 ITR 1 affirmed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nAll India Spinners' Association v. CIT [1944] 12 ITR 482 (PC), CIT v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce [1965] 55 ITR 722 (SC), CIT v.Bengal Home Industries Association [1963] 48 ITR 181 (Cal.), CIT v. Krishna Warriar [1964] 53 ITR 176 ; [1964] 8 SCR 36 (SC),CIT v. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha [1954] 25 ITR 472 (All.), Hyderabad Stock Exchange Ltd. v. CIT [1967] 66 ITR 195 (AP),Lakshmi Narain Lath Trust v. CIT [1969] 73 ITR 402 (Raj.), Loka Shikshana Trust (Sole Trustee) v. CIT [1975] 101 ITR 234 ; [1976] 1 SCR 461 (SC), Mohammad Ibrahim Riza Malak v. CIT [1930] 57 IA 260 ; AIR 1930 PC 226 and East India Industries (Madras) (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1967] 65 ITR 611 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),4(3)(i),16\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),4(3)(i),16\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 937 TO 966 OF 1971, MARCH 30, 1976",
    "Judge Name:": "A.N. RAY, C.J. M.H. BEG AND, JASWANT SINGH, JJ",
    "": "Yogiraj Charity Trust\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12029",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 908 = 1977 SLD 908 = (1977) 36 TAX 56 = (1976) 103 ITR 785",
    "Key Words:": "Section 2(22), read with section 2(14) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 2(6A), read with section 2(4A) of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922] - Deemed dividend - Assessment year 1956-57 - Appellant assessee-company held substantial number of shares in two tea companies which later went into liquidation - Appellant received certain sums from respective liquidators out of total distributable assets - Tribunal held that only 40 per cent of profits derived on sale of land of tea estates as also reserves created on writing up value of assets of land of tea estates of said two tea companies was referable to land from which income derived was agricultural income; to that extent, therefore, total of profit on sale of land and reserves, created on revaluation were to be excluded in computing accumulated profits for finding out section 2(6A)(c) of 1922 Act dividend - Tribunal also held that general and taxation reserve having been included in pool of distributable surplus, could only be said to be excess provision out of profits of two tea companies which were not required to be paid out in discharge of any liability, therefore, balance left out after making above deductions from total distributable pool was accumulated profits and share received by assessee on distribution of such accumulated profits was dividend within meaning of section 2(6A)(c) of 1922 Act - Whether even though 60 per cent of profits made by two companies by sale of tea grown and manufactured by them constituted agricultural income not liable to be taxed in their hands, in view of rule 24 of Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, once those profits got accumulated with those two companies, they answered to discretion of 'accumulated profits' as used in definition of dividend in section 2(6A)(c) of 1922 Act - Held, yes - Whether accumulated profits would retain their character as such even though a part of them was not taxed as profit under Act - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, whatever amount was distributed to assessee and was attributable to accumulated profits and loss account as well as in general reserves and liabilities for taxation, would constitute dividend in assessee's hands and whole amount so received would be liable to be taxed as such - Held, yes - Whether since lands held by two tea companies yielded purely agricultural income in shape of green tea leaves, those lands did not constitute capital asset as defined in section 2(4A) of 1922 Act and any gain arising from transfer of such land would not constitute capital gains liable to be taxed as such and distribution of that amount on liquidation of companies would also not partake character of dividend - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee-company held substantial number of shares in two tea companies. Those two companies owned large tea estate consisting of land, building, plant and machinery. The said tea companies sold their entire tea estates and received a surplus over the book value of its assets. Later, the assets of the two companies were revalued, and on such revaluation the book value of the assets appreciated by an amount. These amounts were carried to the respective reserves of the two companies. Subsequently, the said two tea companies went into voluntary liquidation and on that account the assessee become entitle to receive certain amounts out of the distributable assets of the two companies. For the relevant assessment year the assessee-company urged that apart from sum which had been assessed as capital gain under section 12B of the 1922 Act for the assessment year 1949-50, no other amount could be included in the computation of the accumulated profits available for distribution under section 2(6A)(c) of the 1922 Act. The ITO rejected this contention and allowed only a deduction on account of payment on share premium and included the remaining amount as the assessee's dividend income under section 2(6A)(c) of the 1922 Act. The Tribunal held (a) that only 40 per cent of the profits derived on sale of the land of tea estates as also the reserves created on writing up the value of the assets of the land of the tea estates was referable to land from which income derived was agricultural income; to that extent, therefore, the total of the profit on sale of the land of tea estates and reserves created on revaluation were to be excluded in computing the accumulated profits for finding out the section 2(6A)(c) dividend, and (b) that general and taxation reserves having been included in the pool of distributable surplus could, only be held to be excess provisions out of the profits of the two tea companies which were not required to be paid out in discharge of any liability, and accordingly, the balance left over, after making the deduction indicated above from the total distributable pool, was accumulated profits of the two tea companies and the share received by the assessee on distribution of such accumulated profits was dividend within the meaning of section 2(6A)(c) of the 1922 Act. On cross-reference applications, the High Court held that as regards the profits derived on sale of the land of the tea estates and the reserves created on writing up the value of the assets, only so much of the amount which was brought to tax under the head 'Capital gains' in the hands of two tea companies could only be included in 'accumulate profits' for the purpose of determining the dividend under section 2(6A)(c) of the 1922 Act. As regard amount regarding balance in profit and loss Account and the general and taxation reserve it was held that said amount were wholly includible in the accumulated profits within the meaning of section 2(6A)(c) of the 1922 Act.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD\nDistribution which is attributable to the accumulated profits of the company immediately before its liquidation is deemed to be dividend and as such liable to be taxed.\nSixty per cent. of the profits made by tea companies, by sale of tea grown and manufactured by them were not liable to be taxed under the Act in view of rule 24 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922 because they were to be treated as agricultural income of those two companies.E ven though 60 per cent of the said profits constituted agricultural income in the hands of tea companies, once those profits got accumulated with those two companies, they answer to the description of \"\"accumulated profits\"\" as used in the definition of dividend in section 2(6A)(c) of the 1922 Act. The assessee's contention that as only 40 per cent, of the profits which got accumulated were liable to be taxed in the hands of two companies under the Act and 60 per cent, were not liable to be so taxed, only 40 per cent, of the amount of accumulated profits should be treated as accumulated profits for the purpose of section 2(6A)(c) could not be acceded to. The acceptance of the contention would necessarily postulate reading in section 2(6A)(c) of the 1922 Act the words \"\"accumulated profits as are liable to be taxed under the Act\"\". The words \"\"as are liable to be taxed under the Act\"\" are not there in the definition and it would not be permissible to so construe the clause as if those words were a part of that clause. There is also nothing in the language or context of that clause as would warrant such a construction. Accumulated profits would retain their character as such even though a part of them were not taxed as profits under the Act.\nWhatever amount had been distributed to the assessee-company and was attributable to accumulated profits in profit and loss account and general reserves and liabilities for taxation would constitute dividend in the hands of the assessee and the whole of the amount so received would be liable to be taxed as such. Income which is realised by sale of tea by a tea company which grows tea on its land and thereafter subjects it to manufacturing process in its factory is an integrated income. Such income consists of two elements or components. One element or component consists of the agricultural income which is yielded in the form of green leaves purely by the land over which tea plants are grown. The second element or component consists of non-agricultural income which is the result of subjecting green leaves which are plucked from the tea plants grown on the land to a particular manufacturing process in the factory of the tea company. Rule 24 of the Indian Income tax Rules, 1922 prescribes the formula which should be adopted for apportioning the income realised as a result of the sale of tea after it is grown and subjected to the manufacturing process in the factory. Sixty per cent is taken to be agricultural income and the same consists of the first element or component, while 40 per cent represents non-agricultural income and the same comprises the second element or component.\nSo far as the lands held by the two tea companies, they yielded purely agricultural income in the shape of green tea leaves. Forty per cent of the income on sale of tea which was received by them was not income from land. It was income which should be ascribed to manufacturing process to which the green tea leaves were subjected in the factories of those companies. As the lands held by them yielded agricultural income, it would follow that those lands did not constitute capital asset as defined in section 2(4A) of the 1922 Act. Clause (iii) appended to section 2(4A) of the 1922 Act expressly states that capital asset does not include any land from which income derived is agricultural income. Any gain arising from the transfer of such land would not constitute capital gain under the Act and consequently would not be liable to be taxed as such. The distribution of that amount on the liquidation of the companies would also not partake of the character of dividend.\nAs a result of the above, the appeals were dismissed.\nNote: The case was decided in favour of the revenue.\nCASE REVIEW\nDecision of the Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Tea Estates India (P.) Ltd. [1972] 86 ITR 705 affirmed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nAnglo-American Direct Tea Trading Co. Ltd. v. Commr. of Agricultural IT [1968] 69 ITR 667 (SC), CIT v. Girdhardas & Co. P. Ltd.[1967] 68 ITR 300 (SC), IRC v. George Burrell [1924] 2 KB 52 (CA), Karimtharuvi Tea Estates Ltd. v. State of Kerala [1963] 48 ITR SC 83 and Mrs. Bacha A. Gazdar v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 1 (SC) and First ITO v. Short Bros. (P.) Ltd. [1966] 60 ITR 83 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),2(6A)(c),12,4\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),2(6A)(c),12,4\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Rules, 1922=24\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1491 AND 1693 OF 1971, APRIL 26, 1976",
    "Judge Name:": "H.R. KHANNA AND P.K. GOSWAMI, JJ",
    "": "Tea Estate India (P.) Ltd\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12030",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 909 = 1977 SLD 909 = (1977) 36 TAX 53 = (1976) 102 ITR 382",
    "Key Words:": "Section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 23(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Best assessment - Assessment years 1942-43 to 1947-48 - For relevant assessment years, assessee did not file any return - Subsequently, ITO made best assessment on assessee and made his own estimate of income by taking into account general market condition during relevant period, and admission made by assessee before Investigation Commission and facts found by Commission - Assessee contended that ITO was not justified in referring to report of investigation commission and material collected by it for purpose of making estimate as Act under which Investigation Commission was constituted was declared to be ultra vires by Supreme Court - Whether merely because Act under which Investigation Commission was constituted was declared to be ultra vires by Supreme Court it did not follow as a matter of law that material collected by Investigation Commission could not be relied upon by ITO - Held, yes - Whether further since while making estimate, ITO had taken into consideration a number of other circumstances, estimate as such could not be said to be arbitrary, capricious or conjectural - Held, yes\nFACTS\nFor the assessment years 1942-43 to 1947-48, the assessee did not file any return and neither did he comply with the notice issued under section 22(4) of the 1922 Act. The ITO, thereafter, proceeded to make an ex parte best assessment and estimated the income of the assessee for the period from 1942-43 to 1947-48, by taking certain facts into consideration: (i) the general market condition during the material period; (ii) the admissions made by the assessee before the Investigation Commission and (iii) the facts found by the Commission. The ITO on these considerations estimated the assessee's concealed income from business at Rs. 37 lakhs. On appeal, the AAC reduced the estimate made by the ITO. In making the reductions, he placed reliance on the estimates made by the Investigation Commission. On second appeal, the Tribunal agreed with the reduction made by the AAC and approved of the reasons given by the appellate authority for making the reduced estimate. It repelled the contention of the assessee that the estimate made by the ITO was based solely on the findings given by the Investigation Commission on the ground that the order of the ITO disclosed that, apart from referring to the findings of the Investigation Commission, the ITO had exercised his own independent in the matter and had taken into account a number of other circumstances.\nOn reference, the assessee contended that the ITO was not justified in referring to the report of the Investigation Commission and the material collected by it for the purpose of making the estimate, as the Act under which the Investigation Commission was constituted was declared to be ultra vires by the Supreme Court.\nHELD\nIt was true that the Act under which the Investigation commission was constituted was declared to be ultra vires by the Supreme Court but it did not follow as a matter of law that the material collected by the Investigation Commission could not be relied upon by the ITO. As had been seen, the ITO relied upon the admissions made by the assessee and, after referring to the findings of the Commission, made an estimate of the income of the assessee which was in excess of that made by the Investigation Commission. In making this enhanced estimate, the ITO took into consideration a number of circumstances. The estimate as such could not be said to be arbitrary, capricious or conjectural. It was supported by the relevant materials on the record.\nThe reference applications were, thus, liable to be dismissed.\nNote: The case was decided against the assessee.",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(2),34(1A),22(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(2),34(1A),22(4)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT CASE NOS. 808, 809, 811, 814, 815 OF 1971, APRIL 10, 1973",
    "Judge Name:": "R.L. GULATI AND C.S.P. SINGH, JJ",
    "": "Gangadhar Baijnath\nvs\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12031",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1JpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 910 = 1977 SLD 910 = (1977) 36 TAX 29 = (1977) 107 ITR 214",
    "Key Words:": "CASES REFERRED TO\nCA Abraham v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 425 (SC), Blatch v. Archer [1774] 1 Cowp. 63, CIT v. Anwar Ali [1970] 76 ITR 696 (SC), CIT v. Gokuldas Harivallabhdas [1958] 34 ITR 98 (Bom), CIT v. Gujarat Travancore Agency [1976] 103 ITR 149 (Ker) [FB], Collector of Customs v. D. Bhoormull AIR 1974 SC 859, Fattorini (Thomas) (Lancashire) Ltd. v. IRC [1943] 11 ITR (Supp) 50 (HL), Gangi Reddy(T.K.) v. Anjaneya Reddy (M.C.) [1961] 22 ELR 261, Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1972] 83 ITR 26 (SC), Jain Bros. v . Union of India [1970] 77 ITR 107 (SC), Khemka & Co. (Agencies) P. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [1975] 35 STC 571 (SC), Lal Chand Gopal Das v . CIT [1963] 48 ITR 324 (All), Morvi Cotton Merchants' Industrial Corporation Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [1975] 36 STC 347 (Guj), Motilal Joitaram Patel v. STO [1975] TLR 1589 (Guj), Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan & Sons Ltd. 1968 AC 107 (HL), Offi. Liq., Security & Finance (P.) Ltd. v. B.K. Bedi [1974] 44 Comp Cas 499 (Delhi) [FB] and Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer AIR 1956 SC 404",
    "Court Name:": "Gujarat High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=271(1)(a),148,139(1),139(2),275A,280,276,142,133,143,285,286,206,273,272B,212,270,178A,167\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=271(1)(a),148,139(1),139(2),275A,280,276,142,133,143,285,286,206,273,272B,212,270,178A,167\\n\\r\\n\\rCompanies Act, 1956=454\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=28,29(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT Reference No. 24 of 1973, May 3, 1976",
    "Judge Name:": "B.J. DIVAN, C.J. P.D. DESAI AND B.K. MEHTA, JJ",
    "": "Additional Commissioner of IncomE tax\nvs\nI.M. Patel & Co"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12032",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1J5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1987 924 = 1987 SLD 924 = (1987) 56 TAX 130",
    "Key Words:": "Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5 -Delay for sufficient cause-Condonation of -- Whether Court should have a pragmatic and liberal approach-Held yes-Whether state and private litigant should be treated equally-Held yes.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1963=51\\n\\r\\n\\rLimitation Act, 1963=51\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=OrderXXI\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 460 of 1987, decision dated: 19-2-1987",
    "Judge Name:": "M. P. THAKKAR AND B. C. RAY, JJ",
    "": "COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION\nVs\nMST. KATIJI AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12033",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1J5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1982 705 = 1982 SLD 705 = (1982) 45 TAX 182",
    "Key Words:": "Martial Law Regulation No. 32 of 1969, read with M.L.R. Circulars Nos. 1 and 3 of 1969 and Sections 29, 45 and 46 of the Income Tax Act, 1922-Excess income declared by assessee processed and charged to tax in 1969-Part payment made by assessee before 1971 -Balance tax whether debt due to the Government of Pakistan-Held yes-Emergence of the People's Republic of Bangladesh on 26-3-1971--Amount due to the Government of Pakistan, whether can be realised by the Government of Bangladesh on or after 26-3-1971---Held yes\nIt was in pursuance of MLR 32 promulgated by the Government of Pakistan that the assessment had been made and demand Notice issued. This assessment had attained finality and there was no appeal against such assessment. The Administrative Review does not lie as mentioned above because it does not fall under paragraph 15(d). Therefore, the amount was due to Government of Pakistan (Expl. 2, Section 46.)\nAny debt due to any Government that functioned within the territories comprised now in Bangladesh is also debt to the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The assessment that was made final by issuance of notice of demand under Section 29 read with Section 45 has become a debt due to the Government under Section 46 of the Income Tax Act. The assessee had made part payment only. Since fresh notice of demand was issued to pay and the assessee failed to do so he will be deemed to be in default and Section 46 provides for the recovery of debt due to the Government. By the amendment of the definition in General Clauses Act, this debt due to the Government of Pakistan has become a debt to the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. This leads to the conclusion that the legislative amendment in the General Clauses Act by President's Order No. 147 of 1972 was not considered in its perspective. Mr. T.H. Khan is perfectly correct that had the true import been taken into consideration the would have been otherwise. It is irrelevant to consider as to how this debt was created. The validity of MLR 32 is not an issue nor can it be made an issue, because, the tax assessed by operation of law already became a debt to the Government of Pakistan by 15-1-71 and the appellant firm accepting the assessment as final made part payments. This debt is now being realised by the Government of Bangladesh. So, the demand made by respondent No. 1 of payment of outstanding tax does not suffer from want of legal authority.\nCase referred to:-\nDoorga Prasad v. Secretary of State 13 ITR 285",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Bangladesh",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=45,46,29\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=45,46,29\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Review Petition No. 3 of 1980, decision dated: 2-2-1981.On Civil Review petition from the judgment and order dated 30-11-1978 passed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh III Civil Appellate Division, in Civil Appeal No. 108 of 1978",
    "Judge Name:": "KEMALUDDIN HOSSAIN, C.J., FAZLE MUNIM, RUHUL ISLAM AND BADRUL HAIDER CHOWDHURY, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF TAXES AND ANOTHER\nVs\nMALLICK BROTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12034",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1J5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1978 298 = 1978 SLD 298 = (1978) 38 TAX 30 = 1978 PTD 77",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 30, 30(3) as substituted by Finance(Supplementary Provisions) Ordinance No. XVII of 1971 -- Appeal -- Limitation -- Appeal filed within time -- Short of Appeal fee by Rs. 75 -- Balance fee deposited after two years of the period of Limitation -- Application for condonation of delay made after four years of the period of limitation -- No case made out for condonation of delay -- Whether assessee obliged under the law to deposit full fee within the prescribed time -- Held yes -- Whether any obligation on the part of office to inform assessee about the shortfall of fee -- Held no -- Appeal filed whether barred by time -- Held yes -- Whether a fit case for condonation of delay -- Held no -- Appeal to Tribunal -- Limitation -- Condonation of delay -- Word \"\"shall\"\" in section 30(3) -- Interpretation -- Fulfillment of prerequisite condition of payment of fee of Rs. 100 -- Held, obligatory -- No obligation on office of Tribunal to inform appellant regarding shortfall of fee of appeal -- Appellant, after being informed of shortfall of fee, taking more than two years to pay balance fee and taking another two years for making an application for condonation of delay thus incurred in filing complete appeal -- Appellant in failing to deposit required fee on or before last date of limitation committing deliberate default in not complying with mandatory provision of law and also not showing sufficient cause for not presenting appeal in time -- Negligent conduct and deliberate default, held, disentitles appellant to any belief for condonation of delay -- Interpretation of statutes -- Word \"\"shall\"\" -- Makes provision of statute compulsive in nature and does not leave any discretion -- Appeal to Tribunal -- Non-signing of appeal memo, a mere irregularity but non-payment of full prescribed fee, an illegality",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=30(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=30(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=148\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 212 of 1973-74(Assessment year 1970-71) decided on 8-10-1977",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN ABDUL KHALIQ MUHAMMAD MAZHAR ALI, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND A. A. ZUBERI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12035",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1J5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1988 373 = 1988 SLD 373 = (1988) 57 TAX 6",
    "Key Words:": "Interpretation of statute-Subordinate legislation-Retrospective legislation No power unless expressly so authorised. Promissory estoppel-Allegations necessary to establish-Mere vague expressions not sufficient-Representation should be clear and unambiguous Exemption-Power of Government to grant exemption---Cannot be exercised retrospectively unless Government specifically empowered- Exemption granted retrospectively when Government had no such power--Whether can be cancelled by Government-Held yes--Parliament can delegate its legislative power within the recognized limits. Where any rule or regulation is made by any persons or authority to whom such powers have been delegated by the legislature, it may or may not be possible to make the same so as to give retrospective operation. It will depend on the language employed in the statutory provision which may in express terms or by necessary implication empower the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect. But where no such language is to be found, it has been held by the courts that the person or authority exercising subordinate legislative functions cannot make a rule, regulation or bye-law which can operate with retrospective effect(see Subba Rao). In Dr. Indramani Pyarelal Gupta v. W.R. Natu [1963] 1 SCR 721-the majority not having expressed any different opinion on the point ; Modi Food Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1955] 6 STC 287(All); AIR 1956 All 35; India Sugars Refineries Ltd. v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 Mys 326 and General S. Shivdev Singh v. State of the Punjab [1959] PLR 514 [FB]. In the instant case, on the date on which the notification was issued, the Kerala Government had no such power under Section 10 of the Act as it stood then to issue a notification granted exemption with retrospective effect. Such power was actually conferred on it later on by the Kerala Legislature only by way of amendment in 1980 by the Kerala Act 19 of 1980.\nThe authority which can issue a notification may cancel it also. Section 10(3) of the Act confers such power of cancellation expressly. The State Government did so and cancelled the earlier notification as there was a public hue and cry that the State Government had shown undue favour to the Kerala cashew nut factory owners at a time when the State was passing through grave and difficult financial position. Moreover the transactions in question related to the past period. Hence the appellants are not entitled to any relief either on the principle of promissory estoppel or on the basis of the earlier notification issued under Section 10 of the Act.\nCase followed:-\nITO v. M. C. Ponnose [1970] 75 ITR 174(SC)\nCases referred to\nIndrani Pyarelal Gupta(Dr.) v. W. R. Nathu [1963] SCR 721, Modi Food Products Ltd. v. CST [1955] 6 STC 287(All), AIR 1956 All 35, India Sugars Refineries Ltd. v. State of Mysore [1960] AIR 1960 Mys 326; Shivdev Singh(S.)(General) v. State of the Punjab [1959] PLR 514(Punj) [FB].",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1725 of 1977, decision dated: 12-3-1986. On appeal from the judgment and order dated 1-12-1976, of the Kerala High Court in O.P. No. 1740 of 1976",
    "Judge Name:": ". E. S. VENKATARAMIAH AND M. P. THAKKAR, JJ",
    "": "BAKUL CASHEW CO. AND OTHERS\nVs\nSALES TAX OFFICER, QUILON, AND ANOTHER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12036",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1J5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1978 299 = 1978 SLD 299 = (1978) 38 TAX 25 = 1978 PTD 85",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 10(2)(xvi) -- Business expenditure -- Proceedings before Appellate Authorities -- Legal fee incurred -- Whether allowable deduction - Held yes -- Business expenditure -- Expenses incurred as legal fee -- Held, allowable under section 10(2)(xvi) --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(xvi)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(xvi)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No 653(KB) of 1975-76(Assessment year 1973-74) decided on 18-1-1978",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN ABDUL KHALIQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND A. A. ZUBERI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12037",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1J5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1978 300 = 1978 SLD 300 = (1978) 38 TAX 36 = 1978 PTD 89",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 23(3), 33(6), 34, 15BB(4AA) (inserted by Finance Ordinance 1972) --Reassessment -- Tribunal's decision that dividend income derived from Tax Holiday company was not liable to tax -- Matter not pursued by Department by way of Reference to High Court and decision becoming final -- Reassessment proceedings initiated for the same year and dividend included in taxable income consequent upon insertion of sub-section (4AA) in Sec. 15BB by Finance Ordinance, 1972, deeming to have always been so inserted -- Whether illegal and without jurisdiction -- Held yes --Order of Tribunal not assailed by Department in reference under section 66(1) -- Held, such order attained finality under section 33(6) -- Retrospective insertion of subsection (4AA) to section 15BB could not operate to destroy valid given by Tribunal much earlier --Income-tax Officer, without studying legal aspect of matter, resorting to proceedings causing unnecessary harassment and litigation to assessee -- Such hurried action of Income-tax Officer held deplorable --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=23(3),34,15BB,66(1),33(6)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=23(3),34,15BB,66(1),33(6)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 200(KB) of 1976-77(Assessment year 1969-70), decision dated: 16-1-1978",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN ABDUL KHALIQ AND MUHAMMAD MAZHAR ALI, JUDICIAL MEMBERS AND A. A. ZUBERI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12038",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1J5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1978 301 = 1978 SLD 301 = (1978) 38 TAX 25 = 1978 PTD 65",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 10(5), 10(5)(b)(after amendment by Finance Ordinance 1969) -- Omission of the prefix \"\"actually\"\" before the word \"\"allowed\"\" in clause(b) of Sec. 10(5) by Finance Ordinance, 1969 -- Whether made any significant variation to the legal position -- Held no -- Depreciation -- Written down value -- No depreciation on plant, machinery or building allowed prior to the charge year 1972-73 -- Depreciation for the year 1972-73, whether should be on the basis of cost price of plant, machinery or building -- Held yes -- Written down value in respect of subsequent year -- Whether should be adopted after deducting the depreciation allowed in the preceding year -- Held yes -- Allowance on depreciation of plant, machinery and building of factory -- Word \"\"allowed\"\" -- Contemplates actual allowance of depreciation -- Mere fact that assessee's claim for depreciation was refused in part -- Held, cannot estop, assessee from agitating claim during years under consideration --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(5)(b),10(2)(vi)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10(5)(b),10(2)(vi)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. Nos. 729(PB) of 1972-73 and I.T.A. No. 8868-A of 1973-74(Assessment Years 1972-73 and 1973-74), decision dated: 21-9-1976",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN ABDUL KHALIQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND A. A. ZUBERI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12039",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1J5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1978 302 = 1978 SLD 302 = (1978) 38 TAX 5 = 1978 PTD 49",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 10(2A), 10(7) read with rule 6(1) of the First Schedule to the Income-tax Act -- General Insurance Business -- Profits of Insurance business, whether to be computed only under rule 6(1) of the First Schedule to the Income-tax Act -- Held yes -- Provisions of Sec. 10(2A) of the Act whether attracted for inclusion in the total income the outstanding credit balances by way of adjustment -- Held no -- Business of insurance -- Application of provisions of section 10(2A) to business of insurance ousted by section 10(7) -- Profits of insurance business required to be computed with reference to provisions of Insurance Act, 1933 and not in ordinary manner --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2A),10(7),8,9,10,12,18\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=10(2A),10(7),8,9,10,12,18\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. Nos. 345(KB) and 346(KB) of 1976-77, decision dated: 9-4-1978",
    "Judge Name:": "M. T. SIDDIQUI, PRESIDENT AND A. A. ZUBERI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12040",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1J5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1978 303 = 1978 SLD 303 = (1978) 38 TAX 181 = 1978 PLD 1027",
    "Key Words:": "Provisions of the Evidence Act -- Whether applicable to the proceedings under the Income-tax Act -- Held no -- Appeal -- Limitation -- Certified copy of order complained against -- Whether should answer the requirements as given in Section 76 of the Evidence Act, 1972, by reference, even though Evidence Act is not applicable -- Held yes -- Whether certified copy should bear a certificate of an authorised officer(and not a clerk) that it is true copy of the original in his custody -- Whether should be excluded in computing the period of limitation -- Held yes -- Time requisite for obtaining certified copy -- Whether should be excluded in computing the period of limitation -- Held yes -- Whether assessee entitled to inspect the record and get certificate copy, even though attested copy had already been supplied and get supplied to him -- Held yes -- "Certified copy", meaning of -",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),30,65,54,67A\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),30,65,54,67A\\n\\r\\n\\rEvidence Act, (1 of 1872)=76\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "T. R. No. 148 of 1972, decision dated: 3-5-1978, hearing DATE : 3-4-1978",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAFIUR RAHMAN AND GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX AND INCOME TAX, RAWALPINDI ZONE, RAWALPINDI\nvs\nPAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION LTD., RAWALPINDI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12041",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1J5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1978 304 = 1978 SLD 304 = (1978) 38 TAX 126 = 1978 PTD 191 = 1978 PLD 768",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 10(2)(xvi) -- Capital or revenue expenditure -- Company -- Appointment of sole selling agents -- Termination of agency -- Amount paid partly as compensation for termination of agency but mainly on condition that selling agent become the main dealer of the company -- Payment made whether for commercial necessity and expediency -- Held yes -- Whether wholly and exclusively for purpose of business -- Held yes -- Whether admissible as revenue expenditure -- Held yes -- Amount treated as capital receipt in the hands of the selling agent -- Whether adversely affects the revenue nature of the payment in the hands of the company -- Held no -- Business expenditure -- Assessee appointing F as its sole selling agent for distribution of its goods for certain territories subject to condition of agency being terminable by three months' notice on either side -- Assessee later deciding to change its system of distribution by appointing several main dealers on different rates of commission and giving three months, notice of termination of agency to F -- Assessee being desirous of implementing new distribution system immediately offering to pay compensation for loss of commission which F could earn during notice period(calculated at Rs.25,000) and further offering F a sum of Rs.60,000 in consideration of F's loss of profits, if F chose to become main dealer under new system of distribution -- F accepting offer and assessee paying F both sums of Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 60,000 -- Held: Part of consideration though paid to compensate F for loss of profits resulting from termination of agency, major part a consideration for offer of accepting to become main dealer -- Assessee having terminated F's agency with utmost reluctance and yet wanting to retain F as main dealer to get benefit of F's experience and knowledge with a view to smooth running and betterment of its business, payment not ex gratia but one made purely for commercial necessity and expediency, hence a revenue expenditure --",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),10(2)(xvi),10\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),10(2)(xvi),10\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income-tax Reference No. 16 of 1970, decision dated: 3-5-1978. dates of hearing: 12.4.78 and 19.4.78",
    "Judge Name:": "I. MAHMUD AND ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MAIRZA, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST Karachi High Court\nvs\nEXCIDE BATTERIES OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12042",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1NDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1978 305 = 1978 SLD 305 = (1978) 38 TAX 71 = 1978 PLD 890",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),66(2),4(2B),13,23,34,2(11)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),66(2),4(2B),13,23,34,2(11)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "P.T.R. 175(T.R No.98) of 1971, decision dated: 18-4-1978, dates of hearing: 8-3-1978 and 12-3-1978",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAFI-UR-RAHMAN AND GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN, JJ",
    "": "ISLAM JEWELLERS, GUJRANWALA\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAWALPINDI ZONE, RAWALPINDI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12043",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1NDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1978 306 = 1978 SLD 306 = (1978) 38 TAX 25 = 1978 PTD 151 = 1978 PLD 483",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 22(4), 23(4) -- Ex-Parte assessment -- Assessee, a manufacturer of R.C.C. Pipes -- Having head office at Karachi and branches in different cities of Pakistan -- Failure to produce admittedly maintained manufacturing and production accounts, Duty cards, Gate pass Book, Counterfoils of cheques and Pay-in-slips, in response to statutory notices -- Ex-parte assessment under Section 23(4) -- Whether justified -- Held yes -- Accounting -- Assessee adopted mercantile system of accounting regularly -- Change of the method to hybrid system of accounting in respect of a particular transaction -- Whether within competence of assessee -- Held no -- Ex parte assessment -- Best of assessment -- Assessee carrying on extensive business of manufacturing R.C.C. pipes and having branches in different cities of Pakistan -- Suggestion that such assessee did not maintain any manufacturing or production account or stock registers of raw materials -- Hardly inspiring confidence -- Impossible for a manufacturer to work out cost of production without maintaining such accounts -- Assessee admittedly submitting production returns periodically to Government Department -- Fact material evidence for inferring maintenance of production accounts -- Certain documents, e.g., Duty Cards, Gate Pass Book, counterfoils of cheques and pay in slip vouchers also admittedly maintained yet not produced -- Failure to produce such admittedly maintained documents, despite notice to produce them, held, at least partial default and clearly attracted Income-tax Officer's jurisdiction to make ex parts assessment under section 23(4) -- Ex parte assessment -- Accounting system, change in -- Contention that as soon as other party to contract(Water Supply Department) raised dispute with regard to amount already paid to assessee on ground of its having been paid by mistake, assessee could treat it as business liability and was entitled to reverse enter -- Payment in question actually received by assessee and no evidence to show Department's claim having been admitted by assessee as a business liability in accounting year entitling debit -- Assessee having adopted regular method of accounting, held, could not change it in respect of a particular transaction and say he was adopting a hybrid system of accounting --",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),23(4),22(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),23(4),22(4)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income-tax Reference No. 10 of 1969. decided on 11-1-1978. dates of hearing: 13-10-1977 and 27-10-1977",
    "Judge Name:": "I MAHMOOD AND ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, JJ",
    "": "MUSTAFA H.C.C. PIPE WORKS\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12044",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1NDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1978 307 = 1978 SLD 307 = (1978) 38 TAX 5 = 1978 PTD 208 = 1978 PLD 673",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 2(4), 10, 66 -- Reference to High Court -- Inference or conclusion drawn by Appellate Tribunal on certain facts that purchase and sale of shares was incidental to business and taxable -- Whether a mixed question of law and fact -- Held yes -- Tribunal's findings on facts based on no evidence or on irrelevant material, conjectures, surmises or suspicions -- Whether gives rise to question of law -- Held yes --\nAdventure in the nature of trade -- Business -- Purchase and sale of shares -- Number of transactions, whether the determining factor -- Held no -- Whether single transaction can be held to be adventure in the nature of trade -- Held yes -- Adventure in the nature of trade -- Business -- Assessee-company managing agents of certain industries, deriving income from insurance, managing agency and dividends -- One of the objects to act as capitalist and financier and to undertake all kinds of operations -- Purchase and sale of heavy shares with borrowed capital -- Sale of bulk of the shares to sister concern at market rate -- Profits derived from such activities -- Whether eligible to tax -- Held yes -- Question of law -- Income-tax Tribunal on basis of certain facts found by it concluding transaction regarding purchase and sale of shares by assessee to be incidental to his business and consequently taxable -- Inference or conclusion thus drawn from facts, held, raises a question of law --\nQuestion of law -- Finding of fact based on no evidence, or on material irrelevant to inquiry, or where decision based on conjectures, surmises and suspicions -- Issue of law, held, arises in such cases and findings of Tribunal can be interfered with by High Court --\nAssessment -- Number of transactions not determining factors for deciding whether any purchases or sales were in nature of ordinary investment and its realisation an adventure in trade -- Multiplicity of transactions though ordinarily indicative of trading yet, held, a single venture could be held, to be an adventure in trade if connected with assessee's ordinary line of business of intention to venture in trade manifest --\nAssessment -- Shares, buying and selling of -- Tribunal on basis of assessee's Articles of Association finding assessee a financier financing and promoting business of its allied concerns and having not only power to invest its surplus funds but also empowered to act as financier and capitalist and to undertake and carry on all kinds of financial, commercial, trade, and other operations -- Tribunal, held, correctly concluded buying and selling of shares falling within ambit of objects of assessee's business -- Assessment -- Buying and selling of shares -- Objects of assessee being to act as capitalist and financier and to undertake all kinds of financial operations, purchase and sale of securities by assessee a normal step in its business -- Mere fact of its investments having been made mainly in concern controlled by its allied firm -- Makes no difference -- Shares being mainly purchased by assessee with borrowed capital and such purchases being very heavy -- Intention to do business in such shares clearly indicated or at least such being normal step in carrying on business of assessee established -- Bulk of shares purchased by assessee having been sold to a sister concern -- Makes no difference, shares having been sold at market rate -- Purchase and sale of shares by assessee, held, not in nature of capital investment but revenue receipt and taxable income --",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1),66\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),66\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Income-tax Reference No. 3 of 1970 decided on 8-3-1978, dates of hearing: 15-2-1978 and 22-2-1978",
    "Judge Name:": "I MAHMOOD AND Z. A. CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT LTD., Karachi High Court\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, Karachi High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12045",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1NDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 910 = 1977 SLD 910 = (1977) 36 TAX 225 = 1977 PTD 343 = 1977 PLD 1091 = 1978 PTD 91",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 41 -- Income -- Application of income -- Assessee appointed mutwalli of certain properties under an Award -- Assessee apportioning income of properties between himself and his son under a deed of declaration -- Whether a valid or legal assignment attracting exemption from tax under the law -- Held no -- Whether total income from properties assessable in the hands of the assessee -- Held yes -- Whether a case of application of income -- Held yes -\nAssessee managing a definite portion of property as Mutwalli under an arrangement inter se Mutwallis of Waqf alal aulad--Entire in come from such property accruing to assessee who could spend same for his well-being and for his line of family members -- Assessee divesting himself of share of income to give same to his son -- Such application of portion of income not valid of legal assignment attracting exemption under law -- Assessee, held liable to taxed for entire income -- Assessee, by deed of declaration, apportioning net income of properties in his charge between himself and his son in ratio of 60 and 40 respectively -- Case one of application of income and not of a valid or legal assignment attracting exemption under law -- Assessee, held, liable to be taxed for entire income under Section 41 --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=40,16(1)(c),41\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=40,16(1)(c),41\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 156 of 1971, decision dated: 17-3-1977. dates of hearing: 6th, 8-10-1976; 14th, 21st, 22-02-1977 and 8-03-1977",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAMEEM HUSSAIN KADRI AND GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN, JJ",
    "": "SH. SAEEDUDDIN\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12046",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1NDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 911 = 1977 SLD 911 = (1977) 36 TAX 216 = 1977 PTD 335 = 1977 PLD 1047",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 2(7), 13, 34(1), 34(2D), 55, 58 ----Notice -- Reassessment -- Notice issued under Section 34(2D) as well as under Section 34(1) -- Assessment made in pursuance of notice under Section 34(2D) -- Whether valid in law -- Held yes -- Notice under Section 34(1) whether superfluous in the circumstances -- Held yes -- Super-tax -- Whether Section 55 is the charging Section for super tax -- Held yes -- Computation of income under Section 13 whether forms the basis for levy of super tax -- Held yes --\nAssistant Income-tax Officer -- Jurisdiction to make income-tax assessment -- Definition of 'Income-tax Officer' in Section 2(7) including an 'Assistant Income-tax Officer' -- Assistant Income-tax Officer, whether competent to make Income-tax assessment -- Held yes -- Income escaping assessment -- Difference between application of subsections(1) and(2-D) -- Notice under subsection (2-D) already in field and alive when second notice under subsection (1) served -- Assessment, held, validly made under subsection (2-D), notice under subsection (1) being superfluous, in circumstances of case Super-tax -- Section 55, charging section for super-tax -- Such tax leviable on total income of previous year computed under Section 13 -- Computation made under S. 13 forms basis for levy of super-tax -- "Income-tax Officer" -- Definition -- Assessment made by Assistant Income-tax Officer -- Held, made by competent Officer Reference -- Question referred found to be pure question of fact -- No answer to such question necessary --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=2(7),13,proviso,34(1),34(2D),55,58,66(1),22(4),23(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=2(7),13,proviso,34(1),34(2D),55,58,66(1),22(4),23(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 345 of 1972, decision dated: 23-4-1976",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN AND GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MALIK MUHAMMAD AKRAM KHAN & CO\nvs\nIncome Tax OFFICER, JHELUM"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12047",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1NDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 847 = 1985 SLD 847 = 1985 SCMR 1492",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-----Art. 185(3)--Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act (XLVII of 1958), S. 21--Leave to appeal granted to examine whether a revision provided under S. 21 of Act XLVII of 1958, empowered High Court to review its decision given in exercise of that power.\n \n(b) Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act (XLVII of 1958)-\n \n---S. 21--Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 117 & 114--Review-­Powers of High Court--Decision given by High Court in exercise of revisional powers under Act (XLVII of 1958)--Review--Double/fraudulent allotment--Land resumed--Belated revision petition challenging resumption of land dismissed--Review entertained on ground that proceedings being of civil nature, power of review was available under S. 117, C.P.C. in addition to inherent powers of Court to correct errors apparent on face of record or patent errors--Order assailed--Held: By virtue of 5.117 C . P. C Civil proceeding in High Court is governed by provision of Code other than provisions which are excepted--Powers to review its order under S. 114, C.P.C. would, therefore, be available.\n \nHussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi PLD 1970 S C 1; National Telephone Co. v. His Majesty Post Master-General (1913) A C 546 and Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shaft PLD 1981 S C 94 ref.\n \nCh. Muhammad Hasan, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Maqbool Ahmad Qadri, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\n \nCh. Ghulam Mujtaba, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1.\n \nRespondents Nos. 2 to 4: Ex parte.\n \nCh. Qadir Bakhsh, Advocate Supreme Court with Sh. Masud' Akhtar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 5 to 9.\n \nDate of hearing: 17th January, 1984.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1973, decision dated: 17-01-1985",
    "Judge Name:": "ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN, MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH AND SHAFIUR RAHMAN, JJ",
    "": "NIZAM DIN and another--Appellants\nVs.\nFAQIR MUHAMMAD and 8 others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12048",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1NDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 912 = 1977 SLD 912 = (1977) 36 TAX 82 = 1977 PTD 291 = 1977 PLD 1163",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Sections 23 read with Martial Law Regulations Nos.(43/48 of 1958) - Section 66 -- Assessment -- Dividend received out of excess income processed under Martial Law Regulations Nos. 43/48 -- Whether exempt from tax -- Held no -- Reference to High Court -- Assessee voluntarily filling revised return in respect of income of deceased father -- Statutory notices served on assessee and assessment completed accordingly -- No plea raised for impleading other legal heirs of the deceased in assessment proceedings -- Whether assessment can be challenged on that ground -- Held no -- Assessment -- Dividends received by assessee out of excess income assessed under Martial Law Regulation No. 43/48 -- Held, not exempt from assessment -- Reference to High Court -- Objection not raised by deceased assessee's son before Income-tax Officer and assessment could not be challenged by him because grievance could be raised by other legal heirs of deceased -- Applicant not allowed to raise such objection before High Court --",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=23,23(2),66,34,24B\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=23,23(2),66,34,24B\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "P.T.R. No. 18(T.R. No. 35) of 1972, decision dated: 2-6-1976, hearing DATE : 17th to 20-05-1976",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAMEEM HUSSAIN KADRI AND GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN, JJ.",
    "": "MAIN AFTAB IJAZ\nv.\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, Lahore High Court ZONE Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12049",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIR1NDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1977 913 = 1977 SLD 913 = (1977) 35 TAX 39 = 1977 PTD 33",
    "Key Words:": "Property -- Self occupied -- Assessee owner of two houses -- One in his occupation for own residence and the other in occupation of partners for their residence -- The other house, whether \"\"in his occupation\"\" -- Held yes -- Whether both the houses self-occupied and assessee entitled to relief under second proviso to Sec. 9(2) -- Held yes -- Income from property -- House occupied by dependent parents of assessee -- Held, to be considered as self-occupied -- Annual letting value of such house ordered to be added up and then levy tax on excess income, if any --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 1922=9(2),Secondproviso\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Rules, 1922=9(2),Secondproviso\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=19(2)(b)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. Nos. 4554(KB) and 4555(KB) of 1973-74(Assessment years 1972-73 and 1973-74), decision dated: 23-4-1976.",
    "Judge Name:": "A. A. DARESHANI, PRESIDENT AND M. KARIM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12050",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIRVFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 969 = 1985 SLD 969 = 1985 SCMR 1829 = 1985 PTCL 245",
    "Key Words:": "Interpretation of “Notice Given” under Section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nThe petitioners — including the driver, cleaner, and owner of a truck — sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court’s decision dismissing their writ petition challenging the confiscation of goods allegedly smuggled. The truck carrying foreign cloth, betelnuts, betel leaves, batteries, and new tyres was seized by Customs Intelligence on 11th February 1975, and an F.I.R. was lodged on 10th April 1975. A show-cause notice was later issued under Section 180 of the Customs Act by the Deputy Collector.\nThe central legal issue was the interpretation of the phrase “notice given” in Section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, which requires that if no such notice is "given" within two months of seizure, the goods must be returned. The question was whether “notice given” means:\nIssuance of the notice within the two-month period, or\nActual service of the notice on the affected party within that period.\nThe petitioners argued that the notice must be served within two months, relying on Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which creates a presumption of service if sent by post. They asserted that the legislative intent required actual receipt of notice to enable a meaningful response.\nThe Deputy Attorney-General contended that “give notice” meant merely the issuance of the notice, and that requiring service would allow evaders to delay proceedings by avoiding service.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that this was a novel question of law and required authoritative determination regarding the correct interpretation of “notice given” in the context of Section 168(2).\nCitations:\nCustoms Act, 1969, Sections 168(2), 180, and 215\nGeneral Clauses Act, 1897, Section 27\nBlack’s Law Dictionary (definition of "notice")",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=168(2),180,215\\n\\r\\n\\rGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=27\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 51 of 1980, decision dated: 27-02-1985. Date of hearing: 27th February, 1985.",
    "Judge Name:": "ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN AND SHAFIUR RAHMAN, JJ",
    "": "MONOO GUL and others\nVs.\nPAKISTAN and others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12051",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIRVJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 1001 = 1985 SLD 1001 = 1985 SCMR 1915 = 1986 PTCL 22",
    "Key Words:": "The petitioners imported 50-meter lengths of black rubber air hoses from China, claiming classification under Item 40.09 of the Import Trade Control Schedule, which pertains to piping and tubing of unhardened vulcanised rubber. The dispute arose over the Customs Authorities refusing to classify the goods under sub-heading (b) for "motor vehicles," allegedly acting contrary to precedent and mala fide. Petitioners argued that the goods, even when uncut or unassembled, retained the essential character of finished goods under Rule 2(a). They also relied on past import licenses and treatment of similar goods.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court found the matter required further consideration and granted leave to appeal. Both cases are to be heard on the same record, with liberty to file additional documents. Security of Rs. 2,000 was ordered in each case.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal Nos. 286 and 287 of 1984, decision dated: 29-05-1985. Date of hearing: 29th May, 1985",
    "Judge Name:": "ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN AND M.S.H. QURAISHI, JJ",
    "": "M/s KHAWAJA BROTHERS Lahore High Court and anothers\nVs.\nTHE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12052",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIRVJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 1028 = 1985 SLD 1028 = 1985 SCMR 1959 = 1986 PTCL 74",
    "Key Words:": "The petitioner, a private limited company manufacturing biscuits, consumed vegetable ghee as a raw material. Initially, sales tax was levied on vegetable ghee through a capacity duty system under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. However, via a notification dated 16-06-1967, vegetable ghee was exempted from sales tax.\nDespite this exemption, the petitioner sought a refund of sales tax for assessment years 1968-69, 1969-70, and 1970-71, claiming that tax was paid on vegetable ghee used in manufacturing.\nThe Sales Tax Officer rejected the refund claims on 17-06-1972, stating that since no sales tax was actually paid (due to the exemption), no refund could arise.\nThe petitioner appealed, and the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the refund by a consolidated order dated 27-02-1963. The department challenged this ruling by filing a reference under Section 17(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 before the Sindh High Court.\nThe question of law referred was:\n"Whether... the Tribunal was justified in directing the Sales Tax Officer to allow refund of sales tax... when vegetable ghee had suffered no sales tax at all?"\nThe Sindh High Court answered the question in the negative by judgment dated 28-04-1984, holding that no refund is permissible when no tax was paid.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the legal question raised—whether sales tax refund can be claimed where tax liability was previously merged in capacity duty but subsequently exempted—is important and of general public importance, likely to affect numerous similar cases.\nLeave to appeal was granted.\nNo interim relief granted.\nMiscellaneous petitions dismissed.\nAppeals to be heard on existing record with liberty to file additional documents.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=27\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal Nos. K-329, K-330 and K-331 of 1984, decision dated: 26-06-1985. Date of hearing: 24th June, 1985",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL KADIR SHAIKH, S.A. NUSRAT AND ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, JJ",
    "": "M/s A AND B FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. and others\nVs.\nCOMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax/SALES TAX---Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12053",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIRVJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 1034 = 1985 SLD 1034 = 1985 SCMR 1968 = 1985 PTCL 25",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-----Art.185(3)--Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), S. 15-BB (4)--Exemption-­Leave granted to examine question of law arising in respect of assessee's entitlement to claim benefit of exemption from tax..\n \n(b) Income-tax Act (XI of 1922)--\n \n---S.15-BB(4)--Exemption--Income derived from addition of manufacturing units--Exemption refused on ground that existing machinery/ building was also used in additional units/new manufacturing process for which tax holiday was claimed and it could not be treated an independent and identifiable unit--Order impugned on ground that assessee having satisfied all jurisdictional requirements provided in statute for grant of exemption, it could not be refused on extraneous consideration--Held, there being no such qualification or condition in law that a unit or process should be independent and self-contained, impugned order, was not sustainable--Appeal accepted. \n \n(c) Interpretation of statutes--\n \n--- Addition of words in language of statute--Where language of statute unmistakably points to meaning, presents no difficulty in understanding, injection of a word of one's own choice would clearly amount to impermissible inter-meddling with legislative intent and purpose.\n \nEverard v. Ploppleton 5QB 181 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=15-BB(4)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 51-K and 52-K of 1973, decision dated: 21st January, 1985. Date of hearing: 21st January, 1985.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD HALEEM, CHIEF JUSTICE, ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN, JUSTICE SHAFIUR RAHMAN AND ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, JUSTICE",
    "": "PAKISTAN\nVs\nM/s ZEAL PAK CEMENT FACTORY LTD.--Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12054",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVIRlFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1985 1076 = 1985 SLD 1076 = 1985 SCMR 2061 = 1985 PTCL 515",
    "Key Words:": "Confiscation of Undeclared Gold Ornaments – Violation of Foreign Exchange and Import Control Laws\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, Mst. Khatija Begum, arrived at Lahore Airport on 8-2-1976 from Dubai. On personal search (after her baggage was found clean), 46 tolas of gold in the form of two bangles and three rings were found on her person. The customs authorities seized the gold, alleging:\nViolation of:\nS.R.O. No. F.E. 29/49, dated 5-11-1949 (under Section 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947),\nR.S.O. No. 920(I)/73, dated 25-6-1973 (under Section 3(1) of the Import and Export Control Act, 1950).\nOffence punishable under:\nSection 16, read with Section 156(1)(9)/(89) of the Customs Act, 1969.\nThe petitioner claimed:\nThe ornaments were worn openly, not concealed.\nShe did not attempt to smuggle.\nRequested to re-export under Section 142 of the Customs Act.\nHowever, the Assistant Collector rejected this plea, holding:\nThe gold was concealed and not declared.\nSection 142 was inapplicable as it only allows re-export where there is an honest declaration at entry.\nHer subsequent appeals to the Collector and the Board of Revenue were dismissed.\nShe then filed a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court, challenging the confiscation. The High Court dismissed it in limine, noting she had not declared the gold on arrival.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, confirming that:\nThe gold was not declared by the petitioner.\nAlthough worn on the person, the omission to declare, particularly given the heavy weight, undermined her bona fides.\nThere was no basis to interfere with the findings of the customs department or the High Court.\nLeave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=16,142,156(1)(9),156(1)(89)\\n\\r\\n\\rForeign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947=8(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 133 of 1980, decision dated: 4th March; 1985 (Against the judgment and order, dated 19-11-1979 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Writ Petition No. 7015 of 1979)",
    "Judge Name:": "ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN AND SHAFIUR RAHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. KHUDIJA BEGUM\n Vs.\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12055",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVEQ1FDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 1603 = 2012 SLD 1603 = 2012 SCMR 1876 = 2025 PTCL 398",
    "Key Words:": "Mis-declaration of value of imported consignment under the Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nThe importer (petitioner) filed a goods declaration for an imported consignment, declaring its value as US$ 2,367.60. During inspection, the Customs authorities discovered the original invoice within the consignment, revealing the actual value as US$ 50,663.50. Consequently, the Customs authorities issued a show cause notice under Section 32A of the Customs Act, 1969. Upon examination, it was determined that the invoice provided by the importer was fake, while the invoice retrieved during inspection was genuine. The importer’s appeals before the Tribunal and the High Court were dismissed.\nHeld:\nThe courts upheld that the importer was guilty of mis-declaration and concealment of material facts. The authorities rightfully took action as per the law, and the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,32A,156(1)(14A),156(1)(77)),156(1)(86),81,192,196\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No.146-K of 2012, decision dated: 6-09-2012. Date of hearing: 6th September, 2012. (On appeal from order of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 7-3-2012 passed in Spl. Cus. R.A. No.598 of 2011)",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, AMIR HANI MUSLIM AND MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED, JJ",
    "": "JUNAID TRADERS\nvs\nADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (APPRAISEMENT-I)"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12056",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVEQ1JpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1684 = 2015 SLD 1684 = (2015) 112 TAX 46 = 2015 PTD 1653",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=110,161,165,165(1),177(1),122(5A),210,210(1A),211,214(C),237,PartVIIIandPartIX oftheSecond Schedule\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=110,161,165,165(1),177(1),122(5A),210,210(1A),211,214(C),237,PartVIIIandPartIX oftheSecond Schedule\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Rules, 2002=43,44(4)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.P.No. 28035 of 2014, decision dated: 2-4-2015, hearing DATE : 5-3-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "AYESHA A. MALIK, J",
    "": "NOON SUGAR MILLS LIMITED\nVs \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN etc"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12057",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVEQ1J5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2098 = 2014 SLD 2098 = 2014 SCMR 982 = 2014 PLC 961",
    "Key Words:": "Pakistan Red Crescent Society Act ( XV of 1920)-------S. 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 199 & 188---Service Rules framed by Pakistan Red Crescent Society---Non-statutory in nature---Constitutional petition filed before High Court by an employee of Pakistan Red Crescent Society challenging his removal from service---Maintainability---(Service) Rules framed by Pakistan Red Crescent Society were non-statutory and on such count constitutional petition filed by its employee before the High Court challenging his removal from service would not be maintainable---Review petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n Pakistan Defence Officer's Housing Authority v. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed 2013 SCMR 1707 ref.\n \n Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\n \n Muhammad Bilal, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Babar Bilal, Advocate Supreme Court along with Aftab Ali, Assistant Director for Respondents.\n \n Date of hearing: 11th February, 2014.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.R.P. No.163 of 2005 in Civil Appeal No.1080 of 1998, decision dated: 11-02-2014 (To review this Courts judgment dated 1-6-2005 passed in Civil Appeal No.1080 of 1998)",
    "Judge Name:": "TASSADUQ HUSSAIN, JILLANI, CJ, KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Syed NAZIR GILLANI\nVs\nPAKISTAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12058",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2101 = 2014 SLD 2101 = 2014 CLD 303",
    "Key Words:": "Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)-------S. 7---Appeal---Execution of decree---Disbursement of amount---Execution of decree was allowed by High Court directing Court official to disburse amount lying with him to decree holder---Plea raised by appellants was that order was passed in execution without hearing them---Validity---High Court committed no error or illegality while allowing execution application and had rightly ordered disbursement of amount to decree-holder, keeping in view bank rate and such order did not call for any interference by High Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Amber Ahmed Khan v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi PLD 2003 Kar. 405; Jewan Lal Daga and another v. Nilmani Chaudhuri AIR 1928 (Privy Council) 80; (Gudimalla) Narasinham and another v. (Paidimarri) Venkata Subbayya and another AIR 1933 (Madras) 171 and Soneri Bank Limited v. Idrees Ahmed Siddiqui and another 2005 CLD 1003 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Admiralty Appeal No. 2 of 2012, decision dated: 15-07-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND ABDUL MAALIK GADDI, JJ",
    "": "S.S. EAGLE CAPE and another\nvs\nHUSSAIN CAN COMPANY (PVT.) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12059",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2102 = 2014 SLD 2102 = 2014 CLD 263",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 19 & 22---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.58---State Bank of Pakistan, BPD Circular No.29, dated, 15-10-2002---Execution of decree---Compromise decree---Mortgaged property---Change in shares---Suit for recovery of bank loan was decreed on the basis of compromise between the parties deciding shares to be received by two financial institutions out of the assets of defendants/customers---During execution of decree, plaintiff/bank intended to change share ratio in its favour by decreasing that of other financial institution---Single Judge of High Court dismissed the application filed by plaintiff bank---Validity---Plaintiff bank could not enlarge its share in the security having recourse to S. 58 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or for that matter contents of BPD Circular No.29 issued by State Bank of Pakistan, on 15-10-2002---Legal rights for settlement of over-dues was over-ridden by the conduct of parties inter se following the compromise, which had taken into account provisions of law and contents of the Circular---Compromise created a mechanism for modifying rights of parties which were to be decided to be modified on basis of certain existing contents---Modified rights were enumerated in settlement application sanctioned by Banking Court with the consent of parties---Recourse of the provisions of law and BPD Circular No.29 was superseded by arrangement made between the parties---Payment of amount by defendants / customers to plaintiff/bank in pursuance of settlement application and order passed by Banking Court had created rights in parties including defendants / customers and other financial institution in relation to sharing ratio in security---Any modification of such sharing ratio was to have occurred by consent of parties and not unilaterally---Enhancing share of plaintiff/bank of sharing ratio of other financial institution was illegal and against defendants/customers---Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Single Judge of High Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 81 of 2009, decision dated: 9-06-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, C.J. AND MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, J",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN (IDBP)\nvs\nCRYSTAL CHEMICALS LTD. and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12060",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2103 = 2014 SLD 2103 = 2014 CLD 243",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19(1), 19(2), 4 & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2) & O.XXIII, Order XXI---Interpretation of S. 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Execution of decree---Power of Banking Court---Applicability of provisions of C.P.C. to execution of decrees under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Scope---Execution of decree and sale of mortgaged property---Judgment-debtor sought setting aside of order of Banking Court whereby application for execution of decree was allowed to be withdrawn and permission for filing a fresh application was given to the decree holder bank---Contention of -debtor was inter alia that impugned order violated O.XXIII, Rule 4, C.P.C.---Held, that the Banking Court derived its power for execution of its decree from S. 19(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and not from S. 19(2) of the Ordinance---Reference to provisions of the C.P.C. in said S. 19(2) of the Ordinance was for the purpose of adopting a \"\"procedure\"\" for execution of the Banking Court's decree---Procedure to be followed by a court and exercise of its authority were two different things---Powers conferred on an ordinary court under the C.P.C. were alien to the powers conferred on the Banking Court---Authority/power of Banking Court was not subservient to powers conferred on a Civil Court under provisions of the C.P.C.---Banking Courts, as a practice, allowed the plaintiff Financial Institution to file a formal execution application in terms of O.XXI, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. for sake convenience for satisfaction of decree passed by the Banking Court and merely accepting such an application under any provision of the C.P.C. did not mean that such proceedings were converted into execution of a decree in an ordinary suit and did not therefore entail that power conferred on Banking court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 stood compromised or nullified---Subsections (1) and (2) of S. 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were to be read together---Any embargo in terms of O.XXIII, Rule 4, C.P.C. regarding applicability of provisions of O. XXIII, C.P.C. in the execution proceedings had no bearing on power of Banking Court in execution of a decree---Irrespective of fact that certain provisions of C.P.C. were mentioned in execution application of decree-holder Bank, Banking Court under S.19(1) of the Ordinance had power to allow decree-holder to withdraw earlier application and file a fresh one---Power of Banking Court in terms of S.19(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was protected by section 4 of the Ordinance whereby provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 had an overriding effect on provisions of C.P.C.---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n(b) Interpretation of Statutes---\n \n----All provisions of a statute were to be read together and any particular provision of a statute was not to be considered in isolation unless and until there was a clear-cut conflict, which was irreconcilable.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J. M. No. 48 of 2013 in Suit No. B-169 of 2010, decision dated: 22-10-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZAR AKBAR, J",
    "": "Messrs PEARL FABRICS CORPORATION and 3 others--Applicants\nvs\nMessrs KASB BANK LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12061",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2104 = 2014 SLD 2104 = 2014 CLD 297",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S. 3---Intra-Court appeal---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Private company---Appellant was a private company and aggrieved of order passed by Single Judge of High Court whereby demand made by the company to respondent was declared illegal---Validity---Appellant was a private company and could not be regarded as a person performing functions in connection with affairs of Federation or Province---No writ in exercise of powers of Art. 199 of the Constitution could be issued against the company---Division Bench of High Court set aside passed by Single Judge---Intra-Court appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Salahuddin and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. Tokht Bhai and 10 others PLD 1975 SC 1974 and Abdul Wahab and others v. Habib Bank Ltd. and others 2014 PLC (C.S.) 393 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I.C.A. No. 918 of 2010 in W.P. No. 8786 of 2006, decision dated: 1st October, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ UL AHSAN AND FAISAL ZAMAN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MILLAT TRACTORS LTD. through Deputy General Manager Administration and Purchases\nvs\nMUHAMMAD MUNIR AHMAD and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12062",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2105 = 2014 SLD 2105 = 2014 CLD 253",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Factual controversy---Bank guarantee, encashment of---Petitioner who was contractor of respondent authorities had furnished unconditional irrevocable bank guarantee in favour of authorities---Plea raised by petitioner was that authorities could not ask bank to encash bank guarantee in question without first referring it to petitioner---Validity---Bank guarantee in question was unconditional and irrevocable and bank had undertaken to pay immediately on demand upon advising them the reason for demand, without objection and without reference to petitioner, any amount up to the extent mentioned in the guarantee---Decision of authorities was final and binding---Unconditional and irrevocable bank guarantee could not be interfered with except in case of fraud and or in case of question of apprehension of irrevocable injustice had been made out---Liability of a person pursuant to a document / contract and factual controversies requiring evidence could not be determined in exercise of extra ordinary Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---In order to justify granting of extraordinary relief, absence of adequate alternate remedy in law should have clearly appeared---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P. No. 347 of 2013, decision dated: 23rdMay, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "AHMED ALI M. SHAIKH AND SYED MUHAMMAD FAROOQ SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPLIES CORPORATION through DirectoR\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Chief Controller Purchase and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12063",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1305 = 2015 SLD 1305 = (2015) 111 TAX 447 = 2015 PTD 2042",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(10(b),121(1)(d),122(1),122(9),177(2),214\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(10(b),121(1)(d),122(1),122(9),177(2),214\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No.2652/LB/2014 (Tax Year 2011), decision dated: 16-01-2015, hearing DATE : 16-1-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "AMMAR STEEL INDUSTRIES, Lahore High Court\nVS.\nC.I.R., Zone-IV, R.T.O. Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12064",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1296 = 2015 SLD 1296 = (2015) 111 TAX 461",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=3,4A,113,114(6),122(3),129,221,205\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=3,4A,113,114(6),122(3),129,221,205\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "MA(Stay) No. 827/LB/14, ITA No. 1845/LB/12 (Tax Year 2011), decision dated: 14-7-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MOHAMMAD RAZA BAQIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12065",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1685 = 2015 SLD 1685 = (2015) 111 TAX 488 = 2016 PTD 253",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114,116,122C,172,218,221\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=114,116,122C,172,218,221\\n\\r\\n\\rGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=24A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "MA (R) Nos. 87/IB to 90/IB OF 2014 (Tax Years 2007 to 2010), decision dated: 15-10-2014, hearing DATE : 15-10-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRPERSON AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF THROUGH NASAR MAHMOOD GONDAL, SARGODHA\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, R.T.O., SARGODHA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12066",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1686 = 2015 SLD 1686 = (2015) 111 TAX 420 = 2015 PTD 2271",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=120(1),122,122(1),122(9),111(1)(b)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 2570/LB/12 (Tax Year 2007), decision dated: 20-06-2014, hearing DATE : 20-6-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12067",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1278 = 2015 SLD 1278 = (2015) 111 TAX 427 = 2016 PTD 342",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),3,11(1)(2),33(5)(8)(11c),13,33,34c\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),3,11(1)(2),33(5)(8)(11c),13,33,34c\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 401/LB/2014, decision dated: 9-7-2014, hearing DATE : 3-7-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND ABDUL NASIR BUTT, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "M/S. EHSAN CHAPPAL STORE (PVT.) LTD., Lahore High Court\nVS\nCIR., R.T.O.-II, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12068",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1687 = 2015 SLD 1687 = 2015 CLD 634",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 222 & 224(4)---Delay in filing returns of beneficial ownership---Director of broker/company, who was required to report changes in beneficial ownership on Form 32 within the period stipulated under S.222 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, failed to discharge said obligation and filed the return with delay ranging from 246 days to 1,675 days in contravention of S.222(2)(c) of the Ordinance---Said contravention, prima facie attracted penal provisions of S.224(4) of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Director of the company had requested to condone the fault in question, with the plea that same was not committed intentionally---Earlier the Director was almost regular in filing of returns of beneficial ownership---Commission took lenient view of the matter and strictly warned the Director of company to ensure timely compliance of S.222 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No. SMD/BO/Co.222/4(1802)02, dated 30-04-2014, decision dated: 3rd June, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12069",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1688 = 2015 SLD 1688 = (2015) 111 TAX 397",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(19),2(46),3(1)(a)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(19),2(46),3(1)(a)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "STA No. 247/LB/2013, (Tax Period July 2010 to June 2011) decided on 19-12-2014, hearing DATE : 18-12-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND SIKANDAR ASLAM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12070",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1276 = 2015 SLD 1276 = (2015) 111 TAX 345 = 2016 PTD 45",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections: 122(4), 122(1)(5), 111(1)(b), 128(5) - Amendment of assessments - Taxpayer is doctor and deriving income from property and agricultural land - Filed revised return of income increasing property income and professional income along with agricultural income - DCIR amended assessment and made additions - CIR(A) deleted addition in appeal, allowed partial relief and upheld treatment of Taxation officer - He also remanded back case on some issues - Before Tribunal, counsel for taxpayer/appellant contended that revised income tax return filed by it shall be taken to be amended assessment and that DCIR passed assessment order illegally on the basis of Show Cause Notice - Validity - Whether there was no justification for amending assessment without considering revised return filed by taxpayer and the same being remanded by CIR(A) - Held yes - Whether assessment is made by ignoring amended assessment in the shape of revised return which has been filed by taxpayer and which is in the knowledge of DCIR - Held yes - Whether impugned order of CIR(A) is vacated and order passed by Taxation officer is cancelled and declared without any lawful authority - Held Yes.\nWe thoroughly thrash out the documents provided by the Counsel of the taxpayer that: the taxpayer deposited the amount Rs.200,000/ against the declared property income and tendered tax return along with CPR.No.IT.20130629-0397 2385714 Rs.200,000/-and this CPR was filed along with the Tax return and is part of the record then how the DCIR is saying that the taxpayer not provided tax certificate regarding this declared income. We found that the DCIR not bother to check the tax return filed by the taxpayer.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(4),122(1)(5),111(1)(b),128(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(4),122(1)(5),111(1)(b),128(5)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 539/IB of 2014 (Tax Year 2010), decision dated: 3-6-2014. ITA No. 510/IB of 2014 (Tax Year 2010).",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRPERSON AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12071",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 864 = 2015 SLD 864 = (2015) 111 TAX 356 = 2015 PTD 2531",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "MA No. 101/LB/14, (Tax Year 2008), decision dated: 06-06-2014, hearing DATE : 04-06-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12072",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1685 = 2015 SLD 1685 = (2015) 111 TAX 369",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),25,25(2),25(3),32a,33(19),72B,73\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),25,25(2),25(3),32a,33(19),72B,73\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Rules, 2006=36\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "STA No. 314/LB/2014, decision dated: 16-10-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASIF ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12073",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 863 = 2015 SLD 863 = (2015) 111 TAX 379 = 2015 PTD 2516",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),122(1),177,177(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),122(1),177,177(4)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "M.A. (AG) No. 66/LB/13, ITA No. 675/LB/2011 (Tax Year 2008), decision dated: 14-5-2014, hearing DATE : 7-5-2014. ITA No. 986/LB/2011 (Tax Year 2008).",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MOHAMMAD RAZA BAQIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "M/S. NISHAT (CHUNIAN) LTD., Lahore High Court\nVS\nC.I.R. Zone-II, LTU, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12074",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQSFNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1686 = 2015 SLD 1686 = (2015) 111 TAX 393",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,114,116,122C,111(1)(b),120\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,114,116,122C,111(1)(b),120\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "ITA No. 1754/LB/12, (Tax Year 2010), decision dated: 18-06-2014, hearing DATE : 18-6-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12075",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1687 = 2015 SLD 1687 = (2015) 111 TAX 323 = 2015 PTD 1618",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),122(5A),153(1)(a),153(5)(a),214C\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),122(5A),153(1)(a),153(5)(a),214C\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "ITA Nos.789/KB and 949/KB of 2014 (Tax Years 2012 and 2013, decision dated: 23-12-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHARTI, CHAIRMAN AND ABDUL NASIR BUTT, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12076",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1688 = 2015 SLD 1688 = (2015) 111 TAX 310",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,156(14),193\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Act, 1969=32,156(14),193\\n\\r\\n\\rGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=24A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. Old K-79 of 2006, New Appeal No.K-2520 of 2011. decided on 25-11-2013. DATE of healing: 4-9-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "ADNAN AHMED MEMBER (JUDICIAL-II) AND GHULAM AHMED MEMBER (TECHNICAL -II )",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12077",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 1689 = 2014 SLD 1689 = 2014 SCMR 1594 = (2015) 111 TAX 109",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)----S. 196---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 27---Reference to High Court, filing of---Limitation---Commencement of time for purposes of limitation---Scope---Judgment of Appellate Tribunal sent to counsel by registered post---Presumption that such was served---Time for filing reference before High Court would start to run from the date of service of post---Appeal, in the present case, was dismissed by Appellate Tribunal on 17-2-1998, and record showed that had been dispatched to the counsel from office of Appellate Tribunal on 26-2-1998 through registered post---Even otherwise counsel moved first application for supply of copy of on 2-5-1998, i.e. almost seventy days after the appeal had been heard and dismissed---Second application was moved by the counsel after almost 13 months on 5-3-1999, and third application was moved after more than three years on 11-6-1999---Gross negligence was exercised by the counsel in not bothering for at least 70 days to find out as to why the decision had not allegedly reached his office---Reference filed before the High Court on 16-2-2007 in such circumstances was hopelessly time-barred---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n \n Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu AIR 2005 SC 109 = (2004) 8 SCC 774 ref.\n \n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----S. 158---Power of customs authorities to search baggage of a transit passenger---Scope---Under S. 158 of Customs Act, 1969, Customs Authorities had the jurisdiction to search the baggage of a transit passenger when he was leaving the customs station.\n \n(c) Void order---\n \n----Challenge to a void order---Limitation---Party could not sleep over to challenge a void order and it was bound to challenge the same within the stipulated/prescribed time period of limitation from the date of knowledge before the proper forum in appropriate proceedings.\n \n Messrs Blue Star Spinning Mills Limited v. Collector of Sales Tax and others 2013 SCMR 587 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=158,196\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Act, 1969=158,196\\n\\r\\n\\rGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=27\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.427 of 2010 out of Civil Petition No.121-K of 2010, decision dated: 28-05-2014. (On appeal from the judgment dated 24-12-2009 of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi passed in Special Custom Reference Application No.49 of 2007)",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY AND MUHAMMAD ATHER SAEED, JJ",
    "": "GHULAM HUSSAIN RAMZAN ALI\nVs\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (PREVENTIVE), Karachi High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12078",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 1690 = 2014 SLD 1690 = 2014 SCMR 1687 = (2015) 111 TAX 121",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-----Arts. 25, 185(3) & 199---Civil Service---Similar posts in different departments performing similar functions---Up-gradation of posts---Uniformity---Discrimination---Respondents were appointed as Senior Auditors (BPS-16) in the Sales Tax Department---After reconfiguration of tax department respondents were re-designated as Inland Revenue Audit Officers---Respondents filed a constitutional petition before the High Court for up-gradation of their posts on the analogy of up-gradation of posts to BPS-18 of Audit Officers in other departments like Auditor General of Pakistan, Accountant-General Punjab and Controller General of Accounts---Constitutional petition was allowed by the High Court on the grounds that respondents performed similar functions to that of Audit Officers in the other said departments, thus, refusal to grant them BPS-18 would amount to discrimination, and that Paragraph 2(a) of the Office Memorandum dated 20-1-2001 provided for uniformity in the up-gradation of similar posts in different departments of similar nature---Validity---Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider inter alia whether the constitutional petition filed by the respondents before the High Court was maintainable, as its subject matter related to the terms and conditions of service of the respondents and thus within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal; whether Paragraph No. 2(a) of the Office Memorandum dated 20-1-2001, could be construed in a manner that the up-gradation of a post in one department of the Government would furnish a ground to the officers performing similar job in other departments for up-gradation of the post, as the said provision provided that up-gradation could only be made if it was considered to be necessary for bringing about rationalism in the administrative structure; whether maintaining the impugned of the High Court would bring about anomalies within the Inland Revenue Department as the respondents may as a result rank senior to other officers to whom they were subordinate; and whether the respondents could have been granted up-gradation from BPS-16 to BPS-18 when in the meanwhile their posts had already been upgraded to BPS-17 on 14-4-2012.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25,185(3),199\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=25,185(3),199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.908 of 2014, decision dated: 8-07-2014. (On appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 19-2-2014 passed in I.C.A. 303 of 2011), hearing DATE : 8-07-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR-UL-MULK, C.J., GULZAR AHMED AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "CHIEF COMMISSIONER, INLAND REVENUE and another\nVs\nMUHAMMAD AFZAL KHAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12079",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 874 = 2015 SLD 874 = (2015) 111 TAX 285 = 2015 PTD 2606",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(14),2(17),2(35),2(46),3,6,7(1),7(2)(i),7(2)(ii),8(1),8(1)(a),9,11(2),33(5),34,25,26,73,74,66\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(14),2(17),2(35),2(46),3,6,7(1),7(2)(i),7(2)(ii),8(1),8(1)(a),9,11(2),33(5),34,25,26,73,74,66\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Excise Act, 2005=2(16),3,3A,4,14,17,18\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "STA No. 319/IB/2013, decision dated: 17-6-2014, STA No. 24/IB/2014, hearing DATE : 29-5-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD MAJID QURESHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Rashid Qureshi, FCA, --Appellant for the Taxpayer. Imran Sah DR ACMA, for the --Respondent for the Department"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12080",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1692 = 2015 SLD 1692 = 2015 CLD 612",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss. 6 & 22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, R.8---Central Depositories Act (XIX of 1997), S.28---Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001, Rr.3, 4 & 7---Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971, Third Schedule---Involvement of broker company in imposing late payment charges to its clients and irregularities in calculation of 'Net Capital Balance (N.C.B.)---Report submitted by Inspection Team, duly constituted, had revealed---Broker/company had failed to perform its responsibilities by not maintaining proper books of accounts, and not preparing N.C.B. certificate in accordance with Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971---In order to maintain the confidence of investors in the securities market, a number of Rules, Regulations and procedures had been formulated by the Commission, which prescribed the minimum set standards that a broker had to follow---Broker should be perceived as professional that was beyond reproach; and it should perform its functions in a fair, proficient and impartial manner---Violation of the Rules and Regulations, was a serious matter---Commission, taking lenient view to the matter, in exercise of powers under S.22 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, imposed on the broker/company, a penalty of Rs.50,000 (Rupees Fifty Thousand only)---Broker company was further directed to submit a compliance report to the Commission within 45 days of the date of order accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.1(9) SMD/MSRD/C&IW/2013 dated 7-10-2013, decision dated: 29-11-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12081",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1693 = 2015 SLD 1693 = 2015 CLD 618",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)------Ss. 118 & 124---Payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claims---Appellant Insurance Corporation impugned order of Insurance Tribunal whereby application of claimant under S. 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 was allowed and she was held entitled to receive insurance claim along with liquidated damages---Contentions of appellant Insurance Corporation were that the deceased had died due to an accident while handling of inflammable materials, of which the insured did business and that such business was not disclosed to the Insurance Corporation at time of purchasing of policy, therefore no claim could be paid out---Held, that at the time of issuance of insurance policy; the appellant Insurance Corporation itself undertook investigation through its own medical expert and other sources, but nothing was brought on record which prohibited the Insurance Corporation from issuing the insurance policy---When the appellant Insurance Corporation issued repudiation of the insurance policy, the said letter did not contain any sound reasoning for refusal of claim, except that the insured did not disclose certain material facts at time of purchase of policy---In view of S. 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000; neither the scrutiny of the claimant's case was finalized during the ninety days period, nor any payment was made and the policy was repudiated by the appellant Insurance Corporation after expiry of such period; therefore the claimant was rightly held to receive liquidated damages as well---Appellant Insurance Corporation had failed to prove its case by non-production of any witness; and its plea was therefore found not to be correct---No illegality existed in the impugned order---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n Ali Akbar Qureshi and Ibrar Ahmad with Safdar Ali Qureshi, Law Officer for Appellants.\n \n Liaqat Ali Butt for Respondent.\n \n Date of hearing: 11th September, 2014.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.934 of 2011, decision dated: 17-12-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN AND IBAD-UR-REHMAN LODHI, JJ",
    "": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Attorney and another\nvs\nMst. MANZOOR BIBI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12082",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1694 = 2015 SLD 1694 = 2015 CLD 621",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 204-A(1) & 498---Failure to appoint whole time secretary---Company, being a public listed company was required under S.204-A(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 to have a whole time secretary possessing prescribed qualification, but company failed to do so---Objective of the mandatory appointment of a whole time company secretary was to make sure full compliance with all the statutory provisions and the Corporate Laws applicable to the company as being a listed entity---Company which had contravened the provisions of S.204-A(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, Directors and Chief Executive of the company, had made themselves liable for a fine as provided under S.498 of the Ordinance---Company and its Directors had failed to perform their duties with due care and prudence---Directors of the company, who had some fiduciary duties i.e. duties held in trust and some wider duties imposed by statutes, were supposed to be well aware of their legal obligations in connection with statutory requirements of S.204-A(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Penalty as provided under S.498 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 could be imposed on to the company, but Commission taking a lenient view, instead of imposing the penalty, condoned the company because company took steps to appoint whole time secretary; and also tried to get fill the vacant position---Company was issued a 'stern warning' that in case of similar non-compliance in future, a strong action would be taken against the company.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice issue dated 2-05-2013, decision dated: 16-12-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "TARIQ HUSSAIN, DIRECTOR (INSURANCE)",
    "": "SHAHEEN INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12083",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1695 = 2015 SLD 1695 = 2015 CLD 626",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-------S. 5---Condonation of delay---Public functionaries---Principle---Public functionaries cannot seek any preferential treatment in the matter of condonation of delay.\n \n Muhammad Bashir and another v. Province of Punjab 2003 SCMR 83 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S. 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Appeal---Condonation of delay---Public functionaries---Financial institution filed appeal with a delay of seven days and sought condonation of delay on the plea that its staff, under directions of Federal Government, was busy in preparing list of defaulters for submission to State Bank of Pakistan---Validity---Such plea could not be made a ground for condonation of delay---Financial institution failed to show \"\"sufficient cause\"\" for not making appeal within prescribed time period of limitation---High Court declined to condone the delay caused in filing of appeal---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Muhammad Bashir and another v. Province of Punjab 2003 SCMR 83; Imtiaz Ali v. Atta Muhammad and another PLD 2008 SC 462; Lahore Development Authority v. Messrs Sea Hawk International (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore 2003 CLC 269 and Pakistan Handicrafts, Sindh Small Industries Corporation, Government of Sindh v. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation 2010 CLC 323 rel.\n \n Abdul Sattar Lakhani for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.46 of 2000, decision dated: 18-10-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR AND SADIQ HUSSAIN BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "PAK LIBYA HOLDING COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED\nvs\nKOHANOOR EDIBLE OILS LIMITED and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12084",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1696 = 2015 SLD 1696 = 2015 CLD 629",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 130 & 133---Suit for recovery of finance---Discharge of guarantee---Change of management of borrowing company---Plea raised by guarantors was that by change of new management in defendant company, their guarantees were discharged by virtue of S. of 133 of Contract Act, 1872---Validity---Guarantees in question were continuing guarantees and under S.130 of Contract Act, 1872, such guarantees for future transaction could only be revoked if notice in writing for their revocation was given by guarantors---Evidence of plaintiff bank was consistent that approval of release of one guarantee did not contemplate substitution of remaining guarantees with those of incoming management---Guarantees in question were executed in lieu of finance facility granted to defendant company and that liability of guarantors was co-extensive with that of defendant company---Guarantees in question expressly stated that the liability of guarantors would be that of principal debtor---High Court decreed the suit against defendant company and its guarantors jointly and severally---Suit was decreed accordingly.\n \n 2000 CLC 819; 200 MLD 100 and PLD 1986 Kar. 107 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.s. No. 174 of 1998, decision dated: 7-11-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs TOWELINE (PVT.) LIMITED and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12085",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1697 = 2015 SLD 1697 = 2015 CLD 683",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss. 6 & 22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, R.8---Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971, R.8 & Third Sched.---Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001, Rr.3, 4 & 7---Irregularities in calculation of \"\"Net Capital Balance\"\" (N.C.B.)---Report submitted by inspection team, duly constituted, had revealed certain irregularities in calculation of \"\"Net Capital Balance\"\" by the company---Inspection report had further highlighted that the company failed to provide requisite information, maintaining segregation of its client's assets and was involved in imposition of late payment charges to its clients---Company had failed to perform its responsibilities by not recording the securities pledged from house account in the books of accounts which was in violation of Securities Exchange Rules, 1971; company failed to not prepare the \"\"Net Capital Balance\"\" in accordance with said Rules; company imposed late payment charges to clients in violation of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969; company did not maintain segregation of client's assets in violation of General Regulations of Karachi Stock Exchange; and failed to provide the information to the Commission which was in violation of the Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001---Brokers should follow the rules, regulations and procedures formulated by the Commission in letter and spirit---Broker company should be perceived as professional with high integrity and it should perform his functions in a fair, proficient and impartial manner---Violation of rules and regulations was a serious matter---Commission in exercise of powers under S.22 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, imposed on the company a penalty of Rs.100,000.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No. 1(10) SMD/MSRD/C&IW/2013, dated 16-12-2013, decision dated: 29-01-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "DARSON SECURITIES (PVT.) LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12086",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1698 = 2015 SLD 1698 = 2015 CLD 637",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Appeal---Limitation---Delay, condonation of---Sufficient cause---Scope---Limitation period would start from the date of announcement of order and not from the knowledge of the same whether copy of such order was ready or not---Limitation would not depend on the fate of order whether same was in favour of appellant or not---Period consumed in preparation of certified copy could only be condoned in favour of a party provided application for issuance of such copy was made in time---Limitation for filing appeal under S. 22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was thirty days from the date of order---Present appeal was barred by time---Powers vested in the court to condone period of limitation in terms of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 were discretionary in nature---Court must be satisfied that delay in filing of appeal was beyond the control of a party for exercise of such discretion and was not contumacious---Defendant had not made out a prima facie case to exercise such discretion in its favour to condone the delay in filing of present appeal---Once time had begun to run it did not stop, and delay of each and every day had to be explained---Defendant had failed to explain the delay of each and every day---Defendant was required to show sufficient cause but no such cause had been shown to condone delay in filing of appeal---Appeal was dismissed as barred by time.\n \n Sheikh Atiq-ur-Rehman Sarwar v. Sajjad Hussain 2009 SCMR 684; Tauqeer Ahmad Qureshi v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others PLD 2009 SC 760?????????????????????; Muhammad Tariq Khan v. Kh. Muhammad Jawad Asami and others 2007 SCMR 818; Mst. Naseem Akktar and others v. Shalimar General Insurance Co. Ltd. and others 1994 SCMR 22; MCB Ltd. v. Messrs Hirra Farooq Ltd. and others 2009 CLD 922; HBL v. Karachi Pipe Mills Ltd. 2006 CLD 842; Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. v. S. Nusrat Ali Shah and others 2005 CLD 1539; Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. v. Hassan Aftab Fatiana 2009 CLD 36; HBL v. Tauqeer Ahmed Siddiqui and others 2009 CLD 312 ; Messrs Green Oil Mills and others v. NBP and another 2005 CLD 1676; NBP v. Messrs Overseas Trading Services (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2006 CLD 393 and HBL v. National Engineering Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2006 CLD 804 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C.A. No.10 of 2012, decision dated: 4-09-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, J",
    "": "Messrs PANGRIO SUGAR MILLS LTD.\nvs\nBANKERS EQUITY LTD. and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12087",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1699 = 2015 SLD 1699 = 2015 CLD 645",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Remand of proceedings---Non-compliance of direction---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside by High Court and matter was remanded with direction to plaintiff bank to file complete statement of accounts---Bank, in post remand proceedings failed to file complete statement of accounts as directed by High Court---Effect---Directions contained in order of High Court were not complied with in letter and spirit and plaintiff bank failed to produce any evidence in a legally permissible manner, therefore, it was a case of no evidence---Plaintiff bank was provided ample opportunity to substantiate its claim by production of its evidence but failed to avail such opportunity, therefore, plaintiff bank was not entitled to any leniency---Plaintiff bank failed to establish its claim with the help of any evidence, therefore, and decree passed by Banking Court, in favour of the bank was not sustainable and was set aside---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 77 of 2014, decision dated: 13-10-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AMEER BHATTI AND IBAD-UR-REHMAN LODHI, JJ",
    "": "HAROON TRADERS, BHAUN CHOWK CHAKWAL through Proprietor and 2 others\nvs\nK.A.S.B. BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12088",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1700 = 2015 SLD 1700 = 2015 CLD 649",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 11(1)(b), 29, 63(1) & 157---Failure to deposit statutory minimum amount---Company had not made any arrangement to maintain its statutory deposit level as per the provisions of S.29 and S.11 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, despite warning and advise to meet the shortfall of said amount---Company had persisted said non-compliance for a period of 583 days---Company had deliberately contravened the provisions of Ss.29 & 11(1)(b) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 for which the Commission took action as provided under Ss.63(1) and 157(1) of Ordinance---Commission, instead of imposing the penalty, took lenient view, condoned the company because the company had misinterpreted the provisions of S.29 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, which resulted in shortfall in the statutory deposits; company took immediate steps and removed the deficit in the statutory deposit after receiving the show-cause notice which showed the company's intent in complying with law by removing any contravention and no mala fide intent was noticed on the part of the company in the contravention---Stern warning was issued that in case of similar non-compliance in future; a strong action against the company, would be taken.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice issue DATE 14-05-2013, decision dated: 30-12-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASIF ARIF, COMMISSIONER (INSURANCE)",
    "": "PAKISTAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12089",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1701 = 2015 SLD 1701 = 2015 CLD 655",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-------Ss. 40, 43 & 44---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Suit for infringement of trade mark and passing off---Interim injunction, grant of---Plaintiff claimed that trade mark in question was registered in his name and defendant was infringing the same---Validity---In all legal proceedings relating to registered trade mark, Registration Certificate of the mark was a prima facie evidence that registration was valid and after expiration of period for which registration was valid and subsequent renewal would be taken to be valid and conclusive in all respects---On registration and subsequent to that on renewal for a further period of 15 years of mark in question, plaintiff had acquired exclusive right to use the same in concerned class in respect of specified goods---Plaintiff by virtue of registration had right to restrain all persons from using any mark similar to or identical with or resembling the trade mark in question which was likely to deceive or cause confusion of the trade that goods of defendants were produced by plaintiff---Plaintiff had a right to obtain injunction against the person who infringed registered mark of plaintiff on production of Registration Certificate---Plaintiff had made out a good prima facie case for grant of temporary injunction and balance of convenience was also in his favour for grant of injunction---Plaintiff admittedly was likely to suffer an irreparable loss if defendants were allowed to continue to infringe the trade mark of plaintiff---High Court granted interim injunction in favour of plaintiff---Application was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Naseem Ahmed v. Messrs Samuddin Remzan Khan and 2 others 2004 CLD 315 rel.\n \n Ghulam Muhammad Dossal & co. v. Vulcan Company Ltd. and another 1986 MLD 886; M. Sikandar Sultan v. Masih Ahmed Shaikh 2003 CLD 26; The Wellcome Foundation Limited v. Messrs Karachi Chemical Industries (Private) Limited 2000 YLR 1376; Messrs Exide Pakistan Limited v. Pakistan Accumulators (Pvt.) Limited and 2 others 2010 CLD 890; Rio Chemical Company and another v. Pakistan Drug House (Pvt.) Ltd. 2004 CLD 1210; J. N. Nichols (Vimto) PLC a company incorporated in the United Kingdom v. Mehran Bottlers (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi PLD 2000 Kar. 192; Messrs Dewan Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. M.B. Abbasi and others 2007 CLC 1610; Societe Des Products Nestle S.A. v. Food International (Pvt.) Ltd. 2004 CLD 1383; Dabur India Ltd. v. Hilal Confectionery (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2000 Kar. 139; Ghulam Mujtaba Pracha v. Muhammad Saleem 2010 CLD 311; 1992 MLD 2357; PLD 1991 SC 27; Messrs Trista Industries v. Messrs Trisa Bursten Tabrik A.G. 1999 YLR 638; Messrs Durafoam (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Vohra Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. 2002 CLD 1639; Telephone Soap v. Messrs Lever Brothers 1994 CLC 2135 and 1986 MLD 886 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 85 of 2014, decision dated: 21st July, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED SAEED-UD-DIN NASIR, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SALEEM WARIND--Plaintiff\nvs\nMAZHAR and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12090",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1702 = 2015 SLD 1702 = 2015 SCMR 679",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 118 & 122---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 19, 149 & Art. 86(a)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11---Life insurance claim---computation of period of limitation---Effect of acknowledgment in writing in relation to life insurance claim---Application of claimant for insurance claim along with liquidated damages was rejected by Insurance Tribunal on the ground that the same was barred by time---Contention of claimant was, inter alia, that fresh period of limitation would be computed from the time acknowledgment in writing of liability was given by the Insurance Corporation before Federal Ombudsman---Held, the insured deceased died on 23-8-2007 and claim of claimant was repudiated on 13-8-2009 by the Insurance Corporation after which claimant filed complaint before Federal Ombudsman before whom vide letter dated 28-6-2012; an acknowledgement in writing of liability of right of claimant was issued by the Insurance Corporation; therefore fresh period of limitation was to be computed from 28-6-2012 when the said acknowledgement of liability was signed and S. 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was therefore applicable to the present case---Question of limitation was a mixed question of law and facts and same could not be adjudged without recording of evidence and the Insurance Tribunal failed to consider applicability of S. 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and application of the claimant could not be summarily rejected while applying Art. 86(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908---Article 86(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908 would be applicable if the claim of the claimant was payable, whereas in the present case claim of the claimant was reputiated, and such aspect of the case was ignored by the Insurance Tribunal while passing impugned order---High Court aside impugned order and remanded the case to the Insurance Tribunal for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Insurance Appeal No.1092 of 2013, decision dated: 22-01-2015.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. MUHAMMAD MASOOD, JAHANGIR AND CH. MUHAMMAD IQBAL, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SAFIA AKHTAR\nvs\nLIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12091",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 1832 = 2014 SLD 1832 = 2014 CLD 937",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199--- Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court was confined to persons who were performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 199--- Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Constitutional petition against a private limited company---Maintainability---Jurisdiction of the High Court would not be attracted against a private limited company, thus a constitutional petition filed against such company would not be maintainable.\n \n Salah ud Din and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. Tokht Bhai and 10 others PLD 1975 SC 244; Syed Khalid Ali Bukhari and another v. Government of Pakistan and others 2012 PLC (C.S.) 818; Muhammad Masood Butt and 3 others v. S.M. Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. and 6 others 2011 CLD 496 and Muhammad Saleem v. Chief Controller of Boiling KESC Karachi and others 2010 YLR 2946 rel.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional petition against a private limited company---Maintainability---Respondent booked five tractors from the appellant-company (a private limited company) and deposited the requisite amount---Respondent filed a constitutional petition against the appellant-company alleging that it did not hand over the tractors within due date and instead claimed price of the tractors according to revised rates---Single Judge of High Court disposed of the constitutional petition with a direction to appellant-company to handover the tractors to the respondent---Legality---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court was confined to persons who were performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province---Appellant-company was a private limited company, thus jurisdiction of the High Court was not attracted---After depositing the price of the tractors, respondent might have been entitled to their delivery but the issue still remained that the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction could not direct the appellant-company to handover the tractors to the respondent---Constitutional petition filed by respondent was not maintainable, and consequently order of Single Judge of High Court was set aside---Intra-Court appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n Salah ud Din and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. Tokht Bhai and 10 others PLD 1975 SC 244; Syed Khalid Ali Bukhari and another v. Government of Pakistan and others 2012 PLC (C.S.) 818; Muhammad Masood Butt and 3 others v. S.M. Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. and 6 others 2011 CLD 496 and Muhammad Saleem v. Chief Controller of Boiling KESC Karachi and others 2010 YLR 2946 rel.\n \n(d) Jurisdiction---\n \n----Question of jurisdiction determined before taking cognizance---Scope---Prior to taking cognizance of a matter, it was of paramount importance that a court determined the question of its jurisdiction---Any order passed without jurisdiction could not be allowed to hold the field for a moment.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I.C.A. No.129 of 2011 in W.P. No.984 of 2008, decision dated: 1st April, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHUJAAT ALI KHAN AND MAHMOOD AHMED BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "ALGHAZI TRACTOR LIMITED through Chief Executive and another\nvs\nMUHAMMAD HANIF IQBAL and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12092",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 1833 = 2014 SLD 1833 = 2014 CLD 1",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---BSD Circular No.16 of 2004 dated 6-11-2004 issued by State Bank pertaining to \"\"Reporting To Credit Bureaus\"\"---Duty of State Bank and financial institution---Scope---Financial institution would be bound to ensure meticulous compliance of directions contained in such Circular as directions (ii) & (iii) thereof were mandatory in nature on account of use of word \"\"shall\"\" therein---­Duty of State Bank would be to ensure and verify as to whether advice/information given by financial institution was correct or not, and whether financial institution had made meticulous compliance of such Circular or not.\n \n(b) Banker and customer---\n \n----Credit Card and cheque---Duties and liabilities of financial institution and merchant stated.\n \n All credit cards bear a specimen signature of the card holder. This is because of security reasons to enable the merchant to compare and verify the card holder's signature when the credit is presented to the merchant for swiping the same for clearance of payment of the transaction at the time of the transaction.\n \n By issuing credit card, the financial institution allows the customer to enjoy/use the facility through merchants all over the world upto the limit sanctioned to him. Under the banking practice, there is an agreement between the financial institution and the merchant, whereby the merchant agrees to honour payments on behalf of the financial institution, and in consideration of such services, the financial institution agrees to pay a fixed commission to the merchant on every transaction. The interest of both the parties and the risk of fraudulent transactions are duly secured through insurance. The merchant acts on behalf of the financial institution as he accepts and honours the payments of transactions carried out through him. Thus, it is the duty of the merchant to compare and verify the card holder's signature when the credit card is presented to him for swiping and clearance at the time of the transaction. If the merchant fails or neglects in discharging his said duty, the liability of the transaction would fall on the financial institution. The principle is the same as that of a cheque, this is, when a cheque is presented to a banker, it is the primary and foremost duty of the banker to compare and verify the signature appearing on the cheque with that in his record. If the cheque is honoured by the banker, despite discrepancy in the signature, the banker shall be solely responsible for the consequences, and not only the account holder/customer shall not be held liable, but the banker shall also be liable to reimburse the amount debited from his account through such cheque.\n \n The Official Assignee of the High Court of West Pakistan and others v. The Lloyds Bank Ltd., Karachi and others PLD 1969 SC 301 rel.\n \n(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Art. 133---Fact deposed by witness in examination-in-chief not questioned in cross-examination by his opponent party--- Effect--- Such fact would be presumed/deemed to have been admitted by opponent party.\n \n(d) Tort---\n \n----Defamation suit--- Damages, quantum of---Determination---Factors requiring consideration stated.\n \n While determining quantum of damages, the background, social status, position, life expectancy and the nature of the damage caused to plaintiff must be kept in mind.\n \n The loss arising out of injury to reputation of a person cannot be compensated in terms of money.\n \n Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Railways and others v. Abdul Wahid and others 2011 SCMR 1836; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy and others 2012 SCMR 1549; Muhammad Malik v. Fazal Karim and another 1999 MLD 935; Muhammad Ibrahim and others v. Sui Northern Gas Corporation and others PLD 2012 Pesh. 132; Nasreen Firdous v. Tanweer Kishwar Siddiqui and 5 others 1991 CLC 907; Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Publix Industries Ltd. 1991 CLC 1907; Chief Administrator Auqaf, Hyderabad v. Ghulam Shabbir Shah alias Dini Ali Shah 1992 CLC 1263 and Messrs Pak Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd. v. Muhammad Jumshad Saeed 2009 CLD 503 ref.\n \n Abdul Majeed Khan v. Tawseen Abdul Haleem and others 2012 CLD 6 rel.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R.1(g)---Relief against one of defendants not claimed in plaint---Effect---Court declined to pass decree against such defendant.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Banking Suit No.B-26 of 2007, decision dated: 30-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "YAWAR FARUQUI--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs STANDARD CHARTERED BANK LTD. and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12093",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 1834 = 2014 SLD 1834 = 2014 CLD 119",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 3, 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Cost of funds, imposition of--- Scope--- Suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff bank and defendant was aggrieved of cost of funds imposed by Banking Court---Validity---Expiry date of finance facility was 7-1-1999, whereas outstanding finance liability was finally paid in Court on 11-1-2008---Banking Court rightly rejected claim of bank regarding excess markup charged after expiry date of finance and allowed cost of funds for such period in terms of S.3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---High Court declined to interfere in and decree passed by Banking Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Habib Bank AG Zurich through Manager v. Mustafa Shams-ud-Din Ghatilla and 2 others 2003 CLD 658 ref.\n \n Haji Fazal Elahi and Sons through Muhammad Tariq v. Bank of Punjab and another 2004 CLD 162; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Karachi Pipe Mills Ltd. 2006 CLD 842; Prime Commercial Bank Limited v. Agricide (Private) Limited and others 2006 CLD 940 and Trycot Synthetic Fibre Company through Proprietor and another v. Habib Bank Limited 2012 CLD 1670 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.34 of 2009, heard on 26-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "AHMAD DEEN\nvs\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LTD. through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12094",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2106 = 2014 SLD 2106 = 2014 CLD 824",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss.17, 30 & 33---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 158---Arbitration award presented in court---Objections against arbitration award either not filed or not filed within the time prescribed by law---Effect---Power of court to decide whether to make such an award Rule of the Court---Scope---Powers vested in the court to make an award, the Rule of the court were judicial in nature and not ministerial---Absence of objections to such an award did not absolve the court of its responsibility to examine the same---Even in the absence of objections to the arbitration award, the award may be set aside by the court and not made Rule of the Court if it was a nullity; or was prima facie illegal; or for any other reason it was not fit to be maintained; or suffered from an invalidity which was self-evident or apparent on the face of the record---Single Judge of High Court, in the present case, after concluding that objections filed by respondent-company were time barred, without conducting a judicial exercise of examining the award qua its validity, made the same Rule of the Court---Such an order was not sustainable in law---Supreme Court upheld of Division Bench of High Court whereby case was remanded to Single Judge of High Court and directed that Single Judge in post-remand proceedings should decide whether to make the award Rule of the Court after examining as to whether the said award was a nullity or prima facie illegal or was not fit to be maintained or suffered from any other invalidity which was self - evident or apparent on the face of the record---Appeal was disposed of accordingly.\n \n Muhammad Tayab v. Akbar Hussain 1995 SCMR 73 and Messrs Awan Industries Ltd. v. The Executive Engineer, Lined Channel Division 1992 SCMR 65 ref.\n \nPer Khilji Arif Hussain, J.; disagreeing with Sh. Azmat Saeed, J.\n \n(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n---Ss. 15, 16, 30 & 33---Arbitration award presented in court---Objections filed against award---Power of court to examine such an award and set it aside---Scope---While hearing objections and examining the award, the court could not sit as a court of appeal on the award rendered by the Arbitrator and substitute its own view for the one taken by the Arbitrator---Award of the Arbitrator who was chosen as judge of facts and of the law, between the parties, could not be set aside unless the error was apparent on the face of the award or from the award it could be inferred that Arbitrator had misconducted himself.\n \n(c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n----Ss. 17, 30 & 33---Arbitration award presented in court---Objections against arbitration award not filed---Effect---Power of Court to decide whether to make such an award Rule of the Court---Scope---Even if no objection under Ss. 30 & 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 had been filed, the court at the time of making award Rule of Court could see whether award suffered from any patent illegality---In exercise of power under S. 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, even if no application under Ss.30 & 33 of the said Act was filed by a party, the same did not absolve the court of its responsibility to see that the award did not suffer from any patent illegality necessitating either the setting aside of the award or its remission to the Arbitrator---While making an award rule of the court, in case parties had not filed objections, the court was not supposed to act in a mechanical manner, like post office and put its seal on it but had to look to the award and if patent illegality was found on face of it, court could remit the award or any matter referred to Arbitrator for reconsideration or set-aside the same---However, while doing so, the court would not try to find out patent irregularity, and only if any patent irregularities could be seen on the face of award arbitration proceedings like the award was beyond the scope of reference or the agreement of arbitration was void agreement, or Arbitrator awarded damages on black marketing price, or award was given after superseding of the arbitration, etc., court could set aside the same.\n \n Province of Punjab v. Shafique Ahmad PLD 1989 Lah. 26 ref.\n \n(d) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----'General provision' and 'special provision' in a statute---Scope---General provision in a statute could not operate to control a specific (special) provision in the same statute.\n \n Sher Ali Baz v. Secretary, Establishment Division PLD 1991 SC 143 and Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473 ref.\n \n(e) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n----Ss. 17, 30 & 33---Award, setting aside of---Grounds---While exercising jurisdiction under S. 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, award could not be set aside on the grounds which fell under Ss. 30 & 33 of the same Act---Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 could neither be used as substitute of Ss. 30 & 33 of the Act nor given overriding effect, making Ss. 30 & 33 of the Act redundant meaningless.\n \n Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal AIR 1967 SC 1233 and Devendra Singh v. Kalyan Singh AIR 1978 Rajasthan 134 ref.\n \n(f) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n----Ss.17, 30 & 33---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 158---Arbitration award presented in court---Objections against arbitration award not filed within the time prescribed by law---Effect---Remanding matter of award to forum below 13 years after pronouncement of such award---Propriety---Denial of justice---Scope---Dispute between parties was referred to an Arbitrator who gave an award on 6-12-1997---Said award was set aside by consent of the parties on 13-8-1998---As per consent order, both the parties agreed to nominate their Arbitrators within 15 days from the date of the order---Admittedly, the respondent-company did not nominate his Arbitrator, and the Arbitrator nominated by the appellant, after giving notice to the parties, gave ex parte award on 11-11-1998---Evidence on record showed that findings of fact recorded by sole Arbitrator (appointed by appellant) could not be termed as patently illegal to set aside the award under S. 17 of Arbitration Act, 1940---Despite service of notice to respondent-company during different stages of the arbitration proceedings, it failed to appear before the sole Arbitrator---After sole Arbitrator filed its award in court, notice was issued to the respondent-company to file objections and admittedly despite service of notice, the respondent-company failed to file objections within 30 days from the date of service, as required under Art.158 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and ultimately objections were filed with a delay of 74 days---Presently, after 13 years of the arbitration award having been made, asking the parties again to go before the forum below (Single Judge of the High Court) would be tantamount to denial of justice---Appeal was allowed accordingly and of Single Judge of High Court whereby award of sole Arbitrator was made Rule of the Court was upheld. [Minority view]\n \n Ashiq Ali v. Mst. Zamir Fatima PLD 2004 SC 10 and Anwar Ahmad v. Mst. Nafis Bano 2005 SCMR 152 ref.\n \n(g) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n----Ss. 13 & 29---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 34---Interest Act (XXXII of 1839), S. 1---Arbitrator, powers of---Scope---Awarding interest prior to date of decree---Legality---Arbitrator could not award interest prior to date of decree, in the absence of any express or implied agreement between the parties, or on basis of mercantile usage and statutory provisions or on equitable grounds in a proper case---Section 34, C.P.C., which gave discretion to court to award interest from the date of suit or period prior to it, did not apply to arbitration proceedings---Likewise, the Interest Act, 1839 also did not confer power on the Arbitrator to award interest---Grant of interest from the date prior to award or from the date of award until payment of the amount due and payable, the Arbitrator could under no circumstances award interest for the period beyond the passing of the decree by the court in terms of award---Under S. 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, only the court and not the Arbitrator had discretion to order interest, from the date of the decree at such a rate as the court deemed reasonable---Grant of interest prior to date of award, in absence of an express or implied statutory provisions, or agreement between the parties, would be an error of law apparent on the face of award.\n \n(h) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n----S. 13---Arbitrator, powers of---Scope---Arbitrator was not clothed with any power, which neither any law conferred upon him nor there was any such usage of trade having the force of law, nor any agreement between the parties conferring such power.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.319 of 2004, decision dated: 3rd April, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "TASSADUQ HUSSAIN, JILLANI, C.J., KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "A. QUTUBUDDIN KHAN\nvs\nCHEC MILLWALA DREDGING CO. (PVT.) LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12095",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2107 = 2014 SLD 2107 = 2014 CLD 858",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 7, 9 & 20---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199--- Constitutional petition---Dishonestly issuing a cheque, and default in fulfilment of obligation---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Scope---Petitioner instituted a suit for declaration and rendition of accounts along with permanent injunction against the respondent/bank in Banking Court---Court passed injunctive order in favour of petitioner, wherein respondent/bank was restrained to adopt any illegal coercive measures for recovery of loan against the petitioner---Bank which did not put in appearance, moved an application before Justice of Peace for registration of criminal case against the petitioner---Cheque in question issued by the petitioner in favour of the bank, was dishonoured on presentation due to insufficient amount---Justice of Peace vide impugned order, ordered registration of criminal case against the petitioner---Contention of the petitioner was that he being a \"\"customer\"\" and bank being 'Financial Institution', bank could adopt recourse to the procedure under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 for recovery of its defaulted loans by filing proceedings against the delinquent defaulters with the Banking Court having exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate and decide such matter---Validity---By obtaining impugned order from Justice of Peace, ultimate object of bank was for initiation of proceedings under S.489-F, P.P.C. as cheque issued by the petitioner in favour of the bank was dishonoured---Object of the Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and to initiate proceedings under P.P.C., were entirely different, as both the enactments, could not be amalgamated or confused with each other---Civil liability existed between the parties and diverting the same into criminal offence where a complete recourse for recovery of such liability was provided under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, seemed to be with mala fide intention and ulterior motive---Section 20(4) of said Ordinance, provided the remedy wherein cheque dishonestly issued and dishonoured because of insufficient funds, would be governed by said section of law, bank could file a direct complaint in the Banking Court---Bank could avail remedies available under said Ordinance for recovery of its debt, as well as for dishonoured cheque---Proceeding further on the basis of impugned order would be abuse of process of the court and without lawful authority---Order accordingly.\n \n Gul Muhammad and others v. The State 1999 SCMR 2765; MADAWA through President v. Inspector-General of Police, Punjab and 15 others PLD 2013 Lah. 442; Sabir Ahmad v. Nazeer Ahmed and another 2010 PCr.LJ 412; Mian Farid and another v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and 4 others 2005 PCr.LJ 766; Sheikh Mureed Hussain v. S.H.O. Police Station Kohsar, Islamabad and 2 others 2005 PCr.LJ 144 and Muhammad Mazhar Iqbal v. The State and another 2011 CLD 704 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.10394 of 2013, decision dated: 1st October, 2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHOAIB SAEED, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD MASOOD KHAN\nvs\nJUSTICE OF PEACE/ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12096",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2108 = 2014 SLD 2108 = 2014 CLD 848",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)-------S. 34---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S.7---Termination of services of employees of Commission---Appeal to High Court---Maintainability---Jurisdiction conferred by S.7 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 was confined to the matters which were expressly covered by the Companies Ordinance, 1984 itself, such as winding up proceedings, etc. and not the matters, which were not expressly covered by the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Remedy of appeal before High Court under S.34 of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 therefore, could be availed only in the cause provided under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and no other grievance or cause could be agitated before High Court---Employment of the appellants was not covered by the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and therefore, appeal would not lie before High Court in respect of any grievance regarding employment of officers of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan---Appeals were dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeals from Order Nos.140, 187 of 2010 and 33 of 2013, heard on 23rd January, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "RIAZ AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "SOHAIL NAJEEB\nvs\nMINISTRY OF FINANCE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12097",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2109 = 2014 SLD 2109 = 2014 CLD 853",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S. 224(2)---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right---Bar to such declaration---Trading by director, officers and principal shareholders of a company---Show-cause notice under S.224(2) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction challenging issuance of show-cause notice to plaintiff by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), under S.224(2) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Maintainability of such suit---Contention of the plaintiff was inter alia that he had not realized any tenderable and/or other gain and was not therefore liable to tender any amount under S.224 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Held, that declaration sought by plaintiff was not in respect of any legal character of the plaintiff---Very fact that plaintiff had submitted a detailed reply to the show-cause noticed issued by the SECP, was contrary to his claim in the plaint and in the said reply plaintiff had not claimed that the defendants had acted illegally, in a mala fide way or that they were not competent to issue impugned notice under S.224 of the Companies Ordnance, 1984---Fact that plaintiff had submitted to the jurisdiction of the SECP unconditionally amounted to accepting jurisdiction of SECP to issue notice under the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Plaintiff should have appeared before the competent authority for personal hearing, which he had avoided--- Plaintiff had not sought declaration as to his own rights and status; and declaratory relief could only be granted in respect of legal character which was not under threat in the present case---Plaintiff was therefore neither entitled to declaration or permanent injunction--- Suit being incompetent and not maintainable, was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Karsaz Construction Company v. Pakistan 1999 CLC 1719 and Alvi Sons Ltd. v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1968 Kar. 222 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.139 of 2010, decision dated: 28-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZAR AKBAR, J",
    "": "NASIM BEG--Plaintiff\nvs\nSecurities and Exchange Commission court of Pakistan through Chairman and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12098",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2110 = 2014 SLD 2110 = 2014 CLD 862",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 227 & 229---Failure to comply with the provisions of S.227 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Company, under provisions of S.227 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 was required to transfer all money or securities, deposited by its employees in pursuance of their contracts of service with that company, within fifteen days from the date of such deposit in a special account to be opened in a Scheduled Bank and no portion of such amount, could be utilized by that company, except in the case of breach of employment contract on the part of employees as provided in that contract, after notice to the employees concerned---Company had kept separate bank account for Provident Fund, but the payments were made through company's Bank account which was used for normal operation---Company, in circumstances, had mixed its normal operations with the Provident Fund Account--- Spirit and purpose of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, in respect of keeping a separate Bank Account of the Provident Fund, was to safeguard the money deposited by the employees in that respect and to foster the transparency and traceability of the payments/deposits so made in the Provident Fund account---Company by depositing cash in the Provident Fund, had violated the essence of the provisions of S.227 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and the purpose of maintaining separate Bank Account of the Provident Fund, had failed---Bank Statement of the Provident Fund for relevant period showed that there had been certain withdrawals of huge amounts, which did not appear to be withdrawals as a result of termination of the employment contracts---Company had contravened the provisions of S.227 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 by using/withdrawing amount from the Provident Fund account in the normal course of operations, for which penal action provided under S.229 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 could be taken---Company and its Directors had failed to perform their duties with due care and prudence---Securities and Exchange Commission, under S.229 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, taking lenient view, condoned the company, as the act of transfer of the adjusted contribution amount in the Provident Fund, had not harmed the interests of employees of the company and company did not appear to have any malicious intent---Company was advised to ensure that no portion of the balance payable to the Provident Fund be utilized, adjusted or deducted at any cost, and at any point of time and all such balance be transferred and/or paid to the Provident Fund account in strict pursuance of S.227 of Companies Ordinance, 1984.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice dated 12-04-2013, decision dated: 17-07-2013, hearing DATE : 10-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "TARIQ HUSSAIN, DIRECTOR (INSURANCE)",
    "": "ASKARI GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12099",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2111 = 2014 SLD 2111 = 2014 CLD 873",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S.403---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 13(a) & 185(3)---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 26---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss. 230(7), 234(6) & 282-K---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), Ss. 9, 10 & 11---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 409 & 109---Double jeopardy, principle of--- Scope--- Offences committed in one go but punishable under two separate and distinct enactments---Chief Executive Officer of bank (i.e. accused) allegedly obtained loan facilities fraudulently, falsified bank records, misappropriated funds of bank and his company and also committed corrupt practices---Criminal complaint was filed against accused by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) before the High Court---Reference was also filed against accused before National Accountability Bureau (NAB)---Criminal complaint and NAB reference were based on the same acts/omissions by accused---Accused was convicted under the NAB reference for corruption and corrupt practices---Plea of accused that elements of the criminal complaint filed by SECP and NAB reference were identical; that when he was convicted in the NAB reference, he could not be convicted twice for the same acts and omissions in the criminal complaint before the High Court---Validity---Provisions of Ss. 230(7), 234(6) & 282-K of Companies Ordinance, 1984 and Ss. 9, 10 & 11 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 were different enactments of law having different procedure and forum for initiating proceedings thereunder---Although both sets of offences had been committed by the accused in one go, however accused acted in such a manner which constituted offences punishable under two separate and distinct laws, i.e. one under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and the other under the Companies Ordinance, 1984--- Despite the fact that the two separate prosecutions of accused arose out of the same incident or that some of the facts in the two prosecutions were common, the offences committed by accused under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 were quite different from the offences committed by him under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Both were different and distinct pieces of legislation, therefore, acts and omissions committed by accused could not be said to be the same offences---Since the acts committed by accused did not fall within the definition of same offences, therefore, principle of double jeopardy would not come into force---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly and leave was refused.\n \n PLD 2002 SC 273 distinguished.\n \n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 403---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 13(a)---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 26---Double jeopardy, principle of---Scope---No person could be vexed twice and prosecuted or punished for the same offence, but if he was guilty of offence under another enactment, though by the same chain of facts, he could be tried, convicted and punished under that very offence committed by him.\n \n Adam v. Collector of Customs, Karachi PLD 1969 SC 446; Behari and others v. The State AIR 1953 All 510; Monica Bedi v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) 1 Supreme Court Cases 284; Manipur Administration, Manipur v. Thokchom Birasingh AIR 1965 SC 87; Sangeetabar Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and another (2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 621; Muhammad Ashraf and others v. The State 1995 SCMR 626; Brothers Steel Mills Limited and others v. Mian Ilayas Mairaj and 14 others PLD 1996 SC 543 and Sher Muhammad Unar and others v. The State PLD 2012 SC 179 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.304 of 2012, decision dated: 11-02-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY AND IJAZ AHMED CHAUDHRY, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NADEEM ANWAR\nvs"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12100",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2112 = 2014 SLD 2112 = 2014 CLD 913",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------S. 130(2)---Damage to stock of insured due to monsoon rains---Dispute regarding determination of loss---After seven months of having insurance policy by the insured, monsoon rains lashed the city, resultantly, damages were caused to factory stock of insured who lodged claim with the insurance company, which appointed surveyor to survey the loss caused to the insured---Insurance company firstly offered only 10% of the claim amount to the insured, which was not acceptable to him---Insured, claimed that 70% of the assessed loss should be paid to him---Subsequently insurance company enhanced its offer to the 20% of the assessed amount, but same was not accepted by the insured---Said situation led the Appellate Authority to nowhere, nor in determining the magnitude of loss falling under the insurance policy, nor in effecting on amicable settlement; as both parties lacked the substance to establish their respective assertions---Having no other way, but to act in accordance with the conclusion reached by the Ombudsman, insured/appellant party was at liberty to look for redressal at some other judicial forum under the law.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.10 of 2012, decision dated: 7-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "TARIQ HUSSAIN, DIRECTOR (INSURANCE)",
    "": "Messrs PAKISTAN PACKAGES (PVT.) LTD.\nvs\nMessrs ADAMJEE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12101",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2113 = 2014 SLD 2113 = 2014 CLD 893",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance-------Group Insurance Policy, 2008---Group Life insurance for employees---Accidental death benefit for legal heirs of employees---Respondents were legal heirs of employee who died when he met with an accident, and were duly paid amount under group life insurance---Respondents had contended that they were also entitled to accidental death benefit; and their constitutional petition in such regard was allowed---Contention of the appellants was inter alia, that at the time of death, the Life Insurance Policy did not cover accidental death benefit---Validity---Accidental death benefit was only available under the group life insurance policy issued by State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, for the year 2008-09; which expired on 31-5-2009 and when the said group insurance policy was renewed, it only provided for one benefit, namely insurance claim, which was duly paid to the deceased---Group life insurance policy covering the period during which the deceased died, did not provide for accidental death benefit---Impugned order was, therefore, not sustainable in the eye of the law and was set aside.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Intra-Court Appeal No.839 of 2012 in Writ Petition No.21154 of 2011, decision dated: 27-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ UL AHSAN AND MRS. AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ",
    "": "PROJECT DIRECTOR, PUNJAB RURAL SUPPORT PROGRAM (PRSP) and 2 others\nvs\nREHMAT ALI and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12102",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2114 = 2014 SLD 2114 = 2014 CLD 897",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Patents Ordinance (LXI of 2000)-------Ss.7(4)(d), 2(s), 2(t), 8, 21 & 23---Patentable inventions---\"\"Double-number SIM\"\"--- \"\"Novelty\"\" and \"\"invention\"\"---Scope---Subsequent use of a known product or process---Appellant impugned order of Patent Office, Intellectual Property Organization (\"\"IPO\"\"), Pakistan whereby patent application of respondent, for a \"\"double-number SIM\"\" was allowed and patent was granted for the same---Contention of appellant was inter alia that patent application of the respondent neither qualified as an \"\"invention\"\" nor did it qualify as a \"\"process\"\" and/or \"\"produced\"\" within the meanings and scope given in the Patents Ordinance, 2000---Held, that acceptance of patent application of respondent seemed to be a violation of rules, procedure and law applicable thereto---Any invention was patentable if it was new, involved an inventive step, and was capable of industrial application and under S.7(4)(d), for a new or subsequent use of a known product and process, a patent was not to be granted---\"\"Dual\"\" or \"\"Double-number\"\" SIM card was not new to the world and would not fall within the legal as well as the literary definition of the words \"\"invention\"\" and \"\"novelty\"\" and its acceptance as patent would not be in consonance with the principles of law under the Patents Ordinance, 2000---Such technology was already in use in many countries around the world including Pakistan and therefore adhering to the essence of S.7(4)(d) of the Patents Ordinance, 2000, no patent could be granted---If the process of manufacture was already known, such manufacturing could not be called an \"\"invention\"\" and nor any patent could be granted for it and if such patent was already granted, the same could not be allowed to continue---Impugned order whereby patent was granted to the respondent, was set aside---Appeal was allowed, accordingly.\n \n Black's Law Dictionary and 1980 CLC 396 rel.\n \n AIR 1936 Bombay 99 distinguished.\n \n(b) Patents Ordinance, (LXI of 2000)---\n \n----S. 2(i)---\"\"Invention\"\"---Meaning of---\"\"Invention\"\" was the act of or operation of finding out something new, the process of contriving and producing something not previously known or existing, by the exercise of independent investigation and experiment and also the article or contrivance or composition so invented.\n \n Black's Law Dictionary rel.\n \n(c) Patents Ordinance (LXI of 2000)---\n \n----S. 8---\"\"Novelty\"\"---In order that there may be novelty, to sustain a patent, the thing must not have been known to any one before, and mere novelty of form was insufficient.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No.74 of 2012, decision dated: 13-03-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "HASAN FEROZ, J",
    "": "EARTHFACTOR (PRIVATE) LIMITED through Director\nvs\nPATENT OFFICE, IPO-PAKISTAN through Controller and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12103",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2115 = 2014 SLD 2115 = 2014 CLD 924",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199(1)(b)(ii)---Quo warranto, writ of---Territorial jurisdiction of High Court to issue such a writ---Test emanating from Art.199(1)(b)(ii) was as to whether the respondent was holding or purporting to hold the office within the jurisdiction of High Court---In the present case, respondent distribution Company performed functions within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court and appointment was also made by the Authority stationed within the territorial jurisdiction of said High Court---Objection on the territorial jurisdiction was overruled.\n \n(b) Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013---\n \n----R. 2(g)--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199(1)(b)(ii)---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Public Sector Company---Respondent was holding the office of Director of an Electric Supply Company, which was assailed under constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Contention was that interference by the High Court under constitutional jurisdiction was not warranted against the Public Sector Company where same was a non-statutory joint stock company incorporated under Companies Ordinance, 1984 and was not funded by the State---Validity---Such averment was devoid of force for the reason that respondent had admitted that Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013 were applicable on the touchstone of definition of \"\"public sector company\"\" as contained in R. 2(g) of said Rules--- Definition of \"\"public sector company\"\" contained in R. 2(g) of the Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013 was sufficient to bring that within the purview of constitutional jurisdiction---Respondent was holding public office because the respondent-Company was providing essential public service by distribution of electricity to the public and as such was performing function in connection with affairs of the State---Appointment of respondent was amenable in constitutional jurisdiction.\n \n(c) Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013---\n \n----R. 2(g)----\"\"Public Sector Company\"\"---Definition---Scope---\"\"Public Sector Company\"\" means a company, whether public or private, which was directly or indirectly controlled, beneficiary owned or not less than fifty per cent of the voting securities or voting power of which were held by the Government or any instrumentality or agency of the Government or a statutory body, or in respect of which the Government or any instrumentality or agency of the Government or statutory body, had otherwise power to elect, nominate or appoint majority of its directors, and includes a public sector association not for profit, licensed under S. 42 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984.\n \n(d) Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013---\n \n----Rr. 2(d) & 3(2)---Qualification and disqualification of independent Director--- Scope--- Contention of the respondent was that R. 2(d) of the Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013 provided only 'qualification' of independent Director and not the 'disqualification'---Validity---Plain reading of R. 2(d) of the Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013 did not support the contention that R.2(d) provided the definition of qualification only and did not operate as disqualification; had it been the intention of law makers, it would not have been set in negative form, in addition to that the word \"\"or\"\" at the end of sub-rule (v) also made it a disqualification, the proviso part of sub-rule (vi) when read in juxtaposition with R.3(2) providing period of two years for enhancement of independent Directors, shall practically have three terms before he became ineligible to be re-elected as independent Director, meaning thereby that after two years' period from the effective date i.e. 6-6-2013, and if appointment of a non-executive Director contravened the ratio of minimum 40% independent Directors and he did not qualify to be an independent Director, he would become ineligible to remain on the Board.\n \n(e) Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013---\n \n----R. 3---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---\"\"Conflict of interest\"\" of a Member---Scope---Petitioner failed to prove the conflict of interest because the image of diversity in the Board of Directors, contained in R. 3 of the Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013 was of participation from all segments of society and even otherwise, conflict of interest did not attract to mere consumership because if that was admitted true, that would entail the consequence that none of the directors would be able to become consumers of their company---Principle of Conflict of Interest connoted to having rival interest and that situation would have arisen if respondent/(Director) would have been running a business of competition to the company---Constitutional petition was dismissed being devoid of force.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 4462 of 2013, decision dated: 18-02-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ANWAR KHAN KASI, C.J.",
    "": "TARIQ MASOOD KHAN\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Water and Power and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12104",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2116 = 2014 SLD 2116 = 2014 CLD 934",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXI of 2000) -------S. 2(xxvii)---Application for recovery of accidental death benefits---Contention of insurance company was that the death of deceased was due to murder and assault and such risk was excluded from \"\"accidental death benefits\"\"---Insurance Tribunal accepted deceased's widow's claim---Validity---Assault/murder was done with malice or due to some personal enmity whereas accidental death was caused spontaneously and through unexpected external force---Death had been caused by the events which were unusual to the deceased---Incident took place unexpectedly and without any apparent cause or fault on the part of the deceased---Deceased had embraced 'Shahadat' in line of duty when he was injured in a suicidal bomb blast--- Death of deceased was not assault or murder to be treated as excluded risk--- Respondent's case was covered by the 'risk clause'--- Refusal on the part of Insurance Company to the extent of accidental death benefits was unjustified---Respondent was entitled for the recovery of said claim---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. 9-P with C.M. No.206-P of 2012, decision dated: 26-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN FASIH-UL-MULK AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ",
    "": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION\nvs\nSUMERA IQBAL"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12105",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2117 = 2014 SLD 2117 = 2014 CLD 920",
    "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------S. 118---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.84---Stamp Act (II of 1899), Art. 5, Sched. I & S.35---Institution of summary suit on negotiable instrument---Contention of defendant was that blank cheques were handed over to the plaintiff for payment of price and agreement was written that no amount was due against him---Suit was decreed by the Trial Court---Validity---Agreement was mentioned in the written statement but plaintiff had denied the same---Said document was in the custody of defendant and was not confronted to the plaintiff, such document could not be used against plaintiff---Agreement was on the plane paper and no stamp duty had been paid on the same in accordance with law---Stamp duty was required to be paid on the instrument---Non-judicial paper of Rs.100 was required for writing of agreement---Trial Court was bound to impound said document and ask the defendant to deposit original duty along with fine---Instrument which was not duly stamped was inadmissible in evidence---Neither Trial Court had adopted the procedure nor defendant was offered to discharge his duty in accordance with law---Presumption of correctness was attached to negotiable instrument and defendant was bound to rebut the same---Defendant had failed to discharge his duty---Issuance of cheques and signatures thereupon were admitted---Trial Court exercised powers properly for comparison of signatures and handwriting of defendant on the cheques---Findings with regard to filling up the cheques were in accordance with law---Defendant had failed to point out any illegality or infirmity in the findings recorded by the Trial Court---No case for interference by the High Court had been made out---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.145 of 2010, heard on 27-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH\nvs\nMUHAMMAD ASLAM"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12106",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2118 = 2014 SLD 2118 = 2014 CLD 1026",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S. 22---Selling shares of other company---Ready Market trading data of Stock Exchange for relevant period had revealed that company had sold shares of other corporation---Chief Operating Officer of the company, had accepted that it was a mistake on the part of the company and he prayed that Securities and Exchange Commission should take a lenient view of the matter---Company was one of the well-reputed companies of Pakistan, and belonged to a very well known financial and industrial group---Company was expected to be conversant and to fully comply with the regulatory requirements---Company was established to have sold shares of other corporation in the closed period violating clause 35(xxii) of Listing Regulation of (Karachi) Stock Exchange---Violation of the Rules and Regulations was a serious matter, which would entitle the Commission to impose penalty on the company---Commission taking a lenient view, instead of imposing penalty, strictly warned the company to abstain from trading in such manner in future, failing which appropriate action would be taken---Company was further directed to ensure that full compliance be made of all rules, regulations and directives of the Commission, in future for avoiding any punitive action under the law.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.Misc/MSW/SMD/1(05) 2004/1636, dated 6-11-2012, decision dated: 19-04-2013, hearing DATE : 19-11-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "CYAN LIMITED THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICIn the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12107",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2119 = 2014 SLD 2119 = 2014 CLD 941",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)-------Ss. 40A, 40, 35 & 34--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199--- Constitutional petition--- Complaint against conduct of Banking Company made to the State Bank of Pakistan---State Bank of Pakistan, duties of---Petitioner made a complaint regarding commission of an alleged fraud against a Bank to the State Bank of Pakistan, with the request to initiate and conduct inquiry with regard to alleged fraud---Contention of the State Bank of Pakistan was that since the matter of the alleged fraud was pending in two separate civil suits, it would not be proper for the State Bank of Pakistan to take any action in a matter which was sub judice---Held, that reason assigned by State Bank for not proceeding any further on the complaint of the petitioner was not tenable---Mere pendency of any civil suits was not an impediment for the State Bank to conduct any inquiry or investigation in terms of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, as State Bank was not party to the dispute, and even otherwise there was no restraining order operating in the said cases---State Bank of Pakistan was a regulator of the affairs of Banking companies operating in the country, as it was its primary duty and responsibility to attend to any complaint of an account-holder or depositor---State Bank of Pakistan was vested with a controlling and regulating authority under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 and had the statutory duty to give necessary directions to a Banking Company to prevent affairs of a Banking Company from being conducted in a manner which was prejudicial or detrimental to the interest of Banking Company as well as the general depositors---As a regulator the State Bank was bound to see whether the actions of Banking Companies were within the framework of law and specially the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 as well as the relevant circulars and instructions issued by it---Provisions of Ss. 34, 35,40 & 40A of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 empowered the State Bank to oversee the operations of the Banking Companies---State Bank of Pakistan was duty bound to act as an independent and non-partisan regulator and could not absolve itself from proceeding on any complaint merely due to the fact that the dispute was pending before a court of law---Upon receipt of a complaint regarding affairs and conduct of a Banking Company, it was incumbent upon the State Bank to see whether or not there was any default in the statutory performance of duty, patently on record, by the Banking Company so as to take corrective and necessary measures in accordance with the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962---High Court directed the State Bank of Pakistan to attend to the complaint of the petitioner and conduct an independent investigation and thereafter proceed and take action in accordance with law---Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P. No.D-3378 of 2012, decision dated: 17-02-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JJ",
    "": "PERVEZ HUSSAIN\nvs\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN through Governor and others\n Muhammad Ashraf v. United Bank Limited through President and 3 others 2009 CLD 1250 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12108",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2120 = 2014 SLD 2120 = 2014 CLD 948",
    "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)-------S. 44--- Writ petition--- Res judicata, principle of---Applicability---Claim of outstanding electricity bill from subsequent buyer/owner of auctioned property---Scope---Petitioner being a successful bidder purchased a property/Mill auctioned by the orders of Banking Court---Electricity department claimed outstanding bill of property in question from the subsequent buyer/owner and initiated recovery proceedings---Contention of the petitioner was that any liability of outstanding bills of previous owner could not be placed on the shoulders of present petitioner/buyer--- Validity--- Outstanding electricity bill pertained to the period prior to the auction when the Mill in question was functioning under the supervision of its previous owners/directors---Banking Court had dismissed the application for recovery of electricity bills from the bid money and the Electricity Department had not filed any appeal or revision against the said , which had attained finality, therefore the matter was hit by the general principle of res judicata--- Any order made on an application for adjustment of outstanding bills was a judicial order and the affected party was required to challenge the same before the higher forum---Petitioner had purchased the Mill in question as a result of the passed by the Banking Court and auction made later on---Electricity Department could not claim any outstanding bill from the petitioner subsequent buyer/owner of Mill---Impugned recovery proceedings of outstanding electricity bills were set aside---Writ petition was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.189 of 2006, decision dated: 29-01-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR AHMED CHAUDHARY, J",
    "": "Ch. MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE and another\nvs\nEXECUTIVE ENGINEER ELECTRICITY DEPARTMENT, AJK, BHIMBER and 7 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12109",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2121 = 2014 SLD 2121 = 2014 CLD 954",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.89---Auction proceedings---Sale, setting aside of---Property in question was owned by different persons and was mortgaged at more than one places---Bank, after giving notice to borrower, directly auctioned property in question under S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Earlier, co-owners had filed objection against auction of property, which objection was dismissed by Banking Court and had attained finality---Subsequently, respondent filed objection petition under O. XXI, R. 89, C.P.C., on the ground of being one of the co-owners---Banking Court allowed objection petition and set aside auction of whole property---Validity---Property which was auctioned by bank, was mortgaged by various individuals including co-owners--- Objection petition against auction proceedings in favour of appellant was earlier challenged by co-owners and the same was dismissed by Banking Court and appeal was withdrawn, therefore, auction to the extent of co-owners had already attained finality---Such aspect of the matter was not taken into account by Banking Court while deciding objection petition of respondent and auction proceedings in respect of entire property were set aside---Banking Court was bound to decide fate of auction proceedings only to the extent of objection petitioner---High Court set aside the order passed by Banking Court and remanded the matter to Banking Court for decision afresh to the extent of share of appellant in suit property---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n Muhammad Umer Rathore v. Federation of Pakistan 2009 CLC 257; Mir Wali Khan and another v. Manager, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, Muzaffargarh and another PLD 2003 SC 500; Izhar Alam Farooqi Advocate v. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi and others 2008 SCMR 240 and Tehsil Nazim TMA, Okara v. Abbas Ali and 2 others 2010 SCMR 1437 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.165 of 2007, herd on 24-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD BAKHSH KHAN alias MUHAMMAD KHAN\nvs\nAKHTAR HUSSAIN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12110",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2122 = 2014 SLD 2122 = 2014 CLD 961",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 92, 94, 284 & 287---Amalgamation of companies---Authorized share capital, increase in---Principle---Petitioner companies sought approval of scheme of amalgamation---Plea raised by Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan was that authorized share capital of surviving company could not increase without compliance of provisions of S.92 or 94 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Validity---As a result of grant of scheme of amalgamation of petitioner companies by High Court, their authorized share capitals stood automatically merged resulting into automatic increase in authorized share capital of surviving company without recourse to S.92 or 94 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Surviving company was not obliged to take any step for enhancement of its authorized capital or to do any further act or deed---Provisions of S.92 or 94 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, were inapplicable to cases of merger or amalgamation of companies and or their authorized paid-up share capital in such cases would be governed on under Part IX \"\"Arbitration , Arrangements and Reconstruction\"\" of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Respective authorized share capitals of both the companies were subjected to payment of fee at the time of registration and were covered by definition of property of every description under S.287(4) of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Company could not again subjected to pay fee on same authorized share capital on which it had already paid requisite fee---Amalgamation of petitioner companies was allowed as per terms prayed by them---Petition was allowed in circumstances.\n \n J. Miscellaneous No.48 of 2011 in the matter of Messrs Feroze 1888 Mills Limited, Feroze Textile Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., UTI Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., and Friendship (Pvt.) Ltd.; Amalgamation of Shaily v. Unknown 2003 (2) Bom Cr 514 and 2003 (2) MhLj 22 distinguished.\n \n Messrs Omer Iqbal Solvent (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2010 CLD 1802; Mahmood Power Generation Limited and Mahmood Textile Mills Limited v. Joint Registrar of Companies and others 2006 CLD 1364; OBS Pakistan (Private) Limited and Merck Sharp and Dohme of Pakistan Limited in J. Miscellaneous No.19 of 2008; PMP Auto Industries Ltd.'s case [1994] 80 Comp Cas 289 Bom.; Areva T and D India Ltd.'s case [2007] 138 Camp Cas 834; Saboo Leasing P. Ltd.'s case [2003] 117 Camp Cas 728; Hotline HI Celdings P. Ltd.'s case [2005] 127 Camp Cas 165; Jaypee Cement Ltd. [2004] 122 Camp Cas 854 and [2004] 62 CLA 329 ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss. 92 & 94---Authorized share capital---Connotation---Every company limited by shares or limited by guarantee and having a share capital is required to have an authorized capital with which it is registered---Such is one of the essential features of company's constitution and it must be specifically stated in memorandum of association---Authorized capital may be increased above or reduced below the figure stated in memorandum; it is equal to nominal value of shares which directors of company are authorized to issue, hence is termed as \"\"authorized capital\"\"---In its original or altered form, the authorized capital sets limit of capital available for issue and accordingly issued capital of a company can never exceed its authorized capital---Authority by shareholders of company to its directors create new capital by issue of shares---While increase or decrease in authorized capital cannot be affected without a resolution of company in its general meeting where issue of shares may be decided by Board of Directors of the company without recourse to a general meeting, provided that articles of association of company do not provide otherwise.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 287(4)---Words \"\"rights and powers of every description\"\"---Enforcement---Right of a company and power of its shareholders/Board of Directors, to increase or decrease authorized share capital, if denied, can be enforced through a court of law---Such valuable right of company and special and exclusive power of its shareholders/Board of Directors is not intangible, imaginary or incapable of being transferred.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J. Miscellaneous No.21 of 2012, decision dated: 7-03-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "KINGS FOOD (PRIVATE) LIMITED AND HILAL CONFECTIONERY (PRIVATE) LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12111",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2123 = 2014 SLD 2123 = 2014 CLD 975",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Foreign Exchange Manual, 2013-------Chap. XXIII, Ss. 14, 9, 5 & 16---Import Policy Order, 2013, S. 4---Import Policy Order, 2009, Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Import of Sprinkler Lorries---Payment for imports---Letters of Credit---Permission of State Bank of Pakistan required for revolving letters of credit---Amendments to letters of credit---Scope---Petitioner under Import Policy Order, 2009 could import sprinkler lorries whereas under the new Import Policy Order, 2013 sprinkler lorries of specification of the petitioner could not be imported---Section 4 of the Import Policy Order, 2013 stated that the amendments made in the letter of credit would not affect imports made on basis of bill of lading or letters of credit established prior to date of new Import Policy Order, 2013---Contention of petitioner was that he had established the letter of credit for import prior date of promulgation of Import Policy Order, 2013 and the period of letter of credit was one year, so within the said year, he could import old lorries through the letter of credit that had been established prior to promulgation of Import Policy Order, 2013---Validity---Section 14 of Chapter XXIII the Foreign Exchange Manual, 2013 provided different types of \"\"letters of credit\"\", and the petitioner had in fact required establishment of a \"\"revolving letter of credit\"\"---Letter of credit, in the present case was one credit but with different drafts as different consignments were imported, but issuance of such letter of credit was not allowed under S.14 of Chapter of XXIII of the Foreign Exchange Manual, 2013 as the requirement for opening such letter of credit was that the petitioner submitted an application to the State Bank of Pakistan, and without permission of the State Bank of Pakistan, the petitioner's Bank could not open such a letter of credit, therefore, issuance of letter of credit to the petitioner was against law---No doubt that letter of credit could be established on providing letter of invoice, but then all consignments mentioned in the invoice were to be imported at one and the same time, which was not done in the present case---Consignments, if imported through different shipments, then either different invoice and different letters of credit were required, or in the alternate, prior approval of the State Bank of Pakistan was required--- Amendment in the letter of credit was also not covered by law as under S. 9 of the Chapter XXIII, Foreign Exchange Manual, 2013 Bank could extend the letter of credit for period of 12 months but a new amount could be provided through an amendment to the letter of credit---Proposed amendment to the letter of credit in fact amounted to opening a fresh letter of credit without fresh invoice, which was tantamount to a fraud upon the law---Arguments of the petitioner, if accepted, would mean that the Import Policy Order, 2013 could never be implemented---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition rel.\n \n(b) Words and Phrases---\n \n----\"\"Revolving Letter of Credit\"\"--- Meaning stated.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3795 of 2013, decision dated: 7-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "RIAZ AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "Haji ABDUL RAZIQ KHAN\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12112",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2124 = 2014 SLD 2124 = 2014 CLD 985",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Words and phrases-------\"\"Statement of Account\"\"---Definition stated.\n \n \"\"Encyclopedia of Banking of Finance\"\" by Glemn G. Maunn, F.L. Garcia and Chalres J rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Interpretation of S. 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Statement of Account, essentials of---Word \"\"supported\"\" used by the Legislature in S. 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 meant that if the suit was not supported by the Statement of Account, same would not be competent and the word \"\"support\"\" read in the mandatory perspective of the word \"\"shall\"\"; made a plaint filed by a Financial Institution totally dependent upon a duly certified statement of account on the \"\"support\"\" of which a plaint may stand and sustain per Ss. 9(1) & 9(2) of the Ordinance.\n \n Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. 2012 CLD 337 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891) Ss.2(8) & 4---Suit for recovery---Statement of Account---Certification of Statement of Accounts---Application of defendants for leave to defend suit was dismissed---Contention of the defendants was that plaintiff Bank had not filed a proper Statement of Account in terms of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 and the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Held, that Statement of Account in the present case appeared in a typed form on a white paper, being incomplete, sketchy and unsubscribed by the principal accountant or manager and did not fulfil the mandatory requirements of S.9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and Ss.2(8) & 4 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1981---Statement of Account filed by the plaintiff Bank therefore did not qualify as a \"\"Statement of Account\"\" duly certified under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 and did not contain the details of the entire transactions between the plaintiff Bank and the defendants during the period of finance---Statement of Account did not bear any date and particulars with regard to sanction and disbursement of the finance facility, payment of liabilities and date and period of charging of markup---Statement of Account in the present case was also undated and had been subscribed by the Attorney of plaintiff Bank instead of principal accountant or manager of the Bank as required under S.2(8) of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891---High Court set aside order and decree of Banking Court, and remanded the matter to Banking Court to decide the application of defendants for leave to defend and the suit afresh in accordance with law and observed that the plaintiff Bank would be at liberty to file proper statement of account and the defendants may raise such objections thereon as they may deem fit---Appeal was allowed, accordingly.\n \n United Bank Limited v. Messrs Ilyas Enterprises through Proprietor Mr. Ilyas Malik and 2 others 2004 CLD 1338 and Messrs C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chairman v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.49 of 2013, decision dated: 27-03-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND ZAFAR AHMED RAJPUT, JJ",
    "": "ELBOW ROOM and another\nvs\nMCB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12113",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2125 = 2014 SLD 2125 = 2014 CLD 992",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope--- Alternate remedy--- Contractual obligation---Factual controversy---Issue related to resolution of facts which required recording of evidence in order to ascertain whether the petitioner was entitled to any transportation charges etc. or not and if so then to what extent and under what circumstances---When the facts were alleged then the same must be proved through evidence and not through a constitutional petition---Issue raised by the petitioner-company having stemmed from contractual obligation and in the contract proper forum had been provided for the redress of the grievance of the petitioner, the controversy raised by the petitioner in that petition could not be resolved by the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction---Constitutional petition was dismissed with the observation that the petitioner-company could avail his remedy before the proper forum.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.55-D of 2012, decision dated: 26-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL LATIF KHAN AND LAL JAN KHATTAK, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KHURASAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, DERA ISMAIL KHAN\nvs\nDIRECTOR-GENERAL (FDRD), C&W DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF KPK and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12114",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2126 = 2014 SLD 2126 = 2014 CLD 995",
    "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------Ss. 72, 84 & 6---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII Rr.1 & 2---Suit for recovery of money---Non-presentation of cheque, effect---Dishonourment---Cause of action---Scope---Plaintiff sought recovery of money on basis of a cheque given to the plaintiff by the defendant---Suit was dismissed on the ground that the said cheque was never presented to the bank for payment, therefore no cause of action had arisen---Validity----When the cheque was never presented for payment, then in light of S.72 read with S.84 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, there was no refusal by the drawer or the bank for payment of the cheque, therefore, no cause of action accrued to the plaintiff for filing a suit under provisions of O.XXXVII, C.P.C.--- Cheque was only payable on demand and cause of action arose only when such demand was not honoured--- Suit of the plaintiff was therefore, not maintainable--- Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 39 of 2002, heard on 16-08-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, J",
    "": "KHALIFA AZHAR MUMTAZ\nvs\nGHULAM AKBAR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12115",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2127 = 2014 SLD 2127 = 2014 CLD 998",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 22(6) & 19---Execution of decree---Application of debtor before Executing Court contending that Executing Court needed to initiate an investigation as to whether the decree was correctly passed or not---Said application was dismissed---Contention of debtor was that the Executing Court had power to vary alter and amend decree, therefore the said dismissal of application could be impugned by filing appeal under S.22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and there was no need to file appeal against the and decree---Held, that Executing Court for the purpose of execution of decree could assume all powers of a decretal court but that did not mean that the said court could add, alter or nullify the very decree---Question as to whether a decree had been obtained by fraud was not a question arising out of execution, or discharge of satisfaction of a decree, as it affected the very validity of the decree and the Executing Court could not go beyond the decree---Executing Court could not go behind the decree however it could determine an objection with regard to the executability of the decree and it has to take as granted that a valid decree existed---Judgment debtor could only assail the decree before the appropriate Appellate Court---Appeal, being not maintainable, was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Civil Appeal No.D-18 of 2012, decision dated: 17-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL RASOOL MEMON AND RIAZAT ALI SAHAR, JJ",
    "": "MAZHARUDDIN SIDDIQUI and another\nvs\nMessrs INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12116",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2128 = 2014 SLD 2128 = 2014 CLD 1001",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------S. 118---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, R.2---Suit for recovery on the basis of pro note---Proof of execution---Presumption as to negotiable instrument of consideration (etc.)---Plaintiff proved execution of pro note by producing scribe and marginal witnesses---Under S.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 presumption (of due execution) was attached to negotiable instrument---Minor discrepancies could not be made basis for non-suiting the plaintiff---Witnesses had admitted their signatures with slight variations which were not material---Defendant having admitted pro note, variations in deposition of marginal witnesses regarding venue and signatures and non-payment of consideration in their presence were not fatal---Trial Court did not appreciate evidence properly---Appeal was accepted.\n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 118---Presumption as to negotiable instruments of consideration (etc.)---Under S.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 presumption (of due execution) was attached to negotiable instruments.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.12 of 2011, decision dated: 25-10-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL LATIF KHAN, J",
    "": "ABDUL KARIM\nvs\nMUHAMMAD IDREES"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12117",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2129 = 2014 SLD 2129 = 2014 CLD 1005",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 18---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 126---Bank guarantee---Execution of counter guarantee in favour of bank to secure Bank guarantee issued in shape of limit---Scope---Agreement for finance would not be required in cases of bank guarantees---Individual counter guarantee could be obtained in single transaction in bank guarantee cases---Counter guarantee would not be required in respect of every issue of bank guarantee---Signatures of guarantors of borrower would not be required on counter guarantees.\n \n Muzammil Brothers and another v. Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Ltd. through Manager 2006 CLD 1546; United Dairies Farms Pvt. Ltd. and 4 others v. United Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 569; Habib Credit and Exchange Bank Ltd. v. Emirates Bank International Ltd. 2002 CLD 524 and Soneri Bank Ltd. v. Classic Demin Mills Pvt. Ltd. and 3 others 2011 CLD 408 ref.\n \n Muhammad Manzoor-ul-Haq for Appellants.\n \n Muhammad Saleem Iqbal for Respondent No.1.\n \n Date of hearing: 9th September, 2013.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.83 of 2013, heard on 9-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN SHAH AND SHOAIB SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AMBROSIA CHEMICALS through Managing Partner and 3 others\nvs\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Manager and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12118",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2130 = 2014 SLD 2130 = 2014 CLD 1010",
    "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------S. 118---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3---Institution of summary suit on negotiable instruments---Contention of defendant was that he had paid the whole amount to the plaintiff---Suit was decreed by the Trial Court---Validity---Certified copies of dishonoured cheques as well as endorsement of bank and statement of account had not been denied by the defendant---Issuance of cheques had been admitted by the defendant---No proof was available on record to establish that defendant had paid amount to the plaintiff---Presumption of correctness was attached in favour of documents which would fall within the ambit of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881---Defendant was bound to discharge the initial presumption, he had not proceeded with the matter diligently and ex parte decree was passed against him---Ample opportunity had been granted to the defendant but he showed his negligent conduct in pursuing the suit---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.17 of 2011, decision dated: 28-01-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "HASAN FEROZ, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHAHID SIDDIQUI\nvs\nMUHAMMAD MANZAR ALAM QADRI and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12119",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2131 = 2014 SLD 2131 = 2014 CLD 1015",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10(4), 10(6) & 9---Suit for recovery---Application for leave to defend---Procedure of Banking Court---Reading of plaint---Scope---Contention of the customers/defendants was, inter alia, that statement of accounts did not depict a true picture of transactions and that markup applied was not according to the finance agreement---Validity---Execution of finance agreement had not been specifically denied by the defendants---Defendants seeking to appear and defend the suit must disclose a plausible defence or show that there were substantial questions of facts and law which needed to be tried, otherwise, leave to defend had to be refused and suit was to be decreed---Only on an evasive denial or as a routine matter, leave to defend could not be granted---All documents annexed with a plaint were to be read as part and parcel of the plaint and contents whereof could not be read in isolation--- All terms and conditions of the finance agreement between the parties, and the sanction letter should be read in conjunction with the paragraphs of the plaint and it could not be argued that the Financial Institution had not disclosed cause of action and had provided wrong entries in the statement of accounts---Under S.10(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 non-compliance of provisions of S.10(4) of the Ordinance, would result in rejection of application for leave to defend---Defendants in the present case, had failed to specify amount payable to the Bank and had failed to disclose the disputed amount in their application for leave to defend---Application for leave to defend, was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "B.O.S. No.2-P of 2013, decision dated: 3rd February, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MALIK MANZOOR HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "Messrs HABIB BANK LIMITED through Senior Manager--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs R.G. MATCH INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12120",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2132 = 2014 SLD 2132 = 2014 CLD 1020",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 22--- Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 12---Appeal---Condonation of delay---Provisions of Limitation Act, 1908---Applicability---Though provisions of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, have not been made applicable to proceedings under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, however, the same has not excluded applicability of S. 12 of Limitation Act, 1908---In absence of such exclusion, provisions of S.12 of Limitation Act, 1908, are applicable to proceedings under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \n Chairman District Evacuee Trust Committee, Rawalpindi v. Sharif Ahmad and others PLD 1991 SC 246 rel.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Proceedings, conversion of---Principle---Courts have always liberally allowed conversion of proceedings of one kind into the other---Mis-description in title of proceedings and/or mentioning of a wrong provision of law is not considered fatal to grant of relief if it is otherwise available under the law to an aggrieved party.\n \n Margrete Williams v. Abdul Hamid Mian 1994 SCMR 1555 and Muhammad Sarwar v. The State PLD 1969 SC 278 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 12---Appeal---Limitation---Time for certified copy, exclusion of---Condonation of delay---Banking Court passed on 21-12-2005 against defendants who applied for certified copies on 22-12-2005, copies were prepared on 1-2-2006 and obtained on 27-4-2006, while appeal was filed on 16-5-2006---Defendants sought condonation of delay on the plea that no date was given by Copying Agency for delivery of copy, therefore, time spent in obtaining copies was to be excluded while calculating period of limitation---Contention of plaintiff bank was that provisions of Limitation Act, 1908, were not applicable to proceedings under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Time requisite for obtaining certified copies of and decree to be appealed against was to be excluded for the purposes of computing period of limitation---Time requisite was deemed to be the time intervening between the day on which application for copy was made and the day actually intimated to defendants for delivery of copy---Copying Agency was to intimate date on which copy would be ready for delivery---Ambiguity existed as to whether any date for delivery of copies was communicated to defendants or not---Stamp of Copying Agency did not reveal as to when application for obtaining certified copies was made or when were the certified copies prepared or what was date of delivery intimated to defendants---Only date which appeared with stamp was 1-2-2006, i.e. purported date of preparation of certified copies---In absence of requisite dates plea raised by defendants was relied upon by High Court---Period spent in obtaining certified copies of was excluded from computing period of limitation in filing of appeal---Application was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Akhtar Kaleem v. Citibank N.A. through Branch Manager 2004 CLD 1361; Mian Muhammad Sabir v. Malik Muhammad Sadiq through Legal Heirs and others PLD 2008 SC 577; M. Asif Ali Khan v. Ghulam Shabbir 2010 YLR 507; Noor Jahan alias Bhoori through L.Rs. v. Mst. Anjum Mughees and 3 others 2009 MLD 645; Messrs Pak Suzuki Motor Col. Ltd. v. Haji Ahmed Shaikh and another 2005 CLC 680 and Haji Umer and 2 others v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Revenue Department, Karachi and 5 others PLD 2009 Kar. 247 ref.\n \n Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the Secretary Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi and another v. Amjad Ali Mirza PLD 1977 SC 182 rel.\n \n Sardar Riaz Karim for Appellants.\n \n Muhammad Ishaq Rana for Respondents.\n \n Date of hearing: 24th November, 2011.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 75 of 2006, decision dated: 9-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAMOON RASHID SHEIKH AND CH. MUHAMMAD YOUNIS, JJ",
    "": "GHULAM DASTGIR ASIF and another\nvs\nUNITED BANK LTD. through Manager and 7 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12121",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2133 = 2014 SLD 2133 = 2014 CLD 1167",
    "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)-------S. 44---Writ petition---Advertisement for inviting bids---Post bid conditions, framing of---Scope---Contention of petitioner-company was that post bid conditions were framed and condition of ranking of bank was incorporated secretly---Validity---Advertisement inviting request for proposals was not a final document and further conditions could be attached which had not been mentioned in the same---Information was to be furnished with regard to technical as well as commercial aspects---Bidders were required to provide details with regard to extent of offered financing i.e. whether 100% or part thereof---Finance might be in form of supplier's credit, E.C.A., lease or multilateral/commercial bank finance or mix thereof---Documents with regard to financial standing and credit worthiness of bidders were also to be supplied---Proposal was to be evaluated and ranked keeping in view the bidders standing, technical capability, resourcefulness, condition of finance and award was to be made keeping in view the maximum benefit to the Hydro Electric Board---Petitioner had to comply with any additional requirement within a week---Respondents had every right to ask for additional information and to verify such information through its sources---Initially petitioner was first ranked but later on five items were included in the agenda with regard to approval for issuance of Letter of Interest/Letter of Support and petitioner was directed to provide additional information---Bank reference letters were to be issued by first class Financial/Banking institution with regard to credit rating---Information furnished by the petitioner did not come up to the mark and did not fulfil the required criteria whereas reference letters supporting credentials of respondent were evaluated as reliable---Equal chance to compete for award was provided to the parties but petitioner could not succeed due to its financial deficiency---Project was allotted to the other party in accordance with the prescribed procedure of law---Writ petition was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Write Petition No. 2293 of 2012, decision dated: 1st June, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARDAR ABDUL HAMEED KHAN AND AZHAR SALEEM BABAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs CHINAR POWER (PVT.) LIMITED MUZAFFARABAD through Chief Executive\nvs\nAZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR through Chief Secretary and 6 othersNoNs"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12122",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2134 = 2014 SLD 2134 = 2014 CLD 1034",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10 & 9---Suit for recovery---Co-borrowers---Joint and several liability of borrowers, determination of---Application for leave to defend by the defendant was dismissed, and suit was decreed---Contention of the defendant was that she was a co-borrower and had mortgaged her property only to the extent of the finance that had been returned to the plaintiff Bank and that she was not the beneficiary of the enhanced amount sought to be recovered from her---Held, that under agreement of personal guarantee the liabilities of the guarantor were joint and several---Banking Court, if it was of the view that the other borrowers had adjusted the liability and were only responsible for the reduced amount which had been paid, then it was bound to grant leave to defend the suit to the defendants as separate liability could only be ascertained after recording of evidence---Banking Court had relied on a document which was undated and only showed the appellant as a co-borrower and no cheque or statement of account in the name of the appellant was produced---Impugned order of Banking Court was set aside and applications for leave to defend were allowed---Appeal was allowed, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 682 of 2011, heard on 25-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN AND SHUJAAT ALI KHAN, JJ",
    "": "SHAMIM AKHTAR\nvs\nMessrs STANDARD CHARTERED BANK PAKISTAN LIMITED through Manager Legal and Recovery and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12123",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2135 = 2014 SLD 2135 = 2014 CLD 1039",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S. 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10 & S. 20(c)---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42---Suit for declaration---Return of plaint---Winding up of company---Relief claimed in the civil suit covered by provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Registered office of company---Jurisdiction of court---Scope---High Court where the registered office of the company was situated would have the jurisdiction in the matter---Registered office of the company for the purpose of winding up of the same was one which had longest been the registered office of said company during last six months immediately preceding the presentation of the petition for winding up---Cause of action in the present case had accrued within the jurisdiction of High Court whose jurisdiction registered office of the company was situated---Court under S. 20(c), C.P.C. would only have the jurisdiction over the matters if the cause of action had arisen within the local limits of its jurisdiction---\"\"Cause of action\"\" as used in S. 20(c), C.P.C. with regard to jurisdiction of court would with regard to the facts or allegations giving rise to a claim leading to infringement of some right of a party and not to a notional or imaginary assertion in such context---Landing of machinery at the Port of Karachi would not infringe any right of the plaintiffs within the jurisdiction of the Court---If rights were infringed in entering into contract for the purchase of the machinery then such rights would be infringed at the place where the contract was entered i.e. within the jurisdiction of High Court where right was infringed---Plaintiffs could not create a cause of action by their own effort but same must be created by some act of the defendants---Company had entered into an agreement for purchase of machinery in Punjab where registered office of the same was situated and machinery was being imported which would arrive there via Port of Karachi--- Machinery was to be installed and used at Multan (Punjab) within the jurisdiction of Lahore High Court---Defendants had not done anything that had breached or infringed rights of plaintiffs within the jurisdiction of Lahore High Court---Landing of consignment at Karachi Port and that too for its onward journey was not breach of any right---Plaintiffs had to make out a case that certain rights which were being enjoyed by them were declined and the alleged landing of consignment at Karachi for its onward destination would not constitute infringement of rights which they were enjoying--- Plaint was returned in circumstances to the plaintiffs.\n \n D. Munirangappa v. Amidyala Venkatappa and another AIR 1965 Mysore 316; Dessee Veerabhadrayya Venkata Subbayya Firm v. Biswanath Jagadish Parsad AIR 1962 Andhra Pradesh 338; Messrs Brady and Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Messrs Sayed Saigol Industries Ltd. 1981 SCMR 494; Brother Steel Mills Ltd. and others v. Mian Ilyas Miraj and others PLD 1996 SC 543; Muzaffar Ali Awan v. Messrs Pioneer Alliance (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 1989 Lah. 106; Siddique Muhammad Malik and others v. Immad Iftikhar Malik and others 2000 CLC 477 and Iftikhar Hussain and others v. Dadex Eternit and others 2002 CLD 575 ref.\n \n National Investment Trust Ltd. v. Lawerencepur Woollen and Textile Mills Ltd. 2002 CLD 527 and Haji Riaz Ahmed Mir v. Brig. (Retd.) Ch. Muhammad Sharif PLD 2003 Kar. 45 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1580 of 2013, decision dated: 29-01-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, J",
    "": "ZAFAR IQBAL and 3 others--Plaintiffs\nvs\nNASREEN AHMED and 8 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12124",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2136 = 2014 SLD 2136 = 2014 CLD 1049",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.38 of 2006, decision dated: 2-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. AYESHA A. MALIK, J",
    "": "BANK ALHABIB LTD.--Plaintiff\nvs\nANGORA TEXTILE LTD. and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12125",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2137 = 2014 SLD 2137 = 2014 CLD 1057",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S. 22---Failure to disclose relevant price sensitive material information---Meeting of the Board of Directors of the company was held to consider the financial results for the relevant period---Company conveyed the financial results to the Stock Exchange---Same was not considered satisfactory as it contained no cogent reason, explanation, evidence or justification for not disclosing the relevant price sensitive material information---For efficient, fair and transparent market, two principles must apply; companies need to release relevant information as soon as it was available; and all the investors who want to deal in shares, should have access to the same information at the same time---For the protection of the investor's interest, a listed company must communicate information to shareholders and potential shareholders in such a way as to avoid the creation or continuation of a false market---Company had failed to inform the investors in time about impact on financial health of the company, if the financial statement had been prepared in accordance with the decision of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA)---Company had also failed to disseminate the factual position i.e. financial statements were prepared, presented and approved by the Board of Directors of the company on the basis of a stay granted by High Court---Company had failed to conform to the provisions of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 by failing to comply with the provisions of Listing Regulations made thereunder--- Company was liable for the penalty as defined in S. 22 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969---Commission taking lenient view imposed a penalty of Rs.1000,000 (one million) on the company and directed the company that full compliance be made of all orders, Regulations and directives of the Commission in the future for avoiding any serious punitive action under the law.\n \n Amer Tufail, Deputy Managing Director (Services), SNGPL and Wajiha Anwar, Company Secretary, SNGPL representing the Sui Norther Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL).",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.1(3) SNGP/MSW/SMD/2013 - 002 dated 26-03-2013, decision dated: 10-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "SUI NORTHERN GAS PIPELINES LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12126",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2138 = 2014 SLD 2138 = 2014 CLD 1068",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S. 284---Agreement between financial institutions (secured creditors) and management of a company---Discharge of outstanding liability---Sale of charged assets---Financial institutions in the present case were lenders and secured creditors of certain group companies---Financial institutions entered into an agreement with the management of the group companies in terms of S. 284 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 to settle outstanding dues--- Validity--- All members/ shareholders of company secured creditors consenting to the agreement under S.284 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Effect---All living shareholders and the heirs of some deceased members of the group companies constituting 89% of the total equity and voting power in such companies had filed their letters of consent in favour of the arrangement under S. 284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 proposed by the secured creditors, including settlement of their outstanding dues from the sale of the offered assets on \"\"as is where is basis\"\" at a price of Rs.6.0 billion---No shareholder opposed the said arrangement or sale of the offered assets at the said price---Purpose of the arrangement was the bona fide settlement of outstanding dues owed by the group companies to the secured creditors that had been waiting for decision of present petition for the last sixteen years---Object of the arrangement was to be achieved by the sale of properties charged to the financial institutions, as such the said agreement neither infringed the rights of nor was disputed by (any) other claimant, creditor or right holder of the group companies---Financial institutions i.e. secured creditors of the group companies unanimously support the proposed arrangement under S.284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and the sale of the offered assets at Rs.6.0 billion---In terms of S.284(2) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 a creditors' arrangement, bearing support of 75% or more of the class of such creditors for discharge of outstanding liabilities qualified for approval and sanction by the Court---In the present case, with 100% endorsement of all secured creditors of the group companies, the creditors arrangement proposed under S. 284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 was eminently eligible for approval by the Court---Features of proposed arrangement/agreement showed that it promoted public policy of discharging debt to banks holding public money; that it was prudent and reasonable because it was un-objected from any quarter, and that the scheme was not discriminatory in its effect or coercive in its terms---On the tests of validity laid down for sanctioning of creditors' arrangement, there were no grounds whatsoever to decline approval---Bona fides and fairness of the present creditors' arrangement under S. 284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 were unexceptionable in the eyes of law---Present agreement/ arrangement was approved by the High Court but subject to the condition that it shall be implemented in stages: initially, by payment to the secured creditors of the principal amounts claimed, followed by payment of accrued markup and cost of funds after adjustment of the reconciled, adjudicated or determined claims of preferential creditors of the group companies---High Court directed that smaller claimants against the group companies like government institutions and electricity authorities must also be entertained for their statutory claims to be adjusted or settled; that such exercise could be done after verification of their claims to consider whether there were sufficient funds or other tangible security available for discharging the said claims; that at the time of confirmation of sale, remuneration for the two members of the Sale Committee must also be fixed; that the creditors arrangement approved by court would become redundant if the sale of the offered assets pursuant thereto was delayed or avoided, accordingly, the matters that needed to be dealt with and determined prior to approving the sale of assets ought to be resolved at the earliest---Petition was allowed accordingly.\n \n Messrs Pakland Cement Limited through Director Shamim Musheq Siddiqui 2002 CLD 1392 and Caravan East Fabrics Limited v. Askari Commercial Bank Limited 2006 CLD 895 ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 284---Agreement under S. 284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 between secured creditors and management of a company---Discharge of outstanding liability---Charged properties, sale of---Charged properties including private properties of members of company---Legality---If charged properties forming subject matter of sale under an arrangement under S.284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 included private properties of certain members, it did not vitiate the arrangement/agreement proposed by secured creditors---No requirement of law existed to the effect that only properties belonging to a debtor/customer company could constitute charged securities for its secured creditors---When the private members and sponsors of a company charged, mortgaged and encumbered their private assets for obtaining finance for the company, then such mortgaged, charged or encumbered assets could be sold validly to discharge the liabilities owed to the secured creditors.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 284---Agreement under S. 284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 between secured creditors and management of a company---Discharge of outstanding liability---Realization of assets---Secured creditors---Priority in payment---Arrangement under S. 284 Companies Ordinance, 1984 proposing to sell charged assets that were either pledged, hypothecated or mortgaged to the secured creditors to cover finance availed by the company--- In relation to the said charged assets, the secured creditors would be exclusive holders of security entitled to priority for payment and discharge through the realization of such assets.\n \n Orix Leasing Pakistan Ltd. v. Sunshine Cloth Ltd. 2001 PTD 3146 rel.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 284---Agreement under S. 284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 between creditors and management of a company---Discharge of outstanding liability---Company's management and members, role of---In a case of creditors' arrangement, S. 284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 did not mandate that such an arrangement must enjoy the support of the management of the debtor company or any specific proportion of its membership--- Role of members in a creditors' arrangement was to bring objections that disproved the bona fides or fairness of the scheme of the arrangement.\n \n Messrs Pakland Cement Limited through Director Shamim Musheq Siddiqui 2002 CLD 1392 and Caravan East Fabrics Limited v. Askari Commercial Bank Limited 2006 CLD 895 ref.\n \n(e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 284---Agreement under S. 284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 between creditors and management of a company---Fairness of such agreement---Duty of court---Claims made by preferential creditors---Court was under a duty to examine the over-all fairness of the creditors' arrangement---In such respect the Court ought to consider the fate of claims, if any, filed by preferential creditors recognized by law---Such consideration would entertain the claims raised or lodged by statutorily specified creditors, in particular, tax authorities, statutory funds and institutions and utility companies---Effort should be made by the Court that claims asserted by such preferential creditors under public law should not be ignored.\n \n(f) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 284---Agreement under S. 284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 between secured creditors and management of a company---Discharge of outstanding liability---Realization of assets---Secured creditors and preferential creditors---Priority in payment---Preferential creditors could not override the interests and rights of the secured creditors.\n \n(g) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 284---Agreement under S. 284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 between creditors and management of an infrastructural industry---Infrastructural industry/Industrial units---Discharge of outstanding liability towards creditors---Sale of assets to a consenting buyer---Credentials of buyer---Scope---When offered assets under sale valued billions of rupees and they pertained to an essential infrastructural industry, then law, public interest and policy required that such industry was entrusted to bona fide hands---Notwithstanding its financial strength the consented buyer of a huge industrial unit must possess other credentials that satisfied the criteria of domicile, credit worthiness, bona fide business operations and profile, tax probity and compliance by both the buyer and its sponsors.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O. No.63 of 1998, decision dated: 27-05-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, C.J.",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN\nvs\nITTEFAQ FOUNDRIES (PVT.) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12127",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2139 = 2014 SLD 2139 = 2014 CLD 1097",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 404 & 405---Provincial Insolvency Act (V of 1920), S.47---Winding up of company---Distribution of auction proceeds---Claim, partially disallowed---Entitlement of Revenue authorities---Petitioner bank was a secured creditor and a part of its claim was disallowed by official liquidator but petitioner (bank) did not raise any objection at relevant time---Plea raised by petitioner (bank) was that its claim took precedence over that of all persons including the Revenue, claiming under S.405 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Validity---Secured creditor, under the provisions of S.404 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 read with S.47 of Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 was free to relinquish his security and such creditor could choose not to do so but once secured creditor did, then his position altered---Option that was earlier available to secured creditor (i.e. to realize his security by standing outside winding up), was no longer at hand---Position of secured creditor was relegated to that of any other creditor who had proved his debt before official liquidator, in accordance with relevant provisions---As security was relinquished, claim of Revenue must be accorded preference under S.405 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---High Court directed official liquidator to pay the amounts to Revenue out of withheld amount and if there was a balance remaining (whether on account of any accrued profit/mark up or otherwise) that was to be distributed amongst the company's creditors on the same terms as before--- Application was disposed of accordingly.\n \n Re David Lloyd & Co. (1877) 6 Ch D 339; Moor v. Anglo-Italian Bank (1879) 10 Ch D 681; National Development Finance Corporation v. Rawal Papers (Pvt.) Ltd. 1993 MLD 1562; United Bank Ltd. v. PICIC and others 1992 SCMR 1731; Mst. Shanti v. Karachi Transport Corporation and others 2000 CLC 595; PICIC v. Allied Textile Mills Ltd. 1991 MLD 2301; Malik Muhammad Saeed Muhammad Azam and others v. Sargodha Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. PLD 1973 Lah. 682; Kanaiyalal Kripa Sankar Bijoy Sankar Gobinda Sarkar Dikshit Firm v. Shah Mahmud Palwan and others PLD 1959 Dacca 939; Federation of Pakistan v. Pioneer Bank Ltd. PLD 1958 Dacca 535; Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Ali Gul Khan Packages Ltd. 1989 CLC 1774 and Orix Leasing Pakistan Ltd. v. Sunshine Cloth Ltd. 2001 PTD 3146 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J. M. 56 of 2000 in Civil Original No.3 of 1994 and C.M.A. 176 of 2005, decision dated: 11-06-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LIMITED\nvs\nMessrs AJMA CORPORATION LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12128",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2140 = 2014 SLD 2140 = 2014 CLD 1113",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S. 22---Listing Regulations of Karachi Stock Exchange, Regln.16(1), Clause 35(xx)---Failure to disclose material information---Company vide its letter conveyed its financial results to the Karachi Stock Exchange for relevant period---Major difference in the earning and profitability was observed in the said announcements of the company---Company had failed to disclose the requisite price-sensitive material information as envisaged in clause 35(xx) of the Listing Regulations thus did not comply with the provisions of Regulation 16(1) of the Listing Regulations of Karachi Stock Exchange---Effect---For efficient, fair and transparent market, two principles must apply; companies need to release relevant information as soon as it was available; and all the investors who wanted to deal in shares, should have access to the same information at the same time---For the protection of the investor's interest a listed company must communicate information to shareholders; and potential shareholders in such a way as to avoid the creation of false market---When an announcement was to be made a company must take all reasonable care to ensure that any information it disseminates to the market was not misleading, false or deceptive; and that it does not omit anything that was likely to affect the price of the scrip---Company had failed to disclose the requisite price-sensitive material information as envisaged in the Listing Regulation---Management of the company was expected to be conversent in and fully comply with regulatory requirements---Company was established to have failed to conform to the provisions of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 by failing to comply with the provision of Listing Regulations made thereunder---Taking a lenient view, Commission had imposed a penalty of Rs.500,000 on the company, with direction to ensure that full compliance be made of all rules, regulations and Directives of the Commission in future for avoiding any serious punitive action under the law.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.1(15) NRL/MSW/SMD/2013 - 001, dated April 23, 2013, decision dated: 30-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "NATIONAL REFINERY LIMITED (NRL) AND OTHERS, In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12129",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2141 = 2014 SLD 2141 = 2014 CLD 1122",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------S. 118---Suit for recovery of insurance proceeds with accrued bonus under insurance policy and liquidated damages---Refusal of Insurance Company to accept such claim on ground that insured being a serving Police Inspector, who died due to heart attack just after payment of two premiums, had not provided correct information about his health---Proof---Insurance Company had not proved giving of wrong information by insured about his health in Proposal Form---Doctor examined by Insurance Company had denied validity of medical certificate issued by him regarding health of insured---Insurance Company at its option had not got medically examined insured before entering into contract of life insurance policy---Insurance Company had not examined person having conducted inquiry after submission of claim by plaintiff---Insurance Company would have to suffer, if having foregone any formality regarding medical examination of insured person before entering into life insurance policy---Suit was decreed in circumstances.\n \n Malik Muhammad Faisal and another v. State Life Insurance Corporation through Chairman and 2 others 2008 SCMR 456 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Insurance Appeal No.278 of 2013, heard on 12-11-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "JUBILEE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY through Manager\nvs\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSION JUDGE and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12130",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2142 = 2014 SLD 2142 = 2014 CLD 1125",
    "Key Words:": "Patents and Designs Act (II of 1911)-------S. 11---Patents Ordinance (LXI of 2000), S.29---Infringement of patent---Suit for perpetual injunction to restrain such infringement---Term of patent expired---Original jurisdiction of High Court---Abatement, concept of---Effect on pending proceedings---Plaintiff had sought relief to the effect that defendant, be prohibited to sell \"\"Clopidogrel\"\" in addition to any other pharmaceutical ingredients/element or compound---Contention of the defendant was that the plaintiff had no cause of action, as the term of patent of the plaintiff had already expired and allegation of infringement of the patent levelled against the defendant was prima facie without any evidence---Validity---Suit became infructuous in the month of May, 2014---On the instruction of the plaintiff, counsel for the plaintiff stated that instructions had been taken from the plaintiff and since the term of the patent shall, in any case, expire by the end of May, 2014, therefore, suit itself shall be withdrawn---Suit had become infructuous and no purpose could be achieved by any of the parties by keeping this matter pending in court without any reason, therefore, the suit could not be kept pending and was required to be disposed of in pursuance of the 'concept of abatement'---Suit of the plaintiff was disposed of as having become infructuous along with applications.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.367 of 2003, decision dated: 16-06-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "AAMIR RAZA NAQVI, J",
    "": "SANOFISYNTHELABO through Authorized Signatory--Plaintiff\nvs\nZAFA PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES (PRIVATE) LIMITED through Chief Executive/ Director/Secretary/Principal Officer--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12131",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2143 = 2014 SLD 2143 = 2014 CLD 1127",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss. 6 & 22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, R.8---Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001, R.4---Inspection of Books of accounts and other documents of the company---Failure of the company to provide essential information---Effect---Securities and Exchange Commission, in exercise of powers under subsection (1) of S.6 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, and R.4 of Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001 appointed Inspectors to conduct inspection of Books of accounts and other documents required to be maintained by the company---Company failed to provide essential information/documents/details as required by Inspection team---Non-provision of required information/ documents was the violation of Rules and Regulations; and was serious matter as provided in S.6(3) of Securities Exchange Ordinance, 1969 and R.8 of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001---Company had failed to comply with the requirements of the Code of Conduct laid down in Third Schedule of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001---Violation of the Rules and Regulations by the company was a serious matter which would entitle the Commission to even suspend the Registration of the company---Commission elected not to exercise said power, and taking a lenient view in the matter, in exercise of the power under S.22 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, imposed on the company a penalty of Rs.100,000---Commission advised the company to take immediate measures to provide the required information and documents---Company was also strongly directed to fully cooperate and comply with the directions of the Commission in letter and spirit.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.SMD-MSRD-C&IW/10-1(62)/2013, dated March 27, 2013, decision dated: 4-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12132",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2144 = 2014 SLD 2144 = 2014 CLD 1133",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-------S. 2(xlii)--- Term 'sustainable development'---Connotation---Term 'sustainable development' for the first time was recognized in Stockholm Declaration of 1972, and it was defined in Brundtland Report \"\"as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own need\"\"---In Pakistan the term has been defined in S. 2(xlii) of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997---In meeting for URBAN 21 Conference (Berlin, July 2000) a more comprehensive definition of the term 'sustainable development' was adopted.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Public Trust, doctrine of--- Petitioners assailed project namely 'Construction of Signal Free Junction at Azadi Chowk Lahore', on the plea that the project was to affect a portion of Lady Willingdon Hospital Lahore---Validity---When any action of a public authority was questioned before court of law arising an important issue of public interest, the court ordinarily had to examine as to whether the authority while taking such action was conscious of imperative considerations with appropriate deliberations thereupon after having expert opinion before taking decision in accordance with law---Project in question was launched by competent authority after having consultations with all concerned departments and agencies and after having obtained necessary expert opinion to study its feasibility carried out by a renowned and well reputed firm like NESPAK---Authorities proposed and had undertaken rehabilitation and substitution of existing facilities of the hospital likely to be affected to the satisfaction of Medical Superintendent of the hospital with a clear undertaking to complete reconstruction of substitute facilities within a period of 45 days---Public trust was properly safeguarded and it did not call for issuance of any writ against authorities---Material apprehensions, objections and prayers of petitioners had been duly taken care of and fructified by authorities---Petition was dismissed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.2521, 2154 and 3731 of 2014, decision dated: 7-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUS SATTAR ASGHAR, J",
    "": "YOUNG DOCTORS ASSOCIATION and others\nvs\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12133",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2145 = 2014 SLD 2145 = 2014 CLD 1151",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Recovery of bank loan---Written statement, non-filing of---Effect---Plaintiff bank filed suit against defendant for recovery of amount and relied upon different documents including statement of accounts and other documents---Defendants did not file any written statement to rebut the documents relied upon by plaintiff---Effect---Plaintiff succeeded in proving assertions made in plaint by filing affidavit in ex parte proof---Both the plaint in suit as well as affidavit in ex parte proof were on oath and there was nothing in rebuttal---Suit was decreed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.650 of 2005, decision dated: 25-10-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "SADIQ HUSSAIN BHATTI, J",
    "": "EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC--Plaintiff\nvs\nDIAMONDS WORLD, L.L.C. and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12134",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2146 = 2014 SLD 2146 = 2014 CLD 1155",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------S. 124---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Interim order---Insurance Ordinance, 2000 excluding a right of appeal from the interim order, could not be bypassed by impugning such interim order in constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Party affected had to wait till such interim order matured into a final order, and could then attack it, in the proper exclusive forum created for the purpose of examining such orders.\n \n Syed Saghir Ahmad Naqvi v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, S&GAD, Karachi and another 1996 SCMR 1165 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4475 of 2013, decision dated: 10-12-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHEZADA MAZHAR, J",
    "": "UBL INSURERS LIMITED\nvs\nASHIQ HUSSAIN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12135",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2147 = 2014 SLD 2147 = 2014 CLD 1157",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Advances) Act (XV of 1997) S. 9---State Bank of Pakistan Circular No.19, dated 5-6-1997---Incentive Scheme---Binding nature of State Bank of Pakistan Circulars---Scope---Recovery of bank loan---Contention of defendant was that suit for recovery was not maintainable since the defendants had availed and complied with Incentive Scheme issued by the State Bank of Pakistan via Circular No.19 dated 5-7-1997---Held, that a Banking Company could not deviate from Circulars issued by the State Bank of Pakistan due to their binding nature---Directions issued in the shape of Circulars were as consequence of promulgation of a statute or an Act of Parliament and banks were obliged to follow the same---In the present case, since Invective Scheme was duly complied with by the defendants, therefore suit for recovery of plaintiff Bank was not maintainable--- Suit was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "B.O.S. No.14 of 1998, decision dated: 17-03-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MALIK MANZOOR HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs KHYBER TEXTILE MILLS LTD. and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12136",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2148 = 2014 SLD 2148 = 2014 CLD 1310",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Act (XIX of 2001)-------S. 5(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Infringement of trade mark---Grant of temporary injunction restraining defendant from using the registered trade mark---Validity---Plaintiffs being proprietors of registered trade mark had entered into licence agreement whereby defendants were permitted to manufacture and sell fans under registered trade mark for a period of three years---Licence agreement had expired---Parties had referred the matter to arbitrator---Award of arbitrator could not be considered as a further permission or authority to use the trade mark by defendants which would tarnish the reputation and good-will of trade mark and result in irreparable loss to plaintiffs---Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.23 of 2014, decision dated: 20-01-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, J",
    "": "Malik SAFDAR HUSSAIN\nvs\nIRFAN AHMAD AYYUB and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12137",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2149 = 2014 SLD 2149 = 2014 CLD 1177",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9(5) & 12---Suit for recovery---Ex parte decree setting aside of---Procedure of Banking Court---Service/summons---Scope---Suit for recovery was decreed ex parte against the defendants---Contention of the defendants was that service was not duly effected upon them in terms of S. 9(5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Perusal of order of Banking Court and reports on registered envelope and summons revealed that the defendants were not residing at the given address, therefore, such process through summons could not be served upon the defendants---Report of the representative of the courier service clearly suggested that defendants were not residing at the said address---Proclamation in the newspapers also disclosed the address where the defendants were not residing---Specific plea had been taken by the defendants to the effect that they were not resident at the address, and such plea, prima facie found support from said reports---Application for setting aside ex parte decree could not therefore, be decided summarily by the Banking Court and should have been disposed of by casting issues and providing an opportunity to the defendants to substantiate their contention which involved a factual controversy---Impugned order was set aside, matter was remanded and Banking Court was directed to decide the application for setting aside ex parte decree in accordance with law---Appeal was allowed, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.23 of 2008, heard on 10-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND MEHMOOD MAQBOOL BAJWA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs PARAS OIL INDUSTRIES and others\nvs\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12138",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2150 = 2014 SLD 2150 = 2014 CLD 1181",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, Rr. 11 & 10---Suit for recovery of damages---Rejection of plaint---Scope---Banking Court rejected the plaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction---Validity---Plaintiff filed suit against bank and insurance company before civil court which was returned and then he filed the same before Insurance Tribunal which was dismissed as withdrawn on the ground that remedy was to be sought from Banking Court---Customer or financial institution could file a suit in Banking Court in case of default in fulfilment of any obligation with regard to any finance which had been made---Section 9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 empowered the Banking Court to adjudicate the matter brought by the customer---Banking Court had to follow the provision of statute in accordance with law instead of by-passing the procedure provided under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court had passed the impugned order in slipshod manner and beyond the jurisdiction vested in the same---Impugned order had been passed on the application moved under O.VII, R.11, C.P.c. in a casual manner which was not warranted by law instead of deciding the application for leave to defend---Banking Court was bound to decide the application for leave to defend first in order to determine the locus standi of defendant and in case he failed to establish the same to defend the suit then he had no right to file any other application including the one under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.---Rejection of plaint prior to the grant of leave to defend would amount to deviation from the provision of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Rejection or dismissal of plaint could be considered by the Banking Court after the grant of leave to defend if said court had come to the conclusion that substantial question of facts and law had been raised by him but prior to such stage the exercise of jurisdiction would amount to departure from procedure and law---Plaint had been rejcted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction which was incorrect application of law---Order VII, R. 10, C.P.C. was applicable in such like cases and grounds for the same were different as to the grounds enumerated in O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.---Plaints/suits were returned and dismissed from two different forums but same had been ignored by the Banking Court and impugned order had been passed in haste and harsh manner---Impugned order was set aside and case was remanded to the Banking Court for decision in accordance with law---Appeal was accepted in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No.11 of 2010, decision dated: 11-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL LATIF KHAN AND LAL JAN KHATTAK, JJ",
    "": "AMANULLAH KHAN\nvs\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12139",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2151 = 2014 SLD 2151 = 2014 CLD 1185",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Purchase Procedure and Instructions (Revised 2002)-------Chapter III, para. 22---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199--- Constitutional petition--- Locus standi---Principal and agent relationship---Petitioners were sole representatives for a foreign company dealing in helicopters---Respondents /Authorities wrote letters to foreign company informing that petitioners were security wise not clear for any interaction with Army and defence organizations, therefore, foreign company was asked to change its representatives---Validity---Petitioners though were performing as agents of their foreign principals but had no written or oral contract with respondents/ authorities and could not claim any violation on the part of respondents---Petitioners should have agitated against their principal who on the basis of correspondence of respondents/authorities discontinued agreement executed between them---Principals were not made party to proceedings nor any allegation was levelled against them---Petitioners did not seek relief against principals in accordance with law in view of certain terms and conditions of agreement executed in between them---When petitioners had no direct concern with respondents, they could not agitate their grievance against respondents and entire proceedings initiated were futile---When there was no agreement executed between petitioners and respondents, the provisions of law as envisaged by Purchase Procedure and Instructions or Public Procurement Rules, could not be enforced for agitating their rights as they claimed---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n New Jubilee Insurance Company Ltd., Karachi v. National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi PLD 1999 SC 1126; Messrs Nizami Construction Company through Sole Proprietor v. Chief Executive Officer, Gujranwala Electricity Company (GEPCO) and 2 others 2005 CLC 366; Messrs United Woollen Mills Ltd. Workers' Union v. Messrs United Woollen Mills Ltd. 2010 SCMR 1475; Ashfaq Hussain v. Government of the Punjab and others 2011 PLC (C.S.) 799; Shahzada Zahir Shah and 6 others v. Muhammad Usman Ghani and 3 others 2005 YLR 1394; Messrs M.A. Aleem Khan through Chairman v. Province of the Punjab PLD 2006 Lah. 84; Atlas Cables (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Quetta Electric Supply Company Ltd. PLD 2011 Quetta 67; Shabbir Ahmed v. Kiran Khursheed and 8 others 2012 CLC 1236; The Federation of Pakistan, through the Secretary Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmed Khan and others PLD 1974 SC 151; Zaka Ullah Bajwa v. District Coordination Officer, Gujranwala and others 2004 PLC (C.S.) 332; Muhammad Mahmood Bawani v. Deputy Controller, Building Zone-B and others 2007 SCMR 1209; Secretary Revenue Division, CBR/Federal Board of Revenue Islamabad v. Gul Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 295; Federation of Pakistan and others v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others PLD 2009 SC 644; unreported dated 2-5-2011 passed by this Court in I.C.A No.85 of 2011 titled Mst. Mehboob Mehrbani and others v. Secretary, Ministry of Education Islamabad and others; Khalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore 1999 SCMR 1881; Muhammad Abbasi v. S.H.O. Bharakahu and 7 others PLD 2010 SC 969; Lahore Conversation Society through President and 3 others v. Chief Minister of Punjab and another PLD 2011 Lah. 344; Syed Manzoor Hussain v. Tehsil Nazim, Tehsil Municipal Administration, Tehsil Sarai Alamgir, District Gujrat and 3 others PLD 2010 Lah. 101; BP Pakistan Exploration and Production INC, Karachi v. Additional Commissioner, Inland Revenue-B Enforcement and Collection Division-1, Karachi and another 2011 PTD 647; unreported dated 26-9-2012 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.3022 of 2012 titled Iftikhar Ahmed Abbasi v. Senior Superintendent of Police, Islamabad and others; Nagina Bibi and others v. Federal Directorate of Education and others PLJ 2013 Islamabad 33; Amjad Pervaiz v. Inspector-General Railway. Police, Lahore PLJ 2012 Lahore 259; Abdul Rahim Khan v. Managing Director PEPCO, WAPDA House Lahore and 2 others 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1551; Dr. Molazim Hussain Sumro, Medical Superintendent Tehsil Headquarter Hospital, District Bahawalpur v. Special Secretary Health 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1209; Shagufta Begum v. The Income Tax Officer, Circle XI, Zone B, Lahore PLD 1989 SC 360; Niaz Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2004 MLD 460 and Dr. Raja Muhammad Kamran v. Shaheer Constructions through Rao Naveed Aftab (Partner) and 3 others (2013 MLD 118 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Show cause notice---Scope---Issuance of show-cause notice cannot be called in question unless the same yielded some results when a real cause of action accrued to petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.2858, 2868 of 2012 and 2927 of 2013, decision dated: 27-11-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "NOOR-UL-HAQ N. QURESHI, J",
    "": "AEROTRON (PRIVATE) LIMITED through Managing Director and 2 others\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister (Chief Executive) and 9 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12140",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2152 = 2014 SLD 2152 = 2014 CLD 1210",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S. 15E--- Insider Trading--- Respondent, traded extensively in shares of a number of companies, and his trading was conducted through a brokerage company, which was holding Broker/Trading Right Entitlement Certificate of Stock Exchange---Trading of the respondent was also carried out significantly in co-relation with the trading of the Foreign clients of another broker---Information obtained from said other brokerage company, had revealed that another person, the operator in said other brokerage company was responsible for execution of the orders placed by Foreign clients---Said person being an insider had passed on/disclosed the inside information relating to trading orders received from foreign clients to the respondent---Based on said inside information, respondent indulged in insider trading---Said other person was an insider by virtue of his position and employment at the other brokerage company, whereas he gave material non-public information relating to trading orders of foreign clients to the respondent---Respondent, indulged in 'insider trading' in his account on the basis of the inside information, and earned significant amount of profit---In view of the apologetic submission of his offence, the extent of remorse experienced by him, personal circumstances of the respondent; and the hardships bore by his family, due consideration to the prayer of the respondent had been made; and a lenient view in the matter had been taken---Commission, in exercise of powers under S.15 E(1) of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1965, imposed on respondent a fine of Rs.1,100,000 (Eleven Lakh only) for contravention of subsection (1) of S.15-A of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969---Commission had also taken enforcement action against said informer and imposed fine on him for passing on/disclosing inside information pertaining to trading orders of foreign clients to the respondent under S.15-E of Securities Exchange Ordinance, 1969.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.1(14)ISMAILIQBAL/MSW/SMD/ 2013/01, dated 23rd April, 2013, decision dated: 17-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "AAMIR: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12141",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2153 = 2014 SLD 2153 = 2014 CLD 1216",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 122 & 124---Group insurance---Denial of insurance benefits to deceased's widow on ground that deceased had violated his employment contract during service---Applicant, whose husband had died in service of the appellant, had made application for recovery of insurance benefits---Claim of applicant was turned down by appellant on the ground that the applicant's husband, at the time of being in service of the appellant, was also on payroll of the Education Department, which was contrary to the terms and conditions of his contract of service---Contention of the appellant was that said concealment meant that the applicant was not entitled to receive benefits as on such concealment, his contract stood cancelled---Validity---Deceased had joined the appellant in the year 1997---During time of the deceased's service, appellant squashed the energies and capabilities of the employee till the date of his death, and deceased had netted clientage and financial benefits for the appellant, and during such time, the alleged violation of contract by the deceased, never pinched the appellant, and only at the time of making the claim in the year 2007, the appellant found the declaration made by the deceased to be false---Alleged false declaration of the deceased was tolerated during his lifetime, and no cancellation of contract or demotion was ordered---Even otherwise restraint on second employment in the contract was cast on direct or indirect employment under any other insurer transacting life insurance business, and the words \"\"any other employer\"\" meant to include any other employer transacting same business, and expression \"\"any other employer\"\" was therefore ejusdem generis in nature---Claim of applicant/widow was valid---Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.1024 of 2012, decision dated: 10-12-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ AHMAD AND SHEZADA MAZHAR, JJ",
    "": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Chairman and another\nvs\nMst. Begum RASHEEDA JAMIL"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12142",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2154 = 2014 SLD 2154 = 2014 CLD 1220",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 5(8)---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) Ss. 42 & 54---Consolidated suit for recovery of finances filed by Financial Institution and suit for declaration, permanent injunction and rendition of accounts filed by customer/borrower---Appointment of amicus curiae for assistance on technical aspects of banking transactions---High Court observed that the moot issue between parties was with regard to availed financial facilities and disbursement of the same; which could be adjudged by invoking provisions of S. 5(8) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Borrower had already applied for appointment of a commissioner and had offered payment of fee(s) for said commissioner therefore it would be in the interest of both parties that a well reputed and experienced commissioner be appointed to properly audit the accounts submitted by the parties---High Court appointed a commissioner to audit the accounts maintained by the bank with that of the borrower for the purpose of finding out the liabilities of the parties and directed that the fee for said audit be settled by the borrower and further directed the parties to associate themselves with the commissioner and make available to him, the concerned record as and when required.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "B.O.S. No. 2-P of 2012, decision dated: 3rd February, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MALIK MANZOOR HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "Messrs UNITED RUBBER (PVT.) LIMITED and 4 others--Plaintiffs\nvs\nBANK OF KHYBER, (BOK)--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12143",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2155 = 2014 SLD 2155 = 2014 CLD 1223",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S. 22---Listing Regulations of Karachi Stock Exchange, Regln.17---Delay in communicating financial results of the company---Meeting of the Board of Directors of the company was held to consider the financial results of the company for the half year ended on December 31, 2012, but the company communicated its financial results to the Karachi Stock Exchange, a day after the meeting of the Board---Karachi Stock Exchange vide its letter, communicated to the company that its letter intimating closed period was not received timely---Company was required to communicate the reasons for delay in communicating the financial results, but no response to that was received from the company---Company was established to have contravened the provisions of the Listing Regulations of the Karachi Stock Exchange and requirement stated in the Correspondence Manual of Karachi Stock Exchange---Company was expected to be conversant and fully complied with the regulatory requirement---Security Exchange Commission in exercise of the powers under S.22 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, and taking lenient view imposed penalty of Rupees Twenty Five Thousands, with direction to the company to ensure that care and caution be exercised while announcing any price sensitive information; and to ensure that full compliance be made of all rules, regulations and directives of the Commission in future for avoiding any punitive action under the law.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.1(4) ECO/MSW/SMD/2013 dated 26-03-2013, decision dated: 6-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "ECOPACK LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12144",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2156 = 2014 SLD 2156 = 2014 CLD 1228",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9(1)---Filing of suit by authorized person of the bank---Registered power of attorney in favour of officer of the bank---Scope---Court was excluded from going behind a registered power of attorney---Regional General Manager of the bank in the present case was authorized by its Board of Directors empowering him to confer authority on officers of the bank---Regional General Manager executed powers of attorney in favour of the officers signing the plaint---Such plaint filed by officers of the bank was competently filed.\n \n Haji Saghir Ahmed v. United Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 1334 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9(1)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 19 & First Sched., Art.85---Suit for recovery of finance facility---Filing of---Limitation---Acknowledgment of liability in writing by the defendant---Starts fresh period of limitation---Where defendant made an acknowledgement in writing within the limitation period from the date of finance agreement, then under S. 19 of Limitation Act, 1908 a fresh limitation period of three years was given to the plaintiff-bank for filing its claim.\n \n Harchandrai v. The Popular Metal Works, Gujranwala and 2 others PLD 1971 Kar. 925 and Allied Bank of Pakistan v. Safdar Ali Khan PLD 1988 SC(AJ&K) 199 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9(1)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 20 & First Sched., Art.85---Suit for recovery of finance facility---Filing of---Limitation---Defendant authorizing bank to sell mortgaged property--- Effect---Acknowledgment of liability---Starts fresh period of limitation---Letter from defendant giving authorization to the plaintiff-bank to sell mortgaged properties---Sale proceeds of the said properties deposited in the account of the defendant---Such deposits were acknowledgement of liability by the defendant in terms of S. 20 of Limitation Act, 1908 and started a fresh period of limitation of three years for the plaintiff/bank to file its claim.\n \n Harchandrai v. The Popular Metal Works, Gujranwala and 2 others PLD 1971 Kar. 925 and Allied Bank of Pakistan v. Safdar Ali Khan PLD 1988 SC(AJ&K) 199 rel.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 3(1) & (2)---Liability of defendant---Additional mark-up imposed by the bank---Validity---Additional mark-up outside the validity of the finance agreement could not be incorporated to impose liability on the defendant.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9(1)---Suit for recovery of finance facility---Murabaha agreements, existence of---Evident from the General Finance Agreement---Photocopies of some of the Murabaha agreements placed on record---Remaining Murabaha agreements evident from the General Finance Agreement---Plea of defendants that photocopies of only eight out of thirteen Murabaha agreements were available on record, accordingly, Murabaha finance under the five absent agreements could not be included for the purpose of liability---Validity---Such plea of defendants admitting presence of some of the Murabaha agreements was inconsistent with an earlier objection taken by them that no financing had been availed by them from the bank---Moreover the petition for leave to appear and defend the suit (\"\"PLA\"\") did not contain any such plea---Each of the Murabaha agreements pertained to a portion of sanctioned Murabaha finance under the General Finance Agreement---Murabaha agreements were made on the defendants'' request for disbursement of the sanctioned finance---Copies of eight Murabaha agreements on record was indicative of an arrangement between the parties, and in view of the bald and clearly false denial of all sanctioned finances generally, there was no need for the remaining five agreements to be placed on record---Existence of remaining five Murabaha agreements was evident from the General Finance Agreement.\n \n Zeeshan Energy Ltd. and 2 others v. Faisal Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 1741 rel.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 18(2) & (4)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.17---Finance agreement---Not attested by witnesses in terms of Art. 17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Admissibility in evidence before the Banking Court---Scope---According to S. 18(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 a document that failed to comply with requirements of Art. 17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 or any other law, may, nevertheless be received in evidence by a Banking Court---Provisions of S.18(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 diluted the effect of S. 18(2) of the said Act by excluding consequences of inadmissibility in evidence in a case where Art. 17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, was not satisfied---Notwithstanding non-attestation of a document, it shall nevertheless be admissible in evidence before the Banking Court.\n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 18(2) & (4)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.17---Finance agreement---Not attested by witnesses in terms of Art. 17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 but corroborated by supplementary documentations---Admissibility in evidence before the Banking Court---Scope---Finance agreement that failed to comply with requirements of Art. 17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 or any other law, may, nevertheless be received in evidence by Banking Court---Additionally finance agreement in the present case was corroborated by supplementary documentation executed by the defendants--- Supplementary documentation included promissory notes, letters of guarantee executed by defendants, mortgage deeds and general power of attorney for sale of property--- Finance agreement in question was thus admissible in evidence before the Banking Court.\n \n(h) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 3(2), 9(2) & (3)--- Murabaha agreement---Profit/ mark-up charged by bank---Beyond contractual period of finance--- Legality--- Profit/mark-up could not be charged by the bank beyond the life of the Murabaha agreement---Mark-up was not an interest that could be charged by a bank solely with the passage of time.\n \n Muhammad Tariq v. Bank of Punjab and another 2004 CLD 162; Messrs United Bank Ltd. through Authorized Attorneys v. M. Mubeen Khan 2012 CLD 1995 and Bank of Punjab through Authorized Officer v. Messrs KNK Infrastructure (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive Officer and 2 others 2012 CLD 961 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "P.L.A. No.18-B and C.O.S. No.6 of 2005, decision dated: 30-05-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, C.J.",
    "": "Messrs ALBARKA ISLAMIC BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs JAVED NAZIR BRothers--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12145",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2157 = 2014 SLD 2157 = 2014 CLD 1244",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)-------S. 7---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S. 22---Suit filed by plaintiff/customer seeking recovery of damages from Financial Institution/Bank---Plaintiff had contended that he had availed letter of credit facility from defendant bank and negotiated credit facilities on agreed rates and terms of conditions and subsequently delivery of his goods was delayed due to actions of the defendant bank which were, inter alia, escalation of prices, high interest and non-commercial and foul practices, which caused immense loss to the plaintiff---Held, that onus to establish veracity of allegations regarding alleged damages absolutely and unquestionably lay on the plaintiff and he had to establish that the losses and damages were caused by an act, omission or unnecessary negligence of the defendant bank or that the defendant bank had deliberately failed to comply with its responsibilities---Plaintiff had failed to establish his claims and evidence led by the plaintiff was miserably lacking in proving that he sustained damages because of any fault of defendant bank---Plaintiff had also admitted that no notice was issued to the defendant for alleged damages prior to institution of the suit---Plaintiff had therefore failed in discharging his burden to prove that he suffered alleged losses because of defendants and due to said reason, the burden never shifted to the defendant bank---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.D-14 of 2010, decision dated: 10-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR AND SHAHNAWAZ TARIQ, JJ",
    "": "AIJAZ MAHMOOD\nvs\nMessrs HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12146",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2158 = 2014 SLD 2158 = 2014 CLD 1253",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-------S. 46--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Recovery of Sales Tax---Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal---Petitioner/taxpayer contended that his appeal with regard to disputed amount of sales tax was pending before Appellate Tribunal, Inland Revenue; and during the pendency of said appeal he was issued notice for recovery of amount---Contention of petitioner/taxpayer was that unless appeal was decided by at least one independent forum outside the departmental hierarchy, recovery should not be made by Department---High Court directed Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, to decide the appeal or stay application of the petitioner/taxpayer within a period of thirty days, till decision of appeal or stay application, whichever was earlier and no coercive measures should be adopted against the petitioner/taxpayer for the disputed amount---Constitutional petition was disposed of, accordingly.\n \n Messrs Pak Saudi Fertilizers Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2002 PTD 679; Messrs. Z.N. Exports (Private) Limited v. Collector of Sales Tax 2003 PTD 1746 and Additional Collector-II Sales Tax, Lahore v. Messrs Abdullah Sugar Mills Limited and others 2003 PTD 1664 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition 4005 of 2014, decision dated: 17-02-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, J",
    "": "Messrs NIAGARA MILLS (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary (Revenue Division), Federation Board of Revenue, and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12147",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2159 = 2014 SLD 2159 = 2014 CLD 1255",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.3 (2), 9 & 10---State Bank of Pakistan BCD Circular No. 32 dated 26-11-1984---Suit for recovery of finance---Statement of accounts---Cost of funds---Miscellaneous charges---Despite service of process through all mode prescribed under law, defendants remained unrepresented and nobody filed application to seek leave to defend the suit---Plea raised by bank was that suit be decreed in terms of amount reflected in statement of accounts along with cost of funds, miscellaneous and EDS charges---Validity---Presumption of correctness was attached to entries made in certified statement of accounts but such presumption attached to statement of accounts was only to the extent that entries/figures made in statement of accounts were true per books of accounts---Merely on the basis of such presumption, bank's suit could not be straight away decreed as prayed---Bank, per break-up of liabilities given in certified statement of accounts also claimed/debited other charges and EDS charges but the same were declined for want of requisite documents and proof, as in absence of materials, vouchers etc. the same could not be granted---Payment of 'penalty' in the event of delay in payment of agreed purchase price was prohibited in Islamic System of Finance read with in juxtaposition of State Bank of Pakistan BCD Circular No.32, dated 26-11-1984---High Court declined markup beyond the date of expiry of finance agreements, as it could not be allowed---Even in absence of leave to defend application in terms of S.10(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, courts were supposed to do justice and not perpetuate injustice---Jurisdiction vested in courts was to advance cause of justice instead of causing miscarriage of justice---High Court decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff bank and against defendants including cost of funds in terms of S.3(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--- Suit was decreed accordingly.\n \n Messrs Union Bank of Middle East Limited v. Messrs Zubna Limited and 3 others PLD 1987 Kar. 206; Messrs Ahmad Autos and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited PLD 1990 SC 497; PLD 1987 Kar. 207; Muhammad Arshad and another v. Citibank N.A., Lahore 2006 SCMR 1347; United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Sartaj Industries through Qaiser Iqbal, Managing Partner and 6 others PLD 1990 Lah. 99 and Messrs Huffaz Seamlen Pipe Industries Ltd. and 2 others v. Messrs Security Leasing Corporation Ltd. 2002 SCMR 1419 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-79 of 2012, decision dated: 8-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZ-UR-REHMAN, J",
    "": "HABIB METROPOLITAN BANK LTD. through Attorneys--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs HAYS (PVT.) LTD. and 8 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12148",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2160 = 2014 SLD 2160 = 2014 CLD 1273",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S. 22---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, Third Sched., Code of Conduct clause D(2)---Failure to deposit amount of penalty---Securities and Exchange Commission, vide its order imposed a penalty of Rs.50,000 on the company, with direction to deposit said amount of penalty in the account of the Commission, not later than 30 days from the date of order; and furnish copy of the deposit challan to the Commission---Company, instead of complying with the order of the Commission, filed appeal before the Appellate Bench in terms of S.33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997---Said appeal was dismissed and order of the Commission was upheld---Company had failed to provide the desired information after repeated reminders---Company, in circumstances, had contravened clause D(2) of Code of Conduct set forth under the Third Schedule of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001---Conduct of the company of flagrant contravention of the direction of the Commission, was appalling and concerning---Broker holding a certificate of registration, had to all times abide by the Code of Conduct, specified in the Brokers Rules---Each and every market participant was bound to comply with the general and specific directions issued by the Commission---Violation of the Rules and Regulations, was serious matter---Commission taking a lenient view, strictly warned the company to comply with its direction, in future, failing which appropriate action would be taken---Company was further directed to ensure that full compliance be made of all rules, regulations and directors of the Commission in future for avoiding any punitive action under the law.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.MISC/MSW/SMD/1(5)/2004/1738, dated 7-06-2013, decision dated: 28-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "FAIRTRADE CAPITAL SECURITIES (PVT.) LIMITED THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICIn the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12149",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2161 = 2014 SLD 2161 = 2014 CLD 1275",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Auction of mortgaged property---Plaintiff sought to restrain auction of mortgaged property by the Bank on the ground that plaintiff being the owner of the property Bank could not auction the property---Held, that there was nothing on record to show that the plaintiff was the owner of the plots in question---Plaintiff placed on record allotment letters wherein the plaintiff was not shown as a owner of the said plots---Plaintiff had filed a summary of an arbitration award which confirmed that the plaintiff did not own any plot but claimed an interest in the allotment of plots on account of losses it had suffered due to failure of a housing project---Plaintiff had filed a suit for damages and rendition of accounts against the Housing Society, and even if its prayers in the said suit were allowed, it would not be entitled to the plots sought to be auctioned--- Application to restrain the respondents from auctioning the plots was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.76 of 2013, decision dated: 9-10-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. AYESHA A. MALIK, J",
    "": "ACRO DEVELOPERS (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive--Plaintiff\nvs\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Branch Manager and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12150",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2162 = 2014 SLD 2162 = 2014 CLD 1279",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-------S.12(2)---\"\"Initial Environmental Examination (IEE)\"\" and \"\"Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)\"\"---Distinction---Two separate streams have been envisaged under S.12(2) of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, one relating to projects requiring an IEE and the other to those in relation to which an EIA must be submitted.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 201--- Judgment of High Court---Scope---Subject only to a different view being expressed by Supreme Court, interpretation of statutory provisions by a High Court is of binding effect in the Province concerned.\n \n(c) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Purpose of rules of interpretation is, in the end, to discover and apply legislative intent.\n \n(d) Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)---\n \n----S. 12(2), Scheds. I & II---Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)---Object, scope and purpose---Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, is beneficial legislation enacted for welfare of public at large---If in ensuring that its objectives are achieved, a particular person (i.e. proponent of a given project) is put to greater inconvenience or a more onerous burden is cast on him, then so be it---If a project can be regarded as falling within two different entries, one set out in Sched-I and the other in Sched-II, then it must be regarded as falling within the latter hence requiring an EIA.\n \n(e) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----S. 42--- \"\"Declaratory suit\"\" and \"\"seeking of declaration\"\"--- Distinction--- Every suit in which a declaration is sought is not and does not have to be a declaratory suit under S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877.\n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXXIX, R.2---Term 'injury'---Connotation---Term 'injury' as used in O. XXXIX, R. 2, C.P.C. has always been broadly construed and applied---All manner of acts contrary to law, including breach of statutory duty, fall within the scope of an 'injury' to which O. XXXIX, R. 2, C.P.C. can apply.\n \n(g) Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)---\n \n----S. 12---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Interim injunction, grant of---Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)---Defence Housing Authority filed suit against defendant company seeking stay of construction of an underpass on the plea that no EIA had been sought for the construction---Validity---Defence Housing Authority had established a prima facie case as there was a serious breach of applicable statutory provisions---Project in question required EIA but Environment Agency had purported to accord approval of IEE---Mandatory requirements relating to public participation and hearing and solicitation of comments from concerned government agencies were not complied with---Project had a direct and close connection with Defence Housing Authority administered areas and the same would be affected by the Project---High Court restrained and stopped all construction in relation to or touching upon the Project---Karachi Metropolitan Corporation as proponent was not prevented from submitting an EIA for consideration by the Agency and if the same would be submitted it must be accorded on top priority---Application was allowed accordingly.\n \nSalma Iqbal Chundrigar and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2009 CLD 682; Salim Godil and others v. Province of Sindh and others 2014 CLD 222; Standard Chartered Bank v. KMC and others C.P. No.D-3851 of 2012; 2011 SCMR 1743; Matloob Ali Khan v. Additional District Judge East, Karachi and another 1988 SCMR 747; Defence Flyover case, Shehri CBE v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 2007 Kar. 293; Sultan v. Province of Sindh 2004 CLC 392; Muhammad Umer Baig v. Sultan Mehmood Khan and another PLD 1970 SC 139; Ilyas Ahmed v. Muhammad Munir and others PLD 2012 Sindh 92 and Nestle Milkpak Ltd. v. Sindh Institute of Urology and others PLD 2007 Kar. 11 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.538 of 2014, decision dated: 29-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "PAKISTAN DEFENCE OFFICERS HOUSING AUTHORITY--Plaintiff\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Environmental Protection and 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12151",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2163 = 2014 SLD 2163 = 2014 CLD 1410",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014-------Rr. 17 & 16---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition--- Public procurement--- Pre-qualification and pre-qualification process---Petitioner in pursuance of a notice of pre-qualification, submitted its applications for pre-qualification, and subsequently petitioner's name was not mentioned in the list of firms which were pre-qualified for the bidding process---Grievance of the petitioner was that respondent authorities had, with mala fide, not pre-qualified the petitioner and had not given any reasons for its non-pre-qualification---Held, that under R. 17(3) of the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014 the procuring agency shall promptly inform the contractor who had applied for pre-qualification, whether or not he had pre-qualified, and under R.17(4), shall on request from the contractor, communicate to him the reasons for not pre-qualifying the contractor---Petitioner in the present case, had been intimated promptly regarding its non-pre-qualification and it was not the case of the petitioner that it had applied for reasons for the same and no application or request was made by the petitioner to the procuring agency for supply of reasons---Question as to whether a particular contractor was pre-qualified or not was either a policy issue or commercial transaction requiring specialized fields and courts lacked expertise to express any opinion as to technical expertise or managerial capabilities of the contractor--- Courts ordinarily refrain from entering into the policy making domain of executive authority unless the same smacked of arbitrariness, favoritism and a total disregard for mandate of law---Question as to whether petitioners were qualified or not being a factual controversy, could not be resolved by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n Writ Petition No.25522 of 2011 distinguished.\n \n Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 455; Afzal Motors Company (Pvt.) Limited v. Province of Sindh and others 2009 SCMR 659 and Public Health Contractors Welfare Association v. Province of Punjab and others 2004 MLD 21 rel.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Judicial review of executive actions---Policy making domain of the executive---Courts ordinarily refrain from entering into the policy making domain of executive authority unless the same smacked of arbitrariness, favoritism and a total disregard for mandate of law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4872 of 2014, heard on 6-03-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, J",
    "": "Messrs KHALID AND BROTHER through Proprietor and 5 others\nvs\nPUNJAB PROVINCE through Secretary Housing Urban Development and Public Health Engineering Department, Punjab, Lahore High Court and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12152",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2164 = 2014 SLD 2164 = 2014 CLD 1313",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of finance---Non-decision of miscellaneous applications by Banking Court before passing and decree---Effect---Defendant assailed and decree passed by Banking Court on the ground that such applications pending before the court remained undecided before passing of decree---Validity---Decision of pending applications in either way would not affect, alter and change merits and final findings of passed by Banking Court---Defendant could not take any benefit in such context by mere agitating technicalities, while he had failed to establish his case on merits---High Court declined to set aside and decree passed by Banking Court mere in the score of pendency of miscellaneous applications---Banking Court took into consideration all material facts relating to controversy and documentary evidence placed on record was fully discussed and perused--- Defendant failed to point out any illegality and infirmity in passed by Banking Court, which did not call for any interference and the same was maintained--- Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n 2006 CLD 132 and 1993 CLC 334 distinguished.\n \n Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited v. Messrs Rupali Cotton Industries and 4 others 2002 CLD 1430 and Muhammad Arshad and others v. City Bank N.A., Lahore 2006 SCMR 1347 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.13 of 2010, decision dated: 10-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR AND SHAHNAWAZ TARIQ, JJ",
    "": "AIJAZ MAHMOOD\nvs\nMessrs HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12153",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2165 = 2014 SLD 2165 = 2014 CLD 1327",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Precedent-------Legal principles must in the end be applied to facts before Court in each case and such application may sometimes lead to divergent results.\n \n(b) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLVII of 1980)---\n \n----Ss. 3(2)(h) & 4(4)---Suit for recovery of claim arising out of carriage of goods agreement---Action in rem---Plaintiff alleged that on arrival of vessel, consignment was short delivered, landing of which resulted into loss in a sum of Rs.18,672,038.60---In compliance of ad interim order, defendant vessel initially filed letter of undertaking and subsequently it was replaced with bank guarantee equivalent to suit amount---Validity---Plaintiff claimed that landed quantity was less than that consigned---Prima facie question existed with regard to quantity that was delivered to plaintiff---Such question could not be answered with reference to draught survey reports---Inherent vice or method of delivery that could have resulted in loss or spillage and others were either questions of fact or at the most mixed questions of law and fact---Such questions could not be addressed at initial stage and determination was also deferred to as it was dependant on the outcome of trial---Plaintiff was able to make out a prima facie case with regard to its claim of short delivery/landing of the consignment---Plaintiff had made out a case in terms of S.3(2)(h) read with S.4(4) of Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980, for action in rem against the vessel---Balance of convenience was in favour of plaintiff who might suffer irreparable loss and injury, especially if surety provided was discharged---High Court directed that surety furnished pursuant to ad interim order was to remain in place for duration of the suit---Application was allowed in circumstances.\n \n I Congreso del Partido [1981] 1 All ER 1092, 1099; Metal Construction of Greece SA v. Owners of the vessel m.v. Lady Rea 2013 CLD 1829; Sunrise Maritime Inc. v. Uvisco Ltd. (\"\"The Hector\"\") [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep 287 and Homburg Houtimport BV v. Agrosin Private Ltd. and others \"\"(The Starsin\"\") [2003] 2 All ER 785 ref.\n \n V.N. Lakhani & Co. v. m.v. Lakatoi Express and others PLD 1994 SC 894; 1994 CLC 1498; Sun Line Agencies Ltd. v. Psiloritis and others 1984 CLC 1553; Atlantic Steamer's Supply Company v. m.v. Titisee and others PLD 1993 SC 88; Khadija Edible Oil Refinery (Pvt.) Ltd. v. m.t. Galaxy and others 2011 CLD 1329; 2011 CLD 709; The Evpo Agnic [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 411 and 2011 CLD 1343 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Adm. Suit No.1 of 2008, decision dated: 22-11-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD.--Plaintiff\nvs\nM.V. \"\"AVIONA\"\" and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12154",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2166 = 2014 SLD 2166 = 2014 CLD 1351",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 122 & 124---Group Insurance---Appellant Insurance Company impugned the order of Insurance Tribunal, whereby it was ordered to pay life insurance claim to the father of deceased employee of Insurance Company---Contention of the appellant Insurance Company was that the deceased was only appointed as a Sales Officer and was not holding a valid license to work at the time of his death---Held, that deceased was a bona fide worker and it was noticeable in the vouchers that he held a licence---Appellant Insurance Company, it appeared, squashed the energies and capabilities of their employee till the date of his death, who netted financial benefits and clientage for the company, and only at the time of making the claim, it was found that he had no valid license---No illegality in the impugned order was found---Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Insurance Appeal No.5 of 2013, heard on 12-02-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI BAQAR NAJAFI AND MISS AALIA NEELUM, JJ",
    "": "STATE LIFE INSURACNE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Chairman and another\nvs\nMUHAMMAD ASHRAF"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12155",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2167 = 2014 SLD 2167 = 2014 CLD 1323",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 115, 118 & 121---Claim arising out of insurance policy issued before commencement of Insurance Ordinance, 2000---Forum---Recovery of liquidated damages on late settlement of claim---Commencement date of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 was 19-8-2000---Insurance policy in question was issued on 1-7-2000, prior to commencement of said Ordinance---Claimant sought recovery of liquidated damages on late settlement of claim, which claim was allowed by the Insurance Tribunal---Legality---Section 118 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 regarding payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claim would not extend to policies issued before the commencement of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, therefore, Insurance Tribunal set up under the said Ordinance would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter---Claimant was permitted to go to the civil court for his claim--- Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n Mst. Robina Bibi v. State Life Insurance and others 2013 CLD 477; Civil Appeals Nos.449-L of 2009, 284 to 286, 283-L, 586-L to 591-L, 609-L to 613-L, 637-L to 640-L and 767-L of 2013, 817, 818 of 2010, 56-L, 63-L of 2011, 623-L to 628-L, 723-L, 726-L to 731-L of 2013 and Civil Petitions Nos.1253-L of 2011 and 1516-L to 1521-L of 2013 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.786 of 2012, heard on 13-03-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI BAQAR NAJAFI AND ATIR MAHMOOD, JJ",
    "": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Attorney\nvs\nMst. KANEEZ BIBI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12156",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2168 = 2014 SLD 2168 = 2014 CLD 1343",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 27 & 22---Interpretation of S.27 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Suit for recovery was decreed in terms of compromise between the parties, and subsequently, the defendant filed another suit seeking to take advantage of a State Bank Circular---Contention of the defendant was inter alia, that till such time the proceedings of the second suit culminate, status quo with regard to mortgaged property had to be maintained---Held, defendant had sought indirect relief for setting aside or modification of the and decree passed in the first suit, against which defendant had not filed appeal and decree had obtained finality---Under S.27 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 no court or authority was prohibited to revise, recall, call or permit or call into question the and decree of Banking Court or the legality or propriety of anything done by the Banking Court, subject to provisions of S.22 of the Ordinance---Legislature in its anxiety to protect orders of the Banking Court had gone to the extent of ordaining that no authority other than the appellate forum shall even allow to throw a challenge to the validity of orders of the Banking Court and the same could not be assailed before any forum except by the way of appeal---Only possibility in which an injunction or restraining orders against execution of decree and sale of mortgaged property could be granted, would be on the presumption that decree in the first suit might be modified, altered and or set aside, which could not be presumed under provisions of S.27 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--- Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.7 of 2013, decision dated: 4-01-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB AND MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs THARPARKAR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED through Authorized Representative and 7 others\nvs\nBANKERS EQUITY LIMITED through Official Liquidator"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12157",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2169 = 2014 SLD 2169 = 2014 CLD 1341",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 11, 10 & 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O. XII, R. 6---Suit for recovery---Admission in pleadings---Interim decree to the extent of the admitted amount---Plaintiff Bank sought interim decree for the amount admitted by the defendants in their application for leave to defend---Validity---Amount was admitted by the defendants as the net amount due and payable to the plaintiff Bank, whereas the suit was filed by the plaintiff was for a greater amount---Section 11 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 read with O.XII, R.6, C.P.C., empowered the court to pass an interim decree on basis of admitted amount---High Court passed a preliminary interim decree for the admitted amount and directed that arguments for leave to defend for the balance amount shall be heard on a later date---Application was allowed, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.71 of 2011, decision dated: 17-02-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "AYESHA A. MALIK, J",
    "": "BANK OF PUNJAB through SVP--Plaintiff\nvs\nT&N PAKISTAN PVT. LTD. through Chief Executive and 7 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12158",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2170 = 2014 SLD 2170 = 2014 CLD 1354",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9(2) & 10(4)---Banker's Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891) Ss.2(8) & 4---Suit for recovery---Certification of statement of account by \"\"Principal Accountant\"\" or Manager\"\"---Requirements--- Application for leave to defend was dismissed--- Defendant raised objection regarding authenticity of statement of account filed by plaintiff/Bank---Contention of defendant was that statement of account had not been certified by the \"\"Principal Accountant\"\" or \"\"Manager\"\" of the Bank in terms of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, and had instead been certified by a \"\"Senior Officer\"\", therefore, the same was defective---Validity---Defendant at this stage, after the leave to defend application had been dismissed, could not raise such an objection, and even otherwise in the defendant's application for leave to defend, no single entry or illustration in the statement of account was shown to be incorrect nor any discrepancy was shown therein---Statement of account carried presumption of truth by virtue of S.4 of the Banker's Books Evidence Act, 1891 when entries therein were not rebutted with cogent reasons---Every Financial Institution had a \"\"principal accountant\"\" and \"\"manager\"\", but it was not necessary that the said titles of designations were allocated to such officers or were mentioned with their names---No legal bar existed for a Senior Officer, who in the opinion of the Financial Institution was qualified and capable of handling and supervising accounts, to be assigned the task, charge and responsibility of a \"\"principal accountant\"\" or \"\"manager\"\"---Defendants had not made the case that the officer who certified the statement of account was not a senior officer or that the statement of account did not bear any certification---Officer, in the present case, was admittedly a senior officer and attorney of the plaintiff Financial Institution, and power of attorney had been executed in his favour by the plaintiff Bank, which was on record---In any such organization, a senior officer was certainly deemed to be senior or at least equivalent to a manager---Statement of account filed by the plaintiff Bank could not be discarded and the plaintiff could not be non-suited only for the reason that instead of the titles of \"\"Principal Accountant\"\" or \"\"Manager\"\", the title \"\"Senior Officer\"\" had been mentioned with the name of the plaintiff's officer who had certified the statement of account---Statement of account filed by the plaintiff Bank therefore fulfilled the requirements of S.2(8) of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 and S.9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Suit was decreed, in circumstances.\n \n Bankers Equity Limited through Principal Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 931; Messrs Liaquat Flour and General Mills through Partners and 3 others v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 2007 CLD 188; National Bank of Pakistan through Manager v. Messrs Mujahid Nawaz Cotton Ginners through Partners and 6 others 2007 CLD 678; Bankers Equity Limited and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited through Chief Executive and 7 others 2010 CLD 651; Messrs Soneri Bank Limited v. Messrs Compass Trading Corporation (Pvt.) Limited through Director/Chief Executive and 3 others 2012 CLD 1302 and Pakistan Kuwait Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited through Authorized Representative v. Messrs Active Apparels International and 6 others 2012 CLD 1036 distinguished.\n \n Equity Participation Fund v. Messrs Abbrasive Products C. Limited and 4 others 2012 CLD 971; Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd. v. Mian Abdul Jabbar and another 2013 CLD 88; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Apollo Textile Mills Limited and 4 others 2012 CLD 189; Silk Bank Limited v. Messrs Dewan Sugar Mills Limited 2011 CLC 436; Habib Bank Limited through Authorized Attorney v. Haidri Homes through Partners and 3 others 2012 CLD 2016; Mrs. Jawahar Afzal v. Messrs United Bank Limited 2003 CLD 119; Sh. Abdul Sattar Lasi v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and 6 others 2006 CLD 18; Messrs International Traders and others v. Union Bank Limited 2003 CLD 1464; Messrs United Steel Corporation, Moman Pura, Darughawala, G.T. Road, Lahore and 4 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 1999 YLR 2071; Grindlays Bank Limited v. Messrs Cheap John 1992 CLC 1108 and United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Sartaj Industries through Qaisar Iqbal, Managing Partner and 6 others PLD 1990 Lah. 99 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Procedure of Banking Court---Passing of decree---Admission by defendant---Non-disputing of liability---Effect---Non-disputing of liability by the defendant would be sufficient to draw conclusion that decree had been passed on admissible documents.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-117 of 2011, decision dated: 6-02-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "IGI INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED through Attorney--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs ADMORE GAS (PVT.) LTD. and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12159",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2171 = 2014 SLD 2171 = 2014 CLD 1364",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 23 & 19---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.52---Lis pendens, principle of---Applicability---Sale of mortgaged property---Bona fide purchaser---Scope---Suit for recovery was decreed, and mortgaged property was ordered to be auctioned by the plaintiff Bank---Contention of the appellants was that they were bona fide purchasers of the suit property which could not be sold as satisfaction for the decree---Validity---Appellants purchased the property three months after the passing of the decree and under S.23 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001; a suit was converted into an execution application after passing of decree and no formal application was required to be made in this regard---Appellants purchased the property at less price therefore, the purchase of the appellants did not seem to be bona fide--- Principle of lis pendens defeated rights of the appellants--- Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.133 of 2010, heard on 5-03-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND IJAZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN and another\nvs\nJUDGE BANKING COURT NO.1, MULTAN and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12160",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2172 = 2014 SLD 2172 = 2014 CLD 1378",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------S. 4---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 17(2)(a)---\"\"Promissory note\"\"--- Attestation of--- Not a legal requirement---Instrument which fulfilled all the conditions mentioned in S. 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 would be termed as a \"\"promissory note\"\"---Such an instrument was not required to be attested in terms of Art. 17(2)(a) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984.\n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 4---Stamp Act (II of 1899), Ss. 35 & 36---Promissory note---Insufficiently stamped---Neither invalid nor void---Admissibility in evidence of an insufficiently stamped promissory note--- Scope--- Insufficiently stamped Promissory Note was neither invalid nor a void instrument, but it was only subject to disabilities mentioned in S. 35 of the Stamp Act, 1881---Deficiently stamped pro note was not admissible in evidence nor it could be acted upon unless duly stamped---However in terms of S. 36 of Stamp Act, 1881 if a deficiently stamped instrument was once admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, it was not permissible for the Court of first instance, or in appeal or in revision to exclude such instrument from its consideration---Provisions of S. 36 of Stamp Act, 1881 were mandatory in nature and had overriding effect on S. 35 of the said Act imposing a complete bar to question the admissibility of a Promissory Note once it had been admitted and exhibited in evidence without any objection from the other side and included all such instruments which fell under proviso (a) to S.35 of the Stamp Act, 1881.\n \n Ch. Khalid Mehmood v. Ch. Said Muhammad PLD 2005 Lah. 732 ref.\n \n(c) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 4---Stamp Act (II of 1899), Ss. 35 & 36---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VIII, R.1 & O. XIV, R. 1(5)---Promissory Note insufficiently stamped---Admissibility in evidence--- Scope--- Irrespective of the fact that the Promissory note produced by the plaintiff in evidence was insufficiently stamped, it was neither challenged by the defendant in his written statement nor an issue was framed in regard to it--- Insufficiently stamped promissory note was admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit without objection, thus it could not be discarded on the ground that it was insufficiently stamped---Section 36 of the Stamp Act, 1881 debarred the defendant from calling in question the admissibility of such a Promissory Note on the ground that it was insufficiently stamped---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.1428 of 2007, decision dated: 14-05-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR-UL-MULK, AMIR HANI MUSLIM AND IJAZ AHMED CHAUDHRY, JJ",
    "": "Sheikh MUHAMMAD SHAKEEL\nvs\nSheikh Hafiz MUHAMMAD ASLAM"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12161",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2173 = 2014 SLD 2173 = 2014 CLD 1384",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (XLVI of 1981), S. 2---Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010, R.2(1)(d)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Chairman and directors of a company (\"\"petitioners\"\")---Alleged default in repayment of loan---Pending recovery suit---Placing name of alleged defaulter on Exit Control List (ECL) during pendency of recovery suit---Legality---Right to travel abroad---Scope---Mere fact that there was a claim against a person by a commercial bank, which was yet to be adjudicated upon, was no ground for placing name of such person on the Exit Control List or to deprive him of his fundamental right to travel abroad or restrict his right of free movement---No one could be termed a \"\"defaulter\"\" unless so declared by a court of competent jurisdiction---Courts established under the Banking laws were the sole authority to adjudicate upon the default in cases involving commercial loans---Recovery suit filed by the bank was pending, and no determination had been made by the Banking Court relating to status of petitioners as defaulters---No power vested with the commercial bank, the State Bank of Pakistan or for that matter the Federal Government to declare a person to be in default---Such power solely vested with the courts of competent jurisdiction---Any action on part of either the commercial bank or the State Bank of Pakistan, to determine that a customer was in default of an amount calculated by the bank and thereafter recommending placement of his name on the Exit Control List, was notonly violative of settled principles of law but amounted to making the entire system of banking law and banking courts redundant---Petitioners were not given an opportunity of being heard by giving them a notice---Besides petitioners had furnished adequate and sufficient securities to the lending bank to cover the entire alleged claim of the bank, if and when decreed---As such the lending bank was adequately covered in terms of its financial risk---Act of placing name of petitioners on the Exit Control List was without lawful authority and of no legal effect---High Court directed that the name of petitioners should immediately be removed from the Exit Control List---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\n \n Munir Ahmad Bhatti v. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior PLD 2010 SC 697; Higher Education Commission through Project Manager v. Sajid Anwar and others 2012 SCMR 186; Hassan Raz through Lawfully Constituted Attorney v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others 2012 CLD 92; Messrs Zurash Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director and 4 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 3 others 2011 CLD 511; Writ Petition No.20730 of 2010 and Writ Petition No.7713 of 2010 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Arts. 2A, 4, 9, 15 & 25---Right to travel abroad---Scope---Right of a citizen to travel was a Fundamental Right guaranteed by Arts. 2A, 4, 9, 15 & 25 of the Constitution.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Part II, Chapter 1 [Arts. 8 to 28] & Art. 199---Fundamental rights, abridgment of--- Scope---Fundamental rights were sacred and could not be lightly allowed to be taken away or abridged on the whims of private parties or even the State except in accordance with the law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4594 of 2013, decision dated: 20-03-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ UL AHSAN, J",
    "": "JAHANGIR MEHMOOD CHEEMA and another\nvs\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, Islamabad High Court High Court through Secretary and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12162",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2174 = 2014 SLD 2174 = 2014 CLD 1367",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes-------Mandatory provision---Effect---Mandatory provisions of a statute are required to be complied strictly and no deviation of whatsoever nature is acceptable unless otherwise required by law---Compliance of mandatory provision of law is more important than wisdom of individual which negates such compliance.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.VII, R.11---Rejection of plaint---Principle---Still born or incompetent suit should be burried at its inception so that no time is consumed on a fruitless litigation and that in the same breath it may give chance to parties to retrace their steps at the earliest possible moment so that if permissible may find a properly instituted case.\n \n Messrs Standard Hotels (Private) Limited v. Messrs Rio Centre and others 1994 CLC 2413 and Muhammad Akhtar and others v. Abdul Hadi and others 1981 SCMR 878 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Rejection of plaint---Statement of accounts, not certified---Plaintiff, financial institution, did not append certified statement of accounts with the plaint---Defendant besides challenging entire claim and refuting recovery amount raised point of competence---Validity---Claim under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was based on accounts and once such accounts did not qualify test, it could not be a basis of passing decree in favour of plaintiff and on such score claim must fail---Claim of plaintiff financial institution could neither be established nor did it lie as the claim lacked necessary compliance of S. 9(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Plaint was rejected in circumstances.\n \n Bankers Equity Limited v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and others 2003 CLD 931; 2010 CLD 651 and Soneri Bank Limited v. Compass Trading Limited 2012 CLD 1302 ref.\n \n National Bank of Pakistan v. Mujahid Nawaz Cotton Ginners 2007 CLD 788; Apollo Textile Mills Limited v. Soneri Bank Limited 2012 CLD 337; Messrs Standard Hotels (Private) Limited v. Messrs Rio Centre and others 1994 CLC 2413 and Muhammad Akhtar and others v. Abdul Hadi and others 1981 SCMR 878 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-89 of 2012, decision dated: 5-03-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, J",
    "": "HABIB METROPOLITAN BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nABID NISAR--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12163",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2175 = 2014 SLD 2175 = 2014 CLD 1398",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. I., R.10, O.XXI, Rr. 84, 85 & 86---Execution of decree---Auction bidder---Impleading of necessary party---Entitlement---During pendency of suit, intervener sought himself to be impleaded as necessary party, on the plea that he was auction bidder of suit property during execution proceedings of decree passed by Banking Court---Validity---Proposed intervener failed to deposit 25% bid money with Banking Court concerned and could not assume status of auction purchaser---Against proposed intervener no relief was claimed in the suit---It was not necessary to join intervener as necessary party---Writ of attachment was issued in respect of property in question by Banking Court in execution proceedings, therefore, High Court declined to restrain Banking Court from executing decree--- Application was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.960 of 2010, decision dated: 11-07-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED SAEED-UD-DIN NASIR, J",
    "": "Mrs. HUSNA RIZVI--Plaintiff\nvs\nMrs. KIRAN ASIF ALI CHUDHARY and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12164",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2176 = 2014 SLD 2176 = 2014 CLD 1402",
    "Key Words:": "Commodity Exchange and Futures Contract Rules, 2005-------Rr. 11 & 12(4)---Application for grant of certificate of registration as a Broker---Submission of false experience certificate--- Applicant submitted application to the Securities and Exchange Commission and it was observed that applicant had submitted experience certificate, provided by a company stating therein that applicant had more than five years of experience in the relevant field---Further probe, revealed that said certificate was fake/false---Applicant had nothing to present in its defence, and was watchful of the fact that the certificate provided by him was false---Applicant lacked the required experience in the business of buying, selling and dealing in commodities, commodity futures contract or other securities as required under R.11(1) of Commodity Exchange and Futures Contract Rules, 2005--- Application of the applicant was refused in terms of R.12(4) of Commodity Exchange and Futures Contract Rules, 2005---Applicant was strictly prohibited to undertake any regulated financial activity, unless registered with the relevant authority.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.4/BRC-246/PMEX/SMD/2012 dated 19-06-2013, decision dated: 17-07-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "MESSRS PEOPLES FINANCIAL SERVICES (PVT.) LTD.: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12165",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2177 = 2014 SLD 2177 = 2014 CLD 1404",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908). O. XXI, Rr.89 & 90---Recovery suit--- Auction of -debtor's property---Legality---Objection petition filed by -debtor contending that auction process was irregular and illegal---Validity---Bid sheet was prepared by the auctioneer appointed by the Banking Court, who conducted the auction proceedings and submitted his detailed report---Said report reflected that proper steps were taken for conducting the auction proceedings and the highest bid was accepted, which was more than the value of the property shown by the -debtor---Judgment-debtor contended that auction proceedings were irregular and illegal but filed an application before the Banking Court under S. 19(7) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, instead of making an application under O. XXI, Rr. 89 & 90, C.P.C.---Even if objection petition of -debtor was treated as an application under O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90, C.P.C., -debtor had failed to deposit the amounts as mandated in the said Rules, without which the objections could not be entertained---Banking Court had issued notices in terms of S. 19(7) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 in the execution proceedings and thereafter it followed the inbuilt mechanism provided therein, which was summary in nature, thus the Banking Court was not bound to follow the procedure provided under O.XXI, C.P.C.---Highest bidder had deposited the auction amount within the stipulated time, and possession of property in dispute had already been delivered to the highest bidder---No inherent defect was found in the procedure adopted by the Banking Court in terms of S.19(7) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, Rr. 89 & 90---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S. 19---Recovery suit---Sale of debtor's property by auction---Objection application against such sale---Pre-requisites---Deposit of amount---Order XXI, Rr. 89 & 90, C.P.C. mandated that the objector should deposit the amounts mentioned in the said Rules along with the objection application---In the absence of the deposit, the application and or objection could not be entertained by a Banking Court.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI---Recovery suit---Sale of -debtor's property by auction--- Summary procedure--- Once the Banking Court adopted the summary procedure provided under S.19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, it was not bound to follow the procedure provided under O.XXI, C.P.C. in execution proceedings.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.189 of 2006, decision dated: 3rd June, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR-UL-MULK, AMIR HANI MUSLIM AND IJAZ AHMED CHAUDHRY, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NICE N EASY FASHION (PVT.) LTD. and others\nvs\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12166",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2178 = 2014 SLD 2178 = 2014 CLD 1509",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)-------S. 33---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss. 231 & 263---Appeal against interim order, competency of---Inspection of the books of account and papers of the company, was conducted under the order of Securities and Exchange Commission, under provisions of S.231 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, to verify the sale transaction of land of the company; and to verify the loan from Directors and sponsors---Transaction with respect to sale of land, prima facie, cast serious doubts on the legitimacy of transactions/activities, and had necessitated further investigation into the affairs of the company--- Authorities, in exercise of powers conferred under the provisions of S.263 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, appointed Inspectors to conduct investigation on all aspects of the company; and to furnish report along with supporting documents to the Commission within 30 days from the date of the order--- Validity--- Impugned order was an interim order to investigate the affairs of the company, with no penal repercussions for the company---Section 33(1)(d) of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997, had provided that no appeal would lie against an interim order, which did not dispose of the entire matter---Appeal against order of investigation, being an interim order, was not maintainable, which was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.13 of 2013, decision dated: 18-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MOHAMMAD ASIF ARIF, COMMISSIONER (INSURANCE) AND ZAFAR ABDULLAH, COMMISSIONER (SSD, OED, SED & LLGCD)",
    "": "Messrs CLIMAX ENGINEERING COMPANY LIMITED\nvs"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12167",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2179 = 2014 SLD 2179 = 2014 CLD 1424",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 19, 15 & 22---Civil Procedure Court (V of 1908), S.151---Execution of decree of Banking Court---Auction of mortgaged property---Higher bid made by person after conclusion of auction proceedings and confirmation of sale to the auction-purchaser--- Effect--- Mortgaged property was auctioned with the intervention of the court and after following of the procedure, sale was confirmed in favour of auction-purchaser---One month after conclusion of auction proceedings, appellant filed application under S. 151, C.P.C., offering a higher amount for the said property and prayed that appellant's higher bid should be accepted---Validity---Appellant failed to participate in auction and application under S. 151, C.P.C. was filed after one month and eight days from the conclusion of the auction proceedings---Nothing had been stated by the appellant to point out commission of any fraud, irregularity, inadvertence, error or mistake on part of Banking Court or the procedure adopted for the auction---Appellant was neither party to the suit or execution nor participated in the auction proceedings and after a delay of one month and eight days, appellant filed an application under S.151, C.P.C. for acceptance of an offer that the appellant had never made at the time of auction---Banking Court had confirmed the bid in favour of the auction-purchaser and had adopted the procedure and mechanism under the law for the same, therefore, appellant had no locus standi to raise any objection to the auction proceedings---Nothing should be left to the sweet will of any individual to bypass such legal procedure on the pretext that he/she was ready to offer to pay more money than the highest bid made during the auction, which was concluded after following the legal procedure and timeframe by the law and was proclaimed by the Banking Court---Mere increase of offer made by a stranger after more than a month from the conclusion of the auction proceedings could not be accepted as a valid ground for setting aside a valid sale through open auction with intervention of Banking Court unless proceedings of auction were shown to be collusive, fraudulent or lacking transparency---Even mutual understanding, consent or compromise between the decree-holder and the -debtor or any third party would not affect the right of the auction-purchaser, which the Banking Court was bound to honour and protect in order to maintain the sanctity of the transaction--- Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n Investment Corporation Limited v. Shahdin Limited 2001 CLC 1267; Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Zakria Ghani PLD 2005 SC 819 and Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. v. A.B.P.L. PLD 1987 SC 512 rel.\n \n PLD 2005 SC 470; 2007 CLC 1409; Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Nawaz PLD 2004 SC 489; Messrs Irisma International v. United Bank Limited, Karachi 2006 CLD 832; Askari Commercial Bank Limited v. Zafar Ahmed 2008 CLD 800; Messrs Unicom Enterprises v. Banking Court No.5 and others 2004 CLD 1452; Mst. Noor Khatoon v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 2013 CLC 702; S. Soundararajan and others v. Khaka Mahomed Ismail Saheb of Messrs Roshan and Co. AIR 1940 Madras 42 and Muhammad Nawaz v. Barkat Ali PLD 2004 Lah. 21 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.59 of 2013, decision dated: 27-01-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND, JUNAID GHAFFAR, JJ",
    "": "Mst. MEHWISH KASHIF through Attorney/Husband\nvs\nMessrs SUMMIT BANK LTD. and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12168",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2180 = 2014 SLD 2180 = 2014 CLD 1420",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------Ss. 79 & 80---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr. 2 & 3 & O. VII, R. 10---Institution of summary suit on the basis of affidavit---Negotiable instrument---Scope---Contention of defendant was that suit was not based on any negotiable instrument---Trial Court decreed the suit on account of failure of defendant to pray for leave to appear and defend the suit---Validity---Trial Court had not considered as to whether the plaint presented before it was filed on the basis of any \"\"negotiable instrument\"\"---Suit was decreed on account of failure on the part of defendant to file an application for leave of the court to appear and defend the same---Plaintiff had not produced even copy of any cheques and Trial Court did not require him to produce any evidence in support of plaint and to produce any documentary evidence in order to bring his suit within the ambit of summary suit---Trial Court was not competent to entertain and decide suit in absence of any evidence on record to show that suit was filed upon any negotiable instrument---District Judge was bound to direct his office to examine the suits filed under O.XXXVII, C.P.C. at the time of their filing as to whether same were filed upon any negotiable instrument and a separate report must be available on the file of every suit and only then further proceedings were to be taken in such suits---Impugned and decree passed by the Trial Court were not sustainable in the eye of law and same were set aside---Suit was filed before the wrong forum and plaint was directed to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation of the same before court of competent jurisdiction---Appeal was accepted in circumstances.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXXVII, R. 2---Institution of summary suit on basis of negotiable instrument---Scope---Suits upon bills of exchange, hundies and promissory notes might be instituted by presenting a plaint before the competent court---Such suit could be decreed if defendant did not appear or fail to defend the suit by taking leave of the court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.1169 of 2013, heard on 21st January, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "IBAD-UR-REHMAN LODHI, J",
    "": "GHULAM SAMDANI\nvs\nMUHAMMAD ARSHAD MALIK"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12169",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2181 = 2014 SLD 2181 = 2014 CLD 1431",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss. 18 & 22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, R. 8--- Registration as Broker--- Filing false experience certificate--- Applicant, applied for registration as broker and provided an experience certificate issued by a company---Prima facie, certificate provided by the company to the applicant was false---Securities and Exchange Commission, examined the facts, evidence and documents on record, in written and verbal submissions made on behalf of the company---Certificate provided by the company was established to be false and misleading---Violation of S.18 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, was a serious matter, which invoked penalty under S.22 of the Ordinance---Wrong submission of documents, also attracted the provisions of Brokers Rules relating to suspension---Considering that the violation was committed for the first time, and apparently not wilful, Commission opted to take a lenient view on the subject matter, and decided not to impose penalty as provided---Company was strictly warned to abstain from giving any false/ misleading information/statement and/or certificate, in future.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.4(BRK-170)SE/SMD/03, dated 14-05-2013, decision dated: 31st May, 2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "HASNAT AHMAD, DIRECTOR (MSRD)",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12170",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2182 = 2014 SLD 2182 = 2014 CLD 1436",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 11---Charging of markup by Financial Institution beyond date of expiry of finance facility---Suit for recovery---Applications for leave to defend were dismissed and suit was decreed---Contention of the defendants was that plaintiff bank had charged mark-up beyond date of expiry of finance facility---Held, that plaintiff bank could not charge mark up beyond expiry date of finance facility---High Court modified the decree amount by disallowing mark-up charged beyond date of expiry of finance facility---Appeal was allowed, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.200 of 2009, heard on 25 September, 2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs PACE PESTICIDES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 3 others\nvs\nSAUDI PAK COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager and another\n Muhammad Tariq v. Bank of Punjab and another 2004 CLD 162 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12171",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2183 = 2014 SLD 2183 = 2014 CLD 1439",
    "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------S. 20---Dispute pertaining to performance of contract---Arbitration proceedings--- Application to restrain encashment of bank guarantee executed by appellant in favour of the respondent--- Scope---Contention of the appellant was that respondent should be restrained from encashing the bank guarantee till conclusion of arbitration proceedings between the parties---Held, that encashment of bank guarantee was to be restrained only if a prima facie case was made when there was material available on record to show that the person in whose favour the performance bond was executed, had also committed default in performance of the contract---When such a prima facie case was made out then the court could restrain the encashment of a bank guarantee---In the present case, however, time for performance of the contract by the appellant was extended many times, but the appellant failed to discharge its contractual commitment, and only after getting extension of contract, when the contract was still not performed by the appellant, the bank guarantee was sought to be encashed---No justification therefore, existed to restrain the respondent from encashing the bank guarantee---Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.13 of 2013, decision dated: 17-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB AND SALAHUDDIN PANHWAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs GLOBAL ENERGY AND COMMODITY EXCHANGE GROUP ITALY SPA (GECX GROUP) and another\nvs\nTRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Chairman and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12172",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2184 = 2014 SLD 2184 = 2014 CLD 1441",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss. 18 & 22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, Rr.5(4), 7(2) & 8---Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971, R.3(b) & Sched.--- Renewal of certificate of registration as broker, application for---Overstating Net Capital Balance (N.C.B.)--- Company submitted application for renewal of certificate of registration as broker---Calculation of Net Capital Balance (NCB) as on 31-12-2012, submitted by the company had major irregularities, as same was not calculated in accordance with Third Sched. of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971, and prima facie, was overstated---Company by submission of overstated 'NCB' had submitted a statement and given information, which it had reasonable cause to believe to be false or incorrect in material particular in violation of S.18 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, and violation of R.8 of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001---Company was also penalized previously for the same violation---Violation of the Rules and Regulations, was a serious matter, which entitled the Commission to even suspend company's registration---Commission elected not to exercise said power, considering that decision of suspension might increase the systemic risk in the market---Suspension of the company would also have serious adverse impact on other two brokerage houses of the company's group and actual impact would be much greater---Commission taking lenient view, decided to give another opportunity to the company in the matter and renewed the certificate of Registration of the company, with the condition that company would be required to submit a revised Net Capital Balance (NCB) certificate within three months in strict compliance with the Third Schedule of Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971---In view of Regulatory violation, Commission in exercise of the powers under S. 22 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, imposed on the company a penalty of Rs.500,000 with direction to the company to ensure that full compliance be made of all Rules, Regulations and directives of the Commission in future for avoiding any punitive action under the law.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.4/BRK-176/SE/SMD/2004, dated 19-04-2013, decision dated: 6-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "FIRST NATIONAL EQUITIES LIMITED (FNEL): In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12173",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2185 = 2014 SLD 2185 = 2014 CLD 1452",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Preamble---Nature of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was a \"\"remedial statute\"\" and remedial acts/statutes were those which were enacted in order to improve and to facilitate remedies already existing for redress of wrong or injury as well as to correct defects, mistakes and omissions---\"\"Remedial statues\"\" were ones which were made to supply such defects and bridge such difficulties which arose either from general imperfection of all human laws from change of time and circumstances.\n \n Crawford in Statutory Constructions rel.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Remedial statutes/acts, nature of--- Remedial acts/statutes were those which were enacted in order to improve and to facilitate remedies already existing for redress of wrong or injury as well as to correct defects, mistakes and omissions---Remedial statues were ones which were made to supply such defects and bridge such difficulties which arose either from general imperfection of all human laws from change of time and circumstances.\n \n Crawford in Statutory Constructions rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 22 & 27---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court--- Scope---Interlocutory order---Maintainability of constitutional petition against interlocutory order passed by Banking Court---Perusal of S.22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 revealed that where legislature did not provide appeal against interlocutory order, the same could not be challenged by way of constitutional petition as allowing the same would amount to negating provisions of the Ordinance, which did not provide for appeal against an interlocutory order---Section 27 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 explicated the intention of the legislature that interlocutory orders passed by the Banking Courts should not be called into question in any proceedings---Constitutional petition against interlocutory order of Banking Court, was therefore, not maintainable.\n \n Al-Shamas Apparel (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and 3 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. through Chief Manager/Manager Shadman Colony Branch, Lahore and another 2002 CLD 1407; Crawford in Statutory Constructions; Syed Saghir Ahmad Naqvi v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, S&GAD, Karachi and another 1996 SCMR 1165; Sheikh Gulzar Ali and Co., Ltd. and others v. Special Judge, Special Court of Banking and another 1991 SCMR 590; Crescent Factories Vegetable Ghee Mills and 5 others v. National Bank of Pakistan, District Courts Branch, Sahiwal and another PLD 1985 Lah. 150; Federation of Pakistan and another v. Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar PLD 1989 SC 26 and Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. through Chief Manager and Principal Officer v. Judge Banking Court No.II Faisalabad and 8 others 2002 CLD 991 rel.\n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 199---Bar to constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Language used in a statute, if was such that it led to no room for doubt as to the intention of the legislature to oust jurisdiction of the High Court in all circumstances, then such intention would have to be given effect and even acts performed without jurisdiction or with mala fide, would not be open to judicial scrutiny under Art.199 of the Constitution.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3108 of 2012, decision dated: 11-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "M. SOHAIL IQBAL BHATTI, J",
    "": "Messrs UMAR AUTO STORE and others\nvs\nThe JUDGE BANKING COURT and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12174",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRVNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2186 = 2014 SLD 2186 = 2014 CLD 1458",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10(4), 10(5) & 9---Non-compliance of mandatory requirements of S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Effect---Allegation of obtaining of signatures from customer on blank paper by Financial Institution--- Scope--- Suit for recovery---Application for leave to defend was dismissed and suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff Bank---Contention of the appellants (defendants) inter alia was that the plaintiff Bank had obtained their signatures on blank pieces of paper and that statement of account filed by the plaintiff Bank was incomplete and contained serious irregularities---Held, that contention of defendants with regard to signatures on blank paper could not be accepted as where one person signs and delivers to another paper stamped in accordance with law, either wholly blank or having written thereon an incomplete negotiable instrument, in order that the same may be made, or completed into a negotiable instrument, he thereby give prima facie authority to person who receives that paper to make and complete it as case may be into a negotiable instrument for any amount---Defendants, in their applications for leave to defend did not file documents which in their opinion supported the substantial questions of law and fact as required under S.10(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Defendants, therefore, did not comply with mandatory requirements of Ss.10(4) & 10(5) of the Ordinance, and were bound to face consequences for such non-compliance--- Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n Mushtaq Ahmed Vohra v. Cresent Investment Bank Limited 2005 CLD 444; Messrs Shaz Packages and 3 others v. Messrs Bank Alfalah Limited 2011 CLD 790; Messrs Agha Fabrics (Pvt.) Limited and 3 others v. Union Bank Limited and another 2004 CLD 915 and Messrs New Qureshi Agro Traders through Managing Partner and 2 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 2005 CLC 904 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.48 of 2011, decision dated: 5-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR AND SYED MUHAMMAD FAROOQ SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SADIA INDUSTRIES and 3 others\nvs\nMessrs SONERI BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12175",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2187 = 2014 SLD 2187 = 2014 CLD 1468",
    "Key Words:": "Commodity Exchange and Futures Contracts Rules, 2005-------R. 12(4)---Application for grant of certificate of registration as \"\"broker\"\"--- Securities and Exchange Commission issued show cause notice to the applicant on the ground that applicant had mis-stated with regard to his experience and advised him to provide a valid experience certificate---Experience certificate submitted by the applicant had provided enough evidence of his experience of dealing in securities and the business activities which also had supported experience of applicant in commodities trading---In view of the submissions and documents on record, applicant had provided sufficient evidence to the Commission against show-cause notice issued to him--- Show-cause notice, stood disposed of, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.4/BRC-252/PMEX/SMD/2013 dated 26-04-2013, decision dated: 22-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "HASNAT AHMAD, DIRECTOR (MSRC)",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12176",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2188 = 2014 SLD 2188 = 2014 CLD 1473",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10, 9 & 3---Suit for recovery---Interim decree---Contention of plaintiff bank was that defendants had admitted to their liability towards the bank---Held, that record indicated that the disbursement of sum by the plaintiff bank was not denied by the defendants and the defendant company had acknowledged its liability in terms of a letter issued by it, which letter's issuance or signatures of the Chief Executive thereon, had not been denied by the defendants---Dispute between the parties was limited to the differential between the amount disbursed, and the amount claimed by the plaintiff bank---Defendants' attempts to deny the disbursement amount were at best evasive, and an evasive denial, under law, was no denial at all---High Court issued an interim decree for the disbursed amount against the defendants jointly and severally, with cost of funds, in terms of S.3 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and granted the defendants unconditional leave to defend the suit to the extent of the differential amount.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 6 of 2010, decision dated: 8-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ UL AHSAN, J",
    "": "BANK OF PUNJAB through Branch/Chief Manager--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs KHAN UNIQUE BUILDERS PVT. LTD. through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12177",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2189 = 2014 SLD 2189 = 2014 CLD 1482",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S. 306---Statutory notice of demand---Failure to pay debt---Commercial insolvency---Presumption---In the event of failure to pay debt in accordance with statutory notice of demand under S.306 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, insolvency was to be presumed through it could also be proved in other ways.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss. 305, 306 & 309---Winding up of company---Failure to pay debt---Commercial insolvency---Company ceased to be a going concern and it was cripplingly indebted to a number of creditors including petitioners---Company had become \"\"commercially insolvent\"\" and was unable to pay its debts and its paid up capital had been completely wiped out---Even the remotest possibility of revival of the company did not exist and its further existence or continuance would only multiply its liabilities to detriment of its creditors and shareholders---Effect---Winding-up of the company had become inevitable and no objection was received from any quarter and statutory presumption as to commercial insolvency of the company was created---High Court appointed official assignee as Official Liquidator, who would take over complete charge and control of the affairs and assets of the company---High Court directed that official liquidator would perform all such duties and functions and exercise all such powers as were required under the law---Mills of the company were located in different districts in other province, therefore, official liquidator was authorized to seek assistance of such persons at those places as he might deem fit and proper in the best interest of creditors and shareholders and for expeditious winding-up of the company---Petition was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Hala Spinning Mills Ltd. v. International Finance Corporation and another 2002 SCMR 450 and Messrs Ali Woolen Mills v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and 3 others PLD 1990 SC 762 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J. Miscellaneous No.1 of 2013, decision dated: 20-12-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED\nvs\nGULISTAN TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12178",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2190 = 2014 SLD 2190 = 2014 CLD 1489",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S. 22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, Rr.8, 12 & Third Sched.---Failure to deposit amount of penalty as per direction without any justification---Securities and Exchange Commission had imposed a penalty of Rs.100,000 on the company with direction to deposit said amount in the account of the Commission not later than 30 days from the date of order---Company failed to comply with order of the Commission and vide letter informed the Commission that company would like to file an appeal in the Appellate Bench of the Commission against said order---Company which had failed to comply with the direction of the Commission, had contravened clause D-1(2) of the Code of Conduct, setforth under the Third Schedule and R.12 of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001---Conduct of the company contravening the direction of the Commission was unacceptable and concerning---Broker holding a certificate of registration had to all times abide by the Code of Conduct specified in the Brokers Rules, 2001---Each and every market participant was bound to comply with the general and specific directions issued by the Commission---Contravention of the direction of the Commission and failure to comply with the Rules and Regulations by the company was not proper---Violation of the Rules and Regulations was serious matter---Taking a lenient view, company was strictly warned to comply with the direction of the Commission in future, failing which appropriate action would be taken against it.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.1(2) SMD/MSRD/C&IW/2103 dated 22-08-2013, decision dated: 12-09-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "ACE SECURITIES (PVT.) LIMITED THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICIn the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12179",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2191 = 2014 SLD 2191 = 2014 CLD 1493",
    "Key Words:": "Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance (IX of 1984)-------Ss. 4, 2(d) & Sched.---Special Court, jurisdiction of---Embezzlement and misappropriation by a Bank employee--- Scope of scheduled offences--- Petitioner, an employee/officer with the complainant bank, was accused of misappropriation, embezzlement of various amounts in respect of different bank accounts---Contention of the petitioner was that the Special Court established under the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984 did not have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter---Held, that petitioner was an officer of complainant bank and was along with co-accused, charged with misappropriation, embezzlement and other irregularities and after an inquiry conducted by the Bank, petitioner returned a sum of amount and as such admitted his guilt---Petitioner and co-accused, therefore, committed \"\"scheduled offences\"\" as provided under the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984 which provided that such offences committed in respect of or in connection with the business of the bank would be triable by the Special Court established under the Ordinance---Three pre-requisites were required to invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court, which were; that the offence should be a scheduled offence; that the offence should be in respect of a scheduled bank; and that the offence should relate to the business of the bank---Present case fulfilled such criteria and conditions existed which specified that the Special Court possessed the necessary jurisdiction to try an accused person of such offences; and the offences committed by the petitioner clearly brought him within the ambit of \"\"scheduled offences\"\"---Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n M.D. Tahir, Advocate v. Director, State Bank of Pakistan, Lahore and 3 others 2004 CLD 1680 and Ghulam Mustafa v. Presiding Officer, Special Court (Offences against Banks), Rawalpindi 2003 MLD 841 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Revision No.791 of 2004, heard on 12-03-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN SHAH AND MISS AALIA NEELUM, JJ",
    "": "HAMAD RAZA through Special AttorneY\nvs\nThe STATE and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12180",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2192 = 2014 SLD 2192 = 2014 CLD 1499",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5--- Suit for recovery of finances---Condonation of delay---Principle---Application for leave to defend the suit was barred by two days---Application was filed on 26-8-2009 and was not accompanied by any application for condonation of delay, whereas application for condonation of delay was filed by defendant on 23-11-2010---Instead of giving plausible explanation or justification for delay, defendant insisted in his application for condonation of delay that his application for leave to defend the suit was not barred by time---Defendant sought condonation of 'alleged one day delay in filing of leave to defend application' by assuming that there was no delay of two days and by claiming that even delay of one day was an alleged delay---Validity---While seeking condonation of delay, defendant had to submit explanation for delay of each and every day---If each and every day's delay was not explained or justified in satisfactory and convincing manner, delay could not be condoned---For invoking discretionary power of High Court in order to condone delay, defendant had to show strong and solid grounds and also to explain delay of each and every day---Defendant did not attempt to explain or justify delay of two days---High Court declined to condone the delay---Allegations of fact in plaint disclosed subsisting cause of action against defendant and suit was maintained by all standards---Plaintiff was able to show that he was entitled to relief against defendant---If anyone of such conditions precedent for competent suit was lacking, plaintiff was not entitled to decree either under S. 10(1) and (11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Suit was decreed in circumstances.\n \n Messrs Ahmad Autos and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited PLD 1990 SC 497; Messrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353; Mst. Hajra Bibi v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited (ADBP) through Manager 2006 CLD 261; My Bank Limited v. Messrs Muslim Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and 3 others 2011 CLD 1721; Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd PLD 2012 SC 268 = 2012 CLD 337; Khawaja Muhammad Bilal v. Union Bank Limited through Branch Manager 2004 CLD 1555; Masood Alam v. Muslim Commercial Bank 2004 CLD 1227; Akhtar Kaleem v. Citibank N.A. 2004 CLD 1361; Rajana Cotton Factory (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Bank of Punjab 2004 CLD 1569; Imtiaz Ali v. Atta Muhammad and another PLD 2008 SC 462 and Pakistan Handicrafts, Sindh Small Industries Corporation, Government of Sindh v. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others 2010 CLC 323 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10-- -Interlocutory application--- Principle---Defendant cannot file interlocutory/ancillary application and has no right to defend the suit unless allowed by court to defend the suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-97 of 2009, decision dated: 10-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "Messrs HABIB BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nvs\nMAHMOOD ALAM SHERANI and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12181",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2193 = 2014 SLD 2193 = 2014 CLD 1516",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 96, 97, 98 & 101---Reduction in share capital of Company---Power of the court to dispense with addition to name of company of \"\"and reduced\"\"---Petitioner Company sought reduction of its share capital as decided by special resolution passed by its Directors---Contention of the petitioner Company was that said reduction in share capital would not affect ownership or voting rights of shareholders, and would not be detrimental to any Director or shareholder of the Company; and further that nothing was due to any creditor---Held, that special resolution was duly registered with Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan under Form 26 and there were presently no creditors and no prejudice would be caused by reduction in share capital to any share holders---High Court allowed petition for reduction in share capital and directed that the petitioner Company was exempted from writing the words \"\"and reduced\"\" as part of the name of the company upon reduction of its capital.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O. No.6 of 2014, heard on 30-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. AYESHA A. MALIK, J",
    "": "FIVE STAR INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD.\nvs\nREGISTRAR OF COMPANIES"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12182",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2194 = 2014 SLD 2194 = 2014 CLD 1518",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10--- Cross cases---Leave to defend the suit---Principle---Where separate suits are filed against each other by financial institution and customer, applications for leave to defend filed in both suits are to be heard and decided independently on their own merits---Order passed on one application for leave to defend in one suit does not affect or prejudice merits or demerits of application for leave to defend in other suit---In case leave to defend is granted in one suit, even then defendant in other suit does not become entitled for leave to defend the suit as a matter of right.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of finance---Vague defence---Substantial question of law and fact, non-raising of---Defendant in his application for leave to defend the suit vaguely stated 'amount deposited', 'amount withdrawn', 'amount payable/excess paid' and 'amount disputed: nil'---Defendant did not comply with mandatory requirements of S.10(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Defendant was obliged to file under S.10(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, all documents along with his application, which in his opinion could support purported substantial questions of law and fact raised by him---High Court declined to grant leave to defend as it did not comply with mandatory requirements of S.10(4) & (5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and also as he was not able to raise any substantial question of law or fact that could require evidence in the matter---Entries appearing in statement of account and claim made in suit fully corroborated each other---Suit was decreed in circumstances.\n \n Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 268 = 2012 CLD 337 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-59 of 2013, decision dated: 8-05-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "KASB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMUHAMMAD AHMED ANSARI--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12183",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2195 = 2014 SLD 2195 = 2014 CLD 1526",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10, 9 & 4--- Procedure of Banking Courts---Adjudication of banking disputes---Duties of customer and financial institutions---Non-compliance with mandatory provisions of Ss. 10 & 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Effect---Plaintiff institution and defending customer had identical statutory responsibilities respectively under Ss. 9(3) & 10(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to plead and state clearly and particularly the finances availed by the defendant, repayments made by the defendant, and the dates thereof, and the amounts of finance repayable by the defendant, who is saddled with the additional responsibility to specify amounts disputed by him---Defending customer was further obliged to put in a definite response to bank's accounting and had under Ss.10(3) & 10(4) of the Ordinance, to compulsorily plead and answer in the application for leave to defend, his accounts as well as the facts and amounts disputed by the defendant, repayable to the plaintiff---Banking suit was normally a suit on accounts which were duly ledgered and maintained compulsorily in the books of accounts under prescribed principles/standards of accounting in terms of laws, rules, and banking practices---Instead of leaving it to the options of parties to make general assertions on accounts, the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 bound both sides to be absolutely specific on accounts and the parties were obligated equally to plead and to specifically state their respective accounts---Provisions contained in Ss.10 & 9 of the Ordinance required strict compliance and non-compliance therewith attracted consequences of rejection of application of leave to defend along with decree.\n \n Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 268 = 2012 CLD 337 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 10, 9 & 4--- Procedure of Banking Court---Application for leave to defend suit---Adjudication---Non-compliance with mandatory provisions of Ss.9 & 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--- Effect--- Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was a special law, and by virtue of S.4 thereof, its provisions overrode all other laws, and the provisions contained in Ss.9 & 10 of the Ordinance required strict compliance---Non-compliance with said sections attracted consequences of rejection of application of leave to defend, along with a decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-101 of 2013, decision dated: 2-05-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "SILKBANK LIMITED through Authorized Persons--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs AZM CHEMICAL COMPANY through Proprietor and 5 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12184",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2196 = 2014 SLD 2196 = 2014 CLD 1533",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss. 6, 18 & 22---Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001, Rr.3 & 4---Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971, R.2(d) & Third Sched.---Irregularities in calculation of \"\"Net Capital Balance (NCB)\"\"---Inspection report submitted by the Inspection Team, had highlighted major irregularities in calculation of 'Net Capital Balance (NCB)'---\"\"Net Capital Balance\"\" appeared to be not in accordance with Third Schedule of Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971---After examining the written and verbal submissions made on behalf of the company, it was observed that company had failed to perform its professional duty with due care, and, had shown negligence in verifying the calculation and certifying the Net Capital Balance---Amount of securities purchased for clients appearing in NCB, was required to be verified with sufficient appropriate evidence---Company had failed to obtain sufficient evidence and did not apply the necessary prudence in certifying the NCB, and it was not aware about the significance of NCB, the relevant Rules, Regulations, methods of certification and the systemic risk involved as a result of overstatement---On account of professional misconduct and negligence in performing duty by the company with due care, competence and diligence, Commission in exercise of the powers under S.22 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 imposed a penalty of Rupees Twenty Thousand on the company, with direction to the company to ensure full compliance with Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, Rules, Regulations and directives of the Commission in future.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No. 4(BRK-148)SE/SMD/02 dated 23rd January, 2013, decision dated: 6-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "HASNAT AHMAD, DIRECTOR (MSRD)",
    "": "MESSRS AVAIS HYDER LIAQUAT NAUMAN, CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12185",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2197 = 2014 SLD 2197 = 2014 CLD 1543",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S. 114--- Review--- Insurance dispute--- Applicant Insurance Corporation sought review of order passed in the constitutional petition filed by the respondent, whereby direction was given to the applicant Insurance Corporation to look into the grievance/insurance claim of the respondent---Contention of the applicant was inter alias, that no claim had been lodged by the respondent, therefore, the applicant was not in a position to adjudge the status of the insurance policies in question---Validity---Perusal of record revealed that respondent had approached the Insurance Tribunal for redressal of her grievance, but her petition was returned and she was directed to present it before the appropriate forum---Respondent instead of approaching concerned court, filed constitutional petition instead, wherein she changed her address, which fact alone was sufficient to establish that the constitutional petition was filed by the respondent by concealing facts---Respondent, it seemed by way of obtaining a decision on her insurance claim wanted to create a new cause of action, just to frustrate the applicant Insurance Corporation---Order sought to be reviewed was passed without hearing the applicant, and the same deserved to be recalled---High Court recalled impugned order and allowed review application, in circumstances.\n \n Mst. Robina Bibi v. State Life Insurance and others 2013 CLD 477 ref.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Right of hearing was a universally acknowledged principle and nobody could be deprived of it at any cost.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Review Application No. 37 of 2013 in Writ Petition No.6506 of 2013, decision dated: 30-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHUJAAT ALI KHAN, J",
    "": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Attorney and 3 others--Applicants\nvs\nMst. KAUSAR HUSSAIN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12186",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2198 = 2014 SLD 2198 = 2014 CLD 1548",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10 & 22---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Recovery of bank loan---Service of process---Proof---Ex parte order, setting aside of---Converting of proceedings---Suit filed by bank against defendant was decreed ex parte on the ground that process was issued according to all prescribed modes and he failed to appear before Banking Court---Validity---Summons sent to defendant through courier service was returned with the remarks that defendant had shifted from address at which summons was sent---Summons to defendant was sent through ordinary registered post instead of sending the same through registered post acknowledgement due, due to which there was nothing on record to show that summons was duly served upon him or he had refused to receive the same---Bailiff did not submit his report nor was there any report by him available on record to show that summons had received by defendant or he refused to receive the same---No evidence was available on record to show refusal on the part of defendant, or non-service or proper service of summons upon him---By not sending summons through registered post acknowledgement due as specifically provided in S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, mandatory compliance was not made---By passing ex parte order against defendant, despite such non-compliance, Banking Court committed a grave illegality---Summons was not issued in accordance with S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, defendant was not served and service upon him was never held good---Without first holding service good upon defendant, no further proceedings could be taken in suit nor any adverse order could be passed against him---Ex parte order passed against defendant was not sustainable and was liable to be struck down/set aside and application for leave to defend was within time---High Court converted appeals into Constitutional petitions, ex parte order passed by Banking Court against defendant was declared illegal and without jurisdiction and was set aside---High Court directed the Banking Court to decide application for leave to defend in accordance with law---Petition was allowed accordingly.\n \n Civil Petition Nos.139-K of 2006 and 273-K of 2006 Mubarak Ali v. First Prudential Modaraba and Civil Petition No.19-K of 2009 Messrs Axleproducts Limited v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. rel.\n \n Farzand Raza Naqvi and 5 others's case 2004 SCMR 400; Messrs Naeem Associates through Proprietor and 6 others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited through Branch Manager 2004 CLD 1672; Haji Muhammad Yaqoob Akhtar v. Habib Bank Ltd. and others 2009 CLD 1699; Monazam Bibi and 2 others v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. through Branch Manager 2006 CLD 836; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Exim International and 7 others 2012 CLD 471; Fazal-e-Rabbi v. Judge Banking Court and 4 others 2010 CLD 972; Saleem Ahmed v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited through Manager 2007 CLD 872; Messrs Liaqat Flour and General Mills through partners and 3 others v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 2007 CLD 188; Messrs Huffaz Seamless Pipe Industries Ltd. and 2 others v. Messrs Security Leasing Corporation Ltd. 2002 SCMR 1419; Javaid Tanveer Mughal v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Branch Manager and 3 others 2004 CLD 748; Karamat Hussain and others v. Muhammad Zaman and others PLD 1987 SC 139; Muhammad Yusuf v. Mst. Kharian Bibi 1995 SCMR 784; Capital Development Authority, Islamabad through its Chairman, 1994 SCMR 771; Muhammad Aslam (through his L.R.) v. Wazir Muhammad PLD 1985 SC 46; Mst. Amina Begum and others v. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir PLD 1978 SC 220; Messrs United Bank Limited through authorized attorneys v. Banking Court No.II and 2 others 2012 CLD 1556; Messrs Mumtaz Traders and 3 others v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited and another 2009 CLD 169; Ms. Rahima Iqbal v. Banking Court No.II and 2 others 2008 CLD 338; Investment Corporation of Pakistan and 5 others v. Judge, Banking Court No.1, Multan and 9 others 2006 CLD 1161 and Khadim Hussain and 12 others v. Gul Hassan Tiwano and 3 others 2013 CLD 981 ref.\n \n Messrs Simnwa Polypropylene (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs National Bank of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 476 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs West Pakistan Tanks Terminal (Pvt.) Ltd. 2000 CLC 896 distinguished.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Wrong provision of law---Effect---If a wrong provision of law is mentioned in title of an application, the same can be ignored and application can be treated to have been filed under the relevant provision.\n \n(c) Administration of justice---\n \n----Moulding of relief---Correction of wrongs---Superior Courts have inherent and constitutional powers to remedy and correct wrongs committed by subordinate courts---High Court has vast powers in its inherent jurisdiction not only to mould relief but also to convert an appeal, Constitutional petition or revision to any other remedy.\n \n Syed Ghazanfar Hussain through Legal Heirs and others v. Nooruddin and others 2011 CLC 1303 and Mst. Mubarak Salman and others v. The State PLD 2006 Kar. 678 rel.\n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 199--- Constitutional petition--- Interlocutory orders---Principle---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court cannot be invoked against every interlocutory order passed by a court, nor can every appeal against such order be converted into Constitutional petition---Such discretion and inherent powers are to be exercised by High Court keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case and particularly in cases where gross and blatant violation of any of the provisions of law is apparent in the order assailed, for which no remedy is available to aggrieved party or where order assailed has been passed by court by exercising such jurisdiction which was not vested in it by law or where the court fails to exercise of jurisdiction which was vested in it by law.\n \n Messrs United Bank Limited through authorized attorneys v. Banking Court No.II and 2 others 2012 CLD 1556; Messrs Habib Bank Limited through authorized officers/attorneys v. Messrs Victor Electronic Appliances Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2011 CLD 1571 and Bank of Punjab v. International Ceramics Ltd. and 4 others PLD 2013 Lah. 487 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.121 of 2010 and Ist Appeal No.3 of 2011, decision dated: 10-06-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR AND AFTAB AHMED GORAR, JJ",
    "": "ASIF KUDIA\nvs\nMessrs KASB BANK LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12187",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2199 = 2014 SLD 2199 = 2014 CLD 1562",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S. 22---Listing Regulations of Karachi Stock Exchange, Regln.17---Failure of company to send its financial results to Exchange---Meeting of the Board of Directors of the company, was held to consider the financial statements of the company for relevant period, but the results of the company were not communicated to the Karachi Stock Exchange as required under Listing Regulations of Karachi Stock Exchange---Company neither did communicate its results in the manner specified in the Correspondence Manual, nor did it communicate any status of the Board Meeting---Representative of the company, admitted the mistake, and had asserted that the violation of the provisions of the Listing Regulations of Karachi Stock Exchange, occurred because of non-availability of Chief Financial Officer of the company---Representative of the company further assured that in future, the company would strive its best to comply with all the regulatory requirements---Failure of the company to announce its financial results as per regulations having been established, Commission in exercise of powers under S.22 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 imposed on the company a penalty of Rs.50,000 (Fifty thousands only) with direction to the company to ensure that care and caution be exercised to ensure full compliance with Rules, Regulations and Directives of the Commission in the future for avoiding any punitive action under the law.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.1(12)METRO/MSW/SMD/2013, dated 13-06-2013, decision dated: 24-07-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "METROPOLITAN STEEL CORPORATION LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12188",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2200 = 2014 SLD 2200 = 2014 CLD 1567",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S. 306---Limitation Act (IX of 1908) S. 19---Company when deemed unable to pay its debts---Petition for winding up of such company---Time-barred debts---Scope---Notice under S.306 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 could not be validly issued on a time-barred debt, therefore a company could not, on such debt, be deemed unable to pay its debt---Debt must be within the period of limitation in accordance with provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908 when the petition for winding up of a company was presented, and if not, then such a company could not be wound up on such a debt---Debt, if was not time barred when notice under S.306 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 was issued, thereby triggering the deeming provision of said section, but the debt was so barred by time the petition was presented, the company still could not be wound up on the ground that it was unable to pay its debt.\n \n Interactive Media and Communication Solution Private Limited v. GO Airlines Limited (2013) 199 DLT 267; Mosenthals Wool and Mohair S.A. Pty. Ltd. v. C.L. Jain Woolens Mills P. Ltd. (2013) 179 Comp. Cas. 174 (P&H); Gurdino Jiwatram Kukreja v. Eastern Mining and Allied Industries Ltd. (2004) 121 Comp. Cas. 762 (Gau); Mazboot Packers and Engineers Co. v. Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Produce Marketing and Processing Corporation Ltd. (1999) 95 Comp. Cas. 579 (HP); Vijayalakshmi Art Productions v. Vijaya Productions P. Ltd. (1997) 88 Comp. Cas. 353 (Mad); Niyogi Offset Printing Press Limited v. Doctor Morepen Limited (2009) 149 Comp. Cas. 467, 476 and Ridgeway Motors (Isleworth) Ltd. v. Alts Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 92, [2005] 2 All ER 304 rel.\n \n M.G. Kadir & Co. v. Abdul Latif PLD 1970 Kar. 708 and Province of West Pakistan v. Makhdoom Mohamed PLD 1961 Kar. 722 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J.M. No.9 of 2013, decision dated: 11-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "SOUTH ASIA GEOPHYSICAL SERVICES (SAGeo) through General ManageR\nvs\nNEW HORIZON EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION LIMITED (NHEPL)"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12189",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2201 = 2014 SLD 2201 = 2014 CLD 1576",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss. 6, 18 & 22---Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971, R.2(d), Third Sched.---Stock Exchange Member (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001, Rr.3 & 4---Overstating 'Net Capital Balance', in violation of Rules---On review of the inspection report submitted by Inspection Team, duly constituted; it had come to the notice of the Securities and Exchange Commission that 'Net Capital Balance' of the company, was not in accordance with the Third Schedule of Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971, and had been overstated---Prima facie, it appeared that the certificate of 'Net Capital Balance' of the company as on December 31, 2011, certified by 'Auditor', was not in accordance with the Third Schedule of the Rules, 1971; and that Auditor had prima facie certified a statement and given information which Auditor had reasonable cause to believe to be false, or incorrect in material particulars, in violation of S.18 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969---Respondent/Auditor had failed to perform its duties as Auditor for 'Net Capital Balance Certificate'---Auditor had not applied necessary prudence while certifying the 'Net Capital Balance Certificate', which resulted in misrepresentation and overstatement---Since such violation had been noted for the first time, Commission, while taking lenient view, imposed a penalty of Rupees ten thousand only on the Auditor, with direction to the Auditor, to ensure full compliance with Ordinance, regulations and directives of the Commission, in future.\n \n Muhammad Shoaib, Authorized Representative of Messrs Aslam Malik and Company, Chartered Accountants present at hearing.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No. 4/BRK-62/SE/SMD/01, dated 24-04-2013, decision dated: 19-07-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "HASNAT AHMAD, DIRECTOR (MSRD)",
    "": "MESSRS ASLAM MALIK AND COMPANY, CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12190",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2202 = 2014 SLD 2202 = 2014 CLD 1583 = 2015 PLJ 20",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Grant of interim injunction---Essential ingredients---Party seeking interim injunction must show that a prima facie case existed in his favour, the court be satisfied that if injunction is not issued, irreparable damage or injury would be caused to such party and the balance of convenience has to be in favour of the grant of injunction.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, O. II, R. 2 & S. 114---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) S. 12---Suit for specific performance of contract and damages---Contract for sale of sugar---Interim injunction, grant of---Plaintiff had claimed that sugar was not delivered by the defendants as per delivery order and agreements and sought specific performance of agreements and additionally claimed damages---Application for temporary injunction, to restrain defendants from creating third party interests or from selling sugar to the extent of the plaintiff's claim was allowed, however was later modified so as to not include sugar produced in subsequent seasons---Contention of defendants was inter alia, that there was no remaining obligation for supply of sugar to plaintiff and that since plaintiff had calculated and claimed damages in the suit, therefore no interim injunction or specific performance could be granted---Held, that reports of the court appointed Nazir inspections, confirmed that the defendants were creating third party interests in the sugar by selling it to various buyers---Under Rule 2 of Order XXXIX, C.P.C., plaintiff could apply for temporary injunction to restrain defendants from committing breach of contract whether compensation was claimed in the suit or not---Damages claimed by the plaintiff were in addition to the relief of specific performance was not claimed as an alternative relief---Loss or injury which the plaintiff would suffer in case defendants commit breach of agreement, could not be calculated and proper course would be to restrain the defendants from committing breach of contract pending decision of the suit---Balance of convenience lay therefore in favor of the plaintiff---Under Order II, R. 2, C.P.C. a plaintiff should ask for all possible remedies within one civil suit, as the plaintiff was barred from filing an independent case for seeking a different remedy for the same cause of action; and as such seeking damages as an alternative prayer could not bar the plaintiffs from seeking specific performance of contract or interim injunction---High Court recalled earlier order and directed defendants not to dispose of/sell sugar to the extent of plaintiff's claim and/or to create third party interests therein, till disposal of suit---Application for review was allowed, accordingly.\n \n Land Acquisition Officer and Assistant Commissioner, Hyderabad PLD 2005 SC 311; Molasses Export Co. Ltd. v. Consolidated Sugar Mills Ltd. 1990 CLC 609; Amar Lal v. Principal Nishtar Medical College Multan and 6 others 2005 CLC 884; All Pakistan Textile Mills Association v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 2009 Lah. 494; Messrs Petrocommodities (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan PLD 1998 Kar. 1; Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Limited v. PEPSICO Inc. and 4 others 2004 CLC 1530; Tahir Zaman v. Jin Wei (M) SDN BHD and others 2004 CLD 603; Zawar Patroleum v. O.G.D.C. and others 2003 YLR 1450; Coca Cola Beverages Pakistan Limited v. Abdul Hameed Chaudhry 2001 YLR 568; Messrs Gulf Pacific Fertilizer v. Messrs Ali Akbar Enterprises and 2 others 2000 MLD 1537; Government of Pakistan and 3 others v. Kamruddin Valika 1996 CLC 1086; Dada Steel Mills v. Metalexport and 5 others 1985 CLC 1814; Muhammad Azam Muhammad Fazil and Co. v. Messrs N.A. Industries, Karachi PLD 1977 Kar. 21; Pakistan State Oil Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and 4 others 2010 CLC 1843; Syed Waqar Hussain and another v. Messrs National Refinery Ltd. 1993 CLC 2497; Agha Saifuddin Khan v. Pak Suzuki Motors Company Limited and another 1997 CLC 302 and Raees Ghulam Sarwar v. Manzoor Sadiq Zaidi and 4 others PLD 2008 Kar. 458 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.XXXIX,Rr.1,2\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.XXXIX,Rr.1,2\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1177 of 2013, decision dated: 21st March, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, J",
    "": "Mian KAMRAN ILAHI and another--Plaintiffs\nVs\nDIGRI SU Haider Waheed for --Plaintiffs."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12191",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2203 = 2014 SLD 2203 = 2014 CLD 1596",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 22(6) & 22(1)---Interpretation of S.22(6) & 22(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Appeal against interlocutory order---Maintainability---Plaintiff (customer) impugned order of Banking Court whereby his application to lead secondary evidence under Art.74 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984, was dismissed---Held, that while S.22(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 conferred an absolute right upon an aggrieved person to assail validity of a /decree/sentence or final order, S.22(6) on the other hand, circumscribes it and hedges it in respect of interlocutory orders---While S. 22(1) of the Ordinance used the word \"\"may\"\" implying the permission to file an appeal; S.22(6) of the Ordinance in contradistinction opened with the imperative language employing the words \"\"no appeal review or revision shall lie against... any interlocutory order of the Banking Court\"\"---Said choice of phraseology was used by the Legislature to emphasize two facets of the same coin and left no room for doubt that the same were intended to stonewall a challenge to an interim, intermediate or interlocutory order, with the underlying object to let the suits tried by the Banking Court to conclude within the shortest period of time---Law on the subject was designed to allow the banking matters to proceed apace without any hiccup--- Appeal was dismissed.\n \n Black's Law Dictionary (sixth Edition) and 10 Rang. 335 rel.\n \n(b) Words and Phrases---\n \n----\"\"Final Order\"\"---Meaning and scope.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 46 of 2014, decision dated: 17-03-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHUJAAT ALI KHAN AND MAHMOOD AHMED BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD KHAN\nvs\nZARAI TARAKIATI BANK LIMITED through President"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12192",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2204 = 2014 SLD 2204 = 2014 CLD 1601",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-------Ss. 14, 17 & 80---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Infringement of trade mark---Interim injunction, grant of---Plaintiff company alleged that defendant construction company was using its name---Validity---Possible grounds for invalidity fell into two distinct parts, one in relation to S. 14 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 and the other in relation to S. 17 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, which provisions of law were found in chapter II of the statute---Provisions of S.14 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, listed the ground which must result in an application for registration being refused---Such were absolute grounds which apply regardless of whether there was any other trade mark in the field---On the other hand S.17 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, listed relative grounds, which applied in the main if there was another, earlier registered trade mark although S.17(4) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, related to an unregistered mark/right as well in the circumstances therein stated--- Application of defendants could not relate to anything contained in S.80(3) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001---None of the provisions of S.17 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, applied in relation to defendants' unregistered mark/right on the one hand and to the plaintiff's registered trade mark---Insofar as S.80(1) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, was concerned, that could apply, if at all, in relation to only one provision of S.14(4) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001---Trade marks should not be registered if or to the extent that application was made in bad faith---Plaintiff was not entitled to interim injunctive relief--- Application was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Venkateswaran on Trade Marks and Passing-off, 5th edition, 2010; Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd. v. British Steel Corporation [1985] 3 All ER 52; Harrison v. Teton Valley Trading Co. Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ 1028, [2005] FSR 10; Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 14th Ed., 2005; Fry Consulting Pty Ltd. v. Sports Warehouse Inc. (No.2) [2012] FCA 81; Valentino Globe BV v. Pacific Rim Industries Inc. [2010] SGCA 14; Royal Enfield Trade Marks [2002] RPC 24 and Soneri Travel and Tours Ltd. v. Soneri Bank Ltd. 2011 CLD 193 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 712 of 2009, decision dated: 15-05-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "RUPALI POLYESTER LIMITED through Attorney Authorized PersoN--Plaintiff\nvs\nBABA CHINA BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS and 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12193",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2205 = 2014 SLD 2205 = 2014 CLD 1617",
    "Key Words:": "Malicious prosecution-------Suit for damages--- Death of parties--- Maxim \"\"actio personalis moriture cum persona\"\"--- Applicability---Scope---Suit for damages filed by the plaintiff was never decreed and he passed away during pendency of revisions---Cause of action would disappear and extinguish with the death of wrong doer or to the party wronged on the basis of maxim \"\"actio personalis moriture cum persona\"\"---Proceedings had been abated in the present case---Revisions were not proceedable and same were dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Mst. Nasri Begum v. Virgil L. Moor, Consular for Administration, Embassy of the United States of America and 6 others 1989 CLC 511 and Mir Shakeel ur Rehman and others v. Yahya Bakhtiar and others PLD 2010 SC 612 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 3769 of 1994, heard on 24-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHABBIR through Legal Representatives and 3 others\nvs\nMUHAMMAD ZAFEER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12194",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2206 = 2014 SLD 2206 = 2014 CLD 1621",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss. 6 & 22---Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971, Third Schedule---Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001, Rr.3 & 4---Violation regarding calculation of \"\"Net Capital Balance ('NCB')\"\" etc.---Securities and Exchange Commission ordered an inspection of the books and records required to be maintained by the company---On review of the inspection report, various prima facie violations regarding calculation of \"\"Net Capital Balance\"\", recovery of late payment charges and segregation of client's account were observed---Company's justification regarding 'Net Capital Balance' was not tenable---Company had accepted the violation of charging late payment charges; and non-maintenance of separate bank accounts for the clients---Company which had failed to provide any documentary evidence in support of pledging of client's securities, was found guilty of the non-compliance---Commission in exercise of powers under S.22 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, imposed a penalty of Rs.500,000 (Rupees Five hundred thousand only) on the company---Company was further directed to; (i) discontinue the practice of keeping client's securities in its House Account, and transfer such securities to respective sub-accounts; (ii) discontinue the practice of transferring/pledging client's securities; (iii) properly maintain separate bank accounts for the clients and deposit the proceeds of client's trading in the same; (iv) regularize its \"\"Net Capital Balance\"\", in line with the requirements of Third Schedule of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971 and (v) discontinue the practice of charging the late payment charges to the clients.\n \n Muhammad Javed Muhammad Ibrahim and Naveed Yaqoob, Authorized Representatives of Messrs Zafar Moti Capital Securities (Pvt.) Limited present at hearing.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.4/BRK-14/SE/SMD/01 dated 24-04-2013, decision dated: 26-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "HASNAT AHMAD, DIRECTOR (MSRD)",
    "": "MESSRS ZAFAR MOTI CAPITAL SECURITIES (PVT.) LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12195",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2207 = 2014 SLD 2207 = 2014 CLD 1715",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Securities and Exchange Commission (Insurance) Rules, 2002-------Regln. 16(1)(a)---Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000), Ss.46 & 156---Recording and reporting the Available for sale investments, without complying requirements of Regulations---Company had made an investment in the shares of another company---Company had not recorded the impairment, loss on said investment in its financial statement which constituted non-compliance of Regln.16(1)(a) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Insurance) Rules, 2002 and S.46(1)(b) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000---Company was required to state their Available for sales investments at lower of cost or market value in terms of Provisions of Regln.16(1)(a) of Securities and Exchange Commission (Insurance) Rules, 2002, which had been violated as the company had stated its Available for sale investment in the shares of other company at cost, and had not booked impairment in the book value of those investments; as the market price of those shares had fallen well below the cost or book value, which persisted for a considerably longer period of time---Directors of the company had failed to perform their duties with due care and prudence---As the Directors were supposed to be well aware of their legal obligations in connection with statutory requirement of Regln.16(1)(a) of the Regulations, it could be legitimately inferred that the default was committed---Default, having been established, penalty as provided under S.156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 could be imposed on the company and/or its Directors---Commission, taking lenient view condoned the company, issuing a stern warning that in case of similar non-compliance in future a stronger action would be taken against the company.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 196---Duties of the Directors---Directors, in addition to the day-to-day running of the company and the management of its business, also had some 'fiduciary' duties i.e. duties held in trust, and some wider duties imposed by statute; and breach of those statutory duties would usually be a criminal offence punishable by fine or imprisonment---Directors were gauged against a higher standard of accountability which required them to be vigilant, and perform their duties with due care.\n \n Muhammad Afzal Company Secretary Messrs Atlas Insurance Limited attended.\n \n Date of hearing: 5th May, 2014.\n \nORDER\n \n(Under Regulation 16(1)(a) of Part B of Annexure II of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Insurance) Rules, 2002 and section 46 read with section 156 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000)\n \n TARIQ HUSSAIN, DIRECTOR (INSURANCE).---This Order shall dispose of the proceedings initiated against Messrs Atlas Insurance Limited (the \"\"Company\"\") for not complying with the provisions of Regulation 16(1)(a) of Part B of Annexure II of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Insurance) Rules, 2002 (the \"\"Regulations\"\") of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 (the \"\"Ordinance\"\").\n \nBackground Facts\n \n2. The Company has filed its Half-Yearly Accounts as on June 30, 2012 (the \"\"Accounts\"\") in pursuance of the provisions of section 245 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. Amongst other requirements, these Accounts were required to be made in compliance of the requirements of the Regulations, which have been prescribed under section 46 of the Ordinance.\n \n3. Regulation 16(1)(a) of the Regulations lays down the requirement for recording and reporting the available-for-sale investments as:--\n \n \"\"Investment and Investment Properties.---For the purpose of all statements prepared under these regulations, and for the purpose of 534(1) of the Insurance Ordinance 2000.\n \n(a) available for sale investments shall be stated at the lower of cost or market value (market value being taken as lower if the fall is other than temporary). In the case of fixed income investments redeemable at a given date and where the cost is different from the redemption value, such difference shall be amortized uniformly between the date of acquisition and the date of maturity in determining -cost. The market value of investments at the balance sheet date shall be disclosed, as shall the effect of non-compliance with IAS 39;\n \n . . .\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "4. The Accounts reveal that the Company has made an investment in the shares of Messrs Siemens Pakistan, average cost of which amounted to Rs. 1,151.25 per share as on June 30, 2012. The Company had stated its investment in the shares of Messrs Siemens Pakistan at cost (Rs.1,151.25 per share) on the face of its balance sheet made up as on June 30, 2012, thereby reaching an aggregate book value of Rs.1,496,625.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "5. The share price history of Messrs Siemens Pakistan during the period from January 1, 2012 to July 31, 2012 (with date on x-axis and share price on y-axis) has been as follows:--",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "6. The share price history of Messrs Siemens Pakistan given above shows that the share price of the said company has been well below the Company's book value per share of its investment in Messrs Siemens Pakistan and which has been consistently declining during the period under consideration i.e. January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2012 and even till July 31, 2012, which makes it evident that the fall in the market value of the share of Messrs Siemens Pakistan has been other than temporary.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "7. In view of the foregoing paras of this Notice, it may be inferred that the decline in the price of the share of Messrs Siemens Pakistan was not temporary, and accordingly, the Company was required to state the said investment at lower of cost or market value.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "8. Hence, it appeared that the Company has not recorded the impairment loss on its investment in the shares of Messrs Siemens Pakistan, in its financial statements as on June 30, 2012, which constitutes non-compliance of Regulation 16(1)(a) of the Regulations read with section 46(1)(b) of the Ordinance.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Show Cause Notice",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "9. Accordingly, the Show Cause Notice was issued on March 28, 2014 under Regulation 16(1)(a) of the Regulations and section 46(1)(b) Read with section 156 of Ordinance to the Chief Executive and Directors of the Company, calling upon them to show cause as to why the penalty, as provided under section 156 of the Ordinance, should not be imposed upon the Company and/or its Directors for not complying with provisions of Regulation 16(1)(a) of the Regulations.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Company's Response to the Show Cause Notice",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "10. In response to the said Show Cause Notice, the Company, vide their letter No.AIL/SECP/1/ 2014 dated April 3, 2014, while stating that they intend to submit their written response by April 10, 2014 and also showed their intention to be heard in person or through their counsel in order to clarify the matter.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11. Subsequently, the Company has submitted their response, vide their letter No.AC/14/04/1633 dated April 7, 2014, in which the Company has placed adherence on the market price trend of the shares of Siemens Pakistan from July 2, 2012 to September 30, 2012. The Company states that during the period (July 2, 2012 to September 30, 2012), the share price improved from Rs. 800 per share to around Rs.900 to Rs. 950 per share, and also mentioned that the share recorded infra-day high of Rs. 1,002.73 per share on September 28, 2012. And, subsequent surge in the market price of that share led the Company to believe that fall in the share price was not of permanent nature for which impairment could have been recorded. Market price history of the shares of Siemens Pakistan from July 1, 2012 to September 30, 2012, as obtained from the website of the Karachi Stock Exchange has been as follows:--",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The data further revealed that the share price of Siemens Pakistan witnessed an intra­day highest price of Rs. 1,002.73 on September 24, 2012, and not on September 28, 2012.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
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    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
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    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12. Moreover, the Company argued that \"\"fall other than temporary\"\" has not specifically been defined in the Ordinance, hence, the interpretation becomes a subjective and could vary from company to company.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
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    "Court Name:": "",
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    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13. The Company also stated that:--",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
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    "Case #": "",
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    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": " \"\"...Company had holding of only 1,300 shares and financial impact of provision of Rs. 525,395 would have been hardly of any significance. It may not be out of place to mention here that Siemens paid 1,200% cash dividend for the year ended September 30, 2012",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
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    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
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    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": " ...Subsequently when the management thought, that now the fall in the market price could be other than temporary, it sold out the entire holding and recognized the loss...\"\"",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14. The Company further requested the Commission to take a lenient view of the matter as the amount is not material and decision was based on purely management at the time, and showed their intention of being heard.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
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    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
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    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "15. It would be pertinent to mention that the fall below the book value of the Company's investment in the shares of Siemens Pakistan could easily be interpreted as other than temporary, because of the fact that right from January 1, 2012 to June 30, 2012 and from July 1, 2012 to September 30, 2012, the market price of the shares of Siemens Pakistan has never reached the book value of these shares at which the Company has kept on the face of its balance sheet of June 30, 2012. Thus, the fall in price below the book value was of permanent in nature, at least as on June 30, 2012.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Hearings of the Case and Subsequent Developments",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
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    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
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    "Case #": "",
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    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "16. The hearing in the matter was scheduled for May 5, 2014 at 11-30 a.m., which was communicated to the Company and its Directors via the Commission's hearing notices No.ID/Enf/ Atlas/2014/19445 dated April 18, 2014.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
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    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
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    "Case #": "",
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    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "17. Accordingly, the said hearing was attended by Mr. Muhammad Afzal, Company Secretary (who will be referred to as the \"\"Representative\"\" hereinafter).",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "18. During the course of hearing, the Representative reiterated the contents of their response to the Show Cause Notice i.e. the Company's letter No. AC/14/04/1633 dated April 7, 2014. However, the Representative further mentioned that the Company has disposed of its investment in the shares of Siemens Pakistan on May 10, 2013 and May 13, 2013, having an aggregate book value of Rs. 1,496,625 thereby incurring an aggregate loss of Rs. 643,649 thereon, and in this regard, sale confirmation statement and a summary of this disposal were provided.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
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    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Consideration of Company's Submissions",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
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    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
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    "Court Name:": "",
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    "Case #": "",
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    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "19. I have carefully examined and given due consideration to the written and verbal submissions of the Company (through the Representative, Mr. Muhammad Afzal, Company Secretary, and have also referred to the provisions of the law, as mentioned hereinabove. I am of the view that there has been an established default of Regulation 16(1)(a) of the Regulations, as the Company was required to state their Available for Sales investments at lower of cost or market value in terms of the provisions of Regulation 16(1)(a) of the Regulations, which have been violated as the Company has stated its Available for Sale investments in the shares of Siemens Pakistan at cost and has not booked impairment in the book value of these investments, as the market price of these shares had fallen well below the cost or book value, which persisted for a considerably longer period of time i.e. right from January 1, 2012 to September 30, 2012. Thus, the fall in the market value of the said shares was other than temporary. However, if the market value of any such investments would have remained below the book value during the period from April 1, 2012 to July 31, 2012, considering the balance sheet date of June 30, 2012, the fall would have even then been considered as other than temporary.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "20. However, before proceeding further, I find it relevant to discuss the duties of the Directors. The Directors, in addition to the day-to-day running of the Company and the management of its business, also have some 'fiduciary' duties i.e. duties held in trust and some wider duties imposed by statute and breach of these statutory duties will usually be a criminal offence, punishable by fine or imprisonment. Hence, the Directors are gauged against a higher standard of accountability which requires them to be vigilant and perform their duties with due care. In the instant case, however, the Directors have failed to perform their duties with due care and prudence. As the Directors are supposed to be well aware of their legal obligations in connection with the aforesaid statutory requirement of Regulation 16(1)(a) of the Regulations, as aforesaid, therefore, it could be legitimately inferred that the default was committed.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
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    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "21. However, since the Company has disposed the investments under consideration back in May 2013 i.e. before the Show Cause Notice was issued on March 28, 2014, the amount involved was not quite material, the violation pertained to the balance sheet of half-year ended June 30, 2012, and that the Company has also requested the Commission to take lenient view, the violation can be taken as of low severity.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
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    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
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    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Conclusion",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "22. After carefully examining the arguments and studying the facts and findings of the case as mentioned in the above pass of this Order, the default of Regulation 16(1)(a) of the Regulations (i.e. Part B of Annexure II of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Insurance) Rules, 2002) is established. Therefore, the penalty as provided under section 156 of the Ordinance can be imposed onto the Company and/or its Directors.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "23. Section 156 of the Ordinance states that:--",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": " \"\"Penalty for default in complying with, or acting in contravention of this Ordinance.---Except as otherwise provided in this Ordinance, any insurer who makes default in complying with or acts in contravention of any requirement of this Ordinance, and, where the insurer is a company, any director, or other officer of the company, who is knowingly a party to the default, shrill be punishable with fine which may extend to one million rupees and, in the case of a continuing default, with an additional fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees for every day during which the default continues.\"\"",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Order",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "24. In exercise of the power conferred on me under section 156 of the Ordinance, I, instead of imposing penalty, take a lenient view, and thus, condone the Company due to the following reasons:--",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(a) THAT the Company has disposed the investments under consideration back in May 2013 i.e. before the Show Cause Notice was issued on March 28, 2014;",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(b) THAT the amount involved was not quite material;",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(c) AND THAT the violation pertained to the balance sheet of half-year ended June 30, 2012 and not of any annual period.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Also, the Company is hereby issued a stern warning that in case of similar non­compliance in future a stronger action against the Company will be taken.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "25. This Order is issued without prejudice to any other action that the Commission may initiate against the Company and/or its management (including the Chief Executive Officer of the Company) in accordance with the law on matters subsequently investigated or otherwise brought to the knowledge of the Commission.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": " Order accordingly.\"",
    "URL Link:": "Show Cause Notice issuing DATE 28-03-2014, decision dated: 10-07-2014.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "TARIQ HUSSAIN, DIRECTOR (INSURANCE)",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "ATLAS INSURANCE LIMITED: In the matter of",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12196",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2208 = 2014 SLD 2208 = 2014 CLD 1636",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2(c), 2(d), 2(f), 5, 7, 9 & 22---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 55---Suit for declaration, along with mandatory injunction as a consequential relief, was filed by the appellant before the Banking Court claiming to be a benami owner of Deposit Growth Certificates purchased by him in the name of his mother and grandfather---Appellant sought a decree that he was the actual owner and holder of the Deposit Growth Certificates and was entitled to receive the entire amount of the certificates along with the mark-up/interest, and a direction against the Bank to make the said payment---Banking Court disposed of the suit observing that as the Certificates were being claimed by the appellant to be in the names of his deceased relatives, therefore, the appellant should either obtain a succession certificate in respect of Deposit Growth Certificates or he may seek a decree for declaration from the court of competent jurisdiction on the ground that the appellant is a benami owner of these certificates---Aggrieved of the order of the Banking Court, the appellant filed an appeal before the High Court---Contention of the appellant was that he was within the jurisdiction of the Banking Court in terms of S. 7 of the Ordinance, therefore, the impugn order was against the law---Appellant further argued that initially he had filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief before the Civil Court but the plaint was returned and upon the return of the plaint the appellant filed the suit before the Banking Court---Bank argued that no such fact as to the return of the plaint from civil court or an appeal filed against the order of the civil court was mentioned in the plaint before the Banking Court, however, such plea was being taken by the appellant for the first time in appeal---Bank contended that the suit filed by the appellant was not maintainable before the Banking Court---Validity---Accumulative effect of Ss.2(c), 2(d), 2(f) & 9 of the Ordinance was that where a customer or a financial institution committed a default in fulfilment of any obligation with regard to any finance, the financial institution or such as the case may be, the customer, may institute a suit in the Banking Court---Even if the argument of the appellant is accepted that Deposit Growth Certificates fall within the definition of finance as given in S. 2(d) of the Ordinance, it remained an undeniable fact that Deposit Growth Certificates were in the name of other individuals and not the appellant---Any Court or Tribunal, established under a special law, was a court of limited jurisdiction and all the jurisdictional facts must exist before invoking the jurisdiction of a special Court or a Tribunal---If any of the jurisdictional fact is missing, the assumption of jurisdiction by special Court would amount to defective or excessive exercise of jurisdiction---Appellant had failed to establish that he was a \"\"customer\"\" as defined in S.2(c) of the Ordinance---Suit under S. 9(1) of the Ordinance was only maintainable by a customer if a financial institution committed a default in fulfillment of any obligation with regard to any finance---To attract jurisdiction of the Banking Court under S. 9 of the Ordinance, the Appellant had to establish that he was a customer but in the present case the Deposit Growth Certificates were in the names of other persons and it was rightly observed by the Banking Court that the appellant should either obtain succession certificate from the competent court of law or he may seek a decree for declaration to the effect that the appellant was a benami owner of the said certificates from the Court of plenary jurisdiction---Decree for declaration to the effect that the appellant be declared a benami owner of the Deposit Growth Certificates cannot be passed by the Banking Court established under S. 5 of the Ordinance---Section 7(1)(a) of the Ordinance though provides that in exercise of its civil jurisdiction the Banking Court shall have all the powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but subsection (1) of S. 7 of the Ordinance also provides that the Banking Court shall have these powers subject to the provisions of said Ordinance, meaning thereby, that at the first instance the appellant was to establish that all other jurisdictional facts exist to invoke the jurisdiction of the Banking Court, and where the Banking Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter, it shall, in that case, have all the powers vested in a Civil Court---Order of the Banking Court, thus, required no interference and was upheld---Appeal was dismissed by the High Court, in the circumstances.\n \n Haji Muhammad Nawaz Khokhar v. United Bank Ltd. 2012 CLD 1709; Brig. (Retd.) Hamid-ud-Din v. Askari Leasing Ltd. 2012 CLD 898 and Abdul Majeed v. Amir Muhammad and others 2005 SCMR 577 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 2(c), 2(d), 2(f) & 9---Accumulative effect of Ss. 2(c), 2(d), 2(f) & 9 of the Ordinance, would be that where a customer or a financial institution commits a default in fulfilment of any obligation with regard to any finance, the financial institution or such as the case may be the customer may institute a suit in the Banking Court.\n \n(c) Administration of justice---\n \n----Principle of law--- Jurisdiction--- Court or Tribunal, established under a special law, was a court of limited jurisdiction and all the jurisdictional facts must exist before invoking the jurisdiction of a special Court or a Tribunal---If any of the jurisdictional fact is missing, the assumption of jurisdiction by special Court would amount to defective or excessive exercise of jurisdiction.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 2(d)---\"\"Finance\"\", definition of---Term \"\"finance\"\" has wide connotation which includes the bills of exchange, promissory notes or other instruments with or without buy-back arrangement by a seller, participation term certificate, musharika, morabaha, musawama, istisnah or modaraba certificate and term finance certificate.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 5 & 7---Benami owner, declaration of---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Scope---Decree for declaration to the effect that a person be declared a benami owner of the Deposit Growth Certificates cannot be passed by the Banking Court established under S. 5 of the Ordinance---Although S. 7(1)(a) of the Ordinance provides that in exercise of its civil jurisdiction the Banking Court shall have all the powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but subsection (1) also provides that the Banking Court shall have these powers subject to the provisions of said Ordinance, meaning thereby, that at the first instance the person was to establish that all other jurisdictional facts exist to invoke the jurisdiction of the Banking Court, and where the Banking Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter, it shall, in that case, have all the powers vested in a Civil Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 251 of 2010, heard on 29-09-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND M. SOHAIL IQBAL BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "Sh. ALTAN AZMAT\nvs\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Chief Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12197",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2209 = 2014 SLD 2209 = 2014 CLD 1646",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------S. 118---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, R.2---Negotiable instrument--- Presumptions--- Filing of ordinary recovery suit---Effect---Plaintiff filed ordinary suit for recovery of amount on the basis of bank cheques issued by defendants in his favour---Validity---Filing of ordinary suit based on negotiable instrument in no manner deprived plaintiff of the benefits of statutory presumptions attached to negotiable instrument under S. 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881---All cheques and pay orders i.e. loan amount, were debited/shown in statements of accounts---Loan amount was not only acknowledged by issuing five cheques but also acknowledged the same in writing on stamp papers, which were not only signed and executed by defendants but also attested by Notary Public and Justice of Peace---Averments made in plaint, affidavit-in-ex parte proof and documents produced by plaintiff in his deposition had gone un-rebutted/un-challenged and plaintiff had fully succeeded to establish his claim against defendants---Suit was decreed in circumstances.\n \n Muhammad Sabir v. Khalil-ur-Rehman 2002 CLD 1545; Muhammad Yasin v. Shabbir Ahmed 1985 CLC 2111; Muhammad Nazir Khan v. Muhammad Ameer 2012 CLC 644 and Malik Umar Aslam v. Sumaira Malik and another PLD 2007 SC 362 ref.\n \n Syed Kausar Abbas Shah v. Sardar Khan 2005 YLR 3321 rel.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Civil and criminal proceedings---Stopping of civil proceedings---Principle---Civil case cannot be halted to proceed on its merits merely because some criminal proceedings relating to same transaction are pending---Such pendency of cases is not a bar to maintainability of civil proceedings---Both the cases can proceed concurrently because conviction for criminal offence is different matter as far as civil liability is concerned---Spirit and purpose of criminal proceedings is to punish offender for commission of crime, while the purpose behind civil proceedings is to enforce civil rights---Both proceedings in law can co-exist and proceed simultaneously.\n \n Seema Fareed and others v. The State and another 2008 SCMR 839 and Muhammad Saleem and 2 others v. Khuda Bux and 4 others 2013 MLD 266 rel.\n \n(c) West Pakistan Money Lenders Ordinance (XXIV of 1960)---\n \n----S. 3--- Money lending business--- Determination---Investments of savings, do not necessarily, amount to money lending business, if such investments are few and often made to relatives or friends---If such investments by way of advancing loan are frequently made in the shape of regular money lending business coupled with gain also then, such advancing of loan constitutes engagement in money lending business and consequently prohibited.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 57 of 2011, decision dated: 28-05-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZ-UR-REHMAN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD JUNAID PASHA--Plaintiff\nvs\nFAISAL SALEEM and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12198",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2210 = 2014 SLD 2210 = 2014 CLD 1664",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss. 6 & 22---Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001, Rr. 3 & 4---Irregularities in calculation of \"\"Net Capital Balance (NCB)\"\"---Inspection team, after inspecting the books and record maintained by the company, had highlighted major irregularities in calculation of \"\"Net Capital Balance (NCB)\"\" of the company for relevant period and was not in accordance with the Third Schedule of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971---Evidence on record had shown that company had calculated Trade Receivable and Trade Payable on the basis of overall position, rather than individual transaction basis---Violation of Ordinance, Rules and Regulations was a serious matter, but alleged violation was not wilful, as same was because of the interpretation issues and peculiar issues regarding Modaraba business and its regulatory structure---Commission took lenient view and no penalty was imposed on the company---Since the company, apart from being a 'Modaraba', was also holding the certificate of registration as a broker, company was strictly advised to adhere to securities laws and rules pertaining to calculation of 'NCB'---Company was also warned to be vigilant in future, and was directed to ensure full compliance with Securities and Exchange Ordinance, Rules, Regulations and directives of the Commission in future.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No. 4(BRK-148)SE/SMD/02 dated 23rd January, 2013, decision dated: 26-04-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "HASNAT AHMAD, DIRECTOR (MSRD)",
    "": "FIRST EQUITY MODARABA, BROKER Karachi High Court STOCK EXCHANGE LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12199",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2211 = 2014 SLD 2211 = 2014 CLD 1672",
    "Key Words:": "Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S. 202---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Termination of agency---Grant of temporary injunction---Plaintiff had successfully participated in submitting tender for lease of land for petrol and CNG Station and in anticipation of getting dealership for grant of lease he had paid earnest money---Lease Deed was executed for construction of Petrol Pump-cum-CNG station and dealership was promised to the plaintiff for the same---Plaintiff had acquired interest in the subject matter of suit which was the said land in terms of S.202 of Contract Act, 1872---Plaintiff must have put financial and other resources in order to obtain requisite \"\"NOC\"\" for different Government departments---Dealership was offered to the plaintiff subject to successful bidding of land in question---Plaintiff had succeeded in getting the bid approved of the land on which proposed filling station was to be constructed and he had paid heavy amount to procure the said lease---Proposed dealership had been withdrawn with immediate effect and without affording any opportunity to the plaintiff of being heard when he was in the process of obtaining requisite \"\"NOC\"\" for establishment and operation of a Petrol Pump-cum-CNG station---Defendants were restrained by High Court from issuing dealership, explosive certificate as well as approval for construction of building plan in favour of any third party and from creating third party interest with regard to dealership to plaintiff for establishment of Petrol Pump-cum-CNG station at the land which had already been leased out---Application for grant of temporary injunction was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Muhammad Aref Effendi v. Egypt Air 1980 SCMR 588; PLD 1979 Kar. 112; Karachi Catholic Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Jawad Baig PLD 1994 Kar. 194; 2003 SCMR 50; PLD 2004 SC 860 and PLD 1958 Lah. 63 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1459 of 2013, decision dated: 16-07-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED SAEED-UD-DIN NASIR, J",
    "": "UMER FAROOQ--Plaintiff\nvs\nATTOCK PETROLEUM LIMITED through Chief Executive Officer\nand 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12200",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2212 = 2014 SLD 2212 = 2014 CLD 1683",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 290 & 291---Company's affairs---Prevention of oppression and mismanagement---Application to court under S. 290 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Purpose and scope---Section 290 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 was invoked for prevention of oppression or mismanagement---Application under the said section was made where the members of the company were of the opinion that the affairs of the company were being conducted, or were likely to be conducted, in an unlawful or fraudulent manner, or in a manner, which was contrary to its Memorandum and Articles of Association, or in a manner oppressive to the members or any of the members or the creditors, or in a manner prejudicial to the public interest---Court may with a view to brining an end to matters complained of, make such orders which it deemed fit for regulating the conduct of the company's affairs---However a court under Ss. 290 & 291 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 could not look into a dispute inter se the parties (i.e., shareholders).\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss. 290 & 291---Petition to court under S. 290 of Companies Ordinance, 1984--- Maintainability---Oppression and mismanagement in a company---Scope---Inter se dispute between shareholders of a company---Such dispute was not adjudicable under S. 290 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Petitioner and respondent were the only two shareholders in a private company which provided Hajj and Umra services---Petitioner alleged that respondent, without his consent added another shareholder in the company; that respondent and new shareholder forged certain documents and also forged his signatures on company documents and bank accounts and that respondent and new shareholder also did not follow the guidelines with respect to providing Hajj services and illegally used the Hajj quota---Such allegations of petitioner could not be adjudicated under S.290 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, as they did not relate to matters of the company, which ought to be regulated by the Court---Present dispute was in fact a dispute inter se the petitioner, respondent and the new shareholder---Court under Ss. 290 & 291 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 could not look into a dispute inter se the parties---Allegations made by petitioner did not amount to oppression and mismanagement under S.290 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Petition under S. 290 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 was held to be not maintainable in such circumstances and was consequently dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O. No. 17 of 2013, decision dated: 25-06-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. AYESHA A. MALIK, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD IJAZ TAHIR\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12201",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2213 = 2014 SLD 2213 = 2014 CLD 1688",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss.6 & 22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, R.8---Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001, Rr.3, 4 & 7---Irregularities in calculation of \"\"Net Capital Balance (NCB)\"\"---Inspection team, duly constituted, in its report had pointed out irregularities in calculation of 'Net Capital Balance (NCB)' by the broker company---\"\"Net Capital Certificate\"\" was not in accordance with the Third Schedule of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971---Company had failed to properly maintain segregation of its client's assets and to prepare KYC and CDD Policy in a timely manner---Company, therefore, was involved in the imposition of late payment charges---Segregation of clients' assets was of paramount importance for the protection of investors' interest---Company being the custodian of clients' assets was expected to comply with the applicable regulatory framework in letter and spirit---Penalty of Rs.25,000 was imposed on the company with further directions; that the company would comply with Rules and guidelines issued in letter and spirit; to ensure segregation of clients' assets, maintain separate bank account for the clients' funds and use that one account solely for the purpose of client's funds.\n \n Kamran Shahzad, Director and Muhammad Faisal, Manager Operations representing Fairtrade Capital Securities (Pvt.) Limited.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.1(27) SMD/MSRD/C&IW/2014 dated 29-04-2014, decision dated: 18-06-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "FAIRTRADE CAPITAL SECURITIES (PVT.) LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12202",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2214 = 2014 SLD 2214 = 2014 CLD 1696",
    "Key Words:": "Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)-------Ss. 2(c-a) & 10(1)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Infringement of copyright---Interim injunction, grant of---Art work---Plaintiff was in production of original audio-visual content and had assailed program 'Coke Studio Season 6' aired by defendant company---Plea raised by plaintiff was that by airing 'Coke Studio Season 6', defendant infringed copyrights of his art work---Validity---Video of defendant could not be regarded as infringing plaintiff's video---Plaintiff sought to place reliance on certain specific instances of similarity or commonality but such instances lost any relevance that might appear to have, if considered in isolation---Two videos were distinct and each proceeded on its own basis and ideas described in both the works and the same were also distinct---High Court did not find any infringement of plaintiff's work even in any sense---Plaintiff failed to make out any case for interim injunctive relief on the ground of infringement of work under Copyright Ordinance, 1962---Application was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers Ltd. [1937] 3 Ch D 503; R.G. Anand v. Delux Films and others AIR 1978 SC 1613; Computer Associates International Inc. v. Altai Iac. (1992) 982 F.2d 693; Independent Media v. Ali Saleem and another 2006 CLD 97; Copinger & Skone James on Copyright 16th ed., 2010; IPC Media Ltd. v. Highbury-Leisure Publishing Ltd. [2004] EWHC 2985 (Ch), [2005] FSR 20 and Dymow v. Bolton (1926) 11 F.2d 690 ref.\n \n Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co. (1930) 45 F.2d 119 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1303 of 2013, decision dated: 13-05-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD KASHAN--Plaintiff\nvs\nCOCA COLA CORPORATION PAKISTAN LIMITED through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12203",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2215 = 2014 SLD 2215 = 2014 SCMR 1710",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 5(3)---Power of High Court to transfer a case from one Banking Court to another---Scope---Discretionary power---Considerations that should weigh with the High Court before deciding to transfer a case---Discretion conferred upon the High Court to transfer a case was not be exercised whimsically or in routine---No party to a lis could demand the transfer of a case as a matter of right, and it was for the Judge of the High Court to take all the ambient circumstances into consideration before allowing any application for transfer of a case from one Banking Court to another---Before invoking its power to transfer a case, the High Court should see as to whether in the background of the peculiar facts of a case, it would be appropriate, expedient and conducive to the interests of justice to pass a transfer order; whether the transfer order would relieve the parties of their hardships in pursuing the case or it would compound the miseries and whether it would make things easier for witnesses to be produced by the parties to the lis.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Members of the Bar---Duty of---Maintaining discipline and decorum during proceedings---As officers of the Court, it was expected of Members of the Bar, that they would help maintain discipline and decorum, letting the proceedings to be carried out in a manner conducive to the administration of justice---In no case should Members of the Bar play up small matter, which tended to foul up things or undermine the authority of the court or descend the administration of justice into chaos.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 5(3)---Transfer of case from one Banking Court to another---Grounds not warranting transfer of case---Scope---Ego of applicant---Judge not yielding to desires of counsel for applicant---No reason was found in the present case to believe that Judge before whom suit was being heard, would not do justice to the applicant---No ground existed within the parameters of S. 5(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to transfer suit of applicant to another court of competent jurisdiction---Seemingly in the present case ego of the applicant had been hurt during proceedings and the matter was made worse and exacerbated when counsel for applicant took it to heart that the Judge did not oblige him and did not yield to his desires when the bank brought some disputed documents on record---Application for transfer of case was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "T.A. No. 108-C of 2013, decision dated: 2-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAHMOOD AHMED BHATTI, J",
    "": "SHAKEEL AHMAD\nvs\nZARI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12204",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2216 = 2014 SLD 2216 = 2014 CLD 1710",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 5(3)---Power of High Court to transfer a case from one Banking Court to another---Scope---Discretionary power---Considerations that should weigh with the High Court before deciding to transfer a case---Discretion conferred upon the High Court to transfer a case was not be exercised whimsically or in routine---No party to a lis could demand the transfer of a case as a matter of right, and it was for the Judge of the High Court to take all the ambient circumstances into consideration before allowing any application for transfer of a case from one Banking Court to another---Before invoking its power to transfer a case, the High Court should see as to whether in the background of the peculiar facts of a case, it would be appropriate, expedient and conducive to the interests of justice to pass a transfer order; whether the transfer order would relieve the parties of their hardships in pursuing the case or it would compound the miseries and whether it would make things easier for witnesses to be produced by the parties to the lis.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Members of the Bar---Duty of---Maintaining discipline and decorum during proceedings---As officers of the Court, it was expected of Members of the Bar, that they would help maintain discipline and decorum, letting the proceedings to be carried out in a manner conducive to the administration of justice---In no case should Members of the Bar play up small matter, which tended to foul up things or undermine the authority of the court or descend the administration of justice into chaos.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 5(3)---Transfer of case from one Banking Court to another---Grounds not warranting transfer of case---Scope---Ego of applicant---Judge not yielding to desires of counsel for applicant---No reason was found in the present case to believe that Judge before whom suit was being heard, would not do justice to the applicant---No ground existed within the parameters of S. 5(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to transfer suit of applicant to another court of competent jurisdiction---Seemingly in the present case ego of the applicant had been hurt during proceedings and the matter was made worse and exacerbated when counsel for applicant took it to heart that the Judge did not oblige him and did not yield to his desires when the bank brought some disputed documents on record---Application for transfer of case was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "T.A. No. 108-C of 2013, decision dated: 2-04-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAHMOOD AHMED BHATTI, J",
    "": "SHAKEEL AHMAD\nvs\nZARI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12205",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2072 = 2013 SLD 2072 = 2013 CLD 439",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss 2(a), 2(c), 10---Suit for recovery---\"\"Provider of finance\"\"--- Financial Institution--- Scope--- Plaintiff had acquired \"\"Sukuk\"\" certificates issued by the defendants---Said \"\"Sukuk\"\" certificates had been originally allotted to another institution and were subsequently traded in the financial market and the plaintiff acquired the said \"\"Sukuk\"\" certificates in good faith---When the original allottee did not receive the \"\"rental payment\"\" against said certificates; it contacted the defendants and contended that it had never transferred said \"\"Sukuk\"\" certificates---Plaintiff's title to the certificates, therefore, led back to an elaborate swindle---Plaintiff contended that the transaction embodied in the \"\"Sukuk\"\" certificates was \"\"finance\"\" within meaning of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and the defendants, who had issued the said certificates, were \"\"customers\"\" within the meaning of the Ordinance, and therefore the suit for recovery was maintainable---Validity---Question to be determined was whether the plaintiff on acquisition of said \"\"Sukuk\"\" certificates became a financial institution that had provided finance to the defendants within the meaning of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001; there was a distinction to be drawn between a person who was a provider of finance and someone who was a holder of debt--- Provider of finance, if it was financial institution, as defined in S.2(a) of the Ordinance, was entitled to bring a suit under the Ordinance but a mere holder of debt, however, even if the same was a financial institution, may or may not be able to do so---Every provider of finance within the meaning of the Ordinance was also a holder of debt, but every holder of debt was not necessarily a provider of finance within the meaning of the Ordinance ----For the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to apply it was crucial that the finance should originally have been provided by the financial institution----Crucial element in the definition of \"\"customer\"\" was the origination of the finance that was being sued upon and whether or not it was extended by a financial institution---Even if the finance was held at the time of default by a financial institution, it was merely a holder of debt and was therefore, in such capacity, not entitled to bring a suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Suit being not maintainable, was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-187 of 2009, decision dated: 31st May, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "MEEZAN BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nWAPDA FIRST SUKUK COMPANY LIMITED through Chief Executive Officer and 2 others----Defendants\n Ijaz Ahmed and Aijaz Shirazi for --Plaintiff.\n Abid Aziz Sheikh for ----Defendants Nos.1 and 2."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12206",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2073 = 2013 SLD 2073 = 2013 CLD 1",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 19 & 22---Execution proceedings---Mortgaged property at place \"\"K\"\" attached by Banking Court at place \"\"L\"\"---­Objection petition by another decree holder-Bank that such property could not be attached as same was purchased by objector at reserve price fixed in failed auction thereof by Banking Court at place \"\"K\"\" in satisfaction of its decree obtained against deceased principal debtor and mortgagor---­Validity---Objector-Bank had filed recovery suit against principal debtor and mortgagor of property at place \"\"K\"\" in court at place \"\"K\"\" after its attachment by court at place \"\"L\"\" in execution proceedings---Deceased principal debtor in his statement made to court at place \"\"L\"\" claimed to be owner of three properties including property at place \"\"K\"\", which he got registered in names of his family members---Mortgagee and objector of such properties was same objector-Bank---In absence of proof on record of the means of mortgagor (wife of principal debtor) to acquire ownership of two of properties including property at place \"\"K\"\", principal debtor appeared to have been laundering and re-cycling embezzled monies belonging to his company under liquidation before court at place \"\"L\"\"---Objector-Bank had strong financial links with deceased principal debtor and had advanced him loan---Objector-Bank had knowledge about present execution proceedings---Objector-Bank, though claimed equitable mortgages in its favour regarding other two properties and displayed same collusive protection in relation thereto, but had not challenged order of court at place \"\"L\"\" allowing sale thereof---Such inaction of objector-Bank would show its plea to be defective and bogus---Fraudulent and collusive action to avoid process of court at place \"\"L\"\" by resort to a collusive and artificial sale in execution of a collusive decree could not receive protection of immunities and exceptions created for honest transactions entered by genuine and bona fide parties--­Neither principal debtor nor his mortgagor wife nor objector-­Bank were bona fide parties to a genuine and honest execution sale by court at place \"\"K\"\"---Principal debtor, his wife-mortgagor and objector-Bank had colluded to create an obstruction to enforcement of attachment order passed by court at place \"\"L\"\"---High Court at place \"\"L\"\" dismissed such objection petition in circumstances.\n \n Union Leasing Limited v. Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. through Deputy Managing Director and 8 others 2005 CLD 958; United Bank Limited v. P.I.C.I.C. and others 1992 SCMR 1731; Mana and 4 others v. Hussain Bakhsh and 5 others 1993 CLC 1400; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan through Deputy Chief Manager v. Saadi Asmatullah and others 1999 SCMR 2874 and Orix Leasing Pakistan Ltd. v. Sunshine Cloth Limited 2001 PTD 3146 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M. No.334-L of 2004 in Civil Original No.45 of 1990, decision dated: 29-09-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES, PAKISTAN through Joint Registrar of Companies--Applicant\nvs\nTAJ COMPANY LTD. and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12207",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2074 = 2013 SLD 2074 = 2013 CLD 16",
    "Key Words:": "Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-------Ss. 11, 16 & 17--- Environmental Samples Rules, 2001---Release of untreated effluent---Main allegation was that the wastewater samples collected from the mill, were found beyond the limits of National Environmental Quality Standards---Environmental Protection Agency, initiated proceedings against the mill for violation of S.11 of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997---Case of prosecution was that date of collection of wastewater sample was 9-2-2010, but the test report bore the date of receiving of samples as 15-2-2010 and customer reference number contradicted the number mentioned on Forms B & C---Said material contradictions had made the whole case of prosecution as doubtful one---No details of procedure adopted by mill was disclosed in respect of manufacturing process, use of water and its alleged polluted discharge in the environment causing damage to the underground water quality---Prosecution had not brought anything in respect of service of notice on the mill---If representative of mill had failed to appear on the relevant date, another opportunity of hearing should have been afforded instead of issuance of Environmental Protection Order on the same date---Violation was in the case of mandatory provisions of Environmental Samples Rules, 2001---Issuance of Environmental Protection Order without providing the copy of report and service of notice, appeared to be harsh and against the principles of natural justice---Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against mill beyond shadow of reasonable doubt---Chief Executive Officer of the mill was acquitted, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Environmental Protection Tribunal, Karachi",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Complaint No.17 of 2010, decision dated: 30-06-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. ASHRAF, JAHAN, CHAIRPERSON AND ABDUL KARIM MEMON, MEMBER LEGAL",
    "": "DIRECTOR-GENERAL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF SINDHComplainant\nvs\nFAROOQ GULZAR, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, GULZAR OIL INDUSTRIES"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12208",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2075 = 2013 SLD 2075 = 2013 CLD 177",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 22--- Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 29--- Appeal---Application under S.5, Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay for appeal filed under S.22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Maintainability---Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 by virtue of ouster clause was not applicable to the proceedings of the appeal under S.22 of the Ordinance; as the same prescribed a period of 30 days for filing of the appeal---No enabling and permissive provisions of the law existed in the said Ordinance in order to apply S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Provisions of S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 were not attracted to the appeal preferred under S.22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Application for condonation of delay was not maintainable---Appeal, being barred by time, was dismissed.\n \n Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286; Abdul Rasheed and another v. Bank of Punjab through Branch Manager 2004 CLD 800; Protein and Fats International (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 2 others v. Capital Assets Leasing Corporation Limited through Manager 2005 CLD 857; Sikandar Hayat v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2005 CLD 870; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Rehmania Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 3 others 2006 CLD 81 and Messrs S. Malik Traders and another v. Saudi Pak Leasing Company Ltd. 2009 CLD 171 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 20 of 2012, decision dated: 17-05-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MEHMOOD MAQBOOL BAJWA AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KHAN TRACTORS, ALIPUR ROAD, KHAN GARH DISTRICT MUZAFFARGARH through Proprietor and 2 others\nvs\nHABIB BANK LIMITED, RAILWAY ROAD BRANCH, MUZAFFARGARH through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12209",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2076 = 2013 SLD 2076 = 2013 CLD 197",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 20---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 265-K & 403---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 13---Default in payment of bank loan---Double jeopardy, principle of---Applicability---Acquittal before trial---Accused persons availed various loans from complainant bank and on default of payment of loan, bank filed complaint under S.20 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---On application filed by accused persons, Trial Court acquitted them in exercise of powers under S.265-K, Cr.P.C.---Validity---All liabilities against alleged misappropriation were admitted by co-accused, who was real beneficiary of the deal---Bank had already filed similar nature of complaint on 17-1-2001 and after its dismissal on 4-9-2002, bank kept mum from the date of dismissal till filing of present complaint---Bank failed to render any reason for filing second complaint after lapse of seven years---No appeal or application against order of dismissal was preferred---Complaint in question also amounted to double jeopardy, which was against S.403, Cr.P.C. and also against Art.13 of the Constitution---High Court did not find any probability of conviction of accused persons for alleged offence, even if prosecution would have allowed to produce evidence against them---Charge levied against accused persons being without substance and groundless, therefore, Trial Court had rightly acquitted accused persons under S.265-K, Cr.P.C., which needed no interference---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 265-K---Acquittal before framing of charge---Scope---Trial Court under S.265-K, Cr.P.C. can acquit accused at any stage, if charge against accused facing trial is groundless and there is no likelihood of his conviction---Trial Court can acquit accused even before framing of charge.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 22 of 2011, decision dated: 1st November, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID MEHMOOD, J",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Vice President/Chief Manager\nvs\nZAHID S. SHEIKH and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12210",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2077 = 2013 SLD 2077 = 2013 CLD 218",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 22(6)---Suit for recovery was decreed ex parte against the defendants--- Banking Court, during execution proceedings, passed an order which was impugned by the defendants---Contention of the defendants was that they had already made an application under S.12(2), C.P.C. for setting aside ex parte decree which was still pending and that until said application was decided, execution proceedings should not be undertaken--- Validity--- Impugned order was interlocutory in nature, causing no prejudice at all to the defendant; which even otherwise could not be assailed in view of S.22(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Appeal, being incompetent, was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 11 of 2012, heard on 28-06-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MEHMOOD MAQBOOL BAJWA AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ",
    "": "Mst. NASREEN FATIMA\nvs\nThe BANK OF PUNJAB through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12211",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2078 = 2013 SLD 2078 = 2013 CLD 224",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19--- Suit for recovery was decreed--- Objection petition to sale of mortgaged property was dismissed by Appellate Court and sale was confirmed---Contention of the -debtor/appellant was that no auction was held on the spot---Validity---Question as to whether the auction at all was conducted at the spot could only be resolved by the Banking Court after the framing of issues and enabling the parties to lead evidence; and if the auction had not taken place, no valid sale could be confirmed---High Court set aside impugned order and remanded the matter to the Banking Court---Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\n \n Mumtaz-ud-Din Feroze v. Sh. Iftikhar Adil and others PLD 2009 SC 207 and Messrs British Biscuits Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Atlas Investment Bank Limited 2005 CLD 674 ref.\n \n Mrs. Salma Javed v. Deutsche Bank A.G. Lahore through Attorney and 4 others 2004 CLD 1560 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 9 of 2011, heard on 20-06-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MEHMOOD MAQBOOL BAJWA AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ",
    "": "AASIM SAjj CourtAD SIDDIQUI and another\nvs\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through Branch Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12212",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2079 = 2013 SLD 2079 = 2013 CLD 228",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-------Ss. 4, 5 & 6--- \"\"Manufacturing\"\" or \"\"design defect\"\"---Scope--- Complainant (appellant) obtained an auto rickshaw after obtaining loan facility from Bank---Complainant filed complaint before Consumer Court on the basis that auto rickshaw was consuming too much petrol and its parts were not working properly---Consumer Court rejected the complaint---Contentions of complainant were that expert, who was deputed for inspection by the Consumer Court, categorically stated that rickshaw was not equipped with an air filter which shortened the life of the engine, and that solenoid valve was faulty which caused difficulty in starting the rickshaw---Validity---Grievance of complainant did not attract Ss. 4, 5 or 6 of Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005---Non-availability of air filter could not be termed as a \"\"manufacturing defect\"\", as an air filter was a replaceable part in an engine and had a specific life span and had to be replaced after it exhausted its life expectancy---Similarly a \"\"solenoid\"\" was also a part which might become defective through rough or improper use and had a definite life span and could be replaced to use the equipment or machine (auto rickshaw)---Defects pointed out by complainant could not be said to have caused any effect on the basic design and were not material deviation from the manufacturer's own specification and such fact had been admitted by the expert during his cross-examination---Defects alleged by complainant were of minor nature and could also occur due to negligence/rough use---Said defects could simply be overcome by replacing the relevant parts---Complainant did not get the rickshaw inspected by the Motor Vehicle Examiner or some other expert of similar qualification to support his allegation regarding inherent mechanical defect---Complainant after having apparently made an ill-informed choice of getting an auto rickshaw, wanted to get rid of it and was trying to use the Consumer Protection Act, 2005 as a tool to obtain back the money invested by him and wriggle out of his contractual relationship with the manufacturer and the bank---Complainant could not produce any cogent and reliable evidence from which it could be inferred that auto rickshaw contained any manufacturing defect, which had caused him any damage---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Words and phrases---\n \n----\"\"Manufacturing defect\"\"---Meaning.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.447 of 2011, decision dated: 3rd October, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AZAM\nvs\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12213",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2080 = 2013 SLD 2080 = 2013 CLD 233",
    "Key Words:": "Cantonments Act (II of 1924)-------Ss. 60, 83 & 99-A---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54--- Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S. 3---Octroi charges, recovery of--- Suit for declaration, injunction and recovery of money---Intra-court Appeal---Import and use of crude oil within limits of Cantonment Board---Octroi charges, recovery of---Legality---Plaintiff was contractor of Cantonment Board and collected octroi on articles imported for use, consumption or sale within the limits of Cantonment Board concerned---Defendant-company was oil refinery and denied import of crude oil from abroad and refused to pay octori on the ground that oil was supplied through underground pipelines---Validity---Octroi tax was not like toll tax so as to be imposed at entry of road or bridge but octroi tax was liable not merely on import or entry of goods in octroi limits but also on its sale, consumption or use within such limits---Mere import of crude oil was not of any significance so as to attract levy of octroi---Entry of crude oil within octroi limits was admitted, therefore, it would be immaterial if the same was brought through underground pipelines or by road etc.---Defendant availed remedy provided under S.99-A of Cantonments Act, 1924, but without success due to retrospection of notification in question, which was since issued in favour of defendant under the provisions of same statute, hence its applicability could not be denied by defendant--- Octroi duty imposed on import, use etc. of crude/mineral oil, mentioned in duly approved octroi schedule issued under notification dated 10-9-1976, with previous sanction of Federal Government and also published in official gazette in compliance of S.60 and other sections of Cantonments Act, 1924, could not be termed to be ultra vires of the Constitution in any way---Division Bench of High Court directed defendant to pay octroi duty on import and use of crude oil in its refinery within octroi limits of Cantonment Board to plaintiff for period of his octroi--- Division Bench of High Court reversed findings of Judge in Chambers of High Court on material issues---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n Mst. Nargis Moeen and another v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Defence, Islamabad and another PLD 2003 Lah. 730; Bela Automatic Ltd. v. KMC and 2 others PLD 1999 Kar. 410; Messrs Universal Merchants v. Commissioner of Karachi and 2 others 1980 CLC 704; Municipal Committee Multan v. Burmah Shell Storage and Distributing Co. of Pakistan Ltd. and another PLD 1976 Lah. 726; Municipal Corporation, Faisalabad v. Atta Muhammad and others 1990 SCMR 84; Messrs Anwar Khan Mahboob Co. v. The State of Bombay and others AIR 1961 SC 213; Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. Belgaum v. Belgaum Borough Municipality, Belgaum AIR 1963 SC 906; Burshane (Pakistan) Ltd.'s case PLD 1983 Kar. 517; C.E.O. and another v. Burshane (Pak.) Ltd. 1986 SCMR 1308; AIR 1947 F.C. 14; Chief Officer, Corporation City of Lahore v. The Punjab Flour and General Mills Co. Ltd. Lahore (Regular Second Appeal No.1744 of 1943; Messrs Saadat Factory v. The Chairman, Municipal Committee, Dera Gazi Khan (Writ Petition No.42 of 1961); Jafarabad Municipality v. Kathiawar Industries Ltd. AIR 1969 Gujarat 344; Kathiawar Industries Ltd. v. Jaffrabad Municipality AIR 1979 SC 1721; Chief Administrator Auqaf v. Mst. Amna Bibi 2008 SCMR 1717; Ashraf Sugar Mills v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1993 CLC 910; Collector of Central Excise and Sales Tax Lahore v. Messrs Abdullah Sugar Mills Ltd. 2008 PTD 894; M.A. Rashid Khan and 2 others v. Azad Government and others PLD 1981 AJ&K 30 and Sheikh Fazal Ahmad v. Raja Ziaullah Khan and another PLD 1964 SC 494 ref.\n \n Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1992 SCMR 1652 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.231 of 1999, decision dated: 10-09-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM C.J. AND NISAR MUHAMMAD SHAIKH, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RAMZAN KATIAR through Legal Heirs\nvs\nPAKISTAN REFINERY LTD. and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12214",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2081 = 2013 SLD 2081 = 2013 CLD 267",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-------S. 2(c)---West Pakistan General Clauses Act (VI of 1956), S. 2(47)---\"\"Consumer\"\", definition of---Scope---\"\"Firm\"\" as a consumer---Scope---Complaint filed by a \"\"firm\"\" against a manufacturer of products---Pre-requisites---\"\"Firm\"\" being a \"\"person\"\" fell within the definition of \"\"consumer\"\" as provided in S.2(c) of Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 and might competently maintain a complaint against a manufacturer in respect of a product before the Consumer Court, if it satisfied that there was a transaction of sale or lease; that the sale or lease was of a product; that buying or leasing of product was for consideration; that obtaining of product was not for resale purposes, and that obtaining of product was not for a commercial purpose, which did not include use by a consumer of product bought and used by him only for purpose of his livelihood as a self-employed person.\n \n Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S. G. Industrial Institute AIR 1995 SC 1428; Ravi Kant and others v. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and others AIR 1997 Del. 182; Department of Enterprise Trade and Investment v. The Carrill Group Ltd. (2007) NICA 39; MFI Furniture Centre Ltd. v. Hibbert 160 JP 178 and Benincasa v. Dentalkit (1998) All ER (EC) 135 ref.\n \n(b) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)---\n \n----S. 2(c)--- \"\"Consumer\"\", definition of--- Scope--- Term \"\"consumer\"\" was comprehensive and covered not only consumer of products but also consumer of services---Term \"\"consumer\"\" did not include a person or entity which obtained any product either for resale or for any commercial purpose, which did not include use by a consumer of products bought and used by him only for the purpose of his livelihood as a self-employed person.\n \n(c) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)---\n \n----S. 2(c)---West Pakistan General Clauses Act (VI of 1956), S. 2(47)---Consumer, definition of---\"\"Firm\"\" as a consumer---Scope---Complainant (appellant) who was running a registered firm purchased an Electronic Bagging Plant (\"\"Plant\"\") from the defendant---Said Plant was installed by defendant at the premises of the complainant, but it did not work properly---Complainant filed a complaint before the Consumer Court for recovery of entire amount paid to defendant as cost of the machine; for recovery of extra cost paid for purchase of new machine, and for recovery of economic losses arising from deficiency and loss of use of product---Consumer Court returned complaint holding that Corporation (firm) of complainant did not fall within the definition of consumer as given in Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005---Validity---Firm being a \"\"person\"\" fell within the definition of \"\"consumer\"\" as provided in S.2(c) of Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 and might competently maintain a complaint against a manufacturer in respect of a product before the Consumer Court--- Appeal was allowed, impugned order was set aside and case was remanded to Consumer Court for decision afresh in accordance with the law.\n \n Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S. G. Industrial Institute AIR 1995 SC 1428; Ravi Kant and others v. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and others AIR 1997 Del. 182; Department of Enterprise Trade and Investment v. The Carrill Group Ltd. (2007) NICA 39; MFI Furniture Centre Ltd. v. Hibbert 160 JP 178 and Benincasa v. Dentalkit (1998) All ER (EC) 135 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.133 of 2009, heard on 17-10-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID WAHEED, J",
    "": "ZIA ULLAH MALIK\nvs\nNADEEM BAIG"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12215",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2082 = 2013 SLD 2082 = 2013 CLD 349",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.89---Sale without intervention of court---Objection petition---Deposit of 5% of auction price---Objectors claimed to have ex parte decree in their favour and filed objection petition against sale of shop in question by bank without intervention of court---Plea raised by objectors was that they had deposited 5% of auction price---Validity---Objection application for setting aside of sale on the ground of deposit of 5% of auction price as envisaged by O.XXI, Rule 89, C.P.C. was only entertainable by Executing Court when sale of immovable property had taken place in execution of decree---Application moved by objectors by invoking provisions of O.XXI, Rule 89, C.P.C. was incompetent---Objectors could not claim setting aside of auction/sale completed in favour of auction purchaser merely on the ground that they had deposited 5% of auction price before Banking Court unless some illegality was established or pointed out in effecting of auction or of the sale in favour of auction purchaser---Order passed by Banking Court was unexceptionable and the same did not call for any interference by High Court---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.158 of 2008, heard on 20-04-2012, hearing DATE : 20-04-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR SAEED SHEIKH AND MIAN SHAHID IQBAL, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHARIF and another\nVs\nHafiz MUHAMMAD ISMAIL and 10 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12216",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2083 = 2013 SLD 2083 = 2013 CLD 291",
    "Key Words:": "(a) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)-------S. 6---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 264---Ordinance, expiry of---Pending cases---Effect---Once an Ordinance expires, the law which was repealed by that Ordinance takes the field---Expiry of Ordinance during pendency of case does not affect pending application and the same remains maintainable.\n \n Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan PLD 1995 SC 66; Federation of Pakistan v. M. Nawaz Khokhar PLD 2000 SC 26; State v. Muhammad Sharif PLD 1960 Lah. 236; The Sargodha Bhera Bus Service Limited v. The Province of West Pakistan PLD 1959 SC 127 and Air League of PIAC Employees v. Federation of Pakistan M/O Labour and Manpower Division Islamabad and others 2011 SCMR 1254 rel.\n \n(b) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Ordinance (XXXIII of 2009)---\n \n----Ss. 3 & 4---Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011), Ss. 3 & 4---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151---Suit for injunction--- Enforcement of arbitration agreements---Stay of proceedings---Null and void agreement---Determination---Defendants sought stay of proceedings before Court referring the same to arbitration in terms of arbitration mechanism agreed between the parties---Validity---Pre-condition for refusing stay of proceedings was that arbitration agreement was null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed---Words null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed should be read keeping in view rule of ejesdem generis i.e. when a particular word pertaining to class, category or genus or followed by general words, the general words were construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified---plaintiff failed to point out from record that arbitration agreement was null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed---Application for stay of suit could not be rejected as arbitration agreement could be refused to a party to arbitration agreement unless court had found the same as null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed---Plaintiff failed to bring case within the exceptions provided under S.4(2) of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Ordinance, 2009 or Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011, so as to refuse to stay the proceedings---High Court directed to refer disputes between parties to arbitration in terms of arbitration clause stated in agreement and stayed proceedings before court---Application was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Messrs Travel Automation (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director v. Abacus International (Pvt.) Ltd. through President and Chief Executive and others 2006 CLD 497; Far Eastern Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Quest International Nederland BV and others 2009 CLD 153; Gas Authority of India Ltd. v. Spie Capag, S.A. and others AIR 1994 Delhi 75; Svenska Handelsbanken and others v. Messrs Indian Charge Chrome Ltd. and others ((1994) 2 Supreme Court Cases 155; A. Merdith Janes Co. Ltd. v. Crescent Board Ltd. 1999 CLC 437; R.M. Investment & Trading Co. Pvt. Limited v. Boeing Co. and others AIR 1994 SC 1136; Messrs Srivenkateswara Constructions and others v. The Union of India AIR 1974 Andhra Pradesh 278; SQN. LDR. (R.) Khurram Zaman v. Mrs. Afia Zafar and others 2008 CLD 662; Lahore Development Authority through Director General, L.D.A., Lahore v. Mohandisin-e-Masud through Managing Partner and another 2010 YLR 66; Aftab Khalil and others v. Shaukat Hussain 2008 CLC 1592; Messrs Eckhrdt & Co. Marine Gmbh v. Muhammad Hanif PLD 1993 SC 42; Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Limited v. Pepsico. Inc. and others 2004 CLD 1530; Messrs Shakil Waqas & Co. and others v. General Manager/Marketing, Pakistan Railways and others PLD 2011 Kar. 185; Concentrate Manufacturing Company of Ireland and others v. Seven-up Bottling Company (Private) Limited and others 2002 CLD 77; Tahir Zaman v. Jin Wei (M) SDN BHD and others 2004 CLD 603; Marghub Siddiqi v. Hamid Ahmad Khan and others 1974 SCMR 519; Lahore Stock Exchange Ltd. through Managing Director and another v. Messrs Hassan Associates through Managing Partner 2010 MLD 800; Messrs Gulf Pacific Fertilizer, California, U.S.A. through Attorney v. Messrs Ali Akbar Enterprises and others 2000 MLD 1537; Zulqarnain and others v. Surbuland Khan and another 2004 SCMR 1084; Noor Ahmad v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1969 Baghdad-ul-Jadid 17; Mrs. Mussarat Shaukat Ali v. Mrs. Safia Khatoon and others 1994 SCMR 2189; Metropolitan Steel Corporation Ltd. v. Macsteel International U.K. Ltd. 2006 CLD 1491; M.A. Chowdhury v. Messrs Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. and others PLD 1970 SC 373; Messrs Uzin Export and Import Enterprises for Foreign Trade v. Messrs M. Iftikhar and Company Limited 1993 SCMR 866; Messrs Danish Brothers Limited and others v. Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited 1994 MLD 2227; Associated Agencies Ltd. and another v. Industrija Masina/Tractora and another PLD 1993 Kar. 459; Messrs Serulean (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi v. Messrs Bhoja Airlines (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chairman and another 2001 YLR 3150; Island Textile Mills Ltd. Karachi v. V/O Technoexpert and another 1979 CLC 307; Port Qasim Authority, Karachi v. Al-Ghurair Group of Companies and others PLD 1997 Kar. 636; Lahore Stock Exchange Limited v. Fredrick J. Whyte Group (Pakistan) Ltd. and others PLD 1990 SC 48; Dar Okaz Printing and Publishing Limited Liability Company v. Printing Corporation of Pakistan Private Limited PLD 2003 SC 808; Haji Soomar Haji Hajjan v. Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. 1981 SCMR 129; S. Ghous Mohiuddin v. Messrs National Refinery Ltd. PLD 1968 Kar. 652; Izhar Alam Farooqi, Advocate v. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi and others 2008 SCMR 240; Wak Orient Power and Light Limited v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation and others 2002 SCMR 1954; Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Tahir Edible Oil (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2003 CLC 416; North-West Frontier Province Government, Peshawar through Collector, Abbottabad and another PLD 1993 SC 418; International Multi Leasing Company v. Capital Assets Leasing Corporation Limited and another 2004 CLD 1; Messrs Eckhardt & Co., Marine Gmbh v. Muhammad Hanif PLD 1993 SC 42 and Far Eastern Impex (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi v. Quest International Nederland BV and others 2009 YLR 334 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1804 of 2009, decision dated: 7-09-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J",
    "": "CUMMINS SALES AND SERVICE (PAKISTAN) LIMITED through Authorized Signatory--Plaintiff\nvs\nCUMMINS MIDDLE EAST FZE through Chief Executive and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12217",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2084 = 2013 SLD 2084 = 2013 CLD 387",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66 & 85---Execution of decree---Auction proceedings---Reserve price, fixing of---Duty of court---Non-depositing of remaining amount---Judgment debtor assailed auction proceedings on the ground that reserve price which was fixed could only be modified by Banking Court and not by court Auctioneers---Validity---Proclamation stated reserve price much less than that fixed by Banking Court and court Auctioneers were not authorized in law to modify terms of auction, in particular, the reserve price fixed by court---Court Auctioneers were to mandatorily have followed terms of auction settled in proclamation and to have paid due regard to provisions of O.XXI, Rule 66, C.P.C.---No notice was given to decree holder and debtor for drawing up proclamation, therefore, there was no valid sale in favour of respondent, which could be confirmed---Remaining 3/4th amount of auction was to be deposited with court within fifteen days from date of sale but no amount was so deposited---High Court directed to re-auction mortgaged property as auction proceedings and order rejecting objection petition and issuance of sale certificate by Banking Court were illegal and nullity in the eye of law---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n Messrs A.M. Rice Corporation and others v. Bank of Punjab and others 2003 CLD 1783; Messrs S.P.R.L. Rehman Brothers and others v. Judge Banking Court No.II, Lahore 2000 MLD 1957; Messrs Maqi Chemicals Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Habib Bank Ltd. and others 2003 CLD 571 and Noor Badshah v. House Building Finance Corporation and others PLD 2006 Lah. 771 ref.\n \n Mrs. Salma Javaid v. Deutsche Bank and others 2004 CLD 1560 and Messrs Majid and Sons and others v. National Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 1742 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.84---Execution of decree---Auction proceedings---Non-deposit of 25% of reserve price---Effect---Failure on the part of successful bidder to pay 25% of reserve price on the spot to court Auctioneer was sufficient to vitiate whole proceedings as required under O.XXI, Rule 84, C.P.C.\n \n Messrs Dawood Flour Mills and others v. National Bank of Pakistan 1999 MLD 3205 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 15 & 19(7)--- Auction proceedings--- Objection petition---Imposition of penalty---Scope---Requirement for depositing upto 20% of sale proceed can be imposed by Banking Court after making necessary investigation on objection petition and not as a pre-requisite condition to consider the petition.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.19 of 2003, heard on 14-12-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL AND MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "JHANG TEXTILE INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 6 others\nvs\nPAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LTD. and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12218",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2085 = 2013 SLD 2085 = 2013 CLD 416",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2(c), 9, 7 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Application for setting aside decree on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation---Non-impleadment of mortgager/owner of mortgaged property in suit for recovery---Effect---Suit for recovery was decreed against the defendants whereafter during execution proceedings, the applicant/appellant (who was not party to the suit) made application under S.12(2), C.P.C. for setting aside the decree on the ground that she being the owner of the mortgaged property was not impleaded in the suit---Contention of the plaintiff Bank was that the applicant/appellant was the wife of the defendant who, through power of attorney in his favour, had mortgaged the property and the applicant/appellant being the wife of the defendant had knowledge of the finance facility availed as well as the court proceedings---Validity---Plaintiff Bank, at the time of the filing of the suit, was fully aware of the fact that the appellant/applicant was the lawful owner of the mortgaged property and mortgage deed in favour of the plaintiff Bank was executed on her behalf by the alleged attorney, who was her husband---Appellant/applicant therefore, squarely fell within the definition of \"\"customer\"\" in terms of S.2(c) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and was a necessary party to the suit---Non-impleadment of the appellant as a party was therefore a gross error on the part of plaintiff Bank---Effect of non-impleadment of the appellant was that there was neither any decree against her nor could her personal property be sold in execution of a decree to which she was not a party---Mortgage deed in favour of plaintiff Bank was executed by a general power of attorney which authorized the defendant/attorney to sell or mortgage the said property but it did not mean that he could do so without the knowledge of the principal (appellant/applicant)---Plaintiff Bank should have at least impleaded the appellant/applicant as a party to the suit so that she could put across her stance as she was the lawful owner of the mortgage property and had valuable rights qua the said property---High Court set aside decree of the Banking Court and remanded the case with the direction that the appellant/applicant be granted an opportunity to move application for leave to defend the suit---Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\n \n Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) through Authorized Signatory v. American Express Bank Limited 2005 CLD 1764; Vesu and another v. Thekkedath Veetil Kannama and others AIR 1926 Madras 991; Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 341 and Malik Riaz Ahmad and others v. Mian Inayat Ullah and others 1992 SCMR 1488 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.29 of 2012, decision dated: 23rd February, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, C.J. AND MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, J",
    "": "SHAHZADA AKHTAR\nvs\nBANK ALFLAH LTD. through Manager and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12219",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2086 = 2013 SLD 2086 = 2013 CLD 423",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Leave to defend the suit---Scope---Obtaining leave to defend is sine qua non or condition precedent to defend banking suit---Defendant is obligated to obtain leave to defend and without obtaining leave, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, does not permit defaulting defendant to contest claim set up in banking suit.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10--- Application for leave to defend the suit---Dismissal for non-prosecution---Where defendant despite ample opportunity, fails and or neglects to appear and satisfy court that substantial question of law and fact have been raised in leave to defend application that necessitate recording of evidence, in default of his doing so, Banking Court in terms of S.10(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, read with provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, may in such situation dismiss the application for non-prosecution and or ignore the same---Result in either of eventuality is same and by virtue of deeming clause, allegation of fact in plaint deems to be admitted and Banking Court may pass decree in favour of plaintiff on the basis thereof or such other material as Banking Court may require in the interests of justice.\n \n Sahara Trading International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Bank Alfalah 2004 CLD 1522 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10---Application for leave to defend the suit---Dismissal for non-prosecution---Mark up, calculation of---Appointment of Local Commissioner---Application for leave to defend the suit filed by defendants was dismissed by Banking Court for non-prosecution---Validity---Defendants filed leave to defend application but neglected, failed and defaulted to purse leave application, this failed to obtain leave within contemplation of S.10(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Despite several and last opportunity given, consequently the application was dismissed and suit on the basis of facts pleaded and material placed along with plaint, was considered and suit was decreed---Defendants were not able to make out any case for interference and High Court declined to take any exception to and decree passed by Banking Court as regard principal amount---High Court appointed Local Commission to calculate mark up on outstanding principal amount in accordance with finance agreement for subject facility---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n \n Rose Incorporate v. Bolan Bank Ltd. 2002 CLD 598; Messrs Noor Flour Mills v. Judge Banking Court Balochistan, Quetta and another 2011 CLD 1263; Abid Aziz Khan v. Bank of Punjab 2007 CLD 997; Apolo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. 2012 CLD 337; Asim Hussain Qadri v. Deuteche Bank 2006 CLD 1129 and Nasim Nizami v. Habib Bank Ltd. 2006 CLD 1213 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Preamble---Object, purpose and scope---Scheme of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, a special enactment is to prove summary procedure and speedy remedy for recovery of outstanding finance and enforcement of obligation and to avoid lengthy litigation under general provisions of law.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Spl. H.C.A. No.162 of 2011, decision dated: 28-06-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND AFTAB AHMED GORAR, J",
    "": "ADMORE GAS (PVT.) LIMITED and 6 others\nvs\nSTANDARD CHARTERED BANK (PAKISTAN) LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12220",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2087 = 2013 SLD 2087 = 2013 CLD 627",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2(c) & 9---Civil Procedure Code (v of 1908), O.I, R.10---Suit for recovery of loan amount by sale of mortgaged property---Application under O.I, R.10, C.P.C. by intervener claiming to have purchased mortgaged property from defendant-borrower through sale agreement---Maintainability---Pre-requisite for invoking provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was existence of relationship between parties as financial institution and customer---Person being able to show existence of an agreement with financial institution or dealing therewith in capacities as enumerated in S.2(c) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 could be impleaded as necessary party to proceedings---Sale in question was between two private persons without consent/involvement of Bank, thus, intervenor by mere such purchase would not acquire status of a \"\"customer\"\" as defined under S.2(c) of the Ordinance---No proceedings for and against a person, who was neither a customer nor financial institution, would be maintainable before the Banking Court---Mere execution of agreement for sale of mortgaged property and its possession would not create any legal right in favour of intervenor in banking proceedings---High Court dismissed such application in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Spl. H.C.A. No.25 of 2011, decision dated: 26-09-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND FAROOQ ALI CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HANIF\nvs\nNIB BANK LIMITED and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12221",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2088 = 2013 SLD 2088 = 2013 CLD 463",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.II, R.2---Omitting of claim---Effect---If appellant omits to sue or relinquish any portion of his rights, entitlements and claims, he is precluded from reagitating such claim or grounds in subsequent proceedings or appeal.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.89---Execution of decree---Setting aside of sale---Principle---Act of court---Banking Court disposed of all applications while confirming auction proceedings in favour of auction purchaser and claim of objection petitioner was misconceived---Effect---Inadvertence, mistake, error or irregularity on the part of court could not take away rights of auction purchaser which accrued in his favour when he deposited bid amount as provided under law---Both applications under O.XXI, Rule 89, C.P.C. were filed without substantial compliance of O.XXI, Rule 89(1)(a) and (b), C.P.C. and it could be considered as if no such applications had been preferred---High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Banking Court, whereby objections petitions were dismissed and sale was confirmed in favour of auction purchaser---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD 1987 SC 512; United Bank Limited v. Messrs A.Z. Hashmi (Pvt.) Limited 2000 CLC 1438; Tribhovandas v. Ratilal AIR 1968 SC 372; Unicom Enterprises v. Banking Court No. 5 2004 CLD 1452 and Lutufr Rahman v. Mst. Tahera Khatun and others PLD 1961 Dacca 303 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 50 of 2012, decision dated: 21st December, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, J",
    "": "Mst. NOOR KHATOON and 3 others\nvs\nMessrs HABIB BANK LTD. and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12222",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2089 = 2013 SLD 2089 = 2013 CLD 488",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 19 & 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 84 & 85---Sale of property in execution of decree---Power of Nazir or Commissioner appointed by court to accept or reject any bid---Time for deposit of balance sale price by highest bidder, commencement of---Scope.\n \n The procedure prescribed for public sale under the Code of Civil Procedure is that the bidder after having been declared purchaser by the officer conducting sale under Order XXI, Rule 84, C.P.C. has to deposit 25% of the offered amount and thereafter in the same breath he is granted under Rule 85 fifteen days time for deposit of balance sale price. The Court sales are normally conducted by the Nazir or Commissioner appointed by the Court, who has no authority whatsoever to either accept or reject any bid, his function is only to place the list of the bidders, the amount offered by such bidder before the court by pointing out the highest bidder. Once the sale report is placed before the court, then in terms of Order XXI, Rule 84, C.P.C. the court declares the highest bidder and directs for payment of balance sale price and for this reason time for deposit of balance sale price does not commence from the day Nazir declares a bidder highest in order, but such time commences once the court accepts any of the bids.\n \n The order accepting the bid or declaring a bidder \"\"purchaser\"\" must be unequivocal and specific leaving no doubt as to the status of highest bidder and of course should reflect application of mind.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 19 & 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.89, 90 & 91---Sale of property in execution of decree---Confirmation of sale by court before expiry of period provided by law to challenge such sale---Effect---Court in such case would become functus officio to grant relief under O.XXI, Rr. 89, 90 & 91, C.P.C.---Principles.\n \n Notwithstanding the procedure adopted by the court for the public sale of a property, unless an application under Order XXI, Rules 89, 90 & 91, C.P.C. is dismissed earlier, the confirmation of sale before the expiry of period provided by law to challenge such sale, gives an inference that the sale was confirmed and made absolute in order to render the court functus officio and to prevent relief(s) under Order XXI, Rules, 89, 90 & 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n \n Confirmation of sale on the very day when the bid of the highest bidder is accepted or even before expiry of the period provided for preferring an application to set aside the sale, gives an inference that the sale was confirmed and made absolute in order to render the court functus officio and to prevent relief(s) under Order XXI, Rules 89, 90 & 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n \n Afzal Masood Butt v. Banking Court No.2, Lahore 2005 CLD 967; Muhammad Attique v. Jami Limited and others PLD 2010 SC 993; Mst. Asma Zafarul Hassan v. Messrs United Bank Limited 1981 SCMR 108 and Messrs Ashraf Agro and others v. HBL 2008 CLD 449 ref.\n \n Gauri Ram v. Jaishi Ram AIR (37) 1950 Hamachal Pardesh 1; L. Rajan v. Muthusami Naidu AIR 1981 Madras 285 and Pathummakutty v. Thekkechalil Kathiyumma AIR 1990 Karalla 286 rel.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 203---Supervisory jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---High Court in exercise of such jurisdiction could correct misuse of judicial power and set record straight.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.81 of 2012, decision dated: 6-11-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAJJAD ALI SHAH AND RIAZAT ALI SAHAR, JJ",
    "": "YAWER KADIR\nvs\nBANKING COURT NO.V, PAKISTAN SECRETARIAT, Karachi High Court and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12223",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2090 = 2013 SLD 2090 = 2013 CLD 504",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2(c), 2(a), 7 & 9---Suit for recovery of loan was decreed against appellant---Contention of the appellant was that he had not obtained the finance facility, was neither a borrower nor guarantor and had signed all documents in the capacity of a witness only---Validity---Perusal of documents revealed that same were signed by the appellant as a witness only and was not an executing party who could be held liable in terms of the agreement, and therefore, he could not be sued under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court, under the Ordinance had jurisdiction to resolve the controversy between the financial institution and the customer with regard to any finance, whereas, in the present case, the appellant was neither a financial institution nor a customer---No liability whatsoever of the plaintiff Bank for repayment could be created or received from the appellant---Decree of the Banking Court was set aside---Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.40 of 2010, decision dated: 20-09-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMAD ABBASI AND FAROOQ ALI CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "NASEEM BAZ KHAN\nvs\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through Manager and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12224",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2091 = 2013 SLD 2091 = 2013 CLD 501",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 7 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O. IX, R.13---Suit for recovery was decreed against defendant---Contention of defendant was that his application for leave to defend was dismissed in default of his appearance and his application under Order IX, R. 13, C.P.C. for setting aside ex parte decree should be allowed---Validity---Banking Court dismissed application for leave to defend on merits and contention that it was dismissed for non-appearance was not factually correct---Since decree was passed after dismissal of application for leave to defend on merits, the decree was assailable through appeal under S.22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 and filing application under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. was misconcieved and not competent---Appeal was dismissed.\n \n Messrs Agrocare and 3 others v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. 2011 CLD 990 and Mst. Tahira Yasmeen and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank through Branch Manager and 6 others 2005 CLD 927 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.131 of 2010, heard on 22-10-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ AHMAD AND AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SAHIB GAS WAYS through Partner and 4 others\nvs\nThe BANK OF PUNJAB through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12225",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2092 = 2013 SLD 2092 = 2013 CLD 511",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 15(11)---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.2---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Auction of mortgaged property without intervention of Banking Court---Appointment of nominee by highest bidder to make payment and complete formalities of such auction---Deposit of 15% of bid amount by nominee of highest bidder, but his failure to deposit balance 85% thereof within specified time resulted into forfeiture of such 15% amount---Suit by such nominee after four years for refund of such forfeited amount on ground that as Bank had compromised with borrower, thus, Bank was obliged to pay back 15% bid amount with profit to nominee---Maintainability---Offer of mortgaged property for sale by Bank, when respondent to by a proposal of highest bidder and was accepted by Bank, then a binding contract came into existence between the parties---Nominee's case was based on such independent contract irrespective of any provision of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Nominee had not disputed sale of suit property or its subsequent sale---Nominee's claim for recovery of forfeited amount of bid could not be equated with expression \"\"dispute of sale of property\"\" as used in S.15(11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit---High Court returned plaint to nominee for its filing in competent court.\n \n Muhammad Yusuf v. Mst. Kharian Bibi 1995 SCMR 784; Abdul Aziz v. Sheikh Abdur Rahim PLD 1984 SC 164; Mian Rashid Ahmad v. Syed Azeem Shah 1991 SCMR 94; Mst. Sardar Begum v. Malik Khalid Mehmood and others 1986 CLC 2342; Ameer Umar v. Additional District Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan 2010 SCMR 780 and Anwar Khan v. Fazal Manan 2010 SCMR 973 ref.\n \n Mehr Ashiq Hussain v. Citi Bank NA 2006 CLD 167 and united Bank Limited v. Adamjee Insurance Company 1988 CLC 1608 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.113 of 2011, decision dated: 7-12-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, J",
    "": "ALBARAKA BANK (PAKISTAN) LIMITED\nvs\nRaja ASHFAQ HUSSAIN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12226",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2093 = 2013 SLD 2093 = 2013 CLD 508",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 20 & 7---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.489-F---Cheque issued to Financial Institution for repayment of loan---Dishonouring of cheque---Quashing of F.I.R. under 489-F, P.P.C.---Petitioner sought quashing of F.I.R. filed against him on the ground that since dispute was between a Financial Institution and customer, therefore, the sole jurisdiction in the matter vested with the Banking Court under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--- Validity--- Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 being a special enactment had an overriding effect on ordinary law, therefore, the petitioner could not be proceeded with under provisions of the P.P.C. and only remedy available for the Financial Institution was to invoke provisions of S.20 of the Ordinance by filing a direct complaint under S.7(1)(b) of the Ordinance---Prosecution of the petitioner under S.489-F, P.P.C. was an abuse of the process of the court and was without lawful authority--- Financial Institution was debarred from taking advantage of S.489-F, P.P.C.---F.I.R. against the petition was quashed, in circumstances.\n \n PLD 2009 Lah. 541; 2009 PCr.LJ 325; 2010 YLR 547; 2009 CLD 1422; 2010 CLD 344; 2010 PCr.LJ 412; 2009 CLD 1149; 2011 CLD 1539; 2012 MLD 1551; 2012 PCr.LJ 1890; 2006 CLD 625 and 2010 CLD 10 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous No.22-Q of 2012, decision dated: 29-01-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ANWAR KHAN KASI, J",
    "": "ABID MAHMOOD MALIK\nvs\nSTATION HOUSE OFFICER, POLICE STATION MARGALLA and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12227",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2094 = 2013 SLD 2094 = 2013 CLD 526",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10 & 22---Application for leave to defend the suit---Appeal---Insurance policy, recovery from---Defendants admitted sanction of loan, execution of finance agreement and other charged documents---None of the documents executed between parties or relied upon by bank were refuted or denied by defendants---Disbursement of finance facility and its full availment was also admitted---Plea raised by defendants was that bank was under legal obligation to seek reimbursement and recovery of outstanding liabilities against defendants from insurance company and not from them keeping in view execution of insurance policy---Validity---Defendants were liable to pay their all outstanding liabilities towards claim of bank, irrespective of clause relating to insurance of goods and machinery---Insurance policy was duly signed by defendants, whereas bank was neither signatory to such insurance policy nor there was any clause in such policy, which could possibly put bank under obligation to file a claim with insurance company of any outstanding liability of defendants, in case of default---High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Banking Court, as application for leave to defend was rightly dismissed---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.3 of 2012, decision dated: 11-09-2012????????.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMAD ABBASI AND FAROOQ ALI CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs JAN SHER KHAN PETROLEUM SERVICE through Proprietor and another\nvs\nMessrs ALLIED BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12228",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2095 = 2013 SLD 2095 = 2013 CLD 531",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recover of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9(5), 12 & 22---Suit for recovery of finance---Suit filed by the plaintiff bank, having been decreed ex parte by the Banking Court against the defendants they filed application under S.12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which was dismissed---Validity---Application for setting aside ex parte and decree which was to be filed within 10 days of the impugned order, was filed after more than 2 months---Defendants had failed to explain the delay of each and every day in filing application for setting aside ex parte and decree---Record had revealed that service was duly effected upon the defendants---Defendants having failed to disclose any sufficient cause for recalling of ex parte and decree, impugned of the Trial Court did not warrant any interference.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.4 of 2011, decision dated: 10-12-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID WAHEED AND MUHAMMAD YAWAR ALI, JJ",
    "": "GHULAM ASGHAR KHAN and 3 others\nvs\nBANK OF PUNJAB"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12229",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2096 = 2013 SLD 2096 = 2013 CLD 534",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9(5) & 10(1)---Application for leave to defend, non-filing of---Effect---When defendant, despite service in terms of S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, did not come forward and file leave to defend application or otherwise fails to obtain from Banking Court, leave for defending the suit, then allegations of fact in plaint are deemed to be admitted---Resultantly, Banking Court in such or may pass a decree in favour of Bank.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 3(2) & 9---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Cost of funds and liquidated damages---Principle---Application for leave to defend filed by defendant was dismissed and bank also sought recovery of cost of funds and liquidated damages---Validity---Along with finance agreement, neither 'Repayment schedule' was annexed nor in the agreement itself there was any mention of dates of installments on which it became due, and even number of installments were not mentioned---Bank was only entitled to claim 'cost of funds' from date of expiry of finance agreement---Bank was not entitled to liquidated damages in absence of any positive evidence, as the same required evidence muchless to the effect of actual loss suffered---Even fixed amount of liquidated damages could not be awarded unless quantum of actual loss was proved---Suit was decreed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-23 of 2010, decision dated: 5-11-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZ-UR-REHMAN, J",
    "": "NIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nTHREE STAR HOSIERY MILLS (PVT.) LTD. and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12230",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2097 = 2013 SLD 2097 = 2013 CLD 546",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 15, 19 & 22---Auction of mortgaged property by Bank under S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Objection petition by -debtor alleging such auction to be fraudulent and without notice to him---Banking Court accepted such objection petition and set aside the auction---Pleas of auction purchaser were that objection petition was time-barred; that Banking Court had set aside auction after four years without considering huge amount incurred by him on renovation and construction of suit property---Validity---Decision of Full Bench of Lahore High Court in Muhammad Umar Rathore v. Federation of Pakistan 2009 CLD 257 which had declared S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 as ultra vires to Constitution on 23-12-2008, would not apply to suit property auctioned on 8-11-2006---Bank had not proved publicizing of proposed auction in two daily newspapers as required by S.15(4) of the Ordinance---Bank had not submitted accounts of auction to Banking Court within thirty days---Auction report showed that Bank had conducted auction at its office and sent its report to its Head Office, but approval was not available on record---Bank had sold suit property at less than the reserve price---Bank had not informed Banking Court or local authorities while handing over possession of suit property to auction purchaser, without preparing its inventory---Bank along with auction report had not placed on record list of bidders that participated in the auction and other proceedings conducted at the spot---Collusion between Bank and auction purchaser was apparent on face of record---Auction purchaser had not provided any details for alleged amount incurred by him---High Court modified impugned order by directing debtor to pay 20% instead of 5% to auction purchaser on price of auction and also directed Banking Court to appoint local commission for preparing quantum of machinery added and ascertaining its price and expenses incurred by auction purchaser.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.156 of 2010, decision dated: 7-11-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN AND MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Rao MUHAMMAD SADAQAT ALI and another\nvs\nMessrs RANA JAMAL AKBAR ICE FACTORY RAJAN PUR and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12231",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2098 = 2013 SLD 2098 = 2013 CLD 558",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.128---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 57---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Suit for recovery of loan amount surety's liability---Application for leave to defend suit by guarantor---Guarantor's pleas were that suit was time-barred; that court had granted leave to another defendant on similar ground of limitation; that statements of accounts found mentioned mark-up over mark-up and huge amount against penalties and that assets of principal company due to its winding up had been sold, but plaintiff had failed to file its claim thereagainst---Validity---Provision S.128 of Contract Act, 1872 would not affect application of statute of limitation---Point of limitation raised in the present case was a mixed question of law and fact---Such complicated questions raised by guarantor would require evidence---Wisdom and applicability of Art.10-A of the Constitution could not be ignored or overlooked in circumstances---High Court accepted the leave application unconditionally.\n \n National Bank of Pakistan v. F.S. Aitzazuddin and 2 others PLD 1982 Kar. 577; United Bank Ltd. v. Haji Bawa Company Ltd. and 3 others 1981 CLC 89; National Bank of Pakistan v. General Tractor and Machinery Co. Ltd. 1996 CLC 79; National Commercial Bank Ltd. Karachi v. Muhammad Tufail and another PLD 1975 Kar. 671; Sreenath Roy and others v. Peary Mohan Mookerjee AIR 1917 Cal. 154; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Shoaib Corporation and others 2004 CLD 631 and Messrs Shaz Packages v. Messrs Bank Alfalah Limited 2011 CLD 790 rel.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S. 128---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 58---Liability of surety---Scope---Recovery of loan amount from guarantor/surety---Limitation---Provision of S.128 of Contract Act, 1872 would not affect application of statute of limitation---Right of action against guarantor would generally arise at the same time as right of action against principal debtor---Principles.\n \n Under section 128 of the Contract Act, 1872 the liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. This section is directed to defining the liability of a surety upon the terms of contract of guarantee, but it does not affect the application of the statute of limitation. The right of action against surety would generally arise at the same time as right of action against the principal debtor.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-32 of 2003, decision dated: 8-11-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J",
    "": "BANKERS EQUITY LIMITED through Authorised Representative and 6 others--Plaintiffs\nvs\nMUZAFFAR HUSSAIN and 4 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12232",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2099 = 2013 SLD 2099 = 2013 CLD 583",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 12, 19 & 22---Appeal---Limitation---Summer vacations of Court of appeal---Effect---Ex parte decree was passed against defendant, who filed application for setting aside of the decree but Banking Court instead of deciding the application, directed auction of mortgaged property---Validity---Appeal should have been filed within 30 days and crucial day fell in summer vacation, therefore, appeal preferred on the first day court opened after summer vacation, was within the period of limitation---Setting schedule for auctioning mortgaged property and fixing date for submission of auction report without deciding application of defendant for setting aside ex parte decree was declared illegal---Order was passed by Banking Court in wrong exercise of jurisdiction vested in the court---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.177 of 2011, decision dated: 30-10-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND IJAZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "FALAK SHER SHERWANI\nvs\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12233",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2100 = 2013 SLD 2100 = 2013 CLD 600",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Un-rebutted documents---Effect---Bank produced documentary evidence to prove borrower's failure to repay loan amount---Borrower did not produce evidence in rebuttal to disprove documentary evidence of bank---Banking Court dismissed application for leave to defend the suit and decreed the same in favour of bank---Validity---Un-rebutted documentary evidence of bank successfully established borrower's default in payment of loan amount---Banking Court properly appreciated evidence in accordance with settled principles of law and not a single anomaly either legal or factual was pointed out by borrower---No substantial objection and/or prima facie defence was raised by borrower before Banking Court---Un-rebutted documents filed by bank fully substantiated its claim and finding recorded by Banking Court required no interference by High Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.134 of 2011, decision dated: 8-10-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAQBOOL BAQAR AND NAIMATULLAH PHULPHOTO, JJ",
    "": "WASEEM YOUSUF\nvs\nSTANDARD CHARTERED BANK (PAKISTAN) LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12234",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2101 = 2013 SLD 2101 = 2013 CLD 613",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10---Suit for recovery of loan amount by sale of mortgaged property---Non-appearance of defendant (borrower-mortgagor)---Application by intervener under O.I, R.10, C.P.C. for impleading him as party in suit claiming to have purchased suit property from defendant through sale agreement and having filed against him suit for its specific performance---Validity---Defendant had mortgaged suit property with Bank in year 2008, whereas intervener claimed to have purchased same through sale agreement in year 2009---Intervener had no concern with present suit, wherein he was not necessary or proper party---Intervener would be at liberty to proceed with his suit filed against defendant---High Court dismissed such application in circumstances.\n \n(b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)---\n \n----S. 58(f)---Mortgage by deposit of title deeds---Scope---Memorandum of deposit of title deeds was not required by law for such mortgage.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Non-appearance of defendant and non-filing of leave application despite service of summons upon him---Effect---Allegations of fact made in plaint would be deemed to be admitted in such circumstances---Banking Court in such circumstances might decree suit on basis of such allegations and/or such other materials required by court in interest of justice.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-31 of 2010, decision dated: 17-10-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZ-UR-REHMAN, J",
    "": "NIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nALI HAMID TRAVELS and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12235",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2102 = 2013 SLD 2102 = 2013 CLD 1002",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)---Suit for recovery of finance---Ex parte decree in favour of Bank, passing of---Defendant's application under S.12(2), C.P.C. for setting aside decree on ground of fraud---Object of S.12(2), C.P.C.---Plea of plaintiff-Bank was that Banking Court had become functus officio after passing impugned decree, thus, could not set aside same for having attained finality---Validity---Use of words \"\" \"\" and \"\"decree\"\" in S. 12(2), C.P.C. made clear that such application would be maintainable after passing thereof and not before that---Banking Court was competent to entertain and decide such application---High Court repelled the plea of plaintiff---Principles.\n \n Objections that High Court has become functus officio after passing the decree and that the impugned decree cannot be set aside as it has attained finality, are not tenable. The very object of section 12(2), C.P.C. is to provide a specific remedy to a party, who is aggrieved by an order, or decree, obtained against him by misrepresentation or by exercising fraud or from a court/forum that has no jurisdiction to pass the same. Misrepresentation or fraud can happen between the parties inter se or upon the court itself. The inclusion of the words \"\" \"\" and \"\"decree\"\" in section 12(2), C.P.C. clearly shows that an application under this section for setting aside the and decree will be maintainable only after passing of the and decree and not before that. The court shall not be deemed to have become functus officio while hearing and deciding the application under section 12(2), C.P.C. and shall have the competent jurisdiction to entertain and decide the same. Section 12(2), C.P.C. would not have been inserted lately if it was the intention of the legislature to take away all the powers from the courts after passing of the and decree.\n \n The finality of a is subject to the provisions of section 12(2), C.P.C.\n \n Mobina Begum v. The Joint Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan 1994 MLD 1441 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)---Suit for recovery of finance---Ex parte decree in favour of Bank, passing of--- Defendant's application under S.12(2), C.P.C. for setting aside such decree on ground of fraud---Defendant's plea was that Bank obtained such decree by concealing settlement agreement executed between parties, which had been acted upon---Validity---Bank had not denied execution of such agreement, which was still intact and subsisting---Bank while acting upon such agreement had withdrawn public notice issued for sale of mortgaged property---Bank being party to such agreement and beneficiary thereof had knowledge about its execution and subsistence at time of filing such suit--- Bank had filed suit without disclosing such agreement and had not brought to notice of court before passing of impugned decree, but had kept on pressing suit as if such agreement did not exact---Such acts of Bank amounted to concealment of material facts/documents, misrepresentation and fraud committed by Bank with defendant and upon court---High Court set aside impugned decree and accepted such application while directed defendant to file leave application within specified time.\n \n Javaid Tanveer Mughal v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and 3 others 2004 CLD 748; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Polycol Textile Industries and others in Suit No.B-229 of 2000; 2001 CLC 1187; 2005 CLD 192; 2010 CLD 1762; Lal Din and another v. Muhammad Ibrahim 1993 SCMR 710 and Muhammad Tahir v. Emirates Bank International PJSC and another 2010 CLC 1545 ref.\n \n Government of Sindh v. Khalil Ahmed 1994 SCMR 782; Muhammad Akram Shaikh v. Messrs Pak Libya Holding Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and 14 others PLD 2010 Kar. 400; Khadim Hussain and others v. Abid Hussain and others PLD 2009 SC 419; Mst. Fehmida Begum v. Muhammad Khalid and another 1992 SCMR 1908 and Allah Wasaya and 5 others v. Irshad Ahmad and 4 others 1992 SCMR 2184 rel.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 12(2)---Application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Fulfilment of all or any of requirements of S.12(2), C.P.C.---Effect---Impugned order/ /decree in such case could not sustain.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous No.10 of 2010 in Suit No.B-52 of 2006, decision dated: 24-12-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "Messrs ARK GARMENTS INDUSTRY (PVT.) LTD. through Managing Director and 2 others--Applicants\nvs\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12236",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2103 = 2013 SLD 2103 = 2013 CLD 643",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery Of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Suit for recovery of amount paid to beneficiary after encashment of Bank Guarantee/Performance Bond---Application for leave to defend---Contention of the defendants was that the plaintiff Bank had violated the terms and conditions of the Bank Guarantee by enchasing the same in favour of the beneficiary---Validity---Defendants had not placed on record the document of the guarantee establishing as to how the plaintiff had violated its terms and it was not the claim of the defendants that the guarantee had expired---While the plaintiff Bank had also not placed on record the document of the guarantee, the defendants had themselves admitted to the same---Defendants had also filed a separate suit in the civil court wherein they alleged that the beneficiary had violated the terms of the guarantee and had not alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff Bank had dishonored the terms of the guarantee---Contract of guarantee was an independent contract of the principal contract---Application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed and suit of the plaintiff Bank was decreed as prayed for.\n \n Pak Consulting engineering v. Pakistan Steel Mills 2002 SCMR 1781 and Messrs Ayaz Builders v. Board of Trustees Karachi Port Trust 2008 CLC 726 ref.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S. 126---Contract of guarantee or surety---Bank Guarantee---Contract of guarantee was an independent contract of the principal contract.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.33 of 2010, deiced on 22-11-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN, J",
    "": "Messrs SILKBANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs K.K.P. (PVT.) LTD. and 9 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12237",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2104 = 2013 SLD 2104 = 2013 CLD 672",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10 & 5---Suit for recovery of finances- Application for leave .to defend was dismissed---Contention of defendant was that even after dismissal of application for leave to defend, grounds agitated therein by defendant could still be looked into by the court---Validity---Said contention was untenable as the grounds urged by defendants in their leave to defend had already been rejected by the court and as such same could not be re-agitated-Under S.10(11) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, Court had to pass and decree in favour of plaintiff against the defendants forthwith upon dismissal of defendants' application for leave to defend.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10---Dismissal of application for leave to defend the suit---Scope and effect stated.\n \nDismissal of application for leave to defend did not mean that entire claim of plaintiff in a suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance,12001 should be decreed as prayed, for by the plaintiff without ';examining the claim of the plaintiff. In such an event, no doubt the plaintiff becomes entitled to a decree, but only to the extent of such amount, which is permissible in law. Markup other than the agreed rate and/or beyond the agreed 'period cannot be granted to the financial institution. Similarly, no other charges or amounts can be allowed to the financial institution to which the customer had not agreed. The court must examine the claim of the financial institution in the light so the above before passing the decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-4 of 2010; decided on 15-11-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "ASKARI BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs SHAHI TEXTILES and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12238",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2105 = 2013 SLD 2105 = 2013 CLD 678",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10 & 19--- Suit for recovery--- Application of defendant for leave to defend was dismissed and suit was decreed---Defendant subsequently made application before Executing Court to pay the decretal amount in instalments which. was allowed by the Executing Court---Validity---Defendant had voluntarily accepted the validity of the impugned decree of Banking Court by promising to pay the decretal amount in instalments and the Executing Court had accepted such request of the defendant---Defendant was therefore estopped to question the legality and validity of the impugned decree of Banking Court--Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 182 of 2009, heard on 6-02-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ AHMAD AND SYED IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE and another\nvs\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through Manager-"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12239",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2106 = 2013 SLD 2106 = 2013 CLD 724",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Preamble---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Preamble---Proceedings before Banking Court---Absence of procedure in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Effect---Procedure provided in C.P.C. would become applicable in such case.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIII, R.1---Suit for recovery of finance---Grant of leave to defend---Procedure---Framing of issues and fixation of case for evidence after granting of defendant's leave application unconditionally---Plaintiff's application for withdrawal of suit with permission to file fresh one due to existence of some formal defect therein---Validity---Procedure provided in C.P.C. for decision of suit would be followed after granting of leave application due to absence of procedure in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Plaintiff had not pointed out any formal defect, which might result into dismissal of suit---Court had to pass decree according to pleadings and evidence to be adduced by both parties---Plaintiff had every opportunity to adduce evidence or amend plaint in accordance with law---High Court dismissed such application in circumstances.\n \n Sardar Muhammad Kazim Ziauddin Durrani and others v. Sardar Muhammad Asim Fakhuruddin Durrani and others 2001 SCMR 148; Municipal Committee Chakwal v. Ch. Fateh Khan and others PLD 1959 (W.P.) Lah. 535; Pehlwan and others v. Haji Muhammad Muran and others 2005 SCMR 1405; Muhammad Saleem v. Muhammad Tariq 2009 CLC 1295; Mana and 4 others v. Hussain Bakhsh and 5 others 1993 CLC 1400; Ghulam Farid and 2 others v. Muhammad Ashraf and 8 others 2000 YLR 2166; Ismail v. (1) Fida Ali and (2) Sayyed Iqbal Shabbir PLD 1965 SC 634; Karamat Ali Khan and another v. Sardar Ali and 29 others PLD 2001 SC(AJ&K) 30; Ahban Uthool Village v. Ahban Zani Village PLD 2004 Pesh. 198 and Muhammad Din v. Atta Muhammad and others PLD 1957 Lah. 971 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Miscellaneous No.595-B of 2012 in C.O.S. No.8 of 2011, decision dated: 11-10-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN, J",
    "": "The BANK OF PUNJAB through Attorney--Applicant\nvs\nMessrs ZEPHYR TEXTILE LIMITED through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others\n Sardar Muhammad Kazim Ziaduddin Durrani and others v. Sardar Muhammad Asim Fakhuruddin Durrani and others 2001 SCMR 148 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12240",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2107 = 2013 SLD 2107 = 2013 CLD 738",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 7(4)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 154---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.408, 410, 419, 468 & 471---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---Intra Court appeal---Offence committed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Registration of F.I.R for such offence---Legality---\"\"Registration of F.I.R.\"\" and \"\"taking of cognizance\"\"---Distinction---Plea was that only Banking Court could take cognizance of an offence under the said Ordinance on a complaint in writing made by a person authorized by the Bank, therefore, registration of F.I.R. by the complainant was without jurisdiction---Validity---Registration of F.I.R. and taking of cognizance were two distinct and independent concepts under criminal law---No clog or implied prohibition on registration of F.I.R. had been provided specifically--- Appeal was dismissed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Intra-Court Appeal No.14 of 2013, decision dated: 21st February, 2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "RIAZ AHMED KHAN AND NOOR-UL-HAQ N. QURESHI, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL RAUF CHAUDHRY and 2 others\nvs\nThe STATE and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12241",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2108 = 2013 SLD 2108 = 2013 CLD 801",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19(7)(b), proviso---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90--- Auction of mortgaged property---Investigation of claims and objections---Furnishing of written undertaking by the Financial Institution for payment of penalty in the event objections were found to be valid---Scope---Suit for recovery was decreed whereafter application of respondent/applicant under proviso to S.19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was allowed and the plaintiff Bank was ordered to file a written undertaking to compensate the aggrieved party and pay twenty per cent penalty in the event the objections were found to be valid---Contention of plaintiff-Bank was that said order was not sustainable as the -debtor had not paid anything towards his liability to the plaintiff-Bank and S.19(7) of the Ordinance was applicable to the present case--- Validity--- Proviso to S.19(7) of the Ordinance clearly indicated that a written undertaking was to be given by the financial institution in the mode and manner laid down therein, and as such the impugned order being in harmony with the said S.19 of the Ordinance, as well as with the terms of the proviso to S.19(7) of the Ordinance was valid and in consonance with the law and could not be interfered with---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.17 of 2011, decision dated: 22-02-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "RIAZ AHMAD KHAN AND MUHAMMAD AZIM KHAN AFRIDI, JJ",
    "": "SAMBA BANK LTD. through Authorized Officer/Attorney\nvs\nMessrs PARAMOUNT ENTERPRISES and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12242",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2109 = 2013 SLD 2109 = 2013 CLD 805",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 22(6) & 22(1)---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3(2)--- High Court appeal--- Maintainability---Interpretation of Ss.22(1) & 22(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Plaintiff (customer) impugned order of Banking Court whereby his application to lead secondary evidence under Art.74 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, was dismissed---Contention of the defendant-bank was that present appeal was not maintainable in terms of provisions of S.22(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---No appeal lay against any interlocutory order passed by the Banking Court---Impugned order, for all intents and purposes, was an interlocutory order as the lis was still pending before the Banking Court, which had still not rendered its final verdict---Legislature had made orders such as the impugned order, non-appealable by specifically making provisions in this respect by virtue of S.22(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---When the Legislature had specifically prohibited the filing of an appeal against the interlocutory order, no exception could be drawn from such legislative intent, which otherwise would amount to defeating the clear intent of the Legislature---Appeal of the plaintiff was therefore, without merit which was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n Mst. Hameeda Shamim and others v. Deputy Commissioner and 7 others 2009 MLD 556; Karachi Water and Sewerage Board through Managing Director and another v. Muhammad Moosa 2001 CLC 221; Abdul Waheed Khan and another v. Allemuddin Khan 2001 CLC 333 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd. and others 2001 CLC 1187 distinguished.\n \n Raj Muhammad v. Mst. Chan Bibi and others 1984 SCMR 1068; Muhammad Ibrahim v. Raj Muhammad and another PLD 1984 SC (AJ&K) 51 and Mian Muhammad and 10 others v. Additional Commissioner (Revenue)/ Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and 2 others 1991 SCMR 520 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No.210 of 2011, decision dated: 27-11-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND SADIQ HUSSAIN BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "NADEEM ATHAR and another\nvs\nMessrs DUBAI ISLAMIC BANK (PAKISTAN) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12243",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2110 = 2013 SLD 2110 = 2013 CLD 831",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 32(2)(k) & 156---Inclusion of deposits received as security against guarantees as admissible assets---Insurance---Company in its statement of assets for solvency purposes, had included the deposits received as security against guarantees as admissible assets in violation of S.32(2)(k) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000---Directors of the company, in addition to the day to day running of the company, and the management of its business, also had some 'fiduciary' duties i.e., duties held in trust and some wider duties imposed by statute; and breach of those statutory duties, would be a higher standard of accountability which required them to be vigilant and perform their duties with due care---Directors, in the present case, had failed to perform their duties with due care and prudence---Directors were supposed to be well aware of their legal obligations as required by the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 under S.32(3), and were required to ensure compliance with the clear wordings of S.32(2) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000---Legitimate inference was that the default was committed---Commission in exercise of powers conferred under S.156 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 instead of imposing the maximum penalty, imposed a nominal fine of Rupees one hundred thousand only---Company was issued a stern warning that in case of similar non-compliance in future, strong action would be taken against it.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice dated 24-07-2012, decision dated: 28-09-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID NASIM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (INSURANCE)",
    "": "Messrs EFU GENERAL INSURANCE LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12244",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2111 = 2013 SLD 2111 = 2013 CLD 836",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 27, proviso--- Interpretation--- Correction of typographical or clerical errors---Scope---Phrase \"\"clerical or typographical error\"\", connotation---Suit for recovery was decreed by Banking Court---Application of the plaintiff-Bank under S.27 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 for modification of the decree, in relation to the calculation of markup and amount recoverable, was dismissed---Contention of the plaintiff Bank was that the term \"\"clerical mistake\"\" had a wide connotation and covered the situation of the present case---Validity---Perusal of the of Banking Court revealed that the Banking Court gave its after due consideration of arguments and there was no cavil about the same and even while deciding the application of the plaintiff-Bank under S.27 of the Ordinance, the court reconfirmed its earlier decision---Findings of the Banking Court, could be challenged through appeal but the same did not give any impression of any omission or clerical error---Clerical error meant omission of a kind which if corrected did not change the effect of the main order and if a correction of any error ended, increased or reduced liability, the same would amount to review of , which was not covered under S.27 of the Ordinance---Enhancement of liability could not be done through \"\"correction of typographical error\"\" or omission or typographical mistake---Review, revisiting or correction of an error, which changes the fate of the and decree was beyond the scope of S.27 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which had a very restricted application---Appeal was dismissed.\n \n Aisha and others v. Molvi Abdul Sattar 2005 CLC 296; Crown v. Habibullah and others PLD 1952 Lah. 587; Bank Al-Falah Ltd. v. Messrs Bilal Spinning Mills Ltd. and another 2005 CLD 206 and Shaikh Kamran Maqbool v. Bolan Bank Limited through Manager and another 2006 CLD 163 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 27, proviso--- Finality of order--- Correction of typographical or clerical errors---Scope---Review or revisiting or correction of an error, which changes the fate of the and decree was beyond the scope of S.27 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which had a very restricted application.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.180 of 2006, heard on 23rd June, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH AND KH. FAROOQ SAEED, JJ",
    "": "ASKARI COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Authorized Signatory\nvs\nMessrs BAKE LINE PRODUCTS through Partners and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12245",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2112 = 2013 SLD 2112 = 2013 CLD 841",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 66 & 92---Suit for recovery---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property---Auction-purchaser, rights of---Suit was decreed thereafter mortgaged property was put to auction which was purchased by the respondent---Contention of the appellant/ debtor was that after fresh evaluation of the mortgaged property a fresh proclamation had to be issued and re-advertised in terms of provisions of O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. and further that the mortgaged property had been auctioned at a throwaway price---Validity---No such plea was raised by appellant before Trial Court and he was present on each date before Trial Court during execution proceedings---No fresh notice under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. was required to be served when the fresh evaluation had taken place at the request of the appellant/ debtor and when he was in knowledge about the auction-purchaser's offer---Last assessment of value of mortgaged property was made through an evaluator appointed by the court and the property was sold at the determined \"\"forced sale\"\" value---Respondent auction-purchaser had acquired valuable rights in the mortgaged property which could not be disturbed or recalled at present stage at behest of the appellant/ debtor---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I. A. No.D-75 of 2012, decision dated: 27-09-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND FAROOQ ALI CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "MUKHTAR AHMED\nvs\nMessrs UNITED BANK LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12246",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2113 = 2013 SLD 2113 = 2013 CLD 854",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLI, R.33--- Suit for recovery of finance/loan---Application for leave to defend---Defendant alleged non-delivery of leased assets to him by Bank---Dismissal of leave application by Banking Court while directing parties to submit accounts/break-up along with supporting documents---Non-delivery of leased assets to defendant discovered from such documents, which resulted into dismissal of suit---Bank's plea was that after dismissing leave application, Banking Court was bound to decree suit---Validity---Issue addressed and decided at time of dismissal of leave application could not be reconsidered by Banking Court---Interim order of dismissal of leave application had merged with final order of dismissal of suit---Defendant by alleging non-delivery of leased assets had raised substantial question of fact and law, thus, Banking Court ought to have granted him leave to defend suit---Jurisdiction exercisable by High Court in an appeal arising from and decree would be in continuation of original suit---Appellate Court could exercise powers available to original court---Mere setting aside of impugned /decree would not meet ends of justice as interim order of dismissal of leave application would then become operative---Defendant's omission to file cross-objections against findings recorded by Banking Court while dismissing leave application could be saved in terms of O.XLI, R.33, C.P.C.---Banking Court had decided leave application without considering material available on record---High Court granted leave application unconditionally and remanded case to Banking Court to decide question of handling over possession of leased assets after recording evidence of parties.\n \n Messrs Ahmad Autos v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited PLD 1990 SC 497; Mrs. Jawahar Afzal v. Messrs United Bank Limited 2003 CLD 119; CM. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587; Bankers Equity Limited v. Bentonite Pakistan Limited 2010 CLD 651 and Tariq Rafique Sheikh v. Citi Bank 2008 CLD 1252 ref.\n \n Muhammad Nawaz v. Ahmad Bibi 1995 SCMR 266; Khalid Mehmood v. Asghar Ali Bhatti 2005 CLC 1821; N.-W.F.P. v. Abdul Ghafoor PLD 1993 SC 418; Syed Ghaus Bakhsh v. Land Acquisition Collector 2007 MLD 1315 and Province of Punjab v. Col. Abdul Majeed 1997 SCMR 1692 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.107 & O.XLI, R.33--- Appeal--- Jurisdiction of High Court--- Scope---Jurisdiction exercisable by High Court in an appeal arising from and decree would be in continuation of original suit---High Court in appeal could pass any order, which could be passed by Trial Court---Appellate Court could exercise powers available to original court.\n \n(c) Appeal---\n \n----Right of---Conferable by law expressly.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLI, R.22---Interim order, passing of---Remedy of aggrieved party---Scope---Such order in absence of right of appeal, review or revision thereagainst could be challenged in an appeal from final /decree by plaintiff or defendant through cross-objections irrespective of non-filing of an appeal or objection by any of them---Principles.\n \n Muhammad Nawaz v. Ahmad Bibi 1995 SCMR 266; Khalid Mehmood v. Asghar Ali Bhatti 2005 CLC 1821; N.-W.F.P. v. Abdul Ghafoor PLD 1993 SC 418; Syed Ghaus Bakhsh v. Land Acquisition Collector 2007 MLD 1315 and Province of Punjab v. Col. Abdul Majeed 1997 SCMR 1692 rel.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XLI, R.22---Interim order, passing of---Remedy of aggrieved party---Scope---Such order in absence of right of appeal, review or revision thereagainst could be challenged in an appeal from final /decree by plaintiff or defendant through cross-objections irrespective of non-filing of an appeal or objection by any of them---Principles.\n \n Muhammad Nawaz v. Ahmad Bibi 1995 SCMR 266; Khalid Mehmood v. Asghar Ali Bhatti 2005 CLC 1821; N.-W.F.P. v. Abdul Ghafoor PLD 1993 SC 418; Syed Ghaus Bakhsh v. Land Acquisition Collector 2007 MLD 1315 and Province of Punjab v. Col. Abdul Majeed 1997 SCMR 1692 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.152 of 2010, decision dated: 19-12-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, J",
    "": "CRESCENT LEASING CORPORATION LIMITED through Constituted Attorney\nvs\nMessrs SARHAD GOODS TRANSPORT COMPANY and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12247",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2114 = 2013 SLD 2114 = 2013 CLD 912",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 27---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.152---Finality of ---Arithmetical mistakes---Correction of errors---Special and general law---Scope---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which is a special statute had provided a parallel provision to obtain remedy as claimed which excludes application of general principle of law i.e. S.152, C.P.C.---Provision of S.152, C.P.C. deals with clerical or arithmetical mistakes in s, decrees or orders arise therein from accidental slip or omission whereas proviso to S.27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, deals with only clerical or typographical mistakes in ---Arithmetical mistake is considered to be mistake of calculation; clerical mistake is mistake in writing or typing whereas error arising out of or occurring from accidental slip or omission is error due to careless mistake of Court---Legislature's intent is very visible and clear while incorporating provision of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and only includes clerical and typographical mistakes.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Special law excludes application of general law in the context in which formal provision has been enacted.\n \n Captain (Rtd.) Nayyar Islam v. Judge Accountability Court No.III and others 2012 SCMR 669 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9, 22 & 27---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.152---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Accidental slip---Scope---Banking Court passed and decree in favour of bank to the extent of Rs.67,490 but on application filed by bank, a sum of Rs.289,117 was included in decretal amount as service charges which were stated to have been missed due to accidental slip---Validity---Alleged claim of service charges was Rs.533,656/40 whereas Banking Court while deciding application under S.152, C.P.C. had come to the conclusion that in fact it was Rs.289,117 and such could not be an accidental slip, as claimed---Figure of Rs.289,117 could only be achieved after discussion, deliberation and arguments and not merely by clerical or typographical mistake, which in fact was mandate of S.27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court misapplied S.152, C.P.C. and while applying provision of S.27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, it provided no room for accidental slips as claimed in application which was granted in terms of order as the same could not have been done---High Court set aside the order passed by Banking Court---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Captain (Rtd.) Nayyar Islam v. Judge Accountability Court No.III and others 2012 SCMR 669; Zarai Taraqiati Bank v. Hassan Aftab Fatima 2009 CLD 36 and Messrs Agro Care and 3 others v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank 2011 CLD 990 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.92 of 2011, decision dated: 11-12-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, J",
    "": "ANWAR MEHMOOD\nvs\nMessrs ASKARI BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12248",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2115 = 2013 SLD 2115 = 2013 CLD 941",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 54, 66, 67, 68, 89 & O.XXIII, R.1---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts. 166 & 181---Execution proceedings---Public auction of mortgaged property---Judgment-debtor's application under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. for setting aside auction sale---Auction-purchaser's plea was that such application filed beyond 30 days was time barred by virtue of Art. 166 of Limitation Act, 1908---Non-confirmation of auction sale by Banking Court on account of compromise made between Bank and borrower---Validity---Duty of Executing Court under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. was to cause proclamation of intended auction and such proclamation was required to be drawn up after notice to decree holder and debtor stating therein time and place of auction and accurate description of property to be auctioned---Neither debtor had been served with requisite notice in terms of O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. nor reserve price and venue of auction had been mentioned in sale proclamation---Valuation report had been obtained in violation of direction of Banking Court much after date of auction---Impugned auction had taken place before expiry of 30 days---Auction purchaser had deposited 25% of bid money after conclusion of auction proceedings, but not immediately in compliance of terms and conditions of auction---Impugned auction was collusive, unfair and in violation of mandatory provisions of O.XXI, C.P.C.---Article 181 of Limitation Act, 1908 and not Art. 166 thereof would apply to the present case---Executing Court had neither confirmed nor had accepted auction, thus, no vested right to confirmation of auction had accrued in favour of auction purchaser---In absence of specific provision of law pertaining to compromise of execution, court had inherent powers to pass order on compromise application filed in execution proceedings---High Court dismissed appeal filed by auction purchaser.\n \n Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 1987 SC 512; Muhammad Din v. Ellahi Noor and 4 others PLD 1975 Lah. 1393; U.B.L. v. Heryana Asbestos Cement Industries (Ltd.) and 20 others 2006 CLC 1272; Muhammad Suleman v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and 11 others 1987 CLC 1338; Muhammad Attique v. Jami Limited and others PLD 2010 SC 993; Messrs National Electric Company of Pakistan v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited and 2 others 1996 CLC 192; Noor Ellahi v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and 4 others 2007 CLC 1409 and Noor Badshah v. House Building Finance Corporation through District Manager, HBFC, Faisalabad and another PLD 2006 Lah. 771 ref.\n \n Muhammad Attique v. Jamil Ahmad and others PLD 2010 SC 993 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, Rr. 89 & 90---Application for setting aside of auction sale---Scope---Such application could be filed either under R. 89 or 90 of O. XXI, C.P.C., but both such applications had different connotations and parameters---Question of deposit of an amount of 20% or not exceeding 20% of sum realized in sale or otherwise of furnishing security would not arise in absence of application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C.---Person upon filing of application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. would become disentitled to make application under R.89 thereof---Principles.\n \n Nadia Malik v. Makki Chemical Industries Pvt. Ltd. and others 2011 SCMR 1675 rel.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908---\n \n----S. 151, O.XXI, R.11 & O.XXIII, R.1--- Execution proceedings, compromise in---Scope---In absence of specific provision of law pertaining to compromise of execution, court had inherent powers to pass order on compromise application filed in execution proceedings.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19(2)---Execution of decree, three different modes for---Effect---Once the mode for execution of decree was chosen, then the same could not be changed by Executing Court---Principles.\n \n The word \"\"or\"\" used twice in subsection (2) of section 19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 has to be read disjunctively which classify three modes for execution of the decree. Once the mode for execution of the decree is chosen, then same cannot be switched over to another made by the Executing Court much less unilaterally.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.31 of 2011, decision dated: 19-12-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM AND AZIZ-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN\nvs\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN, HYDERABAD and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12249",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2116 = 2013 SLD 2116 = 2013 CLD 974",
    "Key Words:": "(a) State Bank of Pakistan Act (XXXIII of 1956)-------S. 9A--- State Bank of Pakistan--- Purpose and functions---State Bank of Pakistan in its capacity as the premier regulatory authority of the Government of Pakistan in the financial sector acted as a watchdog over the Government in order to secure monetary stability and soundness of the financial system---Main function of State Bank of Pakistan was to ensure and secure stability of the financial system in the country and for such purpose it issued guidelines and advices from time to time in the shape of Banking Control Department (BCD) Circulars.\n \n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S. 25---State Bank of Pakistan Act (XXXIII of 1956), Preamble--- Banking Control Department (BCD) Circulars issued by State Bank of Pakistan--- Binding effect--- Scope--- Such Circulars/ Instructions issued by State Bank of Pakistan were binding upon all concerned.\n \n Hashwani Hotels Limited v. Federal of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 315 ref.\n \n(c) State Bank of Pakistan Act (XXXIII of 1956)---\n \n----S. 9A---Banking Control Department (BCD) Circulars issued by State Bank of Pakistan--- Scope--- Such Circulars, which could be termed as delegated legislation/directives/orders, could not displace legislative instruments such as Acts of Parliament.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 29---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S. 15 [since repealed]--- State Bank of Pakistan Act (XXXIII of 1956), S. 9A---Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S. 39---State Bank of Pakistan, BCD Circular No. 13 dated 20-6-1984---State Bank of Pakistan, BCD Circular No. 32 dated 26-11-1984---Interest-bearing loan---Compound interest, grant of---Power of State Bank of Pakistan in relation to recovery of interest-bearing loans---Scope---Claim of Bank (respondent) was allowed with simple interest---Bank filed appeal before High Court contending that as per agreement between parties compound interest was to be allowed--- High Court allowed compound interest to the Bank--- Contention that in view of BCD Circular No.13 dated 20-6-1984, and BCD Circular No.32 dated 26-11-1984, Bank could not charge compound interest on loans given by it after 1-1-1985, and that Bank had unlawfully amalgamated three loans into one and started charging compound interest---Validity---Powers and functions given to State Bank of Pakistan were entirely divorced from the laws enacted from time to time for recovery of outstanding loans by the Banks and other development financial institutions, hence it could not be said that after 1-1-1985 no loans previously given by any company/development financial institutions on the old interest bearing system could not be recovered as such---Section 15 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (since repealed) provided that both interest and mark-up could be recovered and the same was reflected in S.29 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Parties had voluntarily agreed to amalgamation of loans through the agreement, which provided for 12% compounded interest---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Qamaruzaaman Khan v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and others 2009 CLD 460 and Mushtaq Ahmed Vohra v. Crescent Investment Bank Limited 2005 CLD 444 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.17-K of 2011, decision dated: 27-02-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY AND GULZAR AHMED, JJ",
    "": "AZAM WAZIR KHAN\nvs"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12250",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2117 = 2013 SLD 2117 = 2013 CLD 1504",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 5(8)---Amicus curiae appointed by Banking Court being a Chartered Accountant, but neither having experience of 10 years at banking side nor worked at senior management level in any Financial Institution of repute or State Bank of Pakistan---Validity---Banking Court as a special court was bound to strictly follow Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 for being a special law---Where law required a thing to be done in a particular manner, then same would lawfully done only if same was done in such manner and not otherwise---Duty of court was to appoint an amicus curiae possessing qualifications and experience as mentioned in S.5(8) of the Ordinance---Appointment of an amicus curiae in a manner other than that as provided in the Ordinance would be a nullity in eyes of law---Such appointment of amicus curiae was illegal, thus, report submitted by him was set aside by High Court in circumstances.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Where law required a thing to be done in a particular manner, then same would lawfully be done only if same was done in such manner and not otherwise.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 7(2), 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Suit for rendition of accounts against Bank by customer---Framing of issues by Banking Court after granting leave to Bank to defend suit---Appointment of Chartered Account by Court as amicus curiae at the request of parties to sort out as to what was actually due and what had been paid by customer to Bank---Filing of report by amicus curiae and application by Bank for rejection of plaint to be time barred---Filing of objection petitions by Bank on subsequent date against report of amicus curiae and reply by customer to Bank's application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. and adjournment of proceedings by Bank for arguments thereon---Suit decreed by court after hearing arguments of parties while leaving such application undecided---Validity---Banking Court after framing of issues and despite availability of list of witnesses had neither provided opportunity to lead evidence nor allowed them to exhibit documents lying on record---Banking Court after granting leave was legally obliged to adopt procedure provided in C.P.C.---Banking Court had not framed legal issue on point of limitation--- Propriety required the court to decide first a pending interlocutory application before passing a final order on the suit---Banking Court, therefore, was obliged to decide such application first and then the suit---Failure of Banking Court to decide such application had vitiated impugned ---High Court set aside of Banking Court and remanded case to said court for its decision afresh on merits after framing issue on point of limitation and allowing parties to produce evidence.\n \n (d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 7(2), 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XVI, R.1---Duty of Banking Court after granting defendant leave to defend suit---Scope---Banking Court would be legally obliged to follow procedure laid down in C.P.C. i.e., to frame issues, allow parties to lead evidence thereon and decide each and every issue---Principles.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XVI, R.1 & O.XX, R.5---Duty of parties during trial and that of court after framing the issues---Scope.\n \n The trial of a civil suit commences after the framing of issued under Order XVI, C.P.C., which are meant for ascertaining the real dispute between the parties by narrowing down the area of conflict and determining where the parties differ. After framing of issues, the court shall provide opportunity to the parties to lead their respective evidence for enabling the court to render an effective . During the trial, the parties are required to prove the issues and not the pleadings and similarly, the court is bound to decide each and every issue.\n \n(f) Administration of justice---\n \n----Propriety required court to decide first a pending interlocutory application before passing a final order on the suit---Failure of court to decide such application would vitiate final ---Illustration.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No.54 of 2006, decision dated: 9-04-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "ROOH-UL-AMIN KHAN AND IKRAMULLAH KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SONERI BANK LIMITED through AVP/Manager\nvs\nMessrs AZEEM MATCH (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 7 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12251",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2118 = 2013 SLD 2118 = 2013 CLD 1053",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. IX, R.9---Suit dismissed for non-prosecution---Plaintiff's plea was that after withdrawal of Vakalatnama by his earlier counsel, no notice was issued to him; and that court was required to issue him notice for each and every date---Validity---Court had given specific date and reasonable time to plaintiff either to engage another counsel or pursue his earlier counsel to proceed with the case---Duty of plaintiff was to pursue his case vigilantly and engage another counsel and not to act recklessly---Court in such circumstances was not bound to send notice to plaintiff for each and every date---Such application was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. IX, R. 9---Dismissal of suit for non-prosecution---Restoration---Words \"\"sufficient cause' as used in O.IX, R.9, C.P.C.---Connotation.\n \n There is no strait-jacket (precise) formula for determining what \"\"sufficient cause\"\" is. The expression \"\"sufficient cause\"\" so as to grant relief under order IX, Rule 9, C.P.C. has been left to the wisdom, good sense and discretion of the court. The words \"\"sufficient cause\"\" for restoration of suit is not susceptible of any exact definition and no hard and fast rule can be laid down. As to what is \"\"sufficient cause\"\" depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Parameter of each case would primarily be its own facts, it would have to be taken into consideration for determining as to whether \"\"sufficient cause\"\" was shown or not. The court is to be satisfied as to the sufficiency of good cause and it has to be subjective satisfaction. Where suit is dismissed for default, it is the duty of that party or counsel to show sufficient cause as to why case was not prosecuted on the relevant date. Mere engagement of counsel does not absolve the party of his responsibility as it was as much his duty as that of counsel engaged by him to see whether the case was properly and diligently prosecuted or not, and if counsel was lacking his sense of responsibility, it is the party who engaged him should suffer and not the other side.\n \n Sufficient cause has been given a meaning to embrace all relevant circumstances. The question would be whether the plaintiff honestly intended to be in court and did his best to get there in time, but for intervention of some inevitable cause he failed to appear, which is sufficient cause inviting order for restoration.\n \n Muhammad Ismail v. Faiz Bakhsh and others 1987 SCMR 732; Muhammad Qasim and others v. Moujuddin and others 1995 SCMR 218; Muhammad Aslam v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 898; Al-Waqar Corporation v. Rice Export Corporation and another 2011 MLD 266; Province of Sindh and another v. Anwar SBLR 2012 Sindh 1021; Messrs United Bank Ltd. and others v. Messrs Plastic Pack (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2012 CLC 229; Jangoo v. Fasahatullah Khan and others 2012 CLC 556; Pehalwan Goth Welfare Council v. District Co-ordination Officer (DCO), Karachi and others PLD 2012 Sindh 110; Sheikh Muhammad Saleem v. Faiz Ahmad PLD 2003 SC 628; Abdul Karim and 2 others v. Rehm Ali 1991 MLD 63; Mst. Ghulam Sakina and others v. Karim Baikhsh and others PLD 1970 Lah. 412; Sabzal and others v. Bingo and others PLD 1989 Kar. 1; Mian Muhammad Asif v. Fahad and another 2009 SCMR 1030 and Abdul Rashid v. Director-General, Post Offices, Islamabad and others 2009 SCMR 1435 ref.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. IX, R.9---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5 & Art.163---Suit dismissed for non-prosecution---Restoration---Limitation--- Delay, condonation of--- Scope--- Plaintiff would be obliged to show sufficient cause for his previous non-appearance and explain delay of each and every day---Principles.\n \n For the purposes of restoration of suit and condonation of delay, the plaintiff has to demonstrate the sufficient cause whereby he was prevented not to diligently pursue the suit, while for the purposes of condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 delay of each and every day has to be explained. If condonation is allowed, even then it does not mean that restoration of suit will also be achieved, but this remedy is subject to the proof of sufficient cause.\n \n Sufficient cause has been given a meaning to embrace all relevant circumstances. The question would be whether the plaintiff honestly intended to be in court and did his best to get there in time, but for intervention of some inevitable cause he failed to appear, which is sufficient cause inviting order for restoration.\n \n Muhammad Ismail v. Faiz Bakhsh and others 1987 SCMR 732; Muhammad Qasim and others v. Moujuddin and others 1995 SCMR 218; Muhammad Aslam v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 898; Al-Waqar Corporation v. Rice Export Corporation and another 2011 MLD 266; Province of Sindh and another v. Anwar SBLR 2012 Sindh 1021; Messrs United Bank Ltd. and others v. Messrs Plastic Pack (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2012 CLC 229; Jangoo v. Fasahatullah Khan and others 2012 CLC 556; Pehalwan Goth Welfare Council v. District Co-ordination Officer (DCO), Karachi and others PLD 2012 Sindh 110; Sheikh Muhammad Saleem v. Faiz Ahmad PLD 2003 SC 628; Abdul Karim and 2 others v. Rehm Ali 1991 MLD 63; Mst. Ghulam Sakina and others v. Karim Baikhsh and others PLD 1970 Lah. 412; Sabzal and others v. Bingo and others PLD 1989 Kar. 1; Mian Muhammad Asif v. Fahad and another 2009 SCMR 1030 and Abdul Rashid v. Director-General, Post Offices, Islamabad and others 2009 SCMR 1435 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 7(2), 22 & 27---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R. 9 & O. XVII, R.17---Application for restoration of suit dismissed for non-prosecution---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Scope---Banking Court, in absence of procedure provided in respect of any matter in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, would have to follow procedure laid down in C.P.C.---Order of dismissal of suit for non-prosecution neither decided rights of parties on merits nor was a , decision or decree liable to be challenged in appeal---Such order could not be considered a decision under O.XVII, R. 3, C.P.C.---Provision of S. 27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 did not bar Banking Court from restoring suit, which had been dismissed for non-prosecution without touching merits of case---Banking Court before restoring suit would be bound to see whether sufficient cause for previous non-appearance had been shown or not and whether such application was barred by limitation, if so, then whether delay of each and every had been explained or not---Principles.\n \n Messrs Makran Fisheries (Pvt.) Limited v. Platinum Co. 2006 CLD 52 and Shaikh Kamran Maqbool v. Bolan Bank Limited through Manager and another 2006 CLC 163 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-1630 of 1998, decision dated: 27-02-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J",
    "": "NORTHERN POLYTHENE LIMITED (NPL) through Director--Plaintiff\nvs\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12252",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2119 = 2013 SLD 2119 = 2013 CLD 1105",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-------S. 33---Limitation Act (IX of 1908) S. 5---Appeal to High Court---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Provisions of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 had been excluded from application to cases covered by special laws and therefore, cases instituted under Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005,which was a special law, could not be governed by provisions of S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Benefits available for seeking condoation of delay under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 therefore, could not be extended in such cases---Appellate Court, under S.33 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 did not have suo motu powers in respect of condoning delay.\n \n Hafeez Ahmad and others v. Civil Judge, Lahore and others PLD 2012 SC 400 distinguished.\n \n(b) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)---\n \n----S. 27---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (XLVI of 2001) S. 7---Jurisdiction of Consumer Court in respect of matters between a Financial Institution/Bank and its customer---Consumer/complainant sought damages from respondent Bank contending inter alia that he had paid all due instalment of the auto vehicle leased from the bank, however, the bank despite repeated requests, did not release the registration book of said vehicle and had created an embargo on further transfer of the vehicle's ownership---Consumer Court directed respondent Bank to pay damages to the consumer/complainant---Contention of the Bank was that said matter fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and the Consumer Court had no jurisdiction in the matter---Validity---No objection regarding jurisdiction of the Consumer Court was raised by the Bank before the Consumer Court---Consumer Court was vested with the power granting damages to the complainant/consumer in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.94 of 2013, decision dated: 6-03-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR SAEED SHEIKH, J",
    "": "NIB BANK LTD. through Power of Attorney\nvs\nPRESIDING OFFICER, DISTRICT CONSUMER COURT, SIALKOT and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12253",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2120 = 2013 SLD 2120 = 2013 CLD 1133",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-------S. 2(d)--- \"\"Damage\"\", definition of--- Scope--- Account holder of a bank suffering losses and damage due to fraud committed by employees of the Bank---Such damage would be covered under the term \"\"damage\"\" defined in S.2(d) of Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005.\n \n(b) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)---\n \n----S. 2(k)--- \"\"Services\"\", definition of--- Scope--- Term \"\"services\"\" had not been given restricted sense (definition) for the purpose of Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 and a generalized definition had been placed upon the term.\n \n Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta AIR 1994 SC 787 ref.\n \n(c) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)---\n \n----S. 2(k)--- \"\"Services\"\", definition of--- Scope--- Services provided by a Bank to its account holders---Concept (of services) provided in the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 was wide enough to include therein the services provided by a Bank which encompassed all kinds of facilities, advice or assistance being provided to its account holders.\n \n Standard Chartered Bank Ltd. v. Dr. B.N. Raman AIR 2006 SC 2810 ref.\n \n(d) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)---\n \n----S. 2(c) & (k)---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S. 2(c)---Account holder (consumer) of a bank (service provider)---\"\"Consumer\"\" and \"\"services\"\" as defined under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 and \"\"customer\"\" as defined under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Scope---Decision of superior Courts on the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which had defined the term \"\"customer\"\" had no relevance to the definition of \"\"consumer\"\" as well as of \"\"services\"\" being provided by the bank which were amenable to the jurisdiction of the Punjab Consumer Courts.\n \n Izhar Alam Farooqi, Advocate v. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi and others 2008 SCMR 240 rel.\n \n(e) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)---\n \n----Ss. 2(d), (k) & 27---Account holder of a Bank suffering losses and damage due to fraud committed by employees of the Bank---Complaint filed by account holder against the Bank---Consumer Court, jurisdiction of---Scope---Account holder of a Bank when defrauded by the Bank or its employees could justifiably lodge a claim against the Bank before the Consumer Court established under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.Os. Nos.203, 204, 205 and 373 of 2009, decision dated: 21st November, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR SAEED SHEIKH, J",
    "": "ALLIED BANK LTD, FAISALABAD through Attorneys of the Bank\nvs\nKHALID MEHMOOD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12254",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2121 = 2013 SLD 2121 = 2013 CLD 1165",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 &10---Suit for recovery---Application for leave to defend suit was dismissed and suit was decreed---Validity---Plaintiff Bank had complied with provisions of S.9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and its claim was duly supported by all finance documents while the defendant, in his application for leave to defend suit, could not raise any substantial legal ground to dislodge claim of the Plaintiff Bank---Defendant instead took a false plea that he was not the Director of the company that availed the finance facility, which claim was false in view of the certified copy of Form 29 issued by Securities and Exchange Commission Pakistan---Further contention of defendant which merely was an objection alleging signatures on one or two documents were doubtful, which in the absence of any other substantial legal ground, would not justify filing the leave to defend application by a customer, and the same could not be treated as proper compliance with the provisions of S.10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001---Filing of application for leave to defend the suit, in circumstances, was not justified.\n \n American Express Bank Ltd. v. Adamjee Industries Limited 1995 CLC 880; Al-Hadayat Textile through Proprietor and 2 others v. Soneri Bank Limited 2003 CLD 105 and Kamran Zali v. Messrs Union Bank Limited and 4 others 2002 CLD 876 distinguished.\n \n Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 268 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery---Application for leave to defend suit---Burden of proof---Scope.\n \n Once a financial institution files a suit for recovery, after having complied with the requirements of section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, by furnishing duly certified statement of account, the documents relating to the grant of finance and the detail of amount of finance availed by the customer, amounts repaid, with the dates of payments and the amount of finance and other amounts relating to the finance payable up to the date of institution of suit, the burden to dislodge the said claim shifts upon the customer who is required to file leave to defend application in terms of section 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 in the form of written statement containing summary of the substantial question of law as well as of facts in respect of which evidence is required to be recorded. It shall also specify details mentioned in section 10(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.19 of 2011, decision dated: 18-10-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND FAROOQ ALI CHANNA, JJ",
    "": "ATIF MANZOOR\nvs\nFAYSAL BANK LIMITED through President and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12255",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2122 = 2013 SLD 2122 = 2013 CLD 1254",
    "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------S. 13---Sale of Goods Act (III of 1930), S. 2(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115 & O.XXXVII, Rr. 1, 2, 3---Suit for recovery of money---Negotiable instrument---Delivery order---Plaintiff sought recovery of money in summary proceedings on the basis of delivery order and Trial Court granted leave to defendant to appear and defend the suit---Validity---Plaintiff, if at all, might have claimed his right as prayed for in the suit, as per entitlement, in accordance with law but not by way of filing suit under O.XXXVII, R.3, C.P.C. and could proceed like ordinary suit, according to normal procedure prescribed under Civil Procedure Code, 1908---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside order passed by Trial Court as corum non judice---Revision was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Messrs National Security Insurance Company Limited and others v. Messrs Hoechst Pakistan Limited and others 1992 SCMR 718 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.A. No.158 of 2011, decision dated: 21st November, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED MUHAMMAD FAROOQ SHAH, J",
    "": "Messrs SERI SUGAR MILL through Manager Administration and Attorney--Applicant\nvs\nHaji KHAWAND BUX GHULAM MUHAMMAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12256",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2123 = 2013 SLD 2123 = 2013 CLD 1273",
    "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 497(2)--- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.409, 420, 109, 34 & 477-A---Central Depositories Act (XIX of 1997), S.24---Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969), S. 16(c)---Criminal breach of trust by banker, merchant or agent, cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, abetment, common intention, falsification of accounts, handling book-entry securities without authority, prohibition and restriction on pledging customers' securities---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegation against the accused [alleged director of a company (brokerage house) dealing in securities] was that he, in connivance with the co-accused and different banks, unauthorizedly and illegally, pledged shares of various clients, including those of the complainant, with the banks to secure finances for the company, and as a consequence of default committed by the company, the banks sold the pledged shares causing colossal losses to the complainant and other clients of the company---Prosecution contended that in terms of S.24 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997, a stock broker was not authorized to pledge shares with any bank/financial institution and/or Stock Exchange without authorization from the sub-account holder, and that such restriction was also imposed by S.16(c) of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969---Contentions of the accused were that he was a paid employee of the company and was working for the company as a General Manager and that he had resigned from his job with the company---Validity---Investigation officer had admitted that none of the witnesses, whose statements were recorded under S.161, Cr.P.C., had alleged any personal involvement of the accused in the entire transaction; that he had not been able to lay hands on any document which might implicate the accused directly, and that all relevant documents pertaining to the transactions/scam in question had been signed and executed by the two absconding co-accused---Neither the complainant had made any allegation against the accused nor he nominated the accused in the F.I.R., but the accused had been nominated as a co-accused in the challan---Accused held merely 0.02% shares in the capital of the company, therefore, it seemed that he was merely a paid employee---Accused remained on physical custody of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) for about 11 days, but nothing incriminating could be procured and/or discovered against him---None of the documents pertaining to the transaction in question had been executed and/or signed by the accused---Holding further inquiry into the guilt of the accused was essential---Accused was admitted to bail, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Bail Application No. 380 of 2012, decision dated: 18-04-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAQBOOL BAQAR AND MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JJ",
    "": "Syed MUHAMMAD FURQAN--Applicant\nvs\nThe STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12257",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2124 = 2013 SLD 2124 = 2013 CLD 1291",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10(11) & 9---Suit for recovery---Dismissal of application for leave to defend---Effect---Under S.10(11) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, Banking Court had to pass and decree in favour of plaintiff against defendant forthwith upon dismissal of defendant's application for leave to defend---Dismissal of application for leave to defendant, however, did not mean that entire claim of plaintiff in a suit for recovery under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 should be decreed as prayed for by the plaintiff without examination of the claim of the plaintiff---Plaintiff became entitled to a decree only to the extent of such amount which was permissible by law---Markup more than the agreed rate and/or beyond the agreed period, could not be granted to financial institution and no other charges or amount could be allowed to the financial institution to which the customer had not agreed to.\n \n Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. 2012 CLD 337; Messrs United Bank Ltd. v. Banking Court No.II and 2 others 2012 CLD 1556; Mrs. Jawahar Afzal v. United Bank Ltd. 2003 CLD 119; Khawaja Muhammad Bilal v. Union Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 1555 and Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs SABCOS (Pvt.) Ltd. 2006 CLD 244 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 2(d), 2(e) & 10---\"\"Finance\"\", meaning of---\"\"Obligation\"\"--- Scope--- Word \"\"Charity\"\"--- Connotation---Financing agreement stipulating obligation upon customer to pay a certain percentage to charity in case of default or delay in payment---Legality---Suit for recovery--- Application for leave to defend was dismissed---Plaintiff bank, in addition to principal amount and markup had also claimed an amount from defendant as \"\"charity\"\"---Contention of plaintiff was that defendant was liable to pay the said amount in view of the agreement between the parties, which stipulated that in case of delay or default committed by defendant, the defendant undertook to pay a certain percentage of the outstanding amount for the period of default, to a charity fund---Validity---Various finance facilities could be granted by a financial institution to the customer and all types of finance facilities had been defined in S.2(d) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Any facility or accommodation which was not covered by said S.2(d) of the Ordinance, would not be deemed to be, or called, \"\"finance\"\" and same could not be claimed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Cause of action for filing a suit for recovery under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 accrued only upon breach of an obligation by any parties in relation to \"\"finance\"\" which was defined in the Ordinance as \"\"finance\"\"---\"\"Charity\"\" had neither been defined as \"\"finance\"\" in S.2(d) of the Ordinance, or elsewhere in the Ordinance---Essential feature of finance was that some amount of facility was granted by the financial institution to the customer in any form defined in S.2 of the Ordinance---Plaintiff Bank, in the present case, instead of granting any amount or facility, was claiming from the defendant an amount at fixed rate in the name of \"\"charity\"\" in case of delay in repayment or default by defendant---Penalty or penal charges in any form could not be claimed by the financial institution/plaintiff---Charity amount charged on the contract price was nothing but markup under the guise of charity---Charity fund, according to the agreement between the parties was constituted by the plaintiff Bank and was used by it at its sole discretion---Charity could not be claimed or charged compulsorily, or under compulsion---Charity, in legal parlance, was a gift---Charity or gift was something a donor gave or granted with his own free will, at his own discretion and according to his own choice and not under compulsion or dictates of others---Plaintiff Bank was not entitled to any amount or account of charity, and said claim was rejected by High Court---Suit was partially decreed, accordingly.\n \n Dawood Islamic Bank Limited v. Admore Gas (Pvt.) Limited and 6 others 2012 CLD 263 rel.\n \n(c) Words and Phrases---\n \n----\"\"Charity\"\"---Connotation---Charity, in legal parlance, was a gift---Charity or gift was something a donor gave or granted with his own free will, at his own discretion and according to his own choice and not under compulsion or dictates of others---Charity could not be claimed or charged compulsorily, or under compulsion.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-181 of 2009, decision dated: 21st December, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "EMIRATES GLOBAL ISLAMIC BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMUHAMMAD ABDUL SALAM KHAN--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12258",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2125 = 2013 SLD 2125 = 2013 CLD 1305",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 3 & 9---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Liquidated damages, grant of---Principle---Suit filed by Bank was decreed in favour of bank and against defendants jointly and severally in the sum of Rs.100,798,440 along with cost of funds and cost of suit, however liquidated damages were not granted---Validity---Single Judge of High Court was not cognizant of the fact that amount shown as recoverable from defendants in summary of accounts, filed by Bank, also included amount of liquidated damages at fix rate of 20%---Liquidated damages in absence of any evidence, showing actual amount of damages sustained by any party, particularly when cost of funds in terms of S.3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, had already been granted along with cost of suit, could not be allowed at flat rate--- Division Bench of High Court upheld and decree by modifying the same by deleting amount of liquidated damages i.e. Rs.16,799,740 claimed by Bank at flat rate of 20%---Appeal was disposed of accordingly.\n \n Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 596 and Atif Manzoor v. Faysal Bank Limited and others I.A. No.19 of 2012 decided on 18-10-2012 rel.\n \n Allah Ditta v. Ghulam Haider and others 1988 SCMR 964 and Muhammad Sultan and others v. Faqirullah and others 1991 CLC 1098 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No.207 of 2011, decision dated: 18-12-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMAD ABBASI AND SADIQ HUSSAIN BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "SHADMAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY PVT. LIMITED and 2 others\nvs\nNIB BANK LIMITED through Authorized Attorney"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12259",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2126 = 2013 SLD 2126 = 2013 CLD 1325",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 3 & 9---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 23---Suit for recovery of non-interest based finance---Bank's claim of over-due mark-up after agreed period on basis of defendant's agreement to pay same---Validity---No financial institution could transact banking business after 20-6-1984 on interest based system or mark-up on mark-up basis, except in case of foreign loan---Lender institution under non-interest based system could recover buy back price of commodity only upto agreed period, but not thereafter---Defendant's such agreement was illegal and hit by S.23 of Contract Act, 1872, thus, Bank was not entitled to recover any mark-up after agreed period---Such claim of Bank was rejected in circumstances.\n \n Crescent Commercial Bank now Samba Bank Ltd. v. Genertech Pakistan Ltd. 2011 CLD 37; A.M. Burq and another v. Central Exchange Bank Ltd. and others PLD 1966 (W.P.) Lah. 1; Faisal Bank through duly appointed Attorneys v. Messrs Zimindara Rice Mills and 21 others 2007 CLD 1164; Habib Bank v. Messrs Qayyum Spinning Ltd. 2001 MLD 1351; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Karachi Pipe Mills Ltd. 2006 CLD 842; Mst. Akhtar Begum v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 2009 SCMR 264; Mst. Riffat Jehan and another v. Habib Bank Limited and 10 others 2005 CLD 941; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Ilyas Enterprises through Proprietor Mr. Ilyas Malik and 2 others 2004 CLD 1338; Messrs United Dairies Forms (Pvt.) Limited and 4 others v. United Bank Limited 2005 CLC 569; Bankers Equity Limited through Principal Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 931; Faysal Bank Limited v. Genertech Pakistan Ltd. and 6 others 2009 CLD 856; National Bank of Pakistan and others v. Karachi Development Authority and others PLD 1999 Kar. 260; Messrs Ittefaq Industries (Regd.) through Managing Partner and 2 others v. Bank of Punjab through duly Constituted Attorney 2004 CLD 1356; Dr. S.M. Rab v. National Refinery Ltd. 2005 CLD 1330; Nasim Nizami v. Habib Bank Limited 2006 CLD 1213 and Syed Asad Abbas v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Branch Manager and others 2006 CLD 79 ref.\n \n Waman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. AIR 1959 SC 689 and Anayat Ali Shah v. Anwar Hussain and 2 others 1995 MLD 1714 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 2(d)(e)(i) & 9---Suit for recovery of restructured finance by Bank---Jurisdiction of Banking Court to entertain such suit---Scope---Banking Court could take cognizance of default committed by financial institution or customer in non-fulfilling financial obligation with regard to any finance---Structuring of finance by Bank would not change nature of finance, rather would facilitate customer to pay finance in extended period---Liability restructured was a finance in terms of S.2(d) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, thus, Banking Court would have jurisdiction to entertain such suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.165 of 2010, decision dated: 20-02-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nKASHIR TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12260",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2127 = 2013 SLD 2127 = 2013 CLD 1339",
    "Key Words:": "Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance (IX of 1984)-------S. 2(d)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860) Ss. 467, 468 & 471---Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) S. 7---Interpretation of S.2(d) of the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance 1984---Special Court (Banks) jurisdiction of---\"\"Scheduled offence\"\", definition and scope---Banking Company impugned order of Special Court (Banks) whereby its criminal complaint against respondents was dismissed under S.203, Cr.P.C. on ground that the complaint did not fall within the definition of \"\"scheduled offence\"\" under the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984---Contention of Bank was that the respondents who had availed finance facility from the Bank, had manipulated documents from the Bank, in order to show that they had discharged their liability to the Bank and had redeemed their mortgaged properties from the charge of the Bank, and the same fell under the definition of \"\"scheduled offence\"\" under Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984---Validity---Perusal of manipulated documents revealed that the same were manipulated with the sole intent of depriving the Bank from recovery of outstanding liability and to unsecure the finance facility, which prima facie appeared to fall within the ambit of Ss. 467, 468 and 471, P.P.C.---Special Court (Banks) misled itself by holding that such manipulation did not indicate that the accused had allegedly committed any cheating fraud or manipulation in respect to or in connection with the business of the Bank, and had given a very narrow meaning to the words \"\"business of the bank\"\"---Special Court (Banks) erred by holding that its jurisdiction only extended to cases where some monetary fraud was committed in the transaction---Words \"\"alleged to have been committed in respect of or in connection with the business of a bank\"\" used in S.2(d) of the Ordinance, did not call for a narrow interpretation but embraced all such acts which pertained to banking transactions and withdrawal of an amount from a bank account was undoubtedly a banking transaction---Special Court (Banks) in order to determine whether an offence was triable as a \"\"scheduled offence\"\" or not had to examine whether the allegation which constituted such offence was in any manner linked with the business of the financial institution or not and had to keep in mind that with the passage of time the Financial Institutions had expanded their business as earlier banks dealt in documents only but now hypothetically dealt in goods also---Business which the banks engaged in was detailed in S.7 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962---Respondents, in the present case, had manipulated the documents to show that they had paid their entire liability and had redeemed their properties from the charge for the bank, and since creation of charge/mortgaged to secure finance was business of the bank according to S.7(g) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, therefore, the same had a direct nexus with mortgage and the business of the bank, and fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Special Court as a scheduled offence---High Court set aside impugned order and directed Special Court (Banks) to bring complaint on record and issue process accordingly--- Revision was allowed, in circumstances.\n \n A. Habib Ahmed v. M.K.G. Scott Christian and 5 others PLD 1992 SC 353; Karachi College Teachers Co-operative Housing Society v. Judicial Magistrate XVI, Karachi East and another 2011 YLR 1825; Ali Hussain and 2 others v. Presiding Officer Special Court for Offences in Respect of Banks Karachi and 3 others PLD 1989 Kar. 157 and Sikandar Ali v. The State 1989 PCr.LJ 614 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Revision No.130 of 2011, decision dated: 21st February, 2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAJJAD ALI SHAH AND NAIMATULLAH PHULPOTO, JJ",
    "": "ALLIED BANK LIMITED through Authorised Officer--Applicant\nvs\nSIKANDAR ALI and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12261",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2128 = 2013 SLD 2128 = 2013 CLD 1390",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Rejection of plaint by Banking Court---Scope---Due process---Suit for declaration before Banking Court was filed by the customer/plaintiff seeking declaration to the effect that the plaintiff had nothing outstanding against the defendant bank---Banking Court, after framing of issues, dismissed the suit on basis of statement by defendant/Bank that the Bank would not adopt coercive measures against plaintiff for recovery of loan without determination from competent court---Contention of the plaintiff was that said order of the Banking Court was untenable in law---Validity---Under provisions of S.9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, if the financial institution committed a default in the fulfilment of any obligation with regard to any finance, the customer was also competent to institute a suit in the Banking Court by presenting a plaint---Since the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 did not provide procedure with regard to scrutiny of plaint, therefore, procedure laid down under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. was applicable to plaints before Banking Court---Only relevant material to determine whether the plaintiff had a cause of action or not for the purpose of Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. were only the facts stated in the plaint---Plaintiff could not be non-suited in the circumstances of the case merely on the basis of statement of the defendant-Bank and in the present case Banking Court did not take into consideration the facts given in the plaint---Suit for recovery filed by the defendant bank with respect to finance availed by the plaintiff was pending and if plaintiff's application for leave to defend in the said suit was dismissed, the plaintiff would be left remediless, and such state of affairs would violate Art.10-A of the Constitution; consolidation of the present suit with the defendant-Bank's suit would, therefore, be in the interest of justice---High Court set aside order of Banking Court and remanded the case to the Banking Court with the direction to consolidate the suit with the suit filed by the Bank---Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\n \n Muhammad Khalid Butt v. United Bank Limited 2003 CLD 911 and M.L. Traders through Proprietor and others v. Judge, Banking Court No.IV, Lahore and 2 others 2007 CLD 634 ref.\n \n Messrs First Women Bank Limited v. Registrar, High Court of Sindh, Karachi and 4 others 2004 SCMR 108 rel.\n \n Messrs A-Umar Fabrics through Proprietor and 2 others v. Habib Bank Limited through General Attorney/Manager 2006 CLD 1181 distinguished.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R.11---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 9 & 7---Rejection of plaint---\"\"Cause of action\"\"---Connotation---Expression \"\"cause of action\"\" meant the cause for which the suit was brought---Term \"\"action\"\" meant those proceedings in which a legal demand of a right was made and the term \"\"cause of action\"\" referred to every fact, which if traversed, it should be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to and which if not proved, gave the defendant a right to and for this purpose only facts stated in the plaint were to be construed in order to determine whether they constitute a cause of action---Relevant material to determine whether the plaintiff in a suit had a cause of action were only the facts stated on the plaint.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 51 of 2012, heard on 5-09-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUS SATTAR ASGHAR AND MALIK SHAHZAD AHMAD KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ\nvs\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Manager and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12262",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2129 = 2013 SLD 2129 = 2013 CLD 1430",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19--- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr.66, 67(2) & 90---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Execution of decree---Illegal auction---Wrong description of property---Non-compliance of proclamation of sale---Press publication---Judgment debtor assailed auction proceedings on the pleas that Court-Auctioneer without any authority, in the advertisement of auction, had fixed date different from the one fixed by court and illegally auctioned property on such date; that description of property was wrongly and incorrectly mentioned in the advertisement; that proper advertisement required under law was not made as property was situated in city \"\"M\"\", whereas advertisement/publication was made in inconspicuous newspapers published from cities \"\"L\"\" and \"\"V\"\"---All such factors were vital, which vitiated auction but such aspects had not been taken into account by the courts below---Leave to appeal was granted by Supreme Court to consider the contentions of -debtor---Petition was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.275-L of 2013, decision dated: 30-04-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND IQBAL HAMEEDUR RAHMAN, JJ",
    "": "QAISER ABBAS\nvs\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12263",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2130 = 2013 SLD 2130 = 2013 CLD 1398",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R. 66---Execution of decree with or without intervention of court---Mode---Scope---Suit upon announcement of and decree by court would stand converted into execution proceedings automatically---Court had discretion to adopt any mode for execution of decree---Court or financial institution once having opted and invoked provision of O.XXI, C.P.C. could not later on avoid its express provisions relating to auction proceedings and issuance of public notice of sale through newspapers---Duty of court would be to protect rights of -debtor by trying to fetch appropriate price through sale of his properties and would avoid its sale at throwaway price---Principles.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, R. 66---Execution proceedings---Sale of property by public auction---Essential conditions---Such sale, if made without fulfilling mandatory requirements of O.XXI, R. 66, C.P.C., would be unlawful and liable to be set aside---Principles.\n \n Provisions of Order XXI, Rule 66, C.P.C. are mandatory in nature and without fulfilling basic requirements, if auction is taken place, it would not be considered to have been lawfully made. \n \n The absence of mandatory notice to the -debtors under Order XXI, Rule 66, C.P.C. is by itself sufficient for setting aside the court auction. Before calling upon Court Auctioneer to conduct auction, duty of Executing Court is to have satisfied itself that mandatory notice has been issued to -debtors. Such contravention of provisions of Order XXI, Rule 66, C.P.C. by Executing Court would vitiate entire proceedings including sale, which is nullity in eyes of law.\n \n The word \"\"cause\"\" appearing in Rule 66, Order XXI, C.P.C. requires a specific order of court, which produces the effect of drawing the proclamation envisaging the terms and conditions of sale. Thus, includes the settlement of conditions etc., by court itself or to approve those filed by parties after hearing them. It is duty of the court to cause to be made a proclamation of sale. Such proclamation must be drawn after notice to the -debtor.\n \n Intention of law is to fix reserve price in proclamation to safeguard rights of -debtor. \n \n The proclamation should include the estimate if any, given by either -debtor or decree-holder or both the parties.\n \n It is mandatory that the value so determined by the parties i.e. the decree-holder and the -debtor, is to be stated in the proclamation, as the word \"\"shall\"\" has been stated therein. The rationale behind stating the said value in the proclamation is to ensure full disclosure to the prospective bidders.\n \n Muhammad Amin alias Jaloo v. Judge Banking Court and others 2011 CLD 280; Muhammad Hassan v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and others 2003 CLD 1693; Khursheed Begum and others v. Inam-ur-Rehman Khan and others PLD 2009 552; Muhammad Attique v. Jami Limited and others PLD 2010 SC 993; [Brig. Rtd.) Mazhar-ul-Haq and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd., Islamabad PLD 1993 Lah. 706; Desh Bandhu Gupta v. N.I. Anand and Rajinder Singh 1994 1 S.C.C 131; Mirza Munawar Baig and others v. Bank Alfalah Limited and others 2007 YLR 126; Messrs Ripple Jewellers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. First Woman Bank 2003 CLD 1318; Messrs Spinghar Textile Mills Ltd. and another v. United Bank Ltd. and another 2011 CLD 1683; Mrs.Aziz Fatima and others v. Mrs. Rehana Chughtai and others 2000 CLC 863; Mrs.Shahida Saleem and another v. Habib Credit and Exchange Bank Ltd. and others 2001 CLC 126; Mst.Nadia Malik v. Messrs Makki Chemical Industries Pvt. Ltd. 2011 SCMR 1675; Balram v. Ilam Singh and others AIR 1996 SC 2781; Manilal Mohanlal Shah and others v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad AIR 1954 SC 349; Appu v. Achuta Menon and others AIR 1926 (Madras) 755; Shahid Ali v. Mrs. Aziz Fatima and others PLD 2010 SC 38; Muhammad Ahmed Sheikh v. J.S. Bank Limited 2012 CLC 498; Feroz Abdul Karim v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 2012 CLC 545; (Capt. Rtd.) Nayyar Islam v. Judge, Accountability Court No.III 2012 SCMR 669; Commissioner of Income-Tax v. D.P.S.(I.) (Pvt.) Ltd. 1998 PTD 2809 and Ibrar Hussain v. State 2012 YLR 805 ref.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, R. 85---Deposit of remaining purchase money by purchaser within 30 days as per direction of Court Auctioneer---Validity---Provision of O. XXI, R. 85, C.P.C. requiring such deposit to be made within 15 days was mandatory---Non-payment of such money would render sale proceedings as a complete nullity---Court in such circumstances could take suo motu action for setting aside sale.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, R. 66---Proclamation of sale---Reserve price of property not fixed in proclamation---Effect---Such omission would render proclamation to be illegal and make auction proceedings liable to be set aside. \n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr. 66, 84 & 85---Sale of mortgaged property in execution of decree by Official Assignee by adopting mode provided in O.XXI, C.P.C.---Proclamation of sale not containing particulars required to be incorporated therein by Official Assignee in terms of O. XXI, Rr. 66, 84 & 85, C.P.C.---Effect---Such proclamation for being illegal would not be sustainable---High Court set aside such sale while directed Official Assignee to set down fresh draft of proclamation of sale in terms of O.XXI, Rr. 66, 84 & 85, C.P.C. in presence of both parties and submit same before court.\n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, R. 65---Sale in execution of decree---Official Assignee, appointment of---Scope---Court for conducting such sale could appoint Official Assignee.\n \n(g) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Special law---Applicability---Provisions of special law would exclude application of general law.\n \n Yawar Faruqui and Irfan Memon for Decree Holder.\n \n Mian Raza Rabbani, Zeeshan Abdullah and Sajid Ansari for Judgment Debtor Nos. 1 & 2.\n \n Naveed-ul-Haq for the Bank of Punjab.\n \n S. Nauman Zahid Ali for Standard Chartered Bank Ltd.\n \n Date of hearing: 14th December, 2012.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J",
    "": "Messrs NIB BANK LIMITED--Decree Holder\nvs\nMessrs APOLLO TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED and 2 othersJudgment-Debtor"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12264",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2131 = 2013 SLD 2131 = 2013 CLD 1472",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition--- Maintainability--- Suit for recovery of bank loan---Grant of leave to defend the suit---Petitioner bank was aggrieved by order passed by Banking Court, whereby unconditional leave was granted to respondent borrower to defend the suit---Validity---Constitutional petition was maintainable in exceptional circumstances, where petitioner could show blatant illegality in order, such that Banking Court did not follow expressed mandate of law or that Banking Court had exercised its powers outside the jurisdiction conferred; in such situation, in order to meet the ends of justice and to prevent gross miscarriage of justice constitutional petition was maintainable---Granting leave merely gave respondent borrower an opportunity to lead evidence to defend its case and no right of petitioner bank was prejudiced---Petitioner bank did not have open and shut case on the basis of which decree could be passed and that petitioner bank would have to prove its claim through evidence---In leave granting order entries relied upon by petitioner bank did not provide sufficient data to show that disbursement and utilization of finance had been made by respondent borrower---High Court did not find any illegality in leave granting order and it did not fall within the ambit of exceptions---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Sheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi and another v. Judge Banking Court 2007 CLD 69; Messrs United Bank Ltd. through Authorized Attorneys v. Banking Court No.II and 2 others 2012 CLD 1556; United Bank Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Banking Court No.2, Karachi and 6 others 2011 CLD 931; Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and others v. Yar Muhammad and others 2004 CLD 1084; Messrs Sajid Brothers and Co. through Proprietor and 2 others v. Manager, Allied Bank Limited and 8 others 2012 CLD 1858 and 2011 CLD 1571 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.5864 of 2013, decision dated: 29-04-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. AYESHA A. MALIK AND ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "BANK OF PUNJAB\nvs\nINTERNATIONAL CERAMICS LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12265",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2132 = 2013 SLD 2132 = 2013 CLD 1780",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Appeal before High Court---Delay in re-filing of appeal after removal of office objections, condonation of---Appellant's plea was that office of High Court had not given him notice about raising of any further objection; that he received file from office on 7-6-2007 in order to remove further objections and re-filed same on 18-6-2007; and that he could not be penalized in absence of such prior notice---Validity---Nothing on record to show issuance of notice to appellant for removal of further objections and as to why office had not fixed appeal for hearing in motion due to non-removal of further objections within specified time---Appellant could not be penalized for such inaction of office---Appeal was, held to be within time.\n \n Bank of Punjab v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal Lahore and 2 others PLD 2010 Lah. 666; Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286; Muhammad Anwar and others v. Mst. Ilyas Begum and others PLD 2013 SC 255; Protein and Fats International (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 2 others v. Capital Assets Leasing Corporation Limited through Manager 2005 CLC 857; Messrs Khan Tractors, Alipur Road, Khan Garh District Muzaffargarh through Proprietor and 2 others v. Habib Bank Limited, Railways Road Branch, Muzaffargarh through Manager 2013 CLC 177; Shazia Munawar v. Punjab Public Service Commission through Secretary, Lahore PLD 2010 Lah. 160 and Province of Punjab through District Collector Lodhran and 6 others v. Muhammad Khalid Khan 2005 CLC 1083 ref.\n \n Mst. Sabiran Bi v. Ahmad Khan and another 2000 SCMR 847 and Farman Ali v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2013 SC 392 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.324 of 2007, decision dated: 6-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAUF AHMAD SHEIKH AND MAMOON RASHID SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "BANKERS EQUITY LIMITED\nvs\nDECENT INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12266",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2133 = 2013 SLD 2133 = 2013 CLD 1562",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 15(10) & 15(4)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)--- Sale of mortgaged property--- Fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of jurisdiction in sale of mortgaged property---Scope---Suit for recovery was decreed whereafter during sale of mortgaged property, some of the defendants made application under S.15(10) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 for filing of proper accounts of the sale proceeds, which was allowed, and the Bank was ordered to remit the excessive amount to the defendants---Subsequently, the other defendants/applicants made application under S.12(2), C.P.C. for setting aside order for filing of accounts, on grounds of fraud and contended that the rest of the defendants had connived with the Bank to sell away the property at throw away price---Said application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was rejected by the Banking Court---Defendants/applicants impugned the said order inter alia on the ground that no notice was served upon the defendants/applicants before the order for filing of accounts was made---Validity---Bank had adopted the procedure laid under S.15(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 by putting to auction the mortgaged property and had published two notices, one in an English daily and one in an Urdu Daily, both having country-wide circulation---After receipt of an application under S.15(10) of the Ordinance, the other defendants/applicants would be deemed to have been validly served by the Banking Court by publication in the newspaper---After the property had been put into auction, and the highest successful bid was offered, the Financial Institution/Bank was only to file the proper accounts of the sale proceeds in the Banking Court, which was done--- Application made by the applicants/defendants after a lapse of ten years was of no avail and they should have availed remedy of appeal against decree of Banking Court---Impugned order was a final order and even otherwise an application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was not maintainable as there was no element of fraud, misrepresentation and lack of jurisdiction in the present case---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was rightly rejected by Banking Court---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n Muhammad Aslam and another v. National Bank of Pakistan and 7 others 2009 CLD 1389; Ghulam Mustafa Bughio and another v. Judge Banking Court No.4, Karachi and another 2006 CLD 528; Messrs Gold Star International and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 2000 MLD 421 and Mst. Ruqiyya Rhazes v. Al-Falah Bank and 7 others 2002 CLD 401 rel.\n \n Messrs Unicon Enterprises v. Banking Court No.5 City Court Building, Karachi and 2 others 2004 CLD 1452; Muhammad Umer Rathore v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2009 Lah. 268 and Javaid Mahmood v. United Bank Limited and 4 others 2001 CLC 2011 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.7566 of 2012, decision dated: 30-01-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD TAHIR through Special Power of Attorney and 2 others\nvs\nMUHAMMAD ASHRAF and 16 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12267",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2134 = 2013 SLD 2134 = 2013 CLD 1516",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Petitioner's plea was that he had mortgaged one property with the Bank, which had issued letter to Sub-Register not to accept without its NOC, registration of sale deed of 9 other properties belonging to the petitioner---Bank's plea was that petitioner had availed finances for such 9 properties, which he could not sell without repaying amount of finance---Validity---Banking Court had jurisdiction to decide such dispute pertaining to financial transaction---Banking Court had passed restraint order against such properties in a suit filed by Bank---Petitioner had already filed suit in Banking Court challenging validity of such letter--- High Court dismissed constitutional petition in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-3469 of 2010 decided on 19-04-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB AND NADEEM AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "NASIRUDDIN SHAHAB\nvs\nSUB-REGISTRAR-I and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12268",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2135 = 2013 SLD 2135 = 2013 CLD 1581",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXI, R. 66---Execution of decree---Auction of debtor's property---Proclamation of sale by public auction--- Proceedings under O. XXI, R. 66, C.P.C.---Scope---Order XXI, R. 66, C.P.C. provided an exhaustive procedure for the proclamation of sale by public auction---Order XXI, R. 66, C.P.C. provided as to how the proclamation of intended sale shall be caused to be made; how it shall be drawn up after notice to the decree holders and debtors and how it would state the time and place of sale and specify as fairly and accurately as possible (a) the property to be sold, (b) the revenue assessed upon the estate or part of the estate, where the property to be sold was an interest in an estate or in part of an estate paying revenue to the Government, (c) any encumbrance to which the property was liable, (d) the amount for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, and (e) every other thing which the court considered material for a purchaser to know in order to judge the nature and value of property---In the absence of any of the said particulars, the purpose of sale could not be achieved---Failure to comply with provisions of O. XXI, R. 66, C.P.C. could not be defended under any canons of law and propriety, when it tended to damage the rights of the decree holders or those of debtors, simply because a sale had been effected in favour of a third party---Although proceedings under O. XXI, R. 66, C.P.C. did not involve any judicial determination, but at the same time it could not be disputed that they laid a sure foundation for judicious and judicial determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties, therefore, a balance had to be struck to protect the rights and liabilities of the parties which could either be imperiled or even extinguished by not complying with the provisions of O.XXI, R. 66, C.P.C. [Majority view]\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R. 66---Execution of decree passed by Banking Court---Sale of debtor's property by way of public auction---Auction proceedings tainted with serious lapses causing prejudice to decree holder (i.e. the Bank) as well as debtor---Non-mentioning of reserve price of auctioned property---Effect---Recovery suit filed by the Bank against the defendant was decreed by the Banking Court to the amount of Rs.1,67,02,105.84---Bank filed execution application for recovery of decretal amount by sale of mortgaged property in question under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C.---Banking Court issued sale proclamation in consequence whereof property in question was ordered to be sold to person \"\"M\"\" being the highest bidder in the sum of Rs. 1,35,00,000---Objector/appellant, who was a stranger to the execution proceedings, filed an application under S. 151, C.P.C. wherein he offered an enhanced price of Rs. 1,55,00,000 for the property in question, however said application was dismissed by Banking Court---Subsequently objector and defendant/ debtor filed a joint application under S. 151, C.P.C. wherein price offer for property in question was increased from Rs. 1,55,00,000 to Rs.1,67,02,106 however said application was also dismissed on the basis that objector had failed to establish his right or title in respect of the property in question and also his locus standi to file the application(s) under S.151, C.P.C.---Appeal filed by objector against dismissal of his application by Banking Court was also dismissed by the High Court---Validity---In the present case, things were done in a casual and cursory manner without due application of mind---Questions as to when writ of attachment was issued; when it was received after being duly executed, if it was executed at all; what was the point in issuing writ of attachment again; how and when the terms of sale were settled; when and what the court considered material for the purchaser to know in order to judge the nature and value of the property, were questions which were not answered by the record---Absence of answers to said questions went to the root of the case and brought the whole proceedings under a thick cloud of doubt---Another question was as to what were the extraordinary circumstances which necessitated the passing of orders by Banking Court at the back of the parties, which illegality alone was sufficient to vitiate the whole proceedings ending in the auction of the property---Proceedings leading to sale of property in question were marred by serious lapses which caused serious prejudice to the decree holder (i.e. the Bank) as well as the debtor (i.e. the defendant), who along with the objector offered a price for the property which was much greater than that given by the auction purchaser (i.e. person \"\"M\"\")---No reserve price was provided for the auction, and although the expression \"\"reserve price\"\" did not find mention in O.XXI, R. 66, C.P.C., but the words used in the said Rule pointedly hinted thereto--- Sale by auction, in absence of reserve price, was apt to giving a walkover to manoeuvers to fix any price of choice---Number of bidders for the auction were close to nil---Clever manoeuvering forcing way for disposal of a property in execution of a decree for a paltry sum had to be guarded against jealously with all care and circumspection so that such property might go for a sum it deserved---Impugned s of Banking Court and High Court were set aside , and case was sent back to Banking Court for proceedings de novo in accordance with law--- Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed accordingly. [Majority view]\n \n Messrs Majid and Sons and another v. National Bank of Pakistan through Manager and another 2004 CLD 1616; Messrs Magi Chemical Industries v. Habib Bank 2003 CLD 571; Appu alias Subramania Patter v. O. Achuta Menon and others AIR 1926 Madras 755; Mir Wali Khan and another v. Manager, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, Muzaffargarh and another PLD 2003 SC 500; Nanhelal and another v. Umrao Singh AIR 1931 Privy Council 33 and Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1987 SC 512 ref.\n \nPer Anwar Zaheer Jamali, J; disagreeing with Ejaz Afzal Khan, J. [Minority view]\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19(3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R.66---Execution of decree passed by Banking Court---Power of financial institution to sell off mortgaged, pledged or hypothecated property without intervention of Banking Court---Scope---Section 19(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 provided that in the cases of mortgaged, pledged or hypothecated properties, the financial institutions had been empowered to sell or cause the same to be sold with or without intervention of the Banking Court, either by public auction or by inviting sealed tenders and appropriate the sale proceeds towards the total or partial satisfaction of their decree---Section 19(3) further laid down that the decree in favour of the financial institution, passed by the Banking Court in itself constituted and conferred sufficient powers and authority in its favour to sell or cause the sale of mortgaged, pledged or hypothecated property together with transfer of marketable title and that no further order of the Banking Court was required for such purpose---Financial institution was not required to wait for any further direction or order of Banking Court, but had the option of selling the mortgaged property on its own either by public auction or by inviting the sealed tenders---Procedure for auction of property contemplated under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 had absolutely no material bearing in such regard. [Minority view] \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R. 66---Execution of decree passed by Banking Court---Sale of debtor's property by way of public auction---Fraud, manipulation, collusion, misrepresentation and mala fide in the auction process---Proof---Bona fide auction purchaser---Scope---Fraud, manipulation, collusion, misrepresentation, mala fide etc. on the part of Banking Court, financial institution or the auction purchaser, if proved, would be fatal to any purported solemn transaction of sale, either through public auction, through negotiation, inviting of tenders or by any other mode, but such situation would only arise when such fact was brought to the notice of the court by the aggrieved party at the earliest in accordance with law and was substantiated/proved to the satisfaction of the court---Conversely, any whimsical attribution to such effect would not prejudice the rights of the auction purchaser, as the principle 'Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit\"\" (an act of the Court shall prejudice no man), would be squarely attracted in his favour in line with the principle of protection of rights of a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration. [Minority view]\n \n(e) Administration of justice---\n \n----Courts while proceeding with any lis, had to clear their mind from any predetermined notions and had to examine the case of the parties before it in a fair and equitable manner, giving due consideration to the case of all the litigating parties by placing it in juxtaposition and evaluating their respective claim in line with applicable law.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr. 66 & 89---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art.116---Execution of decree passed by Banking Court---Sale of debtor's property by way of public auction---Protection of rights of a bona fide purchaser of auctioned property---Scope---Recovery suit filed by the Bank against the defendant was decreed by the Banking Court to the amount of Rs.1,67,02,105.84---Bank filed execution application for recovery of decretal amount by sale of mortgaged property in question under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C.---Banking Court issued sale proclamation in consequence whereof property in question was ordered to be sold to person \"\"M\"\" being the highest bidder in the sum of Rs. 1,35,00,000---Objector/appellant, who was a stranger to the execution proceedings, filed an application under S. 151, C.P.C. wherein he offered an enhanced price of Rs. 1,55,00,000 for the property in question, however said application was dismissed by Banking Court---Subsequently objector and defendant/ debtor filed a joint application under S. 151, C.P.C. wherein price offer for property in question was increased from Rs. 1,55,00,000 to Rs.1,67,02,106 however said application was also dismissed on the basis that objector had failed to establish his right or title in respect of the property in question and also his locus standi to file the application(s) under S.151, C.P.C.---Appeal filed by objector against order of Banking Court was also dismissed by the High Court---Validity---Objector, who was a stranger to the proceedings, moved his first application under S. 151, C.P.C., wherein he did not question the legitimacy of auction of mortgaged property in favour of highest bidder (i.e. person \"\"M\"\"), but only offered a higher bid of Rs.1,55,00,000---Said application was not only time-barred but also filed by a stranger and not the debtor/defendant, and thus it was liable to be rejected outrightly on such ground alone---First application under S. 151, C.P.C. was dismissed by the Banking Court vide its order, which remained unchallenged and thus attained finality---Subsequently second application under S. 151, C.P.C., which was also time barred, was jointly filed by the debtor/defendant and objector with a better offer of Rs.16,707,106 for sale of mortgaged property in favour of objector, who did not bother to participate in the open public auction---Said application also, did not attribute any mala fide, fraud or misrepresentation of any nature on part of either Nazir of the Court, who conducted the auction proceedings in favour of highest bidder (i.e. person \"\"M\"\") , or against the Bank whose representative fully watched such proceeds to ensure its transparency and to safeguard the interest of his Bank---Only grievance agitated in the second application was that the mortgaged property so sold through court auction, could have earned more (money) and for such reason, the court should accept their offer---Second application under S. 151, C.P.C. was similar to the first application and thus was also barred on the principle of constrictive res judicata as the first application was already dismissed by the executing/Banking Court, which order admittedly remained unchallenged--- Judgment debtor/defendant and objector did not even bother to file any application for condonation of delay in filing their applications under S. 151, C.P.C., despite being aware of the auction proceedings---Judgment debtor/defendant and objector were not at all objecting to the auction of mortgaged property in favour of person \"\"M\"\" in the sum of Rs.1,35,00,000 on any factual or legal ground having nexus to any irregularity or fraud; instead they simply wanted to buy back the mortgaged property at a higher price---Mere increased offer made by some stranger after more than one month and fifteen days to the fall of hammer during auction proceedings could not be accepted by the Executing Court as a valid ground for setting aside a valid sale through open auction with intervention of the court, unless the proceedings of auction were shown to be collusive, fraudulent or lacking transparency---Even some mutual understanding, consent or compromise between the decree holder and the debtor or any third party would not affect the rights of the auction purchaser, which the court was bound to honour and protect in order to maintain the sanctity of such transaction---Under O. XXI, R. 66, C.P.C. it was not a mandatory requirement that each proclamation of sale must contain the \"\"reserve price\"\" of the mortgaged property under sale---Adherence to any technical procedure prescribed under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 could not be enforced merely to defeat the process of sale of mortgaged property under S. 19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---By virtue of O. XXI, R. 89, C.P.C. where the property was under-valued for the purpose of sale or sold at a lesser price than its market value or otherwise, the debtor or any other person holding interest in the property could get rid of such sale and retrieve the property from the purchaser upon further payment of five per cent of the sale price to the purchaser, and payment of decretal sum to the decree holder, while in the present case neither the debtor nor any other person came forward to avail such opportunity in time---However, later on the debtor came forward after more than four months to offer more money than the auction sale price of Rs.1,35,00,000---All such facts reaffirmed that there was no irregularity or fraud what to speak of any other legal impediment, which could justify striking down a confirmed sale through court in favour of person \"\"M\"\"--- Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly and impugned order of High Court was maintained. [Minority view].\n \n Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. v. A.B.P.L. PLD 1987 SC 512; Narsing Das v. Mangal Dubey [(1883) 5 All 163]; Saadatmand Khan v. Phul Kaur [ILR 20 All. 412 (P.C.)]; Md. Said Khan v. Md. Abdus Sami AIR 1932 All 664; Dwarka Dass v. Bhawani Prasad and others AIR 1960 Allahabad 510; Ghulam Abbas v. Zohra Bibi PLD 1972 SC 337; Asma Zafarul Hassan v. United Bank Ltd. 1981 SCMR 108; Rashad Ehsan v. Bashir Ahmad PLD 1989 SC 146; Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Zakraia Ghani PLD 2005 SC 819 and Mumtaz ud Din Feroze v. Iftikhar Adil PLD 2009 SC 207 ref.\n \n(g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, R. 66---Sale of debtor's property by way of public auction---\"\"Reserve price\"\" of mortgaged property under sale---Under O.XXI, R. 66, C.P.C. it was not a mandatory requirement that each proclamation of sale must contain the \"\"reserve price\"\" of the mortgaged property under sale. [Minority view]\n \n(h) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R. 66---Execution of decree passed by Banking Court---Sale of mortgaged property by way of public auction---Applicability of Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Scope---Adherence to any technical procedure prescribed under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 could not be enforced merely to defeat the process of sale of mortgaged property under S. 19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Section 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 gave vast discretion to the Executing/Banking Court as regards procedure to be followed by it, thus Banking Court could not be compelled to adhere to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for issuing proclamation for sale of mortgaged property through public auction. [Minority view]\n \n(i) Pleadings---\n \n----Fraud, misrepresentation, collusion or mala fide--- Proof---Elementary principle of pleadings was that where allegations of fraud misrepresentation, collusion or mala fide were attributed, necessary particulars and details in such context were to be unfolded in the application/pleadings, and any bald or vague statement to such effect was of no legal consequence.\n \n(j) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, R. 66---Execution of decree---Sale of debtor's property by way of public auction---Property, nature of---Scope---Process of public auction in terms of O. XXI, R. 66, C.P.C. was not merely confined to the sale of immoveable properties, but it also included sale of any other property, which might not be an immovable property. [Minority view]\n \n(k) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Nothing could be added or read in a provision of law which was not provided therein by the legislature.\n \n(l) Limitation---\n \n----Delay in availing remedy---Condonation of delay---Scope---Invoking of remedy by some aggrieved party beyond the prescribed period of limitation created valuable legal rights in favour of the opposite party, therefore, in such cases delay of each day was to be explained by the defaulting party to the satisfaction of the court, which could not be condoned lightly or as of routine, as such arbitrary exercise of discretion would cause serious prejudice to the interest of the opposite party.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "(On appeal against the judgment dated 20-11-2002 passed by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi in Ist Appeal No.31 of 2002.)",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, TARIQ PARVEZ AND EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs LANVIN TRADERS, Karachi High Court\nvs\nPRESIDING OFFICER, BANKING COURT NO.2, Karachi High Court and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12269",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2136 = 2013 SLD 2136 = 2013 CLD 1637",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss. 15-A & 15-E---Insider trading---Person who was the Chief Executive Officer of company, was also a member of Board of Directors of a Corporation---Said person was authorized to operate the trading account on behalf of the company and by virtue of his position at both the enterprises the company and Corporation were in possession of material information regarding the financial and operation condition of the Corporation---Open ended decision taken by Board of Directors of the company to sell shares of Corporation for portfolio reallocation, could not substitute the sale of shares by the company, just prior to announcement of financial results---Said person fell under the definition of 'Insider' as he was serving as Chief Executive of the company and non-executive Director of the Corporation---Directors of any company, were first source of insider information, however, the person in possession of insider and confidential information, must take proper care and caution, so that confidentiality was neither compromised, nor breached---Person in possession of inside information would hold that information as a trust---In the present case, it was evident that being on the Board of Directors of the Corporation, said person was directly privy to the inside information regarding worsening operational condition as well as weakening financial position of the Corporation---Considering the financial position of the Corporation the company sold shares of the Corporation aggressively---Three components of S.15 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 i.e. insider, inside information and inside trading were established to be present in the case---Said person was the insider, determining financial and operating position of the Corporation, and financial result, was inside information, and selling of shares of the Corporation by the company on basis of insider information just days before the announcement of financial result of the Corporation, constituted inside trading---Said person was privy to the inside information by virtue of his position at the Corporation, disclosed inside information to the company on the basis of which company sold the shares of the corporation; before dissemination of material non-public information---Contravention of S.15-A(1) of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, stood established against the company--- Commission, in exercise of powers under S.15-E of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, directed the company to deposit a fine of Rupees Two Million only, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.Misc/MSW/SMD/1(05) 2004/1635 dated 6-11-2012, decision dated: 19-04-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSRD)",
    "": "CYAN LIMITED THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICIn the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12270",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2137 = 2013 SLD 2137 = 2013 CLD 1661",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 3, 17 & 22--- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.47---Suit for recovery of loan---Grant of costs of funds---Cost of funds in the decree were allowed under Ss. 3 & 17 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Determination of cost of funds by the Executing Court---Executing Court granted cost of funds from the date of institution of suit---Bank had impugned the order of the Banking Court whereby the cost of funds had been determined from the date of institution of the suit and not from the date of default till realization of amount, as claimed by the Bank---Contentions of the Bank were that under Ss. 3 & 17 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the Bank was entitled to the grant of cost of funds from the date of default till its realization and not from the date of institution of suit and that the date of default was to be considered as the date beyond which the mark-up was not allowed by the Banking Court---Respondents contended that the cost of funds could only be recovered from the respondents from the date of institution of suit and that no date of default was determined by the Banking Court while passing the decree---Validity---Under the provisions of Ss.3 & 17 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the customer was liable to pay cost of funds from the date of default till realization of the cost of funds as certified by the State Bank of Pakistan---Banking Court while passing the decree in favour of the Bank had granted cost of funds under Ss. 3 & 17 of the Ordinance---Although specific date of default was not mentioned in the decree, however, the date of default was defined in a manner that the claim of the Bank of an amount of mark-up charged after the date of default was declined by the Banking Court while passing the decree---Banking Court was mindful of the date of default at the time of passing the decree, after which date no mark-up was allowed to the Bank---Statement of account showed the relevant date of default beyond which the mark-up was not allowed in the decree by the Banking Court, and this date was to be taken as the date of default for the purposes of S.3 of the Ordinance---Argument of the respondents that cost of funds should be from the date of institution of suit was not tenable for two reasons, firstly, that under S.3 of the Ordinance, the cost of funds were to be granted from the date of default, and secondly, that the date of default was already determined in the decree---Executing Court could determine the date of default under S. 47, C.P.C., if no such date was defined in the decree but, in the present case, date of default was defined and could be ascertained from the decree---Impugned order was not sustainable in view of the settled principle of law that an Executing Court could not go behind the decree and was obliged to execute the decree as it was---Impugned order of the Banking Court was set aside and the appeal was allowed by the High Court, in the circumstances.\n \n Habib Bank Limited v. Tauqeer Ahmed Siddiqui and another 2009 CLD 312; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited v. Northern Polyethylene Limited and others 2006 CLD 565; Bank of Punjab through Authorized Officer v. Messrs KNK Infrastructure (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive Officer and 2 others 2012 CLD 961; Messrs Emen Textile through Sole Proprietor and another v. Habib Bank Limited 2010 CLC 547; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Pakistan Belting (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 5 others 2006 CLD 808; Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited through Branch Manager v. Hassan Aftab Fatiana 2009 CLD 36 and Crescent Commercial Bank Now Samba Bank Ltd. v. Genertech Pakistan Ltd. 2011 CLD 37 ref.\n \n Zahid Industries v. Habib Bank 2007 CLD 618; Muhammad Ali v. Zakir Hussain PLD 2005 Lah. 331; Ayesha Bibi v. National Logistic Cell 2002 CLC 747; Hassan Masood Malik v. Additional District Judge and others 1994 MLD 1877 and Messrs Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. v. KF Development Corporation Ltd. 2004 CLC 671 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 3 & 17---Cost of funds---Grant of---Under the provisions of Ss.3 & 17 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the customer was liable to pay cost of funds from the date of default till realization of, the cost of funds as certified by the State Bank of Pakistan.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 47---Powers of Executing Court---Date of default, determination of---Executing Court could determine the date of default under S.47, C.P.C. if no such date was defined in the decree by the Court.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 47---Execution of decree---Executing Court cannot go behind the decree and is obliged to execute the decree as it is---Principle.\n \n Zahid Industries v. Habib Bank 2007 CLD 618; Muhammad Ali v. Zakir Hussain PLD 2005 Lah. 331; Ayesha Bibi v. National Logistic Cell 2002 CLC 747; Hassan Masood Malik v. Additional District Judge and others 1994 MLD 1877 and Messrs Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. v. KF Development Corporation Ltd. 2004 CLC 671 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.449 of 2011, heard on 7-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. AYESHA A. MALIK AND ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED through Authorized Attorneys\nvs\nPAK POLY PRODUCTS (PVT.) LTD. and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12271",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2138 = 2013 SLD 2138 = 2013 CLD 1667",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXI, R. 89---Execution of decree---Application for setting aside of order of sale of mortgaged property through auction---Applicant's plea that property had been sold at a low price---Validity---Property sold through auction would never fetch market value---Inadequacy of sale price in court sale would not be a valid ground for setting aside such sale---Such application was dismissed---Principles.\n \n It is very well-known to a person of ordinary prudence that a property sold through auction will not fetch the market value and will always be sold for a price below the market value.\n \n Mere inadequacy of sale price in court sale is no valid ground for setting aside the sale. A buyer is always reluctant to purchase a property in court sale as it involves litigation; it is time consuming and has the element of uncertainty. The court sales do not fetch market price for the reason and sale through auction cannot be set aside on this score alone.\n \n Mumtaz-ud-Din Feroz v. Sheikh Iftikhar Adil and others 2009 CLD 594 ref.\n \n East Yarn Trading Company and others v. United Bank Limited and others 2007 CLD 1555 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, R. 94---Execution proceedings---Sale of property through auction, confirmation of---Validity---Ownership right in property would be deemed to have vested in auction purchaser once such sale was confirmed by court. \n \n Muhammad Attique v. Jami Limited and others PLD 2010 SC 993 rel.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional petition in matters wherein High Court having ultimate appellate or revisional powers under relevant statute---Scope stated.\n \n In matters, where the High Court itself is the repository of the ultimate appellate, revisional or referral power conferred by the relevant statute, it is in the rarest of cases that the High Court may be persuaded to entertain a constitutional petition and to enforce the constitutional remedy in preference to its own appellate, revisional or referral dispensation arising in course of time. \n \n Khalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore 1999 SCMR 1881 Mir Zaman v. Mst. Sheda and others 2000 SCMR 1699 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-1010 of 2012, decision dated: 15-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND SADIQ HUSSAIN BHATTI, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RAFIQ through Attorney\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12272",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2139 = 2013 SLD 2139 = 2013 CLD 1684",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 15 & 23---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.52---Sale of mortgaged property---Principle of lis pendens---- Applicability--- Bona fide purchaser---Scope---Suit for recovery was decreed whereafter during execution proceedings, the appellants made application to the effect that they were bona fide purchasers of the suit property and were not aware of the decree---Contention of the appellants was that when they had purchased the mortgaged property they had taken all precautions before the purchase and had no knowledge of the decree and there was no mention in the record of rights of any charge created over the property by the Bank , and therefore, the said property could not be cast away for satisfaction of the decree---Appellants had purchased the mortgaged property three months after the passing of the decree---Under S.23 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, a suit was automatically converted into an execution application and no formal application was required to be made by the Bank---Appellants had purchased the suit property at a rate less than the one paid by the previous purchaser, and therefore, purchase did not seem to be bona fide---Principle of lis pendens, in the present case, defeated the right of the appellants---Appeal was dismissed.\n \n Khalid Adeeb Khanam v. Messrs Prudential Investment Bank Ltd. and others 2002 CLD 451 and Risaldar Ghazi Khan and another v. Abdur Rehman and another 1984 CLC 1615 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.133 of 2010, heard on 5-03-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ AHMAD AND AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN and another\nvs\nJUDGE BANKING COURT NO.1 MULTAN and 3 others\n Risaldar Ghazi Khan and another v. Abdur Rehman and another 1984 CLC 1615 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12273",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2140 = 2013 SLD 2140 = 2013 CLD 1677",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 129 & 130(2)---Securities and Exchange Commission (Insurance) Rules, 2002, R.35--- Fire Insurance Cover Note, cancellation of---Respondent (insured a Mill) entered into a contract with Insurance Company for obtaining Fire Insurance Cover Note for period of three months starting from 14-10-2009 subject to payment of premium amount---Cheque sent by the Mill regarding payment of premium amount on 25-10-2009, was not received by the Insurance Company and was returned intimating the Mill that as Mill failed to pay amount of premium at the very date of taking the delivery of Fire Insurance Note on 14-10-2009, said Insurance Cover Note stood cancelled automatically---Complaint filed for said cancellation by the Mill, having been accepted by the Insurance Ombudsman, the Insurance Company had filed appeal under S.130(2) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000---Fire Insurance Cover Note, which carried no premium payment date was cancelled on 23-10-2009, only 9 days from issuance of said Fire Insurance Cover Note, without any prior notice to the Mill---Insurance company or its agent did not make any prior advice to the Mill to the effect that the premium must be paid within such period---Law did not support the view that an Insurance company must insist on immediate payment of the premium in order to award of Insurance Cover---Impugned order passed by the Insurance Ombudsman, which could not be differed, was upheld---Insurance company was directed to treat the Cover Note as quite valid as if it had not been cancelled, and was binding to be honoured, in circumstances---Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.8 of 2012, heard on 29-01-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "TARIQ HUSSAIN, DIRECTOR",
    "": "Messrs THE CRESCENT STAR INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED\nvs\nMessrs SULTANABAD MODEL GINNING, PRESSING FACTORY AND OIL MILLS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12274",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQRlNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2141 = 2013 SLD 2141 = 2013 CLD 1687",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-------Ss. 18 & 15---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Eviction of tenant---Change of ownership---Default in payment of rent to new landlord---Present landlord claimed that he had purchased suit property from a company (former landlord) vide a conveyance deed dated 13-2-1997, whereafter he sent a notice to the tenant under S. 18 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 requesting the tenant to pay the rent to him at the previous rate with effect from March 1997---Tenant contended that former landlord, which was a company, was officially dissolved on 4-12-1982, so how could the present landlord obtain conveyance deed from a dissolved company on 13-2-1997; that under S.5 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 only a living person, which included a company, could transfer property, and since in the present case suit property was transferred through a conveyance deed after dissolution of former landlord company, the conveyance deed was a void document---Rent Controller decided in favour of the present landlord and directed the tenant to vacate and hand over possession of suit property---Order of Rent Controller was upheld by First Appellate Court and High Court---Validity---Courts below took into consideration all aspects of the matter including evidence on record, registered conveyance deed, release deed, transfer order of the concerned society, mutation letter and Form P.T.I., and rightly came to the conclusion that present landlord on the basis of registered conveyance deed requested the tenant to tender future rent to him---Title of present landlord had not been questioned by any of the shareholders of the dissolved company---Till date tenant neither tendered rent to the present landlord nor deposited the same in court---Tenant had committed default in payment of rent and was liable to be ejected---Concurrent findings of courts below did not suffer from any illegality or infirmity---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Kassim and another v. S. Rahim Shah 1990 SCMR 647 rel.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 185(3)--- Petition for leave to appeal, dismissal of---Concurrent findings of courts below not suffering from any illegality or infirmity---Effect---No interference would be called for by the Supreme Court in such circumstances while exercising jurisdiction under Art.185(3) of the Constitution.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.189-K of 2013, decision dated: 13-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND GULZAR AHMED, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SYMPHONY (PVT.) LTD.\nvs\nHaji FAZAL KARIM and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12275",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2142 = 2013 SLD 2142 = 2013 CLD 1691",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 11(1)(F), 12(1)(b), 63(1) & 156--- Insurance Companies (Sound and Prudent Management) Regulations, 2012, Regln.2(2)---Failure to seek approval of the Commission before appointing Chief Executive Officer---Effect---Company and its Directors were required to seek approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission before appointing Chief Executive Officer of the company which the company and its Directors had not complied with---Default of Regln.2(2) of Insurance Companies (Sound and Prudent Management) Regulations, 2012 and Ss.11(1)(F) & 12(1)(b) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, had been established, in circumstances---Direction under S.63(1) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, and/or the penalty as provided under S.156 of said Ordinance, could be imposed on to the company and/or its Directors---Commission, however, in exercise of the power conferred on it under Ss.63(1) & 156 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, instead of directing the company to cease entering into new contracts of insurance, imposed a fine of Rs. one million only on the Director of the company for not seeking the approval of the Commission prior to appointment of Chief Executive Officer of the company---Fine of Rs.200,000 was further imposed on each of remaining six Directors of the company for not ensuring the appointment of a 'Fit and Proper' person to act as the Chief Executive Officer.\n \n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)---\n \n----Ss. 11(1)(a) & 12(1)(b)--- Insurance Companies (Sound and Prudent Management) Regulations, 2012, Regln.2(2)--- Duties of the Directors of Insurance Company---Scope---Directors, in addition to the day-to-day running of the company and the management of its business, also had some 'fiduciary' duties i.e. duties held in trust, and some wider duties imposed by statute; and breach of those statutory duties, would usually be a criminal offence, punishable by fine or imprisonment---Directors were gauged against a higher standard of accountability which required them to be vigilant and perform their duties with due care---Directors were supposed to be well aware of their legal obligations in connection with Regln.2(2) of Regulations and Ss.12(1)(b) & 11(1)(F) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice Issue DATE March, 11, 2013, decision dated: 8-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASIF ARIF, COMMISSIONER (INSURANCE)",
    "": "TAKAFUL PAKISTAN LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12276",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2143 = 2013 SLD 2143 = 2013 CLD 1701",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXXVII, Rr. 2 & 3---Institution of summary suit on negotiable instrument---Leave to defend---Principles---If the defendant had succeeded to show a plausible defence or was able to establish that there was some substantial question of fact or law, then he was entitled to the grant of leave to defend---If it seemed that the defence was vague or unsatisfactory or there was doubt as to its genuineness, even then leave should not be refused but certain conditions could be imposed---Court trying summary suit was required to see that there was bona fide allegation of triable issue which was not illusory and court need not to be satisfied that defence would succeed and it was enough that defence was verified by oath.\n \n PLD 1963 SC 163 and 1995 SCMR 925 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXXVII, Rr. 2, 3 & S.151---Institution of summary suit on negotiable instrument--- Application for exemption to furnish bank guarantee---Inherent powers of court---Plaintiff filed suit for recovery of money wherein application for permission to appear and defend the suit was moved which was accepted by the Trial Court and defendant was granted conditional leave to defend the suit by furnishing bank guarantee---Defendant filed application under S.151, C.P.C. for exemption to furnish bank guarantee which was dismissed by the Trial Court---Validity---Trial Court should have allowed the parties to adduce evidence---Defence taken by the defendant was not illusory---Condition of furnishing bank guarantee was based upon the pendency of criminal cases---Triable issue had been raised by the defendant---No sufficient ground existed for imposition of condition of furnishing bank guarantee---Appeal was accepted.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.40 of 2010, decision dated: 16-04-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "AFTAB AHMED GORAR, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD TARIQ\nvs\nMalik BASHIR-UDDIN through Attorney and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12277",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2144 = 2013 SLD 2144 = 2013 CLD 1705",
    "Key Words:": "Prudential Regulations for Consumer Financing (State Bank of Pakistan)-------Reglns. 6 & 14--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition--- Consumer financing---Auto-finance--- Termination of loan--- Consumer impugned actions of respondent Bank whereby his car finance loan was terminated a few months after the disbursement of the loan, and he was asked to pay an amount for delivery of the vehicle to the petitioner---Contention of the petitioner was that the actions of the respondent (Bank) were in violation of the Prudential Regulations for Consumer Finance issued by the State Bank of Pakistan---Validity---Termination of auto-lease was effected without notice and without the case of the petitioner incurring classification under Regln.14 of the said Prudential Regulations for Consumer Finance (State Bank of Pakistan)---Termination letter was not preceded by any notice in terms of Regln.6 of the Prudential Regulations for Consumer Finance (State Bank of Pakistan) and the specific default period of 90 days as per the said Regulations, was not attracted to the present case and the repossession of the vehicle was therefore contrary to the said Regulations---Conduct of the respondent bank also had an element of mala fide and coercion and there was a failure of the respondent Bank to confront the petitioner with his specific default and with the means to cure the same---High Court directed the State Bank of Pakistan to probe the transactions and dealing of the respondent Bank in order to determine a suitable compensation for the petitioner and to take appropriate action against the respondent Bank---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.13234 of 2006, decision dated: 30-10-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, C.J.",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RIAZ\nvs\nPRESIDENT, P.C. BANK, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12278",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2145 = 2013 SLD 2145 = 2013 CLD 1718",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2(c), 7 & 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) & O.I, R.3---Suit for recovery---Necessary party to suit for recovery---Non-impleadment of owner of mortgaged property---Effect---Suit for recovery was decreed and during execution proceedings, the applicant moved application under S.12(2), C.P.C. for setting aside decree contending inter alia that she was the owner in possession of the mortgaged property and she was never impleaded in the suit and had neither mortgaged the said property nor had obtained any finance facility---Application was dismissed by Trial Court---Validity---Bank, at time of filing of suit, was aware that the applicant was the lawful owner of the mortgaged property and the mortgaged deed in favour of bank was executed on her behalf by her alleged attorney (her husband)---In terms of the definition of \"\"customer\"\" in S.2(c) of the Ordinance, applicant was the mortgagor of the security, and therefore, she fell within the said definition of \"\"customer\"\" and was a necessary party to the suit and her non-impleading as a defendant in the suit was a gross error---Effect of such non-impleadment was that there existed neither any decree against applicant nor could her personal property be sold in execution of a decree to which she was not a party to---Nothing on record showed that it could be inferred that the agent (husband) ever communicated to the principal (applicant) about the mortgage of her property and finance facility was only for the benefit of the husband--- High Court observed that the plaintiff bank should have been more cautious about such fact before awarding the finance facility and should at least have impleaded the applicant as party to the suit---High Court set aside order of Trial Court and remanded the case to the said court with the direction to provide the applicant an opportunity to file application for leave to contest---Appeal was allowed, accordingly.\n \n Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) through Authorized Signatory v. American Express Bank Limited 2005 CLD 1764; Vesu and another v. Thekkedath Veetil Kannama and others AIR 1926 Mad. 991; Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 341 and Malik Riaz Ahmad and others v. Mian Inayat Ullah and others 1992 SCMR 1488 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.29 of 2012, decision dated: 23rd February, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL AND MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "SHEHZADA AKHTAR\nvs\nBANK ALFALAH LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12279",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2146 = 2013 SLD 2146 = 2013 CLD 1725",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 76(1) & 95--- Misleading or defective advertise-ment---Bank, being a corporate agent of the Insurance Company, attempted to market three product of the company i.e. Wedding Plan, Retirement Plan, and Education Plan, through advertisement, but name of the Company was not printed anywhere in the said advertisement---Advertisement did not suggest any role of the company---Advertisement, in circumstances, was defective/misleading for the public at large---Insurance Company for which 'Bank' was acting as an agent, was required to ensure that its advertisement should not contain any deceptive or misleading information---Directors of the company, in addition to the day-to-day running of the company, and the management of its business, also had some 'fiduciary' duties i.e. duties held in trust and some wider duties imposed by statute; and breach of those statutory duties would usually be a criminal offence, punishable by fine or imprisonment---Directors were gauged against a higher standard of accountability which required them to be vigilant and perform their duties with due care---Directors of the company had failed to perform their duties with due care and prudence---Commission, in exercise of the power conferred under S.156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, imposed on the company a fine of Rs.800,000 and a fine of Rs.200,000 on the Chief Executive Officer of the company---Company and its management were also directed to take necessary measures for properly educating their agents in respect of all the applicable laws that were relevant to arrangement of agency, and that the company and its management should avoid publication/ disclosure of any misleading and/or deceptive information, either by the company itself or by any of its agents as required by S.76(1) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice Issue DATE January 2, 2013, decision dated: 26-02-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "TARIQ HUSSAIN, DIRECTOR",
    "": "PAK QATAR FAMILY TAKAFUL LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12280",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2147 = 2013 SLD 2147 = 2013 CLD 2087",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-------Ss. 43 & 77---Suit for trademark/trade-name/passing off/copyright, infringement of---Facts essential to give rise to a cause of action to plaintiff stated.\n \n In a case where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant has infringed his trademark, copyright or trade name, it is to be gauged as to whether or not the products of the plaintiff and the defendant are identical or to what extent they are similar in size, shape, colour/colour scheme, texture, packing, presentation or appearance, so as to deceive the customer/consumer to purchase/use the product of the defendant without any hesitation or doubt in his mind, under the impression that he has purchased/used the product of the plaintiff. It is no necessary that the defendant's product should have all the above characteristics to look similar or identical to the product of the plaintiff; any one or some of them may be sufficient in some cases to create such a situation. If the customer/consumer gets deceived or becomes doubtful or confused after looking at or comparing the products of the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff will be justified in bringing an action against the defendant. It is not necessary that the deception or confusion was caused by the defendant deliberately or intentionally, and even unintentional deception and confusion in such cases would give rise to a cause of action to the plaintiff as the main element is the deception and/or confusion, and not the intention of the person responsible for the deception and/or confusion. The above aspect becomes more important and applicable when the plaintiff and defendant are operating and carrying on business in the same area/field, the nature of their business is the same or similar, and the operations and business of the plaintiff were prior in time to those of the defendant.\n \n Messrs Mehran Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Messrs Chiltan Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Limited and others 2001 SCMR 967; Messrs Tabaq Restaurant v. Messrs Tabaq Restaurant 1987 SCMR 1090; Jamia Industries Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Pak) Ltd. and another PLD 1984 SC 8; Glaxo Laboratories Ltd., England v. Assistant Registrar, Trade Marks, Karachi and another PLD 1977 Kar. 858; Messrs Zenith Laboratory (Pak.) Ltd. v. Messrs British Drug Houses Ltd., England and another PLD 1970 Dacca 772; Pakistan Battery Manufacturing Co., Karachi v. Muhammad Hussain and 3 others PLD 1970 Kar. 92; Bandenawaz Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Karachi and another PLD 1967 Kar. 492; New Light Chemical Industries v. Registrar of Trade Marks and another PLD 1963 Dacca 75; Messrs Al-Anis Laboratories through its 4 Partners v. Messrs Al-Chemist and another 1987 MLD 2823; Muhammad Rafiq v. Muhammad Ali 1986 CLC 2621; Bashir Ahmad v. Registered Firm Hafiz Habibur Rehman and another 1980 CLC 1268; Messrs Muhammad Bakhsh and Sons Ltd. and another v. Azhar Wali Muhammad and 11 others 1986 MLD 1870 and Messrs ADT Services AG through Attorney and another v. Messrs ADT Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. through Promoter and Director and 4 others 2005 CLD 1546 ref.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 43 & 77---Infringement of trademark/trade-name/ passing off/copyright--- Steps to minimize possibility of infringement stated.\n \n When a person, firm or company decides to start the business in a particular name and style or with a particular trademark or copyright, he/they are duty bound to ascertain and ensure that the name and style or the trademark or copyright which they intent to use, was not being used by any other entity. If such caution is not exercised and any infringement and/or passing off is caused, the entire responsibility as to the consequences shall rest on the person/entity, who uses the same or similar name and style, trademark or copyright that was already in the use of or was already owned by the other entity.\n \n(c) Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 43 & 77---Infringement of trademark/trade-name/ passing off/copyright---Consequences/impact stated.\n \n In the case of infringement or passing off, the person indulged in or responsible for the infringement or passing off not only commits illegal acts, but he also commits moral and ethical wrongs. He deceives and cheats the unguarded public at large; he deceives and cheats the person whose trademark/copyright/trade name/company name is infringed or whose business or goods are involved in passing off; he causes loss to the business, reputation and goodwill of such person through his illegal acts of infringement, passing off and unfair competition; and he also violates the law.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 727 of 2008, decision dated: 27-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "BAYER AG. through Authorized Signatory and another--Plaintiffs\nvs\nBAYHEALTH CARE (PRIVATE) LIMITED through Chief Executive Director, Company Secretary and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12281",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2148 = 2013 SLD 2148 = 2013 CLD 1796",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2---Limitation Act (IX of 1908) S.5 & Art. 159----Money Suit---Application for leave to appear and defend suit---Limitation---Suit for recovery of money was decreed ex parte against the defendant after she failed to file application for leave to appear and defend the suit within the stipulated period of limitation---Contention of the defendant was that ex parte order against her be recalled, as delay in her filing of application for leave to defend was due to illness and such delay ought to have been condoned---Validity---Service of summons on the defendant was effected on 20-1-2010 and prescribed period of limitation of ten days for filing of application for leave to appear and defend commenced with effect from 21-1-2010---Service effected through any one mode had to be considered as good service--- Application for condonation of delay was based on a vague statement and specific dates during which she was confined to bed, and date of her recovery, were not disclosed in the said application---Delay of each and every day, therefore, was not explained by the defendant---When a defendant failed to appear or failed to obtain leave to defend in response to a summons served or where the court refused to grant leave, allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree---No illegality, therefore, existed in the impugned order---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n Messrs Ahmed Autos and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 1990 SC 497; Messrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353; Shahid Pervaiz alias Shahid Hameed v. Muhammad Ahmad Ameen 2006 SCMR 631; Haji Ali Khan and Company, Abbottabad and 8 others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Abbottabad PLD 1995 SC 362; Naeem Iqbal v. Mst. Zarina 1996 SCMR 1530 and Col. (Retd.) Ashfaq Ahmed and others v. Sh. Muhammad Wasim 1999 SCMR 2832 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Civil Appeal No.13 of 2010, decision dated: 10-09-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "Mst. SHAHMIR\nvs\nGHULAM HYDER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12282",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2149 = 2013 SLD 2149 = 2013 CLD 1802",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of amount for loss suffered by customer due to delayed encashment of his US Dollars by Bank and difference of its conversion rate on relevant dates---Subsequent suit for recovery of finance by Bank against customer---Filing of leave applications by both parties in suit filed against each other---Banking Court dismissed customer's leave application and decreed Bank's suit, while dismissed customer's suit---Validity---Findings of Banking Court were erroneous to the effect that customer had failed to substantiate his objections to statement of accounts filed by Bank and competence of its attorney to institute subsequent suit---Banking Court had accepted Bank's leave application by observing that questions raised therein would require determination on basis of evidence---When there were triable issues in one suit as per such observations of Banking Court, then same would hold true for other suit---Banking Court had erred in law by dismissing customer's suit---High Court set aside impugned and decree and remanded case to Banking Court for its decision afresh while deeming customer's leave application as pending.\n \n Messrs Ali Match Industries Ltd. and 3 others v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 1997 SCMR 943; Faisal Bank Limited v. Badin Board Mills and 6 others 2010 CLD 442; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Ilyas Enterprises through Proprietor Mr. Ilyas Malik and 2 others 2004 CLD 1338; Messrs Ittefaq Industries (Regd.) through Managing Partner and 2 others v. Bank of Punjab through Duly Constituted Attorney 2004 CLD 1356; United Bank Limited v. Tanvir Khalid 2003 CLD 291; Muhammad Ramzan and 4 others v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2004 CLD 1376 and Messrs Al-Kashmir Traders and 6 others v. United Bank Limited through Muhammad Jarar 2005 CLD 1116 ref.\n \n Appollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 268 and Habib Bank Ltd. (Foreign Exchange Branch) v. Dost Muhammad Cotton Mills Ltd. and others PLD 1997 Kar. 331 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.231 of 2007, heard on 21st May, 2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAUF AHMAD SHEIKH AND MAMOON RASHID SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "SHAHBAZ A. KHOKHAR\nvs\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12283",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2150 = 2013 SLD 2150 = 2013 CLD 1820",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 27---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLVII, R.1, Ss.153 & 114---Review of ---Scope---Amendment of ---Aggrieved party, on account of some mistake or error, apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, might apply for review of the to the court, which had passed the decree or made the order---Law has placed an embargo on the 'aggrieved person' to the effect that he could only file an application for revival if no appeal was provided from the order sought to be reviewed or if appeal was provided but no appeal had been preferred.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Arts. 199 & 189---Constitutional petition---Scope---Order/ which has been upheld by the Supreme Court and has attained finality could not be interfered.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XLVII, R.1 & S.114--- Review of ---When appeal was filed by the party challenging the order, then no application for review could be entertained against the said order.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.119 of 2011, decision dated: 5-03-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND SADIQ HUSSAIN BHATTI, J",
    "": "MAZHAR BUTT\nvs\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12284",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2151 = 2013 SLD 2151 = 2013 CLD 1867",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Suit by borrower against financial institution---Leave to appear and defend the suit--- Substantial question of fact and law---Scope---Plaintiff availed finance facility from House Building Finance Corporation and matter was finally settled in Supreme Court in terms of calculating liability---Official Assignee was appointed to calculate liability---Plaintiff filed the suit disputing markup/interest and also claimed recovery of excess amount paid to House Building Finance Corporation and also claimed liquidated damages and general damages which could not be adjudicated through a snap decision---Validity---Was necessary to see whether Official Assignee rightly calculated outstanding liability in terms of settlement reached before Supreme Court and to be adjudicated whether plaintiff was liable to pay markup/profit up to the date of taking over the possession by the Corporation or it was continuing right to claim markup/profit on last calculation made by Official Assignee up to 1-12-2006---Even defendant in leave to defend showed calculation up to 30-4-2009, payable by plaintiff which was on and on---In order to resolve such controversy including the claim of damages and excess amount an opportunity needed to be provided to parties for leading evidence so that bone of contention might be decided---Defendant in its leave to defend application had raised substantial question of law and fact hence, deserved unconditional leave to defend---High Court directed Official Assignee to submit latest report in court with up to date calculation of dues if any---Application was allowed accordingly.\n \n Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry Advocate v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1992 FSC 501; PLD 2000 SC 716; State Bank of Pakistan through Governor and another v. Imtiaz Ali Khan and others 2012 SCMR 280; Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd. and 7 others v. National Bank of Pakistan and another 2003 CLD 326; Messrs Nishat Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 2009 CLD 1215; HBFC v. Muhammad Sharif PLD 2000 SC 760; Messrs Shaz Packages and 3 others v. Messrs Bank Al-Falah Ltd. 2011 CLD 790 and Soneri Bank Ltd. v. Classic Denim Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. 2011 CLD 408 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-66 of 2009, decision dated: 9-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J",
    "": "Messrs BRECAST INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Director/Chief Executive Officer--Plaintiff\nvs\nHOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION through Managing Director--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12285",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2152 = 2013 SLD 2152 = 2013 CLD 1922",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 15(12)---Sale of mortgage property---Scope---Borrower is required in terms of S.15(12) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, to show a positive evidence that all amounts secured by mortgaged property have been paid.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----When an act is required to be done in a particular way, it has to be performed in the manner provided under law---If an act provided to be performed in a particular way is followed by some consequence, then it no more remains mere procedural requirement but assumes mandatory requirement.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 15(2) & (4)---Sale of mortgage property---Scope---Assumption of power under S.15(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, is of such nature that it takes away certain valuable rights of borrower/mortgagor and hence compliance of provisions of S.15(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, becomes mandatory.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 15 & 22--- Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.129(f)--- Sale of mortgage property without intervention of court---Statutory notices, requirement of---Loss of courier receipts---Presumption---Borrower assailed sale of mortgage property on the plea that notices under S.15(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, were not issued--- Validity--- Bank should have been more vigilant in retaining receipt of such courier company through which second disputed notice was sent, more particularly when assumption of powers under S.15(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 depended on fulfilment of S.15(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Loss of such receipt could only yield to establish a presumption which was contrary to the presumption drawn by Single Judge of High Court---Bank did not present postal receipt or courier receipt to enable the court to apply Art. 129 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 to presume that such letter was posted---Presumption drawn on assumption and hypothesis and that too in respect of special law i.e. Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the provisions of which were mandatory and any departure from such mode would render all subsequent event nullity---Prima facie question of second and third notices were not established at least at interlocutory stage, therefore, powers under S.15(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, were not passed on to bank and hence not available to the bank to proceed in terms thereof---Division Bench of High Court in Special High Court Appeal set aside order passed by the Single Judge and auction of property under consideration was uncalled for---Appeal was allowed.\n \n Izhar Alam Farooqi v. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi 2008 SCMR 240; Mst. Shamim Akhtar v. Muhammad Riaz 2008 CLD 186; Haji Muhammad Yaqoob Akhtar v. Habib Bank Ltd. 2009 CLD 1699; Iftikhar Ahmed v. My Bank Ltd. through President 2009 CLD 374; Shakoor Hussain v. Muhammad Sadiq 1991 MLD 67; Amin Khan v. University of Sindh PLD 1968 Kar. 899; Messrs Waqas Electronics and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and others 1999 SCMR 85; Ghulam Rasool and others v. Sardarul Hassan and another 1997 SCMR 976; Muslim Commercial Bank Limited and another v. Aamir Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 464; S.M. Zahir v. Pirzada Fazal Ali Ajmari 1974 SCMR 490; E.A. Evans v. Muhammad Ashraf PLD 1964 SC 536; Anjum Hayat Mirza v. Rehmat Khan 1996 SCMR 1230; Fakhar Mahmood Gillani v. Abdul Ghafoor 1995 SCMR 96; Messrs M.A. Khan and Company v. Messrs Pakistan Railway Employees Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. 1996 CLC 45; PLD 1997 Kar. 37; Syed Riazul Hassan v. Zamirul Haque 1983 CLC 2274; Mrs. Parveen Chaodhry v. VIth Senior Civil Judge, Karachi and another PLD 1976 Kar. 416 and Shankareppa v. Shivarudrappa AIR 1963 Mysore 115 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No.98 of 2012, decision dated: 7-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, J",
    "": "IRFAN NAWAB through Attorney\nvs\nSONERI BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12286",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2153 = 2013 SLD 2153 = 2013 CLD 1965",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------S. 42---Non-Banking Finance Companies and Notified Entities Regulations, 2008, Regls. 54(4), 57 & 66---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss. 10 & 33---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S. 282-J---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9 & O.VII, Rr. 10 & 11---Suit for declaration, recovery of money and damages---Non-payment of redemption money of Units of Reliance Income Fund purchased by plaintiff from defendant-company---Defendant's application under O.VII, Rr. 10 & 11, C.P.C. for rejection or return of plaint for want of jurisdiction as such dispute pertaining to \"\"Mutual Funds\"\" and its redemption could be decided only by Securities and Exchange Commission; and that plaintiff had failed to avail remedy of appeal under S.33 of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997---Validity---Executive Director of the Commission through his letter in response to plaintiff's complaint had advised him to approach appropriate forum for resolution of such dispute---Director had neither granted any relief to plaintiff nor issued him show-cause notice nor passed any order---Such letter had not decided any rights of parties, thus, same could not be treated as an order, rather same would be treated as an advisory or administrative direction, not appealable under S.33 of Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1997---Civil Court had jurisdiction to try all suits, except those barred expressly or impliedly---No specific bar existed in Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1997 on filing of present suit, thus same was maintainable--- Application under O.VII, Rr.10 & 11, C.P.C. was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan v. Mian Nisar Elahi 2009 SCMR 1392; National Accountability Bureau v. Zahida Sattar PLD 2001 Kar. 256; Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal PLD 1969 SC 187; Fouzia Begum v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad 2009 CLD 1537; Mst. Zahida Sattar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2002 SC 408; M. Waqar Monnoo, Member Central Managing Committee v. All Pakistan Textile Mills Association through C.E.O. 2003 CLD 1185; Qayyum Nawaz Khan v. Regional Manager, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, Dera Ismail Khan PLD 1997 Pesh. 72; Abbasia Cooperative Bank (Now Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank Ltd.) v. Hakeem Hafiz Muhammad Ghaus PLD 1997 SC 3; Amin Cotton Company v. Karachi Cotton Association Ltd. PLD 1968 Kar. 797; Shah Muhammad v. Mst. Resham Bibi 1986 CLC 2561; Collectorate of Central Excise Karachi v. Syed Muzakkar Hussain 2006 PTD 219; Attaullah v. Sanaullah PLD 2009 Kar. 38; Black's Law Dictionary; Judicial Dictionary by K.J. Aiyar 13th Edition; Deedar Hussain Jakhrani v. Federation of Pakistan 2011 PLC (C.S.) 203 and Sabir Hussain v. Board of Trustees Karachi 2010 YLR 3313 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----Ss. 94, 151, O.XXXIX, Rr. 1, 2 & O.XL, R.1---Inherent jurisdiction of Civil Court---Extent---Temporary injunction, grant of---Receiver, appointment of---Scope.\n \n Where there are compelling reasons and interest of justice requires or demands, the courts are neither helpless nor are they fettered by the specific provisions of Order XXXIX or Order XL, C.P.C., and in exercise of their inherent jurisdiction will certainly grant relief by way of temporary injunction or through appointment of a Receiver to protect the rights of citizens. It is not possible and prudent to specify or identify the various situations or reasons where or when the courts will exercise their inherent powers under S.94 or S.151, C.P.C. for granting a temporary injunction or appointing a Receiver. In each case, the court evaluates the overall situation considering the peculiar facts and circumstances on record and then the decision is taken whether in the interest of justice inherent powers are to be exercised or not. Each case has its own different set of facts and again and again new situations come before the court and, therefore, it is not possible to lay down specific principles restricting the power of courts to exercise their inherent jurisdiction in certain specified situations or for certain reasons only. If this were done, it would only impede the administration of justice and restrict the development of law.\n \n Under Clause (e) of S.94, C.P.C., in order to prevent ends of justice from being defeated, court may, if it is so prescribed, make an interlocutory order as may appear to the court to be just and convenient. Passing of an interim order is on the part of working of judicial system and no separate or specific provision is necessary to empower a court to issue interim order. The power to grant interim relief vests in a court as a necessary corollary to the power to grant main relief. Not only under O.XXXIX, Rr. 1, & 2, C.P.C. injunction can also be granted under Ss.94 & 151, C.P.C.\n \n Ali Muhammad Brohi v. Haji Muhammad Hashim PLD 1983 Kar. 527 ref.\n \n Mst. Salma Jawaid v. S.M. Arshad PLD 1983 Kar. 303 and Sayyid Yousuf Husain Shirzai v. Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority 2010 MLD 1267 rel.\n \n(c) Non-Banking Finance Companies and Notified Entities Regulations, 2008---\n \n----Regls. 54, 57 & 66--- Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.10---Non-redemption of Units at Net Asset Value by Non-Banking Finance Company within statutory period of six days of request for redemption made by Unit-Holder---Consequences stated.\n \n The redemption request has to be honoured within six days. If NBFC will operate their affairs in such a way and fail to comply with the specific regulations to honour and redeem the units within a specific period of time, there will be serious chaos and turmoil and the confidence reposed by the public-at-large on the financial institutions/Non-Banking Finance Companies will be shattered, their rights will be seriously prejudiced and their money will be on stake. Once redemption request is made, it is the responsibility of NBFC to honour the same without any delay or excuse. It does not sound good and logical that a person who has purchased units from NBFC on the hopes that he will have reasonable profit and returns/growth on his investment or funds, has to face serious hardship and problems to get back his own money on actual Net Assets Value (NAV) prevailing on the date of lodging his request, but has to wait for a long time for the redemption at the will and leisure of the NBFC, which is totally against the spirit of regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997, which infact notified the regulations to safeguard and protect the rights and interest of unit holders.\n \n(d) Words and phrases---\n \n----\"\"Order\"\", meaning of.\n \nBlack's Law Dictionary; Judicial Dictionary by K.J. Aiyar 13th Edition and Deedar Hussain Jakhrani v. Federation of Pakistan 2011 PLC (C.S.) 203 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1731 of 2009, decision dated: 24-05-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J",
    "": "JAHANGIR SIDDIQUI--Plaintiff\nvs\nNOMAN ABID INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12287",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2154 = 2013 SLD 2154 = 2013 CLD 1995",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9(2)---Documents attached with plaint---Scope---Unless full particulars supported by documents are disclosed in plaint, defendant would not be able to rebut the same---Mandatory under S.9(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, that plaint should be supported by statement of account.\n \n Bankers Equity Limited and others v. Bentonite Pakistan Limited and others 2003 CLD 931 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9, 10 & 22---Recovery of Bank loan---Leave to defend, dismissal of---Effect---After dismissal of application for leave to defend, suit was decreed in favour of Bank---Validity---Defendants in their letter admitted that they could not make payment of outstanding dues of plaintiff Bank and then raised objections to statement of account but on scrutiny objections were found to be superficial and having no substance---Defendants could not prove that any of the entries in statement of account produced before Banking Court was wrong---If there was any discrepancy in statement of account, the same should have been brought to the notice of court to reconcile the same---High Court dismissed leave to defend application of defendants on technical ground as well as on merits---Defendants could not show any infirmity in order passed by Single Judge of High Court and such findings were maintained in High Court appeal.\n \n C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587; National Bank of Pakistan v. Al-Asif Sugar Mills Limited and others 2001 MLD 1317; Soneri Bank Limited v. Compass Trading Corporation (Pvt.) Limited and others 2012 CLD 1302 and Akber Soap Factory and another v. National Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLC 1698 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No.16 of 2011, decision dated: 22-02-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND SADIQ HUSSAIN BHATTI, J",
    "": "ELITE PUBLISHERS LIMITED and 3 others\nvs\nSONERI BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12288",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2155 = 2013 SLD 2155 = 2013 CLD 2005",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. VII R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Power of the Court to reject plaint under Order VII, R. 11, C.P.C.---Scope---Court enjoyed an independent, suo motu and sua sponte power to examine the plaint at any stage of the suit under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. under the wisdom that the Court could always, nip a frivolous suit in the bud, by rejecting the plaint in order to retain its docket and time for more serious claims---Order VII, R.11, C.P.C. contemplated firstly that a stillborn suit should be properly buried, at its inception, so that no further time is consumed on a fruitless litigation and secondly, it gave the plaintiff a chance to retrace his steps, at the earliest possible moment, so that, if permissible under law, he may found a properly constituted case---Such power is grounded in good public policy and the Court enjoyed an insular power under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. to examine the plaint, primarily on the basis of the contents of the plaint---For the Court it did not matter if the defendants in a suit had been issued summons or applications for leave to defend or written statements have been filed by the defendants or even whether the defendants were in Court to defend their positions; the Court could still proceed unilaterally against the plaintiff alone without engaging the other party, if the court was of the view that the plaint was liable to be rejected.\n \n Mst. Shamim Tahira and others v. Zarai Taraqiyati Bank of Pakistan Ltd. through Manager and another 2007 CLD 778; Platinum Insurance Company's case 1997 MLD 2394; Waheed Corporation case: Falcon Ventures Pvt. Ltd. through Chief Executive, Iftikhar Ahmad v. Punjab Banking Court No.II, Lahore and another 2004 CLD 726; Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645; Manzoor Ahmad and another v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager Nankana Sahib Branch and 3 others 2005 CLD 653; Muhammad Azwar Siddiqui v. Chief Executive Union Leasing Ltd. and 21 others 2006 CLD 946; and Messrs Multimed Marketers through Managing Partner and 7 others v. United Bank Limited through Manager 2007 CLC 344 distinguished.\n \n PLD 1967 Dacca 190 and AIR 2003 SC 759 rel.\n \n(b) Words and Phrases---\n \n----\"\"Sua sponte\"\", meaning of---Latin: \"\"of their own accord\"\"---Describes an act of authority taken without formal prompting from another party.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 7(2), 9 & 10(8)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.VII, R.11---Procedure of Banking Court---Power of Banking Court to reject plaint if the same did not disclose a cause of action---Scope---Contention of the plaintiff was that the plaint could not be rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. before considering application for leave to defend filed by the defendants---Held, that inherent power of the Banking Court under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. preceded the statutory obligation of the Banking Court under S.10(8) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court had a primary obligation to examine the plaint and reject it, inter alia, if the same did not disclose a cause of action and such power could be exercised at any stage of the suit and it did not matter if an application for leave to defend, or written statement had been filed by the defendant---Power of the Court under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. read with S.7(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 preceded and prevailed over the power of the Court under S.10(8) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \n Haji Abdul Karim and others v. Messrs Florida Builders (Pvt.) Limited PLD 2012 SC 247; Jewan and 7 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others 1994 SCMR 826; Haji Allah Bakhsh v. Abdul Rehman and others 1995 SCMR 459; S.M. Shafi Ahmad Zaidi thought Legal Heirs v. Malik Hassan Ali Khan (Moin) through Legal Heirs 2002 SCMR 338; Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation Ltd. v. Mian Abdul Latif and others PLD 2008 SC 371; Bank Alfalah Limited v. Iftikhar A. Malik 2003 CLD 363; ARY Traders (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 2003 CLD 1601; Raja Ali Shan v. Messrs Essem Hotel Limited and others 2007 SCMR 741; Abdul Rehman v. Sher Zaman and another 2004 CLC 1340; Saleem Bhai and others v. State of Maharashtra and others AIR 2003 SC 759; Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath and others AIR 1987 SC 1926; I.T.C. Limited v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and others (1998) 2 SCC 70; P.R. Sukeshwala and another v. Dr. Devadatta V.S. Kerkar and another AIR 1995 Bombay 227 and Burmah Eastern Ltd. v. Burmah Eastern Employees' Union and others PLD 1967 Dacca 190 rel.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Standard of plaint in a suit filed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Essential requirements enumerated.\n \n Plaint filed in a regular suit has to meet the standards of \"\"pleadings\"\" and \"\"plaint\"\" given under Orders VI and VII of the C.P.C. Plaint under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, however, has a special format, requiring a higher standard of precision. The plaint under the special law has to be tailored strictly in accordance with the statutory standards set-out and given in section 9 of the Ordinance i.e., the plaint must bring to the Banking Court a dispute between the \"\"financial institution\"\" and the \"\"customer\"\" only. It must arise out of the contractual relationship indicating default in fulfillment of any \"\"obligations\"\" of \"\"Finance.\"\" It must indicate the contractual breach, which is to be monetized and reflected in the Statement of Account (certified in case of a financial institution), which has to accompany the plaint. In addition, the plaint can carry a claim for damages if it arises out of the Finance Agreement between the parties but not tortious claims simpliciter. Such is the standard required of a plaint in a banking suit under section 9(1) and (2) of the Ordinance. The \"\"cause of action\"\" to be pleaded in a plaint under the Ordinance must be fashioned to meet the above requirements. Narration of general allegations of breach without reference to the Finance Agreement or allegation of damages without any monetized quantification of the damage caused or absence of reference to the precise violation of the finance agreement (indicating the relevant clause) does not constitute a plaint that meets the standard of section 9 of the Ordinance.\n \n(e) Administration of justice---\n \n----Non-actionable plaint was a non-starter and in the interest of administration of justice and good judicial governance, it was best if such a plaint, which did not disclose a cause of action, was removed from the docket of the Court at the earliest.\n \n Nasimuddin Siddiqui and another v. United Bank Limited and others 1998 CLC 1718, Citi Bank N.A. v. Syed Shahansha Hussain 2009 CLD 1564; Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. 2012 CLD 337 and Messrs United Bank Ltd., Karachi v. Messrs Mohibali Tannery Ltd. and 8 others PLD 1994 Kar. 275 rel.\n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII Rr. 1 & 11---Examination of plaint---Standard of plaint---\"\"Cause of action\"\", meaning and connotation of---Essential elements of \"\"cause of action\"\"---Cause of action was the foundation of a lawsuit and was the \"\"totality of material facts which it was necessary for the plaintiff to allege and prove in order to succeed\"\"---Elements of a cause of action were: first, the breach of duty owing by one person to another; second the damage resulting to the other from the breach---\"\"Cause of action\"\" has been held from the earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse---Test of \"\"cause of action\"\" was that if what the plaintiff stated was taken to be correct, did it entitle him to a relief or not in law---Cause of action meant the infringement of the right which furnished occasion for the action and must be antecedent to the institution of a suit and on the basis of it the suit must be filed---Plaint if it did not disclose a cause of action, a Court will reject such a plaint---Plaint must, therefore, be pregnant with a lawful cause of action for the suit to progress and fructify---For Court it would be meaningless and futile to proceed with a suit if upon examination the court found it to be devoid of any cause of action---Purpose of conferment of powers under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. was to ensure that litigation which was meaningless and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court---Obligatory upon the courts to judicially assess, ideally at the very beginning, if the plaint disclosed a \"\"cause of action\"\" and if it did not, reject the same without further ado.\n \n PLD 1959 SC 356; (2004) 3 SCC 277; 1991 SCMR 2030; 2000 CLC 63; 1986 Supp SCC 315; (1998) 2 SCC 70 and PLD 1967 Dacca 190 rel.\n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 7---Suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Examination of plaint---Standard of plaint---Plaint under S.9 of the Ordinance must disclose a cause of action which spelled out the \"\"default in fulfillment of any obligation with regard to any finance\"\" and for this reason that S.9(2) of the Ordinance prescribed that the plaint must be supported by statement of account, which was applicable to both the parties i.e., customer and the financial institution---Additional requirement existed for the financial institution to get their statement of account certified under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 and such requirement of the Statement of Account is to quantify the default complained of under the Finance Agreement(s) entered between the parties---Default or breach, arising out of the contract between the parties or in fulfillment of any obligation with regard to any finance, must be numerically quantified and reflected through the Statement of Account---Section 9(2) of the Ordinance further stated that the plaint shall be supported by all other relevant documents relating to the grant of finance.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. Nos.128, 129, 133 and 134 of 2012, decision dated: 27-12-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "GULISTAN TEXTILE MILLS LTD.--Plaintiff\nvs\nASKARI BANK LTD. and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12289",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2156 = 2013 SLD 2156 = 2013 CLD 2022",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------S. 7---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.9---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 2(c)(d), 7 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Suit for specific performance of underwritten agreement and sponsor agreement---Fresh issuance of shares by making public offer thereof for increasing in share capital of defendant-company---Bank agreeing with company through underwritten agreement to subscribe and take up specified number of shares in event of public offer thereof being under-subscribed---Sponsor agreement between Bank and other defendants, whereby they agreed to take up shares in terms stated therein---Failure of other defendants to take up shares, which Bank had taken under underwritten agreement in event of public offer thereof being under-subscribed--- Return of plaint by Banking Court for want of jurisdiction--- Bank's plea that shares were property, and subscription of underwritten shares by Bank was a purchase of property falling with definition of \"\"finance\"\"---Validity---Shares were property of movable type and share certificates were goods as per Sale of Goods Act, 1930---Shares once issued to a subscriber, he would become shareholder of company and holder of property at such time--- Act of issuance of fresh share capital by company would not be a sale of property--- Underwriting obligation was owed by Bank not on behalf of company---Sponsor agreement was not owed by company, but by its directors and/or sponsors, who were legally separate and distinct persons---Obligation undertaken by Bank in respect of an underwritten agreement/ transaction could not be regarded as \"\"finance\"\" within meaning of S.2(d) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Act, 2001---Principles---High Court dismissed appeal.\n \n National Bank of Pakistan v. S.G. Fibre Ltd. and others 2004 CLD 689; Bank Alfalah Ltd. v. Iftikhar A. Malik 2003 CLD 363; Naini Gopal and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1965) 35 Comp. Cas. 30; Mughul and Sons v. NIB Bank Ltd. and another 2012 CLD 1915; Procter and Gamble Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Bank Alfalah Ltd. 2007 CLD 1532 and Karachi Electric Provident Fund v. National Investment (Unit) Trust 2003 CLD 1026 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.31 of 2009, decision dated: 31st May, 2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "GHULAM SARWAR KORAI AND MUNIB AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD.\nvs\nMessrs SAFA TEXTILE LIMITED and 7 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12290",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2157 = 2013 SLD 2157 = 2013 CLD 2030",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 7(4)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O. VII, R.11---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Scope---Suit for damages against defendant-Bank based on allegations that plaintiff was illegally arrested by the defendant Bank and its employees---Contention of the plaintiff was that he had obtained a loan from the bank but was illegally arrested, and was, as a result, entitled for damages---Plaint was rejected by Trial Court on the ground that as per S.7 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, civil court lacked jurisdiction---Validity---Present suit was not with regard to financial liability but was for damages under allegations that plaintiff had been illegally arrested, was sent to jail and suffered loss of reputation, liberty etc.---Provisions of S.7 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were therefore, not applicable to the present case---Suit, if it were for simple damages, then only the civil court had jurisdiction---High Court set aside impugned order and remanded the case to Trial Court---Appeal was allowed, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.182 of 2006, heard on 27-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "KH. IMTIAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "Prof. (Retd.) Raja MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN\nvs\nMessrs HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION through District Manager and others\n Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Yar Muhammad 2004 CLD 1084 distinguished."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12291",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2158 = 2013 SLD 2158 = 2013 CLD 2033",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 22--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Interlocutory orders, appeal against--- Maintainability--- Converting appeal into constitutional petition--- Scope--- For assailing interlocutory orders passed under Banking laws, no right of appeal vests in litigant and is specifically barred---Resort cannot be made to revisional and appellate jurisdiction of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, or to constitutional jurisdiction by filing petition under Art.199 of the Constitution to circumvent such specific bar under banking law---High Court has wide powers to treat appeal as petition under Art.199 of the Constitution and likewise a petition can be converted into appeal subject to limitation and jurisdiction---Appeal against interlocutory order cannot be converted into constitutional petition because statute has excluded right of appeal from interim order and the same cannot be bypassed by bringing under attack such interim orders in constitutional jurisdiction---Party affected has to wait till it matures into a final order and then to attack it in proper exclusive forum created for the purpose of examining such orders.\n \n Pakistan Fisheries Ltd and others v. United Bank Limited PLD 1993 SC 109 and Syed Saghir Ahmad Naqvi v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, S&GAD, Karachi and another 1996 SCMR 1165 rel.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Same transaction---Civil and criminal proceedings---Scope---Pendency of civil proceedings relating to same transaction is not a bar to commencement or continuation of criminal proceedings---Both proceedings can proceed concurrently as conviction for criminal offence is altogether a different matter from civil liability.\n \n(c) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---\n \n----Ss. 5(r) & 9(a)(viii)---Wilful default of Bank loan---Prosecution---Pre-condition---Once Banking Court decrees suit of Bank only then bank is armed with unimpeachable evidence to get borrower declared as wilful defaulter---In absence of decree in favour of Bank, borrower cannot be declared wilful defaulter only on the basis of notice under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 22(6)---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), Ss.5 (r) & 9 (a)(viii)---Suit for recovery of Bank loan---Wilful default of bank loan---Remedies---Bank first filed banking suit under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, against respondents for recovery of money---Respondents filed leave to defend applications therein which were still pending and instead of following that remedy, bank resorted to new remedy by sending notice to respondents under the provisions of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Respondents approached Banking Court seeking orders restraining Bank from taking any action under notice issued by NAB---Validity---Bank had nothing to show that respondents were wilful defaulters; it could only be so when a competent court would determine liability of debtor i.e. respondents that lender (Bank) could approach Accountability Court under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Bar provided under S.22(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, could not be circumvented by filing revision under S.115, C.P.C. or appeal under O.XLIII, C.P.C. or constitutional petition under Art.199 of the Constitution--- Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Federation of Pakistan v. Mufti Iftikharuddin and another 2000 SCMR 1; Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. The General Public PLD 1989 SC 6; Chenab Cement Products Limited v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672; Shafique Ahmed Butt v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 1983 CLC 1352; Sunrise Textile Mills Limited v. Crescent Commercial Bank Ltd and others 2007 SCMR 1569; Mrs. Shahida Faisal v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2005 SC 323; The Bank of Punjab v. Administrator General, Central Zakat PLD 1994 Lah. 207; Mrs. Imtiaz Begum; v. Tariq Mehmood and another 1995 CLC 800; Umar Farooq Shah and others v. Mst. Shagufta Nasreen and others 1997 CLC 1846;Shaheen Airport Services v. Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution 1994 SCMR 881; Salah Muhammad v. Muhammad Roz and others PLD 1962 (WP) Lah. 68; PIA Corporation v. Wafaqi Mohtasib and 2 others PLD 1994 Kar. 32; Shamim Akhtar and others v. Mst. Maimoona Begum 1996 CLC 1257; International Multileasing Company v. Capital Assets Leasing Corporation Ltd. and others 2004 CLD 1; Mohar Khan and others v. Sultan Khan and others 1988 CLC 20; Marghub Siddiqi v. Hamid Ahmad Khan and others 1974 SCMR 519; Unichem Corporation (Pvt) Ltd. and others v. Abdullah Ismail and others 1992 MLD 2374; Haji Sardar Khalid Naseem v. Muhamamd Ashraf and others 2006 SCMR 1192; Seema Fareed and others v. The State and another 2008 SCMR 839; Talib Hussain v. Anar Gul Khan and others 1993 SCMR 2177; Messrs Mehran Solvent Extraction (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. IDBP 2008 CLD 844; Ms. Afshan Ahmed v. Habib Bank Limited and another 2002 CLD 137; Habib Bank Limited v. Bela Automobiles Ltd. 2006 CLD 169 and Marhaba Textile Ltd. v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 1822 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No.133 of 2011, decision dated: 24-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND SADIQ HUSSAIN BHATTI, J",
    "": "BANK OF PUNJAB through Authorized Attorney\nvs\nMessrs AMZ VENTURES LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12292",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2159 = 2013 SLD 2159 = 2013 CLD 2050",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S. 18---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S. 316---Recovery of bank loan---Execution of decree---Limitation---Decree holder filed execution application against debtors but the same was dismissed by Banking Court being barred by time---Validity---Dispute between the parties was not that principal debtor was not a company---After winding-up order, decree holder approached Company Court for execution of decree---Company Court entertained execution application and accepted decree holder's claim partially and finalized execution of decree against debtor company---Pendency of execution of decree before Company Court established the fact that decree holder filed execution of decree within three years of passing of decree and did not fail to file execution of decree within three years of the decree---High Court set aside the and remanded the matter to Banking Court for proceedings with execution of decree--- Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n Muhammad Sher v. Muhammad Khan PLD 1975 Lah. 1016; Muhammad Jalat Khan and another v. Ghulam Sarwar (deceased) represented by legal heirs) and 3 others 1986 CLC 552 and United Bank Limited Bank Square Branch, Lahore v. Fateh Hayat Khan Tiwana and 7 others 2004 CLD 223 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.172 of 2006, heard on 6-02-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN AND SHUJAAT ALI KHAN, JJ",
    "": "NIB BANK LTD.\nvs\nMessrs SUNSHINE CLOTH LTD. through Official Liquidators and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12293",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2160 = 2013 SLD 2160 = 2013 CLD 2056",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Organizations Rules, 2013-------R. 2(b) & (g)---'Associate member' and 'corporate member'---Scope---Associate membership can only be allowed with some restrictions in the class itself---Requirement of annual turnover of fifty million rupees or above is mandatory for both the classes of members.\n \n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----Ss. 42 & 54---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss.42 & 177---Trade Organizations Ordinance (XLIX of 2009), Ss.1(3) & 35(a)---Suit for declaration and injunction--- Chamber of Commerce and Industry, elections of---Voter lists---Corporate and Associate class---Dispute was with regard to holding of elections of Chamber of Commerce and Industry and pertaining to inclusion of voters in corporate class and associate class---Plea raised by plaintiffs was that when election was stayed by High Court, then in view of S.177 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, previous management would continue till next elections---Validity---Provision of S.177 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, had no direct application or germane to the controversy involved---Once High Court restrained the Chamber of Commerce and Industry concerned from holding elections it meant that status quo order was required to be maintained and formation of ad hoc committee in intervening period was not a lawful act---Entire controversy could be resolved between corporate and associate class of members if extraordinary general meeting was convened and appointment of ad hoc committee would not serve the purpose, as the same not only complicated the situation but would become further instrumental to delay election process---High Court directed that present executive committee of the Chamber would continue to hold their offices till next elections and would not terminate/cancel membership of any member nor induct any new member---High Court further directed the executive committee to hold extraordinary general meeting (EGM) of its members on 21 days clear notice to all members in accordance with articles of association and agenda of the meeting would be to discuss articles of association to decide the matter according to will of majority of members---High Court also directed that after deciding fate of articles of association in the meeting executive committee would announce date of next election and also appoint independent and impartial election sub-committee and appellate commission as provided in articles of association to conduct elections---Suit was decreed accordingly.\n \n Abu Dhabi Medical Devices Co. L.L.C. v. Federation of Pakistan 2010 CLC 1253; Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2009 SC 879; PLD 2010 Kar. 261; Lahore Race Club v. Raja Khusbakht-ur-Rehman PLD 2008 SC 707; Rimpa Sunbeam's case PLD 2006 Kar. 444; Muhammad Saeed v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1954 Sindh 117; Pakistan v. Waliullah Sufyani PLD 1965 SC 310; Mushtaq Ali Tahirkheli's case PLD 2003 SC 930; Chalna Fibre v. Abdul Jabbar PLD 1968 SC 381; 2010 CLD 760; PLD 2011 Kar. 416; 1998 SCMR 1618; PLD 1993 SC 395 and 2012 CLD 1339 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suits Nos. 1408 and 1409 of 2012, decision dated: 5-08-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J",
    "": "SHAFIQUE AHMED QURESHI and others--Plaintiffs\nvs\nHYDERABAD CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY through President and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12294",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2161 = 2013 SLD 2161 = 2013 CLD 2080",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 19 & 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 11, 47, O.VII, R.11 & O.XXIII, R.3---Suit for recovery of loan---Rejection of plaint---Res judicata, principle of---Applicability---Scope---Compromise between Bank and customer---Consent decree, execution of---Suit for recovery was decreed in terms of a compromise, after which the Bank filed fresh suit for recovery on the ground that the defendant failed to pay installments in terms of said compromise---Plaint was rejected concurrently on ground of res judicata for the reason that the plaintiff Bank should have instead filed an execution petition under S.47 of the C.P.C.---Contention of the plaintiff Bank was that after passing of the consent decree there were three subsequent agreements between the parties, which gave rise to fresh causes of action, and for which the only remedy was filing of a fresh suit---Validity---Contention of the Bank was not tenable as present case was not one where the total outstanding liability had been repaid or any condition was incorporated in the re-scheduling agreements which went beyond the scope of the previous suit and compromise decree---Plaintiff Bank had not argued that the new principal debtors or fresh guarantors were introduced or old properties were released and new properties were mortgaged or such similar conditions were agreed in the subsequent agreements which were beyond the scope of the suit, compromise decree and outside the jurisdiction of the Executing Court---In absence of any such material change in the compromise decree, the Executing Court would be in a position to execute the decree under S.47 of the C.P.C., and could also take into consideration event of agreements and understandings arrived at between the decree holder Bank and the debtors, even after passing of the compromise decree---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n Ram Das v. Ali Bahadur AIR 1933 Pesh. 53; Lachhumal Morumal v. Atta Muhammad Khan Nabibaksh Khan and others AIR 1939 Sindh 343; Surput Singh and others v. Mahraj Bahadur Singh AIR 1937 Cal. 222; Nagendra Nath Manjumdar v. Kshitish Chandra Ghose PLD 1958 Dacca 179; Ch. Muhammad Nawaz v. Ch. Rahmat Ali and others 1994 SCMR 349; Messrs Amin Cotton Co. Ltd. v. Messrs Muhammad Jamil and Co. PLD 1967 Kar. 795 and Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman WAPDA, Lahore v. Mian Abdul Rauf PLD 2002 Lah. 268 distinguished.\n \n Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan through Vice President IDBP v. Messrs Crystal Chemicals Limited through Director/Guarantor Crystal Chemical Ltd. and 9 others PLD 2009 Lah. 176; Fakir Abdullah and others v. Government of Sindh through Secretary to Government of Sindh Revenue Department Sindh Secretariat Karachi and others PLD 2001 SC 131; Barkat Ullah through Legal Heirs and 12 others v. Wali Muhammad through Legal heirs and 3 others 1994 SCMR 1737; Mrs. Mussarat Shaukat Ali v. Mrs. Safia Khatoon and others 1994 SCMR 2189; Messrs Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. Karachi v. Messrs Star Oil and Ice Mills Ltd. Multan PLD 1973 Kar. 409; Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Branch Manager Principal Officer v. Muhammad Suleman Khan and others 2011 CLD 523; Muhammad Nazir and others v. Muhammad Arif and others 2006 MLD 187; Ch. Rehmat Ali and others v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Lahore and others PLD 1966 Kar. 31 and Mussarat Shahnaz v. Suleman Gillani 2003 MLD 1740 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.523 of 2012, heard on 9-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. AYESHA A. MALIK AND ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "SAMBA BANK LTD. through Authorized Officers\nvs\nMessrs SYED BHAIS and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12295",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2162 = 2013 SLD 2162 = 2013 CLD 2250",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 20(4), 22 & 7---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 22-A, 22-B & 154---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Dishonouring of cheque issued by customer for repayment of loan advanced by Bank---Registration of case on application of Bank by order of Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace---Quashing of F.I.R.---Objective in enacting the Banking Laws was to provide speedy remedy at one forum to the Banks for the recovery of their loans and for the customers of the Banks to approach the same court in case of grievance against the Banks---Objective to legislate S.20(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and S.489-F of P.P.C. being altogether different, should not be intermingled---Order passed by Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace and F.I.R. registered on the basis thereof being abuse of process of law were untenable---Constitutional petition was accepted and order passed by Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace and F.I.R. registered on the basis thereof were quashed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.25016 and Criminal Original No.2275-W of 2012, heard on 21st February, 2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUS SATTAR ASGHAR, J",
    "": "Raja ABDUL RASHEED\nvs\nSTATION HOUSE OFFICER, POLICE STATION PEOPLES COLONY, FAISALABAD and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12296",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2163 = 2013 SLD 2163 = 2013 CLD 2107",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 19 & 15---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Execution of decree by the Banking Court---Sale of mortgaged property---Objection petition---Bank filed suit for recovery of loan amount against the mortgagor who did not file application for leave to defend nor did he appear and suit was decreed ex parte---Execution petition was filed and mortgaged property was ordered to be attached---Petitioner filed objection petition for protection of his possession being tenant of mortgaged property which was dismissed by the executing court---Validity---Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, applied to cases where notices were issued by the financial institution to the mortgagor demanding payment of the outstanding mortgage money and such notices could be issued even without approaching the Banking Court---No notices were issued by the Bank and suit for recovery was filed before the Banking Court which resulted into passing of the decree---Upon pronouncement of and decree, S.19 of the Ordinance would come into play, which provided the mechanism for execution of the decree and sale of the mortgaged property with or without intervention of the Banking Court---Applicability of subsection (3) of S.15 of the Ordinance had been specifically excluded in the sale of mortgaged, pledged or hypothecated property by a financial institution in exercise of its power conferred by S.19(3) of the Ordinance---Burden was on the petitioner to prove the assertion that lease in his favour was bona fide and the question as to whether the lease was bona fide or not, could be proved only through evidence and not otherwise---Question as to the presumption of the lease to be not bona fide, was to be left at the discretion of the Banking Court, and such question was to be decided and such discretion was to be exercised by the Banking Court according to the facts and circumstances of each case---Lease was created in favour of the petitioner during the subsistence of the mortgage in favour of Bank---Consent of Bank/mortgagee was also not obtained by the mortgagor--- Lease was created for a term of five (5) years through an unregistered document, the purpose of not getting the lease registered was obvious---Had the lease been submitted for registration, the Sub-Registrar would have immediately refused to register the same in view of the mortgage already registered with him---Mala fides on the part of mortgagor and collusion on the part of petitioner were apparent---Facts about creation of the lease in favour of the petitioner after creation of the mortgage, petitioner having failed in establishing that Rs. 1,060,000.00 was paid by him towards the rent, and the collusion on his part, were noticed by the Banking Court---Lease was not bona fide and petitioner was not entitled to the protection under the proviso of S.15(6) of the Ordinance---Mortgagor did not file any appeal against the decree passed by the Banking Court for the sale of the mortgaged property and said decree had attained finality---Duty of the Banking Court was to execute the decree in accordance with law---No infirmity or illegality in the impugned order passed by the Banking Court was found---Constitutional petition was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-4559 of 2012, heard on 17-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND NADEEM AKHTAR, J",
    "": "BASHIR AHMED\nvs\nALLIED BANK LIMITED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12297",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2164 = 2013 SLD 2164 = 2013 CLD 2102",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. IX, R.9 & S.151---Plaintiff-Bank filed suit for recovery of loan amount---Suit was dismissed for non-prosecution---Application was moved for restoration of the same which was accepted by the Banking Court---Provisions of S.7(a) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, envisaged that the powers of civil court had been conferred upon the Banking Court which were available under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908---Provisions of S.7(2) of the said Ordinance, provided that Banking Court in the matters to which procedure had not been provided would follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908---Under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Banking Court could dismiss the suit for non-prosecution and restore the same---Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.369 of 2006, decision dated: 5-11-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR SAEED SHEIKH AND AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ANWAR and another\nvs\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12298",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2165 = 2013 SLD 2165 = 2013 CLD 2116",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10 & 9---Contract Act (IX of 1872) S.65---Procedure of Banking Court---Obligation of person who has received advantage under void agreement or contract that becomes void---Scope---Application for leave to defend of defendant was dismissed and suit for recovery was decreed----Contention of the appellant was that he had earlier obtained a business finance facility, which was fully adjusted against a home loan, and nothing was payable against said business finance facility as he obtained a loan-exit form; however, the suit was decreed against liability of the appellant in relation to both the business finance facility and the home loan---Validity---Appellant had admittedly availed the business finance facility which was adjusted against new facility in nature of a home loan, however, there was no denying of the fact that the appellant kept utilizing the previous facility by withdrawing different amounts from the account therefore adjustment of previous facility would not discharge the liability of the appellant---Subsequent facility of home loan also remained outstanding and not even a single debit or credit entry in the statement was rebutted by the appellant---Section 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 no where stated that in case ancillary requirements were not met, the borrower was absolved from fulfilling the mandatory requirement of S.10(3) of the Ordinance---Section 65 of the Contract Act, 1872 protected the respondent Bank from wrongful advantage taken by any person (of the bank's negligence) and such person was bound to restore the same in its entirety---No illegality existed in the impugned order---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.177 of 2012, decision dated: 10-07-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN SHAH AND SHOAIB SAEED, JJ",
    "": "MANZOOR QADIR\nvs\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12299",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2166 = 2013 SLD 2166 = 2013 CLD 2120",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 39 & 40---Change of its name by company---Procedure and legal effect of such change stated.\n \n Incorporation, registration, management, change in the management, shares, amalgamation, merger, change in name, conduct and affairs of companies, certain other association and corporate enterprise and matter incidental thereto are regulated and controlled by the Companies Ordinance, 1984, which is a comprehensive Code in itself. A company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 is permitted to change its name in accordance with the provisions of section; which inter alia require a special resolution with the approval of the Registrar of Companies in writing bringing the change of its name. The effect of such change in the name of the corporate entity is dealt with in section 40 of the Ordinance; whenever a special resolution is passed by the company with the concurrence of the Registrar of Companies, such change in name of the company is to be recorded in the Register of the companies in place of its former name and a fresh certificate of incorporation with new name is issued. On issuance of certificate of incorporation with altered or new name, the process of change of name of a corporate entity is complete. Whenever name of a company is changed in accordance with section 39, the company that has changed its name is mandated to continue use of its former name along with its new name side by side for a period of one year from the date of issuance of such altered certificate of incorporation. Change in the name of a company does not affect any right or obligation of the company nor render defective or any legal proceedings by or against the company nor rights and interest of creditors and or other persons dealing with the company in any manner are prejudiced, legal proceedings, contract and or transaction as the case may be continued or commenced and or executed and enforced against the company by its former name or by its new name and for all practical purposes change of name does not affect or bring about the change of management and or transfer of management and change in name does not bring into being a new legal entity it remains the same entity merely with a new identity.\n \n(b) Disposal of Land and Estate Regulations, 1965---\n \n----Regln. 14 & Appendix-F, Condition No. 17---Karachi Development Authority Order (P.O. V of 1957), Art. 15---­Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition--- ­Industrial plot--- Petitioner-company as allottee/lessee of such plot sought to change its name into record of City District Government and permission to mortgage such plot---City Government required petitioner to register change of its name with Sub-Registrar, then change of name in its record and permission to mortgage such plot would be processed and finalized---Validity---Petitioner had not claimed change in its name on basis of any registered document or inheritance or decision of court---Petitioner had sought change in its name on basis of resolution of its Board of Directors with concurrence of Registrar of Companies in accordance with S. 39 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, thus, such change in name would not involve any change of interest i.e. same would be without transfer of title, right and interest in such plot---Petitioner's company despite change in its name would remain same company with a new name and identity---Such change in record of City Government could be made on payment of Rs.10 per square yard as mutation fee---High Court directed City Government to effect such change in its record on payment of Rs.10 per square yard and process petitioner's request for permission to mortgage plot in accordance with law within specified time.\n \n Pioneer Protective Glass Fibre P. Ltd. v. Fibre Glass Pilkington Ltd. Vol.60 1986 Company Cases page 707; Kalipada Sinha v. Mahalxmi Bank Ltd. AIR 1966 Calcutta 585; Sulphur Dyes Ltd. v. Hickson and Dadajee Ltd. Vol. 83 (1995) Company Cases page 533 and Hira Textile Mills Ltd. v. Executive District Officer (Revenue), Kasur and 4 others 2009 CLD 839 rel.\n \n(c) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Fiscal statute---Charging provision would be construed strictly, but ambiguity therein, if any, would be resolved in favour of assessee---Principles.\n \n Charging provisions may it be prescribing fee or tax are to be strictly construed and in case of any ambiguity, it is to be resolved in favour of the subject/assessee. A person cannot be compelled to pay more than what is prescribed and fixed by or under the authority of law.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-3383 of 2011 and C.M.As. Nos.2223 and 2224 of 2013, decision dated: 11-03-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND SADIQ HUSSAIN BHATTI, J",
    "": "SALFI TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED and another\nvs\nCITY DISTRICT GOVERNMENT OF Karachi High Court through D.C.O. and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12300",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2167 = 2013 SLD 2167 = 2013 CLD 2133",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Preamble---Object of enacting law is to provide speedy remedy at one forum to banks for recovery of their finances and for customers of banks to approach same court in case of grievance against banks.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.20 (4)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.489-F---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 22-A & 22-B---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---Intra court appeal---Registration of case---Special and general law---Forum of choice---Scope---Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, on the application of bank directed Station House Officer to register case against borrower as cheque issued by him was dishonoured---Plea raised by bank was that it could file complaint under S.20(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, but was not debarred from getting a case registered under S.489-F, P.P.C.---Validity---In case of special law and a general law on the same subject, which if standing alone would include the same matter and conflict with special law, it was the special law to prevail, since it evinced legislative intent more objectively and specifically than the general law---Intent to legislate S.20(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and S.489-F, P.P.C. were altogether different and should not be intermingled---Bank was debarred from getting criminal case registered under S.489-F, P.P.C. to redress its grievance through speedy remedy of his choice---Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Single Judge of High Court, who had rightly set aside the order passed by Ex-Officio Justice of Peace--- Intra court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Intra Court Appeal No.224 of 2013, decision dated: 8-07-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUS SATTAR ASGHAR AND SHUJAAT ALI KHAN, JJ",
    "": "FAYSAL BANK\nvs\nJUSTICE OF PEACE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12301",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2168 = 2013 SLD 2168 = 2013 CLD 2138",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 131, 127 & 129---Suit for recovery--- Contract of guarantee/surety--- Death of surety---Effect---Application for impleadment of legal heirs of surety as party(s) in the suit for recovery---Revocation of continuing guarantee by surety's death---Scope---Plaintiff Bank sought to implead legal heirs of one of the defendants in the suit for recovery, who had died, on basis of a guarantee furnished by the said deceased defendant---Contention of the plaintiff Bank was that the said personal guarantee had stated that in event of his death, defendant's successors would be liable and that S.131 of the Contract Act, 1872 provided that the death of a surety revoked the continuing guarantee but only in absence of a contract to the contrary---Validity---Contract of guarantee could not be enforced unless there was some consideration for the guarantee and the contract of guarantee must be based on consideration and if the consideration so specified was not brought on record, then court could not assume such consideration---Nothing was mentioned in the plaint as to what financial facility was availed by the said defendant against the guarantee executed by him and it was not mentioned whether any demand was raised against the deceased defendant in his lifetime---Although the deceased defendant had agreed that in case of his death, the bank shall have the right to dispose of his moveable and immovable assets, but no schedule was attached with guarantee to show whether the defendant/guarantor had provided any details of his moveable and immovable assets---Vast difference existed between a \"\"guarantor\"\" and a \"\"mortgagor\"\"; and had the deceased defendant in his lifetime mortgaged property against some finance facility, recovery could have been made through disposal of assets by impleading his legal heirs, however, this was not the situation in the present case---Mere mentioning of the words in the guarantee that the same \"\"would be binding on successors-in-interests\"\" would have no significance and the legal heirs could not be held responsible unless they agreed to the covenant made in the guarantee by their predecessors-in-interest in their absence---Condition of S.131 of the Contract Act, 1872 \"\"in absence of any contract\"\" did not mean to hold responsible legal heirs of a deceased guarantor as there existed no contract between the plaintiff Bank and the said legal heirs, and therefore, S.131 of the Contract Act, 1872 was not applicable---Legal heirs of the deceased defendant, were therefore, neither necessary or proper party(s) to the suit and the plaintiff had failed to figure out any cause of action against the said legal heirs---Application was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n First Women Bank Ltd. v. Mrs. Afifa Iftikhar and 2 others 2008 CLD 552; Rafique Hazquel Masih v. Bank Alfalah Ltd. and others 2005 SCMR 72; Malik Bashir Ahmad Khan and another v. Qasim Ali and 12 others PLD 2003 Lah. 615 and Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Indus Lenentose (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2003 CLD 1788 distinguished.\n \n Muslim Commercial Bank v. East and Exports (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2007 CLD 1205 and Mst. Fayyazi Begum and 6 others v. Ali Hassan and another 2009 CLD 1476 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-62 and C.M.A. No.11385 of 2012, decision dated: 28-08-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J",
    "": "MEEZAN BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs FOCUS APPARELS (PVT.) LTD. and 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12302",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2169 = 2013 SLD 2169 = 2013 CLD 2149",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Act (IV of 1938)-------Ss. 45 & 39---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 78---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXII, R. 4---Suit for recovery of insurance money---Incorrect information to insurance company---Proof of signature and hand-writing--- Death of defendant--- Effect--- Contention of plaintiffs-insurance company was that at the time of getting the insurance policy, insured/deceased husband of the defendant had given incorrect information as to his health---Suit was decreed by the Trial Court but the same was dismissed by the Appellate Court---Validity---Insurance Policy of Rs. 75,000 was not denied by the plaintiffs at the time of its payment---Deceased declared that he did not suffer from any serious disease which declaration was verified by the Area Sales Officer---Plaintiffs got conducted an inquiry at the time of second claim of another insurance policy by their investigator who submitted his report that deceased was suffering from blood cancer and liver disease---No inquiry was conducted with regard to claim of Rs.75,000---Defendant's case was that her husband died because of heart attack---Investigator as well as scribe admitted that he had not conducted the inquiry with regard to the claim of Rs. 75,000---Plaintiffs had failed to produce the original record of the hospital and scribe of the documents was not examined by them---Doctor and brother of the deceased who made statements with regard to the disease were not produced---Copies of the documents other than the judicial record could not be received in evidence without proof of signature and handwriting---Investigation report could not be termed as a valid, reliable or conclusive proof of the fact that deceased was suffering from blood cancer or liver disease---Plaintiffs-Insurance company were debarred from making the investigation after expiry of two years---Insurance Policy was effected on 13-4-1981 and policy-holder died on 3-7-1984 whereas death claim was made on 2-8-1984---Investigations were made and report was submitted on 21-4-1985 after four years of issuance of policy---Plaintiffs had failed to establish any false or fraudulent statement on the part of policy-holder---Plaintiffs/Company were not competent to claim refund of death claim---Defendant (wife of deceased) died during pendency of revision petition and same stood abated---Legal representatives of the deceased were not liable to any financial liability of their predecessor who could be liable to the extent of the estate which had devolved upon them---Nothing was on record to show that any estate of the deceased-nominee had devolved upon her legal heirs---Revision could not proceed against legal representatives of the deceased---Revision was disposed of.\n \n Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Sana Ullah Khan and others PLD 1988 SC 67 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.1656 of 2002, decision dated: 12-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUS SATTAR ASGHAR, J",
    "": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Principal Office\nvs\nMst. MAQSOODAN BIBI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12303",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2170 = 2013 SLD 2170 = 2013 CLD 2156",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 96, 97 & 98---Instances in which reduction of share capital of company is commonly adopted, listed.\n \n Guide to the Companies Act, 17th Edition 2010 authored by A. Ramaiya, at pages 1407 to 1409 rel.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 96, 97, 98 & 101---Reduction in share capital of Company---Power of the court to dispense with addition to name of company of the phrase \"\"and reduced\"\"---Scope---Order of court confirming reduction of share capital of the Company---Nature and scope of---Court firstly has to be satisfied that if any creditors had objected to the reduction in share capital of the company, that either their consent to the reduction had been obtained or their debts or claims had been discharged with or settled---Court's power in said matters relating to reduction of share capital was discretionary with further powers to impose conditions if found necessary keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case---Court generally required the company to use the words \"\"and reduced\"\" as part of its name after capital reduction and to publish the same in newspapers for the sake of public's knowledge of the reasons for the reduction in share capital but such condition may be dispensed with if reduction did not involve diminution of any liability in respect of unpaid share capital or payment to any shareholder of any paid-up capital---Extent and amount of reduction was a domestic matter and so long as there was no injustice caused to the creditors or shareholders, the court was not concerned with the precise amount of reduction of capital---Powers were conferred on the court in order to enable it to protect the interests of dissenting shareholders including even those who did not appeal and in making its order, the Court approved a minute and embodying minute in a confirmatory order was a sufficient approval---Said minute was designed to show the altered structure of the company capital and the amount of remaining share capital, the number of shares into which it was to be divided, the amount of each share if any at the date of registration of the minute deemed to be paid-up on each share---In order to determine whether to approve the reduction of capital or not, the court would consider the factors whether shareholders had been treated equitably, whether the reduction proposals had been properly explained, whether creditors or third party interests had been prejudiced and whether the reduction had a discernable purpose.\n \n Pak Asian Fund Limited's case 1999 CLC 1603; Bankers Equity Ltd.'s case 1988 MLD 1408; Guide to the Companies Act, 17th Edition 2010 authored by A. Ramaiya, at pages 1407 to 1409; Westburn Sugar Refineries Ltd.'s case [1951] 1 All ER 881 and Palmer's Company Law's case Vol.1 25th Edn. rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J.M. No.11 of 2013, decision dated: 5-08-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J",
    "": "COMPANIES ORDINANCE, 1984 FOR CONFIRMING THE REDUCTION IN CAPITAL: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12304",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1FpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2171 = 2013 SLD 2171 = 2013 CLD 2167",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 14, 20 & 30---Non-completion of work by respondent within agreed time---Award of fresh contract by applicant to a third party for completing remaining work--- Respondent's notice to appellant claiming Rs.1,13,78,207---Reference of dispute between parties to Arbitrator in terms of arbitration clause in contract---Submission of claim by respondent for Rs.2,24,18,619 instead of Rs.1,13,78,207---Award by Arbitrator for differential amount of Rs.4.9 million made rule of court by Trial Court---Validity---According to terms of contract, respondent's claim had to be confined to amount for which he had issued notice to applicant---Neither court nor Arbitrator was competent to enlarge scope of contract or application made under S.20 of Arbitration Act, 1940---Award for differential amount between respondent's contract and such third party's contract was beyond jurisdiction of Arbitrator---Arbitrator's function was not to be influenced by his imagination and opinion, rather he was obliged to apply agreed clauses of contract between parties---High Court set aside impugned and remanded case to Trial Court for its decision afresh in terms of reference.\n \n Fauji Foundation and another v. Shamim-ur-Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457 and Shamim-ur-Rehman v. Fauji Foundation, Rawalpindi and another 1992 SCMR 1496 ref.\n \n House Building Finance Corporation v. Shahinshah Humayun Corporative House Building Society and others 1992 SCMR 19 and Shamim-ur-Rehman v. Fauji Foundation, Rawalpindi and another 1992 SCMR 1496 rel.\n \n(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n----Ss. 17 & 30---Making award rule of court---Powers of court---Scope---Court while examining correctness and legality of award could neither act as a court of appeal nor undertake reappraisal of evidence recorded by Arbitrator in order to discern error or infirmity therein.\n \n(c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n----S. 30--- Award, setting aside of--- \"\"Misconduct of Arbitrator\"\"---Meanings.\n \n In the judicial sense, the misconduct of an Arbitrator means his failure to perform his essential duty resulting in substantial miscarriage of justice between the parties.\n \n Mian Corporation through Managing Partner v. Messrs Lever Brothers of Pakistan Ltd. through General Sales Manager, Karachi PLD 2006 SC 169 and Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Conciliator Appointed by the Government of Sindh and 6 others PLD 1977 SC 237 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.226 of 2011, decision dated: 3rd July, 2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ AHMAD AND ALI BAQAR NAJAFI, JJ",
    "": "FAUJI FOUNDATION through General Manager (Engineering)\nvs\nMessrs CHANAN DIN AND SONS through Attorney and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12305",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1F5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2172 = 2013 SLD 2172 = 2013 CLD 2173",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss. 6, 16 & 22---Central Depositories Act (XIX of 1997), Ss. 16, 24 & 28---Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001, Rr.3 & 4---Mishandling of securities by the company and late payment of charges to its clients---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan ordered an inspection of the books and record required to be maintained by the company---Inspection Team, after inspection, had disclosed that the company was mishandling the securities of its clients, and company was involved in imposing late payment charges to its clients---Major irregularities in calculation of Net Capital Balance (NCB), was also observed, and it appeared that NCB was not in accordance with the Third Schedule of Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971---In many instances, the company had moved/pledged the shares without proper authority of the sub-account holders and was imposing late charges in violation of S.16 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969---Violation of the Ordinance, Rules and Regulations was a serious matter---In view of the regulatory violations, the company was directed to deposit a sum of Rs.100,000 under S.22 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 and a further sum of Rs.300,000 under S.28 of Central Depositories Act, 1997 to the Commission by way of penalty---Company was directed to ensure that the shares of the investors be transferred to the respective sub-accounts at the earliest---Company was further directed to ensure full compliance with Ordinance, Rules and Regulations and directives of the Commission, in future.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.4(BRK-204)SMD/BR/06 dated 13-11-2012, decision dated: 11-04-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "HASNAT AHMAD, DIRECTOR (MSRD)",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12306",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1F5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2173 = 2013 SLD 2173 = 2013 CLD 2207",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 11(1)(c), 36, 63(1) & 156---Securities and Exchange Commission (Insurance) Rules, 2002, R.13---Solvency position of the company had revealed that it was insolvent by an amount of Rs.49,328,754---Default under the relevant provisions of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 was established---Company's Legal Counsel had admitted such situation---Directors of the company, in addition to the day to day running of the company and the management of its business, also had some 'fiduciary' duties, i.e., duties held in trust and some wider duties imposed by statute; and breach of those statutory duties would usually be a criminal offence; punishable by fine or imprisonment---Directors were gauged against a higher standard of accountability, which required them to be vigilant and perform their duties with due care---Directors, in the present case, had failed to perform their duties with due care and prudence---Directors were supposed to be well aware of their legal obligations in connection with statutory requirement of Ss.11(1)(c) & 36 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, and were required to maintain adequate solvency so as to comply with the minimum/solvency/requirements on relevant date and even thereafter, which was grossly overlooked by the Directors---Company was required to act practically for the recovery of its outstanding balance---Legitimate inference could be that the default was committed knowingly and willingly, therefore default of Ss.11(1)(c) and 36 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, was established---Penalty as provided under Ss.63(1) and 156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, could be imposed on the company---In exercise of powers conferred on the Commission under S.156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, fine of Rs.300,000 on the company; and Rs.100,000 on each Director of the company, including the Chief Executive Officer, was imposed---Company and its Directors were directed to take immediate steps to meet the shortfall in their solvency requirements; and that the Annual Audit Accounts and Regulatory Returns for the relevant year, should evidence that the company had complied with the mandatory requirements of Ss.11(1)(c) & 36 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice issued dated 6-07-2012, decision dated: 17-12-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "TARIQ HUSSAIN, DIRECTOR (INSURANCE)",
    "": "SHAHEEN INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12307",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1F5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2174 = 2013 SLD 2174 = 2013 CLD 2220",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-------S. 114---Trade Marks Rules, 2004, R.85---Appeal before High Court---Delay, condonation of---Impugned order passed on 29-8-2007, certified copy whereof applied on 25-9-2007, which was prepared and issued on 12-11-2007, whereas appeal was filed on 9-1-2008---Validity---Period of 60 days for filing an appeal, if computed from date of impugned order, then appeal would be barred by 133 days---Period of 48 days consumed in obtaining certified copy of impugned order, if excluded from 133 days, then delay would come to 85 days---High Court had jurisdiction to allow further time after considering merits of case, if there was an application for condonation of delay, but not otherwise---Appellant had not filed application for condonation of delay, thus, no relief could be given to him by way of implied condonation of delay---High Court dismissed appeal for being time barred.\n \n National Detergents Limited v. Nirma Chemical Works and another 1992 MLD 2357; 1928 Volume 45 RPC 193; 1928 Volume 45 RPC 421; 1909 Volume 26 RPC 850; Exon Corporation and Esso Inc. v. Syed Nasir Ahmed Jafry and another 1994 SCMR 918; Clifford Chance v. Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks 2009 CLC 339 and Arshad Nasim v. Registrar of Trade Marks and another 1986 CLC 2622 ref.\n \n Clifford Chance v. Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks 2009 CLC 339; Arshad Nasim v. Registrar of Trade Marks and another 1986 CLC 2622; Messrs Star Cotton Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi v. Collector of Customs, Karachi and another 2010 PTD 1739; Abid v. The State 1998 SCMR 1146; Honda Atlas Cars (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Honda Sarhad (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2005 SCMR 609 and Miss Rahat Afroze v. State Life Insurance Corporation and others 2008 SCMR 656 rel.\n \n(b) Limitation---\n \n----Appeal on its face being time-barred---Effect---Appellate Court would not be bound to discuss and dilate upon merits of case.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)=114\\n\\r\\n\\rTrade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)=114\\n\\r\\n\\rTrade Marks Rules, 2004=85\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No.16 of 2008, decision dated: 19-04-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, J",
    "": "Messrs S. S. CORPORATION through Authorized Attorney\nvs\nPROGRESSIVE TRADERS (PVT.) LTD. and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12308",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1F5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2175 = 2013 SLD 2175 = 2013 CLD 2230",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 22---Appeal---Ex parte without examining documentary evidence---Scope---Suit filed by respondents/ plaintiffs was decreed in their favour by the Banking Court--- Appellants/defendants contended that documentary evidence produced on record had neither been examined nor discussed by the Banking Court---Validity---Mere reference of documents exhibited would not amount to minutely examining the same by the Banking Court---Every bit of evidence had to be discussed and should be based on the basis of evidence---Notwithstanding the fact that there was nothing in rebuttal from the appellants/defendants' side but respondents/plaintiffs had to prove their case on their own strength---Impugned was set aside in circumstances---Case was remanded to the Banking Court with a direction to pass the after discussing every bit of documentary evidence placed on record.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.77 of 2008, heard on 4-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN SHAH AND SHOAIB SAEED, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN (ZTBL) through Branch Manager and another\nvs\nALLAH YAR through Special Attorney and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12309",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1F5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2176 = 2013 SLD 2176 = 2013 CLD 2232",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S. 22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, Rr.8, 12, Third Schedule, Code of Conduct---Duty of Broker towards clients---Scope---Handling of conflict of interest---Method---Contravention of Code of Conduct in trade transactions---Company purchased 578,000 shares of its clients at the rate of Rs.920 in its proprietary account, and only after five days from purchase of said shares, sold the same at the rate of Rs.1000 to its associate company---Said transaction resulted in an appropriate profit of Rs.46 million to the company---Commission sought clarification from the company regarding said transactions which resulted in a significant gain to the company---Response of the company was found unsatisfactory---Company, though was a reputed institution and had large base of foreign clients, it was its obligation to work more professionally and prudently---Market intermediaries were required to treat their customers in a fair manner characterized by high standards of honesty and integrity---Primary duty of a broker/company was to act as an agent for parties who wished to buy or sell shares and not enter into transactions where conflict of interest would arise between the broker and its clients---Broker's responsibility was always to place the interest of the customer ahead of its interest---Broker's obligation and duty to the customer, must be paramount which was not only moral duty of broker, but law also put onus on the shareholders of the broker company to give preference to its clients when such situation would arise---Conflict of interest was a fundamental and pervasive issue in developed and emerging capital market, where transactions between the market participants were primarily assisted by market intermediaries---Market intermediaries in primary and secondary capital market had to balance their own interest and those of issuers and investors--- Situation creating a conflict of interest could occur between a broker and a client, and between different groups of clients---Former class of conflict would take place between the brokers' own economic interest and the interests of its clients---Best way to handle the conflict of interest, was to avoid situations which placed broker in positions where its duty to its clients was at odds with its personal interest---Broker/company, prima facie had contravened clauses A(1), A(2), A(5) & B(6) of Code of Conduct set forth under Third Schedule of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, in circumstances.\n \n(b) Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)---\n \n----S. 22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, Rr.8, 12, Third Schedule, Code of Conduct---Primary responsibility of broker---Scope---Trade transactions in contravention of Code of Conduct---Proprietary trading was not prohibited for the broker/company, but the law had set certain parameters and restrictions, which a broker had to follow for trading in its proprietary account in order to protect the interests of the clients---In the present case, the company, though had conducted trading from its proprietary account, but the pattern of trading by the company was very unusual and abnormal---Transactions under questions, were very peculiar in nature, since in a very short span of time huge profit was earned by the company---Last three years' proprietary trading history of the company, had shown that transactions of similar nature, were not undertaken by the company with any of its clients---Company failed to safeguard the interest of its clients by giving preference to its own interest over their interest---Primary responsibility of a broker, was to advise the clients and act on their behalf for the purchase and sale of shares; it was duty of the broker to fulfil its prime responsibility to execute those transactions at the best amicable market price in a transparent manner, in order to safeguard the interest of its clients---Broker company had failed to act with due skill, care and diligence in conduct of its business, and to protect the interests of its clients---Company was established to have contravened the provisions of the Code of Conduct prescribed in the Third Schedule of the Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001---Violation of the Rules and Regulations was a serious matter, which entitled the Commission to even suspend company's registration, but the Commission in exercise of the powers under S.22 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, imposed on the company a penalty of Rs.50,000,000 (Rupees Fifty Million only) with direction to the company that in future full compliance was made of all the rules, regulations and directives of the Commission.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No. Misc/MSW/SMD/1(05) 2004/1621 dated 17-10-2012, decision dated: 19-02-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSCID)",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12310",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1F5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2177 = 2013 SLD 2177 = 2013 CLD 2284",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)-------S. 3---Defamation---Scope---Libel or slender---Defamation was the publication of a statement which reflected on a person's reputation and tended to lower him/her in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally or tended to make them shun or avoid him/her---Defamation ordinarily took the form of two separate torts i.e. libel and slander---Libel was actionable per se and injury to reputation would be presumed---Three elements which must exist to prove element of libel or slender were that imputation must be defamatory; that it must identify or refer to the claimant and that it must be published/communicated to at leat one person other than the claimant.\n \n(b) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)---\n \n----Ss. 3, 4 & 9---Defamation---Damages---Contention of the plaintiff was that defendant filed an application before District Police Officer attributing false implication of theft of his cattle against the plaintiff and imputing derogatory statements against him---Suit was dismissed concurrently---Validity---Documentary evidence produced by the petitioner-plaintiff failed to contain any defamatory imputation and any allegation of theft of cattle against the petitioner-plaintiff---Contents of application did not fall within the ambit of libel---Witness of petitioner-plaintiff appearing in the witness box stated that the petitioner-plaintiff bore a good reputation and commanded the honour and respect in the area and he had not stated that the imputation of the respondent-defendant had lowered the respect or reputation of the petitioner - plaintiff in his estimation or in the estimation of right thinking members of the society in general or made him shun to avoid the petitioner-plaintiff---Petitioner-plaintiff had not been able to establish the allegation against the respondent-defendant for causing defamatory imputation amounting to libel or slander to claim damages---No misreading or non-reading of evidence, material illegality or irregularity in the impugned s and decrees was found---Revision was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.3700 of 2011, decision dated: 14-05-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUS SATTAR ASGHAR, J",
    "": "FAQIR MUHAMMAD\nvs\nMUHAMMAD SHAKIL"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12311",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1F5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2178 = 2013 SLD 2178 = 2013 CLD 2254",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------Ss. 6(1), 16, 18 & 22---Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001, Rr.3, 4 & 7---Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971, R.2(d) & Third Sched.---Violations of existing regulatory framework governing the brokerage business---Inspection team, after inspection of the Books and Record of the Broker/ company, had highlighted violations of the existing regulatory framework governing the brokerage business---Record showed that, if 'Net Capital Balance (NCB)' was calculated in strict compliance with the requirements of Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971, 'NCB' of the brokerage company would have been negative which implied that the company by submitting false 'NCB' had attained much higher trading exposure thereby increasing the systemic risk in the market, thus it stood established that 'NCB' as calculated by the company was not in accordance with the Third Schedule of Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971; that the company by submission of overstated 'NCB' had submitted a statement and given information, which it had reasonable cause to believe to be false or incorrect in material particulars in violation of S.18 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969---Violation of Third Schedule of Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971; and S.16 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, stood established which was a serious matter---Company was directed to pay by way of penalty a sum of Rs.100,000 (One Hundred Thousand only) on account of said violations---Company was further directed to make necessary arrangements for compliance with the regulatory framework, and submit a comprehensive report in that regard.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.4/BRK-62/SE/SMD/01 dated 14-11-2012, decision dated: 15-02-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "HASNAT AHMAD, DIRECTOR (MSCID)",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12312",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1F5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2179 = 2013 SLD 2179 = 2013 CLD 2263",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Tort-------General damages including for mental torture, claim for---Proof---Standard or method stated.\n \n No standard or method of proof can be laid down with precision in the claims made under the category of general damages including the mental torture. In the suits for damages, the doctrine \"\"Res ipsa loquitur\"\" is to be applied as it is attracted when the things that inflict damage are under the sole management and control of defendant.\n \n Damages may be awarded on account of mental anguish as well.\n \n Sabran Bibi and 7 others v. WAPDA through Chairman, WAPDA House 2003 CLC 885; Sufi Muhammad Ishaque v. The Metropolitan Corporation, Lahore through Mayor PLD 1996 SC 737 and Malik Gul Muhammad Awan v. Federation of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 507 rel.\n \n(b) Tort---\n \n----Damages, suit for---Grave injuries sustained by plaintiff and his family members as a result of rash and negligent driving of car by defendant---Plaintiff claimed Rs.2 Crore as damages for having become disabled to earn his livelihood due to fracture on thigh etc.---Trial Court decreed suit to extent of Rs.5 lac---Validity---Plaintiffs had proved wrongful act of defendant, who instead of providing medical aid to them had decamped from site---Defendant was bound to prove absence of his negligence and rashness in accident, but he failed to do so---According to evidence on record, plaintiff and his family had sustained serious physical injuries and suffered mental torture and agony and had been made to languish for rest of life---Plaintiff as sole earning male member of his family had become disabled permanently and business of his wife had closed down---Plaintiffs remained admitted in hospital for treatment for a considerable time---Plaintiffs had sustained actual and collateral loses as their car had been smashed, job and business had gone and had to lead a depressed life for being worried about future of two minor children---Plaintiffs' claim was result of such wrongful act of defendant and was not remote, thus, they were entitled to be recompensed reasonably---Damages decreed by Trial Court were too meagre to commensurate to injuries, mental agony, torture suffered by plaintiffs and loss of physical disability sustained by first plaintiff---High Court enhanced damages to Rs.15 lacs with mark-up at bank rate on unpaid decretal amount from date of decree of Trial Court and on amount decreed by High Court till its realization.\n \n Mukhtiar Begum v. Karachi Transport Corporation and another 1992 MLD 1711; Hyder and another v. Burmah Shell Oil Company of India, Ltd. and others PLD 1951 Sindh 24; Muhammad Aziz Ullah Qureshi v. Iqbal Umar and others 1982 CLC 1081; Muhammad Younus Khan and 3 others v. Karachi Road Transport Corporation and another 1984 CLC 2830; Sabran Bibi and 7 others v. WAPDA through Chairman, WAPDA House 2003 CLC 885 and Sufi Muhammad Ishaque v. The Metropolitan Corporation, Lahore through Mayor PLD 1996 SC 737 ref.\n \n Pakistan Railways through its General Manager v. Javed Iqbal 1995 SCMR 446 and Malik Gul Muhammad Awan v. Federation of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 507 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.133 of 2005, decision dated: 27-06-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ AHMAD AND MAMOON RASHID SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "SOHAIL IKRAM and others\nvs\nMUJAHID SHAH and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12313",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1F5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2180 = 2013 SLD 2180 = 2013 CLD 2270",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes-------Special law has overriding effect over general law.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 7 (b)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 380 & 406---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.22-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199--- Constitutional petition---Special law---Banking offence---Registration of case---Petitioner availed finance facility from respondent bank and also pledged bags of rice---Bank alleged that petitioner had misappropriated or stolen the rice bags and sought direction from Ex-Officio Justice of Peace for registration of F.I.R.---Validity---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was a special law and had overriding effect over the provisions of Penal Code, 1860---When Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, itself provided procedure for dealing with matters of civil as well as criminal nature, only Banking Court constituted under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, had jurisdiction to take action upon criminal acts performed by parties---Provision of S.7(b) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, created a prohibition in respect of lodging of criminal case under the provisions of Penal Code, 1860---Ex-Officio Justice of Peace was not within his jurisdiction when he ordered for registration of case against petitioners under the provisions of Penal Code, 1860---Bank had no authority to file application under S.22-A, Cr.P.C., nor Ex-Officio Justice of Peace had any jurisdiction, in presence of Banking Court, to order for registration of case against petitioners---High Court set aside the order passed by Ex-Officio Justice of Peace---Petition was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Murshid Ali and 4 others v. S.H.O. Police Station Saddar, Khanewal and another 2011 PCr.LJ 1763; Mian Asim Farid and another v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and 4 others 2005 PCr.LJ 766 and Malik Tariq Mehmood v. Messrs Askari Leasing Ltd. PLD 2009 Lah. 629 ref.\n \n Shaukat Ali and others v. The State and others 2012 CLD 1 and Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and others v. Mian Asim Fareed and others 2006 SCMR 483 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.789 of 2012, decision dated: 2-07-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED MUHAMMAD KAZIM RAZA SHAMSI, J",
    "": "TARIQ HAMEED and 2 others\nvs\nADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12314",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1F5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2181 = 2013 SLD 2181 = 2013 CLD 2274",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 46(1), 51(1) & 156---Failure to file Annual Audited Accounts and Regulatory Returns within time---Company was required to file its Annual Audited Accounts and Regulatory Returns for relevant year on or before stipulated date, but company had failed to do that even after maximum allowable extention of time thus committed default---Directors of the company, in addition to the day to day running of the company and the management of its business, also had some 'fiduciary' duties, i.e. duties held in trust; and some wider duties imposed by statute, and breach of those statutory duties would be a criminal offence, punishable by fine or imprisonment---Directors were gauged against a higher standard of accountability which required them to be vigilant; and perform their duties with due care---As default of Ss.46(1) & 51(1) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 and Regulations had been established penalty as provided under S.156 of the Ordinance could be imposed on the company and its Directors---Commission, in exercise of its power conferred under S.156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, instead of imposing the maximum penalty, imposed a fine of Rs.20,000 on the company---Company and its management were also warned and directed to take special care in filing the Annual Audited Accounts, Regulatory Returns and other statutory returns as required by law.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=46(1),51(1),156\\n\\r\\n\\rInsurance Ordinance, 2000=46(1),51(1),156\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice Issued dated 6-07-2012, decision dated: 28-12-2012, hearing DATE : 30-11-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "TARIQ HUSSAIN, DIRECTOR (INSURANCE)",
    "": "CREDIT INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12315",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2182 = 2012 SLD 2182 = 2012 CLD 394",
    "Key Words:": "Access Promotion Rules, 2004-------R. 12---- Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act (XVI of 1996), S. 23---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199--- Constitutional petition--- Reporting requirements---Petitioner was issued show cause notice under S.23 of Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996 by Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) by virtue of which petitioner was asked to submit International Incoming Traffic Data for the months of January, February and March 2010 and also explain in writing within thirty days of the issuance of the said notice as to why their licence should not be suspended, terminated or any other enforcement order should not be passed against them---Held, petitioner, through the show-cause notice, was asked to provide information as required under Rule 12(1)(a) of the Access Promotion Rules, 2004 and therefore no adverse order had been passed against the petitioner---Show-cause notice could not be challenged in constitutional jurisdiction---Constitutional petition being not maintainable, same was accordingly dismissed with costs.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3190 of 2010, decision dated: 24-06-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "RIAZ AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "Messrs DANCOM PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive OfficeR\nvs\nPAKISTAN TELECOMMUNICATION AUTHORITY through Chairman and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12316",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2183 = 2012 SLD 2183 = 2012 CLD 71",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XII, R.6---Recovery of bank loan---Judgment on admission---Principle---Banking Court granted leave to defend the suit and framed issues---Plaintiff sought passing of under O.XII, R.6 C.P.C. on the ground that defendant had allegedly made admissions with regard to claim of plaintiff---Validity---Issues were framed with regard to liability to pay under guarantees and circumstances under which guarantees had been executed it could not be said that it was a case of admission and the case could not be decided on the decision of two issues referred by plaintiff---Dispute between the parties could not be decided without first resorting to leading of evidence on all issues including those two which were subject-matter of application under O.XII, R.6, C.P.C.---Application was dismissed in circumstances.\n Macdonald Layton and Company Pakistan Ltd. v. Uzin Export-Import Foreign Trade Co. 1996 SCMR 696; Mian Tajammul Hussain and 3 others v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan 1993 SCMR 1137; G.R. Syed v. Muhammad Afzal 2007 SCMR 433 and State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Wali Muhammad Akbarji and others 1985 CLC 2865 distinguished.\n Izzat Khan and another v. Ramzan Khan and others 1993 MLD 1287; Muhammad Zaki and another v. Muhammad Taqi PLD 1995 Kar. 416 and Gerry's International (Pvt.) Limited through Managing Director v. Qatar Airways through Area Manager PLD 2003 Kar. 253 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M.As. Nos.2808 of 2005 and 3014 of 2004 in Suit No.B-40 of 2000, decision dated: 31st May, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SALMAN HAMID, J",
    "": "SAUDI PAK INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT COMPANY (PVT.) LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12317",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2184 = 2012 SLD 2184 = 2012 CLD 1",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 7(4)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 406---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Breach of trust---Quashing of F.I.R.---Petitioner obtained loan from complainant Bank and mortgaged assets and properties, besides hypothecation of stock---Complainant Bank on inspection of stock, noted deficiency therein and intimated the petitioner but their grievance was not properly redressed---Case under S. 406, Penal Code, 1860 was got registered against petitioner for mis-appropriation of hypothecated stock--- Petitioner's contention was that under S.7(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 the only remedy available to complainant Bank was to file complaint before Banking Court to decide the matter as there was embargo under the Ordinance to avail remedy under any ordinary law, either civil or of criminal nature---Validity---No order for quashing of F.I.R. could be passed in absence of any finding that the offences mentioned in F.I.R. were false and malicious and there was no finding that a particular forum or mode had been prescribed with respect to taking of cognizance of an offence which also implied prohibition regarding the registration of F.I.R.---Registration of F.I.R. and taking of cognizance of cases were two distinct and independent concepts under the criminal law---If the intention of law-maker was to put any clog on the registration of F.I.R. then the legislature would have said so specifically and if the law put a condition only on the taking of cognizance then it could never be read to imply prohibition on registration of F.I.R.---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n Murshid Ali and 4 others v. SHO, Police Station Saddar Khanewal and another 2011 PCr.LJ 1763; Nizar Ali Fazwani and another v. Messrs Pak Golf Leasing Company Limited and another 2009 PCr.LJ 325; Malik Tariq Mehmood v. Messrs Askari Leasing Ltd. 2009 CLD 1422; Muhammad Iqbal v. Station House Officer and 2 others 2009 CLD 1149 and Sabir Ahmed v. Nazeer Ahmed and another 2010 PCr.LJ 412 distinguished.\n Shaikh Muhammad Taqi v. The State 1991 PCr.LJ 963; Ghulam Sarwar Zardari v. Piyar Ali alias Piyaro and another 2010 SCMR 624; Zahid Jameel v. SHO and others (W.P. No. 7635 of 2008); Mahmood Akhtar Khan v. The State and 2 others 2010 CLD 639; Asif Mehmood Bhatti v. Federal Investigation Agency and 2 others 2002 YLR 3847; Muhammad Saleem Bhatti v. Syed Safdar Ali Rizvi and 2 others 2006 SCMR 1957; Haji Sardar Khalid Saleem v. Muhammad Ashraf and others 2006 SCMR 1192 and Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq and others 2006 SCMR 276 ref.\n Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and others v. Mian Asim Fareed and others 2006 SCMR 483 fol.\n \n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 561-A---Quashing of F.I.R.---Allegation of malice, effect of---F.I.R. can be quashed if the very registration of case is proved to be mala fide on the record but mere allegation of malice does not confer jurisdiction to grant such relief.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2495 of 2010, decision dated: 21st October, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MEHMOOD MAQBOOL BAJWA, J",
    "": "SHAUKAT ALI and others\nvs\nTHE STATE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12318",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2185 = 2012 SLD 2185 = 2012 CLD 92",
    "Key Words:": "Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (XLVI of 1981)-------S. 2---Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010, R.2(1) & (2)--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Exit control list---Bank loan, recovery of---Name of petitioner had been placed on Exit Control List for recovery of bank loan when recovery suit was pending before Banking Court of competent jurisdiction---Validity---Where a person was involved in a private dispute, the provisions of Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010, were not applicable, unless government interest was at stake or where person was involved in fraud against foreign banks and reputable companies with significant foreign investment or if it was shown that person was involved in heinous crime or in drug trafficking---Nothing was available on record that petitioner had committed any fraud with respondent banking company nor there was any such allegation against him of such nature---Suit relied upon by respondent banking company was simpliciter a case of financial liabilities which were secured against tangible security and the same had been liquidated against principal borrower and liability, if any, against petitioner was shown to be less than Rs.100 million---Unless such liability was shown against petitioner, as per Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010, name of petitioner could not be placed on Exit Control List---High Court directed the authorities to delete the name of petitioner from Exit Control List, as there was no justification for the same---Petition was allowed in circumstances.\n Hashmat Ali Chawla v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2003 Kar. 705; Zia Mohyuddin v. Additional Director (Emigration) Fedral Investigation Agency Airport, Karachi and others PLD 2010 Lah. 128 and Zurash Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and 3 others 2011 CLD 511 ref.\n Malik Altaf Javed and Malik Naeem for Petitioner.\n Muhammad Ashraf Khan Mughal, D.A.-G. for Respondent No.1.\n Muhammad Aslam, Additional Director and Mudasar Latif, Assistant Director for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.\n Date of hearing: 29th September, 2011.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P.D. No.756 of 2011, decision dated: 29-09-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND IMAM BUX BALOCH, J",
    "": "HASSAN RAZA through Lawfully Constituted AttorneY\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad High Court High Court and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12319",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2186 = 2012 SLD 2186 = 2012 CLD 141",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Leave to defend the suit---Substantial question of law or fact---Scope---Simple denial of payment does not by itself raise a substantial question of law or fact, mandate of S. 10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, or even a plausible case.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, R.2---Recovery of money---Leave to defend the suit---Pre-condition---Defendant cannot appear and defend the suit under the provisions of O.XXXVII, R.2, C.P.C. unless he obtains leave from judge, whereas under the provisions of S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, it is mandated that substantial questions of law and facts must be alive, which constitutes, \"\"substantial questions of law and fact\"\"---Defendant having overcome such hurdle becomes entitled to leave.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit---Restructuring of loan---Defendant did not deny availing of finance facility and contended that finance facility extended in year, 2007, was nothing but renewal of running finance facility previously granted and defendant never agreed to the same---Validity---Restructured amount was always an admitted and acknowledged amount by borrower and no disbursement was involved in such restructuring which was distinct and different from fresh finance, where disbursement was pivotal---Restructuring of borrower's liability was an accommodation and latitude extended by financial institution---No case for leave was made out and application for leave to defend the suit by defendant was dismissed--- Suit was decreed accordingly.\n Azmat Wali v. Hassan Al-Adawai and 2 others 1983 CLC 546; Fine Texile Mills Ltd. Karachi v. Haji Umer PLD 1963 SC 163; Habib Bank v. Qayoom Spinning Ltd. 2001 MLD 1351 and Muhammad Arshad and another v. Citibank NA 2006 CLD 1011 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-128 of 2010, decision dated: 30-05-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SALMAN HAMID, J",
    "": "NIB BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nvs\nDEWAN TEXTILE MILLS LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12320",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2187 = 2012 SLD 2187 = 2012 CLD 170",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 48, 65, 74 & 76---Recovery of bank loan---Report of Chartered Accountant---Effect---Suit filed by bank was decreed in its favour on the basis of report prepared by Chartered Accountant appointed by Banking Court to examine the accounts of bank---Banking Court, after going through tabulated figures and conclusion arrived at in the Chartered Accountant's report, observed that assessment of accounts had thoroughly been made by Chartered Accountant, as he had dealt in details each and every transaction of three accounts maintained by defendants with bank and such figures were not controverted by bank during cross-examination---Banking Court further held that while dealing with accounts, entries from Books of Accounts and Registers made for the purposes of calculations, were in accordance with Arts.74 and 76 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Validity---Conclusion arrived at after affording extensive cross-examination of Chartered Accountant and opinion arrived therein fell within the parameters of Arts. 48 and 65 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Bank failed to point out any error either in the observation and conclusion drawn by Chartered Accountant in his report, nor any illegality had been pointed out in the and decree passed by Banking Court, which otherwise was based on proper reading of evidence and sound principles of law---Division Bench of High Court, in High Court appeal, did not find any error in the and decree passed by Banking Court, which was otherwise based upon report of an expert, whereas neither bank nor defendants could refer to any document or evidence which could possibly justify any interference in the ---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n United Bank Limited v. Messrs Central Cotton Mills Ltd. and 5 others 2001 MLD 78; Banque Indosuez v. Banking Tribunal for Sindh and Balochistan and others 1994 CLC 2272; Trinity Private School and another v. Mumtaz H. Hidayatullah and others 1997 SCMR 494; Habib Bank Limited v. Service Fabrics Ltd. and others 2004 CLD 1117; Messrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and others v. Messrs National Development Finance Corporation 2002 CLC 166; Messrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Ltd. and 6 others v. National Development Finance Corporation, Karachi PLD 2002 SC 500; Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Hussain Khan and others 2004 CLC 1229; Syed Iqbal Hussain v. Mst. Sarwari Begum PLD 1967 Lah. 1138; Zaheer-ur-Din v. Mst. Khurshida Begum 1996 CLC 580; M.A. Khan v. Mst. Masooda Shaheen 1981 CLC 1358; Darbar Khan Talukdar and others v. Babu Apurba Kumar Hazra and others PLD 1959 Dacca 26; Chandan Mull Indra Kumar and others v. Chiman Lal Girdhar Das Parekh and others AIR 1940 Privy Council 3; Bhawani Sahai Saliq Ram v. Chhajju Mal and others 1937 Allahabad 276; B.B. Harjimal and Sons v. Firm of Dhampatmal AIR 1921 Sind 42; Haji Fazal Elahi and Sons v. Bank of Punjab 2004 CLD 162; Samar Gul v. Central Government and others PLD 1986 SC 35; Syed Niamat Ali and 4 others v. Dewan Jairam Dass and another PLD 1983 SC 5; Mehar Din v. Dr. Bashir Ahmed Khan 1985 SCMR 1 and Habib Bank Limited v. Al-Jalal Textile Mills Ltd. 2003 CLD 1007 distinguished.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XII, R. 6---Recovery of loan--- Admission--- Scope--- Admission necessarily has to be unequivocal, clear, unconditional and unambiguous---Such admission should not only be in respect of amount but liability to pay the same to plaintiff.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Recovery of loan---Plaint---Necessary facts---Plaintiff bank was to state his claim in plaint by specifying amount of finance availed by defendant from financial institution; amounts paid by defendant to financial institution and debits of payments; and amount of finance and other amounts relating to finance payable by defendant to financial institution upto the date of institution of the suit and supporting evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeals Nos. 39 and 47 of 2008, decision dated: 3rd October, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED and others\nvs\nRAFIQ AHMED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12321",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 2925 = 2016 SLD 2925 = (2016) 380 ITR 652",
    "Key Words:": "Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with rule 8A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 - - Expenditure incurred in relation to income not includible in total income (Interest) - Assessing Officer disallowed an amount under section 14A by holding that interest bearing funds had been used to earn tax free dividend, etc. - Whether section 14A requires Assessing Officer to record satisfaction that interest bearing funds have been used to earn tax free income based upon credible and relevant evidence - Held, yes - Whether since there was no tangible material that could have enabled Assessing Officer to record satisfaction in terms of section 14A, disallowance made was unjustified - Held, yes [Para 10][In favour of assessee]\nFACTS\n \nâ– \n \nThe assessee-company filed its return of income.\nâ– \n \nThe Assessing Officer disallowed an amount under section 14A, read with rule 8D by holding that interest bearing funds had been used to earn tax free dividend etc.\nâ– \n \nOn appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition by holding that the revenue had not been able to prove that interest bearing funds were used.\nâ– \n \nOn appeal, the Tribunal also affirmed said order of Commissioner (Appeals).\nâ– \n \nOn appeal:\nHELD\n \nâ– \n \nSection 14A requires the Assessing Officer to record satisfaction that interest bearing funds have been used to earn tax free income. The satisfaction to be recorded must be based upon credible and relevant evidence. The onus, therefore, to prove that interest bearing funds were used, lies squarely on the shoulders of the revenue. Thus, if the Assessing Officer is able to refer to relevant material while recording satisfaction that borrowed funds were used to earn interest free income as opposed to the assessee's own funds, the Assessing Officer may legitimately disallow such a claim. The Assessing Officer, however, cannot, by recording general observations, particularly where the assessee has denied using interest bearing funds, proceed to infer that interest bearing income must has been used to earn exempted income. Section 14A being in the nature of an exception, has to be construed stricly and only where the Assessing Officer records satisfaction, on the basis of clear and cogent material, shall an order be passed under section 14A, disallowing such a claim. As there is no tangible material on record that could have enabled the Assessing Officer to record satisfaction in terms of section 14A, findings recorded by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal that the Assessing Officer has failed to discharge this onus are neither perverse nor arbitrary and, therefore, do not call for interference. [Para 10]\nCASE REVIEW\n \nCIT v. Winsome Taxtile Industries Ltd. [2009] 319 ITR 204 (Punj. & Har.) (para 11) followed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nCIT v. Hero Cycles Ltd. [2010] 323 ITR 518/189 Taxman 50 (Punj. & Har.) (para 6), CIT v. Winsome Textile Industries Ltd. [2009] 319 ITR 204 (Punj. & Har.) (para 6) and CIT v. Deepak Mittal [2014] 361 ITR 131/[2013] 219 Taxman 314/38 taxmann.com 83 (Punj. & Har.) (para 6).",
    "Court Name:": "Punjab and Haryana High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=14A\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=14A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT APPEAL NO. 320 OF 2013, JANUARY 27, 2015",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJIVE BHALLA AND B.S. WALIA, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax-I, Ludhiana\nv.\nAbhishek Industries Ltd.*"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12322",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2188 = 2012 SLD 2188 = 2012 CLD 194",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-------Ss. 3 & 5---Condonation of delay---Principles---Delay of each day is to be explained---Mandatory duty under S.3 of Limitation Act, 1908, has been imposed upon court to dismiss a suit, appeal or application, if it has been instituted after prescribed period of limitation---Party wishing to take advantage of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, must therefore, satisfy the court that it was not negligent and had been prosecuting its case with due diligence and care.\n \n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---\n \n----S. 5---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Negligence of counsel---Effect---Negligence of counsel is negligence of party because he is agent of the party---Gross negligence on the part of counsel, while the party may have a good case for proceeding against him, cannot form a ground for extension of time under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Party wishing to take advantage of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, must satisfy the court that it has not been negligent rather had been pursuing his case with due diligence and care and was not inactive.\n \n(c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---\n \n----S. 5---Condonation of delay---Old age has not been considered as a ground for condonation of delay under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Appeal---Condonation of delay---Expression \"\"sufficient cause\"\"---Pre-condition--- Appellants contended that counsel representing them did not inform them about passing of and decree by Banking Court against them---Validity---In order to have benefit of S. 5 of Limitation Act, 1908, it was the duty of appellants to explain delay that elapsed beyond the period allowed by law for filing the appeal---Existence of \"\"sufficient cause\"\" was condition precedent for exercise of discretion under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Expression \"\"sufficient cause\"\" was a cause which was beyond the control of party invoking aid of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Cause of delay which, by due care and attention, the party could have avoided, could not be a \"\"sufficient cause\"\"---The test of whether or not a cause was sufficient was to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by exercise of due care and attention; whether it was a bona fide cause---Nothing was to be deemed to be done bona fide or in good faith which was not done with due care and attention---Appellant failed to make out a case for condonation of delay in filing of appeal---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n Jhanda v. Maqbool Hussain and others 1981 SCMR 126; Sher Muhammad v. Said Muhammad Shah 1981 SCMR 212; Mustafa v. Settlement Commissioner, Bahawalpur Division, Bahawalpur 1974 SCMR 104 and Saddiqunnisa v. Khan Sahib Agha Muhammad Sultan Mirza and others PLD 1972 Kar. 103 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. D-85 of 2011, decision dated: 5-08-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED AND MUHAMMAD TASNIM, JJ",
    "": "Mst. KHALIDA KHATOON and another\nvs\nASKARI BANK LIMITED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12323",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2189 = 2012 SLD 2189 = 2012 CLD 189",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9(2) & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend suit---Statement of accounts---Defendants, application for leave to defend the suit did not deny having taken the loan---Plea raised by defendants was that statement of accounts provided by bank did not fulfil requirement of S. 9(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and the suit was not filed by authorized persons---Validity---Bank gave statement of accounts in sufficient detail and break-up, not only therein but also in the body of plaint, and the same had met the requirements of S. 9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, as the requisite information was ably communicated to the defendants---Documents attached with plaint showed that the suit was competently filed---No substantial question of law and facts was raised by defendants in their application for leave to defend that required recording of evidence for which leave was necessary---Defendants had also admitted their liability and no case for leave was made out--- Application was dismissed in circumstances.\n C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chairman and 5 others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587; Bank of Punjab through Manager v. Mrs. Mah Tallat Sultan and another 2006 CLD 773; National Bank of Pakistan through Manager v. Messrs Mujahid Nawaz Cotton Ginners through Partners and 6 others 2007 CLD 678; Bankers Equity Limited and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited through Chief Executive and 7 others 2010 CLD 65 and Soneri Bank Limited v. Classic Denim Mills (Pvt.) Limited and 3 others 2011 CLD 408 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-115 and C.M.As. Nos. 7950, 7951, 7952, 11614 of 2009, decision dated: 9-06-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SALMAN HAMID, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs APOLLO TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED and 4 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12324",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2190 = 2012 SLD 2190 = 2012 CLD 218",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Words and phrases-------\"\"Obiter dictum/dicta\"\" Definition\n \nHabib Bank Ltd. and another v. Wasim Enterprises and others 2007 CLD 473 ref\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 19 & 22---Execution of decree for recovery of suit amount passed against defendants jointly and severally limiting liability of defendant-mortgagor to amount secured and shown in Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deeds plus all service charges and cost etc.---Auction of mortgaged property--- Application by defendant-mortgagor that from sale proceeds of mortgaged property, only amount secured by such Memorandum could be recovered and not beyond that---Acceptance of such application by Executing Court---Decree-holder's plea that decree was passed against both defendants jointly and severally; and that Executing Court had gone beyond decree by accepting such application as observations of Banking Court made in decree limiting liability of defendant - mortgagor to the extent of amount secured and shown in such Memorandum were not a substantive decision and were liable to be ignored---Validity---­Such observations of Banking Court, being in nature of a proviso restricting application of main statute, had restricted earlier part of whereby liability of both defendants had been held to be joint and several---Such observations were not only part of substantive order, but qualified as such---Decree-holder had not appealed against such decree---Executing Court by accepting such application had not gone beyond decree and committed any illegality--- High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.\n \nHabib Bank Ltd. and another v. Wasim Enterprises and others 2007 CLD 473; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Iftikhar Ahmed and 7 others 1993 CLC 535; Blacks Law Dictionary; Hyderabad Development Authority v. Abdul Majeed and others PLD 2002 SC 84; Najmul Hassan Ata and 4 others v. Habib Bank Limited through President and 5 others 2006 CLD 1506 and Ist Appeal No.46 of 2005 ref.\n \n(c) Execution---\n \n----Executing Court, powers of---Scope---Executing Court could not go beyond decision in original and decree.\n \nHabib Bank Ltd. and another v. Wasim Enterprises and others 2007 CLD 473 fol\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 34-B---­Decree in suit for recovery of loan amount---Non-granting of interest on suit amount by Banking Court in terms of S. 34-B, C.P.C.---Validity---Grant of such interest was a mandatory right of loan giving agency---Decree-holder in such case would have a remedy to file appeal against such omission of Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No. 37 of 2010, decision dated: 1st April, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs HABIB BANK LIMITED\nvs\nBANKING COURT NO.II and 2 others\nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Iftikhar Ahmed and 7 others 1993 CLC 535 ref"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12325",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2191 = 2012 SLD 2191 = 2012 CLD 239",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S. 151---Inherent jurisdiction---Object, scope and extent---Court has inherent powers under S.151, C.P.C. to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court---Such are enabling provisions and powers thereunder can be exercised by court to cover ostensibly impossible situations for complete dispensation of justice, for which Civil Procedure Code, 1908, has been designed but despite the best efforts of draftsman to cater for all possible situations, if it is found lacking in meeting some eventualities, the court can act ex delicto justitia, supply the omission in the procedure, adopt methodology for effectually carrying out the purpose in view. \n \nPLD 1993 SC 418 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----Ss. 48, 151, O.IX, Rr.8 & 9---Execution application, restoration of--- Inherent powers--- Applicability---Provision of O.IX, R.9, C.P.C. is designed for restoration of suit wholly or partly dismissed under O.IX, R.8, C.P.C. and it does not speak anything about restoration of application dismissed in default---Absence of necessary provisions do not necessarily lead to absence of jurisdiction in a civil court for restoration of execution application dismissed in default upon proof of sufficient cause---Execution application can be restored in exercise of inherent powers. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.48, 151, O.IX, Rr. 8 & 9--- Appeal--- Execution application, restoration of--- Inherent jurisdiction--- Execution application filed by decree holder was dismissed for non-prosecution and application for restoration of execution was also dismissed for non-prosecution, thereafter application for restoration of the application for restoration was also dismissed for non-prosecution---Held, while deciding second restoration application, Executing Court was only obliged to see whether any case was made out for restoration of earlier application but instead of considering the crucial question whether any sufficient cause had been made out or not, second restoration application was dismissed without considering the reasons for non-appearance mentioned in personal affidavit of the counsel filed in support of restoration of application---High Court set aside the order dismissing second application for restoration of execution application and the same was restored to its original position---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.35 of 2009, decision dated: 11-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs UNITED BANK LIMITED through Attorneys and 2 others\nvs\nMessrs PLASTIC PACK (PVT) LIMITED and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12326",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2192 = 2012 SLD 2192 = 2012 CLD 212",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Recovery of bank loan---Application for leave to defend the suit was moved during pendency of suit by the defendant---Defendant did not deny having taken the loan but only relied upon a suit filed by him against the bank---Validity---Mere filing of suit for accounts by defendant / borrower did not mean and form valid, good or substantial ground for leave---Defendant had to stand on his own legs and to make out a case for leave to defend it---No substantial question of law and facts was raised by defendant---Only by passing amounts claimed by plaintiff had been denied, that too by taking the stand that suit against bank was pending, was not sufficient to claim leave---Application was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-127 of 2009 and C.M.As. Nos. 9684 of 2009, 4701 of 2010, decision dated: 28-04-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SALMAN HAMID, J",
    "": "NIB BANK LTD. through Authorized Attorney--Plaintiff\nvs\nSHADMAN ELECTRONIC INDUSTRY (PVT.) LTD. and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12327",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2193 = 2012 SLD 2193 = 2012 CLD 263",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Recovery of bank loan---Mark up on mark up---Despite notices issued to defendants, they did not file application for leave to defend the suit---Nothing was available on record whereby it could be deduced that amounts claimed by bank were not due and payable by defendants to bank, more particularly when legal notice was sent, despite receipt by defendants, was not responded to and liability mentioned therein was not disputed or denied---Defendants had only mentioned that they would revert back to it in due course of time---Validity---Principal outstanding amount and agreed profit together with cost of funds as calculated by plaintiff was accepted against Murabaha facility and Ijarah facility---Charity against Murabaha and Ijaraha facility was declined inasmuch as the same was nothing but mark up on mark up and could not be allowed in any form---Suit of bank was decreed to the extent of amounts mentioned in statement of summary of accounts minus charity mentioned against Murabaha and Ijarah finance--- Suit was decreed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-195 of 2010, decision dated: 23rd May, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SALMAN HAMID, J",
    "": "DAWOOD ISLAMIC BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nADMORE GAS (PVT.) LIMITED and 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12328",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2194 = 2012 SLD 2194 = 2012 CLD 332",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit---Substantial question of law and fact---Evidence, recording of---Defendant contended that no amount whatsoever was due and payable as facility under Murabaha Finance Agreement was not disbursed and Forced TR was paid off by defendant---Validity---Documents appended with plaint showed that principal amount under Murabaha Finance Agreement was Rs.150,000,000 and its resale price was Rs.154,974,658---Resale price having been settled, therefore, prima facie, plaintiff was not entitled to charge profit of Rs.9,768,164 of which no plausible explanation was available to plaintiff---What amount was actually due and payable under Forced TR, if compared with the figures mentioned in application and agreement for irrevocable documents was to be proved which was the application and agreement for irrevocable documents which showed that Forced TR of US$ 776,026.24 was created---If US$ were calculated at the rate of Rs.62.30 (conversion rate at the relevant time) it had come to Rs. 48,346,435 as against the same, plaintiff had mentioned that defendant had paid the amount towards such Forced TR to the extent of Rs.51,184,543 which also required reconciliation through evidence--- All such discrepancies having been raised by defendant had come within the pale of substantial questions of law and fact and required evidence and to prove the case, leave had become inevitable and the same was granted---Application was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-74 and C.M.A. No. 8880 of 2010, decision dated: 3rd June, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SALMAN HAMID, J",
    "": "FAYSAL BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs DEWAN TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12329",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2195 = 2012 SLD 2195 = 2012 CLD 285",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 96, 115, O.XXXIX, Rr.1, 2 & O.XLIII, R.1---Interlocutory order---Appeal---Maintainability---Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Applicability--- Scope--- Appellant sought interim injunction under O.XXXIX, R.1 and 2 C.P.C., which application was dismissed by Banking Court-­--Appellant assailed the order of Banking Court before High Court in appeal under O.XLIII, R. 1(r), C.P.C.---Validity---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was a special statute and Civil Procedure Code, 1908, even if its provisions were not specifically ousted by any section of the Ordinance the same was still a general law so far as banking matters were concerned---Prima facie, the provisions of S. 22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, would prevail over the general law and sections providing for appeals and revisions under Civil Procedure Code, 1908, including O.XLIII, R. 1(r), S. 115 and S. 96, C.P.C.---If there was a bar for filing an appeal against an interlocutory order under S.22(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, then it could not be circumvented by filing appeals or revisions under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, even if orders of Banking Court had been made on application filed under any provision of Civil Procedure Code, 1908---High Court declined to circumvent the bar provided under S.22(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, by filing revision under S.115, C.P.C. or appeal under O.XLIII, R.1(r), C.P.C. or under any of the provisions and such revision or appeal were not maintainable---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMs. Afshan Ahmed v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited and another 2002 CLD 137; Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Indus Lenentose (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2003 CLD 1788; Pakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109; Tri-Star Polyster Limited v. City Bank 2001 SCMR 410; Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Limited, Peshawar Cantt. and others v. Government of Pakistan through Collector Customs, Customs House, Jamrud Road, Peshawar and others 2002 SCMR 496; Messrs Tank Steel and Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Dera Ismail Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 77; Mian Tahir-ul-Rafique v. City Housing 2005 MLD 26; Karachi Pipe Mills Limited v. Habib Bank Ltd. and another 2003 CLD 1487; Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Bela Automotives Ltd. 2006 CLd 169; Muhammad Ayub Butt v. Allied Bank Ltd., Peshawar and others PLD 1981 SC 359; Marhaba Textile Ltd. v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 1822 and Rasu Food Industries and another v. Messrs Pakistan Industrial Leasing Cooperation Limited and others 2005 SCMR 1643 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 13 of 2010, decision dated: 13-06-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MAZHAR BUTT\nvs\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12330",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2196 = 2012 SLD 2196 = 2012 CLD 337",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Petition for leave to defend suit---Procedure of Banking Court---Provisions of Ss.9 & 10, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 oblige the parties to the suit to identically plead/state the same nature of accounts or the heads of accounts.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9(3) & 10(3)(4)---Petition for leave to defend suit---Procedure of Banking Court---Plaintiff institution and the defending 'customer' have identical responsibility respectively under Ss.9(3) and 10(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to plead and state clearly and particularly the finances availed by defendant, repayments made by him, the dates thereof and the amounts of finances repayable by such defendant who has also been saddled with the additional responsibility to also specify the amounts disputed by him---Defending customer is thus obliged to put in a definite response to the Banks' accounting and has under S.10(3) and (4) to compulsorily plead in answer in the leave petition his accounts as well as the facts and amounts disputed by him as repayable to the plaintiff.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Preamble & S.9---Banking suit---Procedure---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, has rationale of schematic discipline---Banking suit is normally a suit on Accounts which are duly ledgered and maintained compulsorily in the books of Accounts under the prescribed principles/standards of Accounting in terms of the laws, rules and Banking practices---Instead of leaving it to the option of the parties to make general assertions on accounts, the Ordinance binds both the sides to be absolutely specific on accounts---Parties to a suit have been obligated equally to definitively plead and to specifically state their respective accounts---Scope of the suit thus becomes well defined---Controversies are confined to the claimed and/or the disputed numbers, facts and reasons thereof---Unnecessary controversial details, the evidence thereto and the time of the trial, are curtailed---Trial would remain within the laid out parametrical scope of the claimed and the disputed accounts.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 10(1)(3)(4)(6)(11) & 9(3)---Petition for leave to defend suit---Procedure of Banking Court---Non-impleadment under Ss.10(3)(4) and 9(3) of the Ordinance of accounts in terms of said provisions, entails legal consequences under S.10(1)(6) and (11) of the Ordinance.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 4 & 10---Petition for leave to defend suit---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is a special law and provides a special procedure for banking suits---Provisions of the Ordinance under S.4 thereof override all other laws and require strict consequences of rejection of leave petition along with decree etc.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Provisions of Ss.9 & 10 of the Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 are mandatory.\n \nNiaz Muhammad v. Fazal Raqib PLD 1974 SC 134 ref.\n \n(g) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Construction of statute as to whether mandatory enactment shall be considered directory only or obligatory, with an implied nullification for disobedience---Principles.\n \nIt is true that no universal rule can be laid down for the construction of statutes as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory, with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of the Courts to try to get at the real intention of the legislature, by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed. As a general rule however, a statute is understood to be directory when it contains matter merely of direction but not when those directions are followed up by an express provision that, in default of following them, the facts shall be null and void. To put it differently, if the Act is directory, its disobedience does not entail any invalidity; if the Act is mandatory disobedience entails serious legal consequences amounting to the invalidity of the act done in disobedience to the provision.\n \nNiaz Muhammad v. Fazal Raqib PLD 1974 SC 134 ref.\n \n(h) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10(3)(4)(5)(6) & (11)--- Petition for leave to defend suit---Requirements---Application of defendants, in the present case, was not in conformity with mandatory provisions (S.10(3) & (5)) did not fulfil the mandates of S.10(3)(4)(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and failed to plead the required accounts without showing any cause or reason for inability to comply with said requirements---Petitioners, attracted the prescribed legal consequences, in circumstances---Principles.\n \nIn the present case, the application for leave to defend the suit filed by the petitioners did not fulfil the requirement of section 10(3), (4) and (5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. It was admittedly not in conformity with the said mandatory provisions. No cause or the reasons for inability to comply with said requirements were shown. Instead it was expressly admitted by the petitioners before the High Court and also before the Supreme Court that the petitioners failed to fulfil the mandates of the said provisions and did not plead the required accounts. The petitioners/defendants thus attracted the prescribed legal consequences of:--\n \n(i) rejection of their leave petition under section 10(6);\n \n(ii) non-entitlement under section 10(1) to defend the suit for not obtaining leave to defend the suit in terms provided for in section 10;\n \n(iii) the allegations of fact in the plaint were deemed under section 10(1) to have been admitted by them; and\n \n(iv) a and decree against them and in favour of the plaintiff bank under sections 10(1) and (11).\n \n(i) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9(2) & 10---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVII of 1891), S.4---Procedure of Banking Court---Provision of S.9(2), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is mandatory and without strict compliance wherewith, the plaint is incomplete and cannot become basis of a suit under the Ordinance---Principles.\n \nSubsection (2) of section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 makes it mandatory for a Banking institution to support its plaint in a suit against the customer by a statement of account duly certified under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 and also by all other relevant documents relating to grant of finance. Without such a 'Statement of Account' filed along with the plaint, a customer will obviously remain totally unaware of the amount advanced, mark up charged and the basis, break up, premise mode of calculation of account nature of default and the actual amount of Bank's claim against the defendant-customer. He will thus be unable to frame his defence within the limited period prescribed by law, to show reasonable, serious and plausible grounds of contest to be able to seek and obtain leave to defend the suit. Absence of filing the requisite statements of account along with the plaint, will essentially amount to absence of providing adequate, proper and reasonable opportunity of defence to the defending customer. Being thus unable to file a proper leave petition within thirty days under section 10(2) or within twenty one days under section 10(12) of the Ordinance, such a customer may or may not later be able to amend his leave petition. His defence shall thus be rendered illusory, hence denied. Upon the compliance a Banking Company with the provisions of section 9(2) of the Ordinance, depends the right of defence of a defendant in the summary suits as visualized under the Ordinance, wherefor, the filing of duly certified statements of account by a Banking company along with its plaint, cannot be taken to be a mere formality or a technicality. This provision can only be held to be mandatory. Without strict compliance wherewith, the plaint is incomplete and cannot become basis of a suit under this law.\n \nThe similarity of the provisions legislated in sections 9 and 10 of the Ordinance leads to identical consequences in the absence of the demanded accounts and the documents. Suit of the plaintiff institution will be rejectable while defendants' leave petition will be exposed to rejection etc. A Plaintiff institution may be rendered unable or deficient in appropriately setting up its answers to the accounts, disputed amounts and facts of the defendant in reply to the leave application as per section 10(8) of the Ordinance. And that in the absence of the requisite account and the facts etc. in defence filed by a defendant in the leave petition, a plaintiff will remain unaware of the admitted or denied or disputed accounts and facts of the defendants, to adequately, seriously and reasonably pursue the suit and its trial. This will obviously defeat the intent and the object of the provided provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \nIn the absence of the support of statements of accounts and finance documents, Bank's plaint was liable to be rejected. Consequent upon the rejection of the leave petition, the defendants were deemed to have admitted the contents of the plaint. The defendants remained bound thereto. The court of course was not so bound. It was not expected to proceed blindfolded. The court therefore in performance of its duty, itself examined the plaint along with documents to decide as to whether the suit complied with the mandatory provisions of section 9 or not and as to the nature of the order, or decree to be passed by the Court.\n \nBankers Equity Limited and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited through Chief Executive and 7 others 2010 CLD 651 ref.\n \n(j) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10---Petition for leave to defend---Petitioners had not shown the prejudice caused to them purportedly by alleged incomplete statements of accounts, which in fact were complete on considering the effect of rollovers---Separate statement of accounts was filed by the plaintiff Bank in each separate/independent account which commenced without a debit from its respective date of commencement---Petitioners had failed to distinguish the particulars of one account from the other, lending non-credibility of their objection as raised---In the absence of denial of availing of the finance facilities, execution of the charge/security documents and admission of the outstanding liability or the statement of accounts, there existed no substantial question of law or fact requiring evidence.\n \n(k) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 15---Pledging of goods with Bank as security for the advance, does not absolve the defendant (customer) from his liability to clear his dues---Bank only acquires a lien over such pledged goods for the recovery of his dues and had a right, after notice to the debtor, to sell those goods to reimburse itself---Debtor can claim an adjustment of the sale proceeds of the goods against the amount claimed by the Bank only where such a sale is actually held.\n \nMessrs Muhammad Siddiq Muhammad Umar v The Australasia Bank Ltd. PLD 1966 SC 684 ref\n \n(l) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XLI, R.1 & S.96---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.22---Special High Court appeal--- Provision regarding production of certified copy of the decree sheet along with memo of appeal to be mandatory and the appeal unaccompanid with the certified copy of the decree sheet not to be properly constituted and thus incompetent.\n \n(m) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.96 & O.XLI, R.1---Appeal---Comparative analysis of the 'appeal' provisions in Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \nThe linguistic construction, phraseology, terms, words and the schematic design/layout of the appeal under S.22, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 provision is distinguishably different than in section 96 of the C.P.C. Under section 22 an appeal has been provided against \"\"any , decree, sentence, or final order passed by a Banking Court, within 30 days of such , decree, sentence or final order\"\". Was intention of the legislature to provide a scheme of appeal(s) under section 22 to be different from that in section 96, C.P.C.\n \n(n) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.109---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XII, R.4---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185--- Appeal to Supreme Court---Limitation---Scope---Where appeal was allowed against the or decree or a final order, filing of appeal within limitation was mandatory from the delivery of and waiting for the grant of certified copy of the decree would not enlarge the limitation and in such a case non-filing of the decree would not be fatal to the appeal.\n \nImtiaz Ali v. Atta Muhammad and another PLD 2008 SC 462 and Nakuleswar Sikdar v. Barum Chandra Chakravorty and another 1971 SCMR 54 ref.\n \n(o) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Application for leave to defend suit---Decree in the defendant's suit was passed by a single Judge of the High Court in the exercise of Banking jurisdiction, on the grounds of default of the petitioners under S.10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 as well as on merits---Special High Court Appeal was also dismissed principally on the said grounds---Judgments and decrees had been validly passed and petition for leave to appeal was not sustainable--- Supreme Court, in circumstances, declined to go into the question of maintainability or competence of the appeal which was left to be decided in an appropriate case and because none of the counsel had addressed on such aspect of the case particularly in view of the propositions recorded by the court.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.1183 of 2011, decision dated: 12-10-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI AND MIAN SAQIB NISAR, JJ",
    "": "APOLLO TEXTILE MILLS LTD. and others\nvs\nSONERI BANK LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12331",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2197 = 2012 SLD 2197 = 2012 CLD 506",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10--- Leave to defend---Provisions of S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, are mandatory and non-compliance thereof is fatal.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Appeal---Plea not raised in application for leave to defend the suit---Banking Court passed and decree in favour of bank after disposal of application for leave to defend the suit---Plea raised by defendant was that bank should have first presented the bills for clearance to foreign buyer and if the same were dishonoured, only then suit could be filed---Validity---Ground raised by defendants in appeal was not raised or even argued before Banking Court, therefore, such plea could not be allowed to be raised before High Court---Plea was factual and Banking Court had failed to appreciate and explore if the bills were presented for payment by the bank and if the same had been dishonoured or not and only if such was the outcome, then the suit could have been filed---No such ground having been raised in leave to defend application, appreciation or otherwise of the same was not possible by High Court---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was legal, apt to the facts and circumstances of the suit and did not call for any interference---High Court declined to dislodge the findings of Banking Court---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nVeerappa Chetty v. Vellayan Ambalam and others AIR 1919 Madras 179; C.C. Sinha v. Bidhu Bhusan De and another AIR 1955 Calcutta 562 (V.42,C.175 Nov); Kanhyalal and others v. Ram Kumar and others AIR 1956 Rajasthan 129 (AIR V 43 C 40 Aug); F. Nanak Chand Ramkishan Das and others v. Lal Chand Ganeshi Lal and others AIR 1958 Punjab 222 (V.45 C 60); United Bank Ltd v. Taj Seafood Industries, Karachi and 4 others PLD 1975 Kar. 410; United Bank Limited v. Azmat Trading Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. and 5 others 2001 CLC 1172; Haji Abdullah Khan and others v. Nisar Muhammad Khan and others PLD 1965 SC 690; Lahore Cantt. Park View Cooperative Housing Society v. Muhammad Ishaq and others 2000 SCMR 39 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Shahyar Textile Mills Ltd. 2003 CLD 1370 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 54 of 2010, decision dated: 18-10-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED AND SALMAN HAMID, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SHAHI TEXTILES and 4 others\nvs\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through President"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12332",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2198 = 2012 SLD 2198 = 2012 CLD 396",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss. 42, 39 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 8---Plaintiff, a steel mill (public sector entity), in a suit for declaration, cancellation, injunction and damages, filed application seeking interim injunction against Water & Sewerage Board stating therein that for the purpose of its operations, the plaintiff needed huge quantity of water on a daily basis (running into millions of gallons per day), for which it was billed by the Water and Sewerage Board---Basic contention of the plaintiff was that the water being supplied to it came from, or belonged, to the Provincial Government and that the Water and Sewerage Board was not entitled to charge for the same and that in addition to the water charges claimed by the Board, it also charged for Sewerage and Conservancy and for fire fighting purposes, thus the bills raised and demands made from time to time by the Water and Sewerage Board had four distinct elements---Plaintiff's case was that (for the various reasons stated in detail) it was not liable to make payment to the Board in respect of any of said charges---Plaintiff also claimed that it was entitled to continued supply of water, thus the interim relief sought was that its water supply should not be disrupted for any alleged non-payment of the billed amounts---Validity---High Court disposed of the application in the terms that the Water and Sewerage Board, the City District Government and the Provincial Government were restrained from preventing, restricting or hindering the supply of water to the plaintiff in any manner interfering in or with the same subject to the terms that the plaintiff was liable to make payment of water charges as per the Agreement, and the Board was empowered to bill for and collect the same; that plaintiff and the Board shall be at liberty to compute the amount payable up to the date of present order on the stated basis, and if there had been (according to the plaintiff) any overpayment, or (according to the Board) any underpayment, then the concerned party shall be entitled to make an appropriate application for such orders as the court may deem appropriate; that Rs.200 million earlier deposited by the plaintiff and withdrawn by the Board shall be deemed adjustable against the water charges; that plaintiff shall continue to make timely payment of the water charges in terms of future billing---Water and Sewerage Board, City District Government Provincial Government were restrained from recovering demanding or collecting any amount by way of sewerage or conservancy charges, whether by way of arrears thereof as on the date of present order, or on account of any future billing---Future billing by the Board may continue to reflect these elements, and the plaintiff shall be entitled, without prejudice to its case, to deposit the billed amount(s) with the Nazir of the High Court, which amounts shall be dealt with in terms of such orders or directions as may be given by the court---If at all any such amounts were deposited, then the Nazir shall immediately invest the same in some profit bearing scheme---Plaintiff shall be obligated to make payment of the arrears of the \"\"fire\"\" element of the billing up to the date of present order, which payment shall be made in six equal monthly instalments (and payable each month thereafter accordingly), and which shall be deposited with the Nazir of the court---City District Government (or any successor entity) shall be entitled to withdraw the same by making an appropriate application to the court---Future billing by the Board shall not contain any such element, and the Board was restrained from in any manner collecting, demanding or recovering any such amount from the plaintiff---City District Government (or any successor entity) may recover, demand and collect the \"\"fire tax\"\" in future in accordance with any applicable law for the time being in force.\n \nKarachi Municipal Corporation v. Karimi and Co. PLD 1967 Kar 371; Karimi and Co. v. Karachi Municipal Corporation 1974 SCMR 440; S.Z. Mehdi v. Government of Sindh and others 1990 CLC 352; ABN Amro Bank v. Karachi Water and Sewerage Board 2009 YLR 775; ABN Amro Bank v. Chairman, Karachi Water and Sewerage Board 2006 CLC 597 and Nazir Ali v. Karachi Water and Sewerage Board 2004 CLC 578 ref.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S. 2(d)---Consideration---Act or omission which serves as the consideration for the promise, need not come from the promisee; it may move from \"\"any other person\"\".\n \n(c) Precedent---\n \n----Every must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found---Case is only an authority for what it actually decides and cannot be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it.\n \nQuinn v. Leatham [1901] AC 495 and Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 146 and C.M.A. No.9360 of 2007, decision dated: 2-12-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "PAKISTAN STEEL MILLS CORPORATION (PRIVATE) LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nKarachi High Court WATER AND SEWERAGE BOARD through Chief Executive and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12333",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2199 = 2012 SLD 2199 = 2012 CLD 429",
    "Key Words:": "Punjab Undesirable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Act (I of 1993)-------S. 11---Cooperative Societies Act (VII of 1925), S. 31---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 48---Claim---Proof---Petitioners filed claim before Punjab Cooperative Board for Liquidation on the basis of Special Modarba Receipt duly issued by Finance Corporation in question---Punjab Cooperative Board for Liquidation declined to entertain the claim on the ground of its being forged---Validity---Despite lengthy cross examination on one petitioner as well as the other witnesses while appearing in witness box, the Board failed to shatter their veracity, who remained consistent on all material points---Punjab Cooperative Board for Liquidation instead of producing any evidence to prove their claim, opted to produce documents through Law Officer which were wrongly relied upon by the Judicial Officer while passing order against petitioners---Claim of petitioners was established from the documents produced by them before Judicial Officer who wrongly confined his findings to one Special Modarba Receipt inasmuch as the petitioners filed their claim under different Special Modarba Receipt---Findings of Judicial Officer on all issues were not confidence inspiring rather ran contrary to the record---High Court directed Punjab Cooperative Board for Liquidation to pay the amount to petitioners as claimed by them and set aside the order passed by Judicial Officer---Petition was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Cooperative Petition No.39 of 2011, decision dated: 4-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ AHMAD CHAUDHRY, C, J",
    "": "BASHIRAN BIBI and others\nvs\nPUNJAB COOPERATIVE BOARD FOR LIQUIDATION and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12334",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2200 = 2012 SLD 2200 = 2012 CLD 436",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961)-------S. 39(3)---Bank claim, enforcement of---Attachment of property---Scope---Properties to be considered for the purposes of S.39(3) of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961, must be the properties of borrower itself---Exercise of attachment of properties cannot begin with the properties of other persons, if any, liable for payment of the finance, including guarantors; it is only, if all properties specified of the borrower appear insufficient for the purposes of S.39(3) of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961, then the matter can proceed on to a consideration of the properties of other persons which may be liable to attachment.\n \n(b) Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961)---\n \n----S. 39(3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151---Bank claim, enforcement of---Attachment of property---Pre-conditions--- Non-issuance of show-cause notice---Recalling of attachment order--- Suit was pending against borrower, with regard to recovery of credit facility and to enforce the claim of bank, properties of guarantor were attached under S.39 of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961---Borrower sought recalling of attachment order---Plea raised by the bank was that the application filed by borrower was beyond the period specified in S.39(7) of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961---Validity---Issuance of proper show-cause notice under S.39(6) of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961, was necessary condition for application of S.39(7) of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961, which was not a standalone provision but was in continuation of an act begun in terms of former subsection---Provisions of S.39(7) of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961, could not be invoked without a proper show-cause notice being issued, and it itself was a specific order making attachment absolute and such order was passed against the properties in question---No ad interim order of attachment of property of guarantor was made as contemplated by S.39(3) of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961, and order of attachment actually made was not in any case followed up by show cause notice required in terms of S.39(6) of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961---Non-compliance with requirements of S.39 of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961, having been made, therefore, order of attachment could be recalled---High Court recalled the order whereby properties of guarantor were attached for enforcement of bank claim---Application was allowed in circumstances.\n \nIndustrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and another PLD 1986 SC 74 and Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. French Food Products (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2009 CLD 93 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J.M. No. 40 of 2002 and C.M.A. No. 594 of 2008, decision dated: 14-10-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN\nvs\nMessrs TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES (PRIVATE) LTD. and 15 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12335",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2201 = 2012 SLD 2201 = 2012 CLD 451",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 11---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 55---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 171---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199--- Constitutional petition--- Suit for rendition of accounts, mandatory and permanent injunction---Petitioner bank repossessed vehicle of respondent on non-payment of monthly instalments on lease of vehicle and credit card facility---Banking Court, on application for interim relief in suit filed by respondent, directed restoration of vehicle in favour of respondent---Contention of petitioner-Bank was that substantial payment was due from the respondent on credit card facility and that the petitioner Bank had a general banker's lien on the car---Validity---Perusal of order of Banking Court revealed that the question of general banker's lien on credit card liability had not been taken into account or decided---Nature of such lien would depend not only upon the provision of the law applicable but also upon documents executed by the respondent in respect of credit card facility---Grant of interim relief was to be reconsidered after taking into account the rights and obligations of the parties in respect of vehicle in question not only with reference to the documents executed for the lease of vehicle but also with regard to the credit card facility---Order of Banking Court was set aside and case was remanded for decision afresh on application for interim relief---Constitutional petition was accepted, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Write Petition No. 1098 of 2005, decision dated: 28-02-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED, J",
    "": "UNION BANK LIMITED through Manager and another\nvs\nMUHAMMAD ASLAM FIAZ KHOKHAR and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12336",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2202 = 2012 SLD 2202 = 2012 CLD 447",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to defend suit---Plaintiff bank filed a suit for recovery of loan amount with accrued and future mark up---Defendant submitted his application for leave to defend suit and written statement---Banking Court decreed the suit along with cost and defendant had filed appeal---Defendant in his application for leave to defend, had denied regarding the execution of any document in favour of the plaintiff bank, and had clearly admitted that he was regularly paying the amount to the plaintiff bank---Defendant in his application for leave to defend, had nowhere stated as to how much finance facility he had availed and how much amount he had paid---Defendant did not annex any receipt or document regarding the finance facility, which was mandatory provision of law provided in S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Plea taken in the application by the defendant was self-contradictory and he was blowing hot and cold in the same breath---Facts and figures mentioned in the memorandum of appeal, nowhere found place in the application for leave to defend---Defendant, in appeal, had altogether taken different stance with certain amount and figure which was missing in the application for leave to defend---Defendant had not come to the court with clean hands and it was only a futile exercise debarring the plaintiff/bank from the recovery of outstanding loan---When the defendant had himself admitted that he was paying the outstanding amount according to law then his appeal was meritless and decree passed by the Banking Court was in accordance with law and did not warrant interference by High Court---Impugned /decree which was based on solid footings needed no interference---Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No. 8 of 2010, decision dated: 10-08-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATTAULLAH KHAN AND KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN, JJ",
    "": "IMAM DIN\nvs\nBANK OF KHYBER, D.I. KHAN through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12337",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2203 = 2012 SLD 2203 = 2012 CLD 453",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)-------Preamble---Defamation---Object and scope---Defamation Ordinance, 2002, is a special law on the subject creating special remedies and also providing specific court for trial of cases and appeal--- Jurisdiction for trial of cases under Defamation Ordinance, 2002, was conferred on District Court.\n \n(b) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)---\n \n----Ss. 2(bb) & 13 [as amended by Defamation (Amendment) Act (IX of 2004)]---West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance (II of 1962), S.7 [as amended by Sindh Civil Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002]---Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Ordinance (X of 1980), S.15---High Court appeal---Defamation suit---Trial---High Court, jurisdiction of---Suit for recovery of Rs.5 million was filed by plaintiff in High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction---Single Judge of High Court returned the plaint to plaintiff for filing the same before District Court--- Validity--- Jurisdiction with regard to District Court was not to be read as provided in West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, where High Court had been conferred jurisdiction to hear suits exceeding value of Rs.15 million as a principal civil court of original jurisdiction---District Court was court of trial of cases under Defamation Ordinance, 2002, it would be the District Court and no other court including High Court and it was the appeal against final decision and decree of that court which would be heard by High Court--- Division Bench of High Court did not find any illegality in the order passed by Single Judge of High Court and the same was maintained---High Court dismissed the appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C.A. No. 122 of 2005, decision dated: 19-10-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED AND SALMAN HAMID, JJ",
    "": "PAKISTAN HERALD PUBLICATIONS (PVT.) LTD. and 2 others\nvs\nKarachi High Court BUILDING CONTROL AUTHORITY through Controller of Buildings"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12338",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2204 = 2012 SLD 2204 = 2012 CLD 464",
    "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 2(c), 14(2), 17, 31 & 39---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.20(c)---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 23 & 28---Making award rule of court---Territorial jurisdiction of court---Award having been announced by the sole arbitrator, contractor company moved the court for making the award rule of the court---Court at place 'P' allowed the petition by partially making the award rule of court---Appellant had raised objection with regard to jurisdiction of the court, contending that as the contract/agreement was executed at place \"\"I\"\" and Head Office of the appellant as well as respondent company being located at place \"\"I\"\" and \"\"L\"\", the court at \"\"P\"\" had no territorial jurisdiction over the matter---Plea of respondent company was that relevant clause of the agreement had merely fixed the venue at place \"\"I\"\" for the purpose of arbitration only, which had nothing to do with conferring of an exclusive jurisdiction in the court at place \"\"I\"\"---Agreement between the parties was executed at place \"\"I\"\" for a work to be done within District \"\"P\"\" and \"\"N\"\"---Agreement provided a clause for referring the dispute to adjudicator and then to the sole arbitrator---Agreement further provided that arbitration between the parties would be made at place \"\"I\"\"---Where there were many courts having the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the parties under the agreement, and the parties with their mutual consent agree to refer their dispute to any such court or courts, such consent agreement between the parties was not against the provisions of S.23 or 28 of the Contract Act, 1872---In the present case no such clause of agreement conferring jurisdiction in any one court except the one that the arbitration would be held at place \"\"I\"\"; in given circumstances, dispute between the parties could be referred to the court having the jurisdiction under the general law---Head Office of respondent company being at place \"\"L\"\", suit regarding any dispute against respondent could be filed at place \"\"L\"\"---Work being done was within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at place \"\"P\"\" and dispute between them also cropped up there---Sub-offices of both the parties were also situated at place \"\"P\"\"---Such a dispute between the parties regarding the subject matter situated within the territorial jurisdiction of courts at place \"\"P\"\" could well be referred and agitated before the court at place \"\"P\"\" as cause of action wholly or partly, within the meaning of S.20(c), C.P.C. arose there---No bar existed in the agreement that the courts at place \"\"P\"\" would have no jurisdiction---Court at place \"\"P\"\" could well entertain the dispute--- Findings of the courts below were set aside directing the office to send both the cases to the court of Senior Civil Judge at place \"\"P\"\", who would decide the matter between the parties at its earliest.\n \nMessrs Kadir Motors (Regd.) Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd., Karachi and 3 others 1992 SCMR 1174; Messrs Trade Masters (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive v. Messrs Shell Pakistan Ltd. through Chief Executive 2010 CLD 670; Messrs Unitrade Impex and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2010 CLC 1267; Special Communication Organization through Director-General, Rawalpindi v. Messrs IBELL (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore 2007 CLC 248; Food Corporation of India and another v. Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. AIR 1988 SC 1198; Messrs Nanak Chand Shadurain v. The Tinnelvelv-Tuticorin Electric Supply Co. Ltd., Calcutta AIR 1975 Madras 103; Messrs Salem Chemical Industries v. Messrs Bird and Co. (P) Ltd., Calcutta AIR 1979 Madras 16; Messrs Road Transport Corporation and others v. Messrs Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. and others AIR 1981 Bombay 299; Messrs Angils Insulations v. Messrs Ashmore India Ltd. and another AIR 1995 SC 1766; Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India and others AIR 2001 SC 416; Ravi Glass Mills Limited v. I.C.I. Pakistan Powergen Limited 2004 YLR 2503 and Special Communication Organization v. Messrs IBELL (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore 2007 CLC 248 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.52 of 2010, decision dated: 5-07-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL AND YAHYA AFRIDI, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY-\nvs\nMessrs PUT SARAJEVO GENERAL ENGINEERING COMPANY and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12339",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2205 = 2012 SLD 2205 = 2012 CLD 471",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 12 & 22---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.84---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2), O.VII, Rr.1(c) & 9(1A)(b)--- Suit for recovery of bank loan---Fraud---Proof---Comparison of signatures---Powers of court---Suit filed by bank was decreed ex parte against some of the defendants and execution was filed---Such defendants got ex parte decree set aside on the ground that they did not mortgage their properties resultantly suit filed by bank was dismissed---Validity---Mortgage deed in respect of properties showed name of one defendant as witness, whereas power of attorney of the same date showed that same defendant executed it on such date and some other person was shown as a witness---Such anomaly itself showed nothing but fraud and forgery and vitiated the two documents---Banking Court, on its own, under the provisions of Art.84 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, looked into the signatures of the defendant as available on mortgage deed and power of attorney, both of the same date and compared the same from the ones available on Vakalatnama, leave to defend application and other documents and came to the conclusion that signatures appearing on deeds and power of attorney were forged---Banking Court after looking into the matter had rightly dismissed the suit and required no interference--- Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 69 of 2005, decision dated: 27-09-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED AND SALMAN HAMID, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED\nvs\nMessrs EXIM INTERNATIONAL and 7 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12340",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2206 = 2012 SLD 2206 = 2012 CLD 458",
    "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 20, 30, 34 & 39---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.73---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Arbitration proceedings--- Award, objection to--- Damages---Entitlement---Plaintiff who was distributor of defendant company his distributorship having been terminated by defendant, he filed suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Defendant, during pendency of suit, filed an application under S.34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for settlement of dispute through arbitration as provided in one of the clauses of the agreement---With consent of the parties, Trial Court referred the matter to arbitrator---Both the parties made a joint statement before the arbitrator that they would abide by the award made by the arbitrator---After hearing the parties, the arbitrator held the plaintiff entitled to get amount Rs.16,49,033 as damages---No objection was raised by defendant before the arbitrator with regard to scope of reference or upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator---Parties raised no objection on the credibility or jurisdiction of the arbitrator---When arbitrator award was made and announced, the defendant company, seeing the award unfavourable to it, took certain objections with regard to scope of reference for determination of the dispute---Validity---Defendant at that stage could not be allowed to point out any lacuna, whatsoever in the order of reference or the jurisdiction of the arbitrator---When the plaintiff submitted his claim for damages before the arbitrator who also framed issues on that point, ample opportunity was available to the defendant to take objections that neither scope of reference nor agreement allowed the award of damages, but defendant completely failed to do so---Under S.73 of the Contract Act, 1872, damages could be claimed even if there was no clause in the agreement---Award of the arbitrator was in accordance with law and same could not be set aside---Courts below were not justified in law while setting aside the award---Constitutional petition filed by the plaintiff was allowed as prayed for and impugned s passed by courts below were set aside, in circumstances. \n \nMessrs Aslam Saeed & Co. v. Messrs Trading Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 1985 SC 69; Messrs Sirmur Chemical and General Industries Ltd. Nahan v. The Union of India and others AIR 1958 Himachal Pradesh 20; Syed Arif Ali Sabir v. Abdul Samad through LRs and 2 others 2008 YLR 2309 and Messrs Farooq & Co. v. Federation of Pakistan and 3 others 1996 CLC 2030 ref.\n \nMessrs Quality Builders Ltd. v. Karachi Metropolitan Corporation 1999 CLC 1777; WAPDA and another Messrs Khaznzada Muhammad Abdul Haque Khan Khattak and Co. PLD 1990 SC 359 and Messrs Agrimpex Trading Company Ltd. v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. 2004 MLD 477 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.2020 of 2007, decision dated: 3rd November, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. SHAHID SAEED, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NADEEM\nvs\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, BHAKKAR and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12341",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2207 = 2012 SLD 2207 = 2012 CLD 477",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr. 67, 69 & 72---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property---Decree-holder's offer to purchase such property at reserved price made after postponement of auction proceeding by court auctioneer due to non-availability of any bidder---Confirmation of sale in favour of decree-holder by court---Validity---Decree-holder had not obtained permission of court before making such offer---Court auctioneer was legally bound to require decree-holder before entertaining its offer to obtain permission from court---Court before confirming any sale would decide its validity and after coming to conclusion that sale was valid, only then court might confirm same---Decree-holder had only made an offer to purchase such property and that too without permission of court, thus, there was no sale, which could be confirmed by the court---According to O.XXI, R.69(2), C.P.C., where court or court-auctioneer adjourned sale for a longer period than seven days, then fresh proclamation under R.67 thereof would be required to be made except in case of waiver of right by -debtor---Court, in the present case had not issued notice under O.XXI, R.67, C.P.C. for re-conducting sale---Court had ignored mandatory requirement of law while confirming sale on a single offer of decree-holder and that too against reserved price---Execution proceedings had been commenced under C.P.C. and not under S.19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---High Court set aside impugned order for being illegal.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, R. 72---Property to be sold in execution of decree---Purchase/sale of such property by/to decree-holder without permission of court---Scope---Such purchase/sale would be voidable if not void in absence of consent of debtor---Principles.\n \nUnder Order XXI, Rule 72, C.P.C. if decree-holder intends to participate in auction proceedings, then decree-holder has to obtain permission of executing court.\n \nThe perusal of Rule 72, O.XXI, C.P.C. shows that decree-holder will not be permitted to participate in auction proceedings, meaning thereby the law only binds the decree-holder for obtaining permission and it is silent for the permission of -debtor, this clear distinction in law is intentional. The -debtor if will purchase the property, he will offer maximum price as the maximum price will be in his benefit for discharging the liability under the decree, whereas the decree-holder may try to purchase land on lesser price, that is the reason the legislator has taken care of slightest possibility of unfairness which may cause loss to the -debtor, hence the logical conclusion under the provision of Order XXI, Rule 72, C.P.C. is, if the decree-holder intends to participate in auction, he is bound to obtain permission of court and any sale in favour of decree-holder without court's permission will be voidable if not void in the absence of debtor's consent.\n \n(c) Administration of justice---\n \n----Cognizance of a matter taken by court under one procedure---Effect---Proceedings once commenced under such procedure would be finalized thereunder---No pick and choose authority would be available to court in law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.391 of 2011, decision dated: 5-10-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN AND SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "M. AHMED SH. and 2 others\nvs\nJ.S.B. BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager-"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12342",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2208 = 2012 SLD 2208 = 2012 CLD 483",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2(c), 2(d), 2(e) & 7(4)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3--- Intra court appeal--- 'Customer', status of---Determination---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Scope---Plaintiff filed civil suit on the ground that loan guarantee alleged to him was based on his lost papers of property mortgaged with the bank---High Court in exercise of original civil jurisdiction rejected the plaint on the ground that matter pertained to the Banking Court---Validity---Plaintiff having executed loan guarantee, was \"\"surety\"\" within the definition of \"\"customer\"\" as contained in S. 2(c) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Obligation by virtue of S. 2(e) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, amongst others included mortgage and performance of an undertaking, therefore, again plaintiff fell within the pale of provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, in as much as mortgage in respect of house in question was also created by plaintiff in favour of the bank---By virtue of S.7(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, it was only a Banking Court, which would decide whether plaintiff was 'customer' of bank or otherwise---Banking Court was the only forum where suit could have been preferred---Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere with the order passed by Single Judge of High Court--- Intra court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.276 of 2010, decision dated: 12-10-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED AND SALMAN HAMID, JJ",
    "": "Mst. ARIFA SHAMS through Special Attorney\nvs\nMUHAMMAD IMTIAZ AHSAN and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12343",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2209 = 2012 SLD 2209 = 2012 CLD 488",
    "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------S.30---Award, setting aside of---Misconduct---Arbitrator neither heard parties nor gave reasons in award nor mentioned therein as to which piece of disputed land would be given to each party---Award showing some additions made at its end---Validity---Arbitrator was bound to give cogent reason for making award---Addition of new lines at the end of award, which might be result of some afterthought and non-mentioning of any reason therein would tantamount to glaring misconduct on part of Arbitrator--- Requirements of law having not been met by Arbitrator, award was set aside, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 2660 of 2004, heard on 14-09-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. SHAHID SAEED, J",
    "": "RAZA MUHAMMAD\nvs\nMUHAMMAD KHAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12344",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1JpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2210 = 2012 SLD 2210 = 2012 CLD 491",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------Ss.16, 17, 20, 120 & O.VII, R.10---Territorial jurisdiction---Original civil jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Customer of bank filed suit against bank at place \"\"K\"\", before High Court where head office of the bank was situated---Plea raised by defendant bank was that the concerned branch was located at place \"\"P\"\", in another Province, therefore, the suit should be returned for filing the same before appropriate court---Validity---Original civil jurisdiction of High Court must also be regarded as extending to the situation where the defendant ordinarily resided, or worked for gain, at place \"\"K\"\"---If a corporation had its principal office or head office at place \"\"K\"\", High Court at \"\"K\"\" would also have jurisdiction, and the same was regardless of whether the cause of action had accrued at place \"\"K\"\" or not---Any other view would necessarily result in a loss and curtailment of the court's jurisdiction and that was not a result that the law countenanced by applying S.120, C.P.C. to High Court---Head office of defendant bank was situated at place \"\"K\"\", therefore, it necessarily followed that plaintiff could bring the suit at place \"\"K\"\" and file it on the original side of High Court, notwithstanding that cause of action had accrued entirely at place \"\"P\"\"---High Court declined to return the plaint to plaintiff, as the court had jurisdiction in the matter---Application was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Naveed Aslam and others v. Ayesha Siddiqui and others PLD 2010 Kar. 261; Muhammad Naveed Aslam and others v. Ayesha Siddiqui and others 2011 CLC 1176; Shaikh Muhammad Amin & CO. v. Provincial Industrial Development Corporation 1991 CLC 684; West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Fateh Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 1964 Kar. 11l; Wajid Hussain Farouqui v. Shahida Shahnwaz and others 2007 CLC 394; Gulfam and others v. Bibi Qudsia Begum and others 2003 CLC 1183; WAPDA and others v Mian Ghulam Bari PLD 1991 SC 780; Agricides (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Ali Agro Supply Corporation Ltd. 1988 CLC 59 and Muhammad Bachal v Province of Sindh and others 2011 CLC 1450 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----Ss. 16, 17 & 20---Jurisdiction of courts---Discretion of court--- Scope--- One of the key requirements of jurisdictional rules is that the rules must be certain and this must be so, whether they are statutory in nature or judicially evolved---Such is so because such rules affect, regulate and control exercise of judicial power at the most fundamental level---Leaving matters to discretion of the court introduces, an unacceptable uncertainty in the law; all rules must of course be interpreted but that is an entirely different matter.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Suit No.751 of 2009 and C.M.A. No. 8164 of 2011, decision dated: 25-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "Haji RIAZ AHMED through Attorney and another--Plaintiffs\nvs\nMessrs HABIB BANK LIMITED through President and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12345",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1J5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2211 = 2012 SLD 2211 = 2012 CLD 502",
    "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 14, 17 & 39---Making award rule of the court---Work, according to agreement arrived at between the Authority and the construction company was completed, but the payment having not been made to the company accordingly, matter was referred to arbitrators according to terms of the agreement---Two arbitrators announced the award, which was submitted for making same as rule of the court---Court without commenting upon the validity of the award straightaway made the same rule of the court---Validity---Court was duty bound to consider all the questions regarding validity of the award, both on legal as well as on its factual aspects---Under the law court could refuse to make the award Rule of the Court or could remit the award back to the arbitrators by pointing out deficiencies in the award---All such exercise should also be based on reasons---Such was not just a mechanical process that on the one end of the machine one would insert the award and on the other end would get the authentication of the court on the award--- Short-cut as adopted by the court was not permissible under the law---Trial Court even did not bother to have a look on the award what to talk of considering its validity---Such a could not be maintained---Judgment and decree of the Trial Court were set aside and case was remanded to the Trial Court for decision afresh in accordance with law as earlier as possible, but not later than one month.\n \nMessrs Mechanised Constractors of Pakistan Limited v. Airport Development Authority, Karachi 2000 CLC 1239 and Noor Nabuwwat v. Moulvi Muhammad Noor Ali Khan 1999 CLC 1685 ref.\n \nGovernment of N.-W.F.P. v. Shahin Shah and others 2009 MLD 1418 and Pakistan Television Corporation Limited v. Messrs Interconstruct (Pvt.) Limited through Managing Director, Peshawar PLD 2010 Pesh. 34 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 29 of 2009, decision dated: 14-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "EJAZ AFZAL KHAN AND MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL, JJ",
    "": "GOVERNMENT OF N.-W.F.P. and others\nvs\nMessrs JAN CONSTRUCTION CO."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12346",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1J5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2212 = 2012 SLD 2212 = 2012 CLD 706",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Lease of property for 99 years---Rejection of proposal---Petitioner, in response to advertisement issued by Ministry of Railways for commercial development of Railways property on joint venture basis, submitted the bid document and was the sole bidder---Petitioner had prayed that Railways which had failed to execute the agreement in terms of the bid document be directed to perform their part of agreement---Petitioner while submitting the bid documents, had annexed a certificate from a Commercial Bank for establishing his financial stability, which was the necessary document for participating in the bid as it was a joint venture and the petitioner was to invest the money for raising commercial building on the land of Railways---Issuing Bank of the financial stability certificate confirmed that no such certificate had been issued by the Bank---Bid money deposited by the petitioner was refunded to him---Petitioner having submitted false document, proposal and bid of the petitioner, was rightly rejected by Railways---Constitutional petition was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1186 of 2011, decision dated: 31st March, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN, J",
    "": "BAKHT FRAZ CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, \nMULTAN through Chief Executive\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through\nChairman Pakistan Railways, Islamabad High Court High Court\nand 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12347",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1J5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2213 = 2012 SLD 2213 = 2012 CLD 512",
    "Key Words:": "Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)-------Ss. 3, 9 & 13---Suit for damages for defamation---Plaintiff had alleged that the defendant wrote baseless and frivolous letter to the high-ups of the plaintiff; and for that matter proper inquiry was initiated against the plaintiff and after proper inquiry she was exonerated of the charges levelled against her by the defendant and that letter/complaint of the defendant had injured the reputation of the plaintiff in her department and in her family, which resulted into physical and mental torture for her and her family---Trial Court dismissed the suit---Validity---Plaintiff under the law was required to prove the issuance/writing of letter by defendant to high-ups of the plaintiff with a malice to defame her in the eyes of her high-ups, colleagues and other friends and family members, but evidence on record led by the plaintiff was deficient in that regard---Very letter/complaint, which was the bone of contention of the suit of the plaintiff, had not been brought on the record as same was not tendered in evidence---Plaintiff had failed to prove that in consequence of inquiry, she remained suspended---Under the law the plaintiff was required to serve the defendant with a notice within two months of the knowledge of defamatory material came into her knowledge, but that had not been done---Mere assertion in the pleadings would not absolve the plaintiff from her obligation when same had been denied by the defendant---Very foundation of the suit thus was not in accordance with law---Available evidence and material on the record could in no way be termed as sufficient for grant of decree for damage in favour of the plaintiff---Claim of the plaintiff being baseless, was not tenable, in circumstances. \n \nAppellant in person.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.80 with C.M. No.103 of 2010, decision dated: 22-09-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL AND NISAR HUSSAIN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "RAZIA SULTANA\nvs\nSHAHID DURRANI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12348",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1J5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2214 = 2012 SLD 2214 = 2012 CLD 517",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Tort-------Malicious prosecution--- Suit for compensation---Limitation---Rejection of plaint--- Suit for damages against alleged wrongful dismissal was filed after more than 9 years from the said dismissal order along with application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay---Grounds disclosed by the plaintiff for condonation of said inordinate delay in filing suit were far from satisfactory---Applications for condonation of delay were dismissed, in circumstances---Appeals, otherwise being barred by time, were dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Yousuf v. Ghayyur Hussain Shah 1993 SCMR 1185 distinguished.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Where special provision was applicable, general provision, would not apply.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeals Nos.176, 177 and 178 of 2009, decision dated: 12-10-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND NISAR AHMED SHAIKH, J",
    "": "FEROZE ABDUL KARIM\nvs\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through Managing Director"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12349",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1J5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2215 = 2012 SLD 2215 = 2012 CLD 520",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)-------Preamble & Part V--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art.184(3)--- Constitutional petition--- Privatization of--- Validity and legality of privatization--- Private Foundation successfully bid for the Bank as the highest bidder, which was accepted by the Privatization Commission on 30th of December, 2003 as it found the Foundation's bid to be higher than the reference price---State Bank of Pakistan also provided their clearance for declaring the Foundation as successful bidder and Cabinet Committee on Privatization (Privatization Committee) accepted the recommendation of the Privatization Commission, and the Foundation paid the initial sale price and entered into an agreement on 26th of February 2004 with the Privatization Committee and the State Bank of Pakistan for the purchase of 51% share of the government stake in the Bank and for taking over the management of the Bank---Contention of petitioners was that privatization of Bank had been carried out in haste, in a non-transparent manner and on the desire of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)---Validity---Federal Government examined the issue of privatization of the Bank in the year 1995 and a summary was initiated, report was requisitioned from the Bank which among other things included taking ways and means to improve the performance of the Bank so as to make it a profit earning enterprise rather than a loss making entity for sale---Privatization Commission in December 1998, invited Expressions of Interest in relation to sale of 26% shares of the Bank and eight parties submitted the Expression of interest, and Commission thereafter, called for Statement of Qualification from potential bidders, but this process had to be abandoned in view of the military takeover in October, 1999---Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000 was promulgated to provide a legal regime to the privatization process and the Commission appointed a firm of Chartered Accountants as the Financial Advisor for such exercise---Being dissatisfied with the number of statement of qualifications submitted in the year 2002, Commission once again called for Expression of interest in April 2003 and this time 19 parties submitted the expression of interest followed by submission of statement of qualifications---Said statements of the bidders were examined by a Pre-qualification Committee and such bidders were also granted access to all the relevant information regarding the Bank and its assets so that the bidders could carry out due diligence at their end---Commission in November 2003, decided that while bidders would be required to bid for 51% of the issued and paid up capital of the Bank, they would also have the option of either purchasing the entire 51% stake at once or first to acquire a 26% or more stake with management control and then pay for the remaining stake within a period of not exceeding two years---Pre-qualification Committee formed by the Commission in its meeting, held in December, 2003, permitted three potential bidders to participate in the bidding process, including, the Foundation---Reference price recommended by the Financial Advisor was Rs.20.609 billion for the value of government stake of 51% in the Bank which was being invested, however, said reference price was revised by the Commission itself and fixed at Rs.22.143 billion, which was also later approved by the Cabinet Committee on Privatization (Privatization Committee)--- Bidding for the sale of 51% shares was held on 29-12-2003 but only two parties, including the Foundation submitted the bidding documents and the earnest money---Highest bid was received from the Foundation and was accepted by the Privatization Commission in its meeting on 30th of December, 2003 as it found it to be higher than the reference price of Rs. 22.143 billion---State Bank of Pakistan also provided their clearance for declaring the Foundation as successful bidder vide letter dated 31st December, 2003 and Privatization Committee accepted the recommendation of the Privatization Commission on 1st of January 2004, and the Foundation paid the initial sale price and entered into an agreement on 26th of February, 2004 with the Privatization Committee and the State Bank of Pakistan for the purchase of 51% share of the government stake in the Bank and for taking over the management of the Bank---Privatization of Bank was part of the overall policy of privatization whereby several financial institutions were disinvested to improve their financial viability---Process of privatization of the Bank, in circumstances, showed that the impugned privatization was neither done in utter haste nor it was institution specific---Decline in financial worth of the Bank could be gathered from a comparison of its 50% share of the local commercial banking market prior to its nationalization with the volume of its non-performing loans after nationalization which grew from Rs. 25.00 billion to Rs. 198.00 billion in the period between 1989 to 1998---Privatization Commission and Committee were conscious of the history of the Bank's privatization, the critical state of its finances and how the earlier attempts made since 1995 could not be successful, which must have made them wiser to take every step with care and without unnecessary delay to search for a credible buyer---Nationalized banks were privatized because they were no longer profit bearing enterprises and their poor performance and dismal balance sheets was attributable to a host of factors, including overstaffing, over-branching, political interference for grant and recovery of loans leading to huge portfolios of non-performing loans, under capitalization, poor customer services and lack of professional management---Adverse effects of growing losses on national economy were some of the compelling reasons requiring privatization of the Bank---Contention of petitioners that impugned privatization was undertaken merely at the behest of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or done in undue haste, lacked any concrete proof and entailing factual inquiry could not be a valid basis for interference in constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court---Mere advice or suggestion from an international financial institution, which assists and aids developing countries towards economic progress, may not amount to a pressure of the kind to have deprived the competent authority under the law to have taken independent decision---Better performance and rising profits of the Bank justified the impugned process of sale and made it a credible exercise---Approval of the Bank's privatization by the Privatization Committee was within the purview of Privatization Commission and the whole process did not reflect violation of any statutory provision---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n(b) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)---\n \n----Preamble & Part V---Privatization Commission (Modes and Procedures) Rules, 2001. Rr. 3, 4, 5 & 6---Privatization Commission (Hiring of Valuers) Regulations, 2001 Regln. 3---Privatization Commission (Valuation of Property) Rules, 2001 Rr. 4, 5 & 6(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition---Judicial review of administrative action---Scope---Manner and procedure for privatization, approval or rejection of highest ranked bidder, additional modes of privatization, negotiated sale, manner and procedure for hiring of valuers, valuation of property by the valuer and adviser and processing of valuation report---Privatization of a Bank----Allegations of mala fides in the privatization procedure---Private Foundation as the highest bidder---Validity---Foundation successfully bid for the Bank as the highest bidder, which was accepted by the Privatization Commission on 30th of December, 2003 as it found the Foundation's bid to be higher than the reference price---State Bank of Pakistan also provided their clearance for declaring the Foundation as successful bidder and Cabinet Committee on Privatization (Privatization Committee) accepted the recommendation of the Privatization Commission, and the Foundation paid the initial sale price and entered into an agreement on 26th of February 2004 with the Privatization Committee and the State Bank of Pakistan for the purchase of 51% share of the government stake in the Bank and for taking over the management of the Bank---Contention of petitioners was that procedure adopted for privatization of the Bank was tainted with mala fides; procedure was carried out in violation of the Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000 and that approval of the Foundation as the highest bidder by the Privatization Committee warranted interference under judicial review---Validity---No allegation was made regarding some personal gain made by any Member of the Privatization Committee or Commission or the Financial Advisor, or that any one of them wanted to help the highest bidder for mala fide reasons---General allegations of being influenced by International Monetary Fund (IMF) or crony capitalism were insufficient to establish that the impugned privatization was tainted with mala fides warranting interference in judicial review---Substantial compliance was made with the relevant provisions of the Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000 and the Rules/Regulations framed thereunder and minor deviation of Rules or Regulations, if any, in absence of any credible allegation of mala fides or corruption would not furnish a valid ground for interference in judicial review---Important steps taken by the Privatization Commission in compliance of Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000 and the Rules/Regulations framed thereunder, included, appointment of Chartered Accountants as Financial Advisor because of the slow international response for the search of potential buyers; calling for Expressions of Interest through advertisement; requisition of Statements of Qualification from bidders; constitution of a Pre-qualification Committee; the screening of three parties by the said Committee and recommendations of three parties by the Pre-qualification Committee for undertaking due diligence---Said three parties, recommended by the Pre-qualification Committee were invited to review the documentation relating to the Bank, however only the Foundation submitted a Confidentiality Agreement in December, 2002 and at that point Privatization Commission, if it intended to help the Foundation, could have declared it the highest bidder, but instead in April 2003, the Commission again called for Expressions of Interest through advertisements---Pre-qualification Committee, thereafter, recommended the Foundation and two other potential buyers, which was approved by the Privatization Commission, after which, Data Room of the Bank remained open for the potential buyers to carry out their due diligence---Privatization Commission simultaneously also finalized the process of privatization by taking various steps in compliance of Rules 3, 4 and 5 of Privatization Commission (Modes and Procedures) Rules, 2001---Bid of the Foundation, being the highest bid, was also higher than the reference price approved by the Privatization Committee---All such steps indicated that there was substantial compliance with the relevant provisions of the Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000 and the Rules/Regulations framed thereunder---Process of privatization was neither tainted with lack of transparency or mala fides nor the Foundation lacked qualifications prescribed in law---Constitutional petition was dismissed  accordingly.\n \n(c) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)---\n \n----Preamble---Privatization Commission (Modes and Procedures) Rules, 2001, Rr. 3, 4, 5 & 6---Privatization Commission (Hiring of Valuers) Regulations, 2001 Regln. 3---Privatization Commission (Valuation of Property) Rules, 2001, Rr. 4, 5 & 6(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition---Judicial review---Scope---Minor deviation from Rules/Regulations framed under Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000, if any, in absence of any credible allegation of mala fides or corruption would not furnish a valid ground for interference in judicial review---Constitutional petition was dismissed, accordingly.\n \n(d) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)---\n \n----Preamble--- Privatization Commission (Modes and Procedures) Rules, 2001, Rr. 3, 4, 5 & 6---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition---Manner and procedure for privatization, approval or rejection of highest ranked bidder, additional modes of privatization, negotiated sale--- Privatization of Bank---Private Foundation as highest bidder--- Validity--- Steps taken by Privatization Commission  in  compliance of Rules 3, 4, 5 & 6 of Privatization Commission (Modes and Procedures) Rules, 2001, recorded--- Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(e) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)---\n \n---Preamble--- Privatization Commission (Valuation of Property) Rules, 2001, Rr. 4 & 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition---Manner and procedure for valuation of property by the valuer and adviser hired by the Commission---Transfer of non-performing loans of value of Rs.1.283 billion to CIRC (Corporate Industrial Restructuring Corporation) and issuance of recovery bonds worth Rs.9.804 billion in respect of tax refunds in the Bank prior to privatization---Validity---Transfer of non-performing loans to CIRC (Corporate Industrial Restructuring Corporation) was carried out in an entirely transparent manner and all the bidders were informed in advance---Loans were transferred from the Bank to CIRC in the years 2001 and 2003, and some loans were then transferred back and various other amounts were also adjusted by mutual consent after which an amount of Rs.994.076 million was paid to the Bank by CIRC---Transfer of bad loans to CIRC was a well thought out and fully planned strategy which had the effect of enhancing the value of the Bank and contact was established between the Bank and officials of the Finance Ministry on a regular basis in order to execute the transfer efficiently---Transfer to CIRC was completed after CIRC's due diligence and resolution of Bank's non-performing loans with State Bank of Pakistan's Resolution Committee--- Government had issued bonds against the Bank's admitted tax liability, when taxation authorities had collected taxes  from the Bank in excess of its actual liability---Both the transfer of non-performing loans to CIRC and issuance of bonds were duly considered by the valuer in assessing the value of the Bank---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n(f) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)---\n \n----Preamble---Privatization Commission (Valuation of Property) Rules, 2001, Rr. 4, 5 & 6 (2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition---Judicial review---Manner of processing for valuation report and procedure for valuation of property by the Valuer and Adviser hired by the Commission--- Privatization of Bank---Valuation and determination of fair price of the Bank---Discounted Dividend Method for valuation of Bank--- Allegations of non-compliance with valuation Rules and collusion in appointment of Valuer---Validity---Reserve price of the Bank was fixed on the basis of a methodology known as \"\"Discounted Dividend Method\"\" which was different from the \"\"Discounted Cash Flow\"\" methodology and in case of determination of reserve price of banks 'Discounted Dividend Method' was used---Petitioners did not controvert the explanation given by the Privatization Commission for the valuation and determination of fair price of the Bank and it was also not disputed that the valuation was carried out in terms of the Financial Advisory Services Agreements; that the mode of valuation adopted by the valuer was permissible under the Privatization Commission (Valuation of Property) Rules, 2001 and that the valuation report was processed by the Board of the Privatization Commission in accord with Privatization Commission (Valuation of Property) Rules, 2001---Approval of the highest bid of the Foundation by the Privatization Committee being higher than the reference price was neither improper nor violative of the law governing the process of privatization to call for judicial review---No material was available on record to establish that either the valuer was appointed collusively or the valuation carried out by it was against the Rules or best practices being followed--- Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(g) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)---\n \n----Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition--- Privatization of Bank----Recapitalization/Bail out of the Bank prior to its privatization---Private Foundation successfully bid for the Bank as the highest bidder, which was accepted by the Privatization Commission on 30th of December, 2003 as it found the Foundation's bid to be higher than the reference price---Government had contributed a sum of Rs.17.7 billion to recapitalize/bail out the Bank, prior to its privatization, citing the reason that by not doing so would have brought the Bank close to bankruptcy---Validity---Injecting money into banks had been a worldwide phenomenon during the period of financial crunch---When said amount was injected into the Bank in question, the volume of its non-performing loans was huge and the Federal Government and its Financial Experts deemed it proper to finance the Bank---Petitioners had not referred to any opinion of some reputed economist holding the impugned bail out to be inappropriate or unwise or against best practices being followed---Keeping in view the opinions of academics and heads of states who were at the helm of affairs during the economic and banking crisis, decision of Government to recapitalize/bail out the Bank and privatize it subsequently, was motivated by bona fide considerations---Government's injection of money into banks was amongst the known methods to prop up the banks and such bail outs were not intended to merely help the banks, rather these were also designed to keep the economy afloat, so that the banks continued to advance loans for further investments which in turn meant more jobs and greater productivity---Measures taken by Government to recapitalize the Bank or to reduce the volume of its non-performing loans to make it more attractive for sale was neither against the law or the best practices being followed, nor did it reflect mala fides to furnish a ground for interference---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n(h) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)---\n \n----Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition---Privatization of Bank through bidding----Recapitalization/bail out the Bank prior to its privatization---Extracts from books/papers of heads of state and academics, explaining and justifying bail out of banks in different parts of the world during economic crisis provided.\n      \nAutobiography 'Decision Points' by George W. Bush; On the Brink by Henry M. Paulson Jr.; Beyond the Crises by Gordon Brown and White Paper on All the Options for Managing a Systemic Bank Crises co-authored by three academicians cited.\n \n(i) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)---\n \n----Preamble--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3), Part II, Chap. 1--- Constitutional  petition---Maintainability---Privatization of Bank through bidding---Locus standi of the petitioners---Petitions were in the nature of public interest litigation and the court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction qua matters of public importance relating to enforcement of Fundamental Rights had been liberal particularly if the issue raised was relatable to a public injury arising from breach of public duty---Petitions were maintainable.\n \n(j) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 184(3)---Judicial review of Executive's authority---Scope and limitations---Once the competent authority in the government has taken a decision backed by law, it would not be in consonance with the well established norms of judicial review to interfere in policy making domain of the executive authority.\n      \nAsia Foundation and Construction Ltd. v. Trafalgar House Construction (I) Ltd. ((1997) 1 Supreme Court Cases 738) ref.\n \n(k) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition---Judicial review of award of contract by government--- Scope and limitations---Duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality and its concern should be, whether a decision-making authority, exceeded its powers; committed an error of law; committed a breach of the rules of natural justice; reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached , or abused its powers---Question whether a particular policy of a particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair, is not for the court to determine and it is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken--- Court must exercise its discretionary powers of judicial review with circumspection and only in furtherance of public interest and not merely for making out of a legal point and it should always keep the larger public interest in mind to decide whether to interfere or not--- Only when the public interest overwhelms any other consideration, the court should interfere.\n      \nTata Cellular v. Union of India (36(1994) 6 SCC 651) and Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. ((2000) 2 Supreme Court Cases 617) ref\n \n(l) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 184(3)--- Constitutional petition--- Judicial review of administrative action--- Grounds--- Grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review, includes, illegality, which  means the decision-maker must understand the law correctly that regulates his decision - making power and must give effect to it; irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness, and procedural impropriety.\n      \nTata Cellular v. Union of India (36(1994) 6 SCC 651) ref.\n \n(m) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 184(3)--- Constitutional petition--- Judicial review of administrative action--- Scope--- Not every wandering from the precise paths of best practice, lend fuel to a claim for judicial review.\n      \nR.V. Deptt. of Constitutional Affairs [2006 All ER (D) 201] quoted.\n \n(n) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 184(3)--- Constitutional petition--- Judicial review of administrative action--- Scope--- Judicial review would be available only if public law element is apparent which would arise only in a case of bribery, corruption, implementation of unlawful policy and the like.\n      \nAirport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of Indian and others [(2006) 10 SCC] quoted.\n \n(o) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 184(3)--- Constitutional petition--- Judicial review of administrative action on account of mala fides---Scope---In absence of some un-rebuttable material on record qua mala fides, the court would not annul the order of executive authority which otherwise does not reflect any illegality or jurisdictional defect.\n \n(p) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 184(3)--- Constitutional petition--- Judicial review of administrative action on basis of mala fides---Proof of mala fides---Scope---Onus is entirely upon the person alleging mala fides to establish it, because, there is, to start with, a presumption of regularity with regard to all official acts, and until that presumption is rebutted, the action cannot be challenged merely upon a vague allegation of mala fides---Mala fides must be pleaded with particularity, and once one kind of mala fides is alleged, no one should be allowed to adduce proof of any other kind of mala fides nor should any enquiry be launched upon merely on the basis of vague and indefinite allegations, nor should the person alleging mala fides be allowed a roving enquiry into the files of the government for the purposes of fishing out some kind of a case.\n      \nFederation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmed Khan PLD 1974 SC 151 quoted.\n \n(q) Mala fides---\n \n----Definition and Scope---Mala fides literally means in bad faith and action taken in bad faith is usually action taken maliciously, in which the person taking the action does so out of personal motives either to hurt the person against whom the action is taken or to benefit oneself.\n      \nFederation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmed Khan PLD 1974 SC 151 quoted.\n \n(r) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition---Judicial review of cases concerning financial management or awarding of contracts by the government---Scope and limitations---Courts while dealing with such cases must appreciate that these are either policy issues or commercial transactions requiring knowledge in the specialized fields and courts lack the expertise to express any opinion on the soundness or otherwise of such acts/transactions---Court should ordinarily refrain from interfering in policy making domain of executive authority or in the award of contracts unless those acts smack of arbitrariness, favoritism and a total disregard of the mandate of law---Court, under judicial review, cannot examine the details of the terms of the contract which have been entered into by the public bodies or the State and have inherent limitations on the scope of any such enquiry, but at the same time the court can certainly examine whether decision making process was reasonable rational, not arbitrary and violative of the Constitution.\n      \nWatan Party v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 697 fol.\n      \nSterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N Publications Ltd. ((1993) 1 Supreme Court Cases 445) quoted.\n \n(s) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition---Judicial review of economic decisions by government--- Scope and limitations---Court refrains from interfering with economic decisions as it has been recognized that economic expediencies lack adjudicative disposition and unless the economic decision, based on economic expediencies, is demonstrated to be so violative of constitutional or legal limits on power or so abhorrent to reason, that the court would decline to interfere---Government while taking a decision related to economic issues, has a right to trial and error as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within limits of authority.\n      \nMessrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 582 and BALCO Employees Union (Regd.) v. Union of India AIR 2002 SC 350 ref.\n \n(t) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition---Administrative decisions of government bodies--- Judicial restraint and judicial review---Principles---Scope---Court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which decision was taken by the government because the court does not have the expertise in the domain of administrative decision making.\n      \nTata Cellular v. Union of India ((1994) 6 Supreme Court Cases 651) ref.\n \n(u) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Arts. 184(3) & 199---Constitutional petition---Scope---Where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of person by reason of violation of any constitutional or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court and in case of breach of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class of persons, in the Supreme Court seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons.\n      \nS.P. Gupta and others v. President of India and others AIR 1982 SC 149 ref.\n \n(v) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Part II, Chap. 1 & Art. 184(3)--- Constitutional petition---Scope---Fundamental Rights---Locus standi of petitioner---Scope---Group or class actions---Where there is violation of Fundamental Rights of a class or a group of persons who are unable to seek redress from the court, then the traditional rule of locus standi can be dispensed with, and the procedure available in public interest litigation can he made use of, if it is brought to the notice of the court by a person acting bona fide---Article 184(3) of the Constitution provides abundant scope for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights of an individual or a group or class of persons in the event of their infraction and it would be for the Supreme Court to lay down the contours generally in order to regulate the proceedings of group or class actions from case to case.\n      \nMiss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416 ref.\n \n(w) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Arts. 184(3) & 199---Constitutional petition---Judicial review---Scope---Availability of alternate remedy---Even the existence of an alternate remedy cannot prevent the court from exercising its power of judicial review if the said alternate remedy is neither efficacious nor expeditious---If an adequate remedy provided by law is less convenient, beneficial and effective in case of a legal right to performance of a legal duty, the jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked and if a statutory functionary acts mala fide or in a partial, unjust and oppressive manner the court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction has power to grant relief to the aggrieved party.\n      \nAl-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 324 and Wukala Mahaz Barai Tahafaz Dastoor v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 1263 ref.\n      \nWatan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 697 quoted.\n \n(x) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Arts. 184(3) & 199---Public interest litigation---Scope---Frivolous petitions which are neither of public importance nor relatable to enforcement of a fundamental right or public duty---Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the veil of public interest a private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking---Public interest litigation should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented cases or those founded on personal vendetta---Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration---Such petitions deserve to be rejected at the threshold, and, in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos. 5 and 15 of 2004, C.M.A. No.4251 of 2011 and H.R.C. No. 14144-S of 2009, decision dated: 29-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "TASSADUQ HUSSAIN, JILLANI, MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Dr. AKHTAR HASSAN KHAN and others\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12350",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1J5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2216 = 2012 SLD 2216 = 2012 CLD 598",
    "Key Words:": "Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002-------R. 185---Demarcation of areas after award of mining leases and reducing mining area of petitioner while increasing that of respondent---Impugned demarcation notification set aside by Appellate Authority, but restored by High Court---Validity---Petitioner's bid of Rs.81 million and that of respondent Rs. 10 million were submitted on the basis of previous demarcation which establish that mining area of petitioner was larger than that for which respondent had submitted its bid---Acting upon impugned notification would be manifestly unfair for the same had significantly reduced the area of mining lease of petitioner and increased that of respondent---Supreme Court accepted appeal while directing the Authority to notify demarcation of disputed areas prior to the auction process in future.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1526 of 2011, decision dated: 17-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR-UL-MULK, SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY AND AMIR HANI MUSLIM, JJ",
    "": "GHULAM MURTAZA\nvs\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12351",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1J5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2217 = 2012 SLD 2217 = 2012 CLD 609",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S. 19---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 265-K & 417---Appeal against acquittal--- Application filed by three respondents under S.265-K, Cr.P.C. for acquittal was allowed by Banking Court---Allegation against the respondents was that machinery/plant for which loan was provided, was missing and the mortgaged property had been handed over to someone else on lease---Allegations of mis-utilization of the finance and the removal of machinery/plant were directed against one respondent---Counsel for the bank had contended that it was an admitted position that loan was obtained by said three respondents and they were liable for the criminal offence---Validity---Under the law, obtaining loan and inability to pay back the same was not a criminal offence---It could be a civil liability to be proceeded in civil forum provided under the law, but the commission of default in repayment of loan, would not give birth to a criminal offence---Machinery/plant had been removed which allegation was directed against one respondent only---Criminal proceedings against said respondent, in circumstances, would continue, whereas no useful purpose would be served, if remaining respondents were proceeded against; as there was no likelihood of their conviction, in the circumstances of the case.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Acquittal Appeal No. 161 of 2010, decision dated: 23rd November, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Attorney\nvs\nABDUL LATIF CHANNA and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12352",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1J5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2218 = 2012 SLD 2218 = 2012 CLD 619",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 20 & 4---Application for filing arbitration agreement in court and referring the matter to arbitration---Petroleum Concession Agreement and Petroleum Farmout Agreement---Petitioners, on the basis of a Petroleum Concession Agreement signed between the Government and the respondents, had entered into a Farmout Agreement with the respondents to carry out petroleum exploration operations---Deed of Assignment for the exploration work was signed between the parties on the basis of said Farmout Agreement---Under said Farmout Agreement and the Deed of Assignment , the majority 75% shares of the operation were transferred to the plaintiffs while the remainder minority shares were retained by the respondents and the Government---Dispute between the parties arose relating to default in payment and non-participation in work by the respondents after exploration work had started on the basis of the Farmout Agreement---Contention of the petitioners was that the forum for settlement of such dispute under the Farmout Agreement was arbitration, and that the respondents did not want to initiate arbitration---Contention of the respondents was that the transfer of shares of the operations to the petitioners was illegal which had been challenged in a constitutional petition, and the defendants had initiated a civil suit regarding the demand for payment, and the right of the petitioners to carry out exploration work and in presence of said constitutional petition and civil suit, the matter could not be referred to arbitration and that the Farmout Agreement was superseded by the Deed of Assignment---Validity---Deed of Assignment itself was issued on the basis of the Farmout Agreement, and it could not be said that the Deed of Assignment had overruled the Farmout Agreement---Respondents, on the basis of Farmout Agreement had agreed to transfer 75% of the working interest to the plaintiff, and approval for the said transfer was given by the President of Pakistan by virtue of the Deed of Assignment---Farmout Agreement as well as the Deed of Assignment determined the rights and liabilities of the parties---Contention of the respondents that under Deed of Assignment disputes could only be settled through arbitration in accordance with the Petroleum Concession Agreement and not the Farmout Agreement was misleading as the Petroleum Concession Agreement provided for settlement of disputes between the Government and the parties---In the present case, the dispute was between the parties only (petitioner and respondents), who had the working interest in the exploration and production of petroleum products---High Court accepted the application of the petitioner for referring the matter to arbitration, with the direction to the parties to nominate the arbitrators, and in case of dispute between the parties, an Umpire would be appointed by the arbitrators, with the consent of the parties, whose decision shall be final and binding upon the parties---Basic dispute between the parties was regarding payment required to be made by the respondents however, the respondents could raise any other issue before the arbitrator.\n \n(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n----S. 41---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX Rr.1 & 2---Procedure and powers of court---Petroleum Concession Agreement and Petroleum Farmout Agreement---Application of petitioners/applicants for permission to carry out exploration and development work at the petitioners'/applicants' own risk and cost---Contention of the petitioners/applicants was that the working could not be carried out without joint decision of the parties having the working interest in the operations and the respondents' non-participation in meetings was with the object to stop the petitioners/applicants from carrying out work---Petitioners/applicants further contended that the representative of the Government did not attend the meetings due to non-participation of the respondents---Validity---Record showed that petitioners/applicants had got 75% working interest in the operations, whereas the respondents had got 20% of the working interest, therefore, the petitioners/applicants had a prima facie case---Balance of convenience was also in favour of the petitioners, because if work was stopped at the site, huge loss would be caused to the petitioners as well as to the Government, and the same would result into an irreparable loss not only to the petitioners but also the public , as interest of the public was also indirectly involved in the matter---High Court directed that the petitioners would be at liberty to carry out the work even if the respondents did not participate in the meetings---Representative of the Government was directed to participate in the meetings, if he otherwise had no objection---High Court accepted application of petitioners, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.S. No.249 of 2011, decision dated: 29-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "RIAZ AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "OMV MAURICE ENERGY LIMITED through General ManageR\nvs\nOCEAN PAKISTAN LIMITED through Chief Executive Officer and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12353",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1J5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2219 = 2012 SLD 2219 = 2012 CLD 640",
    "Key Words:": "International Arbitration-------Public Interest Litigation---Dispute over legality and validity of joint venture agreements between Provincial Government and transnational corporations/ international companies---Arbitration over such dispute---Application to stay arbitration proceedings at International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) and International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)---Appointment of arbitrator by Provincial Government---Petitioner had moved an application to direct the respondents not to take further steps in the arbitration of the matter and also withdraw request for arbitration at the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) and International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), till the Supreme Court decided upon the legality and validity of the joint venture agreements---Validity---Provincial and Federal Government were directed by Supreme Court to make a request to the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) and International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), not to take any further steps in the arbitration proceedings and extend the period for nomination of arbitrator, so that Supreme Court could finally dispose of the petitions filed before it on the same subject and matter.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 796 of 2007 and C.M.As Nos. 4560 and 4561 of 2009 and C.M.A. No. 116 of 2011,",
    "Judge Name:": "IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J., KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND TARIQ PARVEZ, JJ",
    "": "Maulana ABDUL HAQ BALOCH and others\nvs\nGOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12354",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1J5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2220 = 2012 SLD 2220 = 2012 CLD 649",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Malicious prosecution-------Suit for recovery of amount on the ground of false and malicious prosecution---Plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of amount on the ground that defendant had instituted a false and baseless private complaint, which was dismissed by the Trial Court and Appellate Court below---Plaintiff claimed that due to said false complaint he was entitled to recovery of suit amount because prosecution was malicious---Defendant in his written statement had denied all the allegations stating that he had correctly filed the complaint against the plaintiff---Trial Court had considered the contents of plaint, written statement and evidence produced by the parties; and after detailed examination of evidence, concluded that plaintiff had failed to prove his case---Findings of the Trial Court were upheld by the Appellate Court below and High Court---Validity---Nothing was in the statement of witnesses wherefrom it could be ascertained that the prosecution of the plaintiff was malicious---Only evidence which was produced by the plaintiff was that he was acquitted in said private complaint filed by the defendant/complainant---From mere acquittal, it could not be said that prosecution of the plaintiff was malicious one; it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit for damages that his prosecution was without reasonable cause and malicious---If a person had got reasonable and probable cause, the prosecution could not be described as malicious because he had got enmity---Whatever was stated by the plaintiff or his witness, the defendant cross-examined the witnesses and no material point was left in cross-examination---Plaintiff also failed to prove that he had suffered damages due to prosecution and that the proceedings had interfered with his liberty and affected his reputation--- Appeal was dismissed by Supreme Court.\n \nMuhammad Akram v. Mst. Farman Bi PLD 1990 SC 28; Haji Muhammad Latif Khan v. Muhammad Hanif 2007 SCR 125; Muhammad Arif v. Muhammad Boota and 4 others 2007 SCR 363; Muhammad Latif Khan and 2 others v. Muhammad Afsar Khan PLD 2000 SC (AJ&K) 31; Naber Shaha v. Shamsuddin and others PLD 1964 Dacca 11 and Muhammad Mantazuddin v. Shamsur Rahman PLD 1964 Dacca 618 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VIII, R.5---Specific denial---If the allegation in the plaint was not denied by the defendant in clear terms or by necessary implication; and if there was evasive denial, such denial could not be considered; and allegation in the plaint, would be considered to be correct.\n \nQurban Hussain v. Mst. Bashir Begum and 6 others PLD 1986 SC (AJ&K) 109 ref.\n \n(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Art. 133---Cross-examination of a witness---Cross-examination of witness was a right of adverse party; and if a particular portion of the statement of a witness was not cross-examined, that would be deemed to be admitted true---If the statement of any witness would go against the defendant and he failed to cross-examine on that point, then the point would be deemed to be admitted.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court (AJ&K)",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.14 of 2007, decision dated: 17-01-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, C.J. AND RAJA SAEED AKRAM KHAN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NAZIR KHAN\nvs\nMUHAMMAD AMEER-\nIslamuddin and others v. Ghulam Muhammad and others PLD 2004 SC 633 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12355",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2221 = 2012 SLD 2221 = 2012 CLD 658",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 11(1)(F), 12(1)(e), 99(4) & 156---Duties of the management of insurance company---Failure to meet criteria for sound and prudent management---Management of the company, in addition to the day to day running of the company and the management of its business, also had some fudiciary duties i.e. duties held in trust and some wider duties imposed by statute---Breach of those statutory duties would usually be a criminal offence punishable by fine or imprisonment---Directors of company were gauged against a higher standard of accountability which required them to be vigilant and perform their duties with due care---In the present case, the Directors had failed to perform their duties with due care and prudence---Directors were supposed to be well aware of their legal obligations in connection with statutory requirements of S.12 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 which dealt with criteria for sound and prudent management read with S.11(1)(F) of said Act, it could legitimately be inferred that the default was committed knowingly and willfully---Penalty as provided under S.156 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, could be imposed on the company, however, instead of imposing the maximum penalty, a nominal fine of Rs.100,000 was imposed on the company and was also sternly warned that in case of any non-compliance in future, more punitive action would be taken against the company.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice dated 17-10-2011, decision dated: 4-01-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID NASIM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (INSURANCE)",
    "": "Messrs NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE\nCOMPANY: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12356",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2222 = 2012 SLD 2222 = 2012 CLD 663",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Malicious prosecution-------Damages for---Plaintiff was mentioned as one of the accused in the F.I.R.---Plaintiff after his arrest in the case remained in judicial lock-up for some period, but acquitted after trial by extending him benefit of doubt---Plaintiff's claim for recovery of damages for malicious prosecution---Proof---Police after holding detailed investigation had declared plaintiff guilty of charges and placed his name in Column No.3 of Challan submitted in Trial Court---Trial Court as well as High Court had dismissed plaintiff's application for his acquittal moved under S.249-A, Cr.P.C., during trial---Prosecution of plaintiff could not be declared to be malicious merely on ground of his acquittal in such case---Trial Court had acquitted plaintiff not on ground of registration of false case, but on ground of failure of prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt---Acquittal of plaintiff by extending him benefit of doubt would establish that defendant had not lodged such case without reasonable and probable cause and for having malice against plaintiff---Suit was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nHicks v. Faulkner (1881) 8 QBD 167; Denning L.J. in Tempest v. Snowden (1952) 1 KB 130; Sher Muhammad v. Maula Bux 1995 CLC 1134; Sadaruz Zaman v. The State 1990 SCMR 1277; Feroze Khan v. Fateh Khan and 2 others 1991 SCMR 2220; Mahmood Akhtar v. The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and another PLD 1992 SC 240; Subedar (Retd.) Fazale Rahim v. Rab Nawaz 1999 SCMR 700; Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Razzak and another PLD 1994 SC 476 and United Bank Limited and 5 others v. Raja Ghulam Hussain and 4 others 1999 SCMR 734 rel.\n \n(b) Malicious prosecution---\n \n----Damages for---Factors essential to be proved by plaintiff stated.\n \nThe basic elements, on the basis of which a suit for recovery of an amount as damages for malicious prosecution can be accepted or rejected, are that: (a) the prosecution of the plaintiff by the defendant; (b) there must be a want of reasonable and probable cause for that prosecution; (c) the defendant must have acted maliciously i.e. with improbable motive and not to further the ends of justice; (d) the prosecution must have ended in favour of the person proceeded against; and (e) it must have caused damage to the party proceeded against.\n \nProsecutor may be wrong, but if he honestly believed that accused had committed a criminal offence, he cannot be initiator of malicious prosecution. Even otherwise, malice alone would not be enough, there must also be shown to be absence of reasonable and probable cause. \n \nThe maxim \"\"the reasonable and probable cause\"\" means that it is an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon full conviction, based on reasonable grounds of the existence of a state of circumstances, which assuming them to be true would reasonably lead any ordinary prudent man to the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of crime imputed.\n \nIf reasonable and probable cause is established, then question of malice becomes irrelevant.\n \nMere fact that prosecution instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff ultimately failed cannot expose the former to the charge of malicious prosecution, unless it is proved by the plaintiff that the prosecution was instituted without any justifiable reason and it was due to malicious intention of the defendant and not with a mere intention of carrying the law into effect.\n \nAcquittal on extension of benefit of doubt does not mean that accused was falsely implicated and possibility would be excluded that accused might also have been involved in the matter.\n \nHicks v. Faulkner (1881) 8 QBD 167; Denning L.J. in Tempest v. Snowden (1952) 1 KB 130; Sher Muhammad v. Maula Bux 1995 CLC 1134; Sadaruz Zaman v. The State 1990 SCMR 1277; Feroze Khan v. Fateh Khan and 2 others 1991 SCMR 2220; Mahmood Akhtar v. The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and another PLD 1992 SC 240; Subedar (Retd.) Fazale Rahim v. Rab Nawaz 1999 SCMR 700; Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Razzak and another PLD 1994 SC 476 and United Bank Limited and 5 others v. Raja Ghulam Hussain and 4 others 1999 SCMR 734 rel.\n \nAtif Farzauq Raja for Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.536 of 2009, decision dated: 16-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MALIK SHAHZAD AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "ALAM DIN\nvs\nMUHAMMAD HUSSAIN and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12357",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2223 = 2012 SLD 2223 = 2012 CLD 673",
    "Key Words:": "Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001-------Rr. 3, 4(h) & 5(4), (5)---Application for grant of certificate of registration as a broker---Detailed scrutiny of information/documents attached with the application for grant of certificate had revealed that financial position of the applicant company was severely deteriorated, as the company defaulted on its loans payable to the Banks; had failed to provide its audited financial statements; was facing serious unresolved management conflicts; had no proper Board of Directors as the Chief Executive Officer/Nominee Director of the company had resigned but the company was still declaring the said person as its Chief Executive Officer---Change of Nominee Director of the company was neither reported to, nor notified by, the Stock Exchange---Present Directors of the company did not fulfil the experience as stipulated in R.4(h) of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001---Allowing the company to undertake securities business in view of said deficiencies was not in the interest of investors and stock market---Applicant company being not eligible for registration as a Broker, its application was refused in terms of R.5(5) of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Application for Certificate of Registration, decision dated: 5-01-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSCID)",
    "": "REGISTRATION OF GUARDIAN SECURITIES\n(PVT.) LTD.: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12358",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2224 = 2012 SLD 2224 = 2012 CLD 675",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-------Ss. 4 & 17(4)---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss.30, 31, 32, 451 & 452---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S.44---Writ petition---Acquisition of property--- Public purpose---Scope---Notification issued by Collector for acquisition of property for construction of a Power Project by company, had been challenged by the owners of the property---Petitioners (owners) had contended that said company being a non-State-Subject and not registered in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, acquisition of property for such company was neither lawful nor same was being acquired for the public purpose--- Validity--- Term \"\"company\"\" would mean a company registered under the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Certificate issued by Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, had revealed that the company had delivered the necessary documents required under Ss.30, 31, 32 & 451 of Companies Ordinance, 1984; and thereafter the proceedings of acquisition of land in the company's favour had been made---Once any company was registered after fulfilling the requirements of proceedings then it could not be said that the company was non-State Subject---Purpose for which land was being acquired for the company was of public utility---Even otherwise acquisition proceedings, though were being taken in favour of company, but ownership of said project would be given to Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government---Controversy that the company was not State Subject had, therefore, become irrelevant---Company had also stated in written statement that their status was that of collector/lessee and; they would use the project only for 35 years, subject to payment of settled tariff to Azad Government---Contention of the petitioners that property in question had been acquired for the company, being misconceived was turned down, in circumstances.\n \n(b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)---\n \n----Ss. 4 & 17(4)---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S.44---Writ petition---Acquisition of land for public purpose---\"\"Public purpose\"\", determination of---Scope---Collector Land Acquisition had the prerogative to determine as to whether purpose of acquisition was public purpose or not--- Question of public purpose, could not be determined by High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction---Property in question having been acquired by Government for construction of project by company which would remain in the ownership of Government and after using 35 years as a contractor, the project would be handed over to the Government; land in question, therefore, was required for public purpose within the meaning of S.4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894---Prayer of the petitioners for abrogation of notification pertaining to emergency acquisition, was also declined.\n \nAdministrator Municipal Corporation Committee Kotli and others v. Muhammad Abdullah and 3 others 2001 YLR 3367 rel.\n \n(c) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)---\n \n----Ss. 4 & 15--- Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S. 44---Writ petition---Acquisition of land--- Determination of amount of compensation---Collector had the sole prerogative to determine the amount of compensation---Constitution of Advisory Committee for the purpose through impugned notification was contrary to basic provision of Land Acquisition Act, 1894---No provision of law existed under which said notification was promulgated---Price of the land in question was determined by Advisory Committee and not by the Collector while exercising its independent power---Impugned notification pertaining to the constitution of District Price Assessment Advisory Committee for the purpose of acquisition of land was quashed by High Court---Ancillary proceedings of the Advisory Committee regarding fixation of market value of immovable property in question, were declared without jurisdiction and set aside---Collector, was directed to assess the market value of land including other things attached to said land in accordance with the provisions of S.15 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894.\n \nMessrs Qureshi Vegetables and Ghee Mills v. Deputy Collector Excise and Taxation Mirpur and others 1994 SCR 123; Iqbal Razzaq Butt v. Abdus Salam Butt and 6 others 1999 MLD 261; Walayat Khan and 2 others v. Muhammad Azam and 12 others PLD 1996 SC(AJ&K) 18; Messrs Haroon Brothers v. Drugs Registration Board and another 1992 CLC 1017; Attaullah Atta v. Ghulam Bashir Mughal and 5 others 1996 CLC 1551 and Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Defence and 2 others v. Muhammad Khan and another PLD 1991 SC(AJ&K) 33 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1208 of 2011, decision dated: 7-12-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "GHULAM MUSTAFA MUGHAL, C.J., MUNIR AHMED CHAUDHARY AND M. TABASSUM AFTAB ALVI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASLAM and 27 others\nvs\nAZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF\nJAMMU AND KASHMIR through Chief Secretary to\nAzad Govt. Muzaffarabad and 9 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12359",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2225 = 2012 SLD 2225 = 2012 CLD 698",
    "Key Words:": "Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-------S. 21---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 133---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Public Nuisance---Nuisance created by machines in grind mill installed in inhabited area---Notices were issued by Supreme Court to Director-General Environment to explain as to whether installation of grind mill in inhabited area was permissible---Director-General Environment submitted report outlining, the different forms of nuisances created by the machines installed; the reasons for the nuisance; remedial measures that could be adopted to reverse the impact of the nuisance, and the fact that machines had since been sealed and were not operational on orders of the Assistant Commissioner---Contention of petitioner was that the grind mill was a nuisance in all forms and manifestations and it was required to be removed--- Validity---Respondent had stated that machines installed by him had been sealed under order of the Assistant Commissioner and in case he operated them again, same would abide by all the remedial measures suggested by the Director-General Environment in his report---Petition for leave to appeal was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.1004 of 2011, decision dated: 27-01-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "EJAZ AFZAL KHAN AND IJAZ AHMED CHAUDHRY, JJ",
    "": "MAHMOOD KHALID\nvs\nSENIOR MEMBER BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB,"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12360",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2226 = 2012 SLD 2226 = 2012 CLD 701",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Execution without intervention of court---Suit was decreed in favour of bank by Banking Court on the basis of agreement between the parties---Bank initiated execution proceedings under S.19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, against debtors---Appellant contested execution of the decree on the ground that debtors were not the owners of property under execution---Validity---As a ploy to defeat the decree and proceedings initiated by bank under S.19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, appellant filed applications, all of which were dismissed by Banking Court by observing that earlier in time, the same advocate who had preferred applications on behalf appellant, also moved similar applications on behalf of some other person and that such applications had been dismissed by Banking Court with cost---Banking Court also dismissed the application on the ground that appellant had already preferred civil suit without impleading bank therein and by misrepresentation and twisting of facts ex parte injunction order was obtained, without disclosing that appellant or some other person was not the owner of the property---Civil suit in respect of property in question was pending adjudication before High Court, wherein bank had also made its appearance (by filing application under O.I, R.10, C.P.C.) and injunctive order against the bank and debtors who were operating in the civil suit in favour of appellant in respect of property in question--- All allegations on either end would be looked into and thrashed out vis-a-vis title of the property through evidence therein, therefore, High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Banking Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.82 of 2011, decision dated: 20-09-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED AND SALMAN HAMID, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HAFEEZ\nvs\nBANKING COURT NO.1, Karachi High Court\nand 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12361",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2227 = 2012 SLD 2227 = 2012 CLD 746",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 15, 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58--- Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Ordinance (X of 1980), S.15--- High Court appeal---Execution of decree---Objection to attachment of property---Investigation of claim--- High Court stayed execution of decree on the application filed by objector on the ground of pendency of suits against debtor/bank---Validity---No stay was operating either in the suits filed by objector nor any appeal was pending against such and decree---Objections filed by objector had already been dismissed whereas appeal against such order also met the same fate---Order passed by High Court as Executing Court restraining execution of banking and decree amounted to review of its own order and negated effect of the order passed in appeal, and the same was not permissible in law---Order passed by High Court was in the nature of final order, whereby the entire execution proceedings had come to a \"\"halt\"\" since 6-3-2007, otherwise the order fell within the Exceptions provided under S.22(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, hence appealable---Division Bench of High Court set aside the order passed by single Judge of High Court and directed the court to proceed with the execution of proceedings in accordance with law and dispose of the same within a reasonable period---Division Bench of High Court also directed that the pending suits of the objector should also be heard and disposed of on their own merits strictly in accordance with law---High Court appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \nMessrs Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Bela Automotives Ltd. 2006 CLD 169; Nazir Ahmed Vaid and others v. Habib Bank AG Zurich 2005 CLD 1571; Messrs Huffaz Seamlen Pipe Industries Ltd. and 2 others v. Messrs Security Leasing Corporation Ltd. 2002 SCMR 1419; Malik Israr Salim v. Citi Bank NA Lahore and another 2003 CLD 588; Messrs Tri Star Polyester Ltd. v. Citi Bank 2001 SCMR 410 and Bolan Bank Limited v. Capricorn Enterprise (Pvt.) Ltd. 1998 SCMR 1961 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C.A. No. 61 of 2007, decision dated: 30-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM C.J. AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN\nvs\nMessrs WHITE GOLD EXPORTERS (PVT.) LTD.\nand 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12362",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2228 = 2012 SLD 2228 = 2012 CLD 866",
    "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 561-A--- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.420/468/ 471/34---Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, forgery for purpose of cheating, using as genuine a forged document, common intention---Application for quashing of order---Complainant/ applicant had obtained financial facilities (loan) from the Bank, against which he provided a commercial building on a plot as collateral/security---Complainant provided the Bank with photocopies of title documents of other various immovable properties owned by him, to show his credit worthiness to obtain the financial facility---Bank subsequently sent a letter to the Sub-Registrar mentioning that such immovable properties were purchased by the complainant from the Bank's financial facilities and he had executed declarations in the name of the Bank, therefore, no registration of any deed for transfer of such immovable properties was to be accepted without issuance of 'no objection certificate' (NOC) from the Bank---Complainant lodged F.I.R. against the accused (bank officials) and on investigation report submitted by police under S.173, Cr.P.C., Magistrate agreed with the police report and approved F.I.R. as 'B' class---Contention of complainant was that Investigating Officer essentially based his findings on the handwriting expert's report with respect to complainant's signatures, seal on the declarations and stamp, which the Magistrate accepted mechanically without appreciating that such report of expert was contested; that accused were directly charged in the F.I.R. for the commission of forgery which they corroborated by producing forged agreements and expert evidence, therefore in view of the complexity of the case, trial was imperative; that Magistrate did not appreciate a report from a different Bank, which revealed that one of the said immovable properties was purchased by the complainant on a mortgage agreement, through said different bank, before obtaining the financial facilities, therefore question of purchase of said immovable property from financial facilities of the Bank did not arise, and that interest of Bank had already been fully secured by the commercial building on the plot which was kept as collateral/security---Validity---Accused had not disputed the fact that complainant sent the photocopies of title documents of immovable properties to show his creditworthiness---Expert evidence report obtained by the complainant showed dissimilarities in the stamp and signature---Letter written by the Bank to the Sub-Registrar mentioned that NOC had to be obtained from the Bank first in respect of immovable properties but said letter did not mention that the properties were mortgaged with the Bank, which showed that letter was written with ulterior motive---Material witnesses had not been examined by the Investigating Officer and his report was wrong to the extent that one of the immovable properties was purchased through a mortgage agreement with a different Bank---Magistrate had been impressed by the handwriting expert's opinion and did not appreciate the fact that there were other documents on record which showed tha the complainant never mortgaged the immovable properties mentioned in the declarations and the Bank's letter to the Sub-Registrar---Financial facility of the Bank had already been secured by the commercial building on the plot, which left no occasion for the complainant to mortgage other immovable properties with the Bank---Accused had apparently committed breach of trust by using the allegedly forged declarations against the complainant---Further examination of other witnesses and documents was required because of which it was not an open and shut case and required further probe, which was only possible if case proceeded further through trial---Impugned order of Magistrate being illegal, was set aside, and the case was sent for trial after restoration of the F.I.R.\n \nNoor Muhammad v. The State 2005 SCMR 1958; Syed Muhammad Umer Shah v. Bashir Ahmed 2004 SCMR 1859; Anwar Ahmed v. Nafis Bano through Legal Heirs 2005 SCMR 152 and Ali Ahmed alias Ali Ahmed Mia v. The State PLD 1962 SC 102 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.284 of 2011, decision dated: 21st December, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SALMAN HAMID, J",
    "": "NASIR UDDIN SHAHAB--Applicant\nvs\nTHE STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12363",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2229 = 2012 SLD 2229 = 2012 CLD 764",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------S. 72---Specific Relief Act, (1 of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Nomination by insurance policy holder---Error in court order---­Resemblance in names of insurance policy holder and nominee---Insurance policy was issued in the name of the deceased but due to resemblance in names of deceased and his mother, court while disposing of the suit, made the mistake of declaring that insurance policy was issued in the name of the deceased's mother, which deprived deceased's widow from her share of insurance policy and share of this minor child was reduced significantly---Insurance Corporation had filed written statement in which it categorically stated that deceased at the time of purchasing Life Insurance Policy nominated his mother as his nominee but after his marriage he changed his nomination and nominated his wife as his nominee---Neither the fact of filing written statement by Insurance Corporation was brought to the notice of the court nor any application for rectification/ recalling of erroneous order had been filed---Error having occurred into the assessment of shares of legal heirs of deceased, High Court in the interest of justice ordered issuance of notice to all the legal heirs of the deceased.\n \n(b) Act of court---\n \n----Error in court order---No one shall suffer on account of an error of court.\n \n(c) Insurance---\n \n----Insurance policy, benefit of---Interest of minors---Duty of court---Court is obliged to look after and protect interests of a minor on its own.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1316 of 2004 and C.M.A. No.735 of 2006, decision dated: 16-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, J",
    "": "FAISAL through L.Rs.--Plaintiffs\nvs\nMrs. KHALIDA BANO and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12364",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2230 = 2012 SLD 2230 = 2012 CLD 758",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Malicious prosecution-------Suit for damages on basis of malicious prosecution arising out of civil litigation---Conditions essential to constitute a 'cause of action for such suit stated.\n \nCondition precedents for a person to have a cause for damages on the basis of malicious prosecution arising out of civil litigation are that (i) the plaintiff was prosecuted by the defendant; (ii) the prosecution ended in plaintiffs favour; (iii) the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause; (iv) the defendant was actuated by malice; (v) the proceedings had interfered with plaintiffs liberty and had also affected his/her reputation; and finally (vi) the plaintiff had suffered damage. \n \nMuhammad Amin v. Jogendia Kumar Bannerjee AIR 1947 Privy Council 108; Haji Muhammad Shafi v. Mst. Hamidan Bibi 1990 MLD 597 and Ali Asghar v. Fazal Akbar 1988 CLC 147 ref.\n \nMuhammad Akram v. Mst. Farman Bi PLD 1990 SC 28 fol.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Powers of court---Scope---Court could reject plaint even without an application by defendant---Principles.\n \nThe plain reading of the provision contained in Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. clearly provides that there is no express requirement for the defendant to file an application to seek the rejection of the plaint. The court has the authority under the said provision to reject the plaint even without any application made by an interested party \n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R. 11--- Rejection of plaint--- Essential considerations---­Court would consider only plaint and not plea raised in written statement, if same was beyond pale of what was contained in plaint. \n \nJewan v. Federation of Pakistan 1994 SCMR 826; Muhammad Akhtar v. Abdul Hadi 1981 SCMR 878; Nazir Ahmad v. Ghulam Mehdi 1988 SCMR 824 and Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation Ltd. v. Mian Abdul Latif PLD 2008 SC 371 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1162 of 2008, decision dated: 11-10-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "YAHYA AFRIDI AND NISAR HUSSAIN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "SHEHZADA\nvs\nKHAIRULLAH and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12365",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2231 = 2012 SLD 2231 = 2012 CLD 779",
    "Key Words:": "Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-------S. 2(c)--- \"\"Consumer\"\", \"\"Service provider\"\"--- Consumer Court jurisdiction of---Scope---To confer jurisdiction upon Consumer Court, there must be a \"\"consumer\"\" having grievance either against a manufacturer or service provider, however buyer for re-sale or hire for any commercial purpose were excluded from the definition of a \"\"consumer\"\"---Contribution of amount on monthly basis by the complainant with group of persons in order to pay the same turn by turn on monthly basis, did not bring complainant within the definition of \"\"consumer\"\" provided in S.2(c)(i) of Consumer Protection Act, 2005---Section 2(c)(ii) of the Act defined \"\"consumer\"\" as a person who hired services for a consideration, but in the present case, every contributor paid and received equal amount and the \"\"collector\"\", by collecting the amount on monthly basis had no additional benefit which could be termed as \"\"consideration\"\" in order to establish the complainant as a \"\"consumer\"\"--- Section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2005 was not applicable in view of the facts of the case and specifically S.21(c) and (d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2005, did not apply as no representation regarding particular kind, standard or equality of service was made by the collector of the amount and similarly there was no representation on part of the \"\"collector\"\" concerning his skill, qualification or experience in providing alleged service---Grievance of complainant was outside the jurisdiction of Consumer Court---Impugned order of Consumer Court was set aside---Appeal was allowed. [pp. 781, 782, 783] A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H & I",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.287 of 2008, heard on 12-12-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MEHMOOD MAQBOOL BAJWA, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD JAVED IQBAL\nvs\nABDUL LATIF ALVI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12366",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2232 = 2012 SLD 2232 = 2012 CLD 774",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S. 13 & O.XI, R.1---Foreign ---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Interrogatories, delivery of---Plaintiff bank filed recovery suit against defendant on the basis of decree passed by a foreign court against same defendant and in favour of same plaintiff--- Defendant filed application under O.XI, R. 1, C.P.C. to serve interrogatories on plaintiff bank---Validity---All questions put to plaintiff bank by defendant related to evidence to be led by plaintiff---If at all, plaintiff bank would choose to lead evidence in respect of original cause of action, then defendant was entitled to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses and to examine and challenge any document that they might produce and proposed questions could be put to such witnesses---No party was entitled to serve interrogatories to find out the facts constituting the other side's evidence and proposed questions of defendant fell in such category---Defendant should, therefore, wait for the trial to put such questions to plaintiff's witness, if the latter would choose to lead evidence on original cause of action---Inappropriate for defendant to serve proposed interrogatories on plaintiff bank at present stage---Application was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.908 of 2003 and C.M.A. No.1433 of 2004, decision dated: 17-12-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nSyed JAFFAR ABBAS--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12367",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2233 = 2012 SLD 2233 = 2012 CLD 796",
    "Key Words:": "Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937)-------Ss. 2(1)(b), 4 (1)(2) & 5---Foreign award---Making of award rule of the court---Court, duties of---Scope---Dispute between the parties was decided by arbitrators under English law and award was announced---Plaintiff sought making the award rule of the court---Validity---High Court was not an appellate forum to re-examine final award within the parameters of provisions made available under Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937---Interference, if any, could only be warranted if the conditions surfaced the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937---Defendant should have availed remedy in appeal available to it, which it did not avail---High Court by exercising powers could pass an executing order, not travelling beyond the final award---Final award having already been filed, same was made rule of the court by High Court and suit was decreed in terms of the final award accordingly.\n \nAlfred C. Toepfer International GMBH v. Pakistan Molasses Company 2003 CLD 1666 and Messrs Continental Grains Co. v. Messrs Naz Brothers 1982 CLC 2301 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1434 of 2004, decision dated: 10-10-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, J",
    "": "NOBLE CHARTERING INC. through Attorney--Plaintiff\nvs\nAWAN TRADING COMPANY (PVT.) LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12368",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2234 = 2012 SLD 2234 = 2012 CLD 802",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Organizations Ordinance (XLIX of 2009)-------S. 21(4)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---High Court appeal---Delay---Condonation of---Appellants challenged order of Authority dated 29-12-2009 through appeal to the High Court filed on 25-2-2010 with a delay of 28 days---Contention of appellants was that copy of order dated 29-12-2009 was supplied to them two days prior to the filing of present appeal, and that the officials of the Authority with mala fide intention adopted an adverse attitude towards them and the delay in filing of present appeal was neither intentional nor deliberate---Validity---Order was made by the Authority on 29-12-2009 marked in the name of one of the appellants, but there was no endorsement as to when said order was served on him---Time of service was most important because period of limitation had to be counted from the date of service; which was missing---High Court, while keeping in view such circumstances, condoned the delay in filing of the appeal.\n \n(b) Trade Organizations Ordinance (XLIX of 2009)---\n \n----Ss. 14(3), 21(2) & 21(4)---Appeals in matters relating to the electoral process before the conduct of an election---Powers of the Director-General Trade Organizations---Scope---Appellants had preferred an appeal before the Authority challenging order of Director-General Trade Organizations that was dismissed as being not maintainable on technical grounds---Said order of Authority was assailed in the present appeal---Validity---Director-General of Trade Organizations was the final forum of appeals in matters relating to the electoral process before conduct of the election---Perusal of application filed by appellants before Director-General Trade Organizations reveals that it was filed with the subject \"\"Cancellation of illegal schedule of forthcoming election of Chamber of Commerce Quetta\"\"---Said application was proceeded with and decided by the Director-General Trade Organizations---Grievance of appellants was in respect of matter pertaining to the electoral process, and that too, before the conduct of the election, which was decided by the Director-General of the Trade Organizations being the competent Authority---According to S.14(3) of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 2009, no further appeal lay to the Federal Government under S.21 of the said Ordinance---Authority rightly refused the appeal as being not maintainable and there was no illegality in the impugned order---Appeal was dismissed by High Court, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.3 of 2010, decision dated: 16-01-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. SYEDA TAHIRA SAFDAR, J",
    "": "SHAH WALI and 6 others\nvs\nQuetta court CHAMBER OF COMMERCE\nAND INDUSTRY and 17 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12369",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2235 = 2012 SLD 2235 = 2012 CLD 827",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 8, 21 & 23---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 9, 42 & 54--- Suit for possession, declaration and permanent injunction---Appointment of referee---Rival parties had filed suits against each other---Plaintiffs had filed a suit for possession against the defendant and during pendency of said suit, the defendant had filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Both rival suits were consolidated---On the appeal of the defendant, two persons were nominated for appointment as referees; and the Trial Court appointed a referee, who submitted his report in compliance of the order of the Trial Court---Trial Court, on the basis of said report, decreed the suit of plaintiffs and dismissed the suit of the defendant---Said and decree was affected and Appellate Court, having dismissed the appeal, the defendant had assailed the said order---Grounds taken in the revision petition by the defendant could not be considered as the referee had been appointed with the consent of the parties; and High Court not only had approved the appointment of said referee, but had also issued the direction to decide the fate of the suit on the basis of the statement of the referee---Question arising during pendency of the suit which stood decided and settled under order of a Revisional Court, could not be allowed to be reagitated in appeal filed against the decree---Courts below had rightly passed the and decree in accordance with the report of referee available on record--- Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nBaqa Muhammad v. Muhammad Nawaz and others PLD 1985 Lah. 476 and Shamshad Khan and others v. Arif Ashraf Khan and 2 others 2008 SCMR 269 rel.\n \n(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n----Ss. 8, 21, 22 & 23---\"\"Arbitrator\"\" and \"\"Referee\"\"---Distinction---Referee was the one who would make statement according to his own knowledge, but the arbitrator, after obtaining the material and recording the statement of the parties, would draw his conclusion and on the basis of that material, he got his statement recorded; and he was also liable to cross-examination.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revisions Nos. 1880 and 1832 of 2011, heard on 20-09-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AMEER BHATTI, J",
    "": "SAEED AHMAD\nvs\nNIAZ AHMAD and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12370",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2236 = 2012 SLD 2236 = 2012 CLD 832",
    "Key Words:": "Public Procurement Rules, 2004-------R. 29---Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Ordinance (X of 1980), S. 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---High Court appeal---Suit for declaration---Application for grant of interim injunction---Plaintiff company assailed bidding process for supply of goods and claimed to be the lowest bidder---Single Judge of High Court declined to grant interim injunction in favour of plaintiff---Validity---Bidding process initiated by authorities was not violative of Public Procurement Rules, 2004, as the bid of the companies was the lowest one and authorities rightly accepted such bid---Order passed by Single Judge of High Court was well reasoned and there was no illegality or irregularity in the same, which could call interference by Division Bench of High Court--- High Court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C.A. No.168 of 2011, decision dated: 15-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED AND IMAM BUX BALOCH, JJ",
    "": "DATA STEEL PIPE INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD.\nvs\nSUI SOUTHERN GAS CO. LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12371",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2237 = 2012 SLD 2237 = 2012 CLD 842",
    "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------Ss. 4 & 13---Stamp Act (II of 1899), S. 2(5)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr. 2, 3 & O.VII, R.10---Suit for recovery of amount on basis of pro note---Return of plaint---Trial Court returned the plaint to the plaintiff for its presentation before the competent court of jurisdiction, holding that alleged promissory note on basis of which suit was filed was not a pro note, but was a bond--- Validity--- Money had been admitted by executant/defendant which was payable as per demand of the plaintiff---On the basis of said promissory note, the receipt regarding the payment of disputed money to the defendant had been acknowledged by marginal witnesses; and said document bore the signature of defendant---Document produced by the plaintiff was a pro note because it was expressly mentioned therein that suit amount would be paid to the plaintiff on his demand---From no score of interpretation or any law said promissory note could be considered as a bond---Defendant, as per contents of the promissory note was obliged to pay the amount as the same was a pro note and not a bond---Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court were set aside and case was remanded to Appellate Court for disposal within four months.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 124 of 2010, decision dated: 12-09-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN, J",
    "": "Syed FIDA-UR-REHMAN SHAH\nvs\nMUHAMMAD ZAHID"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12372",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2238 = 2012 SLD 2238 = 2012 CLD 846",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss. 122(1)(a) & 122(3)---Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005), S.2(c)(ii) & 13---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 143, 199 & Fourth Sched., Federal Legislative List, Item No.29---Constitutional petition---Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial law---'Consumer'---Definition---Liability for faulty or defective services---Scope---Claim under an insurance policy filed before Consumer Court--- Maintainability--- Jurisdiction of Insurance Tribunal--- Scope--- Insurance company (respondent) allegedly failed to pay the policy proceeds to the policy-holder for his insured car---Policy-holder claimed relief before the Consumer Court in his capacity of a policy-holder of the insurance company, alleging that the insurance company committed a breach by failing to perform its duty/service according to the policy-holder's insurance policy---Insurance company assailed the order of the Consumer Court with the contention that for a claim arising from an insurance policy, Consumer Court could not have any jurisdiction to determine a dispute, as such jurisdiction solely vested in an Insurance Tribunal---Validity---Subject of insurance was dealt with by Item No.29 of the Federal Legislative List in the Fourth Sched. to the Constitution, and Insurance Ordinance, 2000, was framed in exercise of authority conferred by Item No.29 of the Federal Legislative List---Section 122(3) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, provided that jurisdiction of the Insurance Tribunal was exclusive in matters that fell within the ambit of its authority, and S.122(1)(a) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 stated that jurisdiction of the Insurance Tribunal extended to \"\"claims filed by a policy holder against an insurance company in respect of or arising out of a policy of insurance\"\"---Claim of policy-holder fell under S.122(1)(a) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, as the said provision created an exclusive remedy in respect of claims based on Insurance policies--- Insurance Ordinance, 2000, as a competent Federal Legislation prevailed over conflicting Provincial Legislation under Art.143 of the Constitution, and even otherwise provisions of a special law on a subject excluded the application of a general law to such subject, and assuming that remedy of policy-holder was competent before Consumer Court, yet such remedy was general in character in comparison to his remedy before the Insurance Tribunal---Constitutional petition was allowed and it was held that suit filed by the policy-holder before the Consumer Court was not maintainable.\n \nInspector General of Police, Punjab v. Mushtaq Ahmad Warraich PLD 1985 SC 159 ref.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Law of general application and special law---Applicability and scope---Provisions of a special law on a subject excluded the application of a general law to that subject.\n \nInspector General of Police, Punjab v. Mushtaq Ahmad Warraich PLD 1985 SC 159 ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 143 & Fourth Sched., Federal Legislative List, Item No.29---Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000), Ss.122(1)(a) & 122(3)---Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005), Ss.2(c)(ii) & 13---Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial law---Laws framed in exercise of authority conferred by Item No. 29 of the Federal Legislative List in the Fourth Sched. to the Constitution, as competent federal legislation prevailed over conflicting provincial legislation under Art. 143 of the Constitution---Provisions of a special law on a subject excluded the application of a general law to such subject.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1130 of 2010, decision dated: 18-01-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "REGIONAL MANAGER, ADAMJEE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.\nvs\nPRESIDING OFFICER, DISTRICT CONSUMER COURT, Lahore High Court and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12373",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2239 = 2012 SLD 2239 = 2012 CLD 850",
    "Key Words:": "Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)-------Ss. 371, 372 & 373--- Issuance of succession certificate---Bank account having endorsement of \"\"either or survivor\"\"---Islamic law---Inheritance---Applicability---Scope---Petitioner, and his son, who later on died, opened joint account in the bank, with clear instruction that account would be operated \"\"either or survivor\"\"---After death of son of the petitioner/joint account holder, respondents being legal heirs of deceased applied for issuance of succession certificate, which finally was issued to them being successors of the deceased---Validity---Claim of the petitioner/father of deceased, was that amount deposited in the account, did not come within the legacy of deceased; and that as per instructions and declaration of both account holders when joint accounts were opened, belonged solely to the petitioner---Petitioner had urged that he being survivor of the account holder, was legally entitled to receive the entire amount deposited in the banks---Deceased/son of the petitioner, before his death proceeded abroad and joint accounts were opened during the period when deceased was abroad and was earning handsome amount in Pound Sterling during those days---Amount in Pound Sterling was transferred in the joint account and nothing was on record suggesting that petitioner had any source of such great earnings and that he himself had deposited money in the suit accounts---Respondents/legal heirs of deceased had proved that all the amount was deposited from abroad in shape of Pound Sterling by the deceased---Petitioner had failed to prove that the amount was gifted in his favour by the deceased---Even in cases of nomination, nominee was not entitled to receive the entire amount of the deceased---Such nomination could not override provision of Islamic Law of inheritance---No legal heir could be deprived from receiving their respective share---Appellate Court had correctly appreciated the legal and factual aspect of the case---In absence of any illegality, irregularity, misreading or non-reading of evidence, revision petition against of the courts below, was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nGuran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta AIR 1928 PC 172; Habib Ullah v. Shikhupura Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. 1987 SCMR 53 and Safdar Ali Khan v. Public at Large 2004 SCMR 1219 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revisions Nos. 379 and 381 of 2010, decision dated: 25-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID MEHMOOD, J",
    "": "Syed SHAH PIR MIAN KAZMI\nvs\nMst. NELOFER (Widow) and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12374",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQS1NTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2240 = 2012 SLD 2240 = 2012 CLD 854",
    "Key Words:": "Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001-------Rr. 8, 9, 12 & Third Sched.---Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969), S.22---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss.33 & 34---Failure to deposit amount of penalty---Suspension of registration---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, imposed a penalty of Rs.400,000 on the company registered with the Commission under S.22 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 and directed the company to deposit said amount in the account of the Commission within 30 days---Appeal filed by the company under S.33 of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997, was dismissed and order imposing penalty was upheld by the Appellate Bench---Company, neither preferred an appeal under S.34 of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 nor deposited the amount of penalty as directed through order of the Commission---Admission of default and failure of the company to deposit the amount of penalty and failure to comply with the direction of the Commission, despite being afforded numerous opportunities to deposit the amount of penalty, had established that the company had contravened clause D(1)(2) of Code of Conduct set forth under the Third Schedule and R.12 of the Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001---Conduct of the company of consistent and flagrant contravention of direction of the Commission, was appalling and deeply concerning---Registration of the company, as a broker was suspended for a period of fifteen days, by the Commission in exercise of the powers under R.8 of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001; company was directed to immediately deposit the amount of the penalty and furnish a copy of the deposit challan in the office, failing which registration of the company as a broker would be cancelled in accordance with R.9 of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No.1(07)BS/KSE/MSW/SMD/2009 dated 22-11-2011, decision dated: 28-12-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR/HOD (MSCI)",
    "": "ZAFAR MOTI CAPITAL SECURITIES (PRIVATE) LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12375",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2241 = 2012 SLD 2241 = 2012 CLD 858",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962-------Ss. 2(l) & 39---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11 & O. XXIX, R. 1---Suit for infringement of copyright by company---Application for rejection of plaint---Subscription and verification of pleadings---Respondent (company) had filed suit against applicant (company) for infringement of respondent's copyrights over certain licensed music content--- Applicant filed present application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. for rejection of respondent's plaint with the contention that suit had not yet been filed by the duly authorized person in accordance with law; that respondent only had the right to sell and distribute the licensed content and was not the owner of copyright, therefore, it had no cause of action and locus standi to file the suit, and that respondent had filed an application before the Copyrights Office, but same was pending and the request had not yet been granted---Validity---Contention of applicant that plaint had not been verified by duly authorized person, same was a formal defect which could be cured subsequently and the plaint could not be rejected on such ground---Mere failure on part of respondent to get the copyright registered did not invalidate or impair the copyright nor destroyed the right to sue for copyright infringement---Contentions of applicant raised crucial and substantial questions of facts and law which were to be adjudicated at the trial of the suit and same could not be decided without recording of evidence---Respondent had properly pleaded the cause of action in the plaint and at present stage the contents of the same were admitted to be true---Lack of proof or weakness of proof in the circumstances of the case did not furnish any justification for coming to the conclusion that there was no cause of action or locus standi shown in the plaint---Rejection of plaint on technical grounds would have amounted to depriving the respondent from his legitimate right of availing legal remedy--- Plaint of respondent could not be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of C.P.C., and, consequently, application for rejection of plaint was dismissed.\n \nShadoo Muhammad Khan v. Ganmoon 1989 MLD 4624; Soneri Bank Limited v. Classic Denim Mills (Pvt.) Limited 2011 CLD 408 and Messrs Ferozesons Pvt. Ltd. v. Dr. Col. Retd. K.U. Kureshi 2003 CLD 1052 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R. 11; O.III, R.4; O.VI, Rr.14 & 15; O.XLI, R.1 & O. XXIX, R. 1---Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), Ss.2(l) & 39--- Suit for infringement of copyright by company--- Rejection of plaint--- Scope--- Defects in pleadings, application and memorandum of appeal with regard to presentation, signing and verification being technical irregularities relating to matter of procedure, could be rectified at any stage of proceedings and could not furnish basis for rejection of plaint, application or memorandum of appeal. \n \nShadoo Muhammad Khan v. Ganmoon 1989 MLD 4624 quoted.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R. 11---Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), Ss.2(l) & 39---Suit for infringement of copyright by company---Rejection of plaint--- Scope---For decision of application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C, the facts as alleged in the plaint were to be looked into and nothing extraneous could be seen and where the plaint, prima facie, disclosed a cause of action, same could not be rejected. \n \n(d) Administration of justice---\n \n----Prime object and purpose of establishing courts was to dispense justice to the parties before it in accordance with the law and discourage adjudication on technicalities. \n \n(e) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)---\n \n----Ss. 2(l) & 39---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11 & O.XXIX, R.1---Suit for infringement of copyright by company---Application for rejection of plaint---Trial Court, inadvertently, did not frame issues regarding objections taken in the written statement of the applicant (defendant)---High Court, while dismissing application for rejection of plaint gave directions to Trial Court to add such issues.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.S. No.1 and C.M. No.260-S of 2011, decision dated: 21st March, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, C.J.",
    "": "DIGITAL MEDIAL SOLUTIONS PRIVATE LIMITED through Company Secretary--Plaintiff\nvs\nWARID TELECOM PRIVATE LIMITED through Faisal SaeeD--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12376",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2242 = 2012 SLD 2242 = 2012 CLD 1302",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9(2)---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.2(8)---Certification of statement of accounts to be filed along with suit--- Words \"\"bank\"\" and \"\"principal accountant\"\" as used in S. 2(8) of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891---Scope---For purposes of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, such word \"\"bank\"\" would be read as \"\"financial institution\"\", while such word \"\"principal accountant\"\" would include Chief Financial Officer ---Certificate at end of such statement must be subscribed by any one of the officers identified by S. 2(8) of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891---Principles.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S. 2(8)--- Suit for recovery of loan amount by Bank--- Application for grant of leave to defend suit---Customer's plea was that persons having certified statement of accounts were not \"\"officers\"\" as contemplated by S.2(8) of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 and were not in employment of Bank at time of filing of such suit---Validity---Power of attorneys filed along with plaint simply described such persons to be officer of Bank without having power to certify such statement on behalf of plaintiff-Bank--- None of such attorneys was principal accountant or manager of plaintiff-Bank--- Certificates at the end of such statements did not specify name or title of its signatories--- Specific statutory requirements of S.2(8) of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 could not be ignored---Such statement was not duly certified within meaning and for purposes of said Act--- Defendant was entitled to unconditional leave to defend suit---High Court accepted leave application in circumstances.\n \n(c) Power of attorney---\n \n----Power of attorney containing a clause empowering attorney to do all such acts, deeds etc., as would be deemed by attorney to be necessary or expedient \"\"to carry on and manage business of the Bank\"\"---Scope---General clauses of such nature in a power of attorney must be given a contextual meaning and would invariably be intended to be supplementary to and supportive of specific provisions of instrument and would not be regarded as conferring independent powers on their own---Illustration.\n \n(d) Natural justice, principles of---\n \n----Person sued in a court of law would be entitled as of right to defend himself and contest claim put forward by plaintiff--- ­Such right being manifestation of fundamental principles of natural justice would lie at the heart of judicial adjudicatory system.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10(3) to (6)---Suit for recovery of loan amount by Bank---Application for leave to defend suit---Bank's plea was that such application was liable to be rejected for failing to comply with requirements of S. 10(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Defendant had filed suit for rendition of accounts against Bank---Defendant in leave application had raised specific objections regarding amounts claimed by Bank in the plaint of present suit---Such objections raised by defendant could be regarded as constituting sufficient cause within meaning of S. 10(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 as to why he had been unable to comply with requirements of subsection (4) thereof---High Court granted unconditional leave to defend suit in circumstances.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10(3) to (6)---Suit for recovery of loan amount by Bank---Application by borrower for grant of leave to defend suit not conforming to requirements of S. 10(3) to (5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Effect---­Such requirements for being purely procedural in nature would go only to form of leave application and not its merits---Rejection of leave application on ground of not being in conformity with requirements of S.10(3) to (5) of the Ordinance while regarding same to be mandatory and not directory, would be ultimate success of form over substance---Denying the defendant a right to defend himself by hearing his leave application on account of procedural infirmities in its form would place procedure on a pedestal far higher than that warranted under the law---Procedure was the handmaid of justice and not its mistress, rather its stepmother----Provisions of S.10(3) to (5) of the Ordinance read with subsection (6) thereof were directory in nature and not mandatory---Leave application on account of non-compliance of such requirements would not be liable to be rejected as a matter of course---Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-93 and C.M.A. No.7894 of 2009, decision dated: 23rd January, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "Messrs SONERI BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs COMPASS TRADING CORPORATION (PVT.) LIMITED through Director/Chief Executive and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12377",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2243 = 2012 SLD 2243 = 2012 CLD 1582",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 22---Specific Relief Act, (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 25---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction--- Equality of citizens---Relief/incentive package of Bank for loanees who had defaulted on installments--- Applicability--- Debtor (appellant) along with others obtained a loan of Rs.3,23,500 from the Bank on 19-12-1993, and same was to be repaid to the Bank in 20 equal instalments till 7-7-2004---Bank offered an incentive/relief package to all the loanees and in that regard issued a notice---Bank, as per the said notice had offered to its loanees, who had obtained the loan during the specific period that they could get their accounts closed by depositing the specified amount---Debtor on receipt of said notice, deposited certain amount in the Bank in two instalments accordingly and approved the Bank authorities for the closing of his account, as he had deposited the amount as per offer of the Bank---Bank refused to close the account of the debtor on the pretext that the relief package was not meant for people who were regularly repaying their loans to the Bank but for those who were defaulters of at least two instalments, and since debtor had defaulted on only one instalment, he could not get the relief offered by the Bank---Debtor instituted a suit for declaration with permanent injunction before the Banking Court but same was dismissed---Validity---When the Bank had offered a relief package which was accepted and the amount was deposited, the Bank could not refuse the same on the pretext that it was not for those who made regular payment for the loan but only for defaulters---Bank's offer and money deposited in response thereto had created valuable rights in favour of the debtor---Case of debtor for availing the facility offered by the Bank was on much better footing as compared to those who, in view of the Bank, 'deserve' the relief---Case of debtor fell within the purview of the Bank's incentive scheme and the same was obliged to admit the claim of the debtor and close his account---Bank could not be allowed to adopt a new version and claim anything which was contrary to the relief package---Persons equally placed must be treated alike in matters of privileges and liabilities as envisaged in Art.25 of the Constitution---Refusing benefit of relief package to the debtor would not have only discouraged the regular payers of loans but would have also penalized them for making regular payments---Banking Court had failed to apply its judicious mind and erred in law while passing the impugned ---Appeal of debtor was allowed, impugned of Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to the Banking Court for decision afresh.\n \nMst. Anwar Begum through Attorney v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank of Pakistan through Manager and 4 others 2009 YLR 308 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 22---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 25---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Equality of citizens---Relief/incentive package of Bank for loanees who had defaulted on instalments--- Applicability--- Scope---Contention of Bank that the relief package was not meant for people who were regularly repaying their loans to the Bank but for those who were defaulters of at least two instalments, and since debtor had defaulted on only one instalment, he could not get the relief offered by the Bank---Validity---High Court while allowing the appeal of the debtor observed that contention taken by the Bank tantamount to encouraging people who obtained loan from the banks with intention not to return them, and in fact relief should be for those whose dealings were more clean so that the people who paid their loans regularly could be encouraged---High Court further observed that attitude of banks was softer towards the defaulters and harder towards regular payers as small loanees were subjected to penalization but loans worth crores and billions were written off by governments/banks, which practice in the view of the High Court was neither appreciable nor in accordance with the Injunctions of Islam.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.504 of 2010, heard on 12-03-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. SHAHID SAEED AND IJAZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "ALLAH DITTA\nvs\nZ.T.B.L. HEAD OFFICE AT Islamabad High Court High Court through President and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12378",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2244 = 2012 SLD 2244 = 2012 CLD 957",
    "Key Words:": "Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance (IV of 2001)-------S. 17--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Ejectment petition filed by landlord company through a person not having any authorization letter/resolution of the Board of the company---Maintainability---Tenant (petitioner) assailed concurrent findings of the courts below ordering the ejectment of tenant from the premises---Contention of the tenant was that the landlord was a private limited company and the ejectment petition was filed through the Secretary of the company who had no authorization letter to move said ejectment petition---Validity---Landlord had filed ejectment petition, but along with said petition, no resolution passed by the Board of the landlord company was attached---Constitutional petition also did not mention as to through whom the ejectment petition was filed and that he was authorized by the Board of the landlord company through any resolution---Constitutional petition was not even signed by the person through whom the ejectment petition was filed---Authorization letter produced during the course of evidence, was actually issued by the person through whom the ejectment petition had been filed and on the basis of such letter he simply authorized a witness to give a statement in evidence during the proceedings---Said letter was not a resolution passed by the Board of landlord company---Ejectment petition being not maintainable, in circumstances, orders of the courts below were set aside---High Court, however, observed that the landlord would have right to file a fresh ejectment petition in accordance with the law, rules and procedure, and that the acceptance of the tenant's constitutional petition by the High Court would not come in the way of the landlord filing a fresh ejectment petition--- Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1241 of 2010, decision dated: 21st February, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "RIAZ AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "Messrs The BRANDS through Muhammad ArshaD\nvs\nRENT CONTROLLER, Islamabad High Court High Court and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12379",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2245 = 2012 SLD 2245 = 2012 CLD 935",
    "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 17 & 30---Award making rule of court---Umpire, role of---Scope---Misconduct---Parties agreed to get their dispute resolved through arbitration and for that purpose, four persons were appointed as arbitrators while fifth was appointed as umpire---Award was announced by umpire which was made rule of the court but the same was set aside by Lower Appellate Court---Validity---Umpire was a person who had to make award if two arbitrators disagreed---Where two or more arbitrators were appointed and arbitration agreement itself provided that in event of their disagreement, matter in dispute would be referred to decision of third person, umpire would act only when there existed difference between arbitrators themselves---Jurisdiction of umpire commenced only after difference of opinion between arbitrators and not before---If umpire acted and took part in deliberation before difference arose between the arbitrators then active participation of umpire in proceedings would be deemed to be an illegality---Award itself, in the present case, was void document having been announced by umpire (Sarpunch) who was not authorized to participate in the arbitration proceedings---Even if arbitrators were authorized to appoint umpire, even then umpire had no role to play---No dispute existed between arbitrators and as such help of umpire was not required---Courts below were not courts of appeal of arbitration but court before making award as rule of court was bound to see whether arbitrator had mis-conducted himself and award was partial one---Arbitrators had mis-conducted, they involved an umpire (Sarpunch) who participated in proceedings, rather he influenced all arbitrators and did not hand over the award to parties but he kept the same with him and after that he handed over the award to petitioners who filed application before court---No notice was issued to respondents before announcement of award---Lower Appellate Court had rightly set aside the award and dismissed application of petitioners---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nUnited Bank Limited v. Consolidated Exports Limited and 3 others 1996 MLD 1727; Mst. Rasul Bibi v. Nasrullah Khan 1994 CLC 1774 and Mst. Farrukh Jabin v. Maqbool Hussain through legal representatives and others PLD 2004 SC 499 ref.\n \n \n15. There is no order as to costs.\n \nM.H./A-154/L Revision dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.82-D of 2009, heard on 6-06-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN, J",
    "": "Haji ABDUL RAHIM\nvs\nMUHAMMAD SHARIF (DECEASED) through L.Rs."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12380",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2246 = 2012 SLD 2246 = 2012 CLD 1556",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10(11)---Words \"\"forthwith\"\" and \"\"shall\"\"---Object, scope and purpose---Words \"\"forthwith\"\" and \"\"shall\"\" used in S.10(11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, cast a duty upon Banking Court to decree suit in favour of plaintiff against defendant immediately, when defendant's application for leave to defend is rejected or where a defendant fails to fulfil conditions attached to grant of leave to defend---Object of inserting S.10(11) in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, is not to cause prejudice to any party but is to provide expeditious and equitable relief in banking suits to plaintiff after dismissal of defendant's application for leave to defend.\n \nBlack's Law Dictionary (Seventh Edition); Chambers 21st Century Dictionary (1996 Edition); K. J. Aryer's Judicial Dictionary (A complete Law Lexicon) Thirteenth Edition; P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd Edition, Volume 2) D-I 2005; Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) Volume 17; Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Sonery Bank Ltd. 2012 CLD 337; Mrs. Jawahar Afzal v. United Bank Limited 2003 CLD 119; Khawaja Muhammad Bilal v. Union Bank Limited 2004 CLD 1555 and Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs SABCOS (Pvt.) Ltd. 2006 CLD 244 rel.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Where any statute provides a procedure for doing a thing in a particular manner that thing should be done in that particular manner and in no other manner.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Consolidating of suits---Leave to defend, refusal of---Two suits were pending before Banking Court, one filed by bank and the other filed by one of the defendants, after refusal of leave to defendants in suit filed by bank, Banking Court allowed application of defendant and consolidated both the suits---Plea raised by bank was that both the suits could not be consolidated---Validity---Dismissal of application for leave to defend the suit meant that accounts between parties could be settled without recording of evidence---When no evidence was required to settle accounts, then decree for settlement of accounts was to follow as no other step was left in the suit to be taken other than passing of decree on the basis of accounts already placed before court by parties---After dismissal of application for grant of leave to defend the suit, law had envisaged that suit should be decreed forthwith---At a stage when only decree was to be passed in a suit, consolidation of such suit with any other suit in which evidence was to be recorded would defeat the object of S.10(11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Order of consolidation passed by Banking Court also had the effect of nullifying the order whereby application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed, therefore, such order of consolidation of suits could not be sustained in law---Banking Court had violated the provisions of S.10(11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, therefore, order for consolidating the suits was not sustainable and the same was set aside---High Court directed Banking Court to conclude/decide the suit filed by petitioner bank expeditiously under S.10(11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--- Petition was allowed accordingly.\n \nMuhammad Shafi and others v. Habib Bank Ltd. and others SBLR 2010 Sindh 1573; Messrs Tank Steel and Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Dera Ismail Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 77; Messrs First Women Bank Limited v. Registrar, High Court of Sindh, Karachi and others 2004 SCMR 108; Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Food and Agriculture v. Special Court (Banking) Sindh and others 1991 SCMR 2355; Zarai Taraqiati Bank v. Laeeq Ahmed 2009 SCMR 301; Muhammad Yaqoob v. Behram Khan 2006 SCMR 1262; Messrs Tri-Star Polyester Limited and another v. Citi Bank 2001 SCMR 410; Bolan Bank Limited v. Capricorn Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. 1998 SCMR 1961; Syed Ali Azhar Naqvi v. The Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 3 others PLD 1994 Kar. 67; M.A. Kareem Iqbal v. Presiding Officer, Banking Court No.III and 4 others 2003 CLD 1447; Karachi Pipe Mills Limited v. Habib Bank Ltd. and another 2003 CLD 1487; Marhaba Textile Ltd. v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 1822; Ms. Afshan Ahmed v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited and another 2002 CLD 137; Karachi Water and Sewerage Board through Managing Director v. Messrs M.A. Majeed Khan and 2 others 2002 CLC 566; Muhammad Ashraf and others v. Union Bank of Middle East and others 1991 MLD 2037; Al-Shams Apparel (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and 3 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. through Chief Manager/Manager Shadman Colony Branch, Lahore and another 2002 CLD 1407; Muslim Commercial Bank Limited through Chief Manager and Principal Officer v. Judge Banking Court No.2, Faisalabad and 8 others 2002 CLD 991 and Doha Bank Limited through Duly Authorized Attorney v. Javaid Carpets (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director and 6 others 2001 MLD 1532 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10(11)--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition--- Maintainability--- Expeditious disposal of case---Banking Court, after dismissal of application for leave to defend filed by defendant, consolidated the suit with another suit which was filed by defendant--- Validity--- Constitutional petition was maintainable as constitutional jurisdiction of High Court could be invoked by an aggrieved party who had no other remedy---Banking Court failed to exercise jurisdiction which was vested in it under S.10(11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--- Petition was maintainable in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-1595 of 2010, decision dated: 26-07-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB AND NADEEM AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs UNITED BANK LIMITED through Authorized AttorneyS\nvs\nBANKING COURT NO.II and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12381",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2247 = 2012 SLD 2247 = 2012 CLD 905",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-------Ss. 40 & 46(2)---Infringement of trade mark---Interim injunction, grant of---Appellant owned restaurant with the registered trademark \"\"Dera Restaurant\"\" and the respondents owned the adjoining restaurant that was previously named \"\"Fazl-e-Haq Family Restaurant\"\" but was renamed as \"\"Fazl-e-Haq Dera\"\"---Appellant alleged violation of its trademark by the use of the word \"\"Dera\"\" in the respondent's restaurant---Trial Court declined grant of interim relief on the ground that the name \"\"Fazl-e-Haq\"\" clearly distinguished the two restaurants, and said order of Trial Court was assailed by the appellant---Validity---Similarity between trademarks adopted by contesting parties should be such as to create reasonable confusion and deception in the mind of the unwary purchaser---Evidence was yet to be recorded in the main suit, on the point as to whether there was sufficient basis for confusion and deception to be inferred from the facts of the case, however there was merit in appellant's contention that the two establishments being located adjacently, the respondent's restaurant on account of common word in its name had a likelihood of attracting/diverting customers away from the appellant's restaurant---Accordingly, for the reason of proximity between the two establishments, there was a likelihood that the word \"\"Dera\"\" in the name of the respondent's restaurant would cause confusion and deception amongst customers---Photograph of the latest signboard outside the respondent's restaurant did not minimize the effect of the name \"\"Dera\"\" that was written in a large size but in a different font than the one used to write \"\"Fazl-e-Haq\"\", and for purpose of interim relief said notification adopted by respondent was not satisfactory---High Court ordered, that subject to the outcome of the main suit, the respondent's restaurant may include the word \"\"Dera\"\" only if it was written in one line and in one font of equal size as \"\"Fazl-e-Haq Dera\"\"---Appeal was partly allowed, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.436 of 2009, decision dated: 31st January, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "Malik MUHAMMAD RAFIQ AWAN\nvs\nJAVAD IQBAL and others\nJamia Industries Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Pak.) Ltd. and another PLD 1984 SC 8 and Messrs Mehran Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Messrs Chiltan Ghee Mill (Pvt.) Limited and others 2001 SCMR 967 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12382",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2248 = 2012 SLD 2248 = 2012 CLD 961",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 3--- Suit for recovery of loan--- Agreement for rescheduling of loan--- Levying of service charge---Charging of mark-up---Plaintiff had advanced an amount of Rs.78 million under Murabaha finance agreement to the defendant and purchase price of goods transacted was fixed at Rs.90 million---Plaintiff, upon expiry of the facility and having defaulted in payment, entered into a rescheduling agreement which extended term of finance but levied service charges @ Rs.16.88 % for the extended term---Defendant's contention was that mark-up had been charged beyond contract period--- Held, rescheduling agreement was not enforceable with respect to service charges as said charge was clearly in the nature of an interest and could not accrue either under law or on the terms of the Murabaha facility---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, created for unpaid creditor/financial institutions an entitlement to compensation through cost of funds as determined under the provisions of S.3 of the Ordinance from date of default until date of realization---Defendant's contention with respect to accrual of mark-up under the rescheduling agreement was upheld---Suit was decreed to the extent of unpaid amount against the defendants jointly and severally along with the payment of cost of funds with effect from the date of default till realization in terms of S.3 of the Ordinance.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.72 of 2009, decision dated: 21st September, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "BANK OF PUNJAB through Authorised Officer--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs KNK INFRASTRUCTURE (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive Officer and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12383",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2249 = 2012 SLD 2249 = 2012 CLD 908",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Schedule of instalments, determination of---Bank (appellant) had sanctioned amount to defendant (respondent) as financial assistance and by way of security respondent mortgaged his agricultural land in favour of Bank and also executed a finance agreement according to which respondent had to pay buy back price/markup to the Bank through eight yearly instalments with effect from 7-7-1998 to 7-7-2005---According to agreement between the parties, defendant was obliged to pay regular yearly instalments to the Bank but during those eight years till the suit was finally decreed, the respondent had paid only a token amount---Banking Court refused to grant leave to defend the suit to the defendant and decreed the Bank's suit but determined some schedule of instalments for the respondents to pay off his liabilities, payable up to 7-7-2008---Banking Court was not empowered and authorized under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, to pass such and decree and that too when date of expiry of the buy back agreement was 7-7-2008---Banking Court stretched the date of payment of outstanding dues to 7-7-2008, which was illegal and thus not tenable---Bank statements issued by appellant-Bank showed that defendant had paid part of the amount to the Bank after the suit was decreed, thus, after deducting amount paid by defendant before the suit together with the amount paid after it, the remainder still stood outstanding against the defendant---Agreement between parties stood expired on 7-7-2008 after which no further mark up could be claimed by the Bank from the respondent---Appeal was allowed and and decree of Banking Court was set aside and the Bank's suit was decreed for the remaining amount with costs on fund along with costs of suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No. 2 of 2007, decision dated: 29-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED SAJJAD HASSAN SHAH AND QAISER RASHID KHAN, JJ",
    "": "ZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LTD. through Manager\nvs\nWAQAR AZEEM KHAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12384",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2250 = 2012 SLD 2250 = 2012 CLD 1133",
    "Key Words:": "Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (XLVI of 1981)---S. 2--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Allegations of Bank default and misappropriation of pledged stock---Name of accused placed in Exit Control List---Validity---Order of High Court passed in the matter showed that pledged stock was sold by the Bank to accused against the payment of Rs.140 million under the supervision of the High Court, therefore, it could not be said that accused had misappropriated the stock---Order of High Court also showed that in its plaint Bank had not mentioned anything concerning the misappropriation of pledged stock and it seemed Bank was trying to blackmail the accused--Authorities. had wrongly entered the name of the accused in the Exit Control List, which was against his fundamental rights---Accused had the right and constitutional protection for travelling abroad in connection with his business---Constitutional petition was allowed and authorities were directed to delete the name of the accused from the Exit Control List.\n \nMunir Ahmad Bhatti v. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior through Secretary and others PLD 2010 Lah. 697 and Mian Tahir Jahangir v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and another 2008 YLR 1857 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.2377 of 2011, decision dated: 30-01-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN, J",
    "": "Sheikh NIAZ ANJUM\nvs\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, Islamabad High Court High Court through Secretary and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12385",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2251 = 2012 SLD 2251 = 2012 CLD 1372",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10(8) & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---­Leave to defend suit, application for---Dismissal of leave application for non-appearance of defendant and passing of decree by court---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. for setting aside such order and decree---Plaintiff's plea was that against impugned order and decree, only appeal was competent and not application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Validity---Once leave application was filed, then court would be statutorily bound to consider the same regardless of non-appearance of defendant or his counsel---Disposal of leave application must show application of mind by court to its contents---Court would be bound to grant such application, if satisfied that there was even a single substantial question of law or fact raised therein---Court while dismissing leave application had not even considered the same---Impugned order and decree were without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside under S.12(2), C.P.C.---High Court set aside impugned order and decree and restored leave application---Principles.\n \nChaoudhry Mairajuddin v. West Pakistan Province and others 1970 SCMR 96; Abid Aziz Khan and 2 others v. Bank of Punjab 2007 CLD 997 and Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and others v. National Development Finance Corporation, Karachi 2002 CLC 166 ref.\n \nDr. Asad Pervez Sheikh v. National Bank of Pakistan 2005 CLD 438; Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan and another 2003 CLD 326 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd. 2001 CLC 1187 rel.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Application not disclosing the provision under which the same was made---Effect---Substance of relief sought by applicant would be relevant and not specific provision cited therein---Where substance of application accorded with a particular provision, then same would be treated thereunder---Illustration.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-124 of 2010 and C.M.A. No.9336 of 2011, decision dated: 15-02-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMEHMOOD ILYAS KHAN and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12386",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2252 = 2012 SLD 2252 = 2012 CLD 1115",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S. 19--- Execution proceedings--- Auction of property by Banking Court through its Nazir--- Validity--- Nazir in such a case would act as \"\"AMEEN\"\" of public property.\n Petitioner in person.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitution Petition No.D-2456 of 2008, decision dated: 17-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, J",
    "": "Messrs SUPER TRADERS through ProprietoR\nvs\nALEEM KHAWAJA and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12387",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2253 = 2012 SLD 2253 = 2012 CLD 971",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Maintainability--- Mandatory provision--- Essential feature---Non-filing of statement of accounts---Effect---Suit filed by bank was dismissed by Banking Court on the ground that the statement of accounts filed by plaintiff Bank purportedly to support the plaint, containing entries, did not truly reflect the entries as per Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891--- Plea raised by Bank was that provisions of S.9(1) and (2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, were merely directory and not mandatory---Validity---One of the essential features of mandatory provision was not merely use of word \"\"shall\"\" which might be used merely to stress importance of compliance of particular requirement emphasized or prescribed in enactment---Where consequences of failure to comply with direction or requirement of a statute were not stated, the direction was treated as directory and not mandatory---Where directions to do something in a particular manner entailed some penalty or consequence, like the consequences for not complying with requirements of S.10(3), (4) and (5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, unless sufficient cause was shown, was visited by rejection of application for leave, had made the provision mandatory---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court, negated the principle of mandatory provision of law, therefore, the same was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nPLD 1978 Kar. 926; PLD 2001 SC 499; 2000 SCMR 1305; 2001 SCMR 1001; PLD 2007 Kar. 243; 2007 CLC 315; Citibank N.A. v. Judge Banking Court IV and 2 others 2001 CLC 171 and Habib Bank Limited v. English Engineering Co. 2005 CLD 292 ref.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Mandatory provision---Essential feature---One of the essential features of mandatory provision was not merely the use of word \"\"shall\"\" which might be used merely to stress importance of compliance of particular requirement emphasized or prescribed in the enactment---Where consequences of failure to comply with direction or requirement of a statute were not stated, the direction was treated as directory and not mandatory---Where directions to do something in a particular manner entailed some penalty or consequence, like the consequence for not complying with requirements of provision of a statute, was visited by rejection of application, had made the provision mandatory.\n \nPLD 1978 Kar. 926; PLD 2001 SC 499; 2000 SCMR 1305; 2001 SCMR 1001; PLD 2007 Kar. 243 and 2007 CLC 315 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 101 of 2006, decision dated: 25-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND AHMED ALI M. SHAIKH, J",
    "": "EQUITY PARTICIPATION FUND\nvs\nMessrs ABBRASIVE PRODUCTS CO. LIMITED\nand 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12388",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2254 = 2012 SLD 2254 = 2012 CLD 1578",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2(b)(ii) & 22---Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009, Arts. 69, 71(2)--- Writ petition---Suit for recovery of loan---Jurisdiction of Chief Court to entertain suit filed under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Scope---Intra-court appeal before Chief Court--- Scope--- Bank (respondent) had filed a recovery suit against the defaulters (petitioners), and since the claim exceeded fifty million rupees, as envisaged under S.2(b)(ii) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, Chief judge of the Chief Court entrusted the suit to a judge of the Chief Court---Defaulters filed a writ petition against such order of the Chief judge with the contentions that nomination and entrustment of the suit to any judge of the Chief Court, was derogatory to S.2(b)(ii) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which section only envisaged \"\"High Court\"\" and not the \"\"Chief Court\"\", and that the Chief Court had no concept of intra-court appeal and if the nominated judge passed any decree against the defaulters, they would be deprived of their right to intra-court appeal---Validity---Chief Court assumed and exercised all the powers of a \"\"High Court\"\" under general laws extended to Gilgit-Baltistan---Chief Court had been empowered to entertain the suits under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, as a \"\"High Court\"\"---Chief judge exercised jurisdiction of the Banking Court under the Ordinance and did not act as a judge of the High Court in its ordinary jurisdiction, therefore, any order/ /decree passed by him could be appealed against before the Chief Court under S.22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, notwithstanding the fact that the Chief Court had no rules of intra-court appeal---Chief Court directed the competent authority having legislative power to look into the serious consequences of the issue and to introduce necessary amendments to the Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009---Order accordingly.\n \n2002 SCMR 496 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Writ Petition No.38 of 2011, decision dated: 14-12-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAHIB KHAN AND MUZAFFAR ALI, JJ",
    "": "SAFDAR ENTERPRISES PVT. LIMITED through Javed Hussain and 8 others\nvs\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through President Head Office and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12389",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2255 = 2012 SLD 2255 = 2012 CLD 1402",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S. 181---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1, 2 & O.XLIII, R. 1---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S. 3--- Intra-court appeal--- Ad interim order restraining defendant from acting as a Director of Company and from participation in Board Meetings---Validity---Restraining the defendant from acting as a Director and participating in Board meetings was within the jurisdiction of the Company Judge---Special provision had been provided in terms of S.181 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for removal of a Director, therefore, interim order to such extent was unwarranted and could not have been passed in the suit---Order of Single Judge of High Court was modified to the extent that the defendant was free to participate in the Annual General Meeting of the company in his capacity as a Director and shareholder of the company and could raise objections on the accounts presented in the meeting---Appeal was disposed of, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.112 and C.M.As. Nos.2332, 2323, 2252, 1668 of 2011, decision dated: 29-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ",
    "": "SHAHID MAZHAR\nvs\nSHADMAN COTTON MILLS LIMITED and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12390",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2256 = 2012 SLD 2256 = 2012 CLD 1336",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 2(c)---Mortgagor as customer---Scope---Law does not contemplate that a mortgagor ought to be a beneficiary of finance or ought to have nexus with principal debtor in order to be liable on mortgage executed by him/her.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 3, 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit---Execution of mortgage---Proof---Two loan facilities were advanced to defendant company and suit was filed for recovery of Rs.75.848 million--- Guarantor denied having executed mortgage deeds of her property. in favour of bank---Validity---Some of charged documents were executed on behalf of guarantor by her husband as general attorney but the attorney was not on record---Bank had shown that documents were signed by guarantor in year 1997, including registered mortgage deed for an amount of Rs. 100,000 and another mortgage deed for an amount of Rs.6.155 million, were signed \"\" by guarantor personally and signatures matched---Both the mortgage documents stated that security was tendered to secure disbursement of finance to defendant company---High Court passed interim decree in favour of bank to the extent of Rs.6.155 million and in respect of claim made by the bank for remaining amount of Rs.75.8 million unconditional leave to defend was granted to the guarantor---Decretal amount, under. S.3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was subject to payment of cost of funds from the date when, guarantor first disputed her liability towards bank in her petition for leave to appear---Petition was allowed accordingly. (p. 13381 B",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.63 of 2001, decision dated: 11-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "BANK OF KHYBER--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs SPENCER DISTRIBUTION LTD. through Chief Executive and 14 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12391",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2257 = 2012 SLD 2257 = 2012 CLD 1608",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 7---Suit for recovery of loan---Relief to be specifically stated---Scope---Banking Court decreeing a suit for recovery of finance including a finance facility, which was not subject matter of the suit---Validity---No application was filed for amendment of memo of plaint to incorporate the said finance facility and same was not the subject matter before the Banking Court---Banking Court could not decree the suit in respect of an amount which was not subject matter before it in the suit---Appeal was allowed, s and decrees of courts below were set aside and matter was remanded to the Banking Court for decision afresh strictly in accordance with the law.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R. 7---Relief to be specifically stated---Scope---Facts not disclosed in the pleadings---Effect---Provisions of Order VII, Rule 7, C.P.C. empowered the court to grant an effective or ancillary relief even if not prayed, as the plaint as a whole was to be looked into in order to determine relief for which plaintiff was entitled, however, no relief could be granted upon facts and documents not disclosed in the pleadings.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.110 of 2002, decision dated: 3rd July, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J., JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "Syed PHOOL BADSHAH and others\nvs\nADBP through Manager, Peshawar High Court Branch and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12392",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2258 = 2012 SLD 2258 = 2012 CLD 2032",
    "Key Words:": "Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-------Ss. 11 & 16--- Release of untreated effluent---Environmental Protection Agency, keeping in view the potential impacts of Textile Mills on environment, due to release of untreated effluent, got the mill inspected by team of Environmental Protection Agency---Inspection Team collected the samples and on getting the wastewater tested, it was observed that the level of Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD), and Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) were in excess of the National Environmental Quality Standards---Environmental Protection Order was issued directing for immediate stoppage of production process of the mill till installation of wastewater treatment plant---Period of establishment of the mill was only one month---Prosecution witness did not remember the colour of cooler in which samples of water in question were kept---Prosecution witness had given contradictory statement in respect of ice used to cool the sample of water---In view of contradictory evidence of prosecution witnesses, who had gone to collect the samples, it had become doubtful as to whether the samples were kept at the required temperature or not---Evidence of prosecution witness was also silent as to whether the seals of sample bottles were intact or not and who had received the samples and where those were kept when received in the late night---No proper chain of custody was established by the prosecution in the case---Result as per certificate of test or analysis produced on record, contradicted the result as per other test report which reflected negligence on part of laboratory; and it appeared that care and caution was not taken by the laboratory at the time of issuing the certificate---No reliance could be placed upon vague and contradictory certificate---If any one had failed to appear on part of the mill, then instead of issuing Environmental Protection Order to stop production forthwith, another opportunity should have been provided to mill---No one should be condemned unheard---Out of many spinning mills, only present mill had been targeted though it had submitted copy of treatment plant and ensured compliance of the same---Same policy should have been adopted towards the present mill---Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the mill beyond shadow of reasonable doubt--- Mill having not been proved involved in contravention of Ss.11, 16 of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, Chief Executive Officer of the mill was acquitted in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Environmental Protection Tribunal, Karachi",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Complaint No.14 of 2010, decision dated: 9-06-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. ASHRAF, JAHAN, CHAIRPERSON AND ABDUL KARIM MEMON, MEMBER LEGAL",
    "": "DIRECTOR-GENERAL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF SINDHComplainant\nvs\nSHABBIR AHMED, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12393",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2259 = 2012 SLD 2259 = 2012 CLD 1633",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 22(1), 22(2), 4, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.47, 104, O.XXI & O.XLIII---Execution of decree---Suit for recovery was decreed---Sale of mortgaged property---Appeal against order of Banking Court for fixing reserve price for auction---Maintainability---Section 104 and O. XLIII, C.P.C. specified the orders of the court from which appeal lay---Fixation of reserve price, in pursuance of auction proceedings, was neither stated nor mentioned as an appealable order under the provisions of the C.P.C.---According to S.4 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001; in case if any inconsistency between the provisions of the Ordinance and any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of the Ordinance would have an overriding effect---According to S.22(1) of the Ordinance, only a , decree, sentence or final order passed by a Banking Court would be appealable before the High Court---Section 22(2) of the Ordinance barred appeal, review, revision against an order accepting or rejecting an application for leave to defend or any interlocutory order of the Banking Court, or an order passed under S.15(11) or 19(7)---Orders impugned were neither final within the meaning of S.22(1) of the Ordinance nor could be termed as interlocutory order aimed at disposal of the entire case---Appeal being not maintainable, was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.As. Nos.8 and 9 of 2011, decision dated: 29-05-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "RIAZ AHMAD KHAN AND MUHAMMAD AZIM KHAN AFRIDI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD FAWAD and another\nvs\nSTANDARD CHARTERED BANK (PAKISTAN) LIMITED through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12394",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2260 = 2012 SLD 2260 = 2012 CLD 1611",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. VII, Rr.1(i) & 11(c)---Plaint without payment of court-fee filing of---Effect---Discretion of court to proceed with such suit.\n \n(b) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)---\n \n----Ss. 3(2)(i), 3 & 4---Suit for recovery of amount of furnace oil supplied to ship---Sale of ship by its previous owner to defendant before filing of such suit by plaintiff---Effect---Where defendant had paid valuable consideration for ship and its beneficial ownership vested in him and he had no knowledge about suit claim, then in absence of any evidence to show that he was party to any sham transaction, he could not be made liable for plaintiff's claim.\n \nBangladesh Shipping Corpn. v. M.V. 'NEDON' PLD 1981 Kar. 246; The \"\"Banco\"\" [1971] Vol. 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 49; M.V. \"\"Goloz\"\" Ex-M.V. \"\"Mustafa Bey\"\" v. Pacmar Shipping (Pvt.) Ltd. 2010 CLD 660; Yukong Ltd. South Korean Co. v. M.T. Eastern Navigator PLD 2000 SC 57; The \"\"Freccia del Nord\"\" [1989] Vol. 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 388; \"\"The Indian Grace No.2\"\" [1998] Vol. 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 1; Alexander G. Tsavliris & Sons v. M.V. Rice Trader 1985 CLC 1355; The \"\"Monica S.\"\" [1967] Vol. 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 113; In re ARO CO. Ltd. [1980] The Law Reports 1 Ch. 196; The \"\"Daien Maru No.18\"\" [1984] Part 5 Case 10 High Court of Singapore; Oriental Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Panaghia Odigitria 1991 MLD 148; Kuwait Flour Mills Co. Sak v. M.V. \"\"Kashmir\"\" 1990 MLD 2196 and Khadija Edible Oil Refinery (Pvt.) Ltd. v. M.T. \"\"Galaxy\"\" 2011 CLD 1329 ref.\n \n(c) Letter of Credit---\n \n----??????? Irrevocable Letter of Credit issued by Bank---Validity---Such letter could not be manipulated for back-dated as a number of formalities had to be met before Bank would issue such letter.\n \nOmair Nisar for Plaintiff.",
    "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M.A. No.115 of 2012 in Admiralty Suit No.1 of 2012, decision dated: 27-07-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "QAZI FAEZ ISA, C.J.",
    "": "Messrs INTERNATIONAL BUNKERING MIDDLE EAST DMCC through Authorized Attorney--Plaintiff\nvs\nM. T. TRIDONAWATI and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12395",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2261 = 2012 SLD 2261 = 2012 CLD 1654",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90 & S.47---Execution of decree---Sale of property---Application/objection petition for setting aside auction on ground of alleged irregularities and fraud by the Court Auctioneer, the Bank staff and the auction-purchaser---Said application/objection-petition was dismissed by Banking Court and order of the Banking Court was assailed by the appellant---Validity---Reserve price which was determined by the decree-holder Bank in the year 2008 was reduced after a period of one year; which was a mischievous act of the decree-holder Bank---Manner in which the auction proceedings were conducted showed pre-determination in the minds of the Court Auctioneer and the auction-purchaser and both were in prior knowledge as to at what rate the highest bid would be finalized and what would be the one-fourth bid amount, and the exact same amount in shape of an already prepared Pay Order was in possession of the auction-purchaser---Said Pay Order was naturally prepared prior to the participation of the auction-purchaser in the auction proceedings---Collusiveness of the interested persons was seen, and the appellant was deprived of the actual value of her property---Banking Court while confirming the sale price had conveniently ignored the fact that a year ago the decree-holder Bank had itself determined the value of the property much higher than to what the property was to put to auction for and objections raised by the appellant in such regard were not considered in an appropriate manner; and sale of such tainted proceedings should not have been confirmed---Inadequacy of price, if was by the reason of fraud and material irregularity; would provide a ground for setting aside the decree and also the sale in the execution of such a decree---Dismissal of application/objection petition under Order XXI, Rule 90 of the C.P.C. without recording of evidence of parties was not justified, and without recording findings adduced on such evidence; the Banking Court should not proceed to reject an objection petition filed under Order XXI, Rule 90, C.P.C.---Appeal was accepted, and the sale as a result of the impugned auction was set aside.\n \nBrig. (Retd.) Mazhar-ul-Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Islamabad and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706 and Mir Wali Khan and another v. Manager, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, Muzaffargarh and another PLD 2003 SC 500 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXI, R.90---Application for setting aside sale as a result of execution of a decree---Practice and Procedure---Dismissal of application under Order XXI, Rule, 90, C.P.C. without recording of evidence of parties was not justified, and the court, without recording findings adduced on such evidence should not proceed to reject an objection petition filed under Order XXI, R.90, C.P.C.\n \nMir Wali Khan and another v. Manager, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, Muzaffargarh and another PLD 2003 SC 500 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.253 of 2010, heard on 15-05-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ AHMAD AND IBAD UR REHMAN LODHI, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. QAMAR KHALID RASOOL\nvs\nFAYSAL BANK LIMITED and anther"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12396",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2262 = 2012 SLD 2262 = 2012 CLD 1670",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 3 & 22---State Bank of Pakistan BCD (Banking Control Department) Circulars Nos.13 & 34---Islamic financing--- Buy-back price--- Scope--- Excess amount claimed by financer (customer) over and above the buy-back price would convert the transaction into an interest based transaction, which was prohibited under the Islamic modes of financing introduced under BCD (Banking Control Department) Circulars 13 & 34 of the State Bank.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 3 & 22---Islamic financing---Provision of prompt payment bonus--- Effect on buy-back price---Amount that is determined to be payable as prompt payment bonus within the stipulated time is to be regarded as actual buy-back price and anything above this buy-back price would enter the transaction into the realm of interest based financing, and once financier agrees to a lesser amount for settlement of his claim then he cannot charge any amount over and above such lesser amount---Accounts have to be settled at such lesser amount under the Islamic mode of financing, therefore, any amount that is charged in excess of this amount i.e. after deducting prompt bonus would certainly bring the transaction within the ambit of interest, which would convert a permissible transaction under Islamic banking laws into a non-permissible interest based transaction.\n \n2007 CLD 1655 and 1999 MLD 1888 ref.\n \nFilzholmes v. The Bank of Upper India Ltd. AIR 1923 Lah. 548 distinguished.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 3 & 22---Depositing outstanding amount after default date--- Calculation of cost of funds--- Scope---Default in repayment of amount is to be treated only to the extent of the outstanding amount that is not repaid within the contractual period but is deposited subsequently---Cost of funds is to be calculated only on the defaulted sum at the rates applicable from the date of commission of default till the defaulted sum was deposited in the Banking Court.\n \nAppellant No.1 in person.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.52 of 2009, decision dated: 16-04-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ",
    "": "TRYCOT SYNTHETIC FIBRE COMPANY through Proprietor and another\nvs\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12397",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2263 = 2012 SLD 2263 = 2012 CLD 1675",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.11 of 2011, decision dated: 23rd May, 2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "NOOR-UL-HAQ N. QURESHI, J",
    "": "SUMMIT BANK LTD. through Authorized Officer/Attorneys--Plaintiff\nvs\nFARHAD--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12398",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2264 = 2012 SLD 2264 = 2012 CLD 1973",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19---Execution of decree---Appellant Bank assailed orders of the Banking Court whereby it allowed the respondent to withdraw 25% of her bid, deposited after she was declared the successful bidder in the sale of the property of the -debtors under S.19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Respondent made said application for withdrawal on the ground that the appellant Bank represented to her that it was only the Bank that would confirm the sale alone--- Validity--- Proclamation advertisement published to invite bids for the sale of the property, nowhere mentioned that the sale would be subject to the final order of the Banking Court and that the Court was involved for auctioning the property--- Respondent-auction-purchaser, was therefore, justified in believing that the appellant Bank would confirm the sale---Appellant Bank was unable to show any document or communication which confirmed that the Bank informed the perspective bidders about the order passed by the Banking Court---Respondent-auction-purchaser was therefore, justified in withdrawing her bid---No illegality in the impugned order of the Banking Court having been found, appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. 19 of 2008, decision dated: 24-11-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN AND MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Assistant Vice President\nvs\nMessrs IMPERIAL PIPE INDUSTRIES PRIVATE) LIMITED and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12399",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2265 = 2012 SLD 2265 = 2012 CLD 1976",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 15(1)(b)--- Mortgage money--- Documentation---Any collateral document which refers to mortgage is insufficient for the purposes of definition of mortgage money and the same would include a document that may be necessary to be prepared, filed or maintained to meet any statutory requirement.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 15---Sale of mortgaged property---Bar to jurisdiction of court---Principles---If there has been any failure to comply with mandatory requirements of any of the subsections of S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, or a matter does not otherwise come within its terms, bar contained in S.15(12) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, cannot be applied.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 12(b) & 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Sale of mortgaged property---Interim injunction, grant of---Defendant bank issued public notice regarding auction of properties of plaintiff customer---Plea raised by plaintiff was that he had paid off secured money and bank had not issued three statutory notices---Validity---In a suit filed by customer, in which sale of mortgaged property was challenged and it was contended that secured money had been paid off, appropriate test would be that for limited purposes of ascertaining whether S.12(b) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, was engaged, customer's claim should be examined as though it were a leave to defend application filed in suit filed by financial institution---For such purpose, financial institution's pleadings and material placed on record would also have to be examined---If on such basis, it was concluded that claim had raised a leave question with respect to repayment of secured moneys, then for limited purposes, it could be said that moneys had been repaid and thus if a case was otherwise made out, an injunction could be issued---High Court granted interim injunction against sale of mortgaged property without intervention of court---Application for grant of injunction was allowed accordingly.\n \nSindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2009 SC 879; Mir Muhammad Idrees and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 213 and Muhammad Umer Rathore v. Federation of Pakistan 2009 CLD 257 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 15--- Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 69---Sale of mortgaged property--- Provision of S.69 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, applies generally to mortgages and moneys advanced or repayable in terms of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, whereas S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, relates only to mortgage-money, as specifically defined in.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-77 and C.M.A. No.10220 of 2011, decision dated: 22-05-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "IRFAN NAWAB--Plaintiff\nvs\nSONERI BANK LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12400",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2266 = 2012 SLD 2266 = 2012 CLD 1995",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Recovery of bank loan---Appeal---Cost of funds and service fee---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was assailed by bank on the ground that bank was entitled to recover service fee from defendant---Validity---Service which was being rendered by bank to defendant had come to an end on 22-6-2007, when defendant stopped availing facility and credit card in question was cut into two pieces and was dropped by him in drop box of concerned branch of the bank---No justification was available for charging service fee after such date as the same would have been justified only if defendant after committing default was still utilizing the facility and bank was rendering services to him---Rate at which service fee was to be charged by bank was never agreed by parties nor any specific rate was mentioned in plaint and statement of accounts---Mark-up/profit could not be charged without mutual agreement and/or beyond mutually agreed period---Customer could not be penalized twice for the same wrong/default and for the same period, that was, default in fulfilment of his obligation by charging service fee or any other type of penalty from him from the date of default on one hand and on the other hand by claming cost of funds from him with effect from the same date of default---Cost of funds having been granted to bank by Banking Court from the date of default on the amount claimed by bank, therefore, bank was not entitled to service fee for the same period---High Court declined to interfere in and decree passed by Banking Court---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nMst. Jannat Bibi v. Sher Muhammad and others 1988 SCMR 1696; Malik Muhammad Faisal and others v. State Life Insurance Corporation through Chairman and 2 others 2008 SCMR 456; Sh. Fateh Muhammad v. Muhammad Adil and others PLD 2007 SC 460; Zulifqar and others v. Shahadat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582; Bin Yamin and 3 others v. Choudhry Hakim and others 1996 SCMR 336; Dr. Zia-ur-Rehman Khan and others v. Dr. Atiq-ur-Rehman Khan PLD 2009 Lah. 641; Messrs C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chairman and 5 others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587; Haji Fazal Elahi and Sons through Muhammad Tariq v. Bank of Punjab 2004 CLD 162; Muhammad Sharif and Sons through Proprietor and another v. United Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 974 and Muhammad Akram Choudhry v. Style Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. 2004 CLD 1714 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.97 of 2010, decision dated: 30-04-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB AND NADEEM AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs UNITED BANK LTD. through Authorized Attorneys\nvs\nM. MUBEEN KHAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12401",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2267 = 2012 SLD 2267 = 2012 CLD 2016",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Conditional leave---Non-compliance of condition---Certified statement of accounts---Defendants failed to comply with condition imposed while granting leave to defend the suit on the plea that suit was not maintainable---Validity---No rebuttal of statement of accounts was on the record and as such the suit was maintainable---Certified statement of accounts under S.4 of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, was the core document under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Statement of account was available on record and no entry of the same was challenged and as such it was presumed that account prepared and maintained by bank were correct---Statement of account having certificate under S.4 of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, was admissible per se specially when there was no opposition and there was no objection against any debit entry---In absence of any rebuttal, amount due as per statement of account would be deemed to be the correct liability of defendants---Suit was decreed accordingly.\n \nHaji Ali Khan and Company, Abbottabad and 8 others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited Abbotabad PLD 1995 SC 362; Naeem Iqbal v. Mst. Zarina 1996 SCMR 1530; Col. (Retd.) Ashfaq Ahmed and others v. Sh. Muhammad Wasim 1999 SCMR 2832 and Messrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No.166 of 2010 and C.M. No.167-B of 2012, decision dated: 8-03-2012.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED through Authorized Attorney--Plaintiff\nvs\nHAIDRI HOMES through Partners and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12402",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2268 = 2012 SLD 2268 = 2012 CLD 2029",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 15--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Sale of mortgaged property---Petitioner impugned action of sale of his mortgaged property by the respondent Bank under S.15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 on the ground that S.15 of the Ordinance had been declared unconstitutional by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Muhammad Umer Rathore v. Federation of Pakistan (2009 CLD 257)---Validity---Full Bench was a declaratory one with respect to the validity of a law and its effect therefore operated in rem---Bank's recovery of dues by the sale of the mortgaged property under S.15 of the Ordinance was declared to be illegal; and present declaration was made in personam and did not impair the Bank's right to obtain recovery through lawful processes including by way of filing a suit for recovery before a competent Banking Court---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\n \nMuhammad Umer Rathore v. Federation of Pakistan 2009 CLD 257 fol.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 15--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Sale of mortgaged property---Petitioner impugned action of sale of his mortgaged property by the respondent Bank under S.15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 on the ground that S.15 of the Ordinance had been declared unconstitutional by Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Muhammad Umer Rathore v. Federation of Pakistan (2009 CLD 257)---Validity---Contention of the respondent Bank was that Supreme Court had suspended said of the Full Bench of High Court in 2009 CLD 257 which had declared S.15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to be unconstitutional---Held, said suspensory order of the Supreme Court was to have effect inter partes only and was not a in rem.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.11891 of 2009, decision dated: 16-09-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "Mst. MEERAN BIBI (AMEER BIBI) and 4 others\nvs\nMANAGER, ZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED, PHOOL NAGAR, DISTRICT KASUR and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12403",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1931 = 2011 SLD 1931 = 2011 CLD 496",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-197 of 2010, decision dated: 24-12-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID ANWAR BAJWA AND TUFAIL H. IBRAHIM, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD MASOOD BUTT and 3 others\nvs\nS.M. CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD. and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12404",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2269 = 2012 SLD 2269 = 2012 CLD 393",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0.XXIX, R.1---Suit for recovery of Bank loan-Plaint signed by two attorneys of Bank authorized by its President through Power of Attorney notarized in accordance with law---Such Power of Attorney fulfilled requirements of S.9(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Suit was validly instituted and maintainable.\n \nBanque Indosuez v. Jet Travels Limited and others 1991 CLC 446; National Bank of Pakistan v. Muhammad Ashraf Sanik PLD 1987 Lah. 17 and Khyam Films and another v. Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd. 1982 CLC 1275 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), Ss.2(8) & 4---Suit for recovery of Bank loan---Leave to defend suit, application for---Defendant's plea was that statement of accounts contained unjust entries without showing details thereof---Validity---Defendant in support of his plea had not pointed out any specific entry in such statement---Such statement lying on record contained all transactions of defendant's account and was certified and dated by competent officer in accordance with provisions of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891---High Court repelled defendant's plea for being vague. \n \nBank of Punjab v. Mrs. Mah Tallat Sultan and another 2006 CLD 773; National Bank of Pakistan and others v. National Battery Industries and others 1994 CLC 2133 and Messrs Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Limited v. Messrs Marvi Agrochem (Private) Ltd. and others 2007 CLD 1374 distguished.\n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Mujahid Nawaz Cotton Ginners and others 2007 CLD 678 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of Bank loan---Leave to defend suit, application for---Leave application showing non fulfilment of requirements of S.10(314) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Defendant's admission to have availed amount of finance mentioned in plaint and executed documents in favour of Bank to secure its repayment---Effect--Defendant had failed to show any sufficient cause for his inability to comply with such requirements---Defendant had failed to discharge his obligation under finance agreement---Defendant had failed to make out any substantial question of law and fact requiring leading of evidence by parties---High Court dismissed leave application and decreed suit as prayed for.\n \nUnited Bank Limited v. Messrs Ilyas Enterprises and others 20.04 CLD 1338; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, Karachi v. Messrs Zamco (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2007 CLD 217; Shahid Farooq Sheikh v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited 2005 CLD 1489; Zeeshan Energy Ltd. and others v. Faisal Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 1741; U.B.L. v. Messrs Sindh Tech. Industries Ltd. and others 1998 CLD 1152 and Messrs Malik & Company and others v. Muslim Commercial Bank and others 2002 CLD 1621 ref.\n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Mujahid- Nawaz Cotton Ginners and others 2007 CLD 678; Bank of Punjab v. Mrs. Mah Tallat Sultan and another 2006 CLD 773 and National Bank of Pakistan and others v. National Battery Industries and others 1994 CLC 2133 distguished.\n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs A.I. Brothers (Private) Limited and others 2007 CLD 1356; Bank of Khyber v. Messrs Spencer Distribution Ltd. and others 2003 CLD 1406 and Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Sabcos (Pvt.) Ltd. 2006 CLD 244 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.89 of 2009, decision dated: 15-11-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J",
    "": "ALLIED BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMUSLIM CO1TON MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12405",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2270 = 2012 SLD 2270 = 2012 CLD 733",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------Ss. 13 & 44-A---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 117---Foreign --Execution---Scope---Upon obtaining foreign by plaintiff, three courses are open to such plaintiff firstly he can obtain execution of foreign by proceeding under S.44-A, C.P.C., if the country from which decree has been obtained is United Kingdom or any reciprocating territory and in that case, plaintiff can outrightly obtain execution of the decree from District Court of concerned district of Pakistan and plaintiff need not file suit even and need not go through procedure prescribed for trial of suit---Secondly plaintiff can file suit in Pakistan on the basis of foreign treating it as cause of action---In adopting second course, if conditions prescribed in S.13 C.P.C. are fulfilled, the is conclusive between parties and otherwise it is res judicata between them and such Courts in Pakistan are bound by its findings---Such suit is to be filed within the period of six years from the date of that as provided under Art.117 of Limitation Act, 1908---Third course against foreign is that plaintiff can file suit on the original cause of action as it does not cone to an end after passing of foreign but remains intact until and unless that foreign is satisfied---If conditions mentioned in S.13 C.P.C. are not satisfied, then the decree remains open to collateral attack in Pakistan. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 96---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S:13-:-Recovery of finances---Foreign ---Certified copies and its translation--Plaintiff company filed recovery suit against defendant in a foreign country, where finance was availed and was to be repaid, the suit was decreed in favour of bank by foreign court---On the basis of and decree passed by foreign Court, plaintiff filed suit against defendant in Pakistan for recovery of decretal amount---Validity---There was nothing in S.13 C.P.C. which had effect of excluding provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, or to sit on a foreign in appeal---Plaintiff had filed suit on the basis of foreign treating it as cause of action, which the plaintiff could do under the law---High Court did not find any illegality in the form of suit and the suit was maintainable in banking jurisdiction as provided under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Plaintiff bank had filed certified copies of foreign and its translation duly attested by the Consulate General of Pakistan was also brought on record, as required under Art.96 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Defendant did not file application for leave to defend the suit and there was nothing on record to rebut the claim of plaintiff---Suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff in circumstances. \n \nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Virk House Trading Company Ltd. 2009 CLD 451; United Bank Limited v. Naeem Ullah Malik and others 2009 CLD 1459; Popat Virji v. Damodar Jairam AIR 1934 Bombay 390; Emirates Bank Intl. Limited v. Messrs Osman Brothers and others 1990 MLD 1779 and Abdul Ghani v. Haji Saley Muhammad PLD 1960 Kar. 594 rel.\n \nMian Nazir Ahmed v. Abdur Rashid Qureshi 1986 CLC 1309; Ganguli Engineering Ltd. v. Smt. Sushila Bala Dasi and another AIR 1957 Cal. 103; Messrs Kadir Motors (Regd.), Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd., Karachi and others 1992 SCMR 1174 and T. Zubair Limited and 2 others v. Judge, Banking Court No.III, Lahore and another 2000 CLC 1405 ref.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S.14---Foreign ---Scope---Such is presumed to be pronounced by court of competent jurisdiction within the contemplation of S. 14, C.P.C.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-162 of 2010, decision dated: 14-02-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nBAHJANI SCRAP TRADING COMPANY LLC and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12406",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2012 2271 = 2012 SLD 2271 = 2012 CLD 373",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 5(1) & (3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.24---Transfer of case---Principle---Term \"\"Banking Court\"\"---Scope---Financial Institution filed suit against defendants before Banking Court and defendants sought transfer of the same to High Court on the ground that already another suit filed by defendants was pending against the bank in High Court---Validity---Term \"\"Banking Court\"\" appearing in the end of section 5(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was referable to both the categories of Banking Courts---High Court was fully empowered to withdraw a suit from any Banking Court established by Federal Government under section 5(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for its trial before its own Banking jurisdiction and vice versa---Such power of transferring cases was analogous to the power of High Court that was contained in section 24, C.P.C. by virtue of which High Court could also withdraw any case pending in any court subordinate to it and try or dispose of the same itself---Transfer of suit for its trial with other suit should not be allowed where customer's application for leave to defend the suit had already been dismissed---Where leave to defend was granted in a suit filed by a financial institution and recording of evidence had yet not started or was at an initial stage, High Court might allow transfer of suit from one Banking Court to another or to its own banking jurisdiction for trial but not where customer's leave to defend application was still pending adjudication in a suit filed by financial institution---High Court should not mechanically exercise its power of transfer under section 5(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, but should allow Banking Court to first dispose of leave to defend application--Mere seeking transfer on the ground preventing conflicting s was not enough in ordering transfer of banking cases---High Court was fully empowered to withdraw a banking case pending in a Banking Court for its trial before its own Bench hearing banking case but while considering such transfer application, High Court must ensure that every purpose for which expeditious mechanism for disposal of recovery suits devised under banking laws, was not defeated---Order 'was passed accordingly. \n \nFirst Women Bank Ltd. v. Registrar of High Court 2004 SCMR 108 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9(4)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.10---Res sub judice, principle of---Applicability---Stay of proceedings---provision of section 10, C.P.C. have been made inapplicable to banking suits under section 9(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which enables Banking Court to proceed with trial of suit filed by financial institution irrespective of the fact that customer has already filed a suit for settlement of account or damages against financial institution subsequent to the suit filed by its customer---Subsequent suit filed by financial institution continues to proceed and is not liable to be stayed on the basis of conditions laid down in section 10, C.P.C. \n \n(c) Precedent---\n \n----Precedents remain binding only when elucidation that they provide does not come into conflict with any statutory provision.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Transfer Applications Nos.2, 3, 11 and 22 of 2010, decision dated: 8-10-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY, C.J. MUSHIR ALAM AND FAISAL ARAB, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHAFI and others--Applicants\nvs\nHABIB BANK LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12407",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1932 = 2011 SLD 1932 = 2011 CLD 461",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9(1)---Recovery suit, filing of---Locus standi---Contention of defendants was that as no resolution of Board of Directors was appended with the plaint, therefore, suit filed on behalf of bank was not filed by competent person---Validity---Plaint could be presented by a financial institution before Banking Court duly signed and verified on oath either by branch manager or such other officer of the bank who held power of attorney- or was authorized otherwise---Plaintiff bank brought on record valid power of attorneys and the same had fulfilled requirements of section 9 (1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Suit was maintainable in circumstances. \n \nThe Central Bank of India, Ltd., Lahore v. Messrs Taj-­ud-Din Abdur Rauf and others 1992 SCMR 846; PICIC Commercial Bank Limited v. Spectrum Fisheries Limited 2006 CLD 440; United Bank Limited v. Pak. Leather Grafts Limited and others 2010 CLC 701; Al-Madina Electric Store v. Habib Bank Limited 2006 CLD 734; Habib Bank Limited v. A.B.M. Graner (Pvt.) Limited and others PLD 2001 Kar. 264 and Nusrat Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. United Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 1421 distinguished.\n \nBanque Indosuez v. Jet Travels Limited and others 1991 CLC 446; National Bank of Pakistan v. Muhammad Ashraf Sanik and another PLD 1987 Lah.17 and Khyam Films and another v. Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd. 1982 CLC 1275 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.176---Recovery of bank loan--- Pawnee's right--- Default by pawnor---Remedy---Defendants contended that suit filed by bank was not maintainable as plaintiff bank should have sold pledged shares available with it----Validity---It was a right of pawnee/pledgee either to bring a suit upon debt or to sell goods pledged upon giving a reasonable notice of sale---Both rights were concurrent and had been provided under section 176 of Contract Act, 1872--- Pawnee had a right under section 176 of Contract Act, 1872, to auction the debt, notwithstanding possession of goods, subject to pawnee's right to redeem the goods upon tender of amount due before the sale---Plaintiff bank had rightly filed suit in spite of the fact that pledged shares were not sold and were retained by plaintiff bank-Such action of bank was in line with the provisions of section 176 of Contract Act, 1872. \n \nA.M. Burq and another v. Central Exchange Bank Ltd. and others PLD 1966 (W.P) Lah. 1; Muhammad Habib and others v. Messrs National Bank of Pakistan 1989 MLD 1026; Salim Adamjee v. Al-Faysal Investment Bank Ltd. and another PLD 1999 Kar. 468 and Messrs Crystal Enterprises and others v. Platinum Commercial Bank Ltd. and others 2002 CLD 868 rel.\n \n(c) Administration of justice---\n \n----When a particular procedure has been provided under a statute for doing a particular thing in particular manner, the party invoking such provision of law has to act in accordance with the procedure laid down in that statute. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10 (3)(4)(5)(6)--Recovery of bank loan-Leave to defend the suit---Non-compliance of mandatory requirements---Effect---Plaintiff bank resisted application for leave to defend on the ground that defendants did not comply with mandatory requirements of section 10(3)(4)(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Application filed by defendants did not comply with the provisions of section 10 (3)(4) and (5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, therefore, the same was liable to be dismissed under the provision of section 10(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Defendants failed to show any sufficient cause for their inability to comply with such requirements---Defendants did not discharge their obligations as per agreement and suit was rightly filed by plaintiff bank---Defendants failed to make out any substantial question of law as well as fact in respect of which any evidence was required to be led---Application for leave to defend the suit filed by defendants was dismissed by High Court---Suit was decreed in circumstances. \n \nMuhammad Khan and others v. Shabarati PLD 1995 Kar. 267; Muhammad Haleem and others v. H.H. Muhammad Naim and others PLD 1969 SC.270; Vedabai alias Vaijayantabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others AIR 2001 SC 2582; Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi and another AIR 1968 SC 222; Bank of Baroda v. Sansar Chand Kapur and another AIR 1994 Delhi 359; United Bank Limited v. Progas Pakistan Limited 2010 CLD 828; Messrs Fybron (Pvt.) Limited and others v. National Bank of Pakistan 2006 CLD 127; Rahat Badaruddin Bandey v. Union Bank Limited 2005 CLD 1080 and Bankers Equity Limited and others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and others 2003 CLD 931 distinguished.\n \nNIB Bank Limited v. Taha Spinning Mills Limited and others 2010 CLD 635; Askari Commercial Bank Limited v. Hilal Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2009 CLD 588; Messrs Mach Knittrs (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited 20.04 CLD 535; Bank of Khyber v. Messrs Spencer Distribution Ltd. and others 2003 CLD 1406; Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Sabcos (Pvt.) Limited 2006 CLD 244; Muhammad Arshad and another v. Citibank N.A., Al-Fallah Building, Lahore 2006 CLD 1411; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs A.I. Brothers (Private) Limited and others 2007 CLD 1356; American Express Bank Ltd v. Adamjee Industries Limited 1995 CLC 880; Messrs Razzaq & Company 'v. Messrs Riazeda (Pvt.) Limited 1990 CLC 1243 and Siddique Woollen Mills and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 1033 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-107 of 2009 and C.M.A. Nos.8592, 9265, 8595, 8591, 8593 and 8594 of 2009, decision dated: 15-12-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J",
    "": "KASB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMirza GHULAM MUJTABA and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12408",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1933 = 2011 SLD 1933 = 2011 CLD 458",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 19 & 22---Execution proceedings---Auction of mortgaged property---Dismissal of objection petition for non-prosecution and confirmation of auction by Banking Court---Appeal against impugned order---Judgment-debtor's plea supported by affidavit to the effect that on crucial date, junior of his counsel appeared before court and requested for an adjournment, but his presence was not marked and objection petition was decided in absence of appellant and his counsel---Validity---Decree-holder had not filed counter-affidavit to rebut such affidavit of -debtor---High Court accepted such affidavit of -debtor, meaning thereby that he was represented by another counsel on crucial date, thus, Banking Court could not proceed against him---Petition contained objection against auction conducted by Auctioneer, decision whereof was necessary---Judgment-debtor on technical ground could not be deprived of an opportunity to represent his case before Banking Court---High Court set aside impugned order and directed Banking Court to decide objection petition within specified time.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.7 of 2006, decision dated: 18-05-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATTAULLAH KHAN, J",
    "": "Sheikh SALAHUDDIN\nvs\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12409",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1934 = 2011 SLD 1934 = 2011 CLD 883",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 19---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property---Petitioners neither were defendants in the suit filed by the Bank nor they were mortgagers, but were owners of the property which was sold in execution of decree obtained by Bank against ­ debtors---One of the petitioners deposited amount in court to defray the costs of auction and to cover the amount at which the mortgaged property was auctioned---Auction of property in question, otherwise was vitiated because the auction-purchaser had failed to make payment of balance amount within stipulated period---Leave to appeal was granted to consider said aspects of the case---Since a short question was involved, the office was directed to fix the appeals for hearing.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 1171-L and 1172-L of 2009, decision dated: 20-04-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": ", JUSTICE, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "Ms. KAUSER PERVEEN and another\nvs\nKASB BANK LIMITED, Lahore High Court and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12410",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1935 = 2011 SLD 1935 = 2011 CLD 790",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Leave to defend the suit---Banking Court---Responsibility---Documents to be appreciated---Banking Court dismissed leave to defend application filed by defendants and decreed the suit in favour of bank---Plea raised by defendants was that besides raising various preliminary objections, they had also framed questions of law but Banking Court without appreciating the same dismissed leave to defend the suit application--Validity-While deciding leave to defend application, heavy responsibility rested upon Banking Court to appreciate not only the contents of plaint but also leave to defend application and replication, if any filed---In order to pass a speaking order with sound reasoning, it was necessary to look into facts of the case and also consider documents attached with plaint, leave to defend application and replication---After going through entire pleadings of parties, it was obligatory upon Banking Court to decide question of law raised in leave to defend application and not to dismiss or reject it in perfunctory and cursory manner---In banking suit it was a sole opportunity for defendants to apply for leave to defend and their entire future rested upon its decision, therefore, in all fairness defendants had legitimate right to be heard and all questions of law and facts raised in leave to defend application should be answered by Banking Court for the reason that on rejection of leave to defend, defendants were to go out of arena without any further opportunity to defend---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court against defendants and order dismissing leave to defend application could not be sustained and the same was set aside---High Court remanded the case to Banking Court to decide leave to defend application afresh in accordance with law---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nMessrs Kinza Fashion (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 2009 CLD 1440; Messrs Haq Feed Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. National Development Finance Corporation 2007 CLD 975; Habib-ur-Rehman v. Judge Banking Court No. 4 Lahore 2006 CLD 217 and Messrs Naeem Associates v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited 2004 CLD 1672 rel.\n \nMessrs Mach Knitters (Pvt.) Limited v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited 2004 CLC 53,5 and Muhammad Arshad v. Citibank N.A. Lahore 2006 SCMR 1347 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 9 of 2010, decision dated: 24-03-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SHAZ PACKAGES and 3 others\nvs\nMessrs BANK ALFALAH LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12411",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1936 = 2011 SLD 1936 = 2011 CLD 785",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2(c)(d), 7, 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of amount and damage--- \"\"Customer\"\" and \"\"Finance\"\"--- Definition---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Scope---Plaintiffs had alleged in their plaints that they were maintaining account in the defendant Bank, which account was not properly maintained and the Bank had failed to perform its liabilities; that they had deposited various amounts in cash as well as through cheques and other negotiable instruments, but Bank had failed to credit said amount in their accounts and that the Bank had illegally detained the amount and was not ready to pay it to the plaintiffs---Maintainability of suit filed by the plaintiffs was objected to by the Bank alleging that Banking Court had no jurisdiction in the matter as plaintiffs did not come within the definition of \"\"customer\"\" and their claim also did not come within the definition of 'finance\"\" as defined in S.2(c)(d) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court accepting objection of defendant Bank, returned both the plaints to the plaintiffs---Validity---Word 'customer' in S.2(c) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was limited to a person on whom finance had been extended and it included a person on whose behalf a guarantee or letter of assurance had been issued by the financial institution and person, other than defined in said section would not come within the definition of a 'customer'---Mere being an account-holder of the Bank, plaintiffs could not be considered as 'customers'; and amount allegedly deposited by the plaintiffs also would not come within the purview of finance'---Opening of an account and depositing of amount by an account-holder would not be considered as finance'---All claims relating to advancement of 'loan' or default in fulfilment of an obligation pertaining to any finance' was triable by the Banking Court---Law had not permitted any other claim to be tried by a Banking Court---Plaintiffs in the present case had claimed that they had deposited their amount with the defendant Bank, but had not been credited in their account---Claim of the plaintiffs, did not come within the jurisdiction of the Banking Court---No illegality or irregularity having been found in the impugned orders, appeals were dismissed by High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Quetta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeals Nos. 9 and 10 of 2004, decision dated: 16-03-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL AND MRS. SYEDA TAHIRA SAFDAR, JJ",
    "": "Haji DAD MUHAMMAD\nvs\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12412",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1937 = 2011 SLD 1937 = 2011 CLD 507",
    "Key Words:": "Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002-------R. 235(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition--Auction, cancellation of---Vested right---Petitioner claimed to be highest bidder and assailed the order of competent authority whereby auction was cancelled---Validity---Not only that orders passed by competent authority was in exercise of powers under R.235(2) of Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002 but also after giving opportunity to the petitioner of being heard---Fresh auction of area in question was to be held soon and petitioner would be at liberty to take part in forthcoming auction---Petitioner had no vested right for obtaining lease of area in question merely on the basis of acceptance of his highest bid vide letter issued by competent authority---Order declaring petitioner as highest bidder was already set aside by lease granting authority, therefore, High Court declined to interfere in the matter---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.13779 of 2010, decision dated: 23rd July, 2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AHMAD FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Messrs NASIR NAWAZ through Muhammad BukhsH\nvs\nASSISTANT DIRETOR, MINES AND MINERAL and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12413",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1938 = 2011 SLD 1938 = 2011 CLD 842",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XXV of 1997)-------S. 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, R.2, O.XXI, Rr.10, 89, 90 & S.48---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts.165, 166 & 181---Suit for recovery of loan---Banking Court decreed the suit directing sale of property mortgaged to plaintiff bank---Appellants/owners of the property filed objection petition which was dismissed by the executing court for being time-barred under Art.166 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Scope and application of Arts.165 & 166, Limitation Act, 1908--Appellants/ objection petitioners contended that they never mortgaged the property to the bank---Suit land was not mortgaged to bank by appellants at the time of institution of suit---Judgment-debtor did not obtain non-encumbrance certificate from Revenue Department before filing of the suit---Executing court committed glaring mistake by passing order of attachment of suit property and subsequent auction which dispossessed owners of the property---Executing court did not consider that the execution petition was time-barred---Factual controversy of limitation was decided without framing the issues and recording of evidence---Article 165 of Limitation Act, 1908 did not apply to the application filed by -debtor whereas Art.166 of Limitation Act, 1908 was applicable to application filed by -debtor as well as to an application filed by any of persons mentioned in O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90, C.P.C. for setting aside the sale within thirty days from the date of sale---Provisions of Art.181 of Limitation Act, 1908 provided for period of 3 years for filing first application for the execution of a decree---Executing court made an error by proceeding under S.22 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 which, having been promulgated after the dispute between the parties arose, could not be applied with retrospectively---Appeal was allowed---Impugned order passed by the Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to executing court for decision afresh after framing the issues and providing opportunity of hearing to the parties. \n \n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---\n \n----Arts. 165 & 166---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90---Application of provisions of Arts.165 8. 166, Limitation Act, 1908---Scope---Articles 165 & 166 of Limitation Act, 1908 differed in application---Article 165 of Limitation Act, 1908 did not apply to the application filed by -debtor whereas Art.165 of Limitation Act, 1908 was applicable to application filed by -debtor as well as to an application filed by any of persons mentioned in O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90, C.P.C. for setting aside the sale within 30 days of the date of the sale.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 35 and C.M. No. 3-C of 2006, decision dated: 2-12-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQ AND RAUF AHMAD SHAIKH, JJ",
    "": "Haji MUHAMMAD ASHIQ through Legal heirs and others\nvs\nBANK OF OMAN LTD. through A.V.P. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12414",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1939 = 2011 SLD 1939 = 2011 CLD 484",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19(3)---Civic Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.152--Amendment of decree---Mortgaged property, selling of---Banking Court decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff-bank and directed to publically auction mortgaged property and to deposit sale consideration in court---Plaint1ff-bank sought amendment of and decree on the ground that mortgaged property could be sold by bank directly---Validity---Plaintiff bank was empowered under S. 19(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, to sell mortgaged properties by public auction or by inviting sealed tenders and to appropriate the proceeds towards the total and partial satisfaction of decree with or without intervention of Banking court-Though decree provided for selling of mortgaged property by Court and depositing of its sale proceeds in Court but in view of provision of S. 19(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, plaintiff-bank could exercise its right---Plaintiff-bank did not need to obtain any order of Court or amendment in decree in that regard---Application was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-69 of 2001, decision dated: 3rd November, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED, J",
    "": "KASB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs MEKRAN FISHERIES (PVT.) LTD and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12415",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1940 = 2011 SLD 1940 = 2011 CLD 780",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit---Re-possession of vehicle---Defendant availed financial facility for purchase of vehicle but he failed to repay the financial facility---Application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed by Banking Court and suit was decreed in favour of Financial Institution---Plea raised by defendant was that Financial Institution had re-possessed the vehicle, therefore, leave to defend the suit should have been granted to him---Validity---Documents of re-possession filed by defendants together with such statement were scrutinized by Banking Court so also letter of Financial Institution showing that vehicle was not re-possessed by it---Banking Court came to conclusion that documents of re-possession were prepared for wrongful gain and vehicle had not been re-possessed by Financial Institution---Such finding of Banking Court was based upon sound reasons and therefore, the same did not call for interference by High Court---No serious and bona fide dispute of triable issue existed between the parties so as to get it resolved by recording evidence---Leave to defend the suit was rightly refused by Banking Court and suit was rightly decreed in favour of Financial Institution---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No. 34 of 2009, decision dated: 16-09-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND NISAR MUHAMMAD SHAIKH, JJ",
    "": "NOOR ISLAM and another\nvs\nMessrs CRESCENT LEASING CORPORATION LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12416",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1941 = 2011 SLD 1941 = 2011 CLD 704",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 20(4)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.489-F---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.497(5)---Dishonestly issuing a cheque---Pre-arrest bail, cancellation of--According to F.I.R. accused had availed a loan facility of Rupees twelve million from the Bank---Cheques issued by the accused towards repayment of this loan amount had been dishonoured on presentation in the Bank---Contention of the defence counsel was that the contents of the F.I.R. had depicted a matter of recovery of loan, which could be recovered by the complainant by filing a complaint under S.20 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, so no criminal case could have been registered against the accused and he had been rightly allowed pre-arrest bail---Complainant, no doubt, could file a complaint under S.20(4) of the said Ordinance, but the Bank was not debarred from getting the criminal case registered against the accused under. S.489-F, P.P.C.---Complainant had the prerogative to get redressed his grievance through efficacious and speedy remedy of his choice and no objection from the other side in this regard could be entertained---Ingredients of S.489-F, P.P.C. were fully attracted---Accused had not bothered to arrange for the return of loan according to agreement, which showed mala fides on his part---Dishonour slips issued by the Bank available on record had connected the accused with the offence---Parameters laid by Superior Courts for grant of pre-arrest bail had been ignored by trial Court---No ill-will or personal grudge on the part of the complainant or the police was pointed out on behalf of accused for his false implication in the case---Bail granted to accused was cancelled in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous No.12134-CB of 2010, decision dated: 20-12-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ AHMAD CHAUDHRY, C, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD MAZHAR IQBAL\nvs\nTHE STATE and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12417",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1942 = 2011 SLD 1942 = 2011 CLD 1062",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 7 & 22--Appellant who had defaulted in making the stipulated payment had made request simpliciter that the mark-up amount may be substantially reduced keeping in view the hardship faced by him---Validity---Whenever a person defaulted in fulfilling his legal and financial obligations, the Bank or the Financial Institution was entitled to receive and recover the amount from the person---Decisions are made by looking at the facts and circumstances of the case---Where no justifiable reason had been pointed out to disturb the order passed by the Banking Court, no relief could be granted on compassionate grounds alone. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Suit for recovery of amount---Merely for the reason that copies of power of attorney were filed subsequently by the Bank will not make the suit incompetent---Even if the plaint was not competently filed, such an anomaly could be rectified subsequently.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No. 39 of 2009, decision dated: 9-04-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ",
    "": "TAHIR ANEES\nvs\nMessrs CITI BANK N.A.\nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs ESS EMM ESS Corporation Pakistan Ltd. and 5 others 2005 CLD 854 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12418",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1943 = 2011 SLD 1943 = 2011 CLD 885",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)-------Ss. 5, 4 & 3---Admiralty suit---Short landing by vessel---Action in rem and personam---Scope---Vessel as well as owner can be joined in the proceedings---Principles.\n \nMessrs MSC Textiles (Private) Limited v. Asian Pollux and others 2007 CLD 1465 and Bangladesh Shipping Corporation v. M.V. Nedon and another PLD 1981 Kar. 246 ref.\n \n(b) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)---\n \n----S. 4---Admiralty suit---Short landing by vessel---Action in personam--Mode of exercise of jurisdiction under S.4, Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980---Scope---Precondition for invoking jurisdiction under S.4(4)(a)(b) of the Ordinance is that the person who would be liable on the claim in an action in personam, when the cause of action arose should beneficially own majority shares in the ship---Bald statement in the pleadings that the ship in question was the sister ship of offending ship or the inference that the ship was a sister ship for the reasons mentioned which were not sustainable was not sufficient to disclose a cause of action---Principles. \n \nLord Denning in I Congreso del Parlido [(1981)] 1 All Englan Law Reports 1092; M.V. Sea Success I v. Liver Pool and London Steamship Rotection and Indemnity Association Ltd. AIR 2002 Bombay 151; Messrs Maratos and Co. v. Trice Trader PLD 1989 Kar. 94; Global Tradeways Ltd. v. Tsavliris Russ (World Salvage & Towage) Limited and another 2004 YLR 2581 and V.N. Lakhani and Company v. M.V. Lakatoi Express PLD 1994 SC 894 ref.\n \n(c) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)---\n \n----Ss. 3 & 4---Admiralty suit---Short landing by vessel---Application for arrest of vessel---Plaintiff had invited attention of the court to commercial invoices, bill of ladings, survey report, dry certificate after discharging, joint dip statement and letters of Chief Officers to the Master of Ship and contended that from the perusal of the documents shown it would be seen that invoices and bill of ladings show the manifested consignment and survey report revealed the short landing; that apart from survey reports short landings were further confirmed from the letters titled as \"\"discrepancy bill of lading and ship quantity\"\" addressed to the Master of the vessel by Chief Officer of the vessel and that short landing was also established from the perusal of joint dip statement---Defendants had not denied the genuineness of the documents produced---Held, plaintiff prima facie, had made out a case for confirmation of earlier order of arrest of the vessel---Actual quantum of loss was yet to be established by the plaintiff by leading evidence but at the present stage tentative assessment of the record suggested that plaintiff had made out a case of confirmation of orders of arrest---High Court observed that if the arrested vessel was allowed to leave the limits of the court's jurisdiction without a security, the suit shall loose its utility and may not be possible to execute the decree if any passed, as by time the suit will be finalized the vessel may sink or she may be purchased by a bona fide purchaser without notice---Applications for arrest of the vessel were allowed and the interim order passed in the suit was confirmed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Adm. Suits Nos. 2, 5, 6 and 7 of 2011 and C.M.As. Nos. 5, 26, 28, 30 of 2011, decision dated: 18-02-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J",
    "": "Messrs FAISALABAD OIL REFINERY (PVT.) LTD. and others--Plaintiffs\nvs\nM.T. GALAXY and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12419",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1944 = 2011 SLD 1944 = 2011 CLD 938",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to defend suit--Appeal---Suit filed by plaintiff bank was dismissed by the Banking Court---In the present case, the entries of the statement of account, were denied and disputed by defendant/loanee from the day one---Once authenticity and correctness of statement of account was challenged, bank was required to prove entries made therein and only production of certified copies of statement of account would not absolve the bank front proving the entries so questioned---Bank had conducted the case in a very casual and careless manner and failed to prove even the existence of loan, what to talk of entries of statement of account---Bank could only succeed when the case was proved through cogent and reliable evidence in its favour---Burden of proof being on the Bank, it having failed to discharge the same, the only way, in normal course before the court was to dismiss the claim of the Bank---Plaintiff/bank had failed to prove its case through cogent and reliable evidence---Trial Court, in circumstances, had rightly dismissed the suit, which otherwise was barred by time---In absence of any misreading or non-reading of evidence on the record, impugned could not be interfered with in appeal by High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No. 49 of 2006, decision dated: 2-03-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL, J",
    "": "MCB BANK LIMITED, Peshawar High Court\nvs\nMessrs TILA FRONTIER FRUIT COMPANY and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12420",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1945 = 2011 SLD 1945 = 2011 CLD 931",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10, 11 & 27---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Suit for recovery of finance---Application for leave to defend suit---Plaintiffs claim partly admitted by defendant in such application--Acceptance of leave application by Banking Court without passing interim decree for admitted amount---Validity---When dispute between parties did not extend to whole claim of finance, then Banking Court while granting leave to defend with respect to disputed amount would be bound to pass interim decree in respect of such part of claim appeared to be payable by defendant to plaintiff-No appeal or constitutional petition against interlocutory order was provided under applicable law---High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction had power to correct wrong particularly when no efficacious remedy under applicable law was available to aggrieved party---High Court directed Banking Court to pass preliminary decree for amount admitted by defendant. \n \nSheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi and another v. Judge Banking Court and 3 others 2007 CLD 69; Trimbak Gangadhar Telang and others v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide and others AIR 1977 SC 1222; Messrs First Women Bank Limited and another v. Judge (Banking Court), Sindh High Court Karchi 2002 MLD 1655; Syed Saghir Ahmed Naqvi v. Province of Sindh and another 1996 SCMR 1165 and Abdul Majid v. Syed Muhammad Ali Shamim and 10 others 2000 SCMR 1391 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n---Art. 199---Constitutional petition against interim order not appealable under relevant statute---Maintainability---High Court had power to correct wrong particularly in case of non-availability of efficacious remedy to aggrieved person under applicable statute---Principles. \n \nKhalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore 1999 SCMR 1881 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-1716 of 2010, decision dated: 7-04-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J., AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED\nvs\nPRESIDING OFFICER, BANKING COURT NO.2, Karachi High Court and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12421",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1946 = 2011 SLD 1946 = 2011 CLD 963",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 29---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 13 & 14---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 117---Suit for recovery of Bank loan with interest on basis of foreign and decree---Validity---Plaintiff Bank having a Branch Office in foreign country was established and registered under laws of Pakistan---Defendant-guarantor was residing within jurisdiction of Banking Court-.. Relationship of customer and banker existed between parties as defendant stood guarantor for loan granted by Bank through its Branch Office in foreign country-Defendant after having been duly served had contested suit in foreign court, which granted him opportunity to defend himself through counsel---Foreign court of first instance consisting of three Judges on 26-11-2002 had passed /decree against defendant after proper trial and examining all relevant documents and evidence produced by parties and found him liable for payment of suit amount---Foreign Appellate Court consisting of six Judges after hearing defendant had dismissed his appeal on 28-11-2004, whereagainst no further appeal was filed---Bank had produced certified copies of s and decrees passed by foreign court of first instance and foreign Appellate Court with its translation---Nothing was available on record to show that foreign /decree fell within any exceptions mentioned in S. 13, C.P.C.---Such foreign / decree for being conclusive and binding on defendant could furnish cause of action and basis to Bank to maintain present suit against defendant (guarantor)---Judgment/decree of initial foreign court had merged in foreign appellate decree---Limitation of six years provided under Art. 117 of Limitation Act, 1908 for filing suit on basis of foreign would start from 28-11-2004, when defendant's appeal was dismissed by foreign Appellate Court---Present suit filed on 25-11-2010 was, thus, within time---Defendant, in the present suit was not served in person, but his service effected through publication of citations in newspapers would be deemed to be valid service---Defendant despite service had neither entered appearance nor filed application for leave to defend suit, thus, allegations of fact in plaint would be deemed to be admitted---Bank's claim with interest was supported by duly attested statements of accounts---Recovery of interest on finance was prohibited under Islamic modes of finance---Recovery of interest on foreign loans was permissible by virtue of circular No.13, dated 30-6-1984 issued by State Bank of Pakistan, Banking Control Department---Suit amount had been decreed by foreign court under its law on basis of loan agreement executed between parties, for repayment of which defendant stood guarantor---Foreign courts had passed a valid and legally enforceable s and decrees in favour of Bank and against defendant---Banking Court had jurisdiction to entertain present suit---Suit was decreed for amount finding mention in foreign s and decrees. \n \nEmirates Bank International Ltd. v. Messrs Osman Brothers and 9 others 1990 MLD 1779; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Virk House Trading Company Ltd. 2009 CLD 451; United Bank Limited v. Naeem Ullah Malik and 2 others 2009 CLD 1459; Chairman Board of Mining Examination and Chairman Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee AIR 1977 SC 965; Messrs Farm and Foods International through Attorney v. Hamid Mahmood 2006 CLC 492; Maulvi Abdul Qayyum v. Syed Ali Asghar Shah and 5 others 1992 SCMR 241; Baijnath Karnani v. Vallabhdas Damani AIR 1933 Madras 511 and Messrs Ahmad Autos and another v. A.B.L. PLD 1990 SC 497 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----Ss. 13 & 14---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 117---Suit on basis of foreign ---Execution of foreign decree---Limitation---Execution of foreign decree could not be filed in Pakistan, if same had not attained finality for being under challenge before foreign Appellate forum---Period of six years provided under Art. 117 of Limitation Act, 1908 for filing such suit on basis of foreign /decree would start running from date when such decree attained finality after dismissal of such appeal---Illustration. \n \nChairman Board of Mining Examination and Chairman Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee AIR 1977 SC 965; Messrs Farm and Foods International through Attorney v. Hamid Mahmood 2006 CLC 492 and Maulvi Abdul Qayyum v. Syed Ali Asghar Shah and 5 others 1992 SCMR 241 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 191 of 2010, decision dated: 15-03-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ UL AHSAN, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED through Authorized Attorneys--Plaintiff\nvs\nAZAM MAJEED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12422",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1947 = 2011 SLD 1947 = 2011 CLD 957",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for rendition of account---Lease agreement of vehicle, that actual price thereof at 20%, would be paid by the lessee and remaining amount was to be paid in 60 monthly instalments---Lessee was entitled to free comprehensive insurance free registration etc.-Plaintiff filed suit against the Bank when he came to know that bank had charged him for the said benefits---Suit was dismissed by the Banking Court---Validity---Documents of the bank itself denied the version of the bank---Bank had indirectly included the amount of insurance etc. amount of benefits in the instalment on one side and on the other side, referred the same to be the benefits of the package---Impugned and decree of Banking Court were set aside by High Court in appeal, and the suit of the plaint(ff was decreed holding that the bank was not entitled to recover the disputed amount. \n \nIsaac Ali Qazi for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No. 78 with C.M. No. 340 of 2009, decision dated: 22-03-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, C.J., AND MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL, J",
    "": "KHURSHID KHAN\nvs\nREGIONAL GENERAL MANAGER (OPERATION), HABIB BANK LTD. and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12423",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1948 = 2011 SLD 1948 = 2011 CLD 959",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Application for leave to defend, dismissed for non-prosecution---Effect---Application for leave to defend having been dismissed, therefore, in view of S.10(11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, suit was decreed against defendant in circumstances. \n \nAjaz Ahmed for the Plaintiff.\n \nNemo for Defendants.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-117 and C.M.As. Nos. 1090, 10290 of 2010, decision dated: 11-02-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, J",
    "": "CITIBANK N.A.--Plaintiff\nvs\nABDULLAH APPARELS (PVT.) LIMITED and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12424",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1949 = 2011 SLD 1949 = 2011 CLD 982",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9(5) & 12---Ex parte decree against principal debtor and guarantor---Guarantor's application for setting aside such decree on ground that he was not served with summons in suit; that he came to know about decree after his arrest in its execution; and that newspapers had no circulation in his area---Validity---Report in respect of summons issued through registered post and Divisional Police Officer were not available on record---Service of summons was effected upon defendants through publication in two newspapers available on record-As service was duly effected on defendants through publication, therefore, no further notice was required to be issued to them---Guarantor had not denied his address finding mention in plaint---Reports of process serving agencies on notices and warrants issued in execution proceedings showed avoidance of service by defendants---Ex parte decree was passed on 12-4-2008, whereas guarantor filed such application on 28-4-2009 after his arrest on 24-7-2009 in its execution---Guarantor had failed to appear before court' at relevant time after his service through publication-As per his admission, guarantor got knowledge of decree on 24-7-2009, when he was arrested---Guarantor had filed such application after 21 days of his arrest without giving any reason or explanation for such delay---Avoidance of service of process of court by defendants showed mala fides on their part---Nothing on record to show that Bank had committed fraud with guarantor---Guarantor had failed to approach court within provided period and establish that he was not properly served---Such application was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Quetta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. S-1 of 2009, decision dated: 24-02-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. SYEDA TAHIRA SAFDAR AND, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ALI\nvs\nBRANCH MANAGER, NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12425",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1950 = 2011 SLD 1950 = 2011 CLD 995",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVII of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10(2)---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.10(1)---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979), S.7(2)---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Appendix B, Form No.4---Suit for recovery---Single Judge of High Court dismissed defendant's application for leave to defend for being time-barred and subsequently decreed the suit---Contention of defendant was that the day on which summons was served had to be excluded while computing the period of limitation---Plaintiff contended that word 'of, and not word from' having been used in S.10(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, S.9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 was not applicable, therefore, the day of service of summons could not be excluded while computing the period of limitation---Validity---Under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 and the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, day of service of summons was excluded from consideration---Form No.4 of Appendix 'B' of the C.P.C. as adapted for use under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 required defendant to obtain leave from the court within 30 days from the service of summons---Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provided for exclusion of the first day in a series of days or any other period of time---Absence of word from' would not mean that the first day would be included---General Clauses Act, 1897 did not provide for inclusion of the first day where word 'of had been used---Inclusion or exclusion of the first day would be determined by the contents of statutory provision---Under S.10(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the day on which summons was served would be excluded---Section 9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 provided for specific form of summons which used the word from'---Section 10(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was applicable where service was effected by a summons in the form prescribed by S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Inclusion of day of service on the basis of a summons which allowed defendant to file leave to defend within 30 days from' service would be most inequitable---Conjoint reading of the provision of Ss.9(5) and 10(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 suggested that day of the service of summons had to be excluded from consideration---Section 10(2) did not expressly provide for exclusion of the day of service while computing the period of limitation---Where such inclusion could have a penalizing effect of debarring the defendant from appearing in the suit, interpretation which excluded the day of service should be preferred---Provisions relating to limitation should be construed to preserve the rights of parties unless relevant statutory language was clear and connoted only one meaning---Leave to defend was held to have been filed within time---Appeal was allowed and case was remanded to the Single Judge to be decided on merit. \n \n(b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---\n \n----S. 9---Scope of S.9, General Clauses Act, 1897---Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provided for exclusion of the first day in a series of days or any other period of time--Absence of word from' would not mean that the first day would be included---General Clauses Act, 1897 did not provide for inclusion of the first day where word 'of had been used. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVII of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10(2)---Scope and application of S.10(2), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Under S.10(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 the day on which summons was served would be excluded---Section 10(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was applicable where service was effected by a summons in the form prescribed by S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Spl. HCA No. 167 and C.M.A. No. 1598 of 2010, decision dated: 13-12-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED AND MUNIB AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SHAHI TEXTILES and 3 others\nvs\nASKARI BANK LIMITED through President"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12426",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1951 = 2011 SLD 1951 = 2011 CLD 990",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 7(2), 22 & 27---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.13---Suit for recovery of loan---Banking Court decreed the suit ex parte---Application for setting aside the ex parte decree was dismissed---Defendants contended that the Trial Court had erred in holding that the application under O.IX, R.13, C.P.C. was not maintainable in view of S.27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances), Ordinance, 2001 as said section did not bar the court to recall its own order passed on merit and that under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 procedure laid down in C.P.C. was applicable to set aside the ex parte decree, as such mandatory provision of law was ignored by the Banking Court---Validity---Defendants did not appear in the court despite service of notice, so the ex parte decree was passed by the Banking Court on merit---Judge, Banking Court having discussed merits of the case, the and decree fell within purview of final /order---Under S.22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, any person aggrieved by any , decree, sentence or final order passed by a Banking Court might, within a period of 30 days, of such , decree, sentence or final order prefer an appeal to the High Court, therefore, defendants misconstrued the provisions of S.7(2) and S.22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Under S.7(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the provisions of C.P.C. were applicable only where the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was silent and no procedure had been laid down--Application of provisions of S.7 and S.22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was to be determined by the fact whether the ex parte decree was passed before or after the filing of petition for leave to appeal---Defendants appeared and filed petition for leave to defend the suit but none of them appeared on the crucial date, hence the Judge, Banking Court decided the matter ex parte on merits---Application of defendants under O.IX, R.13, C.P.C. was rightly dismissed---Appeal was, therefore, dismissed.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---Ss. 7(2) & 22---Application of Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Scope---Under S.7(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the provisions of C.P.C. were applicable only where the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was silent and no procedure had been laid down---Application of provisions of Ss.7 and 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was to be determined by the fact whether the ex parte decree was passed before or after the filing of petition for leave to appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 92 of 2007, heard on 23rd February, 2011,",
    "Judge Name:": "SAGHEER AHMAD QADRI AND CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AGROCARE and 3 others\nvs\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12427",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1952 = 2011 SLD 1952 = 2011 CLD 1013",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 20 & 9---Default in payment of finance---Criminal complaint---Provisions of S.20 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, relating to certain offences, would be enforced by a Financial Institution against a person, who dishonestly committed a breach of terms of security documents to his advantage; and to the detriment of the Financial Institution; or who made fraudulent misrepresentation or committed a breach of an obligation; or representation made to a financial institution on the basis of which, the financial institution had granted a finance etc.---Respondents who had allegedly committed default in payment of finance; would not fall in any of the contingencies available in S.20 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Criminal complaints preferred by Bank against the respondents, were misconceived, in circumstances--Impugned order which was passed by the Banking Court in criminal case was just and proper and required no interference by High Court---Proper remedy which was available to the bank was under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which provided for institution of banking suit by bank against person who committed default in repayment of loan/finance. \n \nNemo for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Banking Appeals Nos. 1 to 7 of 2011, decision dated: 3rd February, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "AHMED ALI SHAIKH AND SALMAN HAMID, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Attorney\nvs\nSANAULLAH and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12428",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1953 = 2011 SLD 1953 = 2011 CLD 1003",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend suit, application for---Availing of finance facility and execution of documents by defendant not denied---Such application not filed in conformity with provisions of S. 10(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Filing of copy of ledger maintained by defendant containing debit and credit entries in rebuttal of statement of accounts filed by Bank showing break-up of outstanding amount---Validity---Defendant had admitted availing of loan facility and execution of documents---Defendant had not Pointed any unauthorized entry of charges in such break-up claim filed by Bank---Such break-up showed amount availed and payments made by defendant and mark-up accrued thereon---High Court dismissed leave application and decreed the suit in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-51 of 2007, decision dated: 26-01-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J",
    "": "Messrs HABIB BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs UNIVERSAL CARGO SERVICES (PVT.) LTD. and 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12429",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1954 = 2011 SLD 1954 = 2011 CLD 976",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Leave to defend suit, application for---Loan obtained from Bank 'P' having merged into another Bank 'A' which also merged in another Bank 'S' (plaintiff Bank)---Suit filed by plaintiff through a person holding Power of Attorney from Bank 'A'---Plea of defendant claiming to be customer of Bank 'P' that plaintiff Bank had filed suit without resolution of its Board of Directors-Validity--All liabilities, interests and accounts of Bank 'P' after its merger into Bank 'A' and then merger of Bank 'A' into plaintiff-Bank stood transferred to latter---Obligations and liabilities owned by defendant to Bank . 'P' under Finance Agreement as result of is merger into Bank 'A' and then merger of Bank 'A' into plaintiff Bank stood transferred to plaintiff Bank---Such mergers published in widely circulated newspapers had taken place with approval of State Bank and Ministry of Finance---Defendant had admitted execution of documents in favour of Bank 'P' and Bank 'A'---Payments made by defendant were not supported by documentary evidence---Defendant in leave application had not raised any substantial question of law and fact---Defendant while filing leave application had not complied with mandatory requirements of S. 10(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---High Court dismissed leave application in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-75 and C.M.A. No. 7832 of 2009, decision dated: 28-10-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MS. RUKHSANA AHMED, J",
    "": "ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND LTD. through Paper Market Road Branch, Karachi High Court--Plaintiff\nvs\nSAEED ABBAS--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12430",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1955 = 2011 SLD 1955 = 2011 CLD 1024",
    "Key Words:": "Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-------Ss. 11, 16 & 17---Prohibition of certain discharges or emissions---Violation of environmental protection order---Imposition of penalty---Respondent/accused misstated before the Tribunal many times that he had adopted remedial measures---Site Inspections were ordered to be conducted by the department several times and reports had revealed that respondent/unit consisted of one main furnace, two small heating furnaces and four moulding machines---Raw material was moulded in main furnace at 1000-1100°C---Whole process emitted fumes of diesel in the atmosphere and generated high noise, which was source of discomfort for all the inhabitants of the locality and caused serious environmental implications in thickly populated area---Night working also enhanced problems of inhabitants of the area---Respondent/unit was playing hide and seek with the Tribunal and abusing the process of law---Whenever, site inspection was ordered to be conducted by the Tribunal, respondent closed the unit to avoid the site inspection---Such behaviour had been practised by the respondent since 2006---Site inspection reports sufficiently evident that due to functioning of respondent unit, large number of inhabitants of the locality were suffering due to high noise, gaseous emissions in the locality---Site inspection reports had sufficiently connected respondent unit with commission of offence under S.11 of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997---Respondent unit had to be closed permanently to save the people from all types of environmental complications---Respondent was charged with Rs.500,000 as fine for the past pollution to be deposited within one month of passing the order---Order accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Environmental Tribunal, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Complaint No. 118 of 2009 and Private Complaint No. 58 of 2007, decision dated: 27-01-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHAWAJA MUHAMMAD AFZAL (CHAIRPERSON), CH. KHALIL (MEMBER TECH.) AND MS. GULZAR BUTT (MEMBER LEGAL)",
    "": "DG EPAComplainant\nvs\nQASIM GLASS BOTTLES"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12431",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1956 = 2011 SLD 1956 = 2011 CLD 1018",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 3, 17 & 22---Companies Ordinance, (XLVII of 1984), S. 290--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Order of High Court dated 18-4-2001 passed in liquidation proceedings to wind up plaintiff Bank for being unable to pay its debts---Subsequent suits filed by plaintiff--Bank in year 2000 for recovery of finance availed by petitioners/mortgagors--Non-filing of appeal against decrees dated 2-12-2002 and 13-2-2008 passed against petitioners by Banking Court---Statement filed before Liquidator by plaintiff Bank showing its cost of funds fixed by State Bank of Pakistan w.e.f. 31-8-2001 on basis of annual financial statement for year 2007---Petitioners plea that State Bank had acted illegally and in excess of jurisdiction in fixing such cost of funds of plaintiff having retrospective effect from year 1999 in absence of its annual audited accounts of each year since promulgation of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 on 31-8-2001---Validity---Bank after passing order of its winding up had filed suits against petitioners and consequent thereto two decrees had been passed against them on 2-12-2002 and 28-5-2003---Decree dated 28-5-2003 was later on modified on 13-2-2008 with cosent of parties allowing cost of funds to plaintiff from the date of promulgation of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 till realization of decretal amount---Petitioners despite having an alternative and efficacious remedy under law had not challenged such decrees or orders before competent forum---Allegations levelled against Bank would require recording of evidence, which could not be done in Constitutional jurisdiction---State Bank had not committed any illegality in calculating cost of funds of plaintiff Bank on basis of its last available audited accounts for year 2007 as plaintiff was under liquidation since year 2000---Petitioner had no case on merits---High Court dismissed constitutional petition for being not maintainable in circumstances. \n \nWealth Tax Officer and another v. Shaukat Afzal and 4 others 1993 SCMR 1810 rel.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional petition containing allegations requiring recording of evidence---Maintainability---Such controversy could not be entertained in Constitutional jurisdiction for its scope being very limited.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-2389 and Miscellaneous No.11961 of 2009, decision dated: 10-05-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, C.J. AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, J",
    "": "Mst. SAFIA BEGUM through Attorney and 2 others\nvs\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN through Governor and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12432",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1957 = 2011 SLD 1957 = 2011 CLD 1073",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S. 224---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33---Involvement of officer of the company in `insider trading'---Imposition of penalty---Appellant who was employed with the company as Fund Manager, was also acting as Manager, Equity Trading Department; and member of the Investment Committee of the company---Appellant was also involved in decision making with respect to day, to day investments of the funds of the company---On perusal of the trading data of Stock Exchange for the period under review, it transpired that the appellant traded in his personal capacity through another company and his trading concentrated in the same shares in which the funds had traded---Appellant traded in a manner, whereby, the appellant bought shares at a lower rate prior to initiation of buying activity of the funds and sold his shares once the price appreciated resulting from the purchases made by the funds---Authority passed impugned order and imposed a penalty of Rs.357,592 being an amount equivalent to the gain made based on inside information and further directed the appellant to surrender said amount being the amount of profit realized by the appellant---Appellant failed to abide by the policy of the company for trading of shares in personal capacity; he failed to obtain prior permission of the company before trading in the securities and was required to trade through company, whereas he traded through other company, which was again a clear violation of the policies---Appellant having been established to be involved in \"\"insider trading\"\", question as to whether or not the appellant was front running, did not arise---Impugned order of imposition of penalty and surrender of amount of profit realized by appellant was not interfered with in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No. 5 of 2010, decision dated: 1st June, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI, CHAIRMAN AND TAHIR MEHMOOD, COMMISSIONER, (CLD)",
    "": "SALMAN ALI HUSSAIN\nvs"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12433",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1958 = 2011 SLD 1958 = 2011 CLD 1144",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 19 & Art. 50---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Limitation---Loan amount being payable in instalments by defendant---Statement of accounts showing last deposit of instalment by defendant on 19-3-2005---Suit filed on 14-11-2008 for recovery of outstanding dues dismissed by Banking Court for being time barred---Plaintiffs plea that through letter dated 19-7-2006 filed along with plaint, defendant had acknowledged his liability by stating that he would clear plaintiffs dues by selling merchandise, thus, such letter amounted to acknowledgement in terms of S. 19 of Limitation Act, 1908, and suit filed within three years thereof was within time---Validity---Relationship of banker and customer existed between the parties---Defendant in said letter, had not only admitted to have obtained finance facility, but had undertaken to clear outstanding dues by selling merchandise---Such letter was an acknowledgement of his liability by defendant towards plaintiff giving rise to fresh period of limitation in terms of S. 19 of Limitation Act, 1908---Suit was not time barred---Impugned order suffered from grave misreading of record---High Court set aside impugned order and remanded case to Banking Court for its decision afresh. \n \nHukumat Sing Kundanmal v. Nenumal Bejhumal AIR 1928 Sind 45; United Bank Limited, Stock Exchange Branch, Lahore v. S. Khalid Hakeem 2002 CLD 1275; Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Limited v. Arif Noor 2009 CLD 1428; Sualeh Sons (Private) Limited v. Karachi Development Authority 1997 CLC 893; Behlol v. Quetta Municipal Corporation 1997 SCMR 536 and Syed Muhammad Rafiq Shah v. Syed Fida Hussain Shah 2003 MLD 966 ref.\n \nHarchandrai v. The Popular Metal Works, Gujranwala and 2 others PLD 1971 Kar. 925 and Pakistan v. Messrs Ameejee Valeejee and sons and another PLD 1978 Kar. 244 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 4 of 2010, decision dated: 21st April, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED AND SHAHID ANWAR BAJWA, JJ",
    "": "S.M.E., LEASING LIMITED\nvs\nMessrs UMAR KNITTING and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12434",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1959 = 2011 SLD 1959 = 2011 CLD 1080",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S. 4---Suit for recovery of loan--Application for leave to defend suit---Defendant/loanee, having failed to repay amount advanced to him, the plaintiff bank filed suit for recovery of loan against the defendant---Application filed by the defendant to defend suit was dismissed and suit was decreed---Main argument of the defendant was that impugned and decree had been passed on the basis of photo copy of the documents with regard to the reconstruction of loan and original documents were not produced---Counsel for defendant had not disputed the amount of loan---Bank, no doubt was under legal obligation to produce the original documents---Statement of amount in question, certified under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 was annexed by the bank with the plaint---No objection with regard to the said statement had been raised by the defendant; nor it was disputed that said amount was not borrowed by the defendant---Suit, in circumstances, was rightly decreed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 394 of 2009 and F.A.O. No. 228 of 2010, heard on 2-11-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "IQBAL HAMEED UR REHMAN AND TARIQ, JAVAID, JJ",
    "": "Messrs CHAUDHRY TEX through Proprietor and 2 others\nvs\nHABIB BANK LTD. through Branch Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12435",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1960 = 2011 SLD 1960 = 2011 CLD 1721",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9(5) & 10---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Delay in filing application for leave to defend---Application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay---Defendant's plea that on 1-11-2010, guard of his factory had informed him about Bailiff of High Court to have brought summons of suit, which he refused to collect, where after he rushed to court and obtained copies of pleadings; that he was served through publication of summons in newspaper on 23-10-2010 and filed leave application on 29-11-2010---­Validity---According to S. 9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, service of summons on defendant, if effected by any one of the modes prescribed therein, would be deemed to be valid service---Defendant had neither denied his service on 23-10-2010 through publication nor alleged same to be invalid---Neither choice of defendant would prevail nor would he be allowed to decide as to which mode of service be held to be good out of four prescribed modes---Defendant, despite his service through publication had filed leave application beyond prescribed period of limitation---High Court dismissed leave application for being time-barred.\n Sitara Rice Trading and another v. UBL and another 2011 CLD 254; Axle Products Limited v. ABL 2009 CLD 836; Haji Muhammad Yaqoob Akhtar v. HBL and others 2009 CLD 1699; Nazir Hussain and another v. Bank of Punjab through Manager 2007 CLD 687; Hussan Ara and 8 others v. Bank of Punjab through Manager 2006 CLD 1502; Monazam Bibi and 2 others v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. through Branch Manager 2006 CLD 836; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Muslim Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 others 2011 CLD 393; Simnwa Polypropylene (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. NBP 2002 SCMR 476; Arshad Ahmed and 2 others v. Trust Commercial Bank Ltd. through Manager 2005 CLD 1705 and Khawaja Muhammad Bilal v. Union Bank Ltd. through Branch Manager 2004 CLD 1555 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-154 and C.M.As. Nos. 13145, 13146 of 2010, decision dated: 2-05-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SALMAN HAMID, J",
    "": "MY BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs MUSLIM COTTON MILLS (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12436",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1961 = 2011 SLD 1961 = 2011 CLD 1192",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 37 & 38---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33---Rectification of name of company---Petition was filed for cancellation of the certificate of incorporation of the company, alleging that the complainant group was well known industrial group established in 1960 which adopted the trademark 'Adamjee\"\" and since then it had extensively and continuously been used for all its services and products in Pakistan---Joint Registrar of Companies after hearing the parties, found that the company had contravened S.37 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984; and directed the company to change its name within 30 days of the date of the direction---Company had preferred appeal against impugned order---Section 38 of the Companies Ordinance had empowered the Registrar Companies for issuance of direction within three years of incorporation of a company registered through inadvertence or otherwise with the name which was in contravention of S.37 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Direction to change the company's name, having been given by' the Registrar within prescribed period of three years, impugned order could not be interfered with.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No. 52 of 2011, decision dated: 14-07-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI, CHAIRMAN AND TAHIR MAHMOOD, COMMISSIONER (CLD)",
    "": "KHUSHI MUHAMMAD, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF ADAM JEE PLASTIC INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED\nvs\nJOINT REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES (CRO, FAISALABAD)"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12437",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1962 = 2011 SLD 1962 = 2011 CLD 1072",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of damages by customer---Application for grant of leave to defend suit by Bank---Bank's plea that claimed damages could not be granted without recording evidence of parties---Validity---High Court with parties' consent granted such application unconditionally.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-143 of 2009, decision dated: 15-12-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J",
    "": "Mirza GHULAM MUJTABA and another--Plaintiffs\nvs\nKASB BANK LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12438",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1963 = 2011 SLD 1963 = 2011 CLD 1361",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of Bank loan---Leave to defend suit, application for---Denial of principal debtor and guarantors to have availed loan and executed documents in favour of Bank and contention that documents of title in possession of Bank were handed over as a trust just to show their financial status; and that at relevant time guarantors being foreign nationals were not present in Pakistan---Proof---Record showed that principal debtor after having availed loan had requested for its enhancement, which was granted against mortgage of property owned by him and guarantors---Guarantors along with leave application had not attached any document to show their absence from Pakistan at time of execution of disputed documents---Signatures of defendants on disputed documents produced by Bank did tally with their signatures appearing on leave application and were genuine---Loan was initially sanctioned in year 1998 and was enhanced in years 1999 and 2000, but defendants had not bothered to know about status of their property till filing of suit against them in year 2006---Guarantors had not denied being directors of principal debtor-company, which was granted loan---Defendants being close relatives had tried to swallow loan amount availed by them---Defendants had not shown as to for what purpose their financial status was shown to the Bank---Defendants had admitted to having business relations with Bank for last twenty years---Preparation of forged documents by Bank was not possible as same would not only entail penal action against delinquents, but reputation of Bank as a whole would be at stake---Documents tendered by defendants at different times would speak volumes about fact that principal debtor had availed loan, while remaining defendants being directors stood guarantors against such loan---Bank had explained entries in statement of accounts, according to which suit amount was outstanding against defendants---Defendants had not denied that amount claimed by Bank had never been credited in account of principal debtor, which fact alone was sufficient to determine their liability--- Suit was decreed in circumstances.\n \n Mst. Akhtar Begum v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 2009 SCMR 264 and Mst. Riffat Jehan and another v. Habib Bank Limited and 10 others 2005 CLD 941 ref.\n \n(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Art. 59---Handwriting expert, opinion of---Evidentiary value---Not necessary for court to send matter to handwriting expert in every case---Court in case of ambiguity could refer matter to expert for opinion---Prerogative of court either to send matter to handwriting expert or form an opinion after bare perusal of disputed material---Such opinion could not be conclusive unless same found support from relevant documents.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XIII, R.4---Documents exhibited in evidence or not---Validity---Court had power to consider all such documents to arrive at a just conclusion.\n \n(d) Administration of justice---\n \n----Technicalities cannot be allowed to impede way of substantive justice; rather same should be ignored while determining rights of parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No. 367 of 2006, heard on 26-05-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ AHMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J. AND MAZHAR IQBAL SIDHU, J",
    "": "Sheikh MUHAMMAD AZIM and another\nvs\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12439",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1964 = 2011 SLD 1964 = 2011 CLD 1485",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 263, 265, 290, 305 & 309---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 151---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33---Investigation of company's affairs on application by members---Petitioner being Chairman of company alleged that in his absence from country, respondent Directors had not only transferred huge amount from company's account to their personal accounts, but had maintained duplicate/bogus and unofficial accounts; and that due to respondents' inefficiency, business had suffered huge loss---Petitioner's application under S. 151, C.P.C., with prayer to appoint Chartered Accountant to inspect accounts of company since year 2007 onwards---Order of High Court directing Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan to appoint Chartered Accountant as Inspector to investigate affairs of company since year 2007---Validity---Shareholders of company had a legal right to know about affairs of company for they being its stakeholders---Petitioner being Chairman and having 22% shareholding of company had right to know about it and its financial status and enquire from other shareholders about its financial status--- Allegations levelled against respondents of misappropriation and manipulation could be determined on basis of documents, which required a thorough investigation into financial affairs of company---Such investigation could be done by appointing a person having sound knowledge of subject to dig out true affairs of company---Appointment of Inspector in such circumstances was necessary for ends of justice---Court under S. 151, C.P.C., had power to pass such orders, which would be necessary to meet ends of justice---Where court was satisfied that prima facie case was made out, then discretion vested with court to give directions for appointment of an Inspector or not---Such exercise of jurisdiction would not be open to any exception--- Both, parties would have fair chance to repel allegations levelled against each other with help of documents---High Court dismissed appeal and maintained impugned order in circumstance.\n Nadar Press Ltd. v. N.P.S.N. Ramiah Nadar and others (1968) 38 Comp. Cases 337 (Mad.); Service Industries Textiles Ltd. v. SECP and others 2000 MLD 1880; Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal AIR 1969 SC 707; Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd. [(1975) 45 Comp. Cases 33 (Del.)]; V.J. Thomas Vettom v. Kuttanad Rubber Co. Ltd. (1984) 56 Comp. Cases 284 (Ker.); Fazal Din and others v. Milkha Singh AIR 1933 Lah. 193; Secretary to Govt. (West Pakistan) and others v. Abdul Kafil PLD 1978 SC 242; Muhammad Iqbal v. Riaz Sabir 1984 CLC 2375; Progressive Consultants (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Corporate Law Authority and others 2002 CLD 726; Alembic Glass Industries' case [(1972) 42 Comp. Cases 63 (Guj.)]; 2003 YLR 2150; Ejaz Siddiqui v. Kaneez Begum 1992 CLC 1658; (1983) 54 Comp. Cases 368; Diamond Industries Limited v. Appellate Bench of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 2002 CLD 1714; Sardar Khan Niazi v. Barex Lahore Ltd. 2005 CLD 1670; Brothers Steel Ltd. v. Mirajuddin PLD 1995 SC 320; Attock Refinery Ltd. v. Executive Director, Enforcement and Monitoring Division, SECP 2010 CLD 774; Qamar Loan v. Kashmirian (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 1997 Kar. 376; Muhammad Shabbir Khan v. Muhammad Anwar 1988 CLC 1955; Amina Begum v. Ghulam Dastagir PLD 1978 SC 220 and Safia Bibi v. Aisha Bibi 1982 SCMR 494 ref.\n Government of Sindh v. Sirtaj Bibi PLD 2001 Kar. 442 and Brothers Steel Ltd. and others v. Mian Mirajuddin and 15 others PLD 1995 SC 320 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 151---Inherent powers of court---Scope.\n Section 151, C.P.C., signifies inherent powers to a court in order to do complete administration of justice to pass such orders as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice. The courts are empowered under the said Section to pass such orders, which are necessary to do substantial justice between the parties, subject to the condition that court is not to act upon something which is specifically prohibited by express words in this regard. The words \"\"as may be necessary for ends of justice\"\" used in the said Section are quite significant and empower the court to such orders as may be necessary for ends of justice. \n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 265---Appointment of Inspector to investigate affairs of company---Jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Where court was satisfied that prima facie case was made out, then discretion rested with court could be exercised to give directions for appointment of Inspector---Such exercise of jurisdiction would not be open to any exception.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 195 of 2010 and C.M.A. No. 723, J.M. No. 30 of 2009, decision dated: 13-06-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ",
    "": "LIGHT METAL AND RUBBER INDUSTRIES (PRIVATE) LIMITED and others\nvs\nSARFRAZ QAUDRI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12440",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1965 = 2011 SLD 1965 = 2011 CLD 1504",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1968)-------Ss. 15-A, 15-B, 15-C & 15-E---Insider trading by virtue of the material \"\"inside information\"\" relating to shares of the company---Board of Trustees of the Company's Funds, delegated certain powers to an Investment Advisory Committee---Said Committee delegated the powers to make investment regarding investment in listed equities to the Treasury Manager of the company; and authorized him to issue instructions to the Stock Brokers---Treasury Manager was primarily responsible for taking all the investments decisions of the Funds---After share price was increased significantly, Treasury Manager, while using his position as trustee, sold his almost entire holding to the Fund and realized gain and it was prima facie established that he was involved in \"\"Insider trading\"\" by virtue of the material 'inside information' relating to the shares of the company---Prima facie it was established that father of the Treasury Manager also traded in the shares of the company based on information of declaration of interim cash dividend---Treasury Manager after having purchased shares of the company, then sold those to Funds, thereby realizing personal gains in a short period of time---Claim of Treasury Manager with respect to bona fide investment decision was not true; he fell within the scope and meaning of 'insider' and information possessed only by him to invest in the shares of the company was 'inside information'--- Fine of Rs. 200,000 was imposed on the Manager for contravention of subsection (1) of S.5-A of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No. MSW/SMD-SOUTH/2011/150 of 2011, decision dated: 16-06-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR (SMD)",
    "": "JAWAD AHMED, TREASURY MANAGER, TREET CORPORATION LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12441",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1966 = 2011 SLD 1966 = 2011 CLD 1647",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 158, 233, 282-J, M & 476---Non-Banking Finance Companies (Establishment and Regulations) Rules, 2003, R.7(1)(db)---Failure to hold Annual General Meeting and to submit Annual account and balance-sheet---Company had failed to hold Annual General Meeting for relevant year, even within extended time; and Directors of the company had also failed to lay before the company in Annual General Meeting a balance-sheet and profit and loss account for relevant year, within stipulated period---Reasons put forth by the authorized representative of the company, did not carry merit and did not justify the default---Directors of the company were responsible to hold timely Annual General Meeting for providing timely information to its shareholders in order to enable them to consider and approve the significant matters like approval of accounts, appointment of auditors, election of Directors, performance of the company and other important issues relating to the company---Past record of the company revealed that the management of the company had committed such defaults in the past as well---Directors of the company had admitted their failure to fulfil the responsibility entrusted to them in the Companies Ordinance, 1984 with respect to presenting the financial statements of the company and holding Annual General Meeting for the approval of financial statements within the stipulated period---Since the company and its Directors had been penalized on similar non-compliance in the past, company and its Directors needed to take all the steps necessary to eliminate inefficiencies in the system that prevented the company from presenting the financial statements and holding Annual General Meetings on time---Explanations with regard to company's failure to furnish copy of its Annual report and other financial statements of the company to the Commission within the prescribed time as required under R.7(1)(db) of Non-Banking Finance Companies (Establishment and Regulations) Rules, 2003, did not prove that failure or contravention or default took place or was committed without the Directors' knowledge---Commission, in exercise of powers conferred in terms of S.158(4), read with S.476 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, imposed penalty of Rs.50,000 on the Chief Executive and every Director of the company, and in exercise of the powers under S.282-J of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, imposed fine of Rs.100,000 on the company Chief Executive and every Director for contravention of R.7(1)(db) of Non-Banking Finance Companies (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No. SCD-SD(Enf)/TRG/2011/136, dated 2-05-2011, decision dated: 10-08-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID NASIM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR",
    "": "Messrs TRG PAKISTAN LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12442",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1967 = 2011 SLD 1967 = 2011 CLD 1530",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S. 16---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R. 58---Execution of decree obtained by Bank against debtor--- Objection petition--- Objector a Modaraba Company seeking possession of leased machinery lying in factory of debtor on basis of money decree obtained from Modaraba Tribunal after getting permission to sell same without intervention of Tribunal---Objector claimed to have made payments of Letters of Credit opened by debtor for importing such machinery---Validity---Agreement and mortgage deeds produced by Bank did not mention/specific description of machinery claimed by objector---­Objector had produced cheques to prove payments made against Letters of Credits opened by debtor for importing such machinery---Judgment of Modaraba Tribunal had attained finality for not challenged in appeal by debtor---Plaint in suit filed by objector in Modaraba Tribunal disclosed details of machinery imported by debtor and lease agreement executed in favour of objector for such machinery---Bank had failed to prove any lien/charge over such machinery, which belonged to the objector---High Court accepted objection petition in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution No. 93 of 2000 and C.M.A. No.2285 of 2001, decision dated: 23rd May, 2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, J",
    "": "vs\nMessrs NUSRAT TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED and othersJudgment Debtor"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12443",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1968 = 2011 SLD 1968 = 2011 CLD 53",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)------S.245---Failure to prepare and transmit quarterly account Imposition of penalty--In terms of the provisions of S.245 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 company was required to prepare and transmit to the members, Registrar and the Commission its quarterly accounts within prescribed period, but company had failed to file said quarterly account-Authorized Representative who appeared on behalf of all the Directors, admitted the default, he, however, contended that the company had suffered heavy losses which had forced the management to suspend its operations and lay off factory and head office staff---Closure of factory of the company was not a cogent reason for ;non-submission of quarterly accounts to the shareholders; in such circumstances it became more important for the shareholders that they receive timely information about the affairs of the company---Directors were duty bound to ensure compliance with all the statutory requirements and were responsible for timely preparation and circulation of quarterly accounts to its members, Registrar and Commission---In the present case directors who had failed to do so, had deprived the shareholders of the statutory right to receive the quarterly accounts in time---Default though was established, but keeping in view the fact that the company had filed said quarterly accounts though with delay, lenient view was taken in the matter and instead of imposing maximum fine of Rs.100,000 on every Director, fine of Rs.100,000 was imposed on Chief Executive of the company under subsection (3) of S.245 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984-Other Directors were strictly warned to be careful in future. \n \nM. Javed Panni/Authorized Representative) Present.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/Enf-II/18/2008, dated 8-08-2008, decision dated: 15-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "TAHIR MAHMOOD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "Messrs S.G. POWER LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12444",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2605 = 2010 SLD 2605 = 2010 CLD 53",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)------S.245---Failure to prepare and transmit quarterly account Imposition of penalty--In terms of the provisions of S.245 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 company was required to prepare and transmit to the members, Registrar and the Commission its quarterly accounts within prescribed period, but company had failed to file said quarterly account-Authorized Representative who appeared on behalf of all the Directors, admitted the default, he, however, contended that the company had suffered heavy losses which had forced the management to suspend its operations and lay off factory and head office staff---Closure of factory of the company was not a cogent reason for ;non-submission of quarterly accounts to the shareholders; in such circumstances it became more important for the shareholders that they receive timely information about the affairs of the company---Directors were duty bound to ensure compliance with all the statutory requirements and were responsible for timely preparation and circulation of quarterly accounts to its members, Registrar and Commission---In the present case directors who had failed to do so, had deprived the shareholders of the statutory right to receive the quarterly accounts in time---Default though was established, but keeping in view the fact that the company had filed said quarterly accounts though with delay, lenient view was taken in the matter and instead of imposing maximum fine of Rs.100,000 on every Director, fine of Rs.100,000 was imposed on Chief Executive of the company under subsection (3) of S.245 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984-Other Directors were strictly warned to be careful in future. \n \nM. Javed Panni/Authorized Representative) Present.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/Enf-II/18/2008, dated 8-08-2008, decision dated: 15-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "TAHIR MAHMOOD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "Messrs S.G. POWER LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12445",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2606 = 2010 SLD 2606 = 2010 CLD 1198",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 16---Special Relief Act (1 of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal of suit---Permission to file fresh suit---Fraud with bank---Effect---Plaintiffs filed suit for declaration and rendition of accounts against bank and sought direction for filing of statement of accounts---Plea raised by bank was that plaintiffs committed fraud with bank at the time of getting finance facility---Plaintiffs sought withdrawal of suit with permission to file fresh---Validity---Plaintiffs could not be allowed to withdraw the suit simpliciter when fraud had been alleged to have been committed by plaintiffs---Suit of plaintiffs could not proceed, therefore, High Court declined to grant permission to withdraw that same---Suit was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nHaji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979 and Mst. Zahida Sattar and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2002 SC 408 fol.\n \nPakistan Lawyers Forum v. General Pervaiz Musharaf and others 2000 SCMR 897; Tariq Mohsin Siddiqui and 2 others v. The State through National Accountability Bureau 2005 MLD 1827 and Kulsoom and another v. Trustees of Port of Karachi through Chairman K.P.T. Karachi and 2 others 2002 SCMR 718 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.37 and C.M.No.357 of 2010, decision dated: 29-06-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, J",
    "": "HARRIS STEEL INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and another--Plaintiff\nvs\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Manager--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12446",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2607 = 2010 SLD 2607 = 2010 CLD 56",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)------S.208--Making investment in associated companies or associated undertakings unauthorizedly---Imposition of penalty--Company had given abnormal trade credit to its associate without the authority of a special resolution and without any return, which was in contravention to the provisions of S.208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984-Provisions of S.208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 having been violated, the Directors of the company were liable for the penalty as defined in subsection (3) of S.208 of the Ordinance--However, keeping in view the fact that the debt had been recovered by the company, lenient view had been taken and instead of imposing a maximum fine of Rs. ten million on each Director, fine of Rs.100,000 was imposed on each Director.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No. EMD/233/404/2002-2494-2500, dated 26-03-2009, decision dated: 6-07-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "TAHIR MAHMOOD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "KOHINOOR POWER COMPANY LTD.: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12447",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2608 = 2010 SLD 2608 = 2010 CLD 1171",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------S. 123-Widow of insured person filed application before Insurance Tribunal urging that her husband was policy holder for a sum of Rs.100,000 on non-medical grounds which Insurance Company had issued in his favour without medical examination--Insurance company contested application on the ground that insurance policy was obtained by misrepresentation and by suppression of facts by the policy holder---Insurance Tribunal dismissed application of the widow-Validity---Contention that insurance policy of deceased husband of the applicant was repudiated, was not supported by lawful repudiation order as no such order had been produced during trial of the application Insurance Company's witness did not produce any written report of his investigation and stated in the examination-in-chief that deceased remained under treatment in the hospital-In absence of any written report or of any record of the hospital, Insurance Company could not establish the' alleged fraudulent conduct or concealment of some facts prior to purchasing of insurance policy by the deceased-Company's witness did not even allege any misrepresentation having been made by policy-holder before purchasing insurance policy--High Court accepted the appeal and set aside impugned and directed the Insurance Company to make payment under insurance policy to the applicant. \n \n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)---\n \n----S. 123---Insurance claim---Application for---Plea of Insurance company that application was time-barred--Insurance Tribunal dismissed application for recovery of insurance claim---Validity---Contention that such appli­cation was time-barred was repelled as only upon the constitution of the Insurance Tribunal under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, the right to keep remedy, by invoking the powers of the Tribunal, could be availed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.440 of 2007, heard on 7-07-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR SAEED SHEIKH AND MIAN SHAHID IQBAL, JJ",
    "": "Mst. FATIMA BEGUM \nvs\nSTATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12448",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2609 = 2010 SLD 2609 = 2010 CLD 408",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 188, 189, 193, 208, 214, 215, 216 & 217---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997), S.33---Investments in associated companies and undertakings--Disclosure of interest by Directors of company---Declaring a Director to be lacking fiduciary behavior---Imposition of penalty---Appeal to the Appellate Bench of the Commission---Examination of annual accounts of the company of which appellants were Directors showed that short term borrowings including bank credit facilities had been transferred by Associated Companies to the company of the Directors---Said associated company suffered a severe set back with respect to its business venture, which caused severe liquidity crunch and said associated company and Directors of the appellant/Company were unable to pay back their loans to various banks---Two companies had entered into a conveyance through which the loan liability was transferred from associated company to the company for consideration, including quota for exports of textile products, margin of trading business transfer and good-will etc.---Commission issued show-cause notice to six Directors of the company under provisions of Ss.193(1), 214, 215(1), 216 & 217 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, to which reply was submitted---Authorities decided to proceed on the basis of the record since, appellants/Director's counsel failed to appeal before the authority despite numerous opportunities having been afforded to him---Authority passed impugned order imposing penalties on appellants/Directors of the company---Contravention of the appellants came to light on examination of annual accounts of their company and the Commission took the action in the best interest of the shareholders and the creditors of the company---Commission was duty bound to protect the interest of the investors and in the present case rightly issued show-cause notice without any complaint from the shareholders or the creditors---Appellants holding common directorship on the Board of Directors of the company, had acted in their personal interest and transferred the liability of bank loan from associated company to the company, which was a public limited company to the detriment of the shareholders of the company without adequate and reliable consideration---Appellants had acted in violation of Ss.193, 214 & 216 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Impugned order could not be interfered with, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No. 28 of 2007, decision dated: 12-11-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SOHAIL DAYALA, COMMISSIONER (SMD) AND S. TARIQ ASAF HUSSAIN, COMMISSIONER (LD).",
    "": "JAHANGIR ELAHI and 4 others\nvs\nEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12449",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2610 = 2010 SLD 2610 = 2010 CLD 49",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.235 & 476--Transferring incremental depreciation from surplus on revaluation of fixed assets account to un-­appropriated profit--Imposition of penalty---Company had been transferring the incremental depreciation from surplus on revaluation of fixed assets account to un-­appropriated profit/accumulated loss through profit and loss account in contravention of S.235 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Explanation furnished on part of the company was not found satisfactory and case was fixed for hearing and on date of hearing Chief Executive appeared and he referred to the written submissions and stated that in his opinion the treatment adopted by the company did not affect the true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company---Chief Executive further argued that proper disclosure had been .made in the accounts; and the company had not tried to conceal any thing from the shareholders, he however admitted non-compliance with the requirements of S.235 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and assured to rectify the default in financial statements of the company---Default was established, however, in view of assurance given by the Chief Executive for future compliance, taking lenient view, instead of imposing a maximum penalty of Rs.20,000 on each Director, imposed a fine of Rs.10,000 on the Chief Executive of the company only for the said default---Other Directors were strictly warned to be careful in future.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/233/269/2002-3091, dated 7-05-2009, decision dated: 26-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI AZEEM IKRAM, DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "MIAN TEXTILE INDUSTRIES LTD.: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12450",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2611 = 2010 SLD 2611 = 2010 CLD 60",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 227, 229, 476 & 495---Failure to transfer provident fund contribution to provident fund trust---Imposition of penalty---Company, in terms of the provisions of S.227 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, was required to pay the provident fund contributions to provident fund trust within 15 days of collection---Company was also required under order of the Commission to repay its past liabilities towards provident fund trust; but had failed to do so-Chief Financial Officer, who was Authorized Representative of the company appeared and stated that default was not intentional; but an outcome of poor financial position of the company; he however assured that the management of the company was very serious about payment of company's liabilities towards the provident fund trust; he requested that time should be allowed to the company---Amounts collected from employees as contributions to a provident fund constituted by the company were in the nature of trust money in the hands of a company and same must be paid to the trustees within stipulated time---Provisions of S.227 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 were meant to protect the funds of the employees by obligating company/trustees to deposit contributions in the safe/secured modes of investment/deposits permitted thereunder---Compliance with the said provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984 also became important due to the fact that such amounts were unsecured and in case a company would go insolvent the employees would be the worst victims---Companies, in circumstances could not be allowed to withhold such money on any pretext whatsoever and any default in that regard could not be ignored---Directors of the company had failed to comply with the requirements of S.227 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 by failing to pay the provident fund contribution in the manner prescribed thereunder---Directors of the Company had also failed to ensure compliance with the order of the Commission---Directors, in circumstances, had made themselves liable for action under S.229 and S.495(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984--Nevertheless, considering company's financial condition as well as commitment for future compliance, lenient view was taken and instead of imposing maximum fine, less penalties were imposed accordingly on the Directors.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No. EMD/233/373/2002-3094, dated 8-05-2009, decision dated: 13-08-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI AZEEM IKRAM, DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "DANDOT CEMENT COMPANY LTD.: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12451",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2612 = 2010 SLD 2612 = 2010 CLD 66",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)------Ss.492, 476 & 158---False statement, penalty for---Company incorporated as public limited company made an application to the Commission in the month of October, 2008 signed by a person for extension in time for holding Annual General Meeting under S.158 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Said person in his letter dated November 27, 2008 to the Commission informed that he had resigned from the company since April, 30, 2008; and that he had not signed any document after April 30, 2008---In view of said information provided by said person who allegedly had signed application, company had prima facie made false statements regarding Company Secretary in the application, furthermore signatures of said person were also forged---Chief Executive who appeared on behalf of all the Directors of the company, admitted the default and asked for a lenient view---Company by making false statement regarding Company Secretary in the application, had contravened the provisions of S.492 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984-Default Was established, however, taking a lenient view in the matter, instead of imposing maximum fine of Rs.500,000 on every Director, penalty of Rs.200,000 was imposed only on Chief Executive of the company, while other Directors were strictly warned to be careful in future.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/233/255/2002-1364, dated 1st December, 2008, decision dated: 17-08-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "TAHIR MAHMOOD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "HAMID TEXTILE MILLS LTD.: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12452",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2613 = 2010 SLD 2613 = 2010 CLD 779",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-------Art.95---Power of attorney executed in foreign country---Power of attorney not authenticated by High Commission of Pakistan in that country---Effect---No benefit could be given to attorney thereof. \n \n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----S.42---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.54---Suit for declaration of ownership on basis of sale agreement---Validity---Such agreement itself would not create any interest or charge on property---Sale of immovable property of value of one hundred rupees and upwards could be made only by registered document---Such suit was not maintainable. \n \n(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----S.42---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.54---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss.19 & 23---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R.11---Suit for declaration of ownership on basis of sale agreement---Plea of defendant-Bank was that suit property was mortgaged with Bank and was subject-matter of decree under execution for recovery of loan amount from vendor-defendant; and that such agreement was void for being executed by vendor-defendant during pendency of execution of such decree---Validity---Vendor­ defendant had not yet cleared dues of Bank---Such agreement for being hit by provision of S.23(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was void and of no legal effect---Plaintiff had not acquired any right in suit property to maintain such suit in terms of S. 42 of Specific Relief Act, 1977---Plaint in such suit was rejected for being not maintainable.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Suit No. Nil of 2008, decision dated: 28-02-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED, J",
    "": "AZRA SAEED--Plaintiff\nvs\nRAEES KHAN through General Attorney and 5 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12453",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2614 = 2010 SLD 2614 = 2010 CLD 880",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.284 & 287---Scheme of arrangement-Petitioners arrived had sought sanctioning of a scheme of arrangement between them whereby non-listed companies, were to merge into a public limited company---Under the scheme of arrangement, the entire undertakings of non-listed companies inclusive of their assets, liabilities and obligations of every description were to be transferred to and vested in the public limited company---Public limited company, in consideration of such transfer was required to issue 60 ordinary shares of Rs.10 each to non-listed companies' share-holders for the every 100 ordinary shares of Rs.10 held by them-Official Assignee submitted report of meeting---Neither any member nor creditor of the non-listed companies or public limited company raised any objection to the sanctioning of the scheme of arrangement i.e. transfer of all assets, liabilities and obligations of non-listed companies to public limited company---None of the members or the creditors had pointed out any prejudice that could he caused to them upon sanction of the scheme of arrangement by the court and adjustment of shares of the share-holders of the non-listed companies to the extent mentioned in the scheme---Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan in its reply had also shown no reservation as to the sanctioning of the scheme of arrangement---Scheme of arrangement, as stated, was sanctioned by High Court, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J.M. No.22 of 2007, decision dated: 24-09-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB, J",
    "": "DELTA CLIMATE CONTROL AND ENGINEERING LTD. and others: In re"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12454",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2615 = 2010 SLD 2615 = 2010 CLD 1656",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10, 22 & 24---Suit for recovery of loan---Limitation---Application for leave to appear and defend suit---Lease finance from Modaraba Company---Guarantee was issued by the Bank assuring that in case of default by debtors, it would discharge the liability---Default having been committed by debtors, suit was filed against them as also the Bank/guarantor--Application for leave to appear and defend, by the Bank was dismissed by the Trial Court and suit was decreed against all the debtors including the Bank---Guarantee issued by the Bank had expired and suit as claimed was time-barred---Counsel for the Modarba Company had submitted that as per the provision of S.24 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the suit could be instituted even after the expiry of limitation, when a sufficient cause was shown---Modarba Company, in its plaint had not mentioned the circumstances constituting the sufficient cause, besides that as per the provisions of O.VII, R6, C.P.C. ground of exemption of limitation had to be mentioned in the plaint---Question of limitation was considered to be a substantial question of fact and law, entitling the defendants/ debtors to the grant of leave---Impugned and decree was set aside and case was remanded to the court below to frame appropriate issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and decide the case afresh.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 342 of 2004, decision dated: 12-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND ALI AKBAR QURESHI, JJ",
    "": "UNION BANK LTD. through Attorney\nvs\nMessrs B.R.R. INTERNATIONAL MODARABA and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12455",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1825 = 2009 SLD 1825 = 2009 CLD 1492",
    "Key Words:": "Company Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.305(e), 306(1) & 325---Companies Court Rules, 1997, R.76---Winding up of company---Petition for---Notice was ordered to be issued to the company and was restrained from alienating the substantial asset of the company till the next date of hearing---Company, however, would be at liberty to sell goods in the ordinary course of business.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Company Original No.4 and C.Ms Nos. 92, 93 and 94 of 2009, decision dated: 15-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUNIR PERACHA, J",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through AttorneY\nvs\nDEWAN SALMAN FIBRE LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12456",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1826 = 2009 SLD 1826 = 2009 CLD 1492",
    "Key Words:": "Company Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.305(e), 306(1) & 325---Companies Court Rules, 1997, R.76---Winding up of company---Petition for---Notice was ordered to be issued to the company and was restrained from alienating the substantial asset of the company till the next date of hearing---Company, however, would be at liberty to sell goods in the ordinary course of business.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Company Original No.4 and C.Ms Nos. 92, 93 and 94 of 2009, decision dated: 15-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUNIR PERACHA, J",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through AttorneY\nvs\nDEWAN SALMAN FIBRE LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12457",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1827 = 2009 SLD 1827 = 2009 CLD 80",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (IV of 1963)-------S.3---Sugar Industry, establishment of---Letter granting permission to establish Sugar Industry signed and issued by Economic Adviser under directions of competent authority---Validity---Such letter would be deemed to be an order issued by the Government. \n \n(b) Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (IV of 1963)---\n \n----S.3---Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997), Ss.12 & 16---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Sugar industry, establishment of---Prayer in constitutional petition to restrain respondent from establishing industry without permission of Provincial Government and Environment Protection Authority---Obtaining of such permission by respondent during pendency of constitutional petition---Effect---Constitutional petition for all practical purposes had become infructuous. \n \n(c) Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (IV of 1963)---\n \n----Ss.3 & 11---Sugar Industry, establishment of----Issuance of Notification dated 15-7-2005 by the Governor allowing setting up of sugar industry in the Province up to specified capacity--Issuance of letter dated 23-11-2005 by Chief Minister addressed to all DCOs imposing ban on setting up of sugar industry---Validity---Chief Minister being head of the executive could frame policies to be adopted by the Government--Any change in such policy, after its adaption by the Government, could be made through a notification to be issued by the Governor---Chief Minister by issuing such letter could not supersede notification issued by the Governor reflecting the will of Government.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3415 and C.M. No.1709 of 2006, decision dated: 10-10-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI, J",
    "": "THAL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION LIMITED through Legal ManageR\nvs\nGOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB through Chief Secretary Punjab and 11 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12458",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2738 = 2007 SLD 2738 = 2007 CLD 86",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances), Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.12---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.13 & O. VII, Rr. 1, 2---Recovery suit decreed ex parte--Application for setting aside same moved after limitation period and also not accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, was refused---Validity---Nothing was urged in application as to when the defendant had come to know of the decree in question---Mere mentioning of a date of knowledge not supported by an affidavit of other defendants was vague---Since two of the defendants had appeared before Court there was no force in the argument that defendants were not served by trial Court before passing ex parte decree---Trial Court treating the application under O.IX, R.13, C.P.C. as under S.12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 had rightly dismissed the application being barred by limitation. \n \nSaudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan and another 2003 CLD 596 and Messrs C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chairman and 5 others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal against Order No. 233 of 2005, decision dated: 13-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Mian MUHAMMAD YOUSAF and 5 others\nvs\nORIX LEASING PAKISTAN LIMITED through Chief Executive"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12459",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2739 = 2007 SLD 2739 = 2007 CLD 1459",
    "Key Words:": "Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S.25(3)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XII, R.6---Commitment to make payment---Enforceability of---Limitation---Function of public functionaries-Scope----To bring the case within the purview of S.25(3), Contract Act, 1872, it must be shown that writing signed by a debtor or his agent to pay liability, whole or in part thereof, which creditor could have enforced, but for the law of limitation in the suit---Commitment to make payment; if extended after the expiry of limitation, it would become independently enforceable---Plea of limitation in terms of S.19 of Limitation Act, 1908, in circumstances could not, be invoked to deny such right--When 'liability was not disputed then in all fairness admitted amount should have been paid, instead of engaging the claimant in undesired and lengthy litigation---By denying legitimate claim, it was not realized that execution had caused double loss; firstly to the rightful claimant; and secondly in incurring expense that was paid out of the public fund--Public functionary was always expected to resolve petty dispute, controversy and technicalities in favour of citizenry---Application under O.XII, R.6, C.P.C. stood granted with cost. \n \nRiasatullah v. The Tripura Modern Bank Ltd. PLD 1968 Dacca 260; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Shamim Qureshi PLD 1988 Kar. 481; Pervaiz Akhtar v. The Additional District Judge Rawalpindi PLD 1990 SC 681 and Minaram v. Seth Rupchand LR 33 LA. 165 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C.A. No.164 of 2006, decision dated: 16-02-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND MUHAMMAD AFZAL SOOMRO, JJ",
    "": "SOALEH MUHAMMAD and Brothers\nvs\nCANTONMENT BOARD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12460",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2740 = 2007 SLD 2740 = 2007 CLD 1445",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sale of Goods Act (III of 1930)------S.15---Sale by description---Use of term \"\"as is where is\"\" in relation to delivery of goods---Inspection of goods when not relevant---Principle of contra proferentum---Contract for sale of Basmati Special Rice was awarded to appellant by respondent---Appellant lifted some of the agreed quantity but refused to lift remaining stock as rice did not meet the description set out in the contract between the parties---Appellant filed a suit seeking specific performance of contract, claimed damages and refund of security amount along with the sum deposited by it with respondent in excess of the security amount---Defence set up by respondent was that sale had been made on \"\"as is where is\"\" basis therefore, respondent was not obliged to meet the description of rice given in the contract---Suit was partly decreed by trial Court, however, plea of specific performance and claim of damages was disallowed---Suit of appellant was dismissed in its entirety by the appellate Court---Validity---Appellant proved his case by producing oral as well as documentary evidence on record---Onus to prone the issue that suit was not instituted by duly authorized person has placed on respondent but it did not produce any evidence td discharge this onus-- Appellant made repeated offers to .respondent for joint inspection and survey of contracted rice with the object of substantiating its contention that rice made available by the latter was not Basmati Special Rice but such offers were not: accepted by respondent---Words `Basmati Special Rice' had been used as many as six times in the contract document leaning no room for doubt that contracted rice was being sold by description---Term \"\"as is where is\"\" had been used only in relation to delivery of the rice and it did not in any manner absolve the respondent from its obligation to supply the agreed quality of rice---Principle of contra proferentum was not applicable in the case as there was no ambiguity which made it difficult to ascertain the intention\"\" of contracting parties---Meaning of term \"\"as is where is\"\" would have been determined on the basis of the context in which the term was used---Section 16(2) of Sale of Goods Act could not benefit respondent in circumstances---Contract was for sale by description and there was no occasion for appellant to inspect the rice prior to the date of contract---Inspection of rice, post contract, would be relevant, but only for the purpose of enabling the appellant to determine \"\"if it met the contracted description and, if necessary, to refuse taking delivery---Time was not of the essence of contract and contract was based on reciprocal promises---Appellant was only obliged to lift the rice if it met the description given in the contract and he has not bound to lift the rice which did not meet such description---Record revealed that respondent committed breach of contract however, no direct nexus between lost profits and breach of contract \"\"had been proved on record nor there was any evidence to prove the quantum of damages claimed by appellant---Damages were, therefore, not allowed---Appellant, however, was held entitled to refund of entire security amount and said excess amount with mark-up-- Appellate decree was modified accordingly. \n \nParamount Corporation, Karachi v. Haji Moosa Haji Omar, Karachi PLD 1954 Sindh 32 and Messrs Fairland Export Syndicate v. Messrs Bengal Oil Mills Ltd., Karachi PLD 1970 Kar. 125 ref. \n \nUnited Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Al-Noor Enterprises and another 2006 CLD 822 'and Thornett and Fehr v. Beers and Son (1919) 1 KB 486 distinguished.\n \n(b) Words and phrases---",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular Second Appeal No.95 of 2006, heard on 1st March, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AMIN BROTHERS (PVT.) LIMITED through Director\nvs\nPAKISTAN AGRICULTURAL STORAGE AND SERVICES CORPORATION LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12461",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2741 = 2007 SLD 2741 = 2007 CLD 93",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 227, 229 & 476---Failure to make payment to Provident Fund Trust-Imposition of penalty---Amount payable to Provident Fund Trust by the Company, was withheld and Company had not made payment to said Fund as required under S.227 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Company admitted default and submitted that the default was due to financial and liquidity problems in the relevant year---Representative of the Company had requested to condone unwilful and unintentional contravention of related provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984 and had sought the approval of the Commission for a repayment schedule---Argument 'advanced on behalf of Directors of the Company that moneys in question were not paid to the Fund due to liquidity constraints, was not tenable because it was obligatory for the company to pay the employees contribution as well its own contribution within fifteen days from the date of collection thereof---Underlying purpose of S.227(2) & (3) of Companies Ordinance, 1984 was to protect the funds of the employees by obligating the company/trustees to deposit contributions in the safe/secured modes of investment/ deposits permitted under S.227(2) of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Directors having breached the mandatory requirements of S.227 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 as they had failed to ensure timely payment to the Provident Fund, action against them was necessary under S.229 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, whereunder punishment with a fine of Rs. Five thousand Rupees could be imposed and they would also be liable to pay loss suffered by the employees on account of such contravention--Considering that default was admitted by the Company which had also assured that the balance amount would be paid, taking a lenient view, instead of imposing fine on Chief Executive and Directors of the Company, only fine of Rs.5,000 was imposed on Chief Executive of the Company and all Directors were reprimanded to remain careful in future in compliance with mandatory statutory provisions.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/233/656/2004-11348-11354, dated June 7, 2006, decision dated: 29-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI AZEEM IKRAM, DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "Messrs PHARMAGEN LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12462",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2742 = 2007 SLD 2742 = 2007 CLD 975",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan--Application for leave to defend suit-Appeal---Suit was decreed in the sum of Rs.38,50,348 and said amount was worked out after deducting the claim for liquidated damages, which formed part of the said amount---Contention of counsel for defendants was that statement of accounts, referred to in the plaint by plaintiff Bank, did riot: at all support the impugned decree keeping in view the admitted amount paid back by defendants to plaintiff---Counsel for defendant stated that the detailed statement of amount was also not consistent with the plaint and claim as mentioned in the plaint, could not have been decreed, despite the fact that leave to defend suit was refused---Not a word was mentioned in the impugned as to how Banking Court had proceeded to decree the suit in the said amount---Banking Court had done nothing to reconcile plaint with different statements of accounts produced by plaintiff Bank---Impugned and decree, in circumstances was not at all sustainable---Permission was granted to plaintiff to amend plaint suitably and consequently to grant leave to defend suit to defendants---Impugned and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside---Suit would be deemed to be pending in the said Court, which would summon the parties---Amended plaint would be taken on record and thereafter a chance would be given to defendants to amend written statement and suit would be decided in accordance with law. \n \nAsad Javed for Appellants.\n \nUmar Farooq for Respondent.\n \nDate of hearing: 9th April, 2007.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.238 of 2003, heard on 9-04-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Messrs HAQ FEED INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 7 others\nvs\nNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION--Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12463",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2743 = 2007 SLD 2743 = 2007 CLD 1399",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)------Art. 18---Right of lawful business and trade---Shortage of raw material---Effect---Shortage of raw material in a particular area is not a valid ground to restrain a person from his constitutional right of ding business in a particular area. \n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Arts. 18, 184 (3) & 199--Constitutional jurisdiction of Supreme\n \nCourt and High Court---Scope---Lawful business---Restraining order---Person aggrieved of action of public functionaries can invoke extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of High Court for interference and simultaneously jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Art. 184 (3) of the Constitution can be invoked in a matter of public importance involving enforcement of fundamental rights---Constitutional jurisdiction of superior courts cannot be invoked and exercised in aid of injustice or to restrain a person from doing lawful business of his choice in accordance with law and Constitution. \n \n(c) Punjab Industrial (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (IV of 1963)--\n \n----S.3---Notification No. AEA-III-3-5/2003, dated 15-7-2005---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.18 & 185 (3)---Right of lawful trade and business---Shortage of raw material---Installation of sugar mill---Petitioner was running a sugar mill and sought interference of High Court for restraining respondent from raising a new sugar mill on the plea of shortage of raw material in the area---High Court dismissed the petition---Validity---Petitioner was not competent to maintain constitutional petition to challenge setting up a new sugar mill in the area on the ground that- establishment of industry was against public interest and policy of law---Constitutional mandate was that neither any restriction could be placed on setting up of a lawful business or trade nor any person in private sector could be allowed to create monopoly in such trade or business---Provincial Government having conceded the right of private respondent for setting up of sugar .mill, raised a serious objection to the locus standi of the petitioner to challenge establishment of sugar mill in the district---Supreme Court declined to interfere with the passed by High Court---Leave to appeal was, refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.1085 of 2006, decision dated: 9-02-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI AND CH. IJAZ AHMED, JJ",
    "": "THAL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION LIMITED (LAYYAH SUGAR MILLS) through Legal ManageR\nvs\nGOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB through Chief Secretary, Punjab and 11 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12464",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2744 = 2007 SLD 2744 = 2007 CLD 1457",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to defend suit---Appeal to High Court---Defendants were served in the manner prescribed by the law, who put in appearance and filed application for leave to defend suit, which application was dismissed by the Banking. Court observing that it did not raise any substantial question of fact and law---Banking Court however, proceeded to dismiss 90% of the claim of Bank---Validity---All the points raised in the application for leave to defend suit were discussed point by point by the Trial Court, but still it proceeded to dismiss suit by the Bank almost in its entirety for which there was no justification---Allowing appeal of Bank impugned and decree passed by the Banking Court, were set aside, with the result that suit filed by Bank would be deemed to be pending before the Banking Court---Defendants were granted leave to defend the suit by consent of counsel for the Bank ---Leave application would be deemed to be written statement; issues arising out of the pleadings, would be framed and after giving an opportunity to the parties to lead evidence, suit would be decided on its merits.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.265 of 2005, heard on 12-04-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD\nvs\nMessrs SHAIKH ORENTAL RUGS through Proprietor and 2others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12465",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2745 = 2007 SLD 2745 = 2007 CLD 435",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.9---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Charging of mark­up/interest on principal amount beyond contract-agreement period---Entitlement---Mark-up/interest could only be charged under agreement between parties or if permissible under law, but not otherwise--Mark-up could not be charged beyond contract period. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Suit by Bank for recovery of amount paid as penalty imposed upon borrower by State Bank for not exporting goods for which finance was awarded---Validity---State Bank under the rule and Scheme had authority to impose such penalty---Borrower had to incur burden of such penalty---Bank was well within right to claim and recover such amount. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.133 & 135---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Application by guarantor for leave to defend suit--Questions requiring consideration were: whether documents on basis of which guarantor was sued were executed by him with regard to loan facility for recovery of which suit was filed: whether in finance for which defendant stood surety had been adjusted, and thus he was discharged as guarantor---Leave to defend suit was granted to guarantor in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 186 of 2003, heard on 20-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED\nvs\nMessrs USMAN TEXTILES and 6 others\nMian Aftab A. Sheikh and 2 others v. Messrs Trust Leasing Corporation Limited and others 2003 CLD 702 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12466",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2746 = 2007 SLD 2746 = 2007 CLD 480",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)--------Ss. 7, 9 & 21---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to appear defend suit---Defendants filed application for leave to appear and defend suit within prescribed period, but said and dismissed by Banking Court, despite serious factual and legal objections were raised by defendants in their application---Provisions of S.10 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, provided that leave to appear and defend suit should have been granted to defendant, if serious and bona fide dispute had been raised which included both legal and factual points of controversy--Objections about valid institution of suit and also the absence of the statement of account, raised in the case were vital, on the bases of which, the Court should have granted leave to the defendants---If the Court was not inclined to take action against plaintiff Bank for non f fling of statement of account, then at least, defendants should have been asked to file the amended leave application, so as to raise necessary plea about the account statement after it was submitted incomplete---Court while refusing leave, had not considered the contents of the plaint about the disbursement and the repayment chart given therein---Impugned and decree were set aside defendants were permitted to file amended leave application, only to the extent of challenging figures therein and not permitting them in any manner to raise any new plea, within a period of two months---Banking Court would decide leave application within two months. \n \nMessrs Ittefaq Industries (Regd.) through Managing Partner and 2 others v. Bank of Punjab through duly constituted Attorney 2004 CLD 1356 and Bankers Equity Limited through Principal Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 931 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 683 of 2001, heard on 4-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NENSER DRUGS (PVT.) LIMITED and 3 others\nvs\nTHE BANK OF PUNJAB"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12467",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2747 = 2007 SLD 2747 = 2007 CLD 1442",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)------Ss. 10, 9 & 39---Claim of exclusive copyright---Requirements---Held, in order to avail such monopoly in the manuscript and to claim exclusive copyright thereof, it must have somewhere been got registered under the provisions of copyright law---Where there was no document on record indicative of the fact that manuscript used by the publisher had ever been registered in accordance with law and if any such document ever existed in favour of the publisher and not placed on record, the claim of publisher was liable to be rejected on this score alone. \n \nNoor Khan's case 1984 SCMR 681 and Ch. Abdul Ghani's case 1988 SCMR 390 fol.\n \n(b) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)--\n \n----S. 28---Protection of typography and term of protection---Scope---Held, even if the publisher had any right in the typographic arrangement of the editions of publication, it was to subsist for a period of twenty fine years from the beginning of the calendar year next following the year in which the edition was first published---Where there was no evidence on record, which palpably seemed to have been suppressed, as to when the script was first published because such printing had remained in vogue for many decades even beyond twenty fine years, no case of copyright involvement had been made out in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.Ps. Nos. 1392-L, 1393-L, 1394-L and 1395-L of 2003 decided on 2-08-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN AND TASSADUQ HUSSAIN, JILLANI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs TAJ COMPANY LIMITED through General ManageR\nvs\nHaji AHMAD JAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12468",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2748 = 2007 SLD 2748 = 2007 CLD 964",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.51---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Detention of -debtor in pursuance of execution of decree---Record did not show any allegation that the petitioner/ -debtor was guilty of any act or omission specified in S.51, C.P.C. which would make him liable for detention in pursuance of execution of decree---No preliminary inquiry appeared to have been conducted and it was not even prima facie established that the petitioner/ -debtor was liable to be arrested and detained---No citizen could be deprived of his liberty without due process of law---Order of detention was set aside by the High Court in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.11421 of 2005, decision dated: 15-07-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED, J",
    "": "Dr. RAUF AHMAD AZHAR\nvs\nBANKING COURT NO. II, Lahore High Court and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12469",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2749 = 2007 SLD 2749 = 2007 CLD 1465",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)-------S. 3(2)---Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (XXVI of 1925), Art. III, Cl. (6), para.3---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.63---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.31---Admiralty suit---Breach of contract for affreightment---Limitation---Computation---Bills of lading in original were with the plaintiff as the contract with the named consignee was rescinded; cargo was never delivered, it was in the defendant's warehouse; correspondence on record. showed that the delivery was 'not made and amidst reshipment negotiations the notice of auction was issued yet the defendants did not inform the plaintiff about the auction proceedings and goods were eventually auctioned which fact the plaintiff learnt later---Defendants until last minute continued to represent that they were making arrangements and efforts to re-export the goods to Pakistan---Allegation of fraud, committed by one of the employees of the consignee, who allegedly was mixed up with the auction-purchaser of the subject goods was, on record---Held, prima facie, at the best, date of auction could be taken as reckoning date to compute limitation of one year on which date the defendant could be said to have failed to deliver the goods---Principles. \n \nAbdul Jalil Chowdhury v. Muhammadi Steamship Company PLD 1961 SC 340 quoted.\n \nBritish India Steam Navigation Co. v. Abdul Razzak Abdul Kadir PLD -1967 SC 68; Dutsche Dampschiffaharts-Gesellschaft PLD 1975 Kar. 819 and Central Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Chitagong Steamship Corporation Ltd. PLD 1963 SC 633 ref.\n \n(b) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)---\n \n----S. 4---Charterer---Definition and scope---\"\"Slot Charter\"\" is included in the definition of \"\"charterer\"\"---Expression the charterer of the ship can include a slot charterer and a slot charterer can properly be described as the charterer of the Ship---Principles.\n \nSlot charter is included in the definition of charter. There is no reason to construe the word \"\"Charterer\"\" as if it meant demise charterer. If the draftsman had meant to confine the expression \"\"charterer\"\" to one type of charterer namely the demise charterer, there is no reason why he should not have done so. Charterers have for many years ordinarily included demise charterers, time charterers and voyage charterers, among others. Whether or not the expression \"\"charterer\"\" includes slot charterer, it naturally includes a time charterer or voyage charterer. The expression the charterer of the ship can include a slot charterer and that a slot charterer can properly be described as the charterer of the ship. \n \nTerm \"\"Charterer\"\" has varied shades of meaning, term charterer includes voyage charterer, time charterer, sub-charter, demise charterer, there is no reason why the slot charterer be excluded. In subsection (4) referred to above, words used are `when a person who would be liable on the claim in action in personam was when the cause of action arose the owner or charterer of or in possession and control of the ship.' The word charterer is not qualified, unlike English .pct therefore, no restricted meaning could be assigned to it. The term charterer clearly includes slot charterer. A slot charterer is liable for all the consequences for the contract of carriage of goods as any charterer could be. Slot charter is in fact lease or hire of a space or cell on board of a vessel, for storage of goods and cargo. Through slot charter, the owner or the charterer lets out or sublets and allocates space/cell or more popularly known as a slot on board a vessel to more than one sub-charterer. \n \nThus, no doubt is left in mind that slot charterer cannot escape the liability to answer the claim in rem against the very offending vessel or against any other ship which at the time when the action is brought is either under charterer's ownership or is a sister ship. \n \nMediterranean Shipping Company SA v. Owners of Ship \"\"TYCHI\"\" [1999] EWCA CIV 1150 = (1999] 2, Lloyd's Report 11 quoted.\n \nA-Z Dictionary of Export, Trade and Shipping Terms, (http:/www.exportbureau.com) and Maritime and Shipping Dictionary, 2006 Edition, by AGA Faquir Muhammad at page 547 ref.\n \n(c) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)---\n \n----S. 4---Scope and applicability of S.4, Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980---Jurisdiction in rem and claim in personam---Scope---Slot Charterer--- Liability---Admiralty jurisdiction under S.4 of the Ordinance could be invoked by action in rem, against the offending ship or against the sister ship---Claim in personam lies where the person who would be liable on the claim was the owner or charterer of, or in possession or in control of the ship when the cause of action arose---Slot charterer could not escape the liability to answer the claim in rem against the very offending vessel or against any other ship which at the time when the action was brought was either under charterer's ownership or was sister ship---Jurisdiction in rem could be invoked, against offending vessel, when one proceeds in rem, the purpose is to draw out the owner or charterer, or any person who claimed to be interested or in possession or in control of the offending vessel---In such event, the person having any interest in the offending vessel had two options either to come out and defend the entire claim or abstain---However, if such person chose to abstain, then the liability was limited to the extent to the vessel otherwise not.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Admiralty Suit No.29 of 2004 decided on 23rd December, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "Messrs MSC TEXTILES (PRNATE) LIMITED through Executive Director--Plaintiff\nvs\nASIAN POLLUX and 5others----Defendants\nAhmed Investment Ltd. v. Sunrise IV PLD 1980 Kar. 229; Bangladesh Shipping Corporation v. Nedon PLD Kar. 246 and Yukong LTD.outh Korea Co. v. M.T. Eastern Navigation PLD 2001 SC 57 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12470",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2750 = 2007 SLD 2750 = 2007 CLD 1456",
    "Key Words:": "State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29 dated 15-10-2002-------Contention was that having held that BPD Circular No.29 of 2002 was applicable to the appellant, the Trial Court came to the wrong conclusion that appellants were not entitled to its benefit on account of failure to make payment of the requisite 10% amount---Counsel for appellant had argued that the failure to make payment was not attributable to appellants but to respondents, who took the erroneous plea that appellants were not entitled to the benefits of the circular in question---Contention required consideration and being the first appeal against the and decree, was admitted to hearing.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special high Court Appeal No.D-181 of 2007 decided on 30-07-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED C.J. AND MUHAMMAD AFZAL SOOMRO, J",
    "": "Messrs A.I. BROTHERS (PVT.) LTD. And another\nvs\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12471",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2751 = 2007 SLD 2751 = 2007 CLD 997",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Leave to defend---Dismissal of application for leave to appeal for non-prosecution---Without jurisdiction and illegal---Procedure---Interpretation, scope and application of S.10, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Defendant is required to file petition for leave to appeal in accordance with the conditions enumerated in S.10, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the Banking Court is required to examine the same and if the application fulfils the requirements set there, to place it on record---Once petition for leave to appeal is part of record, it is the cardinal duty of the Banking Court, to consider the plaint, the petition for leave to appeal and the replication filed and thereafter proceed to grant leave conditional or unconditional or reject the application under S.10(11) of the Ordinance---Banking Court, therefore, is required to consider and decide the application on merits, since it has been left with no other choice in this context---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 does not visualize the dismissal of application for non-prosecution, as no such powers have been conferred upon the Banking Court---Such action otherwise would amount to defeating the legislative intent---Dismissal of petition for leave to appeal for non-prosecution therefore, was without jurisdiction and patently illegal and entire structure built upon it was bound to fall---Even otherwise High Court on appeal has ample powers under O.XLI, R.33, C.P.C. to pass appropriate orders if the matter so requires. \n \nMuneer Floor Mills (Private) Limited and 4 others v, National Bank of Pakistan through Chief Manager and 2 others 2005 CLD 1019; Ka Iran Co. and others v. Messrs Modern Motors and another PLD 1990 SC 713; Nowsheri Khan v. Said Ahmad Shah 1983 SCMR 1092; Delta Weavers (Pvt.) Limited through Director and 3 others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited 2003 CLD 1751; Haji Khudai Nazar and another v. Haji Abdul Bari 1997 SCMR 1986; Messrs Baghpotee Services (Private) Ltd. and others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. 2001 CLC 1363; Messrs Rose Incorporate, Bajwa Manzil and 4 others v. Messrs Bolan Bank Limited 2002 CLD 598; Shafis Pak Associates (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and another v. Habib Bank Limited and 3 others 2002 CLD 379; Muhammad Iftikhar through Special Attorney v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited through Chairman and another 2005 CLD 1454; 2004 CLD 854; National Development Finance Corporation v. Sheikhoo Cooking Oil Mills Limited and 7 others 2002 CLD 341 and United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Zafar Textile Mills Ltd. 2000 CLC 1330 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal against Order No.363 of 2006, heard on 17-04-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "ABID AZIZ KHAN and 2 others\nvs\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12472",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2752 = 2007 SLD 2752 = 2007 CLD 1552",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S.9(5) & 12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Service of process---Defendant/borrower in his application for setting aside decree averred that when suit for recovery of amount was filed, he was not residing at the address on which process was issued---Defendant alleged that creditor Bank was well aware of his new address and suing at former address was a deliberate attempt to procure ex parte decree---Defendant's application for setting aside decree was dismissed for limitation---Validity---Record proved that all modes of service given in section 9(3) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (then applicable) were resorted to and service upon defendant was effected on the address which he had himself provided to creditor Bank and was found mentioned in loan documents---Defendant was served on his last known address and nothing was on record to show that creditor Bank was ever informed about change in his address---In view of rule that \"\"debtor must seek the creditor\"\" defendant was under obligation to intimate the Bank about change in his address but such obligation was not discharged---Omission on the part of defendant was fatal and hp was to suffer for such omission---Application for condonation of delay was lacking necessary information about the-date of knowledge of decree, hence rightly dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.282 of 2003, decision dated: 1st November, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "NASEEM ULLAH KHAN\nvs\nUNITED BANK LIMNED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12473",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2753 = 2007 SLD 2753 = 2007 CLD 1478",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery. of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit---Limitation---Bank stated in plaint that default accrued fast time in March, 1996, then in August, 1997, while the suit was filed in November, 2000---Defendant, in petition for leave to defend the suit, also raised the objection of suit being barred by limitation---Banking Court without adverting to the objection of limitation dismissed the application for leave to defend the .suit and decreed the suit in favour of bank---Validity---Judgment passed by Banking Court noted that question of limitation was duly urged but it was not adequately answered---Banking Court did 'not address the contentions of parties and there was also no basis for holding as to how the suit was within limitation---Question of limitation was a mixed question of law and fact and, therefore, had to be decided after perusing material evidence in such context---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside, defendant was allowed conditional leave to defend the suit and case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh on merits---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.836 of 2002 decided on 9-08-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "ZAHID HAMEED and another\nvs\nPAHISTAN INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LEASING LIMITED through Chief\nExecutive"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12474",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVQTFNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2754 = 2007 SLD 2754 = 2007 CLD 1484",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trust-------Connotation---Term `trust' is commonly used for a \"\"trust\"\" registered and created under Trust Act, 1882; or for the right to beneficial enjoyment of property to which another person holds legal title---\"\"Trust\"\" in former case is an obligation annexed to ownership of property and arising out of confidence reposed in and accepted by owner, or declared and accepted by him for benefit of another or the owner---Person who reposes or declares confidence is called \"\"author of trust\"\", person who accepts confidence is called `trustee'; person for whose benefit confidence is accepted is called `beneficiary' or `beneficiaries'; subject matter of trust is called `trust property' or 'trust money' and instrument, if any, by which trust is declared is called `instrument of trust', it be private or public i.e. charitable---Trust in latter case, signifies relation whereby one or more persons hold something material or accept some obligation in trust for another or for the benefit of other persons; relation when it finds manifestation in its practical form is named as `trust'; person in such relation, who holds something or accept some obligation for benefit of other is called `trustee' and for whose benefit something is held is called 'beneficiary' or 'cestui que trust'---In farmer case, it is an 'institution' while in latter it is relation of confidence. \n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss.2 (21), 148 & 152---Word, 'trust' as used in S.148 of Companies Ordinance, 1984--Connotation---Dry Port Trust, a person---Entering notice of trust on register of members---Rectification of Register of members of respondent-Company was sought by petitioner by seeking removal of name of `Dry Port Trust' as shareholder/member of respondent-Company---Plea raised by petitioner was that Dry Port Trust was not a legal entity, hence could not be a shareholder in respondent-Company---Contention of Dry Port Trust was that it being a legal entity, having registered instrument of trust, was authorized to invest in stocks and was eligible to become member of respondent-Company---Validity---Word `trust' used in S.148 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, related to a trust, where relationship of trustee and cestui que trust was created---Provisions of S.148 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, did not extend to a trust as an institution, registered and created under Trust Act, 1882---Dry Port Trust fell within the definition of person and was capable of becoming a member in a company---Only restriction in such respect was when instrument of trust failed to prone or prohibit the Trust to become member/shareholder in a company---Instrument of trust, if had imposed conditions then Trust could become member, subject to such conditions---Petitioner failed to make out a case for rectification of the Register of Members of respondent-Company---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nE.D. Sasson and Company Limited v. Kapatch XLV Bombay Law Reporter 46; Palmer's Company Law (13th Edition) and Perkins and others v. Mexican Santa Barbra Mining Co.\"\" (1890) 24 QBD 613 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O. No.57 of 2006, decision dated: 29-06-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SOHAIL BUTT\nvs\nCAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12475",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2755 = 2007 SLD 2755 = 2007 PLJ 753",
    "Key Words:": "Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 (IV of 2001)--\n----S.17(4)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--Art. 199--Bonafide--Requirement for personal use--Occupation by lady and her husband--Ejectment order--Appeal was allowed by First Appellate Court--Assailed--Contested--Breach of terms of contract--Validity--Lady would be required to get lease deed executed in favour of the purchaser by tenant in possession--Contract was admitted by occupant--Court did not find any malafide emanating on the part of petitioner with reference to transaction entered into by her--Petition was accepted.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "W.P. No. 57 of 2006, heard on 23.5.2007",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWAR-UL-HAQ, J.",
    "": "Mst. TASNEEM IQBAL\nvs\nARSHAD KHAN and another--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12476",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2756 = 2007 SLD 2756 = 2007 PLJ 753",
    "Key Words:": "Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 (IV of 2001)--\n----S.17(4)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--Art. 199--Bonafide--Requirement for personal use--Occupation by lady and her husband--Ejectment order--Appeal was allowed by First Appellate Court--Assailed--Contested--Breach of terms of contract--Validity--Lady would be required to get lease deed executed in favour of the purchaser by tenant in possession--Contract was admitted by occupant--Court did not find any malafide emanating on the part of petitioner with reference to transaction entered into by her--Petition was accepted. [P. 755] A",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "W.P. No. 57 of 2006, heard on 23.5.2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWAR-UL-HAQ, J.",
    "": "Mst. TASNEEM IQBAL\nvs\nARSHAD KHAN annd another--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12477",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2757 = 2007 SLD 2757 = 2007 PLJ 759",
    "Key Words:": "Court Fee Act, 1870 (VII of 1870)--\n----S. 13--Refund of Court fee--Memorandum of appeal--Provisions of--Applicability--Entitlement--Question of--If suit was remanded in appeal for a second decision by lower Court, the Appellate Court would grant to appellant a certificate authorizing him to receive back from Collector the full amount of fee paid on memorandum of appeal--Held: Applicant is entitled for refund of full amount of Court fee paid on memorandum of appeal--Application was allowed. [P. 760] A & B",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M. No. 36 of 2007 in R.F.A. No. 106 of 2003, decision dated: 7.2.2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, JJ.",
    "": "vs"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12478",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2758 = 2007 SLD 2758 = 2007 PLJ 751",
    "Key Words:": "Police Function--\n----Under the law function of the police is only to collect the evidence and their opinion is neither admissible in evidence and nor binding upon the Court. [P. 753] A\nPolice Order, 2002--\n----Art. 18(6)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--Arts. 4 & 199--Constitutional Petition--Violation of--Provisions of--Transfer of investigation--Cancellation report--DSP disagreed with cancellation report and no vested right accrued in favour of the petitioner on the basis of the report submitted by investigating officer--Even if the cancellation report had been submitted before the concerned Magistrate he too could have disagreed being decided by trial Court--Challan submitted before Court of competent jurisdiction no interference at this stage was called for--No illegality justifying the acceptance of writ petition has been found--Petition was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "W.P. No. 6842 of 2006, decision dated: 8.2.2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "HASNAT AHMAD KHAN, J.",
    "": "MUHAMMAD TAHIR MALIK\nvs\nDISTRICT POLICE OFFICER, MUZAFFARGARH and 5 others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12479",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2759 = 2007 SLD 2759 = 2007 CLD 1481",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)-------S. 43(F)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R. 58---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185--- Appeal to Supreme Court---Appellant had challenged the passed by the High Court, aide which appeal filed by the respondent was allowed and order passed by the Single Judge of High Court, was set aside---No adverse finding with regard to the claim of the appellant had been given by the Division Bench in the impugned and the. matter was left to be decided by the Court of Special Jurisdiction i.e., the Company Judge---Primary concern of appellant, appeared to be the delay in deciding the application, which could not be taken exception to because the winding up matter was pending for the last 15 years and before Supreme Court for the last 6/7 dears---Even otherwise, impugned was a remand order and in absence of any observation, which could have prejudiced appellant, no interference was warranted---While dismissing appeal, Company Judge was directed by the Supreme Court to decide the matter expeditiously---Respondent in the meanwhile, would not alienate or encumber the property and would not remove any material/articles/machinery lying there.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.1027 of 2007 decided on 29-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "TASSADUQ HUSSAIN, JILLANI, NASIR-UL-MULK AND SYED, JAMSHED ALI, JJ",
    "": "SAMAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION\nvs\nMUHAMMAD SHAFI PETAL"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12480",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2760 = 2007 SLD 2760 = 2007 CLD 1504",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)------Ss.226 & 229---Mismanagement and misuse of securities and deposits---Imposition of penalty---Objective of provisions of S.226 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 was to secure the amounts collected from the dealers of the company from being misutilized--Company was required to act like a trustee of the dealers---Deposits received by the company were, in fact, security deposits, but company had failed to fulfil the requirement of S.226 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 to keep the deposits of the dealers in separate bank accounts and wrongly assumed that company was exempt from the requirements as laid down in S.226 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Chief Executive had breached the mandatory requirement of S.226 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Action, in circumstances was necessary under S.229 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, which had provided fine of Rs. five thousand, however, considering the fact that the company had made effort to rectify the default in response to issuance of show-cause notice by the Commission, which was evident from the reduction in the amount of security deposit, lenient view was taken and instead for imposing maximum penalty of fine of Rs.2,000 was imposed on Chief Executive of the Company under S.229 of Companies Ordinance, 1984.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/233/652/2004-8828, dated 7-03-2006, decision dated: 1st August, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "TAHIR MAHMOOD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "In the matter of: Messrs SOUTHERN NETWORKS LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12481",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2761 = 2007 SLD 2761 = 2007 CLD 1509",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)---Suit for recovery of loan---Money decree passed by Banking Court, having been confirmed by the High Court in appeal, petitioner had sought leave to appeal against said and decree---Ground urged by petitioner was that Senior Vice-President, Regional Office, through whom suit was filed, was not authorized to file the suit in the name and on behalf of the Bank---High Court relied on a Notification No.EST/110/1292/72 dated 13-9-1974, wherein the Board of Directors of the Bank, had authorized the officer of the rank of Senior Vice-President to institute the suit---No argument, whatsoever having been addressed by counsel for petitioner against said Notification, impugned - and decree were held perfectly valid.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2021-L of 2005, decision dated: 20-10-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR AND KARAMAT NAZIR BHANDARI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs TERMIZI OIL INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Director and 3others\nvs\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Senior Vice President"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12482",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2762 = 2007 SLD 2762 = 2007 CLD 1491",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.208, 476 & 495---Making unauthorized investment in associated company---Non-complying with the direction of Commission---Imposition of penalty---Chief Executive and Directors of the company, made unauthorized investments in then associated company---Authority in respect of investment under S.208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 vested in the share-holders and that authority axis abused by the Directors as they invested funds of the company without taking approval of the share-holders into the said associated company and moreover, the directions of the Commission remained unattended---Show­-cause notice under S.495(1) of Companies Ordinance, 1984 was served on the Chief Executive and Directors of the Company, but after allowing carious extensions in submission of reply, company failed to respond---Opportunity of hearing was given to the Chief Executive and the, Directors of the Company---Manager Corporate Affairs appeared on behalf of Chief Executive and all Directors of the Company---Main contentions made in their submission; had been analysed, but were not found satisfactory---Default of non-compliance of directions of the Commission were also evident from the subsequent annual audit account---Default having been established, Directors were liable for penalty under provisions of S.495(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, however, considering the fact that management was making efforts for revival of the company, instead of imposing maximum fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees and in the case of a continuing non-compliance to a further fine not exceeding two thousand rupees for every day during which such non-compliance would continue on the Chief Executive and each Director as prescribed by S.495(1) of Companies Ordinance, 1984, fine of Rs.50,000 was imposed on each Director---Further, all the Directors were warned to be careful and vigilant in future and comply with the requirement of law in letter and spirit.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show Cause Notice No. EMD/233/404/2002-755-61 dated 28-07-2006, decision dated: 17-07-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "TAHIR MAHMOOD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "In he matter of: Messrs KOHINOOR POWER COMPANY LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12483",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2763 = 2007 SLD 2763 = 2007 CLD 1498",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.253(3), 255(3)(6), 476 & 498---Failure to submit signed audit report---Imposition of penalty---Record of the Commission had revealed that company had submitted annual accounts in compliance with S.233 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Said; accounts had revealed that accounts were signed by the Chief Executive and the Director of the Company but audit report attached with the accounts was not signed by the Auditor, but was initialed by him---Auditor was aware of the fact that company was presenting the accounts in the annual general meeting which were -not authorized by hire---Despite the said knowledge Auditor had failed to make representation in said annual general meeting and bring the fact to the knowledge off share-holders and regulatory authorities---Show-cause notice was issued to the Auditor in which 14 days time was. given to respond to said show-cause notice, but same was replied with a. delay of two months---Arguments put forward by the Auditor in response to show-cause notice were not tenable---Auditors being the ultimate watchdog of the share-holders' interest, were required to give a report on the accounts and books of account after conducting the audit in accordance with the prescribed procedure and requirements of Companies Ordinance, 1984 and standards---If auditors found any irregularity, they were required to issue a modified report, if said irregularity was material to the accounts, otherwise they would issue a clear report to the share-holders, who were the ultimate entity to whom the Auditors were responsible-- Auditors were also responsible to report to the members and the regulatory authorities of any irregularity noticed during the audit---Auditors .should be vigilant in performing their duties with. due care---Chartered Accountants/Auditors had not signed the annual accounts of the company for the relevant year, which the company had presented in annual general meeting and got approved from the shareholders-- Auditors however, having reported said fact to the Commission subsequently, taking lenient view, instead of imposing a maximum penalty of Rs.50,000 under S.498 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, nominal fine of Rs.5, 000 was imposed for not submitting the signed audit report-- Auditor, however, was directed to furnish to the Commission and the company within 14 days of the order, signed audit reports.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Number and DATE of Notice EMD/233/578/2002 dated 15-09-2006, decision dated: 1st August, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI AZEEM IKRAM, DIRECTOR ENFORCEMENT,",
    "": "In the matter of: Messrs NAMDAR & CO., CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12484",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2764 = 2007 SLD 2764 = 2007 CLD 1511",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90---Recovery of Bank loan---Execution of decree---Out of court settlement---Setting aside of sale---Suit flied by bank was decreed and mortgaged property was sold through auction---Auction-purchaser deposited full consideration amount and was waiting for sale confirmation by Executing Court, when bank filed application for withdrawal of execution application, as bank and debtor had reached some settlement---Application filed by bank was dismissed by Executing Court---Plea raised by -debtor was that Executing Court ought to have allowed withdrawal of execution proceedings instead of confirming sale of her property in favour of auction-purchaser---Validity---Once property was sold by court in execution proceedings, the same could be nullified only on the basis of circumstances envisaged by O.XXI, Rr.89 and 90, C.P.C.---Mere arrangement reached between decree holder and -debtor, after such sale could not be considered as sufficient enough to set aside the sale as by then third party rights had intervened---Irrespective of the fact that sale had been confirmed by the court or not tinder . O.XXI, R.92, C.P.C., nullifying court sales whenever -debtor had come to some arrangement with decree-holder would shatter confidence of people in stability of sates made through courts---Court sale should only be set aside when equitable grounds for nullifying it existed in favour of the person who owned or held any interest in the property sold---Such equitable grounds lead already been provided by late under the provisions of O.XXI, Rr.89 and 90, C.P.C.---Judgment-debtor herself did not take any legal step for seeking setting aside of sale for more than 15 months---Auction-purchaser who had paid entire sale consideration could not be deprived. Of the property sold to him through court sale---High Court declined to interfere with the order passed by Executing Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nHudaybia Textile Mills Limited v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited PLD 1987 SC 512 and Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Zakaria Ghani PLD 2005 SC 819 = 2005 CLD 1589 rel.\n \nFarida v. Sanjida 2000 SCMR 1264; Navalkha & Sons v. Ramaya Das AIR 1970 SC 2037; Captain PQ Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. A.W. Brothers 2004 SCMR 1956; Magi Chemicals Industries v. Habib Sank Limited 2003 CLD 571 and Shahida Saleem v. Habib Credit and Exchange Bank Limited 2001 CLC 126 distinguished.\n \n(b) Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90---Setting aside of sale---Principles---Person who. owns or has acquired any proprietary interest in property, which is being sold by court in execution proceedings, to seek recall of order of sale within 30 days of such sale upon deposit of 5% of the purchase money for payment to the auction-purchaser---Such provision if invoked will tin stipulated time is sufficient enough to avoid court sale as it gives successful bidder 5% of purchase money as compensation for denying him right to buy the property---Order XXI, R.90, C.P.C. also entitles a person whose interests in property sold by court in execution have been affected on account of any material irregularity or fraud in the conduct of sale proceedings or price that was procured was inadequate and did not commensurate with value of the property---Such rule covers situation where owner of property under sale was either not aware of sale of his property or his property ought not to have been put to sale in the first place.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I.A. No.108 of 2006, decision dated: 21st August, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED, C.J. AND FAISAL ARAB, J",
    "": "Mrs. YASMEEN YAQOOB\nvs\nMessrs ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD. and 3others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12485",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2765 = 2007 SLD 2765 = 2007 CLD 1520",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S.3---Customs Act (IV of 1969), S.202--- Recovery of government dues---Liability of `subsidiary company' and indirect responsibility on `associated company' or associated undertaking---Scope.\n \nThe term \"\"sister concern\"\" finds no mention either in the Company Law or in the Customs Act. There is a concept of \"\"subsidiary company\"\" and the \"\"holding company\"\" and there can also be a connection of an \"\"associated company\"\" or \"\"associated undertakings\"\" between two corporate bodies or firms. In the former case, the \"\"holding company\"\", as per section 3 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, directly or indirectly controls more than 50% of the voting power of a \"\"subsidiary company\"\", may be held liable for the liabilities against the \"\"subsidiary company\"\". Such an indirect responsibility cannot be fixed on an \"\"associated company\"\" or \"\"associated undertakings\"\" for the outstanding liability of one of them. \n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)--\n \n----S.3---Customs Act (IV of 1969), Ss.202 & 193---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.23 & 199---Constitutional petition---Recovery of government dues---Petitioner-Company was directed by Customs Authorities, not to remove any goods from his business premises till such time the amount of taxes recoverable from another company was paid in full and simultaneously a direction was issued to the petitioner-Company \"\"not to sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise deal with all movable and immovable property belonging to it directly or indirectly except with the prior permission of the Assistant Collector (Customs)\"\"---Contentions of the petitioner-company were that it was a corporate body and had got no concern. with the defaulter company; that there was no outstanding liability of the Customs Department against it and petitioner-Company being neither a 'holding company' of the defaulter-company nor the petitioner being a Director or guarantor of the defaulter-Company, neither the notice could be served nor an embargo could be unposed on the business transactions of the petitioner-company---Validity---Both the Corporate bodies did not fit in even as \"\"associate companies\"\" or \"\"associate undertakings.\"\", merely to justify the term `sister concerns' as alleged .by the department---Demand of the liability of another corporate body from the petitioner-company, in circumstances was prima facie illegal and without jurisdiction---Issuance of impugned demand notice in the name of the petitioner-company was gross misuse of authority and a demonstration of an authority not vested in the department which was strongly deprecated by the High Court---Impugned notice could not he held to have been issued under the Customs Act, 1969, and therefore, same could not have been challenged in appeal under S.193 Customs Act, 1969 and the only remedy available to the aggrieved person was to challenge the said notice. in a constitutional petition---Constitutional petition was allowed, the impugned notice was set aside and any action taken thereunder stood reversed---High Court directed that the copy of the present be forwarded to the Central Board of Revenue for taking appropriate action against the person responsible for such illegal, unjust, arbitrary and illogical demand notice along with a restraint order---Principles.\n \n1997 SCMR 169; 2001 YLR 2696 and 1999 SCMR 1881 ref.\n \nUnder the Constitution, every person, or for that matter every juristic person, was entitled to own the property and business (subject to the legal restrictions) and such an owner can use, sell, transfer or otherwise transact in such property and business. Before placing a particular person under restraint, the functionaries of the State are required to establish not only the scope of responsibility of such person vis-a-vis the defaulter but they are also duty bound to ensure that such a person or juristic person cannot be put under an unconditional complete restraint. Issuing a notice on the personal beliefs, without such verification, shall amount to the misuse of authority which shall be amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. \n \nA bare perusal of section 202, Customs Act, 1969 would show that the demand notice has to be served on the person who was liable to pay such amount either as a principal or as an agent or who may be liable under a guarantee or any other instrument. By thorough scanning of the entire record, one could not trace the responsibility of the petitioner with regard to the outstanding amount payable by defaulter-Company Admittedly, there was no amount directly outstanding against the petitioner in this regard. Defaulter-company was exclusively liable for the said amount, subject to the adjudication by the appropriate forum. The petitioner-company was neither an agent of the defaulter-company nor a guarantor for the payment of such liability. There was no instrument whatsoever to hold the petitioner-company liable in this behalf. Therefore, the demand of the liability of another corporate body from the petitioner-company was prima facie illegal and without jurisdiction\n \nThe petitioner-company being a corporate body, could be directly a shareholder of defaulter-Company or it could regulate the affairs of said company through a nominated/representative Director but there was no proof that any shares of the defaulter-Company were .ever purchased by the petitioner-Company or that. petitioner-Company lead ever been on the panel of Directors of said company. Had it been so, the department could be, remotely justified in issuing the impugned demand notice. However, the department had not been able to prove that it had made any effort to verify the said status of the petitioner-company with regard to defaulter-company. \n \nThe extract from Form No.29 and the other documents of both the petitioner and the defaulter-company show that the petitioner-company, was being managed by the Directors and the Chief Executive who had a nexus with the Directors of the defaulter-company. At the most, two of the share-holders of the petitioner-company were the share-holders in the company of defaulter-company. Even these facts were provided by the petitioner, which could not be rebutted by the department the voting power of each of such share-holders is less than 10% of the defaulter-company. Therefore, both the corporate bodies do not fit in even as \"\"Associate Companies\"\" or \"\"Associate Under-takings\"\" merely to justify the term \"\"sister concern\"\". \n \nThe responsibility of a shareholder, in a company limited by shares, is restricted to the extent of the unpaid amount of the share capital purchased by him. He can be called upon to pay the unpaid amount of the share capital. However, if the entire share capital is paid up by a shareholder, he is entitled to the benefits attached with the number of shares purchased by him and his liability stall be limited to the extent of his investment in the share capital.\n \nIf the company i.e. defaulter-company suffered a loss, it would be proportionately shared by each of the shareholders, including the said two shareholders. Thus, the maximum loss of the said individual shareholder shall be to the extent of the amount invested by him in the share capital by purchasing a particular number of shares. But he could not be held liable for a single penny beyond the amount of the said shares. Although the point of responsibility of such shareholder was not a point in issue in the present case but the position was being high-lighted to stress that the maximum liability which could be imposed on the said two persons, being individual shareholders of the defaulting company, could not exceed the value of their shares. In such a situation, the demand of the entire outstanding liability from the petitioner-company vas net only illegal but issuance of the impugned demand notice in the name of the petitioner-company was the gross misuse of authority and a demonstration of an authority not vested in the department. \n \nThere is no doubt that the officials of the Customs department were the earning hands of the Government and, therefore, extraordinary latitude was extended to them by the Government to facilitate the revenue generation but in pursuit of such an endeavour, the exercise of authority to the extent of illegality shall be counter-productive to the very concept of civilized society. The placement of embargo and restraint, as depicted through the impugned order, unfortunately displayed the unbridled exercise of authority over the citizens by those who were on the other side of the table. Such a barbarious action could not be conceived even in the most uncivilized societies. Corporate bodies are regulated by well recognized principles throughout the world. The Corporate bodies have independent juristic personalities governed by their Directors, who are trustees of the capital of the share-holders. They cannot be held liable for the liabilities of the share-holders and vice versa. In such a situation, it will be illogical to presume that the corporate body, being the independent juristic person, may be held responsible for the liabilities of another corporate body without establishing a connection between the two. The petitioner did not control the defaulter-company nor was guarantor thereof. There was no undertaking or instrument to make the petitioner responsible for liabilities of the defaulter-Company. \n \nUnder section 193 of the Customs Act, an aggrieved person could file an appeal to the Collector (Appeals) within thirty days of such decision or order. This section has been referred to in the written statement of the Customs department without realizing that such remedy has been expressly barred with regard to the notice under section 202. Since the impugned notice purported to have been issued under the said section, therefore, such a notice could not be challenged under the' said provision in appeal. However the stress of section 193 of the Customs Act .relates to \"\"any decision or order passed under this Act\"\". The impugned notice could not be issued either under the Customs Act or under any other legal instrument of a civilized society, therefore, the impugned notice could not be held to be an order under \"\"the Act\"\". Since the impugned notice was entirely illogical and unreasonable, therefore, it could not be challenged in appeal under the said section and the only remedy available to the aggrieved person was to challenge the absurd notice in a constitutional petition. Similarly, the concept of appeals and internal redressal mechanism through an Appellate Tribunal or through the Board etc. shall only relate to the grievances of an action legally taken by an authority of the Federal Government under the statutory provisions. The objections with regard to the assessment, legality of the demand, propriety of an assessment etc. could be challenged by a person through the fora created within the Department itself but if a third person having no relationship or responsibility with the defaulter was required to pay the liability of the defaulter, such an action could not: be challenged in the internal redressal system. Such an illegal and arbitrary order had to be taken to the Court where the fundamental rights of a citizen were watched and the citizens were protected from the atrocities of irresponsible administrative agency. \n \nConstitutional petition was allowed, the impugned notice was set aside and any action taken thereunder stood reversed. Copy of this was directed to be forwarded to the Federal/Central Board of Revenue nor taking appropriate action against the person responsible for such illegal, unjust, arbitrary and illogical demand notice coupled with a restraint order.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.883 of 2007, decision dated: 24-07-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ-UL-HASSAN KHAN AND MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SALEEM CIGARETTE INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive\nvs\nASSISTANT COLLECTOR (CUSTOMS) and 4others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12486",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2766 = 2007 SLD 2766 = 2007 CLD 1542",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)------S.118---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr.1 & 2---Suit for recovery of loan amount on basis of pro note and its receipt---Execution of such documents denied by defendant in written statement, but his admission in cross-examination to have executed same as guarantee for business with plaintiff---Effect---Where execution of negotiable instrument was admitted, then burden of proof of non-payment of consideration would lie on its executant---Section 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, provided that until contrary was proved presumption would be that negotiable instrument was made/drawn for consideration---Defendant had failed to prove non-payment of consideration through independent and cogent evidence---Suit was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nMuhammad Boota v. Fiaz Ahmed 1979 SCMR 465 and Haji Karim and another v. Zakir Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100 rel.\n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S.118---Negotiable instrument---Denial of consideration---Burden of proof---Where execution of negotiable instrument was admitted, Cheri burden of proof of non-payment of consideration would lie on its executant.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.2101of 2006, decision dated: 5-03-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J., ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR, KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY, MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI AND MIAN SHAKIRULLAH, JAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AZIZUR REHMAN\nvs\nLIAQUAT ALI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12487",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2767 = 2007 SLD 2767 = 2007 CLD 1547",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----S.9(4)---Suit for recovery of loan by plaintiff-Bank---Suit for damages filed by defendant/customer against plaintiff-Bank---Effect---Mere fact that defendant had filed suit for damages against plaintiff, would not disentitle plaintiff from obtaining decree in the suit and would not affect proceedings in terms of S.9(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Both rival suits were to be disposed of on their own merits.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-5 of 2007, decision dated: 10-04-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISAR IQBAL, J",
    "": "MY BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nvs\nSPEEDWAY FONDMETALL PAKISTAN LTD. and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12488",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2768 = 2007 SLD 2768 = 2007 CLD 1532",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, R.17 &, VII, R.1(i)---Plaint not containing clause regarding valuation of suit---Application for amendment of plaint for inserting therein valuation clause made by plaintiff rafter raising of objection by defendant---Validity---Such omission could be provided through amendment in plaint---Plaintiff was fully justified in seeking such amendment---Application was allowed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, R.17---Suit for declaration that Bank had. no right to withhold payment due under Letters of Credit---Application for amendment of plaint to insert in its prayer clause direction to Bank to pay a sum of Rs.150 million---Plea of Bank that no relief had been sought against Bank in plaint, wherein no amount had been quantified against Bank---Validity---Such plea of defendant-Bank was misconceived in view of such declaration sought in the plaint---Plaintiff s application for amendment of plaint was accepted in circumstances. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.2(c), 2(d)(iii) & 9---Suit against Bank by beneficiary of guarantee or Letter of Credit---Maintainability--No one could invoke jurisdiction of Banking Court except financial institution and its customers, but only regarding dispute relating to financial facility defined as finance\"\" under S.2(d) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Customer'---Categories of----Person not being a customer of financial institution, if connected in some way to a Transaction defined as finance\"\" under S.2(d) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, could neither sue nor be sued under S.9 thereof---Beneficiary of letter of Credit and guarantee would not fall within definition of \"\"customer\"\" as given in S.2(c) of the Ordinance---Legal remedy for and against person not being a customer would lie before ordinary civil court, but not before Banking Court---Principles.\n \nNo doubt, letter of Credit is included in the definition of \"\"finance\"\" under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, but this does not mean that all parties that may be connected in any way to \"\"any financing defined under section 2(d) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, could invoke the jurisdiction of Banking Court. In this regard, section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is very clear, wherein parties to a banking suit are specifically mentioned. Section 9 of the Ordinance states that \"\"where a customer or a financial institution commits a default in the fulfillment of any obligation with regard to any finance, the financial institution or, as the Case may be, the customer may' institute a suit in the Banking Court Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances)' Ordinance, 2001, being a special law, its scope is to be confined to the parties, which are entitled to invoke its jurisdiction and section 9 clearly mentions that they are only two i.e. a financial institution, and its customer. Other than these two if a person is connected in some way to a transaction falling under the definition of \"\"finance\"\", that person not being a customer of the financial institution could not invoke the jurisdiction provided under section 9 of the Ordinance as section 9 of the Ordinance does not authorize such person to invoke banking jurisdiction. The real test is not that a dispute has arisen in relation to a transaction defined as \"\"finance\"\" under section 2(d) of the Ordinance, but the real test is that dispute should have arisen between a \"\"financial institution\"\" and its \"\"customer\"\". There is no denying the fact that such dispute must relate to a financial facility defined under the term \"\"finance\"\" but it is also necessary that dispute must relate to a financial facility defined under the term \"\"finance\"\", but it is also necessary that dispute should have arisen between a financial institution and its customer and no one else. A dispute relating to any of the transactions covered by the definition of \"\"finance\"\", if' not between a financial institution and its customer, then this is not sufficient the give jurisdiction to the Banking Court to try such dispute. A party other than a financial institution or a customer can neither sue nor be sued under section 9 of the Ordinance, as there is no such room for them in section 9 of the Ordinance. Hence a person not being a customer, if has to sue a financial institution, he is to do so under the provisions of general law and not under section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. \n \nDefinition of \"\"customer\"\" as provided in S. 2(d) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 includes three categories of persons. First category is of the. person to whom finance is extended by a financial institution. This category means persons who avail fund based financial facility from a financial institution. \n \nThe second category of persons who come within the definition of \"\"customer' are the persons, who avail non-fund based financial facility such as Guarantee or Letter of Credit i.e. the persons on whose behalf a Guarantee or a Letter of Credit had been issued by a financial institution. The persons for whose benefit such instruments are opened i.e. the beneficiary of such instruments are not included within the definition of section 2(c) of the Ordinance, as it includes within its ambit as \"\"customer\"\" only such person on whose, behalf a Guarantee or a Letter of Credit has been issued. The persons who are entitled to receive finance from a financial' institution without any obligation to repay, such as a beneficiary of Guarantee or Letter of Credit or a person who is entitled to receive payment from a financial institution in order to make supplies to a customer of a financial institution cannot be treated as a `customer' of the financial institution. There is no room for including the beneficiary of the non-fund based facility to be included in the definition of \"\"customer\"\". A beneficiary cannot be treated a customer of a financial institution as financial institution is not concerned as to who is the beneficiary of its Guarantee or Letter of Credit. It may not even come in contact with the beneficiary of a Guarantee: or a Letter of Credit. The beneficiary has merely figured in at the instance of the person on whose behalf the financial institution has issued a Guarantee or a Letter of Credit. Extending the meaning of the word \"\"customer\"\" to the beneficiary of an instrument would amount to doing violence to the provisions of section 2(c) and section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. \n \nThe third and the last category of persons who fall under the definition of \"\"customer\"\" are those who stand surety or indemnifier before a financial institution on behalf of direct customers of financial institutions. This last category of persons though not, the direct customers of a financial institution, as is the case with the first two categories of persons, but through a deeming provision of section 2(c) of the Ordinance, they too have been made customers of the financial institutions as they have taken upon themselves the obligation to discharge the liability of a customer, who availed the financial facility from a financial institution. \n \nThe above analysis of the meaning of the word \"\"customer\"\" as defined in section 2(c) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 clearly leads to the conclusion that the word \"\"customer\"\" means and includes (a) a person to whom finance has been extended directly by a financial institution; (b) a person on whose behalf a financial institution undertakes to make payment to a third party e.g. under a Guarantee or a Letter of Credit; and (c) a person who has taken upon himself the obligation to repay to the financial institution the defaulted sum in his capacity as surety or indemnifier. Therefore, only these three categories of persons come within the definition of \"\"customer\"\" and only they can sue or be sued under section 9 of the Ordinance. No person, no matter in what capacity he is connected with a financial facility, if he does not fall within the definition of a \"\"customer\"\" as defined under section 2(c) of the Ordinance, he can neither sue nor be sued under section 9 of the Ordinance, 2001 and the legal remedy for and against him lies before ordinary Civil Court. \n \nThe definition of \"\"customer\"\" as provided under section 2(c) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 includes within its ambit only such persons against whom a financial institution has recourse in the event of .default in repayment of finance provided by it i.e. the persons upon whom obligation is created to repay in case of default in repayment and no one else and it is for this reason that section 9 of the Ordinance envisages only a financial institution and its customer as party to a banking suit. Thus, the persons who ultimately become liable to make payment to a financial institution in case of a default in the repayment of finance are the persons who fall under the definition of \"\"customer\"\" and none else.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-35, C.M.As. Nos.1591, 7388, 7389, 7690 and 7691 of 2006, decision dated: 13-08-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB, J",
    "": "PROCTER & GAMBLE PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD., Karachi High Court--Plaintiff\nvs\nBANK ALFALAH LIMITED, Karachi High Court and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12489",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2769 = 2007 SLD 2769 = 2007 CLD 1550",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 22---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.129---Suit for recovery of security amount---\"\"Demand Finance Facility\"\" under self-employment scheme which was sanctioned and was availed by borrowers, whereas respondents stood their guarantors and had secured repayment of said finance facility---Borrowers having failed to repay their entire outstanding liability, Bank initiated recovery proceedings by filing suit before Banking Court---Suit was dismissed on -the basis of report procured from A.I.G. Police Criminalistic Division, without discussing the effect of deposit of original title documents by the mortgagors, creation of charge on the mortgaged property, appearing on record for the last 10 years, valuation certificates, site plan etc., and effect of registered mortgage deed having a legal presumption attached thereto that all judicial and official acts were performed regularly as provided in illustration \"\"e\"\" to Article 129 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984--Impugned and decree were set aside and case was remanded to the Banking Court for decision afresh after providing an opportunity to both parties for adducing evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.A. No.7 of 2006, decision dated: 15-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZULLAH M. MEMON AND SAJJAD ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "FIRST WOMEN BANK LTD.\nvs\nMst. KARIMA BANO and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12490",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2770 = 2007 SLD 2770 = 2007 CLD 298",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-----Ss. 476, 477 & 484--- Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33--Revision---Scope---Conversion of revision into an appeal---Petitioner had filed revision petition under S.484 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 against impugned order which was also passed in revision, albeit under S.477 of the Ordinance---Revision under S.484 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 lay against those orders which had not been passed under provisions of S.476 of the Ordinance---Order imposing the penalties passed by Registrar of Companies, which was upheld in revision by Commissioner, was passed under S.476 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Such order, in circumstances could not be challenged in revision under S.484 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Besides, a revision did not lie against an order which was passed in revision---Revision petition filed by petitioner, however, was converted into appeal under S.33 of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 in order to meet the ends of justice and to decide the issue on its merits.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 254(6)---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33---Disqualification of an auditor---Imposition of penalty---Scope---Registrar of Companies, after issuing show-cause notices to petitioner, had imposed a fine/penalty on petitioner for being appointed and having acted as the auditor of the Company under S.254(6) of Companies Ordinance, 1984---No evidence was available on record which could suggest that show-cause notices issued to the petitioner were based on mala fide intention---Commission which had upheld order of Registrar of Companies was, legally duty bound to take cognizance of any contravention of the laws being administered by it---Issuing of show-cause notices, passing of orders and imposition of fines, were parts of said legal duty which was performed by the Commissioners and Officers of the Commission---Unless the parties could produce some real evidence that any of those acts had been done in bad faith there was no reason to come to such a conclusion---Penalty under S.254(6) of Companies Ordinance, 1984 could only be imposed if the auditor so appointed, had acted as the auditor of the Company---Department had not produced any evidence that the petitioner had acted as the auditor of the Company---Petitioner's contentions that the Company was dormant and that no audit had been conducted, had not been repelled by Department either---Penalty imposed on the, auditor under S.254(6) of Companies Ordinance, 1984, was set aside, in circumstances.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-\n \n---Ss. 254 & 259---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33---Disqualification of auditor---Imposition of penalty---Annual return (Form-A) filed by the Company had proved that petitioner being a Director of Company was appointed as the auditor of the Company, whereas subsection (3) of S.254 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 had disqualified a Director of a Company to be appointed as the auditor---Plea of petitioner that it was a computer or typing mistake, could not be accepted as subsequent returns filed by Company, had shown the same appointment---Contravention could not be accepted to be not wilful---Penalty imposed on Director of the Company under S.254(3) of Companies Ordinance, 1984 read with S.259 of the Ordinance, for appointing an unqualified person as auditor was made out---Director having not acted as the auditor of the Company, taking lenient view fine/penalty imposed on the Director under S.259 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, was reduced accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Revision/Appeal No.3 of 2005, decision dated: 2-06-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "ETRAT H. RIZVI AND SHAHID GHAFFAR, COMMISSIONERS",
    "": "WASEEM AHMED SIDDIQI\nvs\nZAFAR-ULHAQ HIJAZI (EX-COMMISSIONER), SEC and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12491",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2771 = 2007 SLD 2771 = 2007 CLD 565",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Recovery of bank loan---Failure to seek leave to defend the suit---Defendants, in spite of due service, failed to seek leave to defend the suit, thus the suit was proceeded ex parte---Effect---Statement of account showed that no repayments had been made and therefore, the entire buyback price was recoverable from defendants---Bank, in addition to buyback price, was entitled to recover cost of funds from the date of default of each instalment till realization of entire buyback price---Defendant company created an equitable mortgage by way of deposit of title documents over its immovable property together with the buildings and structure constructed thereon---Equitable mortgage was evidenced by Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deeds---Defendants also executed their personal guarantees to secure the facilities---High Court in exercise of Banking jurisdiction, decreed the suit with mark-up and applicable rate of cost of funds to be recovered from defendants who were jointly and severally liable---Claim of liquidated damages was rejected---High Court directed to recover decretal sum through sale of mortgaged properties and assets of defendants---Suit was decreed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-20 of 2004, decision dated: 6-12-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB, J",
    "": "ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED--Plaintiff\nvs\nNORTHERN POLYETHYLENE LIMITED and others----Defendants\nNaveeDuLHaque for --Plaintiff."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12492",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2821 = 2006 SLD 2821 = 2006 CLD 1188",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-----Ss. 158 & 476---Failure to hold annual general meeting--Imposition of fine---Company which was required to hold its annual general meeting for relevant 'year within prescribed time, having failed to comply with said mandatory requirements, a show-cause notice was served on the company and its Directors including Chief Executive, calling upon them to show-cause as to why penalties as provided under Ss.158(4) & 476 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 may not be imposed on them, but no response was received to the said notice---Directors and Chief Executive had intentionally avoided appearance before Commission despite the fact that they were provided two opportunities of hearing by the Commission which they failed to avail---Effect---Company had failed to hold annual general meeting even after issuance of show-cause notice---Default, in circumstances was wilful and deliberate---Protection of investors/share-holders was one of the primary objectives of Companies Ordinance, 1984 as investors/share-holders provide seed for capital formation---If the interest of investors was protected they would save and invest more; their interest was protected by transmission of timely, adequate and meaningful information to them and it was annual and interim accounts which provide information to investors about the affairs of the Company---Annual general meeting was a forum where investors could freely speak, discuss and vote on important matters concerning approval of accounts, appointment of auditors, election of Directors etc.---Directors of the company had not observed said compulsory requirement of law---Default under subsection (1) of S.158 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 regarding non-holding of Annual General Meeting for the relevant year, stood established; however, instead of imposing maximum fine of Rs.50,000 on the company and every Director\"\" and a further fine of Rs.2,000 per day for the continuous default; fine of Rs.20,000 was imposed on Chief Executive and on each Director under S.158(4) of Companies Ordinance, 1984.\n \nNo one appeared.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/Enf-II/246/2005, dated January 26, 2006, decision dated: 5-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI AZEEM IKRAM, DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "In the matter of: Messrs CRESCENT KNITWEAR LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12493",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2822 = 2006 SLD 2822 = 2006 CLD 79",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---------Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Non-filing of counter affidavit ---Application for leave to appear and defend the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution, after the same had been argued thus the suit was decreed ex parte in favour of bank---Plea raised by defendant was that his application was supported by affidavit which had not been controverted---Validity---Even if leave application was to be dismissed for non-prosecution, yet while decreeing the suit of bank, Banking Court ought to have applied its mind to the facts of the case and adjudged, if the plaint was supported by statement of accounts and such documents on the basis of which suit of bank was justified---Claim of defendant in leave application and affidavit in that behalf had not been controverted---Banking Court, in a mechanical and sketchy manner had passed the decree, which did not reflect application of a judicial mind ---Ex ­parte decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for deciding the leave application afresh---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.372 of 2004, decision dated: 23rd December, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Syed ASAD ABBAS\nvs\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12494",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2823 = 2006 SLD 2823 = 2006 CLD 694",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)--------Ss. 245 & 476---Failure of Company to prepare and submit its quarterly accounts---Imposition of penalty---Company which under S.245 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 was required to prepare and transmit to the members and simultaneously file with Commission its quarterly accounts, having failed to do within prescribed time, a show-cause notice was served on Chief Executive and other Directors of the Company---Protection of investors/share-holders of the Company was one of the primary objectives of Companies Ordinance, 1984---If the interest of the investors was protected they would save and invest more and their interest could be protected by transmission of timely, adequate and meaningful information to them and it was the annual and interim accounts which could provide information to investors about the affairs of the Company---Default in preparing and transmitting quarterly account was considered wilful and deliberate---Chief Executive and Directors had failed to protect the interest of shareholders and the track record of the Company with regard to filing quarterly and annual account was also not satisfactory---Default under subsection (1) of S.245 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 regarding non-submission of quarterly accounts, stood established, in circumstances---However, instead of imposing maximum fine of Rs.100,000 on every Director, Rs.30,000 were imposed on Chief Executive and Rs.20,000 on each Director accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/Enf-II/291/2004 dated February, 28, 2006, decision dated: 10-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "DR. SAJID QURESHI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (CLD)",
    "": "In the matter of: Messrs ZAHUR TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12495",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2824 = 2006 SLD 2824 = 2006 CLD 800",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.9---Suit for recovery of finance provided for purchase of vehicle---Default in payment of instalments by customer---Suit by Bank for recovery of balance amount after taking possession of vehicle---Maintainability---Agreement between parties provided that on_ failure of customer to pay any instalment on its due date, Bank would become entitled to demand immediate payment of entire balance amount and take possession of vehicle and sell the same---Bank, after taking possession of vehicle sold same and credited its sale proceedings to customer's account---Bank, after taking possession of vehicle, was not left without any remedy regarding recovery of balance amount---Customer in leave application had not denied execution of documents, availing of finance facility and delivery of possession of vehicle to him---Suit was decreed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 89 of 2006, heard on 7-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "HAROON RASHID\nvs\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12496",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1523 = 2005 SLD 1523 = 2005 CLD 1367",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10---Leave to defend, grant of---Requirements---Leave to defend cannot be granted mechanically in each case and even if the leave to defend is granted, it has to be restricted to the specific issue raised by the defendant in his application for leave to defend---Concept of leave to defend requires that the defendant should come up with a positive defence of a particular fact which has to be supported by certain documentary evidence to convince the Court that there was sufficient ground for granting leave to defend---Mere denial of the execution of a deed will not be sufficient for the exercise of such discretion by the Court---Principles.\n \nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is a special statute and the Banking Courts are bound to follow summary procedure which is otherwise supported by the time tested Order XXXVII of the C.P.C. The leave to defend cannot be granted mechanically in each case and even if the leave to defend is granted, it has to be restricted to the specific issue raised by the defendant in his application for leave to defend. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 specifies certain special rules of evidence comprising of certain presumptions in favour of the plaintiffs and estoppels against the defendants. The concept of leave to defend requires that the defendant should come up with a positive defence of a particular fact which has to be supported by certain documentary evidence to convince the Court that there was sufficient ground for granting leave to defend. The mere denial of the execution of a deed will not be sufficient for the exercise of such discretion by the Court. Had there been any positive fact alleged in the application for leave to defend, the Court would have required the defendant to prove such fact but the mere denial required negative evidence and the negative proof of fact is difficult. The verbal denial of the agreement was disproved by the documentary evidence produced by the Bank and thus, the documentary evidence negated and nullified the oral negative assertion. The Courts have the authority in such cases to compare, prima facie, the signatures of the persons appearing on the loan documents and there, the Court had exercised the said discretion effectively.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----\n \n----Ss.22 & 24---Appeal---Condonation of delay---Impugned was passed on 22-9-2004 and the certified copies were issued on 9-12-2004 whereas the appeal was filed on 8-1-2005 which means that the appeal was filed on 31st day after the receipt of certified copies---Allegation that the application for copies was submitted on 22-9-2004 and not on 27-9-2004 was not supported by any documentary evidence except an affidavit and that too, by the counsel for the appellant, that the contents of the application were correct and nothing had been concealed from the Court---Any documentary proof or the copy of the application containing the date of application should have been produced which could indicate the date of receipt of application and the probable date on which the copy was likely to be ready---No such documentary evidence was furnished---Appellant, had to prove the delay of each single day to be entitled for condonation but in the present case, there were mere statements or denials, without any proof which could not be relied upon---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No.2 of 2005, decision dated: 21st March, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "EJAZ AFZAL KHAN AND MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF\nvs\nHABIB BANK LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12497",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1524 = 2005 SLD 1524 = 2005 CLD 1229",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)-------S. 34---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 100---Appeal to High Court---Scope---Allegation of default by member of Stock Exchange in selling the shares---Concurrent findings of the Single as well as Division Bench of the Securities and Exchange Commission before whom all relevant documents were produced which were duly considered and discussed by them---None of the documents or signatures of (he appellant thereupon produced before the Commission in original as well as before Appellate Authority was ever disputed by the appellant and these documents which were maintained by the Stock Exchange or its members in usual course of business were rightly given due credit by the Commission---Appeal to High Court under S.34, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 being a second appeal, its scope was governed by S.100, C.P.C.---Principles---Concurrent findings of fact by a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction as specialized agency appointed by the Government could not be interfered with in second appeal merely for the reason that on re-appraisal of certain documents or factual submissions, a different decision could have possibly been taken---Ending of fact by a specialized Tribunal, except of course which were patently without any. material available on record, could not be disturbed in second appeal nor a fresh re-appraisal of the evidence brought on record could be undertaken unless one of the three conditions as contained in S.100, C.P.C. were answered---Appellant having failed to agitate the impugned decision on any of the three grounds warranting interference in second appeal by High Court, his appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.7 of 2002, decision dated: 30-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR, J",
    "": "FAYYAZ AHMAD\nvs\nMUHAMMAD SARFRAZ GHUMMAN and 2 others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12498",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1525 = 2005 SLD 1525 = 2005 CLD 868",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Bank at the request of borrowing company opened Letter of Credit for import of goods, while other defendant stood guarantor for repayment of amount---Goods arrived in Pakistan, but defendants, did not repay the amount---Banking Court decreed suit after dismissing leave application of defendants---Plea of defendants was that goods were of perishable nature, which perished due to delay in its arrival, thus Bank could not claim amount from them--­Validity---Bank had paid amount to corresponding Bank abroad and goods had reached Pakistan---As per documents placed on record, defendants as principal and surety respectively were bound to pay suit amount to Bank upon demand---Constitutional petition appended with appeal showed that goods were not released on account of tripartite dispute between defendants inter se and Customs Department, which claimed that goods belonged to another person, who owed money to Department---Such Constitutional petition was decided with consent, whereby guarantor-defendant agreed to release of goods to borrowing company---Department had consented to such arrangement on basis of letter addressed to Bank requesting for release of goods to borrowing company---High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.291 of 1998, heard on 16-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BUKHARI, JJ",
    "": "ZAFAR & COMPANY through Sheikh RiaZ-uD-Din and another\nvs\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12499",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1526 = 2005 SLD 1526 = 2005 CLD 1235",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)------Ss. 46, 117 & 129---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 79 & O. VII, R. 11---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 189---Suit for injunction against infringement of trade mark, passing of; damages and account of profits-Plaintiff, impleaded the party alleged to be infringing the trade mark and the Collector of Customs (Appraisement) but failed to implead Federal Government in the suit---Validity---If a suit was filed against the Government, the suit should have been filed in the name of Federal Government as per provision of S.79, C.P.C.---Suit, in circumstances, without making the Federal Government or Provincial Government as party was not maintainable and was violative of S. 79, C.P.C. and Art. 189 of the Constitution---Suit . being hit by the said provisions of law, plaint was rejected under O. VII, R.11, C.P.C. \n \nProvince of Punjab v. Muhammad Hussain PLD 1993 SC 147 and Haji Abdul Aziz v. Government of Balochistan 1999 SCMR 16 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.347 of 2005, decision dated: 26-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAHMAT HUSSAIN, JAFFERI, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD YOUNUS SHAIKH--Plaintiff\nvs\nCOREX ENTERPRISES and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12500",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1527 = 2005 SLD 1527 = 2005 CLD 1237",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss.20 & 118---Recovery of bank loan---Blank documents---Effect---Borrowers denied restructuring/renewal of original financial facility and also objected to the documents filed by bank on the ground of being blank---Validity---According to restructured schedule borrowers were to pay total outstanding liabilities in 60 instalments and they had paid 10 such instalments---Bank at the time of filing of suit reduced the liability of borrowers by adjusting the amount paid in those 10 instalments---Such fact was sufficient to indicate that the agreement was not only executed and signed by borrowers but the same was also implemented by depositing the agreed instalments in their account---High Court declined to hold that borrowers did not execute the agreement with bank---Even if f it be taken that the documents were signed, when those were blank, borrowers in view of Ss.20 and 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, were estopped from challenging legality, genuineness and enforceability of those documents-Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court did not suffer from any legal error and the same was maintained by High Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nMushtaq Ahmad Vohra v. Crescent Investment Bank Limited 2005 CLD 444 and Habib Bank Ltd. v. A.B. M. Graner (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2001 Kar. 264 distinguished.\n \nBank of Khyber v. Messrs Spencer Distribution Ltd. and 14 others 2003 CLD 1406; Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Hashim Paracha and another PLD 1987 Kar. 76; S.K. Abdul Aziz v. Mahmoodul Hassan and 3 others 1988 CLC 337; Haji Karim and another v. Zikar Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Messrs Gujrat Friends Traders and others PLD 1988 Lah. 166; Messrs United Bank Limited v. President Bazm-e-Salat and another PLD 1986 Kar. 464; Bazm­e-Salat and others v. Messrs United Bank Limited PLD 1989 Kar. 150; Prudential Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hydari Ghee Industries Ltd. and 9 others 1999 MLD 1964 and Messrs Bank of Oman Limited v. Messrs East Asia Trading Co. Ltd. 4 others 1987 CLC 288 ref.\n \nWaqar Mushtaq Ahmad for Appellants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.923 of 2001, heard on 30-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ARSHAD and another\nvs\nCITIBANK, N.A. through Attorney Muhammad Shariq Butt, Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12501",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2835 = 2003 SLD 2835 = 2003 CLD 908",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---------S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.69--­Specific Relief Act (1 of 1877), S.12---Execution of decree--­Sale of mortgaged property through auction---Stoppage of auction on the intervention of appellant---Locus standi of appellant---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, pendency of---Appellant had filed the suit alleging that the -debtor had agreed to sell the mortgaged property to her and had received major portion of consideration amount with delivery of possession to her--­Appellant intended to deposit the decretal amount and had sought stoppage of auction under O.XXI, R.69, C.P.C.--­Judgment-debtor resisted the application and denied execution of any such agreement---Application under O.XXI, .R.69, C.P.C. was dismissed by the Executing Court on the ground that the appellant had no locus standi to file the same as no legal title had yet been transferred in favour of the appellant---Validity---If the suit of the appellant was decreed, the same would establish that the appellant was entitled to a conveyance of title in her favour as per the terms agreed between her and the -debtor---As a consequence, the right to title would date back to the agreement even though the decree might be passed at a subsequent date---As ,the appellant had offered to pay off. the outstanding amount to satisfy the decree obtained by the Bank, the -debtor could not have any objection, if the decretal debt was satisfied and the property was saved from auction--Respective rights of the appellant and the -debtor in respect of disputed property would remain unaffected and would be decided by the Civil Court before whom the appellant's suit for specific performance was pending adjudication---Order of Executing Court was set aside and auction was stopped with a condition of deposit of decretal amount---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.443 of 2002, heard on 21st November, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. NAZIRAN BIBI\nvs\nCITI BANK N.A. and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12502",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2836 = 2003 SLD 2836 = 2003 CLD 590",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Failure of defendant to pay instalments on its due dates as per terms of loan agreement---Plea of defendant was that suit was premature as on such dates, entire amount claimed had not become due or payable---Validity---Bank had an option can either to file suit for recovery of due instalments only or cancel facilities and demand immediate payment of entire loan---Bank had rightly filed the suit.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 17(3)(4)---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 9 & 18(3)(4)--­Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984) Art. 17(2)(a)---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Defendant alleged guarantee document, letter of hypothecation and deed of floating charge to be void for having been attested and executed prior to coming into force of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 and Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Both Act, 1997 and Ordinance, 2001 had specifically saved documents required to be attested under Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, if same had been executed prior to enforcement thereof---Attestation of guarantee and hypothecation by two witnesses not required under Ordinance, 2001---Such documents executed in year 1988 could not be held void, inoperative and of no legal effect--­Such plea was repelled being devoid of any legal force.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.674 of 1995, decision dated: 4-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. --Plaintiff\nvs\nMessrs ALFAHM TEXTILE MILLS LTD. and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12503",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2068 = 2002 SLD 2068 = 2002 CLD 622",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----Ss. 18 & 21---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. X36, Rr.66, 67 & 90---Execution of decree---Appellants filed objection petition under O. Off, Rr.66,67 & 90 for setting aside the auction of property---Executing Court directed appellants to deposit 2096 of auction price within one month-- Appellants failed to comply with such order even within the extended time, thus, objection petition was dismissed---Validity---Order dismissing objection petition was not open to exception in such circumstances---Appeal was dismissed being without merits.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.558 of 2001, heard on 23rd January, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs RADIEUX (PRIVATE) LIMITED through\nChief Executive and 6 others\nvs\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF\nPAKISTAN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12504",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1FpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2069 = 2002 SLD 2069 = 2002 CLD 186",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.15(2)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199--­Constitutional petition---Decree for recovery of amount--­Banking Court refused to grant relief of all time mark-up to petitioners under Incentive Scheme (Circular dated 24-3-1999)---Validity---Controversial question of accounts being involved in the case, High Court, with agreement of parties, disposed of the Constitutional petition with directions to Banking Court to determine the liability, if any, of petitioners according to terms of Circular dated 24-3-1999 issued by Bank after taking into account the amounts already deposited by them in their accounts and under orders of Banking Court and High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 6913 of 1999, heard on 18-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Messrs MAHPARA GARMENTS through Proprietor and anothers\nvs\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN\nand another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12505",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1F5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2070 = 2002 SLD 2070 = 2002 CLD 188",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S.92---Public charities---Filing of suit under S.92, C.P.C.--­Object and scope ---Reliefs which can be obtained by decree in such suit are removal of trustee; appointment of new trustee; vesting of any property in trustee; directing for accounts and inquiries; declaration of the proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein allocated to particular object of the trust; authorizing the whole 'or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; setting of a scheme; or granting such further or other reliefs as the nature of the case may require---Question whether suit or proceeding falls within S.92, C.P.C. depends not upon the character in which the plaintiff sues, but upon the nature of the relief sought.\n \nPramatha Nath Mullick v: Pradhyumma Kumar Mullick and another AIR 1925 PC 139; Janaki Bai Ammal v. Sri Triuchitrambala Vinayakar of Melman AIR 1935 Mad. 825; Raje Anandrao v. Shamrao AIR 1961 SC 1206; Mehboob Elahi v. K.M. Idrees PLD 1955 Lah. 242 and Charan Singh and another v. Darshan Singh and others AIR 1975 SC 371 ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (AL VII of 1984)---\n \n----S.290---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.92---Oppression and mismanagement of companies---Application to Court--­Proceedings initiated by trust alleging mismanagement and oppression of minority shareholder---Validity---Where the relief asked for in the proceedings was not similar to that mentioned in cls. (a) to (b) of S.92, C.P.C., such proceedings would not be subject to the permission from the Trust merely because the character of the petitioner/plaintiff was a Trust --- Ground urged for want of sanction was not tenable in circumstances.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S.290---Prevention of oppression and mismanagement--­Application to Court---Locus standi---Shares were purchased by petitioner but full amount had not been paid---Objection was raised by the respondents to maintainability of the application--­Validity---Where the shares stood transferred and registered in the name of the petitioner purportedly purchased from the share­holders, if full amount had not been paid, the remedy was by way of suit; but the entitlement to file application under S.290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, could not be challenged by asserting that the petitioner had not acquired 2096 shares to qualify it to move to the Court---Objection was repelled in circumstance.\n \nShiromani Sugar Mills Limited v. Debi Parasad AIR 1950 All. 508 distinguished.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S.290 ---Chcu-itable Endowments Act (VI of 1890), Ss. 5(1) & 10 -­-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.V7, R.17 --- Prevention of oppression and mism nagement --- Application by Trust Foundation---Maintainability---Federal Government by Notification dated 25-10-1977, under S.10 of the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, divested the treasurer of the property of Foundation/Trust and vested the same in the Committee of Administration---On divestment of the treasurer, the property of the Trust, vested in the person or persons acting in the administration thereof and be deemed to be held by him or them on the same terms on which it was held by such treasurer--­Application under S.290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, was fled by the Trust---Validity---Where the 'Committee of Administration' under the Scheme framed by the Federal Government held the property of the Trust for the same purpose and on the same Trusts, the powers of the Committee were analogous to the powers of the treasurer with right to sue and to be sued while administering the Trust property as Trustees--- Foundation was constituted under Scheme approved by the Federal Government under S.5(1) of the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890---In case the proceedings were initiated in the name of Committee of Administration, the same would be a case of mis­description to be remedied through an application for amendment of title under O.VI, R.17, C.P.C.---Proper description for the proceedings was in the name of the Foundation-- Application filed in the name of the Trust was maintainable in circumstances.\n \nTreasurer of Endowments for Pakistan v. Inamur Rehman Alvi 2000 CLC 135 ref.\n \n(e) Words and phrases---\n \n--\"\"Trust\"\" and \"\"trustees\"\"---Distinction--Both \"\"Trust\"\" and \"\"Trustee\"\" are two distinct and separate identities---Trust has no juristic personality, whereas, the Trustee has the position of corporate sole.\n \n(f) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S.290---Prevention of oppression and. mismanagement--­Application to Court---Persons authorised to file the application--­Class of persons who may approach the Court by petition, for prevention of oppression and mismanagement are categorized as any member or members holding not less than twenty per cent of the issued share capital; a creditor or creditors having interest equivalent in amount to not less than twenty per cent of the paid-up capital of the Company and the Registrar.\n \n(g) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)----\n \n----S.290---Prevention of oppression and mismanagement--­Jurisdiction of Court---Object---Provisions under S.290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, give power to the Court to save a company from winding up by making a suitable order, which is an alternative remedy to the winding up.\n \nGeneral Development and Housing Corporation v. Ghulam Mustafa and others 1987 MLD 413 and Muhammad Fakree and 3 others v. Fakree Development Corporation Limited and 8 others 1992 MLD 668 ref.\n \n(h) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss.290, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414 & 415---Prevention of oppression and mismanagement---Proceedings before Court--­Proceedings under S.290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, cannot be confined to the provisions of S.410 to S.415 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984.\n \nRegistrar of Companies, Pakistan through Joint Registrar of Companies v. Taj Company Limited and 8 others 1993 CLC 1413 and Muhammad Yousuf v. Taj Company 1994 CLC 403 ref.\n \n(i) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss.158(2), 290 & 305(b)---Prevention of oppression and mismanagement---Failure to hold Annual General Meeting at a place where of we was registered---Petitioner raised such plea in the petition under S.290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984--­-Factum of holding of Annual General Meeting up to the year 1998 was not denied and the same was confirmed by the Registrar--­ Meeting pertaining to the year 1999 was held in foreign country (London) and the meeting for the year 2000 could not be held, due to non-availability of the Directors --- Effect --- Where the company was a private company, there was no bar of holding such meeting at any other place than in town of the registered office, though in respect of the listed company (public limited company), the Annual General Meeting had to be held in the town of registered office in terms of S.158(2) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984--- Company would be deemed to be under mismanagement if failed to convene two consecutive General Meetings in terms of S.305(b) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984--- Petition, in the present case, was filed before expiry of the time for holding meeting for the year 2000, thus the ground for not holding two consecutive meetings was not available to the petitioner in circumstances.\n \nMalik Muhammad Ishaque represented by 9 Heirs and 11 others v. Messrs Erose Theatre, Karachi and 26 others PLD 1973 Kar. 52; Ganga Prasad v. Prem Kumar Kohli AIR 1949 All. 173 and Sardar Begum v. Muhammad Aslam 1989 SCMR 704 ref.\n \n(j) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S.290---Prevention of oppression and mismanagement-----Application to Court---Disputed question of fact---Where contention of petitioner was not supported by comments of Registrar, such fact had become disputed and required detailed inquiry and. the same could not be gone into by Company Judge in circumstances.\n \nHabib Bank Limited v. Messrs Golden Plastic Company\n \nLimited 1991 MLD 124 and Salahuddin Khan v. Al-Mansoor PLD 1987 Lah. 569 ref.\n \n(k) Companies Ordinance (XLVH of 1984)------\n \n----S.290---Term 'oppression'---Connotation---Loss of confidence between group of shareholders---Term \"\"oppression\"\" has not been defined in Companies Ordinance, 1984, and it is left to the Court to decide on the facts of each case whether there is such oppression which calls for action under S.290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Question in each case is whether the conduct of the affairs of a company by the majority shareholders is oppressive to the minority shareholders and the same depends upon the facts proved in a particular case---Not enough to show that there is just and equitable cause for order under S.290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Mere loss of confidence between groups of shareholders does not come within the mischief of S.290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, unless it is shown that such lack of confidence has sprung from a desire to oppress the minority in the management of the Company's affairs and that there is at least an element of lack of probity and fair dealing to a member in the matter of this proprietary right as a shareholder.\n \nMohan Lal Chandumall and others v. Punjab Company Limited, Bhatinda and others AIR 1961 Punj. 485 and Shanti Prasad Jain v. Kalinga Tubes Limited and others AIR 1965 SC 1535 ref.\n \n(l) Companies Ordinance (XLW of 1984)---\n \n----S.290---Prevention of oppression and mismanagement---Proceedings before Companies Judge---Territorial jurisdiction--­Court has no jurisdiction over the persons residing in foreign country (England) but has jurisdiction over the person though residing in different Provinces regarding matter connected with the company and its asset---Petition is maintainable against directors of company, who are residing in Pakistan.\n \nBishadendu Gupta v. H. Langham Reed and others AIR 1937 Pat. 196 rel.\n \n(m) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S.290---Prevention of oppression and mismanagement in affairs of company ---Returns not properly filed by respondents--­Application under S.290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, was filed by the petitioner on the ground that some returns filed by the respondents were not properly filed and were not accepted and deficiencies were not removed---Validity---Such vague statement could hardly be sufficient material to form. an opinion that affairs of the company were being mismanaged---Petitioner had failed to bring on record the material to form an opinion by High Court that the affairs of the company were being mismanaged and/or any oppression was caused to the minority shareholders---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nThe Sheriff of Bombay v. Hakimji Motaji & Co. AIR 1927 Born. 521; Secretary, B. & R. v. Fazal Ali Khan PLD 1971 Kar. 625; Fauji Foundation v. Shameem-ur-Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457; Shameem-ur-Rehman v. Fauji Foundation 1992 SCMR 1496; Muhammad Sharif v. Mahmood and another 1984 CLC 2380; Secretary-cum-Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department, Government of Balochistan, Quetta and 2 others v. Ghulam Muhammad Khan and another 1986 CLC 2987; Messrs Capital Farms, Islamabad v. National Development Finance Corporation PLD 1996 Lah. 99; Habibullah v. Ali Muhammad 1986 CLC 1227 and Ali Mohataram Naqvi v. Messrs Cogefar-Astaldi Sidmail PLD 1986 Kar. 574 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 19 to 21 of 2000, decision dated: 18-05-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "Messrs SHAHEEN FOUNDATION-\nvs\nMessrs CAPITAL F.M. (PVT.) LIMITED\nand others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12506",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1F5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2071 = 2002 SLD 2071 = 2002 CLD 1",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.18(6) & 21---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)---Execution of decree for recovery of Bank loan--¬Ratable distribution of assets of -debtor---Property of -debtor was sold in execution of decree--¬Executing Court accepted applications of a few objectors holding them entitled to ratable distribution of such sale proceeds---Bank challenged the order in revision petitions before High Court with a prayer that if such petitions were not competent, then those be treated as Intra-Court appeals---High Court dismissed revision petitions being not maintainable---Contention of Bank was that impugned order being final was appeal able under S.21 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997; and if the view of High Court was accepted, then an order depriving, decree-holder of fruits of decree, howsoever unreasonable or arbitrary it may be, could not be rectified or redressed against, as no remedy against same would be available under any law---Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider such contention of petitioner raising a question of general importance.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Advances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.5---Judge of High Court acting as Banking Court--¬Effect---When a Judge of High Court is nominated by Chief Justice for expeditious disposal of the cases under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, such Judge acts as Banking Court and any order passed by him as such Court is in the capacity of a Banking Court and not the High Court in its ordinary jurisdiction.\n \nPakistan Fisheries Limited v. United Bank Limited PLD 1993 SC 109; Messrs Tank Steel and Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Limited, Dera Ismail Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 77 and Messrs Tri-Star Polyster Limited and another v. Citibank 2001 SCMR 410 ref.\n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.18(6)(a)---Investigation of claims---Provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Applicability---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Preamble---Objections in respect of attachment of any property whether mortgaged, pledged or not, could be filed under the provisions of S.18(6)(a) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 and not under the C.P.C. as the provisions of the C.P.C. have been excluded by the non obstante clause of its subsection.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss.18(5) & 18(6)---Execution of decree---Objection petition, filing of---Investigation of claim regarding attached property- --Remedy against---Where objection petitions are filed under S.18(6) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, orders passed thereon , would be appeal able under S.18(5) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of. Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997.\n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----5.18(6)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.73--¬Proceeds of execution-sale---Ratable distribution---Principles---For ratable distribution, it is necessary that the assets must be held by the Court; there should be more than one person who have money decrees in their favour against the same -debtor and application should be made before the receipt of assets by the executing Court.\n \n(f Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.18(6)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.2(2)(3) & 73---Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936), S.15---Proceeds of execution-sale---Ratable distribution---Suit for recovery of Bank loan was decreed in favour of the financial institution- --Banking Court, at the time of execution of the decree entertained two applications for ratable distribution of the proceeds of execution-sale---One application was filed by a labour leader who was a decree-holder from Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and the second application was filed by Customs Authorities on the basis of protection provided under S.73(3), C.P.C.---Revision against the order passed by Judge of High Court as Banking Court was dismissed by Division Bench of High Court---Plea raised by the decree-holder was that the objectors were not 'decree-holders' within the meaning of S.2(3), C.P.C., therefore, they could not invoke provisions of S.73, C.P.C.--¬Validity---Division Bench of High Court, in the present case, did not ascertain as to whether the application qualified the requirements of S.73, C.P.C.---Objectors were not decree¬ holders as no decree had been passed by any Court in their favour---Direction/order issued by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, for the recovery of wages was not a decree within the meaning of S.2(2), C.P.C. and as such, application could not be treated to be an application under S.73, C.P.C.---Such objectors could only resort to execute the order of the Authority in the manner prescribed in the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 itself---Order passed by the Division Bench of High Court was set aside and the case was remanded to the Division Bench of High Court for decision afresh.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos.897 and 898 of 1999, decision dated: 29-05-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD BASHIR, JEHANGIRI, ACTG. C.J., CH. MUHAMMAD ARIF AND MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL, JJ",
    "": "PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LIMITED, Peshawar High Court CANTT. and others\nVs.\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Collector Customs, Customs House, Jamrod Road, Peshawar High Court and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12507",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1F5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2072 = 2002 SLD 2072 = 2002 CLD 46",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) SsA2 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) ¬Law Reforms Ordinance (X11 of 1972), S.3 Intra Court Appeal Recovery of Bank loan Setting aside of decree ¬Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. Failure to file appeal under S.21 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Effect Appellants were party to suit and filed their written statement Witnesses were neither cross examined by the appellants nor they led any evidence in rebuttal Case of the respondent had gone unrebutted and unchallenged as the same was based on documentary evidence which had not been seriously disputed by the appellants, rather it was admitted by them Banking Court decreed the suit against the appellants which was assailed by the appellant application under S.12(2), C.P.C. Such application w dismissed by the Banking Court Appellants assailed t e and decree passed by the Banking Court as well as the order dismissing the application under S.12(2), C.P.C. in the Intra Court appeal Validity Instead of filing appeal under S.21 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits arid Finances) Act, 1997, at the proper time, the appellants preferred applications under S.12 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 and under S.12(2), C.P.C. ¬High Court, in intra Court appeal declined to interfere with the and order passed by the Banking Court Intra Court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.9 Modarba (Floatation and Control) Ordinance (XXXI of 1980), preamble Notification No.F.48(7)/80 A(11), dated 30 12 1986 Suit for recovery of Bank loan against Modarba management company Banking Court ¬Jurisdiction Doctrine of de facto Applicability Objection was raised to the jurisdiction of Banking Court on the ground that under Notification No. 48(7)/80 A(11), dated 30 12 1986, the jurisdiction against Modarba company was vested only in the Tribunal constituted under the Notification Validity Although by virtue of the Notification the Tribunal was empowered to try all cases under the provisions of Modarba (Floatation and Control) Ordinance, 1980, yet the Notification was neither brought to the notice of the Banking Court nor any such application was filed by any of the parties to the suit Suit, in the present case, proceeded all along without any objection or application for its transfer to the newly created Tribunal Where the Banking Court bona fide passed and decree on merits, the same was protected under the doctrine of de facto Judgment and decree based on bona fides and on merits should be assumed to have been passed de jure and would be deemed to possess all attributes of a lawful operative and binding order.\n \nJaved Iqbal v. Kh. Muhammad Arif 1999 SCMR 13 and Mehmood Khan Achakzai v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 426 rel.\n \n(c) De facto, doctrine of \n \n Connotation Doctrine of de facto is based on higher consideration of public policy and is calculated to ensure continuity to avoid dislocation and to prevent confusion in the conduct of public affairs on the one hand, and the safeguard of public and private rights emerging from the de facto act of officer performing functions of the State in the ordinary course, on the other Doctrine of de facto is a well recognized rule embedded in the jurisprudence Under the doctrine of de facto, bona fide acts in public interest performed by persons assuming authority, which turn out to be illegal, are assumed to have been performed by a de jure authority/person and are binding Acts of officers de facto performed by them within the scope of their assumed official authority in the interest of public or third person and not for their own benefit, are generally as valid and binding as if they were the acts of officers de jure.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.38 of 1999, decision dated: 15-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL BASIT ZAHID and another --Appellants\nVs.\nMODARABA AL TIJARAH and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12508",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1F5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2073 = 2002 SLD 2073 = 2002 CLD 53",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes Two statutes on same subject Effect If provisions of later Act are so inconsistent with or repugnant to those of earlier Act, then earlier stands impliedly repealed by the later.\n \nMessrs Tank Steel and Re Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd.. Dera Ismail Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 77 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.2(a) National Development Finance Corporation Act (XVIII of 1 9 73), S.25 National Development Finance Corporation, a banking company Provisions of S.25 of the National Development Finance Corporation Act, 1973, whereby the Corporation was not deemed to be a banking company for the purpose of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, stood impliedly repealed by S.2(a) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Corporation was competent to file suits for recovery of loans invoking the jurisdiction of Banking Court under the provisions of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.2(a) & 9 National Development Finance Corporation Act (XVIII of 1973), Ss.15 & 25 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Maintainability National Development Finance Corporation, a banking company was a body corporate which was transacting business of advancing loan to various enterprises in Pakistan Credit agreement and other documents, executed by the borrower company established the nature of the Corporation's business and the relationship between the Corporation and the company -Objection was raised to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the Corporation was not a banking company under S.25 of the National Development Finance Corporation Act, 1973 and under the provisions of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 Validity From the perusal of the definition of the 'Banking Company' as given in S.2(a)(i)(ii) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, the Corporation was covered by the definition of a 'Banking Company' ¬Contention that Corporation was not a Banking Company as defined in the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, was irrelevant because the definition of a Banking Company given in the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, could not be taken into account for determining whether or not the plaintiff was a 'Banking Company' for the purpose of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Suit was maintainable in circumstances.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.8 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Limitation ¬Provisions of S.8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 ¬Applicability Limitation prescribed under S.8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances. Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, was for filing of suit for recovery of any amount which was written off, released, adjusted under any agreement or was due on account of withdrawal of any suit or proceedings Where the case of the defendant Company did not fall under any of the categories enumerated in S.8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, suit was not barred by time.\n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.10 Leave to defend suit Failure to raise serious and bona fide dispute Effect Where the borrower company had failed to raise serious and bona fide dispute warranting the grant of leave to defend the suit, the application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed.\n \n(f) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.9 & 10 National Development Finance Corporation Act (XVIII of 1973), S.15 Suit for recovery of Bank loan ¬Leave to defend suit refused Corporation had placed on record the photo copies of all the documents, on the basis of which they had filed the suit- Execution of the documents had not been specifically denied by the borrower company even in their application for grant of leave Effect -Execution of all the documents was admitted and statement of accounts was duly verified/ certified under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, which was also on record, to which presumption of correctness was attached As a consequence of the dismissal of the application for the grant of leave to defend the suit, the allegations made in the plaint would be deemed to have been admitted Where there was no rebuttal of the documents on record, the suit would be decreed.\n \nMessrs Tank Steel and Re Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Dera Ismail Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 77 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Suit No. 74 of 2000, decision dated: 23rd July, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION --Plaintiff\nVs.\nSPINNING MACHINERY COMPANY OF PAKISTAN LIMITED --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12509",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1F5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2074 = 2002 SLD 2074 = 2002 CLD 94",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Islamic Jurisprudence Banking in Islam Mark up on mark up Scope Mark up cannot be allowed like interest recurring on the interest ¬bearing loan, as the same is in total negation of the mark up system of finance introduced by abolishing interest based loans of the banking companies.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872) \n \n S. 74 Liquidated damages Proof Damages to be awarded under S.74 of the Contract Act, 1872, demand proof of actual loss through evidence.\n \n(c) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.11(4) Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 74 Liquidated damages Non awarding of Grievance of the Bank was that the Banking Tribunal refused to award the liquidated damages, charges, costs and mark up while passing decree in favour of the Bank Validity No evidence was either presented or sought to be presented by the Bank regarding liquidated damages Only on failure of Judgment debtor to pay the decretal amount, the liquidated damages under S.11(4) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, were permissible at the discretion of the Tribunal Liquidated damages, if allowed automatically, would amount to charging of interest, thereby defeating the intent and purpose of legal change introduced in Banking Laws ¬Where no reasons to seek such discretion from the Tribunal were given nor did any occasion thereto arise, the Tribunal would be justified in refusing to award liquidated damages to the Bank Bank failed to produce any evidence on record for other charges and costs and the same was denied by the borrower, therefore, the Bank was not entitled to claim such costs or charges Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 365 of 1997, heard on 4-06-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR ALAM KHAN AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nJASARAT HUSSAIN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12510",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1F5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2075 = 2002 SLD 2075 = 2002 CLD 97",
    "Key Words:": "Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) Ss.91 & 92 Auction of property mortgaged with Bank ¬Rights of person who had purchased property for valuable consideration Property had been placed in the auction pool after the original suit filed by the mortgagee Bank was decreed by the Trial Court Persons who claimed to have purchased the property for valuable consideration, made statement that they were prepared to deposit the amount due under the decree as recoverable by the Bank Said purchasers of the property under a registered sale deed, having an interest in property were protected under Ss.91 & 92 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Purchaser of property could clear the liability and as \"\"subrogagee\"\" could acquire the rights of the Bank with whom the property was mortgaged, by subrogation and by the operation of law ¬Purchasers of property would move a separate application before the Trial Court where the suit was pending and Court after hearing the parties would decide the matter as to possession of property.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Civil Appeal No.D 3 of 2001, decision dated: 19-07-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERVEZ AND MUHAMMAD AFZAL SOOMRO, JJ",
    "": "Dr. BHAGWANDAS and another --Appellants\nVs.\nMessrs HABIB BANK LIMITED, LARKANA and another --Respondents\nEast and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. PLD 1963 SC 663 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12511",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1F5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2076 = 2002 SLD 2076 = 2002 CLD 102",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) S.41 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 ¬Constitutional petition Banking Company Directions issued by State Bank of Pakistan in exercise of powers under S.41 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 ¬Legality Directions issued by State Bank of Pakistan were neither to prevent the affairs of any Banking Company from being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of depositors, or in a manner prejudicial to the interest of Banking Company which rendered all Commercial Banks, nor the same were issued to secure proper management of any Banking Company Contention of the petitioner was that the directive issued by the State Bank of Pakistan was against the provisions of 5:41 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 Validity Only ground on which direction could be issued was 'the public interest' Where the directive did not mention as to how the same was in the public interest rather the same was directly against the interest of the depositors, such directive was in violation of S.41 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 19.62 Direction issued by the State Bank of Pakistan was without lawful authority and the same was set aside in circumstances.\n \nIn the present case the impugned order (directive) does not expressly mention for what purpose or object, the direction has been issued. It can, however, be gathered from the contents of the order that the direction has not been issued \"\"to prevent the affairs of any Banking Company from being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the depositors, or in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Banking Company\"\" which include all the Commercial Banks in this case. The direction has also not been issued \"\"to secure the proper management of any Banking Company generally.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The only other ground on which a direction can be issued is \"\"the public interest\"\". The impugned order does not mention as to how the direction is in the public interest., Section 41, Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 provides that a direction can be issued to safeguard the interest of the depositors. It cannot, therefore, be issued to the detriment to the interest of depositors and the impugned order does exactly the same. The direction contained in the impugned order is directly against the interest of the depositors. The impugned order, and the direction therein, is, thus, in violation of the law itself, viz. section 41 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, under which the. order has been issued. It was, therefore, declared that the impugned order/direction had been issued without lawful authority and was of no legal effect.\"",
    "URL Link:": "Constitutional Petition No.D 1491 and Miscellaneous No.3938 of 2001, decision dated: 30-07-2001.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "S.A. RABBANI AND M. MUSA K. LEGHARI, JJ",
    "Court Name:": "Kamal Azfar for Petitioner.\nIjaz Ahmed for Respondent.",
    "Law and Sections:": "Messrs UNIVERSAL LEASING CORPORATION LTD. er\nVs.\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12512",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1F5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2077 = 2002 SLD 2077 = 2002 CLD 116",
    "Key Words:": "Small Business Finance Corporation Act (XXIX of 1972) Ss. 20, 21 & 22 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional petition Repayment of loan ¬Recovery of mark up/interest Petitioners being customers of Corporation had obtained loan with their free consent and had executed agreements in that respect with the Corporation Petitioners, who were liable to return the loan, did not dispute their liability to repay the principal amount, but had asserted that as interest/mark up had been declared by Federal Shariat Court as well as Supreme Court against Injunctions of Islam, they were not liable to pay the interest Interest/mark up though in any form had been declared against Injunctions of Islam, but its recovery had not been disallowed in past and closed transactions Petitioners, in circumstances, were liable to repay the amount as per agreement executed with the Corporation alongwith agreed interest/mark up.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 764 of 2001 /BWP, heard on 21st May, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHEIKH ABDUR RAZZAQ, J",
    "": "NUSRAT ALI ANJUM er\nVs.\nSMALL BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION, RAHIM YAR KHAN through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12513",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1F5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2078 = 2002 SLD 2078 = 2002 CLD 137",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.21(1) Appeal Scope Order or decision not falling within the definition of the decree/order/sentence as specified in S.21(1) of the Act cannot be challenged by way of an appeal under S.21 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art.l99 Constitutional petition Interlocutory order ¬Constitutional petition against such order Maintainability ¬Where statute does not provide appeal against interlocutory order, then the same cannot be challenged by way of a Constitutional petition as allowing such an order to be impugned by way of a Constitutional petition would amount to negating the provisions of the statute which 'does not provide for an appeal against an interlocutory order.\n \nSyed Saghir Ahmed Naqvi v. Province of Sindh and another 1996 SCMR 1165 and Muhammad Iftikhar Mohmand v. Javed Muhammad and 3 others 1998 SCMR 328 ref.\n \n(c) Interpretation of statutes \n \n Object of statute Duty of Court Court should not act in a manner by which the object of a statute is defeated and the same is rendered nugatory.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0.1, R.10 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Constitutional petition Maintainability Assailing order of Banking Court passed on application under O.I, R.10, C.P.C., in Constitutional jurisdiction Validity Where Banking Court had passed separate order on application under O.I, R.10, C.P.C. filed by the petitioner, the same could easily be made ground for attack in the appeal to be filed against the final Constitutional petition was not maintainable in circumstances.\n \nBolan Bank Limited v. Capricorn Enterprise (Pvt.) Limited 1998 SCMR 1961; Muhammad Ayub Butt v. Allied Bank Limited PLD 1981 SC 359 and Pakistan v. Special Court (Banking), Sindh and others 1991 SCMR 2355 ref.\n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.7 & 9 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979), Ss.6 & 7 Provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 and Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 Comparison Nature of the case, procedure to be followed and the powers to be exercised in deciding case by a Banking Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, are similar and analogous to the corresponding provisions and powers conferred on the Special Court constituted under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1979.\n \n(f) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.7 & 9 Civil, Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115 ¬ Constitution. of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Constitutional petition Conversion of Constitutional petition into petition under S.115, C.P.C. Order on application under 0.1, R.10, C.P.C. was passed by Banking Court Plea raised by the petitioner was that as the order was under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the Constitutional petition be converted into revision petition under S.115, C.P.C. ¬Validity Where the order was passed under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and not under the provisions of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, the same could have been challenged under 5.115, C.P.C. Petitioner, in the present case, did not file the revision allowing the period of limitation for filing the same to lapse and then approached the High Court for invoking the Constitutional Jurisdiction of High Court after nine months of passing of the order -Constitutional petition was not allowed to be converted into revision petition under S.115, C.P.C. in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D 1685 of 2000 and Miscellaneous No.4697 of 2000 in Suit No.366 of 1999, decision dated: 10-04-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J. AND WAHID BUX BROHI, J",
    "": "Ms. AFSHAN AHMED er\nVs.\nMessrs HABIB BANK LIMITED and another --Respondents\nMessrs Central Cotton Mills Limited and another v. Messrs Atlas Bot Lease and others 1998 SCMR 2352 and Messrs Abdul Aziz Ayoob v. Assistant Collector of Customs and 3 others PLD 1990 Kar. 378 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12514",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1F5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2079 = 2002 SLD 2079 = 2002 CLD 162",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.15 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.2(2) & O.XXXIV, R.2 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 ¬Constitutional petition Preliminary decree Rule of merger Petitioners' appeal filed against preliminary decree was dismissed by Appellate Court on point of limitation whereafter respondents' application for amendment of preliminary decree was allowed by Banking Court -Contention. of petitioners was that irrespective of dismissal of earlier appeal on point of limitation, preliminary decree stood merged in the decree passed by Appellate Court, therefore, Banking Court had no jurisdiction to make amendment in preliminary decree and it was the Appellate Court, which could have amended the decree Validity ¬Earlier appeal was not decided on merits, but it was dismissed on point of limitation, therefore, principle of merger would not be attracted Merger was for a limited purpose of computation of period of limitation and execution of decree Constitutional petition was dismissed as having no force.\n \nMaulvi Abdul Qayyum v. Syed Ali Asghar Shah and 5 others 1992 SCMR 241 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.15 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 ¬Constitutional petition Decree in favour of Bank Debtor's suit for damages pending against Bank Effect Decree in favour of Bank, though under challenge in Constitutional petition, had been satisfied by petitioners without any objection, whereas their suits for damages filed against respondent Bank were pending adjudication Contention of petitioners was that in case of acceptance of Constitutional petition, they could claim refund of amount Validity If suits filed by petitioners were decreed, then there would be no impediment in recovering the decretal amount from the Bank Constitutional petition was dismissed being devoid of merits.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 15686 of 1996, decision dated: 8-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "WESTMINISTER ENTERPRISES and 2 others ers\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12515",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2080 = 2002 SLD 2080 = 2002 CLD 183",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XVof 1997) Ss.9 & 21 Suit for recovery of money Bank filed suit against defendants being legal representatives of deceased borrower, wherein they were issued show cause notice, which they replied by taking a stand that they were not legal representatives of the deceased; property mortgaged with Bank by the deceased was not owned by him and he could not create mortgage over the same; and they were not liable to pay debt of the Bank in excess of the assets left by deceased and inherited by them Banking Tribunal refused to accept such reply and decreed the suit Validity Such question could not be decided without framing issues and recording the evidence Banking Tribunal had decided the suit in a summary manner without adopting such procedure Appellate Court set aside impugned and decree, and remanded the case to Banking Court for its decision afresh within specified time after framing issues and allowing the parties to adduce evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.214 of 1997, heard on 24-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN SAQIB NISAR, JJ",
    "": "IMMAD IFTIKHAR and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12516",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2081 = 2002 SLD 2081 = 2002 CLD 240",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.2(b)(i) & 7(6) Suit for recovery of Bank loan Jurisdiction of Banking Court Transfer of the suit under S.7(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ¬Value of claim made in the suit was sum of Rs.1,81,056.67 Suit pending before the High Court was ordered to be transferred to Banking Court under S.2(b)(0 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.74 of 1973 and Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 3195 and 3196 of 2001, decision dated: 19-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERWEZ, J",
    "": "Messrs NATIONAL AND GRINDLAYS\nBANK LIMITED, Karachi High Court --Plaintiff\nVs.\nARSHAD ALI KHALID QURESHI\nand another ----Defendants\nHabib Ahmad v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Company 1999 CLC 1953 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12517",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2082 = 2002 SLD 2082 = 2002 CLD 242",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XXLVI of 2001) Ss.9 & 10 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Failure to appear in Court, in response to sununons duly served on the defendant ¬Effect Where contentions of the financial institution had gone unrebutted and unchallenged the suit was decreed accordingly.\n \nPLD 1989 SC 75 ref.\n \n(b) Administrative action \n \n Power exercised by executive Mode of exercise Principles ¬Where power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden Such principle would apply with greater force when a Constitutional provision has provided for a method of performance and prescribed a limitation of time for doing a thing.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B 33 of 2001, decision dated: 21st November, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERWEZ, J",
    "": "Messrs MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs HAWKESBAY SPORTSWEAR INC. --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12518",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2083 = 2002 SLD 2083 = 2002 CLD 245",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) Art 199 Constitutional petition Factual controversy Bank loan, recovery of Plea taken was that interest/mark up being form of interest were against Islam Validity Where the petitioner had obtained loan facility from Bank and had executed some charge documents favoring Bank, even under the Islamic norms of justice, the petitioner was bound to fulfil the contractual obligations and commitments undertaken through the execution of those documents Petition was not maintainable in circumstances.\n \nMessrs Momin Motor Company v. The Regional Transport Authority, Dacca and others PLD 1962 SC 108; Muhammad Mumtaz Masud and 2 others v. House Building Finance Corporation and 2 others 1994 SCMR 2287 and Syed Anwar ul Hussain v. District Manager, Small Business Finance Corporation Branch, Vehari and 2 others 2001 YLR 2741 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ---------\n \n Arts.l99 & 203 G Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court ¬Plea of mark up/interest; being un Islamic Validity High Court in view of Art 203 G of the Constitution has no power or jurisdiction, under the law, to determine the same as un Islamic.\n \nMuhammad Ramzan v. Citibank 2001 CLC 158; Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khaki v. Syed Muhammad Hashim and 2 others PLD 2000 SC 225 and Mrs. Farha Nasir v. Pakistan through Secretary to Government, Ministry of Economics and Commercial Affairs, Islamabad and 2 others 2001 MLD 1657 rel.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art,199 Constitutional petition Maintainability Factual controversies Execution of loan agreement under duress and blackmailing Petitioner alleged that he was made to sign the loan agreement which was result of fraud, torture, blackmailing and criminal duress Validity Such factual controversies could not be decided without recording evidence of parties and the same could not be undertaken in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court and fell within the domain of Courts of plenary jurisdiction High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction vested in it under Art 199 of the Constitution could neither enter into factual controversies nor decide disputed question of facts Petition was not maintainable in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Younas Khan and 12 others v. Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary, Forest arid Agriculture, Peshawar and others 1993 SCMR 618; Umer ,Hayat Khan v. Inayatullah Butt and others 1994 SCMR 572; Muhammad All and another v. Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary and 2 others 1986 CLC 1123 and Mst. Kaniz Fatima through Legal Heirs v. Muhammad Salim and 27 others 2001 SCMR 1493 ref.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.21(1) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199 ¬Constitutional petition Adequate remedy Borrower, instead of filing appeal against and decree passed by Banking Court, filed Constitutional petition Validity Remedy of appeal under S.21(1) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, was provided against and decree passed by Banking Court and such remedy was adequate and efficacious Petitioner without availing the alternate remedy of appeal, had straightaway filed Constitutional petition which was not maintainable under Art.l99(1) of the Constitution Petition was dismissed in limine.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal. Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 ref.\n \n(e) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art 199 Constitutional petition Laches, principle of ¬Applicability Judgment and decree were passed by Banking Court in the year 1997, against the petitioner but the same had not been assailed before any higher forum as provided under law Effect Where the petitioner slept over the matter and acquiesced in the and decree, principle of laches was applicable.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 19449 of 2001, decision dated: 29-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ATHAR HASSNI er\nVs.\nCITIBANK and 5 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12519",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2084 = 2002 SLD 2084 = 2002 CLD 251",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordnance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.5, 7(6) & 29(2) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), OVII, R.10 & O.XXXVII Banff Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), S.6(1)(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss. 7(6) & 28 ¬ Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199 Constitutional petition ¬Return of Customer's suit against Bank for recovery of pledged forwarding compensation thereof Civil Court on account of lack of jurisdiction transferred such suit to Banking Court Banking Court after recording evidence and hearing the arguments, returned the plaint to customer for its presentation before proper forum Contention was that customer was in doldrums who, on account of said two s had been left without any remedy Validity Customer fwd suit on 23 2 1985; when Bang Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, was in force and by virtue off S.6(1) thereof, only Banking Company was competent to against its customer, whereas customer had to resort to Courts of plenary jurisdiction for seeking his remedy against Banking Company Only Civil Courts, at the relevant time, had jurisdiction in such matters, thus, transfer of customer's suit by\n \nCivil Court was not warranted by law Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 was repealed by S.28 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, which came into force on 31 5 1997 and by virtue of S. 7(6) thereof, all proceedings pending before Special Courts or other Courts including High Court stood automatically transferred to newly constituted Banking Courts If original order of transfer of suit passed by Civil Court was considered to be illegal, even then perforce of S.7(6) of Act 1997, suit filed by customer would be deemed to have been transferred to Banking Court When impugned order was passed, Act of 1997 was in force, thus suit filled by customer would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court, which was bound to decide same in accordance with law Impugned order having been passed against such express provisions of law, could not be upheld Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, came into force on 30 8 2001 and by virtue of S.7(6) thereof, suit of customer would be deemed to be transferred and pending for disposal before Banking Court established under S.5 of Ordinance of 2001 ¬Constitutional petition was accepted and impugned order was set aside with direction to Banking Court to decide the suit of customer in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1421 of 1998, heard on 12-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FARMS, J",
    "": "M.ANWAR SALEEM er\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12520",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2085 = 2002 SLD 2085 = 2002 CLD 254",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.18 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199 Constitutional petition Execution of decree Petitioners claiming to be bona fide purchasers of mortgaged property filed objection petition, which was dismissed for non prosecution on 29 1 1997 Banking Court on 20 5 1997 consigned execution petition to record room, when Bank desired to sell the mortgaged property itself Petitioners challenged order dated 20 5 1997 through Constitutional petition Maintainability Real grievance of petitioners should have been against the order dated 29 I 1997 and not order dated 20 5 1997 Petitioners could file application for restoration of objection petition or fresh objection petition, but they had not availed such remedies at the relevant time Order dated 21 1 1997 had attained f finality, which had not been challenged even in the Constitutional petition Failing to avail such alternate, adequate and efficacious remedy at appropriate stage would disentitle the petitioners to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court Petitioners being not aggrieved persons within the ambit of Art 199(1) of Constitution, High Court dismissed the Constitutional petition.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.12394 of 1997, heard on 10-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Syed IJAZ ALI SHAH GILLANI and 7 others ers\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED\nthrough Manager and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12521",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2086 = 2002 SLD 2086 = 2002 CLD 254",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.18 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199 Constitutional petition Execution of decree Petitioners claiming to be bona fide purchasers of mortgaged property filed objection petition, which was dismissed for non prosecution on 29 1 1997 Banking Court on 20 5 1997 consigned execution petition to record room, when Bank desired to sell the mortgaged property itself Petitioners challenged order dated 20 5 1997 through Constitutional petition Maintainability Real grievance of petitioners should have been against the order dated 29 I 1997 and not order dated 20 5 1997 Petitioners could file application for restoration of objection petition or fresh objection petition, but they had not availed such remedies at the relevant time Order dated 21 1 1997 had attained f finality, which had not been challenged even in the Constitutional petition Failing to avail such alternate, adequate and efficacious remedy at appropriate stage would disentitle the petitioners to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court Petitioners being not aggrieved persons within the ambit of Art 199(1) of Constitution, High Court dismissed the Constitutional petition.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.12394 of 1997, heard on 10-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Syed IJAZ ALI SHAH GILLANI and 7 others ers\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED\nthrough Manager and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12522",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2087 = 2002 SLD 2087 = 2002 CLD 261",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunal Ordinance (LVII of 1984) S. 7 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199 Constitutional petition Contempt of Court Banking Tribunal, after passing the decree against defendant, on his application initiated contempt proceedings against the plaintiff Bank for having obtained from another Bank confidential report regarding credibility of the defendant Validity Banking Tribunal had mechanically issued impugned notice to plaintiff Banking Tribunal without pursuing the application and in complete oblivion of law on the subject issued contempt notice to the petitioner, whereas from bare reading of its contents, no case for contempt of Court has been made out Banking Tribunal had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and had grossly violated the provisions of law If any loss had been caused to the defendant or its Directors/guarantors, appropriate remedy was to file suit for damages and not to initiate contempt proceedings High Court accepted Constitutional petition and declared the impugned notice and proceedings initiated by Banking Tribunal as illegal and without lawful authority.\n \n(b) Banker and customer \n \n Exchange of confidential opinion regarding credential of customer between two Banks Banks are within their rights to ask from each other about reliability and credibility of customers with whom they are dealing within financial matters and are also under obligation to respond to the communications addressed to them divulging true facts to another financial institution No exception can be taken by customer to such confidential and privileged communications exchanged between financial institutions in the best of their interest\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)\n \n Art 199 Constitutional jurisdiction Scope High Court could exercise Constitutional jurisdiction in matter, wherein no factual controversy was involved and impugned action was without jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 10013 of 1995, decision dated: 17-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "M. IFT1KHAR MIAN, The Chief Manager, \nUnion Bank Limited and others ers\nVs.\nCHAIRMAN BANKING TRIBUNAL, FAISALABAD\nand another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12523",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2088 = 2002 SLD 2088 = 2002 CLD 264",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) S.6 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), OIX, R.2, O.XVII, R.3 & O.XXI, R.83 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. l99 Constitutional petition Execution of decree ¬Petitioners filed application under O.XXI, R.83, C.P.C., after having deposited some decretal amount which was dismissed by Banking Court for their failure to deposit process fee on a date when Bank representative was present in the Court Validity Dismissal of application on such ground was highly technical Appearance of Bank representative on such date without service of notice could not be believed Provisions of O.IX, R.2, C.P.C., were not of imperative nature, thus, rigid application thereof was not warranted Dismissal order under said provision could not be passed when defendant had appeared before the Court in person or through his agent Discretion of Court under O.IX, R.2, C.P.C. should be exercised sparingly only in case of grave negligence and not in routine Petitioners were non suited despite their bona fide to honour their commit¬ ment High Court accepted Constitutional petition and set aside impugned order and directed Banking Court to decide petitioners' application in accordance with law.\n \nMessrs Hoechst Pak Limited v. Messrs Ch. Agriculture Traders 1993 CLC 1892; Shamroz Khan and others v. Muhammad Amin and others PLD 1978 SC 89; Rehmat Ali v. Fazal Hussain and 8 others 1990 CLC 761; Crescent Sugar Mills and Distillery Limited v. Central Board of Revenue and. others PLD 1982 Lah. 1 and Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and others PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 104 ref.\n \n(b) Administration of justice \n \n Cases must be decided do merits instead of technicalities.\n \nManager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678 and Said Muhammad and others v. M. Safdar and others PLD 1989 SC .532 ref.\n \n(c) Jurisdiction \n \n Where basic order was without jurisdiction, then superstructure raised thereon would fall to ground automatically.\n \nCrescent Sugar Mills and Distillery Limited v. Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 1982 Lah. 1 and Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and others PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 104 ref.\n \nCh. Muzammal Khan for Petitioners. Tariq Nawaz Bhatti for Respondents.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition NoA1383 of 1994, decision dated: 17-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "TANVEER AKHTAR and 2 others ers\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, SHAKARGARH\nand another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12524",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2089 = 2002 SLD 2089 = 2002 CLD 269",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.9 Appeal Failure to deposit decretal amount ¬Appellants did not deposit the decretal amount for the reason that the mortgage was sufficient security for the recovery of decretal amount Validity Appellants were required to deposit the decretal amount Supreme Court declined to interfere with the passed by High., Court whereby appeal against the and decree passed by the Banking Tribunal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1199 of 1996, decision dated: 26-09-2000.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD BASHIR, JEHANGIRI, MUNIR A. SHEIKH AND NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs LYALLPUR OIL & GENERAL MILLS\nand 6 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12525",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2090 = 2002 SLD 2090 = 2002 CLD 271",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans Ordinance (XIX of 1979) S.12 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.l99 ¬Constitutional petition Appeal filed by defendants against decree in favour of Bank was disposed of in terms of compromise reached between the parties, whereby defendants paid decretal amount and Bank waived the other charges Banking Court on defendants' application directed the Bank to deliver them pledged goods or pay equivalent amount Validity Pledged goods having already been entrusted to defendants, matter stood concluded and fructified Direction of Banking Court to return pledged goods had been passed in complete oblivion of record of the case and order of Appellate Court High Court accepted Constitutional petition and declared impugned orders as illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.24931 of 1997, heard on 12-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED er\nVs.\nBANKING COURT (RECOVERY NO. 1)\nand 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12526",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2091 = 2002 SLD 2091 = 2002 CLD 274",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9, 10 & 21 Suit for recovery of amount Leave to defend ¬After filing of written statement, Banking Court, instead of framing all the issues arising out of the pleadings of parties, framed only a preliminary issue and invited Bank to adduce evidence in support of the same Bank did not confine itself to preliminary issue, but adduced evidence in respect of entire case Banking Court through same not only decided preliminary issue in favour of Bank, but decreed the suit ¬Contention was that Banking Court had passed decree in a manner as if leave was not granted to defendants in respect of matters arising out of pleadings other than those reflected in preliminary issue Validity Provisions of Ss.9 & 10 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, did not permit Banking Court to grant leave conditionally or in, respect of some matters and not in respect of the others Impugned order did show that leave to appear and defend had been granted to defendants, but in spite of that, Banking Court had proceeded in a manner not permissible under the provisions of the Act Appellate Court set aside impugned and decree and remanded case to Banking Court for dealing with the matter as a regular long cause.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.404 of 2001, heard on 17-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S.KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. RAKHSHANDA ASAD and another --Appellants\nVs.\nMessrs BANK OF PUNJAB through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12527",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2092 = 2002 SLD 2092 = 2002 CLD 274",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9, 10 & 21 Suit for recovery of amount Leave to defend ¬After filing of written statement, Banking Court, instead of framing all the issues arising out of the pleadings of parties, framed only a preliminary issue and invited Bank to adduce evidence in support of the same Bank did not confine itself to preliminary issue, but adduced evidence in respect of entire case Banking Court through same not only decided preliminary issue in favour of Bank, but decreed the suit ¬Contention was that Banking Court had passed decree in a manner as if leave was not granted to defendants in respect of matters arising out of pleadings other than those reflected in preliminary issue Validity Provisions of Ss.9 & 10 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, did not permit Banking Court to grant leave conditionally or in, respect of some matters and not in respect of the others Impugned order did show that leave to appear and defend had been granted to defendants, but in spite of that, Banking Court had proceeded in a manner not permissible under the provisions of the Act Appellate Court set aside impugned and decree and remanded case to Banking Court for dealing with the matter as a regular long cause.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.404 of 2001, heard on 17-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S.KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. RAKHSHANDA ASAD and another --Appellants\nVs.\nMessrs BANK OF PUNJAB through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12528",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2093 = 2002 SLD 2093 = 2002 CLD 286",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) S.405(1)(a) Interpretation Language used in S.405(1)(a) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 is free from any ambiguity, absurdity or confusion, which cannot be twisted whatever principle of interpretation may be pressed into service No undue advantage can be taken on the basis of far fetched scholarly interpretation, which the plain language does not imply nor intended to mean, rather it should be interpreted in such a manner that object of its enactment is promoted rather than hampered.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLYH of 1984) \n \n S.405(1)(a) \"\"Revenue\"\" Connotation Term \"\"Revenue\"\" as used in S.405(1)(a) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 cannot be confined within a limited sphere as it covers variety of fields, which mainly relate to income generating areas or resources of the Government for such generation.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)\n \n -S.405(1)(a) Words \"\"due and payable within the twelve months next before that date\"\" as have been used in S.405(1)(a) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 mean the amount free from any dispute or controversy, liability whereof has either been admitted\n \nby company or otherwise duly proved on the basis of record, would be subject to preferential treatment, if it related to period within twelve months next before the date of winding up of company.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVH of 1984) -----\n \n Ss.305 & 405(I)(a)(8)(c) West Pakistan Government Dues Recovery Ordinance XXII of 1962), S.3 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) Claim of Provincial Government that company under liquidation owed as debt certain amount, which was recoverable as arrears of land revenue per its Notification, was declared as an ordinary unsecured debt Company Judge dismissed the appeal of Government Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider, whether Company Judge and Joint Official Liquidators had erred in law in classifying such claim of Government as unsecured ordinary debt\n \n(e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-----\n \n S.405(1)(a) West Pakistan Government Dues Recovery Ordinance (XXII of 1962), S.3(1) Preferential claim Notification of Provincial Government issued under S.3(1) of West Pakistan Government Dues Recovery Ordinance, 1962, had no overriding effect on the mandatory prerequisites and prescribed procedure as envisaged under S.405(1)(a) of Companies Ordinance, 1984.\n \n(f) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.305 & 405(1)(a)(8)(c) West Pakistan Government Dues Recovery Ordinance (XXII of 1962), S.3 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) Winding up proceedings Preferential. claim -Provincial Government for recovery of balance price of Steam Coal and Hard Coke supplied to company, issued Notification dated 26 2 1991 under S.3(1) of West Pakistan Government Dues Recovery Ordinance, 1962 Company Judge concurred with the report of Joint Official Liquidators, whereby such claim of Government was not treated as secured and preferential, but it was classified as an ordinary unsecured trade debt Held, such claim did not fall within the ambit of \"\"taxes\"\", \"\"cases\"\" and \"\"rates\"\" as used in S.405(1)(a) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 Supreme Court, in view of the definition of \"\"Revenue\"\", disapproved the findings of Company Judge and Liquidators that such deal was a commercial deal simpliciter and declaring such amount due as unsecured for the reason that such deal on behalf of Government was for generation of more income Expression \"\"the relevant date\"\" as used in S.405(8)(c) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 means that date of winding up order would be the relevant date, where company was wounded up compulsorily by Court Company was wounded up on 16 6 1994 by order of Court on application of a Bank dated 21 2 1994 Amount in question was due in year 1980 81, had such amount been due and payable within twelve months next before such date of winding up, then preferential treatment could have been claimed, which could not be extended to the instant case as the amount was due and payable in year 1982 Notification dated 26 2 1991 issued by Provincial Government under S.3(1) of West Pakistan Government Dues Recovery Ordinance, 1962, had no overriding effect on the mandatory prerequisites and prescribed procedure as envisaged under S.405(1)(a) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 Amount in question could have been recovered as arrears of land revenue prior to passing up of winding up order Company, presently, was not in existence for practical purposes, therefore, question of recovery of such amount as arrears of land revenue would not arise, because the procedure prescribed west Pakistan in Land Revenue Act, 1967 could not be followed Merely by issuance of notification that amount in question could have been recovered as arrears of land revenue, would not entitle Provincial Government to claim preferential treatment; which could not be done in view of the provisions of S.405(1)(a) of Companies Ordinance, 1984.\n \nPunjab Cables v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1989 Lah. 121 and Prem's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. IV, 1964, Arora Law House, New Delhi, India ref.\n \n(g) Interpretation of statutes \n \n Function of Court Courts are not concerned with the consequences of interpretation, however, drastic or inconvenient the result may be, because function of the Court is interpretation and not legislation.\n \nMuhammad Ismail v. State PLD 1969 SC 241 ref.\n \n(h) Interpretation of statute \n \n Purpose of interpretation of a statutory provision is to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature, which has, of necessity, to be gathered from the words used by the Legislature itself If those words are clear and unmistakable, then they cannot be givers any meaning other than that which they carry in their ordinary grammatical sense.\n \nMuhammad Ismail v. State PLD 1969 SC 241 ref. (i) Words and phrases ¬ \"\"Revenue\"\" Its broad and general meanings.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.629 of 1997, decision dated: 8-11-2001",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI AND, JAVED IQBAL, JJ",
    "": "DIRECTOR INDUSTRIES, GOVERNMENT\nOF N.W.F.P., Peshawar High Court --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs NOWSHERA ENGINEERING\nCOMPANY LIMITED through Managing Director\nand 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12529",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2094 = 2002 SLD 2094 = 2002 CLD 296",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.l5(2)(b) & 21 Decree for recovery of amount -During pendency of appeal, appellants' offer to pay decretal amount in instalments was opposed by respondent Bank alleging the same to be an attempt to frustrate execution proceedings already initiated for auction of attached property and that they had retracted from such offers previously made by them Property put to auction seemed to be of higher value, which might not fetch proper price in present circumstances and its sale would not be in the interest of either party, thus, High Court accepted the offer in the interest of Bank as appellants were satisfying impugned decree in toto High Court modified the decree in exercise of its jurisdiction/powers under S.15(2)(b) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 by allowing the appellants to pay the decretal amount in 9 instalments on specified dates, failing which respondent Bank would be free to realize the balance amount of decree through auction of attached property without objection/ resistance from the appellants.\n \nMalik Saeed Hassan for Appellants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.279 of 2001, heard on 15-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. PAZ AHMAD AND MIAN SAQIB NISAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MIAN MUHAMMAD ASHRAF\n& SONS through Partners\nand 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB ESTABLISHMENT\nthrough duly Constituted Attorney --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12530",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2095 = 2002 SLD 2095 = 2002 CLD 296",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.l5(2)(b) & 21 Decree for recovery of amount -During pendency of appeal, appellants' offer to pay decretal amount in instalments was opposed by respondent Bank alleging the same to be an attempt to frustrate execution proceedings already initiated for auction of attached property and that they had retracted from such offers previously made by them Property put to auction seemed to be of higher value, which might not fetch proper price in present circumstances and its sale would not be in the interest of either party, thus, High Court accepted the offer in the interest of Bank as appellants were satisfying impugned decree in toto High Court modified the decree in exercise of its jurisdiction/powers under S.15(2)(b) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 by allowing the appellants to pay the decretal amount in 9 instalments on specified dates, failing which respondent Bank would be free to realize the balance amount of decree through auction of attached property without objection/ resistance from the appellants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.279 of 2001, heard on 15-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. PAZ AHMAD AND MIAN SAQIB NISAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MIAN MUHAMMAD ASHRAF\n& SONS through Partners\nand 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB ESTABLISHMENT\nthrough duly Constituted Attorney --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12531",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2096 = 2002 SLD 2096 = 2002 CLD 298",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.12---Use of comma' and word 'or' in S.12 of the Act--¬ Effect ---Both 'comma' and word or' signify two different situations which are: Where a decree has been passed, after due service and where summons have not been duly served.\n \n \nEbrahim Brothers Limited v. Wealth Tax Officer PLD 1985 Kar. 407 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 12---Decree, setting aside of---Limitation--; Computation---Only one period of limitation was provided under S.12 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Date of commencement of period of limitation was different in two situations: in case of decree that had been passed after due service of summons, the period of 21 days started from the date of decree itself while where the summons had not been duly served, the period started from date of knowledge---In case of former situation, the applicant had to satisfy Banking Court that he was prevented by sufficient cause from making application under S.9 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997; while in latter situation, the applicant had only to show that the summons were not duly served on him--¬Both the situations were governed by the same period of limitation Le. 21 days---Where application under S.9(4) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 was filed beyond 21 days after the date, the applicant acquired knowledge of decree, such application was rightly dismissed as time-barred by the Banking Court---Appeal was dismissed in limine.\n \nAli Sibtain Fazli for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.294 of 2001, decision dated: 8-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULUI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KAPUR TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive\nVs.\nBANKERS EQUITY LIMITED through Chief Executive"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12532",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2097 = 2002 SLD 2097 = 2002 CLD 298",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.12---Use of comma' and word 'or' in S.12 of the Act--¬ Effect ---Both 'comma' and word or' signify two different situations which are: Where a decree has been passed, after due service and where summons have not been duly served.\n \n \nEbrahim Brothers Limited v. Wealth Tax Officer PLD 1985 Kar. 407 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 12---Decree, setting aside of---Limitation--; Computation---Only one period of limitation was provided under S.12 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Date of commencement of period of limitation was different in two situations: in case of decree that had been passed after due service of summons, the period of 21 days started from the date of decree itself while where the summons had not been duly served, the period started from date of knowledge---In case of former situation, the applicant had to satisfy Banking Court that he was prevented by sufficient cause from making application under S.9 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997; while in latter situation, the applicant had only to show that the summons were not duly served on him--¬Both the situations were governed by the same period of limitation Le. 21 days---Where application under S.9(4) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 was filed beyond 21 days after the date, the applicant acquired knowledge of decree, such application was rightly dismissed as time-barred by the Banking Court---Appeal was dismissed in limine.\n \nAli Sibtain Fazli for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.294 of 2001, decision dated: 8-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULUI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KAPUR TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive\nVs.\nBANKERS EQUITY LIMITED through Chief Executive"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12533",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2098 = 2002 SLD 2098 = 2002 CLD 301",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordnance (XLY of 1979) Ss. 2 & 6 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Ordinance (II of 1983), Ss. 2, 4 & 5 Execution of decree passed by Civil Court during the period between the date of promulgation of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Ordinance (II of 1983) and 17-4-1988 i.e. the date of of Supreme Court passed in Yasmeen Nighat's case (PLD 1988 SC 391) settling the law qua absence of jurisdiction in Civil Courts as to suits for recovery of Bank loans valuing Rs.1,00,000 or below Special Banking Court dismissed the Bank application for execution of such decree holding same as void Contention of the Bank was that decree passed by Civil Court prior to of Supreme Court had become final by non filing of appeal by respondents, and thus, had assumed character of \"\"past and closed transaction\"\" Validity ¬Judgment and decree so passed by Civil Court being a in personam, had become \"\"final\"\" in absence of challenge arid was thin \"\"a past and closed transaction\"\" ¬Special Banking Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by dismissing execution application of the Bank Appellate Court accepted the appeal and set aside the impugned order as a result of which, execution petition filed by the Bank would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court, who would decide same in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No, 45 of 1995, heard on 19-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD., \nMcLEOD ROAD, BRANCH, Lahore High Court --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs LUCKY AUTOS AND RICKSHAW EXCHANGE, \n1 ROYAL PARK, McLEOD ROAD, Lahore High Court\nand 2 others --Respondents\nMst. Yasmeen Nighat v. National Bank of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 391; F.A.0. 269 of 1994 and F.A.0. 261 of 1993 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12534",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2099 = 2002 SLD 2099 = 2002 CLD 303",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------Ss. 2(a)(e), 6, 13 & Sched.---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.7(6)---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLV1 of 2001), Ss. 5, 7(6) & 29---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199---Constitutional petition---Suit for recovery of money--¬Respondent being a leasing company leased out a vehicle to petitioner and on committing default in payment of its monthly rent, respondent filed suit against petitioner---Contention of petitioner' was that respondent was not a banking Company, thus, notification of inclusion of its name in Schedule of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 could not be issued and on such score, Banking Tribunal could not assume jurisdiction in the matter---Validity---Definition of \"\"Banking company\"\" as given in S.2(a) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 includes a company specified in its Schedule--Definition of Finance\"\" as given in S.2(e) of the Ordinance, includes a \"\"lease\"\" also---Federal Government in exercise of its powers conferred under S.13 of the Ordinance had included the name of respondent-company at Serial No. 18 in the Schedule of the said Ordinance---No exception, thus, could be taken by petitioner with regard to issuance of such notification or filing of recovery suit against him by respondent-company under S.6(1) of the Ordinance--¬Constitutional petition was dismissed being devoid of merits --¬Suit as a result of repeal of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, would be deemed to be transferred and pending before Banking Court established under S.5 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which would decide same in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. 11463 of 1995, decision dated: 8-10-2001.’",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Messrs EXTRACTION PAKISTAN LTD.\nthrough Chief Executive\nVs."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12535",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2100 = 2002 SLD 2100 = 2002 CLD 312",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) S.6 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), OXXXVII, R.3 Suit for recovery of amount Application for leave to appear and defend suit Banking Court dismissed the application solely on the ground that the amount required to be deposited by defendant, had not been so deposited Validity Requirement of deposit of money as a condition precedent for hearing such application was wholly without legal warrant Application submitted by defendant could not be dismissed on such ground, rather such condition could only be imposed after hearing the defendant Appellate Court accepted the appeal and set aside impugned and decree while observing that defendant's application for leave to appear and defend would be deemed to be pending before competent Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 112 of 1994, heard on 26-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S.KHAWAJA AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "Mst. KANIZ BIBI --Appellant\nVs.\nTHE MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12536",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2101 = 2002 SLD 2101 = 2002 CLD 312",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) S.6 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), OXXXVII, R.3 Suit for recovery of amount Application for leave to appear and defend suit Banking Court dismissed the application solely on the ground that the amount required to be deposited by defendant, had not been so deposited Validity Requirement of deposit of money as a condition precedent for hearing such application was wholly without legal warrant Application submitted by defendant could not be dismissed on such ground, rather such condition could only be imposed after hearing the defendant Appellate Court accepted the appeal and set aside impugned and decree while observing that defendant's application for leave to appear and defend would be deemed to be pending before competent Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 112 of 1994, heard on 26-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S.KHAWAJA AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "Mst. KANIZ BIBI --Appellant\nVs.\nTHE MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12537",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2102 = 2002 SLD 2102 = 2002 CLD 313",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S. 7 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI- Rr.58, 59 & 62 ¬Execution of decree Objection to attachment of property ¬Respondent claimed to be bona fide purchaser for value of attached property without notice of any encumbrance thereon and in possession thereof since 1996, when agreement to sell was executed in his favour by debtor Executing Court accepted such agreement at its face value without determining the allegation of decree holder Bank that such agreement was collusive and there was no conveyance of title in favour of the respondent Validity Provisions of O.XXI, R.62, C.P.C., mandated an inquiry in order to determine such matter of factual contention Appellate Court accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to Executing Court for decision afresh along the lines indicated.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.312 of 2001, decision dated: 21st November, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED\nthrough Attorney --Appellant\nVs.\nSAJID MAHMOOD and 5 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12538",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2103 = 2002 SLD 2103 = 2002 CLD 315",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 18 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.90 & 95 Property auctioned in execution of decree was objected to by appellant debtor on the ground of inadequacy of price resulting from fraud and material irregularity in holding the auction Banking Court rejected the objection petition Validity Fraud in auction proceedings had neither been specifically pleaded nor it was otherwise discernible from such proceedings, nor any fraud had been committed in holding the auction nor Executing Court had gone outside the limits prescribed by law ¬Appellant had not a good case on merits Neither ex parte nor order of dismissal of application for setting aside such decree was challenged Non mentioning of minimum price in Schedule of auction was hardly of any relevance, when property had been auctioned at a price more than decretal amount In absence of any specific prejudice having been caused to the appellant, such objection could not be entertained at appeal stage, when it had not been taken up before Executing Court Properties auctioned through Courts did not fetch market price for a number of reasons, foremost amongst them being shyness of purchasers to involve themselves in transactions entailing proceedings before Courts Appellant, at appeal stage, offered to pay decretal amount and interest on total auction price Every owner of property particularly one in which he had resided alongwith his family had a peculiar sentimental value for him, whereas purchasers had not yet experienced that set of mind Appellate Court while allowing another opportunity to the appellant to save his property directed him to pay within 30 days to the Bank the decretal amount with profit and to auction¬ purchaser profit on auction price @ 1396 till date of its payment, and in case of failing to do so, his appeal would stand dismissed both on account of bar of limitation and on merits Appeal was disposed of accordingly.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S. 21 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.14 Prosecuting the remedy before other forum Condonation of delay Appellant challenged order of Banking Court in Constitutional petition, which was subsequently disposed of and within 10 days thereof, he filed appeal Time spent in prosecuting Constitutional petition was sought to be condoned Validity Proceedings in Constitutional petition could not ordinarily be said to be proceedings before a forum without jurisdiction Lapse of 10 days in filing appeal after disposal of Constitutional petition had not been explained No case for condonation of delay was made out.\n \nAbdul Ghani v. Ghulam Ahmad PLD 1977 SC 102; P.M. Amer v. Qabool Muhammad Shah and others 1999 SCMR 1049; Raja Karamat Ullah and others v. Sardar Muhammad Aslam Sokhara 1999 SCMR 1892 and Brig. (Retd:) Manhar ul Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Islamabad and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706 ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. 199 Proceedings in Constitutional petition could not ordinarily be said to be proceedings before a forum without jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 485 of 2001, heard on 13-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASEEM SIKANDAR AND MANSOOR AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Syed MUNIR HUSSAIN GILANI --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED, TOWNSHIP BRANCH, Lahore High Court through constituted Attorney and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12539",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2104 = 2002 SLD 2104 = 2002 CLD 330",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973) Arts.199 & 203 G Constitutional petition Declaration of mark up/interest as un Islamic Scope Contention was that petitioner was not liable to pay interest/mark up on loan being un Islamic Validity Petitioner had executed documents/ agreement undertaking thereby to pay the principal amount alongwith mark up and all other charges, and he could not wriggle out of his express commitments Petitioner was bound by the documents governing the terms and conditions of availing the loan facility which were still enforceable High Court in view of Art.203 G of Constitution of Pakistan had no jurisdiction to determine charging of mark up/interest as un Islamic Petitioner could not take advantage of Aslam Khaki's case PLD 2000 SC 225, as that case was a past and closed transaction High Court dismissed the Constitutional petition in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Ramzan v. Citibank N.A. 2001 CLC 158 and Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khaki v. Syed Muhammad Hashim and 2 others PLD 2000 SC 225 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 14014 of 1993, heard on 1st October, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HAQ NAWAZ er\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Chairman,"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12540",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2105 = 2002 SLD 2105 = 2002 CLD 332",
    "Key Words:": "Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961) S.39 Application by Bank for enforcement of its claim Due to absence of appellants borrowers' counsel on 7 2 1995, when arguments on his miscellaneous application were to be heard, Court below, without proceeding ex pane against him in miscellaneous application, also decided and allowed the main application of the Bank Validity Was not clear from the order sheet of the Court below as to whether 7 2 1995 was the date fixed for hearing of main application also, rather the same showed that only miscellaneous application was fixed on that date If appellants' (borrowers') counsel was not present on that date, only his miscellaneous application should have been dismissed and the main application of respondent Bank under S.39 of the Ordinance should have been fixed for hearing ¬Court below had committed material irregularity as it had not heard the appellants on main application High Court set aside impugned order and remanded the case to Court below for deciding afresh the main application as well miscellaneous application after giving opportunity of hearing to appellants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.55 of .1995, decision dated: 11-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHAFIQUE SAIGAL and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF\nPAKISTAN through Chief Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12541",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2106 = 2002 SLD 2106 = 2002 CLD 334",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.9 Suit for recovery of loan Competency of suit was challenged by the defendant/ borrower contending that the suit was not instituted by authorized person Power of attorney produced on record by the plaintiff Bank clearly showed that the person who instituted the suit on behalf of the plaintiff Bank was authorized to institute the same Suit properly instituted by the person in accordance with the power of attorney which was executed in his favour, was competently filed Contention of defendant/ borrower was repelled.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.307 of 1998, heard on 20-09-2000.",
    "Judge Name:": "MALIK MUHAMMAD QAYYUM AND RAJA MUHAMMAD SABIR, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ CHAUDHRY and another --Appellants\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12542",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2107 = 2002 SLD 2107 = 2002 CLD 336",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Jurisdiction---------Court; jurisdiction of---Consent of parties cannot confer upon or take away jurisdiction from the Courts.\n \n \n(b) West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance (II of 1962)----\n \n----S.18---Valuation bf suit---Forum of appeal ---Determination--¬Valuation of suit fixed by plaintiff in the plaint determines the jurisdiction of the Court---Such valuation is the basis for determination of forum for the purpose of filing of appeal.\n \nGovernment of Pakistan v. Messrs Allah Bakhsh 2000 CLC 1598 and Ditta Khan v. Muhammad Zaman and others 1993 MLD 2105 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.18---Execution of decree---Forum for- execution--¬Determination---Suit was valued for a sum of Rs.1,76,80,544.45 and was decreed for a sum of Rs.3,03,25,593.66 by Banking Court---Execution of the decree was transferred to High Court--¬Objection raised by the debtor was that since the valuation of the suit was less than the pecuniary jurisdiction of High Court the execution petition was not maintainable before the High Court---Validity---Determining factor for the purpose of jurisdiction was the amoun; fixed by the plaintiff in the suit on which amount the subject-matter of the suit had been valued---Once the plaintiff had determined the value of the suit/relief in the plaint that would be conclusive for the purpose of determining the forum of appeal---Banking Court which initially assumed the jurisdiction on the basis of the value fixed by the decree-holder in the plaint itself, was' the only Court which had pecuniary jurisdiction to execute the decree and to decide other matters relating to the execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree and to deal with all the ancillary matters relating thereto---High Court could neither entertain such execution petition nor undertake the execution proceedings on account of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction---Decree was transferred to the Banking Court for execution accordingly.\n \nGovernment of Pakistan v. Messrs Allah Bakhsh 2000 CLC 1598 and Ditta Khan v. Muhammad Zaman and others 1993 MLD 2105 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Petition No.52-E of 1996, decision dated: 7-08-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "MASHRAQ BANK\nVs.\nMessrs AMTUL REHMAN INDUSTRIES (PVT.)\nLIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12543",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2108 = 2002 SLD 2108 = 2002 CLD 341",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.10, 12 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.13 ¬Setting aside of ex parte decree Failure to appear before Banking Court Non appearance of the defendant was due to negotiation for settlement with the Bank When case was listed for hearing and the names of the counsel of the parties appeared in the cause list nobody appeared before the Banking Court to inform that the parties were negotiating for some settlement ¬Effect Application filed by the defendants under O.IX, R.13, C.P.C. for setting aside the ex parte decree did not fall within the ambit of S.12 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 In view of the remedy of appeal being available under S.21 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, the ex parte decree, could not be set aside under O.IX, R.13, C.P.C. Application was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nSh. Muhammad Mubarak and 5 others v. Muhammad Iqbal and 11 others 1994 CLC 1708 and Ex Hav. Mirza Mushtaq Baig v. General Court Martial 1994 SCMR 1948 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.12 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of I 908), O.IX, R.13 ¬Setting aside of ex parte decree Provisions of O.IX, R.13, C.P.C. ¬Applicability In presence of the remedies provided by Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, itself, application under O.IX R.13, C.P.C. for setting aside of an ex parte decree is not maintainable.\n \nMuhammad Khalid Mahmood Khan for Applicant. Tariq Kamal Qazi for Plaintiff.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Miscellaneous No.453 B of 2001 in C.O.S. No.9 B of 2000, decision dated: 17-07-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION --Plaintiff„¢\nVs.\nSHEIKHOO COOKING OIL MILLS LIMITED and 7 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12544",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1JpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2109 = 2002 SLD 2109 = 2002 CLD 349",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6(8) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXMV, R.2 ¬Preliminary decree, non passing of Non adherence to provisions of O.XXMV, C.P.C. by Banking Tribunal in not passing a preliminary decree Effect Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, was promulgated to provide a mechanism of recovery of finance provided by Banking Companies under a system or financing not based upon interest Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, provided for a special procedure for recovery suits as also the mechanism for execution of the decree in consequence thereof ¬Where Banking Company claimed enforcement of mortgage of immovable property, decree passed by the Banking Tribunal was a final decree for foreclosure, sale or redemption as per provisions of O.XXXTV, C.P.C. Such non adherence to the provisions of O.XXXIV, C.P.C. had no effect in circumstances.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6(8) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIV, R.2 ¬Recovery suit Execution of mortgaged property Preliminary decree, non passing of Decree passed by Banking Tribunal axis assailed on the ground that the Tribunal, instead of passing preliminary decree in the first instance, had .passed final decree ¬Validity Banking Tribunal passed the decree for recovery through sale of mortgage property in terms of S.6(8) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and the Tribunal was not required to pass a preliminary decree as provided in O.XXMV, C.P.C. Banking Tribunal was within its jurisdiction to order execution of the same through sale of the mortgaged property ¬Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 120 of 1989, heard on 25-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR ALAM KHAN AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "FIRM MUSLIM TRADERS GENERAL MERCHANT AND RICE DEALERS, PATTOKI through Partner (Managing Partner) and 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12545",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1J5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2110 = 2002 SLD 2110 = 2002 CLD 352",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9 & 10 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Application for leave to defend Limitation Computation of Failure to make plausible defence in application for leave to appear and defend the suit Notices were published on 23 7 1999 and 31 7 1999, whereas the application for leave to defend was filed on 2 9 1999 Application for leave to defend was dismissed for non prosecution on 8 10 1999 and the Banking Court decreed the suit in favour of the Bank Validity Even if taking the latter date for computing the time, the leave to appear and defend application was beyond time and was liable to be dismissed ¬Plausible defence had to flow from the application in order to make out a case for permission to leave to appear and defend, but when appellants had not made out a case within the frame of plausible defence in the application, High Court declined to interfere with the and decree passed by the Banking Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 140 of 2000 decided on 24-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN SAQIB NISAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs HAQ KNITWEAR (PVT.) LIMITED and 9 others --Appellants\nVs.\nPRUDENTIAL COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12546",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1J5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2111 = 2002 SLD 2111 = 2002 CLD 355",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances Ordinance (XXV of 1997) Ss.9 & 16 Suit for recovery of loans Appeal against and decree of the Trial Court Compromise between the parties Controversy involved in the appeal stood amicably settled in compromise arrived at between the parties during pendency of the appeal Both parties stated at the Bar that terms of agreement with regard to compromise had been duly settled and they would abide by the same Appeal was allowed and suit filed by the Bank against the appellant was decreed in terms of agreement/compromise arrived at between the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.652 of 2001, decision dated: 25-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ALLAMA TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive and 6 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12547",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1J5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2112 = 2002 SLD 2112 = 2002 CLD 356",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loan, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. VII, R. 11 Suit for recovery of loan Leave to defend suit Appellants/borrowers resisted the suit of respondent Bank by filing application for leave to defend alongwith application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. contending that it was time barred as the finance facility had expired on 31 12 1994 and the suit was filed on 2 6 2000 and respondent Bank was not competent to charge mark up beyond the period of 31 12 1994 Banking Court rejected the application and decreed the suit Validity None of the grounds raised by appellants was considered in the impugned All the documents except statements of accounts bore the date of 1 I 1994 No single document showing the extension of facility beyond the period of 31 12 1994 was available on record -Statements of accounts showed entries of debit and credit till 16 11 1999 and charging of mark up for unspecified period at unspecified rate beyond period of 31 12 1994 Banking Court seemed to have decided the suit by giving bland, general, vague and unsubstantiated observations, which did not find support from documents available on record High Court set aside the impugned and decree and remanded the case to Banking Court for its fresh decision in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.584 of 2000, heard on 27-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR ALAM KHAN AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs FAZAL ABDULIAH EXPORTS (PVT.) LIMITED\nthrough Chief Executive and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12548",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1J5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2113 = 2002 SLD 2113 = 2002 CLD 362",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XXXIV, R.2 Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), S.6(8) Preliminary decree, non passing of Banking Tribunal not passing a preliminary decree under provisions of O.XXXIV, C.P.C. Effect Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, was promulgated to provide a mechanism of recovery of finance provided by Banking Companies under a system or financing not based upon interest Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, provided for a special procedure for recovery suits as also the mechanism for execution of the decree in consequence thereof ¬Where Banking Company claimed enforcement of mortgage of immovable property, decree passed by the Tribunal was a final decree for foreclosure, sale or redemption as per provisions of O.XXXIV, C.P.C. Non adherence to the provisions of O.XXXIV, C.P.C. had no effect in circumstances.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6(8) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIV, R.2 ¬Recovery suit Execution of decree for recovery through sale of mortgaged property Preliminary decree, non passing of Decree passed by Banking Tribunal was assailed on the ground that the Tribunal instead of passing preliminary decree in the first instance had passed final decree Validity Banking Tribunal passed the decree for recovery through sale of mortgaged property in terms of S.6(8) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and the Tribunal was not required to pass a preliminary decree as provided in O.XXXIV, C.P.C. Banking Tribunal was within its jurisdiction to order execution of the same through sale of the mortgaged property.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 202 of 1988, heard on 25-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR ALAM KHAN AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "Mst. ZAMURAD AFZA --Appellant\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through President and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12549",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1J5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2114 = 2002 SLD 2114 = 2002 CLD 362",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XXXIV, R.2 Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), S.6(8) Preliminary decree, non passing of Banking Tribunal not passing a preliminary decree under provisions of O.XXXIV, C.P.C. Effect Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, was promulgated to provide a mechanism of recovery of finance provided by Banking Companies under a system or financing not based upon interest Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, provided for a special procedure for recovery suits as also the mechanism for execution of the decree in consequence thereof ¬Where Banking Company claimed enforcement of mortgage of immovable property, decree passed by the Tribunal was a final decree for foreclosure, sale or redemption as per provisions of O.XXXIV, C.P.C. Non adherence to the provisions of O.XXXIV, C.P.C. had no effect in circumstances.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6(8) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIV, R.2 ¬Recovery suit Execution of decree for recovery through sale of mortgaged property Preliminary decree, non passing of Decree passed by Banking Tribunal was assailed on the ground that the Tribunal instead of passing preliminary decree in the first instance had passed final decree Validity Banking Tribunal passed the decree for recovery through sale of mortgaged property in terms of S.6(8) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and the Tribunal was not required to pass a preliminary decree as provided in O.XXXIV, C.P.C. Banking Tribunal was within its jurisdiction to order execution of the same through sale of the mortgaged property.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 202 of 1988, heard on 25-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR ALAM KHAN AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "Mst. ZAMURAD AFZA --Appellant\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through President and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12550",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1J5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2115 = 2002 SLD 2115 = 2002 CLD 365",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.9 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) Setting aside of decree Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. Scope Borrower accepted the decree and sought permission from the Banking Court, to pay the principal amount in instalments After the borrower had consented to the decree, application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was filed by him to set aside the decree Validity Where the decree had been consented and the borrower had made statement for deposit of principal amount, he had no locus standi either to file an application under S.12(2), C.P.C. or any other application challenging the decree Application was not maintainable in circumstances.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 9 & 12 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 ¬Constitutional petition Setting aside of decree Suit filed by the Bank was decreed by the Banking Court and the decree was accepted by the petitioner Petitioner assailed the order passed by the Banking Court on the ground that he had noted wrong date of hearing Validity Petitioner, in .the present case, was in the knowledge of the proceedings and had been pursuing the same all the time, as he had consented to the decree, sought permission from the Banking Court to pay the principal amount in instalments Plea of wrong noting of the date was of no avail to the petitioner Where the petitioner had, not come to the High Court with clean hands to seek equitable relief, High Court declined to exercise Constitutional jurisdiction in his favour Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.9 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) Proceedings under S.9 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. Applicability Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. have no applicability to the proceedings arising out of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997.\n \nMessrs Gold Star International and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 2000 MLD 421; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Zafar Textile Mills Limited 2000 CLC 1330 and Emirates Bank International Limited v: Messrs Usman Brothers and others PLD 1998 Kar. 338 ref.\n \nAshar Ellahi for Petitioner.\n \nMian Yousaf Umar for Respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 21729 of 1998, decision dated: 7-06-2001",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "MUNIR AHMAD er\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12551",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1J5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2116 = 2002 SLD 2116 = 2002 CLD 369",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9 & 10 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Application for leave to defend Negligence of Bank Determination Banking Court, jurisdiction of Contention of the borrower was that the project could not be completed due to fault and negligence of the Bank Validity Exercise of determining such negligence and fault could not be undertaken by Banking Court in the suit for recovery of Bank loan.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.10 Application to defend the suit Grant of Plea of pendency of suit for damages Borrowers had already filed a suit for recovery of some amount as damages against the Bank and the same was pending in the same Court Effect Pendency of suit for damages was not sufficient, within the parameters of law, for the grant of leave to defend the suit.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.10 Leave to defend the suit Grant of Plea of damages caused due to negligence of Bank Borrowers failed to bring any material on record, even prima facie, to prove that they had, in fact, suffered any losses No amount of alleged damages caused to the borrowers had either been mentioned in their applications for leave to defend or in any of the documents No documentary evidence in support of the said assertion had been placed on record to prima facie show that the borrowers had in fact suffered any losses and if so what was the quantum of such losses Mere a bald assertion regarding causing losses would not entitle the borrowers for the grant of leave to defend the suit.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 9 & 10 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Non receipt of any payment from the Bank Contention of the borrowers was that they had not received any payment from the Bank, rather the suppliers had directly received the same from the Bank ¬Validity Where the borrower company had not denied the availing of the financial facilities, it could not say that no transaction was undertaken between the parties Even if some payments were made directly to the suppliers those must be pursuant to some arrangements between the parties and in accordance with the agreement Where Banking Court declined to grant leave to appear and defend the suit, the allegations made in the plaint were deemed to be correct as provided under S.9(4) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Suit was decreed in circumstances.\n \nMessrs Ahmad Autos and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited PLD 1990 SC 497 ref.\n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.10 Leave to defend the suit Management; change of Plea raised by the borrowers was that as the management of the defendant company had been changed, therefore, the borrowers not being the existing Directors of the defendant company were not liable to re pay the loan Neither the change of management was accepted by the Bank nor the alleged incoming management had furnished fresh documents, including the finance agreements, guarantees and the mortgage, nor the charge documents and other allied instruments were released/ discharged by the Bank Effect Where there was no change of management, it was a lame excuse only to manipulate a ground for the grant of leave to defend the suit Application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(f) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.9 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.130 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Revocation of guarantee Suit was filed against borrowers as well as the surety Contention of the surety was that she had resigned from the management and was absolved from the liability of her being a surety of the Bank loan No notice for revocation of guarantee, as contemplated under S.130 of the Contract Act, 1872, was served upon the Bank by the surety Effect As such it could not be said that surety stood discharged In the absence of notice the guarantees furnished by the surety could not possibly be revoked.\n \n(g) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.10 Leave to defend the suit Failure to raise serious and bona fide dispute Effect Where the dispute raised by all the defendants was neither serious nor bona fide, the defendants had failed to make out a case for the grant of leave to defend the suit Application for leave to defend was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(h) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 9 & 10 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Photo copies of documents produced by Bank Bank had placed on record the photo copies of all the documents, on the basis of which the suit was filed Execution of the documents had not been denied by the borrowers even in their application for the grant of leave to defend Effect Execution of all the documents would be deemed to be admitted Statement of accounts, in the present case, which was duly verified/certified under the Bankers' Books of Evidence Act, 1891, was also on record, regarding the correctness of which no objection was raised by any of the borrowers Presumption of correctness was attached to such statement of account under the law, therefore, the entries made therein were presumed to be true and correct Where there was no rebuttal of the documents on record by the borrowers, the suit was decreed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 29 of 1999, decision dated: 10-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Plaintiff\nVs.\nN.T.N. (PVT.) LIMITED --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12552",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1J5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2117 = 2002 SLD 2117 = 2002 CLD 379",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Ordinance (XXV of 1997) Ss.9 & 12 Suit for recovery of loan Ex parte decree, setting aside of Banking Tribunal issued notice to the defendants who filed reply to the show cause notice issued by Chairman, Banking Tribunal and case was fixed for arguments with direction to submit written arguments Plaintiff filed written arguments but the defendants failed to file the same Banking Tribunal dismissed the reply to show cause notice filed by the defendants for non prosecution and decreed the suit ex pane ¬Application for setting aside the ex parte decree by the defendants was also dismissed Defendants contended that their counsel failed to note the correct date of hearing and was misled about the fixation of the case on date of hearing Question whether the defendants' counsel noted incorrect date, was a question which necessarily could be resolved only through recording of evidence Defendants, prima facie, on account of the contents of the application supported by an affidavit, were able to prove the same Application for setting aside ex parte decree, in circumstances, should have been allowed instead of its dismissal Ex pane and. decree passed by the Banking Tribunal against the defendants were set aside with the result that the suit and. reply to the show cause notice would be decided afresh after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 99 of 1996, heard on 25-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN SAQIB NISAR, JJ",
    "": "SHAMS PAK ASSOCIATES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and another --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12553",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1J5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2118 = 2002 SLD 2118 = 2002 CLD 381",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9 & 10 Suit for recovery of loan Grant of leave to appear and defend suit Principles Grant of leave was not a matter of routine or matter of right Defendant seeking leave to defend had to disclose a plausible defence and where no substantial question of law or fact was involved needing trial and the defence set up was vague or sham, leave could be refused and the suit decreed For the purpose of grant of leave to defend, the party was required to make out a plausible cause and must show that serious and bona fide dispute existed between the parties which could not be resolved without recording evidence ¬Defendant, in the present case, had not come with clean hands and had failed to make out plausible cause to defend suit Trial Court, in circumstances, had rightly exercised its discretion in refusing leave to the defendant and order of the Trial Court could not be interfered with.\n \nPan Ocean Enterprises (Pvt.) Limited and 4 others v. Faysal Islamic Bank of Bahrain and others 1996 MLD 816; Messrs United Bank Limited v. Flora Textiles Limited and 6 others PLD 1996 Lah. 333; Hazoor Bakhsh v. Ghulam Farid 1996 MLD 704; Messrs Ali Match Industries Limited and 3 others v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 1997 SCMR 943; Sheikh Gulzar Ali & Company Limited and others v. Special Judge, Special Court of Banking and another 1991 SCMR 590 and United Bank Limited v. Muhammad Sharfuddin 2000 MLD 456 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No.31 of 2000, decision dated: 14-06-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIRUL MULK AND IJAZ UL HASSAN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. ANWAR BEGUM --Appellant\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12554",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1J5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2119 = 2002 SLD 2119 = 2002 CLD 386",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9 & 10 Suit for recovery of loan Leave to appear and defend suit Defendant who was one of the Managing Directors of the Company, obtained non interest based financial facility from the plaintiff Bank by executing various documents in its favour and in order to secure said financial facility defendant mortgaged properties and plant machinery etc. through execution of Memorandum of Deposit of title deed Defendant resisted suit Und applied for grant of leave to appear and defend on various grounds and denied having affixed her signatures on the documents attributed to her and were made basis of suit by the plaintiff Bank Defendant had contended that she being an old lady of advance age had been defrauded by other defendant with the collusion of the Bank officials and. that she was entitled to the grant of leave to defend the suit on account of having disputed the signatures attributed to her Lady defendant had claimed that keeping in view the controversy involved regarding genuineness or otherwise of her signatures, the Trial Court should have resolved the point in issue after recording the evidence Validity Comparison of admitted signatures of the defendant appearing on the Vakalatnama, general power of attorney and appeal etc. with those of disputed signatures appearing on the documents made basis of the suit by the Bank had shown that those were absolutely identical and had no distinction Bare denial of signatures by the defendant on the letter of guarantee and other documents without any prima facie proof, could not furnish a ground for the grant of leave to appear and defend the suit especially when nothing was on record in support of allegations of fraud or fabrication Not believable that on account of being a Pardahnashin lady of advance age the defendant was not engaged in the business of Company, that she had no knowledge about the loan and that she had not executed documents in favour of the plaintiff Bank Leave to appear and defend the suit had rightly been refused for valid and cogent reasons and order of refusal did not warrant any interference.\n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Hajira Bai and 2 others PLD 1985 Kar. 431 and National Development Finance Corporation v. Bhital Rubber Industries Ltd. and 7 others 2001 CLC 492 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No. 28 of 2000, decision dated: 20-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL RAUF KHAN LUGHMANI AND IJAZ UL HASSAN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. ZAMURD BEGUM --Appellant\nVs.\nI.D.B.P. and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12555",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2120 = 2002 SLD 2120 = 2002 CLD 391",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XXXVIII R.5 Attachment before Furnishing of security for production of property Pre condition Where Court is satisfied by affidavit or otherwise that defendant with intent to obstruct or delay execution of any decree that may be passed against him, is about to dispose of property at any stage of the suit, the Court can pass an order under O.XXXVIII. R.5, C.P.C.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n -O.XXXVIII R.5 Attachment before Furnishing of security for production of property Intention of defendant, inferring of After receipt of legal notice given by the plaintiff and prior to institution of the suit, the defendant had transferred his property to his wife, just to avoid the decree which might be passed against him Effect Intention of the defendant was to be inferred from the attending circumstances Transfer by the defendant in favour of his wife in clandestine manner prior to institution of suit showed the conduct/intention of the defendant Where the plaintiffs case came within the provision of O.XXXVIII, R.5, C.P.C., High Court directed the defendant to furnish security.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1117 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 7236 of 2000, decision dated: 20-08-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR-UR-REHMAN, J",
    "": "Messrs PRINZE (PVT.) LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nSHAHID SAEED KHAN and others --Respondents\nFaqir Ali v. Muhammad Hayat PLD 1976 Lah. 298 distinguished.\nSyed Ziauddin Nasir for --Plaintiff.\nEjaz Ahmed for --Defendant."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12556",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2121 = 2002 SLD 2121 = 2002 CLD 397",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.12 & 18 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 ¬Constitutional petition Ex parte decree, setting aside of After passing of ex parte decree, defendants made application for its setting aside Banking Court, without making any decision on such application, issued warrants of arrest of defendants -Validity Banking Court was under an obligation to dispose of the application irrespective of its result, so that in case of its decision adverse to defendants, they could avail their other remedies before higher forums High Court accepted the appeal anal directed the Banking Court to decide the application filed for setting aside the ex pane decree within specified time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 11692 of 2000, heard on 18-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "ABDUL HAMID KHOKHAR C/O Metal Manufacturing Company outside Khiali Gate, Gujranwala er\nVs.\nBANKING COURT and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12557",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2122 = 2002 SLD 2122 = 2002 CLD 399",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.12 & 21 Ex pane decree, setting aside of Limitation ¬Decree was passed on 9 9 1998, whereas application for its setting aside was made on 12 10 1998 Limitation provided under S.12 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 for setting aside ex-parte decree was 21 days Banking Court dismissed the application being time barred Validity Banking Court had rightly dismissed the application Appeal was dismissed.\n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Tradewell (Pakistan) Corporation and 2 others 1991 CLC 1243 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 107 of 2000, heard on 18-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "KHALID PERVAIZ --Appellant\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12558",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2123 = 2002 SLD 2123 = 2002 CLD 401",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 3, 12 & 27 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) ¬Decree in suit for recovery of loan Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. for setting aside the decree of Banking Court -Maintainability Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. have no application to proceedings arising out of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997.\n \nEmirates Bank International Limited v. Messrs Usman Brothers and others PLD 1998 Kar. 338; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Zafar Textile Mills Limited 2000 CLC 1330 and Life, Paper Store and others v. Bank of Punjab and others 2001 YLR 77 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 17221 of 1999, heard on 18-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ., J",
    "": "Mst. RUQIYYA RHAZES er\nVs.\nAL FALAH BANK and 7 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12559",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2124 = 2002 SLD 2124 = 2002 CLD 403",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6 Suit for recovery of money Some of the defendants filed reply to show cause notices, while rest of them, although duly served, did not choose to file the reply and abandoned the proceedings Banking Tribunal, after taking into consideration the points/questions raised in reply to show-cause notices: passed the decree Such decree could not be said to be an ex parte decree.\n \n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n Ss.6 & 9 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 ¬Constitutional petition Decree passed by Banking Tribunal-----¬Non-filing of appeal Effect Defendants did not file appeal against decree, but after three years of its passing challenged the same through Constitutional petition Maintainability of Constitutional petition Decree had attained finality after lapse of period of limitation prescribed for filing of appeal After passing of decree, defendant went into deep slumber deeming it valid and final, thus, had acquiesced in the matter Constitutional petition was hit by principles of acquiescence and laches deserving dismissal.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 18(6) & 21(5) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 ¬Constitutional petition Execution of decree Order of Banking Court to auction the property was challenged through Constitutional petition Validity Impugned order at best, could be termed as interlocutory order, which was outside the purview of Constitutional jurisdiction Defendants could file objections to attachment and sale of property under S.18(6) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 and in case of their failure, could file appeal under S.21(5) of the said Act, which remedies were adequate and efficacious Impugned order was not amenable to Constitutional jurisdiction in circumstances.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.18 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional petition Execution of decree High Court stayed further execution proceedings subject to deposit of Rs.10 lacs Non-¬compliance of order Effect- Non compliance of stay order exhibiting the conduct of petitioners would operate against them High Court refused to exercise Constitutional jurisdiction in the matter, which was an equitable and discretionary relief.\n \n(e) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. 199 Interlocutory order is outside the purview of Constitutional jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1837 of 1998, heard on 12th October 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Messrs SHARIF COTTON GINNING, PRESSING AND OIL FACTORY and 4 others ers\nVs.\nMessrs NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12560",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2125 = 2002 SLD 2125 = 2002 CLD 407",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6 Decree Mark up Remission of While passing decree in a suit for recovery of amount, Banking Tribunal has no jurisdiction to give direction to Bank for remission of mark up.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n Ss.6(5), 10 & 11 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199 ¬Constitutional petition Setting aside of ex parte decree on the application of a person not party to the suit/decree Validity ¬Application for setting aside the decree was not even signed by any person Applicant had no nexus with decree as he was not party to the suit Effect Ex parte decree had attained finality as parties thereto did not file any application for its setting aside ¬Applicant having no locus standi to file application being not authorized to do so by the parties to the decree, application was misconceived and non maintainable Banking Tribunal had passed the impugned order in complete oblivion of the record of the case High Court accepted Constitutional petition and set aside impugned order being illegal and without lawful authority.\n \n(c) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.11 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional petition Dismissal of execution petition for non prosecution on a date when proceedings were fixed only for awaiting the reply from Head Office of the decree holder Validity Execution petition could not have been dismissed in default on a date not fixed for hearing Impugned order could not be said to be a legal order, which was set aside by High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction Constitutional petition was accepted.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 13947 of 1997, heard on 10-10-2001",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager er\nVs.\nMst. RUKHSANA and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12561",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2126 = 2002 SLD 2126 = 2002 CLD 410",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.Il Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 1991 Constitutional petition Judgment debtors, during execution of ex parte decree, produced receipts showing deposit of amount under Prime Minister's Package, whereupon Banking Tribunal, being satisfied, consigned the execution petition to record Validity ¬Banking Tribunal after calculating the amounts had come to the conclusion that debtors were entitled to deduction of amount deposited by them out of the principal amount Order passed by the Banking Tribunal was not challenged by the Bank before higher forum, hence, the same attained finality binding the Bank by its terms Impugned order was well reasoned and did not suffer from any legal infirmity, therefore, High Court refused to interfere with the same and dismissed the Constitutional petition.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 19378 of 1997, heard on 11-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager er\nVs.\nZAFAR ULLAH alias MUZAFFAR AHMAD and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12562",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2127 = 2002 SLD 2127 = 2002 CLD 412",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.10 & 21 Leave to defend the suit Serious and bona fide dispute Borrower imported goods on account of the Bank and on the failure of the importers to clear the goods after retiring the documents and making the payment the Bank was stuck ¬Borrowers were saddled with the documents and a liability ¬Dispute did exist between the Bank and the borrower, in the present case and, therefore, the leave to defend should have been granted by the Banking Court and matter disposed of on merits Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court were set aside and leave to defend was granted Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.217 of 1999, decision dated: 11-12-2000.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID QURBAN ALVI AND MUSHIR ALAM, JJ",
    "": "Rana QAMAR ZAMAN and 6 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12563",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2128 = 2002 SLD 2128 = 2002 CLD 415",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997 S.18 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional petition Decretal amount, recovery of Issuance of bailable warrants Banking Court issued bailable warrants for the recovery of decretal amount from the debtors ¬Judgment debtors' counsel had stated before the High Court that debtors had appeared before dancing Court and had deposited the required security in the Banking Court Effect ¬Order of issuance of bailable warrants against the ¬ debtors was recalled in view of the statement given by the debtors' counsel High Court directed the Banking Court to decide the matter in accordance with law and to retain the amount of the security so deposited till the final disposal of the case Constitutional petition axis disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D 1830 of 2001, decision dated: 31st October, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ROSHAN ESSANI AND MUSHIR ALAM, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AHMED FOOD INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED and 2 others ers\nVs.\nBANKING COURT NO. 1 through learned Presiding Officer/Judge and 3 others --Respondents\nS. Zaki Muhammad, D.A.G."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12564",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2129 = 2002 SLD 2129 = 2002 CLD 417",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss.6(6), 9, 10 & 11 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. l99 ¬Constitutional petition Maintainability Decree not challenged in appeal Effect Challenge through Constitutional petition to and decree of Banking Tribunal after two years of its passing Validity Constitutional petition was not maintainable, because petitioner had not challenged the and decree in appeal provided under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 ¬Petitioner had acquiesced in the matter and as such was bound by the terms of decree Constitutional petition was also hit by the principle of laches, because petitioner had agitated the matter after lapse of two years, which was a past and closed transaction High Court refused too exercise Constitutional jurisdiction in the matter and dismissed the Constitutional petition.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. l99 Constitutional petition would not be maintainable against and decree not challenged in appeal within stipulated time.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. 199 Laches Constitutional petition filed against and decree after two years of its passing was, to be hit by the principle of laches.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 12897 of 1997, decision dated: 11-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "ZAFAR IQBAL er\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12565",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2130 = 2002 SLD 2130 = 2002 CLD 417",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss.6(6), 9, 10 & 11 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. l99 ¬Constitutional petition Maintainability Decree not challenged in appeal Effect Challenge through Constitutional petition to and decree of Banking Tribunal after two years of its passing Validity Constitutional petition was not maintainable, because petitioner had not challenged the and decree in appeal provided under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 ¬Petitioner had acquiesced in the matter and as such was bound by the terms of decree Constitutional petition was also hit by the principle of laches, because petitioner had agitated the matter after lapse of two years, which was a past and closed transaction High Court refused too exercise Constitutional jurisdiction in the matter and dismissed the Constitutional petition.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. l99 Constitutional petition would not be maintainable against and decree not challenged in appeal within stipulated time.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. 199 Laches Constitutional petition filed against and decree after two years of its passing was, to be hit by the principle of laches.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 12897 of 1997, decision dated: 11-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "ZAFAR IQBAL er\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12566",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2131 = 2002 SLD 2131 = 2002 CLD 419",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finance) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 15 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), OXX, R.5 ¬Decree Banking Court after granting leave to defend, framing issues and recording evidence, decreed the suit on assumption that in fact leave to defend had not been granted to appellants/defendants Impugned even otherwise was sketchy and did not comply with requirements of O.XX, R.5, C.P.C. Appellate Court set aside the same and remanded the case to Banking Court for passing in accordance with provisions of O.XX, R.5, C.P.C. after hearing both the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.414 of 2001, decision dated: 15-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs BALLY SHOES (PVT.) LIMITED and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nEQUITY PARTICIPATION FUND, STATE LIFE BUILDING through Incharge EPF, Cell I.D.B.P. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12567",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2132 = 2002 SLD 2132 = 2002 CLD 420",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.15 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional-----petition Setting aside of ex parte decree Banking Court without adverting to grounds taken by petitioner in his application for setting aside of ex parte decree and application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, for condonation of delay, dismissed both the applications on the assumption that presence of his brother (defendant) was sufficient to believe that petitioner had also been served -¬Validity Such approach of Banking Court was, perfunctory and could not be countenanced by any stretch of imagination ¬Banking Court was bound to decide both the applications dealing with the grounds taken therein after calling for reply from the Bank Impugned order being .devoid of reasons and sketchy warranted interference by High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction Constitutional petition was accepted and impugned order was set aside with direction to Banking Court to decide the applications for setting aside of ex pane decree and condonation of delay under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 8066 of 2000, heard on 18th October 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "TAHIR KARIM er\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT NO. 1, FAISALABAD and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12568",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2133 = 2002 SLD 2133 = 2002 CLD 423",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Preamble Enactment of Banking Laws Object Banking Laws are enacted to provide speedy measures for recovery of outstanding loans of Banking Companies as their recovery suits remained pending in the Civil Courts for years together Special law has been enacted to meet the economic situation which has arisen on account of defaults in payment of loans and finances by borrowers and customers of the Banking Companies.\n \n(b) Cost \n \n Imposition of costs Effect Costs is the only panacea which heals every sore in litigation.\n \n(c) Administration of justice \n \n Expeditious disposal of cases Deciding lis on technicalities Validity Judicial forum has to act in consonance with the dictates of justice and, equity where a cause is decided expeditiously but after giving full and ample opportunity to all sides Law favours disposal of lis upon hearing and not on mere technicalities Procedure is designed to secure advancement of justice With a view of securing expeditious disposal of cases by a Court, legal requirement cannot be sacrificed Courts are required to apply their mind before passing any order or .\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.12 Recovery of Bank loan Ex parte decree, setting aside of Borrower contested the suit on all grounds and denied claim of Bank Evidence of Bank was being recorded when on one date due to absence of the borrower and his counsel, the Banking Court passed ex parte decree Application to set aside the said decree was dismissed by the Banking Court- Validity High Court set aside the order passed by the Banking Court on payment of Rs. 5,000 as costs and remanded the case to the Banking Court for decision afresh.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No.9 of 2000, decision dated: 31st October, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "QAZI EHSANULLAH QURESHI AND IJAZ UL HASSAN, JJ",
    "": "Malik MUHAMMAD AYAZ --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs UNITED BANK LIMITED through Manager and 12 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12569",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2134 = 2002 SLD 2134 = 2002 CLD 426",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.8(2) Suit for recovery of Bank loan Filing of the suit by unauthorized person Effect Unless the attorney was so authorized by resolution passed by the Company's Board of Directors under S.8(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and. Finances) Act, 1997, the suit was incompetent.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.8 & 9 Written off loan Suit filed by unauthorized person Bank filed the suit in September, 1997, whereas the loan was written off in March, 1993 Suit was decreed by the Banking Court in favour of the Bank Plea raised by the borrower was that the suit was beyond the period prescribed by law and the same was filed by unauthorized person Validity Suit, in the present case, was filed by a person who was not duly authorized in that behalf as provided under S.8(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 ¬Where the Banking Court had not examined the legal position in respect of time barred claim and competency of Bank to file such suit without having authority from Board of Directors, the and decree passed by it were without lawful authority and the same were set aside Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \nDumez Boric v. International Forwarders Limited NLR 1983 UC 184; Punjab Livestock Dairy and Poultry Development Board v. Shaikh Muhammad Younas 1980 CLC 1932; Khan Iftikhar Hussain of Mamdot v. Messrs Ghulam Nabi Corporation Limited, Lahore PLD 1971 SC 258; National Bank of Pakistan and others v. National Battery Industries and others 1994 CLC 2133 and H.M. Ebrahim Sait v. South India Industrials Ltd. AIR 1938 Mad. 962 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Civil Appeal No.D 1 of 2000, decision dated: 6-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAWAR HUSSAIN, JAFFERY, J",
    "": "Haji MUHAMMAD MIRZA --Appellant\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Attorney Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12570",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2135 = 2002 SLD 2135 = 2002 CLD 433",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Act (IV of 1938) S. 44 A Delisting of Insurance Company by Bank ¬Principles Delisting should only be after due consideration and keeping in mind all the facts of the case and should be considered as a last measure and should be used very sparingly By delisting and blacklisting Insurance Companies in an arbitrary and capricious manner, Bank would be holding themselves vulnerable to action for damages.\n \n(b) Insurance Act (IV of 1938) \n \n S.106 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199 Constitutional petition Claim of loss by fire by Bank Denial of liability by petitioner Insurance Company as Co Insurer to pay such loss ¬Delisting of such Co Insurer Company by Bank Validity Union Insurance Company issued Fire Insurance Policy in favour of Bank as mortgagee of building, machinery and stock in factory premises of mortgagor Union Insurance Company received an intimation of loss from Bank on account of fire Petitioner Insurance Company was requested on the basis of Co Insurance Policy to depute surveyors for assessing loss, but it denied its liability to pay such loss alleging Co Insurance Policy to be a fake, false and fabricated document Bank lodged F.I.R. and after investigation of the case, challan was submitted in Court only against Manager of Union Insurance Company, whereas petitioner Insurance Company was exonerated from the charge Suit filed by Bank for recovery of alleged loss was decreed by Banking Court, wherein petitioner Insurance Company was not party ¬Controller of Insurance being guiding factor for all Insurance Companies and empowered to ensure strict compliance of the rules had also exonerated petitioner Insurance Company from allegations levelled by Bank Behaviour of Bank, in view of all such factors in favour of petitioner Insurance Company, was very strange and partisan and it was not justified to resort to such a harsh stand Bank had not at all acted with prudence ¬Constitutional petition was accepted and impugned action of Bank was declared to be unwarranted and unjustified.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P.D. No.296 of 2000, decision dated: 22-11-2000.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID QURBAN ALVI AND. S.A. RABBANI, JJ .",
    "": "THE CRESCENT STAR INSURANCE CO. LIMITED er\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent\nNew Jubilee Insurance Company v. National Bank of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 1126 fol."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12571",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2136 = 2002 SLD 2136 = 2002 CLD 439",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 7, 15 & 21 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.18 Suit for recovery of amount Bank alleged to have inadvertently credited suit amount to the account of defendants being maintained with it, which was withdrawn by defendants in 1977 Bank filed suit on 11 11 1981, which was dismissed by Banking Court being time barred Contention of Bank that on account of provisions contained in S.18 of Limitation Act, 1908, period of limitation did not run against Bank, was wholly misconceived Section 18 of Limitation Act, 1908, would be applicable, where a person having a right to file a suit had been kept from the knowledge of such right by means of fraud committed on him by the other side ¬Defendants had not committed any fraud nor had they committed any act to prevent Bank from acquiring knowledge of its rights ¬Mistake, if any, was entirely on the part of Bank and was not induced by any deceit or fraud on the part of defendants Bank had the means of detecting its mistake, which in fact had been detected through an audit of its accounts Section 18 of Limitation Act, 1908, thus had no application in circumstances.\n \n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) \n \n S.18 Applicability Section 18 of Limitation Act, 1908, would be applicable, where a person having a right to file a suit had been kept from the knowledge of such right by means of fraud committed on him by the other side.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 229 of 1999, heard on 3rd December, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAD S. KHAWAJA AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs CLIMAX TRADING CORPORATION and 7 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12572",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2137 = 2002 SLD 2137 = 2002 CLD 441",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Words and phrases \"\"Claim\"\" Defined.\n \nBlack's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn. ref.\n \n(b) Words and phrases \n \n \"\"Cause of action\"\" Defined.\n \nBlack's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn. ref.\n \n(c) Financial Institution (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.2(b)(ii) Recovery of Bank loan Jurisdiction of High Court ¬Where valuation of suit was in excess of Rs.5 crores, the same fell within the jurisdiction of High Court within the meaning of S.2(b)(ii) of the Financial Institution (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance, 2001 Suit before High Court was maintainable in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 428 of 1987, decision dated: 8-10-2001",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERVEZ, J",
    "": "A. HABIB AHMAD --Plaintiff\nVs.\nHONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12573",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2138 = 2002 SLD 2138 = 2002 CLD 444",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.18(6) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional petition ¬Execution of decree Constructed house was advertised by Court Auctioneer as plot and auctioned the same for Rs.2, 70, 000 ¬Executing Court rejected objection petition filed by petitioner ¬Validity Issuance of advertisement by Court Auctioneer with regard to plot instead of house brought the case in the area that auction had not been held in terms of the property in question -Auction purchaser had already filed suit against the petitioner for specific performance of agreement to sell executed between them for a consideration of Rs. 5,05,000 Such facts made it clear that property in question had not been sold at market price High Court accepted the Constitutional petition and set aside impugned order subject to conditions that petitioner would have to satisfy the decree within specified time and would have to pay 5% to auction purchaser on amount of auction price, failing which Constitutional petition would be deemed to be dismissed.\n \nDawood Flour Mills v. National Bank of Pakistan 1993 MLD 3205 and Messrs S.P.R.L. Rehman Brothers and others v. Judge Banking Court II and another 2000 P.C.T.L.R. 1 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1563 of 2001, decision dated: 5-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ZAHID er\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT NO. II, FAISALABAD and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12574",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQ1NTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2139 = 2002 SLD 2139 = 2002 CLD 447",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) Arts. 199 & 203 G Constitutional petition Bank loan Charging of interest/mark up Petitioner/borrower contended that charging of mark up/interest by Bank was ran Islamic --Validity High Court in view of Art. 203 G of the Constitution had no power or jurisdiction to determine such question.\n \nMuhammad Ramzan v. Citibank 2001 CLC 158 and Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khaki v. Syed Muhammad Hussain and 2 others PLD 2000 SC 225 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.9 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional petition Bank loan Challenge to demand of interest mark up by Bank Maintainability Petitioner/borrower had got the alternative remedy to file a suit against Bank under S.9 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, thus, Constitutional petition was not maintainable.\n \nCh. Muhammad Ismail v. Fazal Zada, Civil Judge, Lahore and 20 others PLD 1996 SC 246 and Mrs. Farha Nasir v. Pakistan through Secretary to Government, Ministry of Economics and Commercial Affairs, Islamabad and 2 other 2001 MLD 1657 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.9 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199 Constitutional petition Bank loan Demand of interest/mark up on loan was alleged by petitioner borrower to be against the Injunctions of Islam Validity Petitioner had obtained a lours facility from Bank and had executed some charge documents favouring Bank Petitioner had entered into agreement with leis free will, thus, he was bound under Islamic norms of justice to fulfil the contractual obligations and commitments undertaken by him through execution of such documents High Court refused to exercise Constitutional jurisdiction under such facts and circumstances, and dismissed the petition.\n \nDr. Mahmood ur Rahman Faisal and others v. Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Pakistan. Islamabad, and others PLD 1992 FSC 1; Messrs Momin Motor Company v. The Regional Transport Authority, Dacca and others PLD 1962 SC 108; Muhammad Mumtaz Masud and 2 others v. House Building Corporation and 2 others 1994 SCMR 2287 and Syed Anwar ul Hussain v. District Manager, Small Business Finance Corporation Branch, Vehari and 2 others 2001 YLR 2741 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. 25519 of 1998, heard on 27-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Chaudhry FARRUKH RASOOL er\nVs.\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Finance, Government of Pakistan and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12575",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2140 = 2002 SLD 2140 = 2002 CLD 451",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.14 & 21 Decree Objection petition Appellant's claim was that mortgage of disputed plot in favour of Bank axis not valid, and that he was bona fide purchaser thereof for valuable consideration without having prior notice of any encumbrance thereon Banking Court, after recording evidence, rejected the objection petition Validity Bank claimed to be mortgagee of disputed plot on basis of two documents viz. an application for transfer of allotment of disputed plot signed by its original allottee, from whom mortgagor had acquired it, which was found to be a fake document as it was not part of record of Capital Development Authority; and copy of letter addressed to original allottee, which did not bear signatures of any functionary of Capital Development Authority Both such documents had not resulted in creation of mortgage in favour of Bank Nothing was available on record to show that appellant was not bona fide purchaser of disputed plot Appellate Court accepted the appeal and allowed the objection petition accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 147 of 2001, decision dated: 1st November, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "KHALIDA ADEEB KHANAM --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs PRUDENTIAL INVESTMENT BANK LTD. and 9 others --Respondents\nHabib Bank Limited v. Messrs Ajma Corporation and others 2000 CLC 1425 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12576",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2141 = 2002 SLD 2141 = 2002 CLD 463",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XXII, R.4(3)(4) & S 96 Appeal Death of one of the respondents No list of legal representatives was filed by the deceased respondent during the trial and the counsel expressed his difficulty in pursuing further with the case Validity High Court, in view of amendment of O.XXII, R.4, C.P.C. effected by Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, opted to proceed with hearing of the appeal.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) \n \n S.8(3) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI Execution Of decree Procedure to be adopted by Banking Court Principles Once the Banking Court had opted to execute decree in the manner prescribed in Civil Procedure Code, 1908, more particularly in accordance with the provisions of O.XXI, C.P.C. thereof, the discretion vested in the Banking Court by virtue of S.8(3) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, to adopt any mode or procedure for execution of its decree stood exhausted.\n \nHudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1987 SC 512 ref,\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) \n \n Ss. 6(4) & 8(3) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 62 & 103 Execution of decree Objection to attachment and sale of mortgaged property Jurisdiction of Banking Court Scope Attachment and sale of the property in execution of decree was a matter which squarely fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of Banking Court vested in it by S.6(4) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, and jurisdiction of any other Court in such matters was completely barred.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) \n \n S.6(4) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.96 & O.XXI, Rr. 62, 103 Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12 Specific performance of agreement to sell Property auctioned in execution proceedings ¬-Suit property was auctioned by Banking Court in execution proceedings, sale was confirmed and sale certificate was ordered to be issued Plaintiff alleged that agreement to sell regarding suit property was executed in his favour by the owner for valuable consideration Trial Court in view of the bar contained in O.XXI, Rr.62 & 103, C.P.C. rejected the plaint- Plea raised by the plaintiff was that the sale in favour of the auction purchaser pursuant to proceedings for the execution of decree was ineffective upon his rights Validity Plaint in the present case was barred under S.6(4) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, and also on principles underlying O.XXI, 8.103, C.P.C. Rejection of the plaint was maintained by High Court in circumstances.\n \nMohiuddin Molla v. The Province of East Pakistan and others PLD 1962 SC 119 distinguished.\n \nFazla v. Mehr Din and 2 others 1997 SCMR 837; Kishwar Jehan and 2 others v. The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 1988 MLD 596; Mst. Yasmeen Nighat and others v. National Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 1988 SC 391; Messrs Sindh Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Oits Elevator Company and 3 others 2000 CLC 1524; Khawaja Ghulam Qadir v. Messrs Regent Properties Ltd. and 5 others 1997 MLD 646; Mst. Khurshid Begum and others v. Mst. Ghulam Kubra and others 1982 SCMR 90; Sh. Ghulam Nabi and others v. Ejaz Ghani and others 1982 SCMR 650 and Mahmood Ahmad v. Muhammad Shafi and 3 others 1981 CLC 389 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 158 of 1990, decision dated: 19-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN NAZIR AKHTAR AND MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, JJ",
    "": "Chaudhry ABDUL MAJID --Appellant\nVs.\nSADAQAT SAEED MALIK and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12577",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2142 = 2002 SLD 2142 = 2002 CLD 472",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Five Years Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate Rules, 1992 R. 11 Public Debt Act (XVIII of 1944), Ss. 2(2)(a)(iii), 11 & 11(1 A) Public Debt Rules, 1946, R.14 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 185(3) & 199 Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider as to whether High Court had rightly found that R. I1 of Five Years Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate Rules, 1992 was ultra vires of S. I 1 of Public Debt Act, 1944; that what was the nature of Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate, and could it be equated with a bond as had been found by the High court, that whether Foreign Currency Bearer Certificates were governed by S.2(2)(a)(iii) of Public Debt Act, 1944; that whether R.14 of Public Debt Rules, 1946 and S.11(1) of Public Debt Act, 1944, were attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case or S.11(1 A) of the Act would govern the situation and that whether in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction, High Court could give finding as to genuineness of the claim of the respondent.\n \n(b) Five Years Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate Rules, 1992 \n \n R. II Public Debt Act (XVIII of 1944), Ss.2(2)(a)(i)(ii)(iii)(iv) ¬Stamp Act (II of 1899), S.2(5) Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate, whether bond or Government security Such certificate could not be construed to be a bearer bond falling under S.2(2)(a)(iii) of Public Debt Act, 1944, thus, reliance upon definition of \"\"bond\"\" as given in Stamp Act, 1899 and other Statutes and dictionary meaning of expression \"\"bond\"\" would not be proper Such certificates were Government securities, a category apart from securities falling under S.2(2)(a)(i)(ii)(iii) of Public Debt Act, 1944, which would fall within the ambit of S.2(2)(a)(iv) of the Act.\n \n(c) Five Years Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate Rules, 1992 \n \n R. 11 Public Debt Act (XVIII of 1944), Ss. 2(2)(a)(V to (iv), 11(1) & 11(1 A) Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate Issuance of duplicate certificate Such certificate being a Government security notified in pursuance of S.2(2)(a)(iv) of Public Debt Act, 1944, would be governed in matter of issuance of duplicate certificate by S. 11 (1 A) of the Act, providing a right to get duplicate thereof in case it had been defaced or mutilated Rule 11 of Five Years Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate Rules, 1992, to the extent of prohibiting issuance of duplicate of defaced or mutilated certificates, was ultra vices of the provisions of S. 11(1 A) of the Act, which could not be enforced.\n \n(d) Five Years Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate Rules, 1992 \n \n R. 11 Public Debt Act (XVIII of 1944), S.11(1 A) Public Debt Rules, 1946, 2.2(7)(8)(9) Foreign Currency Bearer Certificates affected by termite Right to obtain duplicate certificate In the case of mutilated and defaced security, the document itself was available in some form, but it had been destroyed or damaged to the extent of its material parts, whereas in case of lost security, the original document itself was not available with the holder Where documents themselves were available but in torn pieces having been affected by termite and its material parts were neither visible nor decipherable, such would. be a case of mutilated security and would fall within the ambit of S.11(1 A) of Public Debt Act, 1944, and holder thereof could not be denied his right to obtain duplicate certificates.\n \n(e) Five Years Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate Rules, 1992 \n \n R. 11 Public Debt Act (XVIII of 1944), S.11(1 A) Protection of Economic Reforms Act (XII of 1992), S.3 Protection of Economic Reforms Ordinance (XXXIX of 1991), S.3 Protection of Economic Reforms Ordinance (III of 1992), S.3 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.24(1) Foreign Currency Bearer Certificates, if lost, burnt or destroyed Right to obtain duplicate thereof Section 11(1 A) of Public Debt Act, 1944, provides that duplicate certificates can be issued only in case, they are mutilated or defaced, but not if they are lost, burnt or destroyed ¬ Such provisions are negating the protection given by Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, to investments and savings made in foreign exchange, for it deprives altogether the owners of their investments and savings Rules 11 of Five Years Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate Rules, 1992 and S.11(1 A) of Public Debt Act, 1944 being in conflict with Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, Protection of Economic Reforms Ordinance, 1991 and Protection of Economic Reforms Ordinance, 1992 the later would prevail for having overriding effect and holder of such certificate, even in case the original is lost, burnt or destroyed, would be entitled to get duplicate thereof to make use of his investments and savings Such interpretation would be in consonance with fundamental rights as enshrined in Art. 24(1) of the Constitution.\n \n(f) Five Years Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate Rules, 1992 \n \n R. 11 Public Debt Rules, 1946, R.14 Public Debt Act (XVIII of 1944), S.11 Protection of Economic Reforms Act (XII of 1992), S.10 Mutilated, defaced burnt or destroyed Foreign Currency Bearer Certificates Issuance of duplicate certificates ¬ Absence of Rules Investments and savings made through Foreign Currency Bearer Certificates were protected and saved under Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, and holder of such certificates was entitled to use and derive benefit thereof In absence of rules regarding issuance of duplicate of such certificates, Public Debt Rules, 1946 relating to other securities in case they were mutilated, defaced, lost or bunt, could be invoked and followed.\n \n(g) Five Years Foreign Currency Bearer Certificate Rules, 1992 \n \n R. II Public Debt Act (XVIII of 1944), S.II Public Debt Rules, 1946, R.14 Foreign Currency Bearer Certificates affected by termite Issuance of duplicate certificates Broken pieces of damaged original certificates were provided to the Bank ¬Issuance of such certificates in respondent's name was established from inquiry held by State Bank and its particulars were available in the record maintained by the concerned Bank, which had not yet been encashed by any person No hindrance thus existed in the way of issuance of duplicate certificates to the holder of such certificates to secure the amount invested by him through such certificates and the profit earned thereby.\n \n(h) Protection of Economic Reforms Act (XII of 1992) \n \n Ss. 3 & 10 Protection of Economic Reforms Ordinance (XXXIX of 1991), Ss.3.& 10 Protection of Economic Reforms Ordinance (III of 1992), Ss.3 & 10 Such laws have overriding effect, whereunder savings and investments made in foreign exchange are saved notwithstanding anything contained in any other law to the contrary, and cannot be altered to disadvantage of beneficiaries in view of solemn commitment given by Federal Government as embodied in different provisions thereof.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 238 of 1999, decision dated: 6-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD BASHIR, JEHANGIRI, MUNIR A. SHEIKH AND RANA BHAGWANDAS, JJ",
    "": "STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN, SECURITIES DEPARTMENT, CENTRAL DIRECTORATE through Chief Manager, Lahore High Court --Appellant\nVerses\nJAVED AHMAD and 2 others --Respondents."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12578",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2143 = 2002 SLD 2143 = 2002 CLD 490",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 19 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58 ¬Claim to property attached in execution of decree Title in such property came to vest in appellant on 12 3 2001 by virtue of Hibba Nama\"\" and relinquishment deed Attachment of such property took place on 5 5 2001 Validity Appellate Court: while relying on the case titled Naseer Ahmed and another v. Asghar Ali (1992 SCMR 2300) set aside such attachment order with observations that respondent Bank would be at liberty to invoke other remedies available to it under law, if it was of the view that alienations comprised in \"\"Hibba Nama\"\" and relinquishment deed had been effected with the object of avoiding creditors such as the respondent Bank.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 733 of 2001, decision dated: 6-12-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAD S. KHAWAJA AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "TAHIR ZAHOOR MIAN --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED, TIMBER MARKET BRANCH, Lahore High Court through Manager and 3 others --Respondents\nNaseer Ahmad and others v. Asghar Ali 1992 SCMR 2300 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12579",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2144 = 2002 SLD 2144 = 2002 CLD 491",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-- Ss. 12 & 21 Ex parte decree, setting aside of Appellant in his application contended that his address given in the plaint was incorrect Banking Court dismissed the application ¬Validity Address given in the plaint was the same, which appellant had himself given in the agreement entered by him with respondent Bank and had not denied execution thereof ¬Banking Court had rightly dismissed such application High Court dismissed the appeal in circumstances.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 18 & 21 Execution of decree Appellant did not press objection petition filed to assail auction of property Executing Court confirmed the auction in favour of auction purchaser Legal right in auctioned property had become duly vested in the auction purchaser Such auction could not be allowed to be challenged at such a late stage before the Appellate Court.\n \nKhashnood Akhtar Raja for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 84 of 1999, heard on 12-12-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAD S. KHAWAJA AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "AQEEL AHMED alias AQEEL AMJAD --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A., FAISALABAD through General Attorney --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12580",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2145 = 2002 SLD 2145 = 2002 CLD 493",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 15, 18 & 21 Decree for recovery of loan amount ¬Contention of appellant was that claim of interest was unjustified as statement of accounts did, not reflect the payments made by appellant to Bank from time to time Validity Appellant could not controvert the findings of Banking Court that statement of accounts was prepared in accordance with law and did not contain any exaggerated amount Mere factum of alleged payments by appellant to Bank from whom running finance facility had been availed, could hardly be a good ground for interference by High Court in first appeal Executing Court could effectively look into such question during execution proceedings ¬High Court dismissed the appeal in limine.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 341 of 2001, heard on 29-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASEEM SIKANDAR AND MUHAMMAD SAEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ABID ALI --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. through its Attorney Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12581",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2146 = 2002 SLD 2146 = 2002 CLD 495",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Foreign Exchange (Temporary Restrictions) Act (IV of 1998) S.2 Protection of Economic Reforms Act ()W of 1992), Ss.5(4) & 10 State Bank of Pakistan Circular No. 17, dated 6 6 1998 ¬State Bank of Pakistan Circular No. 23, dated 2 7 1998 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. l99 Constitutional petition ¬Maintainability Petitioner availed finance facility from Bank against Foreign Currency Accounts Petitioner defaulted in payment of amount due, on which Bank adjusted his liability from such accounts Contention of petitioner was that within the terms of agreements, Bank could raise a demand for settlement of outstanding liability, but could not proceed to liquidate his Foreign Currency Accounts Validity Petitioner could not withdraw foreign currency from his accounts without settling the liabilities of Bank not only because of restriction placed on such withdrawal under S.2 of Foreign Exchange (Temporary Restrictions) Act, 1998, but the same had been collateralised as security for the finance obtained by him Contract executed between the parties was to prevail in all circumstances Bank had authority to make such adjustments within the terms of agreement and security documents Protection available to Foreign Currency Accounts under Economic Reforms Act, 1992 could, not cancel or abolish the agreements between parties No writ could be issued to Bank for breach of the terms of agreements or security documents as they were not performing function in connection with affairs of Federation or Province ¬Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nShaukat Ali Mian and another v. The Federation of Pakistan 1999 CLC 607 and Federation of Pakistan and others v. Shaukat Ali Mian and others PLD 1999 SC 1026 ref.\n \n(b) Foreign Exchange (Temporary Restrictions) Act (IV of 1998) \n \n S.2 Protection of Economic Reforms Act (XII of 1992), Ss.5(4) Finance facility was availed against Foreign Currency Accounts Bank adjusted liability of petitioner from his such accounts Contention of petitioner was that Bank should have allowed him in presence of foreign currency dealer to withdraw foreign currency for encashing the same from open market and then liquidating his liability Validity Such Foreign Currency Accounts being charged and encumbered, Bank was justified in not allowing withdrawal therefrom under security arrangement between parties Such facility if allowed by Bank to petitioner, then such private accommodation could not be termed as a legal arrangement or contract between parties to vest petitioner with a right to seek enforcement thereof Such a right would be in conflict with basic concept of pledge, special lien, charge, encumbrance or security collateralisation.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 17482, 20746 and 22700 of 1998, decision dated: 20-12-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR ALAM KHAN, SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "Raja LAL MIAN er\nVs.\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12582",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2147 = 2002 SLD 2147 = 2002 CLD 509",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss. 6 & 9 Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 62, 128, 129 & 134 ¬Decree for recovery of money Liability of guarantor-Appellant guaranteed the liabilities of respondent Corporation arising out of agreement, dated 5 6 1989, whereunder finance facility had to expire on 30 6 1990 Such liabilities were fully repaid and adjusted on 16 9 1990 Respondent Bank then allowed fresh finance to the Corporation on 16 9 1990 Appellant was sued as guarantor for such new/fresh liability Banking Tribunal decreed the claim of the Bank Validity Guarantor could only be burdened to the extent and in accordance with the terms of guarantee executed by him Finance facility under agreement dated 5 6 1989 expired on 30 6 1990, whereunder entire ability of the Corporation stood cleared as was apparent from settlement of accounts Neither to new facility allowed on 16 9 1990 nor to variation of terms of agreement, dated 5 6 1989, appellant had given her concurrence nor fresh guarantee had been obtained from her for such new/ renewed facility Appellant was not liable for any, amount advanced to the Corporation by way of fresh facility or renewal of earlier facility Banking Court was not justified in passing decree against appellant in favour of the Bank in circumstances.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872) \n \n Ss. 126 & 128 Liability of guarantor Extent Guarantor could only be burdened to the extent and in accordance with the terns of guarantee executed by him.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 77 of 1998, heard on 27-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAD S. KHAWAJA AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "Mst. PARVEEN AMIR --Appellant\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12583",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2148 = 2002 SLD 2148 = 2002 CLD 512",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.9 Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss. 290, 316 & 410 Suit for recovery of loan Stay of proceedings Defendant-¬Company was subsidiary Company of the Company which was under liquidation No proceedings could take place against defendant Company unless permission was sought by Company Judge from the Company Court under provisions of 5.316 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, as applicable to the defendant-¬Company Proceedings of suit were stayed in circumstances.\n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Banking Tribunals Nos. 1 and 11 others PLD 1994 Kar. 358; IDBP v. Bahawalpur Board Mills Limited and others J.M. No. 69 of 1991; Pakistan American Fertilizers, Mianwali v. Ameer Abdullah Khan and another 1984 CLC 2170; UBL v. Sindh Tech. Industries Limited 1988 CLC 1152 and PLD 1994 Kar. 338 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B 96 of 2000, decision dated: 8-01-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATA UR REHMAN, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs TAJ PRINTING & PACKAGING INDUSTRIES LTD. and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12584",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2149 = 2002 SLD 2149 = 2002 CLD 542",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) S.33 B Circulars issued by State Bank of Pakistan under S.33 B providing incentive scheme to long term Bank defaulters and sick units for making payment to the Bank Nature Such circulars having been issued under authority conferred by statute must be treated as having the force of law.\n \n(b) Banking Companies Ordnance (LVII of 1962) \n \n S.33 B Circulars issued by State Bank of Pakistan providing incentive scheme Dates stipulated in such circulars ¬ Entitlement to benefit under the scheme Statutory provisions i.e. S.33 B, Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, had expressly provided for laying down the general guideline for facilitating recovery of bad or doubtful loans, advances of finances by giving incentives to borrowers or customers to make payment within a specified time frame Time for payment; in circumstances, was of the essence and it could not be said that as a general rule the time limit could not be considered to be of the essence for the purpose of availing benefits under the incentive schemes.\n \n(c) Interpretation of statutes \n \n Delegated legislation While construing the provisions of delegated legislation, the scope of authority conferred upon the delegatee by the parent statute, must always be kept in view.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No. 153 of 2000, decision dated: 8-06-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMessr AZMAT TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12585",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2150 = 2002 SLD 2150 = 2002 CLD 550",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- S. 9 Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.126 & 128 Recovery of Bank loan Guarantor, liability of Scope Creditor, in an action against a guarantor, is only required to establish the liability of the principal debtor and occurrence of default or breach of the terms leading to the liability Guarantor cannot resort to technicalities to defeat the claim of the creditor Even where the contract becomes unenforceable against the principal debtor the guarantor would still be liable for the surety he had executed, unless there was any covenant to the contrary.\n \n(b) Baking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finance) Act (XV of 1997) ---\n \n S. 21 Appeal Bar to file appeal against any interlocutory order of Banking Court Object Intention of the Legislature is that such disputes are resolved as early as possible.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art 185(3) Leave to appeal, grant of Scope Clean hands ¬Concurrent findings of fact by the Courts below Provisions of Art. 185(3) of the Constitution could not be invoked for discretionary/equitable relief against concurrent findings of fact, particularly when the petitioners have not come to the Court with clean hands.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ----\n \n S. 9 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 185(3) Suit for recovery of Bank loan Concurrent findings of fact by the Courts below Principal borrower did not contest the matter white the guarantor filed application for leave to defend the suit which was dismissed by the Banking Court as well as by High Court ¬ Validity Principal borrower had received the amount from the financial institution and also leased assets, yet it was not paying the dues of the institution on the basis of misconceived pleas and technicalities which was against law and equity Only object of the borrower in the present case was to prolong the proceedings and to avoid payment Supreme Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by the Courts below Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.292 K of 2001, decision dated: 6th, December, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI, RANA BHAGWANDAS AND ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs HUFFAZ SEAMLEN PIPE INDUSTRIES LTD. and 2 others ers\nVs.\nMessrs SECURITY LEASING CORPORATION LTD. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12586",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2151 = 2002 SLD 2151 = 2002 CLD 557",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) - S. 10 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.126 Application for leave to defend the suit Bank filed a suit for recovery of money against the defendants as guarantors Plea of defendants was that they never executed personal guarantees; and that one of the defendants, after ousting them from management of the company, had procured the finance by forging documents ¬ validity Such defendants had vaguely denied execution of guarantees Record showed that at the relevant time, they were Directors of defendant Company and in such capacity had executed letters of guarantees and stood guarantors Nothing was brought on record to show that either the guarantees were forged by Bank or such defendants were forced by the other defendant or the Bank to execute guarantees Plea of defendants that documents had been forged by one of the defendants had no bearing on the case, because it had not been alleged that Bank had forged the same Dispute about alleged ouster from management of company and grabbing of properties by the defendant was between the private persons, which was not the subject matter of present proceedings, and Banking Court was not the forum for determination of such, dispute inter se the defendants Said defendants had executed guarantees, and had denied neither statement of accounts nor availing of financial facilities by defendants Company Mere vague denial of execution of documents would not absolve them from discharging the liabilities incurred by them through execution of personal guarantees and other documents Application for leave to defend the suit being devoid of force was dismissed.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S. 10 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.126 Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1894), S.4 Application for leave to defend the suit Bank filed suit for recovery of money against defendant Company and its Directors/mortgagors/guarantors ¬ Defendants in applications for leave to defend did not deny sanctioning of financial facilities and availing the same nor their signatures on documents annexed with the plaint, but asserted that all such documents were not meant to be used in the financial facilities and in he manner in which they had been used by Bank Validity Such assertion on the face of it was unbelievable and did not appeal to reason; more so when defendants had not been able to show as to what were the alleged transactions, wherein such documents were meant to be used, and which were those financial facilities regarding which they had delivered those documents to the Bank Except financial facilities subject matter of the suit, no other accounts/facilities/transactions existed between the parties, in respect which it could be said that these documents were delivered to the Bank Defendants, apart from minor discrepancies, could not point out any legal infirmity in the statement of accounts, so as to disentitle Bank from claiming suit amount Statement of accounts had been verified/certified by Bank in accordance with the provisions of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 and presumption of truth was attached to such entries maintained by Bank in normal course of business, and there was no rebuttal thereof Defendants did not show either in their leave application or during arguments that how much account of finance was availed by them; how much amount had been repaid; what amount was still payable by them; and which amounts were disputed Such omission on their part was not only contrary to provisions of S.10(4) of the Ordinance, but showed the hollowness of their case No unauthorized entry debited in the accounts of defendants were found in the statement of accounts Bank had not charged any penal interest or liquidated damages in any statement of accounts, which would show veracity thereof and bona fides of the Bank ¬Director/guarantors/mortgagors (i.e. defendants other than the company) had signed and executed documents and had undertaken as per terms of personal guarantees to liquidate outstanding amount, in case the company principal debtor failed to liquidate the same Defendants in view of their having executed personal guarantees could not shirk from liquidating their liabilities and they were jointly and severally liable to liquidate the liabilities of company under the provisions of Contract Act, 1872 Defendants had failed to raise any substantial question of law and facts to be tried by Court necessitating recording of evidence Application for leave to defend the suit were dismissed, resultantly the allegations made in the plaint would be deemed to be admitted Defendants had not denied their signatures on all the documents filed by Bank in support of its claim, meaning thereby that execution of such documents would be deemed to have been admitted by them ¬Bank was not entitled to grant of liquidated damages as per the principle laid down in case of Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd., Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments etc. 2001 MLD 1955 ¬Suit was decreed against the defendants jointly and severally with costs to be determined under S.3(2) of the Ordinance.\n \nKhan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot (represented by 6 heirs) v. Messrs Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd., Lahore PLD 1971 SC 550 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n S. 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXX, R.1 ¬Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S.196(1) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.10 Application by company for leave to defend the suit Maintainability Neither any resolution of the company nor authorization was filed with original as well as amended leave application Validity Non placing on record of any resolution or authorization would go to show that before filing either original leave application or amended leave application no resolution had been passed by Board of Directors of defendant Company authorizing its Director either to file such application or defend the Company Such a resolution was necessary under law before initiating or defending any proceedings by or against a company/corporate body Original application as well as amended application filed unauthorisedly did not deserve any consideration as on legal plane, there was no application for leave to defend the suit on behalf of the Company, which could be said to be pending before the Court.\n \nKhan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot (represented by 6 heirs) v. Messrs Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd., Lahore PLD 1971 SC 550; Abubakar Saley Mayet v. Abbot Laboratories and another 1987 CLC 367; Bankers Equity Ltd. through Attorney and 5 others v. Sunflo CIT Russ Ltd. (formerly known as Sunflo Juices Ltd.) through Managing Director PLD 1999 Lah.450; Government of Pakistan v. Premier Sugar Mills and others PLD 1991 Lah. 381 and Messrs Standard Hotels (Private) Ltd. v. Messrs Rio Centre and others 1994 CLC 2413 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n S. 10(3)(4)(5)(6)(12) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.10 ¬ Amended application for leave to defend the suit During pendency of original application for leave to defend the suit, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, came into force Defendants had, thus, to file amended application by virtue of S.10(12) of the Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 wherein they failed to give the amount of finance availed by them; the date of payment; amount of finance and other amount relating to finance payable by them to financial institution; the amount of finance and other amount, which they disputed as payable to financial institution ¬ Validity Defendants had failed to file amended application within the parameters of S.10(12) of the Ordinance, 2001 and had not complied with the requirements of S.10(3), (4) & (5) of the Ordinance, 2001 nor had shown any sufficient cause for their inability to comply with such requirements Provisions of S.10(12) of the Ordinance, 2001 was mandatory in nature, as its non compliance entailed penal consequences as provided under S.10(6) of the Ordinance, 2001 Presumption, thus, would be that no application for grant of leave to defend the suit was deemed to be pending Such amended application could not be considered under law as the same deserved summary rejection in pursuance of S.10(6) of the Ordinance, 2001 ¬Amended leave application was rejected in circumstances.\n \n(e) Interpretation of statutes -----\n \n  Mandatory or directory provision Test Provision of law couched with penal consequences would be considered as mandatory Where no penal consequences entailed to non compliance of a provision of law, then such provision of law would be taken as directory.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.78 of 2000, decision dated: 30-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "BOLAN BANK LIMITED through Attorneys --Plaintiff\nVs.\nBAIG TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED through\nChief Executive and 6 others ----Defendants\nM. Naeem Sahgal for --Plaintiff.\nZahid Malik for ----Defendants Nos. l to 4 and 7.\nSaif ud Din Chughtai for --Defendant No.5.\nFaisal Hanif for --Defendant No.6."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12587",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2152 = 2002 SLD 2152 = 2002 CLD 577",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --- Preamble Provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, being a special statute, would have overriding effect upon the provisions pf general law.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 3, 4 & 7(1)(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.141 ¬Provisions of C.P.C. Extent of applicability Banking Court established under S.4 of .the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances Act, 1997) was bound by the procedure provided under the Act and. could not deviate there from while adjudicating the suit filed before it by a customer or a Banking Company Provisions of C.P.C. would not be attracted, where in a given circumstance, special provisions of Act were available If the Act did not provide any remedy or make any headway, in such a case, the provisions of C.P.C. could be made applicable Banking Court could exercise the powers vested in a Civil Court under C.P.C., but it would not mean that special mandatory provisions of the Act would give way to the provisions of C.P.C.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ----\n \n Ss. 4, 9(3)(4) & 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.141 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199 Constitutional petition ¬ Suit against Bank Banking Court, after presentation of plaint, issued notice to defendant Bank and upon its service directed it to file statement of accounts, which was accordingly filed ¬ Banking Court heard arguments of parties and fixed the case for order Contention of the plaintiff was that procedure adopted by Banking Court was violative of S.9(3)(4) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Validity Procedure for service of summons and deciding the suit as prescribed under S.9 of the said Act was mandatory in nature Banking Court had not adopted such procedure, but had evolved in his own wisdom a procedure alien to the provisions of the act and even to the provisions of C.P.C. Banking court established under S.4 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 was bound by the procedure provided under the Act and could not deviate therefrom while adjudicating the suit filed before it by a customer or a Banking Company High Court accepted Constitutional petition and declared the entire proceedings. undertaken by Banking Court in the suit to be illegal and without lawful authority.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---\n \n S. 141 Provisions of C.P.C. could, be made applicable in case, where special law did not provide the remedy.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.12686 of 2001, decision dated: 13-12-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "AHMAD MURAD MALIK er\nVs.\nPRESIDING OFFICER, BANKING COURT --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12588",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2153 = 2002 SLD 2153 = 2002 CLD 591",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) - S.22 Non deposit of amount with respondent as per terms of Appellate Court's order recorded on appellant's offer Appellant sought extension of time Mere fact that an application for extension had been made would not bar giving effect to such order, which was recorded on the offer of appellant and was self¬ executory in nature Appeal stood dismissed as per terms of such order.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 222 of 2001, decision dated: 16-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASEEM SIKANDAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, AJ",
    "": "Messrs TAJ GHEE AND GENERAL MILLS (PVT.) through Rana Ijaz Ahmed, \nChief Executive --Appellant\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12589",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2154 = 2002 SLD 2154 = 2002 CLD 592",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ----- Ss. 18 & 21 Application for return of title documents after satisfaction of decree Banking Court dismissed such application on the ground that respondent Bank hard two other suits pending against appellants, thus, Bank was entitled to retain the title documents on account of general lien available with Bank ¬Validity General lien under law was available to a banking company only in respect of goods Bank was asserting an interest over title deeds, which were not goods by definition ¬High Court set aside impugned order, and directed the Bank to hand over the original title deeds to appellants within specified time subject to any other order, which might be passed by a competent Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.127 of 2001, heard on 14-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SAJIDA SULTANA and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF\nPAKISTAN through Qayyum Javed Khan, Manager, \nAgricultural Development Bank of Pakistan,"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12590",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2155 = 2002 SLD 2155 = 2002 CLD 593",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) --S.11 Sale of property in execution of decree Judgment¬debtor substituted his mortgaged property known as A with property known as B Objection of debtor was that property known as C could not be sold before sale of property known as A Validity Bank had already sold the substituted property known as B in execution of decree thus property known as C could neither be released from attachment nor exempted from sale.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.313 of 2001, heard on 21st January, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. RAANA AKBAR --Appellant\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Mr. Tariq Hameed, \nGeneral Manager, Finance, its duly constituted\nAttorney and 6 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12591",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2156 = 2002 SLD 2156 = 2002 CLD 595",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- S.7 Constitution of Pakistan (1973) Art.199 Constitutional petition Summoning of plaintiffs' witness for further cross¬ examination Plaintiffs' allegation in the plaint was that defendant Bank had obtained their signatures on blank documents Plaintiffs produced an employee of Bank, who produced on record eight documents executed by them in respect of facility availed from Bank Both plaintiff and Bank cross¬ examined the witness Plaintiffs appeared as witness and after acknowledging his signatures on such documents deposed that those were signed in blank Bank employee being a witness to such documents, Bank filed application for summoning him for cross examination in order to ascertain, whether all such documents were duly filed in or were blank when signed ¬ Banking Court rejected the application Validity Only suggestion put to the witness was in respect of memorandum of deposit of title deed, which he denied by deposing that the same was incomplete when signatures were obtained on it No such suggestion was put in respect of the other exhibited document thus, there was no occasion for the Bank to put any suggestion to the said witness on the issue as to whether or not all exhibited documents were incomplete Occasion for such question had arisen on a subsequent date, when the plaintiff testified that all exhibited documents were signed by him in blank In sequence of such events, it was the night of Bank to summon the other person being a witness to such documents to prove that those had not been signed in blank Bank was not debarred from producing the said person as their witness even though he had earlier appeared Bank would be entitled to produce their said employee on next date of hearing Constitutional petition was disposed of with such direction.\n \nAhsan Ilahi v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1981 SCMR 336 rel.\n \n(b) Pleadings \n \n Plaint by itself did not prove the assertions made therein, rather the contents thereof had to be proved through testimony given on oath subject to cross examination by other side.\n \n(c) Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984) -\n \n Art. 119 Burden of proof alleged that defendants had obtained their signatures on blank documents Plaintiffs had to prove such assertion through evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 19694 of 2001, decision dated: ,11th January; 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J",
    "": "BANK OF PUNJAB through its Managing Director, 7 Egerton Road, Lahore High Court and another ers\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD PERVEZ MALIK and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12592",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2157 = 2002 SLD 2157 = 2002 CLD 598",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ---- Ss.10, 15 & 21 Application for leave to appear and defend the suit Suit was decreed after dismissal of such application for non prosecution Contention of defendant was that his counsel was present in the Court in early hours of the day, but subsequently did not enter appearance: and that Banking Court was bound to decide such application on merits instead of dismissing the same for non prosecution Validity Impugned was not in consonance with law Plaintiff had not been granted fair opportunity to defend the case properly High Court set aside impugned and decree holding that application filed by defendants would be deemed to be pending adjudication before Banking Court.\n \nMuhammad Haleem and others v. H.H. Muhammad Naim and others PLD 1969 SC 270 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.521 and Civil Miscellaneous Nos.3 C and 4 C of 1999, decision dated: 7th January 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND SAQIB NISAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ROSE INCORPORATE, Bajwa Manzil\nand 4 others --Appellants\nVs. \nMessrs BOLAN BANK LIMITED through\nMuhammad Aslam Chaudhry, Manager\nand Muhammad Yousaf Qureshi, Officer Joint\nAttorneys of the ----Plaintiff Bank --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12593",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2158 = 2002 SLD 2158 = 2002 CLD 605",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-- S.22 Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), S.13 Withdrawal of appeal on the basis of compromise --Prayer for refund of court fee paid on memorandum of appeal Appeal after having been admitted for regular hearing had, not been faced for hearing and opposite party had not put in appearance High Court allowed the prayer.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.332 of 1997 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1 of 2002 decided on 16-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs HUSSAIN PAPER AND BOARD MILLS (PVT.) LTD. and 4 others \nVs.\nHABIB CREDIT AND EXCHANGE BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12594",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2159 = 2002 SLD 2159 = 2002 CLD 606",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) S. 6-- Limitation Act (1X of 1908), Art. 132, Expln. (c) Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S.17 Suit for recovery of money based on Memorandums of Deposit of title deeds Limitation ¬Plaintiff Bank in support of its claim produced in evidence two Demand Promissory Notes dated 23 12 1982 and 9 8 1983, and Memorandums of Deposit of title deeds Special Judge found such memorandums to be compulsorily registrable under Registration Act, 1908 and dismissed the suit on the ground that the same had to be filed within 3 years from date of last acknowledgement of liability Validity Such memorandums merely recorded the earlier deposit of title deeds and did not in themselves create any mortgage, thus, were not compulsorily registrable -- Last acknowledgement had been made by defendants on 9 8 1983 Since mortgage had been duly created by defendant in favour of Bank by deposit of title deeds, period of limitation for filing of such suit was 12 years from 9 8 1983 and not 3 years Suit having been filed on 24 8 1993 was well within time High Court set aside the impugned /decree and decreed the suit of Bank with costs.\n \n(b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) --\n \n S.58W Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S.17 Mortgage by deposit of title deeds Memorandums of Deposit of title deeds contained the fact that prior to execution of Demand Promissory Notes, title deeds mentioned in the Schedules of memorandums had been deposited with Bank with the intention of creating an equitable mortgage in favour of Bank over the properties comprised in the title deeds Contention of mortgagors was that mention of sum secured together with rate of interest in such memorandums would make them mortgage deeds requiring compulsory registration under Registration Act, 1908 Validity ¬Such memorandums showed that mortgage had been created prior to their execution through deposit of original title deeds ¬Memorandums merely recorded the earlier deposit of title deeds and did not in themselves create any mortgage in praesenti, thus, were not compulsorily registrable.\n \nUnited Bank of India Ltd. v. Azirannessa Bewa alias Azizannessa Bewa PLD 1965 SC 274 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.250 of 1994, heard on 12-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs MALIK & COMPANY through Proprietor\nMan Naim Ahmad and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12595",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2160 = 2002 SLD 2160 = 2002 CLD 609",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6 Financial Institutions (Recovery Finances) Ordinance (JAW of 2001), S.7(4)(6) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9 & O.VII, R.11 Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 &. 54 Bank fled suit for recovery of money against petitioner and company before Banking Tribunal Petitioner thereafter filed in Civil Court suit for declaration and injunction that he never stood guarantee in the matter of loan provided by Bank to the company Trial Court rejected the petitioner's plaint holding that the matter was related to jurisdiction of Banking Tribunal --- Appellate Court upheld such order ¬Validity Banking Tribunal no longer existed and the matters were being dealt with by Banking Courts and the law covering the jurisdiction of such Courts provided for filing of suit by company as well as the customer or borrower High Court disposed of revision petition with a direction that file of the case, which otherwise automatically stood transferred to Banking Court, would be sent to Banking Court, where the same would be taken up alongwith the suit fled by respondent Bank, and the question as to whether or not petitioner had executed a valid guarantee or had otherwise guaranteed repayment of loan, would be decided by Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.750 of 1996, decision dated: 23rd January, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "PERVEZ AHMAD KHAN BURKI, ADVOCATE er\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through Principal Officer\nand General Attorney --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12596",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2161 = 2002 SLD 2161 = 2002 CLD 612",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XX, R.7 Decree cannot be dated prior, to date of .\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)\n \n Ss.2(c), 7(6) & 22 Pecuniary jurisdiction Suit for, recovery of amount less than Rs.50,000,000 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 came into force on 30 8-2001 Single Judge of High Court announced in such suit on . 10 9 2001 Contention of defendants was that jurisdiction to decide such suit being vested in Banking Court by virtue of S. 7(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and decree passed on 10 9 2001 were without jurisdiction Validity Single Judge of High Court had passed impugned and decree due to an oversight and without keeping in view the provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Appellate Court set aside impugned decree being without jurisdiction with direction to send record of the case to Banking Court which was the forum having jurisdiction in the matter.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.776 of 2001 in C.O.S. No.98 of 1999 decided on 12-12-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "NAZIR COTTON MILLS LIMITED through\nChief Executive and 6 others --Appellants\nVs.\nISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED through Messrs Saqib Ahmed Khan (Branch Manager) and Rashid Hafeez Malik, its duly constituted Attorneys --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12597",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2162 = 2002 SLD 2162 = 2002 CLD 614",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) Ss.305(e)(f)(h) & 306 Legal Practitioners (Fees) Act (XXI of 1926), S.4 Petition for winding up of company for its failure to pay professional fee to petitioner despite notice under S.306 of the Companies Ordinance; and for the reasons that company was conceived and brought forth for unscrupulous and fraudulent activities, usurping the money of its creditors and customers; and that it was just and equitable that company should be wound up Validity Petitioner sought recovery of his professional fee in the form of a petition for winding up Alleged fee due could not be taken to be a \"\"debt\"\" as mentioned in S.305(e) of the Companies Ordinance to be a ground for winding up of company Alleged liability having been denied by company could not be taken as ground for winding up Resolution of factual controversies was germane to regular recovery proceedings and winding up proceedings under the Ordinance was no answer to such situation Petitioner for recovery of alleged fee could institute and maintain legal proceedings under S.4 of Legal Practitioners (Fees) Act, 1926 Non payment of alleged fee of petitioner had no direct relation with business of company Nothing was brought on record to show that company was unable to pay its debts or it was just and equitable that it should be wound up Commercially viable company could not be permitted to be wound up merely for the reason that it was not willing to pay a certain amount allegedly due on account of services provided Petitioner could establish through evidence that company actually owed it the alleged sums, and once they succeeded in doing so before a competent Civil Court and their claim was converted into a decree, then they would be in a position to claim that company owed it a debt and the question of winding up for its inability to pay that debt would arise thereafter Petitioner had sought winding up of a company, which had not yet commenced any business ¬Alleged creditor having provided legal services or for that matter having provided any other service had no business to claim that company was incorporated for fraudulent activities and it was operating against the interest of its creditors, when in fact there was no creditor at all High Court dismissed the petition in circumstances.\n \nBlack's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn.; Encyclopedia of Banking and Finance by Charles, J. Woelfel. 10th Edn.; Registrar of Companies v. Kavita Benefit (Pvt.) Limited (1978) 48 Comp. Cas. 231; Cherukuru Krishnaiah v. Rajah Sir AIR 1958 Andh. Pra. 342;. Sharda Bhandari v. Ananya Electronics (1993) 78 Comp. Cas. 167; Paramount Enterprises v. Rechem (1985) 57 Comp. Cas. 200; M. Gordhandas & Co. v. M.W. Industries AIR 1971 SC 2600; Investment Corporation of Pakistan v. Messrs American Marble Products 1998 CLC 514; O.P. Basra v. Kiathal Cotton AIR 1962 Punj. 151; Messrs Khyber Textile Ltd. v. Messrs Allied Textile Mills Ltd. 1989 CLC 1167; Investment Corporation of Pakistan (ICP) v. Messrs Noor Silk Mills Ltd. 1998 CLC 543; Mullah Abdullah and 9 others v. Saria Rope Mills Ltd. PLD 1971 Kar.597; Federation of Pakistan v. The Standard Insurance Company Ltd. PLD 1986 Kar.409; Messrs Adage Advertising, Lahore v. Messrs Shezan International Ltd. 1970 SCMR 184; Messrs Metito Arabia Ltd. v. Messrs Gamoon (Pakistan) Ltd. 1997 CLC 230, Muzaffar Abbas Malik and 2 others v. Messrs Pakistan PVC Ltd. PLD 1998 Kar.71; United Bank Ltd. v. Golden Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 1998 Kar. 330 and Messrs Platinum Insurance Company v. Daewoo Corporation, Sheikhupura P L D 1999 SC 1 ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n S.305 Winding up of company Purpose to seek a winding up by a creditor is invariably to see that whatever is left of the assets, the same may not further diminish before an actual recovery is effected Ground for winding up of company arises only when it is unable to pay its debts and the creditors are of the view that if the matter is left any further, then either their security will diminish or the amount due to them will further be reduced.\n \n(c) Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984) -\n \n Arts. 70 & 71 Absence of documentary evidence in defense to a claim Effect Defence to claim could not be, false or ingenuine merely for the reason that in all probability, no documentary evidence to support the same could be produced ¬Raising of a dispute to challenge or deny a liability was not conditional to the availability or veracity of an evidence, which was likely to be introduced in support thereof.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original No.97 of 1997, heard on 22-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASEEM SIKANDAR, J",
    "": "Partner Talib H. Rizvi, Senior Advocate er\nVs.\nWAK ORIENT POWER AND LIGHT LTD. through Chief Executive --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12598",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2163 = 2002 SLD 2163 = 2002 CLD 623",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XVI of 2001) Ss. 19 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.55 & O.XXI R37 Appeal Execution of decree Prayer in execution petition for arrest of appellant with the object of satisfying the decree was accepted by the Banking Court Validity Decree obtained by Bank was to be satisfied through sale of properties mentioned in Farad Taleeqa Banking Court should have, in the first instance, attempted to sell such properties Where sale proceeds were not sufficient to satisfy the decree or debtor impeded the sale or committed other prejudicial acts, then it would have been proper to proceed against the debtors personally High Court modified the impugned order and held that there was no justification for issuing warrants of arrest against the appellant Appeal was partially allowed in such terms.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.82 of 2001, decision dated: 22-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mirza SHAHID BRIG --Appellant\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and\n8 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12599",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2164 = 2002 SLD 2164 = 2002 CLD 636",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Appeal (civil) Regular first appeal does not lie against an order.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 10, 12 & 21 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5 Appeal ¬Limitation Applications for leave to defend Banking Court after dismissing such applications for non prosecution decreed the suit on 19 3 2001 Defendants filed application under S.12 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 for setting aside of and decree, but the same was dismissed as being not maintainable vide order, dated 18 5 2001 Defendants filed regular first appeal against and decree, dated 19 3 2001 as well as order, dated 18 5 2001 Defendants also filed first appeal against Order, dated 18 5 2001 Validity Defendants applied for certified copies of impugned and decree after 65 days of its passing i.e. on 24 5 2001, when period of 30 days prescribed under S.21 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 for filing of appeal had already expired Defendants had neither filed application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, for condonation of delay nor had given explanation in memorandum of appeal for preferring appeal beyond prescribed period of limitation Regular First Appeal thus was grossly time barred Regular First Appeal would not lie against the impugned order High Court declined to entertain regular first appeal against order, dated 18 5 2001, which had already been challenged in first appeal against order and had been admitted for regular hearing ¬Defendants could not file two appeals against the same order ¬High Court dismissed the regular first appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.489 of 2001, heard 10-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWAURUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "ZAR JABEEN TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. through\nChief Executive and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. through Tanvir Hussain"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12600",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2165 = 2002 SLD 2165 = 2002 CLD 639",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- Ss. 9,10,12 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. IX, R.6 Ex pane decree, setting aside of Plea of one of the appellants (2) was that his address had. been incorrectly given in the plaint Validity Sale deeds of mortgaged property tend title deeds of the said appellant (2) deposited with respondent- ¬Bank showed that his address as given in such documents had not been mentioned in cause title of the plaint Address of another appellant (1) i.e. borrouring company as mentioned in various finance documents had been correctly given in the plaint, thus, impugned decree would stand. and remain fully enforceable against the appellant company Other appellants (2) had not been properly, served before passing of ex pane decree High Court set aside impugned and decree to the extent of appellant (2) who might, within, 21 days from date of submit an application for leave to appear and defend the suit in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.917 of 2001, decision dated: 6-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "APEX INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATES and another --Appellants\nVs.\nBANK AI FALAH LIMITED, L.D.A. PLAZA, KASHMIR ROAD, BRANCH, Lahore High Court --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12601",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2166 = 2002 SLD 2166 = 2002 CLD 641",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S. 18 Civil Procedure Code N of 1908), O.XXI, R.90 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional petition ¬Mortgaged property was auctioned in execution of money decree Objection petition filed by petitioner was dismissed on his. failure to deposit 2096 of auction amount Petitioner contended that he had made payment of suns due to the Bank as per relief package allowed by Bank, but instructions to withdraw execution petition were issued by the Bank after the date of auction of property Validity Equities of case were against the petitioner as he had repeatedly frustrated the attempts of Executing Court to auction the property and thereafter had refused to comply with its order requiring him to deposit 2096 of auction amount Action taken by Executing Court was entirely justified and strictly in accordance with laur ¬Constitutional petition to challenge Court auction would not lie in such circumstances High Court dismissed the Constitutional petition with observations that auction amount would be paid to the petitioner, because decree holder Bank had already issued a certificate stating therein that outstanding amount recoverable by Bank had been fully adjusted as per relief package.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4647 of 2000, decision dated: 15-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J",
    "": "Mst. GHULAM ZUHRA er\nVs.\nREGIONAL CHIEF, NATIONAL BANK\nOFTAKISTAN, MACLAGON ROAD,"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12602",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2167 = 2002 SLD 2167 = 2002 CLD 653",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S. 18 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151 & O.XXI, Rr.89, 90 Court auction held in execution of decree obtained by appellant Bank Bank objected to auction by filing application under S.151, C.P.C. on the ground that persons named therein were ready to offer an amount higher than the auction price ¬Banking Court dismissed application as such person had not participated in the auction Validity Bank in its application had not claimed any right under O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90, but had set out a plea on behalf of the persons named therein Bank had not complied with the terms of O.XXI Rr.89 & 90, C.P.C. Banking Court had rightly dismissed the application of Bank in circumstances High Court dismissed the appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.205 of 2001, heard on 23rd January, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\n Vs.\nMessrs RADIEUX (PRIVATE) LIMITED through\nChief Executive and 7 others --Respondents\nRao Muhammad Suleman v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and 11 others 1987 CLC 1338 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12603",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2168 = 2002 SLD 2168 = 2002 CLD 655",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.10, 15 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VI, R.17 & O. VIII, R.10 Banking Court after granting leave to defend, directed the defendants to file written statement and also reply to application under O. VI, R.17, C.P.C., filed by plaintiff Bank ¬Contention of defendants was that Banking Court after disallowing them from bringing written statement on record and then invoking the provisions of O.VIII, R.10, C.P.C., had closed their right of defence Validity Banking court should not have required the filing of written statement before us decision on application for amendment of plaint Only after such decision, it would have been possible for defendants to know, whether the plaint as filed or as amended had to be answered by them ¬Banking Court itself had granted to defendants leave to defend the suit after they having raised serious and bona fide questions of law Defendants were entitled to one final opportunity to file written statement before their right could be closed under OXIII, R. 10, C.P.C. Appellate Court set aside impugned and decree and remanded the case to Banking Court for trial.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 431 of 2001, heard on 29-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA., JJ",
    "": "Messrs M.L. TRADERS through Proprietor and another --Appellants\n Vs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12604",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2169 = 2002 SLD 2169 = 2002 CLD 657",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) S.12 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 29 Appeal, delay in filing of Condonation Sufficient cause Ground urged in application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, was that appellants' counsel was busy in marriage ceremony of his daughter Respondent contended that provisions of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, were not available to appellants, because an express period of limitation for filing appeal had been provided in the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 Validity Contention of the respondent was well founded as the same was based on S.29 of Limitation Act,1908 Reason given in application did not constitute sufficient cause Justifying condonation of delay, even if the provisions of S.5 of Limitation Act, had been applicable to the appeal Appeal was dismissed being time barred.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 14 of 1997, heard on 30-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MUNIR & CO., KAMALIA and 2 others --Appellants\n Vs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through 2 Attorneys --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12605",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2170 = 2002 SLD 2170 = 2002 CLD 658",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 7, 9 & 10 Suit for redemption of mortgaged property and release of mortgage deed Application for grant of leave to appear and defend the suit Banking Judge, in absence of any triable issue between the parties needing evidence was quite justified to decline to accept application of defendant for grant of leave to appear and defend the suit. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 2, 7(4) & 9(1) Requirement and condition precedent for filing suit before Banking Court Borrower or a customer of Banking Company would be entitled to file a suit when any of them committed a default in fulfilling any obligation with regard to any loan or finance First requirement was that parties should be either borrower or a customer or a Banking Company which had been defined in S.2 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997; second condition precedent was that such suit must arise from a commission of a default in fulfilling any obligation touching business of loan or finance If transaction was outside the scope of loan or finance, even then commission of any default in fulfillment of obligation would not bring a suit within jurisdiction of the Banking Court Question whether there existed any agreement to grant loan or finance, would definitely fall within jurisdiction of Banking Court Where a suit was filed by a customer or a borrower claiming that amount received by him was not as a result of loan or finance, it would fall within jurisdiction of Bunking Court. \n \nUnited Bank Ltd. v. Adamjee Insurance Co. Ltd. 1988 CLC 1660; Munir Ahmad Siddique and another v. Feroz Ahmad Siddique and 2 others 1990 MLD 1776; National and Grindlyas Bank Ltd. v. N.P. Miranda and 2 others 1984 CLC 2106; Messrs Shafiq Hanif (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. PLD 1993 Kar.107 and Kamran Industry (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and others 1994 SCMR 1970 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 2(b), 7 & 9 Cases which Banking Court could competently hear and adjudicate enumerated.\n \nA Banking Court as established under section 2(b) of the Act, 1997, is competent to hear and adjudicate cases, inter alia, of the following nature: \n \n(a) All suits filed by the Banking Companies against borrower or customer for recovery of Loan of Finances, either based on interest or mark up as defined in Act, 1997.\n \n(b) All suits or claims filed by, a borrower or customer against the Banking Company claiming any adjustment, set off or setting up a counterclaim either through an independent suit or in a suit filed by a Banking Company.\n \n(c) Suits for accounts arising out of a Loan or Finance as defined in the Act, 1997.\n \n(d) Suits for specific performance seeking enforcement of an agreement or contract to pay or re pay any Loan or Finance or to perform any obligation arising out of such agreement.\n \n(e) All the suits for declaration as to legality, validity or otherwise of a document which creates Loan or Finance as defined in the Act, 1997.\n \n(f) All the suits for cancellation of any instrument through which any liability to pay or to re pay a Loan or Finance may arise.\n \n(g) All the suits for prohibitory injunction which may restrain any of the parties namely Banking Companies, borrower or customer from performing their obligation and duties arising out of such business pertaining to Loan or Finance. In the like manner, all suits in the nature of mandatory injunction.\n \n(h) All the suits for damages (excluding top cases) arising out of the breach of contract executed in respect of Loan or Finance between the Banking Company on the one hand and the borrower or customer on the other. \n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.2(b) & 7 Jurisdiction of Banking Court to adjudicate controversy relating to redemption of mortgaged property ¬Banking Court had exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon matters relating to redemption of mortgaged property and release of its documents. \n \n(e) Contract Act (IX of 1872) \n \n Ss.2(e) & 37 Execution of agreement No one could be allowed to go beyond terns and conditions contained in the agreement executed between the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No. 16 of 2000, decision dated: 30-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAH, JEHAN KHAN AND IJAZ UL HASSAN, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through President and 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nKHALID MEHMOOD --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12606",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2171 = 2002 SLD 2171 = 2002 CLD 666",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.12 Ex pane decree, setting aside of Limitation Filing of application for setting aside ex parte decree after prescribed period of limitation without giving valid or justifiable cause for delay Banking Court had rightly dismissed such application as being time barred.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.179 of 2001, heard on 12-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Miss RAZIA SULTANA --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12607",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2172 = 2002 SLD 2172 = 2002 CLD 667",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 9 & 22 Customer filed suit against Bank for rendition of accounts Bank duly rendered the accounts Banking Court ordered the Bank to pay a sum of Rs.9,400 to the customer ¬Bank contended that after having rendered accounts, the customer was left with no further cause of action Validity No occasion for passing such order existed for the Banking Court ¬High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned order, whereby Bank was directed to pay such amount to the customer.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.815 of 2001, decision dated: 14-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nand another --Appellants\nVs. \nMst. MERAJ BIBI --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12608",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2173 = 2002 SLD 2173 = 2002 CLD 669",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 10, 15 & 21 Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S.230 Decree for recovery of money Contention of appellant was that statement of accounts appended with plaint by the Bank was not correct; and that Bank had charged mark up for a period after the expiry of limit provided to the appellant ¬Validity Objection in respect of statement of accounts must be more specific No such objection had, been taken by appellant in his petition for leave to appear and defend Limited company was required by law to maintain its own accounts Appellant being a limited company had not filed its own account to controvert the statement of accounts filed by the Bank Such bald allegations without backing by any documentary proof could not be given any credence Banking Court had disallowed the mark up for 210 days in order to avoid charging of mark up twice Impugned and decree being not open to exception High Court dismissed the appeal. \n \nHaq Nawaz Chatha for Appellant.\n \nS. Khalil Mehmood for Respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.325 of 2001, decision dated: 30-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "BABA FAREED GHEE INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive\nand 3 others --Appellants\nVs. \nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12609",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2174 = 2002 SLD 2174 = 2002 CLD 684",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) S.8 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.13 & O.XXI-- R.93 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199 Constitutional petition Recovery of Bank loan Ex parte decree against borrower Auction of borrower's property Ex parte decree set aside Refund of purchase money to auction purchaser -Property was put to auction in execution of ex parte decree passed against the borrower and the same was purchased in auction by the respondent Ex parte decree was set aside by the Banking Court and the remained upheld up to Supreme Court Borrower returned the loan resultantly the recovery suit was withdrawn by the Bank Auction money was not refunded to the respondent and the Bank applied to the Banking Court for refund of the same Banking Court directed the Bank to refund the auction money with simple interest of 1596 per annum from the date of deposit of auction money till the date when the order of refund of the money was passed by the Banking Court ¬Validity Where the Bank had utilized the amount deposited by the auction purchaser, the auction purchaser was entitled to refund of all the amount alongwith 1596 per annum profit as granted by the Banking Court Order passed by the Banking Court was modifled to the extent that the auction purchaser was also entitled to refund of all the profit till full and final payment by the Bank High Court directed the Bank to refund the principal amount alongwith 1596 profit per annum to the auction purchaser Constitutional Petition was disposed of accordingly.\n \nMuhammad Yousafs case PLD 1989 Lah.322; Abdus Sattar's case PLD 1989 Lah.384; Shambilid Ghori's case PLD 1989 Lah.478; Naseer Ahmad's case PLD 1992 Lah.82; Col. (Retd.) Muhammad Aslam's case PLD 1993 Lah.11; Kunwar Rohani Raman's case AIR 1943 PC 189; Sh. Mehraj Din's case PLD 1965 Lah.374; Iqbal Ahmad's case PLD 1977 Lah. 409; Allah Dia v. Settlement Commissioner Lands 1982 CLC 1908; Hassan Khan v. Mst. Rape Jan 1983 CLC 615; Khalid Saeed v. Hockey Club of Pak. Ltd. 1987 CLC 959; Usman Enterprises v. Collector of Customs, Quetta 1995 CLC 1137; Muhammad Ali v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner PLD 1983 Lah.86; Ghufran Ahmad Siddiqui and others v. Subhand Sheikh and others PLD 1983 Lah.157; Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali and others v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1973 SC 236; Khiali Khan v. Haji Nazir and 4 others PLD 1997 SC 304; Muhammad Zahoor and others v. Lal Muhammad and others 1988 SCMR 322; Captain Sultan Mir Khan v. Khanzada Ain ud Din and others 1968 SCMR 1004 and Muhammad Khan v. Ramnarayan Misra and others AIR 1956 Orissa 156 distinguished.\n \n(b) Practice and procedure --\n \n Question of law Such question can be raised on any point at any stage.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 15026 of 1998, heard on 13-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager Gole Cloth Branch, Faisalabad er\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT NO. 1, FAISALABAD and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12610",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2175 = 2002 SLD 2175 = 2002 CLD 689",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (RV of 1997) --S. 12 Scope of S.12, Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Scope of S.12 was confined to satisfaction of the Court that defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from making an application that summons was not duly served, provided application, under S.12 was filed within 21 days from the date of knowledge.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -\n \n Ss. 9(4), 12 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12 (2) ¬Suit for recovery of loan Ex parte decree, setting aside of ¬Provision of S.12(2), C.P.C. Applicability Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. could be pressed into service in Banking cases, but it required examination as to whether grounds were available or not to press into service S.12(2), C.P.C. Mere falsity of claim to the knowledge of person to forward claim, could not be a ground for setting aside decree on ground 'of fraud If the claim was false it would be a false representation made on Court, but this could not by itself be a ground for setting aside decree because if such ground was accepted there would be no end to the litigation for every decree which would not proceed on some legal ground alone would be liable to be challenged on ground that a party had deliberately put forward an untrue case Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. would apply if fraud or misrepresentation was alleged during the proceeding of suit in Court and not to anything outside the Court.\n \nEmirates Bank International v. Messrs Usman Brothers PLD 1998 Kar. 338; Gold Store International v. Muslim Commercial Bank 2000 MLD 421; Mian Muneer Ahmed v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1998 Kar. 278; Tawakkal Export Corporation and others v. Muslim Commercial Bank and another 1997 CLC 1342; Lal Din and another v. Muhammad Ibrahim 1993 SCMR 710 and Begum Anwari Khanum v. Messrs Passcon (Pvt.) Ltd. 1993 MLD 1555 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss. 9(4) & 12 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. V, R. 20 ¬Suit for recovery of amount Mode of service of summons ¬Deeming effect of service of summons by publication under O. V, R. 20, C.P.C. would be that once a proper publication was made in newspaper which satisfied requirement of law, presumption would arise that service thereby was effected on defendant For such service to qualify for necessary presumption requirement of declaration of publication sufficient to carrying knowledge to defendant, should be met Where presumption of effectiveness of service through publication arose a defendant, upon appearance, could show that public notice did not come to his notice ¬Defendant being incapacitated and publication of summon did not come to her knowledge due to her ailment Defendant having shown sufficient cause for her non appearance and decree were set aside against her only.\n \nMuzafarul Haq v. Muslim Commercial Bank PLD 1993 Lah.706 and United Bank v. Mohabali Trading PLD 1994 Kar.275 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1641 of 1998, decide don 14-05-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs TAWAKKAL GARMENT INDUSTRIES LTD. and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12611",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2176 = 2002 SLD 2176 = 2002 CLD 695",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- Ss. 9(4) & 12 Ex parte decree Setting aside of Defendant could not reach the rostrum due to rush in the Court room and the decree was passed ex pane Validity Contention having been supported by affidavit of the defendant, High Court considered that the defendant was deprived of his right of hearing Judgment and decree passed against the defendant ex parte was set aside in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.770 of 2001, decision dated: 13-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWUAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "TAHIR ISLAM --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. through its Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12612",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2177 = 2002 SLD 2177 = 2002 CLD 712",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997 - S.9 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), OJI, R.3 Causes of action, joinder of two financial facilities were granted in favour of joinder by the Bank Parties were same and the interest was joint Bank filed one suit wherein the causes of action were joined Validity When the causes involve joint interest, plaintiff was empowered under OII, R.3, C.P.C. to combine several causes of action against the defendants in one suit Causes of action in the present case, could be amalgamated in one suit and there was no illegality committed by the plaintiff in filing one suit thereby combining two causes of action Suit was rightly instituted in circumstances.\n \nThe Directorate of Industries and Mineral Development, Government of the Punjab through its Director, Lahore and 3 others v. Messrs Masood Auto Stores through Masood Ahmad Malik, Partner, Lahore PLD 1991 Lah. 174 ref.\n \n(b) Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) -\n \n S.17 Multifarious suits Joining of causes of action ¬Insufficiency of court fee- Contention of the defendant was that court fee was insufficiently stamped Validity Where the plaintiff had paid the maximum court fee, suit was not insufficiently stamped but was properly valued in circumstances.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans. Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n S.10 Application for leave to defend Plea not raised in the application Effect Where the defendants had not taken a plea in their application for the grant of leave to appear and defend the suit, they were precluded from pleading and raising such plea at the time of arguments.\n \nCity Bank v. Tariq Mohsin Siddiqui and others PLD 1999 Kar. 196 ref.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)- \n \n S.17(2) Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.17 Documents not attested by two witnesses Validity All the documents relied upon by the plaintiff Bank in support of its claim were signed and executed before coming into force of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, therefore, simply on account of the fact that some of the documents were not attested by two witnesses, would not invalidate those document.\n \nMessrs United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Redco Textiles Ltd. and 7 others 2000 CLC 968 ref.\n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.9 & 22(2), proviso Suit for recovery of Bank loan Fresh cause of action Scope Fresh cause of action arose in favour of the plaintiff on the date of promulgation of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, which was promulgated on 31 5 1997, therefore, the suit filed on 31 5 1997, was not barred by time.\n \n(f) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.10 Application for leave to defend No substantial questions of law and fact involved Effect Where the defendants had failed to raise substantial question of law and facts to be tried by Banking Court in respect of which evidence needed to be recorded application for leave to defend was rightly dismissed.\n \n(g) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 9 & 10 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Application for leave to defend, dismissal of Effect With the dismissal of application for leave to defend the suit, the allegations made in the plaint would be deemed to be admitted Plaintiff had produced photocopies of all the documents execution whereof was vaguely and feebly denied by the defendants in their application for leave to defend the suit Plaintiff had produced certified/ verified copies of the statement of accounts pertaining to the account of the defendant to which presumption of correctness was attached Validity Where there was no rebuttal of the documents on record and of the statement of accounts, the suit was decreed.\n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd., Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 131 of 1999; heard on 8-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs NAQI BEVERAGES (PVT.) LTD. and 7 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12613",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2178 = 2002 SLD 2178 = 2002 CLD 723",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9 & 21 Recovery of Bank loan- Decree against mortgagor and guarantor Attorney of the mortgagor and guarantor had executed sale deed in favour of his son prior to the execution of guarantee Banking Court decreed the suit in favour of the Bank Contention of the appellant, who was mortgagor and the guarantor, was that the property was not available for mortgage Transferee of the suit property did not question the and decree Validity Where the appellant had not questioned or disputed the execution of the guarantee, no exception could be taken to the and decree passed against the borrower High Court declined to interfere with the and decree passed by the Banking Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 115 of 1998, decision dated: 13-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J AND MUSHIR ALAM, J.",
    "": "Mrs. ROSHAN BANG --Appellant\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12614",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2179 = 2002 SLD 2179 = 2002 CLD 739",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Administration of justice Judicial Officers must pass s with reasons.\n \nMollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss. 7, 17 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) ¬General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24 A Decree for recovery of money Appellants being stranger to such decree filed application under S.12(2), C.P.C., for setting aside the same ¬Banking Court by merely mentioning one sentence dismissed the application as time barred as well as on merits Validity ¬Judicial Officers must pass s with reasons Public functionaries, in view of S.24 A, General Clauses Act, 1897, were duty bound to pass orders with reasons -High Court set aside the impugned order with observations that application filed by the appellants would be deemed to be pending adjudication before Banking Court to be decided within specified time.\n \nMollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 and Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid e Azam International Airport, Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 414 of 2001, decision dated: 12-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Malik ZAHEER NAWAZ and 6 others --Appellants\nVs.\nPAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL LEASING CORPORATION LIMITED and 7 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12615",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2180 = 2002 SLD 2180 = 2002 CLD 741",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (%V of 1997) Ss. 9 & 10 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Necessary parties Guarantor, proceedings against Contention, of the guarantors was that they need not join the proceedings actively as in case of failure of the remaining defendants to discharge their liability or in case the decree if passed was not satisfied, only then their property mortgaged with the Bank would be under the charge Validity Names of the guarantors, in circumstances, were struck off from the application for leave to appear and defend the suit and they were treated as pro forma defendants in the suit accordingly.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery. of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997 -\n \n S.10 Unconditional grant of leave to appear and defend the suit Mistake in calculation of claim and mark up Effect Mere denial of liability without denial of getting financial facility from the Bank would not be enough to suggest that either there was no liability or it was discharged Mistake in the calculation of claim or the dispute relating to mark up was also not a ground either to reject the claim of the Bank in toto or grant un¬conditional leave Defendants, instead of offering any explanation for not discharging their liability or accepting their liability, had denied the claim of the Bank through evasive pleadings, which would lead to draw an inference that the defendants, instead of discharging their liability, intended to delay the return of loan Where the defendants had obtained the financial facility from the Bank, the defendants were under legal and moral obligation to discharge their liability in terms of agreement and on failure were bound to face the consequences ¬High Court did not find any plausible and reasonable ground to grant unconditional leave to defendants to appear and defend the suit Leave was, however, granted subject to furnishing of cash security or Bank guarantee to the tune of disputed amount in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No.4 of 2001, heard on 3rd January, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, J",
    "": "Messrs UNION BANK LIMITED through Vice President and Attorney --Plaintiff\nVs.\nSILVER OIL MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED and 17 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12616",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2181 = 2002 SLD 2181 = 2002 CLD 746",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) S.444(3) Winding up of foreign company Scope Order of winding up in case of unregistered foreign company can be passed by High Curt under S 444(3) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n S.444 Winding upon foreign company Commercial insolvency, plea of Allegations made in the petition for winding up of the respondent company was that the company should be dissolved because of commercial insolvency and the substratum of the company had gone Allegations made in the petitioner remained unchallenged by all the parties Official Assignee way appointed by High Court as Official Liquidator Petition for winding up was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous No.54 of 2000, decision dated: 15-08-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, J",
    "": "Messrs PAK SHAHEEN (PVT.) LTD. er\nVs.\nIN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES ORDINANCE 1984 through Agent Messrs Pak Shaheen (Pvt.) Ltd."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12617",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2182 = 2002 SLD 2182 = 2002 CLD 759",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.9 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 ¬-Constitutional petition Decrees passed against petitioners by Banking Tribunal was not assailed in appeals, but was assailed in Constitutional petitions after expiry of period of limitation prescribed for filing appeal High Court disposed of the Constitutional petitions by virtue of rendered in the case of Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore anti. others (PLD 1996 Lah. 672) Bank thereafter initiated execution proceedings, over which petitioners objected that in view of case Chenab Cement Product (supra), such decrees would be deemed to have been set aside, thus, was not executable Banking Tribunal dismissed the objection petition Validity Such decrees were saved and would be considered to be past and closed cases and had become final by virtue of passed in the case of Chenab Cement Product (supra) and there was no legal impediment in executing the same Where decree passed by Banking Tribunal had been challenged through filing of appeal and simultaneously by way of filing Constitutional petition, and the latter had been disposed of in pursuance of the case of Chenab Cement Product (supra), then in such event, the decree would not be covered within the scope of said and would not fall within the term \"\"past and closed case\"\", but would be deemed to be set aside High Court dismissed the Constitutional petitions being devoid of force, resultantly the decrees passed in the petitioners' cases would be executed by the Banking Courts established under S.5 of Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah.672; Messrs Isman Drug House (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others v. Messrs Habib Credit and Exchange Bank Limited and 4 others 2000 YLR 1484; Soneri Bank's case KLR 1997 Civil Cases 742; R.F.A. No. 101 of 1995; Aziz ul Haq Qureshi and others v. Habib Bank Limited and others Civil Petition No.2172 L of 1999 and United Bank Limited v. Messrs The Hina Export Co. (Pvt.) Limited Office, Karachi 1998 PSC 78 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.12374, 1055 of 1999, 21629 of 1998 and 12587 of 1996, heard on 14-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Syed FARASAT ALI SHAH er\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12618",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2183 = 2002 SLD 2183 = 2002 CLD 770",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) Ss.6(2)(a)(4) & 8(3) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 189 ¬Dismissal of execution application by Special Court filed in respect of decree passed by Civil Court on 28 3 1983 after coming into force of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Ordinance (II of 1983) Validity Judgment passed by Supreme Court Whether can be given retrospective effect ¬Past and closed transaction Judgment in appeal was operative as from the date it was announced and it did not have the effect of re opening the rights of the parties concluded finally under the High Court Authority of law laid down by Supreme Court under Art. 189 of the Constitution being prospective, decision of High Court nevertheless stood overruled on same question of law but that would not affect right of parties already determined by High Court Judgment and decree in the present case, were not challenged by the debtor which had become final and was a past and closed transaction Execution application was wrongly dismissed by the Banking Court which would be decreed pending and would be decided in accordance with law Appeal was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 12 of 1994, heard on 11-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs HASHMI SONS and 16 others --Respondents\nHabib Bank Limited v. Messrs Qadri Traders and another 1998 PCTLR 923 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12619",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2184 = 2002 SLD 2184 = 2002 CLD 778",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.21 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 29 Appeal ¬Condonation of delay Validity Period of filing of appeal having been specified in the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act 1997, itself, the provisions of S.29 of the Limitation Act, 1908, were applicable Delay in filing of appeal could riot be condoned under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, or under any other provision of law.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.21 .Appeal Condonation of delay Ignorance of law ¬Instead of filing appeal in the first instance against and decree the appellant filed Constitutional petition Present appeal was filed after withdrawal of the petition Plea of ignorance was raised Validity Ignorance of law could not constitute a valid ground for condoning delay Appeal was dismissed as time barred.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.219 of 2001, decision dated: 12-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "MAJEED AKBAR FAROOQI --Appellant\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Manager (Attorney) --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12620",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2185 = 2002 SLD 2185 = 2002 CLD 786",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.5(3) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) & O.IX, R.9 ¬Consolidation of proceedings Application under S.12(2), CP.C. & O.IX, R.9, C.P.C. was pending in one Court while execution proceedings regarding same decree were pending in another Court Effect High Court for the sake of convenience and in order to avoid conflicting orders, withdrew the execution proceedings and entrusted to the other Court for disposal ¬Application was allowed accordingly.\n \nAnwar Akhtar for Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Transfer Application No.475 C of 2001, decision dated: 28-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "KARAMAT NAZIR BHANDARI, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HANIF er\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12621",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2186 = 2002 SLD 2186 = 2002 CLD 787",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) S.48 Execution Limitation Banking Court dismissed execution application on the ground that the same was filed three years after passing of and decree Validity Period for filing of execution application was six years in view of S.48, C.P.C. Where decree was passed on 30 5 1975, the execution application moved on 3 5 1981, was within time Order passed by the Banking Court was set aside and the execution application was deemed to be pending Appeal was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 182 of 1993, heard on 23rd January, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs RIAZ AHMAD & SONS (REGD.) through Managing Partner and 2 others --Respondents\nMehboob Khan v. Hassan Khan Durrani PLD 1990 SC 778 fol."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12622",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2187 = 2002 SLD 2187 = 2002 CLD 805",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal trial Mens rea Mens rea or a guilty mind was an essential ingredient of a criminal offence and it was sound rule of construction to read element of mens rea in statutory provisions, unless statute expressly or by necessary implication excluded it.\n \n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) \n \n Ss.27(1), 43 A & 83(1 C) Appreciation of evidence Benefit of doubt Prosecution had failed to prove its case against accused beyond any reasonable doubt Benefit of doubt was extended to accused and they were acquitted from the charge.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Original Miscellaneous No.7 of 1990, decision dated: 5-05-1992.",
    "Judge Name:": "QAISAR AHMAD HAMIDI, J",
    "": "STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN Complainant\nVs.\nSyed AKBAR HUSSAIN RIZVI and others Accused"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12623",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2188 = 2002 SLD 2188 = 2002 CLD 812",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997 Ss. 9, 10 & 21 Leave to appear and defend the suit ¬Conditional leave Finance was provided to the borrower to import certain vehicles Scheme under which the vehicles were to be imported was discontinued and consequently the goods were not released Effect Where the documents were signed for the purpose of import of the vehicle, High Court granted conditional leave with a direction to deposit the admitted amount of the loan facility and it was made clear that in case the borrower failed to deposit the amount, the leave would stand withdrawn and the decree passed by the Banking Court against the borrower would be revived.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.212 of 2000, heard on 7-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "NAEEMULLAH SHEIKH and another --Appellants\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12624",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2189 = 2002 SLD 2189 = 2002 CLD 821",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 18(6) & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.47 ¬Execution Diminution in value of pledged stock ¬Determination Power of Executing Court Judgment debtor filed application for dismissal of execution petition on the ground that due to failure of the decree holder, the stock pledged by the debtor had been destroyed and rendered worthless Executing Court dismissed the application on the ground that the claim made by the debtor was yet to be determined Validity ¬Contention between the parties had to be determined by the Executing Court If there were factual matters to be decided for the purpose of such determination, under S.47, C.P.C. the same also had to be decided in execution proceedings Order passed by the Executing Court was set aside and the application was revived accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.276 of 2001, heard on 21st February, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs RIZCO CARPETS (PVT.) LTD. and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12625",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2190 = 2002 SLD 2190 = 2002 CLD 823",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Stamp Act (II of 1899) Preamble Interpretation of provisions of Stamp Act, 1899 Scope Stamp Act, 1899 is a fiscal statute and consequently, it must be construed liberally in favour of the citizen and against the Government and any substantial doubt be resolved in favour of the citizen.\n \n(b) Stamp Act (II of 1899) \n \n S.2(14) \"\"Document\"\" Meaning As the term \"\"document\"\" has not been defined in the Stamp Act, 1899, therefore, it has to be given the ordinary dictionary meaning.\n \nConcise Oxford Dictionary, Ninth Edn., 1998, p.398; Chamber's Dictionary, 1994 Edn., p.496 and Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edn. ref.\n \n(c) Stamp Act (II of 1899) \n \n S.2(14) Term includes' as used in S.2(14), Stamp Act, 1899 Effect By use of the term includes' in S.2(14), the Legislature has extended the meaning of the term instrument' by including documents which would otherwise ordinarily be not included in the meaning of the term instrument.\n \n(d) Words and phrases \n \n \"\"Instrument\"\" Defined.\n \nStroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edn., 1971 72, p.1368 ref.\n \n(e) Stamp Act (II of 1899) \n \n S. 2(14) Term instrument' Connotation Term instrument' as defined in S.2(14) of the Stamp Act, 1899, includes every document by which any right or liability is or purports to be created, transferred, extinguished etc. ¬Consequently, the definition does not include those documents by which no right or liability is so created, transferred or extinguished etc.\n \n(f) Interpretation of document \n \n Written instrument relating to a transaction between parties Interpretation For the purpose of determining true nature of such document, one must look at its substance and not at its form.\n \n(g) Stamp Act (II of 1899) \n \n S.2(10) Word conveyance' Defined Verb used in the definition of the word conveyance' is in present tense, therefore, it means that the transfer of the property must take place in the present by virtue of the instrument ¬Property in the goods must be transferred by the document itself and it should not be record of a fact which has taken place in the past or a record of a past transaction between two or more parties.\n \n(h) Stamp Act (II of 1899) \n \n S.2(10) Conveyance Memorandum of past transaction, whether a conveyance deed Neither a memorandum of a past transaction or a statement confirming that certain property was transferred in the past from one person to another nor a memorandum or an agreement stating that certain property would be transferred in future by executing another document comes within the definition of conveyance' as defined in the Stamp Act, 1899 Only the document whereby the property is in fact transferred by virtue of the instrument itself from some person to another would fall within the definition of conveyance and would be subject to stamp duty as specified in the Stamp Act, 1899.\n \nAIR 1934 All. 201; AIR 1934 Lah. 530; Muhammad Hasham v. Emperor (1932) 139 IC 154 and Thakur Bageshwari Charan Singh v. Thakurain Jagarnath Kuari (1932) 136 IC 798 ref.\n \n(i) Stamp Act (II of 1899) \n \n S.2(10) Conveyance Bank loan Agreement of finance on mark up basis Such document whether a conveyance deed Parties entered into such agreement whereby the Bank purchased certain movable property from the borrower with an agreement that the latter would buy back the same at the higher price Goods were not specifically described in the agreement but a general description was stated in order to prepare a document to comply with the mode of finance permitted by the State Bank of Pakistan No real sale and purchase of the goods whatsoever was shown in the agreement Such agreement was a paper transaction where no actual sale or purchase or transfer of title or passing of risk in the goods was involved As the Bank took no risk whatsoever, the documents were prepared to comply with the requirements of the State Bank of Pakistan Various documents executed by the parties including the Mark up Agreement indicated that the agreement was used as a mode for providing finance to the borrower and the same could not be regarded as a conveyance of property as defined in the Stamp Act, 1899.\n \n(j) Interpretation of. document \n \n Document evidencing conveyance of property Necessary ingredients Such document basically consists of Recitals' which relate to the past history of the property transferred and sets out the facts and the instrument necessary to show the title and the relation of the parties to the subject¬-matter of the deed and the introductory recital which explains the motive for the preparation and execution of the deed as such the same is followed by Consideration for the Contract', Acknowledgement of Receipt of Consideration', the Operative Words' which is the spirit of the document, the Description of the property transferred', Exceptions and Reservations, Covenants and Undertakings' by the parties with their signatures and attestation Most important part of the deed is the operative words' which express the intention of the persons executing the document Such operative words disclose the nature of the transaction Operative word now commonly used is conveys'.\n \n(k) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.17 Stamp Act (11 of 1899), S.2(10) Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.l7(2) Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.2(e) & (h) Mark up agreement between Bank and borrower whether a conveyance deed Since such agreement is signed by one party only, therefore, the same cannot be termed as an agreement which requires the signatures of two parties for it to be enforceable as a contract under the provisions of S.2(e) & (h) of the Contract Act, 1872 at the best it can be regarded only as an acknowledgement or a confirmation of a past transaction signed by the customer ¬Alternately if the Mark up agreement is signed by both parties, the same would simply be an agreement between the Bank and its customer confirming the terms and conditions agreed by the parties on the basis of which the Bank would provide finance to the customer in one of the modes suggested by the State Bank of Pakistan by BCD Circular No.13, dated 1 1 1985 and not a conveyance deed\n \n(l) Stamp Act (II of 1899) \n \n Ss.2(14), 40, Arts.5(d) & 40(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.17 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional petition Instrument insufficiently stamped Impounding of the photocopy of original instrument Authorities treated the mark up Agreement as a conveyance deed and intended to impound photocopy of the agreement Contention of the Authorities . was that possession of the original instrument was not necessary and if a party had admitted that the copy of the instrument was genuine and from the copy it was evident that it was insufficiently stamped, the Collector was empowered to demand the deficit stamp duty and could impose a penalty for insufficient stamping Validity Contention of the Authorities was not spelt out from the wordings of Ss.2(14) & 40 of the Stamp Act, 1899 Photocopy of the original instrument could not be termed as instrument' such meaning would be preposterous and a blatant abuse of the word instrument' used in the Stamp Act, 1899 There could not be more than one title document of ownership of one property as the original document was the only document which was the instrument of title intended and had come within the meaning of the term instrument' No other document could replace the same Only the original document required to be stamped under the provisions of the Stamp Act, 1899 Demand for payment of the alleged deficit stamp duty on a photocopy of the Agreement of Finance was not warranted by the provisions of S.40 of the Stamp Act, 1899 Mark up agreement was not a conveyance deed as urged by the Authorities but was a photocopy of a document which at the best could be regarded as an acknowledgement or confirmation of a past transaction and was not liable to Stamp duty as a conveyance Order passed by the Authorities was set aside for the property was not chargeable to stamp duty under Art.40(c) but was subject to duty under Art.5(d) of Sched. I of the Stamp Act, 1899 Petition was allowed in circumstances.\n \nPLD 1952 BJ 41; AIR 1932 All. 291 AIR 1918 Lah. 354; PLD 1959 Kar. 1; AIR 1958 Raj. 291; PLD 1975 Kar. 861; PLD 2000 SC 2.25; Ameen v. Haji Abdul Sattar and others 1998 CLC 1256; Messrs Mehrban Fabrics (Pvt.) Limited v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD 1997 Lah. 654; Concise Oxford Dictionary, Ninth Edn., 1998, p.398; The Chamber's Dictionary, 1994 Edn., p.496; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edn. and The Conveyancer by P.C. Mogha and N.S. Bindra's Conveyancing, 7th Edn., 1993 ref.\n \n(m) Administration of justice \n \n Opportunity of hearing Object and scope Requirements of an opportunity of hearing means that the person must be issued a letter/notice informing him of the action proposed to be taken against him and asking him to explain why it should not be done so After service of such notice, it is necessary that an opportunity be provided to the person to whom the show cause notice has been issued to appear in person and explain his position verbally or in writing If the person chooses not to appear in person and explain his position or does not send a written response, such person does so at his own risk.\n \nAtta Muhammad Qureshi v. Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1971 SC 61 ref.\n \n(n) Interpretation of statute \n \n Every word in a statute has to be given its plain and ordinary meaning and due weight must be given to every word used in the Statute.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos.318, 374, 539 and 351 of 1997, decision dated: 31st December, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. AHMED SARWANA AND MUHAMMAD MOOSA K LEGHARI, JJ",
    "": "BAYER PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. and others ers\nVs.\nBOARD OF REVENUE and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12626",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2191 = 2002 SLD 2191 = 2002 CLD 853",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordnance (XIX of 1979) S.6(2)(2) (as amended by Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Ordinance (II of 1983) 8a 8(3)) ¬Execution of decree Dismissal of execution application by Banking Court on the ground that the and decree had been passed by Civil Court after coming into force of Ordinance (II of 1983) ,Validity Where the and decree was not challenged by the debtor, the same had become final qua him and a past and closed transaction View taken by the High Court in the case titled Habib Bank Limited v. Qadari Traders reported as 1998 PCTLR 923 was fully applicable to the case Order passed by the Banking Court wag set aside as a result whereof, the execution petition filed 6y the Bank would be deemed to be pending before the Banking Court Appeal was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 71 of 1994, heard on 11-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB & CO. and another --Respondents\nHabib Bank Limited v. Messrs Qadri Traders and another 1998 PCTLR 923 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12627",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2192 = 2002 SLD 2192 = 2002 CLD 856",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 12(2) & O.XXIII, R.3 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.19 ¬Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance (L of 2000), Ss.2(L),. 10, 20 8a Sched. ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) Suits filed by petitioner for redemption of mortgaged property and that filed by respondent for recovery of loan amount were disposed of in terms of Memorandum of Understanding executed between the parties, whereby petitioner agreed to pay the loan amount in quarterly installments subject to the condition 'that in event of default of any installment; the entire principal amount and interest accrued thereon then remaining unpaid would become immediately payable by petitioner and respondent would be entitled to, file execution application for recovery thereof Petitioner, after paying four (4) installments stopped further payments and filed applications under S.12(2), C.P.C. which were dismissed by Trial Court Appellate Court also dismissed the petitioner's appeals Contention of petitioner was that Memorandum of Understanding was ;,.obtained through misrepresentation, coercion and fraud; disposal of such applications without inquiry was against law, though Trial Court had omitted penal interest, but respondent was still charging the same; and that respondent could refer a question of bona fide dispute relating to liability etc., of the obligor to Governor State Bank of Pakistan for verification and correct determination/ calculation by Verification Committee ¬Validity Petitioner had failed to substantiate the allegations of fraud, misrepresentation and coercion as no particulars thereof had been given in application under S.12(2), C.P.C. Mere allegation not supported by any material would not invariably warrant inquiry or investigation in each case Petitioners had agreed to pay interest/mark up on rescheduled outstanding amount, as such they being the privy to rescheduling of loan could not turn around to say that interest/mark up had been fraudulently charged Parties with their free will and consent had entered into compromise, whereupon signatures of the parties and their counsel had been verified by Trial Court, which had decreed the suit in terms thereof ¬Petitioners had acted upon the consent decree by paying four (4) quarterly installments Had petitioners been aggrieved of consent decree, they would have challenged the same in appeal No appeal had been filed against consent decree, which had attained finality Consent decree did not suffer from fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction, thus, the same was not amenable to challenge under S.12(2), C.P.C. Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance. 2000, came into force on 22 9 2000, whereas consent decree was passed on 18 2 1998, thus, the date on which consent decree was passed, Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance, 2000 was not in force Said Ordinance came into force during pendency of applications under S.12(2), C.P.C. but its provisions could not be pressed into service as the applications had been found to be incompetent and consent decree, had been found to have been lawfully and validly passed Judgment passed by Appellate Court was well founded not warranting any interference Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petitions in circumstances.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n S. 12(2) Fraud, misrepresentation, allegations of ¬Decision of such application without inquiry Validity Mere allegations of fraud, misrepresentation and coercion not supported by any material would not invariably, warrant inquiry or investigation in each case.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --\n \n S. 12(2) Framing of issues Trial Court is not bound to frame issues in each and every case, but it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case Where Court finds that further inquiry is required, it would frame issues and record evidence of the parties, but if it is of the opinion that no inquiry is required, then it can dispense with the same and proceed to decide the application.\n \n(d) Fraud \n \n Allegation of Where allegation of fraud is levelled, the same must be specified and details thereof should be given.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal Nos.2720 to 2723 of 2001, decision dated: 2-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. RIAZ AHMAD, MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL AND TANVIR AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs DADABHOY CEMENT INDUSTRIES\nLTD. and 6 others ers.\nVs.\nNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION,"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12628",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2193 = 2002 SLD 2193 = 2002 CLD 867",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.22 Appeal Judgment without reasoning Banking Court had given no reasons for its finding that the action of decree holder Bank was not fair Validity Where no basis was given to support the conclusion reached by the Banking Court, the order passed by the Court was set aside Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \nKhalid Salim for Appellant. Nemo for Respondents Date of hearing: 12th March, 2002.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.34 of 2002, heard on 12-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "ALBARAKA ISLAMIC BANK B.S.C. (E.C.)\nthrough Senior Vice President --Appellant\nVs.\nANSARI TRADE LINKERS (PVT.)\nLTD. and 6 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12629",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2194 = 2002 SLD 2194 = 2002 CLD 868",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.9 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.176 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Retaining the pledged goods as collateral security Validity Pledgee Bank finder the provisions of Contract Act, 1872, was entitled to either sell the goods prior to the filing of the suit or to bale its suit and to retain the pledged goods as collateral security Where the Bank exercised the second option, the Bt7nk had rightly retained the goods in its custody as collateral-security.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, . Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.9 8s 18 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Pledged good, account for Objection raised by the defendants was that the Bank under ,the law was required to account for the goods in its custody Validity Such matter could only arise in the execution proceedings, when the collateral security was realized in such proceedings through sale of the same ¬Objection was repelled accordingly.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 4997) \n \n Ss. 9 & 10 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Application for leave to appear and defend the suit Serious and bona fide dispute Plea raised by the defendant was that the different business entities were jointed in the proceedings by the Bank Defendants were partners in one concern while they were proprietors of the other. concerns Defendants being owners of the business 6oncerns had executed personal guarantees to secure loan, facilities advanced by the Bank Banking Court declined leave to appear and defend the suit Validity Where the guarantees were not disputed by the defendants, they where liable for the Bank's claim and had not been able to show any credible, bona fide or substantial defence to the so it filed by the bank ¬ Banking Court had rightly dismissed the application for leave to appear and defend the suit and the suit was rightly decreed in favour of the Bank Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nM.M. Alam for Appellants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.275 of 1998, heard on 21st February, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs CRYSTAL ENTERPRISES and 6 others --Appellants\nVs.\nPLATINUM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. and 2 others through General Attorney --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12630",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2195 = 2002 SLD 2195 = 2002 CLD 875",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.IX, R.8 & O.XXII, R.1 Dismissal of suit Failure to bring on record legal representative of deceased defendant ¬Despite repeated opportunities, the Bank failed to bring on record the legal representatives even the costs awarded to the Bank was not paid Effect Banking Court had rightly dismissed the suit under O.IX, R.8, C.P.C. Order passed by the Banking Court was maintained in circumstances.\n \nM. Naeem Sehgal for Appellant.\n \nMirza Naseer Ahmed for Respondents.\n \nSabir Mahmood Bhatti for Respondent No.6.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.132 of 1995, decision dated: 4-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LTD. through Attorneys --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs HOME AIDS CORPORATION and 6 others through Managing Director --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12631",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2196 = 2002 SLD 2196 = 2002 CLD 876",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances; Credits and Finances) Act (%Y of 1997) S.10 Leave to appear and defend the suit Bona fide and serious defence Defendant alleged that neither he had executed any guarantee in favour of the Bank, nor he was connected with the company as a shareholder or as a Director Effect Defendant had disclosed a bona fide and serious defence to the suit filed by the Bank High Court allowed the leave to appear and defend the suit in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.478 of 2001, heard on 5-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "KAMRAN ZALI --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs UNION BANK LIMITED and 4 others through Manager --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12632",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2197 = 2002 SLD 2197 = 2002 CLD 878",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) S. 37(1)(a)(b) Taking off a trade mark from register Pre¬ conditions to be established by an aggrieved person are that applicant for registration has obtained registration without any bona fide intention to use the same in relation to the goods and that there has been no bona fide use of the trade mark in relation to those goods by proprietor thereof up to one month before the date of rectification application or a continuous period of five years or so has elapsed during which there has been no bona fide use, thereof Mere non¬ user for a period of five years or longer up to a date one month before the application under S.37 of Trade Marks Act, 1940, is sufficient ground for removal of trade mark.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n S. 37 Rectification application Proof Applicant must show that he is an aggrieved person; and that the mark that needs to be removed has not been used for the lat 5 years.\n \nIn re: Powell T.M. 1 RPC 195; Powell v. Bringham Vinergar Brewery Coy. (The Yorkshire Relish case) (1894) AC 8; Crossly and Coy's Trade Mark 15 RPC 377; National Bell Company v. Metal Goods Manufacturing Company AIR 1971 SC 898 and Chiswick Products Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks, Karachi PLD 1983 Kar. 423(sic) ref.\n \n(c) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n Ss. 37(1)(a)(b), proviso, 46(2) read with Ss. 6, 8 & 14(1) ¬Removal of a trade mark from register Aggrieved person ¬Applicant adopted in year 1985 in India the mark \"\"Laser\"\" in relation to the goods it was manufacturing, selling and also exporting to Pakistan since 1992 Applicant sought removal of similar trade mark obtained by respondents in Pakistan in respect of their goods Respondents conceded non use of trade mark in relations to the goods for which it was registered during statutory period, but contended that they had during the relevant period used the trade mark in another class Validity Applicant had not been able to show user of trade mark in Pakistan and non user by respondents for five years Evidence brought on record by applicant was restricted to letters and invoices, which did not pertain to direct import into Pakistan by any party in Pakistan from applicant Applicant themselves admitted that they had adopted the trade mark \"\"Laser\"\" in 1985, but they had failed to show that indeed the mark had been registered in India Applicant's goods had found their way into the market in Pakistan since 1992, but present application had been filed in 1998, whereas application for registration had been made in 1994 before the local Trade Mark Registry Such delay on the part of applicant was unjustified Applicant did not explain such delay in applying for registration of trade mark in Pakistan and making application for rectification Applicant was not an aggrieved person strictosenso Application was dismissed with observations that applicant might apply again, if it was in a position to bring proof.\n \nCluett, Peabody & Co. Inc. v. Assistant Registrar of T.M. 1991 SCMR 927 and Abdul Aziz v. Seven up Co., Karachi and another PLD 1978 Kar. 14 ref.\n \n(c) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n Ss.37(1)(a)(b), proviso, 46(2) read with Ss.6, 8 & 14(1) ¬Aggrieved person Explained.\n \nIn re: Powell T.M. 1 RPC 195; Powell v. Bringham Vinergar Brewery Coy. (The Yorkshire Relish case) (1894) AC 8; Crossly and Coy's Trade Mark 15 RPC 377; National Bell Company v. Metal Goods Manufacturing Company AIR 1971 SC 898; Chiswick Products Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks, Karachi PLD 1983 Kar. 423(sic); Cluett, Peabody & Co. Inc. v. Assistant Registrar of T.M. 1991 SCMR 927 and Abdul Aziz v. Seven up Co., Karachi and another PLD 1978 Kar. 14 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous No.9 of 1998, decision dated: 20-03-2000.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALVI, J",
    "": "MALHOTRA SHAVING PRODUCTS LIMITED --Applicant\nVs.\nACCURAY SURGICALS LTD., and another through\nChief Executive/ Managing Director/\nDirector/ Secretary/ Manager --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12633",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2198 = 2002 SLD 2198 = 2002 CLD 904",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) S.12(2) & O.XXI, Rr.l, 2 Order, setting aside of Plea of fraud and misrepresentation Suit for recovery of three Bank loans was decreed in favour of the Bank One out of the three loans was settled under the 'incentive scheme of the State Bank of Pakistan\"\" and a letter of settlement was issued During the pendency of execution of the decree ¬Judgment debtor relying on the letter of settlement filed application under O.XXI, Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C. contending that the decree had been satisfied Application under O.XXI, Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C. was allowed and the Executing Court recorded that the decree had been satisfied Plea raised by the decree holder was that the debtor did not disclose that only one loan was satisfied and other two loans were yet to be paid off, hence the order passed by the Executing Court was obtained by misrepresenting the correct and true facts Validity Such misrepresentation was a fraud played on the Court which led to the passing of the order of satisfaction of decree If such misrepresentation had not been made before the Executing Court, the satisfaction would not have been recorded Such misrepresentation and fraud perpetuated on the Court to obtain orders fell within the scope of S.12(2), C.P.C. Courts were not expected to act in aid of injustice to perpetuate illegalities or put a premium on ill gotten gains Dues in the present case in two accounts had not been paid and non¬-pointing out of the true facts had resulted in an incorrect decision Fraud had been played on the Court and the facts¬had been misrepresentated Order passed by the Executing Court was set aside Application was allowed in circumstances.\n \nIftikhar Hussain and others v. Hameed Akhtar Niaz 1996 SCMR 1942; Lal Din and another v. Muhammad Ibrahim 1993 SCMR 710; Mst. Izzat and another v. Kadir Bux PLD 1959 Kar.221; Mst. Safia Bibi v. Mst. Aisha Bibi 1982 SCMR 492; Umer Bux and 2 others v. Azim Khan and 12 others 1993 SCMR 374 and Government of Pakistan v. Khalil Ahmed 1994 SCMR 782 distinguished.\n \nChief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others PLD 1975 SC 331; Manager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678 and Messrs Vulcan Company (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore through Managing Director v. Collector of Customs, Karachi and 3 others PLD 2000 SC 825 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous No.37 of 2001 in Suit No.685 of 1994, heard on 13-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR MANSOOR KHAN, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Applicant\nVs.\nMessrs KHAIRPUR TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED and 8 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12634",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2199 = 2002 SLD 2199 = 2002 CLD 915",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss. 6, 9 & 11 Suit for recovery of Rs.21,56,166 alongwith liquidated damages, expenses and costs -Defendant offered to pay decretal amount in instalments, in case he was exempted from paying insurance and cushion charges, costs of suit and liquidated damages Bank did not agree to waive such charges and payment of decretal amount in instalments Banking Tribunal decreed the suit in the sum of Rs.16, 76, 806 including mark up up to date of suit in 12 quarterly instalments Contention of Bank was that without its consent, defendant could not be permitted to pay decretal amount in instalments; Bank was entitled to mark up from the date of suit till date of decision; and that Banking Tribunal had declined the insurance and cushion charges, liquidated damages and costs of suit on the assumption that matter was being disposed of with the consent of parties Validity Since no evidence had been recorded in the case it was not possible to finally determine the claim of Bank Appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned and decree and remanded the case to Banking Court for its fresh decision in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.78 of 1995, heard on 11-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through the Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nSABTAIN SHAH --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12635",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2200 = 2002 SLD 2200 = 2002 CLD 917",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Jurisdiction Jurisdiction under special law Scope Where a special law confers exclusive jurisdiction on Special Court or forum created for the purpose then ordinary jurisdiction conferred under the general law would not be available.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S. 7(6) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S. 7(6); Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.38 Execution of decree Dispute, between the parties was with regard to execution of the decree passed by High Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction Contention of the decree holder was that after the establishment of Banking Courts, the decree was to be executed by the Banking Court established under the special law whereas plea raised by the debtor was that it was the, jurisdiction of the Court which lead passed the decree to execute the same Validity-By establishing Banking Court in terms of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, all proceedings including execution of a decree pending in any Court stood transferred or deemed to have been transferred to the Banking Court having jurisdiction Such intention of Legislature was very much clear from tile provision of S.7(6) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, and similar provisions were contained in S.7(6) of the Financial Institution; (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and it was further provided under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, that the Banking Court to which proceedings were transferred would proceed from the stage where the proceedings had reached immediately prior to the transfer Contention of debtor that High Court would continue to have jurisdiction could not be sustained Proceedings were transferred to the Banking Court presently established under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 having jurisdiction in the matter.\n \nHabib Ahmed v. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Company and 5 others 1999 CLC . 1953; Ali Hussain Rajabali and 2 others v. A. Habib Ahmed and others H.C.A. No. 182 of 1998 and Messrs United Bank Ltd. v. Mst. Rehana Raza PLD 1983 Kar.467 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.59 of 1964; Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos.3775 and 3776 of 2001, decision dated: 4-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs J. TYLOR & CO. Limited --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12636",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2201 = 2002 SLD 2201 = 2002 CLD 923",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Executing Court Executing Court, interference in decree Validity When decree remains intact then the Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree.\n \nMessrs Conforce Limited v. Messrs Rafique Industries Ltd. and others PLD 1989 SC 136 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art.189 Judgment passed by Supreme Court Effect ¬Such has prospective effect and not retrospective effect and past and closed transactions cannot be re¬opened.\n \nMuhammad Yousuf v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Pakistan, Lahore PLD 1968 SC 101 ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art.l99 Constitutional petition Past and closed transaction Jurisdiction of Executing Court Suit for recovery of Bank loan was decreed in favour of the Bank and the borrower did not assail the decree During the execution proceedings the borrower assailed the decree passed by the Banking Court on the basis of titled M/s. Chenab Cement Product (Put.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others reported as PLD 1996 Lah. 672 Judgment so relied upon by the borrower was considered by Supreme Court in case titled M/s. Tri Star Polyester Limited v. Citibank reported as 2001 SCMR 410 and the Supreme Court saved the decrees passed by the Banking Courts before the relied upon by the borrower and the aggrieved persons did not file appeals in time under the provisions of banking laws Effect High Court declined to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672; Messrs Tri Star Polyester Limited v. Citibank 2001 SCMR 410; Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali's case PLD 1973 SC 236 and Rana Muhammad Arshad's case 1998 SCMR 1468 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.23160 of 1996, decision dated: 4-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "Mian MUHAMMAD LATIF and 2 others ers\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD ASLAM NAGI, CHAIRMAN, BANKING TRIBUNAL, Lahore High Court and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12637",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2202 = 2002 SLD 2202 = 2002 CLD 933",
    "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) S.561 A Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.20(4) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.13 Complaint against dishonour of cheque ¬Criminal proceedings Quashing of Contention of accused was that statement of complainant having not been recorded by Trial Court immediately upon receipt of the complaint, proceedings against him were hit by S.20(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 as well as Art.l3 of Constitution of Pakistan (1973) Validity ¬Contention was repelled because it was not pointed out by accused as to what prejudice was caused to him by non¬-examination of the complainant immediately upon receipt of complaint Pendency of civil suit filed by complainant against accused with regard to recovery of amount which was subject matter of criminal case against accused, was no ground for quashing of criminal case as it could not tantamount to double jeopardy If a criminal liability was spelt out from facts and circumstances .of a particular case, accused could be tried upon a criminal charge Quashing of proceedings against accused in circumstances would tantamount to stifling of proceedings pending before Trial Court, which was not warranted by law Application for quashing of proceedings was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMrs. Tahmina Bashir v. Abdul Rauf and another 1995 CLC 973 and United States v. Irwin Halper 490 US 435 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Revision No.18 and Miscellaneous Application No.319 of 2001, decision dated: 12-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ROSHAN ESSANI AND S. A. RABBANI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs QUALITY STEEL WORKS LIMITED and 2 others --Applicants\nVs.\nMessrs GULF COMMERCIAL BANK and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12638",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2203 = 2002 SLD 2203 = 2002 CLD 950",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)------S.9---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5---Appeal---Principle laid down by Full Bench of Lahore High Court in case titled Messrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others reported as PLD 1996 Lah. 672----Applicability---Judgment and decree was passed by the Banking Tribunal before the date rendering of the in Chenab Cement Product's case and the same was challenged through the filing of present appeal---Contention of the appellant was that the subject of the present appeal was liable to be set aside as the same was not saved by the said ---Validity---Where the appeal was filed according to the provisions of S.9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 the decree under appeal .was not saved, and did not fall within the terms past and closed cases' within the meaning and scope of the in the Messrs Chenab Cement Product's case---Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Tribunal was set aside and the suit for the recovery of Bank loan would be deemed to -be pending before the newly-constituted Banking Courts established under S.5 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah.672 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal. No.84 of 1994, decision dated: 19-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AMAN ULLAH KHAN\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12639",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2204 = 2002 SLD 2204 = 2002 CLD 953",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) Art.l99 Constitutional petition Maintainability Appre¬hensions of petitioner Petition is not maintainable on mere apprehensions.\n \nNational Re rolling Steel Mills' case 1968 SCMR 317(2) rel.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6(5) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. l99 ¬Constitutional petition Petitioners not coming to Court with clean hands Concealing of material facts Effect Ex parte and decree was passed against the petitioners by the Banking Tribunal Petitioner's application under S.6(5) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, for setting aside the ex parte and decree was dismissed by the Tribunal Petitioners without disclosing the fact of dismissal of the application, assailed the ex parte and decree before High Court in Constitutional petition ¬Validity He who seeks equity must come with clean hands Where the petitioners did not approach the High Court with clean hands by concealing the material facts, High Court declined the exercise of discretion in their favour Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nAbdul Rashid v. Pakistan and others 1969 SCMR 141; Principal, K.E.M.C., Lahore v. Ghulam Mustafa and others 1983 SCMR 196; Rana Muhammad Arshad v. Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Multan Division and others 1998 SCMR 1462 and Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner PLD 1973 SC 236 rel.\n \n(c) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S. 6(3) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. V, R.20 ¬Service through press publication Grievance of the defendants was that, they were residing in the Province of Sindh and the newspapers in which the proclamation was made did not have wide circulation in the Province ¬Validity Loan was secured by the original loanee in the Province of Punjab, the land was also situated in the Province of Punjab, therefore, the Banking Tribunal was justified to get the service effected through proclamation in the newspapers having wide circulation in the Province of Punjab Service was effective in circumstances.\n \nMst. Afzal Begum v. Y.M.C.A. PLD 1979 SC 18; Muhammad Ishaque v. Chief Administrator Auqaf PLD 1977 SC 639 and Brig. (Retd.) Mazhar ul Haq v. Messrs M.C.B. Limited PLD 1993 Lah. 706 distinguished.\n \nMessrs Ahmad Auto's case PLD 1990 SC 497 rel.\n \n(d) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S. 6(3) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. V, R.20 ¬Mode of service Provisions of O. V, R.20, C.P.C. ¬Applicability Special law excludes the general law Three modes of service having been prescribed by the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, thus excluded the provisions of General law Provisions of O.VI, R.20, C.P.C. were not applicable in circumstances.\n \nZia ur Rehman's case PLD 1973 SC 49; United Bank Ltd., Karachi v. Messrs Kashmir Corner 1988 CLC 1068 and Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Messrs Tahir Traders and 8 others PLD 1986 Kar.369 rel.\n \n(e) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6(3) Service of defendant Scope Three modes having been prescribed under the Banking laws, service by any one of the three modes including publication would constitute a good service.\n \nMessrs Ahmad Autos and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited PLD 1990 SC 497 rel.\n \n(f) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n Ss.6(5) & 9 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 ¬Constitutional petition Alternate remedy available not availed Failure to file appeal Application for setting aside ex parte decree passed against the petitioners was dismissed by the Banking Tribunal Petitioners instead of fling appeal assailed the order before High Court in Constitutional petition Validity Where the petitioners had alternate remedy to file appeal before High Court under the provisions of the Banking laws, the Constitutional petition was not maintainable Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Ismail's case PLD 1996 SC 246 rel.\n \nMessrs S.M. Ilyas & Sons Ltd. v. Monopoly Control Authority, Islamabad and another PLD 1976 Lah. 834; Fazal Bibi and others v. Abdul Haq and others 1991 CLC 291; Haji Muhammad Islam v. Muhammad Rafique and 2 others 1991 CLCL ,84; Messrs Dawood Yamaha Ltd. v. Government of Balochistan and 3 others PLD 1986 Quetta 148; Government of Sindh v. Raeesa Farooq and 5 others 1994 SCMR 1283; Messrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672; Islamia University Bahawalpur v. Dr. Muhammad Khan Malik PLD 1993 Lah. 141; Abdul Rahim and 2 others v. Messrs United Bank Ltd. PLD 1997 Kar.62; Headmaster, Government Zia ul Aloom High School, Raja Bazar, Rawalpindi and others v. Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board and others 1996 CLC 1785; Abdul Wahid v. Banking Tribunal, Bahawalpur and others 1995 MLD 1960 and Messrs Tank Steel and Re rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Dera Ismail Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 77 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 3 others Respondents",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "ZAKARIYA and 6 others ers\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12640",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2205 = 2002 SLD 2205 = 2002 CLD 962",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-----O. XXI, R. 89(1) as amended by Lahore High Court---Sale of property in execution of decree-Setting aside of-Acquiring title in the property either prior or after the auction sale Remedy Any person who acquires title in property auctioned in execution of decree prior to the auction sale, such person can make an application under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. to have such sale set aside Effect of the amendment made in O.XXI, R. 89(1), C.P.C. by Lahore High Court is that the right to have an auction sale set aside has also been conferred on those persons who are vested with an interest, in the auctioned property at the time of the making of an application under O.XXI, R. 89, C.P.C. Such interest may be acquired by an applicant even subsequent to the auction sale.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.19 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.23(1) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 89 & 90 Sale of property in execution of decree Objector acquiring title in property under sale prior to the date of auction sale Locus standi Banking Court entertained objection raised by such person ¬Validity Such purchaser of the property had locus standi to maintain objection petition either under R. 89 or R.90 of O.XXl, C.P.C. Banking Court, as such, far from being functus officio, was the competent forum having jurisdiction to decide the objection petition filed by such purchaser Purchasers of the property could maintain objection petitions to challenge the auction sale confirmed by the Banking Court in favour of the auction purchaser.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.19(i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.10 ¬Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.52 Sale of property in execution of decree Acquiring title in mortgaged property Effect Disputed property was mortgaged in favour of the Bank and decree for the sale of the same had been passed in favour of the Bank Title of the property was conveyed by the mortgagor in favour of some other person during the pendency of proceedings before the Court Contention of the Bank was that the mortgage during pendency of proceedings was illegal Validity Title in such property could have been conveyed by the mortgagor (who was the debtor in the present proceedings) during the pendency of the present proceedings Conveyance of the mortgaged property subject to the mortgage, was not prohibited by the general law.\n \nAjodheya Lal Mahaseth v. Mahanth Brij Kishore Dass AIR 1940 Pat. 615 and Banque Indosuez v. Muhammad Saleem 1987 CLC 795 ref.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S. 19(i) Sale of mortgaged property Validity Sale of a mortgaged property in violation of the terms of the mortgage and delivery of possession of mortgaged property to a purchaser, was an offence under the provisions of S. 19(i) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Such statutory provision did not declare the sale itself to be void as it merely visualized penal consequences for the mortgagor and that too where the sale made by him was contrary to the terms of the mortgage Where the sales were made by the mortgagor/ debtor in favour of the purchasers, such sales were not affected by the provisions of S.19 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S. 23(1) Sale of mortgaged property prior to promulgation of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Effect Where title in the disputed property had been acquired by the purchasers prior to the change in the substantive law brought about by the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, such sale of the disputed property in favour of the purchasers was not hit by S.23(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O. XXI, R. 89 Sale of property in execution of decree ¬Objection by a person acquiring interest in property under sale on the basis of agreement Validity Objection on the basis of O.XXI of R. 89, C.P.C. could only be made where objector had interest in the property auctioned Objector had relied merely on the investment agreement, entered into with the debtor, such agreement would not create any title or interest in the disputed property in favour of the objector Objection petition was not maintainable in circumstances.\n \n(g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.XXI, Rr. 89 & 90 Setting aside of sale of property in execution of decree Interest in the property under sale as mentioned in the provisions of O. XXI, Rr. 89 & 90, C.P.C. ¬Distinction In order to vest a person with locus standi to move an application under O.XXI, R. 89, C.P.C., a subsisting interest is required in the auctioned property Interest in the property sold is not necessarily required under O.XXI, R. 90, C.P.C. Its requirement merely is that the objector should be a person whose interests are affected by the sale ¬Difference in the language of Rr. 89 & 90 of O.XXI, C.P.C. has been judicially interpreted as being material Interest involved, referred to in O.XXI, R.90 C.P.C., need not to be an interest in the property as such but can be an interest which is otherwise adversely affected by an auction sale.\n \nNarayanan v. Pappayi AIR 1927 Mad. 783 and Dhirendra Narth Roy; v. Kamini Kumar Pal AIR 1924 Cal. 786 ref.\n \n(h) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.23(1) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.19(i) ¬ Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr. 89 & 90 Execution of decree Sale of mortgaged property ¬ Objection Interest in the mortgaged property On the basis of an agreement the objector made investment in the mortgaged property and possession of the property was handed over to the objector by the debtor/borrower Banking Court in execution of decree sold the property by auction and objection petition assailing the sale was dismissed by the Banking Court Contention of the Bank was that the objector had no locus standi to file the objection petition on the basis of mere an agreement with the debtor/borrower Validity Agreement relied upon by the objector was not a mere agreement to sell as observed by the Banking Court but was a contract which according to the objector had been materially acted upon ¬Objector had not only been put in possession of the disputed property but he had also raised construction thereon after investing a substantial sum of money at the site as a real estate developer Grievance of the objector in the present case, was that if the auction sale remained in force, his entire investment would be lost High Court with the assistance of the counsel for the parties had conservatively estimated the value of the disputed property at Rs.80,00,000 approximately and the auction sale, which the objector desired to challenge, was for a sum of Rs.12,30,000 in favour of the real brother of the ¬-debtor/borrower Objector, in the circumstances of the present case, had locus standi to maintain objection petition under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. Order passed by the Banking Court was set aside and the objection petition was remanded to the Banking Court for decision on merits High Court directed to the Banking Court to decide the matter on the basis of the State law at the time when the various parties came to be vested with substantive rights in the disputed property High Court desired that changes be made in existing laws in order to ensure protection of bona fide interests of innocent parties Property rights of the objector who was a bona fide purchaser of property for valuable consideration in the present case, had been jeopardized very easily because there were no effective means available to him to make a title search and to avoid the nightmarish consequences which the objector had faced Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Orders Nos.208 and 361 of 2001, heard on 16-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Al Haj Chaudhry MUHAMMAD BASHIR --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12641",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2206 = 2002 SLD 2206 = 2002 CLD 962",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-----O. XXI, R. 89(1) as amended by Lahore High Court---Sale of property in execution of decree-Setting aside of-Acquiring title in the property either prior or after the auction sale Remedy Any person who acquires title in property auctioned in execution of decree prior to the auction sale, such person can make an application under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. to have such sale set aside Effect of the amendment made in O.XXI, R. 89(1), C.P.C. by Lahore High Court is that the right to have an auction sale set aside has also been conferred on those persons who are vested with an interest, in the auctioned property at the time of the making of an application under O.XXI, R. 89, C.P.C. Such interest may be acquired by an applicant even subsequent to the auction sale.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.19 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.23(1) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 89 & 90 Sale of property in execution of decree Objector acquiring title in property under sale prior to the date of auction sale Locus standi Banking Court entertained objection raised by such person ¬Validity Such purchaser of the property had locus standi to maintain objection petition either under R. 89 or R.90 of O.XXl, C.P.C. Banking Court, as such, far from being functus officio, was the competent forum having jurisdiction to decide the objection petition filed by such purchaser Purchasers of the property could maintain objection petitions to challenge the auction sale confirmed by the Banking Court in favour of the auction purchaser.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.19(i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.10 ¬Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.52 Sale of property in execution of decree Acquiring title in mortgaged property Effect Disputed property was mortgaged in favour of the Bank and decree for the sale of the same had been passed in favour of the Bank Title of the property was conveyed by the mortgagor in favour of some other person during the pendency of proceedings before the Court Contention of the Bank was that the mortgage during pendency of proceedings was illegal Validity Title in such property could have been conveyed by the mortgagor (who was the debtor in the present proceedings) during the pendency of the present proceedings Conveyance of the mortgaged property subject to the mortgage, was not prohibited by the general law.\n \nAjodheya Lal Mahaseth v. Mahanth Brij Kishore Dass AIR 1940 Pat. 615 and Banque Indosuez v. Muhammad Saleem 1987 CLC 795 ref.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S. 19(i) Sale of mortgaged property Validity Sale of a mortgaged property in violation of the terms of the mortgage and delivery of possession of mortgaged property to a purchaser, was an offence under the provisions of S. 19(i) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Such statutory provision did not declare the sale itself to be void as it merely visualized penal consequences for the mortgagor and that too where the sale made by him was contrary to the terms of the mortgage Where the sales were made by the mortgagor/ debtor in favour of the purchasers, such sales were not affected by the provisions of S.19 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S. 23(1) Sale of mortgaged property prior to promulgation of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Effect Where title in the disputed property had been acquired by the purchasers prior to the change in the substantive law brought about by the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, such sale of the disputed property in favour of the purchasers was not hit by S.23(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O. XXI, R. 89 Sale of property in execution of decree ¬Objection by a person acquiring interest in property under sale on the basis of agreement Validity Objection on the basis of O.XXI of R. 89, C.P.C. could only be made where objector had interest in the property auctioned Objector had relied merely on the investment agreement, entered into with the debtor, such agreement would not create any title or interest in the disputed property in favour of the objector Objection petition was not maintainable in circumstances.\n \n(g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.XXI, Rr. 89 & 90 Setting aside of sale of property in execution of decree Interest in the property under sale as mentioned in the provisions of O. XXI, Rr. 89 & 90, C.P.C. ¬Distinction In order to vest a person with locus standi to move an application under O.XXI, R. 89, C.P.C., a subsisting interest is required in the auctioned property Interest in the property sold is not necessarily required under O.XXI, R. 90, C.P.C. Its requirement merely is that the objector should be a person whose interests are affected by the sale ¬Difference in the language of Rr. 89 & 90 of O.XXI, C.P.C. has been judicially interpreted as being material Interest involved, referred to in O.XXI, R.90 C.P.C., need not to be an interest in the property as such but can be an interest which is otherwise adversely affected by an auction sale.\n \nNarayanan v. Pappayi AIR 1927 Mad. 783 and Dhirendra Narth Roy; v. Kamini Kumar Pal AIR 1924 Cal. 786 ref.\n \n(h) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.23(1) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.19(i) ¬ Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr. 89 & 90 Execution of decree Sale of mortgaged property ¬ Objection Interest in the mortgaged property On the basis of an agreement the objector made investment in the mortgaged property and possession of the property was handed over to the objector by the debtor/borrower Banking Court in execution of decree sold the property by auction and objection petition assailing the sale was dismissed by the Banking Court Contention of the Bank was that the objector had no locus standi to file the objection petition on the basis of mere an agreement with the debtor/borrower Validity Agreement relied upon by the objector was not a mere agreement to sell as observed by the Banking Court but was a contract which according to the objector had been materially acted upon ¬Objector had not only been put in possession of the disputed property but he had also raised construction thereon after investing a substantial sum of money at the site as a real estate developer Grievance of the objector in the present case, was that if the auction sale remained in force, his entire investment would be lost High Court with the assistance of the counsel for the parties had conservatively estimated the value of the disputed property at Rs.80,00,000 approximately and the auction sale, which the objector desired to challenge, was for a sum of Rs.12,30,000 in favour of the real brother of the ¬-debtor/borrower Objector, in the circumstances of the present case, had locus standi to maintain objection petition under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. Order passed by the Banking Court was set aside and the objection petition was remanded to the Banking Court for decision on merits High Court directed to the Banking Court to decide the matter on the basis of the State law at the time when the various parties came to be vested with substantive rights in the disputed property High Court desired that changes be made in existing laws in order to ensure protection of bona fide interests of innocent parties Property rights of the objector who was a bona fide purchaser of property for valuable consideration in the present case, had been jeopardized very easily because there were no effective means available to him to make a title search and to avoid the nightmarish consequences which the objector had faced Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Orders Nos.208 and 361 of 2001, heard on 16-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Al Haj Chaudhry MUHAMMAD BASHIR --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12642",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2207 = 2002 SLD 2207 = 2002 CLD 983",
    "Key Words:": "Modaraba Companies and Modarabas (Floatation and Control) Ordinance (XXXI of 1980) S. 30 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.10 Recovery of Musharka facilities Leave to appear and defend the suit ¬Conditional order Bona fide dispute Financial institution admitted that the entire principal amount had been paid by the borrower besides another sum of Rs.1 million deposited by the borrower Contention of the borrower was that the Banking Court had not taken into account the agreements between the parties whereby the financial institution was to share the loss in the business Validity Contention of the borrower did constitute substantial question to be resolved by the Banking Court High Court granted leave to defend the suit with the condition of depositing Rs.3 million within one month of the passing of the order High Court directed that in case of failure to deposit the amount, the leave granting order would be recalled Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.415 of 1998, heard on 8-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND PERVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs HOTEL KASHMIR PALACE (PVT.) LIMITED through Major (Retd.) Javed ul Hassan and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nMessrs FIRST ELITE CAPITAL MODARABA --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12643",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2208 = 2002 SLD 2208 = 2002 CLD 986",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S. 10 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.10(12) Application for leave to appear and defend Failure to file application under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Suit for recovery of Bank loan was filed against the defendants who filed application for leave to appear and defend the suit under S.10 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 After filing of the application Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was promulgated and the defendants did not file new application under the said law Banking Court without considering the contents of the application already filed by the defendants decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff Validity Banking Court should have considered the contents of the earlier application and only if the Court had come to the conclusion that the same did not comply with the provisions of S.10(12) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, only then the Court could have dismissed the same Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded for decision afresh in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 115 of 2002, decision dated: 10-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "CHAUDHRY SPRAY CENTRE through Sole Proprietor Ch. Saifullah and 5 others --Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through Attorney/ Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12644",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2209 = 2002 SLD 2209 = 2002 CLD 988",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 10, 15 & 21 Suit for recovery of loan amount by Bank Some defendants filed application for leave to defend the suit raising a plea that their property was not mortgaged, while other defendants being real beneficiaries did not file any such application Banking Court decreed the suit Validity Mortgage of property in question in favour of Bank was duly supported by documents -Application for leave to defend did not contain any document to show that property had not been mortgaged with Bank Real beneficiaries had not filed any application for leave to defend the suit, thus, Banking Court had no option except to .pass decree against beneficiaries as per law laid down by Supreme Court in case of Messrs Ahmad Autos (PLD 1990 SC 497) No illegality or infirmity was found in impugned and decree Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMessrs Ahmad Autos v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 497 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XY of 1997) \n \n S. 21(1) Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5 Appeal ¬Limitation Delay, condonation of Appellants alongwith appeal filed an application for condonation of delay contending that after filing application for leave to defend the suit, they were under the impression that their names had been struck off from the arena of defendants by Banking Court; and they came to know about the decree after receiving notice from Executing Court Validity ¬Decree was passed on 3 10 2000, whereas application for obtaining its certified copy was filed on 2 4 2001, when the same had already become time barred ¬Appellants had pursued the case throughout before Banking Court, thus, it was their duty and obligation to explain the delay of each day Appeal was dismissed being time¬-barred.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.248 of 2001, decision dated: 13-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BUKHARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHAHBAZ through Legal Heirs and 5 others --Appellants\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through its Attorney and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12645",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2210 = 2002 SLD 2210 = 2002 CLD 991",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) Art. 199 Constitutional petition Interlocutory orders Maintainability Interlocutory orders are not amenable to Constitutional jurisdiction, thus, Constitutional petitions against such orders cannot be entertained.\n \nBashir Ahmad v. Province of Punjab and others 1988 CLC 196.5; Malik Abbas Raza v. Government of Balochistan and others PLD 1968 Lah.163; Ghulam Hussain and another v. Malik Shahbaz Khan and another 1985 SCMR 1923; Muhammad Siddique Qazi v. Muhammad Ibrahim and another 1987 MLD 265 and Ghulam Muhammad and others v. Munir Ahmad Shah and others 1994 CLC 14 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art.l99 Interlocutory order Constitutional jurisdiction Scope High Court would not interfere in interlocutory order, where the same was neither passed in excess of jurisdiction nor suffering from want of jurisdiction.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. 199 Constitutional jurisdiction Scope Exercise of discretionary powers High Court would be reluctant in interfering with orders passed by subordinate Court in exercise of its discretionary powers.\n \nMian Rafique Saigol and another v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. and another PLD 1996 SC 749 and Sh. Muhammad Ramzan v. Special Judge, Banking Court 1986 MLD 614 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss. 10, 13 & 21 Framing issues at the time of granting leave to defend the suit Duty of Banking Court Banking Court, after granting leave to defend and treating leave application as written statement, directed the parties to file proposed issues on adjourned date of hearing Validity ¬Such course was contrary to provisions of S.10(10) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which had enjoined upon Banking Court to frame issues in its order granting leave Adjourning suit to a future date for framing of issues was against the intent of law High Court directed Banking Court to strictly comply with provisions of S.13 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and decide the suit within stipulated period of 90 days, even though it had to undertake day today proceedings.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss. 10, 13 & 22(6) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S. 10 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional petition by Bank challenging order of Banking Court granting leave to respondents/ borrowers to defend the suit Maintainability Legislature in its own wisdom had made the order granting or rejecting an application for leave to defend the suit as non appealable by virtue of S.22(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Allowing Constitutional petitions to be filed against such orders and that, too by financial institutions would tantamount to defeat the legislative intent and negate the provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 having been promulgated for speedy disposal of cases relating to financial institutions and recovery of public money illegally withheld by some unscrupulous customers If the suit pending before Banking Court was finally decided against petitioner Bank, then the same would have a right of appeal under S.22(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, wherein all the grounds raised in the Constitutional petition would be available to Bank before appellate forum as impugned order would merge into final order and could be assailed before Appellate Court Impugned order had neither been passed in excess of jurisdiction nor was suffering from want of jurisdiction nor exercise of discretion by Banking Court in passing the same was not shown to be arbitrary, fanciful or against the recognized principles of law Leave to defend the suit had been granted to respondents on 31 1 2002, thus, Banking Court had to dispose of the suit on or before 30 4 2002, as per force of S.13 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 If Constitutional petition against such interlocutory order was allowed to be entertained, then the same would set at naught said provisions High Court dismissed the Constitutional petition being incompetent and not maintainable.\n \nWrit Petition No.791 of 1999; Syed Saghir Ahmad Naqvi v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, S&GAD, Karachi and another 1996 SCMR 1165; Muhammad Iftikhar Mohmand v. Javed Muhammad and 3 others 1998 SCMR 328; Ms. Afshan Ahmad v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited and another 2002 CLD 137; Shaikh Gulzar Ali & Co. Ltd. and others v. Special Judge, Special Court of Banking and another 1991 SCMR 590; Crescent Factories Vegetable Ghee Mills and 5 others v. National Bank of Pakistan, District Courts Branch, Sahiwal and another PLD 1985 Lah. 150; Messrs Salman Mehmood Cotton Ginners, Kabirwala and 2 others v. Special Judge, Banking (II) and another PLD 1982 Lah. 353; Messrs Narumal Jetomal and 2 others v. Judge of the Special Court of Sindh and another 1983 CLC 2695; Khokhar Engineering Company and 2 others v. Habib Bank Limited 1986 MLD 2941 and Syed Ali Azhar Naqvi v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 3 others PLD 1994 Kar.67 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3826 of 2002, decision dated: 11-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Chief Manager and Principal Officer er\nVs."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12646",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2211 = 2002 SLD 2211 = 2002 CLD 1001",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss. 6 & 9 Suit for recovery of finance by Bank ¬Liquidated damages, entitlement to Banking Tribunal while decreeing the suit refused to award liquidated damages to Bank Validity Liquidated damages could not be granted by Banking Tribunal as per reasons given in Allied Bank's case reported as 2001 MLD 1955 High Court dismissed the appeal having no merits.\n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd., Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos. 106, 221, 266, 267, 194 and 201 of 1992 and 267 and 266 of 1993, heard on 12-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Attorney --Appellant\nVs.\nHaji FAQIR MUHAMMAD and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12647",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2212 = 2002 SLD 2212 = 2002 CLD 1002",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.10, 15 & 21 Suit for recovery of loan by Bank ¬Banking Court decreed the suit against all defendants by observing that appellant defendant had not filed any application for leave to defend the suit Validity High Court after examining the original record found that appellant defendant had in fact filed such application, which was lying on record of Banking Court Appellant¬-defendant was, thus, entitled to be heard on such application High Court accepted the appeal and set aside the impugned and decree to the extent of appellant defendant only with directions to Banking Court to decide said application within specified period after hearing the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.617 of 2001, heard on 26-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": ", JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SAMINA RIAZ --Appellant\nVs.\nPLATINUM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12648",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2213 = 2002 SLD 2213 = 2002 CLD 1002",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.10, 15 & 21 Suit for recovery of loan by Bank ¬Banking Court decreed the suit against all defendants by observing that appellant defendant had not filed any application for leave to defend the suit Validity High Court after examining the original record found that appellant defendant had in fact filed such application, which was lying on record of Banking Court Appellant¬-defendant was, thus, entitled to be heard on such application High Court accepted the appeal and set aside the impugned and decree to the extent of appellant defendant only with directions to Banking Court to decide said application within specified period after hearing the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.617 of 2001, heard on 26-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": ", JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SAMINA RIAZ --Appellant\nVs.\nPLATINUM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12649",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2214 = 2002 SLD 2214 = 2002 CLD 1010",
    "Key Words:": "Punjab Finance Act (XV of 1977) S.3 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.199 & 70(4) & Fourth Sched., Part 1, Item No.48 Constitutional petition ¬Professional tax Imposition of tax on corporations by Provincial Government under S.3 of Punjab Finance Act, 1977 Contention of the petitioner was that by virtue of Item No.48 in the Federal Legislative List in Fourth Sched. to the Constitution, it was only the Federal Government which could impose the professional tax Validity Levy of professional tax by a Province or by local authority on a corporation was constitutionally not permissible Levy of professional tax by the Provincial Government was set aside Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.20840 of 2001, heard on 27-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J",
    "": "Messrs PAKISTAN TELECOMMUNICATION COMPANY LTD. through General Manager (South) er\nVs.\nGOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB through Secretary, Excise and Taxation, Lahore High Court and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12650",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2215 = 2002 SLD 2215 = 2002 CLD 1018",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss. 2(c)(e) & 6 Modaraba Companies and Modaraba (Floatation and Control) Ordinance (XXXI of 1980), Ss.2(a) (b)(c) & 24 Suit for recovery of money was filed by Bank before Banking Tribunal Plaintiffs case was that it negotiated the export bills of defendant company from time to time, credited the value of respective export bills into account of defendant maintained with Bank and the amounts were then withdrawn by defendants from said account as reflected in the statement of accounts ¬Defendant company objected to jurisdiction of Banking Tribunal for not being a Modaraba Tribunal as envisaged by law Validity Jurisdiction of Banking Tribunal would extend in cases, where claim was to be filed by \"\"Holder of Modaraba Certificate\"\" against the \"\"Modaraba Company' or by a \"\"Modaraba Company\"\" against any \"\"other party with whom it had entered into business\"\" Nature of transaction undertaken by the parties to suit had to be seen for determining the question of jurisdiction of Modaraba Tribunal Transaction undertaken by the parties was neither a \"\"Modaraba Business\"\" nor plaintiff was holder of \"\"Modaraba Certificate\"\" nor same was \"\"Modaraba Company\"\" Plaintiffs case fell within the definitions of finance\"\" as given in S.2(e) and \"\"customer\"\" as given in S.2(c) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, thus, the same did not fall within the jurisdiction of Modaraba Tribunal.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S. 9 Suit for recovery of finance by Bank Liquidated damages, entitlement to Bank would not be entitled to recover the amount of liquidated damages as per principle laid down in the passed in Allied Bank's case reported as 2001 MLD 1955.\n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 fol.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.3(2), 10 & 29 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.10 ¬Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), S.6 Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4 Amended application for leave to defend under S.10, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, non-¬filing of Effect Defendants' reply to show cause notice issued to them by Banking Tribunal under S.6(2) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, was treated as an application for leave to defend the suit after promulgation of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans. Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Defendants after coming into force of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, did not file amended application for leave to defend within 21 days allowed by Banking Court, but relied upon their reply to show cause notice submitted before Banking Tribunal Validity Words \"\"an amended application for leave to defend\"\" and \"\"in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance\"\" as used in S.10(12), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, were of great significance requiring that when an application for leave to defend was already pending at the time of coming into force of said Ordinance, the defendants would be allowed a period of 21 days for filing amended application for leave to defend thereby sufficiently complying with provisions of S.10(3)(4) & (5) of the Ordinance Defendants in the present case had not filed amended application for leave to defend, thus, there was neither any compliance of provisions of S.10(3)(4) & (5) of the Ordinance, nor they had shown sufficient cause for their inability to do so Provisions of S.10(12) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, were mandatory in nature as non-compliance thereof entailed penal consequences ¬Application for leave to defend was rejected as per provisions of S.10(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Since defendants had no defence the allegations made in the plaint would be deemed to have been admitted Banking Court was, thus, obliged to pass and decree in favour of plaintiff Bank under S.10(11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Defendants had not specifically denied the photo copies of documents produced by Bank alongwith the plaint, meaning thereby that execution of all such documents would be deemed to be admitted by them ¬Statement of accounts was duly, verified/ certified under Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, to which presumption of correctness was attached and there was a rebuttal on record thereof Defendants had failed to raise substantial question of law and facts to be tried by Court after recording of evidence High Court decreed the suit with cost of funds and the Bank was also declared entitled to the costs to be determined under S.3(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance. 2001.\n \n(d) Interpretation of statutes \n \n Mandatory or directory provisions Distinction Nature, determination of Principle Provision of law couched with penal consequences would be considered mandatory, but provision of law not entailing penal consequences to its non¬compliance would be taken as directory.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit NA.38 of 1998, heard on 14-12-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Plaintiff\nVs.\nFIRST TAWAKAL MODARABA through Tawakkal Management (Pvt.) Ltd. and 5 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12651",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2216 = 2002 SLD 2216 = 2002 CLD 1045",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9, 10 & 12 High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol. V, Chap. 3, R.8 Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.) Ex parte decree, setting aside of Sufficient cause Banking Court on 18 8 2000 dismissed defendants' application under S.10, Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) for non prosecution and decreed the suit on 19 2 2001 Defendants sought setting aside of ex pane decree and restoration of application on the ground that both defendants and their counsel, who were stationed at Rawalpindi and Islamabad respectively, had not received intimation for hearing of application on 18 8 2000 or 19 I 2001 and that earlier only intimation notices regarding hearing had been issued Validity ¬Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.) were silent about intimation notice to a party or counsel stationed out of Karachi Rule 8 of High. Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol. V applicable on appellate side provided intimation of pacca date fixed in a case to be sent by registered post (A.D.) to such parties or their counsel not ordinarily resident of Karachi Such practice had been followed constantly on original side of High Court Intimation notice in the present case to defendants' counsel had been issued for those hearing when matter was not adjourned to a fixed date Court had not fixed 18 8 2000 for hearing the cause No intimation notice had been issued to defendants or their counsel, when the matter was fixed for final hearing on 19 1 2001 Non¬appearance of counsel was due to non issuance of intimation notice of hearing, which was 'sufficient cause\"\" for setting aside an ex parte decree Defendant had gained knowledge of ex pane decree on 21 3 2001, when Bank staff visited their project at Karachi Application made on 26 3 2001 was within time ¬High Court set aside ex parte decree subject to security.\n \n(b) Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.) \n \n R.74 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss. 9, 10 & 12 ¬Defendants in interlocutory application made two prayers for setting aside of ex parte decree and restoration of application filed under S.10 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Validity Rule 74 of Sindh High Court Rules (O.S.,) provided that interlocutory application would contain only one prayer or one series of alternative prayers of the same kind Application contained two prayers, which were contrary to R.74 of Sindh High Court Rules (O.S.) High Court allowed defendants to elect one of the prayers made therein, whereupon they opted for setting aside the ex parte decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1445 of 1999 and Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246 and 2247 of 2001, heard on 11-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED er\nVs.\nMessrs A.I. BROTHERS (PVT.) LIMITED and 5 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12652",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2217 = 2002 SLD 2217 = 2002 CLD 1090",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.18 Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), Ss.41 & 58(f) Execution of decree Objection Purchase of mortgaged property Failure to secure the original documents from the vendor Protection of S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Applicability Suit was decreed by the Banking Court in favour of Bank and the suit property was the subject matter of execution proceedings ¬Objector raised the plea of being bona fide purchaser for consideration from the ostensible owner Objection was disallowed by the Executing Court Validity Mortgage of immovable property being a charge against property, would go with the same even if property in question had been alienated Objector in the present case, had purchased the property in question without securing the original documents from the original owners, as such the objector was not bona fide purchaser as he had a duty to took into the registered deeds Where the objector had not made any inquiry to find out from the Sub Registrar with regard to charge of the Bank over the property in the absence of having made any inquiry and looked upon S. 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the objector's interest could not be held to be bona fide or protected High Court did not find any infirmity or illegality in the order of the Executing Court and, therefore, the same was upheld Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMaulana Riaz ul Hassan v. Muhammad Ayub Khan and another 1991 SCMR 2513 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.18(6) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 41 ¬Execution of decree Investigation of claim Transfer by ostensible owner Benefit of S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Scope Principle contained in S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is an equitable principle and cannot be availed of by a person who has come to the Court with unclean hands Vendee had purchased the property in question from the original owners collusively to frustrate the rights of the Bank (mortgagee) principle of bona fide purchaser was not attracted in circumstances.\n \nIqbal Sultan v. Chand Sultan and others 1990 CLC 366: Mst. Amina Bibi and others v. Sadiq Ali and others 1994 MLD 2430 and Mst. Noor un Nisa's case 1994 SCMR 2087 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.18(6) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), Ss.41 & 58 Execution of decree Investigation of claim Purchase of mortgaged property Bona fide purchaser for consideration Remedy Appellant had purchased the suit property from the original owner whereas the property was already mortgaged with the Bank Effect Appellant had alternative remedy to file a suit against the original owners and had no remedy against the Bank in circumstances of the case.\n \nMuhammad Ibrahim v. Secretary, Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1993 Kar.478 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.90 of 2001, decision dated: 3rd April, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BUKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Major MUHAMMAD TARIQ --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK HOUSING FINANCE COMPANY LTD. through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12653",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2218 = 2002 SLD 2218 = 2002 CLD 1095",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, R.2(B) Loan instalments Failure to clear the instalment in due time Loan facility was advanced to the plaintiff on the basis of letter of credit Four installments were paid to the plaintiff in due time whereas the fifth instalment was withheld by the Bank on the plea of issuance of interim injunction by the Banking Court Contention of the plaintiff was that in view of the provision of O.XXXIX. R.2(B), C.P.C. the interim injunction issued by the Court had lapsed after six months, therefore the Bank should have made the payment of fifth instalment after six months Validity ¬Bank as such ought to have made payment of the fifth instalment immediately after six months without any demand being made by the plaintiff Bank could only have withheld payment of the fifth instalment prior to the six months High Court directed the Bank to pay fifth instalment with 1096 interest thereon Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nHaral Textiles Mills Limited v. Banque Indosuez Belgium S.A. and others 1999 SCMR 591 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos. 156 of 2002 and 767 of 2001, decision dated: 18-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs HABIB BANK LIMITED through Chief Manager and another --Appellants\nVs.\nMessrs HEBEI MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT IMPORT/EXPORT CORPORATION through Attorney and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12654",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2219 = 2002 SLD 2219 = 2002 CLD 1097",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872) S. 74 Banking, Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), S.11(4) Liquidated damages, recovery of Suit for recovery of Bank loan included liquidated damages Validity Claim of liquidated damages not being entertainable was declined.\n \n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd.. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n Ss. 6(2) & 9 High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol.I, Chap. 16 B, Rr.18 & 19 Counsel fee, award of Grievance of the plaintiff was that the Banking Tribunal at the time of passing the decree in its favour did not include fee of the counsel in the decretal amount Validity Matter of omission of grant of counsel fee pertained to the costs For the purposes of assessment of costs with reference to counsel fee, a certificate had to be filed by the counsel for the plaintiff or for that matter of the defendant No such certificate was filed in the present case even the amount which was being claimed to be awarded was neither mentioned in the plaint nor in the memorandum of appeal ¬Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.215 of 1992, heard on 13-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND PERVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs ASGHAR ENTERPRISES and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12655",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2220 = 2002 SLD 2220 = 2002 CLD 1099",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) ¬ Ss. 6(2) & 11(4) Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.74 Liquidated damages, recovery of Suit for recovery of Bank loan included liquidated damages Banking Tribunal decreed the suit in favour of the Bank but declined to include liquidated damages in the decree Validity Claim of liquidated damages was not entertainable High Court declined to interfere with the and decree passed by the Banking Tribunal in view of Allied Bank of Pakistan v. Aisha Garments reported as 2001 MLD 1955.\n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd., Faisalabad v. Aisha Garments 2001 MLD 1955 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.75 of 1994, heard on 27-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs MUSLIM CORPORATION, OKARA through Managing Partner and 5 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12656",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2221 = 2002 SLD 2221 = 2002 CLD 1101",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 15 & 21 Recovery of Bank loan Decree passed in favour of Bank did not include costs Validity Banking Court had chosen not to award costs in the decree High Court declined to allow the same.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.767 of 2001 and 156 of 2002, decision dated: 18-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs HABIB BANK LIMITED through its Chief Manager and others --Appellants\nVs.\nMessrs HEBEI MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT IMPORT/EXPORT CORPORATION through their Attorney --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12657",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2222 = 2002 SLD 2222 = 2002 CLD 1102",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.12 Ex parte decree, setting aside of Service to defendant not denied Defendant was served personally as well as through citation in newspaper Suit was decreed ex parte by the Banking Court due to non appearance of the defendant Application under. S.12 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, to set aside the ex parte decree was dismissed by the Banking Court Validity Where the defendant was served through personal service and served through citation as well, the Banking Court was justified in remarking that personal service having not been denied in the petition the petitioner could not approach that Court' under S.12 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans. Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997.\n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Tradewell (Pakistan) Corporation and 2 others 1991 CLC 1243; Haji Ali Khan & Company, Abbottabad and 8 others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Abbottabad PLD 1995 SC 362; Maj. Pervez Shakoor and 4 others v. Muhammad Usman 1991 MLD 536; Nazam Din and others v. Jalal Din and others 1992 MLD 510; Hassan Din and another v. Jalal Din and 2 others 1991 CLC 33; Lt. Col. Mohsin Shah v. Mst. Qaseema Wahid and others 1995 MLD 1032; (Col. Retd.) Ashfaq Ahmed and others v. Sheikh Muhammad Wasim 1999 SCMR 2832; Abdul Ghafoor v. Executive Engineer, Rasool Division and 2 others PLD 1988 Lah.180 and Province of the Punjab through Board of Revenue, Lahore and 2 others v. Muhammad Hussain and 4 others 1988 CLC 514 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.408 of 2001, decision dated: 21st March, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASEEM SIKANDAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "RAHEEL IKHLAS --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs CITIBANK N.A. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12658",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2223 = 2002 SLD 2223 = 2002 CLD 1105",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order (1 of 1983) Arts.9 & 10(3) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. l99 Constitutional petition Complaint before Wafaqi Mohtasib Limitation Complainant, after availing loan facility from the Bank, suffered loss due to flood in September, 1988 Complainant on 3 11 1991 filed complaint before Wafaqi Mohtasib for direction to the Bank to make good the losses suffered by him on account of food, over which Wafaqi Mohtasib made certain recommendations to the Bank Contention of Bank was that complaint was grossly time barred Validity Complaint under Art. 10(3) of Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, could be filed within three months from the day on which aggrieved person first had notice of the matter alleged in complaint Complainant's factory was hit by flood in the year 1988, but he had neither approached any forum nor filed complaint before Wafaqi Mohtasib within prescribed period Only exception to bar of. limitation was contained in last portion of Art. 10(3) of Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 Complaint filed after three years was clearly time barred, which could not be entertained by Wafaqi Mohtasib, particularly when no \"\"special circumstances\"\" for entertaining the same after period of limitation had been mentioned in the impugned order Essential ingredients for entertaining complaint after period of limitation were clearly absent from the impugned order, 'thus, same having been passed in excess of jurisdiction conferred upon Wafaqi Mohtasib could be interfered with in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction by the High Court High Court accepted Constitutional petition and set aside the impugned order.\n \n(b) Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order (I of 1983) \n \n Art.9(1)(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 ¬Constitutional petition Decision of complaint by Wafaqi Mohtasib during pendency of suit between the parties ¬Validity Wafaqi Mohtasib had decided complaint in January, 1993; whereas Bank had filed suit against complainant in September, 1992 Subject matter of complaint was, thus, sub judice before Court of competent jurisdiction at the time, when Wafaqi Mohtasib had investigated and/or inquired into the matter Wafaqi Mohtasib would have no jurisdiction as per Art.9(1)(a) of Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, to investigate or inquire into the matter being sub judice before a Court of competent jurisdiction Wafaqi Mohtasib had no jurisdiction to embark upon enquiry into the dispute between parties as highlighted in the complaint Impugned order having been passed in excess of jurisdiction conferred upon Wafaqi Mohtasib, could be interfered with in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction High Court accepted Constitutional petition and set aside impugned order.\n \n(c) Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order (I of 1983) \n \n Arts.9 & 11 (l)(a) to (g) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional petition Complaint before Wafaqi Mohtasib Complainant, after availing loan facility from the Bank suffered loss due to flood in September, 1988 ¬Mortgaged property was insured, thus, he approached the Bank for filing claim against Insurance Company for recovery of his losses, but in vain Complainant filed complaint before Wafaqi Mohtasib for giving direction to the Bank to make good the losses suffered by him on account of flood, over which Bank was directed not to charge interest on loan, extend additional finance facility to complainant and prepare afresh schedule of repayment of loan allowing reasonable time to complainant to discharge his liabilities ¬Contention of Bank was that said recommendations were outside the purview of Art.11(1) of Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 Validity Article 11 of Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 provided that where matter considered in opinion of Wafaqi Mohtasib amounted to maladministration, then he would communicate his findings to concerned Agency as provided under cls. (a) to (g) thereof Impugned recommendations were not such, which could be made by Wafaqi Mohtasib under Art. 11(1) of Order, 1983 Impugned order having been passed in excess of jurisdiction conferred upon Wafaqi Mohtasib, was not sustainable under law, which could be interfered with in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction High Court accepted Constitutional petition and set aside impugned order in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 13515 of 1996, heard on 18-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED er\nVs.\nWAFAQI MOHTASIB (OMBUDSMAN) REGIONAL OFFICE, Lahore High Court and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12659",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2224 = 2002 SLD 2224 = 2002 CLD 1143",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.12 & 21 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) ¬Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XIII, R.1 Petitions for leave to appeal barred by 425 days Condonation Banking Court on 7 4 2000 dismissed petitioners' applications for setting aside ex parte decree and their appeals were also dismissed on 19 10 2000 Petitioners alongwith petitions for leave to appeal filed applications for condonation of delay contending that criminal proceedings in respect of documents allegedly executed by them as guarantors, were pending against respondent loanee and a Bank officer, who were granted bail against cash security of Rs.2,50,000 each, which they deposited and was adjusted by said Court against loan on 30 7 2001, therefore, petitioners felt satisfied that decretal amount had, already been paid to Bank and there was no need to file appeal Validity Impugned was passed on 19 10 2000, whereas in criminal case was passed on 30 7 2001, which too was set aside by High Court, thus, said ground could not be held to be sufficient No explanation was given as to why petitioners against whom ex parte decree had been passed and their applications for setting aside the same had been dismissed, had not approached Supreme Court within period of limitation Applications for condonation of delay were dismissed, resultantly main petitions were also dismissed as barred by time and leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 595 /L and 601 L of 2002, decision dated: 28-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHEIKH, TANVIR AHMED KHAN AND FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, JJ",
    "": "AMJAD ALI and another ers\nVs.\nMessrs M.C.B. and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12660",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2225 = 2002 SLD 2225 = 2002 CLD 1146",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) S.254(3)(d) Companies (General Provisions and Forms) Rules, 1985, Rr.4(2) & 25 Securitiesand Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33 Appeal to Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission ¬ Auditor was alleged to be indebted to the company ¬Executive Director (Specialized Companies Division) of the Commission on such allegation issued show cause notice to the auditor in capacity of statutory auditor of company ¬Auditor in reply denied his involvement in any trading business indebtedness with the company and requested that he be allowed to present his case through authorized representative Executive Director insisted on personal appearance of the auditor (appellant) but on his failure in appearing so, passed ex parte order imposing fine, on him Auditor regarding his non appearance on date of hearing before Executive Director submitted that he had to proceed to U.S.A. on account of operation of his son and information of said exigency was duly notified to the Specialized Companies Division of the Commission Auditor's contention was that despite his said request, insistence of Executive Director on his personal appearance was not legally justified Validity Executive Director had erred in insisting upon personal appearance of according to R.125 read in proceedings for an alleged offence, with R.4(2) of the Companies. (General Provisions and Forms) Rules, 1985, could appear before the Commission through an Advocate, a practising member of Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan and a practising member of Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Pakistan ¬Auditor (appellant) had not been provided sufficient opportunity to present his case and impugned order had been passed in haste Appellate Bench of the Security Exchange Commission set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to Executive Director (SC) for its decision after providing proper opportunity of hearing to auditor/appellant through an authorized representative, if he so desired.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n S.254(3)(d) Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33 S.R.O. No. 183(1)/2001, dated 20 3 2001 S.R.O. No. 862(1)/2000, dated 6 12 2000 Appeal to Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission Defaults under S.254 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 Powers of Executive Director (Specialized Companies Division) of the Securities and Exchange Commission to take cognizance of such offence Scope ¬Notification S.R.O. No. 862(1)/2000, dated 6 12 2000, whereby cognizance of defaults and offences committed under statutory provisions was to be taken by Commissioner concerned had been amended through S.R.O. No.183(1)/2001, dated 20 3 2001 and as per S.2(i) thereof, Executive Director (SC) had been delegated powers of the Commission to exercise all adjudicatory powers under relevant laws and to take cognizance of the offences as such Executive Director (SC) was fully empowered to take cognizance of defaults under S.254 of Companies Ordinance, 1984.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No. 16 of 2001, decision dated: 16-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "M. ZAFAR UL HAQ HYAZI, COMMISSIONER (CL) AND SHAHID GHAFFAR, COMMISSIONER (SM)",
    "": "Messrs BILWANI & CO. CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS --Appellant\nVs."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12661",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2226 = 2002 SLD 2226 = 2002 CLD 1170",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.10(3)(4)(5)(11) & (12) Leave to defend suit Failure to file amended application Effect Defendant having not complied with the requirements of S.10(3)(4)(5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, failed to file amended application in accordance with the provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and no application under S.10(12) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for leave to defend was presumed to be pending Suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff in circumstances.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes \n \n Penalty clause in a statute Effect When a provision of law is couched with the penal consequences then such provision of law is considered as a mandatory provision of law and where no penal consequences entail to the non¬compliance of a provision of law, in that case such provision of law is taken as directory.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.10(6) & 10(12) Penal consequences for non filing of application for leave to defend Provisions of S.10(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 are mandatory in nature Non compliance of S.10(12) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance. 2001, entails penal consequences as provided under S.10(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) ordinance, 2001.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finance, Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.9 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.II. R.3 Joinder of causes of actions Suit for recovery of two Bank loans¬--Maintainability Two financial facilities were granted in favour of the borrower by the financial institution, parties were same and the interest was joint, such causes of action could be amalgamated in one suit No illegality was committed by the financial institution by combining two causes of actions in one suit Suit was maintainable in circumstances.\n \nThe Directorate of Industries and Mineral Development Government of the Punjab through Director Lahore and 3 others v. Messrs Masood Auto Stores through Masood Ahmad Malik, Partner, Lahore PLD 1991 Lah.174 ref.\n \n(e) Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) \n \n S.17 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.9 Suits for recovery of Bank loan Multifarious suits Court fees, fixation of Scope Suits which embraces two or more distinct causes of action and when a suit is filed combining multifarious causes of action, then each claim on the basis of causes of action is to be valued separately and requisite court fee is to be paid on the suit under the provisions of S.17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870.\n \nThe Directorate of Industries and Mineral Development Government of the Punjab through Director. Lahore and 3 others v. Messrs Masood Auto Stores through Masood Ahmad Malik, Partner, Lahore PLD 1991 Lah. 174 ref.\n \n(f) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.9 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.9 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Liquidated damages Recovery Such damages are not recoverable in view of principle laid down in case titled Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd., Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments Ltd. reported as 2001 MLD 1955 Liquidated damages were not granted in circumstances.\n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd., Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 rel.\n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.9 & 10 Banker's Book Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.2(8) Suit for recovery of Bank loan Application for leave to defend rejection of Photo copies of documents produced by the plaintiff were not denied by defendants in their application for leave to defend Plaintiff in statement of account had claimed nothing but the repurchase price that too in accordance with the agreements for finances and the statements of accounts and duly verified/certified under the Banker's Books Evidence Act, 1891 Effect As the execution of the documents were not denied, the same were deemed to be admitted by the defendants Presumption of correctness was attached to the statements of accounts and as the application for leave to defend was dismissed and there was no evidence in rebuttal of the documents on record, the suit was decreed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 45 of 1998, heard on 21st December, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "SAUDI PAK INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT COMPANY (PVT.) LIMITED, Islamabad High Court High Court --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMOHIB TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED Lahore High Court and 3 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12662",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2227 = 2002 SLD 2227 = 2002 CLD 1205",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9 & 15 Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.420/468/471/109 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.185(3) & 199 Constitutional petition before High Court Execution of ex parte decree for recovery of Bank loan from petitioners (guarantors) and respondents (borrowers) Adjustment of amount of bail bonds against decretal loan amount ¬Petitioners registered a criminal case against respondents for having fraudulently used their title documents for obtaining loan and showing them as guarantors Criminal Court while granting bail to respondents on furnishing bail bonds ordered the adjustment of amount of bail bonds against decretal amount High Court declared such order to be without lawful authority in Constitutional petitions filed by respondents Validity Till recording of a finding by Criminal Court after trial that petitioners were guilty of the offence, the amount of bail bonds provided by them could neither be confiscated nor utilized against amount of loan, which could be recovered in execution proceedings by Bank against all debtors or any of them Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and refused to grant leave to appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos.462 L and 466 L of 2002, decision dated: 13-02-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHEIKH. ACTG. C.J. AND FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J",
    "": "Haji MUHAMMAD ASHIQ er\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD AJMAL QURESHI and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12663",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2228 = 2002 SLD 2228 = 2002 CLD 1207",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Chartered Accountants Ordinance (X of 1961) Ss.20D, 20C, 20B, 20A. 27 & Sched. II, Part 1, CI. (7) ¬Chartered Accountants Bye laws. 1961. Chap. X Scope and application of Ss. 20D, 20C, 20B, 20A. 27 & Sched. II, Part 1. Cl.(7) of the Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 and Chap. X of the Chartered Accountants Bye laws 1961 Professional misconduct by member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants Enquiry by Investigation Committee Mandatory requirements ¬Investigation Committee to \"\"consider\"\" the facts of the complaint of professional misconduct and form an \"\"opinion\"\", the criterion of which was to be purely objective -Consideration implied personal and formation of an opinion by the Committee about the correctness of the complaint or 'otherwise To \"\"consider\"\" would mean to carefully examine, to determine, to adjudicate and to apply mind fairly honestly reasonably and bonafidely Terms \"\"consider\"\" and \"\"opinion\"\" Connotation Failure to follow mandatory procedure prescribed by the relevant statutory provisions both by the Investigation Committee and the council coupled with the complaint of professional misconduct being full of follies, loopholes and legal infirmities, reference to the High Court under S.20D(2) of the Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 was liable to be rejected as provided under S.20F of the said Ordinance Principles Duty of Institute of Chartered Accountants to monitor the affairs of its members outlined by the High Court.\n \nLaw requires the Institute that it shall lay the complaint containing relevant and necessary material before the Investigation Committee as and when received by it. On receipt of the complaint, Investigation Committee is required to consider the facts laid before it. On consideration of the facts if it is of the opinion that the facts or the complaint require investigation, it shall give a notice to the member concerned and hold an inquiry. The member concerned. After the service of notice, is to be given an opportunity of hearing and the proceedings of the Investigation Committee are necessarily to be conducted in presence of the member concerned. It is thus, mandatory upon the Investigation Committee to \"\"consider\"\" the facts of the complaint laid before it and form an 'opinion' to see as to whether ex facie a basis has been made for proceedings against a member. It is only then that an opinion is formed by the Investigation Committee after considering the. material facts placed before it to proceed against a member, then a notice is to be served upon the member concerned and the proceedings are taken against him.\n \nUse of term 'consideration' and 'opinion' in the Ordinance and Bye laws is significant and clearly shows that the Legislature intended the criterion to be purely objective. \"\"Consideration\"\" implies perusal and formation of an opinion by the authority concerned about the correctness of the report or otherwise.\n \nThe word 'consider' means to look at attentively, or carefully, to think, to take into account, to regard, hold the opinion.\n \nIn the present case the Investigation Committee had to form its opinion on factual existence of certain grounds capable of objective determination.\n \nTo 'consider' would mean to carefully examine, to determine, to adjudicate, and last but not least to apply mind. Undoubtedly such application of mind should be fair, honest, reasonable, and bona fide.\n \nIn the present case on receipt of the complaint from the Corporate Law Authority it was not laid before the Investigation Committee. But in derogation of the legal provisions the comments were called by the Institute from the accused members. Thus, the Investigation Committee had no occasion to consider the material in the complaint and form it's independent opinion. Instead the comments/ explanation were referred to the Investigation Committee. Admittedly, the material forming the basis of the complaint was neither considered by the Investigation Committee nor any independent opinion was formed or recorded by the Investigation Committee to proceed against the accused members. Certainly, the Investigation Committee proceeded on the direction of the Institute. The Investigation Committee did not put the accused members on notice before taking into consideration the material placed before it, though the Ordinance and the Bye laws made thereunder specifically provided that it was mandatory upon the Investigation Committee to issue a notice to the concerned member before proceedings against him. Thus, the provisions of law were flagrantly violated.\n \nThe Investigation Committee conducted ex parte inquiry against the accused members. The members were neither associated with the proceedings of inquiry nor were they provided opportunity of hearing by the Investigation Committee, either before conducting the inquiry or during the proceedings, or even after the conclusion of the inquiry. Thus, not only the provisions of law were flouted, but the proceedings were undertaken in sheer disregard of the fundamental principles of natural justice. After conducting ex parte proceedings against the members, Investigation Committee submitted a report to the Institute. On receipt of the report of the Investigation Committee the Council was required under the provisions of section 20C to record its findings to the effect either to direct that the proceedings against a member be instituted or, as the case may be, the complaint be filed. The Legislature has made it mandatory upon the Council to record a finding. Certainly that findings had to be recorded after evaluating the material made available to the Council as appearing in the inquiry report. Thus, the Council had to tentatively assess and examine the evidence and satisfy itself to the effect that on the basis of facts and circumstances substantiated by the material placed before the Council, action was warranted against the members. Term 'satisfaction' has been defined as 'actual persuasion'. That means a mind not troubled by doubt or which has reached a clear conclusion. However, no independent finding of the Council had been placed on record, as such the legal provisions were, once again, contravened. The proceedings of the Council which had been placed on record were ex parte in nature which, inter alia, authorize the Institute to initiate the proceedings against the members and for that purpose to contact some lawyer and to seek his services for filing reference. The prayer in the reference did not contain the recommendations of the Council as required under section 20D of the Ordinance.\n \nPenal Provisions were to be construed strictly. Benefit must be extended to the accused on account of illegalities and lapses committed on the part of the Institute, as the proceedings were undertaken in a prejudicial and unlawful manner. The proceedings against the members were initiated in a non serious, imprudent faint hearted manner. which were bound to suffer a set back.\n \nOn close scrutiny of the record it had come to light that the complaint filed by the Corporate Law Authority against the members was one and the same, which in the first instance seemed to have been dropped by the Institute by accepting the apology tendered by the members. In fact the complaint was not taken seriously and appeared to have been buried by the Institute. However, subsequently when the Corporate Law Authority again furnished serious and minute details of the professional misconduct allegedly committed by the members, the Management of the Institute, which had by then changed, was constrained to initiate the proceedings in a mindless, half hearted and haphazard manner under the pressure of events, which led to failure due to the absence of legality. In the circumstances the legal objection raised by the members to the effect that the complaint having already been disposed of, could not be revived, had much force. There was no other option except to sustain the contention.\n \nThe complaint being full of follies, loopholes and legal infirmities the Reference was liable to be rejected as provided under section 20F of the Ordinance.\n \nHigh Court observed that the present case if looked into in the context, reflects a terrible state of affairs. Institute of Chartered Accountants which has been vested with the authority to monitor the affairs of its members, has duty towards the Nation in general and the shareholders in particular to take serious and stringent measures to prevent any mishap. It has been noted with serious concern that the proceedings in the present case were initiated by the Institute in a half hearted manner which adversely reflected the role of the Institute itself, and was bound to erode confidence of the shareholders in the Auditors, which requires to be checked. It was because of the lapses on the part of Applicant Institute that the reference had to be rejected.\n \n1991 PCr.LJ 110: 1987 SCMR 1967 and PLD 1995 SC 4101 distinguished.\n \nAbdul Majid Beg v. K. Karimuddin and others 1968 SCMR 867: Shahbuddin v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income tax. Range I, West Zone, Karachi and 4 others PLD 1988 Kar. 587 and Angland v. Payne 1944 NZLR 610 (626) ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss. 252 & 254 Auditor, function of Auditing Meanings Condescending of auditors to the demand of management of companies causes a devastating effect if the auditor puts a seal of approval on the misleading accounts of company.\n \nAs required under section 252 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, each company must, at their annual general meeting, appoint an Auditor to hold office until the next annual general meeting. Only a person who is Chartered Accountant within the meaning of Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 can be appointed to act as an Auditor of a public company as provided under section 254 of the Ordinance.\n \nAn Auditor is not to be confined to the mechanism of checking vouchers and making arithmetical computations. He is not to be written off as a professional \"\"adder upper and subtractor\"\". His vital task is to take care to see that errors are not made, be those errors of computation or errors of omission or commission or downright untruths. To perform this task properly he must come to it with an enquiring mind not suspicious of dishonesty, but suspecting that someone may have made a mistake somewhere and that a check must be made to ensure that there has been none.\n \nAuditing may be defined as the independent examination and investigation of the books, accounts and vouchers of a business with a view to enabling the auditor to report whether the Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss account are properly drawn up so as to show a true and fair view of the state of the affairs and the profit and loss of the business according to the best of the information and explanations obtained by the auditor.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The auditors are the ultimate watchdogs of the shareholders' interest. According' to the set practice. The auditors are required to give a report which is either \"\"clean\"\" or \"\"qualified\"\". By issuing a \"\"clean\"\" report, the auditor certifies that the financial statement reflects \"\"true and fair\"\" view of the company's affairs and a \"\"qualified\"\" report subjects such opinion to some observation of irregularity or inconsistency. The managements of large companies which are dependent or the public confidence, had been frenziedly trying to secure a \"\"clean\"\" audit report from their auditors. Since the auditors are recommended (and virtually appointed) by the Board of Directors, some of them are made to condescend to the management demands. Undoubtedly it causes a devastating effect if the auditors put a seal of approval on the misleading accounts of company.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Fomento Sterling Area Ltd. v. Selsdon Fountain Pen Co. Ltd. (1958) 1 WLR 61 and Principles and Practice of Auditing by R. Glynne Williams ref.\"",
    "URL Link:": "Civil Reference No. l of 1991, decision dated: 8-04-2002.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "MUHAMMAD MOOSA K. LAGHARI, J",
    "Court Name:": "Ghulam Abbas Pishori for Applicant.\nSyed Himayat Ali Pirzada for Respondents.",
    "Law and Sections:": "INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF PAKISTAN --Applicant\nVs.\nMessrs HYDERALI BHIMJI & CO. and another --Respondents",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12664",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2229 = 2002 SLD 2229 = 2002 CLD 1223",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) Ss. 20, 21 & 25 Revised Trade Marks Rules, 1963, Rr.49(2), 48 & 47 Partnership Act (IX of 1932), Ss. 4, 14, 18. 22 & 35 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908). O.XXXIX. R.4 Trade mark Certificate of registration of trade mark not only mentioned the names of the original partners of the firm but also that of the partnership viz. the firm Sale of running business of such firm Effect Trade mark being property of the Firm, in the absence of any disagreement between the partners regarding the trade mark, which was registered as far back as the year 1956, it could safely be concluded that the same belonged to all the partners and indeed the firm itself When running business of the Firm was sold the trade mark would also form part its particularly when the said business was to include the good will also Provision of S.35, Trade Marks Act 1940 being enabling one, provided that the Registrar of Trade Marks would record a change in proprietorship of any trade mark on application by the assignee thereof Trade mark, in the present case, was owned by the original partners through the partnership and was thereafter transmitted to the successive partners upon reconstitution of the firm and consequently proprietorship of the said trade mark rested both with the reconstituted firm and its partners Record showed that trade mark in question had been used right from the very inception of the firm but same had not been renewed in accordance with the Rules Plaintiffs trade mark was also not registered and their application was pending with the Registrar, but they had showed that they were also using the disputed trade mark since 1986 ¬Defendants (firm) being the prior user of the trade mark in question. High Court held that it would be in the interest of justice to vacate the earlier injunction order with the result that both the parties would be allowed to use the trade mark till the suit was decided Principles.\n \nMessrs Kissan Industries v. Messrs Punjab Food Corporation AIR 1983 Delhi 387; Abinash Chandra v. Madhusundan AIR 1952 Cal. 673; Muhammad Zaman Sahib v. Fatimunnisa AIR 1960 Mad. 60; Calmic Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Mark 1985 CLC 2063; Blighty Industries Association Ltd. v. The Scottish Home Industries Association 44 RPC 269; Abdullah Saeed v. Cannon . Rubber Ltd. 1987 MLD 2583; Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Bombay Soda Factory AIR 1963 Mys. 173: Ihlee v. Henshaw 3 RPC 15; J.N. Nicholas (Vimto) PLC v. Mehran Botllers (Pvt.) Ltd. 1996 MLD 1203; Azra Jawed v. Jamshed Alam Khan 1996 MLD 1203: Coopers Inc. v. Pakistan General Stores 1981 SCMR 1039; Prince Rubber Ind. v. K.S. Rubber Industries 1983 PTC 83: Carter & Parker Ltd. v. Scotia Wools Ltd. 1960 RPC 206; In the Matter of the Magenta Time Co. Ltd. Trade Mark 44 RPC 169: Prem Singh v. Ceem Auto Inds. AIR 1990 Delhi 233: Societe de Fabrication et de Distribution de Perfumenie v. Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks PLD 1979 Kar. 83: Hawtin (E.V.) Ltd. v. Hawtin (John F) & Coy Ltd. 1960 RPC 95; Dolphin Laboratories Ltd. v. Kaptab Pharmaceuticals Ltd. AIR 1981 Cal. 76; Shri Swaran Singh v. M/s. Usha Industries AIR 1986 Delhi 343; P.M. Dissels (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Thukral Mechanical Works AIR 1988 Delhi 282; G.T.C. Industries v. I.T.C. Ltd. AIR 1992 Mad. 252; George Balantyne Ltd. v. Balantyne Stewart 1959 RPC 273; Shahnawaz Ltd. v. Khawaja Auto Cars Ltd. PLD 1979 Kar. 387; Muhammad Yusuf v. Sabira A. Muhammad 1990 CLC 1127; Nirmala Kanta v. Mulk Raj Kohli AIR 1977 All. 145: Amina Begum v. Ghulam Dastagir PLD 1978 SC 220; Magnum Films Ltd. v. Golcha Properties Ltd. AIR 1983 Delhi 392; Meenakashi Amal v. Rama Ayyar AIR 1928 Mad. 610; Amin v. Haji Abdul Sattar 1992 CLC 1428; PLD 1'981 SC 108; Attaur Rehman v. Adam Ali 1981 CLC 1747; Khuda Bux v. S. Badrul Hasan PLD 1981 Kar. 657; Muhammad Ishaque v. Eros Theatre PLD 1973 Kar.522; Karim Industries v. Nahan Foundry 1984 CLC 648; Sindh Madarsatul Islam Board v. Shamim 1982 CLC 2242; Muhammad Yousuf v. Sabira A. Muhammad 1990 CLC 1127; Engineering Products Ltd. v. S.I.T.E. PLD 1997 Kar. 258; Unilever PLC v. R.B . Oil Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. 1999 MLD 1447; Rexona Proporietary Ltd. v. Majid Soap Works PLD 1956 Sindh 1; General Sales and Trading v. Abdul Razzak NLR 1961 UC 425; Abdul Jabbar v. Ahmad Jan PLD 1973 Kar. 289 and Telephone Soap v. Lever Brothers 1994 CLC 2135 ref.\n \nAttaur Rehman v. Adam Ali 1981 CLC 1747; Khuda Bux v. S. Badrul Hasan PLD 1981 Kar. 657; Muhammad Ishaque v. Eros Theatre PLD 1973 Kar. 522 distinguished.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O. XXXIX, R.4 Invocation of provisions of O.XXXIX, R.4 ¬Conditions.\n \nOrder 39. rule 4. C.P.C. can be invoked only where the previous injunction order which was sought to be vacated is unduly harsh and or unworkable or the same is deemed to be necessary in view of fresh circumstances. This becomes more imperative where the injunction order sought to be recalled is ex parte. Where a party is able to show the aforementioned circumstances he cannot be non¬-suited merely on the ground that although an appeal could have been filed against the injunction order the same was not done.\n \nMuhammad Yousuf v. Sabira A. Muhammad 1990 CLC 1127 ref.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n S. 151 Scope of S.151, C.P.C.\n \nUnder section 151, C.P.C. the inherent powers of a Civil Court can be invoked in order to do complete justice between the parties and mould relief in accordance with the circumstances in the larger interest of justice.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1394 and Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos.4538, 9722 and 11299 of 1998, decision dated: 15-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY, J",
    "": "KOHINOOR SOAP AND DETERGENTS (PRIVATE) LTD. through Chief Executive of the Company --Plaintiff\nVs.\nBASRA SOAP FACTORY and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12665",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2230 = 2002 SLD 2230 = 2002 CLD 1244",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 18 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58 Execution of decree Investigation of claim in respect of mortgaged property Appellant claimed to be the owner in possession of disputed property on the basis of transfer letter issued by the Development Authority and was in possession of original sale deed executed in favour of -debtor, and that disputed property had never been mortgaged Decree holder Bank had also produced original sale deed executed in favour of debtor Banking Court dismissed appellant's application summarily ¬Validity Deeper inquiry/ investigation was required to ascertain whether any equitable mortgage had been created by debtor in favour of Bank or not Banking Court had dismissed appellant's application in haste High Court allowed the appeal, set aside impugned order and remanded the case to Banking Court for its fresh decision on merits after holding a proper inquiry.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 8 of 2000, heard on 8th May 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "M. JAVED BUTTAR AND SYED, JAMSHED ALI, JJ",
    "": "MAHBOOB ALAM and another --Appellants\nVs.\nCITIBANK and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12666",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2231 = 2002 SLD 2231 = 2002 CLD 1245",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 19(7) & 22 Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882). S.58(f) Investigation of claim and objection, whether property was mortgaged or not Mortgage by deposit of title deeds Bank claiming to be mortgagee of three properties by deposit of title deeds was having original title deed in respect of one property Original title deeds in respect of other two properties were with appellants claiming to be bona fide purchasers thereof for valuable consideration ¬Contention of Bank was that debtor had submitted to Bank an affidavit alongwith attested copies of title deeds and a power of attorney in respect of other two properties, thus, on their basis mortgage by deposit of title deeds stood created in favour of Bank Validity Such contention was legally not well founded Bank was required to obtain original title deeds Title deeds were not lost as had been stated by debtor to Bank Bank had been defrauded by debtor Bank had to bear the consequences of such fraud and not the appellants, who were bona fide purchasers of two properties for valuable consideration and also holding original title deeds thereof ¬Bank could assert its security rights as mortgagee in respect of only one property High Court accepted appellants' appeal in respect of other two properties by allowing his objection petition to that extent.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 288 of 1998, heard on 13-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "SADIQ ALI and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12667",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2232 = 2002 SLD 2232 = 2002 CLD 1247",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) Ss. 6 & 12 Suit for recovery of bank loan Leave to appear and defend suit unconditionally Entitlement ¬Leave application filed by defendants was pending when Banking Court rejected the plaint on the ground that Bank had written, off the amount sought to be recovered after procuring sanction from State Bank of Pakistan Validity Plaint with its original contents could not have been rejected on account of letter, dated 5 2 1981 issued by Bank to defendants on account of sanction for writing off the loan¬-Such subsequent development at the best had given a plausible defence to defendants to seek leave to appear and defend unconditionally Banking Court should not have hastily rejected the plaint, rather should have granted the leave and thereafter on the basis of written statement and issues framed should have considered the effect of said letter and sanction of State Bank of Pakistan for writing off the loan High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned order observing that suit would be deemed pending before Banking Court, which would decide the leave application of defendants in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 64 of 1995, heard on 21st May 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "STANDARD CHARTERED BANK through Attorney of Bank --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs ASIAN BODY BUILDING WORKS and 9 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12668",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2233 = 2002 SLD 2233 = 2002 CLD 1249",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 19 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.LVII, R.1 & S.151 Review of passed by High Court in appeal filed against execution of decree Court Auctioneer auctioned the property for Rs.22,00,000 while ¬-debtor's contention was that its market value was not less than Rs.20 million High Court in order to provide an opportunity to the debtor to save his property had directed him to pay within specified time the decretal amount with profits @ 13% on Rs.22, 00, 000 (amount paid by auction purchaser) High Court during proceedings on review application allowed another opportunity to ¬-debtor to fetch a buyer of R.5 million to save his property -Judgment debtor instead of availing that opportunity to produce a buyer for his property was attempting to delay the proceedings on one pretext or the other Auction purchaser had deposited the purchase price more than one year back and since then he was being denied possession of property without any justifiable cause High Court disallowed further request for extension in time None of the conditions necessary for review of order as contemplated in O.LXVII, R.I. C.P.C. having been made out, High Court refused to grant the review petition.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 485 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 6 C of 2001, decision dated: 11-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASEEM SIKANDAR AND MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "Syed MUNIR HUSSAIN GILLANI --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12669",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2234 = 2002 SLD 2234 = 2002 CLD 1252",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6 Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 133 & 135 Suit for recovery of loan amount Variance in terms of guarantee enhancing rate of interest from 1396 to 1496 Defendant¬guarantor contended that such variation made without his concurrence was sufficient to discharge him from personal liability for debts of Company Validity Enhancement in rate of interest had been approved by borrower company in a meeting of its directors held four years before filing of suit by Bank Defendant as one of the directors was present in the meeting and had certified the minutes of meeting, which had been sent to Bank Defendant had not, at any point of time claimed discharge from his personal liability nor he could urge now that such enhancement had been made without his concurrence Defendant could not be allowed to benefit from provisions of Ss. 133 & 135 of Contract Act, 1872 as the liability of borrowing company and that of defendant stood created when rate of interest was enhanced Defendant as such was personally liable for the amount payable by borrowing company.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.19 Suit for recovery of loan amount Limitation Bank filed suit on 8 11 1984 for recovery of loan facilities advanced in year 1975 ¬Contention of defendant guarantor was that suit was time¬barred Validity Borrower Company had acknowledged its liability outstanding on 31 12 1981, which acknowledge¬ment had been signed by defendant on behalf of the company Suit filed within three years from date of said acknowledgement was not time barred.\n \n(c) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6 Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 2(h) & 124 Suit for recovery of loan amount Defendant guarantor contented that he executed contract of guarantee, while same was blank Validity Defendant had not denied his signatures on guarantee Defendant being director was fully aware of the terms stipulated by Bank for finance availed by the company and personal guarantees of the directors was one of such terms Defendant had signed a letter written on behalf of company to Bank stating therein that personal guarantee of active directors including defendant should be treated as sufficient compliance of the requirement of Bank for personal guarantees of directors Defendant could not be allowed to resile from his personal guarantee in view of express words of said letter.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos. 83 and 111 of 1991, heard on 17-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "KHURSHID ANWAR --Appellant\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED., BANK SQUARE BRANCH, FAISALABAD through General Attorneys and Principal Offices of the Bank and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12670",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2235 = 2002 SLD 2235 = 2002 CLD 1252",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6 Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 133 & 135 Suit for recovery of loan amount Variance in terms of guarantee enhancing rate of interest from 1396 to 1496 Defendant¬guarantor contended that such variation made without his concurrence was sufficient to discharge him from personal liability for debts of Company Validity Enhancement in rate of interest had been approved by borrower company in a meeting of its directors held four years before filing of suit by Bank Defendant as one of the directors was present in the meeting and had certified the minutes of meeting, which had been sent to Bank Defendant had not, at any point of time claimed discharge from his personal liability nor he could urge now that such enhancement had been made without his concurrence Defendant could not be allowed to benefit from provisions of Ss. 133 & 135 of Contract Act, 1872 as the liability of borrowing company and that of defendant stood created when rate of interest was enhanced Defendant as such was personally liable for the amount payable by borrowing company.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.19 Suit for recovery of loan amount Limitation Bank filed suit on 8 11 1984 for recovery of loan facilities advanced in year 1975 ¬Contention of defendant guarantor was that suit was time¬barred Validity Borrower Company had acknowledged its liability outstanding on 31 12 1981, which acknowledge¬ment had been signed by defendant on behalf of the company Suit filed within three years from date of said acknowledgement was not time barred.\n \n(c) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6 Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 2(h) & 124 Suit for recovery of loan amount Defendant guarantor contented that he executed contract of guarantee, while same was blank Validity Defendant had not denied his signatures on guarantee Defendant being director was fully aware of the terms stipulated by Bank for finance availed by the company and personal guarantees of the directors was one of such terms Defendant had signed a letter written on behalf of company to Bank stating therein that personal guarantee of active directors including defendant should be treated as sufficient compliance of the requirement of Bank for personal guarantees of directors Defendant could not be allowed to resile from his personal guarantee in view of express words of said letter.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos. 83 and 111 of 1991, heard on 17-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "KHURSHID ANWAR --Appellant\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED., BANK SQUARE BRANCH, FAISALABAD through General Attorneys and Principal Offices of the Bank and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12671",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2236 = 2002 SLD 2236 = 2002 CLD 1259",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 9(5). 10, 12 & 22 Setting aside of ex parte decree ¬Banking Court refused to set aside the decree Envelope of courier service did not indicate its issuance by any Court or set out the consequences of its non acceptance Courier reported that appellant was not available in Pakistan -Contention of Bank that appellant had been served through affixation was repelled as there was no order passed by Banking Court ordering service through affixation Modes of service provided under Financial Institutions (Financial Institutions) Ordinance. 2001. did not include service through affixation Banking Court could have passed an order to have the appellant served through any other mode including affixation, which had not been done in the present case Banking Court had treated the citation in daily newspaper as good service on appellant on the ground that said newspaper was also read in America by Pakistani community Citation was not constituted proper service. as appellant had been able to establish in Court through copies of his passport that he was not in Pakistan at the time of citation High Court accepted appeal set aside the ex parte decree and allowed ten days time to appellant for filing of application for leave to appear and defend before Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No 139 of 2002, heard on 14-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "MAHBOOB AHMED --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12672",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2237 = 2002 SLD 2237 = 2002 CLD 1261",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans Advance Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 12(2) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6(2) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)--Setting aside of ex parte decree Time barred reply to show cause notice Service on appellants (minor defendants) was effected through their mother (appellant herein) by publication in newspapers, dated 12 4 1995, 15-4 1995 and 13 6 1995 Reply to show cause notice was filed appellants on 19 9 1995 long beyond 10 days provided under S.6(2) of Banking Tribunal Ordinance, 1984 Case was transferred to High Court after promulgation of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Banking Court after notices including publication in newspapers, took up the case and passed ex parte decree against appellants for their non appearance ¬Appellants filed application for setting aside decree on the ground of non service of notices upon them after transfer of case to High Court Banking Court on statement of decree¬holder regarding satisfaction of decree disposed of the application as having become infructuous Validity Time barred leave petition had debarred appellants from seeking defence of suit Appeal being continuation of suit could not entitle appellants to by pass statutory bar of limitation for seeking in appeal defence of suit through removal of and decree passed in the suit Lapse limitation had foreclosed appellants' right to seek Court's consideration to other grounds relevant for suit's defence only Appellants were not entitled to defend the suit for halving filed reply to show cause notice beyond 10 days period of limitation High Court dismissed the appeal in circumstances.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 10. 12(2) & 21 Time barred application for leave to defend Effect Time barred leave petition would debar defendant from seeking defence of suit Appeal being continuation of suit could not entitle defendant to by pass the statutory bar of limitation for seeking in appeal defence of suit through removal of and decree passed in the suit Lapse of limitation forecloses defendant's right to seek Court's consideration on other grounds relevant for suit's defence only.\n \nR.A.F. No. 75 of 2000 fol.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S. 15 Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), S. 11(4) Decree Awarding of liquidated damages ¬Validity Such damages could not be awarded either under S.11(4) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 or under provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances), Act, 1997.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 142 of 2000, heard on 24-05-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR ALAM KHAN AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED, FAISALABAD and others --Appellants\nVs.\nMessrs AWAN TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED COMPANY, FAISALABAD and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12673",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2238 = 2002 SLD 2238 = 2002 CLD 1265",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 15 & 21 Decree for recovery of loan with mark up and taw charges B had issued an Incentive Scheme, dated 12 10 1998 providing that if defaulting borrower paid 10096 of principal amount then due within 60 days, then mark¬up would be waived by Bank Judgment debtor had paid Rs.5,000 on 12 11 1998 under bona fide impression that such payment coupled with earlier payment of Rs.1,27.618 had resulted in payment of entire principal amount ¬Contention of Bank was that a sum of Rs.81,688 as decreed together with law charges in excess of Rs.40, 000 was due and payable by debtor Judgment debtor had deposited Rs.42.963 pursuant to an order passed in present appeal High Court while taking into account the bona fides of debtor ordered that subject to payment of Rs.30.000 as legal charges of Bank within 60 days he would stand absolved of all liability under impugned and decree and in case of his failure to do so, he would be liable to pay the entire decretal debt Appeal was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 558 of 1999, heard on 17-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "ZULFIQAR ALI --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12674",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRFNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2239 = 2002 SLD 2239 = 2002 CLD 1269",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 19 & 22 Execution of decree Order of Banking Court allowing decree holder Bank to participate in auction No exception could be taken to such order in absence of any prejudice caused to debtor High Court dismissed the appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 671 of 2001, decision dated: 15-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Rana MUHAMMAD SHAFI and another --Appellants\nVs."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12675",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2240 = 2002 SLD 2240 = 2002 CLD 1270",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.9(l)(2) Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891). Ss. 2(8) & 4 Suit by customer against Bank Requirement of filing of statement of account with plaint Banking Court rejected plaint for not being supported by statement of accounts Validity Provisions of S.6(1)(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, required customer to append with the plaint a statement of account Only concession available to customer was that such statement of account was not required to be certified in the manner prescribed under Bankers' Books Evidence Act. 1891 Plaintiff having failed to file statement of account, Banking Court was justified in rejecting the plaint.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 896 of 2001, decision dated: 6th May. 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD YUSAF --Appellant\nVs.\nA.D.B.P. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12676",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2241 = 2002 SLD 2241 = 2002 CLD 1271",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) Ss. 6 & 12 Suit for recovery of bank loan Production of additional evidence during pendency of suit Bank produced one witness in its affirmative evidence and reserved its right to produce evidence in rebuttal Bank made application for additional evidence to prove signatures of a witness on plaint Banking Court rejected the application and dismissed the suit Validity Proceedings in the suit were in process, when application for additional evidence was made Object of the application was not to patch up the lacunas in evidence Statement of such witness if recorded, would have facilitated the Court with regard to appraisal of facts requisite for disposal of suit ¬Banking Court had wrongly rejected the application High Court accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned and decree and remanded the case to Banking Court with direction to allow Bank to produce said witness in the suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 340 of 1995, heard on 22nd April 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD., JJ",
    "": "Vs.\nMessrs J.J. TRANDERS and 7 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12677",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2242 = 2002 SLD 2242 = 2002 CLD 1275",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) Ss. 6 & 12 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.19 & Art. 59 ¬Suit for recovery of bank loan based on promissory note ¬Promissory note was dated 13 5 1974 Suit was filed on 12 3 1993 Document relied upon by Bank constituting an acknowledgement was dated 31 2 1992 Banking Court dismissed the suit as being time barred Validity For an acknowledgement to be valid under S.19 of Limitation Act. 1908 for the purpose of extending the period of limitation, the same ought to have been executed within three years from the date of promissory note Impugned and decree was in accordance with law Suit had rightly been dismissed as being barred by limitation High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 66 of 1994, heard on 15-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED, STOCK EXCHANGE BRANCH, Lahore High Court --Appellant\nVs.\nS. KHALID HAKEEM --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12678",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2243 = 2002 SLD 2243 = 2002 CLD 1276",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6 Recovery of bank loan Unauthorized entries in statement of accounts Borrower disputed certain entries made by the Bank in the statement of accounts On the direction of Banking Tribunal the Bank prepared a fresh statement of accounts Banking Tribunal found that two entries in the statement of accounts were not in accordance with law Suit was decreed by the Tribunal after deducting the unauthorized entries Validity While deducting the unauthorized entries from the statement of accounts, in the present case, the Banking Tribunal did not commit any illegality No legal infirmity could be found with the and decree which was legal, unexceptionable and not calling for any interference by High Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 116 of 1995, heard on 8-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nNOOR BIBI --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12679",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2244 = 2002 SLD 2244 = 2002 CLD 1279",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.22 Banking Tribunal Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), S.6 ¬Appeal Conditional leave to appear and defend the suit, non compliance of Decree without trial Banking Court while passing and decree had neither referred to the leave granting order nor reached the conclusion that the conditional leave granting order was not complied with by the appellants Validity High Court found no justification for the suit of the Bank being decreed without trial as a regular suit at least in respect of the present appellants, who were legal representatives of the borrower Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court were set aside and the case was remanded to the Banking Court for decision afresh Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 129 of 2002, heard on 18-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "AMJAD LATIF and 5 others --Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12680",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2245 = 2002 SLD 2245 = 2002 CLD 1280",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872) S.20 Mistake as to a matter of fact One of the parties under mistake contended that the agreement was void under S.20 of Contract Act, 1872 Validity Where both the parties were not under a mistake but only one party was under misconception of facts, the agreement was not void under S.20 of Contract Act, 1872.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (L VIII of 1984) \n \n Ss. 6 & 9 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.20 Appeal ¬Incentiue Scheme, withdrawal of Mistake of fact Incentive letter was issued by Bank to the borrower for deposit of certain amount as full and final payment Borrower in compliance of the letter deposited the amount so demanded with the Bank Banking Court, in the light of amount deposited under the letter decreed the suit in favour of the Bank Plea raised by the Bank was that the letter was issued to the borrower under mistake of fact, therefore, the and decree passed by the Banking Court was liable to be set aside Validity Bank had itself offered the borrower to deposit certain amount on which the remaining amount would be waived By depositing the requisite amount, the borrower accepted the offer, thus, an agreement enforceable under law came into existence After deposit of the requisite amount and having accepted the terms of offer by the borrower, the Bank had no lawful authority to unilaterally retrieve from the terms of the offer, which to all intents and purposes were implemented Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court being valid in law High Court declined to interfere with the same.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 62 of 1995, heard on 2nd April 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMalik IFTIKHAR AHMED --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12681",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2246 = 2002 SLD 2246 = 2002 CLD 1284",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----S.9---Quanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.l7---Recovery of bank loan---Letter of guarantee not signed by two witnesses as required under Art.17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order. 1984---Effect---Requirement of the second witness on the document was based on injunctions of Islam as contained in the Holy Qur'an---Where the execution of the document and the arrangement contained therein or contents thereof were not denied, the provision of Art. 7 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, would not come into play ---Non¬-signing of letter of guarantee by the second witness was just a technicality and the same was rightly ignored by the Banking Court in circumstances.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n---S.9---Recovery of bank loan---Terms of loan agreement--¬Total loss of machinery---Machinery installed by the borrower was totally destroyed, as a result of fire, therefore, the borrower failed to repay the loan---Banking Court decreed the suit in favour of the Bank---Contention of the borrower was that it was agreed between the parties that in case of total loss of machinery only the amount of agreed loss value was to be paid to the Bank---Effect---No dispute existed that fire took place and the machinery was destroyed. therefore, the contention of the borrower had force---Bank, in circumstances, was only entitled to the amount of agreed loss value---Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court was modified to the extent of the value of agreed loss---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 315 of 2000, heard on 2-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND PERVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ASAKE INDSUTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and others\nVs.\nMessrs ATLAS LEASE LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12682",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2247 = 2002 SLD 2247 = 2002 CLD 1288",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.12 Ex parte decree, setting aside of Service on wrong address Plaint filed by the Bank gave two addresses, of the borrower Both the addresses were not the ones which were given by the borrower in loan agreement Process was served on the addresses given in the plaint Borrower did not appear before the Banking Court and the suit was decreed ex parte Application to set aside the ex parte decree was filed by the borrower which was dismissed by the Banking Court Validity Where the addresses given in the plaint could not be taken to be the addresses for sufficient service on the borrower, the Banking Court wrongly dismissed the application High Court set aside the ex parte and decree passed by the Banking Court, allowed the borrower to file application for leave to appear and defend the suit and remanded the case to Banking Court for decision afresh Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 407 of 2001, heard on 23rd April, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "ASIM SHAHZAD --Appellant\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through President and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12683",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2248 = 2002 SLD 2248 = 2002 CLD 1290",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6 Recovery of bank loan Loss in business Claim against insurance company Defendants in their application for leave to appear and defend the suit admitted the claim of the Bank and had stated that they had suffered loss due to heavy floods Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the Bank Plea raised by the defendants was that as the project was insured on the direction of the Bank, therefore, it was the responsibility of the Bank to persuade the insurance company for the claim of defendants Validity ¬Defendants who were aggrieved of the action of the insurance company in refusing to admit their claim could seek their remedy in a suit against the insurance company Merely because the defendants had suffered loss on account of ,floods would not relieve them of their liability under the agreement Triable issue, according to the defendants in the application for leave to appear and defend was the damage to the project and the liability of the Bank to get the claim settled from the insurance company, which was not the responsibility of the Bank High Court declined to interfere with the passed by the Banking Tribunal Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n S.151 Consolidated Scope Disposal of two suits by consolidated Validity Where both the suits involved common questions of law and fact. there was nothing illegal in the disposal of the two suits by consolidated .\n \n(c) Banking Tribunal Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6 Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882). S.67 Right to foreclosure or sale Recovery of bank loan Borrower was ready to surrender mortgaged property in lieu of outstanding loan Contention of the Bank was that the borrower apart from mortgage of the property, had also executed letters of guarantees Effect Not only the mortgaged property could be proceeded against but the Bank could lawfully enforce the personal covenant against the borrower and guarantor Merely because the borrower was prepared to surrender the mortgaged property in favour of the Bank. the personal covenant was not wiped out in circumstances.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.14 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908). O.XXXIV ¬Preliminary decree, passing of Banking Court instead of passing preliminary decree passed final decree immediately Validity Banking Court was not required to pass a preliminary decree as provided under O.XXXIV, C.P.C. and could straightaway pass a final decree under S.14 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997.\n \n(e) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (L VIII of 1984) \n \n S.6(2) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans), Rules, 1980, R.8 Leave to appear and defend the suit ¬Limitation Computation Defendants were served through ordinary process on 7 3 1997 while they had already been served through registered post acknowledgement due on 25 2 1997 Application for leave to appear and defend was filed on 15 3 1997 Plea raised by the defendant was that the starting point of computation of limitation was 7 3 1997, when the summons were served through ordinary process ¬Validity Application filed on 15 3 1997 was beyond the prescribed period of 10 days under S. 6(2) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 Mode of service provided under R.8 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Rules, 1980, was applicable for service under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 Application for leave to appear and defend the suit was time barred in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 592 of 1999, heard on 19-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AGRO FOOD LIMITED through Chief Executive and 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Respondent\nMessrs Ahmad Autos and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited PLD 1990 SC 497 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12684",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2249 = 2002 SLD 2249 = 2002 CLD 1297",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.74 Recovery of bank loan Liquidated charges, insurance claim and cushion charges All such charges were included in the statement of accounts filed by the Bank at the time of filing of the suit for recovery of bank loan Banking Tribunal decreed the suit but did not allow the charges Validity Banking Tribunal had rightly declined liquidated charges to the Bank as the Tribunal had no authority to allow the same under the provisions of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 -Insurance claim and cushion charges could not be recovered/ charged from the borrower as the same were not agreed between the parties Reasons given by the Banking Tribunal for refusal of the insurance claim and cushion charges were in accordance with law High Court declined to interfere with the passed by .the Banking Tribunal Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 124 of 1995. decided on 8-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD TARIQ --Respondent\nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12685",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2250 = 2002 SLD 2250 = 2002 CLD 1299",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XXI, Rr. 54, 66 & 89 Execution of decree Auction sale, setting aside of Proclamation of sale not consistent with the Court order Land to be auctioned was 3 Kanals, and 6 Marlas as mentioned in the Fard Taliqa, whereas land put to auction was 7 Kanals At the top of the proclamation. property meant to be auctioned was shown as 3 Kanals. 6 Marlas, while at a later point in the proclamation total area was stated to be 7 Kanals Neither there was any warrant of attachment for 7 Kanals nor there was any order of Executing Court attaching 7 Kanal of land Appellants were ready to deposit bid money in the Executing Court High Court set aside the auction sale subject to deposit of bid money by the appellants Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 172 of 2001, heard on 28-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "SIDDIQUE WOOLLEN MILLS through all its Partners and 5 others --Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Manager and General Attorney, Badami Bagh Branch, Lahore High Court --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12686",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2251 = 2002 SLD 2251 = 2002 CLD 1301",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XXI, R.37 Execution of decree Detention of ¬-debtor Non issuance of show cause notice In execution proceedings, decree holder filed application under O.XXI, R.37. C.P.C. and notice was issued to the debtor On the same day, after issuance of notice by the Executing Court, the decree holder made an oral, statement alleging that the debtor might leave the territorial jurisdiction of the Executing Court, therefore, the notice was withdrawn and warrant of arrest was issued with a direction that the debtor would remain in prison till realization of the decretal amount Judgment debtor was arrested and confined to prison who remained there for five months Validity Without adopting the normal procedure of summoning the debtor through a show cause notice for the satisfaction of the decree and of the attachment of movable and immovable property of the debtor, the Executing Court had acted in haste in ordering the arrest and detention of the ¬-debtor Order of detention was passed by Executing Court without any lawful justification and the same was set aside Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.XXI. R.37 Execution of decree Apprehension of absconding of debtor Issuance of warrant of arrest by Executing Court in the first instance Instead of issuance of show cause notice to the debtor, on apprehension of the decree holder, the Executing Court issued the warrant of arrest and detained the ¬-debtor in prison Judgment debtor deposited a sum of Rs.50, 000 with the decree holder and was released from the prison Effect Deposit of the amount showed that the apprehension was not well founded and instead of straightaway sending the debtor to jail. He could have been bound, down through an acceptable security or surety bond to ensure his presence on each and every date of hearing Order of detention was set aside by High Court in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 10 of 2001, heard on 23rd April, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "M. JAVED BUTTAR AND SYED, JAMSHED ALI, JJ",
    "": "QAISER HUSSAIN BHATTI --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through President and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12687",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2252 = 2002 SLD 2252 = 2002 CLD 1305",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.12 Financial 'Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.12 Ex parte decree, setting aside of Service of process Appellant was not served under law Effect Judgment and decree passed against the appellant was set aside by High Court High Court allowed the appellant to file application seeking leave to appear and defend within ten days Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No 167 of 2002, decision dated: 10-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHAHZAD SHARIF --Appellant\nvs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. through President and another --Respondents\nS.M. Nasem for the --Appellant."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12688",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2253 = 2002 SLD 2253 = 2002 CLD 1305",
    "Key Words:": "First Appeal from Order No 167 of 2002, decided on 10th June, 2002.S.12 Financial 'Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.12 Ex parte decree, setting aside of Service of process Appellant was not served under law Effect Judgment and decree passed against the appellant was set aside by High Court High Court allowed the appellant to file application seeking leave to appear and defend within ten days Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No 167 of 2002, decision dated: 10-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHAHZAD SHARIF --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. through President and another --Respondents \nS.M. Nasem for the --Appellant."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12689",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2254 = 2002 SLD 2254 = 2002 CLD 1306",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) Ss.7 & 12 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11 ¬Plaint, rejection of Cause of action Factual controversy ¬Plaint filed by Bank was rejected by Banking Court as it showed no cause of action Bank raised pleas of facts but without recording of evidence the Banking Court rejected the plaint for want of cause of action Validity For the purpose of ascertainment of the cause of action the only document which was to be seen was the plaint Unless and until the questions arising from the pleas were determined with reference to evidence on record plaint could not have been thrown away summarily Banking Court having wrongly rejected the plaint, the passed by it was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal from Order No. 73 of 1991, heard on 13-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND PARVEZ AHMED, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Senior Vice President --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs YAQOOB RICE MILLS through Partners 2 to 5 and 5 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12690",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2255 = 2002 SLD 2255 = 2002 CLD 1361",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) Ss. 284 & 287 Amalgamation of companies Object and purpose Object of amalgamation is to achieve economy of scales and to carry on business more economically and efficiently, to streamline and maintain smooth and efficient management and corporate control to cut unnecessary administrative, secretarial and other expenses, to attain the main objectives of both the petitioner companies more feasibly, to avoid duplication of managerial and corporate process and to otherwise carry on business more conveniently and advantageously.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss. 284, 285, 286, 287 & 503 Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, R.55 Sindh Chief Court (O.S.), Rules, R. 953 ¬Amalgamation of companies scheme No objection from any quarter was raised to the scheme proposed by the petitioner companies Registrar Joint Stock Companies had also not commented adversely Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan had already approved the scheme subject to the sanction by High Court Merger being based on ground realities, it would not affect the interest of the members and the same was not against the public interest either Petition was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "In re: COMPANIES ORDINANCE, 1984 and BSIS BALANCED FUND LIMITED and another",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "In re: COMPANIES ORDINANCE, 1984 and BSIS BALANCED FUND LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12691",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2256 = 2002 SLD 2256 = 2002 CLD 1382",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 10 Contract Act (IX of 1872). S.73 Suit for recovery of Bank loan Non appearance of defendants ¬Liquidated damages Financial facility was availed by the defendants who failed to re pay the loan Despite service of process to the defendants by the Banking Court neither anyone appeared on behalf of the defendants nor any application for leave to defend was filed Bank filed all necessary documents with the plaint and claimed recovery of liquidated damages also Validity In absence of any rebuttal. High Court relied upon the documents and statement made in the plaint except the claim in respect of liquidated damages which were declined Suit was decreed accordingly.\n \nHabib Bank Limited v. Messrs Farooq Compost Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. and 4 others 1993 MLD 1571 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.18 Attachment before execution Suit was decreed by High Court in favour of Bank Application under S.18 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, was filed for attachment of the properties mortgaged with the Bank Validity Properties which were mortgaged with the Bank had been listed in the application and the same were attached under S.18 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act. 1997 Application was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B 55 of 2000, decision dated: 14-11-2000.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATA UR REHMAN, J",
    "": "NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs MILLROCK QUARRING (PVT.) LTD. and 7 others --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12692",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2257 = 2002 SLD 2257 = 2002 CLD 1413",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.VII, R.6 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 120 ¬Exemption from limitation Failure to state any reason in plaint Suit for rendition of accounts Limitation Plaintiff secured loan facility from the defendant Bank against stock of rice pledged with the Bank, suit was filed alleging that due to negligence of the Bank, the pledged stock was deteriorated, resultantly it was sold on very low price in auction, therefore, Bank had to suffer for the less price ¬Auction proceedings were conducted on 25 10 1988 and the suit was filed by the plaintiff on 16 12 1996 Exact details of the price of the stocks were mentioned in the plaint and the value of the stocks sold by the auctioneer was also stated, thus suit for specific amount showing difference of value could have been filed Contention of the Bank was that there was no cause of action available to the plaintiff in the present suit and the suit was barred by limitation ¬Validity Limitation for suit of such a nature was governed by Art. 120 of Limitation Act, 1908, wherein period of six years started from the date when the right to sue accrued ¬In the present case, right to sue accrued when the auctioneer opened up the godown and made a report as to contents thereof and also when the auction was completed in October, 1988 Instead of filing the suit till October, 1994, the present suit was filed on 16 12 1996 No statement within the meaning of O.VII, R.6, C.P.C. showing that the suit was within time was available in the plaint ¬Trial Court had rightly dismissed the suit and High Court declined to interfere with the and decree passed by the Trial Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 448 of 1998, heard on 22-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs HUSSAIN RICE FACTORY, MANDI SHAH JEWANA through Partner and 6 others --Appellants.\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through President and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12693",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2258 = 2002 SLD 2258 = 2002 CLD 1417",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.74 Recovery of Bank loan Liquidated charges, mark up and costs of suit ¬Grievance of the Bank was that such charges were not allowed by the Banking Tribunal in the decree against the borrower Loan amount was deposited by the borrower with the Tribunal Effect Tribunal had rightly refused the liquidated damages and also the costs as the Bank was left with no cause of action Bank, in the present case, was not entitled to grant of mark up High Court declined to interfere with the and decree passed by the Banking Tribunal Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 342 of 1995, heard on 6-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMst. NASEEM AKHTAR and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12694",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2259 = 2002 SLD 2259 = 2002 CLD 1418",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6(5) Ex parte decree, setting aside of Amendment of decree During execution proceedings borrower filed application under S.6(5) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, for setting aside of ex parte decree While deciding application under S.6(5) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, the Tribunal amended the decree Validity When there was no application on behalf of either of the parties seeking amendment of the decree, the Tribunal could not amend the same while processing application for setting aside ex parte decree.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6 Recovery of Bank loan Incentive scheme ¬Technicalities Administration of justice Execution of ex parte decree passed by the Banking Tribunal was pending when the borrower filed application to set aside the decree During the pendency of the application, the borrower stated that he had paid the entire loan amount under the Prime Minister's incentive scheme Banking Tribunal in the light of the statement amended the decree and disposed of the execution petition filed by the Bank ¬Validity Tribunal should have recorded the satisfaction of the decree and then instead of amending the decree, should have dismissed the execution petition having borne fruit ¬Net result arrived at by the Banking Tribunal was the same that the Tribunal had dismissed the execution petition but without recording the satisfaction of the decree As a natural consequence of such an eventuality the order passed by the Tribunal was correct Where the order passed by the Banking Tribunal was in accordance with law. High Court declined to interfere in the and decree passed by the Banking Tribunal as the same was for the advancement of justice Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 277 of 1995, heard on 8-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD AFZAL JURA and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12695",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2260 = 2002 SLD 2260 = 2002 CLD 1422",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 10 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 9 & 10 Suit against Bank ¬Dismissal of suit without application for leave to appear and defend Past and closed transaction Banking Court instead of asking the Bank to file application for leave to defend, dismissed the suit for the reason that the transaction subject matter of the suit was past and closed -Validity Banking Court was required to ask the Bank to file an application seeking leave to appear and defend the suit Dismissal of suit by the Banking Court was not consistent with the provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, or by Financial institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Plaint, in the present case, disclosed a cause of action and the same could riot be rejected ¬Banking Court could have considered the application for leave to defend and then decided the same Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded for decision in accordance with law ¬Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 754 of 2001, heard on 23rd April, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "SERFRAZ AHMAD MALIK --Appellant\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12696",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2261 = 2002 SLD 2261 = 2002 CLD 1424",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.21 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5 Appeal ¬Condonation of delay Time barred appeal Proof of delay Suit was decreed against the appellant on 2 1 2001, certified copies of and decree were applied for on 2 7 2001, copies were supplied on the same day and the present appeal was filed on 6 7 2001 Reason for delay was shown as the attack of paralysis on the appellant ¬Neither any date of the attack was mentioned nor there was any medical certificate appended with the application for condonation of delay nor record of hospital showing that the appellant was so seriously ill that she could not apply for getting the certified copies and file the appeal within time provided Effect Appellant failed to make out a sufficient cause for delay in filing of appeal High Court declined to condone the delay Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n S.21 Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), S.13 Appeal Return of court fee affixed on memorandum of appeal Appeal was not heard on merits and was dismissed on the ground of limitation Appellant requested for return of court fee affixed on the appeal Validity High Court directed the return of court fee in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 547 of 2001 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No.2 C of 2002, decision dated: 3rd June, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Mst. RAZIA AKRAM --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12697",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2262 = 2002 SLD 2262 = 2002 CLD 1426",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) Art.29 Compensation for wrongful seizure Provision of Art.29 of Limitation Act, 1908 Applicability Provision of Art.29, Limitation Act, 1908 is only applicable where movable property is wrongfully seized under legal process.\n \n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) \n \n Art. 29 \"\"Legal Process\"\" Meaning Term \"\"legal process\"\" can only mean a process of some Court established under law.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.9 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts. 29 & 49 Wrongful seizure of vehicle Suit for recovery of damages ¬Limitation Vehicle of plaintiff was wrongfully seized by the Bank on 23 3 1997, without any process of law Suit for damages was filed by the plaintiff on 11 2 2000, which was dismissed by the Banking Court as being time barred under the provisions of Art. 29 of Limitation Act, 1908 Contention of the plaintiff was that the provisions of Art.49 of Limitation Act, 1908, were applicable and the suit was within time Validity Article 49 of Limitation Act, 1908 and not Art.29 of the Act was applicable to the suit filed by the plaintiff Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court were set aside and the case was remanded for decision afresh Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n(d) Words and phrases",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 525 of 2001, decision dated: 29-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. RUKHSANA BASHIR --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. through President and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12698",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2263 = 2002 SLD 2263 = 2002 CLD 1462",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 2(c), 9 & 22 Recovery of Bank loan Relationship of borrower or customer Allegation against appellant was that she was in possession of certain items which allegedly were leased by the plaintiff to the borrower Decree on such basis for repayment of finance was passed by the Banking Court against the borrower and the appellant Contention of appellant was that as she was neither a customer nor a borrower. Therefore, decree passed against her was liable to be set aside Validity Banking Court could not have passed a decree against the appellant who was neither a borrower nor guarantor as defined in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 At the most the plaintiff would be entitled to take possession of the items in execution proceedings, if it was determined by the Executing Court that the appellant was, in fact, in possession of those items Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court was set aside Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 442 of 1998, heard on 4-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SALOOMI RANA --Appellant\nVs.\nFIRST LEASING CORPORATION LTD. Through Adnan Naseer and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12699",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2264 = 2002 SLD 2264 = 2002 CLD 1466",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Jurisdiction Pecuniary jurisdiction of Court Proceedings in suits or matters involving subject matter of value less than the minimum pecuniary jurisdiction conferred on the Court ¬When a Court is conferred pecuniary jurisdiction at a higher stage or level then it continues to have jurisdiction to proceed with suits or matters involving subject matter of the value less than the minimum pecuniary jurisdiction conferred on it.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.2(b)(i) & 4 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.24 & 151 Banking Court, jurisdiction of Consolidation of cases Transfer of case from Banking Court, to High Court for adjudication Suit filed by the applicant was pending in High Court whereas the Bank had filed a suit which was pending in the Banking Court Application under S.24, C.P.C. was filed for transfer of the case pending before Banking Court to High Court Objection raised by the Bank was that suit sought to be transferred had the value of the subject matter less than thirty million Rupees, therefore, the same could not be adjudicated by High Court Validity On the basis of principle that the greater included the less would be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case Conferment of jurisdiction at a higher stage or level on High Court by the provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997. would not deprive High Court of its power to proceed with matters wherein the subject matter was of the value less than the minimum or lower limit of the jurisdiction ¬High Court had jurisdiction to proceed with a suit filed under the provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act. 1997, wherein the subject matter was less than Rs.30 Million High Court observed that it would be proper, convenient and in the interest of justice that both the suits should be tried by one and the same Court as parties therein were the same and the issues/disputes which required determination were also identical and similar If both the suits were allowed to proceed in two different Courts then the possibility of conflicting decisions /findings being given could not be ruled out which would cause prejudice and injustice to the parties Suit pending before the Banking Court was transferred to High Court Application was allowed in circumstances.\n \nReference No. l of 1988 made by the President of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1989 SC 75 and Syed Ali Azhar Naqvi v. The Government of Pakistan and 3 others PLD 1994 Kar. 67 distinguished.\n \nMst. Sajida Yousaf v. Lahore Development Authority 1989 MLD 225; Shahzada Sultan Humayun v. Nasiruddin 1984 CLC 3090; Kadir Bux and others v. The Crown PLD 1955 FC 79; Pakistan Fisheries Ltd., Karachi and others v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109; Utility Stores. Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others PLD 1987 SC 447 and Malik Gul Hassan & Co. and 5 others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 1996 SCMR 237 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Transfer Application No. 17 of 2000, decision dated: 4-12-2000.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED SAYED ASHHAD, CJ",
    "": "Malik JEHANGIR KHAN --Applicant\nVs.\nBANKING TRIBUNAL No. 1, Karachi High Court DIVISION, Karachi High Court and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12700",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2265 = 2002 SLD 2265 = 2002 CLD 1473",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) S.27(l) (as amended by Banking Companies (Amendment) Ordinance (LVI of 1979)) Licensing of banking companies ¬Object Object of S.27(1) of Banking Companies Ordinance. 1962, was to effectively check the growing trend of illegal banking business by various investment companies, which were defrauding the public by offering high rate of interest up to 5 to 796 per month.\n \n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) \n \n Ss. 27(1) & 43 B as amended by Banking Companies (Amendment) Ordinance (LVI of 1979) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3) Leave to appeal was granted by Supreme Court to consider, whether High Court had incorrectly interpreted the concept of banking business; whether it was a necessary condition that the business of banking must be transacted with members of the general public; whether the mere borrowing of money from family members could constitute banking business; whether principle of ejusdem generis was applicable in relation to the definition of 'banking'; whether the order of State Bank could have been passed without giving any reasons: and whether the State Bank failed to note that a discretion had been conferred on it under S.43 B of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962.\n \n(c) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) \n \n S.5(b)(c) Term 'public' Connotation Members of one family whether fall within the definition of 'public' as envisaged in S.5(b)(c) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 Members of one family being indefinite would fall within the purview of public, irrespective of the fact that the deposits were obtained from a limited number of them ¬Members of one family or pertaining to a community, besides being members, were 'public' within the meaning of S.5(b)(c) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962.\n \n(d) Words and phrases \n \n \"\"Ejusdem generis\"\" Connotation and applicability Pre¬conditions.\n \nDoctrine of ejusdem generis would apply when the following conditions exist.\n \n(1) The statute contains an enumeration by specific words;\n \n(2) the members of the enumeration constitute a class;\n \n(3) the class is not exhausted by the enumeration;\n \n(4) a general term follows the enumeration; and\n \n(5) there is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires.\n \nDoctrine of ejusdem generis is only a rule of construction and not of substantive law. It provides a mode of interpretation, which is always subject to the intention of the Act. It does not apply if the intention of the Act suggests to the contrary.\n \nBlack's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edn., p. 464; Don Bosco High School v. The. Assistant Director, E.O.B.I. and others PLD 1989 SC 128 and Jamat i Islami Pakistan through Syed Munawar Hassan, Secretary General v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs PLD 2000 SC 111 ref.\n \n(e) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) \n \n Ss 27(1) & 43 B (as amended by Banking Companies (Amendment) Ordinance (LVI of 1979)) Banking business ¬Publication of declaration under S.43 B of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 Contention of the appellants was that no business of banking was being carried out by them and the investments were only received from their family members and not from the public Authorities made necessary inquiries and found that the appellants were transacting business of banking in contravention of S.27(1) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 Factum of holding of inquiry by the Authorities was not challenged either before Supreme Court or before the High Court Only information to be conveyed was that the appellants were transacting the business of banking in contravention of S.27(1) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, which was done arid so was mentioned in the declarations Statements of facts coupled with show cause notices were served upon the appellants, which comprehensively provided them to know about material quoted against them by the Authorities Effect Where full opportunity of personal hearing was afforded and the contention of the appellants was repelled by the High Court by assigning reasons which were unassailable, Supreme Court declined to interfere with the passed by High Court Appeal was dismissed.\n \nMohinder Sindh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others AIR 1978 SC 851; Syed Ali Abide Zaidi and others v. Deputy Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Gujranwala and others PLD 1967 Lah. 836 and Brigadier His Highness Nawab Muhammad. Abbas Khan Abbasi, Ameer of Bahawalpur v. Government of Pakistan through the Joint Secretary, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Rawlapindi and 23 others PLD 1978 Lah. 1166 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos.400 K and 401 K of 1990, decision dated: 8th March. 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI, HAMID ALI MIRZA AND ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR, JJ",
    "": "MERCANTILE TRADERS (PVT.) LTD. and another --Appellants\nVs.\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12701",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2266 = 2002 SLD 2266 = 2002 CLD 1510",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.9 . Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) Suit for recovery of loan Application for leave to defend ¬Limitation Computation Service to defendant was made through three modes viz. through publication in newspaper on 2 6 2000: through registered post acknowledgement due on 1 6 2000 and through bailiff of the Court on 15 6 2000 Banking Court computed period of limitation from publication in newspaper and dismissed application for leave to defend being time barred Appeal before High Court was also dismissed Contention of the defendant was that for purpose of computing the period of limitation, the service effected through bailiff of the Court should be taken into consideration and not the other modes as the former was comparatively more valid having been made in the prescribed manner Validity Service in any of the modes prescribed in S.9(3) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, was deemed to lie valid for the purpose Contention of the defendant that the latest mode should be taken into consideration for computing the period of limitation and not the other, had no force Judgments passed by both the Courts below not suffering from any illegality, leave to appeal was refused.\n \nMessrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353 and Messrs Ahmad Autos , and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited PLD 1990 SC 497 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.2590 L of 2000 decided on 23rd November, 2000.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHEIKH AND MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SIMNWA POLYPROPYLENE (PVT.) LTD and others ers\nVs.\nMessrs NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12702",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2267 = 2002 SLD 2267 = 2002 CLD 1513",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 14, 15 & 18 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.58, 62, 66, 99 & S.151 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3) Execution of decree for recovery of loan amount Objection as to sale of mortgaged property by third person Facility of loan was advanced in the year 1988 and debtor provided all the documents pertaining to the property inclusive of its mutation, non encumbrance certificate from Sub Registrar, approved site plan of the property and many other documents while mortgaging the property Banking Court decreed the suit of Financial Corporation against debtor and decree holder having equipped with the decree filed execution petition and notices thereupon were issued to the debtor under O.XXI, R.66. C.P.C. Nobody having appeared in spite of such notice, order was passed for the auction of the property and auctioneer was accordingly appointed ¬Petitioner claimed that he had purchased the property in question in the year 1989 and moved objection petition under O.XXI, R.99 read with S.151, C.P.C. before the executing Court, and auction was stayed Petitioner only produced photostat copies of the registered sale deeds relied upon by her and original documents or attested copies of the same were not produced Banking Court in the exercise of its powers under O.XXI, R.58, C.P.C. after taking into account all the documents and pleas raised by the parties, dismissed the objection petition which order was maintained by the High Court Validity Claim/objection of the petitioner was rightly dismissed under O.XXI, R.58, C.P.C. as the Banking Judge, after thrashing the entire documents placed on, record, came to an irresistible conclusion that the disputed property, subject matter of the proceedings, was already mortgaged with the Financial Corporation Documents annexed with the objection petition reflected that the petitioner had claimed that she purchased the property in question in the year 1989 while the same was already mortgaged Petitioner had only produced photostat copies of the documents while the decree holder had produced a number of documents to substantiate the claim of the Corporation that the property in question was the very property which was mortgaged by the ¬debtor at the time of grant of loan No illegality, had been committed by the Banking Court in dismissing the objection petition of the petitioner in exercise of its powers under O.XXI, R.58, C.P.C. which order had been maintained by the High Court Petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court was dismissed by the Supreme Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.3178/L of 2000, decision dated: 23rd May, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWED IQBAL AND TANVIR AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SAEEDA BEGUM er\nVs.\nSMALL BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION, DERA GHAZI KHAN and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12703",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2268 = 2002 SLD 2268 = 2002 CLD 1539",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banker and customer Withholding or freezing account of plaintiffs by the Bank Bank froze accounts of the plaints on the pretext that accounts were fictitious and that plaints were not the genuine account holders Plaintiffs tried to assure the Bank that they had genuinely opened their accounts, but failed to prevail upon the Bank Plaintiffs, on offer of the Bank appeared before the Bank Manager and satisfied the Manager that they were the genuine persons and not fictitious account holders, but Manager despite being satisfied, showed his inability to allow plaintiffs to operate their accounts on the plea that higher Bank Authorities did not agree with him Bank having failed to produce any evidence despite many opportunities were provided to it, Trial Court closed its evidence and decreed the suit ¬Validity Receipt of money by banker from or on account of his customer would constitute banker the debtor of customer Banker normally was liable to repay only the person from whom he had received the money Bank borrowed money and would undertake to repay the same or any part of it at the branch of the Bank where account was kept during banking hours upon payment being demanded ¬Customer on his part would undertake to exercise reasonable care in executing his written orders so as not to mislead Bank or make forgery easy and to act honestly towards the Bank Contract between banker and customer could not be unilaterally varied Any person could be a customer of a Bank and an account could be opened by a married woman, a minor, trustee, executor, local Authority, an incorporated body or a Company All considerations of justice, equity and good conscience would prevail before denying drawer its property Nothing had been brought on record, in the present case, to show that plaints were fictitious persons and not genuine account holders, but Bank despite that had withheld money of plaints on flimsy pretext If without justification, a banker would dishonour his customer's cheque he was liable to pay damages to customer for injury caused. \n \n(b) Banker and customer \n \n Relationship of Bank before opening account of a prospective customer could satisfy itself as to credentials of person applying to Bank for opening of account Relationship of creditor and debtor would come into being after opening of account Before acceptance of cheques or negotiable instruments for payment, Bank had to compare signatures of customer on cheque with specimen signatures on documents in its possession. \n \n(c) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) \n \n S.26 Suit for recovery of amount deposited , by customer in the Bank Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.11 ¬Opening of account by a minor Freezing of said Account by Bank on the ground that contract with the minor was void ¬Validity Plaint showed that only two of the plaintiffs were minors Where an instrument was made or negotiated by a minor, making, drawing or negotiating, would entitle the holder to receive payment of such instrument and to enforce same against any party thereto other than a minor Bank could not refuse to make payment of cheques issued by a minor Minor, at any rate could open account through his guardian/next friend Suit was filed by minors through guardian/ next friend Even otherwise protection was to be used as a shield and not as a sword If a contract was for minor's benefit, same could not be used as sword Other plaintiffs were adults and no justification existed in law to freeze their accounts.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.32 of 1985, heard on 19-06-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI AND MUHAMMAD SAEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nCh. AMJAD MAQSOOD and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12704",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2269 = 2002 SLD 2269 = 2002 CLD 1545",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O. XXXVII, R.2 Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss.20 & 118 suit for recovery of money based upon promissory note Defendant's contention was that promissory note was executed on 6 10 1981, and not on 24 5 1982 as claimed by plaintiff, who had filled up said date to bring the suit within limitation Validity ¬Presumption under S.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was attached to a negotiable instrument as to receipt of consideration, date of execution, time of acceptance, time of transfer, order of endorsement, stamp and holder in due course, unless contrary was proved If filling up of date as 24 5 1982 was presumed to be subsequent, even then as per S.20 of the said Act, the authority to fill up the date and complete the instrument vested in the hands of recipient, which authority apparently had been exercised within three years from the date of execution as claimed by the defendant Such authority was not denied to have been conferred on plaintiff Contention was devoid of force. \n \nMessrs United Bank Ltd. v. President, Bazm e Salat and another PLD 1986 Kar. 464; Bazm e Salat and others v. Messrs United Bank Ltd. PLD 1989 Kar. 150 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Aziz ul Hassan 1984 CLC 1035 ref.\n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) \n \n S.118 ganun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.119 ¬Presumption attached to negotiable instrument Plea in rebuttal of such presumption Burden of proof Where statutory presumption is attached as to existence of any fact, then any person setting up a plea in rebuttal, takes upon himself to prove such plea in rebuttal. \n \n(c) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) \n \n S.118 Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.119 ¬Presumption attached to negotiable instrument Burden of proof to rebut such presumption Plea of maker of such instrument was that after having denied consideration, the burden to prove consideration shifted upon holder thereof -Validity Section 18(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act laid down a special rule of evidence contrary to general rule of burden of proof Burden to dispel statutory presumption was always on the party seeking to rebut the same as to the existence of consideration Once execution of such instrument was admitted, then it was for the maker to disprove consideration. \n \nMst. Sughran Begum and 11 others v. Haji Mir Qadir Bukhsh and 2 others PLD 1986 Quetta 232 and United Bank Ltd. v. Mrs. Bilquees Begum and 3 others 1988 CLC 1613 and S.K. Abdul Aziz v. Mahmoodul Hassan and 3 others 1998 CLC 337 ref.\n \n(d) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) \n \n S.4 Stamp Act (II of 1899), Ss. 12 & 35 Promissory note Affixation and cancellation of adhesive stamps ¬Mode Affixation of stamp and its cancellation on promissory note is sufficient compliance of Stamp Act, 1899 No particular mode is provided therefore under S.12 read with S.35 of Stamp Act, 1899.\n \nMalik Muhammad Akram v. Khuda Bakhsh 2000 CLC 759 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs M. Ismail Thakur & Sons Ltd. 1988 CLC 700 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 14 of 1987, decision dated: 6-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SABIR --Appellant\nVs.\nKHALIL UR REHMAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12705",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2270 = 2002 SLD 2270 = 2002 CLD 1550",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.18 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.58, 100 & 101 Execution of decree Mode of Court has the discretion to either follow the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 or follow any other mode that the Court may deem fit in the circumstances of the case ¬Where the debtor or any person claiming through the debtor does not voluntarily give possession of the mortgaged property, the Banking Court has the power to put the Banking Company or the purchaser of the premises in possession of the mortgaged property in any manner deemed fit by it Principles.\n \nSection 18 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 gives very wide powers to the Banking Court to execute the decrees passed by it.\n \nThe provisions of C.P.C. are not mandatory but are only directory in nature and the Court has been given the discretion to execute the decree in accordance with the provisions of C.P.C. or in any other manner it may deem fit. It is also indisputable that the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 was enacted because the previous legislation in the field was not found effective for recovering the claims of the banks expeditiously and keeping in view the delays that were occurring. The Legislature considered it fit to give greater flexibility and discretion to the Banking Court so that the claims of the banks may be recovered without undue delay.\n \nAct is a special statute and the provisions of the special law prevail over the general provisions of C.P.C. Section 18 of the Act recognizes this position and clearly states that the Court has the discretion to either follow the procedure laid down in C.P.C. or follow any other mode that the Court may deem fit in the circumstances of case. \n \nWhere the debtor or any person claiming through the debtor does not voluntarily give possession of the mortgaged property, the Banking Court has the power to put the banking company or the purchaser of the premises in possession of the mortgaged property in any manner deemed fit by it. In the present case, the petitioner was not a tenant of the owner of the property, but claimed to be the tenant of his son who had acquired the property by way of a declaration of gift which was declared to be fraudulent by the High Court. \n \nThe tenant did not produce any documentary evidence to show that he was a lawful tenant of the lawful owner of the premises and that he had taken the property prior to the commencement of litigation by the Bank except a copy of the Extract from Property Register Card issued by the City Surveyor. The said document read in light of the declaration of gift by the owner of the property clearly shows that his son, who was a minor of 17 years at the time of the alleged gift had acquired the property from his father by way of an oral gift dated 28 1 1987. The Gift Deed was not registered with the Registrar of Conveyances. The stamp paper on which the deed is printed was not purchased by the donor or his son but bears the name of some other person without mentioning his father's name which creates doubt about its authenticity. It is common knowledge that back dated documents can be easily procured in this country. Moreover, no document was produced to show that any step was taken by the owner, the father or his son to have the gifted property transferred in the name of donee when he became a major in 1988. If the gift were bona fide, the father or his son would have taken proceedings to record the change in the Property Register of Excise and Taxation Department maintained under the West Pakistan Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, Electricity Supply Corporation; Gas Company and the Telephone Department. The copy of the Kirayanama (Tenancy Agreement) produced by the tenant written on a Stamp Paper of Rs.50 was purchased on 25 9 1998 in the name of the tenant which clearly shows that the alleged tenancy was created by the son who was not the owner during the pendency of the proceedings before the Banking Court. It is, therefore, apparent that this document was made to avoid the execution of the decree obtained by the Bank against the guarantor.\n \nAccording to the documents on record -¬debtor No.1 first obtained financial facilities in 1988, continued to enjoy the same until 1995 and did not liquidate the liabilities within the agreed time as a result of which the Bank was constrained to file the suit on 21 12 1995, inter alia, for recovery of money and for attachment and sale of the mortgaged properties. More than 12 years had passed from the time the financial facilities had been provided and more than seven years had passed since the filing of the suit and no payment had till then been made by the debtors to the decree¬-holder. To meet the ends of justice, the decree was required to be executed expeditiously so that recovery could be made without delay. Consequently, the order of attachment and sale of the mortgaged properties without strictly following the procedure provided in Order XXI, C.P.C. and following the discretionary powers under section 18 of the Banking Companies Act, 1997 was justified in the circumstances of the case. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.18 Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.52 ¬Execution of decree Mortgaged property Such property could not be validly transferred during the pendency of the proceedings in view of bar contained in S.52, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Where the documents filed by the person who acquired such property did not show that he acquired the title in the .property in good faith and for valuable consideration, the transfer was, prima facie, collusive and was made to prevent the decree holders from recovering their lawful dues. \n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.18 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr.58, 100 & 101 Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.52 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Constitutional petition Execution of decree Jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution Scope Petitioner had claimed the title of mortgaged property which he had acquired fraudulently High Court would not allow any person to claim any interest in any property through any agreement the foundation of which was based on fraud ¬Petitioner having come to the Court with unclean hands was not entitled to any discretionary relief available under Art. 199 of the Constitution in circumstances Principles.\n \nThe powers of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution are discretionary and depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The power is principally available to ensure that justice is done in accordance with law, equity and good conscience. In doing so, the Court also looks, at the conduct of the parties. In the present case, the gift of the mortgaged property by the owner in favour of his son who entered into an agreement of tenancy with the petitioner was fraudulent and was made to defeat the claim of the Bank. The transfer of title in favour of the son in the record of Municipal Corporation was made during the pendency of the suit which is contrary to provisions of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Several persons had filed objections taking various pleas against the execution of the decree by the decree holder which were all rejected by the Banking Court for valid reasons. The petitioner is claiming title through son of the owner of the property which title has been acquired fraudulently. The High Court will not allow any person to claim any interest in any property through any agreement the foundation of which is based on fraud. In the circumstances of the case, the petitioner is clearly not entitled to any discretionary relief available under Article 199 of the Constitution. Petitioner's claim is not bona fide, he has not come to the Court with clean hands, the of the Banking Court is proper and the petitioner is not entitled to any relief whatsoever.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1160 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No.2375 of 2000, decision dated: 31st May, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. AHMED SARWANA AND SYED ZAWWAR HUSSAIN, JAFFERY, JJ",
    "": "Agha ATTAULLAH er\nVs.\nPRESIDING OFFICER, BANKING COURT and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12706",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2271 = 2002 SLD 2271 = 2002 CLD 1634",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9(4), 10 & 21 Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42 ¬Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII R. 11 Suit for rendition of accounts and declaration Rejection of plaint without deciding leave application Plaintiff customer claimed to have adjusted financial facility well within time and thus, becoming entitled to clearance certificate, but Bank was not issuing clearance certificate and was demanding more amount from him Bank filed application for leave to defend the suit, which was replied by plaintiff ¬Banking Court instead of deciding leave application while relying upon statement of accounts filed by Bank rejected the plaint for not disclosing any cause of action Validity ¬Rejection of plaint without deciding leave application was against the provisions of law Defendant as a matter of right could not defend the suit unless upon filing of proper application as provided under S. 9(4) read with S. 10 of the Act, Banking Court granted leave to defend the suit to such defendant Banking Court without deciding leave applica¬tion was not empowered to call upon defendant to defend suit, muchless on filing of statement of accounts to reject the plaint Banking Court had completely travelled beyond the scope and provisions of special statute i.e. Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Court in order to reject a plaint had to take into account only the contents of plaint and defence pleas raised by defendant could not be considered for such purpose Plaint disclosed a cause of action as averments contained therein were supported by photo copies of voluminous receipts showing that plaintiff had faithfully paid the amount in instalments Present case did not fall under any of the clauses of O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. Impugned suffered from grave legal infirmity as having been passed in complete oblivion of the express provisions of law High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned / decree, and remanded the case for its fresh decision with, observations that leave application would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court, which would firstly decide such application and then would proceed to decide the suit after hearing the parties in accordance with law. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 9(4) & 10 Leave to defend suit Right of defendant to defend the suit without obtaining prior leave from Court ¬Scope Defendant as a matter of right could not defend suit unless upon filing of proper application as provided under S.9(4) read with S. 10 of the Act, Banking Court granted leave to defend the suit to such defendant. \n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.VII, R.11 Rejection of plaint Defence plea, consideration of Scope Court in order to reject a plaint had to take into account only the contents of plaint Defence pleas raised by defendant could not be considered for such purpose.\n \nRao Saeed Ahmad for Appellants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 542 of 2001, heard on 18-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJA MUHAMMAD SABIR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Sheikh NAZIR AHMED --Appellant\nVs.\nHOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION through General Manager and 4\nothers --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12707",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2272 = 2002 SLD 2272 = 2002 CLD 1639",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) Ss.21, 22, 25 & 26 Right conferred by registration ¬Scope Exclusivity of user attached to registered trade mark is not absolute, but is subject to limitation as provided under Ss.22, 25 & 26 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 Such exclusivity would not affect the right of a prior user, though unregistered Right in trade mark created by prior user despite non registration is superior right recognized under S.25 of the Act.\n \nAbdul Wasim v. Messrs SACO Traders Private Limited and another Suit No.369 of 2001 fol.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n S.25 Unregistered prior user of disputed trade mark ¬Claim by such user for protection under S.25 of Trade Marks Act, 1940 against infringement action Burden of proof ¬Principles. \n \nBy virtue of section 25 of Trade Marks Act, 1940, protection against infringement action is extended to the unregistered user of a trade mark. To claim such right, burden is on the person claiming protection under section 25 of the Act. A person claiming right of a prior user in terms of section 25 has to prima facie demonstrate that contesting mark is in his continuous use; such continuous use is prior in time to the mark used by a person, who claimed to be a proprietor of such mark and or from the date of registration of the subject mark in respect of the same goods, and there is honest and concurrent user as recognized under section 10(2) of the Act.\n \nInitial burden is on the person claiming rights under section 25 of the Act, to prima facie demonstrate through material his prior use of the contesting mark. \n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2 Application for temporary injunc¬tion Decision of Tentative assessment of pleadings etc. ¬Interlocutory applications like one under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C., are generally decided on the basis of tentative assessment of pleadings, affidavits, counter affidavits, rejoinder, if any, and documents annexed thereto.\n \n(d) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n Ss.21 & 25 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2 Suit for injunction, infringement and accounts ¬Application for grant of temporary injunction Photo copies of sale invoices produced by plaintiff and defendant in support of their claim Both the parties had their reservation as to authenticity and credibility of such sale invoices Such photo copies of sale invoices were not prima facie credible material. \n \n(e) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n Ss.21 & 25 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2 Suit for injunction, infringement and accounts ¬Application by plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction ¬Plaintiff applied for registration of subject mark on 17 1 1984 claiming to be two months prior user thereof ¬Defendant applied for registration of subject mark on 2 12 1979, which was advertised in Trade Mark Journal on 2 12 1982 Such application was treated as abandoned for defendant's failure to deposit registration fee Defendant filed interlocutory application on 15 8 1988, which was found to be incompetent Defendant again applied for registration on 22 8 1988 Defendant produced advertisement materials showing advertisement in newspaper and also on Television much anterior to adoption of subject mark by plaint Sale figures produced by plaintiff being contradictory to each other did not prima facie, inspire confidence, thus, could not be given any credence at such stage Defendant had applied earlier for registration of subject mark and had successfully demonstrated that it was prior user and was entitled to protection as recognized under S.25 of the Act Application was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Haroon and another v. F.Y. & Brothers and another 1986 MLD 930; Zakauddin v. Muhammad Zahid and 2 others PLD 1993 Kar.766; Messrs Chas A. Mendoza v. Syed Tausif Ahmed Zaidi and 2 others PLD 1993 Kar. 790 and Messrs Tri Star Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Trisa Bursten Tabrik A.G. and others 1999 YLR 638 ref.\n \n(f) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n Ss.21 & 25 Suit for infringement of trade mark Rights of concurrent user of contentious mark Burden of proof Plaintiff was registered holder of subject mark, whereas defendant claimed to be prior user thereof Plaintiffs plea was that dismissal of defendant's application for rectification amounted to abandonment and waiver on its part to use the subject mark Validity Such circumstance might prima facie, go in favour of plaintiff in the context of concurrent user Such fact of uninterrupted use of subject mark and registration thereof in favour of plaintiff might amount to waiver arid acquiescence as plaintiffs right to claim protection on the basis of concurrent user was concerned Rights of concurrent user was also qualified and subject to proof of \"\"honest concurrent use or of other special circumstance\"\" as might be required in a particular case. \n \n(g) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n Ss.21 & 25 Registered holder of a trade mark and unregistered prior user thereof Distinction between their rights Right of prior user is preferential and superior right subject to proof as against the right of registered holder of contentious mark recognized under S.21 of the Act Right of prior user is valuable and superior right than the right of registered holder of contentious mark Right of prior user in terms of S.25 is not dependent on registration Prior user of unregistered contentious mark in a defensive action has to satisfy the Court that he is using such mark extensively prior to the use by registered proprietor.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 126 of 2002, decision dated: 31st May, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "Messrs DURAFOAM (PVT.) LTD. through Managing Director, and another\n--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nMessrs VOHRA ENTERPRISES (PVT.) LTD. through Managing\nDirector --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12708",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2273 = 2002 SLD 2273 = 2002 CLD 1649",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances/Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.22 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.15 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5, 12(2), (5) as added by Limitation (Amendment) Act (VIII of 1991) & 29 High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol. I, Chap. XIV D, Para.2(ii)(d) Appeal ¬ Delay of 155 days, condonation of Banking Court passed /decree on 11 5 2001 Application for certified copy thereof was made on 24 5 2001 Copies were prepared on 15 6 2001, which were delivered to appellant on 26 10 2001 Appeal was filed on 5 11 2001 Appellant claimed to be entitled to deduct the time consumed in obtaining such copies till the date on which those were received by him Validity By virtue of S. 12(5) of Limitation Act, 1908 read with High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol. I, Chap. XIV D, Para. 2(ii)(d), time intervening between the day on which application was made and the day actually intimated to applicant to be the day on which copy would be ready for delivery, the period up to said date could be excluded Applicant, however, had to satisfy the Court about the various dates given on the slip to collect the copy and the steps taken by him to get copy Appellant's case for condonation of delay was not that he was not intimated by office about the date on which copy was to be supplied -Delay had not been alleged to have occasioned due to carelessness of the office in informing appellant about the date on which copy was ready for, delivery Appellant was, thus, not entitled to exclusion of time from 16 6 2001 (when copy was prepared) till 26 6 2001, (when he received the copy) Appeal had been filed with delay of more than 155 days, whereas 30 days, period was prescribed for its filing under S. 22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 was not applicable to the present case in view of S. 29 thereof High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay as well the appeal.\n \nFederation of Pakistan through the General Manager (Personnel), Pakistan Railways, Headquarters Office, Lahore v. Mrs. Riaz Latif PLD 1990 SC 90; West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi v. Aziz Qureshi PLD 1973 SC 222 and Cantonment Board, Kharian Cantt. v. Muhammad Shaft PLD 1991 SC 400 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.428 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No.2 C of 2002, heard on 3rd June, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "SIDDIQ M. MALIK and others --Appellants\nVs.\nAL BARAKA ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK, B.S.C. (E.C.) through\nVice President and Branch Manager and duly Constituted Attorneys and\nanother --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12709",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2274 = 2002 SLD 2274 = 2002 CLD 1649",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances/Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.22 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.15 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5, 12(2), (5) as added by Limitation (Amendment) Act (VIII of 1991) & 29 High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol. I, Chap. XIV D, Para.2(ii)(d) Appeal ¬ Delay of 155 days, condonation of Banking Court passed /decree on 11 5 2001 Application for certified copy thereof was made on 24 5 2001 Copies were prepared on 15 6 2001, which were delivered to appellant on 26 10 2001 Appeal was filed on 5 11 2001 Appellant claimed to be entitled to deduct the time consumed in obtaining such copies till the date on which those were received by him Validity By virtue of S. 12(5) of Limitation Act, 1908 read with High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol. I, Chap. XIV D, Para. 2(ii)(d), time intervening between the day on which application was made and the day actually intimated to applicant to be the day on which copy would be ready for delivery, the period up to said date could be excluded Applicant, however, had to satisfy the Court about the various dates given on the slip to collect the copy and the steps taken by him to get copy Appellant's case for condonation of delay was not that he was not intimated by office about the date on which copy was to be supplied -Delay had not been alleged to have occasioned due to carelessness of the office in informing appellant about the date on which copy was ready for, delivery Appellant was, thus, not entitled to exclusion of time from 16 6 2001 (when copy was prepared) till 26 6 2001, (when he received the copy) Appeal had been filed with delay of more than 155 days, whereas 30 days, period was prescribed for its filing under S. 22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 was not applicable to the present case in view of S. 29 thereof High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay as well the appeal.\n \nFederation of Pakistan through the General Manager (Personnel), Pakistan Railways, Headquarters Office, Lahore v. Mrs. Riaz Latif PLD 1990 SC 90; West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi v. Aziz Qureshi PLD 1973 SC 222 and Cantonment Board, Kharian Cantt. v. Muhammad Shaft PLD 1991 SC 400 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.428 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No.2 C of 2002, heard on 3rd June, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "SIDDIQ M. MALIK and others --Appellants\nVs.\nAL BARAKA ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK, B.S.C. (E.C.) through\nVice President and Branch Manager and duly Constituted Attorneys and\nanother --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12710",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2275 = 2002 SLD 2275 = 2002 CLD 1663",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss.4 & 6(6) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 ¬Constitutional petition Execution of decree Banking Tribunal passed decree on 23 11 1992 Judgment debtor did not file appeal against decree till 1993; but filed Constitutional petition High Court disposed of Constitutional petition by virtue of rendered in the case of M/s. Chenab Cement Products. (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah.672 with observations that its decision would not affect s and decrees, which had become final Bank thereafter applied for execution of decree Banking Tribunal repelled the debtor's objection to the effect that decree stood set aside by virtue of said decision of High Court Judgment debtor further contended that as appointment of Presiding Officer, who passed the decree, was found to be un Constitutional, thus, the decree was void and incapable of being acted upon Bank referred to of Supreme Court passed in the case of Soneri Bank Limited v. Raja Weaving Mills Limited and another KLR 1997 Civil Cases 742, wherein Supreme Court denied relief to petitioner, who had not challenged the decree passed against him High Court dismissed the Constitutional petition as having no force. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Products (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah.672; E.F.A. No. 113 of 1998 and Soneri Bank Limited through Mian Abdul Wajid, E.V.P. and another v. Raja Weaving Mills Limited and another KLR 1997 Civil Cases 742 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.23531 of 1998, heard on 27-03-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MALIK ABDUL QAYYUM, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD UMAR TARAR and others ers\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT No. II, Lahore High Court and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12711",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2276 = 2002 SLD 2276 = 2002 CLD 1673",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) Ss.316 & 313 Object of S.316, Companies Ordinance, 1984 Mere pendency of the winding up petition ipso facto does not operate as a bar to any suit or proceedings by or against the Company Bar only operates on actual winding up order or the order appointing. Provisional Manager ¬Principles.\n \nFrom the bare perusal of subsection (1) of section 316 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 it is abundantly clear that mere pendency of the winding up petition ipso facto does not operate as a bar to any suit or proceeding by or against the Company. Bar, only operates on actual winding up order or the order appointing Provisional Manager. Object of section 316 of the Ordinance, 1984, is to regulate the pending suit or proceedings pending in any other Courts so that none of the creditors may be prejudiced, their rights and interest are not adversely affected while distributing the assets of Company, amongst them, in accordance with their entitlement and priority if any. \n \nThe Company Court assumes special jurisdiction over pending suit and proceedings only after the winding-¬up order is passed or when Provisional Manager is appointed to try itself all pending suits or proceedings by or against the company either by itself or grant permission to continue such suit or proceedings pending in any other Court. Such view also finds support from the facts that power to stay any suit or proceeding against the Company are exercisable by the Company Court under section 313 of the Ordinance, 1984 at the motion of company or any of its creditors or contributors any time after presentation of the winding up petition and before the winding up order is made. \n \nMessrs Mackinnons Mackenzie & Company v. Mrs. Musarrat Jawed and others Civil Revision Application No.85 of 1998 and Messrs Mackinnons Mackenzie & Co. v. Messrs The Eastern Federal Union Insurance Company Limited and others Civil Revision Application No. 109 of 1997 and Ulbricht's WWE, GES M.B.H.A. Schwanenstadt/Kaufing, Austria v. Ulbricht's (Pakistan) (Pvt.) Ltd. 1990 CLC 1329 ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.316 & 313 Stay of suit on winding up Agents (respondents) themselves had initiated winding up proceedings against their principal and they could apply for the stay or transfer of the proceedings from the Trial Court to that of the Company Court, if it all they were to take any advantage When such a party allows the suit or legal proceedings, to continue. and in fact participates in such proceedings that amounts to acquiescence in the proceedings and at a later stage would work as estoppel from challenging the proceedings on such accused ¬Occasion to seek permission of the company Judge would only arise when any appeal or execution proceedings are filed against the wound up Company Messrs Mackinnons Mackenzie & Co. v. Eastern Federal Union, Insurance Company Limited Civil Revision Application No. 109 of 1997 dissented from. \n \nBashir Ahmed v. Nippon Bodin (Pvt.) Ltd. 1997 CLC 1205 ref.\n \nMessrs Mackinnons Mackenzie & Co. v. Eastern Federal Union, Insurance Company Limited Civil Revision Application No. 109 of 1997 dissented from.\n \n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969) \n \n S.55 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.128 Suit for recovery of sum arising out of short landing of Cargo carried on board by vessel against Shipping Agent Liability of Shipping Agent Determination Concept of co extensive liability as described in S.128, Contract Act, 1872 Applicability Main ground for holding that the Shipping Agent was liable for the claim in suit rested on a declaration given under S.55(e), Customs Act, 1969 whereby the Agent undertook to discharge all the liabilities of the vessel by virtue of such declaration Shipping Agent being an agent holds himself answerable for the discharge of all the claims for damages or short delivery which may be the liability of the owner of the cargo Effect of declaration having been detailed in S.55(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, Agent was liable to. pay all the penalties and to satisfy the claim relating to short delivery in terms of the declaration Claim in the suit having been established, against the carrier after full-dress trial, Shipping Agent was personally liable on its declaration given under S.55(d), Customs Act, 1969 Liability of the Agent only crystallizes and becomes co extensive once such liability is established through Court of law or admitted by the carrier itself Once such liability is established and proved in Court of law, same becomes enforceable against the Agent as well When the liability stood established as against the Principal, the Agent also became jointly and severally liable pursuant to and decree of the Court Concept of co extensive liability as enshrined in S.128, Contract Act, 1872 would be attracted Principles.\n \nIn the present case, main ground for holding that the applicant was liable for the claim in suit rested on a declaration given under section 55(e) of the Customs Act, 1969 whereby the applicant undertook to discharge all the liabilities of the vessel by virtue of such a declaration. Applicant being an agent held himself answerable for the discharge of all the claims for damages or short delivery which may be the liability of the owner of the cargo, which position was not disputed.\n \nEffect of the declaration referred to above, is detailed in section 55(2) of the Act whereby, the agent is held liable to pay all the penalties and is also liable to satisfy the claim relating to short delivery or damages which is caused to the cargo in terms of the declaration. \n \nThe claim in suit was established, against the carrier after full dress trial, therefore, Ship Agent was held personally liable on his declaration given under section 55 (d) of Customs Act. \n \nThe liability of the agent only crystallized and became co extensive with that of the Principal once such liability is established through Court of law or admitted by the carriers themselves. Once such liability is established and proved in Court of law, it becomes enforceable as against the agent as well. Admittedly in the present case the liability stood established as against the Principal. Consequently the agent also became jointly and severally liable pursuant to and decree passed by the Court. It is only after the and decree, that winding up order is passed. Concept of co extensive liability as enshrined in section 128 of the Contract Act would be attracted. \n \nIn the instant case liability as against the agent in terms of section 55 of the Customs Act, was determined by the Court of law. Co extensive liability in legal parlance means to extend equally and to exist at the same time, side by side, together. Purport and intent of a and decree against more than one person also bind such debtor co extensively. It means that either of the parties or debtors could be followed by the decree holder for the satisfaction of the decree. \n \nSurety becomes liable to pay entire amount immediately after passing of decree and it is not deferred until creditor exhausts his remedies against principal debtor. \n \nBurjorjee Cowasjee & Co. v. Habib Insurance & Co. PLD 1975 Kar. 195; Messrs Pakistan Industrial Chains Company v. American Oriental Lines Inc., New York and others PLD 1968 Kar. 89; N.B.P. v. Allied Paper Industries Ltd. 1997 CLC 737; Arumugahm Chattiar v. Sedasivam Pillai AIR 1971 Mad. 321; Messrs Platinum Insurance Company Limited, Karachi through Managing Director v. Daewoo Corporation, Sheikhupura through Director, Administration and Finance PLD 1999 SC 1 and Citibank v. Tariq Mohsin Siddiqi and others PLD 1999 Kar. 196 ref.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n S.316 Bar under S.316, Companies Ordinance, 1984, when not attracted Appeal having been filed by the company which was interested to protect itself against the rigors of the passed against it said bar was not attracted.\n \nThe bar under section 316, Companies Ordinance, 1984 will not be attracted in cases where a and decree was passed against a company prior to its winding¬-up order and where company in distress is very much interested in defending its position to avoid the and decree against it. Such bar is only attracted where any suit or proceedings are to proceed and commended against the Company in terms of section 316(1) of the Companies Ordinance. In the present case, admittedly, the appeal was filed by the company which was very much interested to protect itself against the rigors of the passed against it. \n \nWhere suit or other proceedings were commenced against the Company and winding up order was made or Provisional Liquidator was appointed or the suit was decreed against the Company, then it could be the Company which may be interested to take a protective proceedings by challenging the same before a higher forum and seek exonerate itself from the consequence of decree or action against it. Under the circumstances respondent in appeal were not obliged to obtain any leave from the Company Court. Conclusion of the Appellate Court that the jurisdiction of the Trial Court was barred during pendency of the winding up proceeding before the High Court was erroneous and could not be sustained. \n \nEastern Automobile Syndicate Ltd. v. Rejinder Kumar Singh AIR 1959 M P 95 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Allied Paper Industries Ltd. 1997 CLC 737 ref.\n \n(e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n S.316 Bar against suit Co defendant whose liability is joint and several with that of the Company under liquidation Prerogative of the decree holder to seek execution of a and decree either jointly or severally against any of the persons against whom the decree had been so made.\n \nThere is nothing in section 316 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 that bars action against co defendant whose liability is joint and several with that of company under liquidation. It is prerogative of the decree holder to seek execution of a and decree either jointly or severally against any of the persons against whom the decree has been so passed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.84 of 1997, decision dated: 26-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY --Applicant\nVs.\nMessrs MACKINNON MACHENZIE & COMPANY OF PAKISTAN\nLIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12712",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2277 = 2002 SLD 2277 = 2002 CLD 1673",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) Ss.316 & 313 Object of S.316, Companies Ordinance, 1984 Mere pendency of the winding up petition ipso facto does not operate as a bar to any suit or proceedings by or against the Company Bar only operates on actual winding up order or the order appointing. Provisional Manager ¬Principles.\n \nFrom the bare perusal of subsection (1) of section 316 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 it is abundantly clear that mere pendency of the winding up petition ipso facto does not operate as a bar to any suit or proceeding by or against the Company. Bar, only operates on actual winding up order or the order appointing Provisional Manager. Object of section 316 of the Ordinance, 1984, is to regulate the pending suit or proceedings pending in any other Courts so that none of the creditors may be prejudiced, their rights and interest are not adversely affected while distributing the assets of Company, amongst them, in accordance with their entitlement and priority if any. \n \nThe Company Court assumes special jurisdiction over pending suit and proceedings only after the winding-¬up order is passed or when Provisional Manager is appointed to try itself all pending suits or proceedings by or against the company either by itself or grant permission to continue such suit or proceedings pending in any other Court. Such view also finds support from the facts that power to stay any suit or proceeding against the Company are exercisable by the Company Court under section 313 of the Ordinance, 1984 at the motion of company or any of its creditors or contributors any time after presentation of the winding up petition and before the winding up order is made. \n \nMessrs Mackinnons Mackenzie & Company v. Mrs. Musarrat Jawed and others Civil Revision Application No.85 of 1998 and Messrs Mackinnons Mackenzie & Co. v. Messrs The Eastern Federal Union Insurance Company Limited and others Civil Revision Application No. 109 of 1997 and Ulbricht's WWE, GES M.B.H.A. Schwanenstadt/Kaufing, Austria v. Ulbricht's (Pakistan) (Pvt.) Ltd. 1990 CLC 1329 ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.316 & 313 Stay of suit on winding up Agents (respondents) themselves had initiated winding up proceedings against their principal and they could apply for the stay or transfer of the proceedings from the Trial Court to that of the Company Court, if it all they were to take any advantage When such a party allows the suit or legal proceedings, to continue. and in fact participates in such proceedings that amounts to acquiescence in the proceedings and at a later stage would work as estoppel from challenging the proceedings on such accused ¬Occasion to seek permission of the company Judge would only arise when any appeal or execution proceedings are filed against the wound up Company Messrs Mackinnons Mackenzie & Co. v. Eastern Federal Union, Insurance Company Limited Civil Revision Application No. 109 of 1997 dissented from. \n \nBashir Ahmed v. Nippon Bodin (Pvt.) Ltd. 1997 CLC 1205 ref.\n \nMessrs Mackinnons Mackenzie & Co. v. Eastern Federal Union, Insurance Company Limited Civil Revision Application No. 109 of 1997 dissented from.\n \n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969) \n \n S.55 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.128 Suit for recovery of sum arising out of short landing of Cargo carried on board by vessel against Shipping Agent Liability of Shipping Agent Determination Concept of co extensive liability as described in S.128, Contract Act, 1872 Applicability Main ground for holding that the Shipping Agent was liable for the claim in suit rested on a declaration given under S.55(e), Customs Act, 1969 whereby the Agent undertook to discharge all the liabilities of the vessel by virtue of such declaration Shipping Agent being an agent holds himself answerable for the discharge of all the claims for damages or short delivery which may be the liability of the owner of the cargo Effect of declaration having been detailed in S.55(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, Agent was liable to. pay all the penalties and to satisfy the claim relating to short delivery in terms of the declaration Claim in the suit having been established, against the carrier after full-dress trial, Shipping Agent was personally liable on its declaration given under S.55(d), Customs Act, 1969 Liability of the Agent only crystallizes and becomes co extensive once such liability is established through Court of law or admitted by the carrier itself Once such liability is established and proved in Court of law, same becomes enforceable against the Agent as well When the liability stood established as against the Principal, the Agent also became jointly and severally liable pursuant to and decree of the Court Concept of co extensive liability as enshrined in S.128, Contract Act, 1872 would be attracted Principles.\n \nIn the present case, main ground for holding that the applicant was liable for the claim in suit rested on a declaration given under section 55(e) of the Customs Act, 1969 whereby the applicant undertook to discharge all the liabilities of the vessel by virtue of such a declaration. Applicant being an agent held himself answerable for the discharge of all the claims for damages or short delivery which may be the liability of the owner of the cargo, which position was not disputed.\n \nEffect of the declaration referred to above, is detailed in section 55(2) of the Act whereby, the agent is held liable to pay all the penalties and is also liable to satisfy the claim relating to short delivery or damages which is caused to the cargo in terms of the declaration. \n \nThe claim in suit was established, against the carrier after full dress trial, therefore, Ship Agent was held personally liable on his declaration given under section 55 (d) of Customs Act. \n \nThe liability of the agent only crystallized and became co extensive with that of the Principal once such liability is established through Court of law or admitted by the carriers themselves. Once such liability is established and proved in Court of law, it becomes enforceable as against the agent as well. Admittedly in the present case the liability stood established as against the Principal. Consequently the agent also became jointly and severally liable pursuant to and decree passed by the Court. It is only after the and decree, that winding up order is passed. Concept of co extensive liability as enshrined in section 128 of the Contract Act would be attracted. \n \nIn the instant case liability as against the agent in terms of section 55 of the Customs Act, was determined by the Court of law. Co extensive liability in legal parlance means to extend equally and to exist at the same time, side by side, together. Purport and intent of a and decree against more than one person also bind such debtor co extensively. It means that either of the parties or debtors could be followed by the decree holder for the satisfaction of the decree. \n \nSurety becomes liable to pay entire amount immediately after passing of decree and it is not deferred until creditor exhausts his remedies against principal debtor. \n \nBurjorjee Cowasjee & Co. v. Habib Insurance & Co. PLD 1975 Kar. 195; Messrs Pakistan Industrial Chains Company v. American Oriental Lines Inc., New York and others PLD 1968 Kar. 89; N.B.P. v. Allied Paper Industries Ltd. 1997 CLC 737; Arumugahm Chattiar v. Sedasivam Pillai AIR 1971 Mad. 321; Messrs Platinum Insurance Company Limited, Karachi through Managing Director v. Daewoo Corporation, Sheikhupura through Director, Administration and Finance PLD 1999 SC 1 and Citibank v. Tariq Mohsin Siddiqi and others PLD 1999 Kar. 196 ref.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n S.316 Bar under S.316, Companies Ordinance, 1984, when not attracted Appeal having been filed by the company which was interested to protect itself against the rigors of the passed against it said bar was not attracted.\n \nThe bar under section 316, Companies Ordinance, 1984 will not be attracted in cases where a and decree was passed against a company prior to its winding¬-up order and where company in distress is very much interested in defending its position to avoid the and decree against it. Such bar is only attracted where any suit or proceedings are to proceed and commended against the Company in terms of section 316(1) of the Companies Ordinance. In the present case, admittedly, the appeal was filed by the company which was very much interested to protect itself against the rigors of the passed against it. \n \nWhere suit or other proceedings were commenced against the Company and winding up order was made or Provisional Liquidator was appointed or the suit was decreed against the Company, then it could be the Company which may be interested to take a protective proceedings by challenging the same before a higher forum and seek exonerate itself from the consequence of decree or action against it. Under the circumstances respondent in appeal were not obliged to obtain any leave from the Company Court. Conclusion of the Appellate Court that the jurisdiction of the Trial Court was barred during pendency of the winding up proceeding before the High Court was erroneous and could not be sustained. \n \nEastern Automobile Syndicate Ltd. v. Rejinder Kumar Singh AIR 1959 M P 95 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Allied Paper Industries Ltd. 1997 CLC 737 ref.\n \n(e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n S.316 Bar against suit Co defendant whose liability is joint and several with that of the Company under liquidation Prerogative of the decree holder to seek execution of a and decree either jointly or severally against any of the persons against whom the decree had been so made.\n \nThere is nothing in section 316 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 that bars action against co defendant whose liability is joint and several with that of company under liquidation. It is prerogative of the decree holder to seek execution of a and decree either jointly or severally against any of the persons against whom the decree has been so passed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.84 of 1997, decision dated: 26-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY --Applicant\nVs.\nMessrs MACKINNON MACHENZIE & COMPANY OF PAKISTAN\nLIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12713",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2278 = 2002 SLD 2278 = 2002 CLD 1686",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss. 6 & 9 Suit for recovery of finance based on mark¬up Refusal of Banking Tribunal to award mark up for cushion period five times Contention that Bank was empowered to claim the amount of cushion period as debited in the statement of accounts five times Validity Bank could not cite any Circular of State Bank of Pakistan or any law on the subject to substantiate its such contention ¬Concept of charging of amount of mark up for cushion period was introduced in Islamic Banking System in order to compensate financial institutions and conclusion of proceedings for recovery Bank could charge mark up only for cushion period of 210 days and that too only once at the time of institution of suit commencing from the date of default committed by the customer till the institution of suit Mark up in the present case had been charged five times and that too on different occasions and during the currency of the account Banking Tribunal had rightly taken notice of such legal infirmity and declined to award amount of cushion period, to which no exception could be taken by Bank Impugned / decree was legal not warranting modification as prayed for High Court dismissed appeal as being devoid of merits.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 270 of 1995, heard on 13-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs BANDAGI AGRO SERVICES (PVT.) LIMITED and\nanother --Respondents\nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Farooq Compost Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. and 4 others 1993 MLD 1571 fol."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12714",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2279 = 2002 SLD 2279 = 2002 CLD 1689",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.22 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5, 29(2)(b) & Art. 156 Appeal Limitation Condonation of delay ¬Impugned decree was passed on 8 3 2002 Application for certified copy of and decree was made on 20 3 2002, which were prepared and delivered to appellant on 21 3 2002 Appeal filed on 15 4 2002 was barred by time Appellant sought condonation of delay by filing application under S. 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 on the ground that S. 22 of the Ordinance did not provide for any limitation and according to Art. 156 of Limitation Act, 1908, present appeal could be filed within 90 days Validity Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 did not apply as the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance was a special law and prescribed 30 days' period of limitation for filing appeal, which was different from that prescribed for appeal in Limitation Act, 1908 Neither there was any ground for condonation of delay, nor delay could be condoned under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 Basis of the contention of appellant was a book wherein S. 22(1) of the Ordinance had been wrongly published Appellant might have cause of action against the publisher of the Book High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay as well as the appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 245 of 2002, heard on 5-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs FIRM EVERWIN TRADING COMPANY through Zahid Mahmood --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs HABIB BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12715",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2280 = 2002 SLD 2280 = 2002 CLD 1692",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 17 & 22 Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.58(b)(f) Decree for recovery of loan amount Plea of Bank was that appellant defendant had created mortgage in favour of Bank to secure the liabilities of other defendant and delivered original title deed of her house to Bank and executed in favour of Bank registered mortgage deed, general power of attorney and memorandum of deposit of title deed Suit was decreed against all defendants ¬Appellant denied to have executed such documents or delivered title deeds to Bank; her earlier explanation about custody of title deeds with Bank was that another defendant (a friend of appellant's son) had obtained her original title deeds; her explanation in this regard before High Court was that same were handed over to said defendant in order to show to some Government department that he was a person of means Validity Appellant had handed over title documents to Bank in 1998, but thereafter had done nothing to retrieve the same Bank filed shit oil 18 5 2000 Appellant lodged F.I.R. on 7 7 2002 alleging that title deeds given to said defendant had been misplaced Story set up by appellant was far fetched and not credible Timing of such F.I.R. showed that same had been meant to thwart recovery suit filed by Bank ¬Explanation given for handing over title deeds to said defendant was not plausible as how he could have established that he was man of means by showing title deed of a house owned by appellant, who was not related to him No justification 'existed for letting title deeds remain with said defendant for a period of two years ' till lodging of F.I.R. on 7 7 2002 Case set up by appellant was not plausible having been advanced just to frustrate recovery of Bank dues Impugned decree was not open to exception High Court dismissed the appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.219 of 2002, heard on 19-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND¬ ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. ALAM BIBI --Appellant\nVs.\nPALTINUM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12716",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2281 = 2002 SLD 2281 = 2002 CLD 1695",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 12, 9(5), 10 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. V, R.15 Ex parte decree, setting aside of Appellant's plea was that he had not been served Banking Court dismissed application for setting aside ex parte decree ¬Contention of respondent Bank was that appellant had been duly served through a person, who statedly was his nephew Appellant's contention was that said person was not his nephew; and even if said person had been the son of appellant's real brother, same would not make him a member of his family for purposes of O.V, R.15, C.P.C. ¬Validity Appellant's contentions were well founded ¬Application seeking setting aside of ex parte and decree had wrongly been dismissed High Court accepted the application for said reasons and allowed appellant to file within ten days petition for leave to appear and defend the suit, which would be decided by Banking Court on merits Appeal was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 160 of 2002, heard on 13-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "NAJABAT --Appellant\nVs.\nA.D.B.P. HEAD OFFICE through Branch Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12717",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2282 = 2002 SLD 2282 = 2002 CLD 1697",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)Ss. 12, 9(5), 10 & 22 Ex parte decree, setting aside Of ¬Service on wrong address Notice issued to appellant through process serving agency and those appearing in press citation contained his wrong address Contention of respondent Bank' was that notices sent through courier service and registered A.D. post were sent at correct address of appellant Validity Had correct address of appellant been given in the notices sent through process serving agency, he could have been served and would thereafter have entered appearance High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned order and allowed ten days to appellant to file application for leave to appear and defend suit before Banking Court, who would decide same within a further period of one month.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.114 of 2002, heard on 10-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SAEED SHEIKH --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. through Naeem Shuja, Branch Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12718",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2283 = 2002 SLD 2283 = 2002 CLD 1698",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 12 & 21 Ex parte decree Dismissal of application for setting aside such decree Contention of appellants raised in appeal was that Bank had wrongly calculated mark up Validity Appellants in application for leave to defend the suit had acknowledged their liability to repay the amount of finance availed by them No room for denial of liability at appellate stage in view of said admission High Court granted two adjournments to appellants to approach respondent Bank for purpose of showing to, Bank the basis of their assertion for not having calculated mark up properly Appellants neither approached Bank nor showed any valid reason for such omission High Court in circumstance inferred that appellants were attempting to delay the decision in appeal Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 162 of 2001, heard on 13-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AKBAR SOAP FACTORY and another --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12719",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2284 = 2002 SLD 2284 = 2002 CLD 1700",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S. 18 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XXI, R.89 ¬Execution of decree Court auction of land in favour of decree holder Bank Objection to such sale Appellant (Judgment debtor) and another debtor showed their willingness td purchase such land belonging to them ¬Banking Court with consent of hank allowed both the debtors to deposit auction price plus 596 separately by specified date Other debtor deposited the amount, whereas appellant failed to do so, on which Banking Court dismissed his objection petition ¬Validity Disputed land was part of a joint Khata owned by appellant, other debtors including auction¬-purchaser ( debtor) Auction purchaser ( ¬-debtor) possessed a valid and subsisting interest in such land apart from having a subsisting interest in entire Khata and thus he was entitled to acquire the land auctioned in favour of Bank Such right was available to auction¬ purchaser (Judgment debtor) under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. ¬Appellant had failed to abide by his commitment and his Constitutional petition to assail such order had also been dismissed Impugned order was not open to exception in such circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.305 of 2001, heard on 11-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "GHULAM RASOOL --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 4\nothers --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12720",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2285 = 2002 SLD 2285 = 2002 CLD 1703",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) S.12 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLI, R. 17(2) ¬Hearing of appeal ex parte Appeal was represented Name of counsel for respondent Bank had been published in cause list, but none had entered appearance to represent respondent Bank despite various calls were made High Court after exhausting its cause list on that day proceeded ex parte against respondent Bank. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) \n \n Ss. 6, 8 & 12 State Bank of Pakistan Circular No. 19, dated 5 6 1997 Sttit for recovery of Bank loan Banking Court dismissed the defendants' application for leave to defend and decreed the suit Appeal was admitted for regular hearing after defendants furnished requisite security as directed by High Court Defendants after settling their matter with Bank pursuant to an incentive scheme, filed application for setting aside impugned /decree High Court proceeded ex parte against Bank as none appeared on its behalf Photocopies of pay-¬in slips placed on record showed payment of outstanding amount as undertaken by defendants Contents of application were correct as same were supported by an affidavit coupled with the receipts, undertakings and other allied documents Defendants had liquidated their liabilities incurred through passing of impugned /decree while availing the incentive scheme introduced by State Bank of Pakistan vide Circular No. 19, dated 5 6 1997 Impugned /decree stood satisfied, which explained the absence of Bank as well as of its counsel Appeal stood allowed having been fructified on account of satisfaction of impugned /decree, thus, no executable decree remained in the field.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.40 of 1994, heard on 18-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJA MUHAMMAD SABIR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "M.N. IFFI OIL MILLS through Sole Proprietor and another --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12721",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2286 = 2002 SLD 2286 = 2002 CLD 1707",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 10 & 22 Suit for recovery of money Leave to defend Plea of defendant was that he had not issued any cheque for drawing amount in question from Bank Banking Court rejected application for leave to defend and passed the decree Validity None had appeared for the Bank to controvert the statement or produce in Court the cheque issued by defendant Banking Court dismissed such application without justification, though defendant had shown a substantial defence High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the /decree, allowed the application filed by defendant for leave to appear and defend the suit, and remanded the case to Banking Tribunal for its decision as a regular long cause.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.118 of 2002, decision dated: 10-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL RAZZAQ --Appellant\nVs.\nA. D. B. P. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12722",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2287 = 2002 SLD 2287 = 2002 CLD 1708",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 17 & 22 Decree for .recovery of money Relief claimed in appeal was that appellant wanted to make payment of decretal debt, in instalments Validity ¬Appellant after passing of decree had not paid any amount to respondent Bank in satisfaction thereof No equity was in favour of appellant, thus, he was not entitled to any relief or indulgence High Court dismissed the appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 439 of 2002, decision dated: 20-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL SATTAR --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12723",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2288 = 2002 SLD 2288 = 2002 CLD 1709",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 17, 10 & 21 Decree for recovery of loan amount against guarantors/ mortgagors Validity Alleged guarantors were neither party nor signatory nor witness to the deed, thus, on its strength, they had not incurred any liabilities Bank had impleaded said guarantors as defendants in the suit for the reason that they were shown as co owners in original title deed of the land deposited with Bank Memorandum of deposit of title deed had been executed solely by borrower, wherein he had acknowledged only surrender of original title deed relating to land, which already stood partitioned amongst him and alleged guarantors through registered agreement of partition ¬Banks reliance on original title deed was misconceived and unfounded as same was under erroneous assumption that total land had been mortgaged in its favour by borrower¬defendant and completely forgetting mentioning of partition agreement itself in memorandum of deposit of title deed Alleged guarantors in leave application had raised a specific plea that they were neither borrowers nor guarantors nor mortgagors, but Banking Court had not given any findings on such material aspect of the case Banking Court without adverting to such plea, without determining their liabilities in suit and without examining the documents on record qua appellants had proceeded to pass impugned and decree saddling them with colossal liability of suit amount Alleged guarantors had no nexus with execution of memorandum of deposit of title deed and their land was mortgaged with Bank High Court accepted appeal of the alleged guarantors and set aside impugned /decree to the extent of guarantors while maintained same against remaining defendants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.233 of 1998, heard on 19-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJA MUHAMMAD SABIR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs RAJPUT DAIRY FARM (PVT.) LIMITED and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Vice President (General Attorney) --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12724",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2289 = 2002 SLD 2289 = 2002 CLD 1730",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 9, 17 & 22 Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42 Suit for declaration by plaintiffs to discharge liability of their deceased father under an incentive scheme issued by Bank Plaints on 30 11 2000 attempted to make payment of 20% of outstanding amount, but same was not accepted by Bank Plaintiffs then filed suit on 21 12 2000 and Court directed them to deposit entire amount as per terms of incentive scheme on or before 31 12 2000, which was done accordingly Banking Court dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs in order to qualify for the benefit of incentive scheme, had not deposited sum of 20% within month of November, 2000 Validity Plaintiffs had themselves made an attempt to make such payment ¬Plaintiffs' bona fides were shown from the fact that they had paid entire amount due under the scheme on 21 12 2000, which was well before its expiry on 31 12 2000 Suit, in. circumstances, could not have been dismissed High Court accepted the appeal and set aside impugned and decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.203 of 2002, decision dated: 19-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and another --Appellants\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12725",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2290 = 2002 SLD 2290 = 2002 CLD 1732",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 17 & 22 Decree Appeal High Court decreed the suit in favour of Bank with consent of parties Decretal amount was to be payable within three months Appellant would be entitled to negotiate sale of her house, but purchaser thereof would deposit decretal amount directly with Bank In case of appellant's failure to deposit decretal amount within such time, decree would stand restored, which Bank would be entitled to enforce through all available means High Court disposed of the appeal in such terms.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 148 of 2002, heard on 18-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. TABASUM NAZ --Appellant\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12726",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2291 = 2002 SLD 2291 = 2002 CLD 1733",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 19 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R.58 Execution proceedings Objection to sale of mortgaged property Investigation of claim Objection of debtor was that his rights in property purchased by him out of disputed Khasra number, might not be prejudiced by sale of property mortgaged by him with Bank Bank stated at the Bar that only property of debtor mortgaged with Bank would be sold in execution of decree High Court disposed of the appeal in view of such undertaking given by the Bank.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 147 of 2000, decision dated: 11-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "AMIR SAEED --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs CITIBANK, N.A. and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12727",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2292 = 2002 SLD 2292 = 2002 CLD 1737",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 17 & 22 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 126 Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 58(f) Decree for recovery of loan amount Appellant denied to have executed guarantee or any memorandum of deposit of title deed in favour of Bank Appellant while explaining the custody to his title deed with Bank stated that another respondent (a preacher) had obtained same under some inducement with the object of producing same as security Validity Appellant could not give any detail where title deed was to be shown. or the property comprised therein was offered as security ¬Appellant had not taken steps for almost seven years to retrieve title deed deposited with Bank Stance adopted by appellant was devoid of merit High Court dismissed the appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.220 of 2002, heard on 20-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "RAFIQUE HAZQUEL MASIH --Appellant\nVs.\nBANK ALFALAH LTD. and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12728",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2293 = 2002 SLD 2293 = 2002 CLD 1739",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 12, 9(5) & 22 Ex prate decree, setting aside of Plea of appellant defendant was that neither she was served nor did she file application for leave to defend nor did she appoint any counsel to represent her Banking Court dismissed her application on the ground that application seeking leave to appear and defend filed by other defendants had stated that same was on behalf of the defendant Validity Appellant had not filed any application seeking leave to appear and defend nor had she engaged any counsel to represent her Signature of the appellant did not appear either on leave application or on affidavit in support thereof Record showed that no summons had been issued to the appellant Service through registered post had not been effected on appellant as postal endorsement showed that she was not residing at the given address Contention of respondent Bank that service on two defendants i.e. the Company and its Managing Director, constituted proper service on appellant defendant, was wholly devoid of merit as appellant had been sued in her capacity of guarantor High Court set aside impugned order and allowed the application for setting aside of ex parte decree to the extent of appellant, who would be entitled to file leave application within 10 days, which would be decided by Banking Court in accordance with the provisions of Ordinance, 2001. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S. 9(5) Issuance of summons to defendant Prescribed modes of service Duty of Banking Court to issue process in each .of the four modes of service prescribed under the Ordinance.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 173 of 2002, heard on 13-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SAEEDA --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and 3 other --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12729",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2294 = 2002 SLD 2294 = 2002 CLD 1742",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 18(6) & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90 Execution proceedings Objection to sale of property Investigation of claim Direction of Executing Court to deposit 2096 of sale price Failure of appellant/ debtor to make such deposit Dismissal of application Contention of appellant was that such application had to be dealt with in accordance with S. 18(6) of the Act and provisions of O. XXI, R.90, C.P.C. were not to be followed Validity Provisions of C.P.C., stood excluded by non obstante clause of S. 18(6) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Execution Court had to decide the objection in respect of attachment or sale of property within 30 days, and if it found that such allegation was filed mala fide to delay the sale it could impose penalty up to 2096 of sale price executing Court had acted in violation of the Act by directing appellant to make a deposit of 2096 of sale price as a condition precedent for hearing ,of objection High Court accepted the appeal and set aside impugned order with the result, that objection petition filed by appellant would be deemed to be pending before Executing Court to be decided in accordance with provisions of S.18(6) of the Act. \n \nPakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Limited, Peshawar Cantt. and others v. Government of Pakistan through Collector Customs, Customs House, Jamrood Road, Peshawar and others 2002 CLD 1 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 163 of 2001, heard on 4-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND PARVEZ AHMED, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MAJID & SONS and another ers\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12730",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2295 = 2002 SLD 2295 = 2002 CLD 1745",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 15 & 21 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 73 Decree for recovery of loan amount with liquidated damages ¬Validity Neither there was any basis on record nor any justification had been given in the plaint to burden appellants with liability of liquidated damages Bank could not justify its claim for liquidated damages Banking Court had wrongly awarded such claim to Bank High Court partly allowed the appeal, modified the decree and reduced the amount of liquidated damages decreed by Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.662 of 2001, decision dated: 25-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "BUSHRA KHIZAR and another --Appellants\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12731",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2296 = 2002 SLD 2296 = 2002 CLD 1745",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 15 & 21 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 73 Decree for recovery of loan amount with liquidated damages ¬Validity Neither there was any basis on record nor any justification had been given in the plaint to burden appellants with liability of liquidated damages Bank could not justify its claim for liquidated damages Banking Court had wrongly awarded such claim to Bank High Court partly allowed the appeal, modified the decree and reduced the amount of liquidated damages decreed by Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.662 of 2001, decision dated: 25-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "BUSHRA KHIZAR and another --Appellants\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12732",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2297 = 2002 SLD 2297 = 2002 CLD 1758",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 18, 22(1), 7(2) & 21 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.181 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.48 -Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Constitutional petition Execution of decree Limitation Decree was passed on 30 9 1981 Execution application was filed on 30 5 1997 Executing Court dismissed such application as time barred Validity Execution application had mentioned another application having been filed and dismissed, but no details about dates of its institution and decision had been given High Court assumed that first application had been filed within time prescribed by law, which was three years commencing from date of decree Limitation for second application for execution was not prescribed by Limitation Act, 1908, but was prescribed by S.48, C.P.C. Provisions of S.48, C.P.C. prohibited Court from making an order for execution of decree on any fresh application presented after expiry of six years from date of decree sought to be executed Present execution application squarely fell within the ambit of S.48(a), C.P.C. Section 22(1) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 had done away with the application of Limitation Act, 1908 but not the provisions of S.48, C.P.C., which Banking Court was bound to follow by virtue of S.7(2) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 High Court dismissed the appeal being devoid of merits. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.18 & 21(1) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 ¬Constitutional petition Competency Dismissal of execution petition Right of appeal available, but not availed -Impugned order had the effect of preventing the sale of property by Banking Court and was appealable under S.21(1) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 High Court dismissed the Constitutional petition as being not competent. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah.672 and Messrs Shahzad Ice Factory and 2 others v. Special Judge Banking(II), Lahore and another PLD 1982 Lah.92 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.2419 of 1998, heard on 17-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD. er\nVs.\nZULFIQAR ALI KHAN and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12733",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2298 = 2002 SLD 2298 = 2002 CLD 1761",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- S.22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.96(3) Consent decree Appeal against Appeal against decree passed in consequence of a settlement/ arrangement entered into between parties Maintainability Consent decree was not appealable under S.96(3). C.P.C. Bank had certified adjustment of its account by appellant under an incentive scheme High Court dismissed the appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.254 of 1995, decision dated: 23rd July, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Abdul Waheed Chaudhry, \nAttorney, N.B.P. --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs SHAHEED CHEMICALS through Proprietor and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12734",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2299 = 2002 SLD 2299 = 2002 CLD 1762",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) --Ss. 6 & 12 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, Rr. 2(2) & 3 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5 Suit for recovery of loan amount Defendants failed to appear and file application for leave to appear and defend suit under O.XXXVII, R.3, C.P.C. Bank upon direction of Court produced original documents including statement of accounts, which were exhibited Banking Court found that defendant had availed loan facility and executed documents, but dismissed the suit on the basis of statement of accounts Validity Bank in absence of defendant's application for leave to appear and defend suit was straightaway entitled to decree in view of provisions of 0.11, R. 2(2), C.P.C., and there was no need to call upon Bank to produce original documents ¬Incorrect statement of accounts would not entail dismissal of suit straightaway Documents on record and statement of accounts did show that defendant had availed financial facility and had not repaid same, thus, Bank was entitled to recover outstanding amount from him, more so when defendants had opted to remain absent and had not deemed proper to place their view point before Court ¬Banking Court had non suited Bank on extraneous consideration in complete oblivion of the documents available on record Some unauthorized and questionable entries were found in statement of accounts High Court accepted the appeal, set aside impugned / decree and remanded the case to Banking Court constituted under S.5 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of .Finances) Ordinance, 2001 for its decision afresh after taking into consideration documents on record, statement of accounts and hearing the parties in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No 85 of 1995, heard on 25-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nA.D.B.R, Sheikhupura --Appellant\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD ASHRAF SHAMIM --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12735",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2300 = 2002 SLD 2300 = 2002 CLD 1767",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) -- S.11 Res judicata, principle of Applicability Where prayers in earlier and subsequent suits and petitions for interim injunctions were different, such matter was not hit by the principle of res judicata.\n \n(b) Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance (V of 1970) \n \n Ss.13, 14 & 15 Breach of provisions of Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 Inquiry into such breach Legality ¬Procedure Proper inquiry can be conducted and to that extent witnesses can be summoned and examined on oath ¬Notices for production of documents for the purposes of recording the evidence, the issuing of commission for the examination of witnesses etc. are required to be sent for the purpose of coming to a fair and just conclusion.\n \n(c) Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance (V of 1970) --\n \n Ss.2, 3, 6 & 11 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11 Plaint, rejection of Recovery of war risk surcharge ¬Assertion of plaintiff in the plaint was that shipping line and liner conference had joined hands and formed a sort of cartel and thereafter imposed a form of a to under the name of war risk surcharge Contention of plaintiff was that Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970, prohibited undue concentration of economic power unreasonably, monopoly power or unreasonable restrictive trade practice Validity Plaintff failed to realize that once it was claimed that there was an unreasonable restrictive trade practice and that there was a violation of S.3 of Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970, then ipso facto S.11 of the Ordinance of 1970 would come into play Plaintiff did not avail all remedies provided under Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 Plaint was rejected in circumstances.\n \n(d) Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance (V of 1970) ------\n \n Ss.2, 3, 6 & 11 War risk surcharge, levy of Remedy ¬Suit before Civil Court Maintainability Contention of the plaintiff was that war risk surcharge being levied was void and illegal, contrary to the provisions of Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970, and the same could be assailed in civil suit before Civil Courts Validity When remedy was available under the, provisions of Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970, seeking of relief by way of civil suit was not proper.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suits Nos. 175, 176 and 189; Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 1567 and 1049 of 2002, decision dated: 3rd July, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALVI, J",
    "": "SAPPHIRE TEXTILE MILLS LTD. and others --Plaintiffs\nVs.\nA.P.L. PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12736",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2301 = 2002 SLD 2301 = 2002 CLD 1772",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) -- S.9 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29 Appeal ¬Condonation of delay Filing of time barred appeal without application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay Office returned appeal after raising objection in regard to limitation .7e filing of appeal with application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay Validity Appeal was admittedly barred by time Period of filing of. appeal having been specified in S.9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, provisions of S.29 of Limitation Act, 1908 were applicable ¬Delay in filing of appeal could not be condoned under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 or any other legal provision.\n \nMessrs Munir & Co., Kamalia and 2 others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited through 2 Attorneys 2002 CLD 657 and, Majeed Akbar Farooqi v. Bank of Punjab through Manager (Attorney) 2002 CLD 778 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6 Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.17(2) Decree for recovery of loan amount against defendants¬-guarantors Non attestation of personal guarantees by witnesses Effect Such and decree not void merely because Banking Tribunal had found that personal guarantees furnished by defendants had not been attested in accordance with law.\n \n(c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) --\n \n Ss. 3 & 5 Void order or order without jurisdiction ¬Connotation Distinction Condonation of gross negligence Order being void or without jurisdiction Scope and distinctive features elaborated.\n \nVoid order or an order without jurisdiction is only a type of an illegal order passed by a Court, and the fact that it has been passed and that it may, therefore, create rights cannot be altered by describing it as void or without jurisdiction. Expressions void order and orders without jurisdiction are over worked expressions, which are no doubt relevant in some contexts, but it would be better to use these expressions in the narrow and original sense of lack of competence of the Court or Tribunal \"\"to enter on the enquiry in questions\"\".\n \nMessrs Conforce Ltd. v. Syed Ali Shah and others PLD 1977 SC 599 and Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission and others (1969) 2 AC 147 fol.\n \n(d) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) --\n \n S.9 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29 Appeal ¬Condonation of delay Sufficient cause Judgment and decree were passed on 21 12 1996 Application for obtaining certified copies was made on 22 12 1996, which were prepared and delivered to appellant on 9 1 1996 ¬Appeal was filed on 19 2 1996 without application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay Office on 26 2 1996 returned the appeal after raising objection in regard to limitation Appeal was re filed on 4 3 1996 alongwith application under S.5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay Validity Present was the clear case of negligence in filing the appeal in time Reasons given in application did not constitute sufficient cause, which would have justified condonation of delay, had the provisions of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 been applicable to present appeal High Court dismissed the appeal being barred by time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 102 of 1996, decision dated: 17-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "M. JAVED BUTTAR AND SYED, JAMSHED ALI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs BIO TECH. (PVT.) LTD. Through Javed Qureshi and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12737",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2302 = 2002 SLD 2302 = 2002 CLD 1776",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) -- Ss.6; 9 & 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.12(2), 151 & O.XXVII A, R.1 -Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 & Fourth Shed., Entry No. 28 Constitutional petition Concealment of facts by petitioner Effect Suit for recovery of Bank dues Banking Tribunal decreed the suit after finding reply to show cause notice to be time barred ¬Defendants filed three applications i.e. under S.6(5) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and S.12(2) and O.XXVII A, R.1, C.P.C. Banking Tribunal dismissed all applications Contention of defendants was that Banking Tribunal established by Federal Government had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the suit filed by Bank, a Provincial Corporation Validity High Court had decided such question of law vide dated 11 7 1996 passed in the case of M/s. Chenab Cement Products (Pvt.) Ltd. and others. v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others (PLD 1996 Lah.672), whereby s and decrees of Banking Tribunal passed prior thereto had been saved on the basis of well known principle of past and closed transaction ¬Present decree was passed on 23 5 1995 i.e. prior to said decision of High Court Defendants had alternative remedy to file appeal under S.9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 which had not been filed Defendants by not attaching copy of reply to show cause notice with Constitutional petition had concealed material facts from High Court regarding raising or non raising the point of jurisdiction in such reply Defendants had not approached the Court with clean hands High Court declined to exercise discretion in favour of defendants Defendants had made such applications in order to frustrate the decree granted to Bank, which otherwise had attained finality High Court dismissed the Constitutional petition as having no merits.\n \nImran v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Special Court No.VI, Multan and 2 others PLD 1996 Lah. 542; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and others v. Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao and others PLD 1992 SC 723; Federal Public Service Commission and others v. Syed Muhammad Afaq and others PLD 2002 SC 167; Messrs Indus Match Co. Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd. and another 1996 CLC 1378; Messrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672; Abdur Rashid v. Pakistan and others 1969 SCMR 141; Messrs Grain Systems (Pvt.) Ltd. and 10 others v. Agricultural Development Bank 1993 SCMR 1996; Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali and others v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1973 SC 236 and Rana Muhammad Arshad v. Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Multan Division and others 1998 SCMR 1462 ref.\n \n(b) Equity \n \n \n He who seeks equity must come with clean hands.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.23190 of 1998, decision dated: 18-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs TRADE LINES through Managing Partner and others ers\nVs. \nBANK OF PUNJAB through General Manager and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12738",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2303 = 2002 SLD 2303 = 2002 CLD 1781",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) -- Ss. 305, 309, 333 & 10(2) Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.126 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) ¬Winding up of Company Direction by High Court for encashment of investment guarantee- Validity Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to consider, whether the official liquidator should have lodged the claim under the Bank Guarantee up to the last extended validity date or he should have encashed the Bank guarantee on the date when the High Court accepted the official liquidator's reference.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872) --\n \n S. 126 Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1884), Ss.305, 309, 333 & 10(2) Contract of guarantee Financial Institution was creditor while the guarantee was provided by a Bank which was surety Said guarantee had been executed for the benefit of the company (creditor) now under liquidation Essence of the guarantee was that the guarantor had agreed to discharge the liability of the debtor if the latter failed in performing his liability which all depended on the terms of the guarantee and guarantor could not be made liable beyond the terms of his guarantee Whatever the guarantor had undertaken, the same had to be performed Guarantee having been executed by the Bank, satisfaction of the same could not be avoided on mere technicalities.\n \nPrudential Commercial Bank Limited v. Hydari Ghee Industries Limited and others 1999 MLD 1694 ref.\n \n(c) Contract Act (IX of 1872) --\n \n S. 126 Bank guarantee Liability of guarantor Scope ¬Liability of guarantor depends on the language of the guarantee Terms of the guarantee would demonstrate how far the guarantor has bound itself to indemnify the creditor Guarantee may be absolute or conditional, dependant on the performance of a condition by either party within the terms of the guarantee.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n Ss.316 & 333 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.126 ¬Liqi.~'d.ation of company Bank guarantee, encashment of ¬Jurisdiction Company Judge to order encashment of Bank guarantee given on behalf of the company in liquidation ¬Scope Bank had undertaken to pay a specified amount to the creditor (financial institution) if the borrower failed to raise \"\"capital within the stipulated period No condition whatsoever was attached to the performance of the creditor before making demand Guarantee was extended from time to time Time limit in the guarantee was for the borrower to raise the capital within the stipulated period, failure whereof had given unconditional right to the creditor for encashment of Bank guarantee No time limit having been provided for the creditor, as such the direction given by the Company Judge could not be frustrated on that score ¬Contention that separate suit should have been filed for encashment of Bank guarantee and the Company Judge had no jurisdiction to order encashment of the same in liquidation proceedings was devoid of any force.\n \nDiscount Bank of India Ltd., Delhi v. Triloki Nath and others AIR 1953 Punj. 145; Knowles v. Scott (1891) 1 Ch. 717; Palmer's Company Law, p.414; Manager, Jammu and Kashmir, State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678 and Imtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali PLD 1963 SC 382 ref.\n \n(e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n Ss. 316 & 333 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.126 ¬Liquidation of company Powers of Company Judge and function of Official Liquidator detailed Bank guarantee which was executed for the benefit of the company under liquidation could not be frustrated by putting up technicalities so as to thwart the efficient performance of the liquidator Pushing the creditor for encashment of Bank guarantee through a civil suit would simply be generating multiplicity of litigation which was not the mandate of law ¬Mere. technicalities unless offering insurmountable hurdle not to be allowed to defeat ends of justice.\n \nSection 316 of the Companies Ordinance has given the Company Judge overriding powers for disposing of any matter germane to the winding up proceedings. The principal object of winding up of a company is to realize its property and its liabilities are discharged in accordance with law. The official liquidator who is an officer of the Court is appointed by the Company Judge who looks after and supervises the interests of all the parties concerned in a liquidation of a company. He is a trustee not only for the creditor but for the company under liquidation as well. He has to safeguard the interests of all the parties for the efficient performance of his duties. He is to take possession of movable and immovable properties of the company. Section 333 of the Ordinance has given wide powers to the official liquidator which are exercised by him under the supervision of Company Judge who has been authorised to issue such directions.\n \nThe official liquidator has got ample powers to take steps for the efficient winding up of the company so as to create a balance among the interest of the parties according to law and the rules.\n \nIn a winding up the liquidator acts not merely for creditor but for contributories and for the company also. A liquidator is an agent employed for the purpose of winding up of the company. In some respells he is a trustee; but he is not a trustee for each individual creditor: see Knowles v. Scott (1891) 1 Ch. 717 at p.723. His principal duties are to take possession of assets, to make out the requisite lists of contributories and creditors, to have disputed cases adjudicated upon, to realise the assets subject to the control of the Court in certain matters and to apply the proceeds in payment of the company debts and liabilities in due course of administration, and, having done that, to divide the surplus amongst the contributories and to adjust their rights. Any proceedings necessary for the protection of the property are taken by the liquidator in the name of the company, unless the Court has made a vesting order, in which case he can sue in his official name is respect of property vested in him by the order. He can institute or defend any suit with the sanction of the Court and, he can take any other legal proceedings, civil or criminal, also with such sanction.\n \nIn the present case the bank guarantee was got executed for the benefit of the company under liquidation by the Bank as such the same could not be frustrated by putting up technicalities so as to thwart the efficient performance of the liquidator. What was permissible for the Courts of general jurisdiction in the interest of justice, fairplay and equity when there was no statutory bar, was also permissible for the Company Judge so as to spare the parties from the ordeal of rushing from one forum to another for the redressal of their grievance. All legal formalities were to safeguard the paramount interest of justice. In the present case pushing the creditor for the encashment of bank guarantee through a civil suit would simply be generating multiplicity of litigation which was not the mandate of law. The guarantor in the present case particularly the 'Bank could not avoid its liability on all these technicalities.\n \nMere technicalities, unless offering insurmountable hurdle, should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice.\n \nDiscount Bank of India Ltd., Delhi v. Triloki Nath and others AIR 1953 Punj. 145; Knowles v. Scott (1891) 1 Ch. 717; Palmer's Company Law, p.414; Manager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678 and Imtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali PLD 1963 SC 382 ref.\n \n(f) Administration of Justice ------\n \n Mere technicalities unless offering insurmountable hurdle should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice.\n \nImtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali PLD 1963 SC 382 ref.\n \n(g) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) --\n \n Art. 185 Appeal to Supreme Court New plea ¬Appellant had not raised the plea of jurisdiction before the High Court and fully participated in the proceedings ¬Such plea could not be raised before the Supreme Court.\n \nGhulam Mohi ud Din v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (Pakistan), Lahore and others PLD 1964 SC 875 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 517 of 1993, decision dated: 21st March, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAVED IQBAL, HAMID ALI MIRZA AND TANVIR AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nPAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LTD. and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12739",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2304 = 2002 SLD 2304 = 2002 CLD 1794",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.I, R.10 Scope of O.I, R.10, C.P.C. is very wide Power to transpose is derived amongst others, from O.I, R.10, C.P.C., which has to be interpreted liberally in the interest of complete adjudication of all the questions involved in a lis and in order to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings Such power by the Court is invariably exercised generously and technical hurdles are always bypassed for considerations of effectual adjudication and inexpensive access to justice.\n \nSaid Alam v. Raja Sohrab Khan 1970 SCMR 639; Central Government of Pakistan v. Suleman Khan PLD 1992 SC 590 and Uzin Export Import Enterprises v. Union Bank of Middle East Ltd. PLD 1994 SC 95 ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n S.305 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(2) ¬Appeal to Supreme Court Winding up of company Law leans in favour of adjudication on merits and in winding up cases, utmost endeavour should be made for survival of the Corporate sector rather than to dismantle the same ¬Winding up proceedings against the company in the present case, having been pending for more than two years, Supreme Court found it just, proper and expedient in the interest of justice to decide the appeal on merits rather than to remand the same to the High Court after such delay Object and spirit of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 is to dispose of such cases with utmost promptitude and an appeal before Supreme Court is required to be finally decided within a time span of ninety days.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n S.305 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(2) ¬Appeal to Supreme Court Winding up of a Banking Company Appeal on behalf of ex Chairman of the company Maintainability Order of winding up having been passed against the company, company alone as a juristic person or an aggrieved creditor could appeal for its survival rather than a former Chairman, who had not disclosed/produced his pecuniary or any other legal interest in the company or any resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the company and was lawfully superseded by State Bank of Pakistan and was a convict by a competent Court of law Such person in his personal capacity was not competent to assail the winding up order without authorization of the company and after the supersession of the company by the State Bank of Pakistan, his connections with the company were completely severed -Mismanagement and corrupt practices by the said person, in fact, had brought the company to the state of liquidation and his conviction, unless set aside by Supreme Court, would be an ample proof of his disqualification Appeal by such person against order of liquidation as constituted was thus, liable to dismissal on such score alone.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n S.306 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10 ¬Winding up proceedings in case of a Financial Institution ¬Financial Institution had incurred losses over four Billions of Rupees against capital of Rs.0.656 Billion and was unable to pay its debts State Bank of Pakistan became party to the proceedings on its transposition/substitution after withdrawal of the other party and none of its previous members objected to such supersession Statutory notice under S.306, Companies Ordinance, 1984 were already given by the said party and having failed to respond to the notices, petition for winding up was filed against the Financial Institution State Bank of Pakistan, after transposition/substitution as petitioner was not required to start afresh by issuing notice under S.306, Companies Ordinance, 1984 as non service of notice under S.306, Companies Ordinance, 1984 was not fatal to the petition as a whole as the provision was directory in nature and led to the presumption of inability to pay debt in case demand was not secured or debt not settled.\n \nSindh Glass Industries Limited v. National Development Finance Corporation PLD 1996 SC 601 and Platinum Insurance Company Limited v. Daewoo Corporation PLD 1999 SC 1 ref.\n \n(e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n S. 306 Inability of a company to pay its debts ¬Section 306 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 is a self ¬contained provision to judge the viability of the company ¬Use of word or' between cls. (a), (b) & (c) of S.306(1) brings to the conclusion that said clauses are disjunctive in nature and independent of each other Company thus would be deemed to be unable to pay its debts if any of the courses provided in S.306 is adopted.\n \n(f) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n S.306 Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962), Ss.41 A & 41 B Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10 Petition for winding up proceedings of a Financial Institution Inability of the institution to pay its debts ¬State Bank of Pakistan enjoyed supervisory power under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 over the Financial Institutions and for that reason, in exercise of its power under the said Ordinance, could remove the Directors and other managerial persons according to law State Bank of Pakistan, in the interest of such Financial Institution and the public at large, could also step into the arena to save the creditors Courts of law also had the powers under O.I, R.10, C.P.C. to allow transposition of State Bank of Pakistan in the proceedings against the Financial Institution.\n \nManager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property v. Khuda Yar PLD 1975 SC 678 and Imtiaz Ali v. Ghulam Ali PLD 1963 SC 382 ref.\n \n(g) Administration of justice ----\n \n Procedures are meant only to regulate and foster the cause of justice and not to thawart the same.\n \nManager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property v. Khuda Yar PLD 1975 SC 678 and Imtiaz Ali v. Ghulam Ali PLD 1963 SC 382 ref.\n \n(h) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) --\n \n Ss.41 A & 41 B Scope and appreciation of Ss.41 A & 41 B, Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962.\n \nWhile section 41 A of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 enumerates powers of the State Bank of Pakistan to remove Directors and other managerial persons from the office for reasons to be recorded in writing and after giving a reasonable opportunity' of hearing to the Chairman or Director or Chief Executive of the company, section 41 B of the said Ordinance highlights the powers of the State Bank to supersede a Board of Directors of the Banking Company. Strictly speaking the action taken by the State Bank of Pakistan as aforesaid may not tantamount to taking over control and management of the affairs of the Company but it is restricted to supersession of the Board of Directors by their removal and substitution in the discretion of the Bank. BY supersession and substitution of the Board of Directors of a Company. State Bank of Pakistan does not acquire itself any proprietary or controlling powers in the assets or affairs of the Company, which are to be run and administered by the newly ¬appointed Board of Directors under the Articles of Association and Bye laws of the Company and subject to law.\n \n(i) Protection of Economic Reforms Act (XII of 1992) ----\n \n S.7 Object and scope of S.7, Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992.\n \nSpirit and object of section 7 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, being to create a liberal environment for savings and investments and lawful protection of economic reforms introduced by the Government in order to create confidence in economic policies introduced by Government, it was intended to protect ownership, management and control of any banking, commercial or other company, establishment or enterprise transferred by the Government to any person under any law with the understanding that it shall not be compulsorily acquired or taken over by the Government for any reason whatsoever. Real intention and object behind this provision of law seems to be that after disinvestments of an establishment or enterprise by the Government through Privatisation Commission or any other agency, Government shall not reacquire or take over the ownership, management and control of such establishment.\n \n(j) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) --\n \n Ss.41 A & 41 B Protection of Economic Reforms Act (X11 of 1992), Ss.3 & 7 Substitution of Board of Directors of a Banking Company by the State Bank of Pakistan would not in any sense of the term, amount to compulsory acquisition or take over of the privatized company by the Government -Notwithstanding the overriding effect of the provisions of Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 as spelt out from S.3 thereof, powers of State Bank of Pakistan under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 could neuner be abridged nor curtailed or taken away by intendment ¬Provisions of Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 by themselves were not in conflict with the provisions of Ss.41 A & 41 B of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 and the rule of harmonious interpretation of statutes, required that both the statutes would operate in their respective fields without any overlapping.\n \n(k) Judgment --\n \n Mere wrong citation of a provision of law in the order, would not per se vitiate the .\n \n(l) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n S.305 Order of winding up of company by High Court or a petition under S.305, Companies Ordinance, 1984 Mere reference to a wrong provision viz. S.50, Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 in the lawful winding up order by the High Court would pale into insignificance.\n \nLahore Improvement Trust v. Custodian, Evacuee Property West Pakistan PLD 1971 SC 811 and Baigan v. Abdul Hakeem 1982 SCMR 673 ref.\n \n(m) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n S. 305 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(2) ¬Appeal to Supreme Court Winding up of company ¬Company had completely lost its substratum and was neither viable nor commercially solvent to discharge its huge liabilities Nothing was available on record except a bald statement of the counsel in appeal on behalf of an unauthorized person to suggest that winding up order suffered from any illegality or factual and legal infirmity ¬High Court, in circumstances, was perfectly justified in arriving at the conclusion that it was just and equitable to order the winding up of the company.\n \nMunicipal Corporation of Pakistan v. Sindh Tech. Industries Ltd. 1999 MLD 2609; Sindh Glass Industries Ltd. v. National Development Finance Corporation PLD 1996 SC 601; Platinum Insurance Company Ltd. v. Daewoo Corporation PLD 1999 SC 1 and Hala Spinning Mills Ltd. v. International Finance Corporation 2002 SCMR 450 ref.\n \nPer Javed Iqbal, J. Contra Minority view, (paras.1 32)\n \nIndustrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Sarela Cement Limited Company 1993 CLC 1540; AIR 1953 Lah.633; Platinum Insurance Company Limited v. Daewoo Corporation PLD 1999 SC 1; PLD 1991 SC 1; 1989 CLC 1167; PLD 1998 Kar.71; 1998 CLC 543; AIR 1963 AP 243; AIR 1941 Pat. 603; PLD 1973 Lah. 60; PLD 1993 Kar.322; AIR 1920 Cal. 722; PLD 1990 Kar. 191; 1991 MLD 124 and 1990 CLC 1030 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1213 of 2001, decision dated: 25-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS, JAVED IQBAL AND SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA, JJ",
    "": "RAUF B. KADRI --Appellant\nVs. \nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12740",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2305 = 2002 SLD 2305 = 2002 CLD 1819",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) -- S.6(1)(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3) ¬Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to consider the scope of S.6(1)(d) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) --\n \n Ss.6(1)(d) & 2(l) Distinctive character of trade mark had to be established without any doubt Function of a trade mark primarily was to supply information to the purchaser about the trade mark from where the goods came ¬Expression \"\"trade mark\"\" having been defined in S.2(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, trade mark must fulfil the conditions mentioned in the definition of a trade mark.\n \n(c) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n S.6(d) Interpretation of S.6(1)(d) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 Foreign words are to be considered on the same footing as an ordinary descriptive word Principles.\n \nPerusal of clause (d) of section 6(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 shows that it is in two parts. The first one deals with.\"\" one or more words\"\" having no direct reference to the character and quality of the goods and second is about geographical name or surname or the name of a sect, caste or tribe in Pakistan. When a word has reference to the character or quality of the goods, such as, perfect superfine, best, splendid etc. it would mean as directly referring the character or quality of the goods, as such, would not qualify for registration. Conversely, the words, which do not describe the character or quality goods, would be registrable. Section 6 of the Act does not refer to any language. It being so, the foreign words are to be considered on the same footing as an ordinary descriptive word.\n \n(d) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) --\n \n S 6(1)(d) Distinctive character of trade mark Trade Mark by the surname not commonly understood in Pakistan but had only one significance of referring to surname which was known outside Pakistan was permissible to be registered for the restriction in S.6(1)(d), Trade Marks Act, 1940 was in respect of surname in Pakistan and not that outside of Pakistan View that the earth has become a global village and that the registration of such trade mark would have been in total disregard of international norms in respect of geographical names as well as surnames was against the provisions of S.6(1)(d) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 Principles.\n \nThe restriction in section 6(1)(d), Trade Marks Act, 1940 is in respect of surname in Pakistan and not that outside of Pakistan. The expression \"\"BORIS BECKER\"\" is not commonly understood in Pakistan and it simply refers to surname relating to outside Pakistan. It has only one signification of referring to surname, which is known outside of Pakistan.\n \nUnder the law relating to trade mark, a trade mark cannot be registered if it is devoid of any distinctive character or it is of the nature to deceive the public or cause confusion. Trade mark in question in the present case is not hit by section 6(1), clause (d) and its registration is sought in respect of games and playing things, which included many items. Surnames are commonly used as trade marks Always there is no difficulty when the surname is very rare as it helps in determining the distinctiveness.\n \nIn all cases of doubt it is advisable for the Registrar to err on the side of allowing registration as the proprietor does not get any exclusive right in respect of non ¬distinctive matter contained in the trade mark by registration of the trade mark. Therefore, there is no much of a benefit for the registration of the trade mark.\n \nSince in terms of section 6(1), clause (d) prohibition is confined to geographical name or surname, or the name of a sect, caste or tribe in Pakistan, no valid objection could be raised to its registration. The view that the earth has become a global village and that the registration would have been in total disregard of international norms in respect of geographical names as well as surnames are against the provisions of law, as laid down in section 6(1), clause (d). Such registrations, are permissible.\n \nSupreme Court set aside the of High Court and also the order of Deputy Registrar, Trade Marks with a direction to the latter to accept the application for registration of trade mark and dispose of the same according to law.\n \nHoechest Aktiengesellschaft v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Trade Marks Registry, Karachi Civil Appeals Nos.K 37 and K 38 of 1979 fol.\n \nLaw of Trade Mark in India by Ashwani K.R. Bansal, Edn. 2001, p.84 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1238 of 1995, decision dated: 21st May, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI, HAMID ALI MIRZA AND SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA, JJ",
    "": "TIVI B. V. (A DUTCH CORPORATION) THE NETHERLAND --Appellant\nVs. \nDEPUTY REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12741",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2306 = 2002 SLD 2306 = 2002 CLD 1827",
    "Key Words:": "Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Payment of Loans) Order, 1972 (Martial Law Order No. 241) -- Para. 6 cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Re payment of Loans) Ordinance (XIV of 1966), S.8 ¬Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54 Suit for declaration and injunction Recovery of loan Auction of mortgaged property Plaintiffs being minors at the time of auction participated through their father, who was brother of mortgagee and an employee of Cooperative Bank Such auction was cancelled as being collusive and irregular Suit filed by plaintiffs was dismissed by Trial Court, which was upheld by Appellate Court Validity Neither proclamation of auction proceedings nor any evidence in respect of its being held with prior permission of Board of Revenue had been produced by the plaintiffs Loan against borrower was Rs.1, 06, 992.75, but mortgaged property had been auctioned for Rs.4,500, which was a ridicules amount on its face Auction had been participated by an employee of Cooperative Bank on behalf of his minor sons (plaintiffs) Composite deposit of Zar e Chaharam and signing of cheque by minor showed that auction was void for not having been held in the manner and way it should have been held All such facts proved the collusion on record Findings of Courts below were issue wise, well ¬reasoned and passed within lawful jurisdiction Bank had received total loan from widows of borrower, which factor was not challenged till yet High Court dismissed the petition as being devoid of force.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.1291 D of 1998, decision dated: 2-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. FAKHAR UN NISA KHOKHAR, J",
    "": "Syed ABDULLAH SHAH and another ers\nVs.\nLahore High Court CENTRAL COOPERATIVE BANK through Manager and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12742",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2307 = 2002 SLD 2307 = 2002 CLD 1835",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Chartered Accountants Ordinance (X of 1961) -----Sched. II, Part 1, Cl. (1) Professional misconduct ¬Disclosure of information acquired by Chartered Accountant in the course of his professional engagement without consent of his client Effect Council could not require any member of Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan, whether directly or indirectly, to disclose such information as such disclosure would clearly constitute professional misconduct.\n \n(b) Chartered Accountants Ordinance (X of 1961) \n \n Sched. II, Part 1, Cl. (1) Bye Laws of. Chartered Accountants, 1983, Bye Law 8(3) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss.254, 255 & 257 Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969), S.34(4) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional petition ¬Professional misconduct Directive of council requiring practising Chartered Accountants to furnish to Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan a list of audited companies, otherwise renewal of certificate of practice might be refused to them Validity Any disclosure of information made by petitioner in compliance with such directives would automatically expose him to a charge of professional misconduct as wording of Cl. (1) of Part 1 of Second Sched. to Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 did not make an exception in respect of disclosures made to the Institute ¬Such directive was coercive as same contained threat that members of the Institute such as petitioner would loose their practising certificates, if they did not comply with such directive of Council Members of the Institute could not be required by means of any directive or threatened coercive process to commit professional misconduct as defined in Second Sched. to Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 ¬Working papers files would include client's information relating to audit ands review thereof by Institute would result in client's information becoming available to Institute, which would fall within ambit of professional misconduct as defined in Cl. (1) of Part 1 of Second Sched. to Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 Such directive without making suitable amendments in Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 could not be enforced by the Institute through coercive process set out in Bye Law 8(3) of Chartered Accountants Bye Laws, 1983.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.8987 of 2001, heard on 4-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J",
    "": "Chaudhri NAZIR AHMED ASAD, F. C.A. er\nVs.\nINSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF PAKISTAN and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12743",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2308 = 2002 SLD 2308 = 2002 CLD 1844",
    "Key Words:": "Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance (V of 1970) ----Ss. 3, 4(b), 11, 12(1)(a)(iii) & 20 Undue concentration of economic power Mill was technically, commercially and financially insolvent in 1987 Package offered by financial institution for revival of the mill required the appellant company that Rs.40 million due to it from the Mill would be subordinated to Financial Institution's debt and that no interest would be accrued thereon Authority directed the appellant Company to recover from the Mill its entire amount, which would have accrued as interest on Rs.40 million Validity Appellant Company had its equity at stake in the Mill and was also an unsecured creditor ¬Revival of Mill and its continued existence as a viable unit was in the best interest of appellant Company and its shareholders Appellant Company in such context had accepted the condition imposed by the Financial Institution through a valid resolution passed by its Shareholders at general meeting If such decision had not been taken, appellant Company would have lost both its investment in the Mill and trade receivables of Rs.40 million Such decision had saved the appellant Company and its shareholders from serious Financial loss which would have been caused, had the Mill been liquidated as an insolvent Company Authority while passing impugned order had ignored the material fact that Financial Institution a secured creditor of the Mill had written off the interest for 6 1 /2 years payable to it by the Mill If a secured creditor such as Financial Institution having a first charge over the assets of the kill could consider its best interest to be served by waiving accrued interest and by deferring payment of its debt * * by the Mill then appellant Company being an unsecured creditor had even more ,Justification for doing same, in furtherance of its business interest, No undue concentration of economic power as defined in S.4 of the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention Ordinance, 1970) had been brought about by decision of appellant Company to waive interest on trade debt payable by the Mill or by deferring payment of such debt High Court set aside the impugned order in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 156 of 2002, heard on 5-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J",
    "": "KOHINOOR TEXTILE MILLS LTD. Through Company Secretary --Appellant\nVs. \nMONOPOLY CONTROL AUTHORITY through Chairman, Government\nof Pakistan --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12744",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2837 = 2003 SLD 2837 = 2003 CLD 37",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) Ss. 54 & 58 Sale of immovable property Charge on property sold Plots in question had been mortgaged with Bank since 1990, as security for financial facility ¬Purchaser of the plots claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and relied upon sale deeds which were of latter date i.e. 24 3 1992 Effect Property was encumbered at the time of sale in favour of the purchasers and was not free of charge Such transaction could not be claimed a bona fide as the purchaser on due inquiry would have known of the fact of mortgage and encumbrances ¬Purchaser did not act with due care in the matter in circumstances. \n \n(b) Banking Companies, (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 9 & 18 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI R.58 Constitution of Pakistan (19731) Art. l99 -Constitutional petition Recovery of Bank loan Necessary parties Execution proceedings Objection under O.XXI, R.58, C.P.C. Petitioners claimed to be bona fide purchasers of properties mortgaged with the Bank on the basis of sale-¬deeds Banking Court disallowed the objection filed by the petitioners Petitioners claimed to be necessary party in the proceedings initiated by Bank against the borrower as they were bona fide purchasers of the properties for valuable consideration and the decree was obtained by Bank without impleading them in the suit Validity Bank proceeded on the basis of record available with it according to which the disputed property was mortgaged with the Bank Any dealing by the mortgagor/borrower would not have come its knowledge unless disclosed by the mortgagor, borrower Bank had acted in accordance with law, in suing only the parties to the transactions with it Mortgage of property and sale claimed by the petitioners being of a later date, no further investigation was warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case Banking Court had rightly dismissed the objection petition filed by the petitioners ¬Petition was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nMalik Munsif Awan for Petitioners.\n \nRespondent No. 10 in person.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 14160 of 1998, heard on 13-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD FARRUKH and 2 others ers\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager and 12 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12745",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2838 = 2003 SLD 2838 = 2003 CLD 39",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss. 6, 9 & 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.96 & O.XLI, R. 22 Banking Tribunal partly decreed the claim of the Bank Appeal by Bank in respect of its claim rejected by Banking Tribunal Cross objections by respondents under O.XLI, R.22, C.P.C., praying for dismissal of suit filed by Bank and decree for amount claimed by them as set off ¬Validity Judgment and decree passed by Banking Tribunal could not be challenged through any other mode/manner, except by way of appeal under S. 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, which too could be entertained after deposit of decretal amount Special law overrides the general law Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 being a special statute overrides the provisions of C.P.C. Provisions of S. 96 of C.P.C. had not been made applicable to Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 Respondents had failed to adhere to the provisions of S. 9 of the Ordinance Cross¬-objections filed by respondents and converted into appeal being not entertainable were dismissed by High Court in circumstances. \n \n(b) Appeal \n \n Right of appeal is the creation of a statute Such right is to be exercised according to that particular statute. \n \n(c) Interpretation of statutes \n \n Special law overrides the general law. \n \n(d) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n Ss. 6 & 9 Suit for recovery of loan amount Facility availed by defendants under Refinance Scheme of State Bank of Pakistan Plaintiff Bank paid amount of penalty imposed by State Bank for defendants' failure to ship the goods within prescribed period Defendants did not liquidate such liabilities Bank claimed such amount with 20% mark up Banking Tribunal declined such claim of Bank Validity State Bank of Pakistan. under relevant regulations, in case of non shipment of goods within prescribed period, was authorised to impose penalty upon defaulting party Penalty, in the present case had rightly been imposed Plaintiff Bank had paid such amount to State Bank of Pakistan, which Banking Tribunal ought to have awarded to Bank being entitled to same Banking Tribunal had committed legal error in declining such relief to Bank No agreement was available on record showing that defendants had agreed to 20% rate of mark up Statement of accounts showed that Bank had periodically charged mark up @ 6% for period 22 5 1986 to 30 12 1986, but only on 30 6 1987 had charged mark up @ 20% Bank according to its own showing could have charged mark up only.@ 6%, which rate appeared to be an agreed rate of mark up between parties Findings of Banking Tribunal that Bank was entitled to charge mark up @ 6% were not open to exception High Court partially allowed appeal and modified impugned and decree accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.218 and 383 ~of 1995, heard on 6-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED through Attorney --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs BLESSED INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LIMITED and 6\nothers --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12746",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2839 = 2003 SLD 2839 = 2003 CLD 46",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) S. 58(f) Equitable mortgage Deposit of duplicate or second copy of the title deed Validity Deposit of such documents would not create equitable mortgage. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss. 10(11), 17 & 22 Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 84 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.III, R.1, O.X, R.4 & O.IX, R.12 Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.58(f) Decree for recovery of loan amount against customers and guarantor, though guarantor had denied execution of mortgage deed and documents regarding furnishing of security Validity Guarantor in order to secure finance facility availed by customers had executed registered mortgage deed, an irrevocable power of attorney, memo. of deposit of title deed, and had handed over to Bank original allotment order issued by City Development Authority Guarantor had not appeared in Court, though was summoned by Banking Court to get her thumb-¬impression compared with those on original documents ¬Banking Court had itself made comparison of signatures on finance documents with guarantor's admitted signatures on other documents on record Banking Court had rightly rejected guarantor's application for leave to defend the suit and proceeded to decree the suit for her failure to raise any substantial question of law and facts needing trial of case ¬No exception could be taken to such High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances. \n \nMst. Rabia Bai v. National Bank of Pakistan and mother NLR 1981 CLJ 371 ref.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O. III, R.1, O.X, R. 4 & IX, R. 12 Personal appearance of a party ordered by Court Non compliance of such order ¬Effect Court could proceed against such party under O.IX, R.12, C.P.C., which would also include passing of decree.\n \nBy virtue of proviso to Order III, rule 1, C.P.C., the Court can direct any person to appear in person. Personal appearance can be ordered under Order X, rule 4, C.P.C. and on his failure to do so, the Court can proceed under Order IX, rule 12, C.P.C., which also includes passing of decree. \n \nAyya Nadan v. Thanammal AIR 1920 Mad. 213 and Sri Prabhu v. Dwarka Prasad AIR 1919 Pat. 36 rel.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss. 2(d), 7 & 18 Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.84 Signatures on finance/banking documents, comparison of Powers of Banking Court Scope and purpose.\n \nBanking Court had jurisdiction to compare signatures of a party on finance documents with his/her admitted signatures on documents on record. \n \nCourt in certain eventualities was enjoined with powers to itself compare signatures alongwith other relevant material to effectively resolve main controversy. \n \nWaqas Enterprises v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 1999 SCMR 85 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.533 of 2002, heard on 29-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. IRSHAD BIBI --Appellant\nVs. \nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager and 3 of\nothers --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12747",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2840 = 2003 SLD 2840 = 2003 CLD 51",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss. 6 & 9 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, R.17 ¬Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.9 Suit for recovery of loan amount Suit was decreed against two defendants, but was dismissed against third defendant Bank contended that all defendants were jointly liable to pay the suit amount and prayed for amendment of plaint Validity Banking Tribunal due to clerical error in plaint had not considered the matter properly Application contained particulars of such clerical errors in plaint vis a vis a reference to various defendants Proposed amendment, if allowed, would not change the nature and scope of suit and same was necessary for effective decision of entire controversy between parties High Court permitted Bank to amend plaint, accepted appeal, set aside impugned /decree to the extent of third defendant and remanded case to Banking Court, where Bank would file amended plaint and a notice in terms of S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would be issued to such defendant and matter would then be decided in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.359 of 1996, heard on 6-08-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULUI ANWARUL HAQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs MEHMOOD SABRI BUSINESS CORPORATION and 2\nothers ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12748",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2841 = 2003 SLD 2841 = 2003 CLD 53",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 15, 21 & 27 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R.10 Decree in favour of Bank in suit for recovery of loan amount Plaints in debtors' suits for redemption of mortgaged property and recovery of damages filed against Bank were returned by banking Court under O.VII, R.10, C.P.C. High Court in Constitutional jurisdiction set aside order of return of plaints With observations that suits filed by debtors would be deemed pending before Banking Court to be decided in accordance with law ¬Contention of debtors was that impugned /decree was illegal, because in view of such order of High Court, Banking Court cold not decide suit of Bank independent of other suits filed by debtors ¬Validity Such. contention was unfounded and misdirected as High Court had at no stage directed that suits filed by debtors would be decided alongwith suit, wherefrom present appeal had arisen Judgment debtors had also conceded that no consolidation order had been passed by any Court at any stage Judgment debtors had not raised any other objection to passing of impugned /decree in favour of Bank, thus; same would be deemed to be admitted Banking Court after dealing with each ground taken by debtors had passed impugned /decree in accordance with law, which did not call for interference by High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction Appeal, .in the present case, also could not succeed for the reason that suits filed by debtors had been dismissed, against which no appeal had been filed, thus, same had attained finality ¬High Court dismissed the appeal as being devoid of merits.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 169 of 1999, decision dated: 31st July, 002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ABDULLAH TEHSEEN TRADING COMPANY and 15 others --Appellants\nVs.\nPLATINUM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Chief Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12749",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2842 = 2003 SLD 2842 = 2003 CLD 57",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credit: and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 18 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) 6 O.XXI. Rr. 90, 92 & 94 Execution of decree Sale of mortgaged property Application for setting aside auction proceedings being based on fraud and having been conducted with material irregularity was dismissed by Executing Court and instead confirmed the sale and ordered to issue sale certificate to auction purchaser Judgment¬-debtor thereafter filed application praying that he was ready to pay Rs.20 lacs in lump sum and regarding remaining amount instalments be made and mark up be written off Validity Auction proceedings had taken place in presence of one of the debtors, and on his failure to pay decretal amount, property had been sold in execution of decree Execution having already been held, in circumstances, Executing Court could not go behind the decree Mere filing of application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., was no ground under law to set aside the auction High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.534 of 2001, heard on 26tt June, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NEW RAHAT ENGINEERING WORKS through Proprietor and 4\nothers --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12750",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2843 = 2003 SLD 2843 = 2003 CLD 59",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961) S. 39 Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 30, 31 & 114 Petition by Bank for recovery of loan amount by attachment and sale of mortgaged properties Show cause notice issued to appellants was made absolute by Trial Court Contention of guarantors appellants was that they had not admitted their liability as such and they being legal heirs of principal debtor had inherited nothing from him -Validity Guarantors appellants had not categorically denied or disputed their liability to make payment of loan facility availed by principal debtor Guarantors appellants had furnished joint guarantees, execution and signatures whereof had not specifically been denied by them in their reply or even at subsequent stage, thus, they could not deny their liability as such Appellants in memorandum of appeal signed by their counsel had admitted that they were Directors /principal shareholders and guarantors of principal debtor Guarantors appellants, in view of such clear admission made in memorandum of appeal,, were precluded from contending that they were not guarantors of principal debtor Appellants could not be allowed to approbate and reprobate in same breath Guarantors appellants were shirking from fulfilling their contractual obligations on flimsy grounds Impugned was not open to exception and did not call for any interference by High Court ¬Appeal was dismissed being devoid of any merits. \n \n(b) Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance. (XXXI of 1961) \n \n S. 39 Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), Ss.3 & 5(3) Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 114 Petition by Bank for recovery of loan amount Maxim: \"\"secundum allegata et probata\"\" Applicability Show cause notice issued to appellants was made absolute by Trial Court -Contention of appellants was that after promulgation of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, Trial Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of present petition Validity Jurisdiction of Civil Court was not ousted after coming into force of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 as provisions thereof were in addition to and not in derogation of any other law Provisions of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961, had not lost their enforceability despite promulgation of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 Bank had concurrent remedies and they were authorised under law to seek those remedies even simultaneously as was evident from combined reading of S.3 and proviso to S.5(3) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 Not correct to contend that jurisdiction in present case only vested with Banking Tribunal Appellants had not raised such objection in their reply to main petition filed by Bank Such contention of appellants could be repelled in view of maxim \"\"secundum allegata et probata Principle of estoppel would harshly operate against appellants as they were precluded from raising such plea for the first time before High Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \n(c) Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961) \n \n S. 39 Petition by Bank for recovery of loan amount by attachment and sale of mortgaged/ hypothecated properties Trial Court made absolute show cause notice issued to appellants Contention of appellants was that civil suit filed by them against Bank for recovery of amount pending in Civil Court was not consolidated with present petition in spit of their request Validity Proceedings out of which present appeal had arisen were of or attachment and sale of mortgaged/hypothecated properties, for which exclusive jurisdiction vested with District Judge under S.39(1) of the Ordinance, while alleged suit filed by appellants was' pending before Civil Court Two distinct causes pending before two separate forums could not be consolidated Neither record revealed that appellants had made any such application before District Judge nor they during arguments before High Court could produce any document to substantiate their such contention Appellants were precluded from raising such plea at appellate stage ¬Such contention of appellants was misdirected and unfounded High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.\n \n(d) Appeal \n \n Pleadings Plea not raised in pleadings Effect Such plea could not be argued and that too at appellate stage.\n \n(e) Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984) \n \n Arts 30, 31 & 114 Admission made by party about his status as guarantor in memorandum of appeal signed by his counsel Effect Party could not be allowed to approbate and reprobate in same breath Such party would be estopped from denying his such status in view of such clear admission.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.246 of 2000, heard on 9-07-2002, hearing DATE : 9-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs PAKISTAN WIRES PRODUCTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and 5 others --Appellants\nVs. \nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Senior Vice President --Respondent."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12751",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2844 = 2003 SLD 2844 = 2003 CLD 67",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.2(b)(ii) & 5 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.24 ¬Transfer of case from Banking Court to High Court acting as Banking Court Pre conditions High Court as Banking Court cannot deal with \"\"any other case\"\" except those in which claim exceeds 50 million rupees In claims not exceeding 50 million rupees, jurisdiction has only been confined to the Banking Court established under S.5 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Pre condition for transfer of a case from one Court to the other is that the transferee Court should also be competent and possessed with jurisdiction to try such case which principle is even embodied in S.24, C.P.C. Since High Court as Banking Court is not vested with jurisdiction to try a suit below the monetary slab of fifty million rupees under S. 2(b)(ii) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which is a special statute, therefore, suit for recovery of amount less than 50 million rupees, cannot be transferred to High Court. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss. 2(b)(ii) & 5 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.24 ¬Transfer of banking case from Banking Court to High Court acting as Banking Court Consolidation of the two suits ¬Two suits against the borrower were pending adjudication one before Banking Court and the other in High Court acting as Banking Court Contention of the borrower was that the suit pending before Banking Court be transferred to High Court so that both the suits could be tried together Plea raised by the bank was that the suit pending before Banking Court had the value less than fifty million rupees therefore, High Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the same Validity Bar of competence/jurisdiction prescribed in S.24(1)(a) & (1)(b)(ii), C.P.C. applied only to intra subordinate Court transfers and not to High Court which upon withdrawing a case from a subordinate Court could try the same itself by assumption of such jurisdiction on transfer Such principle by analogy could not be employed to civil suit initiated and tried under the provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 If High Court under S.24, C.P.C. transferred a banking suit pending in a Banking Court to itself for trial, such suit, upon transfer might presumably had become triable by High Court but could not, upon transfer, had become triable by High Court as a Banking Court under the provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, because of the clear jurisdictional bar placed on High Court as Banking Court under S.2(b) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Both the suits could not be tried together under the banking jurisdiction of High Court Power of High Court to transfer cases under S.5(3) of Financial' institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was confined to exercising the same for transfer of cases from one Banking Court to the other as established under S.5(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and defined in S.2(b)(ii) of the said Ordinance Such power could not, therefore, be enlarged to include transfer of a case from such Banking Court to High Court acting as Banking Court Power of transfer as provided to High Court in S.5(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was not available and could not be exercised to transfer of a case to High Court in its Banking jurisdiction High Court declined to, transfer the case pending before Banking Court to High Court acting as Banking Court Application was dismissed in circumstances. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S. 2(b) Civil. Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.24 Transfer of case Jurisdiction of High Court Scope While acting under the Banking jurisdiction High Court acts as Banking Court and not as High Court Powers of transfer under S.24, C.P.C. are conferred on High Court or District Court only and the same does not apply to a Banking Court as constituted in High Court. \n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n S. 24 Financial Institutions' (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.2(b) Transfer of cases from Banking Court to High Court acting as Banking Court ¬Jurisdiction High Court under its general power of transfer under S.24 C.P.C. cannot transfer a banking case from a Banking Court to itself as High Court for trial High Court does not have jurisdiction in view of exclusivity of jurisdiction of Banking Courts established under the provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 For exercising powers of transfer qua suits filed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the provisions of S.24, C.P.C. are not applicable and are not available to High Court Only power that can be exercised for transfer of banking cases is the one granted to High Court under S.5(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Transfer Application No.421 C of 2001, decision dated: 12-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "Messrs SIALKOT DAIRIES LTD. and 8 others ers\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager, \nA.D.B.P. and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12752",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2845 = 2003 SLD 2845 = 2003 CLD 76",
    "Key Words:": "Sale of Goods Act (III of 1930) Ss.55 & 56 Supply of goods Rejection of supply Suit for recovery of damages According to contract of sale of 64,000 Kgs. Glucose Powder between parties said goods were to be supplied in instalments Plaintiff/seller in first instalment supplied 52,000 Kgs. Glucose Powder, but last instalment of remaining quantity of Glucose Powder was rejected by defendants alleging that same had not passed test for \"\"Foreign Sugars, Soluble Starch and Dextrins \"\" Sample of the goods was sent to the National Institute of Health which after test of the same opined that sample was in accordance with requisite test, but despite that remaining quantity of goods in question was not accepted by the defendants Plaintiff continued to make repeated efforts for completion of contract, but defendants, despite a positive report from National Institute of Health, did not receive supply of goods in question Defendants on whom onus shifted after production of affirmative evidence by plaintiff about its quality did not produce any cogent evidence to prove that plaintiff was at fault and was not entitled to damages as claimed by plaintiff Trial Court, in circumstances, had rightly decreed suit holding plaintiff entitled to receive amount of goods supplied to defendants and damages suffered by them for non accepting supply of goods by defendants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.21 of 1990, decision dated: 28-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through The Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Defence and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nMessrs IPHCO INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL CORPORATION (REGD.), Lahore High Court SHEIKHUPURA ROAD, Lahore High Court through Managing Partner --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12753",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2846 = 2003 SLD 2846 = 2003 CLD 88",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) Ss. 8 & 12 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.58 & 95 Execution of decree Auction of property ¬Objection petition Identification of auctioned property ¬Appellants' objection was that property in their possession was not covered by sale certificate issued in favour of auction purchaser Banking Court directed appellants to appear personally and produce proof of ownership of property, but on their failure to do so, objection petition was dismissed Validity Real question before Banking Court was regarding identification of property, which had been auctioned and purchased by auction purchaser Auction-¬purchaser was entitled to ownership rights and possession of that property, which had been auctioned and purchased by her, but under the garb of auction, properties belonging to others could not be given to her Banking Court ought to have provided an adequate and sufficient opportunity to appellants for establishing their claim as made out in objection petition Such was all the more necessary, when rights, title and interest of objectors had to be decided by Executing Court only and in this regard no separate suit could be filed under law Banking Court had not cared to investigate the claims of appellants in accordance with law, but had non suited them on erroneous grounds Objection petition should have been decided after framing issues and recording evidence of parties, whereby it could have been easily determined as to whether property statedly owned by appellants and allegedly possessed by their tenants was subject matter of auction or not Perfunctory manner in which the matter had been dealt with by Banking Court was violative of law and even against the principles of natural justice Tenor of impugned order amply manifested non¬-application of judicial mind and no reasons had been assigned by Banking Court while dismissing objection petition High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned order and remanded the case to Banking Court with direction to decide same afresh after hearing the parties, framing the issues and recording the evidence. \n \n(b) Administration of justice \n \n Courts should be careful in deciding the causes as they always involved valuable rights of parties. \n \n(c) Judgment \n \n Speaking order Judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that Court had applied its judicial mind to issues/points involved When reasons would not be forthcoming, then Appellate Court would be deprived of the view of subordinate Court Impugned , if devoid of reasons and not a speaking order, would not be sustainable in law Passing of perfunctory order in causes involving valuable rights of parties not approved. \n \nAdamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The Province of East Pakistan and others PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 272; Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller, Import and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158; Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 Se 173 and Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Secretary, Ministry of Labour and others 1984 SCMR 1014 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E. F.A. No.30 of 1995, heard on 11-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Mirza NASEEM AHMAD and 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nDr. SADIQA SHARIF and 12 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12754",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2847 = 2003 SLD 2847 = 2003 CLD 94",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872) S.174 Continuing security Pledge of Defence Saving Certificates with Bank against loan advanced to borrower ¬Borrower never demanded return of pledged certificates from Bank, which continued to extend loan facility to her against such security Effect Strong statutory presumption as to continuing security arose in favour of Bank under S.174 of Contract Act, 1872 in circumstances Such certificates would be deemed to have been offered as continuing security. \n \n(b) Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984) \n \n Art. 2(8) Statutory presumption, rebuttal of Burden of proof Party in whose favour statutory presumption is raised need not prove the fact on which the same is based ¬Onus to rebut statutory presumption lies on the party alleging a state of fact contrary to such presumption. \n \nJatindra Nath Malik v. Sushilendra Nath Palit AIR 1965 Cal. 328 ref.\n \n(c) Contract Act (IX of 1872) \n \n S. 174 Goods pledged as one time finance facility and riot as a continuing security Effect Such security could riot be used for any subsequent facility or financial accommodation.\n \n(d) Contract Act (IX of 1872) \n \n Ss. 172 & 177 Pledged goods, wrongful sale of ¬Remedy of pledgor Pledgor could sue pledge for having converted pledged goods for his own use and claim recovery of its realizable value.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeals Nos. 10 and 19 of 2001, decision dated: 8-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "M. ROSHAN ESSANI AND MUSHIR ALUM, JJ",
    "": "Mst. TALAT NASREEN --Appellant\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LTD. and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12755",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2848 = 2003 SLD 2848 = 2003 CLD 102",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) Ss. 8(3), 12 & 2(f) as amended by Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Ordinance (II of 1983)) ¬Petition for execution of decree passed by Civil Court after coming into force of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 Special Judge, Banking Court dismissed such execution petition Validity ¬Judgment debtor had not challenged in appeal such and decree, which was a past and closed transaction and had become final qua him High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned order, as a result whereof execution petition filed by decree holder would be deemed to be pending and would be decided in accordance with law. \n \nF.A.O.No.14 of 1994; F.A.O. No.246 of 1994 and Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Qadri Traders and another 1998 PCTLR 923 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.269 of 1994, heard on 24-05-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nSh. ALTAF AHMAD --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12756",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2849 = 2003 SLD 2849 = 2003 CLD 105",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 10, 15 & 21 General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24 A (as added by General Clauses (Amendment) Act (XI of 1997)) Decree for recovery of loan amount passed by Banking Court without adhering to questions raised in application for leave to defend the suit Validity Banking Court after narrating contentions of parties had not adverted to same and had decided leave application, in complete oblivion of its contents and contentions noted down by Court Impugned was sketchy, slip shod and devoid of reasons and was not at all a speaking and could not be called a judicial within the parameters set up by law Banking Court had not assigned any reason in coming to the conclusion as to how Bank was entitled to a decree Appellants conceded their liability to the extent of Rs.4 millions, while regarding further amount as claimed by Bank, they sought leave to defend on the ground that they had not executed documents relied upon by Bank and had also objected to validity thereof Plea of over charging of mark up was found to be plausible High Court accepted appeal with observations that interim decree for recovery of Rs.4 millions would stand in favour of Bank, while regarding remaining amount, appellants were granted leave to defend the suit in the light of said observations Case was remanded to Trial Court for further proceedings. \n \n(b) Judgment \n \n Concept Speaking order Judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that Court had applied its judicial mind to issues/points involved When reasons would not be forthcoming, then Appellate Court would be deprived of the view of subordinate Court Impugned , if devoid of reasons and not a speaking order, would not be sustainable in law Passing of perfunctory order not approved. \n \nAdamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The Province of East Pakistan and others PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 272; Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller, Import and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158; Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 and Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Secretary, Ministry of Labour and others 1984 SCMR 1014 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.500 of 2001, heard on 4-07-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AL HADAYAT TEXTILE through Proprietor and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nSONERI BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12757",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2850 = 2003 SLD 2850 = 2003 CLD 109",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss. 2(a), 6, 9 & 11(4) General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24 A (as added by General Clauses (Amendment) Act (XI of 1997) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5 Decree for recovery of loan amount with liquidated damages Appellants submitted reply to show cause notices under S. 6(2) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 alongwith application for condonation of delay caused in filing such reply Banking Tribunal on finding such reply being time barred decreed the suit without passing any order on the said application ¬Validity Appellants pursuant to show cause notices issued for 12 12 1993 appeared before Banking Court, but without filing reply sought adjournment Banking Tribunal instead of passing decree against appellants as required under S.6(4) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance adjourned the case Appellants subsequently on 4 1 1994 filed reply to show cause notices alongwith application seeking condonation of delay, which was supported by affidavit ¬Neither reply to such application had been called from the Bank nor the Bank had filed its counter affidavit controverting the contents of application filed by appellants Banking Court had decreed the suit without deciding said application, which would be presumed to be till pending Bank was not entitled to recover the amount debited in appellant's account as liquidated damages ¬Banking Court without taking into account the statement of accounts which was the mainstay of the case of Bank, had proceeded to decree the suit Impugned was sketchy, slip shod and devoid of reasons as the same was not at all a speaking order and could not be called a judicial order\"\" Banking Court had completely misread the record and had not decided the case in accordance with law on the subject and had committed grave legal errors in decreeing the suit High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned /decree and remanded the case, directing that the suit, appellants' reply to show cause notices and their application for condonation of delay would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court. \n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd., Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 fol.\n \n(b) Judgment \n \n Speaking order Judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that Court had applied its judicial mind to issues/points involved Where an order did not provide reasons, the Appellate Court would be deprived of the view of subordinate Court Impugned , if devoid of reasons and not a speaking order, would not be sustainable in law Passing of perfunctory order in the causes involving valuable rights of the parties was not approved. \n \nAdamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The Province of East Pakistan and others PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 272; Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller, Import and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158; Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 and Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Secretary, Ministry of Labour and others 1984 SCMR 1014 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.97 of 1994, decision dated: 17-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs TAJ ZARAI INDUSTRIES through Sole Proprietor and\nanother --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Manager Sub Manager/General\nAttorneys --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12758",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2851 = 2003 SLD 2851 = 2003 CLD 114",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 10 Suit for recovery of amount due in respect of lease finance Borrowers in leave application claimed profits in respect of lease key money deposited with Leasing Company Validity Deposit of lease key money was part of contractual arrangement between Leasing Company and borrowers Leasing arrangement between parties had not provided for any profit on lease key money If lease key money had been deposited against certificates of investment, then Leasing Company would have been obliged to pay profit thereon Leasing Company, in the absence of contract, could not be made liable to pay profit in respect of lease key money. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits, and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 15 & 21 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 74 Decree for recovery of amount due in respect of lease finance Claim for penal interest by Leasing Company for delayed payment of lease rentals Contention of borrowers was that they were not liable to pay penal interest without proof of actual damages, if any, suffered by company Validity Such contention of borrowers had no relevance as no penal interest had been awarded to Company in the decree ¬Company had not filed any appeal or cross objection on such issue, thus, decision of Banking Court had attained finality High Court dismissed the appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.482 of 2601, heard on 10th June 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KHAN MUHAMMAD TEXTILES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LEASING CORPORATION LIMITED through Branch Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12759",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2852 = 2003 SLD 2852 = 2003 CLD 119",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- Ss. 9, 10 & 21 Suit for recovery of amount Application for leave to defend suit Dismissal of application Effect T¬rial Court would be left with no option but to decree the suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.42 of 2000, decision dated: 22-11-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "GHULAM RABBANI AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. JAWAHAR AFZAL --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs UNITED BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12760",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2853 = 2003 SLD 2853 = 2003 CLD 123",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984) Arts. 79, 117 & 120 Execution of document Onus to prove Plaintiff relied on partnership deed which was denied by defendant Plaintiff had neither produced scribe of the deed nor any marginal witness was examined to prove the contents of the deed Only witness produced in Support of the partnership deed was Registry Moharrir who stated about the registration of the partnership deed -Effect On the denial of the defendant regarding execution of the deed, burden to prove the document had shifted to the plaintiff Evidence of the Registry Mohirrir alone was not sufficient to prove the contents and execution of the deed between the parties Requirement of Art. 79 of Qanun e-¬Shahadat, 1984, was not fulfilled by plaintiff in circumstances.\n \n(b) Partnership Act (IX of 1932) \n \n S. 69 Specific Relief Act (I to 1877), S. 42 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115 Partnership in firm ¬Denial Non registration of partnership deed with Registrar of Firms Plaintiff claimed to be a partner in firm on the basis of partnership deed registered with the Sub Registrar but not registered with Registrar of Firms under S.69 of Partnership Act, 1932 Only witness produced to prove the deed was Registry Mohirrir Neither scribe of the deed nor marginal witnesses were produced by the plaintiff to prove execution of the deed Trial Court dismissed the suit whereas the Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the and decree passed by the Trial Court ¬Validity Effect of non registration of the firm with the Registrar of Firms would be that the partnership and its partners would suffer from legal disability in filing suit against the party and as against one another, therefore, suit filed by the plaintiff was hit by the provisions of S. 69 of Partnership Act, 1932 Trial Court while appreciating the law applicable to the case had rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiff Findings of the Appellate Court were not based on proper appreciation of law Judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court were set aside and that of the Trial Court was restored.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.257 of 1999, decision dated: 28-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "TALAAT QAYUM QURESHI, J",
    "": "Malik SUHBAT KHAN er\nVs.\nMalik AJAB KHAN and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12761",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2854 = 2003 SLD 2854 = 2003 CLD 128",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.9 Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts.118 & 119 ¬Recovery of Bank loan Fact of deposit of amount Onus of proof Borrower alleged that he had deposited the amount with one officer of the Bank and produced a receipt in proof of the same Neither the witnesses to the receipt were produced before the Banking Court nor signatures of the official matched with the other receipt issued by the same official Borrower, to prove the alleged payment, had also relied upon statement of the counsel for the Bank which was made on the basis that the parties had entered into an agreement where-under the borrower had made part payment of the decretal amount while the balance had to be paid in instalments Banking Court decided the matter against the borrower Validity Onus to prove the alleged payment lay heavily on the borrower as he had relied on the receipt and it was incumbent upon the borrower to prove the receipt Borrower could not rely upon the statement made by the counsel of the Bank Borrower had failed to discharge the onus of proof placed on him Bank had referred to various documents on record including an application by the borrower showing the borrower's admission that the decree had not been satisfied and also his intent to make payment of the decretal debt if time was allowed to him Banking Court had rightly passed the order against the borrower in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.76 of 2002, heard on 10-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mian SALEEM RAFI --Appellant\nVs.\nCOUNTRY MANAGER, CITIBANK and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12762",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2855 = 2003 SLD 2855 = 2003 CLD 153",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Tender Inviting fresh tender Bidder had no right and/or authority to question wisdom of authority inviting fresh tender/bid/offer.\n \n(b) Tender \n \n Mere submitting of bids does not constitute a right to a contract Basic parameters/criteria for selection/acceptance of proposal also included certain conditions of bidding like factors of \"\"experience\"\", best financial proposal and financial strength of bidders Authority after evaluating bids of parties has to take decision on long term basis including integrity and status of bidding parties. \n \n(c) Tender ¬\n \n Duty of Government while awarding contract ¬Government must act fairly, reasonably, justly and not arbitrarily and in a discriminatory manner Entire process of tendering and subsequent award of contract should be transparent, fair and reasonable. \n \nPacific Multinational (Pvt.) Ltd. v. I.G. Police PLD 1992 Kar. 283; Dadabhoy Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1995 Kar. 33; Port Services (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1995 Kar. 374; Arif Builders and Developers v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1997 Kar. 627; Balochistan Construction Company v. Port Qasim Authority 2001 YLR 2716; Petrosin Products Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Federation of Pakistan 2001 CLC 1412 and Shir Hamainder Singh Arora v. Union of India and others AIR 1986 SC 1527 ref.\n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. 199 Administrative acts Judicial review Duty of Court Scope Duty of Court is to confine itself to question of legality Concern of Court should be, whether a decision making authority had exceeded its powers, abused its powers, committed an error of law or a breach of rules of natural justice or had reached a decision, which no reasonable Tribunal would have reached. \n \nPak Shaheen Container Services (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Trustees of Port of Karachi and others PLD 2001 Kar.30; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India AIR 1979 SC 1628; Sterling Computers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. M & N Publication (Pvt.) Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 51 and TATA Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 ref.\n \n(e) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. 199 Judicial review Administrative action, interference with Grounds, test and principles stated. \n \n(f) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. 199 Award of contract by State functionary Judicial review Scope State functionary in awarding contracts must act fairly, reasonably, honestly and justly ¬Court cannot substitute its opinion with that of State functionary, but certainly has power to judicially review administrative actions to check their reasonableness. \n \n(g) Tender \n \n Award of contract in a fair manner Essentials Tender must be made to proper person in proper form, at proper place and time Tender must conform to terms of obligation Tender must be of lull amount and unconditional Person making tender must be able and willing to perform his obligations. \n \n(h) Words and phrases \n \n \"\"Exception\"\" Meaning. \n \n(i) Words and phrases \n \n \"\"Reservation\"\" Meaning. \n \n(j) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42, 54 & 55 Temporary injunction, prayer for Suit for declaration, temporary and mandatory injunction, compensation and damages Construction of liquid cargo terminal at Port Qasim on Build, Operate and Transfer basis Project was advertised Bid submitted by plaintiff was accepted, but Authority did not execute implementation agreement and re invited tenders Plaintiff again submitted rid, but same was not accepted Plaintiff filed suit and prayed for grant of temporary injunction to restrain authority from awarding contract to another contractor ¬Validity Liquid Cargo Terminal on Built, Operate and Transfer (BOT) basis had to be established, for which sponsors must be of sound financial position Plaintiff's bid was conditional and from its own documents, its financial status was not sound Plaintiff's plea that they could arrange finance from market, if accepted would put such project to uncertainty NESPAK had examined in detail plaintiff's proposal on the criteria laid down in tender documents All such factors had been again examined by Board of Authority Present case was not such, where a decision making authority had exceeded its power, committed an error of law, committed a breach of rules of natural justice and reached a decision which no reasonable person/Authority would have reached Plaintiff had failed make out a prima facie case for grant of injunction -Balance of convenience did not lie in favour of grant of injunction as pubic project would be put in jeopardy for considerable period of time, during which possibility of rising of costs could not be ruled out Plaintiff itself had quantified the damages, thus, plea of irreparable loss was not available High Court dismissed application for temporary injunction in circumstances.\n \nTufail H. Ebrahim for Plaintiff.\n \nMuhammad Arif Khan and Ghulam Muhammad Ebrahirn for Defendants.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M.A. No.8190 in Suit No.1489 of 2001, decision dated: 16-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "I. PURI TERMINALS LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nPORT QASIM AUTHORITY and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12763",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2856 = 2003 SLD 2856 = 2003 CLD 183",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) -- Ss. 26, 27 & 28 Articles of association Object and Scope Articles of Association of a company are terms contract between the members and the terms are legally binding upon the members Such right is enforceable in law provided the terms are not forbidden bylaw. \n \nRayfield v. Hands and others (1958) 2 WLR 851 and In re: Hartley Baird Ltd. (1955) Ch. 143; (1954) 3 WLR 964; (1954) 3 All ER 695 ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n- S. 2(28) Transfer of shares of private limited company Principles Transfer of shares in any manner otherwise pan that provided in Articles of Association would be valid and contrary to the terms of contract agreed upon by the members of the company/shareholders. \n \nHickman v. Kent and Romney Marsh Sheepbreeders' Association (1915) 1 Ch. 881 ref.\n \n(c) Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss. 2(28) & 89 Transfer of shares of private limited company Inclusion of pre emptive right for transfer and purchase of shares in Articles of Association Validity --Such restriction is legal and valid covenant in the Articles of Association. \n \nOntario Jockey Club Ltd. v. Samuel McBrdie AIR 1928 PC 291; Introduction Company Law by L.H. Leigh, V. H. Joffe and D. Goldberg, Second Edn., p.266 and The Principles of Modern Company Law by LCB Gower, Third Edn., pp.392 393 ref.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss. 2(28) & 89 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3) Transfer of shares of private limited company¬---Pre emptive right of existing shareholders/Directors of the company No objection by State Bank of Pakistan to sell the shares Defendants without offering his shares to the existing shareholders/Directors of the company sold the same to third party Plaintiffs assailed the sale of shares on the ground that they were willing to purchase the shares but no notice as required by Articles of Association of the company, had been given either to the Secretary of the company or to them High Court in exercise of original civil jurisdiction dismissed the suit but Division Bench of High Court allowed the appeal and suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs Plea raised by the defendants was that the shares were sold after having no objection from the State Bank of Pakistani Validity No reason existed to take different view with regard to the import and inference drawn in respect of the Articles of the Company that existing members of the Company having shown their willingness to buy the shares had pre emptive right who were not even offered to buy the shares at the fair value to be fixed in accordance with the provisions of Articles of Association, and had first right of refusal to purchase the same Mere fact that no objection was given by the State Bank of Pakistan to the transfer and purchase of shares in favour of transferor would not validate the transaction of purchase in favour of the buyers in respect of shares which otherwise in terms of the Articles of Association was invalid Supreme Court declined to interfere with the passed by Division Bench of High Court Leave to appeal was refuse.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.86 K of 2000, decision dated: 10-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED DEEDAR HUSSAIN SHAH, HAMID ALI MIRZA AND ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR,",
    "": "others ers\nVs.\nMiss MAHENAU AGHA and 8 others --Respondents\nLal Khan v. Ghulam Muhammad 1973 SCMR 252 and Ladli Prasad Jaiswal v. The Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd. PLD 1965 SC 221 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12764",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2857 = 2003 SLD 2857 = 2003 CLD 198",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions Recovery of Finances Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) Ss. 9, 10, 11 & 22 Suit for recovery of Rs.16,31,522 ¬Banking Court while relying on a letter written by defendant passed decree for recovery of Rs.5,31,280 Contention of Bank was that Banking Court should have passed interim decree in terms of such letter and should have allowed Bank to prove rest of its claim Contention of defendant was that Banking Court had erroneously dismissed his leave application and passed decree for such amount as only a sum of Rs.99,500 was outstanding against him As both parties were not satisfied with the decree, High Court with their consent allowed appeal, set aside impugned decree, resultantly application for leave to defend suit filed by defendant stood accepted and suit would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court, which would decide the same after framing issues and recording evidence of parties within specified time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 276 of 2002, heard on 23rd September, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "CITIBANK N.A. through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nLt. Col. ANWARUL HAQ --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12765",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2858 = 2003 SLD 2858 = 2003 CLD 204",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advance, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 15 & 21 Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), S.6(2) Suit for recovery of loan amount Legal and factual pleas raised by defendant to reply to show cause notice issued to him under S.6(2) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 were rejected and suit was decreed with mark up and costs High Court with consent of parties allowed appeal, set aside /decree and remanded case to Banking Court for its decision afresh within specified time after treating reply to show cause notice filed by defendant before the then Banking Tribunal as application for leave to defend suit after hearing the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 543 and Civil Miscellaneous Nos. 1 C and 2 C of 2001, decision dated: 23rd September, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "UMAR HAYAT --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12766",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2859 = 2003 SLD 2859 = 2003 CLD 206",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss. 4, 6 & 9 Appeal against decree passed on 3 12 1995 by Banking Tribunal Validity Constitution and appointment of Banking Tribunal had been declared to be void by Full Bench of Lahore High Court in the case reported as PLD 1996 Lah. 672 Effect of observations made in said Full Bench with regard to past and closed cases was considered by another Full Bench of Lahore High Court in the case reported as 2002 PLD 759, holding that where decrees passed by Banking Tribunal had been challenged by filing first appeals such decrees could not be said to be past and closed transactions Decree in the present case rendered by Banking Tribunal having no jurisdiction and being coram non judice could not be sustained High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned decree, resultantly the suit would be deemed to be pending before competent Banking Court and would be proceeded with in accordance with law. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 and Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. 2002 CLD 759 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos. 38 and 263 of 1996, heard on 3rd September, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULUI ANWARUL HAQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "EQUITY PARTICIPATION FUND through Regional Office Vice President --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs PAKISTAN WIRE PRODUCTS (PVT.) LTD. and 7 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12767",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2860 = 2003 SLD 2860 = 2003 CLD 208",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 19 & 22 Execution of decree Sale of property ¬Executing Court fixed reserve price of factory at Rs.5 millions and of house at Rs. 9 millions Judgment debtors filed application complaining that such reserved price was low as Bank had earlier evaluated factory at Rs.6.96 millions and house at Rs.11.520 millions Executing Court dismissed application observing that debtors could bring customer at the time of auction Validity ¬Rupees 9 million had been fixed as proposed sale value of house, while in case of factory, some machinery items had been reported to have either been removed or replaced with items of lesser value No error was found in order of Executing Court while fixing such reserved price ¬Endeavour were being made by Executing Court to ensure that maximum price was fetched at sale No discrepancy was found in the. advertisement either in dates or time fixed for auction High Court disposed of appeal with observations that Executing Court would ensure conduct of sale in accordance with law and would not allow any one to abuse the process of Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 394 of 2002, decision dated: 4-09-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NICE -ËœN„¢ EASY FASHION PRIVATE LIMITED through Chief Executive and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through General Attorneys and Principal Officers --Respondents\nAshar Elahi for the --Respondent."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12768",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2861 = 2003 SLD 2861 = 2003 CLD 231",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 22 & 10 Appeal against decree passed by Banking Court Appellant's counsel submitted his own affidavit in support of memo of appeal Respondent's counsel did not object to acceptance of appeal and setting aside of decree, provided Banking Court was, directed to decide petition for leave to defend/suit exeditiously High Court with consensus arrived at between counsel for the parties, accepted appeal and set aside impugned decree with direction to Banking Court to decide afresh at the first instance application for leave to defend suit within specified time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.640 of 2001, decision dated: 3rd October, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "RAVI SPINNING MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive and 8\nothers --Appellants\nVs.\nAL TOWFEEK INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED through Branch\nManager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12769",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2862 = 2003 SLD 2862 = 2003 CLD 231",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 22 & 10 Appeal against decree passed by Banking Court Appellant's counsel submitted his own affidavit in support of memo of appeal Respondent's counsel did not object to acceptance of appeal and setting aside of decree, provided Banking Court was, directed to decide petition for leave to defend/suit exeditiously High Court with consensus arrived at between counsel for the parties, accepted appeal and set aside impugned decree with direction to Banking Court to decide afresh at the first instance application for leave to defend suit within specified time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.640 of 2001, decision dated: 3rd October, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "RAVI SPINNING MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive and 8\nothers --Appellants\nVs.\nAL TOWFEEK INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED through Branch\nManager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12770",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2863 = 2003 SLD 2863 = 2003 CLD 232",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S. 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, R.3 ¬Leave to defend Provisions of S.10 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 and O. XXXVII, R.3, C.P.C. Distinguished Defendant is required under O.XXXVII, R.3, C.P.C. to show that some question of fact or law is to be decided in the suit Leave to defend is granted by Banking Court only if 'serious and bona fide dispute' is raised by means of application to be filed by defendant in a suit filed by Banking Company under S.9 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997.\n \n(b) Stamp Act (II of 1899) \n \n S. 35 Document not stamped Effect Document not bearing the requisite stamp duty is not a void document. \n \nUnion Insurance Company of Pakistan Ltd. v. Hafiz Muhammad Siddique PLD 1978 SC 279 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 9 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.96 ¬Appeal Plea that suit not filed by duly authorized person ¬Application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed by Banking Court and suit filed by Bank was decreed against the borrower Plea raised by the borrower was that the suit was not filed by person duly authorized by Bank. and the plaint was bad as requirements of S.9 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, had not been fulfilled Validity Plaint narrated that the Bank was suing through its duly authorized agent Such statement of the Bank was contained in the plaint and the power of attorney had also been placed on record Power of attorney was a registered document and it had authorized the attorney to file the suit Banking Court had rightly considered the objection regarding filing of the suit Appeal was dismissed in limine. \n \nS. Perumal Reddiar v. Bank of Baroda and others AIR 1981 Mad. 180; National Bank of Pakistan and others v. Karachi Development Authority and others PLD 1999 Kar. 260 and Fine Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.563 of 2000, decision dated: 9th May 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ICEPAC LIMITED through Chief Executive and 6 others --Appellants\nVs.\nASIAN LEASING CORPORATION LIMITED through Attorney and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12771",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2864 = 2003 SLD 2864 = 2003 CLD 245",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.9, 10(8)(12) & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11 Suit against Bank by its customer Application for leave to defend by Bank followed by amended application under S.10(12) of the Ordinance Plaintiff failed to reply such applications Banking Court without deciding such applications rejected plaint under O.VII, R. 11, C.P.C. ¬Validity Nowhere provided under S.10 of the Ordinance that while hearing application for leave to defend suit, Banking Court was competent to straightaway reject the plaint Banking Courts established under S.5 of the Ordinance were bound by provisions thereof Banking Court had. first to decide application for leave to defend on merits in either way If Banking Court was of the view that Bank had raised substantial questions of law and facts, then at best could grant leave to defend, but could not dismiss suit or reject plaint at that point of time as main suit was not fixed for hearing Bank was within its right to have filed application under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., after grant of leave and treating leave application as written statement ¬Banking Court could reject plaint after reaching at conclusion that case fell under any clause of O. VII, R.11, C.P.C., but in no way before grant of leave to defend suit, ¬Impugned was clearly in conflict with express provisions of the Ordinance High Court accepted appeal, set aside. impugned /decree, resultantly amended leave application filed by Bank would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court, which would be decided first. \n \nMessrs Platinum Insurance Company through Chief Executive v. Messrs Highways Bridge, Contractor International (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 1997 MLD 2394 and Messrs United Distributors Pakistan Limited v. Ahmad Zarie Services and another 1997 MLD 1835 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S. 5 Banking Court Creature of statute Bound by provision of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 as established under S. 5 thereof.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S. 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, R.3 Interlocutory/ancillary application before grant of leave to defend, filing of Locus standi of defendant Defendant could not even file such application and had no right to defend suit, unless he was allowed by Court to defend suit. \n \nMessrs Platinum Insurance Company through Chief Executive v. Messrs Highways bridge, Contractor International (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 1997 MLD 2394 and Messrs United Distributors Pakistan Limited v. Ahmad Zarie Services and another 1997 MLD 1835 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.59 of 2002, heard on 8-10-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVAIZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs WAHEED CORPORATION through Proprietor and another --Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12772",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2865 = 2003 SLD 2865 = 2003 CLD 251",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872) S.126 Bank guarantee Encashment of Question of encashability of Bank guarantee would depend upon construction of document, terms of guarantee or bond in question. \n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.XXXIX, R.1 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.126 Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.54 Refusal to grant temporary injunction for restraining respondent from encashing Bank guarantee Validity Bank guarantee appeared to be unconditional and did not stipulate that its encashability would in any manner be dependent on performance of a contract on the part of appellant High Court without commenting on merits of rival contentions dismissed appeal against refusal to grant temporary injunction in circumstances. \n \nMercury Corporation v. Pakistan Steel 2000 YLR 734 and Zeenat Brothers v. Aswan e Iqbal Authority PLD 1996 Kar.183 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.289 of 2001, decision dated: 6th March. 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND SYED ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, JJ",
    "": "PAK CONSULTING AND ENGINEERING (PVT.) LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nPAKISTAN STEEL, MILLS CORPORATION (PVT.) LIMITED and another --Respondents\nNational Construction Limited v. Aswan e Iqbal Authority PLD 1994 SC 311 fol."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12773",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2866 = 2003 SLD 2866 = 2003 CLD 254",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.9(5), 10(1), 12 & 22 Ex parte decree for recovery of loan amount Refusal of Banking Court to set aside such decree on the ground that appellants had obtained knowledge of pendency of suit through publication of summons in newspapers Validity Record showed that Banking Court as per requirement of S.9(5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, had issued summons through all the modes of service including publication of summons in leading English and Urdu dailies Neither acknowledgement due showing receipt of registered letters containing summons by appellants was found on record nor such letters had been received back by Court undelivered Courier Agency had sent back to Court envelope containing summons with report viz. \"\"out of our service area\"\" Appellants had not been served through bailiff of Court nor through registered post acknowledgment due nor by courier service Urdu newspaper was not having wide circulation, but appeared to be newspaper having local circulation and that too within the relevant District, whereas addresses of appellants were that of the other District ¬Publication of summons in newspaper had not been made in accordance with law Banking Court had not sufficiently and adequately complied with provisions of S.9(5) of the Ordinance High Court accepted appeal, set aside it impugned / decree while allowing 10 days' time to appellants for filing application for leave to defend the suit before Banking Court. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.9(5) Service of summons through different prescribed modes simultaneously Object of such requirement Intention of Legislature in prescribing all the four modes and publication in newspaper with wide circulation was that defendant, wherever he might be living, must come to know through any of such modes about institution of suit Such was the reason why under S.9(5) of the Ordinance, Banking Court was required to ensure publication of summons in newspaper with wide circulation. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.12, 9(5) & 10(1) Application for setting aside ex parte decree Objection of plaintiff was that such application was time barred Validity Proper service of defendants had not been effected through any of the prescribed modes of service Defendants, thus, could not be said to have knowledge of passing of decree prior to filing of such application Defendants had filed application within 21 days of their knowledge Application was within time Objection was repelled in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 191 of 2002, decision dated: 19-09-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVAIZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs Quetta court SILK CENTER through Sole Proprietor and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager/General Attorney --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12774",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQVNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2867 = 2003 SLD 2867 = 2003 CLD 259",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.18 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.2(2) & 96(3) Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 114 Execution of consent decree Execution petition for recovery of unpaid amount under decree Claim of Judgment debtor for refund of certain amount debited in accounts of decree holder -Executing Court allowed such claim with mark up ¬Validity Such entry being a debit entry was made on 25 10 1992, while consent decree had been passed on 22 2 1999 Executing Court could not go behind decree and was precluded to take notice of any entry in statement of accounts prior to passing of decree, as entire matter stood clinched with passing of consent decree Whatever amount the parties exchanged between themselves before 22 2 1999 had been finalized with passing of consent decree -Judgment debtors were estopped under law from agitating that any amount prior to passing of decree was not due against them Consent decree being not appealable under S.96(3), C.P.C., had attained finality and nobody could challenge terms thereof after its passing rather both parties were bound to execute decree as the same was After payments made as admitted by both parties, only a sum of Rs.83,857 remained payable by debtors out of consent decree Executing Court was bound to execute consent decree to such extent High Court accepted appeal, Set aside impugned order, resultantly Executing Court would execute consent decree only to extent of the remaining payable amount of Rs.83,857.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n S.2(2) & O.XXI, R.10 Execution of decree Executing Court could not go behind the decree. \n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n Ss.2(2), 96(3), O.XXI, R.1 & O.XXIII, R.3 Consent decree, execution of Duty of parties Nobody could challenge terms of consent decree, which would attain finality after its passing as being not appealable under S.96(3), C.P.C. Both parties were bound to execute consent decree as the same was. \n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n-- S.18 Execution of decree Banking Court was under legal obligation to execute decree as the same, was and could not go behind the decree. \n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.18 Consent decree for recovery of money, execution of Duty of Banking Court Banking Court is under legal obligation to execute decree as the same was Banking Court has to see only as to whether consent decree has been satisfied or not, and how much amount remains to be paid by debtor Banking Court is concerned only with payments made after passing of decree and after deduction of such amount, Banking Court has to execute the remaining decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.576 of 2001, decision dated: 1st October, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL LEASING CORPORATION LIMITED through A.V.P. and Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nNOORANI INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 5 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12775",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2868 = 2003 SLD 2868 = 2003 CLD 264",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 18 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R.90 Execution of decree Auction proceedings Four bidders participated in auction of property and offered their bids, out of which three highest bidders withdrew their bids, whereas the lowest bidder remained in field Objection petition of debtor was about inadequacy of price on account of lapse on the part of Court Auctioneer -Executing Court dismissed objection petition for /debtors' failure to deposit 20% amount as required by O. XXI, R.90, C.P.C. Validity Executing Court had no power under law to accept offer of the lowest bidder in conducting some private auction in Court room, when highest bidders had already withdrawn their bids Duty of Executing Court in such circumstances was to have put the property for re auction as per requirement of law ¬Notwithstanding that debtors had failed to deposit requisite amount of 2096 in terms of O. XXI, R.90, C.P.C., the order accepting offer of lowest bidder was void ab initio and illegal, which could not sustain High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned order and annulled confirmation of sale made in favour of lowest bidder.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.As. Nos.323 and 481 of 2001, heard on 2-10-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAQIB NISAR AND MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ISHAQ --Appellant\nVs.\nALTOWFEEK INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED through Manager and Assistant Vice President and 11 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12776",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2869 = 2003 SLD 2869 = 2003 CLD 267",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 19(7) & 22(6) Execution of decree Appeal against order of Banking Court, dismissing objection petition filed by Judgment debtor Maintainability Banking Court had dismissed objection petition in exercise of its powers under S.19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 thus, appeal under S.22(6) of the said Ordinance was competent. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss. 19(7) & 22(6) Execution of decree Dismissal of objection petition disputing correctness of amount to be paid by debtor as per directions of Executing Court Contention of debtor was that he had paid a total sum of Rs.3,79,656 to the Bank, whereas decretal amount was Rs. 2, 48, 225, thus, Bank had received Rs. 1,31, 431 in excess of decretal amount Validity Bank could not be allowed to take even a single penny from debtor in excess of decretal amount Bank through decree under execution was entitled to recover total sum of Rs.2,48,225 from debtor Bank had admittedly received a total sum of Rs.3,24,115 from debtor as against decretal amount of Rs.2,48,225 Bank had, thus, recovered an excess amount of Rs.75,890, which it was not entitled to retain and debtor was entitled to refund of such amount Such sort of highhandedness on the part of a financial institution could not be countenanced by any stretch of imagination Bank had raised objection regarding non maintainability of appeal only to swallow such amount excessively received from debtor High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned order while directing Bank to refund a sum of Rs.75,890 to ¬-debtor within fifteen days as undertook by its Manager. \n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n S. 2(2) & O. XXI, R. 10 Execution of decree Executing Court could not go behind decree and was under legal obligation to execute decree according to its terms.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.237 of 2002, heard on 3rd October, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "GHULAM MUHAMMAD --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12777",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2870 = 2003 SLD 2870 = 2003 CLD 278",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (XLVIII of 1984) Ss. 6 & 9 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.133 Suit for recovery of loan amount Banking Court decreed suit against principal debtor, but disallowed the claim against respondents guarantors on the ground that plaintiff had got executed supplementary agreements relating to finances, thus, they were not liable to pay any amount on basis of such supplementary agreements Contention of plaintiff was that Banking Tribunal had fallen in error as record showed that respondents had executed personal guarantees to secure even supplementary agreements Validity ¬Guarantees executed by respondents were very much part of record available to Banking Tribunal, but same had been overlooked No justification for failure, of Banking Tribunal to pass decree against respondents s prayed for in the plaint High Court passed decree against respondents in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.161 of 1996, heard on 11-09-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, J",
    "": "NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION --Appellant\nVs.\nDr. QUDRATULLAH CHAUDHRY and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12778",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2871 = 2003 SLD 2871 = 2003 CLD 278",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (XLVIII of 1984) Ss. 6 & 9 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.133 Suit for recovery of loan amount Banking Court decreed suit against principal debtor, but disallowed the claim against respondents guarantors on the ground that plaintiff had got executed supplementary agreements relating to finances, thus, they were not liable to pay any amount on basis of such supplementary agreements Contention of plaintiff was that Banking Tribunal had fallen in error as record showed that respondents had executed personal guarantees to secure even supplementary agreements Validity ¬Guarantees executed by respondents were very much part of record available to Banking Tribunal, but same had been overlooked No justification for failure, of Banking Tribunal to pass decree against respondents s prayed for in the plaint High Court passed decree against respondents in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.161 of 1996, heard on 11-09-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, J",
    "": "NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION --Appellant\nVs.\nDr. QUDRATULLAH CHAUDHRY and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12779",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2872 = 2003 SLD 2872 = 2003 CLD 280",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 18 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr. 58, 59 & 60 Execution of money decree Objection of appellant seeking de attachment and release of disputed property was that he was neither a borrower nor ¬debtor Banking Court dismissed objection petition ¬Validity Record showed that appellant was neither arrayed as defendant in the suit nor any decree had been passed against him Appellant had specifically asserted that he was neither debtor nor guarantor nor customer nor had furnished title deed of property to the Bank Banking Court had not dealt with such matters, but had passed impugned order in a mechanical manner without considering the contentions raised by appellant in the objection petition Banking Court before passing impugned order ought to have investigated the claim and objections to attachment of property raised by appellant by providing sufficient opportunity to parties for establishing their respective claims through production of evidence -Impugned order was neither in conformity with record nor in consonance with law on the subject High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned order, resultantly objection petition would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court, which would decide the same in accordance with law after affording adequate opportunity to parties to produce evidence to establish their respective claims. \n \nMst. Surayya Begum v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and 4 others PLD 1990 Lah. 4 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credit and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S. 18(6) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr.58, 59 & 103 Execution of decree Claims and objections raised in objection petition Determination of Recording of evidence Duty of executing Court Executing Court not bound to mechanically record evidence of objector in each and every case Duty of Executing Court is to see as to whether case warrants recording of evidence or not; and whether objection petition is genuine or same has been filed frivolously, contumaciously and, to delay execution proceedings Primary function of Executing Court is to see as to whether objection petition is to be decided after recording of evidence or only after hearing the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E. F.A. No. 750 of 2001, decision dated: 1st October, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SALEEM --Appellant\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN and 12 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12780",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2873 = 2003 SLD 2873 = 2003 CLD 284",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 9, 10 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, R. 1 Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 55 ¬Suit for rendition of accounts, declaration, damages and mandatory injunction Plaintiff filed application for grant of mandatory injunction, when application for leave to defend the suit filed by Bank was pending Banking Court on plaintiffs application directed Bank to deliver him title documents Validity Banking Court after receipt of leave application was obliged under law to have decided same as per provisions of S.10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Leave application had not been decided after lapse of seven months, and for its tendency for such a long period, no plausible justification was found on record Banking Court before embarking upon deciding application for grant of interim relief ought to have decided application for leave to defend suit and thereafter to save proceeded to decide suit including miscellaneous applications Impugned order being perfunctory, slipshod and devoid of reasons also necessitated remand of case High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned order, resultantly application for grant of temporary injunction would be deemed pending before Banking Court, which would in first instance decide application for leave to defend suit and would then decide application for grant of temporary injunction. \n \nMessrs Platinum Insurance Company through Chief Executive v. Messrs Highways bridge, Contractor International (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 1997 MLD 2394; Messrs United Distributors Pakistan Limited v. Ahmad Zarie Services and another 1997 MLD 1835; Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The Province of East Pakistan and others PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 272; Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller; Import and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158; Mollah Ejabar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 and Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Secretary, Ministry of Labour and others 1984 SCMR 1014 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.355 and Civil Miscellaneous No. 1230 C of 2002, decision dated: 1st October, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Chairman and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nMessrs RAVI ENTERPRISES through Chairman --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12781",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2874 = 2003 SLD 2874 = 2003 CLD 288",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.18 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rs.23 A, 58, 59 & 60 Execution of decree Objection petition by appellant seeking de attachment and release of disputed property Banking Court dismissed objection petition Validity Appellant in capacity of one of ¬debtors had filed objection petition Banking Court had dismissed objection in a summary manner without directing appellant to comply with provisions of O. XXI, R.23 A, C.P.C. Bank did not object to remand of case, if appellant was directed to pay decretal amount before entertaining of objection petition High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned order with direction that Banking Court would entertain objection petition only after deposit of decretal amount by appellant and would then decide the same after affording adequate opportunity to parties to produce evidence to establish their claims; but if appellant failed to deposit decretal amount within stipulated time, then his objection petition would be deemed to have been dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.749 of 2001, decision dated: 1st October, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL MAJID --Appellant\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN and 11 others --Respondents,"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12782",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2875 = 2003 SLD 2875 = 2003 CLD 291",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. III, Rr. 1 & 2 Suit for recovery of loan filed by Bank through its Branch Manager Banking Court while deciding leave application dismissed suit for not being filed through competent person Contention of Bank was that suit was filed through its Branch Manager, whose power of attorney given by Competent Authority was produced during arguments, but Banking Court refused to accept the same ¬Validity Mere reading of S.9 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 revealed that Branch Manager was competent to file suit against defendant Suit had been filed by Branch Manager of the plaintiff Bank, who had signed the plaint ¬Impugned was not in accordance with law High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned and decree, resultantly suit filed would be deemed to be pending adjudication, which would be decided by Banking Court alongwith application for leave to defend in accordance with law. \n \nCitibank N.A. v. Judge Baking Court IV and others 2001 CLC 171 and 1994 CLC 1233 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.51 of 1999, decision dated: 2-10-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nTANVIR KHALID --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12783",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2876 = 2003 SLD 2876 = 2003 CLD 293",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) Ss. 42, 54 & 55 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9 ¬Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S.263 Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss.17 & 20 Suit for declaration, injunction and rendition of accounts Acquisition of shares of plaintiff company by defendants companies in a bid of hostile take over of plaintiff Plaintiff filed suit challenging the legality and propriety of such acquisition of its shares Defendants objected to the maintainability of suit on the ground that plaintiff for such wrong could avail remedy provided under S.263 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 Validity ¬Investigation into affairs of defendants Investigation of affairs of defendant companies could only be made by Securities and Exchange Commission, only at the motion of certain percentage of members of any particular company affairs of which were sought to be investigated or on report of Registrar of Companies Plaintiff company was neither holding any share in any of defendants companies nor there was any report by the Registrar Jurisdiction of Securities and Stock Exchange Commission under S.263 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 in such circumstances, could not be set in motion. \n \n(b) Tort \n \n Wrong or breach of any penal law Remedy of person wronged or injured against wrong doer, stated.\n \nA wrong or breach of any penal provision of law may give rise to both penal consequences as well as civil liability. \n \nIn some cases, one person may be personally liable for penal consequences, while other persons may be held vicariously liable for civil liability arising out of same wrong. Even a situation may arise, where a person wronged or injured may not be interested to prosecute wrongdoer for penal consequences, but may be interested to enforce civil liability. In such a situation, a person can neither be denied injunctive relief against apprehended wrong or repetition of wrong nor can be non suited and denied compensation and/or damages that might have been sustained as an aftermath or as a consequence of a wrong, which may otherwise also entail penal consequences. \n \n(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) \n \n Ss.42, 54 & 55 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9 ¬Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S.208 Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997). Ss. 17 & 20 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance (V of 1970), S.20 ¬Central Depositories Act (XIX of 1997), S.27 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (VII of 1947), S.23 Suit for declaration, injunction and rendition of accounts ¬Acquisition of shares of plaintiff company by defendants companies in a bid of hostile take over of plaintiff Plaintiff filed suit challenging such acquisition of its shares as being violative of provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984. Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance 1970, Central Depositories Act. 1997, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 ¬Defendants objected to maintainability of suit on the ground that remedy of plaintiff was available before Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and not through a civil suit Validity Remedy as against penal provisions indeed was available under such enactments, but there was no remedy against civil liabilities that had ensued as a consequence of breach of penal provisions to a party, who had suffered at the hands of wrongdoer Neither there was any legislation nor self regulatory code nor any regulations had been framed by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan to regulate the issues and matters relating to or arising out of transactions relating to substantial acquisition of shares by one company in a bid to take over and/or to acquire management or control of another company Civil Court had jurisdiction to scrutinize legality and propriety of such transactions and resultant civil obligation and liabilities that might have been contracted by defendants out of transaction of acquisition of shares alleged to be in breach of various enactments Suit was maintainable.\n \n1999 CLC 1795; 1990 CLC 1008; 1988 CLC 1186: 1988 CLC 123; 1979 CLD 857; PLD 1949 Lah. 301: PLD 1978 Kar. 612; 1982 PLC 592: AIR 1963 SC 1547; AIR 1965 SC 338; AIR 1956 Bom. 649; PLD 1960 SC 113: PLD 1964 SC 673; Securities and Exchange Commission Pakistan v. Mian Nisar Ellahi and others Civil Petitions Nos.2502 to 2504 of 2001; PLD 1985 Kar. 481; PLD 1969 Kar. 474: 1999 CLC 795: Integrated Technologies and Systems Ltd. v. Interconnect Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 CLC 2019: PLD 1968 SC 381: PLD 1997 SC 3; 1999 CLC 1989; AIR 1947 Mad. 322 and AIR 1967 All. 118 ref.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n S.9 Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.7 Jurisdiction of Civil Court could not be invoked to seek mere enforcement of penal laws. \n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n S. 9 Jurisdiction of Civil Court Scope Civil Court teas jurisdiction to decide all suits of civil nature.\n \n(f) Specific Relief Act (Iof 1877) \n \n S.7 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9 Wrong or breach of a penal law Remedies available to aggrieved person Kinds of Jurisdiction of Civil Court Scope.\n \nA wrong or breach of a penal law may entail both, a criminal liability as well as civil obligation. In case of penal or criminal liability, cognizance is taken and wrong doer is prosecuted and tried by specialized Courts, Authorities or Tribunals constituted or established under relevant enactments. In case, where a civil injury is sustained by a person on account of wrongful act or as an incidence of breach of penal provision committed by another then it is on account of resultant civil injury caused to a person or his property giving rise to civil liability against wrong doer, the jurisdiction of Civil Court rests. Civil Court will not take upon itself the responsibility to take cognizance, try and prosecute a penal offence, except a quasi criminal offence or wrong like contempt of Court. However, Civil Court will not hesitate to redress civil injury and enforce civil liability arising out of penal breach or wrong against a wrongdoer. \n \n(g) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.7 & 152 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9 ¬Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII 1997), S.20 Complicated and disputed question jurisdiction of High Court Scope High Court on the strength of S.7 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, had jurisdiction to adjudicate and decide controversies arising in relation thereto, in respect of which no jurisdiction was conferred on any other authority like Joint Registrar.\n \nRegistrar or Securities and Exchange Commission Where intricate questions of law and facts were involved, despite summary jurisdiction conferred, Civil Court would be competent to resolve such complicated and disputed question arising therefrom, such as issue relating to rectification of share register under S.152 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.273 of 2000 decided on 22-08-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "ENGRO CHEMICAL PAKISTAN LIMITED --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD HUSSAIN DAWOOD and 5 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12784",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2877 = 2003 SLD 2877 = 2003 CLD 320",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 15 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.11, 12(2), 35 A, 151 & O. VII, R. 11 Suit for recovery of damages etc. against Bank Rejection of plaint Bank obtained consent decree for recovery of loan amount, whereby customers had agreed to pay decretal amount in instalments Customers instead of filing appeal against such decree filed application under S.12(2) read with S.151, C.P.C. as well as Constitutional petition, which were dismissed Customer challenging such decree then filed suit for damages etc. Bank's application seeking rejection of plaint on the ground that no cause of action had accrued to customers for filing such suit Validity Customers after having availed finance facility had defaulted not only in repayment thereof, but in also repayment of decretal amount after obtaining concession of instalments for its payment from Banking Court Customers (borrower and guarantor) had no cause of action to bring present suit against Bank, when they themselves were defaulter after availing full facility Present suit was also barred under S. 11 C.P.C. in view of such decree obtained by Bank Plaint was rejected with special costs of Rs.25,000.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1464 of 1999, decision dated: 1st January, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "AAMIR IMPEX through Sole Proprietor and 2 others --Plaintiffs\nVs.\nPRUDENTIAL COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12785",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2878 = 2003 SLD 2878 = 2003 CLD 326",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Paki tan (1973) Arts. 189 & 201 Decision of Supreme Court Binding effect as precedent Principles stated.\n \nBy virtue of provisions contained in Article 189 of the Constitution, any decision of Supreme Court to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, shall be binding on all other Courts in Pakistan. Thus, the law declared by Supreme Court becomes the law of land and is binding on all Courts and all other forums. It is the duty of every authority, whether judicial or otherwise to give effect to the law laid down by Supreme Court. Apart from the Constitutional obligation imposed upon Courts, even the propriety demands that all the Courts including High Court must follow the law laid down by Supreme Court without any hesitation. \n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Arts. 185, 189 & 201 Decision of Supreme Court ¬Jurisdiction of High Court to interpret such decision ¬Scope Where Supreme Court did not express final opinion on question at issue in appeal, but opinion expressed was tentative, then it would be open to High Court to interpret the law itself.\n \nAfaquz Zubair v. Muhammad Idris PLD 1978 Kar. 984 fol.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Arts. 185(3), 189 & 201 Decision of Supreme Court granting or refusing leave to appeal Binding effect as precedent Judgment of High Court remaining intact after refusal of leave to appeal by Supreme Court Status and binding force of such of High Court Principles stated.\n \nAn order of Supreme Court merely granting leave to appeal or refusing leave to appeal by short order, without deciding a question of law does not have the binding force of a precedent. The is binding on the parties only in that particular proceedings. Likewise, a decision of Supreme Court refusing leave to appeal, which is not based upon and does not enunciate a principle of law, does not have a binding effect as a precedent on all other Courts in Pakistan. In such situation, the sole effect of the order of Supreme Court would be that of High Court shall remain intact and if any question of law has been decided by High Court, it shall be treated as a precedent pronounced by High Court having the force of precedent and of binding nature on all Courts subordinate to said High Court. The of High Court left intact and attaining finality with the refusal of leave to appeal by Supreme Court shall not be treated as a precedent having the stamp of authority of Supreme Court. \n \nAbdul Bari v. Malik Amir Jan and others PLD 1998 SC 50; Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213; Khairullah v. Sultan Muhammad 1997 SCMR 906 and Muhammad Riasat v. The Secretary of Education, N.W.F.P., Peshawar 1997 SCMR 1626 fol.\n \nRefusal of leave to appeal does not have the effect of enhancing the status and binding force of of High Court from the precedent of a High Court to that of decision of Supreme Court. \n \nAbdullah v. The State 2001 MLD 1554 ref.\n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. 189 Judgments of Supreme Court Conflict between Decision of larger Bench also later in time would prevail and would have the force of a precedent. \n \nFazal Mehmood Chaudhari v. Ch. Khadim Hussain and others 1997 SCMR 1368; Khairullah v. Sultan Muhammad 1997 SCMR 906 and Muhammad Riasat v. The Secretary of Education, N.W.F.P., Peshawar 1997 SCMR 1626 fol.\n \n(e) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. 201 Division Bench of High Court Law laid down in earlier of Division Bench Binding effect Such is binding on later Division Bench of same High Court, which is obliged to follow such law. \n \n(f) Precedent \n \n Law of precedent is delicate one Necessary before following a precedent to see as to what were the facts of the case, in which decision was given and what was the point, which was to be decided Too rigid observations to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and may also unduly restrict the proper development of law. \n \n(g) Precedent \n \n Judges and lawyers should never be slave of precedent ¬Precedent should be a guide and not a dictator.\n \nThe Art of Judgment by Sir Henery Slessar ref.\n \n(h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n S. 12(2) Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. without availing remedy of appeal against and decree ¬Validity Such application could not be a substitute for an appeal Party allowing and decree to become final after lapse of period of limitation could not be allowed to seek setting aside thereof by recourse to provisions contained in S.12(2), C.P.C. as it would certainly amount to circumvent the law.\n \n(i) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss. 7(1)(a)(2)(4), 10(1), 17 & 27 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss. 7(1)(a)(2)(4), 15 & 27 Banking Tribunals (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979), S.11 Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), Ss.5 & 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.12(2), 114 & O. XLVII, R. 1 ¬Proceedings arising out of Banking Laws Applicability of provisions of Ss.12(2) & 114, C.P.C., to such proceedings ¬Scope Finality attached to orders and s of Banking Court was only qua Court other than a Banking Court Jurisdiction under Ss.114 & 12(2), C.P.C., was exercised by Banking Court itself Provisions of S.27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, S.27 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, S. 11 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 and S.10 of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, thus, would not have the effect of ousting provisions of Ss.12(2) & 114, C.P.C. from being applied to proceedings arising out of Banking Laws Provisions of S.12(2), C,P.C., were applicable to such proceedings in appropriate cases and application under such provisions would be maintainable. \n \nNasir Mehmood v. Doha Bank Limited C. M. No.601 B of 1999, Suit No.47 of 1996; Mian Munir Ahmed v. United Bank Limited PLD 1998 Kar. 278; Messrs Tawakal Export Corporation v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 1997 CLC 1342; National Bank of Pakistan v. Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd. 2001 CLC 1187; Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited v. Messrs National Development Finance Corporation 2002 CLC 166 and Messrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Ltd. v. National Development Finance Corporation, Karachi PLD 2002 SC 500 ref.\n \nMessrs Gold Star International v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 2000 MLD 421 distinguished.\n \nUnited Bank Ltd. v. Canadian Apparel Company Ltd. PLD 1995 Kar. 577 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No.263 of 2001, decision dated: 3rd September, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ROSHAN ESSANI AND MUHAMMAD MUJEEBULLAH SIDDIQUI, JJ",
    "": "KHAIRPUR TEXTILE MILLS LTD. and 7 others --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12786",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2879 = 2003 SLD 2879 = 2003 CLD 349",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 27, 4, 9 & 18 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. l99 Constitutional petition Execution of decree ¬Review of order Property of Judgment debtor was ordered to be auctioned in execution proceedings through Court auctioneer Reserve price of property was fixed as Rs.30 lacs, but on application of Judgment debtor reserve price thereof was increased to Rs.80 lacs When property could not be sold on said reserve price, Banking Court reduced reserve price from 80 lacs to Rs.60 Macs which was not objected to by Judgment debtor Court realizing that reserve price of Rs.60 lacs, also was too high, reduced the same from 60 lacs to Rs.50 lacs, which order had been questioned by debtor through Constitutional petition contending that Banking Court had no Jurisdiction to review its earlier order Validity Banking Court by reducing reserve price of property sought to be auctioned had not reviewed earlier order and order reducing reserve price of property would not fall within scope of S.27 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 If such a harmless order could not be recalled by Banking Court then Banking Courts established for speedy disposal of Bank's recovery cases, could not Function and would standstill Judgment debtor did not raise any objection to recalling of previous two orders whereby reserve price of Rs.30 lacs was changed into 80 lacs and thereafter reserve price was reduced from 80 lacs to 60 lacs Main purpose for establishment of Banking Courts was for expeditious disposal of cases relating to recovery of Bank dues Banking Courts could not handicapped by some unscrupulous Judgment debtors under threat of S.27 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Banking Court was to examine facts and circumstances of each and every case and then to decide the same on its merits as to whether case fell within the scope of 'reviewing' or 'recalling' of order Order of Banking Court in the present case did not fall within scope of 'review' Judgment debtor, in circumstances was not entitled for any discretionary and equitable relief in exercise of Constitutional Jurisdiction of High Court Constitutional petition was dismissed being devoid of merits. \n \nMessrs Shah Jewana Textile Mills Ltd. v. United Bank of Pakistan through Attorney PLD 2000 Lah. 162 and Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Digital Radio Paging (Pvt.) Ltd. and 4 others 2000 CLC 1153 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.18093 of 2001, decision dated: 31st October, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Mst. SHAKILA RIAZ er\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12787",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2880 = 2003 SLD 2880 = 2003 CLD 354",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss. 6 & 9 Appeal against Judgment of Banking Tribunal Plaintiff a financial institution had extended financial facilities to the defendant, through another scheduled Bank Amount received by the defendant was payable within 12 months together with mark up at the agreed rate and the said scheduled Bank issued guarantee Defendant having not paid amount after expiry of stipulated date, plaintiff invoked Bank Guarantee and filed claim with the guarantor Bank through a suit for recovery of amount Banking Tribunal found that plaintiff had failed to lodge its claim within stipulated date as provided by guarantor and that guarantor Bank was not liable to make payment under Bank guarantee Guarantor Bank had asserted that time for filing claim was specifically mentioned as 10 3 1991 in the Bank guarantee whereas claim had been lodged by the plaintiff on 18 3 1991 ¬Validity Bank guarantee issued by the guarantor Bank on 18 .3 1990 was valid up to 15 3 1991 as amount was received by the plaintiff on 18 3 1990 for 12 months which was payable on 18 3 1991 View taken by Banking Tribunal that claim was required to be filed by 10 3 1991 and thereafter no claim was entertainable was based on an erroneous assumption that validity period of guarantee was up to 10 3 1991 Even if any date prior to validity period was mentioned in the Bank guarantee that would not discharge liability of guarantor under the guarantee before expiry of period of validity Filing of claim was merely a mode of convenience Bank guarantee being for a period of 12 months from 18 3 1990, liability of guarantor Bank could not be discharged before 18 3 1991 Claim filed by plaintiff within a period of validity was proper and tenable ¬Guarantor Bank was legally bound to honour its commitment and obligation arising under guarantee issued by it and was liable to make payment to the plaintiff.\n \nAllah Bakhsh and others v. Muhammad Ishaque and others PLD 1984 SC 47; House Building Finance Corporation v. Shahinshah Humayun Cooperative House Building Society and others 1992 SCMR 19; Ghazanfar Hussain v. Rehmat Bibi and others 1989 CLC 310: Mst. Iqbal Begum v. Abdul Ghaffar and others 1995 CLC 105; Radha Sundar Dutta v. Muhammad Jahadur Rahim and others AIR 1939 SC 24 and Forbes v. Gil and others AIR 1921 PC 209 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.83 of 1996, heard on 11-01-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI AND MANSOOR AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "SAUDI PAK INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT COMPANY (PVT.) LTD., Islamabad High Court High Court --Appellant\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD., Lahore High Court and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12788",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2881 = 2003 SLD 2881 = 2003 CLD 359",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.9 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29 Delay in filing appeal Condonation of First appeal filed under S.9 of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 was barred by time and appellant had filed application for condonation of delay under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 Period of 90 days had been prescribed under ordinary law for filing regular first appeal before High Court, while the present case was covered by provisions of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 which was a special law which had prescribed a period of 30 days for filing first appeal before High Court against decree passed by Banking Tribunal Special law having provided a different period of limitation, provisions of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 were neither applicable nor attracted in the case as provided under S.29 of Limitation Act, 1908 ¬Appeal being barred by time was devoid of merits and was dismissed.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.9 Suit for recovery of amount Suit decreed with costs Banking Tribunal while decreeing the suit also awarded costs to the Bank, defendant had filed appeal against said order of Banking Tribunal Validity Awarding of costs being within discretion of Court, Banking Tribunal in exercise of its discretionary powers had rightly awarded the costs Banking Tribunal having not exercised discretion in an arbitrary or in a fanciful manner, order of Banking Tribunal could not be interfered with in appeal.\n \nBashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.391 of 1996, heard on 29-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "SHAHID ALI BABAR --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK HOUSING FINANCE COMPANY LIMITED, Lahore High Court --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12789",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2882 = 2003 SLD 2882 = 2003 CLD 363",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------Ss.124 & 126---Contract of guarantee or indemnity ---Such contract can be created either by parol or written instrument and need not necessarily be in writing, but may be oral--¬Such contract may be expressed by words of mouth or may be tacit or implied and may be inferred from course of conduct of parties concerned.\n \nMathura Das and others v. Secretary of State and another AIR 1930 All. 848 and Nandlal Chanandas v. Firm Kishinchand-Butamal AIR 1937 Sindh 50 rel.\n \nLaw of Guarantees by Geraldine Andrews (Longman Publication), Chap.2, p.11; M.Iver v. Richardson (1813) 1 M & S 557 and Mt. Bittan Bibi and another v. Kuntu Lal and another AIR 1952 All. 996 ref.\n \n(b) Interpretation of documents---\n \n----Transaction between parties contained in more than one document---All such documents must be read and interpreted together and would have same legal effect for all purposes as if they were one document.\n \n(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-----\n \n----Art. 114---Promissory estoppel, doctrine of---Such doctrine could be pressed against any person, who made any representation orally or in writing and while acting upon such representation, the other party changed his position, then person making such representation could not resile from same.\n \nMst. Nur Jehan Begum v. Syed Mujtaba Ali Naqvi 1999 SCMR 2300 and Pakistan through Minister of Finance Economic Affairs and another v. Fecto Belarus Tractors Limited PLD 2000 SC 208 ref.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R.11---Plaint, rejection of---Duty of Court---While considering question of cause of action, Court should apply its mind to facts given in plaint and not to any other matter, and has to presume every allegations made therein as true---Plaint could be rejected, if Court came to the conclusion that if all allegations made in the plaint were proved, plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief whatsoever.\n \nSeven Stars Goods Transport Co. v. The Administrator, Karachi Municipal Corporation PLD 1976 Kar. 21 fol.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R.11---Plaint, rejection of---Vagueness in pleadings---Proper course not to reject plaint, but to direct party to remove vagueness.\n \nSeven Stars Goods Transport Co. v. The Administrator, Karachi Municipal Corporation PLD 1976 Kar. 21 fol.\n \nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----\n \n----Ss.2(c), 7(4) & 9(1)---Suit before Banking Court--¬Conditions precedent---Plaintiff must either be \"\"customer\"\" or \"\"Financial Institution\"\"---Such suit Faust arise from a default in fulfillment of any obligation with regard to any loan or finance---Where transaction was outside the scope of finance, then any default in fulfillment of obligation would not bring the suit within jurisdiction of Banking Court.\n \nAvari Hotels Limited and others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan and 6 others 2000 YLR 2407 and Ramzan Ali v. Javed Industries and others 1999 CLC 1294 ref.\n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----\n \n----Ss.2 (c), 7(4), 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11---Suit by Bank for recovery of loan amount with prayer to direct the defendant to execute guarantee as undertook by him and then declare him liable as guarantor for loan amount---Plaintiffs plea was that defendant had failed to fulfill his promise to execute guarantee on future date---Validity---Such could be a default in promise---Default in promise to execute a guarantee would not bring the defendant within ambit of \"\"customer\"\" to bring a suit against him before the Banking Court--;Suit was not maintainable as relationship of Banker and Customer did not exist between the parties---Application for leave to defend had been accepted and treated as written statement and preliminary issue had been framed in terms of S. 10(10) of the Ordinance---Rejection of plaint, being not the proper exercise of jurisdiction, however, suit was dismissed on preliminary issue in circumstances.\n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Khalid Mehmood 2002 CLD 658 ref.\n \n(h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----\n \n----O.VII, R.11---Plaint, rejection of---Underlying principles stated.\n \nPrinciples involved in Rule 11 of Order VII, C.P.C., are two folds. In the first place, it contemplates that a stillborn suit should be properly buried at .its inception, so that no further time is consumed on a fruitless litigation. Secondly, it gives plaintiff a chance to retrace his step at earliest possible moment, so that if permissible under the law, he may file a properly instituted case.\n \n(i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-----\n \n----O. VII, R.11---Grounds enumerated in O. VII, R.11, C.P.C., forâ-žrejection of plaint are not exhaustive.\n \nRasheed Ahmed Rizvi for Plaintiff.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-92 of 2001, decision dated: 2-10-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "BANK ALFALAH LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nIFTIKHAR A. MALIK --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12790",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2883 = 2003 SLD 2883 = 2003 CLD 379",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Ordinance (XXV of 1997) -- Ss. 9, 11 & 16 Sale of suit property Issuance of Sale Certificate Appeal against order of Trial Court Offer of appellant/ auction purchaser for purchase of suit property was accepted and sale certificate was ordered to be issued in favour of auction purchaser Auction purchaser moved an application before Banking Court to the effect that he alongwith other shopkeepers of suit property had formed a private limited Company with a view to purchase suit property in the name of said private limited Company and that after submission of bid, and acceptance thereof said private limited Company had been incorporated and certificate of incorporation had also been issued in that respect Auction purchaser in his said application had prayed that sale certificate be issued in favour of the Company as nominee of auction purchaser, but Banking Court rejected said. prayer and confirmed the sale in individual name of appellant/ auction purchaser Validity ¬Bank/decree holder had no objection of the sale certificate was issued in favour of the Company as the Bank was only concerned with recovery of amount advanced by it Even otherwise there would be no illegality in issuing Sale Certificate in favour of newly formed Company of which auction purchaser was one of the Directors Appeal was allowed by the High Court and order of Banking Court was modified to the extent that Banking Court would issue Sale Certificate in favour of Company as prayed for by appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.32 of 2002, decision dated: 25-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J. AND WAHID BUX BROHI, J",
    "": "SARFARAZ AHMED --Appellant\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12791",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2884 = 2003 SLD 2884 = 2003 CLD 379",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Ordinance (XXV of 1997) ---Ss. 9, 11 & 16 Sale of suit property Issuance of Sale Certificate Appeal against order of Trial Court Offer of appellant/ auction purchaser for purchase of suit property was accepted and sale certificate was ordered to be issued in favour of auction purchaser Auction purchaser moved an application before Banking Court to the effect that he alongwith other shopkeepers of suit property had formed a private limited Company with a view to purchase suit property in the name of said private limited Company and that after submission of bid, and acceptance thereof said private limited Company had been incorporated and certificate of incorporation had also been issued in that respect Auction purchaser in his said application had prayed that sale certificate be issued in favour of the Company as nominee of auction purchaser, but Banking Court rejected said. prayer and confirmed the sale in individual name of appellant/ auction purchaser Validity ¬Bank/decree holder had no objection of the sale certificate was issued in favour of the Company as the Bank was only concerned with recovery of amount advanced by it Even otherwise there would be no illegality in issuing Sale Certificate in favour of newly formed Company of which auction purchaser was one of the Directors Appeal was allowed by the High Court and order of Banking Court was modified to the extent that Banking Court would issue Sale Certificate in favour of Company as prayed for by appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.32 of 2002, decision dated: 25-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J. AND WAHID BUX BROHI, J",
    "": "SARFARAZ AHMED --Appellant\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12792",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2885 = 2003 SLD 2885 = 2003 CLD 497",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --Ss. 9 & 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXII, Rr. 1 & 3 Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), S.7 ¬Recovery of Bank loan Suit against minors Appointment of guardian ad litem Requirement Father of the minors was duly appointed guardian by the Guardian Judge who appeared before the Banking Tribunal and submitted application for leave to defend the suits on his behalf and on behalf of the minors Banking Tribunal rejected the application and decreed the suit in favour of the Bank ¬Contention of the minors was that they were given no notice and the decree to their extent was void Validity ¬When the application for leave to defend was filed, the father of the minors was still acting as guardian ad litem of the minors No objection having been raised for non¬ appointment of guardian of the minors, the contention of the minors was repelled by the High Court.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loan, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ----\n \n Ss. 9 & 21 Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.58 ¬Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), S.7 Recovery of Bank loan Mortgage of property owned by minorsâ-ž Against such mortgage, the Bank advanced loan to the borrower who was the father of minors and was duly appointed guardian by the Guardian Judge Permission for mortgage of the property owned by the minors to the extent of Rs.16 Lakh, for the purpose of loan, was granted by the Guardian Judge Borrower deposited the title documents of the property with the Bank, executed collateral mortgage deed and received a loan of Rs.90 Lakh Suit was decreed in favour of the Bank and the property owned by the minors was handed over to the Bank in execution of the decree ¬Plea raised by the minors was that at the most the liability of the minors was to the extent of Rs,16 Lakh and not more Validity No permission was ever sought and grained by the Guardian Judge to create collateral mortgage or deposit of title deeds, therefore, father of the minors exceeded his powers as guardian At the time of deposit of title deeds, the bank did not ask the borrower for permission from the concerned Court Findings of Banking Court that since equitable mortgage deed was also created in favour of the Bank which covered the entire finance facility was in excess of jurisdiction as the borrower was legally bound to have obtained permission from the Guardian Judge regarding execution of collateral mortgage deed and deposit of title deeds Liability of the minors in the present case was only to the extent of Rs.16 Lakh in the mortgaged deed and not beyond that Decree by the Banking Court beyond Rs.16 Lakh was set aside by High Court as the excess decretal amount could not be recovered by the Bank from the property owned by the minors Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ------\n \n S. 18 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.52 Banking decree, execution of Attachment of property owned by sons of the debtor Sons of the borrower contended that the decree could not be enforced against them as the property owned by them was not inherited by them ¬Banking Court attached the property on the pretext that the property owned by the sons was purchased by the debtor, though much before the loan was, sanctioned Validity Decree could be executed against the deceased debtor to the extent of the property left by him and legal representatives of the deceased could not be held responsible beyond the property let by the deceased Findings of the Banking Court were erroneous that the property was purchased by the deceased in the name of his sons, as there was nothing on record to support the findings of the Banking Court Even if the property was ,purchased by the deceased in the name of his sons, the same was done much prior to the execution of the mortgaged deed and the sons were owners of the property at the time of execution of the mortgage deed and the deceased debtor never claimed to be the owner of, the property in dispute Entire property of sons could not be attached towards satisfaction of the entire decretal amount in circumstances.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S. 18 Execution of decree Handing over possession of the mortgaged property to decree holder on oral request ¬While handing over possession, application was filed by the owners of the property that the value of the property be assessed Banking Court rejected the application and without getting the value of the property, transferred the same in the name of the decree holder Validity Such exercise of powers by the Banking Court, ignoring the law was without lawful authority and arbitrary Order of transfer of property was set aside in circumstances.\n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -\n \n Ss. 9, 18 & 21 Recovery of Bank loan Adjustment of mesne profits towards loan liability In execution of decretal amount, the property owned by the sons of the debtor was handed over to the decree holder without complying with the provisions of S.18 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Plea raised by the sons of the debtor was that the possession of their property was wrongly handed over to the decree holder and for the period since when the possession was handed over, the rent regarding the property as mesne profits be adjusted to wards loan adjustment Validity Since the possession of the property was ,handed over to the decree holder on their oral request by the Banking Court in arbitrary manner and property 'had been in their use, owners were entitled to mesne profits High Court directed that the fair rent of the property be assessed at the market rate from the date the decree holder took possession till its delivery to the sons of the debtor and amount calculated be adjusted towards the amount liable. to be recovered from the sons ¬Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Quetta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 17 of 2002, decision dated: 22-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMANULLAH KHAN YASINZAI AND FAZAL UR REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. PARVEEN QASIM JAN and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12793",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2886 = 2003 SLD 2886 = 2003 CLD 528",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banker and customer -- Recovery of loan amount Execution of decree Decree was passed in favour of Bank and property was attached and auctioned by the Executing Court subsequent to the stay order by the High Court in appeal Legality Petitioner moved an objection petition against the attachment of the property on the ground that the debtor had executed the agreement to sell in his favour for the sale of the property and that he was also in possession thereof ¬Executing Court, dismissed the objections holding that the agreement to sell did not create any right or interest in the movable property and on the basis of mere agreement, objections could not be maintained Petitioner, aggrieved of the order of the Executing Court came up in appeal before the High Court whereupon auction of the property was stayed Executing Court being unaware of the said order of stay put the property to auction and respondent was declared as the highest bidder Validity Auction was conducted in violation of the stay order passed by the High Court \"\"Stay order\"\" issued by a superior Court against the order of the subordinate Court, even if not conveyed/ communicated or served upon the opposite side, or the Court below, shall operate from the moment, it had been passed, in contrast to the injunctive order would become effective when it was served and in certain cases when it came to the knowledge of the concerned person ¬Property having been put to auction, subsequent to the stay order, such auction was null and void.\n \n(b) Banker and customer \n \n Recovery of loan Execution of decree Objection petition, dismissal of Appeal Events and developments occurring during the pendency of appeal Consideration of Appellate Court is empowered and has the authority to take into consideration, the events occurring during the pendency of appeal, especially those which have the nexus to the lis between the parties For ascertainment of the subsequent, events objection petition of the appellant, in the present case, required some factual inquiry and until and unless appropriate amendment was sought and allowed in the objection petition it was not proper to take into account the subsequent events, on the rule that no one was entitled to plead his case beyond the scope of his pleadings ¬Decree holder who ,may feel affected on account of the decree, should have full and proper opportunity to defend its position in black and white High Court by allowing the appeal set aside the impugned order with the direction to the appellant to apply to the Court below for appropriate amendment in his objection petition, which if allowed, respondent/decree holder, shall be permitted to file his reply and thereafter, the objection petition, be decided afresh.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.465 of 2000, heard on 25-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Ms. BUSHRA KHANUM --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12794",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2887 = 2003 SLD 2887 = 2003 CLD 531",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --O.IX, R.2 Banker and customer Suit for recovery of loan Transfer of case on account of change in law from one Banking Court to another Banking Court Notice to the parties by the transferee Banking Court vide order dated 21 12 1992 for 10 2 1993 Presiding Officer of the Court was on leave on 10 2 1993 and the case was adjourned for 2 5 1993 Banking Court issued notice to the defendants at the cost of the plaintiff for 7 6 1993 and plaintiff was directed to deposit the expenses of Talbana within a week ¬Said order was repeated by the Court till 4 12 1993, plaintiff failed to deposit the process fee within prescribed period i.e. 3 days in view of order dated 4 12 1993 and the case was adjourned to 7 2 1994 Banking Court dismissed the suit as the plaintiff failed to deposit the process fee vide its order dated 9 4 1994 Validity Service of the defendant was not effected in terms of the notice issued by the Court ¬When the notice was issued by the Court then the plaintiff was not supposed to deposit the process fee Subsequent order of the Banking Court after 21 12 1992 for issuance of notice to the defendant with a direction to the plaintiff to deposit process fee was not valid on the well founded principle of law that nobody should be penalised by the act of the Court Provision of O.IX, R.2, C.P.C. being not of imperative nature, rigid application thereof was not warranted and Court was not bound to pass order of dismissal Last order passed by the Banking Court to deposit process fee within 3 days was unwarranted, in law When the basic order was not sustainable in the eye of law then superstructure shall have to fall on the ground ¬Imposition of penalty prescribed under OJX, R.2, C.P.C. rested in the discretion of the Court which was to be exercised only in case of grave injustice and not in routine.\n \nAziz Ullah Khan and others v. Arshad Hussain and others PLD 1975 Lah. 879 and Rehmat Ali v. Fazal Hussain 1990 CLC 761 ref.\n \nMian Irshad Ali v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1975 Lah. 7; Crescent Sugar Mills v. Central Board of Revenue PLD 1982 Lah. 1; Ghaus Muhammad v. Nur Muhammad PLD 1965 Lah. 685 and Shamroze Khan v. Muhammad Amin PLD 1978 SC 89 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) -\n \n O.IX, R.2 Dismissal of suit where summons not served in consequence of plaintiffs failure to deposit process fee ¬Provision of O.IX, R.2 C.P.C. being not of imperative, nature, rigid application thereof was not warranted and Court was not bound to pass order of dismissal.\n \nShamroze Khan v. Muhammad Amin PLD 1978 SC 89 ref.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.IX, R.2 Dismissal of suit where summons not served in consequence of plaintiffs failure to pay costs Imposition of penalty prescribed under O.IX, R.2, C.P.C. rested in the discretion of the Court which was to be exercised only in case of grave injustice and not in routine.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 130 of 1996, heard on 20-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs KHABEER TRADING CORPORATION and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12795",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2888 = 2003 SLD 2888 = 2003 CLD 531",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) -- O.IX, R.2 Banker and customer Suit for recovery of loan Transfer of case on account of change in law from one Banking Court to another Banking Court Notice to the parties by the transferee Banking Court vide order dated 21 12 1992 for 10 2 1993 Presiding Officer of the Court was on leave on 10 2 1993 and the case was adjourned for 2 5 1993 Banking Court issued notice to the defendants at the cost of the plaintiff for 7 6 1993 and plaintiff was directed to deposit the expenses of Talbana within a week ¬Said order was repeated by the Court till 4 12 1993, plaintiff failed to deposit the process fee within prescribed period i.e. 3 days in view of order dated 4 12 1993 and the case was adjourned to 7 2 1994 Banking Court dismissed the suit as the plaintiff failed to deposit the process fee vide its order dated 9 4 1994 Validity Service of the defendant was not effected in terms of the notice issued by the Court ¬When the notice was issued by the Court then the plaintiff was not supposed to deposit the process fee Subsequent order of the Banking Court after 21 12 1992 for issuance of notice to the defendant with a direction to the plaintiff to deposit process fee was not valid on the well founded principle of law that nobody should be penalised by the act of the Court Provision of O.IX, R.2, C.P.C. being not of imperative nature, rigid application thereof was not warranted and Court was not bound to pass order of dismissal Last order passed by the Banking Court to deposit process fee within 3 days was unwarranted, in law When the basic order was not sustainable in the eye of law then superstructure shall have to fall on the ground ¬Imposition of penalty prescribed under OJX, R.2, C.P.C. rested in the discretion of the Court which was to be exercised only in case of grave injustice and not in routine.\n \nAziz Ullah Khan and others v. Arshad Hussain and others PLD 1975 Lah. 879 and Rehmat Ali v. Fazal Hussain 1990 CLC 761 ref.\n \nMian Irshad Ali v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1975 Lah. 7; Crescent Sugar Mills v. Central Board of Revenue PLD 1982 Lah. 1; Ghaus Muhammad v. Nur Muhammad PLD 1965 Lah. 685 and Shamroze Khan v. Muhammad Amin PLD 1978 SC 89 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) -\n \n O.IX, R.2 Dismissal of suit where summons not served in consequence of plaintiffs failure to deposit process fee ¬Provision of O.IX, R.2 C.P.C. being not of imperative, nature, rigid application thereof was not warranted and Court was not bound to pass order of dismissal.\n \nShamroze Khan v. Muhammad Amin PLD 1978 SC 89 ref.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.IX, R.2 Dismissal of suit where summons not served in consequence of plaintiffs failure to pay costs Imposition of penalty prescribed under O.IX, R.2, C.P.C. rested in the discretion of the Court which was to be exercised only in case of grave injustice and not in routine.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 130 of 1996, heard on 20-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs KHABEER TRADING CORPORATION and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12796",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2889 = 2003 SLD 2889 = 2003 CLD 552",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- S.18 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.99, 100, 101 & 58 Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), Ss.53 A, 53 & 54 Execution of decree Auction by decree holder of the mortgaged property Objection application ¬Maintainability Objector had entered into an agreement with the debtor to purchase the mortgaged property Property in question was mortgaged by the alleged vendor/ debtor, in favour of the Bank, as a security for a financial facility obtained by him and the same could not be redeemed Property was still mortgaged in favour of the decree holder Bank for the realization of the decretal amount Permission to sell/purchase the said property was not obtained from the decree holder at the time of entering into agreement to sell Validity Mortgage of immovable property, being a charge against the property, would go with the property and not the person Reliance of objector on S.53 A, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 therefore, was misdirected, untenable and dispelled Mere agreement to sell would not create any right title, or interest of the person, qua the property in question, claiming to be the beneficiary of such an agreement except to clothe him with a right to file a suit for specific performance of an agreement ¬Every transfer of immovable property made with intent to defeat or delay the claim of creditors of the transferor, was voidable at the option of any creditor so defeated or delayed; only exception created under S.53, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was that the rights of the transferee in good faith and for consideration would not be impaired ¬Provisions of O.XXI, R.58, C.P.C. whereunder the objector had filed application being not applicable to the sale of mortgaged property, application so filed, was not competent which was rightly dismissed by the Banking Court ¬Principles.\n \nIn the present case the property was mortgaged by the alleged vendor/ debtor, in favour of the Bank, as a security for a financial facility obtained by him and the same could not be redeemed even uptil now. The said property still stood mortgaged in favour of the decree ¬holder Bank and the same was the only security in the hands of the Bank for the realization of the decretal amount. The mortgage travels with the property and not the person. Even if the alleged agreement to sell was taken to be genuine and enforceable, the objector chose to purchase the mortgaged property and accepted the same with all its encumbrances. Undisputedly, outstanding decretal amount is a clear. charge over the mortgaged property and the same has to be recovered through the sale/auction of, the mortgaged property. Furthermore, even according to the stance of the objector, the parties did not obtain any permission from the decree holder at the time of entering into alleged agreement to sell. Admittedly, the objector was in the knowledge about the creation of mortgage on the said property in favour of the Bank. The objector had himself admitted, in the present case, that at the time of execution of the agreement to sell, it was agreed that the vendor will get the charge cleared from the Bank and then the sale deed would be executed.\n \nThe mortgage of immovable property, being a charge against the property, would go with the same even if the property in question had been alienated. The objector had agreed to purchase the suit property from the original owner, whereas the property was already mortgaged with the Bank and, thus, he had alternate remedy to file a suit against the original owner and had no remedy against the Bank.\n \nTherefore reliance on section 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was misdirected, untenable and was dispelled.\n \nMere agreement to sell does not create any right, title or interest of the person, qua the property in question, claiming to be the beneficiary. of such an agreement except to clothe him with a right to file a suit for specific performance of an agreement. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides in clear terms that a contract of sale does not of itself, create any interest or charge on such property.\n \nSection 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that every transfer of immovable property made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the transferor shall be voidable at the option of any creditor so defeated or delayed. The only exception created under the said provision of law is that the rights of the transferee in good faith and for consideration shall not be impaired.\n \nIn the present case during the subsistence of the mortgage and most probably during the pendency of the suit, the alleged agreement to sell was entered into between the parties. It prima facie establishes that the said agreement was entered into only to defeat and delay the claim of the Bank, which is, undoubtedly, still a creditor. Record does not show any document by the objector, to indicate that the said transfer of the property was in good faith and for consideration.\n \nThe disputed property was mortgaged, the decree, under execution, was passed on the basis of the said mortgage and the Executing Court did not pass any attachment order regarding the said mortgaged property, as the same was not necessary under the law.\n \nNow the question arises as to whether the provisions of Order XXI, rule 58, C.P.C. whereunder the objector filed the application, apply to the sale of the mortgaged property.\n \nA plain reading of Order XXI, rule 58, C.P.C. shows that the provisions thereof are applicable only in case where the property is attached in execution of a decree but not to sale of mortgaged property in execution of a decree for sale of mortgaged property, for a mortgage decree contains, as it ought to contain, a direction for sale of the mortgaged property, the proceedings under such a decree by attachment is unnecessary.\n \nThe objection to the sale of mortgaged property under the provision of Order XXI, rule 58, C.P.C. would not be competent as the said provisions would not apply to a sale of mortgaged property in execution of the decree.\n \nAs the property was mortgaged, therefore, no objection petition under Order XXI, rule 58, C.P.C. was maintainable in law. The provisions of Order XXI, rule 58, C.P.C. are not at all attracted in the present case and the objection petition was rightly dismissed by the Banking Court.\n \nThe possession of the mortgaged property had lawfully been taken over by the decree holder Bank under the orders of the Banking Court and the Bank was still in possession of the said property. Present appeal, the primary object of which was to protect the possession of the objector qua the property in question, had itself become infructuous and on this count too could not be allowed.\n \nMajor Muhammad Tariq v. Citibank Housing Company Ltd. through Manager 2002 CLD 1090; Muhammad Ibrahim v. Secretary, Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1993 Kar. 4?8; Australasia Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Juma Khan Agha Javed Corporation and others PLD 1976 Kar. 414; Mahabir Prashad Singh v: Nogendra Nath Mandal AIR 1921 Cal. 479; Kundan Lal v. Allah Bakhsh AIR 1932 Lah.618; Balijepalli Ramakotl Suryanarayana Tandodar and others v. Kampalli Ramchandrudu and others AIR 1932 Marl. 716; Hafiz Mohomed Ibrahim v. Bhagwan Das AIR 1935 All. 897 and Kishwar Jehan and 2 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 1988 MLD 596 ref.\n \n(b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) --\n \n S.54 Contract of sale does not by itself, create any interest or charge on such property.\n \nMere agreement to sell does not create any right, title or interest in the person, qua the property in question,, claiming to be the beneficiary of such an agreement except to clothe him with a right to file a suit for specific performance of an agreement. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides in clear terms that a contract of sale does not by itself, create any interest or charge on such property.\n \n(c) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) \n \n S.53 Transfer of immovable property made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the transferor shall be voidable at the option of any creditor so defeated or delayed Only exception created under S.53, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is that the rights of the transferee in good faith and for consideration shall not be impaired.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --\n \n O.XXI, R.58 Execution of decree Auction of mortgaged property Objection application under O.XXI, R.58, C.P.C. ¬Competence Provisions of O.XXI, R.58, C.P.C. are applicable only in case the property is attached in execution of a decree but not to the sale of mortgaged property in execution of a decree, for a mortgaged decree contains, a the same ought to contain, a direction for sale of the mortgaged property the proceedings under such a decree by attachment is unnecessary.\n \nAustralasia Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Juma Khan Agha Javed Corporation and others PLD 1976 Kar. 414; Mahabir Prashad Singh v. Nogendra Nath Mandal AIR 1921 Cal. 479; Kundan Lal v. Allah Bakhsh AIR 1932 Lah.618; Balijepalli Ramakotl Suryanarayana Tandodar and others v. Kampalli Ramchandrudu and others AIR 1932 Mad. 716; Hafiz Mohomed Ibrahim v. Bhagwan Das AIR 1935 All. 897 and Kishwar Jehan and 2 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 1988 MLD 596 ref.\n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) act (XV of 1997) ---\n \n S.18(3) Execution of decree Handing over the possession of mortgaged property to the decree holder by the Banking Court Legality Banking Court has been empowered to order for the delivery of possession to the decree holder When an application is made by a Banking Company complaining therein that the debtor does not voluntarily give possession of the mortgaged property sold, or sought to be sold by the Banking Company, then the Banking Court shall put the Banking Company in possession of the mortgaged property Banking Court, in circumstances, would not be committing any illegality in ordering the handing over of the possession of the mortgaged property to the decree holder.\n \n(f) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n S.18(3) Execution of decree Handing over the possession of mortgaged property to the decree holder by the Banking Court Where the debtor or any person claiming through the debtor does not voluntarily give possession of the property, the Banking Court has the power to put the Banking Company or the purchaser of the premises in possession of the mortgaged property in any manner deemed fit by the Banking Court.\n \nAgha Attaullah v. Presiding Officer, Banking Court and others 2002 CLD 1550 ref.\n \n(g) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ---\n \n ---S.27 Review or recalling its order by the Banking Court Competence Banking Court has no powers of review or recalling of order passed by it Banking Court was also not competent to recall its order during the pendency of appeal before the High Court.\n \n(h) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -----\n \n S.18(2) Execution of decree Sale of pledged or mortgaged property by the decree holder, with or without the intervention of the Banking Court, either by public auction or by inviting sealed tenders, and to receive the sale proceeds towards the satisfaction of the decree Principles.\n \nThe decree holder is empowered and competent to sell the pledged or mortgaged property, with or without the intervention of the Banking Court, either by public auction or by inviting sealed tenders, and to receive the sale proceeds towards the satisfaction of the decree. It manifests that, through the introduction of the said provisions of law, Banking Companies have been allowed to sell the pledged or mortgaged properties of their own accord and the discretion has been conferred upon such Banking Companies to sell those properties either with the intervention of the Banking Court or through a public auction. In the present case Banking Court, after going through the law on the subject and hearing the parties, had passed just, legal and fair order, thereby allowing the Bank to sell the mortgaged property in exercise of their option to sell the property of their own accord, to which no exception could be taken by the objector. Banking Court, while accepting the application filed by the decree holder, did not commit any illegality so as to warrant interference by High Court.\n \n(i) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credit and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n S.18(2) Execution of decree Auction of mortgaged property by the decree holder during the operation of injunctive order Successful bidder, being no more interested' in purchasing the auctioned property, asking for the refund of the amount he had deposited for the purchase of the property Entitlement Held, if the auction purchaser was not interested in the purchase of the property for some reason in addition to that the property was sold during the operation of injunctive order, then he could not be pestered for the purchase of the property Bank was directed to refund the amount to the successful bidder without any mark up.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeals from Order Nos. 155 of 1998, 155 of 2000, Writ Petition No. 19655 of 2000 and E.F.A. No.189 of 2001, decision dated: 27-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Raja RIAZ AHMAD KHAN --Appellant\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and 7 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12797",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2890 = 2003 SLD 2890 = 2003 CLD 571",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.19 & 19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.85 & 69 Execution of decree Auction of mortgaged property by decree holder through Court Auctioneer ¬Objection petition by the debtors before the sale was confirmed , by the Court Procedure to be followed by the Court while determining the issues/claims/objection with regard to sale etc. Judgment debtors moved objection petition on the ground that auction was not held/conducted by the Court Auctioneer at site on the date fixed; that the auction proceedings were fictitious and fraudulent; that no one including the Court Auctioneer or the Bank Staff had come to the site on the day fixed for the auction; that auction was not validly postponed; that entire proceedings with regard to auction 'were fabricated and that the purchaser had not deposited the balance 3/4th of the auction money within 15 days of the alleged auction, therefore the auction proceedings stood vitiated Validity ¬Held, on account of non obstante clause of subsection (7) of S.19, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, it was only the summary procedure that had to be followed by the Court while determining the issues/claims/objections with regard to sale but mandatory provisions of O.XXI, C.P.C. could not be dispensed with ¬Any, sale conducted and made absolute in violation of Rules provided in C.P.C. could be validly challenged, on that basis.\n \nIn the present case before the sale could be confirmed by the Court, the debtors filed the objections to the auction, in terms of section 19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and other enabling provisions of law. It was specifically mentioned in the grounds of the objection petition that no auction was held/conducted by the Court Auctioneer at site; the auction proceedings were fictitious and fraudulent. No one including the Court Auctioneer and the Bank Staff had come to the site of auction and the auction was not validly postponed, entire proceedings in this behalf were fabricated; the purchaser had not deposited the balance 3/4th of the auction money within 15 days of the alleged auction, therefore, the auction proceedings stood vitiated.\n \nThe question whether under section 19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the objection petition filed by the debtors. on the grounds taken therein, was incompetent, on account of the non obstante clause of subsection (7), it is only the summary procedure which has been permitted to be followed by the Court while determining the issues/claims/objections with regard to sale etc. But it was not well founded to argue that the objections to the very conduct; of sale as being violative of the mandatory provisions of Order XXI, C.P.C., had been dispensed with. It was only for the purpose of the adjudication of the issues mentioned in this subsection, that the lengthy procedure, provided in the C.P.C., for such determination had been given up. Because under the C.P.C., certain objections to the sale and the issues related thereto were treated as akin to a suit and tried in that manner. Under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which was a special law. the Court has been empowered to decide the objections etc. on the basis of the material before it, which may include the affidavits, etc. without going in the regular trial. However the relevant substantive law part contained in C.P.C., for the sale of immovable property continues to be attracted; this is specially so in view of sections 7(a), 7(2) and 19(2) of the Ordinance, whereby the provisions of C.P.C. have been made applicable to all the nature of the proceedings before the Banking Court, and the decree has to be executed in accordance with the provisions of C.P.C., except where there is some other law on the subject or a different manner is adopted by the Court; any sale conducted and made absolute in violation of rules provided in C.P.C. could be validly challenged on the basis thereof.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -\n \n S.19 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.69 ¬ Execution of decree Sale by auction of mortgaged property by the Court Auctioneer Adjournment of the sale-Procedure to be followed Principles When the adjournment of the sale was absolutely illegal, without jurisdiction, resultantly, any sale allegedly conducted on the adjourned date, shall be invalid and of no legal consequences and effect.\n \nOrder XXI, rule 69, C.P.C. deals wit the adjournment of the sale. The date when fixed by the Court for that purpose can either be adjourned by the Court or by the Court Auctioneer conducting the sale. Obviously, before the auction proceedings are finally concluded by the Court Auctioneer the Court in its discretion at any point of time, can adjourn the sale even without assigning any reasons. But where this power is to be exercised by the Court Auctioneer, it cannot be equated with power of the Court. Rather, the Court Auctioneer can only adjourn the sale, when he is physically present at the site of auction and either it is not possible to commence the proceedings or during the course of auction, a situation arises in which it becomes impossible to conduct or carry the sale, however, the Court Auctioneer unlike the Court has to give the reasons justifying the adjournment because such decision could be challenged before the Court. In the present case, it has not been proved on the record, that the adjournment was made by the Court Auctioneer through a reasoned order, as is the requirement of rule 69, C.P.C. on the date and the time of auction, at the site. No proof, which may have been in the forms of affidavits of the Court Auctioneer or the Bank Officer or any other person which in the light of the summary procedure, under, section 19(7) of the Ordinance, was permissible, was brought on the record, that the adjournment was made by the Court Auctioneer physically being present at the site and he fell seriously ill, that the postponement became imperative. Conversely when the objectors in their objection petition specifically stated that the Court Auctioneer did not visit the site on date of auction, the reply of both decree holders and purchaser is evasive, which is no denial in law and would mean that the Court Auctioneer did not come to the site on the date of auction. It was stated that the Court Auctioneer could not go to the site because of his serious indisposition. Today he has tried to shift his position by arguing that. the officer should be summoned to verify the position. The interim report filed by the Court Auctioneer showed that he was allegedly so seriously ill that he could not go to the site, therefore, the question of his adjourning the sale in terms of Order XXI, rule 69, C.P.C., does not arise for which his physical presence at the site was sine qua non.\n \nAn adjournment/ postponement of the event is always before the happening of the event; but if for any reason the happening of the event has lapsed or frustrated, that Court by the fiction of adjournment cannot postpone the event, which has not occasioned, In other words the Court vide Order XXI, rule 69, C.P.C. has no ex post facto power to adjourn a sale, which otherwise, could not take place on account of the alleged illness of the Court Auctioneer, therefore, any order of the Court affirming the postponement shall be illegal and without jurisdiction. The Court cannot retrospectively either adjourn the sale or endorse, the postponement made by the Court Auctioneer and it is not the intention of the Legislature behind Order XXI, rule 69, C.P.C. Therefore, when the adjournment of the sale was absolutely illegal, without jurisdiction, resultantly, any sale allegedly conducted on the said date; shall be invalid and of no legal consequences and effect.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) ----\n \n S.19(2) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66 ¬Execution of decree Sale of mortgaged property through Court Auctioneer Proclamation of sale by public auction ¬Essentials Place of sale must be specifically mentioned and the failure to do so, shall be a material irregularity, vitiating the sale.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n S.19(2) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.85 & S.148 Execution of decree Sale of mortgaged property through Court Auctioneer Failure of auction purchaser to deposit 3/4th of amount within 15 days as per terms and conditions of sale Auction purchaser sought extension of time to deposit 3/4th amount which the Banking Court extended without giving notice to the debtor and by completely ignoring the mandatory provision of O.XXI, R.85, C.P.C. Effect Order extending the time by the Banking Court, in circumstances, was absolutely illegal and without jurisdiction for the reason that the Court under S.148, C.P.C. could only extend such time which had been fixed by the Court itself -Where, however, time for doing an act, had been determined and fixed by the law, the Court had no power or authority to extend such time Provisions of O.XXI, R.85, C.P.C. which were mandatory in nature, provided that the full payment of the auction price by the purchaser, shall be paid before the close of 15th day from the sale of the property Such being a mandate of law, Court had no authority to enlarge the time.\n \n(e) Act of Court \n \n  Rule that no one shall be prejudiced on account of an act of Court, would only be applicable in the cases, where Court had the authority to pass the order but the order was erroneous Where, however, the Court lacked the authority and absolutely had no jurisdiction, notwithstanding such order having been passed by the Court, a person could not put a premium on void order.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.690 of 2002, heard on 14-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MAQI CHEMICALS INDDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. through Manager and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12798",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2891 = 2003 SLD 2891 = 2003 CLD 584",
    "Key Words:": "Non Performing Assets and Rehabilitation of Industrial Undertakings (Legal Proceedings) Ordinance (LVIII of 2000) --s.9 & 2(1), cl.(g), sub cls.(a), (b) & (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Constitutional petition \"\"Non¬ performing asset\"\" Ingredients given in sub cls. (a), (b) & (c) of cl.(g) of subsection (1) of S.2 of the Non Performing Assets and Rehabilitation of Industrial Undertakings (Legal Proceedings) Ordinance, 2000 have to exist simultaneously if an asset on the books of a financial institution is to be treated as a \"\"non performing asset\"\" Benefits of S.9 of the Ordinance are available to Financial Institutions and their customers only in respect of \"\"non performing assets\"\" and not otherwise In order for any \"\"non performing asset\"\" to be dealt with under the Ordinance, the amount of such \"\"non¬ performing asset\"\" should be more than thirty million rupees as stipulated in sub cl. (c), cl.(g) of S.2(1) of the Ordinance ¬Provisions of S.9 of the. Ordinance, therefore, can be available only if the amount involved is in excess of thirty million rupees.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 18959 of 2002, heard on 20-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J",
    "": "Messrs MUNIR FLOOR MILLS through Chief Executive er\nVs.\nBANKING COURT NO.II, Lahore High Court and 7 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12799",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2892 = 2003 SLD 2892 = 2003 CLD 588",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.22(6) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX. Rr. 1 & 2 Interlocutory order Appeal Maintainability Object of enacting laws relating to recovery of outstanding loans of Banking Companies being to provide speedy measures for recovery of such money, if the interlocutory orders were brought under challenge before the High Court in appeal the object for which the enactment was made would be frustrated Appeal in circumstances, being not maintainable, was dismissed by the High Court.\n \nPakistan Fisheries Ltd., Karachi and others v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109 fol.\n \nProvince of the Punjab v. Dr. S. Muhammad Zafar Bukhari PLD 1997 SC 351 and Mst. Sajida Sultana v. A.D.B.P. Model Branch, Lahore 2002 CLD 592 distinguished.\n \nShah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and another AIR 1981 SC 1786; Syed Qadar and others v. Muhammad Afzal and others PLD 1997 SC 859; Ghulam Hussain Shah v. Ghulam Muhammad PLD 1974 SC 344; Raja Muhammad Afzal v. Ch. Muhammad Altaf Hussain 1986 SCMR 1736; Messrs Huffaz Seamlen Pipe Industries Ltd. and 2 others v. Messrs Security Leasing Corporation Ltd. 2002 SCMR 1419; Messrs Tri Star Polyster Limited and another v. Citibank 2001 SCMR 410; Messrs Afshan Ahmed v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited 2002 CLD 137 and Pakistan Fisheries Ltd., Karachi and others v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 192 of 2002, decision dated: 25-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "Malik ISRAR SALIM --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A., Lahore High Court and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12800",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2893 = 2003 SLD 2893 = 2003 CLD 592",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ---- Ss.10 & 20 Applications for leave to defend the suits were dismissed by the Banking Court and decrees were passed in favour of the Bank Appeal Validity Banking Court, while deciding the leave applications, failed to attend comprehensively to the controversies between the parties as raised in the leave applications and replies filed by the Bank Court also failed to give any findings on any of the issues/points raised by the parties and the orders, refusing to grant leave to defend the suits and also the impugned s were sketchy, non speaking and could not be called a \"\"judicial \"\" within the parameters set up by law No points of controversies were determined and no reasons had been assigned by the Banking Court in coming to the conclusions a$ to how and why the applicants were not entitled for the grant of leave to defend the suits ¬Effect Judgment which was not a speaking and devoid of reasons, was not sustainable in law being in contravention of settled law Judgments, decrees and the orders, declining leave to defend the suit by the Banking Court, were set aside by the High Court and resultantly all the applications, for leave to defend the suits, were deemed to be pending before the Banking Court which was directed to decide the same, after hearing the parties and in accordance with law within a period of one month.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.305 to 307 of 2001, heard on 3rd December, 2002,",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMED, JJ",
    "": "Messrs PAKISTAN AGRO POWER (PVT.) LTD. through Director and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12801",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2894 = 2003 SLD 2894 = 2003 CLD 596",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872) -- S.126 Bank guarantee Default Liquidated damages ¬Interest Rights and liabilities of the parties -Determination Guarantee rights and liabilities of the parties, are determined with reference to the terms and conditions of the guarantee and a contract of guarantee is to be strictly construed in terms of the guarantee Guarantee in the present case unequivocally postulated that the total responsibility of the Bank was restricted to a specified amount Bank irrevocably and unconditionally undertook to pay the said amount to the plaintiff on demand Nothing was brought on record to show that the plaintiff had sustained damages on the ground of default Effect ¬Liquidated damages as a rule, required the positive evidence to show that the actual loss was suffered by the party claiming the damages and even fixed amount stipulated for liquidated damages could not be recovered if the quantum of actual loss was not proved Plaintiff, in circumstances, was neither entitled to any interest nor to any amount as liquidated damages.\n \n(b) Interpretation of document ---\n \n Fundamental principle.\n \nIt is a fundamental principle of interpretation of documents and statutes that they are to be interpreted in their entire context following a full consideration of all provisions of the document or statute, as the case may be, that every attempt shall be made to save the document and for this purpose a difference between general statements and particular statements of the document be differentiated properly to save the document rather to nullify it that no provision of the document be read in isolation or in bits and pieces but the entire document is to be read as a whole to gather the intention of the parties, that the Court for this purpose can resort to the correspondence exchanged between the parties, that the Court shall lean to an interpretation which will effectuate rather than one which will invalidate an instrument.\n \nAllah Bakhsh and another v. Muhammad Ishaque and another PLD 1984 SC 47; Societe Generale De Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan 2002 SCMR 1694; Messrs Pakistan State Oil Company Limited v. Muhammad Tahir Khan and others PLD 2001 SC 980; Sandoz Limited and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1995 SCMR 1431; House Building Finance Corporation v. Shahinshah Hamayun Corporative House Building Society and others 1992 SCMR 19: Ghazanfar Hussain v. Rahmat Bibi 1989 CLC 310; Habib Bank Limited v. Malik Atta Muhammad and 4 others 2000 CLC 451; Haji Adam Ali Agaria v. Asif Hussain and 2 others 1996 MLD 322; Mst. Iqbal Begum v. Abdul Ghaffar and others 1995 CLC 105; Saeed Mahmood v. Halima Bat 1990 MLD 1789 and Najmul Hassan Farooqui v. Messrs United Carpets Limited 1990 ALD 412 ref.\n \n(c) Contract Act (IX of 1872) \n \n S.126 Contract Contract of guarantee Principles of construction\n \nThe principles of construction governing contracts in general apply equally, to contracts of guarantee. Dealing with a guarantee as a mercantile contract, the Court does not apply to it merely technical rules but construes it so as to reflect what may fairly be inferred to have been the parties, real intention and understanding as expressed by them in writing so as to give effect to it.\n \nHalsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 20, para. 143 ref.\n \n(d) Contract Act (IX of 1872) \n \n S. 126 Bank guarantee Contention of the Bank was that the conduct of the plaintiff was mala fide, inasmuch as for about six years the plaintiff did not take any step towards recovery of decretal amount and that the plaintiff held 33% shares in the company Validity Responsibility of the Bank, in terms of the guarantee, would not become inoperative and it was the right of the plaintiff to seek remedy against the respondent, irrespective of its share, if any, in the company.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 185 and 186 of 2002, decision dated: 27-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI, HAMID ALI MIRZA AND TANVIR AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "SAUDI PAK INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT COMPANY (PVT.) LTD., Islamabad High Court High Court --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12802",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2895 = 2003 SLD 2895 = 2003 CLD 606",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- Ss. 9 & 10 Recovery of Bank loan Application for leave to appear and defend the suit, dismissal of Failure to afford any opportunity of hearing Defendants filed separate applications for leave to defend and plaintiff filed application for amendment of plaint Plaintiff did not file reply to the applications for leave to defend while the defendants filed replies to the application filed by the plaintiff All the applications were fixed for arguments and consequently, the Banking Court dismissed the applications of the defendants and the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff Banking Court did not specify in any of the orders as to whether the arguments were to be addressed on the application for amendment of plaint, applications for leave to defend the suit or on all the applications Defendants contended that they were condemned unheard and the applications for leave to defend were dismissed without affording opportunity of hearing to them Validity Interim order passed by the Banking Court was vague and unspecified Banking Court after hearing the arguments only on the application for amendment of the plaint proceeded to decide all the applications under the erroneous perception that the Court had heard the arguments on all the applications, thus, the defendants were not afforded any opportunity of hearing on the applications Validity ¬By not affording the opportunity of hearing to the defendants, their interests had been prejudiced as they had right to be heard by the Banking Court before saddling them to a colossal liability Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court to provide opportunity of hearing before deciding the application for leave to defend.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n S.10 Application for leave to defend Non filing of reply to such application Effect When no reply to application for leave to defend and no counter affidavit were filed it could be presumed that there was no rebuttal on record by plaintiff to assertions made by defendants in their leave application Banking Court could have granted leave to defend the suit on such score alone Banking Court had misread the record of the case and proceeded to pass the decree in mechanical manner without application of judicial mind Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court were set aside in circumstances.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 9 & 10 Recovery of bank loan Statement of accounts, non considering of Passing of decree after dismissal of application for leave to defend Grievance of the defendants was that only on the basis of dismissal of applications for leave to defend, the Banking Court without even looking at the statement of accounts and without discussing the statement of accounts and even documents on record, had proceeded to decree the suit in favour of Bank Validity Defendants had annexed photocopies of certain credit advices with the applications for leave to defend and the same had not been taken into consideration by the Banking Court before passing a decree for huge amount Defendants had a right that the documents relied upon by them with applications for leave to defend should be considered by the Courts before creating liability against defendants Banking Court had misread the documents on record and its approach was perfunctory and it had without discussing the documents on record and dealing with the contentions raised by the defendants, wrongly jumped to the conclusions that the documents appended with the plaint fully supported the claim of the plaintiff Judgment passed by the Banking Court was not a speaking and was devoid of reasons High Court set aside the and decree passed by the Banking Court and case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh.\n \nAdamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The Province of East Pakistan and others PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 272; Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller, Import' and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158; Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 and Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Secretary Ministry of Labour and others 1984 SCMR 1014 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos. 184 and 295 of 2000, heard on 3rd October, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PERVAZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Sh. MUHAMMAD NAEEM and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED, Karachi High Court and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12803",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2896 = 2003 SLD 2896 = 2003 CLD 632",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 12 & 9(4)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, R.2---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)--¬Suit for recovery of money was decreed ex parte---Summons were issued to the -debtor after filing the suit as required under the law and subsequently publication of the same was made in leading newspapers but none appeared---Record showed that on the date the decree was passed no one appeared before the Trial Court, nor any application for leave to defend the suit was filed, and the Banking Court decreed the suit as provided under S.9(4) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 and O.XXXVII, R.2, C.P.C. as the averments made to the plaint were verified on oath and the suit was decreed as prayed---Application for setting aside the said decree on the ground that correct address of the defendant had not been given in the plaint, therefore, it was not served in accordance with law---High Court dismissed the application on the ground of limitation holding that the defendant had, in fact, been served---Defendant, inter alia, contended that the Courts below had not considered the case in its true perspective: that the application for setting aside the decree was in time and the of the High Court had resulted in miscarriage of justice and that the defendant had intimated the plaintiff (Bank) about the change of the address---Validity---Essence of the facts clearly showed that Court had adopted proper course of service of the defendant in the suit and defendant in his own wisdom moved an application before the Court for setting aside the ex parte decree which was time-¬barred---Judgment of the High Court was well-reasoned and was based on the proper appreciation of the material available on record---Neither question of misreading or non-¬reading of the material was available nor question of general public importance was involved in the case---Petition being without merit and substance was dismissed and leave to appeal was declined.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil petition No.3076 of 2001, decision dated: 26th November.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED DEEDAR HUSSAIN SHAH AND MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KAPUR TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED\nVs.\nBANKERS EQUITY LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12804",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2897 = 2003 SLD 2897 = 2003 CLD 658",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Ordinance (XXV of 1997)-------Ss. 9,10 & 21---Financial Institutions (Recovery ' of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.3---Suit for recovery of amount---Application for leave to defend the suit---Entitlement to grant of costs of funds and costs of suit--¬Plaintiff-Bank filed suit for recovery of outstanding amount against defendants---Defendants in their application for leave to defend the suit had stated that they had paid entire amount to the plaintiff-Bank---Plaintiff-Bank admitted statement of defendants with regard to payment of entire amount, but had claimed that despite payment of entire outstanding amount by defendants, plaintiff-Bank was entitled to grant of costs of funds and costs of suit---Trial Court ordered defendants to pay amount of court fee affixed on the plaint and professional fee of counsel for plaintiff only before specified date and plaintiff Bank was directed to issue Clearance Certificate to the defendants---Plaintiff ¬Bank had challenged order of Trial Court in appeal contending that Trial Court had acted against law inasmuch as it was incumbent upon Trial Court to have granted all costs of funds---Validity---Plaintiff-Bank was not entitled to all costs of funds as claimed by it in the light of S.3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 whereunder default would occur when a had been rendered against customer and it was upon said that a decree to be passed had to provide for payment of cost of funds---Judgment, in the present case, had not been passed under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 against defendants as there was no occasion for passing of a because entire amount had already been paid as admitted by plaintiff ¬Bank itself ---No question of default could arise in circumstances. \n \nMuhammad Rashid Qamar for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.123 of 2002, decision dated: 19-09-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK AG ZURICH through Manager\nVs.\nMUSTAFA SHAMSUDDIN GHATILLA and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12805",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2898 = 2003 SLD 2898 = 2003 CLD 661",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.21---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLI, R.1 --¬Appeal not accompanied with copy of decree ---Effect--¬Requirement of filing decree with appeal found place in O.XLI, R. 1, C.P.C. and not in S.21 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act 1997---Appeal was filed on 19-5-1999 annexing therewith certified copy of , whereas decree was signed subsequently on 29-5-1999---Objection that there was no decree on the date of filing of appeal, thus, no appeal could lie on such date would not defeat appeal and pre-empt its decision on merits, when subsequently at a stage where decree had been signed, appeal was admitted by High Court on 1-11-2000 to regular hearing.\n \nBaseer Ahmed Siddiqui v. Shama Afroz 1988 SCMR 892 ref.\n \n(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Art. 129(e)---Judicial record---Presence of counsel of a party noted on top of ---Denial of such fact---Non¬-filing of affidavit by concerned person-Effect---Such contention would lose its significance in absence of such affidavit---Such affidavit could at best hint at inadvertence on the part of Shorthand Writer/Private Secretary, who noted order on dictation of Judge but not against the Judge himself. \n \n(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Art.129(e)---Judicial record---Text of (statement of Judge)---Presumption of genuineness and truth attached to ---Principles---Affidavit by anybody controverting text of ---Admissibility.\n \nGenuineness of judicial record cannot be sacrified at the altar of expediency of a litigant. \n \nAbdullah v. Shaukat 2001 SCMR 60 fol.\n \nStatement of a Presiding Judge, who presides at a trial, whether it be in a criminal or civil case, is at to what has taken place at the trial is conclusive, and neither the affidavits of by-standers nor of jurors nor the notes of counsel nor of Shorthand Writers are admissible to controvert the statement of the Judge. \n \nKatta R. Venkatesayya v. Muhammad Ghouse Saheb AIR 1994 Mad. 45; AIR 1944 Mad. 450 and 10 Bom. HCR 75 fol.\n \nIf such affidavits are now received, it would be the first instance of such a practice and would cause greatest injury to the administration of justice.\n \nAIR 1944 Mad. 450 fol.\n \nGenuineness of the judicial record cannot be sacrificed for any extraneous reason. The sanctity attached to judicial record through illustration at clause (c) of Article 129 of Qanun-e-Shahadat shall not be injured or distorted. Affidavits filed by anybody in support of the text of i.e. the statement of a Judge cannot be permitted to disfigure the above mentioned presumption of genuineness attached to judicial record. There shall, therefore, be no dispute about genuineness of what has been recorded in the . \n \nMuhammad Zaman v. Abdul Ghaffar PLD 1980 Lah.582 rel.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S.96(3) & O.XXIII, R.1---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 114---Appeal from consent decree---Conditions---Consent decree operates as an estoppel for the same is founded on agreement of parties, who would consciously give up their right of appeal in consequence of such agreement---In order to bring the cause within the fold of S.96(3) of C.P.C., in a judicial dispensation dealing with substantive rights of a party, the consent, if any, should be clear, express and unambiguous---Where there is no express and comprehensible consent on behalf of appellant, his appeal would not be hit by mischief of S.96(3), C. P. C.\n \n(e) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S.126---Bank guarantee---Nature---Restraining operation of Bank guarantee-- Essential conditions ---Encashment of Bank guarantee---Scope---Duty of banker and its remedy to seek money back--Exhaustively stated.\n \nBank guarantees are independent contracts and concerned parties must construe them independently as primary contract and encash them notwithstanding any dispute arising out of original contract between parties.\n \nNational Construction Limited v. Aiwan-e-Iqbal PLS 1994 SC 311 ref.\n \nIndeed all secured financial dealings and business such as execution of a bank guarantee etc. are based on commercial morality and mutual trust and confidence, which should not be shaken by taking a turn much against the terms of guarantee itself. Bank guarantee is a tripartite contract of guarantee between the bank, the beneficiary and the person at whose instance, bank issues such guarantee. The Banker is not supposed to question the nature of accounts or liabilities between the other tow parties.\n \nIn order to restrain the operation of a bank guarantee, there should be a serious dispute and there equities in the form of preventing the irretrievable injustice, otherwise the very purpose of bank guarantee would be negatived and the fabric of trading operations would get jeopardized.\n \nAIR 1981 SC 1426 and (1989) 65 Camp. Cas. 283 (SC) rel.\n \nIf a banker is allowed to resile from the contents of guarantee, it would seriously prejudice the sanctity and confidence attached to the bank guarantee.\n \nIf bank wants the money back, the right course is not to disintegrate the terms of guarantee itself, but to take appropriate steps and settle the accounts with party at whose instance bank issued guarantee. \n \nArmy Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1652 and Zahoor Textile Mill's case PLD 1999 SC 880 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 292 of 1999 decided on 17-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "GHULAM NABI SOOMRO AND WAHID BUX BROHI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs DOHA BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nPANGRIO SUGAR MILLS LIMITED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12806",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2899 = 2003 SLD 2899 = 2003 CLD 676",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.l2, 15, 21 & 27---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Decree for recovery of Bank loan---Application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., for setting aside such decree--¬Maintainability---Applicant claiming to be creditor of -debtor raised plea that in its absence, decree could not be obtained---Banking Court dismissed such application---Validity---Applicant had not filed , appeal against decree, which had attained finality and could not be questioned---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 was a special statute providing remedies to parties concerned including right of appeal under S. 21 and an application in the nature of S: 12 thereof as and when warranted by circumstances--¬Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 took care of various situations itself, thus, application under general law i.e. S. 12(2), C.P.C., would not be competent---Decree-holder had filed suit against -debtor for recovery of its outstanding loan amount---Neither obligatory nor a requirement of law for decree-holder to know and mention that -debtor owed some amount to any other Bank (applicant) ---Decree-holder had neither committed fraud nor concealed facts--¬Banking Court had rightly dismissed application under S.12(2), C.P.C., on merits---High Court dismissed appeal with costs on merits as well as being not maintainable. \n \nMessrs Gold Star International and others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 2000 MLD 421; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Zafar Textile Mills Ltd. 2000 CLC 1330; Emirates Bank International Ltd. v. Messrs Osman Brothers and others PLD 1998 Kar. 338; Mian Munir Ahmad v. United Bank Limited PLD 1998 Kar. 278; Pakistan Fisheries Ltd., Karachi v. United Bank Limited PLD 1993 SC 109; Messrs Shah Jewana Textile Mills Limited v. United Bank Limited PLD 2000 Lah. 162 and Messrs Dada Bhoy Cement. Industries Ltd. and others v. Messrs National Development Finance Corporation 2002 CLC 166 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S. 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12 (2)--¬Decree, setting aside of---Dismissal of application under S.12(2), C.P.C., without framing issues---Validity---Not obligatory for Banking Court to frame issues, where no substantial question of fact and law had been raised, which could be decided after framing of issues and recording of evidence. \n \nGhulam Muhammad v. M. Ahmad Khan and 6 others 1993 SCMR 662 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.30 of 1998, heard on 1st October, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs PAKISTAN KUWAIT INVESTMENT COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. \nVs.\nBANK ALFALAH LIMITED and 11 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12807",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2900 = 2003 SLD 2900 = 2003 CLD 683",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 59 & 84--¬Leave to defend, application for---Defendant denied to have signed letter of guarantee annexed with plaint---Court itself could not form any opinion regarding genuineness of signatures of defendant by comparing his signatures on original passport and national identity card with those appearing on letter of guarantee---Court with consent of parties referred such matter to Handwriting Expert for his opinion. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10---Leave to appear and defend suit, application for--¬Defendant dented to have signed letter of guarantee annexed with plaint as he was abroad at the relevant time for medical treatment---Plaintiffs counsel conceded after examining original passport that same did not bear any entry showing that defendant was in Pakistan during the relevant time---Such matter required evidence to enable Bank to establish that letter of guarantee had to fact been signed by the defendant---Court granted to defendant unconditional leave to appear and defend suit with direction to parties to record their evidence on issue, whether letter of guarantee bore signatures of defendant.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.366 of 1999, Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos.299 of 2002 and 9128 of 2001, decision dated: 19-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAQBOOL BAQAR, J",
    "": "Messrs HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs PAN ISLAMIC STEAMSHIP CO. LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12808",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2901 = 2003 SLD 2901 = 2003 CLD 683",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 59 & 84--¬Leave to defend, application for---Defendant denied to have signed letter of guarantee annexed with plaint---Court itself could not form any opinion regarding genuineness of signatures of defendant by comparing his signatures on original passport and national identity card with those appearing on letter of guarantee---Court with consent of parties referred such matter to Handwriting Expert for his opinion. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10---Leave to appear and defend suit, application for--¬Defendant dented to have signed letter of guarantee annexed with plaint as he was abroad at the relevant time for medical treatment---Plaintiffs counsel conceded after examining original passport that same did not bear any entry showing that defendant was in Pakistan during the relevant time---Such matter required evidence to enable Bank to establish that letter of guarantee had to fact been signed by the defendant---Court granted to defendant unconditional leave to appear and defend suit with direction to parties to record their evidence on issue, whether letter of guarantee bore signatures of defendant.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.366 of 1999, Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos.299 of 2002 and 9128 of 2001, decision dated: 19-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAQBOOL BAQAR, J",
    "": "Messrs HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs PAN ISLAMIC STEAMSHIP CO. LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12809",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2902 = 2003 SLD 2902 = 2003 CLD 689",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.2(2) & O.XXIII, R.3---Execution of decree, petition for---Modification of decree in terms of application under O.XXIII, R.3, C.P.C. by the High Court in appeal---Claim or suit of Industrial Development Bank was neither before the Appellate Bench of the High Court nor said claim was- adjudicated upon by the Bench to culminate into a decree as defined in S.2(2), C.P.C. and it was only upon compromise of the parties that reference, was also made to 4096 share of the Industrial Development Bank---Case or appeal before the Appellate Bench of the High Court had arisen out of a decree passed against the -debtors in the suit of the decree-holder (Habib Bank) and not in the suit of Industrial Development Bank--Effect---Claim of Industrial Development Bank as sought to be part of modified decree by the ¬-debtors could not be clubbed with the claim of the decree-¬holder Bank (Habib Bank) to be executed by High Court through enforcement of modified decree in the present execution petition. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.2(b)(i), 5, 7(6) & 19---Terms \"\"Banking Court\"\", \"\"claim\"\" and \"\"case\"\"---Connotation-- Pecuniary jurisdiction of Court, determination of---Principles---Execution of decree--¬Contention of the -debtors was that definition of \"\"Banking Court\"\" given in S.2(b)(i) read with S.19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was to be read to mean that claim in the suit, originally filed was to determine the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court---Validity---Word 'claim' as mentioned in S.2(b) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 related to \"\"claim\"\" of the \"\"case\"\" which, in the present case, was the \"\"claim\"\" of, the execution petition before the High Court---Word \"\"claim\"\" as used in S.2(b)(i) of the Ordinance had a direct reference to the term \"\"case\"\" employed in the said definition of the \"\"Banking Court\"\"--¬\"\"Case\"\", of course, included an execution petition---Word \"\"claim\"\" had not been restricted to the claim of a decree-¬holder-plaintiff in a suit---Term \"\"case\"\" thus could not be restricted to a suit only and claim of decree-holder in the execution petition would determine pecuniary limit of the relevant Court in terms of S.2(b)(i), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Principles.\n \nThe word 'claim' as mentioned in section 2(b) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 relates to the claim of the 'case' which in the present proceedings is the 'claim' in the execution petition before the High Court. The word claim' as used in section 2 (b) (i) of the Ordinance has a direct reference to the term 'case' employed in the said definition of the Banking Court. Case' of course, includes an execution petition. The word 'claim' has not been restricted to the claim of a decree-holder-plaintiff in a suit. \n \nThe word 'case' has consciously been used in this legislative instrument in order to be a determinative factor for the purposes of jurisdiction of the Banking Court as established under section 5 of the Ordinance of 2001 or Banking Court in the High Court. Term 'case' has a wider meaning and connotation than the word 'suit'. 'Case' includes all proceedings, suits, petitions, appeals, reviews, revisions and all other actions relating to or arising out of Its, causes or complaints between the parties. \n \nThe word 'case' has been defined as a general term for an action, cause, suit, or controversy, at law or in equity; a question contested before a Court of justice; an aggregate of facts which furnishes occasion for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a Court of justice. A judicial proceeding for the determination of a controversy between parties wherein rights are enforced or protected, or wrongs are prevented or redressed; any proceeding judicial in its nature. \n \nThe word 'case' has been described as particular occasion, situation or set of circumstances; an example; instance or occurrence; someone receiving some sort of treatment or care; a matter requiring investigation; a matter to be decided in a law Court. \n \nTerm 'case' cannot be restricted to a suit only. The word 'case' obviously includes execution petitions and proceedings undertaken therein. As such, the claim of the decree-holder in the execution petition will determine pecuniary limit of the relevant Court in terms of section 2(b)(i) of the Ordinance. \n \nAfter decision of a suit by a Banking Court, it is the adjudicated claim as decreed by the Banking Court, which becomes the subject-matter of the case-claim in execution proceedings for the purposes of determination of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. In the present execution petition, the amount of amended decree sought to be enforced was Rs.4,36,06,891. As such, under section 7(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 read with section 2(b)(i) High Court did not enjoy the pecuniary jurisdiction to try and proceed with the present execution petition which in fact stood transferred to the Banking Court of competent jurisdiction. \n \nOffice was directed to remit the record of the present case alongwith all petitions thereto, to the Banking Court through special messenger at the expenses/costs of -debtor. The execution petition shall be tried by the Banking Court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with law. \n \nBlack's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edn., by Henry Campbell Black, M.A. and Chamber's 21st Century Dictionary, Revised Edn. by Mairi Robinson ref.\n \n(c) Words and phrases---\n \n----\"\"Case\"\"---Connotation. \n \nBlack's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edn. by Henry Campbell Black; M.A. and Chamber's 21st Century Dictionary, Revised Edn. by Mairi Robinson ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.l9 & 2(b)(i)---Execution of decree---Procedure---Suit, on the pronouncement of and decree by a Banking Court shall automatically be converted into execution proceedings and there shall be no need to file a separate execution application to seek enforcement of decree--¬Conversion of the suit automatically into execution proceedings can, by no stretch, be taken to mean that it is the claim of the plaintiff in the suit which is to be enforced and executed against the -debtors---Execution proceedings are continuation of the suit proceedings and claim of a decree-holder, in execution petition is the claim finally adjudged and settled in the suit by the Court--¬Provision of S.19, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 cannot be interpreted to limit the scope of the word \"\"suit\"\" or \"\"case\"\" to plaintiff-decree-holder's claim in the plaint---Principles.\n \nSection 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 does state that upon pronouncement of and decree by a Banking Court, the suit shall automatically be converted into execution proceedings and there shall be no need to file a separate execution application to seek enforcement of the decree. Conversion of the suit automatically into execution proceedings can, by no stretch, be taken to mean that it is the claim of the plaintiff in the suit which is to be enforced and executed against the ¬-debtors. \n \nCumulative reading of the entire section 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 particularly subsection (2) emphasizes that decree of the Banking Court shall be executed in accordance with the provisions of Civil Procedure Code or any other law for the time being in force or in any such manner as the Banking Court may consider appropriate. Had Legislature intended to make initial claim in the suit as the determining jurisdictional amount, the term employed in the definition of section 2(b) (i) and section 19 of the Ordinance would have been the claim in the 'plaint' and not the 'claim' in the case or suit. The reason is obvious. Upon pronouncement of a and decree, claim in the suit stands duly adjudicated upon and incorporated in the decree, which formally expresses the same in terms of definition of the decree contained in section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. Furthermore, execution proceedings are continuation of the suit proceedings and claim of a decree-holder in execution petition is the claim finally adjudged and settled in the suit by the Court.\n \nIn view thereof, provisions of section 19 of the Ordinance appropriately employ the word 'suit' for conversion of the same into execution proceedings for the purposes of enforcement and execution of the decree passed in the suit. These provisions, therefore, cannot be interpreted to limit the scope of the word 'suit' or 'case' to plaintiff-decree-holder's claim in the plaint.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Miscellaneous No.764-B of 2002 in Execution Application No. 5-B of 1997, decision dated: 26-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED through AttorneyS\nVs.\nMessrs REHMANIA TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LTD., JHANG ROAD, FAISALABAD\nand 30 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12810",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2903 = 2003 SLD 2903 = 2003 CLD 702",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.10 & 21---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.135---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Rescheduling agreement---Discharge of surety---Guarantors in their petition for leave to defend had not raised the question of discharge of their obligations as guarantors upon, rescheduling agreement and raised the said question only after the decree against them by filing an application under S.12(2), C.P.C. before Banking Court or in the appeal before the High Court---Effect---Guarantors having failed to seek leave to defend the suit on the said ground, could not and should not be allowed to agitate said ground in appeal before the High Court or in their petition under S.12(2), C.P.C. before the Banking Court which validly dismissed the same and which order had neither been assailed in appeal nor had any arguments been addressed there against at the Bar. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n---Ss. 10 & 9---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.135---Discharge from guarantee---Application for leave to defend the suit by the guarantors---Requirements---To plead guarantee, its existence had to be essentially General denial of guarantee could not be taken to mean that guarantee was once in existence but later stood revoked, this required specific pleadings as to execution of guarantee, its revocation, cancellation or discharge---Such ground had to be 'seriously' and 'plausibly' pleaded to be a serious, plausible and bona fide ground for leave, in terms of S.9, Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Terms \"\"serious\"\", \"\"plausible or bona fide\"\"---Connotation---Question could be considered a \"\"serious\"\" one only if the same revealed a substantial issue requiring resolution through a process of adjudication/trial upon administration of proof thereto---Assertions of general, bald and vague nature would not and could not give rise to a serious issue---\"\"Plausible\"\" or \"\"bona fide\"\" was a term of psychological connotation, employed in legal diction as prism a person's conduct---Plausibility entails righteousness consistency, honesty, fairness and credence--Non-plausibility is the anotonym of plausibility reflecting a bona fide, belying inconsistence and non¬-credible conduct---No objective test is available to determine plausibility or bona fide---Facts of each case read in the particular case perspective provide due to litigants' good or bad conduct---To show and prove such conduct, facts must be definitely specified and particularly pleaded to be plausible and confidence-inspiring---Denial of the persons to be guarantors in the present case, was purportedly on the basis of non-execution of personal guarantee which fact was contradicted by the guarantors themselves in their appeal upon clear admission to be guarantors per guarantee of specified date---Effort of the guarantors at equating non-execution and non-existence of guarantee with that of the discharge of guarantee was far from being bona fide, honest, consistent and plausible to be a ground for grant of leave to the guarantors---Leave petition of the guarantors in circumstances, was validly dismissed by the Banking Court. \n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n---Ss. 10 & 21---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.135--¬Application for leave to defend the suit by the guarantors--¬Appeal---Question of discharge of guarantee upon restructuring of finance was though not raised by the guarantors in their application for leave to defend, said question as raised in appeal needed to be attended to in the in appeal. \n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)--\n \n---Ss. 9, 10 & 21---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.135--¬Guarantee by the guarantors continues to bind them under the rescheduled arrangement as well. \n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)--\n \n----Ss. 9, 10 & 21---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 133, 135, 138 & 141---Application for leave to defend the suit by guarantor---Plea of discharge of guarantee in appeal on the ground of variation, or composition of the loan or time etc.--¬Validity---If variation or composition of the loan or time etc. as to its repayment was allowed by the creditor to the borrower and consent/assent in advance thereto was given by the guarantor in the letter of guarantee subsequent to the date of guarantee, such variation composition, extension, charge or indulgence being within the contemplation of the parties at the time of execution of guarantee did not effect discharge of the surety/guarantee from obligations under the guarantee, and as such surety continued to be bound by the terms of the guarantee despite moratorium; enlargement of time, composition and variations between the creditor and principal borrower--¬Principles.\n \nIn the present case the object of clauses in the guarantee was to obtain release from the prior consent of the guarantors to any changes, variations, concessions, re¬arrangements, alterations and modifications subsequently agreed upon between the Leasing Corporation and the Company (under liquidation).\n \nThese clauses were meant to allow and protect such subsequent changes, without, effecting release of guarantors in terms of sections 133 and 135 of the Contract Act, 1872 could such an effect be successfully gained or not. \n \nHeld, if variation or composition of the loan or time etc. as to its repayment was allowed by the creditor to the borrower and consent/assent in advance thereto was given by the guarantor in the letter of guarantee, subsequent to the date of guarantee, such variation, composition, extension, change or indulgence being within the contemplation of the parties at the time of execution of guarantee did not effect discharge of the surety/ guarantee from obligations under the guarantee. And as such surety continued to be bound by the terms of the guarantee despite moratorium, enlargement of time, composition and variations between the creditor and principal borrower. \n \nA 'guarantor \"\"could not claim discharge of his guarantee on the ground of indulgence alleged .to have been granted\"\" by the creditor to the borrower, if the guarantee provided for grant of time or other indulgence to the borrower by the creditor subsequently and such grant of time and indulgence was met by the very terms of the letter of guarantee.\n \nThe test was that on terms of the bond if an indulgence or compromise was not excluded and matter was within such terms, the surety bond remains, un-discharged.\n \nWhen the intention of the guarantor was manifest from the document there was no reason why it should not be enforced. \n \n\"\"A surety could not be held bound to something for which he had not contracted unless he had assented to the new terms\"\". \n \nWhen the guarantors had expressly given their advance consent in clear terms to be bound by any variation in the terms of the loan, therefore, having unequivocally expressed their consent to variation with full knowledge of its implications, they could not contend that the variation was without their consent and consequently they were discharged from the obligations. And section 133 of the Contract Act was not applicable as the variation in the contract was made with the clear consent of the guarantors given in the letter of guarantee. \n \nWaiver of rights by a guarantor under sections 133, 134, 135, 139 and 141 of the Contract Act not to be opposed to public policy. \n \nIt was not necessary for the Legislature to provide the words in the absence of any contract in section 133 or 135 or 141 of the Contract Act, 1872 because the sections themselves speak of consent of the surety regarding variance in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor and composition with the principal etc. In the presence of the words without the surety's consent', the words 'in the absence of any contract to the contrary' would have been surplus. Therefore, the rights conferred on the surety under section 133, 135 or 141 of the Contract Act could be waived by specific agreement in the deed of guarantee, as a matter of fact, such an agreement would amount to consent within the meaning of the aforesaid sections of the Act. \n \nThe words \"\"unless it is otherwise provided in the contract\"\" occurring in section 128 of the Contract Act will also govern the other provisions contained in the Chapter VIII of the Act and enable the surety to give up the rights available to him under sections 133, 134, 135 and 141 of the Act. A legal right can be given up provided such giving up of a legal right under any, contract is not hit by section 23 of the Act. Section 133 of the Contract Act makes it clear that any variance made in the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor without the consent of the surety, discharges the surety as to transactions subsequent to variance. This consent of the surety could be obtained either at the time of the contract was made between the principal debtor and the creditor to which the surety gave the guarantee, for making any change or alteration in the contract to be made or not to claim any right or benefit under Chapter VIII of the Act. In other words, in the sure-bond/guarantee-bond itself the surety could agree to waive his rights available to him under the various provisions contained in Chanter VIII of the Contract Act. Such waiving of his right by the surety was permissible under section 133 read with section 128 of the Act. \n \nThe rights available to the surety under Chapter VIII of the Act, could be waived by the surety. Therefore, such waiving of right by the surety was either intended to defeat nor did it defeat any provisions of law. Therefore it was also not possible to hold that the consideration and the object of the agreement of guarantee had the effect of defeating any provisions of law. A recital in the surety bond in question that surety will not be entitled to any of the rights conferred by section 133, 134, 135, 139 and 141 of the Act could not be held to defeat the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Act. The rights conferred on the surety under Chapter VIII were not inalienable rights nor those rights had anything to do with the public policy as such. Public policy was not to defeat the debt of the creditor, it was to ensure that the money of the creditor, was secured and was recoverable in accordance with law; and the debtor or the surety was not absolved from his liability to discharge the debt except in accordance with law. \n \nRam Ranjan Rakshit v. The Chief Administrator, Rehabilitation Finance Administration, New Delhi and others AIR 1960 Cal. 416; Chakkunny v. Viswanatha Iyer AIR 1961 Ker. 312: A.D.B.P. v. Pak. Green Fertilizer Company Ltd. 2000 MLD 1066; T. Raju Setty v. Bank of Baroda AIR 1992 Karnataka 108; Pearl Hosiery Mills's case AIR 1961 Punj. 281; Gitybank N.A. New Delhi v. Juggilal Kamalapat Jute Mills Co. Limited, Kanpur AIR 1982 Delhi 487: Hodges v. Delhi and London Bank Ltd. (1900) 27 Ind. App. 168 and A.R. Krishnaswami Ayyer v. Travancore National Bank Ltd. AIR 1940 Mad. 437 ref.\n \n(f) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n---Ss. 133, 134, 135, 139 & 141---Waiver of rights by a guarantor under Ss. 133, 134, 135, 139 & 141 of the Act is not approved to public policy. \n \n(g) Words and phrases---\n \n---- Terms \"\"serious, plausible or bona fide \"\"---Connotation.\n \n(h) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n---Ss.10 & 9---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 135 & 133--¬Discharge from guarantee---Rescheduling agreement--¬Novation of agreement---Guarantors had expressly given their consent as per letter of guarantee and had assented to any subsequent composition of debt, enlargement of time and other variations between the loosing corporation and the Company (under liquidation)---Guarantee was a continuing guarantee, permitting the creditor and the principal debtor to vary the terms of the leasing agreement--¬Effect---Guarantors had waived their prior right of consent or assent to such variance---Contracting parties had a right to contract out of the privilege of release or discharge by executing an agreement of waiver of prior consent/assent in the guarantee---Rescheduling Memorandum of Under-standing was within contemplation of clauses of the agreement and therefore, did not affect discharge of guarantors from their guarantee obligation and it will be hair splitting to state that the provisions of Ss. 133 or 135, Contract Act, 1872 visualized consent or assent of the guarantors at the time of variance only and the same could not be waived by the guarantors in. advance---Even f some of the terms of original contract could be stated to have been novated by Memorandum of Understanding, such novation still did not in any way absolve the guarantors of their obligations under the joint guarantee, as they had themselves consented in the letter of guarantor to variance of the original agreement between the leasing corporation and the company (under liquidation)---Only in absence of a surety's consent, a surety shall not be bound for the obligations under the novated agreement. \n \nPartap Singh Mohalabahi v. Keshavlal Harilal AIR 1935 PC 21 ref.\n \n(i) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n---Ss. 10 & 9---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 135 & 133--¬Discharge from guarantee---Rescheduling agreement--¬Guarantors, upon signing rescheduling agreement had even otherwise given their assent to such rescheduling as the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by them in their capacity as Directors and/or Chief Executive and Chairman of the debtor company and the guarantee was also made and executed by them in the same capacity---Held, it could not be argued that consent/assent of said guarantors was separately required at the time of execution by them of the rescheduling agreement. \n \nSyed Mansoor Ali Shah and Abbas Mirza for Appellants.\n \nSyed Najam-ul-Hassan Kazmi for Respondent.\n \nDates of hearing: 30th September and 1st October, 2002.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 486 of 1999, decision dated: 4-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "Mian AFTAB A. SHEIKH and 2 others\nVs.\nMessrs TRUST LEASING CORPORATION LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12811",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2904 = 2003 SLD 2904 = 2003 CLD 722",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.7 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan by the Bank--¬Creditor Bank had arrayed certain persons as defendants only for the reason that at the relevant time when the loan facility was availed, they were also the Directors of the borrower company---Such persons were allowed to defend the suit in the first instance where they had pleaded that they were neither the principal debtors nor guarantors--¬Banking Court, however, decreed the suit against all the defendants including the said persons---Contention of said persons before High Court, in appeal, was that their inclusion in the list of defendants in the plaint before the Banking Court was unjustified for the simple reason that they were neither the borrowers nor guarantors, and therefore, were not covered by the term \"\"customer\"\" as defined in law--Validity---Such persons admittedly being not guarantors of the, loan and plaint simply showing said persons as Director shareholders, they were neither a proper nor a necessary party to the proceedings before the Banking Court---Judgment and decree of the Banking Court were set aside by the High Court to the extent of said persons.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.477 of 2002, heard on 16-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "A. RASHID M. HANIF and 5 others\nVs.\nMessrs FAISAL BANK LTD. through Manager and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12812",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2905 = 2003 SLD 2905 = 2003 CLD 724",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances), Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.10 & 9(5)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.II---Application for leave to defend the suit---Rejection of plaint by the Banking Court under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.--¬Plaintiff s had filed separate suits for declaration, mandatory injunction and rendition of accounts before the Banking Court---Banking Court, after presentation of the plaint, issued summons to the defendants as provided under the law, in response thereto applications for leave to defend the suit were filed by the defendants and those applications were adjourned for filing replications and replies to the stay applications, which were submitted--¬Cases, thereafter, were adjourned for hearing the arguments on the said applications, which were addressed on the dates fixed and applications were adjourned for the next date for announcement of the orders and on that date the plaints were rejected---Validity---Held, from the very inception, the main suit was never fixed for hearing and the entire proceedings were undertaken by the Banking Court on the said applications for leave to defend the suit---Main suit having not been fixed for hearing, Banking Court could not reject the plaint in circumstances ---High Court set aside the s and decrees with no order as to costs observing that suits shall be deemed to be pending before the Banking Court, who was directed to decide at the first instance, the applications for leave to defend the suit and if leave to defend the suit was granted then of course, the main suit would be decided by the Judge Banking Court in accordance with law. \n \nR.F.A. No.185 of 2002; Messrs Platinum Insurance Company through Chief Executive v. Messrs Highways Bridge, Contractor International (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 1997 MLD 2394 and Messrs United Distributors Pakistan Limited v. Ahmad Zarie Services and another 1997 MLD 1835 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos. 814 and 815 of 2002, decision dated: 18-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Malik SULTAN MEHMOOD\nVs.\nSME BANK LTD. through Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12813",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2906 = 2003 SLD 2906 = 2003 CLD 729",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. l99---Constitutional petition---Interim injunction, grant of---Prima facie case and balance of convenience---Bank guarantee, encashment of---Plaintiffs provided Bank guarantee to the Bank for sanction of loan---Loanee failed to repay the loan and the Bank was arranging to encash the guarantee provided by the plaintiffs---Both the Courts below declined to grant interim injunction to the plaintiffs against encashment of guarantees ---Contention of the plaintiffs was that Bank guarantee could not be encashed as the Bank had failed to carry out joint audit and the accounts had not been settled---Validity---Parties were not consensus ad idem that the final accounts would be subject to joint audit---No provision in the agreement existed to the effect that the parties would carry out joint audit and thereafter, the calculated amount would be paid by the petitioners--¬Contention of the plaintiffs was misconceived and mis¬directed---Plaintiffs did not have prima facie case in their favour entitling them for grant of temporary injunction restraining the Bank from encashing the Bank guarantee and balance of convenience tilted in favour of the Bank--¬Orders passed by both the Courts below were legal, unexceptional and did riot call for any interference by High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction, thus both the orders were maintained. \n \nMessrs Jamia Industries Ltd. v. Messrs Pakistan Refinery Ltd., Karachi PLD 1976 Kar. 644; Sirafi Trading Establishment v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. 1984 CLC 381; Attock Industrial Products Ltd. v. Heavy Mechanical Complex (Pvt.) Ltd. 1999 MLD 1876; Manzoor Textile Mills Ltd. v. Special Judge Banking, Lahore and others 1996 CLC 422 and Messrs National Construction Ltd. v. Aiwan-e-Iqbal Authority PLD 1994 SC 311 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Interim injunction, grant of--¬Irreparable loss---Proof---Loss measurable in terms of money---Injunction was sought against encashing of Bank guarantee---Validity---Loss caused to plaintiffs on account of encashment of Bank guarantee was measurable in terms of money, therefore, in case of encashment of the Bank guarantee no irreparable loss would be caused to the plaintiffs---High Court declined to grant interim injunction in circumstances. \n \nTauseef Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Lahore Development Authority and others 2002 SCMR 1269 rel.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope--¬Interference in discretionary powers of the Courts below---Both the Courts below in exercise of discretionary powers refused to grant temporary injunction while taking into consideration the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto---Validity---Where discretion was exercised by both the Courts below in accordance with the recognized principles governing the exercise of discretion and the same had not been exercised arbitrarily, perversely or in a fanciful manner, High Court declined to interfere in the orders so passed. \n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court--¬Scope---Public money, withholding of---Pursuant to execution of sale agreement, the petitioners took possession of premises and was in its continuous possession---Petitioners had been successful in withholding public money for the last more than 10 years on one pretext or the other and sought interim injunction against encashing of Bank guarantee provided by them---Validity---Petitioners, in the present case, could not be allowed to forestall the amount to cause further loss to the exchequer---Petitioners were not entitled to the relief in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction---High Court declined to exercise the Constitutional jurisdiction in the matter which was otherwise discretionary and equitable in nature.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.6223 of 1995, heard on 7-08-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Mian MUHAMMAD SHAH and another\nVs.\nGHEE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12814",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2907 = 2003 SLD 2907 = 2003 CLD 738",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXIII, R. 3--- Recovery of Bank loan---Compromise between parties--Effect---Both the parties had settled their dispute through amicable settlement arrived at between the parties and the agreement had been entered into whereby claim as a whole had been adjusted through a lawful compromise---Effect-In view of the joint request of the parties the compromise was accepted as the same was to the satisfaction of High Court lawful and had adjusted whole of the claim-High Court recorded the compromise and had made the same as an integral part of the order-Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.273 and Civil Miscellaneous No. 1329-C of 2000, decision dated: 21st October, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12815",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2908 = 2003 SLD 2908 = 2003 CLD 740",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66--¬Sale of mortgaged property in execution of decree---Presence of -debtor at the time of auction---Judgment-debtor objected to the sale on the ground that the property under auction was not properly described in the proclamation and -debtor was wrongly marked present at the time of auction---Validity---Property had been sufficiently described in the proclamation which was in consonance with the mortgaged documents ---Property had been described by reference to its number and area and the same was the adequate compliance of O.XXI, R.66. C.P.C.---Judgment-¬debtor failed to prove from independent evidence that he was not present at the time of auction---Absence of -debtor at the time of auction even otherwise had no material effect upon the auction and the auction could not be declared fraudulent on such account.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.674 of 2002, heard on 17-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "GHULAM MUSTAFA\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through Branch Manager-General and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12816",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2909 = 2003 SLD 2909 = 2003 CLD 742",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.10---Application for leave to defend the suit--¬Requirements---Defendants neither signed the application for the grant of leave nor furnished any affidavit nor signed/executed powers of attorney in favour of the counsel, nor any power of attorney showing that the chief executive of the company was authorised to file the leave application before the Banking Court---Effect---Defendants having failed to file any leave application, the findings of Banking Court were maintained by High Court in circumstances. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.10---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.84--¬Application for leave to defend---Allegation of forged signatures of defendant---Failure to compare the admitted signature by the Court itself---Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to defend on the ground that the application and affidavit filed by the defendant were forged---Such findings of the Banking Court had been rendered without calling upon the defendant either to admit or deny his signatures---Only after hearing the arguments and comparing the disputed signatures with the admitted signatures of the defendant by the Court itself---Elect--¬Banking Court did not compare the signatures of the defendant with his admitted signatures, which was one of the permissible modes under the law, for arriving at the conclusion by the Court itself as to whether the signatures were genuine or forged, findings of the Banking Court were set aside---Application for leave to defend the suit should have been considered and decided on merits by the Banking Court before passing the and decree against the defendants---Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court was modified to the extent of the defendants who had filed application for leave to defend and the case was remanded to Banking Court for deciding the application afresh accordingly. \n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.10---Application for leave to defend, non filing of--¬Defendant was a private limited company and it was sued through its chief executive---Chief executive was also one of the defendants who had signed and executed the affidavit--¬Banking Court decreed the suit against the company for the reason that the Company had failed to file the application for leave to defend---Validity---Chief executive having signed all the relevant documents of the company, leave application was deemed to have been filed on behalf of the company--¬Findings of Banking Court were set aside in circumstances. \n \nSalman Akram Raja for Appellants.\n \nMuhammad Aslam for Respondent No. 1.\n \nAzhar Hussain for Respondent No.2.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.52 of 2000, decision dated: 26-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KOHINOOR LOOMS LIMITED through Chief Executive and 8 others\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12817",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2910 = 2003 SLD 2910 = 2003 CLD 748",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of Bank loan---Conditional leave, grant of --Charging of illegal and exorbitant mark-up---Leave to appear and defend the suit was not granted and the suit was decreed in favour of the bank---Defendants admitted availing of the loan but disputed charging of mark-up--¬Grievance of the defendants was that the mark-up had been charged illegally and exorbitantly and the same could not be recovered from them---Validity---Only dispute being about the charge of mark-up and not in respect of the principal amount, interest of justice would, therefore, adequately be secured if the defendants were granted leave to defend subject to deposit of principal amount in cash and the rest of the dispute might be allowed to be decided by the Banking Court---Banking Court had not adverted to the crucial aspect of the case and mechanically passed the impugned and decree without attending to the contention raised by the defendants with regard to the .charging of mark-up---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside, defendants were granted leave to defend the suit with a condition to deposit principal amount and the case was remanded to the Banking Court for decision afresh accordingly. \n \nCh. Sarfraz Ahmad and M. Anwar Sipra for Appellants:\n \nNadeem Saeed for Respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.350 of 2001, decision dated: 19-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "JAMSHED ANWAR and another\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12818",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2911 = 2003 SLD 2911 = 2003 CLD 751",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--------Ss.9, 10 & 22---Recovery of Bank loan ---Estoppel, principle of---Applicability---Demanding mark-up against the amount settled between the parties ---Loanee did not deny availing of loan facility but contented that he had deposited the amount as the same was settled with the Bank but the Banking Court had wrongly awarded mark-up beyond the settlement---Validity---Amount paid by the loanee under the settlement was accepted by the Bank and credited towards payment of mark-up and principal in accordance with the terms set out in the settlement letter---Having accepted the payment and appropriated the same towards mark-up and principal according to the terms, the Bank was estoppel from denying the existence of the agreement which stood created and acted upon---High Court m6dified the decree passed by the, Banking Court and the suit was decreed excluding the mark-up beyond the settled period accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.204 of 2002, heard on 6-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL BASIT and 3 others\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12819",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2912 = 2003 SLD 2912 = 2003 CLD 756",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-------Art.25---Equal protection of law---Principles---Reasonable classification and intelligible differentia enumerated.\n \nFollowing are principles of law with regard to equal protection of law:--\n \n(i) That equal protection of law does not envisage that every citizen is to be treated alike in all circumstances, but it contemplates that persons similarly situated or similarly placed are to be treated alike;\n \n(ii) that reasonable classification is permissible but it must be founded on reasonable distinction or reasonable basis;\n \n(iii) that different laws can validly be enacted for different sexes, persons in different age groups, persons having different financial standings, and persons accused of heinous crimes:\n \n(iv) that no standard of universal application to test reasonableness of a classification can be laid down as what may be reasonable classification in a particular set of circumstances, may be unreasonable in the other set of circumstances;\n \n(v) that a law applying to one person or one class of persons may be constitutionally valid if there is sufficient basis or reason for it, but a classification which is arbitrary and is not found on any rational basis is no classification as to warrant its exclusion from the mischief of Article 25;\n \n(vi) that equal protection of law means that all persons equally placed be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed:\n \n(vii) that in order to make a classification reasonable: it should be based--\n \n(a) on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those who have been left out;\n \n(b) that the differentia must have rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by such classification. \n \nI. A. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 1041 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 25--- Reasonable classification--- Principles enumerated.\n \nPrinciples as to classification are as follows:\n \n(a) A law may be Constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances, or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself.\n \n(b) There is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the Constitutional principles. The person, therefore, who pleads that Article 25 of Pakistan Constitution has been violated, must make out that not only has he been treated differently from others but he has been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis and such differential treatment has been unjustifiably made. However, it is extremely hazardous to decide the question of the Constitutional validity of a provision on the basis of the supposed existence of facts by raising a presumption. Presumptions are resorted to when the matter does not admit of direct proof or when there is some practice, difficulty to produce evidence to prove a particular fact.\n \n(c) It must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds.\n \n(d) The Legislature is free to recognise the degrees of harm and may confine its restriction to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest.\n \n(e) In order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, ratters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation.\n \n(f) While good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of the Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the fact of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the Court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of the constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation.\n \n(g) A classification need not be scientifically perfect or logically complete.\n \n(h) The validity of a rule has to be judged by assessing its overall effect and not by picking up exceptional cases. What the Court has to see is whether, the classification made is a just one taking all aspects into consideration.\n \nConstitution of India by V. N. Shuklq, 7th Edn. ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Arts.25 & 199---State Bank of Pakistan EDMD Circular No.4 dated 11-8-2001---Constitutional petition---Principle of equality---Applicability---Dispute was with regard to exchange of \"\"Special U.S. Dollars Bond Certificate\"\" issued on 26-3-1999 and to be matured on 26-3-2002 upon expiry of three years' maturity period---State Bank of Pakistan vide is notification EDMD Circular, No. 4 dated 11-8-2001, declared that the holder of bounds upon encashment in Pak Rupees would receive a \"\"Rupee Redemption Bonus\"\" of 5% of the total Rupee value of the bond---Later on State Bank of Pakistan vide another Circular, withdrew the bonus announced in the earlier Circular---Contention of the petitioner was that the withdrawal of the bonus was discriminatory as the similarly placed persons had been granted the benefit and the petitioner was excluded--¬Validity---Bank was unable to state any reason as to why -the classification had been made between the similarly placed citizens of the country---Specification of the dates in the Circular was not based on intelligible differentia which was arbitrary and whimsical---Petitioner was discriminated against in the matter of application of the conditions mentioned in the Circular---Petitioner was discriminated against in the matter of application of the circular and he was entitled to the benefit of the circular upon fulfilling its conditions---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.881 of 2002, heard on 25-10-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "TRADEX (PVT.) LIMITED through Auhtorized Attorney.\nVs.\nGOVERNOR, STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12820",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2913 = 2003 SLD 2913 = 2003 CLD 765",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.9(3)---Valid service---Scope---Proclamation in news¬paper is a valid service. \n \nMessrs Ahmad Autos and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 497 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss.9, 10 & 12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of--¬Condonation of delay---Valid service on defendant-- -Filing of application for leave to defend within the prescribed period from the date of knowledge of ex parte decree---Application for setting aside ex parte decree was filed after a delay of more than seven months from the date of passing of decree---Address given in plaint and in summons Was true and correct address of the defendant and the summons were issued on the same correct address---Contention of the defendant was that he attained knowledge of decree through a letter posted to him by the Bank, therefore, the application was within time from the date of knowledge of the decree- --Banking Court dismissed the application being barred by limitation---Validity. --Defendant was properly and legally served and he neglected to file application for leave to defend the suit and filed application for setting aside ex parte decree after inordinate delay of- more than seven months---Defendant having duly been served as prescribed under the law, he had the knowledge of the passing of the decree, therefore, if the period of limitation was taken from the date of knowledge, even then the application under S.12 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, was barred by time and had rightly been dismissed by the Banking Court--¬Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court did not suffer from any legal infirmity and the same did not call for any' interference by High Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Delay not explained---Defendant contended - that he had attained knowledge on 16-6-1998, through a letter posted to him by Bank informing about the ex parte decree and application for setting aside the decree was filed on 30-6-1998--¬Effect---Delay till 30-6-1998 was unexplained 'in the application as under the law each day's delay was to be explained by the party seeking condonation of delay---Delay was not condoned in circumstances. \n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.22 (1)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5 --- Condonation Of delay---Provisions of Limitation Act, 1908---Applicability--¬Application to set aside ex parte decree was filed with a delay of more than seven months and application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, was also filed for condonation of delay---Validity---Application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, having been filed before the Banking Court in the proceedings undertaken under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, therefore, perforce of the provisions of S. 22(1) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, the provisions of Limitation Act, 1908, were not attracted---Application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, filed by the defendant was not competent and was rightly dismissed by the Banking Court in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.268 of 2001, heard on 20-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "M. AFZAL\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKSITAN LTD. and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12821",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2914 = 2003 SLD 2914 = 2003 CLD 771",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.21---Appeal---Order already attaining finality in Constitutional petition---Assailing such order further in higher forum---Validity---Effect---Appellant was precluded from agitating or assailing the, order in the appeal. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of Bank loan under Prime Minister Transport Scheme---Application for leave to defend the suit, dismissal of---Liability of Insurance company to pay loan--¬Loan was advanced to the defendant for purchase of vehicle which was duly insured with an insurance company--¬Defendant failed to repay the loan for the reason that the vehicle was stolen and met an accident---Plea raised by the defendant was that as the vehicle was insured, therefore, the insurance company was to liquidate the dues of the Bank---Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to defend and the suit was decreed in favour of the Bank--¬Plea raised by the defendant was that the mark-up was not charged in accordance with law and that he was not liable to pay the suit amount as the vehicle was insured--¬Validity---Availing of the financial facility was admitted and there was no rebuttal on record to the statement of accounts furnished by the Bank---Defendant did not 'raise any plausible defence warranting the grant of leave to defend the suit---High Court declined to interfere with the and decree passed by the Banking Court as the same was legal and unexceptionable---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nHameed Malik for Appellant.\n \nSyed Nazir Hussain for Respondent.\n \nDate of hearing: 5th November, 2002.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.446 of 1998, heard on 5-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "FAKHAR HAYAT\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12822",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2915 = 2003 SLD 2915 = 2003 CLD 771",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.21---Appeal---Order already attaining finality in Constitutional petition---Assailing such order further in higher forum---Validity---Effect---Appellant was precluded from agitating or assailing the, order in the appeal. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of Bank loan under Prime Minister Transport Scheme---Application for leave to defend the suit, dismissal of---Liability of Insurance company to pay loan--¬Loan was advanced to the defendant for purchase of vehicle which was duly insured with an insurance company--¬Defendant failed to repay the loan for the reason that the vehicle was stolen and met an accident---Plea raised by the defendant was that as the vehicle was insured, therefore, the insurance company was to liquidate the dues of the Bank---Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to defend and the suit was decreed in favour of the Bank--¬Plea raised by the defendant was that the mark-up was not charged in accordance with law and that he was not liable to pay the suit amount as the vehicle was insured--¬Validity---Availing of the financial facility was admitted and there was no rebuttal on record to the statement of accounts furnished by the Bank---Defendant did not 'raise any plausible defence warranting the grant of leave to defend the suit---High Court declined to interfere with the and decree passed by the Banking Court as the same was legal and unexceptionable---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.446 of 1998, heard on 5-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "FAKHAR HAYAT\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12823",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2916 = 2003 SLD 2916 = 2003 CLD 812",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------S. 6---Recovery of mark-up beyond agreed period---Suit was decreed by Banking Tribunal in favour of Bank and mark-up awarded up to the period when the default was committed and the suit was filed---Contention of the Bank was that the agreement was to expire on 7-7-1997, therefore, the Bank was entitled to recover the mark-up to that date---Validity---Had no default been committed and the loanee was to make payment uptil 7-7-1997, then the Bank could have recovered the amount of mark-up uptil 7-7-1997---Default, in the present case, was committed by the loanee before the date of expiry of the agreement which culminated to the filing of the suit and the suit was decreed by the Banking Tribunal after taking into consideration all the aspects of the case and making the calculations from the very inception of the loan facility and such calculations were just, fair and legal---None of the documents filed by the Bank proved that the bank was entitled to recover the mark¬up uptil 7-7-1997---High Court declined to award mark-up uptil 7-7-1997---Banking Tribunal had rightly awarded mark-up for cushion period and also insurance charges to the Bank thus all reliefs which could have possibly been passed were awarded to the Bank---Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Tribunal was legal, unexceptionable and did not call for any interference. \n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss.5 & 6---Suit for recovery of Bank loan---Non-awarding of costs---Banking Tribunal, while exercising discretionary powers declined to award the amount of costs ---Validity--Awarding of costs was within the discretion of the Court ---Exercise of discretionary powers was neither arbitrary nor fanciful, therefore, High Court declined to interfere in the exercise of discretionary powers in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 119 of 1997 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1-C of 2002, decision dated: 6-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PERVAIZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nVs.\nLAL KHAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12824",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2917 = 2003 SLD 2917 = 2003 CLD 845",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---------Ss. 9(3) & 12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of--¬Limitation---Starting point---Ex parte decree was passed against the -debtor on 18-11-1997, and application to set aside the ex parte decree was filed on 7-2-2000---All the modes of service including press publication were adopted by the Banking Court before passing the, decree---Plea raised by the -debtor for non-appearance was incorrect address of the -debtor resulting in his having no knowledge of the proceedings---Banking Court dismissed the application being time-barred ---Validity--¬Starting point for getting ex parte decree set aside under S.12 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, was 21 days from the date of decree or when the summons were not duly served from the date of knowledge of the decree-- Judgment-debtor did not mention as to when the ex parte decree came to his knowledge in the application under S. 12 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Publication of notice in the newspaper was a permissible mode of service in accordance with S.9(3) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, and was deemed to be due service ---All particulars of the debtor i.e. his name, parentage and place of residence had correctly been given in the notices issued by Banking Court---Banking Court, was justified to dismiss the application under S.12 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, as barred by time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 106 of 2000, decision dated: 20-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "M. JAVED BUTTAR AND SYED DAMSHED ALI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD TUFAIL\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12825",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2918 = 2003 SLD 2918 = 2003 CLD 848",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.10---Application for leave to defend the suit--¬Encashment of Bank guarantees after the expiry of validity period---Suit for recovery of Bank guarantees was filed by the Bank against the guarantors---Guarantors had already filed a civil suit against the Government department in whose favour the guarantees were furnished---Dispute raised in the application for leave to defend the suit was whether the Bank could or could not encash the Bank guarantees, the period of which had already expired although the validity period of the guarantees had been extended from time to time and that too at the request of the guarantors---Effect of lodging the claims by the Government Department with the Bank for encashing the guarantees, validity period of encashment of which had remained suspended due to the litigation by the guarantors before the Civil Court, was get to be decided---Without deciding such questions, the Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to defend the suit---Validity---All the questions raised by the guarantors needed determination and consideration by the Banking Court for such purpose the guarantors had moved the application for leave to defend the suit---High Court allowed the application for leave to defend the suit with a condition to deposit the principal amount of all Bank guarantees---Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court were set aside and the case was remanded to the Banking Court for decision afresh.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.362 of 2002, decision dated: 27-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MIAN FAKHAR & CO. and another\nVs.\nUNION BANK LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12826",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2919 = 2003 SLD 2919 = 2003 CLD 852",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXI, Rr.10 & 54---Execution of decree---Mortgaged property, attachment of---Validity---Execution of decree for mortgaged property would not call for order of attachment.\n \nAustralasia Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Juma Khan Agha Javed Corporation PLD 1976 Kar. 414 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19(7)---Execution of decree---Investigation of claims and objections in respect of mortgaged machines---Applicant (objector) claimed to have leased out machines to ¬debtor and on his failure to pay monthly rent, had obtained decree for its recovery---Decree-holder (Bank) could not substantiate its contention that applicant was not entitled to claim possession of machines or to show that decree obtained by applicant was for any money except for recovery of arrears of outstanding rent and payable by -debtor to applicant---Applicant had placed sufficient material on record in shape of sale invoices and lease agreements etc., and there was no material to the contrary---Applicant, on the basis of such documents, was proved to be owner of such machines, and thus, was entitled to possession of the same---Application was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution No. 183 of 2001 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No.142 of 2002, decision dated: 21-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERWEZ, J",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nMessrs MYFIP VIDEO INDUSTRIES LTD.\nMst. Razia Ghafoor v. Messrs Eastern General 1987 CLC 777 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12827",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2920 = 2003 SLD 2920 = 2003 CLD 856",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 9 & 7---Banking Court ---Jurisdiction---Scope--¬ Examination of plaint revealed that suit filed in the Banking Court was for recovery of damages on account of alleged defamatory act committed by the respondent--¬Competence---Held, it was only breach of an obligation or upon commission of default in fulfilling any obligation under a loan or finance agreement that a suit would be competent before Banking Court---Alleged defamatory act committed had no nexus with any terms of the loan or finance or any obligation arising under the same---Principles.\n \nIn the present case suit filed was for recovery of damages on account of alleged defamatory act committed by the respondent.\n \nRight to institute a suit in a Banking Court established under section 4 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 is conferred by section 9 of the said Act.\n \nA bare reading of the said provision would show that a banking company, a borrower or customer may institute a suit in the Banking Court in the circumstances stated in section 9(1) of the said Act. These are:--\n \n(i) A default in fulfillment of any obligation by a borrower, or customer or a banking company;\n \n(ii) with regard to any loan or advance.\n \nIn the present 'case the plaint does not at all disclose that a default has been committed by the banking company i.e. the respondent in fulfilling any obligation with regard to any loan or finance.\n \nMatter of loan or finance is governed by terms of the contract between customer or borrower on the one hand and Banking Company on the other. It is only upon breach of an obligation or to use words of the Statute, upon commission of default in fulfilling any obligation, that a suit would be competent before the Banking Court. The, alleged defamatory act committed has no nexus with any terms of the loan or finance or any obligation arising under the same.\n \nThe substantive right to file the suit has been conferred by section 9 of the Act. Section 7 defines powers of the Banking Court and obviously these powers in exercise of civil jurisdiction would be exercised while dealing with a suit which squarely falls within the meaning of section 9 of the Act. If arguments, that by virtue of section 7 the Banking Court stands converted into a Civil Court with plenary jurisdiction to entertain and try suits under section 9, C.P.C., are accepted the entire law so enacted is liable to become redundant.\n \nNasimuddin Siddiqui and another v. United Bank Limited and others 1998 CLC 1718; Oxford Companion to Law by David M. Walker; The Law of Torts by Ratanlal and Dhiraj Lal, 23rd Edn. ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.200 of 1999, heard on 18-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL ELECTRIC COMPANY OF PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED\nVs.\nPRIME COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12828",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2921 = 2003 SLD 2921 = 2003 CLD 861",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 305 & 306---Petition for compulsory winding up of a company by its creditors which were financial institutions and had obtained decrees for recovery of their amounts advanced as loan to the said company which were pending execution---Petitioners contended that a huge amount was due against the debtor company which is unable to pay its debts, thus a request was made for compulsory winding up of the company---Notice of the petition was given to the company who filed counter-affidavit signed by the Chief Executive of the company wherein company had resisted the claim of petitioners and challenged the maintainability of winding up petition on the ground that execution proceedings being pending, petition was not maintainable and that the company had been closed for a temporary period as the company was not in position to pay all its debts---Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that since the company was a corporate, body, therefore, could no orally authorise one of its members to sign the documents or pleadings which was in violation of the provisions of the company law; that no provision of sub-delegation of powers to any officer to sign such documents had been mentioned in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company; that the Company having conceded that execution proceedings were pending same amounted to \"\"admission\"\" that Company was not in a position to pay its debts and that the company be ordered to be wound up compulsorily--¬Validity---Held, Company being a Corporate Body the counter-affidavit filed by the Chief Executive of the Company was not entertainable and he was not competent to sign the said documents under the law and Memorandum of Association of the Company---Fact, that petitioners had filed separate suits for recovery of loan before the Banking Court, and the same had been decreed in favour of the petitioners and execution proceedings were pending, itself led to the conclusion that the Company was unable to pay its debts---Petitioners had served notice upon the Company as required under S.306, Companies Ordinance, 1984 but the Company had failed to pay its debts---High Court, in circumstances, accepted the petition for compulsory winding up of the Company.\n \nBankers Equity Ltd. through Attorney and 5 others v. Sunflo CIT RUSS Ltd. through Managing Director PLD 1999 Lah. 450; Messrs Taurus Securities Limited v. Arif Saigol and others 2002 CLD 1665 (Karachi); Rauf B. Kadri v. State Bank of Pakistan and another 2002 CLD 1794; Habib Credit and Exchange Bank Limited v. Sindh Sugar Corporation Limited 1999 CLC 1909; International Finance Corporation, Washington DC 20433 USA v. Hala Spinning Limited, Gulberg II, Lahore PLD 2000 Lah. 323; Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Limited (PICIC) v. Messrs Waseem Beverages Limited through Chief Executive 2000 MLD 660 and Hala Spinning Mills Limited v. International Finance Corporation and another 2002 SCMR 450 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Quetta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2 of 2002, decision dated: 14-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMANULLAH KHAN YASINZAI, J",
    "": "Messrs SECURITY LEASING CORPORATION LIMITED and 3 others\nVs.\nDIAMOND FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12829",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2922 = 2003 SLD 2922 = 2003 CLD 868",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---------Ss. 15(6)(1) proviso, Explns. (1) & 19(2)---Decree for sale of mortgaged property---Application under S.15(6)(1) proviso, Explanation(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 pending execution proceedings by occupant of the property ---Maintainability--¬Ingredients---Property in question was mortgaged in favour of the Bank at the time of sanctioning the loan in favour of -debtors in 1992---Unregistered rent deed was executed after the mortgage-for the period from 10-8-1999 to 10-8-2004---No proof was available on record qua the payment of advance rent for 5 years---Applicant, and -debtors were close relatives i.e. applicant was wife of one of the -debtors and sister-in-taw of another and thus did not fall within the conditions prescribed in S.15(6)(1), proviso, Explanation (1) of the Ordinance---Executing Court, had passed the order of dismissal of the application in view of S.15(6), proviso, Explanation of the Ordinance after the statement of the applicant and found that she did not execute the rent deed bona fide---Validity---Executing Court, after applying its independent mind had given finding against the applicant that she , was not a bona fide tenant which was in accordance with the law---Executing Court was well within its rights to adopt any procedure at the time of execution of decree in view of S. 19(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and provisions of Civil Procedure Code 1908 were not attracted in stricto senso.\n \nMuhammad Younas v. Dr. S. Muzammil Ali 1981 CL-1 327; Fakhruddin v. Asad Ullah Shah PLD 1982 Kar. 790; S. Hafeezur Rehman v. Federal Land Commission 1983 CLC 2842; Mukhi Chatromal v. Khupenand 1988 CLC 1711; N.D.F.C. v. Fazal Sugar Mills 1993 CLC 642; A.M. Shahid v. S.A. Bashir 1993 CLC 148; Ghulam Mustafa v. Additional District Judge 1991 CLC 81 and Muhammad Amin v. Judge, Family Court, Multan 2001 MLD 52 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----\n \n----S. 15(6)(1), proviso, Explanation (1)---Ingredients prescribed qua- non-maintainability of application under S.15(6)(1), proviso Explanation (1) enlisted.\n \nThe Legislature has prescribed ingredients qua non¬ maintainability of the application under section 15(6) in Explanation read with the proviso which are as follows:--\n \n(i) Lease deed executed after execution of mortgage.\n \n(ii) Duty cast upon Banking Court to see whether the lease was executed to adversely affect the value of mortgaged property or to prejudice the rights and properties of the Financial Institution.\n \n(iii) It should be presumed that the lease is not bona fide unless otherwise proved.\n \n(iv) Under a bona fide lease.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 15(6)(1), proviso, Explanation (1)---Expression \"\"bona fide\"\" occurring in S.15(6)(1) of the Ordinance ---Meaning--¬Meaning of the expression is that an act was done or performed honestly, without fraud, collusion or participation in wrong doing---Presence of any of said - elements may render an act mala fide.\n \nMuhammad Younas v. Dr. S. Muzammil Ali 1981 CLC 327; Fakhruddin v. Asad Ullah Shah PLD 1982 Kar. 790; S. Hafeezur Rehman v. Federal Land Commission 1983 CLC 2842; Mukhi Chatromal v. Khupenand 1988 CLC 1711; N.D.F.C. v. Fazal Sugar Mills 1993 CLC 642 and A.M. Shahid v. S.A. Bashir 1993 CLC 148, ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----S. 19(2) & (7)(a)---When the executing Court invokes S.19(2) then S.19(7)(a) is not attracted.\n \nHudabia Textile Mills v. A.B.L. PLD 1987 SC 512 ref.\n \n(e) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Section of a statute has to be read as a whole organic.\n \n(f) Interpretation of statutes-----\n \n----Proviso to a section---Function---Proviso to a section has an overriding effect and control over the whole section--¬Function of a proviso is to exclude and take out certain cases from the rule to which it is a proviso and to that extent the proviso modifies the main provision of the enactment.\n \nMuhammad Ashraf Khan v. The State 1990 PCr.LJ 169 and Messrs Hamdard Dawakhana v. Commissioner Income-tax PLD 1980 SC 84 ref.\n \n(g) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Explanation attached with a section of an Act ---Purpose--¬Explanation is to enable the Court to understand the Act in the light of the Explanation.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 153 of 2002, decision dated: 8-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND TANVIR BASHIR ANSARI, JJ",
    "": "LUBNA AFZAL\nVs.\nUNION BANK LIMITED and 8 others\nBalaji Singh v. Chakka Gangamma and another AIR 1927 Mad. 85 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12830",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2923 = 2002 SLD 2923 = 2002 CLD 905",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Leave to defend the suit---Illegal charging of mark¬up---Failure to give finding on such plea---Principal amount was deposited by the defendants and they raised objections only with regard to charging of mark-up---Plea raised by the defendants was that the mark-up had been charged/ debited illegally against the recognized principles . of charging of mark-up and in violation of circulars issued by State Bank of Pakistan---Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to defend and decreed the, suit in favour of the Bank including the disputed amount of mark¬up---Validity---Defendants had taken a specific plea regarding illegal charging of mark-up but passed by Banking Court did not give any finding on such issue--¬Banking Court was legally obliged to have rendered some findings on the question of charging of mark-up one way or the other as there were instructions /guidelines from the State Bank of Pakistan regarding the charging of mark-up--¬Banking Court having failed to give findings on the issue of charging of mark-up, the defendants had made out a case for grant of leave to defend the suit---High Court granted leave to defend the suit on limited question of charging/ debiting of mark-up as the principal amount had been liquidated- --Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court was set aside, application for leave to defend the suit was allowed and the case was remanded to Banking Court accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.534 of 2002, heard on 9-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs YUSSRA TEXTILE CORPORATION and 2 others\nVs.\nPICIC COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12831",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2924 = 2003 SLD 2924 = 2003 CLD 911",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.39 & 42---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11 ---Leave to defend the suit, grant of-Rejection of plaint filed by borrower for cancellation of document and declaration---Bank was granted leave to defend the suit filed by the borrower--¬Issues were framed and the case was fixed for evidence, when the Bank filed two suits for recovery of Bank loans--¬Subject-matter of all the suits were the same documents--¬Banking Court declined leave to defend the suit to the borrower and resultantly plaint filed by the borrower was rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. while that filed by the Bank were decreed---Contention of the borrower was that documents relied upon by the Bank were subject-matter of the earlier suit and the controversy could not be resolved without recording of evidence---Borrower further contended that his plaint could not be rejected only for the reason that in the suits filed by the Bank, leave to defend the suits was refused---Validity---In the earlier suit of the borrower and the subsequent suits of the Bank, the subject-matter, and the issues were directly and substantially the same---If the suit of the borrower was decreed, the Bank's suits were bound to fail and vice versa---When leave had been granted to the Bank in the first suit, on the principle of consistency and comity and for the administration of justice, the borrower was also entitled to leave to appear and defend---High Court directed that in order to avoid conflicting s, all the suits should be conducted and proceeded simultaneously and decided together---Banking Court had wrongly rejected the plaint of the borrower under OXII, R.ll, C.P.C. on the premises that the leave applications of the borrower in the suits filed by the Bank had been refused---Judgments and decrees passed by the Banking Court were set aside and the borrower was allowed leave to defend in both the suits---Cases were remanded to Banking Court accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.72-A, 69 and 70 of 2002, heard on 28-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD KHALID BUTT\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12832",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2925 = 2003 SLD 2925 = 2003 CLD 914",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19(3)(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.36 & 51---Execution of decree---Mortgaged property- --Executing Court---Powers and functions---Rights of parties ---Scope--- Auction with or without intervention of Executing Court---To satisfy the decree, passed in favour of Bank, Executing Court allowed the Bank to auction the mortgaged property without intervention of the Court---Plea raised by ¬ debtors was that they be allowed to sell the property of their own accord and then to satisfy the decree ---Validity--¬Although the Bank had agreed to selling of the properties through -debtors, yet the proper course would be to direct the Executing Court to sell/auction the properties under its supervision through Court auction as in such case neither of the parties would have an edge over the other--¬Parties in execution proceedings were to be treated alike and the rights of decree-holder should not be preferred over the interest of Judgment-debtors---On one hand it was the function of Executing Court to execute decree but on the other hand, it was also the duty of Executing Court to protect the rights of -debtors which were not to be jeopradised and sacrificed at the altar of execution of decree---In execution of decree, proper price should be fetched through the sale of properties and properties of -debtors were not to be sold at throw away and paltry price with the connivance of unscrupulous persons, may be decree-holders or its representatives---High Court directed the Executing Court to sell the properties through Court Auctioneer---Order passed by Executing Court was set aside---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.688 of 2002, decision dated: 21st November, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NIZAMUDDIN & COMPANY and 4 others\nVs.\nTHE BANK OF KHYBER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12833",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2926 = 2003 SLD 2926 = 2003 CLD 931",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---------Ss.10(3), (4), (5), (6) & (12)---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Amended application for leave to defend--¬Defendants objected to debiting of undisbursed amounts and wrong charging of mark-up, but neither showed nor pleaded in leave application any account or tabulation qua specific mandate of S.10(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Defendants' contention was that they had filed amended petition for leave under S.10(12) of Ordinance, 2001, thus, remaining subsections thereof would not apply to the same ---Validity---Mandate of S.10(12) of the Ordinance, 2001 was that defendant, who had ,already filed leave application, would file amended leave application in accordance with provisions of said Ordinance---Section 10(12) of Ordinance, 2001 expressly made all provisions of the Ordinance including its subsections (3), (4), (5) & (6) applicable to amended leave petition---Non-submission of mandatory accounts as provided for in S.10(4) would attract penal consequences set out in subsection (6) thereof---High Court rejected leave application for non-compliance with mandatory provisions of S.10(3)(4) of Ordinance, 2001.\n \n(b) Jurisdiction---\n \n----Jurisdiction of a Court within whose territorial limit cause of action or a part thereof would arise, cannot be contracted out by parties.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss. 2(c)(d), 7(4) & 9(1)(2)---Suit by financial institution against its customer---Assumption of jurisdiction by Banking Court---Prerequisites---\"\"Default\"\" of \"\"customer\"\" in fulfilling \"\"obligation\"\" with regard to any 'finance\"\", which would involve accounting.\n \n(d) Bankers Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891)---\n \n----Ss.2(8) & 4---Certified copy of statement of accounts containing entries in books of Bank---Status of such entries and admissible thereof in evidence---Principles.\n \nAs per settled \"\"Banking practices\"\", every amount/ sum advanced or paid to a customer or sum expended/ incurred for and on behalf of a customer by a Banking Company is entered as 'debit' in the books of Bank and the money received from or on behalf of customer, is entered in these books, a customer's \"\"credit\"\" to arrive at a credit or debit balance. On the basis of entries in these books, a statement of accounts truly, faithfully and duly reflecting the entries is prepared by Bank for each account of all practical purposes. These statements of accounts bearing true account profile are to be regularly conveyed to customers to apprise them of their \"\"obligations\"\" towards the Bank or vice versa. These \"\"statements of accounts\"\" containing copies of entries in the books of a Bank, when certified as per section 2 of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 attain the status of prima facie evidence of the existence of such entries in the bankers' book under section 4 ibid, and become admissible in evidence in all legal proceedings of the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded like the original entry.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----S. 9(2)---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), Ss. 2(8) & 4---Suit by financial institution against its customer---Filing of statement of-accounts alongwith plaint--¬Such requirement not a formality or technicality rather mandatory for plaintiff to support its plaint by a statement of accounts duly certified under Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891---Plaint would be incomplete and could not become a basis of such suit without strict compliance with provisions of S.9(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Non filing thereof would amount to non-providing adequate, proper and reasonable opportunity of defence to customer.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9(1)(2)---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), Ss. 2(8) & 4---Suit by Bank against the customer--.-Non-filing of statement of accounts and documents alongwith plaint---Effect---Plaint, statement of account and documents, though distinct, do not enjoy independent existence in terms of S.9(2), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Plaint cannot be structured, constructed, built or raised without foundation of a duly certified statement of account and requisite documents---No suit can be instituted by a Banking Company under S.9(1)(2) of Ordinance, 2001 through a plaint not supported by requisite statement of accounts and documents.\n \n(g) Words and phrases---\n \n----\"\"Support\"\"---Meaning.\n \nWords and Phrases by John B Saunders Butterworth's Publications, 2nd Edn., Vol.5, 1970, pp.153, 1.54; Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., 1979, p.1291; Chamber's 21st Century Dictionary, p.1420 and Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edn., p.1072 ref.\n \n(h) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----S. 9(1)(2)---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), Ss. 2(8) & 4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151, OVII, Rr. 14, 17, 18, O. XI, R. 14 & O. XVIII, R.2---Suit by Bank against its customer---Production of documents along with plaint under C.P.C.---Plaint under S.9(1)(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to be supported by duly certified statement of accounts and documents of finance---Distinction---Civil Procedure Code, 1908, allows a plaint independent of production of documents as consequence of non filing thereof is inadmissibility of such documents in evidence, if leave of Court is not obtained for its subsequent production--¬Freedom of subsequent production of statement of accounts and documents of finance (not filed with plaint) is not available to plaintiff under S.9 of Ordinance, 2001, whereunder suit cannot be initiated through a plaint not supported by such statement and documents.\n \n(i) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----S. 9(1)(2)---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), Ss. 2(8) & 4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151 & O. VII, R. 11---Suit by Banks for recovery of loan amount--¬Plaintiffs had filed alongwith plaint and relied upon Certificates or Schedule of Balances and not statement of accounts---Maintainability---Certificates or Schedules of Balances showed charging of mark-up at a fixed rate like interest, mark-up on mark-up, liquidate damages, expenses, costs, fees and penal interest---Debits were made in general in a consolidated form to reach total amount of claim of each plaintiff-Bank---Method/form of accounts or mark-up at fixed rate or, mark-up in advance or liquidated damages or expenses and fees were not debitable under law in a statement of accounts---Certificates or Schedules of Accounts not truly reflecting entries in Bankers' Books Accounts could not be held to be statements of accounts nor presumption of truth or correctness could be attached to them---Plaintiffs had not produced any books of accounts to support contents of such Certificates of Balances or amounts claimed in plaint---Plaintiffs had failed to comply with mandatory provisions of S. 9(1),(2) of Ordinance, 2001 to support plaint with statements of accounts duly certified under Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891---Suit so filed was not only barred by law, but failed to disclose a cause of action in terms of S.9(1)(2) of Ordinance, 2001---High Court rejected plaint under O. VII, R.11 read with S.151, C.P.C.\n \n(j) Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891)----\n \n----Ss. 2(8) & 4---Certified copy of statement of accounts--¬Evidentiary value---Entries in statement of accounts, if dubious, objected to or challenged, could not alone be taken to be sufficient to prove Bank's claim or customer's liability thereto.\n \nMessrs Muhammad Siddiq Muhammad Umer and another v. Australasia Bank Limited PLD 1966 SC 684 and Citi Bank N.A., A Banking Company v. Riaz Ahmad rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.44 of 2002, heard on 13-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "BANKERS EQUITY LIMITED through Principal Law Officer and 5 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nMessrs BENTONITE PAKISTAN LIMITED and 7 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12834",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2927 = 2003 SLD 2927 = 2003 CLD 952",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------S.6---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.23-A & S.151---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)--¬Recovery of Bank loan---Execution of decree---Objection to maintainability of decree---Non filing of appeal---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Tribunal had attained finality as the borrower did not file any appeal against the same---High Court had in other cases declared certain provisions of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, as unconstitutional---Objection was raised by the borrower during the execution proceedings, to maintainability of the decree on the basis of the by the High Court---Banking Court and High Court dismissed the objection petition filed by the borrower---Contention of the borrower was that since the s and decrees passed by the Tribunal constituted under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, were set aside as its very constitution was declared unconstitutional, therefore, the decree passed against the borrower was rendered coram non judice and execution proceedings could not proceed---Validity---Decree was passed as far back as 10-11-1993 after five years of institution of the suit for recovery---No appeal as provided under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, was filed by the borrower---Bank was well within its right to initiate execution proceedings against the borrower---Supreme Court declined to interfere with the orders passed by High Court--¬Leave to appeal was refused. \n \nSoneri Bank Limited through Mian Abdul Wajid, EVP and another v. Raja Weaving Mills Limited, and another KLR 1997 Civil Cases 742 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 1092/L of 2002, decision dated: 7-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "TANVIR AHMED KHAN AND KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY, JJ",
    "": "Syed FARASAT ALI SHAH\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12835",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2928 = 2003 SLD 2928 = 2003 CLD 956",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XXI, R.65---Sale in execution of decree ---Mode--¬Contention that sale could only be made through public auction and in no other manner, held, not correct. \n \nBrig. (Retd.) Mazhar ul Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited PLD 1993 Lah.706 ref.\n \nAsma Zafarul Hassan v. United Bank Ltd. and another 1981 SCMR 108 fol.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n---- Courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited, unless it is expressly provided for by the Code, but they are to act on the converse principle that every, procedure' is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be-prohibited by the law--¬Prohibition, as a matter of general principle, cannot be presumed. \n \nNarsing Das v. Mangal Dnbey (1883) 5 All. 163 fol.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXI, Rr.66, 67, 68 & 69---Proclamation, publication and conduct of sale---Non-compliance with provisions of C.P.C. is only a material irregularity, but not illegality rendering the sale in disregard of such provisions a nullity. \n \nManilal Mohanlal Shah v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed AIR 1954 SC 349 fol.\n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Nasir Industries 1982 CLC 388 and Syed Brothers v. District Council, Lyallpur PLD 1977 Lah. 542 ref.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXI, R.84---Deposit of 25% of purchase money immediately was a strict requirement of O.XXI, R.84, C.P.C.---Omission to deposit, however, could only be treated as a material irregularity, but would not render the sale as nullity. \n \nRashad Ahsan v. Bashir Ahmed PLD 1989 SC 146 fol.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.84--¬Sale in execution of decree---Deposit of 25% of purchase money---Executing Court granted one week's time to purchaser to make such deposit---Validity---Purchaser could not be penalized for mistake of Court---Deposit within such period and not immediately could not vitiate sale. \n \nRashad Ahsan v. Bashir Ahmed PLD 1989 SC 146 fol.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- \n \n----S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.85--¬Sale in execution of decree---Executing Court granted one week's time to deposit 25% of purchase money---Purchaser failed to deposit entire amount of purchase money within 15 days of passing of such order due to passing of interim order in appeal---Effect---Requiring purchaser to fulfill a condition entirely beyond his control would be highly inequitable---Penalizing purchaser for an act of Court would neither be fair nor equitable. \n \nRashad Ahsan v. Bashir Ahmed PLD 1989 SC 146 fol.\n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.85-Sale in execution of decree---Court did not accept highest bid offered by appellant and directed official assignee to negotiate apart from bidders with any other party interested in buying property---Offer received from outsider in subsequent reference was highest, but appellant did not make improvement in his earlier bid---Court accepted offer of outsider ---Contention of appellant was that negotiations could, only be held, with bidders, but not through inviting fresh offers from outsider---Validity---Sale could be set aside, if same had 'caused prejudice to any of the parties--¬ Decree-holder had not objected to acceptance of outsider's bid, whereas appellant duly represented at the time of hearing had expressed his unwillingness to match such bid---No ground for interfering with impugned order was found---High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.292 of 2002, heard on 12-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND AMIR HANI MUSLIM, JJ",
    "": "Messrs CHAWLA INTERNATIONAL\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12836",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2929 = 2003 SLD 2929 = 2003 CLD 966",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance-------Premiums paid to Insurance company, suit for recovery of---Plea of Insurance company was that as per Cl. (5) of Insurance Policy, no written request for converting insurance policy into a paid-up policy was made by insured, thus, his policy had lapsed automatically---Trial Court dismissed suit, but Appellate Court decreed the same---Validity---Clause (5) of Insurance Policy revealed that condition of written request was not mandatory as no penal consequences were prescribed therefore---Contract between parties, thus, could not become void---Appellate Court had passed impugned after applying its independent mind and properly appreciating evidence---Insurance Company had failed to point out any non-reading or misreading of evidence by Appellate Court or violation of principle laid down by superior Courts---High Court dismissed petition in circumstances. \n \nMessrs S.M. Abdullah & Sons, Karachi v. Messrs Crescent Star Insurance Co. Ltd. 1993 MLD 1239 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S.115---Error of law or fact committed by Subordinate Court---High Court not empowered to interfere except after satisfying itself upon certain matters---Such matters and conditions highlighted.\n \nSection 115, C.P.C., empowers High Court to satisfy itself upon three matters: (a) that order of Subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction, and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction, the Court has not acted illegally; that is, in breach of some provision of law or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial, which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If High Court is satisfied upon these three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusion of Subordinate Court upon questions of fact or law. \n \nN.S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar and another v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras PLD 1949 PC 26 and Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore v. Syed Khalid Mahmood 1985 CLC 657 fol.\n \n(c) Insurance---\n \n----Clause (s) of Insurance Policy giving rise to two possible interpretations---Interpretation more beneficial to the insured would be preferred. \n \nTaj Din Valliani and another v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan NLR 1984 Civil 492 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.2584 of 2002, decision dated: 10-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through General ManageR\nVs.\nABDUL SATTAR KHAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12837",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2930 = 2003 SLD 2930 = 2003 CLD 971",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.9. & 10---Suit for recovery of amount---Application for leave to defend suit---Defendants/borrowers had not denied transaction of having availed loan facility of plaintiff-Bank--¬Annexure filed by defendants to their application for leave to defend suit, itself was an acknowledgment of their liability and request had been made by defendants for re¬structuring finances ---Letter was stated to have been issued by defendants for revival of sick unit which had shown that unit had become sick---Nothing, in the letters was available to show that any cause of loss was on account of any of default of the Bank and there was no allegation of defendants in any of said letters against the Bank---In absence of any genuine or bona fide dispute, leave to defend suit could not be granted---Two of the defendants having expired, their legal heirs who also were guarantors, were liable to pay the amount---One of the defendants who was neither borrower nor guarantor was not a \"\"customer\"\" within meaning of low and thus was not liable to pay the suit amount---Suit wrongly filed against the said defendant was dismissed, however, the suit was decreed against the defendants, who being guarantors were liable to pay the suit amount.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-83 of 2002, decision dated: 14-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR MANSOOR KHAN, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs GALAXY TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12838",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2931 = 2003 SLD 2931 = 2003 CLD 990",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.21---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.87, 89 & 92---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)--¬Execution of decree---Re-auction of property---Failure to set aside earlier auction---Validity---Leave to appeal was granted by Supreme Court to consider, whether without setting aside the earlier auction, Banking Tribunal could competently issue fresh schedule of auction and whether the confirmation of sale in favour of the petitioner as a result of earlier auction was legal and valid and High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction was justified to set aside the sale and interfere in the matter.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos.3087 and 3088 of 2001, decision dated: 5-06-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL AND MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, JJ",
    "": "AFZAL MAQSOOD BUTT\nVs.\nBANKING COURT, Lahore High Court NO.2 and OTHERS--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12839",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2932 = 2003 SLD 2932 = 2003 CLD 992",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XVII, R.3 & O.XXXVII, Rr.2, 3---Suit for recovery amount on basis of Promissory Note---Closing of evidence of defendant for non-production of evidence---After completion of evidence of plaintiff, case was adjourned for, evidence of defendant, but defendant despite obtaining several adjournments had failed to produce the evidence--¬Defendant, on various adjourned dates of hearing, neither produced any evidence nor summoned any witness through process of Court and on the last date of hearing not only any witness of defendant was present, but defendant himself did not appear before the Court and on that date evidence of defendant was closed---Such conduct of defendant was not appreciable in any respect---Nothing was on record to show that on any of the dates of hearing, Presiding Officer of Court was on leave or case had been adjourned on any other reason ---Defendant despite providing sufficient opportunity had failed to produce his evidence---Trial Court, in circumstances, was left with no option, but to invoke provisions of O.XVII, R.3, C.P.C.--¬Order closing evidence of defendant passed by Trial Court, could not be interfered with in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 180 of 1995, heard on 25-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PARVEZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Ch. MUHAMMAD SAEED\nVs.\nRIAZULHAQUE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12840",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2933 = 2003 SLD 2933 = 2003 CLD 996",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)-------Ss.7 & 12(5)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)--¬Suit for recovery, of loan---Application against alleged fraud---Judgment-debtor, in application under S.12(2), C.P.C., had .sought recall of and decree passed against the defendants---Defendant who had guaranteed the repayment of loan having failed to honour the guarantee, -debtor/applicant had guaranteed the repayment of entire outstanding amount---Liability to repay amount having remained un-cleared, suit for recovery of loan was filed by the Bank against the defendants which was decreed---Judgment-debtor filed application under S.12(2), C.P.C. alleging fraud in decreeing the suit---Fraud alleged by the -debtor could only be considered an internal matter between previous and new management of the -debtor and could not afford a ground for intervention under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. could only be pressed into service when fraud had been practised upon the Court and was obtained on basis of such fraud---Judgment-debtor had come into the picture much after the decree was passed in the suit--¬Judgment-debtor having preferred appeal against and decree in the suit, could not assail the same in proceedings under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Application filed by -debtor was liable to be dismissed for the reason that and decree in suit was passed under Banking jurisdiction and in view of negative provision contained in Banking Law, prohibiting review or revision of , order or decree, passed under Banking jurisdiction, power under S.12(2), C.P.C. could not be invoked---Judgment-debtor was a limited Company and being a legal entity could not deny knowledge about proceedings to which it was party---Application filed under S.12(2), C.P.C. was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nNational Commercial Bank Ltd., Karachd v. Muhammad Tufail and another PLD 1975 Kar. 671; Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others PLD 1975 SC 331; Muhammad Younus Khan and others v. Government of N.W.F.P. and others 1993 SCMR 618; Haji Abdullah Khan and others v. Nisar Muhammad Khan and others PLD 1965 SC 690; Khurshid Ali and others v. Shah Nazar PLD 1992 SC 822; Abdul Sattar and others v. Ibrahim and others PLD 1992 Kar. 323; Mst. Surraya Begum v. Aftab Ahmad Khan 1995 CLC 1603; Haral Textile Limited v. Banque Indosuez Belgium S.A. and others 1999 SCMR 591; Ghulam Sarwar v. Muhammad Hussain and others 1987 SCMR 1440 and Emirates Bank International Limited v. Messrs Osman Brothers and others PLD 1998 Kar. 338 ref.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S.128---Guarantor's liability---Proceedings for recovery of loan could competently be filed against guarantor without joining the principal debtors---Existence of valid contract, of guarantee, however, was necessary in that case. \n \nMessrs Platinum Insurance Company Limited, Karachi v. Daewoo Corporation, Sheikhupura PLD. 1999 SC 1 and City Bank v. Tariq Mohsin Siddiqi and others PLD 1999 Kar. 196 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous No.53 of 1997 in Suit No.985 of 1985, decision dated: 9-09-1999.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHTAQUE AHMAD MEMON, J",
    "": "HYESONS SUGAR MILLS (PVT.) LTD.--Applicant\nVs.\nMuhammad Mazhar Ali for, K.M. Usman, K.M. Asif and K.M. Zaki former Director of --Defendant, JudgmentÂ, Debtor No.2."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12841",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2934 = 2003 SLD 2934 = 2003 CLD 1003",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S.148, O. VIII, R.10 & O.XXXVII, Rr.2, 3---Suit for recovery of amount on basis of Pronote---Application to defend suit--¬On statement of plaintiff that he had no objection if application of defendant to appear and defend suit was accepted, Trial Court accepted application of defendant subject to furnishing security equal to suit amount until next date of hearing---Defendant despite several adjournments neither had submitted surety bond nor had filed written statement and Trial Court decreed the suit filed by plaintiff against defendant---Since order to accept application for leave to defend suit was conditional and condition therein having not been complied with despite several adjournments, Trial Court had rightly proceeded to decree suit filed by plaintiff--- Order VIII, R.10, C.P.C. had empowered the Court to pronounce against defendant or make such order in relation to suit as it would think fit where party would fail to file written statement within time fixed by the Court---Rule 10 of O.VIII, C.P.C. being penal in nature it was within discretion of the Court to pronounce even without recording evidence---Judgment and decree passed by Trial Court could not be interfered with in circumstances. \n \nSiddiq Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another PLD 1984 SC 289: Sh. Abdus Saboor and Brothers v. Ganesh Flour Mills Ltd. PLD 1967 Lah. 779 and Mst. Hakumat Bibi v. Imam Din and others PLD 1987 SC 22 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.701 of 2001, heard on 3rd June, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Haji MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE\nVs.\nRana MUHAMMAD SARWAR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12842",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2935 = 2003 SLD 2935 = 2003 CLD 1007",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 2(d)(e)---Term \"\"obligation\"\" as defined to the Ordinance---Scope---Restructuring, renewal or rescheduling of finance---Effect---\"\"Obligation\"\" would mean only an obligation relating to finance, and nothing more\"\"---Neither word finance\"\" contemplated any addition to a debt nor word \"\"obligation\"\" did grant any further return, but only referred to extension of time- ---Restructuring or renewal of finance would not be an increase in amount payable on the date of same being restructured, renewed or rescheduled---Principles:\n \nIt is clear from the word \"\"obligation\"\" that it only refers to enlargement and extension of a. time. It is not provided in the definition of \"\"obligation\"\" that restructuring or renewal would be an increase in the amount payable on the date of its being restructured, renewed or rescheduled. \n \nThe word \"\"obligation\"\" does not grant any further return, but only allows \"\"extension of time in repayment of a finance or for restructuring or renewal or for payment of extension of time in payment of any amount relating to finance or liquidated damages, which is the import of Aslam Khaki' case. It is clear that this only relates to either extension of time for repayment or restructuring of a schedule of payment, but has to be of \"\"finance\"\". Word \"\"obligation\"\" says \"\"amounts relating to a finance\"\". Under section 9 of the Ordinance, 2001, it is clear that Legislature uses the word \"\"obligation with regard to any finance\"\". This obligation would mean only an obligation vis-a-vis the \"\"finance\"\" and nothing more. The word \"\"finance\"\" does not contemplate any addition to a debt. It is only this amount that is due, therefore no addition or mark-up on mark-up can be allowed and roll over or rescheduling or restructuring can be done, but without any addition, of any amount on the debt payable under the first agreement. \n \nUBL v. Gravure Packaging Suit No.493 of 1998 and Dr. M. Aslam Khaki v. Syed Muhammad Hashmi PLD 2000 SC 225 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.617 of 2000, heard on 18-09-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR MANSOOR KHAN, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nALJALAL TEXTILE MILLS LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12843",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2936 = 2003 SLD 2936 = 2003 CLD 1018",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3---Suit for recovery of amount on the basis of a promissory note---Leave to defend suit---Plaintiff had claimed that defendant had obtained suit amount from him on basis of a Promissory Note and had also executed an agreement in that respect---Defendant after obtaining leave to defend the suit filed written statement in which he refuted the claim of plaintiff---Trial -Court after taking into consideration evidence brought on record came to the conclusion that plaintiff had failed to prove that Promissory Note was with consideration and dismissed the suit--¬Evidence of plaintiff with regard to payment of suit amount and execution of, Promissory Note being patently inconsistent, was rightly disbelieved by Trial Court and order dismissing the suit could not be interfered with.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.348 of 1995, heard on 6th ‘September, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "M.A. SHAHID SIDDIQUI, J",
    "": "GHULAM HAIDER --Appellant\nVs.\nZAFAR ULLAH KHAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12844",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2937 = 2003 SLD 2937 = 2003 CLD 921",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-------Ar.199---Circular No.RD/01/2002, dated 22-5-2002 issued by Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan--¬Constitutional petition---Loans obtained by farmers under policy of Bank formulated for calamity affected areas---Bank announced relief package through circular dated 22-5-2002 in view of drought prevailing in different parts of country giving concession to farmers in re-payment of loans and mark-up etc. ---Provincial Government by a notification declared areas belonging to petitioners as calamity hit areas for period from Kharif 2000 to Rabi 2000-2001---Such notification was amended through corrigendum, whereby such period was substituted by 1-7-2001 to 30-6-2002--¬Bank denied to extend benefit of corrigendum to petitioners and demanded from them loans alongwith mark-up etc.---Validity---Corrigendum had been given retrospective effect as period for purpose of calamity and drought was computed from 1-7-2001 to 30-6-2002---Corrigendum conferred benefits on petitioners as drought affectees--¬Petitioners were entitled to relief granted through circular dated 22-5-2002---Denial of Bank to extend such benefit to petitioner was an act without jurisdiction and lawful authority---High Court accepted Constitutional petitions with observations that those petitioners having loan up to Rs.25,000 would be entitled to remission of interest/mark¬up thereon, while those petitioners, who had availed loan up to Rs.1,00,000, would be entitled to 100% remission of outstanding amount of interest/mark-up, provided principal amount was re-paid to Bank within two months either in lump sum or in instalments. \n \n(b) Notification---\n \n---- Retrospective effect of---Scope---Notification taking awab existing rights or creating -new liabilities is always prospective and not retrospective---Notification conferring benefits on indiuidual(s) or class of individuals is always given retrospective effect. \n \nMessrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1652; State Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Faisal Spinning Mills Limited 1997 SCMR 1244 and Anoud, Power Generation Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2001 SC 340 fol.\n \nSamiullah Jan for Petitioners.\n \nSyed Mir Muhammad for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4.\n \nSalah-ud-Din, Khan, D.A.G. for Respondent No.5.\n \nDates of hearing: 18th and 19th December, 2002.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.848, 1042 and 1052 of 2002, decision dated: 14-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAH, JEHAN KHAN AND DOST MUHAMMAD KHAN, JJ",
    "": "FAZAL MUHAMMAD and others\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12845",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2938 = 2003 SLD 2938 = 2003 CLD 1026",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.7(4) & 9(1)---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Mandatory conditions---Such jurisdiction would be attracted only in case, where a customer or banker committed default in fulfilling any obligation with regard to any finance. \n \nQatar Airways PLC v. ANZ Grindlays Bank 2000 CLC 1455; Gharibwal Cement Ltd. v. English Leasiling Ltd. PLD 2001 Lah. 411 and Awari Hotels Limited and others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan and 6 others 2000 YLR 2407 ref.\n \n(b) Words and phrases---\n \n-----\"\"Unit Investment Trust\"\"---Meaning. \n \nBlack's Law Dictionary ref.\n \n(c) Words, and phrases---\n \n---- \"\"Finance \"\"---Meaning. \n \nEncyclopaedia of Banking and Finance, 10th Edn. by Charles, J. Woelfel ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 2(d)(e)---Suit for recovery of value of N.I.T. Certificates by its holder against National Investment Trust---Maintainability---Plaintiff being holder of unit certificates became sharer in the Trust, in which funds had been pooled---Position of plaintiff was, thus, of an investor---Defendant was a financial institution, but plaintiff could not be a customer as defined in S.2(e) of the Ordinance--¬Fixation of price by Trust and right to purchase unit certificates would not bring the same within ambit of finance\"\" as defined in the Ordinance---Unit certificates would remain an investment analogous to \"\"share \"\"---Such suit was not a suit in terms of S. 9 of the Ordinance as there existed neither relationship of \"\"customer\"\" and \"\"banker\"\" between parties nor any default with regard to any finance obtained by plaintiff as a consequence of such relationship---High Court treated such suit as ordinary \"\" suit to be proceeded on its original side.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-106 of 2001, decision dated: 8-03-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "Karachi High Court ELECTRIC PROVIDENT FUND --Plaintiff\nVs.\nNATIONAL INVESTMENT (UNIT) TRUST and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12846",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2939 = 2003 SLD 2939 = 2003 CLD 1033",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.9 & 10---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)--¬Recovery of Bank loan---Leave to defend suit---Bona fide dispute---Scope---Retaining of goods of borrower by Bank--¬Liability towards outstanding amount of the Bank was not denied by the borrowers, except raising the plea that the Bank had retained the goods of the borrowers unauthorisedly---Banking Court decreed the suit in favour of the Bank and the and decree was maintained by High Court---Plea of the borrowers was that the raw material imported by them was retained by the Bank due to which the borrowers had suffered loss---Validity---Plea of the borrowers neither constituted a defence in their favour independently nor it gave rise to a bona fide - dispute between the parties because in such cases, the Court was required to examine the liability and its acceptance by the borrowers---Question of sustaining losses by the borrowers on account of conduct of the Bank could be sorted out in some other forum instead of claiming relief on such basis from Banking Court---Banking Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under S.10 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 could only entertain defence of the borrower, if prima facie a bona fide dispute had been disclosed---Since the borrowers had not denied their liability towards the Bank, therefore, the Banking Court had rightly passed the and decree which was maintained by High Court---Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2288/L of 2000, decision dated: 3rd July, 2001, hearing DATE : 3rd July, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY AND MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL, JJ",
    "": "SIDDIQUE WOOLLEN MILLS and others\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12847",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2940 = 2003 SLD 2940 = 2003 CLD 1036",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. VII, R.2 & O.XXXIX, Rr.1, 2---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.126---Bank guarantee---Suit for recovery of money with a prayer that the other parties be restrained to encash the Bank Guarantee till the final disposal of the suit ---Validity--¬Bank guarantee being an independent contract from the original contract the same could not be restrained from being encashed to enforce the terms of an earlier contract. \n \nMessrs Pioneer Cables Ltd. v. WAPDA and others 2000 UC 53 and Power Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Karachi 1996 UC 367 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 142 of 2002, heard on 22-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI, J",
    "": "Messrs RADIX CHEMICAL PRIVATE LIMITED through Director\nVs.\nMessrs TOP GROWERS CHEMICAL NEWTWORK through Chief Executive and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12848",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2941 = 2003 SLD 2941 = 2003 CLD 1094",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)-------Ss. 41-C & 41-A---Power of State Bank of Pakistan to remove Directors or other managerial persons from the office of Banking Company---Limitations---No order under S.41-A, Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 shall be made except by the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan on a report by Standing Committee---Any person or Bank aggrieved by an order of the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan under S.41-A of the Ordinance may appeal to the Central Board of Directors whose decision shall be final. \n \n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----Ss.41-C & 41-A---Power of the State Bank of Pakistan to remove Directors or other managerial persons from office of Banking Company---Scope---Regulatory power to safeguard the interests of a Banking Company or its depositors to secure proper management of Banks in the public interest vests in the State Bank in terms of S.41-A of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962---Provisions of S.41-C of the Ordinance, however, deal with the manner of exercise of such power and postulate three things that Standing Committee set up by the State Bank of Pakistan is required to examine the affairs of a Bank and no order of removal can be passed in the absence of a report of such Committee; that thereafter an order of removal can be made by the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan giving the person opportunity of being heard and that an order of removal is subject to the incidents of an appeal to the Central Board of Directors. \n \n(c) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----Ss.41-A & 41-C---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court ---Scope--¬Existence of alternate remedy---Requirements---Removal of Directors or other managerial persons of a Banking Company by the State Bank of Pakistan ---Validity--¬Alternate remedy must be equally efficacious and even otherwise Constitutional petition was always entertainable if the necessary factual material upon which an administrative Tribunal could assume jurisdiction did not exist---Whenever an administrative Tribunal unlawfully assumes jurisdiction an aggrieved party could not be required to litigate his grievances in the hierarchy of such Tribunals---If, however, it could be shown that the factual or legal basis upon which jurisdiction was assumed by the State Bank of Pakistan did not exist or if such jurisdiction was assumed not for the purposes laid down in the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, but for some other collateral purpose, a petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution could be entertained---If the necessary material or pre-conditions for assumption of jurisdiction did exist but the order passed suffered from a wrong finding of fact or application of law, the aggrieved party would normally be required to avail the alternate remedy provided in the statute before approaching the High Court. \n \n(d) Contract--\n \n----Memorandum of Understanding---Not an enforceable contract, its weight as regards the intention of the parties, however, could not be overlooked.\n \n(e) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S.41-A---Power of the State Bank of Pakistan to remove Directors or other managerial persons from office of Banking Company---Nature and scope---Provision of S.41-A, Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 enables the State Bank of Pakistan to take both punitive and preventive, action in the interest of the Banking Company, its depositors or the public---Not necessary for State Bank of Pakistan to wait till a person actually causes loss and once it is shown that he had all the intentions of doing so the power to remove could be exercised in a proper case. \n \n(f) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----Ss.41-C & 41-A---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Shareholder of a Banking Company was always entitled to disinvest his shares at such price as may be offered to him and persons holding controlling shares in the Company are mostly found at certain premium over and above the price offered to ordinary shareholders---Employees purchasing the shares of the Bank, in the present case, were restrained from disposing them of for a period of five years from the date of privatization of the Bank---Memorandum of Understanding was admittedly signed after the said period and nothing was placed on record to show any prohibition or illegality in such a transaction---Fact that some shareholders might be able to secure a much higher price for their shares on account of their privileged position in the Banking Company might offend one's ethical susceptibilities but such was the rule in market economy and in the absence of any legal prohibition no objection to such transaction could be sustained---Nothing was available on the record to indicate that the action of the shareholders of the Banking Company holding privileged position and other Directors could have possibly led to a situation detrimental to the interests of the Banking Company or its depositors---No action on the basis of execution of \"\"Memorandum of Understanding\"\" could be taken, order against the employees of the Bank passed by the State Bank of Pakistan was accordingly set aside by the High Court with an observation that State Bank was at liberty to pass any appropriate order on the basis of relevant grounds and will take into consideration the extent of responsibility of each of the person and thereafter determine whether any action was warranted under S.41-A of the Ordinance. \n \n(g) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S.41-A(1)(3)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199, 4 & 23---Constitutional petition---Powers of State Bank of Pakistan to remove Directors or other managerial persons from office of Banking. Company---Provisions of S.41-A(1) & (3) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 confer a power upon the, State Rank of Pakistan not merely to remove a person from its existing employment but to prohibit him from taking part in the management of any other Banking Company which intends to deprive a person of his means of livelihood and therefore, must be construed very strictly--¬Employees of the Bank who were also its shareholders and were in a privileged position in the Bank sold their shares at premium price---Effect---Action of State Bank of Pakistan under S.41-A, Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, held, was not justified---Principles.\n \nSection 41-A(1) and (3) confers a power upon State to remove a person from its existing to prohibit him from taking part in the any other Banking Company. It intends to deprive a person of his means of livelihood and therefore, must be construed very strictly. Moreover Article 4 of the Constitution guarantees that no person shall be prevented from or be hindered in doing that which is not prohibited by law and Article 23 guarantees a fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property subject to the Constitution and any reasonable restriction imposed by law in the public interest. Therefore, a removal in the public interest under section 41-A of the Banking Companies Ordinance on the ground that the persons holding privileged position in the Banking Company sold their shares on premium price, could only be effected if a restriction on the transfer of shares had been imposed by law. Likewise the expression \"\"otherwise undesirable\"\" in section.41-A(1) (a) has to be read ejusdem generis with the earlier words detrimental to the interest of the Banking Company or its depositors and not public power of such drastic nature could be exercised on the ground that the Governor State Bank considers a person's association with the Bank to be undesirable for any subjective reasons. Impugned action could not be taken on the basis of the ground. \n \n(h) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n---S.41-A(1)(3)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199--¬Constitutional petition-- Power of State Bank of Pakistan to remove Directors or other managerial persons from the office of a Banking Company---Pre-conditions---Material on record, in the present case, indicated that extremely liberal financing was granted to a Company .which had even earlier defaulted in payment of dues of the Bank and that such company purchased or agreed to purchase shares of the Bank held by some Directors and Senior Executives of the Bank at a price much higher than the normal price of such shares---Section 95, Companies Ordinance, 1984 prohibited a company from advancing loans or financial assistance or purchase of its own shares---Interests of the depositors, in circumstances, were being compromised by advancing loans to a defaulter for which some Directors and persons in the senior management obtained an advantage by exercising their management, powers---Relevant pre-conditions for exercise of power by the State Bank of Pakistan under S.41-A, Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 did exist in respect of the allegations, in circumstances. \n \n(i) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S.41-A---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199--¬Constitutional petition---Power of State Bank of Pakistan to remove Directors or other managerial persons from the office of Banking Companies---Facts necessary for taking penal action under S.41-A, Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 was established or otherwise was basically a question of fact and High Court, under its Constitutional jurisdiction did not normally enter into such controversies whenever alternate remedies were available---Contention of the petitioner was that the alternate remedy in terms of S.41-C, Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 was only illusory as the Appellate Authority i.e. the Central Board of Directors of the State Bank of Pakistan was headed by the Governor himself who had passed the impugned order and the very concept of an appeal to a higher forum would be destroyed in case he was called upon to preside over a forum where his own decision was questioned: petitioner therefore urged that the Central Board of Directors was a fairly autonomous body after the enactment of State Bank of Pakistani (Amendment) Act, 1994, it would be appropriate that appeal against the impugned order be heard by the Central Board of Directors where the Governor should exclude himself from participating---Validity---High Court directed that, in case, the aggrieved persons were to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the Central Board of Directors of the State Bank of Pakistan, the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan will not participate in the hearings and decision ¬making process of such appeals- --Interim order already passed by the High Court would remain operative subject to any decisions or modification of the interim order passed by the Supreme Court in C.P.L. 150 of 2002. \n \n(j) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S.41-A(1)(3)--Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199--¬Constitutional petition-- Order of removal from service passed under S.41-A(1)(3) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 as a consequence of which the person removed also stood debarred under S.41-A(3) of the Ordinance from taking part in the management of any other Banking Company for the period not exceeding three years---If the period during which such persons had been debarred from being associated with the management of any Bank, had not been specified, the order suffered from lacuna---Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.525 and 669 of 2002, decision dated: 11-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, JJ",
    "": "M. SALEEM SHEIKH\nVs.\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN through Governor and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12849",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2942 = 2003 SLD 2942 = 2003 CLD 1112",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.7(6)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.24---Transfer of a case---Pecuniary jurisdiction of High Court---Jurisdiction of High Court under S.24, C.P.C. cannot be equated with transfer of a case by operation of law---Once the suit under law stands transferred in view of S.7(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the same cannot be retained on the ground that conferment of jurisdiction at a higher level on High Court by Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, would not deprive the High Court of its power to proceed with the matter less than the lower pecuniary limit of High Court. \n \nUnited Bank Ltd. v. Jaffer Flour Mills PLD 1985 Lah.541 and Jehangir Khan v. Banking Tribunal, Karachi 2002 CLD 1466 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.2(b)---Jurisdictional value of the suit ---Determination--¬Factors---Jurisdictional value of the suit could not be set up on the counter claim through the application for leave to defend the suit which had not been allowed and fate of the counter claim was dependant on the result of the adjudication of said application, though the counter claim, for all purposes, was a separate claim/suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-208 of 2000, decision dated: 3rd December, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "GULF COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nSERENA TEXTILES (PRIVATE) LIMITED and OTHERS----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12850",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2943 = 2003 SLD 2943 = 2003 CLD 1117",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)-------S. 25---Specific Relief Act (1 of 1877), Ss.73, 42, 54 & 55---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2--¬Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---High Court appeal---Suit for permanent injunction, mandatory injunction, accounts and damages tentatively assessed at Rs. 500, 00, 000 was filed by the plaintiff with an application under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C. seeking interim injunction against the defendants restraining them from manufacturing, selling and advertising the goods under the infringed \"\"trade mark\"\" or from using the word \"\"Chloride Volta\"\" or from using the word mark/name \"\"Chloride\"\" independently or in conjunction with any other word till pending decision of suit---Application for grant of injunction was dismissed by the High Court in its original jurisdiction on the grounds that there was no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff who had failed to show that its case attracted the test laid down under the settled law on the subject to enforce its rights to a trade mark; that the plaintiff had also failed to show as to whether the defendant had deceived the public into thinking the products as those of the plaintiff or the public was likely to believe tote same, specially when the plaintiff had given up the user of said word and \"\"Chloride\"\" IBL had entered into such agreement with the defendant; that the application was also found to be suffering from laches and that the plaintiff had already prayed for damages hence where a party could be compensated monetarily, such loss could not be described to be irreparable---Validity---No efforts appeared to have been taken by the plaintiff either for early disposal of the appeal, objection to the adjournments or by making any other application for grant of interim relief since 21-11-1996, particularly when more than six years had passed and the appeal was at the same stage where it was filed---Such situation neither showed any urgency in the matter nor justification for grant of interim relief by way of a restraint order---While granting or refusing of an equitable relief the Court had to take into consideration the conduct of the parties as well ---Merits of the case also did not demand; at the present stage, exercise of discretion by -the Court in favour of the plaintiff as neither there appeared to be a prima facie case in his favour nor balance of convenience nor irreparable loss was likely to be caused to him as he had already claimed damages and assessed the alleged loss in terms of money---High Court, in circumstances, dismissed the appeal with the observation that defendants should cooperate with the plaintiffs for disposal of the pending suit at the earliest.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 143 of 1995, decision dated: 27-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J. AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, J",
    "": "EXIDE PAKISTAN LIMITED, Karachi High Court\nVs.\nPAKISTAN ACCUMULATOR (PVT.) LTD., Islamabad High Court High Court and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12851",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2944 = 2003 SLD 2944 = 2003 CLD 1122",
    "Key Words:": "Chartered Accountants Ordinance (X of 1961)-------Ss.20-D & 20-F (as added by Chartered Accountants (Amendment) Act (XV of 1983))---Removal of name of Member of the Institute---Conditions---When the Council intends to remove the name of the Member from the Register for a period exceeding five years or permanently, Council shall not make any Order but refer the case to the High Court with its recommendations thereon and then the case would be heard by the High Court in terms of S.20-F of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1961---High Court, in Intra-Court Appeal, directed the Investigation Committee of the Institute to conduct its proceedings, in the present case, in accordance with Ss.20E & 20F of the Act after a notice to the party of a date of hearing to be fixed in the matter and thereafter to proceed further in accordance with provisions of the Act.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Intra-Court Appeal No. 144 of 1976, heard on 6-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACOUNTANTS OF PAKISTAN and another\nVs.\nRAHIM JAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12852",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2945 = 2003 SLD 2945 = 2003 CLD 1126",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S.52 & O.XXI, R.22---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Father had given guarantee for obtaining loan by the debtors from a Leasing Corporation---Father (since dead) had given guarantee to the, Leasing Corporation for the loan to the debtors but the son had not given any surety or guarantee at the time of sanctioning of loan by the Corporation in favour of the debtors---Decree was passed against the debtors and the deceased father of the said 'son---Leasing Company failed to point out any property which was inherited by the son of his father after his death which aspect of the matter was not considered by the Banking Court---Son was only responsible to discharge the decree secured by the creditor Corporation against the debtors and father of the said person in case the Corporation had brought on the record any property inherited by the son from the property of his father---High Court, accepted first appeal from the order of the Banking Court and set aside the impugned order to the extent of the son subject to the condition that Leasing Corporation was well within its right to know that the son had inherited some property of his father---Appeals of the remaining appellants were not maintainable as no final order had been passed against them.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.70 of 2003, decision dated: 7-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "MAJID ALI KHAN and 3 others\nVs.\nNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LEASING CORPORATION LIMITED (NL), FAISALABAD through Branch Manager and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12853",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2946 = 2003 SLD 2946 = 2003 CLD 1129",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (VII of 1947)-------Ss.12(1) & 23-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Failure to repatriate sale proceeds within specified time---Proceedings against exporters---Jurisdiction of Adjudicating Officer---Exporters had given undertaking on Form 'E' that they would deliver to the State Bank of Pakistan, the Foreign Exchange proceeds of the goods exported, within four months from the date of the shipment/dispatch---Exporters did not approach Pakistan Embassy/Trade Mission, Foreign Chamber of Commerce for recovery of the sale proceeds nor commenced legal proceedings for recovery of the same against the buyer in the country of export---Adjudicating Officer initiated proceedings against the exporters under S.23-B of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and imposed penalty on them---Plea raised by the exporters was that in contravention of S.12(1) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, proceedings under S.24(2) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, were applicable---Validity---All proceedings conducted by the officers of State Bank of Pakistan for violation, of S.12(1) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, by exporters were within the jurisdiction of the officers appointed/designated by the State Bank under S.23-B of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947---Promise made by the exporters was to do certain act i.e. to deliver the value of the exported goods in Foreign Exchange to the State Bank of Pakistan--: Fulfilment of promise of delivery of Foreign Exchange was a unilateral act---To prove the contravention of the undertaking, it was not necessary for State Bank of Pakistan to prove any of the exporters with any other person---Failure to fulfil the undertaking by itself was a clear-cut proof of th9 contravention of the promise and the provisions of S.24(2) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, were not applicable to the circumstances of the case--exporters had contravened the provisions of S.12(1) Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and were rightly proceeded against and penalized under S.23-B of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere with the penalty imposed by Adjudicating Officer---Petition was dismissed in circumstances. \n \n1971 SCMR 642 and 1968 SCMR 323 distinguished.\n \n1994 SCMR 2123; 1998 SCMR 1404; 1998 SCMR 383; 2001 MLD 1554 and Hoosen Dawood & Company v. Government of Pakistan Civil Petition No.138-K of 1992 ref.\n \n(b) Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (VII of 1947)---\n \n----Ss.23 & 23-B---provisions of Ss.23 & 23-B of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947---Distinction---Contravention of any provision of the former makes the same a penal offence punishable with imprisonment while those of the latter are very specific in nature and make the contravention of certain specified provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, subject to payment of penalty. \n \n(c) Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (VII of 1947)---\n \n----Ss.12(1), 23-B & 24(2)---Failure to repatriate sale proceeds within specified time---Proceedings against exporter---Procedure---Exporters giving an undertaking to repatriate the sale proceeds within the prescribed time as required by S.12(1), Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and in case of any delay in receiving the remittance could and should have approached Pakistan Embassy/Trade Mission, Foreign Chamber of Commerce for recovery of the sale proceeds or commenced legal proceedings for recovery of the same against the buyers in the country of export---If the exporters were unable to realize the export proceeds, they should have proved in the proceedings that it was beyond their control by bringing on record evidence that they took all possible steps for recovery of the sale proceeds of the export---Effect---By not bringing in the sale proceeds within the prescribed time, the exporters contravened the provisions of S.12(1) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, which was liable to punishment as provided therein--¬Exporters having not done so made themselves liable to be prosecuted and penalized under S.23-B of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.2680 of 1992, decision dated: 31st January, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. AHMED SARWANA AND M. MUJEEBULLAH SIDDIQUI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD YOUNUS\nVs.\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12854",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2947 = 2003 SLD 2947 = 2003 CLD 1142",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)------S. 126---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S. 18---Contract of guarantee--¬Concept---Essential ingredients---Contract of guarantee is a tri-partite agreement between the creditor, the principal debtor and the surety/guarantor---Surety, at the request of the principal debtor, agrees to answer the default of the debtor and undertakes, performance of the debtor towards the creditor ---Where neither the creditor had been specifically identified nor the principal debtor or his obligations towards the creditor had been specified, surety could not be imposed with the burden of performance of undefined ,obligations upon default of unspecified debtor--¬Guarantee forms, therefore, did not give rise to any enforceable and binding agreement of guarantee between the parties. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 2(c)---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 126---Contract of guarantee---Blank guarantee forms filed by the plaintiff ¬Bank were not valid and enforceable agreements of guarantee between the parties and will serve no purpose to keep the suit pending against the concerned defendants (guarantors) after granting them leave to appear and defend the suit---Said defendants, in circumstances; could not be said to be guarantors, sureties, indemnifiers or the \"\"customers\"\" of the plaintiff-Bank in terms of S. 2(c) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Plaintiff-Bank, in the present case, had confirmed that the case of said defendants was only in their purported capacity as guarantors and not as mortgagors---Names of said defendants, in circumstances, were deleted from the array of defendants and were struck off as parties from the suit for not being guarantors for the finance of the defendant-Company---Names of the said defendants had been struck off by invoking the provisions of O.I, R.10, C.P.C. for the reason that the suit of the plaintiff-Bank was decreed in terms of compromise decree as against other defendants in the case and plaint in the suit could not be partly rejected for the said defendants who were not found to be the customers of the Bank. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10---Suit for recovery of Bank loan---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXII, R.1 ---Non-impleading of heirs of deceased defendants---Suit does not abate upon death of a party even if his legal heirs are not impleaded in the suit--¬Non-filing of amended petition for leave to defend the suit by the said defendants---Effect---Such defendants were deemed to have admitted the plaintiffs claim in the suit which was accordingly decreed against the said defendants as well.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.74 of 1997, heard on 7-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nRAMZAN BAKHSH TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive and 22 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12855",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2948 = 2003 SLD 2948 = 2003 CLD 1149",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XXXIV & O.XXXVII, Rr.1, 2---Recovery of Bank loan--¬Mortgage of property without consent of owner of the property---Bank had failed to break the evidence of the defendant owner of mortgaged property who had in turn succeeded to prove that the mortgage had been created on her property without her permission and knowledge--¬Effect---Even an equitable mortgage could only be created by a person who was in position to obtain loan after submission of title documents of his or her own property by way of security---Property belonged to the defendant/owner who had not given any documentary consent to allow her property's title paper to be handed over to the Bank for creation of an equitable mortgage---Most of the statements made by the defendant/owner had gone unchallenged and un-rebutted---Suit was dismissed against the defendant/ owner in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.255 of 1994, decision dated: 13-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, J",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs JUNAID COTTON MILLS LIMITED and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12856",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2949 = 2003 SLD 2949 = 2003 CLD 1154",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.12---Power to set aside decree by the Banking Court--¬Scope---Banking Court is empowered to set aside the decree upon the terms of costs or to impose the condition to deposit cash or to furnish security as the case may be---Words \"\"relate to the suit in cash\"\" or furnishing of security\"\" relate to the suit amount or any portion thereof at the discretion of the Banking Court---Principles.\n \nBanking Court has been empowered to set aside the ex parte decree upon such terms as to costs, deposit in cash or furnishing of security. \n \nThe Banking Court shall make an order setting aside the decree upon the terms of payment of costs, or deposit in cash or furnishing of security. The words i.e. \"\"deposit in cash\"\" or \"\"furnishing of security\"\" relate to the suit amount or any portion thereof at the discretion of the Banking Court. If a case is covered under section 12 of the, Ordinance, then the Banking Court shall set aside the' decree, subject to the conditions mentioned in the said provision within the discretion of Banking Court, who is also empowered to order for the deposit of amount in cash. The only discretion, which has been conferred upon the Banking Court in this regard, is either to order for the deposit of cash or furnishing of security in respect of the whole of the suit amount or a portion thereof. In the present case, Banking Court, in exercise of its discretionary powers, has restrained itself from directing the -debtor to deposit the suit amount in cash and has ordered to furnish the security equal to the suit amount. Under the present set of circumstances the Banking Court has taken a lenient view, otherwise it was within its powers to direct to deposit the suit amount or a portion thereof in cash. Section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 empowers the Banking Court to set aside the decree upon the terms of costs or to impose the condition to deposit in cash or furnish security, as the case may be.\n \nBanking Court, in the present case, in exercise of its discretionary powers, has imposed the condition of furnishing the security upon the -debtor and subject to the said condition the decree has been set aside. Banking Court has not exercised its discretionary powers in an arbitrary or perverse manner and the same have bees exercised in accordance with the recognized principles governing the exercise of discretion, otherwise the Banking Court could have directed to deposit the decretal amount in cash. In such circumstances, High Court declined to interfere in the discretionary powers exercised by the Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.26 of 2003, decision dated: 17-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "MUZAFFAR-UDDIN\nVs.\nHABIB CREDIT AND EXCHANGE BANK LTD., Lahore High Court and 7 others\nSaeeda Perveen v. United Bank Limited Civil No. 1433-L of 2002 distinguished."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12857",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2950 = 2003 SLD 2950 = 2003 CLD 1159",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)------O.XXI, R.66---Proclamation of sale by public auction--¬ shown in the proclamation of sale/public notice---Effect---Mere fit that reserve price was not shown, the same would not per se vitiate the sale. \n \nGhulam Abbas v. Zuhra Bibi and another PLD 1972 SC 337 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66, 89, 90 & 92---Auction sale, setting ash of --Appellant claimed to be the highest bar and his grievance was that the auction was confirmed in favour of the Party who was lower in bid to the appellant---Offer made by the appellant was much higher, but he was willing to make payment only, through instalments to be staggered for a period of sixteen years---Net amount, the appellant was willing to pay was Rs.50 millions and he was not even prepared to furnish tangible security for the balance amount---Only securities offered were to the extent of Rs.100 millions in the form, of mortgage of agriculture property---Auction-purchaser had made cash offer for an amount of Rs.460 millions and he auction was confirmed in his favour---Validity---Object of auction sale is to facilitate payment of amounts due to decree-holders which would be substantially defeated if only a very insignificant amount is collected through auction sale to satisfy their debts---None of the decree-holders had questioned the sale-Order passed by Court was un¬exceptionable and High Court declined to interfere with the same in appeal---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nBrig. (Retd.) Mazhar-ul-Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited PLD 1993 Lah. 706 and Shahida Saleem v. Habib Credit and Exchange Bank Limited 2001 CLC 126 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeals Nos.284 and 295 of 2002, decision dated: 29-11-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND AMIR HANI MUSLIM, JJ",
    "": "KIRAN SUGAR MILLS (PVTÂ.) LIMITED \nVs.\nBANKER EQUITY LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12858",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2951 = 2003 SLD 2951 = 2003 CLD 1165",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.2(c)(d) & (9)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Suit for declaration, injunction and damages---Return of plaint---Plaintiff sought decree against Bank and its officials for recovery of damages for his personal malicious prosecution/defamation, declaration against their acts and injunction to restrain them from creating any demand against him by considering him director/beneficiary or shareholder of borrower-company---Maintainability---Suit for recovery on basis of finance/loan could be filed only by a banking company against persons, who fell within definition of \"\"customers\"\" or \"\"borrowers\"\"---Plaint and its prayer showed that plaintiffs cause of action against Bank and its officials was in his personal capacity or as Director of company--¬Capacity of Director or shareholder of a company could not be equated with capacity of a person as surety, indemnifier or guarantor of company---Person only in capacity of Director or shareholder of company would not fall within definition of a \"\"customer\"\" or \"\"borrower\"\"---Plaintiff had not sued Bank and its officials with regard to obligations arising out of finance---Suit did not arise out of finance or advance by Bank to borrower-company---Banking Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such suit---Plaint was returned for its presentation before competent Court. \n \nMuhammad Khalid v. Civil Judge 2001 YLR 905; Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Hyderabad and others v. Mannu Khan and others 1973 SCMR 62; 1993 SCMR 2101 and 1990 SCMR 1630 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.VII, Rr.10 & 11---Absence of jurisdiction---Provisions invokable would be as contained in O.VII, R.10, C.P.C., and not in O. VII, R.11, C.P.C.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No.155 of 1998, decision dated: 22-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "Haji MUHAMMAD NAWAZ KHOKHAR--Plaintiff\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED, Karachi High Court through President and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12859",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2952 = 2003 SLD 2952 = 2003 CLD 1171",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLV of 2001)-------S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9---Suit for recovery of damages by the customer against Bank on the grounds that he had applied for grant of loan of Rs.5,00,000 but he was given a sum of Rs.2,56,000; that he had spent Rs.10, 000 for execution of documents in favour of the Bank and a huge amount for ensuring his factory; that although the Bank Authorities had verbally agreed to disburse the remaining amount of Rs.2,85,000 as I.D.A. loan but thereafter they did not sanction the said amount and that due to non-disbursement of the said amount, the plaintiff had sustained damages amounting to Rs.5,00,000--¬Maintainability---Customer or a financial institution committing default in fulfilment of any obligation with regard to any finance, a financial institution or, as the case may be, the customer could institute a suit in the Banking Court under S.9, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for recovery of damages filed by the borrower against a Banking Company as it was the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Judge Banking Court to adjudicate upon the matter. \n \nMst. Yasmin Neghat and others v. National Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 1988 SC 391; Messrs Grainsystems (Pvt.) Limited and 10 others v. Agricultural Development Bank 1993 SCMR 1996; Haji Nabiullah and others v. H.B.L. and 2 others PLD 1990 Pesh. 17; Messrs Shafiq Hanif (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Limited, Karachi PLD 1993 Kar. 107; State Bank of Pakistan v. Chiragh Sun Engineering Limited and another 2000 YLR 1198; Muhammad Nazir Afandi v. IDBP and 3 others PLD 1992 Pesh. 87 and Qayum Nawaz Khan and another v. The Regional Manager, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, Dera Ismail Khan and 4 others PLD 1997 Pesh.72 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.340 of 1996, decision dated: 24-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "TALAAT QAYYUM QURESHI, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED through ManageR\nVs.\nKARIM DAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12860",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2953 = 2003 SLD 2953 = 2003 CLD 1293",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade organizations Ordinance (XLV of 1961)-------S. 9(f)---Amendment in Articles or Memorandum of Association by Trade Organization---Prior approval of appropriate Authority must be obtained for bringing any such change. \n \n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----Ss. 42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11--¬Trade Organizations Ordinance (XLV of 1961), Ss. 9(e) & 12---Suit for declaration and injunction---Rejection of plaint---Suit impugning amendments in Articles of Association made by Trade Organization and participation of a candidate in its election--¬Validity---Plaintiff was not a contesting candidate---Amendment in Articles of Association approved by Trade Organization could be challenged in terms of cl. (e) of S.9 of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961---Plaintiff could challenge result of election within thirty days from the date of announcement and Director Trade Organization could annul election after being satisfied that any irregularity or illegality had been committed---Even interim injunction could be effectively solicited by Director Trade Organization---Plaintiff' having invoked provision of arbitration could effectively obtain remedy by pursuing same, thus, suit was barred under S.12 of the Ordinance---Bringing such matter in Court by member of registered association was deprecated---High Court rejected the plaint in circumstances. \n \nMacsons v. Chambers of Commerce and Industries Suit No. 1344 of 1999 and Abdul Razzak Rajwani v. M.Y: Industries Civil Appeal No. 13-K of 1986 rel.\n \nAbdul Razzak Rajwani v. Messrs M.Y. Industries R.A. No.87 of 1984; M. Waqar Mannoo v. All Pakistan Textile Mills Associate Suit No. 1346 of 1999; Messrs Macsons, Proprietorship Concern v. Chamber of Commerce and others Suit No.1264 of 2000; Muhammad Jamil Asghar v. The Improvement Trust, Rawalpindi PLD 1965 SC 698 and Hamid Hussain v. Government of West Pakistan and others 1974 SCMR 356 ref.\n \n(c) Practice and procedure---\n \n----Where law provides a particular mechanism for impugning a particular action, then such remedy be availed in the matter provided for under the law itself.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.973 of 2002, decision dated: 4-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "WAJID RAFIQUE SHIEKH--Plaintiff\nVs.\nCHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INUDSTRY, Karachi High Court and 19 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12861",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2954 = 2003 SLD 2954 = 2003 CLD 1299",
    "Key Words:": "Foreign Currency Loan (Rate of Exchange) Order P.O. No. 3 of 1982------Arts. 3 & 4(2)---Scope and application of Arts. 3 & 4(2) of the Order---Right of recovery if remained alive (even if subject to certain conditions), it could not be assumed that the transaction had become past and closed and the party would be liable to repay the loan under the Foreign Currency Loan (Rate of Exchange) Order, 1982 on the basis of rate of exchange on the foreign currency loan enforced on the date of actual payment.\n \nIt was provided in Article 3 of Foreign Currency Loan (Rate of Exchange) Order, 1982 that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the of any Court or any agreement, contract or other instrument, the rate of exchange for repayment in respect of an outstanding foreign currency loan would be at the rate of exchange in force under section 23 of the State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956 on the date of actual repayment to the financial institutions. Sub-Article (2) of Article 4 of the said Order, provided that any writ issued, or decision given before or after commencement of the Order, inconsistent to the provisions of the Order, would be null and void and would have no consequence. However, this Order was not made applicable to the cases in which liability in respect of foreign currency loans towards financial institutions stood already discharged and loan was no more outstanding.\n \nIn the present case under the agreement, the petitioners were required to deposit an amount of rupees fifteen lacs inclusive of interest, penal interest, premium and charges payable by them within the time specified therein and this deposit was without prejudice to the right of respondents for claim of the balance amount which would ultimately become due and recoverable. The parties had agreed that in case of failure of the petitioners to deposit the amount of rupees fifteen lacs within the prescribed period, the winding up petition would be deemed to be allowed and if the payment would be made within the time fixed, the winding up petition would stand dismissed as withdrawn. The parties with a view to make amicable settlement of the dispute and to avoid the consequence of litigation and winding up of the Company willingly made the above arrangement before the Company Judge. The plain reading of the terms of agreement in the entirety incorporated in the joint statement of the parties would show that respondents reserved the right of claim of balance amount and neither expressly nor impliedly, abandoned any portion of their claim or made an offer for acceptance of the proposal of final settlement, rather the agreement would evidently suggest that the respondents agreed for the settlement to the extent of disposal of winding up petition subject to the deposit of amount in question as partial payment towards the discharge of financial liability and the balance was to be calculated on the basis of the decision of the High Court Appeal and thus it was provided in the agreement in an unequivocal terms that the final settlement would be made on a future date on the determination of the date of chargeability. The controversy between the parties was confined only to the extent of rate of foreign exchange chargeable either prevailing on the date when repayment was due or on the date of actual payment. The plea of the petitioners was that their total liability stood discharged on the confirmation of the verdict given by the High Court in appeal and there was nothing outstanding against them whereas the case of the respondents on the other hand, was that on the commencement of Presidential Order No. 3 of 1982, the was nullified and in consequence thereto, the petitioners would be liable to repay the loan in terms of Article 3 of the Presidential Order on the basis of rate of exchange enforced on the date of actual payment.\n \nThe joint statement is divided into two parts. The first part contains the admission of petitioners qua their financial liability and in the second part, the right of the respondents for the claim of the balance amount was recognized. The first part relating to the payment of rupees fifteen lacs and the disposal of winding up petition was immediately acted upon and the implementation of the second part was kept pending till the disposal of the appeal by the High Court, therefore, the agreement would manifestly reveal that the claim of respondents, subject to decision of rate of foreign exchange, chargeable from the petitioners would be deemed to be¬ outstanding and in absence of any apparent discrepancy appearing in the two parts of the agreement, no exception would be taken to the view expressed by the High Court to the effect that as long as respondent's right to seek recovery (even if subject to certain conditions) remained alive, it could not be assumed that the transaction had become past and closed. In the light of rule of adhering to the plain meanings of the words used in the statute being capable of depicting the intention of the Legislature, it could safely be held that the express provisions of Presidential Order No.3 of 1982 could not be construed subordinate to the consideration based on the agreement in question or any other instrument and thus the Presidential Order having overriding effect would remove all doubts in respect of rate of foreign exchange chargeable on foreign currency loans. \n \nThe agreement between the parties was conditional and final settlement in respect of the claim of the respondents would be subject to the determination of rate of exchange payment on the loan and therefore, the foreign currency loan obtained by the petitioners was still outstanding which would squarely fall within the ambit of Article 3 of Presidential Order No. 3 of 1982. The judicial verdict of the Courts in the matter was undoubtedly overruled by the Presidential Order No.3 of 1982 and in consequence thereto notwithstanding the agreement between the parties and the of the High Court on the subject, the rate of exchange on foreign currency loans enforced under section 23 of the State Bank of Pakistan, 1956, on the date of actual payment would be charged. It is provided in the Presidential Order itself that it will only apply to outstanding foreign currency loans on the date of its commencement and having no retrospective effect would not be applicable to the loan already paid before its commencement but in the present case, the financial liability of the petitioners subject to certain conditions, was still determinable which was not finally settled, therefore, it was not a case of past and closed transaction and consequently, on the annulment of the , the financial liability of the petitioners would necessarily be determined under Presidential Order No. 3 of 1982. The to the extent of being contrary and inconsistent with the provisions of Presidential Order, would be null and void and in consequence thereto, the petitioners would be liable to repay the loan under the above Order on the basis of rate of exchange on the foreign currency loan enforced on the date of actual payment.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos.857-K and 858-K of 2002, decision dated: 7-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS, SYED DEEDAR HUSSAIN SHAH AND MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs BURJOR ARDSHIR INDUSTRIES LIMITED\nVs.\nPAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12862",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2955 = 2003 SLD 2955 = 2003 CLD 1310",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.22 & 19(7)---Appeal---Maintainability---Execution of decree--¬Aggrieved person---Deletion of name of appellant from the array of appellants---Effect---Said appellant being an aggrieved person, could maintain the appeal independently. \n \nH. M. Saya & Co., Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. Karachi PLD 1969 SC 65 fol.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----S.19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R. 58--¬Execution of decree---Application before Banking Court with reference to the period of limitation prescribed under O.XXI, R.58, C.P.C.---No period of limitation having been prescribed for the purpose under S.19(7), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 objection in this behalf was not sustainable. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----Ss. 19(7) & 22---Execution of decree---Cheque earlier issued in the name of appellant which could not be encashed due to stop payment under Court's order, was issued towards the satisfaction of decree in the suit instituted by the appellant and the intervenor jointly as two partners of a firm---Decretal amount, in circumstances, to be paid during the proceedings of execution application was presumed to be for the benefit of both the plaintiffs in that suit according to their respective shares--¬Banking Court, was to have first decided the question as to whether the other cheque issued by the Nazir of the High Court in the name of the Nazir of the Banking Court in respect of the same amount was for the exclusive benefit of the appellant or the intervenor, being other plaintiff in another suit was also entitled for some share in the said amount---Mere issuance of earlier cheque in the exclusive name of the appellant, which was admittedly not encashed, was not sufficient ground of the fact that only the appellant was entitled for payment of such decretal amount or that the intervenor had no claim to the same---When there was no order from the High Court on merits directing payment to the intervenor and such sum was being paid to him under the orders of the Banking Court, it was necessary that before releasing such payment an enquiry should have been held to decide the claim of intervenor who, on the one hand was not a -debtor before the Banking Court and on the other hand, had some prima facie interest in the decree passed in the suit, being one of the plaintiffs in that suit---View taken by the Banking Court that no enquiry was required to be held by it in this regard not only demonstrated patent illegality but also denial of fair and proper opportunity of hearing to the intervenor---Order of the Banking Court, in circumstances, was not sustainable--¬High Court disposed of the appeal in the terms that Banking Court, shall, within 60 days of the receipt of the order of the High Court in appeal, hold proper enquiry with regard to the claim made by the intervenor, in his application before the Banking Court and other application under S. 19(7) of the Ordinance and decide the same accordingly---Till such enquiry was held by the Banking Court and the application of the intervenor was disposed of the payment of cheque released in favour of decree-holder shall remain invested in some profit bearing Scheme for the benefit of succeeding party---Documents regarding mortgaged properties available with the respondents shall not be released/discharged/redeemed till any further order in that regard was passed by the Banking Court.\n \nPLD 1982 Kar. 577; PLD 1999 Kar. 196 and H.M. Saya & Co., Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd., Karachi PLD 1969 SC 65 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.41 of 2002, decided 28-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ROSHAN ESSANI, ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, JJ",
    "": "Chaudhry MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and others\nVs.\nARSHAD MALIK and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12863",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2956 = 2003 SLD 2956 = 2003 CLD 1318",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr. 66 & 90---Execution of decree---Sale by public auction without issuing notices to -debtors-- Effect---Nothing on record to show that such notices, though required by Executing Court by its order to be issued to -debtors before sale, had been issued or served upon them---Before calling upon Court Auctioneer to conduct auction, duty of Executing Court was to have satisfied itself that its order had been implemented and mandatory notices had been issued to -debtors---Such contravention of provisions of O. XXI, R.66, C.P.C. by Executing Court had vitiated entire proceedings including sale, which was nullity in eyes of law---High Court accepted appeal and set aside sale in favour of auction purchaser, resultantly execution petition would be deemed to be pending before Executing Court to process execution proceedings in accordance with law till recovery of decretal amount. \n \nBrig. (Retd.) Mazhar-ul-Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Islamabad and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.360 of 2002, decision dated: 20th Mach, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs RIPPLE JEWELLERS (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and another\nVs.\nFIRST WOMAN BANK through Officers/General Attorneys/Principal Officers and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12864",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2957 = 2003 SLD 2957 = 2003 CLD 1331",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S.12(2)---Judgment/decree/order, setting aside of---Fraud or misrepresentation, plea of---Duty of applicant---In order to attract S.12(2), C.P.C., burden heavily lay on applicant to establish from his own affidavit that /decree/order had been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. \n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S.12(2) & O.VI, R.4---Judgment/decree/order, setting aside of---Party alleging fraud and misrepresentation, must give full particulars thereof and not on basis of mere surmises, conjectures and suspicion. \n \nDadabhoy Cement Industries v. N.D.F.C. 2002 CLC 166 and 2002 SCMR 1761 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Decree, setting aside of---Plea of applicant was that he had not executed letter of guarantee---Validity---All Directors of borrower-company were members of the same family--¬Applicant had denied his signatures on letter of guarantee executed on a date, when he was one of the Directors of borrower-company---Other Directors had admitted their signatures on similar letter of guarantee on the same date--¬If any Director of borrower-company had forged signatures of applicant on letter of guarantee, then fraud had not been practised in the proceedings of suit for obtaining /decree---High Court dismissed application under S.12(2), C.P.C. \n \nBegum Anwari Khanum Shaikh v. Messrs Passcon (Pvt.) Ltd. 1993 MLD 1557 and Rehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad 1983 SCMR 1064 rel.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9(5) & 10(2)---Service of summons by publication in newspaper---Validity---Such service was as good as personal service except in exceptional cases, where party could establish that in spite of publication of notice in newspaper,' service could, not be held good against him as for example, on the date when notices were published in newspaper, he was not residing in Pakistan. \n \nPakistan Insurance Corporation v. Grindlays Bank Ltd. 1987 CLC 2164 and Ahmed Autos v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 1990 SC 497 rel.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.10(2) & 9(5)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908, S.12(2)---Decree, setting aside of---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C., was filed on 9-1-2002, whereas applicant had got knowledge about decree on 2-12-2001---Plea of applicant was that since 1987, he was not living at address given in the plaint---Validity---Summons had been issued by all three modes---Applicant had not stated that at any time after he shifted from place K to place R, he had informed the plaintiff-Bank about change of his address---Applicant had not stated that plaintiff had deliberately made mis¬statement by showing his wrong address and as such had misrepresented in Court to obtain /decree--¬Applicant could get the decree set aside on satisfying Court that he was prevented by sufficient cause from making application under S.10 of the Ordinance or that he was not duly served---Such application had to be made within thirty days from date of knowledge, but same had been made much after expiry of such period---High Court dismissed application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1718 of 1997, decision dated: 4-10-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "Messrs UNITED BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs SINDH TECH INDUSTRIES LTD. and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12865",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2958 = 2003 SLD 2958 = 2003 CLD 1336",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 18 & 21---Execution of decree---Auction---Sealed tenders were invited by the Official Assignee for the sale of Basmati Rice on \"\"as is where is\"\" basis---Lowest bid was accepted by the Court and intimation calling upon the bidder to pay the balance sum and to take the delivery of rice was received by him---Auction purchaser, not only failed to deposit the balance amount and lift the rice but also in collusion with the Bank managed to stop the payment of pay order delivered by, the auction purchaser towards earnest money on various pretexts---Amount of earnest money, however, was received by the Official Assignee after his reference and the order was passed by the Court in that respect---Official Assignee moved another reference in the Court seeking order for forfeiture of earnest money deposited by the auction purchaser and permission to invite fresh tenders through advertisement---Auction purchaser, in the meantime, submitted an application under S.151, C.P.C. before the Banking Court, praying therein for refund of his earnest money on the ground that as per the Test Certificate in respect of samples of rice obtained by him were not Basmati Rice, therefore, due to non-lifting of rice and non¬payment of balance amount the auction purchaser could not be penalized---Validity---Offer of sale of Basmati Rice through advertisement in various newspapers was with clear condition that such Offer was on \"\"as is where is\"\" basis---Auction-purchaser, before offering the bid had taken the samples of the \"\"Basmati Rice\"\" and did not object to its quality etc. before offering the bid and it was only after the letter of official Assignee calling upon for payment of balance sum that the auction-purchaser set up the pretext of poor quality of rice---Auction-purchaser had failed to produce any explanation as to why after obtaining the samples and before giving his offer, he could not get the same tested from laboratory---Nothing was available on record to hold that the certificate provided by the auction¬ purchaser related to the same samples of rice which were taken by him much before submitting his offer to the Official Assignee---Official Assignee had no personal interest in the matter as he was not to gain any benefit due to forfeiture of the earnest money of the auction-purchaser thus no mala fides, malice or ill-will could be attributed to hire---Order of the Court was well reasoned and self-explaining which was based on proper appreciation of material placed before the Court---Order for forfeiture of earnest money paid by the auction-purchaser was in conformity with the relevant provisions of law and needed no interference in appeal.\n \nProvince of West Pakistan v. Messrs Mistri Patel & Co. and another PLD 1969 SC 80; Fahd Munir v. Tehsil Government, Tehsil Phalia, District Mandi Bahauddin through Tehsil Nazim and others 2002 CLC 1593 and Ch. Muhammad Ashraf v. Punjab Privatization Board through Secretary, Government of Punjab and another 2002 MLD 550 distinguished.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----\n \n----Ss. 18 & 21---Execution of decree---Auction---Phrase \"\"as is where is\"\"---Meaning, significance and import.\n \nPhrase \"\"as is where is\"\" commonly used in such type of transactions though would not, ipso facto, absolve the seller of his own moral commitment, expected fair play and would not protect any misstatement or concealment of material facts on his part, but at the same time it has its own meaning, significance and import in the field of commercial activity as it warns customers/ buyers to be wary, prudent and to act at their own risk while giving their offer or entering into a transaction. In the given circumstances, if -the buyers acted in a negligent, imprudent and irresponsible manner then they had to bless their stars, but no fault can be attributed to the sellers.\n \n(c) Words and phrases---\n \n----\"\"As is where is\"\"---Meaning.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.158 of 2001, heard on 19-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ROSHAN ESSANI AND ANWER ZAHEER, JAMALI, JJ.",
    "": "Messrs JULANDAR (PVT.) LTD.\nVs.\nOFFICIAL ASSIGNEE and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12866",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2959 = 2003 SLD 2959 = 2003 CLD 1343",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Organizations Ordinance (XLV of 1961)---------Ss.3 & 12---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199--¬Constitutional petition---De-affiliating membership--¬Petitioners as members of Chamber of Commerce and Industry and holding licences granted by Government under S.3 of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961 applied for renewal of membership---Managing Committee of Chambers through its resolution declined such request and de-affiliated membership of the petitioners---Director Trade Organizations on petitioner's representation passed order that they would remain affiliated with Chambers until Chambers got approval of .its resolution from its general body in extraordinary general meeting and the Federal Government ---Refusal of Chamber to act such directions of Director---Validity---According to Memorandum and Articles of Association of Chamber, general body had exclusive jurisdiction to de-affiliate a member---Action taken by Managing Committee, unless approved by general body by 3/4th majority of members present in meeting or through proxy as laid down in its Articles, would be illegal and of no legal effect---Managing Committee had neither given any notice to petitioners nor had heard them before passing impugned resolution---Such action was against the principles of natural justice--Without adopting procedure laid down in Memorandum and Articles of Association, no office-bearer or member of any committee of Chamber was authorised to de-affiliate or terminate membership of petitioners, whose names appeared as members in the Articles---Petitioners have prayed for implementation of order passed by Director in discharge of his statutory duties, which was binding on Chamber unless set aside by Competent Authority---Bar contained in S.12 of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961 thus, would stand attracted to such a case---High Court accepted Constitutional petitions and declared impugned resolution to be illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.1989 to 1991 of 2001, decision dated: 26-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMAD AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFFERI, JJ",
    "": "GHARO ASSOCIATION OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY through Representative/ Secretary and 2 others\nVs.\nMINISTRY OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, Islamabad High Court High Court through Secretary and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12867",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2960 = 2003 SLD 2960 = 2003 CLD 1349",
    "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------S. 41---Trade Organizations Ordinance (XLV of 1961), S.12---Eligibility of candidate for posts of Vice-Presidents prescribed by Managing Committee of Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry---Plaintiff challenged such eligibility through application under S.41 of the Act and sought interim relief to stay election--¬Contention of defendants was that arbitration application filed by plaintiff claiming similar relief was pending before Arbitration Tribunal constituted under S.12 of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961---Validity---Not possible for High Court to decide controversy within time due to pendency of arbitration proceedings before Arbitration Tribunal constituted under law---Interim order, if any, passed by High Court would disturb whole election process of the. Federation---High Court disposed of applications with directions to Arbitration Tribunal to take up matter and decide the same on the next day, so that plaintiff might have enough time at his disposal to file nomination, if allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous Application No.64 of 2002, decision dated: 19-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED, J",
    "": "DADU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY through Secretary--Applicant\nVs.\nDr. ANWAR-ULHAQUE, SECRETARY-GENERAL, FEDERATION OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, Karachi High Court and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12868",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2961 = 2003 SLD 2961 = 2003 CLD 1352",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--------S.10---BCD Circular No. 13 dated 20-6-1984---Leave to defend suit, application for---Defendant's plea was that price and buy-back price were mentioned in agreement, but its column of mark-up was blank, thus, in absence of agreement for payment of mark-up, plaintiff-Bank was not entitled to charge mark-up---Validity---Agreement showed that transaction was Marahaba (Bai' Muajjal) or sale on deferred payment basis or agreement for sale on credit--¬One of the modes of Trade Related Financing detailed in Annexure-I of BCD Circular 13, dated 20-6-1984 was purchase of goods by banks and their sale to clients at, appropriate mark-up in price on deferred payment basis--¬Defendant had agreed to pay mark-up in price of goods on or before date specified in agreement---Plaintiff in absence of percentage was entitled for mark-up in price i.e. difference between sale and buy-back price.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----Ss.170 & 171---Lien of bankers---Bank has right to exercise lien, when its customer has breached agreement by not making payment as agreed.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10---Leave to defend suit, application for--Availing of facility, execution of documents and liability to ay was not disputed by defendant---Defendant had failed tb make out a case for leave to defend by raising substantial questions of law and fact requiring evidence---High Court dismissed application in circumstances.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Insurance and Muqadam charges claimed by Bank in terms of letter of pledge---Pledged goods were to be insured against fire, theft and other risks by customer (pawner) and in case of its failure by pawnee (bank)--¬Customer's case was not that goods were insured, rather Bank had insured the same---Bank (pawnee) was thus, entitled for extraordinary expenses incurred by them in shape of insurance as well as by appointment of Muqadam.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-73 of 2000, decision dated: 8-10-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMAD, J",
    "": "ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs MODerN METALLIC SERVICES through Proprietor and 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12869",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2962 = 2003 SLD 2962 = 2003 CLD 1364",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Organizations Ordinance (XLV of 1961)-------Ss.3(2), 9 & 12---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---De-affiliation of petitioners from membership of Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry---Contention of petitioners was that Director Trade Organizations has passed such order at their back without giving them an opportunity of showing cause against action proposed to be taken---Validity---Objections filed on behalf of Director Trade Organizations and Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry were not supported by counter-affidavit---Nothing was available on record to establish that petitioners had been issued any show-cause notices or they had been heard before passing impugned order by Director, Trade Organizations---Section 12 of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961 provided for arbitration under given circumstances---Impugned order did not attract provisions of S.12 of the Ordinance so as to be settled through arbitration---De-affiliating of membership of trade groups could be given legal effect only in case Memorandum and Articles of Association of Chamber of Commerce were amended strictly in accordance with procedure laid down therein---High Court accepted Constitutional petition and set aside impugned order with direction to the Chamber of Commerce to keep vacant seat in Managing Committee till decision of question of membership of petitioners in accordance with requirements of Government's order after providing them adequate opportunity.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-2026 and 2050 of 2001, heard on 21st September, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFFERI, JJ",
    "": "MUTAHIR SAEED CHAWLA and 16 others\nVs.\nCHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, Karachi High Court and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12870",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2963 = 2003 SLD 2963 = 2003 CLD 1370",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---------S. 5---\"\"Bill of exchange\"\"---Nature---Bill of exchange is a negotiable instrument as defined under S. 5 of the Act.\n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 58---Defective title---When, a Bill of Exchange has been lost or has been obtained from any maker, drawer, acceptor or holder thereof by means of an offence or fraud or for an unlawful consideration, neither the person who finds or so obtains the instrument nor any possessor or endorsee who claims through such person is entitled to receive the amount due thereon from such maker, drawer, acceptor or holder unless such possessor or endorsee is or some person through whom he claims, was, a holder thereof in due course.\n \n(c) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S.30---Liability of the drawer---If the drawer of a Bill of Exchange drawing it, engages that on a due presentment, the same shall be accepted and paid according to its tenor and if it is dishonoured he will compensate the holder or endorser who is compelled to pay the same ---Drawee shall' not be liable till such time the same are accepted ---Drawee, on acceptance of 'the Bill of Exchange becomes liable discharging the drawer---Drawer shall and can only be made liable when it is shown as to which of the Bill of Exchange are dishonoured by non-payment---Dishonour could be by refusal to pay.\n \n(d) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-----\n \n----Ss. 30, 103 & 104---Liability of the drawer---If the drawee had not accepted the Bills, it ivas mandatory upon the holder to give a notice of dishonour to the drawer after protesting/noting---Notice to the drawer was of great importance and was mandatory in terms of S. 30 of the Act---Principles.\n \n(e) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----Ss. 48 & 58---Negotiation by endorsement---Defective title---Subject to S. 58 of the Act where tree title is defective, a Promissory Note, Bill of Exchange or Cheque payable to order is negotiable by the holder by endorsement and delivery thereof---General effect of taking an instrument as additional payment is to suspend the right of action of the original debt during the currency of the instrument--¬Principles.\n \nPrice v. Price 153 ER 1174; Stedman v. Gooch 1 Esp. 4 and Ramuz v. Crowe 151 ER 70 ref.\n \n(f) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 48---Negotiation by instrument---Bill of Exchange would be negotiable by the holder of endorsement and deliver---Only question would remain whether the Pill had a defective title.\n \n(g) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 45-A---Holder's right to duplicate of lost bill---Where the instrument had been lost appropriate measures were provided in S. 45-A of the Act---Principles.\n \n(h) Negotiable instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 30---Liability of the drawer---Scope and extent.\n \n(i) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 30---Liability of the drawer---Dishonour by non ¬acceptance or non-payment gives rise to an immediate right of recourse against the drawer of the Bills of Exchange--¬Principles.\n \nUnited Bank Limited v. Ch. Ghulam Hussain 1998 CLC 816; United Bank Ltd. v. Taj Seafood Industries PLJ 1975 Kar. 444; Kanhyalal and others v. Ramkumar and others AIR 1956 Raj. 129; Nenu Ram v. Shivkishen AIR 1950 Raj. 55; Jugjivan Mavji Vithalani v. Messrs Ranchhoddas Meghji AIR 1954 SC 554; Bank of Ireland v. Arche (1834) 11 M&W 383); Harvey v. Martin (1808) 1 Camp. 425 and Roscow v. Hardy 104 ER 170 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 959 of 1990, decision dated: 25-05-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR MANSOOR KHAN, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Plaintiff\nVs.\nSHAHYAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD. --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12871",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2964 = 2003 SLD 2964 = 2003 CLD 1393",
    "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss. 42, 12 & 55---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss.86 & 87---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Sale of shares owned by the lenders which were issued to them in lieu of their outstanding dues---Application under O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, C.P. C. seeking an. interim injunction restraining the defendants and the persons acting through them from handing over the possession of the factory to any third party or create any third party rights, interest in the suit property and shares of the company till final disposal of .the suit for declaration and specific performance---Shares, subject-matter of the original agreement and novation agreement, had not been transferred in the name of the plaintiff --Plaintiff had not brought on record anything to show that shares in favour of the lenders were not issued in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 nor the plaintiff had initiated any action under the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Assertion that plaintiff had right of first refusal for the purchase of shares being sold by the lenders, was not raised in the plaint and only a half-hearted attempt was made in the affidavit in rejoinder to introduce this agreement---Plaintiff had come to the Court after a lapse of six months of the advertisement for sale of shares by the lenders which was published in leading newspapers--¬Plaintiff had stated in the plaint that it was shocked upon receiving credible information - from various sources but however had failed to disclose said sources which provided the information after a lapse of six months---Plaintiff had deliberately attempted to cause a false impression that it owned more than, 50% shares of the company and the shares being sold by the lenders included such shares--¬Such conduct of the plaintiff alone would disentitle it from obtaining any equitable relief---Further, no possibility existed that plaintiff would be running the affairs of the concerned company as plaintiff's nominee directors had voluntarily withdrawn their nominations from the election of the Company Directors and had never shown any interest in the affairs of the Company; even if the shares subject¬ matter of the original agreement and the novation agreement were transferred to the plaintiff, the same would only constitute a small minority in the currently paid-up capital of the Company---Held, plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case; the balance of convenience was also not in favour of the plaintiff nor the plaintiff had been able to show any irreparable loss that may be caused to it on account of sale of shares owned by the lenders which were issued to them in lieu of their outstanding dues---Application of the plaintiff was dismissed with costs.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1296 of 2002, decision dated: 25-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, J",
    "": "METRO MANAGEMENT (PVT.) LTD, through Director--Plaintiff\nVs.\nPRIVATIZATION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad High Court High Court and 5 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12872",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2965 = 2003 SLD 2965 = 2003 CLD 1400",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)-------Ss. 10(2)(2-A) & 80---National Book Foundation Act (XIX of 1972), S.6---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Reproduction of educational materials--¬Application for registration of copyright---Interim injunction, grant of---Defendants, a statute of body, were selling books after incorporating on its opening page their own logo and words \"\"Reproduced by National Book Foundation\"\", while printing on its back page logo and name of National Book Foundation with names of various cities, where National Book Foundation was available---Defendant could not produce any document showing grant of permission by original owner to National Book Foundation or Federal Government to incorporate such name on books and sell them in, the market---Section 10(2-A) of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 could not be read in isolation, rather the whole S. 10(2) had to be read, otherwise entire Ordinance would become redundant---In absence of any authority to the contrary available with Government, case for grant of injunction had been made out which was granted accordingly.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.VII, R.11---Rejection of plaint---Essential considera¬tions ---Necessity of recording evidence to arrive at just decision---Principles illustrated. Application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., can be entertained and looked into only after the plaint has been read. Rejection of plaint has to be based upon the plain reading of plaint. It has to appear on the face of it. The defence taken in written statement shall not be considered as basis for rejection of plaint. In cases, where in order to come to a just and fair decision, it is necessary to investigate the matter, then evidence has to be recorded.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.729 of 2000, heard on 29-06-2000.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, J",
    "": "STANLEY THOMES PUBLISHERS LTD. and another--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nNATIONAL BOOK FOUNDATION and others----Defendants."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12873",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2966 = 2003 SLD 2966 = 2003 CLD 1406",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss.20 & 118---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.233---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Application for leave to defend--¬Defendants admitted signatures on letters of guarantees, but disputed the amount mentioned therein---Defendants in leave application did not disclose amount of finance. availed; amount paid by them; dates of payment; amount of finance and other amounts relating to finance payable by them to Bank; amount of finance and other amounts disputed by them---Effect---Defendants had neither complied with provisions of S.10(4)(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 nor had shown sufficient cause for their inability to do so---No leave application, thus, would be deemed to be pending---Leave application filed was liable to be rejected as per mandatory provisions of S.10(6) of the Ordinance---Defendants had admitted availing of loan facilities by company (principal debtor) and their signatures on documents annexed with plaint---Bald denial of execution of documents by defendants was an attempt to wriggle out of their contractual obligations---No defence at all had been taken by company---If conceded that documents had been given blank, even then in view of Ss.20 & 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, defendants were estopped to challenge legality, validity and genuineness thereof---In view, of execution of personal guarantees and other documents, defendants could not shirk from liquidating their liabilities as they were jointly and severally liable to liquidate liabilities of company under provisions of Contract Act, 1872---Defendants had failed to raise any serious and bona fide dispute warranting grant of leave to defend suit--¬Leave application was dismissed being not maintainable and on merits as well.\n \nMuhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Hashim Paracha and another PLD 1987 Kar. 76; S.K. Abdul Aziz v. Mahmoodul Hassan and 3 others 1988 CLC 337; Haji Karim another v. Zikar Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Messrs Gujrat Friends Traders and others PLD 1988 Lah. 156; Messrs United Bank Ltd v. President, Bazm-e-Salat and another PLD 1986 Kar. 464; Bazm-e-Salat and others v. Messrs United Bank Ltd. PLD 1989 Kar. 150; Prudential Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hydari Ghee Industries Ltd. and 9 others 1999 MLD 1694 and Messrs Bank of Oman Limited v. Messrs East Asia Trading Co. Ltd. and 4 others 1987 CLC 288 rel.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n---- Mandatory or directory provisions---Determination of--¬Provision of law couched with penal consequences would be considered as mandatory---Provision of law entailing no penal consequences for its non-compliance would be taken as directory.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10(6)---Provisions of S.10(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 being mandatory, non-compliance thereof would entail penal consequences of rejection of leave application.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10(3)(4)(5)(6)---Application for leave to defend ---Non¬compliance with provisions of S.10(3)(4)(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--¬Effect---Presumption would be that no application for grant of leave to defend suit was pending---Leave application filed by defendants would be liable to be rejected as perforce of S.10(6) of the Ordinance.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Application for leave to. defend---Defendants (guarantor) denied to have executed letter of guarantee and mortgage deed ---Validity---Examination of such documents showed that defendant had signed personal guarantee, which was attested, by two witnesses, one of them- was her husband---Mortgage deed had been duly executed by defendant through her husband/ attorney and registered with Sub-Registrar--Defendant had executed memorandum of deposit of title deed---Defendant had not alleged that such documents or her signatures thereon had either been forged by Bank or its functionaries or by remaining defendants---Availing of loan by principal debtor not - denied---Defendant had not challenged statement of accounts or any entry thereof---Mere bald and vague denial of execution of documents without any prima facie proof, would not furnish a ground for grant of leave nor same would absolve defendant from liquidating liabilities incurred through execution thereof---Defendant had failed to raise substantial question of law and facts to be tried by Court requiring recording of evidence---Leave application was dismissed being devoid of any force.\n \nGhazala Arif v. Union Bank Ltd: (Now Emirates Bank International, Lahore 2000 CLC 1201 rel.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.3(2), 9 & 10---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), Ss.2(8) & 4---Suit for recovery of loan amount--¬Dismissal of application for leave to defend ---Effect--¬Allegations made in the plaint would be deemed to be admitted---Bank had produced photo copies of documents alongwith plaint, on which suit was based---Execution of such documents would be deemed to be admitted by defendants for not having denied their signatures thereon--¬No serious infirmity had been alleged to statement of accounts duly certified under Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 and to which presumption of correctness was attached---No rebuttal of such documents on record---Suit was decreed with costs and costs of funds to be determined under S.3(2) of the Ordinance in favour of Bank and against defendants jointly and severally.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 63 of 2001, decision dated: 30-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "BANK OF KHYBER --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs SPENCER DISTRIBUTION LTD. and 14 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12874",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMQlNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2967 = 2003 SLD 2967 = 2003 CLD 1419",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----------Ss. 7(6), 9 & 22---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss.2(b), 5, 9 & 22---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199--¬Constitutional petition---Suit for declaration and 'settlement of accounts by borrower against Bank---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Borrower disputed his liability under finance agreements with Bank by filing suit before Banking Court after dismissal of Constitutional petition by High Court with observations that his grievance being relatable to obligations of Bank under terms and conditions of finance, could be adjudicated by Banking Court---Banking Court dismissed suit for not having plenary powers of a Civil Court to deal with cases of ordinary civil jurisdiction either under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 or Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Banking Court without adverting to facts of the case, adhering to provisions of S.9 of Act, 1997 and S.7(6) of Ordinance, 2001 and attending to such order of High Court; had dismissed suit on an unsustainable ground---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned /decree being nullity in eye of law and remanded case to Banking Court for its decision in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Quetta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 6 of 2002, decision dated: 26-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJA FAYYAZ AHMED, C.J. AND AKHTAR ZAMAN MALGHANI, J",
    "": "Messrs HAQ TRADERS through Partners\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager\nNasimuddin v. United Bank Ltd. 1998 CLC 1718 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12875",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2968 = 2003 SLD 2968 = 2003 CLD 1419",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----------Ss. 7(6), 9 & 22---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss.2(b), 5, 9 & 22---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199--¬Constitutional petition---Suit for declaration and 'settlement of accounts by borrower against Bank---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Borrower disputed his liability under finance agreements with Bank by filing suit before Banking Court after dismissal of Constitutional petition by High Court with observations that his grievance being relatable to obligations of Bank under terms and conditions of finance, could be adjudicated by Banking Court---Banking Court dismissed suit for not having plenary powers of a Civil Court to deal with cases of ordinary civil jurisdiction either under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 or Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Banking Court without adverting to facts of the case, adhering to provisions of S.9 of Act, 1997 and S.7(6) of Ordinance, 2001 and attending to such order of High Court; had dismissed suit on an unsustainable ground---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned /decree being nullity in eye of law and remanded case to Banking Court for its decision in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Quetta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 6 of 2002, decision dated: 26-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJA FAYYAZ AHMED, C.J. AND AKHTAR ZAMAN MALGHANI, J",
    "": "Messrs HAQ TRADERS through Partners\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager\nNasimuddin v. United Bank Ltd. 1998 CLC 1718 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12876",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2969 = 2003 SLD 2969 = 2003 CLD 1426",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.18 & 21---Execution of compromise decree---Bank had alleged commission of default by -debtor as per terms of compromise---Judgment-debtor denied such allegation and objected to maintainability of execution application---Dismissal of objection petition---Validity---No finding of Banking Court was found in the impugned order in respect of default/breach committed by ¬ debtor---High Court allowed appeal, remanded case to Banking Court to decide, whether -debtor' had committed default in payment of instalments as per agreed schedule.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 554 of 2001, heard 6n 18-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "SHAMIN SHOES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and others \nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12877",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2970 = 2003 SLD 2970 = 2003 CLD 1429",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S. 290---Petition for regulating affairs of company on ground of fraudulent transfer of shares of petitioner--¬Maintainability---Such petition would not fall within ambit of S.290 of the Companies Ordinance, 19.84 as same did not deal with a situation, where a member of company apprehended that his shares might be or had been transferred in an unlawful or fraudulent manner in favour of other person.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 305(f)(iii)---Winding up petition by a person not presently member of the company---Maintainability---Such petition could be filed only by a person, who owned at least one share of company and his name appeared in register of shareholders of company on the day of its filing, but not by a person, whose name was borne on such register prior to the date of its filing.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-----\n \n----S. 305---Winding up petition by person claiming to be minority shareholder---Maintainability---Such petition could be filed by minority shareholder i.e. holding not less than 20% of equity share capital of company.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss. 152 & 305---Winding up petition on ground of fraudulent transfer of petitioner's shares in favour of third persons---Maintainability---Remedy of petitioner was to file application under S.152 of Companies Ordinance. 1984 for rectification of register of members---Petition for winding up of company was patently not maintainable in law.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 255 of 1998 decided on 2-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. AHMED SARWANA AND M. MUJEEBULLAH SIDDIQUI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN \nVs.\nDAWOOD FLOUR MILL and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12878",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2971 = 2003 SLD 2971 = 2003 CLD 1442",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. VII, R.11, O.XLIII, R.1 & S.115---First appeal from order---Maintainability---Nature of order of remand passed in the present case, by the Appellate Court in fact was to set aside an order of Trial Court whereby plaint was initially rejected though termed as dismissal of the suit---Second appeal in circumstances was not maintainable and the only remedy was to file a civil revision under S.115, C. P. C. ---High Court, in the interest of justice and equity, treated the first appeal from order as civil revision accordingly.\n \n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----Ss.42, 39 & 54---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss. 7, 152 & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9---Suit for declaration, cancellation of documents and perpetual injunction by Director of a Company against the other Director and Joint Registrar of Companies seeking cancellation of purported resignation and deeds of transfer of shares on ground of being forged and fraudulent, ineffective and invalid---Question arose whether in view of the allegations of forgery, fraud, invalidity and fabrication of documents etc. as pleaded by the plaintiff in his suit for declaration, cancellation of documents and perpetual injunction could the Civil Court entertain and try the said suit, in view of provisions of S.7 read with S.152 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Held, Company Judge of the High Court was required to proceed expeditiously upon an application by following a \"\"summary procedure\"\" under S.9, Companies Ordinance. 1984 and such summary procedure did not visualize holding of a trial or an inquiry through a detailed evidence upon allegations of fraud, forgery and fabrication of documents etc. as had been convassed in the civil suit---Such suit therefore, was triable under S.9, C.P.C. by a Civil Court which was a Court of general jurisdiction in all civil matters---Principles.\n \nMessrs Chalna Fibre Company Limited, Khulna and others v. Abdul Jabbar and others PLD 1968 SC 381; Manzoor Ahmad Bhatti and others v. Haji Noval Khan and others 1986 CLC 2560; Akbar Ali Sharif and others v. Syed Jamaluddin and others 1991 MLD 203 and Syed Shafqat Hussain v. Registrar, Joint Stock Companies, Lahore and others PLD 2001 Lah. 523 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 12 of 2003, heard on 10-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASLAM JAVED and another\nVs.\nMalik IJAZ AHMAD and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12879",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2972 = 2003 SLD 2972 = 2003 CLD 1447",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.10 & 22(1)(3)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Refusal of Banking Court to grant leave to defend suit---Challenge to such order through Constitutional petition on the ground that same was patently illegal and void; and that remedy of appeal was inadequate, insufficient and illusory in view of condition of furnishing security or deposit of decretal amount for admission of appeal and grant of stay order, thus, petitioner was entitled to bypass same and approach High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction---Validity---Provisions of S.22(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were not stringent and harsh, but were soft and easy---Pre-condition of furnishing of security, for which a reasoned order would have to be made by High Court in its capacity of Appellate Authority, would not automatically render remedy of appeal as nugatory, inefficacious and inadequate---Proviso' to S.22(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 did not curtail or hinder right of appeal---Filing of Constitutional petition instead of seeking remedy of appeal provided under the statute, particularly when appellate forum was none other, but High Court, was disapproved---Principles.\n \nThe language of section 22(3) of Ordinance, 2001 is altogether different from language of section 21 of repealed Ordinance of 1979 and section 9 of repealed Ordinance of 1984, wherein specific condition for deposit of the amount claimed or due or decreed was provided for admission of appeal. The pre-condition provided in section 22(3) of Ordinance, 2001 for admission of appeal is much easier and softer than the provisions contained in section 12 of repealed Ordinance of 1979 and section 9 of repealed Ordinance of 1984.\n \nProvisions of section 22(3) of Ordinance of 2001 are not as stringent and harsh as were in the earlier statutes relating to recovery of loans/advances of financial institutions and it cannot be said that pre-condition of furnishing of security, for which a reasoned order will have to be made by High Court in its capacity as Appellate Authority, would automatically render remedy of appeal as nugatory, inefficacious and inadequate. The provisions of section 22(3) have given vast power to Appellate Court for stating or declaring the reason and conditions for furnishing the security. Appellate Court after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case and examining the extent of liability of aggrieved party will be absolutely free to determine easy and soft terms for furnishing of security.\n \nMaintainability of the present Constitutional petition appears to be doubtful on another ground namely, where a statute provided a self-contained machinery for determination of questions arising under the statute and it also provides remedy by way of appeal or revision to another Tribunal or Court fully competent to give any relief, then an indulgence by High Court in accepting a Constitutional petition assailing impugned order passed by Tribunal or Court in contravention of the provisions made in the statute, will produce a sense of distrust in Appellate Forum/Court provided by the statute. In such circumstances, Constitutional petition would not be maintainable and it will be imperative for aggrieved party to resort to remedy of appeal provided under the statute.\n \nMst. Kaniz Fatima v. Muhammad Salim and 27 others 2001 SCMR 1493 fol.\n \nThis would be applicable with greater impact in the present case as appellate forum is none other, but High Court.\n \nCh. Muhammad Ismail. v. Fazal Zada PLD 1996 SC 246 fol.\n \nWhere appellate or revisional authority under a particular statute for filing an appeal or revisions against an order passed thereunder is High Court, then in such a situation, High Court will not allow its appellate or revisional jurisdiction to be side-tracked by entertaining a Constitutional petition by aggrieved party and will insist that the provision of statute for filing the appeal or revision be followed, notwithstanding the pre-condition or requirement of furnishing security or depositing the amount claimed or furnishing amount in Appellate Court.\n \nKhalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore 1999 SCMR 1881 fol.\n \nWith regard to contention that impugned order is unlawful, passed in illegal exercise of jurisdiction, contrary to material/ evidence on record and void ab initio, as a result of which it could be challenged directly by invocation of Article 199 of the Constitution in view of the principle enumerated in the case of Mst. Kaniz Fatima 2001 SCMR 1493, it is to be noted that such observation of Supreme Court was qualified by the condition that the controversial question be decided without any comprehensive inquiry into complicated, ticklish, controversial and disputed facts.\n \nMst. Kaniz Fatima v. Muhammad Salim and 27 others 2001 SCMR 1493 ref.\n \nThe provision for depositing decretal amount for granting stay contained in repealed Act of 1997 was similar to the like restrictions contained in Order XLI, Rule 5, C.P.C. Like or similar retractions contained in Order XLI, Rule 5, C.P.C. are in existence since a very long time, but such restrictions have never been held to be causing a hurdle or hindrance in the right of an aggrieved party preferring an appeal in accordance with the provisions of C.P.C. In these circumstances, the proviso to section 22(3) of Ordinance, 2001 can by no stretch of imagination be said to be curtailing or hindering the right of appeal, so as to enable petitioner to bypass the remedy of appeal provided under section 22 of Ordinance, 2001 and to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court for assailing an order, which otherwise will be assailable by way of appeal under section 22 of Ordinance, 2001.\n \nBalochistan Trading Company (Pvt.) Ltd. And another v. National Bank of Pakistan and another 1998 SCMR 1899 fol.\n \nConstitutional petition was found to be misconceived and not maintainable and was dismissed in limine in circumstances.\n \nSyed Saghir Ahmed Naqvi v. Province of Sindh and another 1996 SCMR 1165; Ghulam Hussain and another v. Malik Shahbaz Khan and another 1985 SCMR 1925 and Messrs Tank Steel and Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Dera Ismail Khan and others PLD 1996 SC 77 and Shaikh Gulzar Ali Co. v. Special Judge S. Court of Banking 1991 SCMR 590 ref.\n \nK. M. Samdani for Petitioner,\n \nBadar Alam for Respondent No.2.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.720 of 2002, decision dated: 31st December, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J. AND GHULAM RABBANI, J",
    "": "M. A. KAREEM IQBAL\nVs.\nPRESIDING OFFICER, BANKING COURT NO.III and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12880",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2973 = 2003 SLD 2973 = 2003 CLD 1447",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.10 & 22(1)(3)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Refusal of Banking Court to grant leave to defend suit---Challenge to such order through Constitutional petition on the ground that same was patently illegal and void; and that remedy of appeal was inadequate, insufficient and illusory in view of condition of furnishing security or deposit of decretal amount for admission of appeal and grant of stay order, thus, petitioner was entitled to bypass same and approach High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction---Validity---Provisions of S.22(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were not stringent and harsh, but were soft and easy---Pre-condition of furnishing of security, for which a reasoned order would have to be made by High Court in its capacity of Appellate Authority, would not automatically render remedy of appeal as nugatory, inefficacious and inadequate---Proviso' to S.22(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 did not curtail or hinder right of appeal---Filing of Constitutional petition instead of seeking remedy of appeal provided under the statute, particularly when appellate forum was none other, but High Court, was disapproved---Principles.\n \nThe language of section 22(3) of Ordinance, 2001 is altogether different from language of section 21 of repealed Ordinance of 1979 and section 9 of repealed Ordinance of 1984, wherein specific condition for deposit of the amount claimed or due or decreed was provided for admission of appeal. The pre-condition provided in section 22(3) of Ordinance, 2001 for admission of appeal is much easier and softer than the provisions contained in section 12 of repealed Ordinance of 1979 and section 9 of repealed Ordinance of 1984.\n \nProvisions of section 22(3) of Ordinance of 2001 are not as stringent and harsh as were in the earlier statutes relating to recovery of loans/advances of financial institutions and it cannot be said that pre-condition of furnishing of security, for which a reasoned order will have to be made by High Court in its capacity as Appellate Authority, would automatically render remedy of appeal as nugatory, inefficacious and inadequate. The provisions of section 22(3) have given vast power to Appellate Court for stating or declaring the reason and conditions for furnishing the security. Appellate Court after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case and examining the extent of liability of aggrieved party will be absolutely free to determine easy and soft terms for furnishing of security.\n \nMaintainability of the present Constitutional petition appears to be doubtful on another ground namely, where a statute provided a self-contained machinery for determination of questions arising under the statute and it also provides remedy by way of appeal or revision to another Tribunal or Court fully competent to give any relief, then an indulgence by High Court in accepting a Constitutional petition assailing impugned order passed by Tribunal or Court in contravention of the provisions made in the statute, will produce a sense of distrust in Appellate Forum/Court provided by the statute. In such circumstances, Constitutional petition would not be maintainable and it will be imperative for aggrieved party to resort to remedy of appeal provided under the statute.\n \nMst. Kaniz Fatima v. Muhammad Salim and 27 others 2001 SCMR 1493 fol.\n \nThis would be applicable with greater impact in the present case as appellate forum is none other, but High Court.\n \nCh. Muhammad Ismail. v. Fazal Zada PLD 1996 SC 246 fol.\n \nWhere appellate or revisional authority under a particular statute for filing an appeal or revisions against an order passed thereunder is High Court, then in such a situation, High Court will not allow its appellate or revisional jurisdiction to be side-tracked by entertaining a Constitutional petition by aggrieved party and will insist that the provision of statute for filing the appeal or revision be followed, notwithstanding the pre-condition or requirement of furnishing security or depositing the amount claimed or furnishing amount in Appellate Court.\n \nKhalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore 1999 SCMR 1881 fol.\n \nWith regard to contention that impugned order is unlawful, passed in illegal exercise of jurisdiction, contrary to material/ evidence on record and void ab initio, as a result of which it could be challenged directly by invocation of Article 199 of the Constitution in view of the principle enumerated in the case of Mst. Kaniz Fatima 2001 SCMR 1493, it is to be noted that such observation of Supreme Court was qualified by the condition that the controversial question be decided without any comprehensive inquiry into complicated, ticklish, controversial and disputed facts.\n \nMst. Kaniz Fatima v. Muhammad Salim and 27 others 2001 SCMR 1493 ref.\n \nThe provision for depositing decretal amount for granting stay contained in repealed Act of 1997 was similar to the like restrictions contained in Order XLI, Rule 5, C.P.C. Like or similar retractions contained in Order XLI, Rule 5, C.P.C. are in existence since a very long time, but such restrictions have never been held to be causing a hurdle or hindrance in the right of an aggrieved party preferring an appeal in accordance with the provisions of C.P.C. In these circumstances, the proviso to section 22(3) of Ordinance, 2001 can by no stretch of imagination be said to be curtailing or hindering the right of appeal, so as to enable petitioner to bypass the remedy of appeal provided under section 22 of Ordinance, 2001 and to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court for assailing an order, which otherwise will be assailable by way of appeal under section 22 of Ordinance, 2001.\n \nBalochistan Trading Company (Pvt.) Ltd. And another v. National Bank of Pakistan and another 1998 SCMR 1899 fol.\n \nConstitutional petition was found to be misconceived and not maintainable and was dismissed in limine in circumstances.\n \nSyed Saghir Ahmed Naqvi v. Province of Sindh and another 1996 SCMR 1165; Ghulam Hussain and another v. Malik Shahbaz Khan and another 1985 SCMR 1925 and Messrs Tank Steel and Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Dera Ismail Khan and others PLD 1996 SC 77 and Shaikh Gulzar Ali Co. v. Special Judge S. Court of Banking 1991 SCMR 590 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.720 of 2002, decision dated: 31st December, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J. AND GHULAM RABBANI, J",
    "": "M. A. KAREEM IQBAL\nVs.\nPRESIDING OFFICER, BANKING COURT NO.III and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12881",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2974 = 2003 SLD 2974 = 2003 CLD 1464",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.10 & 21---Plea not taken in application for leave to defend suit---Effect---Such. plea could not be taken at time of hearing of appeal before High Court.\n \nCitibank N.A. v. Riaz Ahmad 2000 CLC 847 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----\n \n----Ss.9, 15 & 21---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4---Suit for recovery of loan amount decreed by Banking Court---Validity---Defendants had not denied availing of finance facility and execution of loan documents---Statement of accounts filed with plaint was duly verified by Bank in accordance with Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891---Presumption of truth attached to such statement of accounts had not been rebutted by defendants with cogent reasons orally or through documents---Contention of defendants that blank documents were signed by them, thus, had no force---Defendants had failed to make out any plausible case for grant of leave to defend suit--¬Banking Court was justified in refusing to grant leave to appeal and decreeing suit of Bank---No illegality or infirmity was found in the impugned ---High Court dismissed appeal with directions to Executing Court to consider at the time of deciding execution petition the defendants' contention qua depositing certain amount with Bank.\n \nGhulam Rasool's case PLD 1971 SC 376 and Allied Bank of Pakistan's case PLD 1990 SC 497 rel.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.17(1)---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.18(1)---Banking documents--¬Signing a blank document would amount to creating or impliedly authorizing Bank to fill in any amount at a later point of time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 648 of 2001, heard on 28-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs INTERNATIONAL TRADERS through Proprietorship and 3 others \nVs.\nUNION BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12882",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2975 = 2003 SLD 2975 = 2003 CLD 1468",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XXIII, R.1(1)(3)---Unconditional withdrawal of suit--¬Effect---Bar contained in O.XXIII, R.1(3), C.P.C., would preclude second suit by the same plaintiff on the same subject-matter.\n \nPLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 287; 1996 SCMR 1051 and PLD 1998 Lah. 441 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIII, Rr.1(3) & 3---Second suit for recovery o f loan amount after withdrawal of earlier suit---Application for leave to defend--¬ Plea of defendants was that second suit was burred by O.XXIII, R. I (3), C.P. C., in view of dismissal of earlier' suit on the same subject-matter between the same parties as withdrawn in view of settlement between the par-lies---Pleas raised by Bank were that Bank had never requested for withdrawal of the suit and such order having been passed on its application seeking decree under O.XXIII, R.3, C.P.C., in terms of settlement was without jurisdiction, thus, such bar did not attract to the second suit, that applications filed by Bank for modification of such dismissal order and revival of suit had been dismissed being not maintainable and that second suit was maintainable having been filed on the basis of fresh cause of action upon breach of settlement by defendants---Validity---Defendants in leave application had not pleaded that Bank had ever made request for unconditional withdrawal of earlier suit---After recording factum of settlement, Court instead of decreeing suit, acting suo motu had dismissed suit as withdrawn without any request/prayer/application from the Bank---Such order had neither culminated in compromise decree under O.XXIII, R.3, C.P.C., nor same could be termed as an order for unconditional withdrawal under sub-rifle (1) nor same could be interpreted to impose bar of sub-rule (3) thereof---Such was in effect an order to dismiss suit as infructuous upon settlement between the parties---Defendants in reply to the Bank's application for revival of suit had conceded that Bank could maintain fresh suit upon breach of settlement as same would give rise to separate cause of action in favour of Bank---Second suit was maintainable and did not in any way attract bar of O,XXIII, R.1(3), C.P.C.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXIII, R.1 (1) (3)---Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of claim---Unqualified right and privilege of plaintiff---Right to choose to continue or elect to discontinue suit absolutely and unambiguously vested in the plaintiff---No other person including defendant had a right to seek withdrawal of suit---Withdrawing suit or abandoning claim without any condition, reservation or rider would preclude plaintiff from instituting fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter or such part of claim---Upon plaintiff's request to withdraw his suit, Court had no discretion to decline disposal/ dismissal of suit as withdrawn except in extraordinary and limited circumstances i.e. where rights had come to vest in defendant, third person or in general public etc.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXIII, R.1 (2)---Withdrawal of suit with liberty to file fresh suit---Scope---Sub-rule 12) of O.XXIII, C.P.C., safeguards against situations of injustice, inequity or unfairness likely to be faced by plaintiff by losing a right to re-file suit on the same subject-matter, if earlier suit was bound to fail by reason of some formal defect or otherwise--¬Said rule prevents technicalities from defeating the justice--¬Only plaintiff has absolute right and privilege to unconditionally withdraw suit under sub-rule (1) of R.1 of O.XXIII, C.P.C. or to seek Court's permission to withdraw suit in situations and exigencies visualized in sub-rule (2) of the said order with liberty to re-file the same escaping bar imposed under sub-rule (3) of R.1, O.XXIII, C.P.C.--¬Defendant or any other person has no right to seek withdrawal of plaintiff's suit and obtain Court's permission to re file same.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXIII, R.1(1)(2)---Withdrawal of suit without or with permission of Court---Scope---Under O.XXIII, R.1(1), C.P.C., plaintiff can withdraw suit at any stage without order of Court---Under sub-rule (2) thereof; plaintiff has to obtain permission of Court for withdrawal---Court's power to permit withdrawal is limited to instances specifically mentioned in cls. (a) & (b) of said sub-rule (2).\n \nHaji Abdul Rashid Sodagar v. S.M. Lalita Roy and others PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 287 fol.\n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXIII, R. 1(1)(2) ---Withdrawal of suit --- Suo Motu jurisdiction of Court---Scope---Until plaintiff so requests, Court has no jurisdiction or discretion under O.XXIII, R.1, C.P.C., to act suo Motu and dispose of or dismiss suit as withdrawn with or without permission to re file same.\n \n(g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXIII, R.1(1)(3)---Unconditional withdrawal of suit--¬Effect---Suit of same nature would not be barred, if filed on basis of fresh cause of action accruing to plaintiff against defendant.\n \n(h) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----Ss.126, 129, 133 & 136---Continuing guarantee--¬Variance in terms of contract---Effect---Where guarantor under personal guarantee pre-consented to changes without reference, recourse or notice to him, then he would be bound by guaranteed obligations, even if variations, concessions, time enlargements and indulgences were granted by creditor to principal debtor.\n \nMian Aftab A. Sheikh v. Messrs Trust Leasing Corporation R.F.A. No.486 of 1999 fol.\n \n(i) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.2(d)(i) & 9---Suit for recovery of loan amount with mark-up---Statement of account annexed with plaint and updated statement -of accounts showed charging of mark-up beyond expiry period of finance agreement ---Validity---Bank no authority to charge mark-up beyond financing agreement---Mark-up charge for 210 days cushion period as per instructions of State Bank was allowed.\n \n(j) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.3, 9 & 17---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Bank filed such suit upon breach of terms of settlement dated 22-10-1997 by defendants---Defendants in settlement package admitted their liability of Rs.38,874,300---Debit entries in consolidated statement of account relating to finance account, mark-up up to finance agreement and 210 days mark-up for cushion period showed total amount due at Rs.37, 715, 062---Held: Bank had filed suit on the basis of its statements of accounts---Banking Court had no option but to pass decree on basis of figures given in the statement of accounts instead of said amount admitted by defendants---Suit was decreed with costs for sum of Rs.37,715,062 alongwith cost of funds of Bank certified by State Bank w.e.f. 22-10-1997 till payment by defendants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 122 of 1999, decision dated: 20-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Zonal Chief--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs SAIF NADEEM ELECTRO LIMITED and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12883",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2976 = 2003 SLD 2976 = 2003 CLD 1487",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLV1 of 2001)-------S.22(6)---\"\"Interlocutory order'---Meaning---Order which is incidental to or a step in aid of a final decision.\n \nPakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd PLD 1993 SC 109 fol.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.19 & 22(6)---Civil Procedure Code. (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.89---Execution of decree by sale of mortgaged property--¬Appellant ( -debtor) was allowed to match highest bid of auction purchaser by depositing amount within specified time---Executing Court dismissed appellant's application seeking extensions of time---Appeal against such interlocutory order---Maintainability---Execution petition was still pending---Appeal was not maintainable as same had not been filed against any final order---Relief demanded in appeal could not be granted to appellant for not having filed application under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C., before the Executing Court---High Court resolved grievance of appellant by granting him extension up to specified date, which he had not complied with up to date---Appellant was neither entitled for any further extension of time or leniency by High Court nor any purpose would be served by same---High Court dismissed the appeal in limine.\n \nPakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd PLD. 1993 SC 109 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 163 of 2002, decision dated: 22-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATA-UR-REHMAN AND MUHAMMAD AFZAL SOOMRO, JJ",
    "": "Karachi High Court PIPE MILLS LIMITED\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LITD and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12884",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2977 = 2003 SLD 2977 = 2003 CLD 1492",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. IX, R. 4 & S. 151---Dismissal of suit for non ¬prosecution---Application for its restoration filed on the next day alongwith affidavit of counsel contending that the counsel had mistaken the date of hearing---Said application was dismissed by Trial Court---Validity---Trial Court ought not to have adopted the extreme measure of not restoring the suit just for one day's absence when an affidavit given by the plaintiff's counsel had explained such failure---High Court set aside the order and remanded the case to Trial Court for further proceedings on merits.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)-----\n \n----S.21---Infringement of trade mark---Procedure---Trade mark dispute ought to be decided after hearing all sides as the infringement of trade mark rights creates problems for the commercial world which are the back bone of the economy.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 123 of 2002, heard on 28-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN, J",
    "": "Messrs NESTLE MILKPAK LIMITED through Finance Control Manager\nVs.\nMessrs ALLIED ENTERPRISES through Managing Director and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12885",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2978 = 2003 SLD 2978 = 2003 CLD 1492",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. IX, R. 4 & S. 151---Dismissal of suit for non ¬prosecution---Application for its restoration filed on the next day alongwith affidavit of counsel contending that the counsel had mistaken the date of hearing---Said application was dismissed by Trial Court---Validity---Trial Court ought not to have adopted the extreme measure of not restoring the suit just for one day's absence when an affidavit given by the plaintiff's counsel had explained such failure---High Court set aside the order and remanded the case to Trial Court for further proceedings on merits.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)-----\n \n----S.21---Infringement of trade mark---Procedure---Trade mark dispute ought to be decided after hearing all sides as the infringement of trade mark rights creates problems for the commercial world which are the back bone of the economy.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 123 of 2002, heard on 28-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN, J",
    "": "Messrs NESTLE MILKPAK LIMITED through Finance Control Manager\nVs.\nMessrs ALLIED ENTERPRISES through Managing Director and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12886",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2979 = 2003 SLD 2979 = 2003 CLD 1506",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.22---Appeal against order of Executing Court, whereby appellant was ordered to be arrested in execution of decree---High Court while issuing pre-admission notice to Bank ordered that in the meanwhile appellant be not arrested---Appellant's counsel thereafter sought adjournment to obtain instructions from appellant as to time frame within which he would discharge total decretal debt---Appellant did not provide such instructions to his counsel, who requested Court to hear appeal on merits--¬High Court on being satisfied that appellant was taking undue advantage of interim relief dismissed his appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No 532 of 2002, heard on 17-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJ, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL HAMEED \nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12887",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2980 = 2003 SLD 2980 = 2003 CLD 1507",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 18(6) & 21---Execution of decree---Attachment of property---Dismissal of appellant's objection petition claiming to be owner of such property since year ,1981 through registered sale-deed---Validity---Loan was secured by pledge of shares of -debtor---Loan agreement was made on 24-3-1982, whereas shares sale agreement and buy-back guarantee agreement were executed on 28-3-1982---Bank had prayed in plaint for giving directions to -debtors to buy-back pledged shares--¬ Judgment-debtors were not owners of property nor they could mortgage same with Bank as same had been sold to predecessor of appellant on 29-2-1981---Banking Court had passed impugned order without applying its mind as there was no mortgage---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned order and accepted objection petition with costs throughout direction to Banking Court to release property immediately.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S. 18(6)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.54, 58 & 62---Execution of decree---Attachment of mortgaged property---Validity---Concept of attachment vis-a-vis a mortgaged property does not exist.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 196 of 1998, heard on 24-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "HASSAN MASOOD and 3 OTHERS\nVs.\nEQUITY PARTICIPATION FUND and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12888",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2981 = 2003 SLD 2981 = 2003 CLD 1511",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---------S.22---Partnership Act (IX of 1932), S.69---Appeal by two persons, one of them was an unregistered firm--¬Maintainability---Appeal on behalf of such firm was not maintainable, thus, High Court deleted its name from array of appellants- --Other appellant being aggrieved with impugned order could maintain appeal independently.\n \nH. M. Saya & Co., Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd., Karachi PLD 1969 SC 65 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58--¬Execution proceedings---Filing objections to order of attachment---Limitation---No period of limitation having been prescribed for such purpose under S.19 (7) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, objection on such ground was also not tenable.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58--¬Partnership Act (IX of 1932), S.69---Execution proceedings--¬Similar objections as raised by unregistered firm were also raised by the intervenor by moving separate application--¬Banking Court without disposing of application of intervenor dismissed the objection petition filed by the firm---Validity--- Even if application of unregistered firm was not maintainable, Banking Court was bound to examine the merits of pleas raised by the intervernor.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.19(7) & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58---Execution of decree---Attachment of cheque lying with Nazir of High Court issued earlier in appellant's name ( -debtor) in execution of decree passed in a suit instituted by him and intervenor jointly as two partners of firm ---Intervenor objected to such attachment on the ground that he was having 90% shares in the firm, while appellant was having 10% shares---Banking Court dismissed objection petition on the ground that cheque was in exclusive name of the appellant, thus, Bank was entitled to its encashment towards satisfaction of its decree---Validity---Duty of Banking Court was to have first decided question as to whether such cheque was for exclusive benefit of appellant or the intervenor was also entitled to some share therein--¬Issuance of cheque in exclusive name of appellant, admittedly not encashed, would not be sufficient proof of the fact that only he was entitled to its payment and that inverneror had no claim therein---Before releasing payment of cheque an enquiry should have been held to decide the claim of intervenor, who was on the one hand not a -debtor before Banking Court and on the other hand as he had some prima facie interest in the decree passed in earlier suit as plaintiff---View taken by Banking Court in the impugned order that no enquiry was required to be held by it in that regard not only demonstrated patent illegality, but also denial of fair and proper opportunity of hearing to intervenor---High Court disposed of appeal with directions to Banking Court to hold proper inquiry with regard to claim of the intervenor.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.41 of 2002, decision dated: 9-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ROSHAN ESSANI AND ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, JJ",
    "": "Chaudhry MUHAMMAD ASLAM and others\nVs.\nDr. ARSHAD MALIK and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12889",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2982 = 2003 SLD 2982 = 2003 CLD 1519",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -------Ss.22 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLVII, R.1---Review of passed in appeal---Amount required to be deposited by appellant for granting him leave to defend suit---High Court reduced such amount at appellant's request with observations that in case he failed to deposit same within specified time, then leave granted to him would\"\" stand withdrawn.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Review Application No.25/C of 2001, heard on 20-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "BOLAN BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nABDUL GHAFFAR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12890",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2983 = 2003 SLD 2983 = 2003 CLD 1521",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --S.18(6) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.73(1)(b) ¬Execution of decree Property belonging to debtor was attached and sold in public auction Factum of respondent being mortgagee of such property before institution of suit was not denied Respondent joined execution proceedings and allowed such property to be sold without any objection Held, respondent had a right to claim sale proceeds of such property in view of S.73(1)(b), C.P.C.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 18(6) & 21(1) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.73(1)(b) Execution of decree Respondent (non party to suit) filed objection petition claiming to be mortgagee of property belonging to debtor before institution of suit Property was sold and Bank (decree holder) withdrew amount of sale proceeds from Court Respondent as mortgagee of property filed application seeking payment of such sale proceeds to him Executing Court accepted such application and directed Bank to deposit such amount in Court for its onward payment to respondent Bank's application praying for recall of such order was dismissed by Executing Court Validity None of impugned orders fell within category of orders stated in S.21(1) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 High Court dismissed appeal being incompetent.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.198 of 2001, heard on 26-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "LONG TERM VENTURE CAPITAL MODARABA --Appellant\nVs.\nHANIF POLY PRODUCTS (PVT.) LTD. and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12891",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2984 = 2003 SLD 2984 = 2003 CLD 1524",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) --Ss.8(3) & 12 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.47 & O.XXI, Rr. 62, 90 & 94 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts. 166 & 181 Execution of decree Sale of mortgaged property ¬Plea of appellant (non party to suit) raised in objection petition was that debtor had sold away property long before the alleged mortgage in favour of Bank (decree¬ holder), thus, he was not its owner at that time Dismissal of objection petition on ground of being time barred ¬Validity Banking Court should have framed issues and recorded evidence to resolve question, . whether such property was owned by debtor at time of mortgage Tentative view being that of objection petition under O. XXI, R.90, C.P.C., was out of limitation, yet case was covered by S.47. C.P.C., for which limitation was governed by Art. 181 of limitation Act, 1908 High Court left open for the Banking Court to decide after framing of issues and recording of evidence to determine point of time, when appellant had got knowledge of auction and should have filed objection petition; and under what provisions objections could be entertained Effect of confirmation of sale in favour of auction purchaser would be deter mined by Banking Court thereafter High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned order with directions to Banking Court to decide objection petition afresh in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No 702 of 2001, heard on 10-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHAFIQUE --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL LIMITED and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12892",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2985 = 2003 SLD 2985 = 2003 CLD 1527",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.10 & 21 Leave to defend Proper opportunity of hearing Banking Court dismissed leave application and decreed suit on a date, when only main case was fixed for ex parte arguments Validity Appellant had not been given proper opportunity of arguing his leave application as same was not fixed for arguments on, such date Impugned was without sufficient reason as same did not reflect application of mind by Banking Court to grounds set out in leave application High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned /decree and remanded case to Banking Court for decision on leave application.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.380 of 2001, heard on 27-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "SHAMS UL ISLAM and another --Appellants\nVs.\nAL TOWFEEK INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12893",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2986 = 2003 SLD 2986 = 2003 CLD 1529",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.19 & 22 Execution of decree Sale of mortgaged property Appellant claimed to have purchased, property from respondent (widow of deceased debtor) ¬Contention of Bank was that initially widow sold property to deceased husband, who mortgaged same with Bank, but she later on by playing fraud sold same to appellant, when she was not its owner Banking Court dismissed objection petition Validity Widow had a disabled son, two young daughters, and a minor son, and was not in a position to pay balance decretal amount Widow requested for waiver of decretal amount by Bank except Rs.1,00,000, which was more than Rs.80,000 Bank's counsel could not state the exact rate of mark up on the basis of which claimed amount had been calculated Record showed that widow had re¬paid principal amount and Bank had excessively charged about Rs. 80, 000 from period of such repayment High Court disposed of appeal with observations that on payment of Rs.50,000 each by appellant and widow within specified period, whole decree would stand satisfied; but in case of appellant's failure to pay his share, entire decretal amount could be recovered by sale of property; but in case of widow's failure, appellant might pay her share in order to save property from auction, but could initiate proceedings against widow for committing fraud.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.583 of 2000, decision dated: 14th: January, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SHAMIM AKHTAR --Appellant\nVs."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12894",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2987 = 2003 SLD 2987 = 2003 CLD 1531",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) Ss.2(1)5 & 21 Trade Marks Rules, 1963 Fourth Sched. Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), Ss.42, 23 & 3 Patents and Designs Act (II of 1911), S.12 Registration of trade mark, copyright and patent and design Effect.\n \nTrade mark' is registrable in respect of some vendible goods in any' of the 34 classes detailed in 4th Schedule to the Trade Mark Rule. Trade mark, in fact, is relatable to or associated with any vendible goods. Such vendible goods acquire special significance when same are associated or reputed to be associated with any trade mark, such goods in commercial parlance may be referred as \"\"Branded good\"\". Indeed Trade mark, Copyright, a Patent and Design give monopolistic right to the registered owner thereof in the sense that such right holder has right to use and exploit such property to the exclusion of others.\n \nHowever as far as trade marks are concerned such are meant to distinguish the goods of owner of the mark whether registered (or otherwise like prior user) from that of the other manufacturers or producers of goods. Such distinction is for the benefit of consumer of such goods, though it also benefits the manufacturers and producers of such goods as well. There is no corresponding provision to section 5 of the Trade Marks Act, under the Copyright Ordinance 1962. Copyright in terms of section 3 of the Ordinance, 1962 is an exclusive right in relation to literary, dramatic, musical, artistic work, in any tangible medium of comprehension either audio or visual in any form that could be copied reproduced, multiplied, communicated, transmitted, repeated, broadcast, telecasted, adopted in any form. Generally artistic work could be protected under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962. Copyright in such artistic work is not necessarily or directly associated with any vendible goods unless of course same is used or proposed to be used and is desired to be used for some vendible goods then in terms of section 14 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 same are required to be registered as such. From the scheme of the Copyright Ordinance it appears to protect \"\"copyright\"\" in original work, by itself it is not relatable or associated with any vendible goods. The holder of such copyright in artistic work has exclusive right to produce and multiply such work. In terms of section 23 of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 the holder of a copyright has exclusive right to reproduce the work in any form, to publish, to perform, to translate, to communicate, broadcast, telecast, perform, adopt. From the scheme of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 it appears that such copyright work independently is capable of reproduction and reproduced copy is vendible independently and individually. It does not have any nexus with any other separate and independent vendible goods unless said artistic work otherwise is also used as a trade mark under the Trade Marks Act as discussed, above.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) --\n \n S.21 Exclusivity of use of a registered trade mark in relation to any vendible goods in respect of which the same was registered Conditions.\n \nSection 21 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 confers exclusivity of use of a registered trade mark in relation to any vendible goods in respect of which it is registered. Such exclusivity to use the registered mark can be gauged from the language of section 21 of the Act of 1940. Once it is demonstrated that a person is registered holder of a mark exclusivity is presumed. However, such exclusivity is subject to certain conditions namely (a) any condition or limitation entered on register at the time of registration by the Registrar as provided for under section 22; (b) prior user of the mark irrespective whether the same is registered or not as provided for tinder section 25; or (c) where the use of the name and description of the goods is used bona fide by a person of his name, place of business either of himself or of his predecessors, or, (d) honest and concurrent user of mark in terms of section 10(2). Defence based on any of the considerations set out above, may be considered formidable statutory defence against claim of infringement or passing off.\n \n(c) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) --\n \n S.14 Any decision rendered in a collateral proceedings will not prejudice or affect the rights of either the plaintiff or of the defendants an proceedings before the Registrar, Trade Marks.\n \n(d) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n S.21 Registration of trade mark Disclaimer When one or more part of a mark were subject to disclaimer then the subject matter of registration would be distinctive manner, get up and colour scheme in which each of the constituting disclaimed parts or portions of mark were placed and arranged to give it the same distinction from the other mark using the same disclaimed part or portion of competing goods Registered holder of trade mark, who had disclaimed, any of the features of the mark either in word, device or get up or where such feature was claimed to be common to trade whatever the case may be Holder of the mark may claim monopoly in the manner in which such mark, device, word or any combination thereof was put to use to distinguish his product from the others Using a copyright material as a substitute for the trade mark was not the intent and purpose of Copyright Ordinance, 1962 ¬Such copyright material independently could not be used or associated with any vendible or saleable goods unless, of course, such copyright was registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1940 Principles.\n \n(e) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962) \n \n S. 39 Trade Marks Act (V of 1940), S.21 Using a copyright material as a substitute for the trade mark was not the intent and purpose of Copyright Ordinance, 1962 ¬Such copyright material independently could not be used or associated with any vendible or saleable goods unless, of course, such copyright was registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1940.\n \n(f) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962) \n \n S.39 Gross misuse of registration of artistic work or other material under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 by the unscrupulous traders with covert object deprecated by the High Court High Court desired the amendment to be made in S.39, Copyright Ordinance, 1962 in view of guidelines suggested in the .\n \nThe Registration of artistic work or other material under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 is being grossly misused by unscrupulous traders with covert object.\n \nSuch persons and traders have transgressed all moral values, they are not ashamed of even adopting artistic work in internationally reputed and world renowned/brand names. Such foreign artistic works which otherwise, are subject matter of trade mark, are got registered under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962. Such practice not only is seriously tarnishing image of our country but at the same time Copyright Law is being used as a cloak to usurp goodwill of holder of trade mark.\n \nDue amendment has been made in section 39 of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 and a proviso has been added to it.\n \nFrom bare perusal of the proviso added to section 39, it appears that only objections are invited through publication in newspapers. Experience shows that unscrupulous traders get the artistic work sought to be copyrighted published in very innocuous newspapers having hardly any circulation. It appears that the proviso added to section 39 of the Ordinance, 1962 is not sufficient to check the malpractice and abuse of Copyright Ordinance.\n \nSuch tendency was effectively checked in India where a proviso was added as far back as in 1983, to section 45 of the (Indian) Copyright Act, 1957, which reads as follows:\n \nProvided that in respect of an artistic work which is used or is capable of being used in relation to any goods, the application shall include a statement to that effect and shall be accompanied by a certificate from the Registrar of Trade Marks referred to in section 4 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958), to the effect that no trade mark identical with or deceptively similar to such artistic work has been registered under that Act in the name of or that no application has been made under that Act for such registration by any person other than the applicant.\n \nThe proviso added to the corresponding provision in Indian Copyright Act appears to be more effective in checking the menace of such abuse of copyright. The law makers may consider amending section 39 of Copyright Ordinance, 1962 in line with proviso to section 45 (Indian) Copyright Act, 1957.\n \n(g) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n S.21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2 Interim injunction Plaintiff had made out prima facie case that they were the registered holder of subject trade mark in terms of S.21 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 to the exclusion of others Application of plaintiff under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2 was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.677 of 2001, decision dated: 23rd May, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "PAKISTAN DRUG HOUSE (PVT.) LIMITED --Plaintiff\nVs.\nRIO CHEMICAL COMPANY and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12895",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2988 = 2003 SLD 2988 = 2003 CLD 1546",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- S.9 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.20 & O.VII, R.10 Suit for damages by customer on account of alleged breach of finance agreement by Bank Return of plaint for its presentation before Court at place K Validity Such agreement executed at place K provided that Court at place K would be the proper Court to entertain all matters arising out of or under such agreement Such clause, wherein though words \"\"only\"\" or \"\"exclusive\"\" were not mentioned, clearly spelt out intention of parties that in case of dispute arising between them with regard to breach of finance agreement, which would include failure to disburse agreed facility or its recalling ,and every nature of dispute having nexus with finance agreements during their subsistence or even thereafter, would be tried by Court at place K, rather than any by any other Court Subsequent establishment of letters of credit at place L or refusal of Bank to disburse amount by its office at place L or rescission of agreement by its office at place L, by itself would not be a cause of action taking case out of ambit of such clause No error was found in impugned High Court dismissed appeal.\n \n2001 MLD 352; 1999 CLC 954 and PLD 2002 Kar. 420 distinguished.\n \n(b) Jurisdiction \n \n Two or more Courts having jurisdiction in matter Parties could validly agree for conferment of jurisdiction upon one of such Courts to the exclusion of other.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.309 of 2001, heard on 26-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "TAHIR TARIQ TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12896",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2989 = 2003 SLD 2989 = 2003 CLD 1549",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) Ss.15 & 14 All pending applications/ oppositions should be decided by the Tribunal simultaneously to avoid conflict of decisions and multiplicity of proceedings If the identical matters were decided in different sets at different times, the decisions were likely to affect adversely the decision of the other set Three applications, in the present case, having duly been ordered to be advertised, were discussed in the impugned of the Tribunal but had not been finally decided on merits Neither the of the Tribunal in question disclosed any legal justification for bypassing the earlier order advertising the said three applications nor any provision of law to that effect was shown Once an application had been ordered to be advertised the same could not be left in abeyance without going through the process of advertisement Judgment of the Tribunal, in circumstances, was set aside by the High Court and all applications and oppositions covered by the appeals in the case were remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication on merit alongwith the three said applications High Court, however, declined to discuss the case or adjudicate the same and directed that the Tribunal would be at liberty to decide the matters afresh in accordance with law.\n \nBasra Soap, Factory v. Punjab Soap Factory PLD 1973 Kar. 279; Playboy Enterprise Inc. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and another 1986 MLD 1312; Iqbal Ahmed v. The Registrar of Trade Marks; Karachi 1988 CLC 1052; Messrs Dynasel (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks, Karachi PLD 2000 Kar. 298; Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks v. Messrs Lackson Company Tobacco Ltd. 1992 SCMR 2323; Nahan Foundry v. Messrs Seth Muhammad Rafique Zarati Foundry and others 1994 MLD 2401 and National Detergents Limited v. Nirma Chemicals Works and another 1992 MLD 2358 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeals Nos.9, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 of 2000 and 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21 of 1999, decision dated: 24-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATA UR REHMAN, J",
    "": "UNIVERSAL TOBACCO (PVT.) LTD. and others --Appellants\nVs.\nJAPAN TOBACCO INC. and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12897",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2990 = 2003 SLD 2990 = 2003 CLD 1559",
    "Key Words:": "Flour Milling Control and Development (Repeal) Ordinance (XXIX of 1977) -- S.7 Industrial. Development Bank Ordinance (IV of 1961), Ss. 39 & 40 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.25(3) ¬Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.19 Federal Government Notification S.R.O. 710(I)/76 Time for filing suit for ¬recovery of amount Limitation Computation Extension of time Acknowledgment of liability and offer to make the payment Time had to be extended and the acknowledgment had to be made before the expiry of limitation period from the date when such liability accrued ¬Application having been admittedly filed much after the period of limitation had expired, the matter was clearly time¬ barred in circumstances Principles.\n \nUBL v. Kurnool Muhammad Munir 1991 CLC 1758; Ghulam Haider v. Mst. Raj Bhari and 4 others PLD 1973 Lah. 372; National Bank of Pakistan v. Bawany Industries Ltd. and 3 others 1982 CLC 2625; Mst. Fattan Bi and others v. Fateh Muhammad and 6 others PLD 1974 Lah. 458; Bank of India v. Muhammad Ashraf and others PLD 1965 . Kar. 69; Government of West Pakistan v. Syed Zainul Ebad Rizvi PLD 1977 Kar. 297; Pakistan v. Messrs Aneejee Valeejee and Sons and another PLD 1978 Kar. 244; Habib Bank Limited v. Shamim. Qureshi PLD 1988 Kar. 481; Messrs Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society Limited v. Zakaria Industries, Karachi 1994 CLC 1280; Messrs United Bank Limited v. Messrs Bombay Frontier Old Tire Co. and another 1986 MLD 1613 and M. G. Kadir & Co. v. Abdul Latif PLD 1970 Kar. 708 ref.\n \nMiss Rashida Siddiqui for Appellant.\n \nMrs. Navin Merchant for Respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Application No. 157 of 1995, decision dated: 10-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALVI, J",
    "": "SINDH FLOUR MILLING CORPORATION through Accounts Officer/ Principal Officer er\nVs.\nMessrs GOOD LUCK INDUSTRIES --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12898",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2991 = 2003 SLD 2991 = 2003 CLD 1567",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --Ss.10, 17 & 22 Decree for recovery of loan amount ¬Plea of appellant (Chief Executive of borrower company) was that he was not in Pakistan at the relevant time, thus, question of his having executed or affixed signatures on documents attributed to him by Bank did not arise and that Banking Court had passed decree on basis of such documents without finally determining their liability Both parties agreed that amounts outstanding against appellants could not be determined without in depth examination of record High Court with consent of parties set aside impugned /decree and granted leave to appellants only to the extent of determining as to how much amount was due against them with clear understanding that they would not raise such plea before Banking Court, which would decide suit within specified time after recording evidence of parties and in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.60 of 12003, decision dated: 12-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AL SHAFI (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 7 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12899",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2992 = 2003 SLD 2992 = 2003 CLD 1570",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) - Ss.18 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.114, O.XXI, R.90 & O.XLVII, R.1 Sale in execution of decree Objection petition Banking Court directed debtor to deposit by specified date 20% of sale price in terms of O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. Judgment debtor sought extension of time, which was granted to him Judgment debtor instead of depositing such amount made application on extended date for review of earlier orders, which was dismissed by Banking Court Validity Judgment debtor had challenged neither order requiring him to make such deposit nor order of extension of time Judgment-debtor applying for extension of time had accepted order of Court for deposit of amount, thus, he was precluded from filing review application against such order Scope, of review being very limited, debtor had failed to establish any error apparent on face of record, or error of like nature warranting review of earlier order High Court dismissed appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.111 of 2002, heard on 10-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "RAFIQ AHMED SANAURI and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nUNION BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager and 5 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12900",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2993 = 2003 SLD 2993 = 2003 CLD 1573",
    "Key Words:": "Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961) S.39 Suit for recovery of loan amount with mark up decreed Validity Appellant Company had not adhered to agreed terms for repayment of finance Initial period of financing stood modified at appellant's request through terms of re scheduling, thus, appellant was obliged to pay the agreed rate of return on amount overdue Claim of Bank had arisen on account of appellants' failure to repay finance in accordance with agreed terms Bank was, thus, not at fault for not filing its suit, when company had initially committed default in meeting its payment obligations ¬Appellant had not filed application for leave to appear and defend suit Statement of accounts showing various credit and debit entries had not been challenged by company Bank had reduced its claim from Rs.36, 91, 971 to Rs.31,24,000.17 High Court allowed appeal and modified impugned decree accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.668 and 675 of 2001, heard on 13-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs COMBINED OIL EXTRACTION (PVT.) LIMITED and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 2 others --Respondents\nHabib Bank v. Messrs Qayyum Spinning Ltd. 2001 MLD 1351 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12901",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2994 = 2003 SLD 2994 = 2003 CLD 1578",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --- S. 4 Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42. & 54 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) Transferring of banking suit having value of less than thirty million rupees Jurisdiction of High Court Consolidation of two suits Bank filed a suit for recovery of Bank loan against borrower as well as guarantor and the same was pending before Banking Court Another suit was filed by the guarantor in High Court, alleging that fraud and forgery had been committed upon him as he did not create any lien on his accounts nor pledged his Bonds High Court transferred the suit pending in Banking Court to High Court for decision of both the suits together Plea raised by the Bank was that claim in banking suit did not exceed thirty million rupees, therefore, under S.4 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, trial of the suit before High Court would be without jurisdiction ¬Validity Trial of both the suits together would not only be expedient in the interest of justice but also in the interest of both the parties as joint trial of both the suits would obviate the possibility of a conflict of s Order passed by High Court was just, fair and equitable and it did not suffer from any inherent defect or error of jurisdiction Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.1 K of 2001, decision dated: 25-01-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD BASHIR, JEHANGIRI, NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI AND RANA BHAGWANDAS, JJ",
    "": "Messrs FIRST WOMEN BANK LIMITED er\nVs.\nTHE REGISTRAR, HIGH COURT OF SINDH, Karachi High Court and 4 others --Respondents\nGul Hassan & Company v Allied Bank of Pakistan 1996 SCMR 244 distinguished."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12902",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2995 = 2003 SLD 2995 = 2003 CLD 1581",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ---S. 21 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Suit for recovery of amount or outstanding loan and dues against the petitioner Constitutional petition by the petitioner seeking that House Building Finance corporation be restrained from making any recovery of the outstanding dues under the decree from the petitioner without extending her the benefit of package announced by the prime Minister dated 23 7 1997 Maintainability Remedy of appeal was available to the petitioner under S.21, Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 which she had not availed Petitioner had taken financial assistance from the Corporation in the year 1976 and had not discharged her liability and entire loan was outstanding against her Such conduct of the petitioner clearly disentitled her from invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court Constitutional petition could not be invoked where consent decrees could be passed ¬Principles.\n \nArticle 199 of the Constitution provided that no petition would lie if any other adequate, alternate remedy, was available. Remedy of appeal, was already available which had not been resorted to by the petitioner.\n \nThe High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction could not take over the function of machinery provided by the statute. The course open to the petitioner was to have instituted appeal against the decree instead of invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court.\n \nExercise of writ jurisdiction was discretionary which was to be used in good faith having a look to all the attending circumstances and relevant factors of the case. The same was to be used in just, fair and reasonable ways. The financial assistance was provided to the petitioner in the year 1976 for construction of a house on certain terms and conditions. The petitioner had not discharged her liability. The entire loan was outstanding against her. Above conduct of the petitioner clearly disentitled her from invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. Even otherwise a writ petition was not maintainable where consent decrees were passed.\n \nSheikh Gulzar Ali & Co. Ltd. and others v. Special Judge, Special Court of Banking and another 1991 SCMR 590 fol.\n \nSheikh Gulzar Ali & Company and 2 others v. Special Judge, Special Court of Banking for Sindh at Karachi and another 1989 CLC 1958 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.582 of 2001, decision dated: 3rd April, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIRUL MULK AND IJAZ UL HASSAN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. ALLAH RAKHI er\nVs.\nGENERAL MANAGER, HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION, HEAD OFFICE Karachi High Court and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12903",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2996 = 2003 SLD 2996 = 2003 CLD 1585",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --S. 19 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 185(3) & 199 Recovery of Bank Loan Dispute with regard to deposit of amount with Bank Contention of the borrower was that he had paid a sum of Rs. 50, 000 to the Bank and the same had not been accounted or Validity Proper course for the borrower was to satisfy the decree or to submit relevant objection before the Executing Court instead of harassing the other party by filing successive Constitutional, petitions which were completely misconceived Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.1556 L of 2002, decision dated: 1st July, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS AND TANVIR AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Rana MUHAMMAD SHAFI er\nVs.\nJAVED IQBAL SIDDIQUI and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12904",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1FpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2997 = 2003 SLD 2997 = 2003 CLD 1587",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) S. 60 & O.XXI, R.58 Islamabad Stock Exchange Articles of Association, Arts. 19 & 20(o) Attachment of membership of stock exchange in execution of decree Rejection of objection petition without recording of evidence Grievance of the petitioner was that the Executing Court could not attach its membership of stock exchange in execution of decree passed against it Plea raised by the petitioner was that the properties enumerated in S.60, C.P.C, did not include membership of stock exchange and the Executing Court had wrongly dismissed the objection petition without recording of evidence Validity. Court of competent jurisdiction could attach membership as a property in execution of a decree under Art. 20(o) of Islamabad Stock Exchange Articles of Association No need arose to record evidence as the dispute related to membership of stock exchange and in that regard the Memorandum and Articles of Association was duly taken into consideration while, deciding the objections by the Executing Court as well as by the High Court No legal infirmity in the order of Executing Court was found, and the same did not warrant interference Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.595 of 2001, decided 9-07-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN MUHAMMAD, AJMAL AND ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR, JJ",
    "": "Islamabad High Court High Court STOCK EXCHANGE (GUARANTEE) LIMITED, Islamabad High Court High Court through Secretary er\nVs.\nFIRST PUNJAB MODARABA through Punjab Madaraba Services (Private) Limited, and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12905",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1F5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2998 = 2003 SLD 2998 = 2003 CLD 1599",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- --S. 12 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) Ex parte decree, setting aside of Constitutional jurisdiction of Supreme Court Factual inquiry Scope Despite service of notice in ordinary course as well as by publication, the borrower did not appear before Banking Court and instead moved application under S.12 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Application was dismissed and ex parte decree was maintained Validity Order passed by High Court was just, fair and equitable Supreme 'Court observed that' in case the borrower felt that, he was not liable to pay the decretal amount or that certain amount credited by him had not been adjusted by the Bank, he might agitate the same before Executing Court as Supreme Court could not embark upon an inquiry into facts in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1833 L of 2002, decision dated: 2-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS AND TANVIR AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "RAHEEL IKHLAS er\nVs.\nMessrs CITIBANK N.A. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12906",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1F5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2999 = 2003 SLD 2999 = 2003 CLD 1601",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VIII, R.11 Suit against Bank not relating to loan or finance ¬Rejection of plaint Agreement executed between parties to suit and a foreign Bank was produced by plaintiff with counter affidavit in reply to defendant's leave application ¬Such agreement was neither referred to in plaint nor suit was based thereon Defendant did not dispute or deny agreement, but referred to same in written statement Held, such agreement could be considered at time of deciding application under O. VII, R.11, C.P. C.\n \n1992 MLD 225; 1994 SCMR 826; 1993 MLD 2419; 2000 CLC 1620 and 2002 SCMR 338 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 9 & 27 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 9 & 27 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R.11 Suit against Bank not relating to loan or finance Issue on jurisdiction of Banking Court was framed, but declined to be decided as preliminary issue Application by defendant seeking rejection of plaint on the ground that suit was barred under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 as same did not relate to loan or finance Validity ¬Framing of an issue as to jurisdiction would not denude Banking Court of its powers to entertain and decide application under O. VII, R.11 or 10, C.P.C., within parameters defined by law for such purpose Any order on such application would not amount to review of earlier order declining to decide such issue as preliminary issue.\n \nAIR 1993 All. 762; 1990 MLD 1764; 1973 SCMR 62; PLD 1995 SC 362; 1999 SCMR 2353 and 2001 CLC 1363 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss. 2(c)(d)(e)(f) & 9 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 2(c)(d)(e) & 9 High Court of West Pakistan (Establishment) Order (XIX of 1955), para. 5 Suit against Bank not relating to loan or finance ¬Jurisdiction of Banking Court Dispute raised by plaintiff was in respect of operation of their Foreign Currency Account at defendant Bank for not following their instructions and withholding of balance sum available in their account Such facts did not determine status of plaintiff as \"\"borrower\"\" or \"\"customer\"\", but only of a foreign currency account holder Such dispute could rot be considered as a dispute relating to some default in fulfillment of any obligation with regard to any loan or finance Such suit neither at the time of its institution nor at later stage could be proceeded under Banking Court's Jurisdiction High Court directed office to treat such suit as a suit on its original civil jurisdiction side and be processed as such.\n \n2000 MLD 1850; 1998 CLC 1781; 2000 YLR 2407; 1999 CLC 1294; 2001 YLR 905; PLD 2000 Lah. 168; PLD 1970 SC 1; 1992 SCMR 1748; 2001 CLC 1363; 2001 SCMR 103; 1998 CLC 1718; 1999 CLC 1953; 2002 CLC 658 and 2002 CLC 1455 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 151 of 1998, decision dated: 25-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, J",
    "": "ARY TRADERS (PVT.) LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMULSIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12907",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1F5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3000 = 2003 SLD 3000 = 2003 CLD 1610",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --- S. 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, R.17 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) Amendment in application for leave to defend the suit Amendment sought to be made in the application was declined by Banking Court as well as by High Court Plea raised by the borrower was that the amendment in pleadings could be sought at any stage Validity Court was vested with the power to allow amendment in its discretion in pleadings at any stage of proceedings but it did not bind the Court to allow the amendment in all cases once application was moved ¬Discretion exercised by the Court for not allowing the amendment did not suffer from any illegality or arbitrariness Supreme Court allowed the borrower to use material available on record of the suit in support of and to substantiate the grounds raised in the original application for grant of leave to appear and defend the suit Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.818 of 2000, decision dated: 24-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD BASHIR, JEHANGIRI AND MUNIR A. SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MAROOF KNITWEAR (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 8 others ers\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12908",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1F5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3001 = 2003 SLD 3001 = 2003 CLD 1612",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) S.9 Jurisdiction of Tribunal Principles When Special Tribunal is constituted under a statute, its jurisdiction depends upon the specific provisions of the statute Jurisdiction may be limited by conditions as to constitution, as regards persons whom or the offences which it is competent to try and as to the orders which it is empowered to make or by other conditions which the law makes essential to the validity of its proceedings and orders Where conditions required for invoking the jurisdiction of Tribunal are not available, then remedy lies to Civil Court under S.9, C.P.C.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes \n \n Meaning of statute and duty of Courts Principles Statutes must prima facie be given their ordinary dictionary meaning however to arrive at the true meanings it is necessary to get an exact conception of aim, scope and object of the whole Act Where statute defines the limits for purposes of benefits a particular way, Courts are bound to give effect to show limitation without traveling outside those limits on a presumed intention of the Legislature, however, great the hardship might be to the parties, if any other course is followed.\n \n(c) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.5 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.II, R.2--¬Damages, claim of Omission to sue for relief regarding damages Cause of action accrued on 10 12 1991 and suit for damages was filed on 16 1 1998 Plaintiff claimed damages on account of breach committed by the defendant in providing finance which cause of action was available to the plaintiff at the time of filing of earlier suit Effect -Plaintiff had to include the whole claim for which the plaintiff was entitled to make and by omitting not to sue in respect of such claim the plaintiff cannot afterwards sue in respect of portion so omitted or relinquished Plaintiff had a right to file suit for the recovery of damages, if any, suffered by him on account of breach of the obligation if any by the defendant before the Banking Court Plaintiff failed to avail the remedy available to him within the terminus quo prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1908 Cause of action accrued on 21 3 1990 and finally on 10 12 1991, therefore, suit filed on 16-1 1998 was barred by time Suit was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O. VIII, R.6 Counter claim Limitation Counter claim and or additional claim, has to be filed within three years from the date of cause of action of the suit Suit filed after three years of the cause of action is liable to be dismissed.\n \nNiamat Ali v. Jaitam Das PLD 1983 SC 5 ref.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O. VIII, R. 6 Counter claim Scope Person not party to suit No counter claim can be made against such person.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 59 of 1998, decision dated: 4-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "DIGITAL RADIO PAGING LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nPAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12909",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1F5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3002 = 2003 SLD 3002 = 2003 CLD 1620",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---S.9 Agracultura Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (IV of 1961), S. 25 West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), Ss. 79 & 80 Bank dues disputed by borrower Recovery as arrears of land revenue Scope ¬Bank could not be equated with a proper judicial forum for determination of amount due against borrower, though under law having summary power of recovery of amount due In event of substantial dispute between parties procedure of recovery of amount by way of land revenue arrears would be available only where amount claimed was found due, ascertained and determined by a competent judicial forum.\n \nAgricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Sanaullah Khan PLD 1988 SC 67; Abdul Latif v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 1962 SC 384; ARK Ocean Lines Ltd. v. Director of Industries and Mineral Development PLD 1976 Kar. 610, Hussain Ali v: Government of Pakistan 1989 MLD 4721; Grain System. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. ABDP 1993 MLD 1031; Abdul Karim v. Province of Sindh 2001 MLD 69 and Raj Kumar v National Bank of Pakistan 1994 CLC 206 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No 382 K of 2001 decided on 2-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS AND HAMID ALI MIRZA, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and another ers\nVs.\nABID AKHTAR and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12910",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1F5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3003 = 2003 SLD 3003 = 2003 CLD 1625",
    "Key Words:": "Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance (V OF 1970) Ss.13, 14 & 15 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2 Application under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C. Seeking a restraining order against the defendants from demanding or recovering directly or indirectly any amount by way of war risk charge Validity Provisions of Ss.13, 14 & 15 of the Monopoly and, Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 provided for interim order and that for all practical purposes a proper inquiry could be conducted and to that extent witnesses could be summoned and examined on oath and notices for production of documents for the purposes of recording of evidence, the issuing of commission for the examination of witnesses etc. were applicable for the purpose of coming to a fair and just conclusion If the plaintiff, in the present case, was of the feeling that there had been a violation of the Ordinance, it would have been proper for him to have availed the remedy mentioned in the Ordinance and proceeded accordingly If it was alleged that war risk surcharge in question was void, and illegal and contrary to the provisions of the said Ordinance, seeking relief by way of suit was not proper remedy Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 having provided the remedy for the plaintiff, his application under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C. was not maintainable.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit Nos. 175, 176 and 189 of 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, J",
    "": "EAPOHIRE TEXTILE MILLS LTD. and others --Plaintiffs\nVs.\nAPL PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12911",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1F5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3004 = 2003 SLD 3004 = 2003 CLD 1630",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Imports and Exports (Control) Act (XXXIX of 1950) --Ss.5 A, 5 B & 3 Powers of the Government could not be exercised by the Export Promotion Bureau as the Legislature had treated the Export Promotion Bureau as a separate and distinct organization (if not a strict legal person from the Federal Government or the Ministry of Commerce) Rules of Business prepared under the Constitutional mandate could allow a Department or officer to discharge such functions Principles.\n \nSection 5 A of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 enables the Federal Government to constitute Commercial Courts and under subsection (2), such Courts headed by Judicial Member would comprise of one Officer of the Federal Government to be nominated by the Ministry of Commerce and another from amongst businessmen or executives out of a selected panel in consultation with the Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Section 5 B(1) provides that the contravention of an order under section 3 relating to export trade shall be tried exclusively by a Commercial Court and subsection (2) stipulates that such Court will take cognizance of an offence upon a complaint in writing made by the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Export Promotion Bureau or an Officer authorized by them. It is evident from a plain reading of section 5 B(2) that the Legislature has treated, the Export Promotion Bureau as a separate and distinct organization (if not a strict legal person from the Federal Government or the Ministry of Commerce). The contention that the powers of the Government could be exercised by the Bureau is, therefore, plainly misconceived.\n \nIn any event, even if it be assumed that the Bureau is merely a Department of the Ministry of Commerce of the Federal Government, it does not necessarily follow that all powers of the Government could be exercised by the Bureau or its officers or for that matter even by all officers in the Ministry unless it can be shown that the Rules of Business prepared under the Constitutional mandate allowed them to discharge such functions.\n \n(b) Locus poenitentiae, doctrine of \n \n Applicability Once a decision vesting certain rights upon a party read been taken and acted upon, the same could not be recalled Doctrine of locus poenitentiae would not apply when the original decision that was rescinded was made by a person not authorized to do so.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P.D. No.2054 of 2002, decision dated: 3rd January, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND AMIR HANI MUSLIM, JJ",
    "": "MASOOM AKHTAR er\nVs.\nSECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12912",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1F5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3005 = 2003 SLD 3005 = 2003 CLD 1634",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for merger of Companies Approval of Company' Court Objection Swap ratio Determination of principle of arms length transaction Applicability Benefits expected from the merger of Companies, inter alia, were claimed to be an increase in profitability after removal of overlapping in management, marketing and distribution expenses; elimination of high cost of complexity behind the existing operations/set up; streamlining of operations by optimizing their energies in the areas of sales, distribution and administration; reduction of administrative costs, effective control and administration on account of coming into being a Single Board of Directors; the need to hold only one annual general meeting and issuance of only one set of annual/half yearly accounts, maintaining only one Register of Shareholders, only one set of books and records; only one administration office to manage the affairs of the merged/ amalgamated Company; exemption of capital gain on the sale of the shares of one of the three Companies becoming available to the shareholders of other two Companies coupled with, ready sale ability of shares of one of the three Companies as. a listed company Amalgamating Companies had claimed that they had obtained written consent from 94% of the creditors of one of the Companies, 98% of the creditors of the other and 96% of the creditors of the third Company General meeting of the said three Companies were convened under the supervision of a local commission appointed by the Company Court and Scheme proposed for merger and various arrangements in its execution were put before the members of the three Companies Local Commissioner had reported that said meetings by a majority of 90% and 98% had finally resolved that the scheme of arrangement between the three Companies and its members was considered by the meetings and was approved, adopted and agreed\"\" ¬Representative of one of the Companies, however, made oral as well as written objection to the merger during the separate extraordinary general meetings of other two Companies Objector had very strong reservations to the proposed merger as allegedly it was calculated only to the benefit of one Company through and through and that the proposed swap ratio had no nexus with the true worth of other two Companies having not been valued by independent valuers Securities and Exchange Commission had not made any material objection to the preferred Scheme Validity Fact that the objector was the only shareholder in the first two Companies while; the Company in which the other Companies were being merged was holding the rest of the shares, would not make the objector to be of different class to be treated at par with the majority shareholders Numerical strength of the two shareholders was too wide to be ignored Swap ratio was determined inter alia on the basis of the audited accounts of the first two Companies and the objector had not come up with his own figures as against those which were picked up by the valuer from the audited accounts Objector, being shareholder had access to every record and books of accounts of the Companies and therefore, in the absence of any counter figure, as opposed to those reflected in the balance sheet of the two Companies, a value challenge the said figures and the swap ratio could not by of any avail No rule of law required that valuation determination of swap ratio could not be mace by Chartered Accountants of the Companies sought to be amalgamated In the absence of an allegation of mala fides fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the valuer, objection of such kind could not be accepted on its face value Break up value, dividend earning capacity market value were the three factors which were relevant to determining the fair value of shares and consequently the swap ratio Objector had not been able to establish that valuation of shares was done only to protect the interest majority shareholders Principle of arms length transaction related more to an outright buy rather than a petition merger or amalgamation where the controlling shareholders would have an edge allowed to them under the law Held. Scheme could be disapproved only if the same appeared to be unfair, unreasonable and oppressive on the face of it to a certain class of shareholders which did not appear to be the case in the facts and circumstance of the merger/ amalgamation Scheme in the present case.\n \nRe: Pfizer Laboratories Ltd. and another 2002 CLD 1209 distinguished.\n \nThe Analysis and Use of Financial Statements by Gerald I. White, C.F.A., Second Edn., pp.933 34; How to Read Balance Sheets by Saeed Ahmed Qureshi, Financial Reporting Standard 7\"\" of the Treatise on Fair Value in Acquisition Accounting, pp.67 to 79; Guide to Take Overs and Mergers by N.A. Sridharan and P.H. Arvindh Pandian Edn., 2002, pp.194 to 197; Amalgamations Mergers Takeovers and Acquisitions by L.M. Sharma published by Company Law Journal, New Delhi, pp.144 to 146; Weinberg and Blank on Takeovers and Mergers, Fifth Edn. by Laurence Rabinowitz 2063; Acquisitions, Mergers, Sales Buyouts and Takeovers; A Hand Book with Forms, Fourth Edn. by Charlas A Scharf, pp.71 to 97; re: O' Neil and another v. Phillips and others, decided on 20 5 1999; re North Holdings Limited v. Sourthern Tropics Limited' Nicholas Andrew Clarke: Lesley Ann Gale Clarke and Kasmare Limited (1999) EWCA Civ. 1612; re: Re Hellenic & General Trust Ltd. (1975) 3 All ER 382; Messrs Revlon v. Mac Andrews & Forbes SC of Delaware 506 A. 2d 173 (1965); re: Hanson Trust PLC etc. v. ML SCM Acquisitions Inc., 781 F. 2nd 264; re: Gift Tax Commissioner, Bombay .v. Kusumben AIR 1980 SC 769; re: W.T. Commissioner, Assam v. Mahadeo Jalan AIR 1973 SC 1023; Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. & Hindustan Lever Ltd (1994) 81 Comp. Cas. 754; Catex Petro Chemicals Ltd (1993) 2 Comp. LJ 383 (Mad.); Miheer H. Mafat Lal v. Mafat Lal Ind. Ltd. (1996) 4 Comp. LJ 124 (SC); Kamala Sugar Mills Ltd. & Tirumurti Mills Ltd. (1996) 4 Comp. LJ (Mad:); Bank of Baroda Ltd. v. Mahindra Ugine Steel Co. Ltd.; (1976) 46 Comp. Cas. 227 (Guj.); Kohinoor Raiwind Mills Ltd. v. Kohinoor Gujar Khan Mills Ltd. 2002 CLD 1314; Konihoor Raiwind Mills Ltd. 2002 CLD 1747; Charles M. Oberly and others v. Alan .P. Kirby and others 592 A. SD 445; In re: Lipton Pakistan Ltd. and another 1989 CLC 818;. Brooke Bond Pakistan Ltd. v. Aslam Bibi Ibrahim and another 1997 CLC 1873; In re: Companies Act, 1913 and another PLD 1983 Kar. 45 EITA India Ltd. and others AIR 1997 Cal. 208; re: Miheer H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. (1996) 87 Comp. Cas. 792; Abdul Rahim v. UBL PLD 1997 Kar. 620; NBP v. KDA PLD 1999 Kar. 260; re: Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd and Hindustan Lever Ltd. (1994) 3 Comp. LJ 46 (Bom.); Aslam Bin Ibrahim v. MCA PLD 1998 Kar. 295; In re: Messrs Pakland Cement Ltd. 2002 CLD 1392; In re: Manekchowk (1970) 40 Comp. Cas. 819; Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd. v. Dhan Fibres Ltd. PLD 2001 Lah. 230; Sussex Brick Company Ltd. (1960) All. ER 772; In re: Companies Ordinance 1984; Balanced Fund Ltd. and another 2002 CLC 1361 and Asian Coffee Ltd. (2000) 3 Comp. LJ 92 (AP) ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for merger of Companies Approval of Company Court Swap ratio, determination of Principles Objection was that swap ratio had been determined only to favour the majority shareholders Validity Every shareholder in the merged Company being entitled to the proposed advantages and disadvantages, the claim of adverse swap ratio to the minority would lose its force Objector, in the present case was looking at the transaction as an outright sale of its shares while the, nature of a merger/ amalgamation was altogether different Counter offer for purchase of majority shares, needed to be seen in that perspective Such an offer was entertainable only when the seller was completely parting with the equity while in case of merger every single shareholder was to become a part of the new entity.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss. 284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of Companies Approval of Company Court Objection on the basis of \"\"Business Judgment Rule\"\" Validity \"\"Business Judgment Rule\"\" in essence meant that management was not liable for mistakes which resulted in loss if made in good faith in exercise of business and free of elements such as conflict of interest or violation of law \"\"Business Judgment. Rule\"\" was not applicable inasmuch as the present case was not that of management by outsider because the management of the three amalgamating Companies was admittedly already with the Company which was amalga¬mating the other two and said two Companies were going in losses for the last some time and the claim of the objector that these were possessed with huge capital assets was not supported by any material on the record.\n \nCharles A. Scharf, Edward E. Shea George C. Back ref.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of Companies Approval of the Company Court Object of Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287, Companies Ordinance, 1984 ¬Scope Objector had objected to the Composition of the Boards of the first two Companies (which were being merged into the third) third Company which was owner of equity of 98% and 90% in the companies had a privilege under the law to dominate the Board through its nominees and it would be unnatural and rather illogical to think that these nominees would act in a manner which was prejudicial to the interest of the principal Company Such fact alone did not provide a ground of their impeachment in the perspective of the merger in question Purpose of the provisions of Ss. 284, 285, 286 & 287 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 would stand defeated if a merger was denied on the sole ground that it was opposed or was otherwise not liked, as in the present case, by a small number of shareholders Even if the alleged nexus between the holding and Subsidiary Companies was assumed yet that factor did not, under any provision of law, require that majority shareholders should concede to the will of minority shareholders Only legal requirement was that the Scheme should not be oppressive, unreasonable and unjust ¬Objector being not specific as to the exact extent of adverse effect to its interest; the companies continuously being in losses while the shares of the third Company being transacted at the Stock Exchange at more than 20 times of its face value and the Scheme was based upon the swap ratio determined by a firm of reputed Chartered Accountants; could not be described to be unjust or unreasonable.\n \n(e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of Companies Approval of the Company Court Objector, in the present case, had negligible share in the total equity of 2% in one Company while in the other it had an interest of 8% only To disapprove the Scheme, or the alternate suggested by the objector, a direction for reconsideration of swap ratio, was not likely to improve the status of the objector Even otherwise to do so would amount to sitting in as an Appellate Court to find out faults in the Scheme as well as the swap ratio which was not possible in the proceedings under Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287, Companies Ordinance, 1984 which conceded a, democratic right of 3/4th majority of the members of a Company to make a choice which the minority had been obliged to accept.\n \nRe: Messrs Pakland Cement Ltd. 2002 CLD 1392 ref.\n \n(f) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of Companies Approval of the Company Court Objection to the Scheme Powers and jurisdiction of Company Court ¬Scope and extent Principles.\n \nA Court should see if the scheme was fair as a whole. However, for that purpose an in depth investigation and probe into every provision of the scheme of arrangement was not necessary.\n \nThe onus was on the objectors to show that the scheme was mala fide or unfair.\n \nUnfairness should not be enough unless it was patent, obvious and convincing.\n \nCourt should not go into the commercial merits or viability of the decision reached by the majority.\n \nWhere majority was acting in a bona fide manner and the scheme was such as a fair minded person, reasonably acquainted with the facts of the case could regard it as beneficial for whom the majority sought to represent, then, unless there were strong and cogent reasons to show that the scheme was misconceived, designed or calculated to cause injuries to others, the Court would sanction it rather than reject it; the Court should prefer a living scheme to compulsory liquidation bringing about an end to a company.\n \nRe: Messrs Pakland Cement Ltd. 2002 CLD 1392 and re: Manekchowk (1970) 40 Comp. Cas. 819 ref.\n \n(g) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of Companies Approval of the Company Court Objection to the Scheme by minority shareholders Objection to the amalgamation was that the Company in which the other two Companies were being merged would have monopoly in the trade Validity Such an objection could not be a reason to deny the approval, as a different and distinct law namely Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 was available in the field and any violation thereof was a matter of independent probe and investigation which could not be undertaken in the present proceedings nor merger/ amalgamation could be refused on that ground Creation of alleged monopoly would rather be for the benefit of the shareholders of the principal Company after merger which would include the objector minority shareholders in the merged two Companies.\n \n(h) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of Companies Approval of Company Court Absence of a provision for amalgamation in the Memorandum and Articles of the Association of a Company would not affect the statutory' powers of the Court to allow the Scheme.\n \nRe; Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd. v. Dhan Fibres Ltd. PLD 2001 Lah. 230 and Pfizer Laboratories Ltd. and another 2002 CLD 1209 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original No.47 of 2002, decision dated: 26-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR, J",
    "": "In re: PAK WATER BOTTLERS (PVT.) LIMITED and 2 others\nKhawaja Saeed uz Zafar and Nasrullah Babar for SECP."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12913",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1F5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3006 = 2003 SLD 3006 = 2003 CLD 1665",
    "Key Words:": "Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980) -- Ss.4 & 5 Admiralty suit Plaintiff had invoked the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court against the defendant vessel by an action in rem Contention was that documentary evidence showed that the proposed defendant was owner of the vessel who had filed written statement therefore his presence before the Court was necessary for proper adjudication Validity Action in personam could have been brought in. respect of damage, loss of life or personal injury as a result of collision Contention that since the written statement on behalf of the vessel had been filed by the proposed, defendant, it had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and thus should be asked to be present in the Court was repelled and application of the plaintiff was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Admiralty Suit No.11 of 2000, heard on 3rd September, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "Vs.\nM.T. PORTOFINO --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12914",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1F5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3007 = 2003 SLD 3007 = 2003 CLD 1658",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --S.10(11) Leave to defend the suit with condition attached When the defendant fails to fulfil the conditions attached to the grant of leave to defend, the Banking Court shall forthwith proceed to pass and decree in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant.\n \nMalik Gul Hasan and Company and 5 others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 1996 SCMR 237; Abdul Rauf Ghouri v. Mrs. Kishwar Sultana 1999 SCMR 929; Abdul Karim Jaffarani v. U.B.L. and 2 others 1984 SCMR 568 and General Investment Limited v. Dubai Bank Limited 1984 SCMR 634 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n Ss.22 & 10 Appeal Appellants cannot be permitted to re agitate the same question in appeal which has been effectively dealt with in their appeal filed earlier.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, R.3(2) Leave to appear and defend suit Banking Court upon application by defendant is fully competent to grant leave to appear and defend the suit either unconditionally or subject to such terms as it thinks fit Such discretion to grant leave conditionally or unconditionally is left to the Court itself as contemplated under O.XXXVII, R.3(2), C.P.C. Discretion so exercised is not to be interfered with lightly unless it is shown that the same was exercised in a fanciful or arbitrary manner.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.22 & 10 Appeal Decree, in the present case, had been passed in favour of the Bank not on the basis of a trial before the Banking Court, but in consequence of failure of the appellants to fulfill the conditions imposed upon them by the Banking Court Contention of the appellants that as the High Court had dismissed the appeal as being incompetent, the other findings contained in the said would be inconsequential qua the rights of the parties, was a feeble attempt to wriggle out of the effects of the said .\n \nDad Muhammad v. Qazi Muhammad Hayat 1996 CLC 1705 distinguished.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.10 Bank had filed suit for recovery of Rs.85,246,891 ¬Defendant having failed to fulfil the conditions attached to the order of leave to appear and defend the suit, the suit was liable to be decreed in toto Banking Court, while decreeing the suit had passed a decree in the lesser sum which was not in accord with its earlier order High Court modified the and decree of the Banking Court to be in the sum of Rs.85,246,891 with costs which was the total claim of the Bank.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.3 of 2003, decision dated: 22-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "TANVIR BASHIR ANSARI AND RUSTAM ALI MALIK, JJ",
    "": "SILVER OIL MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 13 others --Appellants\nVs.\nMessrs UNION BANK LIMITED through Vice President and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12915",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3008 = 2003 SLD 3008 = 2003 CLD 1666",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) Ss.2(2) as added by Foreign Awards and Maintenance Orders Enforcement (Amendment) Ordinance (LIII of 1962), S.2) & 2(1)(c) Notification SRO 481(K) dated 20 4 1960 Enforcement of foreign award Scope Enactment of Foreign Awards and Maintenance Orders Enforcement (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962 was not violative of the Constitution and was promulgated under the authority of the Government of Pakistan Government of Pakistan had privilege/prerogative to decide as to whether the Award given in a particular foreign country is to be enforced in Pakistan or not, notwithstanding that the country in which the Award had been given had not made any reciprocal arrangement for the enforcement of Awards given in Pakistan as contemplated in S.2 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 Government of Pakistan having expressed its intention under S.2(2) of the Act (as amended), High Court would not decline to enforce the Award given in a foreign country Word \"\"territory\"\" used in S.2(2) referred to \"\"country\"\" which covered Conventions entered into or issued by Notification in British India and no further Notification was required in terms of S.2(1) (c) of the Act.\n \nYangtze (London) Ltd. v. Barlas Bros. (Karachi) PLD 1961 SC 573 distinguished.\n \nPLD 1979 Kar. 762 and 1987 CLC 83 ref.\n \n(b) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) --\n \n Ss.7 & 2(2) Grain and Feed Trade Association (London) Rules, R.125 Arbitration proceedings could not be defeated merely on the ground that the arbitration had not taken place either in Germany or in Pakistan as no rule existed creating such a bar.\n \n(c) Trade Association (London) Arbitration Rules \n \n R.4:7 Arbitration Commercial dispute Public policy Grain and Feed Trade Association (London) Arbitration Rules, R.4:7 not allowing the parties to be represented through a Solicitor/ Barrister, was not against public policy.\n \n(d) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) --\n \n S. 7 Conditions for enforcement of Foreign Award High Court would only confine to examine the award within the provision of S.7(1) of the Act and the interference, if any, could only be warranted if the condition under S.7(2) of the Act surfaced High Court would not sit as an Appellate Court nor would go behind the Award to reappraise the evidence High Court, exercising powers under S.7 of the Arbitration (Protocol and 'Convention) Act, 1937, was an executing Court which could not travel beyond the Award save as expressly provided under S.7(2) of the said Act ¬Contention that Award given under R.4:7 of Grain and Feed Trade Association (London) Arbitration Rules was contrary to Public Policy of Pakistan or to the principles of law of Pakistan in terms of Second Sched of Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, was repelled.\n \n(e) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n S.7(2)(b) Conditions for enforcement of Foreign Award ¬Interpretation of S.7(2)(b) of Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 Party against whom the award was sought to be enforced must be given notice of arbitration proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to present his case If the party was under some legal incapacity and was not properly represented then a Foreign Award shall not be enforced by the Court Other condition in cl. (b) of S.7(2) of the Act appearing after the word \"\"or\"\" which ex facie indicated that the conditions were disjunctive.\n \n(f) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) --\n \n S.7(1) Foreign Award may be enforceable if made in pursuance of an agreement for arbitration valid under the law by which the same was governed and had been made by a Tribunal provided in the agreement or constituted in the manner agreed upon by the party in conformity with the law governing the arbitration procedure in respect of a matter which may lawfully be referred to arbitration under the law of Pakistan and then the award had become final in the country in which it was made.\n \n(g) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n Ss.5 & 7(2) Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss.30 & 35 ¬Enforcement of Foreign Award Conditions Once the law under which the award had been given in conformity with the procedure laid down therein the Court in exercise of powers under S.5, Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 would not travel beyond the Award to examine and scrutinize either the evidence or the material, once it had attained finality subject to the grounds provided under S.7(2) of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 Grounds of misconduct and the award having been improperly procured or was otherwise invalid, were not ,vailable under S. 7(2) of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 as in case of Ss.30 & 35 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 340 of 1996, decision dated: 26-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J",
    "": "ALFRED C. TOEPFER INTERNATIONAL GMBH --Plaintiff\nVs.\nPAKISTAN MOLASSES COMPANY and another ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12916",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3009 = 2003 SLD 3009 = 2003 CLD 1685",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- Ss.2(a)(c) & 13 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, Rr.10 & 11 Suit for recovery of amount as insurance claim alongwith damages and compensation against a Banking Company which had financed the plaintiffs Contention of the plaintiffs(customer) was that land, building and other assets of the plaintiffs there required to be insured under the finance agreement and on Bank's recommendation the plaintiffs obtained insurance from the recommended Insurance Companies which had failed to settle the claims of the plaintiffs in case of fire in their factory and plaintiffs had suffered loss due to non settlement of their insurance claim by the Insurance Companies Plaint of the suit had been structured to implead the Bank as defendant alongwith Insurance Companies Only bridge between the Bank and Insurance' Companies was the purported \"\"recommendation\"\" by the Bank to the plaintiffs to obtain insurance from the said Insurance Companies Insurance Policy was admittedly obtained by the plaintiffs themselves and the premium thereunder was also paid by them ¬Plaintiffs had not shown as to how mere recommendations by the Bank placed the burden of acts and omissions of Insurance Companies upon the Bank Plaintiffs had also failed to plead in the plaint that the recommendation of the Bank could bring into existence any contractual relationship between the Bank and Insurance Companies to make the Bank liable to pay the Insurance Companies upon their failure to settle the insurance claim of the plaintiffs No privities of interest or contract had been proved against the Bank to bring the Bank in the position of Insurance Company or to make the Bank liable to pay damages/ compensation to plaintiffs against the Insurance Companies Insurance Companies were not insurers of the plaintiffs obligations under the finance agreement towards the Bank .Said Companies had extended insurance against losses through fire or otherwise of building, machinery etc. under the contract of insurance between the plaintiffs and the companies Plaintiffs had not been able to show that financial obligations under the finance agreement between them and the Bank were undertaken by the Insurance Companies to be settled by them on default of the plaintiffs Insurance Companies, in circumstances, could not be said to be guarantors or indemnifiers to fall within the definition of \"\"customers\"\" under S.2(c) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ¬Insurance Companies also were not financial institutions in terms of S.2(a) or other provisions of the said Ordinance ¬\"\"Banking Company\"\" or a \"\"customer\"\" could bring a suit against each other for defaults arising out of the \"\"finances \"\" Default agitated in the present plaint thus did not arise out of the finance\"\" Plaintiffs' claim for damages and compensation had not arisen out of the \"\"Finance\"\" and no default under the Insurance Law had been committed by the Bank to indemnify the plaintiffs or to pay their insurance claim or otherwise any damages on that basis ¬Insurance claim was based upon indemnity of the Insurance Companies to the plaintiffs and not to the Bank High Court, in circumstances, had no jurisdiction to proceed with the present suit and pronounce therein Any opinion on the other issues framed in the suit was declined be the High Court lest case of the parties was prejudiced by opinion of the Court, which lacked jurisdiction in the matter Case of the plaintiff fell within the scope of O. VII, R.10, C.P. C. and not within the ambit of R.11 of O. VII, C.P.C. Plaint was ordered to be returned for presenting the same, if so advised, to the Court of competent jurisdiction.\n \nE.F.U. General Insurance Limited v. Chairman, Banking Tribunal No. 1 PLD 2001 Lah. 313 and Messrs United Bank Limited v. Messrs Adamjee Insurance Company Limited 1988 CLC 1660 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No.12 of 2000, decision dated: 14-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "Messrs GRACE TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. and another --Plaintiffs\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and 5 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12917",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3010 = 2003 SLD 3010 = 2003 CLD 1693",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XXI, Rr.64, 65 & 66 Execution of decree through sale of property Mandatory steps to be taken by Court before ordering sale of property by public auction Highlighted ¬Contravention of mandatory provisions of R.66 of O.XXI, C.P.C., would render sale unlawful Principles.\n \nWhere a decree is to be executed and satisfied through sale of immovable property belonging to ¬ debtor, there are three mandatory steps, which the Court in terms of Order 21, Rules 64 to 66 is required to take. Firstly, to pass a specific order for sale of property sought to be sold. Secondly, to appoint the officer who shall conduct sale. Thirdly, to effect the conduct of sale in the manner prescribed, in Order XXI, rule 66, C.P.C.\n \nThe provisions of Rule 66, Order XXI, C.P.C. are mandatory in nature and without settling and causing a proclamation of intended sale in terms of said Rule by the Court itself, no sale shall be considered to have been lawfully made. The word \"\"cause\"\", appearing in Rule 66, Order XXI, C.P.C. requires a specific order of Court, which produces the effect of drawing the proclamation envisaging the terms and conditions of sale. This include the settlement of conditions etc., by Court itself or to approve those filed by parties after hearing them.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.19 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66 Execution of decree by sale of mortgaged property ¬Objection as to sale of property Dismissal of objection petition and confirmation of sale Validity Two requisites of O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C., were met i.e. decision of sale of property and appointment of Court Auctioneer No order of Court available on record as to settlement of terms and conditions of sale and drawing of proclamation Court had not issued notice to debtor for causing of proclamation Decree holder had not filed proposed terms and conditions of sale alongwith execution application or subsequently Court had neither delegated nor could delegate powers to Court Auctioneer to draw terms and conditions and issue proclamation Court Auctioneer, thus, on his own, could not issue proclamation of sale Publication of notice of sale by Court Auctioneer, thus, would be an unauthorised act and of no legal consequence ¬Such sale was void ab initio, which could not be protected by applying principle of avoiding technicalities or that act of Court shall not prejudice any party Such sale was liable to be set aside and could not be confirmed High Court allowed appeal and set aside impugned order and sale in favour of auction purchaser.\n \n2001 CLC 2016; 2000 CLC 1425; PLD 2000 Kar. 186; 2000 CLC 1438; PLD 1987 SC 512 and PLD 1984 SC 146 ref.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.XXI, R.66 Proclamation of sale Essentials Duty of Court to settle proclamation of sale itself Court cannot delegate such power to officer appointed by it Knowledge of party about public notice issued by Court Auctioneer advertising sale would not be a substitute for proclamation envisaged by R.66, O.XXI, C.P.C. Sale made in violation of R 66, O.XXI, C.P.C. would be nullity in eye of law.\n \nBrig. (Retd.) Mazhar ul Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Islamabad and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706 and Appu alias Subramania Patter v. O. Achuta Menon and others AIR 1926 Mad. 755 fol.\n \n(d) Administration of justice \n \n No superstructure or legal rights could be based upon foundation, which was void in nature.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n O.XXI, Rr.65, 66(2)(a) & 90 Execution of decree by sale of property Notice of sale issued by Court Auctioneer not containing accurate and adequate description of property (i.e. exact Khasra numbers of land) Effect Such was a serious and material irregularity in sale of property Sale on such score would be liable to be set aside under O.XXI, R.90, C. P. C.\n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90 Right of interested party to set aside sale Scope Right available to interested party under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. is optional and can be exercised, when he does not have a case for setting aside the sale under O.XXI, P.90, C.P.C., that he should pay 5% over and above purchase money to auction purchaser and get property released Where case of a party is duly covered by O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C., then he cannot be compelled to exercise option under O.XXI, R.89, C. P. C.\n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n S.19 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66 ¬\"\"Power to execute decree in any manner as the Banking Court considers fit\"\" Scope Such power can be exercised, where there is request by decree holder and Court by application of conscious mind comes to conclusion that decree cannot be executed by applying general rules as provided in C.P.C. Where there was no speaking order passed in terms of S.19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, but Court had issued notice to. debtor under O.XXl, R.66, C. P. C. then it would be deemed that Court had intended to execute decree according to provisions of C.P.C., rather than under special law.\n \n(h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----------\n \n O.XXI, R.90 High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol.1, Chap. 12 L, R. 13 Application for setting aside sale ¬Rule 13, Chap. 12 A, Vol.I of High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders requiring raising of objection to sale prior to conduct of sale, but not afterwards Applicability such Rule would have no application where time and date of sale had not at all been fixed by Court and Court Auctioneer had not given any notice to objector about date on which he intended to conduct sale.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.200 of 2002, heard on 1st July, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HASSAN --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD through Branch Manager and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12918",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3011 = 2003 SLD 3011 = 2003 CLD 1703",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -S.9 Claim for recovery of liquidated damages by Bank ¬Validity Plaintiff Bank was not entitled to recover such amount Such claim of Bank being not entertainable was rejected in circumstances.\n \n2001 MLD 1955 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.44 of 2002, Civil Miscellaneous No.362 B of 2003, P.L.A. Nos.100 B, 104 B of 2002 and Civil Miscellaneous No.712 B of 2002, decision dated: 8-07-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Vs.\nMessrs PAK PUNJAB CARPETS and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12919",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3012 = 2003 SLD 3012 = 2003 CLD 1705",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --S.19 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.51 & O.XXI, Rr.37, 38, 39 & 40 Execution of decree through arrest and detention of debtor Provisions of S.51 read with O.XXI, Rr.37, 38, 39 & 40, C.P.C. Applicability Warrant of arrest, issuance of Import and essentials Issuance of warrants without complying with such mandatory provisions of C.P.C., would be offensive not only to such provisions of C.P.C., but also against guarantees enshrined in the Constitution No other law available to prescribe such mode of execution of decree, such provisions of C. P. C. would be attracted to proceedings before Banking Court ¬Holding otherwise would mean that debtor in Banking Court is a lesser citizen not entitled to Constitutional guarantees, which idea is offensive to judicial mind.\n \nPrecision Engineering Ltd and others v. The Grays Leasing Ltd. PLD 2000 Lah. 290; Manhattan Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan and another PLD 2000 Kar. 322; Pakistan through Military Estates Officer, Rawalpindi v. Abdul Aziz and another 2001 CLC 1086 and, Ch. Harpal Sing and others v. Lal Hira Lal AIR 1955 All. 402 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.16661, 16981, 16980 and 20806 of 2001, heard on 20-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR, J",
    "": "MEHBOOB ALAM er\nVs.\nFEDERATION OF PAKSITAN through Secretary Finance and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12920",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3013 = 2003 SLD 3013 = 2003 CLD 1709",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) Art.199 Constitutional petition Maintainability ¬Issuance of demand notice by the financial institute for the amount of loan advanced Validity Such notice cannot be called in question, through filing of Constitutional petition ¬Petition was not maintainable in circumstances.\n \nShagufta Begum v. The Income Tax Officer, Circle ¬XI, Zone B, Lahore PLD 1989 SC 360 and Mir Nabi Bakhsh Khan Khoso v. Branch Manager, National Bank of Pakistan, Jhatpat (Dera Allah Yar) Branch and 3 others 2000 SCMR 1017 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) --\n \n Art. 199 Constitutional petition Maintainability ¬Contractual liability, enforcement of Petitioner availed financial facility from financial institution and executed agreements/ documents of his own free will Effect ¬Enforcement of such agreements/ documents could not be enforced through filing of Constitutional petition Petition was not maintainable in circumstances.\n \nMumtaz Masud's case 1994 SCMR 2287 ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) --\n \n Arts.199 & 203 G Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court Charging of interest (Riba) Past and closed transaction Seeking of declaration of \"\"interest\"\" as un¬ Islamic Validity High Court, in view of Art.203 G of the Constitution had no power or jurisdiction under law to decide the matter.\n \nMuhammad Ramzan v. Citibank N. A. 2001 CLC 158 and Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khaki v. Syed Muhammad Hashim and 8 others PLD 2000 SC 225 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n S. 9 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 ¬Constitutional petition Maintainability Efficacious and adequate remedy Recovery of loan Charging of Riba (interest) Past and closed transaction Petitioner obtained loan from financial institution and failed to repay the same ¬ Financial institution issued demand notice for the recovery of the same Plea raised by the petitioner was that charging of Riba (interest) in demand notice being un Islamic could not be claimed Petitioner further contended that the Financial Institution had not provided statement of accounts as he had already paid the principal amount Validity ¬Although the interest/Riba was un Islamic yet past and closed transaction could not be re opened Petitioner was a 'customer', therefore, he could file a suit for the redressal of his alleged grievance before Banking Court under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 2001, thus efficacious and adequate remedy was available to the petitioner Constitutional petition was hit by Art. 199(l) of the Constitution, therefore, the same was not maintainable High Court directed the petitioner to appear before Manager of the Financial Institution and the Manager was directed to provide facility of instalments and to give benefits/ concessions to the petitioner of the incentive schemes issued by the Financial Institutions off and on ¬Petition was disposed of accordingly.\n \nMumtaz Masud's case 1994 SCMR 2287; Muhammad Ramzan v. Citibank N. A. 2001 CLC 158 and Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khaki v. Syed Muhammad Hashim and 8 others PLD 2000 SC 225 ref.\n \nN.A. Butt for Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.9051 of 2002, decision dated: 29-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Mian ABDUL KHALIQ er\nVs.\nMANAGER, SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12921",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3014 = 2003 SLD 3014 = 2003 CLD 1713",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) -- Ss. 284 & 287 Petition for recall of order sanctioning scheme for amalgamation of companies Objection as to jurisdiction of Court to sanction scheme not raised in the petition High Court ignored such objection.\n \n(b) Pleadings \n \n Grounds not taken in petition could not be allowed to be urged during arguments.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n Ss.282 L, Part VIII A Ss.282 A to 282 M (as added by Companies (Second Amendment) Ordinance (CXXIII of 2002) w.e.f 15 11 2002 & 284 Scheme for amalgamation of non¬ Banking Finance Companies Jurisdiction of High Court ¬Scope Under S.282 L of Companies Ordinance, 1984, for passing resolution approving such scheme, two third majority in value of shareholders was required, while under S.284 thereof, three fourth majority was required ¬Jurisdiction of High Court not taken away by Part VIII A of the Ordinance, but was still intact and could not be considered to have been ousted merely by implication.\n \nAftabuddin Qureshi and another v. Mst. Rachel Joseph and another PLD 2001 SC 482; Muhammad Bashir and 2 others v. Muhammad Firdaus and another PLD 1988 SC 232 and Governor, N.W.F.P. and another v. Gul Naras Khan 1987 SCMR 1709 ref.\n \n(d) Jurisdiction--\n Exclusion of jurisdiction of Court not to be readily inferred Statute should not be construed as to oust or restrict jurisdiction of Court, unless very explicit words are used in statute itself in that behalf Such an intention should not normally be imputed to Legislature.\n \nMuhammad Ismail and others v. The State PLD 1969 SC 241; A. Hamid v. Hussain Hyder, Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan, Lahore and another PLD 1971 Lah. 858; Muhammad Aslam v. The State PLD 1967 Lah. 810 and Raja Maula Dad Khan, Advocate v. West Pakistan Bar Council, Lahore and another PLD 1975 SC 469 rel.\n \n(e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-¬\n \n Ss.284 & 287 Expression \"\"amalgamation\"\" ¬Connotation Such expression includes in its fold an arrangement or compromise between company and its members or class of members for becoming shareholders in another undertaking True effect of amalgamation is that when two companies amalgamate and merge into one, transferor company loses its entity and ceases to have its business.\n \nSaraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. C.I.T. Haryuana, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi II, New Delhi AIR 1991 SC 70 ref.\n \n(f) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-¬\n \n Ss. 284 & 287 Term \"\"arrangement\"\" Connotation Such term is of wide import and cannot be given restricted meanings.\n \nHindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. v: Hindusthan General Electrical Corporation Ltd. AIR 1960 Cal. 637 and In re: Patrakar Prakashan (Pvt.) Ltd. (1997) 13 SCL 33 ref.\n \n(g) Words and phrases-¬\n \n \"\"Amalgamation\"\" Meaning.\n \nWild v. South African Supply and Cold Storage Co. (1904) 2 Ch. 268 and Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., para.1539. ref.\n \n(h) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n Ss.284 & 287 Amalgamation/merger of companies ¬Two or more companies are fused into one by merger i.e. one is absorbed into another All amalgamations/ mergers take effect under Ss.284 & 287 of Companies Ordinance, 1984.\n \n(i) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.284 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of companies ¬Jurisdiction of Court Scope High Court would neither act as a post office or conduit nor view such scheme with a view to find out, whether same was ideal scheme nor pick holes in scheme nor approach scheme in a carping spirit.\n \nIn re: Sidhpur Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1962 Guj. 305 and Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd., Islamabad v. Dhan Fibre Ltd., Rawalpindi PLD 2001 Lah. 230 ref.\n \n(j) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) -\n \n Ss.284 & 287 Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts.117, 118 & 119 Scheme for amalgamation/ merger of companies. Essentials Burden of proof Such scheme must be reasonable, fair, bona fide and for economic benefit of merging companies Onus to prove unreasonableness or unfairness would be on those, who object to such scheme.\n \nHindusthan General Electric Corporation Ltd.'s case AIR 1959 Cal. 679 ref.\n \n(k) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n S.284 Scheme for amalgamation of companies sanctioned by Court Objection of first company was that directors of second company had not disclosed to first company net value of shares of their company Validity ¬Directors had a duty to company and its shareholders No concealment found in balance sheet and Auditor's report ¬Non disclosure of such fact would not detract from scheme in any way.\n \nFederation of Pakistan v. Public at Large 1988 SCMR 2041; Johnson and Philips Pakistan Ltd. v. Shalimar Construction Co. 1991 MLD 841; In re: Lipton (Pakistan) Ltd. and another 1989 CLC 818; Brothers Steel Mills Ltd. and others v. Mian Ilyas Miraj and 14 others PLD 1996 SC 543 and Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore through its Chairman and another v. Mst. Salina Afroze and 2 others PLD 1992 SC 263 ref.\n \n(l) Company \n \n Resolution passed by Board of Directors Validity Such resolution could not override resolution passed by shareholders in general body meeting.\n \n(m) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n Ss.284(2) & 285 Withdrawal/cancellation/revocation of order sanctioning scheme for amalgamation of companies ¬Scope Once an order sanctioning scheme had become effective, same would be binding on all members, creditors and company despite any defect or irregularity No provision for withdrawal, cancellation or revocation of order sanctioning such scheme After sanctioning such scheme, jurisdiction of High Court is confined only to matters detailed in S. 285 of Companies Ordinance, 1984.\n \nPalmers's Company Law, 24th Edn. and Chief Commissioner of Pay Roll Tax v. Group Four Industries Pvt. Ltd. (1984) 1 NSWLR 680 rel.\n \n(n) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n --S.285 Scheme for amalgamation of companies Powers of Court to enforce scheme and make modifications therein ¬Scope High Court is equipped with powers of widest amplitude to give necessary directions to parties to make arrangements for purpose of working of the scheme Court must make attempt to make scheme workable and find out modifications, if any, necessary to make scheme workable ¬Modifications include addition to scheme of amalgamation or omission therefrom for purpose of making same workable.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original No.95 of 2002 and Civil Miscellaneous Nos.215/L and 225/L of 2003, decision dated: 12-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, J",
    "": "CAPITAL ASSETS LEASING CORPORATION LTD. er\nVs.\nINTERNATIONAL MULTI LEASING CORPORATION LTD. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12922",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3015 = 2003 SLD 3015 = 2003 CLD 1729",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- Ss. 7, 18 &, 21 Lease of assets (machinery) on rentals ¬Default in payment of monthly rental by the lessee Suit for recovery was decreed by the Banking Court in the terms that, in case of default the entire decretal amount shall become due and payable at once and defendant shall be liable to return lease equipments to the plaintiff forthwith ¬Contention was that order by the Banking Court directing the return of the lease assets was unjust and inequitable ¬Validity Banking Court could not confer title or ownership of the leased assets when the agreement between the parties stipulated that title, ownership and right of property shall at all times remain vested in Modaraba and that at the end of the lease term the leased property would be returned by the lessee in good operating condition and working order Said agreement did not even bind the Modaraba to enter into agreement for sale of the leased property to the lessee Agreements, in the present case, was not claimed to be voidable on the ground of having been obtained through undue influence nor void for being opposed to public policy.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil First Appeal No.44 of 1998, decision dated: 6th March 1999.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND RANA BHAGWANDAS, JJ",
    "": "TECHNO POWERGEN (PVT.) LTD and others --Appellants\nVs.\nAL ZAMIN LEASING MODARABA MANAGEMENT (PVT.) LTD. and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12923",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3016 = 2003 SLD 3016 = 2003 CLD 1734",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (LXVII of 1984) S. 254 Security and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969), S.34(4) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 ¬Constitutional petition Appointment of external auditor ¬Prescribing additional qualifications for auditors ¬Jurisdiction of Security and Exchange Corporation of Pakistan Directive was issued by Security Exchange Corporation of Pakistan whereby certain restrictions were imposed on appointment of external auditors Petitioner being member of Institute of the Chartered Accountants was aggrieved of the said directive Plea raised by the petitioner was that classification which had been made by the Security Exchange Corporation of Pakistan and by Stock Exchanges was violative of S.254 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 Validity Statutory provision under S.254 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, is couched in language which is negative and merely sets out the minimum qualification for an auditor in case of public company which may or may not be a listed company Nothing is contained in S.254 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, prohibiting the Security and Exchange Corporation of Pakistan or a Stock Exchange or for that matter any other private or public body from prescribing additional conditions for the appointment of auditors Stock Exchanges being independent entities incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 are competent to frame their own listing regulations Power to frame regulations is expressly conferred on Stock Exchanges under S.34(1) of Security and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, the only restriction being that the regulations must have prior approval of Security and Exchange Corporation of Pakistan and must be consistent with the rules framed under the provisions of Security and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 Security and Exchange Corporation of Pakistan through its directive had imposed only an additional qualification on such members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants as were desirous of being appointed as external auditors of listed companies ¬No conflict existed between the directive and the provisions of S.254 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 High Court declined to interfere with the directive passed by the Authorities Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Security and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969) \n \n Preamble Companies Ordinance (LXVII of 1984), Preamble Import, object and scope Companies Ordinance, 1984, is a general law which has been enacted for the purpose of regulating all matters relating generally to all types of companies including listed companies Scope of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, is much more limited and is confined to matters such as Stock Exchanges and the listing of companies by such Exchanges.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (LXVII of 1984) \n \n S.254 Security and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969), S. 34(4) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.18 & 25---¬Appointment of external auditor Prescribing additional qualifications for auditors Directive was issued by Security Exchange Corporation of Pakistan whereby certain restrictions were imposed on appointment of external auditors Petitioner being member of Institute of Chartered Accountants was aggrieved of the directive Plea raised by the petitioner was that the directive was in conflict with the provisions of Arts. 18 & 25 of the Constitution, as the same had imposed restriction on ability of petitioner to engage in his profession as Chartered Accountant and also because it was discriminatory Validity Neither any impermissible restriction was imposed on the petitioner nor he was subjected to any invidious discrimination Petitioner could always act as an external auditor of a listed company by obtaining requisite certification from the Institute of Chartered Accountants, on meeting the standards prescribed by the Institute for satisfactory rating under its Quality Control Review Programme Plea was repelled in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3582 of 2003, heard on 25-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD KALEEM RATHORE er\nVs.\nINSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS through President and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12924",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3017 = 2003 SLD 3017 = 2003 CLD 1740",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- Ss.14 & 10 Finance facility against, inter alia, the security of mortgage by way of title deed on property comprising a house to cover the amount of the facility Suit for recovery of the amount by the financial institution ¬Applications for leave to defend by the defendants were dismissed by the Banking Court anti decree for the recovery of amount with costs and future mark up jointly and severally was passed against all the defendants (Directors of the Company) Contentions of the debtors were that facility accorded in term of letter dated 9 6 1996 issued by the Financial Institution was valid up to 30 4 1997 and the appellant (Director of the Company) had resigned from the directorship of the Company on 2 7 1997 and had neither guaranteed nor was party to any subsequent facility granted to the Company by the Financial Institution as such he was not bound to discharge any liabilities of the Company existing at the date of filing the suit Validity ¬Appellant (Director of the Company) had executed a continuing letter of guarantee whereby he assumed full responsibility for the liabilities of the Principal in terms of the facility (including mark up) and covenanted that it would remain in full force and effect until determined as to future transactions through a prior notice from the guarantor but would remain fully effective in respect of any liabilities incurred by the Principal prior to such notice Suit was decreed only to the extent of the amount of the facility granted as a result of negotiations with the appellant as a Director of the Company and one year mark up at the agreed rate Nothing was available to indicate that the appellant served any notice upon the Financial Institute and in any event the liability related to a period prior to his resignation Contention of the appellant was repelled in circumstances.\n \n(b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) --\n \n S.58(f) Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S.17 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss.14 & 10 Mortgage by deposit of title deeds Equitable mortgage Requirement of registration Contention was that the mortgage could not be enforced inasmuch as no transfer of interest had taken place and the memorandum of deposit of title deed was written merely on a document containing stamp paper of Rs.30 and had not been duly registered Validity ¬Document purporting to transfer immovable property was required to be registered, nevertheless S.58(f), provided that there was no requirement of execution of a document for the purposes of creating an equitable mortgage which could be effected by mere deposit of title deed with the mortgagee-¬Memorandum in question did not purport to create a mortgage but only confirmed the factum of the deposit of title deeds relating to the property Such a memorandum confirming a deposit having been made in the past, did not require registration.\n \nAbdul Aziz Ghafoor Khan and another v. Commerce Bank Limited PLD 1978 Kar. 36 and Muhammad Farooq Khan v. Sulleman Punjwani and others PLD 1977 Kar. 88 rel.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss.14 & 10 Transfer of Property. Act (IV of 1882), S.58(7) Finance facility against inter alia the security of mortgage by way of title deeds on property comprising a house to cover the amount of facility Original facility extended by the Financial Institute was got enhanced by the debtor company Suit for recovery of the amount .by the Financial Institute Applications for leave to defend by the defendants were dismissed by the Banking Court ,and decree for the recovery of the amount with costs and future mark up jointly and severally was passed against all the defendants (Directors of the Companies) Contention of the appellant (one of the Directors) who had deposited the title deed was that the original memorandum of deposit of title deed was executed at the time when the initial facility was granted and subsequently when the facility was sought to be enhanced the appellant executed the declaration conveying his no objection to the mortgage of the property in consideration of extension of any finance facility by the Financial Institute and the Financial Institute, at the time of enhancing the facility had not required the appellant to execute a fresh mortgage, therefore, appellant could only be confined to the amount of initial facility and not to the extent of the amount of enhanced facility -Validity When the enhanced facility was obtained by the appellant representing the Company, collateral of property in question being described as a security for the facility, the appellant could not be allowed to assert that the mortgage could not be treated as security for the facility.\n \n(d) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) --\n \n S.58 Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S.17 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss.14 & 10 Mortgage ¬Requirement of registration Scope When a mortgage or other form of transfer of property is effected through an instrument in writing, the same is compulsorily registrable, however, when a written document merely records a transfer having been made in the past no such registration is required.\n \nUnited Bank of India v. Azirannessa Bewa PLD 1965 SC 274 and Muslim Commercial Bank v. Malik & Company 2002 CLD 606 ref.\n \n(e) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) --\n \n S.58(7), proviso as added by Finance Act (I of 1986), S. 2 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss.14 & 10 ¬Mortgage by deposit of title deeds in favour of Banking Company Contention was that in view of the proviso added to S.58(f), Transfer of Property Act, 1882 by Finance Act, 1986, S.2, the equitable mortgage in favour of Banking Company could only be executed if the deposit of the title deeds was accompanied by an entry in the record of rights against the entry relating to such immovable property but in the present case, no such entry having been made there was no completed mortgage of immovable property ¬Validity Proviso to S.58(f), Transfer of Property Act, 1882 only stipulated an additional method of creation of equitable mortgage in favour of a Banking Company without affecting the existing modes of creation of such mortgages -Contention was repelled.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.95 of 2000, heard on 29-08-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, JJ",
    "": "ZAFAR MEHMOOD SHAIKH --Appellant\nVs.\nPRUDENTIAL DISCOUNT AND GUARANTEE HOUSE LIMITED and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12925",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3018 = 2003 SLD 3018 = 2003 CLD 1749",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XLI, Rr.5 & 8 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) Stay of execution Deposit of half of decretal amount Suit for recovery of Bank loan was decreed after dismissal of application for leave to appear and defend the suit During pendency of appeal, the debtor sought stay of execution of decree High Court allowed the stay of execution, with a condition to deposit half of the decretal amount Plea raised by the debtor was that Manager of the Bank had unauthorisedly misappropriated amounts from his accounts and was later on dismissed from service on such act thus the Banking Court had wrongly dismissed his application for leave to defend the suit Validity If the Manager was found quality of misappropriation of the amount, the debtor prima facie would not be liable to pay the amount Order of High Court regarding deposit of amount was suspended and execution proceedings were stayed Petition was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1340 L of 2002 in Civil Petition No.3172 L of 2001, decision dated: 22-08-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHEIKH, J",
    "": "Messrs ROYAL ENGINEER and others ers\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12926",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3019 = 2003 SLD 3019 = 2003 CLD 1751",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.10, 17 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.12(2), 151 & O.XIII, R.2 Suit by Bank for recovery of loan amount Banking Court dismissed leave application and. decreed suit due to absence of defendant on 30 10 2001, when only application of Bank under O.XIII, R.2, C.P.C., was fixed for hearing Defendant's application under S.12(2), C.P.C., for setting aside of / decree was dismissed by Banking Court being incompetent ¬Validity Neither suit nor leave application had been called for hearing on 30 10 2001 Rather only application of Bank seeking permission to produce additional documents was to be taken up for hearing on such date Order of dismissal of subsequent application showed that matter had been approached in a manner as if only a formality was being completed, which was not in consonance with law Mere mentioning of wrong provision of law would not make any lis incompetent - Such matter had to be dealt with under S.151, C.P.C., which incidentally found mention in the title of application under S.12(2), C.P.C. Banking Court had acted without lawful authority while passing impugned and decree High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned / decree, resultantly application filed by Bank under O:XIII, R.2, C.P.C., and leave application alongwith suit would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court.\n \nQazi Muhammad Tariq v. Hasin Jahan and 3 others 1993 SCMR 1949 rel.\n \n(b) Administration of justice",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.405 of 2002, heard on 21st July, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "DELTA WEAVERS (PVT.) LIMITED through Director and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12927",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3020 = 2003 SLD 3020 = 2003 CLD 1754",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --O. VI, Rr.1, 14 & 15 Signing and verification of pleading Essentials Word pleading\"\" means plaint or written statement Body of plaint not separate from its verification Verification is part and parcel of plaint Plaint as well as verification has to be signed by the same party.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n -S.9(1) Suit filed by Bank Non placing on record copy of special resolution or power of attorney authorising person, who signed the plaint Effect In absence of any material available on record, Court could not presume that such person had been duly authorized by Banking Company to file the suit.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss.9(1) & 7 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, R.15 & O.XXIX, R.1 Suit filed by Bank Verification, on plaint not done by authorized officer Effect Suit could not be dismissed due to defect of verification on plaint Omission to verify pleading by authorized officer would neither give rise to any penal consequences nor render the plaint absolutely void or a nullity, rather same was simply an irregularity Signing, verification and drafting of plaint in a particular manner were matter of mere procedure, thus, relevant provisions could not be strictly construed.\n \n(d) Interpretation of statutes -\n \n Mandatory provision Important test for showing that certain proceedings were a nullity, was to show that mandatory provisions of law had been violated.\n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss. 9(1) & 7 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, Rr.14, 15 & O.XXIX, R.1 Defective signing or presentation of plaint by a person not holding authority/power of attorney Not violation of any specific provision of law ¬Such presentation or signing could not make plaint a nullity¬ Rules regarding verification and signatures on plaint, being matter relating to procedure, were to be liberally construed.\n \nRam Labhaya Mal and another v. Firm Chanchal Singh Jaswant Singh AIR 1932 Lah. 28; Wali Muhammad Khan v. Ishak Ali Khan and others AIR 1931 All. 507; Tula Ram Chaudhari v. B. Debi Datt Chaudhari AIR (36) All. 498; Bundi Portland Cement Ltd. v. Abdul Hussein Essaji AIR 1936 Bom. 418; Commerce Bank Ltd., Karachi v: Habib Bakhsh and another PLD 1978 Quetta 45 and Shafiq Metal Works and 5 others v. The Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd., Gujranwala PLD 1973 Note 33 at p.41 ref.\n \n(f) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss. 9 & 15 Suit for recovery of loan amount decreed by Banking Court Validity Statement of account annexed with plaint was not in accordance with agreement executed by parties Mark up had been charged over mark up, which Bank under law could not charge Statement of account did not show date of payment of loan amount and charging of mark up Fresh statement of accounts furnished by the Bank also showed charging of interest @ 19% rendering the same doubtful No reliance could be placed on such statement of account, unless and until all its entries were proved by Bank High Court allowed appeal; set aside /decree and remanded case to Banking Court with directions to record evidence of parties about all entries of statement of accounts and then decide same afresh within specified period.\n \n(g) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss.9 & 7 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.20 Suit for recovery of loan amount by Bank Territorial jurisdiction of Banking Court at place \"\"P\"\" Factory of borrower was situated at place \"\"S\"\" Amounts were withdrawn and deposited at place \"\"P\"\" Held: Banking Court at place \"\"P\"\" would have jurisdiction to entertain such suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No. 109 of 1999, decision dated: 30-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "TALAAT QAYYUM QURESHI, J",
    "": "MEHMOOD KHAN --Appellant\nVs.\nMAKMA STEEL CRAFT (PVT.) LTD. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12928",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3021 = 2003 SLD 3021 = 2003 CLD 1764",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --Ss.10, 314 & 333 Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3 Winding up proceedings Plot allotted to company was cancelled by Authority (LDA) after its sale by Official Liquidator Direction of Company Judge to Authority to give effect in its record to sale deed to be executed, by official liquidator in favour of auction purchaser Intra Court Appeal against such order by Authority (LDA) ¬ Maintainability Company Judge had passed impugned order after passing of winding up order Intra Court Appeal was incompetent in circumstances.\n \nI.C.A. No.14 L of 2001; C.P.L.A. No.765 L of 2002; Agha Fakhruddin Khan v. Messrs Ruby Rice and General Mills Ltd. and others 2001 YLR 1797 and M. Suleman & Co. through Managing Partner v. Joint Official Liquidators and another 1997 CLC 260 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Intra Court Appeal No.4 L of 2002, decided December, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PERVAIZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Lahore High Court DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Lahore High Court through its Director General, L.D.A. and another --Appellants\nVs.\nINVESTMENT CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN, Karachi High Court and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12929",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3022 = 2003 SLD 3022 = 2003 CLD 1767",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) -- S.305 Winding-up of company Locus standi Petitioner was employee of the respondent Company and was also involved to another business Effect Petition was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous No.8 of 2 002, decision dated: 19-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, J",
    "": "EJAZ HASSAN er\nVs.\nSYNECTIV PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12930",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3023 = 2003 SLD 3023 = 2003 CLD 1770",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --Ss.7, 9, 10 & 21 Suit for recovery of amount ¬Application for leave to defend suit Dismissal Defendant filed appeal against of Banking Court whereby its application for grant of permission to appear and defend the suit was dismissed Availing of financial assistance and execution of documents by defendant in favour of Bank had not been denied by the defendant Grievance of defendant in main was that entries reflecting in statement of accounts were fictitious and bogus and that mark up claimed by Bank ran contrary to contracted rate etc. Defendant had not been able to point out any wrong or bogus entry in the statement of accounts, creating doubt in one's mind regarding its authenticity Statements of accounts had been prepared in accordance with Bank record and it had been verified as required by law Mark up had been duly highlighted in sanction advice and it had been charged at contracted rate Mere assertion of defendant that loan was without mark up or that rate of mark up claimed by plaintiff ¬Bank was exorbitant, without positive attempt on part of defendant to substantiate same, was of no consequence ¬Contention that plaint had not been filed by a competent person, was repelled as plaint had been duly verified and affirmed on Oath by Manager of plaintiff Bank Other objections raised by defendant were of no importance ¬Banking Court having dealt with matter in a proper manner, well reasoned and decree passed by Banking Court was unexceptional and hardly called for interference in appeal before High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No.54 of 2001, decision dated: 3rd April, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR UL MULK AND IJAZ UL HASSAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AIMA INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. and others --Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12931",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3024 = 2003 SLD 3024 = 2003 CLD 1774",
    "Key Words:": "Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980) -- Ss.3 & 4 Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.), R. 731 Arrest of vessel Confirmation Monetary dispute between the parties Documents relied upon by the plaintiff were alleged by the defendant to be forged Effect Parties were litigating all over the world and each side was trying to gain advantage over the other Prima facie no case had been made out by plaintiff for confirmation of order of arrest of the disputed vessel Application was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Admiralty Suits Nos.61 and 62 of 2002, decision dated: 20-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, J",
    "": "Messrs ABDOUN OIL COMPANY S.A. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nM.T. CAMARO PRIDE and another ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12932",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3025 = 2003 SLD 3025 = 2003 CLD 1779",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss.6 & 9 Suit for recovery of lea8e finance Bank claimed overdue lease money, additional lease rentals and agreed loss value of leased equipment Banking Tribunal decreed the suit, but declined to allow amount of agreed loss value Validity Amount of agreed loss value was meant only to secure Bank against any loss or damage to leased equipment Bank had not alleged any loss or damage to the leased equipment Banking Tribunal had rightly not allowed such amount High Court dismissed the appeal.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6 Suit for recovery of lease finance Claim for refund of security deposit by defendant Validity Security deposit was equivalent to residual value of leased equipment as set out in lease agreements Residual value of leased equipment was recoverable by Bank, in case defendant opted to retain the same Defendant could claim refund of security deposit, .if he opted to return leased equipment to Bank Statement of account filed by Bank did not show that such amount had been credited towards lease rentals ¬Defendant had already exercised its option to retain leased equipment, thus, Bank was entitled to adjust amount of security deposit towards residual value of leased equipment.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No.326 of 1996, heard on 11-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "ORIX LEASING PAKISTAN LIMITED through Attorney --Appellant\nVs.\nNEW MALIK FOUNDRY AND ENGINEERING WORKS and 5 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12933",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3026 = 2003 SLD 3026 = 2003 CLD 1779",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss.6 & 9 Suit for recovery of lea8e finance Bank claimed overdue lease money, additional lease rentals and agreed loss value of leased equipment Banking Tribunal decreed the suit, but declined to allow amount of agreed loss value Validity Amount of agreed loss value was meant only to secure Bank against any loss or damage to leased equipment Bank had not alleged any loss or damage to the leased equipment Banking Tribunal had rightly not allowed such amount High Court dismissed the appeal.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6 Suit for recovery of lease finance Claim for refund of security deposit by defendant Validity Security deposit was equivalent to residual value of leased equipment as set out in lease agreements Residual value of leased equipment was recoverable by Bank, in case defendant opted to retain the same Defendant could claim refund of security deposit, .if he opted to return leased equipment to Bank Statement of account filed by Bank did not show that such amount had been credited towards lease rentals ¬Defendant had already exercised its option to retain leased equipment, thus, Bank was entitled to adjust amount of security deposit towards residual value of leased equipment.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No.326 of 1996, heard on 11-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "ORIX LEASING PAKISTAN LIMITED through Attorney --Appellant\nVs.\nNEW MALIK FOUNDRY AND ENGINEERING WORKS and 5 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12934",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3027 = 2003 SLD 3027 = 2003 CLD 1783",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.22 Stay by Appellate Court Failure to comply with the direction of Appellate Court Appellants had filed stay application against execution proceedings alongwith appeal Appellate Court directed the appellants to deposit a sum of Rs.20,00,000 but they failed to comply with the direction of the Appellate Court Effect Such order of the Appellate Court was only confined to the stay of execution of decree and if the appellants had not deposited the amount, the execution could be carried on but no mala fides could be attributed to the appellants in circumstances.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n Ss.19 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90 Appeal Sale of mortgaged property, setting aside of Grievance of debtor was that no sale was conducted at the site and all the proceedings in that behalf were fictitious and fraudulent Executing Court without framing of issues just on auction report dismissed the objection Validity Such question could not be resolved by the Executing Court without framing of issues and enabling' the parties to produce evidence Executing Court could not have rejected the objections of debtor just on the basis of auction report Sale' was set aside and the case was remanded to Executing Court with a direction to decide objection petition after framing of issues and .recording of evidence produced by parties Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n S.19 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90 ¬Setting aside of sale Inadequacy of sale price Bank at the time of mortgage of the property had got the property evaluated for a sum of Rs.1,04,27,000 but subsequently the reserve price was fixed for an amount of Rs.4,500,000 without taking the Executing Court in confidence and the property was sold for Rs.46,00,000 Validity Mere inadequacy of sale price by itself was no ground for setting aside the sale Executing Court should have considered the sale on the basis of some material placed on record by the Bank to justify that the reserve price fixed was adequate and justified which apparently was not done Sale was set aside in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.79 of 2003, heard on 12-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs A.M. RICE CORPORATION through Sole Proprietor and another --Appellants\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Branch Manager and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12935",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3028 = 2003 SLD 3028 = 2003 CLD 1788",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.I, R.10 & O.XXII, R.4 Impleading legal heirs of deceased defendant as party to suit under O.I, R.10 & O.XXII, R.4, C.P.C. Criteria different.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --\n \n O.XXII, R.4 Suit against dead person Validity Such defect could not be cured by bringing his legal heirs on record in terms of O.XXII, R.4, C.P.C.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --\n \n O.I, R.10 & O.XXII, R.4 Suit against dead person for recovery of amount due against him Validity Such amount, if subject to other legal limitations, could be recovered from his legal heir(s), then independent of requirement. Of O.XXII, R.4, C.P.C., his legal heirs could be joined as party to suit in a similar manner as if when a proposed defendant to a suit had died before institution of suit, then such suit could be brought against him through his legal heirs.\n \nMuhammad Yousaf v. Syed Ghayyur Hussain Shah and 5 others 1993 SCMR 1185 rel..\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n-- S. 9 Civil procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10 & O.VI, R.17 Suit for recovery of loan amount Factum of demise of mortgagor defendant prior to filing of suit came into knowledge of Bank from leave to defend application filed by other defendants Applications by Bank seeking to implead legal heirs of deceased mortgagor and make corresponding amendments in plaint were dismissed by Banking Court ¬Validity After demise of mortgagor defendant, whatever right she had in mortgaged property, same had devolved upon her legal heirs Request of Bank for joining legal heirs in suit as necessary and proper party within scope of O.I, R.10, C.P.C. was legal and tenable Corresponding amendments sought to be made in plaint were neither going to change nature or character of suit nor by such amendments any prejudice was likely to be caused to opposite party Impugned orders were suffering from illegality and material irregularity and without jurisdiction ¬High Court accepted revision petitions and set aside impugned orders.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n Ss.22(6) & 27 Revision application against order/ of Banking Court Scope In view of bar of filing review, revision or appeal against interlocutory order and finality attached to order/ of Banking Court under S.27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, revision application might not be maintainable against such order/ .\n \nMst. Afshan Ahmed v. Habib Bank Ltd. 2002 CLD 137; Central Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Atlas BOT Lease Co. Ltd and 2 others 1998 SCMR 2352; Bolan Bank Ltd. v. Capricorn Enterprise (Pvt.) Ltd. 1998 SCMR 1961; Pakistan Fisheries Ltd., Karachi and others v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109; Muhammad Ayub Butt v. Allied Bank Ltd. PLD 1981 SC 359 and Shah Jewana Textile Mills v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 2000 Lah. 162 ref.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n Ss.2(b), 5 & 7 .Findh Courts Act (VII of 1926), S.8 High Courts (Establishment) Order (8 of 1970), Art.3 Judge of Sindh High Court while dealing with matter under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 --¬Jurisdiction Nature Such Judge acts as Banking Court and not in its ordinary jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision Applications Nos.2 and 3 of 2002, decision dated: 2-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs HABIB BANK LIMITED --Applicant\nVs.\nMessrs INDUS LENENTOSE (PVT.) LTD. and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12936",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3029 = 2003 SLD 3029 = 2003 CLD 1797",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) -- Art.199 Constitutional petition Judgment not pronounced within 90 days after hearing the arguments ¬Matter was posted for rehearing.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.XXXI, Rr. 1 & 2 Suit by trustees Trustee not willing to join as a plaintiff can always be arrayed as defendant.\n \nLuke v. South Kensington Hotel (1874) 80 All. ER 1293 fol.\n \n(c) Composition --\n \n Interested party could not be bound by a composition operating to his detriment made in his absence.\n \n(d) Trusts Act (II of 1882) \n \n S.13 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXI, Rr.1 & 2 ¬Constitutional petition involving trust property Parties to such petition Suit involving trust property must be filed by all trustees or all of them should be joined therein Such condition of procedural law would not necessarily apply to petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution Strict legal right in respect of trust property only vests in trustees acting jointly.\n \n(e) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) --\n \n Art.199 Constitutional petition Locus standi Strict legal right need not be shown for maintaining Constitutional petition Sufficient legal interest in subject¬ matter would be enough to confer locus standi upon petitioner.\n \nFazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust PLD 1969 SC 223 fol.\n \n(f) Banking Companies Ordinance (L VII of 1962) \n \n S. 41 Trusts Act (II of 1882), S.13 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Constitutional petition Freezing of Bank accounts of Trust Constitutional petition by one of they trustees Maintainability Strict legal right needs not be shown for maintaining Constitutional petition Sufficient legal interest in subject matter would be enough to confer locus standi upon petitioner No conflict of interest amongst trustees Outcome of such petition was not likely to have any prejudicial effect on interest of any one of them Petitioner being one of the trustees, in whom trust property vested and was entitled to operate accounts alongwith other co trustee was held to have sufficient interest to maintain Constitutional petition.\n \nFazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust PLD 1969 SC 223 fol.\n \n(g) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) --\n \n Art.199(1)(a) Banks Nationalization Act (XIX of 1974), S. 3(a) & (b) Constitutional petition against Banking Company Maintainability Respondent company operating .under Banks Nationalization Act, 1.974 was substantially owned and controlled by Federal Government Such company could , be classified as a person performing functions in connection with affairs of Federation, thus, was amenable to Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court.\n \n(h) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) --\n \n S.41 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 199(1)(a)(c), 23 & 24 Freezing of Bank accounts by Banking Company at, directions of State Bank of Pakistan Constitutional petition against such act of Banks by petitioner seeking enforcement of his Constitutional rights guaranteed under Arts.23 & 24 of the Constitution Maintainability Special distinction existed in language used in cls. (a) & (c) of Art.199 of the Constitution Not necessary under Art. 199(c) of the Constitution that person to whom directions were to be given, must necessarily be one performing functions in connection with affairs of Federation, a Province or a local authority Banking Company was bound by any direction of State Bank issued in exercise of statutory powers under S.41 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 State Bank was amenable to jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution and legality of its directions issued in purported exercise of statutory powers could always be examined in such proceedings Such directions, if found to be unlawful, then Banking Company would be bound to perform its obligation towards customers in accordance with law.\n \n(i) Administration of justice \n \n Relief, grant, of Scope Court can always modify relief or grant some relief, which has not been prayed for, provided Court has jurisdiction to do so.\n \nSharaf Faridi v. Province of Sindh PLD 1989 Kar 404 fol.\n \n(j) Banker and customer \n \n -Deposits in a Bank account create only lender and borrower relationship between customer and Bank.\n \nFoley v. Fletcher 1843 1860 AER 953; London Joint Stock Bank v. McMillan and another 1918 19 AER 330 fol.\n \n(k) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) \n \n S.41 United Nations (Security Council) Act, 1948; S.2 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 23, 24 & 199 Anti¬ Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 11 B, 11 C, 11 E, 11 H, 11 I, 11 J & 25 Constitutional petition Freezing of Bank accounts of Trust at directions of State Bank of Pakistan on alleged complicity of Trust in terrorist activities Validity ¬Neither possible nor proper for High Court to form independent opinion as regards such allegation No action against petitioner or his co trustee had been taken under Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 In presence of such special law dealing with suppression of terrorism and conferring powers to freeze accounts reasonably suspected of being used for promotion of terrorist activities, resort to general provision to issue any direction to Banking Company in public interest would be entirely unwarranted When resort to general law would deprive affected party of right to seek review or appeal' to High Court, then such action would be treated as mala fide in law Resolution of Security Council of United Nations, particularly one adversely affecting fundamental rights of citizen, would not operate by its own force, unless given effect to by Federal Government by \"\"order published in official Gazette\"\" No such order of Government was placed on record No material of alleged suspicion of financing terrorist activities had been conveyed nor petitioner had been afforded opportunity to confront the same Such direction under S.41 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 could not withstand test of reasonableness contemplated by Art.23 of the Constitution and could not be sustained on touchstone of Art.24 of the Constitution as no compensation for deprivation of use of property had been .offered to the Trust Such direction could not be upheld on yardstick of Art.23 of the Constitution as right to use or dispose of property had not been subjected to a reasonable restriction imposed by law in public interest Impugned direction had been issued beyond purview of lawful powers of the State Bank of Pakistan High Court allowed Constitutional petition and declared impugned directions as without lawful authority and of no legal effect with directions to Banking Company to honour cheque of the petitioner.\n \nFederation of Pakistan v. Mushtaq Ali Mian PLD 1999 SC 1026; Muhammad Hussain and others v. State Bank' of Pakistan and another C.P.D. No.1786 of 1998; Universal Leasing Corporation v. State Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 102 and Council of Civil Services Union v. Minister for Civil Service (1984) 3 AER 935 ref.\n \n(l) United Nations (Security Council) Act, 1948 \n \n S.2 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.23 Resolution of Security Council of United Nations Not given effect to by Federal Government by \"\"order published in the official Gazette\"\" Validity Such resolution, particularly one adversely affecting fundamental rights of citizen, would not operate by its own force.\n \n(m) Anti Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997) \n \n Preamble Terrorism is a fast going phenomena Making laths and taking appropriate measures by all civilized States within their Constitutional system to combat terrorism would be in larger public interest.\n \n(n) Public International Law \n \n International obligations to the State ought to be duly honoured.\n \n(o) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) \n \n S.41(1) State Bank of Pakistan Act (XXXIII) of 1956), S.27 Powers of State Bank to give directions to any Banking Company Scope Such powers must necessarily be confined to areas specifically relatable to basic functions of State Bank under State Bank of Pakistan, Act, 1956 and regulatory power available to same in respect of Scheduled Banks under Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 Clause (a) of , S.41(1) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 must be read ejusdem generis with powers under cls. (b) & (c) thereof Directions in public interest can ,only be issued to protect interest of Banking Company and its depositor and to secure proper management of company State Bank does not have any unbridled powers to issue any direction in any area of public interest, particularly when law requires some other agency to do so.\n \n(p) Administrative of justice \n \n Natural justice, principles of Applicability Action in emergency situation Action in such situation might be required to be taken without affording an opportunity of prior hearing to affected party Such defect could be cured by providing a subsequent hearing.\n \n(q) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art.23 Right to acquire, hold and dispose of property ¬Imposition of restrictions on such right Validity ¬Restrictions on Legislature power and action taken thereunder are laid down in the Constitution itself Such right can be regulated only through reasonable restrictions imposed by law in public interest Both validity of law and action taken become justifiable from standpoint of reasonableness as well as public interest If restriction to hold property imposed by law is found reasonable, Court would uphold the same.\n \n(r) Judicial Review \n \n Measures taken in respect of National Security ¬Constraints on power of judicial review enforced in U. K. are not applicable to the Constitutional system in Pakistan ¬Such measures in U. K., belong to area of Royal prerogatives and Courts are not inclined to sit in , the moment a nexus with national security is shown No prerogative in Pakistan exists and all public power has to be exercised in accordance with Constitution and law.\n \n(s) Banker and customer \n \n Bank account Rights and obligations of Bank and depositor Scope When a depositor opens an account with a Bank, there is always an implied contract to the effect that Bank would enable him to withdraw such moneys, which he desires subject to, specified condition of the contract Rights and obligations under such contract may be impaired by an overriding law, but executive directives of State Bank cannot be allowed to affect concluded contract.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.D 2537 of 2001, decision dated: 4-08-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND ZIA PERWEZ, JJ",
    "": "SULEMAN and others ers\nVs.\nMANAGER, DOMESTIC BANKING, HABIB BANK LTD. and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12937",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3030 = 2003 SLD 3030 = 2003 CLD 1822",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---O.XLV, R.4 & S.151 Consolidation of proceedings-¬Inherent powers of the Court No express provisions for consolidation of proceedings existed except under the provisions of O.XLV, R.4, C.P.C., for a specific purpose of pecuniary valuation and not for any other purpose Court had inherent power to consolidate the proceedings, provided other conditions were available.\n \nIndustrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. National Engineering Works and others 1983 MLD 1344 and Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 326 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.7 Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S.39 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151 Consolidation of proceedings by Banking Court ¬Scope Civil Court or Tribunal, in absence of express provision in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, was deemed to possess inherent power in its very constitution, which was necessary to do the right and undo a wrong in the course of the administration of justice Provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 had been made applicable only for the matters in respect to which the procedure had not been provided for in the Ordinances Court had inherent power to determine as to how its proceedings should be conducted.\n \nNaresh Mohan Thakur and others v. Brij Mohan Misra and others AIR 1933 PC 43 ref.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.7 Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S.39 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151 Consolidation of proceedings Inherent power of Court Scope Court, in the absence of express provisions, had inherent power, ex debito justitiae, to consolidate the proceedings.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n --Ss.7, 22 & 27 Jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Nature and scope Such jurisdiction is Bunking jurisdiction' and while exercising the jurisdiction the High Court bears the fictional character, of a Banking Court' as defined in the Ordinance Judgment and orders passed by a Banking Court cannot be assailed before any forum except in accordance with the provisions of S.22, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Principles.\n \nThe jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under the Ordinance is Banking jurisdiction and while exercising .such jurisdiction the High Court bears the fictional character of a Banking Court' as defined: in the Ordinance. It' is a fundamental rule that where an enactment creates a new jurisdiction, prescribes the manner in which that jurisdiction is to be exercised and further specifies the remedy, such remedy is exclusive and the party aggrieved of an order made in exercise of that jurisdiction must seek only such remedy and not others. The jurisdiction conferred by the Ordinance on the forums created thereunder, seems to have been jealously guarded by the Legislature. By virtue of subsection (4) of section 7 in all matters to which under the Ordinance, the jurisdiction of the Banking Court extends, no Court other than the Special Court can have jurisdiction to deal therewith. Furthermore, section 27 attaches finality to the orders and categorically lays down that subject to provision for appeal under section 22, no Court or other authority shall revise, review or permit to be called in question any proceeding, , decree, sentence or order of Banking Court or legality or propriety of anything done or intended to be done by the Banking Court, save the correction of any clerical or typographical mistakes in any , decree and sentence passed by it. Evidently, the Legislature in its anxiety to protect the orders of Banking Court, has gone to the extent of ordaining that no. Authority other than the appellate forum specified in section 22, shall even allow to throw a challenge to the validity of such order. Combined effect of these provisions is that and orders passed by a Banking Court cannot be assailed before any forum except in accordance with the provisions of section 22.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.22 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Interim order Appeal Constitutional petition before High Court ¬Maintainability Statute excluding a right of appeal from the interim order cannot be bypassed by bringing under attack such interim order in Constitutional jurisdiction Party affected has to wait till it matures into a final order and then to attack the same in the proper exclusive forum created for the purpose of examining such order.\n \nSyed Saghir Ahmad Naqvi v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, S&GAD. Karachi and another 1996 SCMR 1165 ref.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.22 Appellate power conferred on the High Court was only to the extent of entertaining appeal against the final order and jurisdiction of the Banking Court Principles.\n \nThe object of enacting the: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 provides speedy measures for recovery of outstanding loans of the Banking Institutions as their recovery suits remained pending in the Civil Courts for years together. If the orders in the nature of interlocutory orders are brought under challenge before the High Court, the object for which the enactment was made would be frustrated. The appellate power conferred on the High Court is only to the extent of entertaining appeal against the final order and of the Banking Court.\n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVII of 2001) \n \n S.22 Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S.39 Appeal Scope Order of Banking Court consolidating the proceedings, being an interlocutory order, which had not decided the entire case, was not subject to the appeal in view of the bar contained in S.22(6), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \n(h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n S.151 Inherent power of Court under S.151, C.P.C. ¬Scope Consolidation of analogous proceedings Scope, purpose and effect Consolidation of the proceedings can be ordered by the Court in exercise of its inherent powers and the consent of the parties is not condition precedent for exercise of such powers Principles.\n \nIn administering justice as prescribed by Code, by passage of time, the Courts have experienced the following shortcomings in the Code: \n \nThere will always be cases and circumstances which are not covered by the express provisions of the Code wherein justice has to be done. The reason is that the. Legislature can foresee only the most natural and ordinary events and no rule can regulate for all times to come so as to make express provision against all inconveniences which are infinite in number and, so that their dispositions shall express all the cases that may probably happen.\n \nThe prescribed rule of procedure may be abused, or so used as to give a mere formality, the significance of substantive effect and thus obstruct, instead of facilitating the administration of justice.\n \nSuch power of Court to prevent abuse of the process of the Court is recognized to exist.\n \nIn a civilized society, legal process is the machinery for keeping order and doing justice. It can be used properly or it can be abused. It is used properly when it is invoked for the vindication of men's rights or the enforcement of justice claims. It is abused when it is diverted from its true course so as to serve extortion or oppression; or to exert pressure so as to achieve an improper end. When it is so abused, it is a tort, a wrong known to the law. The Judges can and will intervene to stop it. They will stay the legal process, if they can, before any harm is done. If they cannot stop it in time, and harm is done, they will give damages against the wrongdoer. Sometimes abuse can be shown by the very steps being taken in the Courts. Further, the ultimate object of all procedural rules is to ensure that there should be a fair trial according to law; the fair trial is not all one sided; it means fairness to both the parties.\n \nThe inherent power of the Court is recognized only to meet those cases for which no provision is made by the Code. It follows, therefore, that where there are express provisions of law applicable to particular case, there is no inherent power in the Court to override them. The words nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect' used in section 151 do not mean that the Code stands repealed where a Court decides to exercise its inherent powers ex debito justitiae to consolidate the proceedings. Such power can be exercised for the ends of justice.\n \nEvery procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by Jaw .\n \nCourts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code, but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle prohibitions cannot be presumed.\n \nIn absence of prohibition in the Code, the Court has inherent power ex debito justitiae to consolidate the two proceedings to meet the ends of justice, to avoid likelihood of conflict of opinion, discourage multiplicity of proceedings, duplication of trial of same issue between the same set of parties, to expedite decision, avoid delay and inconvenience, provided the causes are between the same parties, before the same forum, point in issue, defence are substantially common in all such action, common evidence is to be recorded.\n \nIn deciding whether the two proceedings should by consolidated or not. The whole question is whether or not in along run it will be expeditious and advantageous to all concerned to have the two matters tried together as analogous cases. The consolidation of the proceedings neither affects the identity of the proceedings nor affects the rights of the parties provided under the law its effect is common trial, single decision, separate decrees. The consolidation facilitates the Court in trial as well as the parties.\n \nThe Court has inherent power ex debito justitiae to consolidate suits, where it is in the ends of justice to do so to avoid needless expense and inconvenience to parties. In deciding whether two or more suits should be consolidated or not, the whole question is whether or not, in the long run, it will be expeditious and advantageous to all concerned to have the two suits tried together as analogous cases. Where it appears that there is sufficient unity, or similarity in the matter in issue the suits or that the determination of the suits rests mainly on a common question, it is convenient to have them tried as analogous cases. Such power under, section 151 of the Code to consolidate suits is exercisable even without the consent of parties.\n \nThe consolidation of the suits can be ordered by the, Court in exercise of its inherent powers. The consent of the parties is not the condition precedent for exercise of such powers. The purpose of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of litigation, to eliminate award of contradictory s and to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. These purposes are merely illustrative and not exhaustive of the powers of the Court.\n \nMessrs Pakistan Wires Products (Private) Limited and 5 others v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 59 distinguished.\n \nGoldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. (1977) 2 All ER 566; Narinsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey (83) 5 All. 163; Manzoor Ahmed v. Messrs Facto (Pakistan.) Ltd. and others 1996 MLD 265; Dr. Arslan Razzaq v. Ali Hussain PLD 1993 Lah. 97; Sain Muhammad and 4 others v. Muhammad Younis 1993 CLC 723; Harinarain Choudhary and others v. Ram Asish Shingh and others AIR 1957 Pat. 124. and Pakistan v. Agro Marketing Corporation Ltd. 1981 CLC 443 ref.\n \n(i) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVII of 2001) --\n \n S.22 Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S.39 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 151 Consolidation of proceedings Suit of the appellant against the respondent had been consolidated for the purpose of trial with a miscellaneous application by the respondent against the appellant by the Banking Court ¬Record showed that consolidated proceedings emanated from the provisions of two independent special enactments namely Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan. Ordinance, 1961 (both Banking matters) Both the proceedings were short cause cases, former was analogous to the proceedings under O.XXXIV and O.XXXVII, C.P.C. with assertion variance, whereas the petition under S.39 of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan were para materia to the proceedings under O.XXXIV & O.XXI, Rr.54, 58, C.P.C., both proceedings were pending before the same forum viz. Single Judge of High Court on the original side as Banking Court Validity While exercising the special jurisdiction conferred under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the High Court bore fictional character of a Banking Court as defined in the Statute, whereas under the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961 the High Court also bore the fictional character of District Judge Judge of High Court acting as a \"\"Banking Court\"\" or as a \"\"District Judge\"\" was not a persona designate on whom the jurisdiction vested by law was conferred Leave to defend the suit, in the present case, had been granted, whereas in the miscellaneous application, the reply to show cause had been filed ¬Provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 were applicable to the both proceedings and procedure for trial after the grant of leave in Banking suit and reply to show cause in miscellaneous application were also analogous Perusal of proceedings under appeal showed that both the, proceedings were analogous containing the same cause Evidence in both cases would be common between the same parties ¬Consolidation of the proceedings by Banking Judge, in exercise of inherent power to facilitate the trial and to avoid conflict of decision and multiplicity of proceedings, was not contrary to the law No exception could be taken to the impugned order even on merits.\n \nMessrs Pakistan Wires Products (Private) Limited and 5 others v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 59 distinguished.\n \nKarachi Water and Sewerage Board v. M. A. Majeed Khan and others 2002 CLC 566; Muhammad Ayub Butt v. Allied Bank Ltd, Peshawar PLD 1981 SC 359; Bolan Bank Limited v. Capricorn Enterprise (Pvt.) Ltd. 1998 SCMR 1961; Pakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. National Engineering Works and others 1983 MLD 1344; Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 326; Naresh Mohan Thakur and others v. Brij Mohan Misra and others AIR 1933 PC 43; Syed Saghir Ahmad Naqvi v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, S&GAD, Karachi and another 1996 SCMR 1165; Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. (1977) 2 All ER 566; Narinsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey (83) 5 All. 163; Manzoor Ahmed v. Messrs Facto (Pakistan) Ltd. and others 1996 MLD 265; Dr. Arslan Razzaq v. Ali Hussain PLD 1993 Lah. 97; Sain Muhammad and 4 others v. Muhammad Younis 1993 CLC 723; Harinarain Choudhary and others v. Ram Asish Shingh and others AIR 1957 Pat. 124; Pakistan v. Agro Marketing Corporation Ltd. 1981 CLC 443; Pakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109 and State Bank of Pakistan v. Chiragh Sun Engineering Ltd. 2000 YLR 1198 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 135 of 2003, decision dated: 21st August, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED AND GULZAR AHMED, JJ",
    "": "MARHABA TEXTILE LTD. --Appellant\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12938",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3031 = 2003 SLD 3031 = 2003 CLD 1843",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- S.9 Banking Court, jurisdiction of Scope Jurisdiction of a Banking Court is only attracted where a customer or a financial institution commits a default in fulfillment of any obligation with regard to any finance then the suit in Banking Court can be instituted by presenting the plaint.\n \nSyed Mushtaq Hussain Shah v Riaz Muhammad Hazarvi PLD 1978 Kar. 612 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n Ss.7(4) & 9 Banking Court, powers and jurisdiction of-¬Provision of S.7(4), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 excludes the jurisdiction of any Court with regard to any matter to which the jurisdiction of Banking Court extends under the Ordinance including a decision as to the existence or otherwise of a matter of finance Section 7(4) of the Ordinance is controlled by S.9(1) of the Ordinance which contemplates the presence, of three preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Banking Court viz. that the plaintiff be either financial institution or the customer; that cause of action on default in fulfillment of any obligation and with regard to the finance i.e. subject ¬matter.\n \n(c) Damages --\n \n Breach of contract Commission of tort Principles-¬Distinction between a contract and tort.\n \nThe damages' means pecuniary compensation determined by the Court according to circumstances of each case, payable by the wrongdoer' to the wronged' for the injury, loss, or damage caused by one to the other by breach of legal duty, normally by breach of contract or commission of tort. There is a marked distinction between the damages arising out of a contract and a tort. Even the test by which the amount of damages is to be ascertained in contract and in tort may differ it is to be judged in the circumstances of the case. In tort the intention of wrongdoer is considered to be fair in assessing the quantum of damages. Likewise, in case arising out of breach of contract the evidence of malicious motive may be held not to be relevant but it is admissible in the case of tort.\n \nA contract is founded upon consent: a tort is inflicted against or without consent. A contract necessitates privity between the parties: in tort no privity is needed. A tort must also be distinguished from a pure breach of contract. First; a tort is a violation of right in rem, i.e., of a right vested in some determinate person, either personally or as a member of the community, and available against the world at large: whereas a breach of contract is an infringement of a right in personam, i.e. of a right available only against some determinate person or body, and in which the community at large has no concern. The distinction between the two lies in the nature of the duty that is violated. In case of a tort the duty is one imposed by the law and is owed to the community at large. In the case of a contract, the duty is fixed by the will and consent of the parties, and it is owed to a definite person or persons.\n \nThe Law of Torts by Ratanlal and Dhiraj Law, edited by Justice (R) G.P. Singh, 23rd Edn., p.5 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -\n \n Ss.9 & 7(4) Credit card issued by the Bank falls within the term of \"\"finance\"\" but the present case is based on the tort and not contract, where one party claims that the amount is unpaid and the other party claims repayment, nor the damages have been claimed in terms of S.73 of the Con tract Act, 1872, Banking Court, in circumstances, has no jurisdiction over the matters arising out of fulfillment of the obligation with regard to the finance between the Customer and the Banker (financial), excluding the suit for damages based on tort Such suit with the cause i.e. damages based on tort being a civil matter is triable in term of S.9, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 --Claim of damages by the plaintiff, in the present case, is based on tortious act and not on contract, such suit does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Banking Court Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1291 of 1999, decision dated: 10-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "ABDUL REHMAN ALLANA --Plaintiff\nVs.\nCITIBANK --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12939",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2038 = 2004 SLD 2038 = 2004 CLD 766",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss.6 & 9 Suit for recovery of loan amount with liquidated damages and agreed return Refusal of Banking Tribunal to award liquidated damages and agreed return ¬Validity Bank was not entitled to amount of liquidated damages Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 did not empower Banking Tribunal to award amount of return ¬Bank, according to Islamic Mode of financing was not entitled to claim further amount of return, which had already been debited to account of defendant Impugned was in consonance with facts of the case and law on the subject High Court dismissed appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.442 of 1996, heard on 10-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULUTRAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMst. MUHAMMAD KHATOON and 2 others --Respondents\nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments 2001 MLD 1955 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12940",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2039 = 2004 SLD 2039 = 2004 CLD 766",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss.6 & 9 Suit for recovery of loan amount with liquidated damages and agreed return Refusal of Banking Tribunal to award liquidated damages and agreed return ¬Validity Bank was not entitled to amount of liquidated damages Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 did not empower Banking Tribunal to award amount of return ¬Bank, according to Islamic Mode of financing was not entitled to claim further amount of return, which had already been debited to account of defendant Impugned was in consonance with facts of the case and law on the subject High Court dismissed appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.442 of 1996, heard on 10-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULUTRAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMst. MUHAMMAD KHATOON and 2 others --Respondents\nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments 2001 MLD 1955 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12941",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2040 = 2004 SLD 2040 = 2004 CLD 830",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S8.6 & 9 Suit for recovery of loan amount with liquidated damages Plea of defendant was that entire liability had been cleared, and he produced letter of Manager of plaintiff Bank, who had admitted therein that defendant had paid all liabilities except liquidated damages Banking Tribunal disposed of suit as having been adjusted Validity Banking Tribunal had not found any trial or further proceedings in suit necessary in view of such admission as to clearance of liability Banking Tribunal had exercised discretion on sound principles in declining claim of liquidated damages High Court dismissed appeal. \n \nHabib Bank Limited v. Messrs Farooq Compost Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. and 4 others 1993 MLD 1571; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Faisalabad v. Messrs Asisha Garments through Proprietor and 2 others 2001 MLD 1955; Saudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170 and National Development Finance Corporation v. Messrs Millrock Quarring (Pvt.) Ltd. and 7 others 2002 CLD 1382 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.322 of 1996, heard on 6-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nPERVEZ AKHTAR HUSSAIN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12942",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2041 = 2004 SLD 2041 = 2004 CLD 834",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) ¬Ss.6 & 9 - Suit for recovery of loan amount with liquidated damages and other charges Refusal of Banking Tribunal to grant liquidated damages and other charges ¬Contention of Bank was that such refusal was violative of mandatory provisions of law and agreement executed between parties Validity Proof of receiving notice by defendant was mandatory for grant of liquidated damages and other charges Bank had failed to produce on record any proof of receipt of notice by respondents irz terms of agreement and under the provisions if law Banking Tribunal had given findings of fact after proper appreciation of material on record, wherein no illegality or infirmity was found High Court dismissed appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.80 of 1996, decision dated: 12-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs DASTGIR COLD STORAGE IRRIGATION WORKSHOP and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12943",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2042 = 2004 SLD 2042 = 2004 CLD 838",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Pleadings Party cannot be permitted to raise new ground of attack or defence by departing from its previous pleas. \n \nMurad Begum's case PLD 1974 SC 322 fol.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.10 Leave to defend, grant of Failure to raise any serious and bona fide dispute Effect Banking Court would be justified to refuse to grant leave to defend and decree suit against defendant. \n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.15 & 21 Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4 Decree in suit for recovery of loan amount ¬Validity Defendants had admitted availing of loan facility and had not denied execution of all documents annexed with plaint or placed on record Bare assertion of incorrectness of statement of accounts could in no way be, given any weight or made basis for granting leave to defend suit Defendants had not rebutted presumption of correctness attached to statement of accounts certified under Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 Defendants were estopped to wriggle out from their liability on well¬-known principle of estoppel and waiver Banking Court had given finding of fact against defendants after appreciation of documentary evidence High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.\n \nMessrs Chenab Limited Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672; PLD 1985 SC 365; PLD 1996 SC 684; 1999 CLC 137; Muhammad. Iqbal Fasih v. National Bank of Pakistan, Lahore PLD 1980 Lah. 38; Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Jasarat Husain 2002 CLD 93; Haji Muhammad Mirza v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited through attorney Manager 2002 CLD 426; Friendship Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Government of Balochistan through Secretary, Local Government and Rural Development Quetta and others 1998 CLC 1767; Muhammad Ramzan v. Citibank N. A. 2001 CLC 158 and Central Bank of India v. Syed Muhammad Abdul Jalil Shah and others 1999 CLC 671 ref.\n \n(d) Qanun e Shabadat (10 of 1984)",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.561 of 1999, heard on 27-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN, JJ",
    "": "TARIQ JAVED and another --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12944",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1JpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2043 = 2004 SLD 2043 = 2004 CLD 845",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.18 & 21 Execution of decree Bank guarantee, furnishing of High Court in earlier appeal filed against decree allowed Bank to execute same and recover decretal amount from debtor after furnishing Bank guarantee for payment of amount so recovered in accordance with in such appeal Bank applied for execution of decree, but furnished guarantee for one year ¬Objection of debtor that guarantee was not in terms of order of High Court Executing Court overruled objection Validity Bank showed readiness to furnish guarantee in strict terms of such order High Court disposed of appeal with observations that Bank upon furnishing guarantee in terms of such order would be entitled to execution of decree and recover decretal amount from debtor.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 18 of 1998, heard on 27-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "STANDARD CHARTERED BANK through Fareed Khan Verdag (Attorney of the Bank) --Appellant\nVs.\nM. Y. MALIK & COMPANY and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12945",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1J5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2044 = 2004 SLD 2044 = 2004 CLD 913",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.5(3) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.24 Application for transfer (consolidation) of suit from Banking Court to the High Court exercising Banking jurisdiction where another suit between the same parties was pending wherein cause of action giving rise to the said suit was one and the same and similar and identical questions and issues were involved for adjudication ¬Contention of the respondent opposing toe transfer of the suit was that in one of the suits evidence of the applicant had been recorded cross examination had been completed and the matter was now fixed for the evidence of Bank's representatives whereas in the other suit application for leave to defend the suit had not yet been decided and in view of such a situation the respondent (Bank) was likely to suffer as consolidation of suits would result in inordinate delay in disposal of the Bank's suit ¬Validity Such were no grounds for refusing permission for two identical suits between the same parties before one and the same Court and situation stated could be brought to the notice of the Judge on the Banking side of the High Court and appropriate measures could be taken to ensure that the suit of the Bank was not unnecessarily delayed or prolonged ¬Application for transfer (consolidation) of suit was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Transfer Application No.5 of 2003, decided on15-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C, J",
    "": "NAZIMUDDIN --Applicant\nVs.\nMessrs THE BANK OF KHYBER and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12946",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1J5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2045 = 2004 SLD 2045 = 2004 CLD 918",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 7 & 11 Finance of a certain amount guaranteed by the respondent Bank to the appellants Bank, however, recovering from the appellants through the Banking Court an amount higher than the finance guaranteed Plea of the appellants was that Bank should not recover a higher amount than that financed ¬Bank's record showing a call by the third party of a lower finance amount than what was being recovered from the appellant Failure of the Bank to show any call by third party for any further finance Interim decree was passed in favour of the appellants making them liable to pay only the sum financed under the guarantee by the Bank and not more than that and case was remanded to the Banking Court and leave granted to the appellants to defend against the excess amount being recovered by the Bank.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No.383 of 2001, heard on 5-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mehr ZULFIQAR ALI BABER and another --Appellants\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12947",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1J5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2046 = 2004 SLD 2046 = 2004 CLD 922",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.7 State Bank of Pakistan Incentive Scheme (Circular No.36) applicability of State Bank of Pakistan Circular No.36 Plea of appellant Bank was that it was entitled to simple and penal interest which was refused in the decree by the Banking Court Respondents were found entitled for the Incentive Scheme issued under Circular No.36 of State Bank of Pakistan to pay only principal amount plus 5% Respondents found to have deposited with the Bank an amount more than the said requirement under the Incentive Scheme Bank failed to show disability of respondents in qualifying for the Incentive Scheme ¬Held, the total debt of the respondents having been discharged in terms of the Incentive Scheme they were not required to make any further payment to the Bank Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No 504 of 1996, heard on 19-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED - --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs ILAM DIN & COMPANY and 13 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12948",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1J5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2047 = 2004 SLD 2047 = 2004 CLD 924",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.24 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29 Appeal ¬Limitation Applicability of S.5, Limitation Act, 1908 Ordinary law provided a time period of 90 days for filing appeal, whereas Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which was a special law provided a period of 30 days for filing appeal Held, where in a special or local law different periods of limitation had been provided the provisions of S.5, Limitation would not be applicable. \n \nBashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.24 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29(2) Appeal ¬Application for condonation of delay Maintainability Section 5 of Limitation Act 1908 was not applicable in view of S.29(2) of Limitation Act 1908 where the ordinary and local law provided a. different time period for filing of appeal. \n \nBashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 17 of 2003, heard on 27-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "SHERA --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12949",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1J5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2048 = 2004 SLD 2048 = 2004 CLD 927",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (LVlII of 1984) S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Amount asserted by the respondents as having been paid was not denied by the Bank Conceding to the said assertion and not controverting the same, would be deemed to be admission by the Bank Held, in the absence of any application filed by the Bank before the Banking Court to agitate the matter or any plea taken by Bank during the course of arguments, the claim of the Bank that the suit amount had not been properly adjusted was not admissible. \n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Liquidated damages, award of Bank was not entitled to recover the amount of liquidated damages. \n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Future mark up, award of Held, it was a settled law as well as the basic concept of Islamic mode of financing, that the Bank was not entitled to claim future mark¬up Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 did not empower the Banking Tribunal to award future mark up.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.517 of 1996, heard on 28-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nSARWAR and 7 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12950",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1J5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2049 = 2004 SLD 2049 = 2004 CLD 934",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- S. 7 Suit for recovery by a leasing company decreed by Banking Court Execution of documents was not disputed Full payments were alleged to have been made After adjusting the admitted payments made by the defendants under the two lease agreements and over draft finance facility, it was found that the Court had committed no error in awarding the decree against the other defendants and one defendant was found liable jointly and severally to pay the amount outstanding in respect of one transaction of demand finance facility to which she had stood as a guarantor Judgment and decree of the Trial Court only to the extent of said defendant were modified, and except such modification appeal was dismissed with costs throughout. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.7 & 2(a)(b), (d), (e) Banking Court Jurisdiction Leasing company Contention was that Leasing Company could not grant the overdraft finance facility therefore agreement in this behalf was void Such was not \"\"Finance\"\" to bring the transaction within the jurisdiction of the Banking Court Definitions of \"\"financial institution\"\", \"\"finance\"\" and \"\"customer\"\" had clarified that the defendants were customers and recovery was sought for the finance, resultantly under special law,. Banking Court had the jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No.450 of 2002, decision dated: 22-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "KING TYRES INDUSTRIES LIMITED through Director and 7 others --Appellants\nVs.\nUNION LEASING LIMITED through Manager and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12951",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1J5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2050 = 2004 SLD 2050 = 2004 CLD 937",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) Ss. 5 & 6 Suit for recovery Proof of execution of banking documents Bank claimed that the defendant availed the loan facility from the Bank and had not repaid Defendant denied the availing of loan facility and execution of documents Only one witness was produced by the Bank, who deposed about the execution of the documents Onus of issue about proving such documents was on the Bank Statement of the Bank was not corroborated and signatures of defendant were not proved through Handwriting Expert Banking Court thus, had erroneously relied upon such documents Appeal was allowed by the High Court and and decree of the Banking Court were set aside in circumstances. \n \n(b) Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891) \n \n Ss.2(3) & 4 Statements of accounts Presumption of correctness Presumption attached to the statement of accounts is only to the extent that whatever figures are giver. or reflected therein are true and as per the book of account, there is no presumption that the defendant had obtained the loan.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.313 of 2002, heard on 22-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NAFEES --Appellant\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Manager and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12952",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1J5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2051 = 2004 SLD 2051 = 2004 CLD 940",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss.10 & 11 Suit for recovery of loan against principal company and the guarantors Leave to defend the suit Grant of Banking Tribunal having not found the defendant's separate reply as satisfactory or disclosing good defence, decreed the suit No personal guarantee was available from the defendant to secure the finance availed by the principal debtor under the financing agreement nor there was on the record any concurrence given by the defendant for the liability of the company under the financing agreement Serious and bona fide defence to the suit having been disclosed in circumstances, unconditional leave to defend the suit was granted by the High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 221 of 2000, heard on 3rd July, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "JEHANZEB BURKI --Appellant\nVs.\nREGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION and 3 others --Respondents\nMst. Parveen Amir v. National Bank of Pakistan and 3 others 2002 CLD 509 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12953",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1J5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2052 = 2004 SLD 2052 = 2004 CLD 947",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.9 Negotiable Instruments Act (XXIVI of 1881), Ss. 79, 80, 114 & 117 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.34 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.199 & 203 G Constitutional petition ¬Demand of outstanding loan amount with interest/mark up by financial institution Contention of customer was that he had paid more than principal amount, thus, balance amount claimed being \"\"Riba\"\" could not be recovered from him Validity High Court in view of Art.203 G of the Constitution had no jurisdiction to determine validity of charging of interest/mark up Customer had executed different agreements/documents of his own free¬will Interest/Riba, no doubt was un Islamic. but past and closed transactions could not be re opened Customer could file suit for redressal of his grievance before Banking Court, which was efficacious and adequate remedy Constitutional petition was, therefore, not competent High Court directed the customer to discharge his liability strictly in terms of law, rules and terms of agreement by appearing before financial institution, who would settle matter within specified time strictly in accordance with law and rules after hearing and giving him benefits/concessions of incentive schemes, if applicable to his case, and respondent financial institution was directed not to take any action or coercive measure for recovery of outstanding amount till then.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "W.P. No.7483 of 2002, decision dated: 6-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "NADEEM RASHEED er\nVs.\nSMALL BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION through Manager and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12954",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1J5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2053 = 2004 SLD 2053 = 2004 CLD 949",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5 Judgment, validity of Judgment passed under statutory provisions by the Banking Tribunal after the pronouncement of an earlier by a superior Court declaring those statutory provisions as un-Constitutional, is a nullity and is to be set aside. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5 Powers and jurisdiction of Banking Tribunal Banking Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any suit or pass any where the superior Curt has earlier declared the appointment of the Presiding Officer of that Tribunal as un-Constitutional and without lawful authority. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others P LD 1996 Lah.672 ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art.201 Decision of the High Court is binding upon the subordinate Courts Subordinate Courts lack jurisdiction in cases where notifications appointing their Presiding Officers have been declared un-Constitutional by the superior Courts ¬Subsequent s and decrees of the subordinate Courts in the such like cases are liable to be set aside. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.5 All suits deemed to be pending and to be decided afresh pertaining to matters falling under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 shall be entertained by Courts constituted and having jurisdiction under the said legislation.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 138 of 1997, heard on 8-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD AFZAL --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12955",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2054 = 2004 SLD 2054 = 2004 CLD 953",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.5 Fial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Liquidated damages, award of Recovery suit was decreed by the Banking Tribunal without awarding, liquidated damages and future mark up to the Batik Plea of the Bank in appeal was that it was entitled to the award of liquidated damages and future mark up Validity Bank was not entitled to recover the amount of liquidated damages. \n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Future mark up, award of Bank was not entitled to claim future mark up in view of basic concept of Islamic mode of financing Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 did not empower the Banking 7Wbunal to award future mark up.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R. F. A. No. 145 of 1997, heard on 9-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nABDUL WAHEED and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12956",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2055 = 2004 SLD 2055 = 2004 CLD 956",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Liquidated damages, award of Recovery suit was decreed by the Banking Tribunal but declined to award liquidated damages and future mark up to the Bank Validity ¬Bank was not entitled to recover the amount of liquidated damages. \n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Future mark up, award of Bank was not entitled to claim future mark up in view of basic concept of Islamic mode of financing Banking Tribunals Ordinance 1984 did not empower the Banking Tribunal to award future mark up.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 141 of 1997, heard on 9-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nARSHAD ALI --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12957",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2056 = 2004 SLD 2056 = 2004 CLD 958",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.7 Suit for recovery was decreed while adjusting under the Prime Minister's Package Scheme the amount deposited by the respondents alongwith the amount claimed by the Bank Plea of the Bank in appeal was that the of the Banking Tribunal was not sustainable in law In view of the pleadings of the parties before the Banking Tribunal and the payments made by the respondents to the appellant Bank, no such objection was ever taken by the Bank in the Banking Tribunal, which amounted to admission of the said amounts by the Bank No grave legal infirmity was pointed out by the appellant in the impugned of the Banking Tribunal ¬Respondents had rightly liquidated the outstanding loan liability under the Prime Minister's Package Scheme in circumstances. \n \n(b) Banker and customer \n \n New plea Bank had not raised objections to certain averments and payments made by the respondent at any stage of the proceedings at the lower forum Held, the Bank was not allowed to raise a new plea before the appellate forum, which had not been agitated before the lower forum.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 139 of 1997, heard on 9-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMst. AMIRAN BIBI and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12958",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2057 = 2004 SLD 2057 = 2004 CLD 961",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.11 & 17 Suit for recovery was decreed against the appellants Plea of the appellants in appeal was that there was no mark up agreement with the Bank thus mark up charged by the Bank was illegal and that the appellants deposited a certain amount to discharge their liability towards the Bank, but that amount was not reflected in. the statements of account of the Bank Bank failed to identify the adjustment of the said amount in the statement of account but relied upon a letter issued through the Bank's official showing that adjustment had been duly made Said letter did not amount to a statement of account Judgment and decree of the Banking Court was upheld to the extent of amount arrived at after deducting the amount claimed by the appellants to be adjusted but subject to the deposit of the former amount within the prescribed period with the Bank failing which the appeal would be deemed to have been dismissed Disallowing the leave to the appellant to appear and defend the suit for determination of two issues, the case was remanded for decision according to law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 63 of 2002, heard on 10-04-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs S.B. ENGINEERING (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 4 others ers\nVs.\nPRUDENTIAL COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12959",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2058 = 2004 SLD 2058 = 2004 CLD 963",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.7, 10 & 22 Application for leave to defend, dismissal of ¬Suit decreed against the appellant Plea of the appellant was that despite earlier directions of the High Court in the same suit to decide the application for leave to defend the suit after hearing the parties, the Banking Court had decided the said application without providing opportunity of hearing to the appellant a¬ Validity Plea of the appellant had substance as no opportunity of hearing was provided to him by the Banking Court and he was condemned unheard Banking Court had also failed to comply with the directions of the High Court and it was violation of the principles of natural justice Impugned and decree was set aside by the. High Court without direction that suit and the application would be deemed to be pending in the Banking Court. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n Ss.7, 10 & 22 Principles of natural justice, violation of¬--Where the Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to defend and decreed the, suit against the appellant without providing him an opportunity of hearing despite the earlier directions of the High Court in the same suit that sufficient opportunity of hearing was to be provided to the parties, such decree was in violation of the principles of natural justice as the appellant was condemned unheard Impugned and decree was set aside in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.262 of 2003, decision dated: 9-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "ATTA ULLAH KHAN --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12960",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2059 = 2004 SLD 2059 = 2004 CLD 966",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66--¬Execution of decree Auction of mortgaged property Objection of the appellant was that the notice of the proclamation had not been issued to him under O.XXI, R.66 of C.P.C. and that auction schedule was not published Record of the Banking Court showed that notices under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C were issued and the appellant had even filed an objection petition, but due to non-¬prosecution the objection petition was dismissed and the Court-¬auctioneer was appointed to submit the schedule for auction ¬Objections of the appellant were baseless in circumstances ¬Appeal was dismissed in limine. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66--¬Where the record of the Banking. Court showed that notices under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. were issued to the appellant and he had even filed an objection petition, but due to non prosecution the objection petition was dismissed and the Court auctioneer was appointed to submit the schedule for auction, objections of the appellant that the notice of the proclamation had not been issued to him under O.XXI, R.66, CP.C and also that auction schedule was not published, were baseless.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.307 of 2000, decision dated: 9-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR AND NASIM SIKANDAR, JJ",
    "": "Mian MUHAMMAD UNIS QAMAR --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK, N.A. through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12961",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2060 = 2004 SLD 2060 = 2004 CLD 968",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- Ss.3(2) & 7 Suit for recovery decreed in favour of the Bank ¬Plea of the Bank in appeal that the Banking Court while passing the decree had erroneously declined to award interest from the late of disbursement of the principal amount to the respondents end had instead awarded it from the date of filing of the suit ¬Validity View taken by the Banking Court was not consistent with the pleadings of the parties and the statement of account on cord and appeared to be based on the mere assumption that the Bank was entitled to the decree from the date of filing of the suit Proper application of mind was not made by the Banking Court Matter was remanded to the Banking Court by the High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 485 of 1996, heard on 3rd April, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED through Attorneys --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs ITTAFAQ TRADERS and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12962",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2061 = 2004 SLD 2061 = 2004 CLD 970",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.19 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 89 & 90 ¬Execution of decree Sale of property in auction Validity ¬Objections by appellants were that the sale had been made in violation of mandatory rules, as Court auctioneer unauthorizedly reduced in the proclamation of sale the reserved price fixed by the Court, proclamation was not affixed at the site and names of debtors and description of the property were erroneously mentioned in the proclamation Offer to the Banking Court by the appellants to pay 5% of auction price in order to set aside the sale Acceptance of offer by Banking Court but failure of appellants to pay the price within the prescribed time ¬Objections of appellant dismissed by Banking Court and sale confirmed in favour of respondent Where a person had applied under O.XXI, R.89(2) of C.P.C. unless the application was withdrawn, he could not be permitted to take the benefit of O.XXI, R.89(2), C.P.C Appellants having given up their grounds of attack on the sale under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. and had taken recourse to offer for deposit of auction amount instead, in terms of O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. there was no illegality in dismissing their objections and confirming the sale if they had failed to deposit the auction amount within the prescribed time Once having made offer to deposit the auction amount in terms of O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. the appellants were deemed to have given up their plea of O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. Appeal was dismissed by the High Court. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90 ¬Executton of decree Sale of property in auction Validity ¬Where the appellants gave up their grounds of attack on the sale under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. and took recourse to offer for deposit of auction amount instead, in terms of O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. there was no illegality in dismissing their objections and confirming the sale if they had failed to deposit the auction amount within the prescribed time Once having made offer to deposit the auction, amount in terms of O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. the appellants were deemed to have given up their plea of O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. ¬Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E. F. A. No. 331 of 2001, decision dated: 4-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. PARVEEN KAUSAR BHATTI and others ers\nVs.\nCITIBANK, N.A. and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12963",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2062 = 2004 SLD 2062 = 2004 CLD 973",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.10(1) Suit for recovery Failure to file leave to defend within the statutory period Consequence Where some of the defendants failed to file application for leave to defend the suit, as provided under the law, the allegations made in the plaint, shall be deemed to be admitted by the said defendants Suit was decreed in favour of the Bank and against the said defendants. \n \nMessrs Ahmad Autos and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited PLD 1990 SC 497 and Messrs Qureshi Salt & Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi 1999 SCMR 2353 ref.\n \nShoaib Zafar for Plaintiff.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No.59 of 2002, decision dated: 20-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Attorney --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs PROMETALS LTD. and 9 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12964",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2063 = 2004 SLD 2063 = 2004 CLD 974",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.3(2) & 7 West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance (XV of 1960), S.3 ,Suit for recovery was decreed Money decree passed in favour of Bank was based on promissory note Penal interest Legality in the absence of agreement Objection of appellants in appeal was that in the absence of an agreement for charging penal interest, the Bank could only have claimed simple interest and relying on S.3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance 1960 the Bank could not have recovered double the amount from the appellants after having deducted the amount paid by the appellants Record showed that there was no agreement in which appellants undertook to pay penal interest nor it was ever acknowledged by the appellants Penal interest could not be charged without any express contract ¬Held, in the absence of any agreement to pay penal interest, the Bank had no authority to charge the penal interest Amount of penal interest was deducted from the decretal amount in circumstances. \n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Ch. Ram Din & Company and others PLD 1985 Lah. 117 and Allied Bank of Pakistan v. Masood Ahmad Khan 1994 MLD 1557 ref.\n \n(b) West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance (XV of 1960) \n \n Ss.3 & 2(b) Section 3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance 1960, applicability of Suit for recovery was decreed Money decree passed in favour of Bank was based on promissory note One of the objections of appellants in appeal was that under S.3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance, 1960 the Banking Court could not have passed a decree in respect of a debt for a larger sum than twice the amount of the sum found by the Court to have been actually advanced as loan deducting any amount already received by the creditor Interpretation of the word \"\"debt\"\" under S. 2(b) of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance 1960 Exclusion of banking companies and scheduled bank under S.3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance 1960 Section 3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance, 1960 was not applicable to the Bank.\n \nSamandar Khan v. Mst. Maqbool and others 1974 SCMR 388 ref.\n \n(c) West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance (XV of 1960) \n \n Ss.2(b) & 3 Word 'debt' interpretation of Legislature has specifically excluded the debts of the banking companies and the scheduled banks from the application of S.3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance, 1960 Respondent was a banking company and a scheduled bank, thus S3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance 1960 had no applicability on it.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No. 108 of 1997,heard on 16-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHARIF & SONS through Proprietor and another --Appellants\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12965",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2064 = 2004 SLD 2064 = 2004 CLD 978",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.18(6) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001), S.19(7) Decree for recovery of loan under car finance scheme Car forcibly taken into possession by the Bank Application by appellant for return of the car ¬Banking Court consigned the application of the appellant to record on the ground that the car in dispute was sold and Bank¬ had adjusted the sale price to its claim Validity Held, impugned order was not a speaking order, application by the appellant could not be consigned to record merely on the ground that the car in dispute had been sold and the sale amount adjusted Banking Court was bound to decide the application of the appellant in accordance with law Impugned order was set aside by the High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 189 of 2002, heard on 4-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. SHEHNAZ KHALID --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK, N.A. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12966",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2065 = 2004 SLD 2065 = 2004 CLD 980",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.58 & 62 Execution of decree Sale of property under auction Appellant in objection petition had claimed ownership of the property based on a gift made to him orally by the debtor and later executed through a registered memorandum of gift Dismissal of objection petition by Banking Court on the ground that the appellant had failed to place on record the gift document in his favour and also due to the absence of his name in the Revenue Record where some other person's name in the Jamabandi as well as the mutation was mentioned Subsequent placement of memorandum of gift on record by the appellant in the High Court Effect High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant on the grounds that it was necessary to place on record the memorandum of gift earlier before the executing Court and also because the document did not pertain to the same property as the one under auction Simply mentioning of the same Khasra number without the specific number of the property was of no avail, and according to the Revenue Record the gift of the property was not in favour of the appellant but of someon6 else.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 360 of 2001, decision dated: 1st July, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD MUNIR AKRAM alias MUHAMMAD AKRAM --Appellant\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 8 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12967",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2066 = 2004 SLD 2066 = 2004 CLD 982",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 7 & 19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.58 & 62 Execution of decree Sale of mortgaged property under auction No description as to location o f property was given in the proclamation of auction Appellants in the objection petition had claimed ownership of the property and described the same as an undivided one of which debtor could not have been owner of a specific portion until and unless it was partitioned Questions raised by the parties required evidence to come to a correct finding Held, despite the absence of description of the property in the proclamation, no inquiry for the purposes of finding out the exact property that was subject-¬matter of the mortgage and whether that was put to auction, was undertaken by the executing Court and the objection of the appellant was dismissed in a summary manner which was unwarranted Impugned order was set aside with direction to the Executing Court to determine factual controversy based on facts coming on record.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 113 of 2002, decision dated: 1st July, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mian MUHAMMAD BAKHSH and another --Appellants \nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12968",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2067 = 2004 SLD 2067 = 2004 CLD 1023",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) S. 7(2) Enforcement of foreign award Once a foreign award is made it in fact amounts to a foreign and the proceedings before the Court are merely for an affirmation of the award, and only limited objections as to the validity and enforceability thereof are permitted under S 7(2) of the Act.\n \nImtiaz Ahmed v. Ghulam Ali and another PLD 1963 SC 382; Manager Jammu and Kashmir Property in Pakistan v. Khudayar and another PLD 1975 SC 678; Mst. Begum and others v. Mst. Begum Kaniz Fatima Hayat and others 1989 SCMR 883; Jamil Ahmed v. Late Saifuddin 1997 SCMR 260 Nan Fung Textiles Ltd.'s case PLD 1982 Kar.619; B. Upendra Nath Basu v. B. Het Lal and others AIR 1933 All. 380; M. Imamuddin Janjua v. The Thal Development Authority PLD 1972 SC 123; Frederick E. Rose (Commodities) Limited v. Munsoor Ali Tanning Co. NLR 1981 UC 175 Karachi; Conticotton S.A. v. Farooq Corporation 1999 CLC 1018; Messrs European Grain and Shipping Ltd. v. Messrs Polychem Company Ltd. PLD 1990 Kar.254; Nan Fung Textiles Limited v. Sadiq Traders Limited PLD 1982 Kar.619; Alfred C. Toepfer International v. Pakistan Molasses Company 2003 CLD 1666 and A. Meredith Jones & Co. v. Usman Textile Mills Limited 2002 CLD 1121 ref.\n \n(b) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n S. 8(1) Sindh Chief Court Rules, (O.S.), R.297 Foreign award (Switzerland) Evidence Copy of the award had been authenticated by the competent authority of the Canton of Geneva and had been further authenticated to be a genuine document by the Embassy of Pakistan at Berne Such document did not suffer from any illegality or infirmity and was neither violative of S.8(1) of the Arbitration (Protocol & Convention) Act, 1937 nor Rule 297, Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.) Original copy of the award was available with counsel for the plaintiff, which he desired to place on record during the arguments and was directed to file the same day Rights of parties could not be allowed to be defeated on technicalities. \n \nManager Jammu and Kashmir Property in Pakistan v. Khudayar and another PLD 1975 SC 678; Mst. Begum and others v. Mst. Begum Kaniz Fatima Hayat and other 1989 SCMR 883 and Jamil Ahmed v. Late Saifuddin 1997 SCMR 260 ref.\n \n(c) Precedent \n \n---Laws are meant to foster justice and not to thawart the rights of the parties.\n \n(d) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n Ss.5 & 6 Enforcement of a foreign award Territorial jurisdiction of Court Determination Registered office of the defendant was in Karachi; Letter of credit was opened with Pakistani at Karachi and the defendant had themselves filed two suits against the present plaintiff at Karachi for certain claims in respect of the same dispute which was subject matter of Arbitration Contention that Court at Karachi had no territorial jurisdiction was repelled in circumstances. \n \n(e) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n S.5 Limitation Act (IX of 19081, Art. 120 Application for enforcement of a foreign award Limitation Such application is to be registered as a suit and since no period has been fixed for filing such suits under the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1905, the application (suit) shall be governed under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which provides a period of six years for filing such suit. \n \n(f) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n S.7(2) Enforcement of a foreign award Executing Court cannot go beyond the award except as provided under S.7(2) of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 Award in the present case was well reasoned dealing with the matter in controversy and the defendant had failed to assert and agitate all such points in appeal which though filed but was not pursued Objection regarding the arbitrators being guilty of misconduct had no legs to stand. \n \n(g) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n S.7(2) Enforcement of a foreign award Court, in a foreign award is to act as an executing Court and cannot go beyond the award except as provided under S.7(2) of the Act Court cannot assume the role of an Appellate Court Contention that the Courts in Pakistan have no jurisdiction to enforce a foreign award as Pakistan is not a signatory to the convention and there is no reciprocal arrangement between the Government of Pakistan and Government of Switzerland is without substance as law was amended in Pakistan by Ordinance, LIII of 1962 to this effect. \n \nNan Fung Textiles Limited v. Sadiq Traders Limited PLD 1982 Kar. 619; Alfred C. Toepfer International v. Pakistan Molasses Company 2003 CLD 1666; A. Meredith Jones & Co. v. Usman Textile Mills Limited 2002 CLD 1121; Nan Fung Textiles Ltd. v. H. Pir Muhammad Shamasuddin PLD 1979 Kar 762 and Messrs Yangtze (London) Limited v. Messrs Barlas Brothers Karachi PLD 1961 SC 573 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.381 of 2001, decision dated: 7-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, J",
    "": "COGETEX S.A., A COMPANY DULY IN CORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF SWITZERLAND - --Plaintiff\nVs.\nQadir H. Sayeed and Yousuf Ali Sayeed for --Plaintiff.\nMunib Akhtar for --Defendant."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12969",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2068 = 2004 SLD 2068 = 2004 CLD 1077",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9, 10 & 21 Suit for recovery of loans Appeal Financial facilities, as mentioned in suits by Bank, were advanced to defendants, who executed relevant documents and creation of mortgage had not been denied by defendants who failed to liquidate outstanding liabilities Defendants had contended that foreign bills were routed through Bank to foreign corresponding Bank and as Bank had failed to realize proceeds of export bills, Bank was not entitled to recovery of suit amount Said contention which was neither taken by defendants in reply to show cause notices nor was urged before Banking Court could not be raised in appeal Case of Bank was duly supported by certified copies of statements of accounts, which had duly been verified as required by provisions of Banker's Books Evidence Act Defendants though had feebly stated in their replies to the show cause notices that statements of accounts were engineered documents, but they could not show as to how said documents were unreliable Suits filed by Bank, in circumstances were rightly decreed against defendants by Banking Court Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court could not be interfered with in appeal. \n \n(b) New plea/ground \n \n Person would be precluded from raising, altogether a new plea/ground before Appellate/Revisional Court which had not been raised before lower forum.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos. 255 to 257 of 1999, decision dated: 29-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs P&B CARPETS (PVT.) LIMITED and others --Appellants\nVs.\nTHE BANK ALFLAH LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12970",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2069 = 2004 SLD 2069 = 2004 CLD 1088",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.9 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) & O. VII, R. 11 ¬Suit Maintainability Two suits earlier filed by defendants against plaintiff alongwith others having been decreed, plaintiff in his suit filed under S.9 of Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 had challenged said decrees alleging that the decrees had been obtained fraudulently Plaintiff had also sought to restrain defendants from enforcing said decrees and also claimed damages Validity If decrees against plaintiff were obtained by defendants fraudulently, remedy available to plaintiff was to file application under S.12(2), C.P.C. before Court which had passed said decrees Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. had clearly prohibited filing of a separate suit to challenge validity of a , decree or order on ground of fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction Intention of Legislature in amending S.12, C.P.C. by adding subsection (2) was to provide a substitute for such a suit against , decree or order obtained by fraud Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. were applicable with full force to the case of plaintiff Imperative for plaintiff to establish that suits filed by defendants against him were based on malice and that decrees obtained therein were based on fraud Other prayers of plaintiff with regard to compensation etc. were dependent on determination of first prayer of plaintiff with respect to fraud and it could not sustain itself independently ¬Suit filed by plaintiff was barred by S.12(2), C.P.C. and plaint filed by him was liable to be rejected under Order VII, R.II, C.P.C. \n \nBank of India v. Lakshmani Dass AIR 2000 SC 1172; Mst. Fareeda Begum v. Hafiz Muhammad Shamim 1997 CLC 343; Noor Muhammad v. Additional District Judge, Chakwal PLD 1994 Lah. 170; Peer Bukhsh v. The Chairman Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145; Muhammad Yousaf v. Mst. Rafia Begum 2002 CLC 1996; Rahat Mehmood v. Tariq Rasheed PLD 1993 Kar. 648; Sardar Muhammad v. Chaudhry Muhammad Bashir 2000 CLC 1040; Ghazanfar Baig v. Muhammad Salam 2001 YLR 871; Khawaja Muhammad Naseem v. Shafiqur Rehman 1996 CLC 1460; Government of Sindh and another v. Ch. Fazal Muhammad and another PLD 1991 SC 197; Muhammad Akhtar and others v. Abdul Hadi and others 1981 SCMR 878; Abdul Majid and others v. Abdul Ghafoor Khan and others PLD 1982 SC 146; Asif Jah Siddiqui v. Government of Sindh and others PLD 1983 SC 446; Sarwar and 3 others v. Muhammad Saeed ud Din Klan alias Saadat ud Din Khan 1992 CLC 2323; Zafrullah and 3 others v. Civil Judge, Hafizabad and 3 others PLD 1984 Lah. 396; Sardar Bakhah v. Sahib Khatoon 1988 CLC 2037; Iqbal v. Mst. Jainan Babi 1991 CLC 553; Abdul Rauf and others v. Abdur Rahim Khan PLD 1982 Pesh. 172; Mst. Rukhsana Ansar and 2 others v. Mst. Raeesa Khatoon 1993 MLD 1319 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit NO.B 57 of 2002, decision dated: 22-01-2004",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED, J",
    "": "SALEEM RASHID --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs PAK LIBYA HOLDING COMPANY (PVT) LTD. and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12971",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2070 = 2004 SLD 2070 = 2004 CLD 1117",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) ¬ Ss.19 & 2(e) Execution of decree Judgment debtors had not denied that decree holder (Bank) had fulfilled its contractual obligation by rescheduling/ restructuring demand finance facility and by renewing working capital liability of the ¬-debtors Upon grant of rescheduling, restructuring and renewal of said facilities, the executory clauses, if any, of the agreement/ decree were converted into final terms which did not in any way suffer in executability Contention of the objectors that the decree holder bank had failed to perform its reciprocal promises was repelled having no merit. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery) of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.2(e) Renewal/rescheduling/restructuring of financial facilities which has been recognized as \"\"obligation\"\" as defined in S.2(e), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 only ensues upon default, non payment, delayed payment or inability in payment of outstanding liability by a customer who normally seeks such concession upon admission and determination of liability Principles.\n \nRenewal/rescheduling/restructuring of financial facilities only ensues upon default non payment, delayed payment or inability in payment of outstanding liability by a customer who normally seeks such concession upon admission and determination of liability. By soliciting rescheduling or restructuring, as the case may be, a customer, in essence, either requests postponement of repayment of a finance on renewed terms as agreed between the parties or asks for reorganization/ refurbishing of financial basis of a finance and its liquidation. By approving rescheduling/ restructuring/ renewal of a financial facility, the bank forgoes its immediate right of recovery and enforcement of securities against the customer. The effect of rescheduling, restructuring and renewal of finance facility is mutually agreed by the parties to be absorbed by future interest, mark up charges or commissions till the agreed date of liquidation of liability. Rescheduling, restructuring and renewal is also thus a facility or accommodation granted by the bank to a customer. This facility has been recognized as an \"\"Obligation\"\" defined in section 2(e) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss. 3 & 9 Duty of customer Default Effect Customer is duty bound to fulfil obligations to the Financial Institutions ¬Default in discharge of such \"\"obligation\"\" not only incurs the \"\"cost of funds\"\" under S.3(2) of the Ordinance but is also actionable under S.9, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Judgment against a customer under the Ordinance is a pronouncement of default under S.3(3) of duty prescribed under S.3(1) of the Ordinance. \n \n(d) Words and phrases ¬\n \n \"\"Grant\"\" Connotation.\n \nWord \"\"grant\"\" means the giving, bestowing or forwarding of a privilege, right, interest, benefit, subsidy, exemption, concession, approval, sanction or permission. \n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.3 Compromise decree Default Where the ¬-debtors (Customers) were liable to pay instalments of Demand Finance Facility as specified between the Banker and Customer, non payment of the two consecutive instalments of the same amounted to an event of default entitling the decree holder (Bank) seeking execution of the compromise decree. \n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S. 19 Execution of consent decree through enforcement of securities and other modes had been sought by the decree holder after reduction of the amount from the decretal money ¬Endeavours of the debtors to go behind the decree and its amounts by, trying to calculate and recalculate the figures could not be allowed Judgment debtors were bound by their agreements and were debarred under law from going behind the decree passed by consent as compromise entered upon between the Banker and Customer had become final.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M. No.666 B of 2001 in C.O.S. No.28 of 2000, decision dated: 4-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED er\nVs.\nSERVICE FABRICS LTD. and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12972",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2071 = 2004 SLD 2071 = 2004 CLD 1136",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XLV of 1979) Ss. 2(f), 3, 6(1)(a) & 8(3) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.53 A Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 97, 100, 103 & O.XLIII, R.1(ii) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3) ¬Execution of decree for recovery of loan Auction sale by High Court as Special Court (Banking) Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell the property in question by third party ¬Maintainability Protection of provisions of S.53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to such third party Scope and extent under O.XXI, 8.103, C.P.C. Party aggrieved by an order made by the Executing Court could not institute a suit as it could bring an appeal under O.XLIII, R.1(ii), C.P.C. Provisions of S.3, Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 were not intended to permit a party to file a separate civil suit in disregard of the provisions, of O.XXI, R.103, C.P.C. and to frustrate the execution of decree passed by the Special Court (Banking) Third party could have pursued his objection petition before the Special Court to its logical conclusion but he was not entitled to institute a separate suit as his objections could be looked into by Special Court Suit property, in the present case, had already been mortgaged by the debtor with the bank passed by High Court did not suffer from any legal infirmity so as to warrant interference by Supreme Court--¬Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.\n \nIn the present case, the suit property was auctioned by the High Court in favour of the auction-purchaser. The third party himself had filed objection petition on the basis of his alleged agreement to sell in respect of the suit property. The same was dismissed by the High Court as withdrawn and the judicial sale of the suit property was confirmed in favour of the auction-purchaser by following the procedure as laid down in C.P.C. In the facts and circumstances of the case it could not be said that the third party could not seek his remedy before the High Court in terms of Order XXI, C.P.C. The provisions of Rule 103 of O.XXI, C.P.C. were amended by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, whereby it was provided that all questions arising as to the title, right or interest, for possession of immovable property between the applicants under Rules 97 and 100 and the opposite party, would be adjudged upon and determined by the Court, and no separate suit would lie for the determination of any such matter. At the same time a corresponding amendment was also introduced in Order XLIII, Rule 1 (ii) C.P.C. whereby an order under Rule 103, C.P.C. was made appealable. The object of these provisions was to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Executing Court to decide the objections in respect of the execution of decree. The case of Mohiuddin Molla (supra) is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. \n \nThird party could not acquire a better title over the suit property than the -debtor under whom he was claiming his inchoate rights. The protection of section 53-A of Act, 1882, was not available to such party the auction-¬purchaser of the suit property which was sold to him by the High Court in execution of a decree. The auction-purchaser had nothing to do with the -debtor and was not claiming his rights through or under him. The -debtor was no more the owner of the suit property which had been auctioned in favour of the auction-purchaser. In these circumstances, the suit for specific performance of the agreements filed by the third party in respect of the suit property was barred by law. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, creates an estoppel between a transferor and a transferee of an immovable property. It does not bind a third party who does not claim under either of them. \n \nSection 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act did not operate to create a form of transfer of property which was exempt from registration. It created no real right. It merely created rights of estoppel between the proposed transferee and transferor which had no operation against third persons not claiming under those persons.\n \nThe part performance under section 53-A of the Act, 1882, conferred upon the transferee the privilege of invoking the doctrine embodied therein only as a shield against any invasion of his rights by the transferor or person claiming under him. \n \nBy the provisions of sections 2(f) and 6(1)(a) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 as they stood at the relevant time, the High Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction was vested with all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of a case in which the outstanding amount of the loan exceeded one million rupees. Subsection (4) of section 6 expressly provided that no Court other than a Special Court would have or exercise any jurisdiction with respect to any matter to which the jurisdiction of a Special Court extended under the Ordinance, including a decision as to the execution of a decree passed by a Special Court. It was further provided that all proceedings, including the proceedings for the execution of a decree within the jurisdiction of a Special Court, by whatever Court passed, pending in any Court would stand transferred to the Special Court. By virtue of section 8(3) of the Ordinance, as it originally existed, a Special Court was required, on the application of the decree holder, to pass an order for execution of the decree as arrears of land revenue or such other manner as it might deem fit. Therefore, there was nothing to prevent the Special Court to follow the procedure provided by the C.P.C. in appropriate cases, for execution of the decree. \n \nUnder Rule 103, Order XXI, C.P.C., a party aggrieved by an order made by the executing Court, could not institute a suit as it could bring an appeal under clause (ii) of Rule 1 of Order XLIII, C.P.C. the provisions of section 3 of the Ordinance were not intended to permit a party to file a separate Civil suit in disregard of the provisions of Rule 103 of Order XXI, C.P.C. and to frustrate the execution of decree passed by the Special Court (Banking). Third party could have pursued his objection petition before the Special Court to its logical conclusion. He was not entitled to institute a separate suit as his objections could be looked into by the Special Court. The suit property had already been mortgaged by the -debtor with the bank Judgment passed by the High Court did not suffer from any legal infirmity so as to warrant interference by Supreme Court. \n \nS.N. Banerji and another AIR 1941 PC 128; P&T Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Karachi v. Ch. Manzoor Ahmed Sahi PLD 1961 Kar. 53; Yeditha Satyanarayanamurty and others v. Tadi Subrahmanyam and others AIR 1959 Andh. Pra. 534; Stuart & Co. v. C. Mackertich AIR 1963 Cal. 198 and Shamim Akhter v. Muhammad Rasheed PLD 1989 SC 575 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 738 L of 2002, decision dated: 20-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL AND FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, JJ",
    "": "Ch. ABDUL MAJID er\nVs.\nSADAQAT SAEED MALIK and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12973",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2072 = 2004 SLD 2072 = 2004 CLD 1146",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------S.5--Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5-Powers and Jurisdiction of Banking Tribunal-Banking Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any suit or pass any where the superior Court had declared certain provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and the notifications appointing the Presiding Officers of that Tribunal as un-Constitutional.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 and Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 759 ref.\n \n(b) Banging Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)---\n \n-----S. 7 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S5--Past and closed cases-Declarations made in the case of Chenab Cement Product (PLD 1996 Lah 672) was not to affect cases past and closed or invalidate the s/decrees, which had become final--Where, however, the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal was not challenged in appeal but was called into question only through a writ petition which was subsequently disposed of, the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal would be considered to be past and closed case and final by virtue of the said of Messrs Chenab Cement Product-When the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal was challenged in appeal and also by a writ petition and the latter was subsequently disposed of, the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal would not be considered to be past and closed case and would not be covered within the scope of the said and would thus be set aside---Held, as the and decree under appeal was passed after the rendering of the said it did not fall within the terms of past and closed cases' nor within the meaning and scope of the in Chenab Cement Product---Decree was set aside anal suit for the recovery was deemed pending before the newly constituted Banking Court, established under S.5 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to be decided afresh.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 and Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 759 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 133 of 1997, heard on 29-07-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nVs.\nBAKHSH"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12974",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMR1NTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2073 = 2004 SLD 2073 = 2004 CLD 1150",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------S.5---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7--Liquidated damages, award of ---Recovery suit partly decreed by the Banking Tribunal that declined to award liquidated damages and future mark-up to the Bank--¬Plea of the Bank in appeal was that it was entitled to the award of liquidated damages and future mark-up---Validity---Bank was not entitled to recover the amount of liquidated damages. \n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)---\n \n----S.5---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7---Future mark-up, award of---Basic concept of Islamic mode of financing was that the bank was not entitled to claim future mark-up---Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 did not empower the Banking Tribunal to award future mark-up.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No. 142 of 1997, heard on 9-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD ANWAR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12975",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2074 = 2004 SLD 2074 = 2004 CLD 1207",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.18(6)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI & R.58--¬Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged property---Appellant in objection petition claiming to be the owner of the mortgaged property on the basis of a sale-deed---Dismissal of objection petition by Banking Court relying on a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) issued by the Settlement Department in favour of someone else---Validity---Banking Court should have conducted an enquiry in order to determine the validity of transfer on PTD---Permanent Transfer Deed alone is no basis to determine that objectors had no locus standi to file objection petition---Proper enquiry is required to determine with certainty that the particular mortgaged property was allotted on PTD---High Court accepted appeal, set aside the impugned order and remanded case to Banking Court for holding proper inquiry and decide objection petition afresh in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.As. Nos.413 and 441 of 1998, heard on 14-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD GHANI, JJ",
    "": "Mian MUHAMMAD USMAN\nVs.\nBANK OF OMAN LIMITED and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12976",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2075 = 2004 SLD 2075 = 2004 CLD 1210",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)-------Ss.21 & 73---Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), Ss.39 & 41---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for infringement of trade mark and damages---Interim injunction--¬Order granting injunction would not be erroneous, where damages were also claimed---Usurping of goodwill of trademark by defendant, who, prima facie, had no right under Copyright Ordinance, 1962, would be unjust. \n \nShahjehan Khan v. Muhammad Tariq 2002 CLC 571; Plasticrafters Ltd. v. Maniar Industries Ltd. 1980 CLC 812; Abdus Subhan v. Khurshid 2000 YLR 2.898 and Exide Pakistan Ltd. v. Pakistan Accumulator (Pvt.) Ltd. 2003 CLD 1117 ref.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)--\n \n----Ss.21 & 73---Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), Ss. 39 & 41---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Suit for infringement of trade mark---Interim injunction, grant, of--¬Pendency of appeal preferred by defendant against order of Copyright Board would not restrict the Court from granting injunction, if plaintiff was otherwise entitled thereto---Person prima facie having no legal right could not be allowed to continue his business.\n \n(c) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)---\n \n----Ss.21 & 73---Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), Ss. 39 & 41---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Suit for infringement of trade mark ---Pendency of appeal filed by defendant against acceptance of rectification application of plaintiff by Copyright Board---Order of the Court granting interim injunction to plaintiff---Effect---Such order Was tentative in nature and would not prejudice either party before Registrar, Trade Marks or before any forum---Defendants would be at liberty to lead evidence to establish their legal right to do business.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 170 of 2003, decision dated: 18-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY AND AMIR HANI MUSLIM, JJ",
    "": "Rio CHEMICAL COMPANY and another\nVs.\nPAKISTAN DRUG HOUSE (PVT.) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12977",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2076 = 2004 SLD 2076 = 2004 CLD 1215",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.22---Appeal---Factual controversy---Investigation by High Court---Jurisdiction-- Suit for recovery of bank loan was filed against the borrowers---Borrowers had accepted the sanction of loan facility by the bank but it was alleged that the bank had failed to open letters of credit in terms of sanction letter--Borrowers placed on record certain pay-in-slips showing that for each letter of credit, the amount covered therein was deposited before the letters of credit could be opened-- Application for leave to appeal was dismissed by Banking Court and the suit was decreed in favour of the bank---Plea raised by the bank was that it could be proved from record that the payments were not made rather the amounts on the letters of credit were paid by the bank to the beneficiary---Validity---Duty of Banking Court was to look into the defence set up by the borrowers and to give its opinion, if the defence did disclose serious and bona fide dispute or not--Banking Court did, not advert to the real controversy while refusing leave to the borrowers---Judgment passed by the Banking Court was non-speaking and the same could not be sustained--High Court declined to undertake such task in appellate jurisdiction-Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court was set aside and case was remanded to Banking Court for re-deciding the application for leave to defend Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- \n \n----S.22---Appellate jurisdiction of High, Court---Partial setting aside of and decree-Two different appeals were filed by different defendants against same and decree---One appeal was allowed. by High Court and the case was remanded to Banking Court---Bank, in the present appeal, had raised objection regarding its being barred by limitation--Validity---As and decree had been set aside by High Court in other appeal, the same and decree could not be sustained against the present appellants who were co-defendants and 3uarantors in the same suit--Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. Nos.235 and 354 of 2002 and E.F.A. Nos.48 and 150 of 2003, heard on 15-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs VICKY TRADING COMPANY and another\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12978",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2077 = 2004 SLD 2077 = 2004 CLD 1220",
    "Key Words:": "(a) West Pakistan Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance (XIV of 1966)-------Ss.8-A & 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199-¬Constitutional petition---Issuance of show-cause notice---High Court normally, would not like to interfere in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction to call in question a show-cause notice as a. matter of rule---Parties had to exhaust the remedy available to them under law and thereafter if felt aggrieved, could invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution--¬However, if show-cause notice had been issued with mala fide intention and which on the face of it had been issued without any lawful authority, then even if alternate remedy was available, High Court could strike down such notice in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction, instead of asking the parties to undergo agony of departmental appeals, revisions, etc.\n \nMuhammad Afzal Khan v. Karachi Development Authority PLD 1984 Kar. 114; Car Tunes v. Income Tax Officer, Circle V 1989 PTD 478; M.R. Sons v. I.T.O. 1989 PTD 1010; Rice Export Corporation v. Karachi Metropolitan Corp. PLD 1990 Kar. 186; Zeshan Builders v. Karachi Building Control Authority 1992 MLD 2259; Mian S.M. Yousuf Baghpatee v. Kar. Building Control Authority and others 1993 CLC 2491; Attock Cement Pak. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Quetta 1999 PTD 1892; Platinum Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Government of Sindh 2003 MLD 279 (Kar.); Shagufta Begum v. I.T.O. PLD 1989 SC 360 ref.\n \n(b) West Pakistan Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance (XIV of 1966)---\n \n----S.8-B---Restriction on alienation of properties---Section 8-B of West Pakistan Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance, 1966, had put restriction on alienation of properties by a person owing the loan immediately after the enforcement of said Ordinance---West Pakistan Co¬operative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance, 1966, had itself provided that alienation of property by defaulters would be as void and same could not transfer any right, title or interest in the property of debtors unless the loan due against debtor had been repaid.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-176 of 1987, decision dated: 18-03-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MOOSA K. LEGHARI AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. BAGHUL and 17 others\nVs.\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER, THARPARKAR and 13 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12979",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2078 = 2004 SLD 2078 = 2004 CLD 1220",
    "Key Words:": "(a) West Pakistan Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance (XIV of 1966)-------Ss.8-A & 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199-¬Constitutional petition---Issuance of show-cause notice---High Court normally, would not like to interfere in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction to call in question a show-cause notice as a. matter of rule---Parties had to exhaust the remedy available to them under law and thereafter if felt aggrieved, could invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution--¬However, if show-cause notice had been issued with mala fide intention and which on the face of it had been issued without any lawful authority, then even if alternate remedy was available, High Court could strike down such notice in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction, instead of asking the parties to undergo agony of departmental appeals, revisions, etc.\n \nMuhammad Afzal Khan v. Karachi Development Authority PLD 1984 Kar. 114; Car Tunes v. Income Tax Officer, Circle V 1989 PTD 478; M.R. Sons v. I.T.O. 1989 PTD 1010; Rice Export Corporation v. Karachi Metropolitan Corp. PLD 1990 Kar. 186; Zeshan Builders v. Karachi Building Control Authority 1992 MLD 2259; Mian S.M. Yousuf Baghpatee v. Kar. Building Control Authority and others 1993 CLC 2491; Attock Cement Pak. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Quetta 1999 PTD 1892; Platinum Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Government of Sindh 2003 MLD 279 (Kar.); Shagufta Begum v. I.T.O. PLD 1989 SC 360 ref.\n \n(b) West Pakistan Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance (XIV of 1966)---\n \n----S.8-B---Restriction on alienation of properties---Section 8-B of West Pakistan Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance, 1966, had put restriction on alienation of properties by a person owing the loan immediately after the enforcement of said Ordinance---West Pakistan Co¬operative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance, 1966, had itself provided that alienation of property by defaulters would be as void and same could not transfer any right, title or interest in the property of debtors unless the loan due against debtor had been repaid.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-176 of 1987, decision dated: 18-03-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MOOSA K. LEGHARI AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. BAGHUL and 17 others\nVs.\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER, THARPARKAR and 13 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12980",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2079 = 2004 SLD 2079 = 2004 CLD 1239",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)------Ss.9 & 10--Recovery of bank loan-Leave to defend the suit, refusal of--Plea of fabricated loan documents--Defendants had not denied availing of loan facilities and also claimed to have paid certain amounts towards discharge of their liability but had denied execution of loan documents in vague and general terms by not raising any specific plea regarding fabrication or forgery of the documents-Defendants had also not denied execution of guarantees and mortgaging documents in favour of bank--Effect---Allegations raised by the defendants were bald and had contradicted their case---Banking Court had rightly refused leave to defend the suit and the suit was rightly decreed in favour of bank---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) ---\n \n---Ss. 9 & 10---Leave to defend the suit, grant of-Amount deposited by defendants was disputed by the bank---Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to defend the suit and decreed the suit in favour of the bank after adjusting the disputed amount in favour of defendants---Effect---Deposit of disputed amount was an issue between the parties and instead of disallowing the amount to the bank, leave should have been granted to the defendants to the extent of the disputed amount--Such dispute should have been resolved after framing of issues and trial--Denial of the amount to the bank at leave granting stage was illegal and unlawful---Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court to the extent of disputed amount was set aside Application for leave to defend the suit was allowed to the extent of amount deposited by the defendants-Case was remanded to the Banking Court for decision after trial Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos. 307 and 336 of 2002, heard on 16-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Zonal Chief and others\nVs.\nMessrs POWER TEXTILE INDUSTRIES LTD. through Chief Executive and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12981",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2080 = 2004 SLD 2080 = 2004 CLD 1263",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII Of 1984)-------S.6---Recovery of bank loan---Non-award of labour charges--¬Banking Tribunal decreed the suit in favour of bank but declined to award labour charges on the ground that no documents regarding availing of such facility were available on record--¬Observation made by Banking Tribunal was not consistent with the documents on record, rather the Tribunal had proceeded on assumption---Effect--Judgment and decree passed by Banking Tribunal was set aside and the case was remanded for decision afresh.\n \nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Farooq Compost Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. and 4 others 1993 MLD 1571; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Faisalabad v. Messrs Asisha Garments through Proprietor and 2 others 2001 MLD 1955; Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170 and National Development Finance Corporation v. Messrs Millrock Quarring (Pvt.) Ltd. and 7 others 2002 CLD 1382 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.578 of 1996, heard on 2-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD ALI RAZA SHAH and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12982",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2081 = 2004 SLD 2081 = 2004 CLD 1269",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)--------S.9---Appeal---Principle of past and closed transaction--¬Setting aside of passed by Banking Tribunal on the basis of passed by High Court in case titled Messrs Chenab Cement Product Private Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others, reported PLD 1996 Lah. 672--¬Validity---Judgment and decree in the instant case was passed by Banking Tribunal before the date of rendering of the in the case of Chenab Cement Products---Appellant had challenged the through filing of present appeal, therefore, decree under appeal was not saved and the same did not fall within the term \"\"past and closed cases\"\"---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Tribunal was set aside and case was remanded to Banking Court constituted under S.5 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-- Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 and Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Writ Petition No. 12374 of 1999 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R. F. A. No.167 of 1997, heard on 30-07-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through MANAGER\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD KHAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12983",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2082 = 2004 SLD 2082 = 2004 CLD 1281",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R. 19--¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Interpretation of S. 19, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Execution of decree and sale of property with or without intervention of Banking Court---Applicability of O. XXI, R. 19, C.P.C.--¬Scope---Objection/claim raised before the Banking Court was to be dealt with under S. 19(7), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to which C.P.C. was not applicable and the condition imposed by the Banking Court directing the objector to deposit a certain amount as 20% under O. XXI, R. 19, C.P.C. was illegal\n \nAccording to subsection (2) of section 19, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 the decree passed by the Banking Court is executable in accordance with the provisions of C.P.C. However, if a Financial Institution intends to sell the mortgaged property on its own under subsection (3) then permission can be granted by the Banking Court to do so. However, for that purpose, if some body has an objection to such an auction/sale then he can file objections/ claims under subsection (7) of section 19 of the Ordinance which clearly ousts the provisions of C.P.C. for the determination of such claims/objections which are to be dealt in a summary manner. Section 19 of the Ordinance also provides certain penalties for false claims on the one hand and a false or incorrect defence by the Financial Institution on the other side. \n \nThe objection/claim raised by the objector before the Banking Court should have been dealt under subsection (7) of section 19 to which C.P.C. was not applicable and the condition imposed by the Banking Court directing the objector to deposit a certain sum of money as 20% under Order XXI rule 19, C.P.C. was illegal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.33 of 2003, heard on 2-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI AND MIAN MUHAMMAD AKRAM BAITU, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NOOR HAYAT INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT NO.I, MULTAN and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12984",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2083 = 2004 SLD 2083 = 2004 CLD 1286",
    "Key Words:": "Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Reorganization and Conversion) Ordinance (LX of 2002)-------Ss. 4 & 5---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199--¬Constitutional petition---Petitioners, debtors of the Bank, sought direction of the High Court to the Zarai Taraqiati Bank to extend to them the benefit of the \"\"Relief Package\"\" announced by the Bank with further relief to return the Pass-Books and issue a clearance certificate and also to return the extra amount paid by the petitioners---Petitioners had fulfilled all the terms and conditions of the \"\"Relief Package\"\" announced by the Bank but the Bank refused to give relief to the petitioners on the pretext that the amount deposited by the petitioners was deposited by the Mobile Credit Officer of the Bank one day late and therefore the Bank had adjusted the amount deposited by the petitioners in the payment of loan---Petitioners however, had submitted to the High Court that they would not press the petition if a direction be issued to the Bank to consider the application of petitioners in view of the \"\"Relief Package\"\" strictly in accordance with law---Counsel of the Bank having no objection to the proposal of the petitioners, Constitutional petition was disposed of by the High Court with direction to the Bank that the concerned Bank functionary shall look into the matter personally and pass an appropriate order strictly in accordance with law after providing proper hearing to the petitioners.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.570 of 2004, decision dated: 8-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SABIR CH., J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and another\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK OF PAKISTAN through Director R.P. and D.C.D. and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12985",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2084 = 2004 SLD 2084 = 2004 CLD 1318",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66 ¬Auction of mortgaged property, validity of Suit for recovery filed against the appellant was decreed ex parte in favour of the Bank Execution petition Sale of mortgaged property by auction Objection petition filed by the appellant against auction of his property was dismissed by the Executing Court through impugned order Appeal was filed by the appellant against the impugned order Objections of the appellant was that the notice under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. was not issued to him before the auction of the property, the publication of sale was made in a different newspaper from the one that the Court had directed and the auction proceedings conducted by the Court and the auctioneer were fraudulent Validity Order to sell the property through auction was found to have been passed by the Executing Court after issuing notice under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. to the appellant, as the appellant had responded to it by filing an application for setting aside the ex parte decree Change of the publication in the newspaper by the Court auctioneer was not an illegality,, as the purpose of the publication was to bring the auction of the property to the knowledge of the public and it was well achieved Notice was also fixed at different conspicuous places and also sent by registered post to the appellant No fraud was found to have been committed in holding the auction not the Executing Court had gone outside the limits prescribed nor the Executing Court had one outside the limits law Executing Court as well as the Court auctioneer had performed all the legal requirements to conduct the auction of the said property Appeal, in the circumstances, was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.57 of 2003, heard on 9-12-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KASHIF TRADERS and another --Appellants\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12986",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2085 = 2004 SLD 2085 = 2004 CLD 1331",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S.12(2)---Judgment/decree/order, setting aside of---Fraud or misrepresentation, plea of---Duty of applicant---In order to attract S.12(2), C.P.C., burden heavily lay on applicant to establish from his own affidavit that /decree/order had been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. \n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S.12(2) & O.VI, R.4---Judgment/decree/order, setting aside of---Party alleging fraud and misrepresentation, must give full particulars thereof and not on basis of mere surmises, conjectures and suspicion. \n \nDadabhoy Cement Industries v. N.D.F.C. 2002 CLC 166 and 2002 SCMR 1761 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Decree, setting aside of---Plea of applicant was that he had not executed letter of guarantee---Validity---All Directors of borrower-company were members of the same family--¬Applicant had denied his signatures on letter of guarantee executed on a date, when he was one of the Directors of borrower-company---Other Directors had admitted their signatures on similar letter of guarantee on the same date--¬If any Director of borrower-company had forged signatures of applicant on letter of guarantee, then fraud had not been practised in the proceedings of suit for obtaining /decree---High Court dismissed application under S.12(2), C.P.C. \n \nBegum Anwari Khanum Shaikh v. Messrs Passcon (Pvt.) Ltd. 1993 MLD 1557 and Rehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad 1983 SCMR 1064 rel.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9(5) & 10(2)---Service of summons by publication in newspaper---Validity---Such service was as good as personal service except in exceptional cases, where party could establish that in spite of publication of notice in newspaper,' service could, not be held good against him as for example, on the date when notices were published in newspaper, he was not residing in Pakistan. \n \nPakistan Insurance Corporation v. Grindlays Bank Ltd. 1987 CLC 2164 and Ahmed Autos v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 1990 SC 497 rel.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.10(2) & 9(5)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908, S.12(2)---Decree, setting aside of---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C., was filed on 9-1-2002, whereas applicant had got knowledge about decree on 2-12-2001---Plea of applicant was that since 1987, he was not living at address given in the plaint---Validity---Summons had been issued by all three modes---Applicant had not stated that at any time after he shifted from place K to place R, he had informed the plaintiff-Bank about change of his address---Applicant had not stated that plaintiff had deliberately made mis¬statement by showing his wrong address and as such had misrepresented in Court to obtain /decree--¬Applicant could get the decree set aside on satisfying Court that he was prevented by sufficient cause from making application under S.10 of the Ordinance or that he was not duly served---Such application had to be made within thirty days from date of knowledge, but same had been made much after expiry of such period---High Court dismissed application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1718 of 1997, decision dated: 4-10-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "Messrs UNITED BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs SINDH TECH INDUSTRIES LTD. and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12987",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2086 = 2004 SLD 2086 = 2004 CLD 1336",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 18 & 21---Execution of decree---Auction---Sealed tenders were invited by the Official Assignee for the sale of Basmati Rice on \"\"as is where is\"\" basis---Lowest bid was accepted by the Court and intimation calling upon the bidder to pay the balance sum and to take the delivery of rice was received by him---Auction purchaser, not only failed to deposit the balance amount and lift the rice but also in collusion with the Bank managed to stop the payment of pay order delivered by, the auction purchaser towards earnest money on various pretexts---Amount of earnest money, however, was received by the Official Assignee after his reference and the order was passed by the Court in that respect---Official Assignee moved another reference in the Court seeking order for forfeiture of earnest money deposited by the auction purchaser and permission to invite fresh tenders through advertisement---Auction purchaser, in the meantime, submitted an application under S.151, C.P.C. before the Banking Court, praying therein for refund of his earnest money on the ground that as per the Test Certificate in respect of samples of rice obtained by him were not Basmati Rice, therefore, due to non-lifting of rice and non¬payment of balance amount the auction purchaser could not be penalized---Validity---Offer of sale of Basmati Rice through advertisement in various newspapers was with clear condition that such Offer was on \"\"as is where is\"\" basis---Auction-purchaser, before offering the bid had taken the samples of the \"\"Basmati Rice\"\" and did not object to its quality etc. before offering the bid and it was only after the letter of official Assignee calling upon for payment of balance sum that the auction-purchaser set up the pretext of poor quality of rice---Auction-purchaser had failed to produce any explanation as to why after obtaining the samples and before giving his offer, he could not get the same tested from laboratory---Nothing was available on record to hold that the certificate provided by the auction¬ purchaser related to the same samples of rice which were taken by him much before submitting his offer to the Official Assignee---Official Assignee had no personal interest in the matter as he was not to gain any benefit due to forfeiture of the earnest money of the auction-purchaser thus no mala fides, malice or ill-will could be attributed to hire---Order of the Court was well reasoned and self-explaining which was based on proper appreciation of material placed before the Court---Order for forfeiture of earnest money paid by the auction-purchaser was in conformity with the relevant provisions of law and needed no interference in appeal.\n \nProvince of West Pakistan v. Messrs Mistri Patel & Co. and another PLD 1969 SC 80; Fahd Munir v. Tehsil Government, Tehsil Phalia, District Mandi Bahauddin through Tehsil Nazim and others 2002 CLC 1593 and Ch. Muhammad Ashraf v. Punjab Privatization Board through Secretary, Government of Punjab and another 2002 MLD 550 distinguished.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----\n \n----Ss. 18 & 21---Execution of decree---Auction---Phrase \"\"as is where is\"\"---Meaning, significance and import.\n \nPhrase \"\"as is where is\"\" commonly used in such type of transactions though would not, ipso facto, absolve the seller of his own moral commitment, expected fair play and would not protect any misstatement or concealment of material facts on his part, but at the same time it has its own meaning, significance and import in the field of commercial activity as it warns customers/ buyers to be wary, prudent and to act at their own risk while giving their offer or entering into a transaction. In the given circumstances, if -the buyers acted in a negligent, imprudent and irresponsible manner then they had to bless their stars, but no fault can be attributed to the sellers.\n \n(c) Words and phrases---\n \n----\"\"As is where is\"\"---Meaning.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.158 of 2001, heard on 19-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ROSHAN ESSANI AND ANWER ZAHEER, JAMALI, JJ.",
    "": "Messrs JULANDAR (PVT.) LTD.\nVs.\nOFFICIAL ASSIGNEE and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12988",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3032 = 2003 SLD 3032 = 2003 CLD 1343",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Organizations Ordinance (XLV of 1961)---------Ss.3 & 12---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199--¬Constitutional petition---De-affiliating membership--¬Petitioners as members of Chamber of Commerce and Industry and holding licences granted by Government under S.3 of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961 applied for renewal of membership---Managing Committee of Chambers through its resolution declined such request and de-affiliated membership of the petitioners---Director Trade Organizations on petitioner's representation passed order that they would remain affiliated with Chambers until Chambers got approval of .its resolution from its general body in extraordinary general meeting and the Federal Government ---Refusal of Chamber to act such directions of Director---Validity---According to Memorandum and Articles of Association of Chamber, general body had exclusive jurisdiction to de-affiliate a member---Action taken by Managing Committee, unless approved by general body by 3/4th majority of members present in meeting or through proxy as laid down in its Articles, would be illegal and of no legal effect---Managing Committee had neither given any notice to petitioners nor had heard them before passing impugned resolution---Such action was against the principles of natural justice--Without adopting procedure laid down in Memorandum and Articles of Association, no office-bearer or member of any committee of Chamber was authorised to de-affiliate or terminate membership of petitioners, whose names appeared as members in the Articles---Petitioners have prayed for implementation of order passed by Director in discharge of his statutory duties, which was binding on Chamber unless set aside by Competent Authority---Bar contained in S.12 of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961 thus, would stand attracted to such a case---High Court accepted Constitutional petitions and declared impugned resolution to be illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction.\n \nS. Saeeduddin Nasir and Khalid Latif for Petitioners.\n \nS. Tariq Ali and Khalid Javed for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 18th September, 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961=3,12\\n\\r\\n\\rTrade Organizations Ordinance, 1961=3,12\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.1989 to 1991 of 2001, decision dated: 26-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMAD AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFFERI, JJ",
    "": "GHARO ASSOCIATION OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY through Representative/ Secretary and 2 others\nVs.\nMINISTRY OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, Islamabad High Court High Court through Secretary and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12989",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3033 = 2003 SLD 3033 = 2003 CLD 1349",
    "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------S. 41---Trade Organizations Ordinance (XLV of 1961), S.12---Eligibility of candidate for posts of Vice-Presidents prescribed by Managing Committee of Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry---Plaintiff challenged such eligibility through application under S.41 of the Act and sought interim relief to stay election--¬Contention of defendants was that arbitration application filed by plaintiff claiming similar relief was pending before Arbitration Tribunal constituted under S.12 of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961---Validity---Not possible for High Court to decide controversy within time due to pendency of arbitration proceedings before Arbitration Tribunal constituted under law---Interim order, if any, passed by High Court would disturb whole election process of the. Federation---High Court disposed of applications with directions to Arbitration Tribunal to take up matter and decide the same on the next day, so that plaintiff might have enough time at his disposal to file nomination, if allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous Application No.64 of 2002, decision dated: 19-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED, J",
    "": "DADU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY through Secretary--Applicant\nVs.\nDr. ANWAR-ULHAQUE, SECRETARY-GENERAL, FEDERATION OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, Karachi High Court and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12990",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3034 = 2003 SLD 3034 = 2003 CLD 1352",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--------S.10---BCD Circular No. 13 dated 20-6-1984---Leave to defend suit, application for---Defendant's plea was that price and buy-back price were mentioned in agreement, but its column of mark-up was blank, thus, in absence of agreement for payment of mark-up, plaintiff-Bank was not entitled to charge mark-up---Validity---Agreement showed that transaction was Marahaba (Bai' Muajjal) or sale on deferred payment basis or agreement for sale on credit--¬One of the modes of Trade Related Financing detailed in Annexure-I of BCD Circular 13, dated 20-6-1984 was purchase of goods by banks and their sale to clients at, appropriate mark-up in price on deferred payment basis--¬Defendant had agreed to pay mark-up in price of goods on or before date specified in agreement---Plaintiff in absence of percentage was entitled for mark-up in price i.e. difference between sale and buy-back price.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----Ss.170 & 171---Lien of bankers---Bank has right to exercise lien, when its customer has breached agreement by not making payment as agreed.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10---Leave to defend suit, application for--Availing of facility, execution of documents and liability to ay was not disputed by defendant---Defendant had failed tb make out a case for leave to defend by raising substantial questions of law and fact requiring evidence---High Court dismissed application in circumstances.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Insurance and Muqadam charges claimed by Bank in terms of letter of pledge---Pledged goods were to be insured against fire, theft and other risks by customer (pawner) and in case of its failure by pawnee (bank)--¬Customer's case was not that goods were insured, rather Bank had insured the same---Bank (pawnee) was thus, entitled for extraordinary expenses incurred by them in shape of insurance as well as by appointment of Muqadam.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-73 of 2000, decision dated: 8-10-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMAD, J",
    "": "ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs MODerN METALLIC SERVICES through Proprietor and 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12991",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3035 = 2003 SLD 3035 = 2003 CLD 1364",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Organizations Ordinance (XLV of 1961)-------Ss.3(2), 9 & 12---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---De-affiliation of petitioners from membership of Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry---Contention of petitioners was that Director Trade Organizations has passed such order at their back without giving them an opportunity of showing cause against action proposed to be taken---Validity---Objections filed on behalf of Director Trade Organizations and Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry were not supported by counter-affidavit---Nothing was available on record to establish that petitioners had been issued any show-cause notices or they had been heard before passing impugned order by Director, Trade Organizations---Section 12 of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961 provided for arbitration under given circumstances---Impugned order did not attract provisions of S.12 of the Ordinance so as to be settled through arbitration---De-affiliating of membership of trade groups could be given legal effect only in case Memorandum and Articles of Association of Chamber of Commerce were amended strictly in accordance with procedure laid down therein---High Court accepted Constitutional petition and set aside impugned order with direction to the Chamber of Commerce to keep vacant seat in Managing Committee till decision of question of membership of petitioners in accordance with requirements of Government's order after providing them adequate opportunity.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-2026 and 2050 of 2001, heard on 21st September, 2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFFERI, JJ",
    "": "MUTAHIR SAEED CHAWLA and 16 others\nVs.\nCHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, Karachi High Court and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12992",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3036 = 2003 SLD 3036 = 2003 CLD 1370",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---------S. 5---\"\"Bill of exchange\"\"---Nature---Bill of exchange is a negotiable instrument as defined under S. 5 of the Act.\n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 58---Defective title---When, a Bill of Exchange has been lost or has been obtained from any maker, drawer, acceptor or holder thereof by means of an offence or fraud or for an unlawful consideration, neither the person who finds or so obtains the instrument nor any possessor or endorsee who claims through such person is entitled to receive the amount due thereon from such maker, drawer, acceptor or holder unless such possessor or endorsee is or some person through whom he claims, was, a holder thereof in due course.\n \n(c) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S.30---Liability of the drawer---If the drawer of a Bill of Exchange drawing it, engages that on a due presentment, the same shall be accepted and paid according to its tenor and if it is dishonoured he will compensate the holder or endorser who is compelled to pay the same ---Drawee shall' not be liable till such time the same are accepted ---Drawee, on acceptance of 'the Bill of Exchange becomes liable discharging the drawer---Drawer shall and can only be made liable when it is shown as to which of the Bill of Exchange are dishonoured by non-payment---Dishonour could be by refusal to pay.\n \n(d) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-----\n \n----Ss. 30, 103 & 104---Liability of the drawer---If the drawee had not accepted the Bills, it ivas mandatory upon the holder to give a notice of dishonour to the drawer after protesting/noting---Notice to the drawer was of great importance and was mandatory in terms of S. 30 of the Act---Principles.\n \n(e) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----Ss. 48 & 58---Negotiation by endorsement---Defective title---Subject to S. 58 of the Act where tree title is defective, a Promissory Note, Bill of Exchange or Cheque payable to order is negotiable by the holder by endorsement and delivery thereof---General effect of taking an instrument as additional payment is to suspend the right of action of the original debt during the currency of the instrument--¬Principles.\n \nPrice v. Price 153 ER 1174; Stedman v. Gooch 1 Esp. 4 and Ramuz v. Crowe 151 ER 70 ref.\n \n(f) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 48---Negotiation by instrument---Bill of Exchange would be negotiable by the holder of endorsement and deliver---Only question would remain whether the Pill had a defective title.\n \n(g) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 45-A---Holder's right to duplicate of lost bill---Where the instrument had been lost appropriate measures were provided in S. 45-A of the Act---Principles.\n \n(h) Negotiable instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 30---Liability of the drawer---Scope and extent.\n \n(i) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 30---Liability of the drawer---Dishonour by non ¬acceptance or non-payment gives rise to an immediate right of recourse against the drawer of the Bills of Exchange--¬Principles.\n \nUnited Bank Limited v. Ch. Ghulam Hussain 1998 CLC 816; United Bank Ltd. v. Taj Seafood Industries PLJ 1975 Kar. 444; Kanhyalal and others v. Ramkumar and others AIR 1956 Raj. 129; Nenu Ram v. Shivkishen AIR 1950 Raj. 55; Jugjivan Mavji Vithalani v. Messrs Ranchhoddas Meghji AIR 1954 SC 554; Bank of Ireland v. Arche (1834) 11 M&W 383); Harvey v. Martin (1808) 1 Camp. 425 and Roscow v. Hardy 104 ER 170 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 959 of 1990, decision dated: 25-05-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR MANSOOR KHAN, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Plaintiff\nVs.\nSHAHYAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD. --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12993",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3037 = 2003 SLD 3037 = 2003 CLD 1393",
    "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss. 42, 12 & 55---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss.86 & 87---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Sale of shares owned by the lenders which were issued to them in lieu of their outstanding dues---Application under O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, C.P. C. seeking an. interim injunction restraining the defendants and the persons acting through them from handing over the possession of the factory to any third party or create any third party rights, interest in the suit property and shares of the company till final disposal of .the suit for declaration and specific performance---Shares, subject-matter of the original agreement and novation agreement, had not been transferred in the name of the plaintiff --Plaintiff had not brought on record anything to show that shares in favour of the lenders were not issued in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 nor the plaintiff had initiated any action under the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Assertion that plaintiff had right of first refusal for the purchase of shares being sold by the lenders, was not raised in the plaint and only a half-hearted attempt was made in the affidavit in rejoinder to introduce this agreement---Plaintiff had come to the Court after a lapse of six months of the advertisement for sale of shares by the lenders which was published in leading newspapers--¬Plaintiff had stated in the plaint that it was shocked upon receiving credible information - from various sources but however had failed to disclose said sources which provided the information after a lapse of six months---Plaintiff had deliberately attempted to cause a false impression that it owned more than, 50% shares of the company and the shares being sold by the lenders included such shares--¬Such conduct of the plaintiff alone would disentitle it from obtaining any equitable relief---Further, no possibility existed that plaintiff would be running the affairs of the concerned company as plaintiff's nominee directors had voluntarily withdrawn their nominations from the election of the Company Directors and had never shown any interest in the affairs of the Company; even if the shares subject¬ matter of the original agreement and the novation agreement were transferred to the plaintiff, the same would only constitute a small minority in the currently paid-up capital of the Company---Held, plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case; the balance of convenience was also not in favour of the plaintiff nor the plaintiff had been able to show any irreparable loss that may be caused to it on account of sale of shares owned by the lenders which were issued to them in lieu of their outstanding dues---Application of the plaintiff was dismissed with costs.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1296 of 2002, decision dated: 25-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, J",
    "": "METRO MANAGEMENT (PVT.) LTD, through Director--Plaintiff\nVs.\nPRIVATIZATION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad High Court High Court and 5 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12994",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3038 = 2003 SLD 3038 = 2003 CLD 1400",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)-------Ss. 10(2)(2-A) & 80---National Book Foundation Act (XIX of 1972), S.6---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Reproduction of educational materials--¬Application for registration of copyright---Interim injunction, grant of---Defendants, a statute of body, were selling books after incorporating on its opening page their own logo and words \"\"Reproduced by National Book Foundation\"\", while printing on its back page logo and name of National Book Foundation with names of various cities, where National Book Foundation was available---Defendant could not produce any document showing grant of permission by original owner to National Book Foundation or Federal Government to incorporate such name on books and sell them in, the market---Section 10(2-A) of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 could not be read in isolation, rather the whole S. 10(2) had to be read, otherwise entire Ordinance would become redundant---In absence of any authority to the contrary available with Government, case for grant of injunction had been made out which was granted accordingly.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.VII, R.11---Rejection of plaint---Essential considera¬tions ---Necessity of recording evidence to arrive at just decision---Principles illustrated. Application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., can be entertained and looked into only after the plaint has been read. Rejection of plaint has to be based upon the plain reading of plaint. It has to appear on the face of it. The defence taken in written statement shall not be considered as basis for rejection of plaint. In cases, where in order to come to a just and fair decision, it is necessary to investigate the matter, then evidence has to be recorded.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.729 of 2000, heard on 29-06-2000.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, J",
    "": "STANLEY THOMES PUBLISHERS LTD. and another--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nNATIONAL BOOK FOUNDATION and others----Defendants."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12995",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3039 = 2003 SLD 3039 = 2003 CLD 1406",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss.20 & 118---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.233---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Application for leave to defend--¬Defendants admitted signatures on letters of guarantees, but disputed the amount mentioned therein---Defendants in leave application did not disclose amount of finance. availed; amount paid by them; dates of payment; amount of finance and other amounts relating to finance payable by them to Bank; amount of finance and other amounts disputed by them---Effect---Defendants had neither complied with provisions of S.10(4)(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 nor had shown sufficient cause for their inability to do so---No leave application, thus, would be deemed to be pending---Leave application filed was liable to be rejected as per mandatory provisions of S.10(6) of the Ordinance---Defendants had admitted availing of loan facilities by company (principal debtor) and their signatures on documents annexed with plaint---Bald denial of execution of documents by defendants was an attempt to wriggle out of their contractual obligations---No defence at all had been taken by company---If conceded that documents had been given blank, even then in view of Ss.20 & 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, defendants were estopped to challenge legality, validity and genuineness thereof---In view, of execution of personal guarantees and other documents, defendants could not shirk from liquidating their liabilities as they were jointly and severally liable to liquidate liabilities of company under provisions of Contract Act, 1872---Defendants had failed to raise any serious and bona fide dispute warranting grant of leave to defend suit--¬Leave application was dismissed being not maintainable and on merits as well.\n \nMuhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Hashim Paracha and another PLD 1987 Kar. 76; S.K. Abdul Aziz v. Mahmoodul Hassan and 3 others 1988 CLC 337; Haji Karim another v. Zikar Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Messrs Gujrat Friends Traders and others PLD 1988 Lah. 156; Messrs United Bank Ltd v. President, Bazm-e-Salat and another PLD 1986 Kar. 464; Bazm-e-Salat and others v. Messrs United Bank Ltd. PLD 1989 Kar. 150; Prudential Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hydari Ghee Industries Ltd. and 9 others 1999 MLD 1694 and Messrs Bank of Oman Limited v. Messrs East Asia Trading Co. Ltd. and 4 others 1987 CLC 288 rel.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n---- Mandatory or directory provisions---Determination of--¬Provision of law couched with penal consequences would be considered as mandatory---Provision of law entailing no penal consequences for its non-compliance would be taken as directory.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10(6)---Provisions of S.10(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 being mandatory, non-compliance thereof would entail penal consequences of rejection of leave application.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10(3)(4)(5)(6)---Application for leave to defend ---Non¬compliance with provisions of S.10(3)(4)(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--¬Effect---Presumption would be that no application for grant of leave to defend suit was pending---Leave application filed by defendants would be liable to be rejected as perforce of S.10(6) of the Ordinance.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Application for leave to. defend---Defendants (guarantor) denied to have executed letter of guarantee and mortgage deed ---Validity---Examination of such documents showed that defendant had signed personal guarantee, which was attested, by two witnesses, one of them- was her husband---Mortgage deed had been duly executed by defendant through her husband/ attorney and registered with Sub-Registrar--Defendant had executed memorandum of deposit of title deed---Defendant had not alleged that such documents or her signatures thereon had either been forged by Bank or its functionaries or by remaining defendants---Availing of loan by principal debtor not - denied---Defendant had not challenged statement of accounts or any entry thereof---Mere bald and vague denial of execution of documents without any prima facie proof, would not furnish a ground for grant of leave nor same would absolve defendant from liquidating liabilities incurred through execution thereof---Defendant had failed to raise substantial question of law and facts to be tried by Court requiring recording of evidence---Leave application was dismissed being devoid of any force.\n \nGhazala Arif v. Union Bank Ltd: (Now Emirates Bank International, Lahore 2000 CLC 1201 rel.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.3(2), 9 & 10---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), Ss.2(8) & 4---Suit for recovery of loan amount--¬Dismissal of application for leave to defend ---Effect--¬Allegations made in the plaint would be deemed to be admitted---Bank had produced photo copies of documents alongwith plaint, on which suit was based---Execution of such documents would be deemed to be admitted by defendants for not having denied their signatures thereon--¬No serious infirmity had been alleged to statement of accounts duly certified under Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 and to which presumption of correctness was attached---No rebuttal of such documents on record---Suit was decreed with costs and costs of funds to be determined under S.3(2) of the Ordinance in favour of Bank and against defendants jointly and severally.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 63 of 2001, decision dated: 30-07-2002, hearing DATE : 19-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "BANK OF KHYBER --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs SPENCER DISTRIBUTION LTD. and 14 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12996",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3040 = 2003 SLD 3040 = 2003 CLD 1419",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----------Ss. 7(6), 9 & 22---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss.2(b), 5, 9 & 22---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199--¬Constitutional petition---Suit for declaration and 'settlement of accounts by borrower against Bank---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Borrower disputed his liability under finance agreements with Bank by filing suit before Banking Court after dismissal of Constitutional petition by High Court with observations that his grievance being relatable to obligations of Bank under terms and conditions of finance, could be adjudicated by Banking Court---Banking Court dismissed suit for not having plenary powers of a Civil Court to deal with cases of ordinary civil jurisdiction either under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 or Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Banking Court without adverting to facts of the case, adhering to provisions of S.9 of Act, 1997 and S.7(6) of Ordinance, 2001 and attending to such order of High Court; had dismissed suit on an unsustainable ground---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned /decree being nullity in eye of law and remanded case to Banking Court for its decision in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Quetta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 6 of 2002, decision dated: 26-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJA FAYYAZ AHMED, C.J. AND AKHTAR ZAMAN MALGHANI, J",
    "": "Messrs HAQ TRADERS through Partners\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager\nNasimuddin v. United Bank Ltd. 1998 CLC 1718 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12997",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3041 = 2003 SLD 3041 = 2003 CLD 1426",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.18 & 21---Execution of compromise decree---Bank had alleged commission of default by -debtor as per terms of compromise---Judgment-debtor denied such allegation and objected to maintainability of execution application---Dismissal of objection petition---Validity---No finding of Banking Court was found in the impugned order in respect of default/breach committed by ¬ debtor---High Court allowed appeal, remanded case to Banking Court to decide, whether -debtor' had committed default in payment of instalments as per agreed schedule.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 554 of 2001, heard 6n 18-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "SHAMIN SHOES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and others \nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12998",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3042 = 2003 SLD 3042 = 2003 CLD 1429",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S. 290---Petition for regulating affairs of company on ground of fraudulent transfer of shares of petitioner--¬Maintainability---Such petition would not fall within ambit of S.290 of the Companies Ordinance, 19.84 as same did not deal with a situation, where a member of company apprehended that his shares might be or had been transferred in an unlawful or fraudulent manner in favour of other person.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 305(f)(iii)---Winding up petition by a person not presently member of the company---Maintainability---Such petition could be filed only by a person, who owned at least one share of company and his name appeared in register of shareholders of company on the day of its filing, but not by a person, whose name was borne on such register prior to the date of its filing.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-----\n \n----S. 305---Winding up petition by person claiming to be minority shareholder---Maintainability---Such petition could be filed by minority shareholder i.e. holding not less than 20% of equity share capital of company.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss. 152 & 305---Winding up petition on ground of fraudulent transfer of petitioner's shares in favour of third persons---Maintainability---Remedy of petitioner was to file application under S.152 of Companies Ordinance. 1984 for rectification of register of members---Petition for winding up of company was patently not maintainable in law.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 255 of 1998 decided on 2-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. AHMED SARWANA AND M. MUJEEBULLAH SIDDIQUI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN \nVs.\nDAWOOD FLOUR MILL and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12999",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3043 = 2003 SLD 3043 = 2003 CLD 1442",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. VII, R.11, O.XLIII, R.1 & S.115---First appeal from order---Maintainability---Nature of order of remand passed in the present case, by the Appellate Court in fact was to set aside an order of Trial Court whereby plaint was initially rejected though termed as dismissal of the suit---Second appeal in circumstances was not maintainable and the only remedy was to file a civil revision under S.115, C. P. C. ---High Court, in the interest of justice and equity, treated the first appeal from order as civil revision accordingly.\n \n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----Ss.42, 39 & 54---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss. 7, 152 & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9---Suit for declaration, cancellation of documents and perpetual injunction by Director of a Company against the other Director and Joint Registrar of Companies seeking cancellation of purported resignation and deeds of transfer of shares on ground of being forged and fraudulent, ineffective and invalid---Question arose whether in view of the allegations of forgery, fraud, invalidity and fabrication of documents etc. as pleaded by the plaintiff in his suit for declaration, cancellation of documents and perpetual injunction could the Civil Court entertain and try the said suit, in view of provisions of S.7 read with S.152 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Held, Company Judge of the High Court was required to proceed expeditiously upon an application by following a \"\"summary procedure\"\" under S.9, Companies Ordinance. 1984 and such summary procedure did not visualize holding of a trial or an inquiry through a detailed evidence upon allegations of fraud, forgery and fabrication of documents etc. as had been convassed in the civil suit---Such suit therefore, was triable under S.9, C.P.C. by a Civil Court which was a Court of general jurisdiction in all civil matters---Principles.\n \nMessrs Chalna Fibre Company Limited, Khulna and others v. Abdul Jabbar and others PLD 1968 SC 381; Manzoor Ahmad Bhatti and others v. Haji Noval Khan and others 1986 CLC 2560; Akbar Ali Sharif and others v. Syed Jamaluddin and others 1991 MLD 203 and Syed Shafqat Hussain v. Registrar, Joint Stock Companies, Lahore and others PLD 2001 Lah. 523 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 12 of 2003, heard on 10-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASLAM JAVED and another\nVs.\nMalik IJAZ AHMAD and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13000",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3044 = 2003 SLD 3044 = 2003 CLD 1447",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.10 & 22(1)(3)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Refusal of Banking Court to grant leave to defend suit---Challenge to such order through Constitutional petition on the ground that same was patently illegal and void; and that remedy of appeal was inadequate, insufficient and illusory in view of condition of furnishing security or deposit of decretal amount for admission of appeal and grant of stay order, thus, petitioner was entitled to bypass same and approach High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction---Validity---Provisions of S.22(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were not stringent and harsh, but were soft and easy---Pre-condition of furnishing of security, for which a reasoned order would have to be made by High Court in its capacity of Appellate Authority, would not automatically render remedy of appeal as nugatory, inefficacious and inadequate---Proviso' to S.22(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 did not curtail or hinder right of appeal---Filing of Constitutional petition instead of seeking remedy of appeal provided under the statute, particularly when appellate forum was none other, but High Court, was disapproved---Principles.\n \nThe language of section 22(3) of Ordinance, 2001 is altogether different from language of section 21 of repealed Ordinance of 1979 and section 9 of repealed Ordinance of 1984, wherein specific condition for deposit of the amount claimed or due or decreed was provided for admission of appeal. The pre-condition provided in section 22(3) of Ordinance, 2001 for admission of appeal is much easier and softer than the provisions contained in section 12 of repealed Ordinance of 1979 and section 9 of repealed Ordinance of 1984.\n \nProvisions of section 22(3) of Ordinance of 2001 are not as stringent and harsh as were in the earlier statutes relating to recovery of loans/advances of financial institutions and it cannot be said that pre-condition of furnishing of security, for which a reasoned order will have to be made by High Court in its capacity as Appellate Authority, would automatically render remedy of appeal as nugatory, inefficacious and inadequate. The provisions of section 22(3) have given vast power to Appellate Court for stating or declaring the reason and conditions for furnishing the security. Appellate Court after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case and examining the extent of liability of aggrieved party will be absolutely free to determine easy and soft terms for furnishing of security.\n \nMaintainability of the present Constitutional petition appears to be doubtful on another ground namely, where a statute provided a self-contained machinery for determination of questions arising under the statute and it also provides remedy by way of appeal or revision to another Tribunal or Court fully competent to give any relief, then an indulgence by High Court in accepting a Constitutional petition assailing impugned order passed by Tribunal or Court in contravention of the provisions made in the statute, will produce a sense of distrust in Appellate Forum/Court provided by the statute. In such circumstances, Constitutional petition would not be maintainable and it will be imperative for aggrieved party to resort to remedy of appeal provided under the statute.\n \nMst. Kaniz Fatima v. Muhammad Salim and 27 others 2001 SCMR 1493 fol.\n \nThis would be applicable with greater impact in the present case as appellate forum is none other, but High Court.\n \nCh. Muhammad Ismail. v. Fazal Zada PLD 1996 SC 246 fol.\n \nWhere appellate or revisional authority under a particular statute for filing an appeal or revisions against an order passed thereunder is High Court, then in such a situation, High Court will not allow its appellate or revisional jurisdiction to be side-tracked by entertaining a Constitutional petition by aggrieved party and will insist that the provision of statute for filing the appeal or revision be followed, notwithstanding the pre-condition or requirement of furnishing security or depositing the amount claimed or furnishing amount in Appellate Court.\n \nKhalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore 1999 SCMR 1881 fol.\n \nWith regard to contention that impugned order is unlawful, passed in illegal exercise of jurisdiction, contrary to material/ evidence on record and void ab initio, as a result of which it could be challenged directly by invocation of Article 199 of the Constitution in view of the principle enumerated in the case of Mst. Kaniz Fatima 2001 SCMR 1493, it is to be noted that such observation of Supreme Court was qualified by the condition that the controversial question be decided without any comprehensive inquiry into complicated, ticklish, controversial and disputed facts.\n \nMst. Kaniz Fatima v. Muhammad Salim and 27 others 2001 SCMR 1493 ref.\n \nThe provision for depositing decretal amount for granting stay contained in repealed Act of 1997 was similar to the like restrictions contained in Order XLI, Rule 5, C.P.C. Like or similar retractions contained in Order XLI, Rule 5, C.P.C. are in existence since a very long time, but such restrictions have never been held to be causing a hurdle or hindrance in the right of an aggrieved party preferring an appeal in accordance with the provisions of C.P.C. In these circumstances, the proviso to section 22(3) of Ordinance, 2001 can by no stretch of imagination be said to be curtailing or hindering the right of appeal, so as to enable petitioner to bypass the remedy of appeal provided under section 22 of Ordinance, 2001 and to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court for assailing an order, which otherwise will be assailable by way of appeal under section 22 of Ordinance, 2001.\n \nBalochistan Trading Company (Pvt.) Ltd. And another v. National Bank of Pakistan and another 1998 SCMR 1899 fol.\n \nConstitutional petition was found to be misconceived and not maintainable and was dismissed in limine in circumstances.\n \nSyed Saghir Ahmed Naqvi v. Province of Sindh and another 1996 SCMR 1165; Ghulam Hussain and another v. Malik Shahbaz Khan and another 1985 SCMR 1925 and Messrs Tank Steel and Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Dera Ismail Khan and others PLD 1996 SC 77 and Shaikh Gulzar Ali Co. v. Special Judge S. Court of Banking 1991 SCMR 590 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.720 of 2002, decision dated: 31st December, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J. AND GHULAM RABBANI, J",
    "": "M. A. KAREEM IQBAL\nVs.\nPRESIDING OFFICER, BANKING COURT NO.III and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13001",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3045 = 2003 SLD 3045 = 2003 CLD 1464",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.10 & 21---Plea not taken in application for leave to defend suit---Effect---Such. plea could not be taken at time of hearing of appeal before High Court.\n \nCitibank N.A. v. Riaz Ahmad 2000 CLC 847 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----\n \n----Ss.9, 15 & 21---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4---Suit for recovery of loan amount decreed by Banking Court---Validity---Defendants had not denied availing of finance facility and execution of loan documents---Statement of accounts filed with plaint was duly verified by Bank in accordance with Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891---Presumption of truth attached to such statement of accounts had not been rebutted by defendants with cogent reasons orally or through documents---Contention of defendants that blank documents were signed by them, thus, had no force---Defendants had failed to make out any plausible case for grant of leave to defend suit--¬Banking Court was justified in refusing to grant leave to appeal and decreeing suit of Bank---No illegality or infirmity was found in the impugned ---High Court dismissed appeal with directions to Executing Court to consider at the time of deciding execution petition the defendants' contention qua depositing certain amount with Bank.\n \nGhulam Rasool's case PLD 1971 SC 376 and Allied Bank of Pakistan's case PLD 1990 SC 497 rel.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.17(1)---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.18(1)---Banking documents--¬Signing a blank document would amount to creating or impliedly authorizing Bank to fill in any amount at a later point of time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 648 of 2001, heard on 28-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs INTERNATIONAL TRADERS through Proprietorship and 3 others \nVs.\nUNION BANK LIMITED\nMessrs United Bank LTD.„¢s case. PLD 1986 Kar. 464 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13002",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3046 = 2003 SLD 3046 = 2003 CLD 1468",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XXIII, R.1(1)(3)---Unconditional withdrawal of suit--¬Effect---Bar contained in O.XXIII, R.1(3), C.P.C., would preclude second suit by the same plaintiff on the same subject-matter.\n \nPLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 287; 1996 SCMR 1051 and PLD 1998 Lah. 441 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIII, Rr.1(3) & 3---Second suit for recovery o f loan amount after withdrawal of earlier suit---Application for leave to defend--¬ Plea of defendants was that second suit was burred by O.XXIII, R. I (3), C.P. C., in view of dismissal of earlier' suit on the same subject-matter between the same parties as withdrawn in view of settlement between the par-lies---Pleas raised by Bank were that Bank had never requested for withdrawal of the suit and such order having been passed on its application seeking decree under O.XXIII, R.3, C.P.C., in terms of settlement was without jurisdiction, thus, such bar did not attract to the second suit, that applications filed by Bank for modification of such dismissal order and revival of suit had been dismissed being not maintainable and that second suit was maintainable having been filed on the basis of fresh cause of action upon breach of settlement by defendants---Validity---Defendants in leave application had not pleaded that Bank had ever made request for unconditional withdrawal of earlier suit---After recording factum of settlement, Court instead of decreeing suit, acting suo motu had dismissed suit as withdrawn without any request/prayer/application from the Bank---Such order had neither culminated in compromise decree under O.XXIII, R.3, C.P.C., nor same could be termed as an order for unconditional withdrawal under sub-rifle (1) nor same could be interpreted to impose bar of sub-rule (3) thereof---Such was in effect an order to dismiss suit as infructuous upon settlement between the parties---Defendants in reply to the Bank's application for revival of suit had conceded that Bank could maintain fresh suit upon breach of settlement as same would give rise to separate cause of action in favour of Bank---Second suit was maintainable and did not in any way attract bar of O,XXIII, R.1(3), C.P.C.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXIII, R.1 (1) (3)---Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of claim---Unqualified right and privilege of plaintiff---Right to choose to continue or elect to discontinue suit absolutely and unambiguously vested in the plaintiff---No other person including defendant had a right to seek withdrawal of suit---Withdrawing suit or abandoning claim without any condition, reservation or rider would preclude plaintiff from instituting fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter or such part of claim---Upon plaintiff's request to withdraw his suit, Court had no discretion to decline disposal/ dismissal of suit as withdrawn except in extraordinary and limited circumstances i.e. where rights had come to vest in defendant, third person or in general public etc.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXIII, R.1 (2)---Withdrawal of suit with liberty to file fresh suit---Scope---Sub-rule 12) of O.XXIII, C.P.C., safeguards against situations of injustice, inequity or unfairness likely to be faced by plaintiff by losing a right to re-file suit on the same subject-matter, if earlier suit was bound to fail by reason of some formal defect or otherwise--¬Said rule prevents technicalities from defeating the justice--¬Only plaintiff has absolute right and privilege to unconditionally withdraw suit under sub-rule (1) of R.1 of O.XXIII, C.P.C. or to seek Court's permission to withdraw suit in situations and exigencies visualized in sub-rule (2) of the said order with liberty to re-file the same escaping bar imposed under sub-rule (3) of R.1, O.XXIII, C.P.C.--¬Defendant or any other person has no right to seek withdrawal of plaintiff's suit and obtain Court's permission to re file same.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXIII, R.1(1)(2)---Withdrawal of suit without or with permission of Court---Scope---Under O.XXIII, R.1(1), C.P.C., plaintiff can withdraw suit at any stage without order of Court---Under sub-rule (2) thereof; plaintiff has to obtain permission of Court for withdrawal---Court's power to permit withdrawal is limited to instances specifically mentioned in cls. (a) & (b) of said sub-rule (2).\n \nHaji Abdul Rashid Sodagar v. S.M. Lalita Roy and others PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 287 fol.\n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXIII, R. 1(1)(2) ---Withdrawal of suit --- Suo Motu jurisdiction of Court---Scope---Until plaintiff so requests, Court has no jurisdiction or discretion under O.XXIII, R.1, C.P.C., to act suo Motu and dispose of or dismiss suit as withdrawn with or without permission to re file same.\n \n(g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXIII, R.1(1)(3)---Unconditional withdrawal of suit--¬Effect---Suit of same nature would not be barred, if filed on basis of fresh cause of action accruing to plaintiff against defendant.\n \n(h) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----Ss.126, 129, 133 & 136---Continuing guarantee--¬Variance in terms of contract---Effect---Where guarantor under personal guarantee pre-consented to changes without reference, recourse or notice to him, then he would be bound by guaranteed obligations, even if variations, concessions, time enlargements and indulgences were granted by creditor to principal debtor.\n \nMian Aftab A. Sheikh v. Messrs Trust Leasing Corporation R.F.A. No.486 of 1999 fol.\n \n(i) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.2(d)(i) & 9---Suit for recovery of loan amount with mark-up---Statement of account annexed with plaint and updated statement -of accounts showed charging of mark-up beyond expiry period of finance agreement ---Validity---Bank no authority to charge mark-up beyond financing agreement---Mark-up charge for 210 days cushion period as per instructions of State Bank was allowed.\n \n(j) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.3, 9 & 17---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Bank filed such suit upon breach of terms of settlement dated 22-10-1997 by defendants---Defendants in settlement package admitted their liability of Rs.38,874,300---Debit entries in consolidated statement of account relating to finance account, mark-up up to finance agreement and 210 days mark-up for cushion period showed total amount due at Rs.37, 715, 062---Held: Bank had filed suit on the basis of its statements of accounts---Banking Court had no option but to pass decree on basis of figures given in the statement of accounts instead of said amount admitted by defendants---Suit was decreed with costs for sum of Rs.37,715,062 alongwith cost of funds of Bank certified by State Bank w.e.f. 22-10-1997 till payment by defendants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 122 of 1999, decision dated: 20-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Zonal Chief--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs SAIF NADEEM ELECTRO LIMITED and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13003",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3047 = 2003 SLD 3047 = 2003 CLD 1487",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLV1 of 2001)-------S.22(6)---\"\"Interlocutory order'---Meaning---Order which is incidental to or a step in aid of a final decision.\n \nPakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd PLD 1993 SC 109 fol.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.19 & 22(6)---Civil Procedure Code. (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.89---Execution of decree by sale of mortgaged property--¬Appellant ( -debtor) was allowed to match highest bid of auction purchaser by depositing amount within specified time---Executing Court dismissed appellant's application seeking extensions of time---Appeal against such interlocutory order---Maintainability---Execution petition was still pending---Appeal was not maintainable as same had not been filed against any final order---Relief demanded in appeal could not be granted to appellant for not having filed application under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C., before the Executing Court---High Court resolved grievance of appellant by granting him extension up to specified date, which he had not complied with up to date---Appellant was neither entitled for any further extension of time or leniency by High Court nor any purpose would be served by same---High Court dismissed the appeal in limine.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 163 of 2002, decision dated: 22-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATA-UR-REHMAN AND MUHAMMAD AFZAL SOOMRO, JJ",
    "": "Karachi High Court PIPE MILLS LIMITED\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LITD and another\nPakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd PLD. 1993 SC 109 fol."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13004",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3048 = 2003 SLD 3048 = 2003 CLD 1487",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLV1 of 2001)-------S.22(6)---\"\"Interlocutory order'---Meaning---Order which is incidental to or a step in aid of a final decision.\n \nPakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd PLD 1993 SC 109 fol.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.19 & 22(6)---Civil Procedure Code. (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.89---Execution of decree by sale of mortgaged property--¬Appellant ( -debtor) was allowed to match highest bid of auction purchaser by depositing amount within specified time---Executing Court dismissed appellant's application seeking extensions of time---Appeal against such interlocutory order---Maintainability---Execution petition was still pending---Appeal was not maintainable as same had not been filed against any final order---Relief demanded in appeal could not be granted to appellant for not having filed application under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C., before the Executing Court---High Court resolved grievance of appellant by granting him extension up to specified date, which he had not complied with up to date---Appellant was neither entitled for any further extension of time or leniency by High Court nor any purpose would be served by same---High Court dismissed the appeal in limine.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 163 of 2002, decision dated: 22-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATA-UR-REHMAN AND MUHAMMAD AFZAL SOOMRO, JJ",
    "": "Karachi High Court PIPE MILLS LIMITED\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LITD and another\nPakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd PLD. 1993 SC 109 fol."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13005",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3049 = 2003 SLD 3049 = 2003 CLD 1492",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. IX, R. 4 & S. 151---Dismissal of suit for non ¬prosecution---Application for its restoration filed on the next day alongwith affidavit of counsel contending that the counsel had mistaken the date of hearing---Said application was dismissed by Trial Court---Validity---Trial Court ought not to have adopted the extreme measure of not restoring the suit just for one day's absence when an affidavit given by the plaintiff's counsel had explained such failure---High Court set aside the order and remanded the case to Trial Court for further proceedings on merits.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)-----\n \n----S.21---Infringement of trade mark---Procedure---Trade mark dispute ought to be decided after hearing all sides as the infringement of trade mark rights creates problems for the commercial world which are the back bone of the economy.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 123 of 2002, heard on 28-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN, J",
    "": "Messrs NESTLE MILKPAK LIMITED through Finance Control Manager\nVs.\nMessrs ALLIED ENTERPRISES through Managing Director and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13006",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3050 = 2003 SLD 3050 = 2003 CLD 1506",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.22---Appeal against order of Executing Court, whereby appellant was ordered to be arrested in execution of decree---High Court while issuing pre-admission notice to Bank ordered that in the meanwhile appellant be not arrested---Appellant's counsel thereafter sought adjournment to obtain instructions from appellant as to time frame within which he would discharge total decretal debt---Appellant did not provide such instructions to his counsel, who requested Court to hear appeal on merits--¬High Court on being satisfied that appellant was taking undue advantage of interim relief dismissed his appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No 532 of 2002, heard on 17-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJ, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL HAMEED \nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13007",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3051 = 2003 SLD 3051 = 2003 CLD 1507",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 18(6) & 21---Execution of decree---Attachment of property---Dismissal of appellant's objection petition claiming to be owner of such property since year ,1981 through registered sale-deed---Validity---Loan was secured by pledge of shares of -debtor---Loan agreement was made on 24-3-1982, whereas shares sale agreement and buy-back guarantee agreement were executed on 28-3-1982---Bank had prayed in plaint for giving directions to -debtors to buy-back pledged shares--¬ Judgment-debtors were not owners of property nor they could mortgage same with Bank as same had been sold to predecessor of appellant on 29-2-1981---Banking Court had passed impugned order without applying its mind as there was no mortgage---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned order and accepted objection petition with costs throughout direction to Banking Court to release property immediately.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S. 18(6)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.54, 58 & 62---Execution of decree---Attachment of mortgaged property---Validity---Concept of attachment vis-a-vis a mortgaged property does not exist.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 196 of 1998, heard on 24-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "HASSAN MASOOD and 3 OTHERS\nVs.\nEQUITY PARTICIPATION FUND and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13008",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3052 = 2003 SLD 3052 = 2003 CLD 1511",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---------S.22---Partnership Act (IX of 1932), S.69---Appeal by two persons, one of them was an unregistered firm--¬Maintainability---Appeal on behalf of such firm was not maintainable, thus, High Court deleted its name from array of appellants- --Other appellant being aggrieved with impugned order could maintain appeal independently.\n \nH. M. Saya & Co., Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd., Karachi PLD 1969 SC 65 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58--¬Execution proceedings---Filing objections to order of attachment---Limitation---No period of limitation having been prescribed for such purpose under S.19 (7) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, objection on such ground was also not tenable.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58--¬Partnership Act (IX of 1932), S.69---Execution proceedings--¬Similar objections as raised by unregistered firm were also raised by the intervenor by moving separate application--¬Banking Court without disposing of application of intervenor dismissed the objection petition filed by the firm---Validity--- Even if application of unregistered firm was not maintainable, Banking Court was bound to examine the merits of pleas raised by the intervernor.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.19(7) & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58---Execution of decree---Attachment of cheque lying with Nazir of High Court issued earlier in appellant's name ( -debtor) in execution of decree passed in a suit instituted by him and intervenor jointly as two partners of firm ---Intervenor objected to such attachment on the ground that he was having 90% shares in the firm, while appellant was having 10% shares---Banking Court dismissed objection petition on the ground that cheque was in exclusive name of the appellant, thus, Bank was entitled to its encashment towards satisfaction of its decree---Validity---Duty of Banking Court was to have first decided question as to whether such cheque was for exclusive benefit of appellant or the intervenor was also entitled to some share therein--¬Issuance of cheque in exclusive name of appellant, admittedly not encashed, would not be sufficient proof of the fact that only he was entitled to its payment and that inverneror had no claim therein---Before releasing payment of cheque an enquiry should have been held to decide the claim of intervenor, who was on the one hand not a -debtor before Banking Court and on the other hand as he had some prima facie interest in the decree passed in earlier suit as plaintiff---View taken by Banking Court in the impugned order that no enquiry was required to be held by it in that regard not only demonstrated patent illegality, but also denial of fair and proper opportunity of hearing to intervenor---High Court disposed of appeal with directions to Banking Court to hold proper inquiry with regard to claim of the intervenor.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.41 of 2002, decision dated: 9-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ROSHAN ESSANI AND ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, JJ",
    "": "Chaudhry MUHAMMAD ASLAM and others\nVs.\nDr. ARSHAD MALIK and others\nGohar Iqbal for the Intervenor."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13009",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3053 = 2003 SLD 3053 = 2003 CLD 1519",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -------Ss.22 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLVII, R.1---Review of passed in appeal---Amount required to be deposited by appellant for granting him leave to defend suit---High Court reduced such amount at appellant's request with observations that in case he failed to deposit same within specified time, then leave granted to him would\"\" stand withdrawn.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Review Application No.25/C of 2001, heard on 20-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "BOLAN BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nABDUL GHAFFAR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13010",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3054 = 2003 SLD 3054 = 2003 CLD 1521",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- S.18(6) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.73(1)(b) ¬Execution of decree Property belonging to debtor was attached and sold in public auction Factum of respondent being mortgagee of such property before institution of suit was not denied Respondent joined execution proceedings and allowed such property to be sold without any objection Held, respondent had a right to claim sale proceeds of such property in view of S.73(1)(b), C.P.C.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 18(6) & 21(1) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.73(1)(b) Execution of decree Respondent (non party to suit) filed objection petition claiming to be mortgagee of property belonging to debtor before institution of suit Property was sold and Bank (decree holder) withdrew amount of sale proceeds from Court Respondent as mortgagee of property filed application seeking payment of such sale proceeds to him Executing Court accepted such application and directed Bank to deposit such amount in Court for its onward payment to respondent Bank's application praying for recall of such order was dismissed by Executing Court Validity None of impugned orders fell within category of orders stated in S.21(1) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 High Court dismissed appeal being incompetent.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.198 of 2001, heard on 26-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "LONG TERM VENTURE CAPITAL MODARABA --Appellant\nVs.\nHANIF POLY PRODUCTS (PVT.) LTD. and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13011",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3055 = 2003 SLD 3055 = 2003 CLD 1524",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) -- Ss.8(3) & 12 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.47 & O.XXI, Rr. 62, 90 & 94 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts. 166 & 181 Execution of decree Sale of mortgaged property ¬Plea of appellant (non party to suit) raised in objection petition was that debtor had sold away property long before the alleged mortgage in favour of Bank (decree¬ holder), thus, he was not its owner at that time Dismissal of objection petition on ground of being time barred ¬Validity Banking Court should have framed issues and recorded evidence to resolve question, . whether such property was owned by debtor at time of mortgage Tentative view being that of objection petition under O. XXI, R.90, C.P.C., was out of limitation, yet case was covered by S.47. C.P.C., for which limitation was governed by Art. 181 of limitation Act, 1908 High Court left open for the Banking Court to decide after framing of issues and recording of evidence to determine point of time, when appellant had got knowledge of auction and should have filed objection petition; and under what provisions objections could be entertained Effect of confirmation of sale in favour of auction purchaser would be deter mined by Banking Court thereafter High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned order with directions to Banking Court to decide objection petition afresh in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No 702 of 2001, heard on 10-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHAFIQUE --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL LIMITED and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13012",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3056 = 2003 SLD 3056 = 2003 CLD 1527",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.10 & 21 Leave to defend Proper opportunity of hearing Banking Court dismissed leave application and decreed suit on a date, when only main case was fixed for ex parte arguments Validity Appellant had not been given proper opportunity of arguing his leave application as same was not fixed for arguments on, such date Impugned was without sufficient reason as same did not reflect application of mind by Banking Court to grounds set out in leave application High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned /decree and remanded case to Banking Court for decision on leave application.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.380 of 2001, heard on 27-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "SHAMS UL ISLAM and another --Appellants\nVs.\nAL TOWFEEK INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13013",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3057 = 2003 SLD 3057 = 2003 CLD 1529",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.19 & 22 Execution of decree Sale of mortgaged property Appellant claimed to have purchased, property from respondent (widow of deceased debtor) ¬Contention of Bank was that initially widow sold property to deceased husband, who mortgaged same with Bank, but she later on by playing fraud sold same to appellant, when she was not its owner Banking Court dismissed objection petition Validity Widow had a disabled son, two young daughters, and a minor son, and was not in a position to pay balance decretal amount Widow requested for waiver of decretal amount by Bank except Rs.1,00,000, which was more than Rs.80,000 Bank's counsel could not state the exact rate of mark up on the basis of which claimed amount had been calculated Record showed that widow had re¬paid principal amount and Bank had excessively charged about Rs. 80, 000 from period of such repayment High Court disposed of appeal with observations that on payment of Rs.50,000 each by appellant and widow within specified period, whole decree would stand satisfied; but in case of appellant's failure to pay his share, entire decretal amount could be recovered by sale of property; but in case of widow's failure, appellant might pay her share in order to save property from auction, but could initiate proceedings against widow for committing fraud.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.583 of 2000, decision dated: 14th: January, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SHAMIM AKHTAR --Appellant\nVs.\nBANKING COURT No.5, Lahore High Court and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13014",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3058 = 2003 SLD 3058 = 2003 CLD 1531",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) Ss.2(1)5 & 21 Trade Marks Rules, 1963 Fourth Sched. Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), Ss.42, 23 & 3 Patents and Designs Act (II of 1911), S.12 Registration of trade mark, copyright and patent and design Effect.\n \nTrade mark' is registrable in respect of some vendible goods in any' of the 34 classes detailed in 4th Schedule to the Trade Mark Rule. Trade mark, in fact, is relatable to or associated with any vendible goods. Such vendible goods acquire special significance when same are associated or reputed to be associated with any trade mark, such goods in commercial parlance may be referred as \"\"Branded good\"\". Indeed Trade mark, Copyright, a Patent and Design give monopolistic right to the registered owner thereof in the sense that such right holder has right to use and exploit such property to the exclusion of others.\n \nHowever as far as trade marks are concerned such are meant to distinguish the goods of owner of the mark whether registered (or otherwise like prior user) from that of the other manufacturers or producers of goods. Such distinction is for the benefit of consumer of such goods, though it also benefits the manufacturers and producers of such goods as well. There is no corresponding provision to section 5 of the Trade Marks Act, under the Copyright Ordinance 1962. Copyright in terms of section 3 of the Ordinance, 1962 is an exclusive right in relation to literary, dramatic, musical, artistic work, in any tangible medium of comprehension either audio or visual in any form that could be copied reproduced, multiplied, communicated, transmitted, repeated, broadcast, telecasted, adopted in any form. Generally artistic work could be protected under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962. Copyright in such artistic work is not necessarily or directly associated with any vendible goods unless of course same is used or proposed to be used and is desired to be used for some vendible goods then in terms of section 14 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 same are required to be registered as such. From the scheme of the Copyright Ordinance it appears to protect \"\"copyright\"\" in original work, by itself it is not relatable or associated with any vendible goods. The holder of such copyright in artistic work has exclusive right to produce and multiply such work. In terms of section 23 of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 the holder of a copyright has exclusive right to reproduce the work in any form, to publish, to perform, to translate, to communicate, broadcast, telecast, perform, adopt. From the scheme of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 it appears that such copyright work independently is capable of reproduction and reproduced copy is vendible independently and individually. It does not have any nexus with any other separate and independent vendible goods unless said artistic work otherwise is also used as a trade mark under the Trade Marks Act as discussed, above.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) --\n \n S.21 Exclusivity of use of a registered trade mark in relation to any vendible goods in respect of which the same was registered Conditions.\n \nSection 21 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 confers exclusivity of use of a registered trade mark in relation to any vendible goods in respect of which it is registered. Such exclusivity to use the registered mark can be gauged from the language of section 21 of the Act of 1940. Once it is demonstrated that a person is registered holder of a mark exclusivity is presumed. However, such exclusivity is subject to certain conditions namely (a) any condition or limitation entered on register at the time of registration by the Registrar as provided for under section 22; (b) prior user of the mark irrespective whether the same is registered or not as provided for tinder section 25; or (c) where the use of the name and description of the goods is used bona fide by a person of his name, place of business either of himself or of his predecessors, or, (d) honest and concurrent user of mark in terms of section 10(2). Defence based on any of the considerations set out above, may be considered formidable statutory defence against claim of infringement or passing off.\n \n(c) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) --\n \n S.14 Any decision rendered in a collateral proceedings will not prejudice or affect the rights of either the plaintiff or of the defendants an proceedings before the Registrar, Trade Marks.\n \n(d) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n S.21 Registration of trade mark Disclaimer When one or more part of a mark were subject to disclaimer then the subject matter of registration would be distinctive manner, get up and colour scheme in which each of the constituting disclaimed parts or portions of mark were placed and arranged to give it the same distinction from the other mark using the same disclaimed part or portion of competing goods Registered holder of trade mark, who had disclaimed, any of the features of the mark either in word, device or get up or where such feature was claimed to be common to trade whatever the case may be Holder of the mark may claim monopoly in the manner in which such mark, device, word or any combination thereof was put to use to distinguish his product from the others Using a copyright material as a substitute for the trade mark was not the intent and purpose of Copyright Ordinance, 1962 ¬Such copyright material independently could not be used or associated with any vendible or saleable goods unless, of course, such copyright was registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1940 Principles.\n \n(e) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962) \n \n S. 39 Trade Marks Act (V of 1940), S.21 Using a copyright material as a substitute for the trade mark was not the intent and purpose of Copyright Ordinance, 1962 ¬Such copyright material independently could not be used or associated with any vendible or saleable goods unless, of course, such copyright was registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1940.\n \n(f) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962) \n \n S.39 Gross misuse of registration of artistic work or other material under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 by the unscrupulous traders with covert object deprecated by the High Court High Court desired the amendment to be made in S.39, Copyright Ordinance, 1962 in view of guidelines suggested in the .\n \nThe Registration of artistic work or other material under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 is being grossly misused by unscrupulous traders with covert object.\n \nSuch persons and traders have transgressed all moral values, they are not ashamed of even adopting artistic work in internationally reputed and world renowned/brand names. Such foreign artistic works which otherwise, are subject matter of trade mark, are got registered under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962. Such practice not only is seriously tarnishing image of our country but at the same time Copyright Law is being used as a cloak to usurp goodwill of holder of trade mark.\n \nDue amendment has been made in section 39 of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 and a proviso has been added to it.\n \nFrom bare perusal of the proviso added to section 39, it appears that only objections are invited through publication in newspapers. Experience shows that unscrupulous traders get the artistic work sought to be copyrighted published in very innocuous newspapers having hardly any circulation. It appears that the proviso added to section 39 of the Ordinance, 1962 is not sufficient to check the malpractice and abuse of Copyright Ordinance.\n \nSuch tendency was effectively checked in India where a proviso was added as far back as in 1983, to section 45 of the (Indian) Copyright Act, 1957, which reads as follows:\n \nProvided that in respect of an artistic work which is used or is capable of being used in relation to any goods, the application shall include a statement to that effect and shall be accompanied by a certificate from the Registrar of Trade Marks referred to in section 4 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958), to the effect that no trade mark identical with or deceptively similar to such artistic work has been registered under that Act in the name of or that no application has been made under that Act for such registration by any person other than the applicant.\n \nThe proviso added to the corresponding provision in Indian Copyright Act appears to be more effective in checking the menace of such abuse of copyright. The law makers may consider amending section 39 of Copyright Ordinance, 1962 in line with proviso to section 45 (Indian) Copyright Act, 1957.\n \n(g) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) \n \n S.21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2 Interim injunction Plaintiff had made out prima facie case that they were the registered holder of subject trade mark in terms of S.21 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 to the exclusion of others Application of plaintiff under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2 was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.677 of 2001, decision dated: 23rd May, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "PAKISTAN DRUG HOUSE (PVT.) LIMITED --Plaintiff\nVs.\nRIO CHEMICAL COMPANY and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13015",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3059 = 2003 SLD 3059 = 2003 CLD 1546",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --S.9 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.20 & O.VII, R.10 Suit for damages by customer on account of alleged breach of finance agreement by Bank Return of plaint for its presentation before Court at place K Validity Such agreement executed at place K provided that Court at place K would be the proper Court to entertain all matters arising out of or under such agreement Such clause, wherein though words \"\"only\"\" or \"\"exclusive\"\" were not mentioned, clearly spelt out intention of parties that in case of dispute arising between them with regard to breach of finance agreement, which would include failure to disburse agreed facility or its recalling ,and every nature of dispute having nexus with finance agreements during their subsistence or even thereafter, would be tried by Court at place K, rather than any by any other Court Subsequent establishment of letters of credit at place L or refusal of Bank to disburse amount by its office at place L or rescission of agreement by its office at place L, by itself would not be a cause of action taking case out of ambit of such clause No error was found in impugned High Court dismissed appeal.\n \n2001 MLD 352; 1999 CLC 954 and PLD 2002 Kar. 420 distinguished.\n \n(b) Jurisdiction \n \n Two or more Courts having jurisdiction in matter Parties could validly agree for conferment of jurisdiction upon one of such Courts to the exclusion of other.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.309 of 2001, heard on 26-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "TAHIR TARIQ TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13016",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3060 = 2003 SLD 3060 = 2003 CLD 1549",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) Ss.15 & 14 All pending applications/ oppositions should be decided by the Tribunal simultaneously to avoid conflict of decisions and multiplicity of proceedings If the identical matters were decided in different sets at different times, the decisions were likely to affect adversely the decision of the other set Three applications, in the present case, having duly been ordered to be advertised, were discussed in the impugned of the Tribunal but had not been finally decided on merits Neither the of the Tribunal in question disclosed any legal justification for bypassing the earlier order advertising the said three applications nor any provision of law to that effect was shown Once an application had been ordered to be advertised the same could not be left in abeyance without going through the process of advertisement Judgment of the Tribunal, in circumstances, was set aside by the High Court and all applications and oppositions covered by the appeals in the case were remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication on merit alongwith the three said applications High Court, however, declined to discuss the case or adjudicate the same and directed that the Tribunal would be at liberty to decide the matters afresh in accordance with law.\n \nBasra Soap, Factory v. Punjab Soap Factory PLD 1973 Kar. 279; Playboy Enterprise Inc. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and another 1986 MLD 1312; Iqbal Ahmed v. The Registrar of Trade Marks; Karachi 1988 CLC 1052; Messrs Dynasel (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks, Karachi PLD 2000 Kar. 298; Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks v. Messrs Lackson Company Tobacco Ltd. 1992 SCMR 2323; Nahan Foundry v. Messrs Seth Muhammad Rafique Zarati Foundry and others 1994 MLD 2401 and National Detergents Limited v. Nirma Chemicals Works and another 1992 MLD 2358 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeals Nos.9, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 of 2000 and 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21 of 1999, decision dated: 24-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATA UR REHMAN, J",
    "": "UNIVERSAL TOBACCO (PVT.) LTD. and others --Appellants\nVs.\nJAPAN TOBACCO INC. and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13017",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3061 = 2003 SLD 3061 = 2003 CLD 1559",
    "Key Words:": "Flour Milling Control and Development (Repeal) Ordinance (XXIX of 1977) --S.7 Industrial. Development Bank Ordinance (IV of 1961), Ss. 39 & 40 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.25(3) ¬Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.19 Federal Government Notification S.R.O. 710(I)/76 Time for filing suit for ¬recovery of amount Limitation Computation Extension of time Acknowledgment of liability and offer to make the payment Time had to be extended and the acknowledgment had to be made before the expiry of limitation period from the date when such liability accrued ¬Application having been admittedly filed much after the period of limitation had expired, the matter was clearly time¬ barred in circumstances Principles.\n \nUBL v. Kurnool Muhammad Munir 1991 CLC 1758; Ghulam Haider v. Mst. Raj Bhari and 4 others PLD 1973 Lah. 372; National Bank of Pakistan v. Bawany Industries Ltd. and 3 others 1982 CLC 2625; Mst. Fattan Bi and others v. Fateh Muhammad and 6 others PLD 1974 Lah. 458; Bank of India v. Muhammad Ashraf and others PLD 1965 . Kar. 69; Government of West Pakistan v. Syed Zainul Ebad Rizvi PLD 1977 Kar. 297; Pakistan v. Messrs Aneejee Valeejee and Sons and another PLD 1978 Kar. 244; Habib Bank Limited v. Shamim. Qureshi PLD 1988 Kar. 481; Messrs Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society Limited v. Zakaria Industries, Karachi 1994 CLC 1280; Messrs United Bank Limited v. Messrs Bombay Frontier Old Tire Co. and another 1986 MLD 1613 and M. G. Kadir & Co. v. Abdul Latif PLD 1970 Kar. 708 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Application No. 157 of 1995, decision dated: 10-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALVI, J",
    "": "SINDH FLOUR MILLING CORPORATION through Accounts Officer/ Principal Officer er\nVs.\nMessrs GOOD LUCK INDUSTRIES --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13018",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3062 = 2003 SLD 3062 = 2003 CLD 1567",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --Ss.10, 17 & 22 Decree for recovery of loan amount ¬Plea of appellant (Chief Executive of borrower company) was that he was not in Pakistan at the relevant time, thus, question of his having executed or affixed signatures on documents attributed to him by Bank did not arise and that Banking Court had passed decree on basis of such documents without finally determining their liability Both parties agreed that amounts outstanding against appellants could not be determined without in depth examination of record High Court with consent of parties set aside impugned /decree and granted leave to appellants only to the extent of determining as to how much amount was due against them with clear understanding that they would not raise such plea before Banking Court, which would decide suit within specified time after recording evidence of parties and in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.60 of 12003, decision dated: 12-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AL SHAFI (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 7 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13019",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3063 = 2003 SLD 3063 = 2003 CLD 1570",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- Ss.18 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.114, O.XXI, R.90 & O.XLVII, R.1 Sale in execution of decree Objection petition Banking Court directed debtor to deposit by specified date 20% of sale price in terms of O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. Judgment debtor sought extension of time, which was granted to him Judgment debtor instead of depositing such amount made application on extended date for review of earlier orders, which was dismissed by Banking Court Validity Judgment debtor had challenged neither order requiring him to make such deposit nor order of extension of time Judgment-debtor applying for extension of time had accepted order of Court for deposit of amount, thus, he was precluded from filing review application against such order Scope, of review being very limited, debtor had failed to establish any error apparent on face of record, or error of like nature warranting review of earlier order High Court dismissed appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.111 of 2002, heard on 10-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "RAFIQ AHMED SANAURI and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nUNION BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager and 5 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13020",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3064 = 2003 SLD 3064 = 2003 CLD 1573",
    "Key Words:": "Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961) S.39 Suit for recovery of loan amount with mark up decreed Validity Appellant Company had not adhered to agreed terms for repayment of finance Initial period of financing stood modified at appellant's request through terms of re scheduling, thus, appellant was obliged to pay the agreed rate of return on amount overdue Claim of Bank had arisen on account of appellants' failure to repay finance in accordance with agreed terms Bank was, thus, not at fault for not filing its suit, when company had initially committed default in meeting its payment obligations ¬Appellant had not filed application for leave to appear and defend suit Statement of accounts showing various credit and debit entries had not been challenged by company Bank had reduced its claim from Rs.36, 91, 971 to Rs.31,24,000.17 High Court allowed appeal and modified impugned decree accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.668 and 675 of 2001, heard on 13-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs COMBINED OIL EXTRACTION (PVT.) LIMITED and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 2 others --Respondents\nHabib Bank v. Messrs Qayyum Spinning Ltd. 2001 MLD 1351 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13021",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3065 = 2003 SLD 3065 = 2003 CLD 1578",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --- S. 4 Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42. & 54 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) Transferring of banking suit having value of less than thirty million rupees Jurisdiction of High Court Consolidation of two suits Bank filed a suit for recovery of Bank loan against borrower as well as guarantor and the same was pending before Banking Court Another suit was filed by the guarantor in High Court, alleging that fraud and forgery had been committed upon him as he did not create any lien on his accounts nor pledged his Bonds High Court transferred the suit pending in Banking Court to High Court for decision of both the suits together Plea raised by the Bank was that claim in banking suit did not exceed thirty million rupees, therefore, under S.4 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, trial of the suit before High Court would be without jurisdiction ¬Validity Trial of both the suits together would not only be expedient in the interest of justice but also in the interest of both the parties as joint trial of both the suits would obviate the possibility of a conflict of s Order passed by High Court was just, fair and equitable and it did not suffer from any inherent defect or error of jurisdiction Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.1 K of 2001, decision dated: 25-01-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD BASHIR, JEHANGIRI, NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI AND RANA BHAGWANDAS, JJ",
    "": "Messrs FIRST WOMEN BANK LIMITED er\nVs.\nTHE REGISTRAR, HIGH COURT OF SINDH, Karachi High Court and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13022",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3066 = 2003 SLD 3066 = 2003 CLD 1581",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ---S. 21 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Suit for recovery of amount or outstanding loan and dues against the petitioner Constitutional petition by the petitioner seeking that House Building Finance corporation be restrained from making any recovery of the outstanding dues under the decree from the petitioner without extending her the benefit of package announced by the prime Minister dated 23 7 1997 Maintainability Remedy of appeal was available to the petitioner under S.21, Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 which she had not availed Petitioner had taken financial assistance from the Corporation in the year 1976 and had not discharged her liability and entire loan was outstanding against her Such conduct of the petitioner clearly disentitled her from invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court Constitutional petition could not be invoked where consent decrees could be passed ¬Principles.\n \nArticle 199 of the Constitution provided that no petition would lie if any other adequate, alternate remedy, was available. Remedy of appeal, was already available which had not been resorted to by the petitioner.\n \nThe High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction could not take over the function of machinery provided by the statute. The course open to the petitioner was to have instituted appeal against the decree instead of invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court.\n \nExercise of writ jurisdiction was discretionary which was to be used in good faith having a look to all the attending circumstances and relevant factors of the case. The same was to be used in just, fair and reasonable ways. The financial assistance was provided to the petitioner in the year 1976 for construction of a house on certain terms and conditions. The petitioner had not discharged her liability. The entire loan was outstanding against her. Above conduct of the petitioner clearly disentitled her from invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. Even otherwise a writ petition was not maintainable where consent decrees were passed.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.582 of 2001, decision dated: 3rd April, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIRUL MULK AND IJAZ UL HASSAN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. ALLAH RAKHI er\nVs.\nGENERAL MANAGER, HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION, HEAD OFFICE Karachi High Court and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13023",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3067 = 2003 SLD 3067 = 2003 CLD 1585",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- S. 19 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 185(3) & 199 Recovery of Bank Loan Dispute with regard to deposit of amount with Bank Contention of the borrower was that he had paid a sum of Rs. 50, 000 to the Bank and the same had not been accounted or Validity Proper course for the borrower was to satisfy the decree or to submit relevant objection before the Executing Court instead of harassing the other party by filing successive Constitutional, petitions which were completely misconceived Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.1556 L of 2002, decision dated: 1st July, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS AND TANVIR AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Rana MUHAMMAD SHAFI er\nVs.\nJAVED IQBAL SIDDIQUI and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13024",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3068 = 2003 SLD 3068 = 2003 CLD 1587",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) S. 60 & O.XXI, R.58 Islamabad Stock Exchange Articles of Association, Arts. 19 & 20(o) Attachment of membership of stock exchange in execution of decree Rejection of objection petition without recording of evidence Grievance of the petitioner was that the Executing Court could not attach its membership of stock exchange in execution of decree passed against it Plea raised by the petitioner was that the properties enumerated in S.60, C.P.C, did not include membership of stock exchange and the Executing Court had wrongly dismissed the objection petition without recording of evidence Validity. Court of competent jurisdiction could attach membership as a property in execution of a decree under Art. 20(o) of Islamabad Stock Exchange Articles of Association No need arose to record evidence as the dispute related to membership of stock exchange and in that regard the Memorandum and Articles of Association was duly taken into consideration while, deciding the objections by the Executing Court as well as by the High Court No legal infirmity in the order of Executing Court was found, and the same did not warrant interference Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.595 of 2001, decided 9-07-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN MUHAMMAD, AJMAL AND ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR, JJ",
    "": "Islamabad High Court High Court STOCK EXCHANGE (GUARANTEE) LIMITED, Islamabad High Court High Court through Secretary er\nVs.\nFIRST PUNJAB MODARABA through Punjab Madaraba Services (Private) Limited, and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13025",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3069 = 2003 SLD 3069 = 2003 CLD 1599",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ----S. 12 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) Ex parte decree, setting aside of Constitutional jurisdiction of Supreme Court Factual inquiry Scope Despite service of notice in ordinary course as well as by publication, the borrower did not appear before Banking Court and instead moved application under S.12 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Application was dismissed and ex parte decree was maintained Validity Order passed by High Court was just, fair and equitable Supreme 'Court observed that' in case the borrower felt that, he was not liable to pay the decretal amount or that certain amount credited by him had not been adjusted by the Bank, he might agitate the same before Executing Court as Supreme Court could not embark upon an inquiry into facts in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1833 L of 2002, decision dated: 2-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS AND TANVIR AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "RAHEEL IKHLAS er\nVs.\nMessrs CITIBANK N.A. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13026",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3070 = 2003 SLD 3070 = 2003 CLD 1601",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VIII, R.11 Suit against Bank not relating to loan or finance ¬Rejection of plaint Agreement executed between parties to suit and a foreign Bank was produced by plaintiff with counter affidavit in reply to defendant's leave application ¬Such agreement was neither referred to in plaint nor suit was based thereon Defendant did not dispute or deny agreement, but referred to same in written statement Held, such agreement could be considered at time of deciding application under O. VII, R.11, C.P. C.\n \n1992 MLD 225; 1994 SCMR 826; 1993 MLD 2419; 2000 CLC 1620 and 2002 SCMR 338 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 9 & 27 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 9 & 27 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R.11 Suit against Bank not relating to loan or finance Issue on jurisdiction of Banking Court was framed, but declined to be decided as preliminary issue Application by defendant seeking rejection of plaint on the ground that suit was barred under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 as same did not relate to loan or finance Validity ¬Framing of an issue as to jurisdiction would not denude Banking Court of its powers to entertain and decide application under O. VII, R.11 or 10, C.P.C., within parameters defined by law for such purpose Any order on such application would not amount to review of earlier order declining to decide such issue as preliminary issue.\n \nAIR 1993 All. 762; 1990 MLD 1764; 1973 SCMR 62; PLD 1995 SC 362; 1999 SCMR 2353 and 2001 CLC 1363 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss. 2(c)(d)(e)(f) & 9 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 2(c)(d)(e) & 9 High Court of West Pakistan (Establishment) Order (XIX of 1955), para. 5 Suit against Bank not relating to loan or finance ¬Jurisdiction of Banking Court Dispute raised by plaintiff was in respect of operation of their Foreign Currency Account at defendant Bank for not following their instructions and withholding of balance sum available in their account Such facts did not determine status of plaintiff as \"\"borrower\"\" or \"\"customer\"\", but only of a foreign currency account holder Such dispute could rot be considered as a dispute relating to some default in fulfillment of any obligation with regard to any loan or finance Such suit neither at the time of its institution nor at later stage could be proceeded under Banking Court's Jurisdiction High Court directed office to treat such suit as a suit on its original civil jurisdiction side and be processed as such.\n \n2000 MLD 1850; 1998 CLC 1781; 2000 YLR 2407; 1999 CLC 1294; 2001 YLR 905; PLD 2000 Lah. 168; PLD 1970 SC 1; 1992 SCMR 1748; 2001 CLC 1363; 2001 SCMR 103; 1998 CLC 1718; 1999 CLC 1953; 2002 CLC 658 and 2002 CLC 1455 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 151 of 1998, decision dated: 25-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, J",
    "": "ARY TRADERS (PVT.) LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMULSIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13027",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3071 = 2003 SLD 3071 = 2003 CLD 1610",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ---S. 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, R.17 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) Amendment in application for leave to defend the suit Amendment sought to be made in the application was declined by Banking Court as well as by High Court Plea raised by the borrower was that the amendment in pleadings could be sought at any stage Validity Court was vested with the power to allow amendment in its discretion in pleadings at any stage of proceedings but it did not bind the Court to allow the amendment in all cases once application was moved ¬Discretion exercised by the Court for not allowing the amendment did not suffer from any illegality or arbitrariness Supreme Court allowed the borrower to use material available on record of the suit in support of and to substantiate the grounds raised in the original application for grant of leave to appear and defend the suit Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.818 of 2000, decision dated: 24-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD BASHIR, JEHANGIRI AND MUNIR A. SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MAROOF KNITWEAR (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 8 others ers\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13028",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3072 = 2003 SLD 3072 = 2003 CLD 1612",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) S.9 Jurisdiction of Tribunal Principles When Special Tribunal is constituted under a statute, its jurisdiction depends upon the specific provisions of the statute Jurisdiction may be limited by conditions as to constitution, as regards persons whom or the offences which it is competent to try and as to the orders which it is empowered to make or by other conditions which the law makes essential to the validity of its proceedings and orders Where conditions required for invoking the jurisdiction of Tribunal are not available, then remedy lies to Civil Court under S.9, C.P.C.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes \n \n Meaning of statute and duty of Courts Principles Statutes must prima facie be given their ordinary dictionary meaning however to arrive at the true meanings it is necessary to get an exact conception of aim, scope and object of the whole Act Where statute defines the limits for purposes of benefits a particular way, Courts are bound to give effect to show limitation without traveling outside those limits on a presumed intention of the Legislature, however, great the hardship might be to the parties, if any other course is followed.\n \n(c) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.5 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.II, R.2--¬Damages, claim of Omission to sue for relief regarding damages Cause of action accrued on 10 12 1991 and suit for damages was filed on 16 1 1998 Plaintiff claimed damages on account of breach committed by the defendant in providing finance which cause of action was available to the plaintiff at the time of filing of earlier suit Effect -Plaintiff had to include the whole claim for which the plaintiff was entitled to make and by omitting not to sue in respect of such claim the plaintiff cannot afterwards sue in respect of portion so omitted or relinquished Plaintiff had a right to file suit for the recovery of damages, if any, suffered by him on account of breach of the obligation if any by the defendant before the Banking Court Plaintiff failed to avail the remedy available to him within the terminus quo prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1908 Cause of action accrued on 21 3 1990 and finally on 10 12 1991, therefore, suit filed on 16-1 1998 was barred by time Suit was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O. VIII, R.6 Counter claim Limitation Counter claim and or additional claim, has to be filed within three years from the date of cause of action of the suit Suit filed after three years of the cause of action is liable to be dismissed.\n \nNiamat Ali v. Jaitam Das PLD 1983 SC 5 ref.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O. VIII, R. 6 Counter claim Scope Person not party to suit No counter claim can be made against such person.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 59 of 1998, decision dated: 4-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "DIGITAL RADIO PAGING LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nPAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13029",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3073 = 2003 SLD 3073 = 2003 CLD 1620",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---S.9 Agracultura Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (IV of 1961), S. 25 West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), Ss. 79 & 80 Bank dues disputed by borrower Recovery as arrears of land revenue Scope ¬Bank could not be equated with a proper judicial forum for determination of amount due against borrower, though under law having summary power of recovery of amount due In event of substantial dispute between parties procedure of recovery of amount by way of land revenue arrears would be available only where amount claimed was found due, ascertained and determined by a competent judicial forum.\n \nAgricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Sanaullah Khan PLD 1988 SC 67; Abdul Latif v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 1962 SC 384; ARK Ocean Lines Ltd. v. Director of Industries and Mineral Development PLD 1976 Kar. 610, Hussain Ali v: Government of Pakistan 1989 MLD 4721; Grain System. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. ABDP 1993 MLD 1031; Abdul Karim v. Province of Sindh 2001 MLD 69 and Raj Kumar v National Bank of Pakistan 1994 CLC 206 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No 382 K of 2001 decided on 2-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS AND HAMID ALI MIRZA, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and another ers\nVs.\nABID AKHTAR and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13030",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3074 = 2003 SLD 3074 = 2003 CLD 1620",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- S.9 Agracultura Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (IV of 1961), S. 25 West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), Ss. 79 & 80 Bank dues disputed by borrower Recovery as arrears of land revenue Scope ¬Bank could not be equated with a proper judicial forum for determination of amount due against borrower, though under law having summary power of recovery of amount due In event of substantial dispute between parties procedure of recovery of amount by way of land revenue arrears would be available only where amount claimed was found due, ascertained and determined by a competent judicial forum.\n \nAgricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Sanaullah Khan PLD 1988 SC 67; Abdul Latif v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 1962 SC 384; ARK Ocean Lines Ltd. v. Director of Industries and Mineral Development PLD 1976 Kar. 610, Hussain Ali v: Government of Pakistan 1989 MLD 4721; Grain System. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. ABDP 1993 MLD 1031; Abdul Karim v. Province of Sindh 2001 MLD 69 and Raj Kumar v National Bank of Pakistan 1994 CLC 206 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No 382 K of 2001 decided on 2-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS AND HAMID ALI MIRZA, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and another ers\nVs.\nABID AKHTAR and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13031",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3075 = 2003 SLD 3075 = 2003 CLD 1625",
    "Key Words:": "Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance (V OF 1970) Ss.13, 14 & 15 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2 Application under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C. Seeking a restraining order against the defendants from demanding or recovering directly or indirectly any amount by way of war risk charge Validity Provisions of Ss.13, 14 & 15 of the Monopoly and, Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 provided for interim order and that for all practical purposes a proper inquiry could be conducted and to that extent witnesses could be summoned and examined on oath and notices for production of documents for the purposes of recording of evidence, the issuing of commission for the examination of witnesses etc. were applicable for the purpose of coming to a fair and just conclusion If the plaintiff, in the present case, was of the feeling that there had been a violation of the Ordinance, it would have been proper for him to have availed the remedy mentioned in the Ordinance and proceeded accordingly If it was alleged that war risk surcharge in question was void, and illegal and contrary to the provisions of the said Ordinance, seeking relief by way of suit was not proper remedy Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 having provided the remedy for the plaintiff, his application under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C. was not maintainable.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit Nos. 175, 176 and 189 of 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, J",
    "": "EAPOHIRE TEXTILE MILLS LTD. and others --Plaintiffs\nVs.\nAPL PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13032",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3076 = 2003 SLD 3076 = 2003 CLD 1630",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Imports and Exports (Control) Act (XXXIX of 1950) --Ss.5 A, 5 B & 3 Powers of the Government could not be exercised by the Export Promotion Bureau as the Legislature had treated the Export Promotion Bureau as a separate and distinct organization (if not a strict legal person from the Federal Government or the Ministry of Commerce) Rules of Business prepared under the Constitutional mandate could allow a Department or officer to discharge such functions Principles.\n \nSection 5 A of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 enables the Federal Government to constitute Commercial Courts and under subsection (2), such Courts headed by Judicial Member would comprise of one Officer of the Federal Government to be nominated by the Ministry of Commerce and another from amongst businessmen or executives out of a selected panel in consultation with the Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Section 5 B(1) provides that the contravention of an order under section 3 relating to export trade shall be tried exclusively by a Commercial Court and subsection (2) stipulates that such Court will take cognizance of an offence upon a complaint in writing made by the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Export Promotion Bureau or an Officer authorized by them. It is evident from a plain reading of section 5 B(2) that the Legislature has treated, the Export Promotion Bureau as a separate and distinct organization (if not a strict legal person from the Federal Government or the Ministry of Commerce). The contention that the powers of the Government could be exercised by the Bureau is, therefore, plainly misconceived.\n \nIn any event, even if it be assumed that the Bureau is merely a Department of the Ministry of Commerce of the Federal Government, it does not necessarily follow that all powers of the Government could be exercised by the Bureau or its officers or for that matter even by all officers in the Ministry unless it can be shown that the Rules of Business prepared under the Constitutional mandate allowed them to discharge such functions.\n \n(b) Locus poenitentiae, doctrine of \n \n Applicability Once a decision vesting certain rights upon a party read been taken and acted upon, the same could not be recalled Doctrine of locus poenitentiae would not apply when the original decision that was rescinded was made by a person not authorized to do so.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P.D. No.2054 of 2002, decision dated: 3rd January, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND AMIR HANI MUSLIM, JJ",
    "": "MASOOM AKHTAR er\nVs.\nSECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13033",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3077 = 2003 SLD 3077 = 2003 CLD 1634",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for merger of Companies Approval of Company' Court Objection Swap ratio Determination of principle of arms length transaction Applicability Benefits expected from the merger of Companies, inter alia, were claimed to be an increase in profitability after removal of overlapping in management, marketing and distribution expenses; elimination of high cost of complexity behind the existing operations/set up; streamlining of operations by optimizing their energies in the areas of sales, distribution and administration; reduction of administrative costs, effective control and administration on account of coming into being a Single Board of Directors; the need to hold only one annual general meeting and issuance of only one set of annual/half yearly accounts, maintaining only one Register of Shareholders, only one set of books and records; only one administration office to manage the affairs of the merged/ amalgamated Company; exemption of capital gain on the sale of the shares of one of the three Companies becoming available to the shareholders of other two Companies coupled with, ready sale ability of shares of one of the three Companies as. a listed company Amalgamating Companies had claimed that they had obtained written consent from 94% of the creditors of one of the Companies, 98% of the creditors of the other and 96% of the creditors of the third Company General meeting of the said three Companies were convened under the supervision of a local commission appointed by the Company Court and Scheme proposed for merger and various arrangements in its execution were put before the members of the three Companies Local Commissioner had reported that said meetings by a majority of 90% and 98% had finally resolved that the scheme of arrangement between the three Companies and its members was considered by the meetings and was approved, adopted and agreed\"\" ¬Representative of one of the Companies, however, made oral as well as written objection to the merger during the separate extraordinary general meetings of other two Companies Objector had very strong reservations to the proposed merger as allegedly it was calculated only to the benefit of one Company through and through and that the proposed swap ratio had no nexus with the true worth of other two Companies having not been valued by independent valuers Securities and Exchange Commission had not made any material objection to the preferred Scheme Validity Fact that the objector was the only shareholder in the first two Companies while; the Company in which the other Companies were being merged was holding the rest of the shares, would not make the objector to be of different class to be treated at par with the majority shareholders Numerical strength of the two shareholders was too wide to be ignored Swap ratio was determined inter alia on the basis of the audited accounts of the first two Companies and the objector had not come up with his own figures as against those which were picked up by the valuer from the audited accounts Objector, being shareholder had access to every record and books of accounts of the Companies and therefore, in the absence of any counter figure, as opposed to those reflected in the balance sheet of the two Companies, a value challenge the said figures and the swap ratio could not by of any avail No rule of law required that valuation determination of swap ratio could not be mace by Chartered Accountants of the Companies sought to be amalgamated In the absence of an allegation of mala fides fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the valuer, objection of such kind could not be accepted on its face value Break up value, dividend earning capacity market value were the three factors which were relevant to determining the fair value of shares and consequently the swap ratio Objector had not been able to establish that valuation of shares was done only to protect the interest majority shareholders Principle of arms length transaction related more to an outright buy rather than a petition merger or amalgamation where the controlling shareholders would have an edge allowed to them under the law Held. Scheme could be disapproved only if the same appeared to be unfair, unreasonable and oppressive on the face of it to a certain class of shareholders which did not appear to be the case in the facts and circumstance of the merger/ amalgamation Scheme in the present case.\n \nRe: Pfizer Laboratories Ltd. and another 2002 CLD 1209 distinguished.\n \nThe Analysis and Use of Financial Statements by Gerald I. White, C.F.A., Second Edn., pp.933 34; How to Read Balance Sheets by Saeed Ahmed Qureshi, Financial Reporting Standard 7\"\" of the Treatise on Fair Value in Acquisition Accounting, pp.67 to 79; Guide to Take Overs and Mergers by N.A. Sridharan and P.H. Arvindh Pandian Edn., 2002, pp.194 to 197; Amalgamations Mergers Takeovers and Acquisitions by L.M. Sharma published by Company Law Journal, New Delhi, pp.144 to 146; Weinberg and Blank on Takeovers and Mergers, Fifth Edn. by Laurence Rabinowitz 2063; Acquisitions, Mergers, Sales Buyouts and Takeovers; A Hand Book with Forms, Fourth Edn. by Charlas A Scharf, pp.71 to 97; re: O' Neil and another v. Phillips and others, decided on 20 5 1999; re North Holdings Limited v. Sourthern Tropics Limited' Nicholas Andrew Clarke: Lesley Ann Gale Clarke and Kasmare Limited (1999) EWCA Civ. 1612; re: Re Hellenic & General Trust Ltd. (1975) 3 All ER 382; Messrs Revlon v. Mac Andrews & Forbes SC of Delaware 506 A. 2d 173 (1965); re: Hanson Trust PLC etc. v. ML SCM Acquisitions Inc., 781 F. 2nd 264; re: Gift Tax Commissioner, Bombay .v. Kusumben AIR 1980 SC 769; re: W.T. Commissioner, Assam v. Mahadeo Jalan AIR 1973 SC 1023; Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. & Hindustan Lever Ltd (1994) 81 Comp. Cas. 754; Catex Petro Chemicals Ltd (1993) 2 Comp. LJ 383 (Mad.); Miheer H. Mafat Lal v. Mafat Lal Ind. Ltd. (1996) 4 Comp. LJ 124 (SC); Kamala Sugar Mills Ltd. & Tirumurti Mills Ltd. (1996) 4 Comp. LJ (Mad:); Bank of Baroda Ltd. v. Mahindra Ugine Steel Co. Ltd.; (1976) 46 Comp. Cas. 227 (Guj.); Kohinoor Raiwind Mills Ltd. v. Kohinoor Gujar Khan Mills Ltd. 2002 CLD 1314; Konihoor Raiwind Mills Ltd. 2002 CLD 1747; Charles M. Oberly and others v. Alan .P. Kirby and others 592 A. SD 445; In re: Lipton Pakistan Ltd. and another 1989 CLC 818;. Brooke Bond Pakistan Ltd. v. Aslam Bibi Ibrahim and another 1997 CLC 1873; In re: Companies Act, 1913 and another PLD 1983 Kar. 45 EITA India Ltd. and others AIR 1997 Cal. 208; re: Miheer H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. (1996) 87 Comp. Cas. 792; Abdul Rahim v. UBL PLD 1997 Kar. 620; NBP v. KDA PLD 1999 Kar. 260; re: Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd and Hindustan Lever Ltd. (1994) 3 Comp. LJ 46 (Bom.); Aslam Bin Ibrahim v. MCA PLD 1998 Kar. 295; In re: Messrs Pakland Cement Ltd. 2002 CLD 1392; In re: Manekchowk (1970) 40 Comp. Cas. 819; Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd. v. Dhan Fibres Ltd. PLD 2001 Lah. 230; Sussex Brick Company Ltd. (1960) All. ER 772; In re: Companies Ordinance 1984; Balanced Fund Ltd. and another 2002 CLC 1361 and Asian Coffee Ltd. (2000) 3 Comp. LJ 92 (AP) ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for merger of Companies Approval of Company Court Swap ratio, determination of Principles Objection was that swap ratio had been determined only to favour the majority shareholders Validity Every shareholder in the merged Company being entitled to the proposed advantages and disadvantages, the claim of adverse swap ratio to the minority would lose its force Objector, in the present case was looking at the transaction as an outright sale of its shares while the, nature of a merger/ amalgamation was altogether different Counter offer for purchase of majority shares, needed to be seen in that perspective Such an offer was entertainable only when the seller was completely parting with the equity while in case of merger every single shareholder was to become a part of the new entity.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss. 284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of Companies Approval of Company Court Objection on the basis of \"\"Business Judgment Rule\"\" Validity \"\"Business Judgment Rule\"\" in essence meant that management was not liable for mistakes which resulted in loss if made in good faith in exercise of business and free of elements such as conflict of interest or violation of law \"\"Business Judgment. Rule\"\" was not applicable inasmuch as the present case was not that of management by outsider because the management of the three amalgamating Companies was admittedly already with the Company which was amalga¬mating the other two and said two Companies were going in losses for the last some time and the claim of the objector that these were possessed with huge capital assets was not supported by any material on the record.\n \nCharles A. Scharf, Edward E. Shea George C. Back ref.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of Companies Approval of the Company Court Object of Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287, Companies Ordinance, 1984 ¬Scope Objector had objected to the Composition of the Boards of the first two Companies (which were being merged into the third) third Company which was owner of equity of 98% and 90% in the companies had a privilege under the law to dominate the Board through its nominees and it would be unnatural and rather illogical to think that these nominees would act in a manner which was prejudicial to the interest of the principal Company Such fact alone did not provide a ground of their impeachment in the perspective of the merger in question Purpose of the provisions of Ss. 284, 285, 286 & 287 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 would stand defeated if a merger was denied on the sole ground that it was opposed or was otherwise not liked, as in the present case, by a small number of shareholders Even if the alleged nexus between the holding and Subsidiary Companies was assumed yet that factor did not, under any provision of law, require that majority shareholders should concede to the will of minority shareholders Only legal requirement was that the Scheme should not be oppressive, unreasonable and unjust ¬Objector being not specific as to the exact extent of adverse effect to its interest; the companies continuously being in losses while the shares of the third Company being transacted at the Stock Exchange at more than 20 times of its face value and the Scheme was based upon the swap ratio determined by a firm of reputed Chartered Accountants; could not be described to be unjust or unreasonable.\n \n(e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of Companies Approval of the Company Court Objector, in the present case, had negligible share in the total equity of 2% in one Company while in the other it had an interest of 8% only To disapprove the Scheme, or the alternate suggested by the objector, a direction for reconsideration of swap ratio, was not likely to improve the status of the objector Even otherwise to do so would amount to sitting in as an Appellate Court to find out faults in the Scheme as well as the swap ratio which was not possible in the proceedings under Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287, Companies Ordinance, 1984 which conceded a, democratic right of 3/4th majority of the members of a Company to make a choice which the minority had been obliged to accept.\n \nRe: Messrs Pakland Cement Ltd. 2002 CLD 1392 ref.\n \n(f) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of Companies Approval of the Company Court Objection to the Scheme Powers and jurisdiction of Company Court ¬Scope and extent Principles.\n \nA Court should see if the scheme was fair as a whole. However, for that purpose an in depth investigation and probe into every provision of the scheme of arrangement was not necessary.\n \nThe onus was on the objectors to show that the scheme was mala fide or unfair.\n \nUnfairness should not be enough unless it was patent, obvious and convincing.\n \nCourt should not go into the commercial merits or viability of the decision reached by the majority.\n \nWhere majority was acting in a bona fide manner and the scheme was such as a fair minded person, reasonably acquainted with the facts of the case could regard it as beneficial for whom the majority sought to represent, then, unless there were strong and cogent reasons to show that the scheme was misconceived, designed or calculated to cause injuries to others, the Court would sanction it rather than reject it; the Court should prefer a living scheme to compulsory liquidation bringing about an end to a company.\n \nRe: Messrs Pakland Cement Ltd. 2002 CLD 1392 and re: Manekchowk (1970) 40 Comp. Cas. 819 ref.\n \n(g) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of Companies Approval of the Company Court Objection to the Scheme by minority shareholders Objection to the amalgamation was that the Company in which the other two Companies were being merged would have monopoly in the trade Validity Such an objection could not be a reason to deny the approval, as a different and distinct law namely Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 was available in the field and any violation thereof was a matter of independent probe and investigation which could not be undertaken in the present proceedings nor merger/ amalgamation could be refused on that ground Creation of alleged monopoly would rather be for the benefit of the shareholders of the principal Company after merger which would include the objector minority shareholders in the merged two Companies.\n \n(h) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n Ss.284, 285, 286 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of Companies Approval of Company Court Absence of a provision for amalgamation in the Memorandum and Articles of the Association of a Company would not affect the statutory' powers of the Court to allow the Scheme.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original No.47 of 2002, decision dated: 26-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR, J",
    "": "In re: PAK WATER BOTTLERS (PVT.) LIMITED and 2 others\nRe; Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd. v. Dhan Fibres Ltd. PLD 2001 Lah. 230 and Pfizer Laboratories Ltd. and another 2002 CLD 1209 ref.\nKhawaja Saeed uz Zafar and Nasrullah Babar for SECP."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13034",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3078 = 2003 SLD 3078 = 2003 CLD 1655",
    "Key Words:": "Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980) --s.4 & 5 Admiralty suit Plaintiff had invoked the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court against the defendant vessel by an action in rem Contention was that documentary evidence showed that the proposed defendant was owner of the vessel who had filed written statement therefore his presence before the Court was necessary for proper adjudication Validity Action in personam could have been brought in. respect of damage, loss of life or personal injury as a result of collision Contention that since the written statement on behalf of the vessel had been filed by the proposed, defendant, it had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and thus should be asked to be present in the Court was repelled and application of the plaintiff was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Admiralty Suit No.11 of 2000, heard on 3rd September, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "Vs.\nM.T. PORTOFINO --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13035",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3079 = 2003 SLD 3079 = 2003 CLD 1655",
    "Key Words:": "Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980) -- Ss.4 & 5 Admiralty suit Plaintiff had invoked the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court against the defendant vessel by an action in rem Contention was that documentary evidence showed that the proposed defendant was owner of the vessel who had filed written statement therefore his presence before the Court was necessary for proper adjudication Validity Action in personam could have been brought in. respect of damage, loss of life or personal injury as a result of collision Contention that since the written statement on behalf of the vessel had been filed by the proposed, defendant, it had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and thus should be asked to be present in the Court was repelled and application of the plaintiff was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Admiralty Suit No.11 of 2000, heard on 3rd September, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "Vs.\nM.T. PORTOFINO --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13036",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3080 = 2003 SLD 3080 = 2003 CLD 1658",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- S.10(11) Leave to defend the suit with condition attached When the defendant fails to fulfil the conditions attached to the grant of leave to defend, the Banking Court shall forthwith proceed to pass and decree in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant.\n \nMalik Gul Hasan and Company and 5 others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 1996 SCMR 237; Abdul Rauf Ghouri v. Mrs. Kishwar Sultana 1999 SCMR 929; Abdul Karim Jaffarani v. U.B.L. and 2 others 1984 SCMR 568 and General Investment Limited v. Dubai Bank Limited 1984 SCMR 634 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n Ss.22 & 10 Appeal Appellants cannot be permitted to re agitate the same question in appeal which has been effectively dealt with in their appeal filed earlier.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, R.3(2) Leave to appear and defend suit Banking Court upon application by defendant is fully competent to grant leave to appear and defend the suit either unconditionally or subject to such terms as it thinks fit Such discretion to grant leave conditionally or unconditionally is left to the Court itself as contemplated under O.XXXVII, R.3(2), C.P.C. Discretion so exercised is not to be interfered with lightly unless it is shown that the same was exercised in a fanciful or arbitrary manner.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.22 & 10 Appeal Decree, in the present case, had been passed in favour of the Bank not on the basis of a trial before the Banking Court, but in consequence of failure of the appellants to fulfill the conditions imposed upon them by the Banking Court Contention of the appellants that as the High Court had dismissed the appeal as being incompetent, the other findings contained in the said would be inconsequential qua the rights of the parties, was a feeble attempt to wriggle out of the effects of the said .\n \nDad Muhammad v. Qazi Muhammad Hayat 1996 CLC 1705 distinguished.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.10 Bank had filed suit for recovery of Rs.85,246,891 ¬Defendant having failed to fulfil the conditions attached to the order of leave to appear and defend the suit, the suit was liable to be decreed in toto Banking Court, while decreeing the suit had passed a decree in the lesser sum which was not in accord with its earlier order High Court modified the and decree of the Banking Court to be in the sum of Rs.85,246,891 with costs which was the total claim of the Bank.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.3 of 2003, decision dated: 22-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "TANVIR BASHIR ANSARI AND RUSTAM ALI MALIK, JJ",
    "": "SILVER OIL MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 13 others --Appellants\nVs.\nMessrs UNION BANK LIMITED through Vice President and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13037",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3081 = 2003 SLD 3081 = 2003 CLD 1666",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) Ss.2(2) as added by Foreign Awards and Maintenance Orders Enforcement (Amendment) Ordinance (LIII of 1962), S.2) & 2(1)(c) Notification SRO 481(K) dated 20 4 1960 Enforcement of foreign award Scope Enactment of Foreign Awards and Maintenance Orders Enforcement (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962 was not violative of the Constitution and was promulgated under the authority of the Government of Pakistan Government of Pakistan had privilege/prerogative to decide as to whether the Award given in a particular foreign country is to be enforced in Pakistan or not, notwithstanding that the country in which the Award had been given had not made any reciprocal arrangement for the enforcement of Awards given in Pakistan as contemplated in S.2 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 Government of Pakistan having expressed its intention under S.2(2) of the Act (as amended), High Court would not decline to enforce the Award given in a foreign country Word \"\"territory\"\" used in S.2(2) referred to \"\"country\"\" which covered Conventions entered into or issued by Notification in British India and no further Notification was required in terms of S.2(1) (c) of the Act.\n \nYangtze (London) Ltd. v. Barlas Bros. (Karachi) PLD 1961 SC 573 distinguished.\n \nPLD 1979 Kar. 762 and 1987 CLC 83 ref.\n \n(b) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) --\n \n Ss.7 & 2(2) Grain and Feed Trade Association (London) Rules, R.125 Arbitration proceedings could not be defeated merely on the ground that the arbitration had not taken place either in Germany or in Pakistan as no rule existed creating such a bar.\n \n(c) Trade Association (London) Arbitration Rules \n \n R.4:7 Arbitration Commercial dispute Public policy Grain and Feed Trade Association (London) Arbitration Rules, R.4:7 not allowing the parties to be represented through a Solicitor/ Barrister, was not against public policy.\n \n(d) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) --\n \n S. 7 Conditions for enforcement of Foreign Award High Court would only confine to examine the award within the provision of S.7(1) of the Act and the interference, if any, could only be warranted if the condition under S.7(2) of the Act surfaced High Court would not sit as an Appellate Court nor would go behind the Award to reappraise the evidence High Court, exercising powers under S.7 of the Arbitration (Protocol and 'Convention) Act, 1937, was an executing Court which could not travel beyond the Award save as expressly provided under S.7(2) of the said Act ¬Contention that Award given under R.4:7 of Grain and Feed Trade Association (London) Arbitration Rules was contrary to Public Policy of Pakistan or to the principles of law of Pakistan in terms of Second Sched of Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, was repelled.\n \n(e) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n S.7(2)(b) Conditions for enforcement of Foreign Award ¬Interpretation of S.7(2)(b) of Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 Party against whom the award was sought to be enforced must be given notice of arbitration proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to present his case If the party was under some legal incapacity and was not properly represented then a Foreign Award shall not be enforced by the Court Other condition in cl. (b) of S.7(2) of the Act appearing after the word \"\"or\"\" which ex facie indicated that the conditions were disjunctive.\n \n(f) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) --\n \n S.7(1) Foreign Award may be enforceable if made in pursuance of an agreement for arbitration valid under the law by which the same was governed and had been made by a Tribunal provided in the agreement or constituted in the manner agreed upon by the party in conformity with the law governing the arbitration procedure in respect of a matter which may lawfully be referred to arbitration under the law of Pakistan and then the award had become final in the country in which it was made.\n \n(g) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n Ss.5 & 7(2) Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss.30 & 35 ¬Enforcement of Foreign Award Conditions Once the law under which the award had been given in conformity with the procedure laid down therein the Court in exercise of powers under S.5, Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 would not travel beyond the Award to examine and scrutinize either the evidence or the material, once it had attained finality subject to the grounds provided under S.7(2) of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 Grounds of misconduct and the award having been improperly procured or was otherwise invalid, were not ,vailable under S. 7(2) of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 as in case of Ss.30 & 35 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 340 of 1996, decision dated: 26-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J",
    "": "ALFRED C. TOEPFER INTERNATIONAL GMBH --Plaintiff\nVs.\nPAKISTAN MOLASSES COMPANY and another ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13038",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3082 = 2003 SLD 3082 = 2003 CLD 1685",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- Ss.2(a)(c) & 13 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, Rr.10 & 11 Suit for recovery of amount as insurance claim alongwith damages and compensation against a Banking Company which had financed the plaintiffs Contention of the plaintiffs(customer) was that land, building and other assets of the plaintiffs there required to be insured under the finance agreement and on Bank's recommendation the plaintiffs obtained insurance from the recommended Insurance Companies which had failed to settle the claims of the plaintiffs in case of fire in their factory and plaintiffs had suffered loss due to non settlement of their insurance claim by the Insurance Companies Plaint of the suit had been structured to implead the Bank as defendant alongwith Insurance Companies Only bridge between the Bank and Insurance' Companies was the purported \"\"recommendation\"\" by the Bank to the plaintiffs to obtain insurance from the said Insurance Companies Insurance Policy was admittedly obtained by the plaintiffs themselves and the premium thereunder was also paid by them ¬Plaintiffs had not shown as to how mere recommendations by the Bank placed the burden of acts and omissions of Insurance Companies upon the Bank Plaintiffs had also failed to plead in the plaint that the recommendation of the Bank could bring into existence any contractual relationship between the Bank and Insurance Companies to make the Bank liable to pay the Insurance Companies upon their failure to settle the insurance claim of the plaintiffs No privities of interest or contract had been proved against the Bank to bring the Bank in the position of Insurance Company or to make the Bank liable to pay damages/ compensation to plaintiffs against the Insurance Companies Insurance Companies were not insurers of the plaintiffs obligations under the finance agreement towards the Bank .Said Companies had extended insurance against losses through fire or otherwise of building, machinery etc. under the contract of insurance between the plaintiffs and the companies Plaintiffs had not been able to show that financial obligations under the finance agreement between them and the Bank were undertaken by the Insurance Companies to be settled by them on default of the plaintiffs Insurance Companies, in circumstances, could not be said to be guarantors or indemnifiers to fall within the definition of \"\"customers\"\" under S.2(c) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ¬Insurance Companies also were not financial institutions in terms of S.2(a) or other provisions of the said Ordinance ¬\"\"Banking Company\"\" or a \"\"customer\"\" could bring a suit against each other for defaults arising out of the \"\"finances \"\" Default agitated in the present plaint thus did not arise out of the finance\"\" Plaintiffs' claim for damages and compensation had not arisen out of the \"\"Finance\"\" and no default under the Insurance Law had been committed by the Bank to indemnify the plaintiffs or to pay their insurance claim or otherwise any damages on that basis ¬Insurance claim was based upon indemnity of the Insurance Companies to the plaintiffs and not to the Bank High Court, in circumstances, had no jurisdiction to proceed with the present suit and pronounce therein Any opinion on the other issues framed in the suit was declined be the High Court lest case of the parties was prejudiced by opinion of the Court, which lacked jurisdiction in the matter Case of the plaintiff fell within the scope of O. VII, R.10, C.P. C. and not within the ambit of R.11 of O. VII, C.P.C. Plaint was ordered to be returned for presenting the same, if so advised, to the Court of competent jurisdiction.\n \nE.F.U. General Insurance Limited v. Chairman, Banking Tribunal No. 1 PLD 2001 Lah. 313 and Messrs United Bank Limited v. Messrs Adamjee Insurance Company Limited 1988 CLC 1660 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No.12 of 2000, decision dated: 14-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "Messrs GRACE TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. and another --Plaintiffs\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and 5 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13039",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3083 = 2003 SLD 3083 = 2003 CLD 1693",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XXI, Rr.64, 65 & 66 Execution of decree through sale of property Mandatory steps to be taken by Court before ordering sale of property by public auction Highlighted ¬Contravention of mandatory provisions of R.66 of O.XXI, C.P.C., would render sale unlawful Principles.\n \nWhere a decree is to be executed and satisfied through sale of immovable property belonging to ¬ debtor, there are three mandatory steps, which the Court in terms of Order 21, Rules 64 to 66 is required to take. Firstly, to pass a specific order for sale of property sought to be sold. Secondly, to appoint the officer who shall conduct sale. Thirdly, to effect the conduct of sale in the manner prescribed, in Order XXI, rule 66, C.P.C.\n \nThe provisions of Rule 66, Order XXI, C.P.C. are mandatory in nature and without settling and causing a proclamation of intended sale in terms of said Rule by the Court itself, no sale shall be considered to have been lawfully made. The word \"\"cause\"\", appearing in Rule 66, Order XXI, C.P.C. requires a specific order of Court, which produces the effect of drawing the proclamation envisaging the terms and conditions of sale. This include the settlement of conditions etc., by Court itself or to approve those filed by parties after hearing them.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.19 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66 Execution of decree by sale of mortgaged property ¬Objection as to sale of property Dismissal of objection petition and confirmation of sale Validity Two requisites of O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C., were met i.e. decision of sale of property and appointment of Court Auctioneer No order of Court available on record as to settlement of terms and conditions of sale and drawing of proclamation Court had not issued notice to debtor for causing of proclamation Decree holder had not filed proposed terms and conditions of sale alongwith execution application or subsequently Court had neither delegated nor could delegate powers to Court Auctioneer to draw terms and conditions and issue proclamation Court Auctioneer, thus, on his own, could not issue proclamation of sale Publication of notice of sale by Court Auctioneer, thus, would be an unauthorised act and of no legal consequence ¬Such sale was void ab initio, which could not be protected by applying principle of avoiding technicalities or that act of Court shall not prejudice any party Such sale was liable to be set aside and could not be confirmed High Court allowed appeal and set aside impugned order and sale in favour of auction purchaser.\n \n2001 CLC 2016; 2000 CLC 1425; PLD 2000 Kar. 186; 2000 CLC 1438; PLD 1987 SC 512 and PLD 1984 SC 146 ref.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.XXI, R.66 Proclamation of sale Essentials Duty of Court to settle proclamation of sale itself Court cannot delegate such power to officer appointed by it Knowledge of party about public notice issued by Court Auctioneer advertising sale would not be a substitute for proclamation envisaged by R.66, O.XXI, C.P.C. Sale made in violation of R 66, O.XXI, C.P.C. would be nullity in eye of law.\n \nBrig. (Retd.) Mazhar ul Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Islamabad and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706 and Appu alias Subramania Patter v. O. Achuta Menon and others AIR 1926 Mad. 755 fol.\n \n(d) Administration of justice \n \n No superstructure or legal rights could be based upon foundation, which was void in nature.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n O.XXI, Rr.65, 66(2)(a) & 90 Execution of decree by sale of property Notice of sale issued by Court Auctioneer not containing accurate and adequate description of property (i.e. exact Khasra numbers of land) Effect Such was a serious and material irregularity in sale of property Sale on such score would be liable to be set aside under O.XXI, R.90, C. P. C.\n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90 Right of interested party to set aside sale Scope Right available to interested party under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. is optional and can be exercised, when he does not have a case for setting aside the sale under O.XXI, P.90, C.P.C., that he should pay 5% over and above purchase money to auction purchaser and get property released Where case of a party is duly covered by O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C., then he cannot be compelled to exercise option under O.XXI, R.89, C. P. C.\n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n S.19 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66 ¬\"\"Power to execute decree in any manner as the Banking Court considers fit\"\" Scope Such power can be exercised, where there is request by decree holder and Court by application of conscious mind comes to conclusion that decree cannot be executed by applying general rules as provided in C.P.C. Where there was no speaking order passed in terms of S.19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, but Court had issued notice to. debtor under O.XXl, R.66, C. P. C. then it would be deemed that Court had intended to execute decree according to provisions of C.P.C., rather than under special law.\n \n(h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----------\n \n O.XXI, R.90 High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol.1, Chap. 12 L, R. 13 Application for setting aside sale ¬Rule 13, Chap. 12 A, Vol.I of High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders requiring raising of objection to sale prior to conduct of sale, but not afterwards Applicability such Rule would have no application where time and date of sale had not at all been fixed by Court and Court Auctioneer had not given any notice to objector about date on which he intended to conduct sale.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.200 of 2002, heard on 1st July, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HASSAN --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD through Branch Manager and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13040",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3084 = 2003 SLD 3084 = 2003 CLD 1703",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -S.9 Claim for recovery of liquidated damages by Bank ¬Validity Plaintiff Bank was not entitled to recover such amount Such claim of Bank being not entertainable was rejected in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.44 of 2002, Civil Miscellaneous No.362 B of 2003, P.L.A. Nos.100 B, 104 B of 2002 and Civil Miscellaneous No.712 B of 2002, decision dated: 8-07-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Vs.\nMessrs PAK PUNJAB CARPETS and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13041",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3085 = 2003 SLD 3085 = 2003 CLD 1705",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- S.19 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.51 & O.XXI, Rr.37, 38, 39 & 40 Execution of decree through arrest and detention of debtor Provisions of S.51 read with O.XXI, Rr.37, 38, 39 & 40, C.P.C. Applicability Warrant of arrest, issuance of Import and essentials Issuance of warrants without complying with such mandatory provisions of C.P.C., would be offensive not only to such provisions of C.P.C., but also against guarantees enshrined in the Constitution No other law available to prescribe such mode of execution of decree, such provisions of C. P. C. would be attracted to proceedings before Banking Court ¬Holding otherwise would mean that debtor in Banking Court is a lesser citizen not entitled to Constitutional guarantees, which idea is offensive to judicial mind.\n \nPrecision Engineering Ltd and others v. The Grays Leasing Ltd. PLD 2000 Lah. 290; Manhattan Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan and another PLD 2000 Kar. 322; Pakistan through Military Estates Officer, Rawalpindi v. Abdul Aziz and another 2001 CLC 1086 and, Ch. Harpal Sing and others v. Lal Hira Lal AIR 1955 All. 402 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.16661, 16981, 16980 and 20806 of 2001, heard on 20-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR, J",
    "": "MEHBOOB ALAM er\nVs.\nFEDERATION OF PAKSITAN through Secretary Finance and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13042",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3086 = 2003 SLD 3086 = 2003 CLD 1709",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) Art.199 Constitutional petition Maintainability ¬Issuance of demand notice by the financial institute for the amount of loan advanced Validity Such notice cannot be called in question, through filing of Constitutional petition ¬Petition was not maintainable in circumstances.\n \nShagufta Begum v. The Income Tax Officer, Circle ¬XI, Zone B, Lahore PLD 1989 SC 360 and Mir Nabi Bakhsh Khan Khoso v. Branch Manager, National Bank of Pakistan, Jhatpat (Dera Allah Yar) Branch and 3 others 2000 SCMR 1017 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) --\n \n Art. 199 Constitutional petition Maintainability ¬Contractual liability, enforcement of Petitioner availed financial facility from financial institution and executed agreements/ documents of his own free will Effect ¬Enforcement of such agreements/ documents could not be enforced through filing of Constitutional petition Petition was not maintainable in circumstances.\n \nMumtaz Masud's case 1994 SCMR 2287 ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) --\n \n Arts.199 & 203 G Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court Charging of interest (Riba) Past and closed transaction Seeking of declaration of \"\"interest\"\" as un¬ Islamic Validity High Court, in view of Art.203 G of the Constitution had no power or jurisdiction under law to decide the matter.\n \nMuhammad Ramzan v. Citibank N. A. 2001 CLC 158 and Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khaki v. Syed Muhammad Hashim and 8 others PLD 2000 SC 225 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n S. 9 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 ¬Constitutional petition Maintainability Efficacious and adequate remedy Recovery of loan Charging of Riba (interest) Past and closed transaction Petitioner obtained loan from financial institution and failed to repay the same ¬ Financial institution issued demand notice for the recovery of the same Plea raised by the petitioner was that charging of Riba (interest) in demand notice being un Islamic could not be claimed Petitioner further contended that the Financial Institution had not provided statement of accounts as he had already paid the principal amount Validity ¬Although the interest/Riba was un Islamic yet past and closed transaction could not be re opened Petitioner was a 'customer', therefore, he could file a suit for the redressal of his alleged grievance before Banking Court under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 2001, thus efficacious and adequate remedy was available to the petitioner Constitutional petition was hit by Art. 199(l) of the Constitution, therefore, the same was not maintainable High Court directed the petitioner to appear before Manager of the Financial Institution and the Manager was directed to provide facility of instalments and to give benefits/ concessions to the petitioner of the incentive schemes issued by the Financial Institutions off and on ¬Petition was disposed of accordingly.\n \nMumtaz Masud's case 1994 SCMR 2287; Muhammad Ramzan v. Citibank N. A. 2001 CLC 158 and Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khaki v. Syed Muhammad Hashim and 8 others PLD 2000 SC 225 ref.\n \nN.A. Butt for Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.9051 of 2002, decision dated: 29-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Mian ABDUL KHALIQ er\nVs.\nMANAGER, SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13043",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3087 = 2003 SLD 3087 = 2003 CLD 1713",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --Ss. 284 & 287 Petition for recall of order sanctioning scheme for amalgamation of companies Objection as to jurisdiction of Court to sanction scheme not raised in the petition High Court ignored such objection.\n \n(b) Pleadings \n \n Grounds not taken in petition could not be allowed to be urged during arguments.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n Ss.282 L, Part VIII A Ss.282 A to 282 M (as added by Companies (Second Amendment) Ordinance (CXXIII of 2002) w.e.f 15 11 2002 & 284 Scheme for amalgamation of non¬ Banking Finance Companies Jurisdiction of High Court ¬Scope Under S.282 L of Companies Ordinance, 1984, for passing resolution approving such scheme, two third majority in value of shareholders was required, while under S.284 thereof, three fourth majority was required ¬Jurisdiction of High Court not taken away by Part VIII A of the Ordinance, but was still intact and could not be considered to have been ousted merely by implication.\n \nAftabuddin Qureshi and another v. Mst. Rachel Joseph and another PLD 2001 SC 482; Muhammad Bashir and 2 others v. Muhammad Firdaus and another PLD 1988 SC 232 and Governor, N.W.F.P. and another v. Gul Naras Khan 1987 SCMR 1709 ref.\n \n(d) Jurisdiction--\n Exclusion of jurisdiction of Court not to be readily inferred Statute should not be construed as to oust or restrict jurisdiction of Court, unless very explicit words are used in statute itself in that behalf Such an intention should not normally be imputed to Legislature.\n \nMuhammad Ismail and others v. The State PLD 1969 SC 241; A. Hamid v. Hussain Hyder, Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan, Lahore and another PLD 1971 Lah. 858; Muhammad Aslam v. The State PLD 1967 Lah. 810 and Raja Maula Dad Khan, Advocate v. West Pakistan Bar Council, Lahore and another PLD 1975 SC 469 rel.\n \n(e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-¬\n \n Ss.284 & 287 Expression \"\"amalgamation\"\" ¬Connotation Such expression includes in its fold an arrangement or compromise between company and its members or class of members for becoming shareholders in another undertaking True effect of amalgamation is that when two companies amalgamate and merge into one, transferor company loses its entity and ceases to have its business.\n \nSaraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. C.I.T. Haryuana, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi II, New Delhi AIR 1991 SC 70 ref.\n \n(f) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-¬\n \n Ss. 284 & 287 Term \"\"arrangement\"\" Connotation Such term is of wide import and cannot be given restricted meanings.\n \nHindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. v: Hindusthan General Electrical Corporation Ltd. AIR 1960 Cal. 637 and In re: Patrakar Prakashan (Pvt.) Ltd. (1997) 13 SCL 33 ref.\n \n(g) Words and phrases-¬\n \n \"\"Amalgamation\"\" Meaning.\n \nWild v. South African Supply and Cold Storage Co. (1904) 2 Ch. 268 and Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., para.1539. ref.\n \n(h) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n Ss.284 & 287 Amalgamation/merger of companies ¬Two or more companies are fused into one by merger i.e. one is absorbed into another All amalgamations/ mergers take effect under Ss.284 & 287 of Companies Ordinance, 1984.\n \n(i) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.284 & 287 Scheme for amalgamation of companies ¬Jurisdiction of Court Scope High Court would neither act as a post office or conduit nor view such scheme with a view to find out, whether same was ideal scheme nor pick holes in scheme nor approach scheme in a carping spirit.\n \nIn re: Sidhpur Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1962 Guj. 305 and Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd., Islamabad v. Dhan Fibre Ltd., Rawalpindi PLD 2001 Lah. 230 ref.\n \n(j) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) -\n \n Ss.284 & 287 Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts.117, 118 & 119 Scheme for amalgamation/ merger of companies. Essentials Burden of proof Such scheme must be reasonable, fair, bona fide and for economic benefit of merging companies Onus to prove unreasonableness or unfairness would be on those, who object to such scheme.\n \nHindusthan General Electric Corporation Ltd.'s case AIR 1959 Cal. 679 ref.\n \n(k) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n S.284 Scheme for amalgamation of companies sanctioned by Court Objection of first company was that directors of second company had not disclosed to first company net value of shares of their company Validity ¬Directors had a duty to company and its shareholders No concealment found in balance sheet and Auditor's report ¬Non disclosure of such fact would not detract from scheme in any way.\n \nFederation of Pakistan v. Public at Large 1988 SCMR 2041; Johnson and Philips Pakistan Ltd. v. Shalimar Construction Co. 1991 MLD 841; In re: Lipton (Pakistan) Ltd. and another 1989 CLC 818; Brothers Steel Mills Ltd. and others v. Mian Ilyas Miraj and 14 others PLD 1996 SC 543 and Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore through its Chairman and another v. Mst. Salina Afroze and 2 others PLD 1992 SC 263 ref.\n \n(l) Company \n \n Resolution passed by Board of Directors Validity Such resolution could not override resolution passed by shareholders in general body meeting.\n \n(m) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n Ss.284(2) & 285 Withdrawal/cancellation/revocation of order sanctioning scheme for amalgamation of companies ¬Scope Once an order sanctioning scheme had become effective, same would be binding on all members, creditors and company despite any defect or irregularity No provision for withdrawal, cancellation or revocation of order sanctioning such scheme After sanctioning such scheme, jurisdiction of High Court is confined only to matters detailed in S. 285 of Companies Ordinance, 1984.\n \nPalmers's Company Law, 24th Edn. and Chief Commissioner of Pay Roll Tax v. Group Four Industries Pvt. Ltd. (1984) 1 NSWLR 680 rel.\n \n(n) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --\n \n --S.285 Scheme for amalgamation of companies Powers of Court to enforce scheme and make modifications therein ¬Scope High Court is equipped with powers of widest amplitude to give necessary directions to parties to make arrangements for purpose of working of the scheme Court must make attempt to make scheme workable and find out modifications, if any, necessary to make scheme workable ¬Modifications include addition to scheme of amalgamation or omission therefrom for purpose of making same workable.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original No.95 of 2002 and Civil Miscellaneous Nos.215/L and 225/L of 2003, decision dated: 12-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, J",
    "": "CAPITAL ASSETS LEASING CORPORATION LTD. er\nVs.\nINTERNATIONAL MULTI LEASING CORPORATION LTD. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13044",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3088 = 2003 SLD 3088 = 2003 CLD 1729",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --Ss. 7, 18 &, 21 Lease of assets (machinery) on rentals ¬Default in payment of monthly rental by the lessee Suit for recovery was decreed by the Banking Court in the terms that, in case of default the entire decretal amount shall become due and payable at once and defendant shall be liable to return lease equipments to the plaintiff forthwith ¬Contention was that order by the Banking Court directing the return of the lease assets was unjust and inequitable ¬Validity Banking Court could not confer title or ownership of the leased assets when the agreement between the parties stipulated that title, ownership and right of property shall at all times remain vested in Modaraba and that at the end of the lease term the leased property would be returned by the lessee in good operating condition and working order Said agreement did not even bind the Modaraba to enter into agreement for sale of the leased property to the lessee Agreements, in the present case, was not claimed to be voidable on the ground of having been obtained through undue influence nor void for being opposed to public policy.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil First Appeal No.44 of 1998, decision dated: 6th March 1999.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND RANA BHAGWANDAS, JJ",
    "": "TECHNO POWERGEN (PVT.) LTD and others --Appellants\nVs.\nAL ZAMIN LEASING MODARABA MANAGEMENT (PVT.) LTD. and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13045",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3089 = 2003 SLD 3089 = 2003 CLD 1734",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (LXVII of 1984) S. 254 Security and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969), S.34(4) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 ¬Constitutional petition Appointment of external auditor ¬Prescribing additional qualifications for auditors ¬Jurisdiction of Security and Exchange Corporation of Pakistan Directive was issued by Security Exchange Corporation of Pakistan whereby certain restrictions were imposed on appointment of external auditors Petitioner being member of Institute of the Chartered Accountants was aggrieved of the said directive Plea raised by the petitioner was that classification which had been made by the Security Exchange Corporation of Pakistan and by Stock Exchanges was violative of S.254 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 Validity Statutory provision under S.254 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, is couched in language which is negative and merely sets out the minimum qualification for an auditor in case of public company which may or may not be a listed company Nothing is contained in S.254 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, prohibiting the Security and Exchange Corporation of Pakistan or a Stock Exchange or for that matter any other private or public body from prescribing additional conditions for the appointment of auditors Stock Exchanges being independent entities incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 are competent to frame their own listing regulations Power to frame regulations is expressly conferred on Stock Exchanges under S.34(1) of Security and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, the only restriction being that the regulations must have prior approval of Security and Exchange Corporation of Pakistan and must be consistent with the rules framed under the provisions of Security and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 Security and Exchange Corporation of Pakistan through its directive had imposed only an additional qualification on such members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants as were desirous of being appointed as external auditors of listed companies ¬No conflict existed between the directive and the provisions of S.254 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 High Court declined to interfere with the directive passed by the Authorities Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Security and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969) \n \n Preamble Companies Ordinance (LXVII of 1984), Preamble Import, object and scope Companies Ordinance, 1984, is a general law which has been enacted for the purpose of regulating all matters relating generally to all types of companies including listed companies Scope of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, is much more limited and is confined to matters such as Stock Exchanges and the listing of companies by such Exchanges.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (LXVII of 1984) \n \n S.254 Security and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969), S. 34(4) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.18 & 25---¬Appointment of external auditor Prescribing additional qualifications for auditors Directive was issued by Security Exchange Corporation of Pakistan whereby certain restrictions were imposed on appointment of external auditors Petitioner being member of Institute of Chartered Accountants was aggrieved of the directive Plea raised by the petitioner was that the directive was in conflict with the provisions of Arts. 18 & 25 of the Constitution, as the same had imposed restriction on ability of petitioner to engage in his profession as Chartered Accountant and also because it was discriminatory Validity Neither any impermissible restriction was imposed on the petitioner nor he was subjected to any invidious discrimination Petitioner could always act as an external auditor of a listed company by obtaining requisite certification from the Institute of Chartered Accountants, on meeting the standards prescribed by the Institute for satisfactory rating under its Quality Control Review Programme Plea was repelled in circumstances.\n \nKhawaja Abrar Majal for Petitioner.\n \nAnwar Kamal for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n \nKhawaja Saeed uz Zaman and Nasruallah Babar for Respondent No.3.\n \nMujtaba Ali Hamdani for Respondent No.5.\n \nDate of hearing: 25th June, 2003.\n \nJUDGMENT\n \nThe petitioner Muhammad Kaleem Rathore is a Member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants (respondent No. 1). He is aggrieved of two paragraphs of the directive dated 28 3 2002 issued in the form of a Code of Cooperative Governance by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) in purported exercise of the powers vested in SECP under section 34(4) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969. The portion of the aforesaid directive, against which the petitioner asserts a grievance, relates to external auditors of listed companies and is reproduced as under: \n \n\"\"External Auditors\n \n(xxxvii) No listed company shall appoint as external auditors a firm of auditors which has not been given a satisfactory rating under the Quality Control Review Programme of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan.\n \n(xxxviii) No listed company shall appoint as external auditors a firm of auditors which firm or d partner of which firm is non complaint with the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) Guidelines on Code of Ethics, as adopted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "2. The SECP, which is a respondent in this case, has issued directions to .the Stock Exchanges in Pakistan requiring them to insert, the above directive in their respective listing regulations. Learned counsel for SECP has stated that according to his information the Stock Exchanges in Pakistan have, through an amendment, incorporated the above directive in their listing regulations although he is presently in possession of the amended listing regulations of the Karachi Stock Exchange only.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "3. At the outset it needs to be noted that the petitioner has no grievance as to the objective of the aforesaid directive or to its salutary and beneficial nature. His learned counsel has acknowledged that the directive can serve a useful purpose in ensuring the quality of external audits in the case of listed companies. It is, however, contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the directive is violative of section 254 of the Companies Ordinance. More specifically, it has been contended that section 254 does not envisage classification between Members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants. Likewise, section 2 (1)(s) of the Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 also does not envisage such classification. It has therefore, been argued that the classification, which has been made by the SECP in the above directive and by the Stock Exchanges through incorporation of the aforesaid directive in their listing regulations, is violative of section 254 of the Companies Ordinance. On this basis it has been argued that the aforesaid directive of the SECP cannot be given effect because section 254 of the Companies Ordinance being part of a statute, overrides any subordinate legislation such as the Code of Cooperative Governance referred to above which contains the impugned directive.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "4. In order to appreciate the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner it is necessary to examine section 254 aforesaid, the relevant part whereof reads as under: ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "\"254 Qualification and disqualification of auditors. ---(1) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as an auditor ¬\n \n(i) in the case of a public company ox private company which is subsidiary of public company unless he is a Chartered Accountant within the meaning of the Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 (X of 1961); and\n \n(ii) in the case of a private company having paid up capital of three million rupees or more unless he is a Chartered Acc6untant within the meaning of the Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 (X of 1961).\"",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "5. The above statutory provision is couched in language which is negative and merely sets out the minimum qualification for an auditor in the case, inter alia, of a public company which may or may not be a listed company. There is nothing in section 254 which can be taken as prohibiting the SECP or a Stock Exchange or, for that matter, any other private or public body from prescribing additional conditions for the appointment of auditors.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "6. As noted above, the impugned directive has been issued in exercise of powers vested in SECP under section 34(4) of the Securities and Exchange Commission Ordinance, 1969. The said statutory provision, for ease of reference, is reproduced as under: ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "\"34(4) Where the Commission (SECP) considers it expedient so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct a Stock Exchange to make any regulation, or to amend or rescind any regulation already made, within such period as it may specify in this behalf.\"",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The SECP is thus fully empowered to issue the impugned directive. Furthermore, for reasons given below I find no conflict between the said directive and the provisions of section 254 of the Companies Ordinance.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "7. The Stock Exchanges, even otherwise, being independent entities incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, are competent to frame their own listing regulations. The power to frame regulations is expressly conferred on Stock Exchanges under section 34(1) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance; the only, restriction being that the regulations must have prior SECP approval, and must be consistent with the rules framed under the said Ordinance.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "8. At this point it is important to bear in mind that the principal object of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance as set out in its preamble is the protection of investors. Learned counsel for the petitioner did not deny that, the impugned directive, by ensuring the quality of external audits, would directly result in the protection of investors wishing to invest in the securities issued by listed companies. The SECP and the Stock Exchanges therefore, have quite clearly fulfilled a statutory mandate by issuing the impugned directive and through incorporation thereof in the listing regulations.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "9. The Companies Ordinance, 1984 and the Securities and Exchange Ordinance are meant to focus on distinct legislative concerns and to regulate separate areas of activity even though these separate areas may overlap to the extent that both enactments contain provisions dealing with listed companies. The Companies Ordinance, 1984 is a general law which has been enacted for the purpose of regulating all matters relating generally to all types of companies including listed companies. The scope of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, however, is much more limited and is confined to matters such as Stock Exchanges and the listing of companies by such Exchanges.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "10. All that has been done by the SECP through the impugned directive is to impose an additional qualification on such members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants as are desirous of being appointed as external auditors of listed companies. In the circumstances, there is no conflict between the impugned directive and the provisions of section 254 of the Companies Ordinance reproduced above.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "11. Learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that the impugned directive is in conflict with the provisions of Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution inasmuch as it imposes a restriction on the ability of the petitioner to engage in his profession as a Chartered. Accountant and also because it is discriminatory. These contentions are wholly misconceived. For the reasons noted above, I am clear that there is neither any; impermissible restriction imposed on the petitioner nor is there any invidious discrimination against him. The petitioner can always act as an external auditor of a listed company by obtaining requisite certification from the Institute of Chartered Accountants provided he meets the standards prescribed by the Institute for satisfactory rating under its Quality Control Review Programme.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "12. For the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in this petition which is, therefore, dismissed.\"",
    "URL Link:": "Writ Petition No.3582 of 2003, heard on 25-06-2003.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "MUHAMMAD KALEEM RATHORE er\nVs.\nINSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS through President and 4 others --Respondents",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13046",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3090 = 2003 SLD 3090 = 2003 CLD 1740",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- Ss.14 & 10 Finance facility against, inter alia, the security of mortgage by way of title deed on property comprising a house to cover the amount of the facility Suit for recovery of the amount by the financial institution ¬Applications for leave to defend by the defendants were dismissed by the Banking Court anti decree for the recovery of amount with costs and future mark up jointly and severally was passed against all the defendants (Directors of the Company) Contentions of the debtors were that facility accorded in term of letter dated 9 6 1996 issued by the Financial Institution was valid up to 30 4 1997 and the appellant (Director of the Company) had resigned from the directorship of the Company on 2 7 1997 and had neither guaranteed nor was party to any subsequent facility granted to the Company by the Financial Institution as such he was not bound to discharge any liabilities of the Company existing at the date of filing the suit Validity ¬Appellant (Director of the Company) had executed a continuing letter of guarantee whereby he assumed full responsibility for the liabilities of the Principal in terms of the facility (including mark up) and covenanted that it would remain in full force and effect until determined as to future transactions through a prior notice from the guarantor but would remain fully effective in respect of any liabilities incurred by the Principal prior to such notice Suit was decreed only to the extent of the amount of the facility granted as a result of negotiations with the appellant as a Director of the Company and one year mark up at the agreed rate Nothing was available to indicate that the appellant served any notice upon the Financial Institute and in any event the liability related to a period prior to his resignation Contention of the appellant was repelled in circumstances.\n \n(b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) --\n \n S.58(f) Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S.17 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss.14 & 10 Mortgage by deposit of title deeds Equitable mortgage Requirement of registration Contention was that the mortgage could not be enforced inasmuch as no transfer of interest had taken place and the memorandum of deposit of title deed was written merely on a document containing stamp paper of Rs.30 and had not been duly registered Validity ¬Document purporting to transfer immovable property was required to be registered, nevertheless S.58(f), provided that there was no requirement of execution of a document for the purposes of creating an equitable mortgage which could be effected by mere deposit of title deed with the mortgagee-¬Memorandum in question did not purport to create a mortgage but only confirmed the factum of the deposit of title deeds relating to the property Such a memorandum confirming a deposit having been made in the past, did not require registration.\n \nAbdul Aziz Ghafoor Khan and another v. Commerce Bank Limited PLD 1978 Kar. 36 and Muhammad Farooq Khan v. Sulleman Punjwani and others PLD 1977 Kar. 88 rel.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss.14 & 10 Transfer of Property. Act (IV of 1882), S.58(7) Finance facility against inter alia the security of mortgage by way of title deeds on property comprising a house to cover the amount of facility Original facility extended by the Financial Institute was got enhanced by the debtor company Suit for recovery of the amount .by the Financial Institute Applications for leave to defend by the defendants were dismissed by the Banking Court ,and decree for the recovery of the amount with costs and future mark up jointly and severally was passed against all the defendants (Directors of the Companies) Contention of the appellant (one of the Directors) who had deposited the title deed was that the original memorandum of deposit of title deed was executed at the time when the initial facility was granted and subsequently when the facility was sought to be enhanced the appellant executed the declaration conveying his no objection to the mortgage of the property in consideration of extension of any finance facility by the Financial Institute and the Financial Institute, at the time of enhancing the facility had not required the appellant to execute a fresh mortgage, therefore, appellant could only be confined to the amount of initial facility and not to the extent of the amount of enhanced facility -Validity When the enhanced facility was obtained by the appellant representing the Company, collateral of property in question being described as a security for the facility, the appellant could not be allowed to assert that the mortgage could not be treated as security for the facility.\n \n(d) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) --\n \n S.58 Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S.17 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss.14 & 10 Mortgage ¬Requirement of registration Scope When a mortgage or other form of transfer of property is effected through an instrument in writing, the same is compulsorily registrable, however, when a written document merely records a transfer having been made in the past no such registration is required.\n \nUnited Bank of India v. Azirannessa Bewa PLD 1965 SC 274 and Muslim Commercial Bank v. Malik & Company 2002 CLD 606 ref.\n \n(e) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) --\n \n S.58(7), proviso as added by Finance Act (I of 1986), S. 2 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss.14 & 10 ¬Mortgage by deposit of title deeds in favour of Banking Company Contention was that in view of the proviso added to S.58(f), Transfer of Property Act, 1882 by Finance Act, 1986, S.2, the equitable mortgage in favour of Banking Company could only be executed if the deposit of the title deeds was accompanied by an entry in the record of rights against the entry relating to such immovable property but in the present case, no such entry having been made there was no completed mortgage of immovable property ¬Validity Proviso to S.58(f), Transfer of Property Act, 1882 only stipulated an additional method of creation of equitable mortgage in favour of a Banking Company without affecting the existing modes of creation of such mortgages -Contention was repelled.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.95 of 2000, heard on 29-08-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, JJ",
    "": "ZAFAR MEHMOOD SHAIKH --Appellant\nVs.\nPRUDENTIAL DISCOUNT AND GUARANTEE HOUSE LIMITED and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13047",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3091 = 2003 SLD 3091 = 2003 CLD 1749",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XLI, Rr.5 & 8 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3) Stay of execution Deposit of half of decretal amount Suit for recovery of Bank loan was decreed after dismissal of application for leave to appear and defend the suit During pendency of appeal, the debtor sought stay of execution of decree High Court allowed the stay of execution, with a condition to deposit half of the decretal amount Plea raised by the debtor was that Manager of the Bank had unauthorisedly misappropriated amounts from his accounts and was later on dismissed from service on such act thus the Banking Court had wrongly dismissed his application for leave to defend the suit Validity If the Manager was found quality of misappropriation of the amount, the debtor prima facie would not be liable to pay the amount Order of High Court regarding deposit of amount was suspended and execution proceedings were stayed Petition was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1340 L of 2002 in Civil Petition No.3172 L of 2001, decision dated: 22-08-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIR A. SHEIKH, J",
    "": "Messrs ROYAL ENGINEER and others ers\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13048",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3092 = 2003 SLD 3092 = 2003 CLD 1751",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.10, 17 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.12(2), 151 & O.XIII, R.2 Suit by Bank for recovery of loan amount Banking Court dismissed leave application and. decreed suit due to absence of defendant on 30 10 2001, when only application of Bank under O.XIII, R.2, C.P.C., was fixed for hearing Defendant's application under S.12(2), C.P.C., for setting aside of / decree was dismissed by Banking Court being incompetent ¬Validity Neither suit nor leave application had been called for hearing on 30 10 2001 Rather only application of Bank seeking permission to produce additional documents was to be taken up for hearing on such date Order of dismissal of subsequent application showed that matter had been approached in a manner as if only a formality was being completed, which was not in consonance with law Mere mentioning of wrong provision of law would not make any lis incompetent - Such matter had to be dealt with under S.151, C.P.C., which incidentally found mention in the title of application under S.12(2), C.P.C. Banking Court had acted without lawful authority while passing impugned and decree High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned / decree, resultantly application filed by Bank under O:XIII, R.2, C.P.C., and leave application alongwith suit would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court.\n \nQazi Muhammad Tariq v. Hasin Jahan and 3 others 1993 SCMR 1949 rel.\n \n(b) Administration of justice \n \n Mere mentioning of a wrong provision of law would not make any lis incompetent.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.405 of 2002, heard on 21st July, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "DELTA WEAVERS (PVT.) LIMITED through Director and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13049",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3093 = 2003 SLD 3093 = 2003 CLD 1754",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) -- O. VI, Rr.1, 14 & 15 Signing and verification of pleading Essentials Word pleading\"\" means plaint or written statement Body of plaint not separate from its verification Verification is part and parcel of plaint Plaint as well as verification has to be signed by the same party.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n -S.9(1) Suit filed by Bank Non placing on record copy of special resolution or power of attorney authorising person, who signed the plaint Effect In absence of any material available on record, Court could not presume that such person had been duly authorized by Banking Company to file the suit.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss.9(1) & 7 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, R.15 & O.XXIX, R.1 Suit filed by Bank Verification, on plaint not done by authorized officer Effect Suit could not be dismissed due to defect of verification on plaint Omission to verify pleading by authorized officer would neither give rise to any penal consequences nor render the plaint absolutely void or a nullity, rather same was simply an irregularity Signing, verification and drafting of plaint in a particular manner were matter of mere procedure, thus, relevant provisions could not be strictly construed.\n \n(d) Interpretation of statutes -\n \n Mandatory provision Important test for showing that certain proceedings were a nullity, was to show that mandatory provisions of law had been violated.\n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss. 9(1) & 7 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, Rr.14, 15 & O.XXIX, R.1 Defective signing or presentation of plaint by a person not holding authority/power of attorney Not violation of any specific provision of law ¬Such presentation or signing could not make plaint a nullity¬ Rules regarding verification and signatures on plaint, being matter relating to procedure, were to be liberally construed.\n \nRam Labhaya Mal and another v. Firm Chanchal Singh Jaswant Singh AIR 1932 Lah. 28; Wali Muhammad Khan v. Ishak Ali Khan and others AIR 1931 All. 507; Tula Ram Chaudhari v. B. Debi Datt Chaudhari AIR (36) All. 498; Bundi Portland Cement Ltd. v. Abdul Hussein Essaji AIR 1936 Bom. 418; Commerce Bank Ltd., Karachi v: Habib Bakhsh and another PLD 1978 Quetta 45 and Shafiq Metal Works and 5 others v. The Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd., Gujranwala PLD 1973 Note 33 at p.41 ref.\n \n(f) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss. 9 & 15 Suit for recovery of loan amount decreed by Banking Court Validity Statement of account annexed with plaint was not in accordance with agreement executed by parties Mark up had been charged over mark up, which Bank under law could not charge Statement of account did not show date of payment of loan amount and charging of mark up Fresh statement of accounts furnished by the Bank also showed charging of interest @ 19% rendering the same doubtful No reliance could be placed on such statement of account, unless and until all its entries were proved by Bank High Court allowed appeal; set aside /decree and remanded case to Banking Court with directions to record evidence of parties about all entries of statement of accounts and then decide same afresh within specified period.\n \n(g) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n Ss.9 & 7 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.20 Suit for recovery of loan amount by Bank Territorial jurisdiction of Banking Court at place \"\"P\"\" Factory of borrower was situated at place \"\"S\"\" Amounts were withdrawn and deposited at place \"\"P\"\" Held: Banking Court at place \"\"P\"\" would have jurisdiction to entertain such suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No. 109 of 1999, decision dated: 30-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "TALAAT QAYYUM QURESHI, J",
    "": "MEHMOOD KHAN --Appellant\nVs.\nMAKMA STEEL CRAFT (PVT.) LTD. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13050",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3094 = 2003 SLD 3094 = 2003 CLD 1764",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --Ss.10, 314 & 333 Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3 Winding up proceedings Plot allotted to company was cancelled by Authority (LDA) after its sale by Official Liquidator Direction of Company Judge to Authority to give effect in its record to sale deed to be executed, by official liquidator in favour of auction purchaser Intra Court Appeal against such order by Authority (LDA) ¬ Maintainability Company Judge had passed impugned order after passing of winding up order Intra Court Appeal was incompetent in circumstances.\n \nI.C.A. No.14 L of 2001; C.P.L.A. No.765 L of 2002; Agha Fakhruddin Khan v. Messrs Ruby Rice and General Mills Ltd. and others 2001 YLR 1797 and M. Suleman & Co. through Managing Partner v. Joint Official Liquidators and another 1997 CLC 260 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Intra Court Appeal No.4 L of 2002, decided December, 2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND PERVAIZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Lahore High Court DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Lahore High Court through its Director General, L.D.A. and another --Appellants\nVs.\nINVESTMENT CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN, Karachi High Court and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13051",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3095 = 2003 SLD 3095 = 2003 CLD 1767",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) --S.305 Winding-up of company Locus standi Petitioner was employee of the respondent Company and was also involved to another business Effect Petition was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous No.8 of 2 002, decision dated: 19-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, J",
    "": "EJAZ HASSAN er\nVs.\nSYNECTIV PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13052",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3096 = 2003 SLD 3096 = 2003 CLD 1770",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- Ss.7, 9, 10 & 21 Suit for recovery of amount ¬Application for leave to defend suit Dismissal Defendant filed appeal against of Banking Court whereby its application for grant of permission to appear and defend the suit was dismissed Availing of financial assistance and execution of documents by defendant in favour of Bank had not been denied by the defendant Grievance of defendant in main was that entries reflecting in statement of accounts were fictitious and bogus and that mark up claimed by Bank ran contrary to contracted rate etc. Defendant had not been able to point out any wrong or bogus entry in the statement of accounts, creating doubt in one's mind regarding its authenticity Statements of accounts had been prepared in accordance with Bank record and it had been verified as required by law Mark up had been duly highlighted in sanction advice and it had been charged at contracted rate Mere assertion of defendant that loan was without mark up or that rate of mark up claimed by plaintiff ¬Bank was exorbitant, without positive attempt on part of defendant to substantiate same, was of no consequence ¬Contention that plaint had not been filed by a competent person, was repelled as plaint had been duly verified and affirmed on Oath by Manager of plaintiff Bank Other objections raised by defendant were of no importance ¬Banking Court having dealt with matter in a proper manner, well reasoned and decree passed by Banking Court was unexceptional and hardly called for interference in appeal before High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No.54 of 2001, decision dated: 3rd April, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR UL MULK AND IJAZ UL HASSAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AIMA INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. and others --Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13053",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3097 = 2003 SLD 3097 = 2003 CLD 1774",
    "Key Words:": "Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980) -- Ss.3 & 4 Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.), R. 731 Arrest of vessel Confirmation Monetary dispute between the parties Documents relied upon by the plaintiff were alleged by the defendant to be forged Effect Parties were litigating all over the world and each side was trying to gain advantage over the other Prima facie no case had been made out by plaintiff for confirmation of order of arrest of the disputed vessel Application was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Admiralty Suits Nos.61 and 62 of 2002, decision dated: 20-12-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, J",
    "": "Messrs ABDOUN OIL COMPANY S.A. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nM.T. CAMARO PRIDE and another ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13054",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3098 = 2003 SLD 3098 = 2003 CLD 1779",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss.6 & 9 Suit for recovery of lea8e finance Bank claimed overdue lease money, additional lease rentals and agreed loss value of leased equipment Banking Tribunal decreed the suit, but declined to allow amount of agreed loss value Validity Amount of agreed loss value was meant only to secure Bank against any loss or damage to leased equipment Bank had not alleged any loss or damage to the leased equipment Banking Tribunal had rightly not allowed such amount High Court dismissed the appeal.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.6 Suit for recovery of lease finance Claim for refund of security deposit by defendant Validity Security deposit was equivalent to residual value of leased equipment as set out in lease agreements Residual value of leased equipment was recoverable by Bank, in case defendant opted to retain the same Defendant could claim refund of security deposit, .if he opted to return leased equipment to Bank Statement of account filed by Bank did not show that such amount had been credited towards lease rentals ¬Defendant had already exercised its option to retain leased equipment, thus, Bank was entitled to adjust amount of security deposit towards residual value of leased equipment.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No.326 of 1996, heard on 11-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "ORIX LEASING PAKISTAN LIMITED through Attorney --Appellant\nVs.\nNEW MALIK FOUNDRY AND ENGINEERING WORKS and 5 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13055",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3099 = 2003 SLD 3099 = 2003 CLD 1783",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.22 Stay by Appellate Court Failure to comply with the direction of Appellate Court Appellants had filed stay application against execution proceedings alongwith appeal Appellate Court directed the appellants to deposit a sum of Rs.20,00,000 but they failed to comply with the direction of the Appellate Court Effect Such order of the Appellate Court was only confined to the stay of execution of decree and if the appellants had not deposited the amount, the execution could be carried on but no mala fides could be attributed to the appellants in circumstances.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n Ss.19 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90 Appeal Sale of mortgaged property, setting aside of Grievance of debtor was that no sale was conducted at the site and all the proceedings in that behalf were fictitious and fraudulent Executing Court without framing of issues just on auction report dismissed the objection Validity Such question could not be resolved by the Executing Court without framing of issues and enabling' the parties to produce evidence Executing Court could not have rejected the objections of debtor just on the basis of auction report Sale' was set aside and the case was remanded to Executing Court with a direction to decide objection petition after framing of issues and .recording of evidence produced by parties Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n S.19 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90 ¬Setting aside of sale Inadequacy of sale price Bank at the time of mortgage of the property had got the property evaluated for a sum of Rs.1,04,27,000 but subsequently the reserve price was fixed for an amount of Rs.4,500,000 without taking the Executing Court in confidence and the property was sold for Rs.46,00,000 Validity Mere inadequacy of sale price by itself was no ground for setting aside the sale Executing Court should have considered the sale on the basis of some material placed on record by the Bank to justify that the reserve price fixed was adequate and justified which apparently was not done Sale was set aside in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.79 of 2003, heard on 12-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs A.M. RICE CORPORATION through Sole Proprietor and another --Appellants\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Branch Manager and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13056",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3100 = 2003 SLD 3100 = 2003 CLD 1788",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.I, R.10 & O.XXII, R.4 Impleading legal heirs of deceased defendant as party to suit under O.I, R.10 & O.XXII, R.4, C.P.C. Criteria different.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --\n \n O.XXII, R.4 Suit against dead person Validity Such defect could not be cured by bringing his legal heirs on record in terms of O.XXII, R.4, C.P.C.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --\n \n O.I, R.10 & O.XXII, R.4 Suit against dead person for recovery of amount due against him Validity Such amount, if subject to other legal limitations, could be recovered from his legal heir(s), then independent of requirement. Of O.XXII, R.4, C.P.C., his legal heirs could be joined as party to suit in a similar manner as if when a proposed defendant to a suit had died before institution of suit, then such suit could be brought against him through his legal heirs.\n \nMuhammad Yousaf v. Syed Ghayyur Hussain Shah and 5 others 1993 SCMR 1185 rel..\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n-- S. 9 Civil procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10 & O.VI, R.17 Suit for recovery of loan amount Factum of demise of mortgagor defendant prior to filing of suit came into knowledge of Bank from leave to defend application filed by other defendants Applications by Bank seeking to implead legal heirs of deceased mortgagor and make corresponding amendments in plaint were dismissed by Banking Court ¬Validity After demise of mortgagor defendant, whatever right she had in mortgaged property, same had devolved upon her legal heirs Request of Bank for joining legal heirs in suit as necessary and proper party within scope of O.I, R.10, C.P.C. was legal and tenable Corresponding amendments sought to be made in plaint were neither going to change nature or character of suit nor by such amendments any prejudice was likely to be caused to opposite party Impugned orders were suffering from illegality and material irregularity and without jurisdiction ¬High Court accepted revision petitions and set aside impugned orders.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n Ss.22(6) & 27 Revision application against order/ of Banking Court Scope In view of bar of filing review, revision or appeal against interlocutory order and finality attached to order/ of Banking Court under S.27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, revision application might not be maintainable against such order/ .\n \nMst. Afshan Ahmed v. Habib Bank Ltd. 2002 CLD 137; Central Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Atlas BOT Lease Co. Ltd and 2 others 1998 SCMR 2352; Bolan Bank Ltd. v. Capricorn Enterprise (Pvt.) Ltd. 1998 SCMR 1961; Pakistan Fisheries Ltd., Karachi and others v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109; Muhammad Ayub Butt v. Allied Bank Ltd. PLD 1981 SC 359 and Shah Jewana Textile Mills v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 2000 Lah. 162 ref.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n Ss.2(b), 5 & 7 .Findh Courts Act (VII of 1926), S.8 High Courts (Establishment) Order (8 of 1970), Art.3 Judge of Sindh High Court while dealing with matter under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 --¬Jurisdiction Nature Such Judge acts as Banking Court and not in its ordinary jurisdiction.\n \nPakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd., Peshawar Cantt. and others v. Government of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 496 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision Applications Nos.2 and 3 of 2002, decision dated: 2-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs HABIB BANK LIMITED --Applicant\nVs.\nMessrs INDUS LENENTOSE (PVT.) LTD. and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13057",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3101 = 2003 SLD 3101 = 2003 CLD 1797",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) -- Art.199 Constitutional petition Judgment not pronounced within 90 days after hearing the arguments ¬Matter was posted for rehearing.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.XXXI, Rr. 1 & 2 Suit by trustees Trustee not willing to join as a plaintiff can always be arrayed as defendant.\n \nLuke v. South Kensington Hotel (1874) 80 All. ER 1293 fol.\n \n(c) Composition --\n \n Interested party could not be bound by a composition operating to his detriment made in his absence.\n \n(d) Trusts Act (II of 1882) \n \n S.13 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXI, Rr.1 & 2 ¬Constitutional petition involving trust property Parties to such petition Suit involving trust property must be filed by all trustees or all of them should be joined therein Such condition of procedural law would not necessarily apply to petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution Strict legal right in respect of trust property only vests in trustees acting jointly.\n \n(e) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) --\n \n Art.199 Constitutional petition Locus standi Strict legal right need not be shown for maintaining Constitutional petition Sufficient legal interest in subject¬ matter would be enough to confer locus standi upon petitioner.\n \nFazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust PLD 1969 SC 223 fol.\n \n(f) Banking Companies Ordinance (L VII of 1962) \n \n S. 41 Trusts Act (II of 1882), S.13 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Constitutional petition Freezing of Bank accounts of Trust Constitutional petition by one of they trustees Maintainability Strict legal right needs not be shown for maintaining Constitutional petition Sufficient legal interest in subject matter would be enough to confer locus standi upon petitioner No conflict of interest amongst trustees Outcome of such petition was not likely to have any prejudicial effect on interest of any one of them Petitioner being one of the trustees, in whom trust property vested and was entitled to operate accounts alongwith other co trustee was held to have sufficient interest to maintain Constitutional petition.\n \nFazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust PLD 1969 SC 223 fol.\n \n(g) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) --\n \n Art.199(1)(a) Banks Nationalization Act (XIX of 1974), S. 3(a) & (b) Constitutional petition against Banking Company Maintainability Respondent company operating .under Banks Nationalization Act, 1.974 was substantially owned and controlled by Federal Government Such company could , be classified as a person performing functions in connection with affairs of Federation, thus, was amenable to Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court.\n \n(h) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) --\n \n S.41 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 199(1)(a)(c), 23 & 24 Freezing of Bank accounts by Banking Company at, directions of State Bank of Pakistan Constitutional petition against such act of Banks by petitioner seeking enforcement of his Constitutional rights guaranteed under Arts.23 & 24 of the Constitution Maintainability Special distinction existed in language used in cls. (a) & (c) of Art.199 of the Constitution Not necessary under Art. 199(c) of the Constitution that person to whom directions were to be given, must necessarily be one performing functions in connection with affairs of Federation, a Province or a local authority Banking Company was bound by any direction of State Bank issued in exercise of statutory powers under S.41 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 State Bank was amenable to jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution and legality of its directions issued in purported exercise of statutory powers could always be examined in such proceedings Such directions, if found to be unlawful, then Banking Company would be bound to perform its obligation towards customers in accordance with law.\n \n(i) Administration of justice \n \n Relief, grant, of Scope Court can always modify relief or grant some relief, which has not been prayed for, provided Court has jurisdiction to do so.\n \nSharaf Faridi v. Province of Sindh PLD 1989 Kar 404 fol.\n \n(j) Banker and customer \n \n -Deposits in a Bank account create only lender and borrower relationship between customer and Bank.\n \nFoley v. Fletcher 1843 1860 AER 953; London Joint Stock Bank v. McMillan and another 1918 19 AER 330 fol.\n \n(k) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) \n \n S.41 United Nations (Security Council) Act, 1948; S.2 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 23, 24 & 199 Anti¬ Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 11 B, 11 C, 11 E, 11 H, 11 I, 11 J & 25 Constitutional petition Freezing of Bank accounts of Trust at directions of State Bank of Pakistan on alleged complicity of Trust in terrorist activities Validity ¬Neither possible nor proper for High Court to form independent opinion as regards such allegation No action against petitioner or his co trustee had been taken under Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 In presence of such special law dealing with suppression of terrorism and conferring powers to freeze accounts reasonably suspected of being used for promotion of terrorist activities, resort to general provision to issue any direction to Banking Company in public interest would be entirely unwarranted When resort to general law would deprive affected party of right to seek review or appeal' to High Court, then such action would be treated as mala fide in law Resolution of Security Council of United Nations, particularly one adversely affecting fundamental rights of citizen, would not operate by its own force, unless given effect to by Federal Government by \"\"order published in official Gazette\"\" No such order of Government was placed on record No material of alleged suspicion of financing terrorist activities had been conveyed nor petitioner had been afforded opportunity to confront the same Such direction under S.41 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 could not withstand test of reasonableness contemplated by Art.23 of the Constitution and could not be sustained on touchstone of Art.24 of the Constitution as no compensation for deprivation of use of property had been .offered to the Trust Such direction could not be upheld on yardstick of Art.23 of the Constitution as right to use or dispose of property had not been subjected to a reasonable restriction imposed by law in public interest Impugned direction had been issued beyond purview of lawful powers of the State Bank of Pakistan High Court allowed Constitutional petition and declared impugned directions as without lawful authority and of no legal effect with directions to Banking Company to honour cheque of the petitioner.\n \nFederation of Pakistan v. Mushtaq Ali Mian PLD 1999 SC 1026; Muhammad Hussain and others v. State Bank' of Pakistan and another C.P.D. No.1786 of 1998; Universal Leasing Corporation v. State Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 102 and Council of Civil Services Union v. Minister for Civil Service (1984) 3 AER 935 ref.\n \n(l) United Nations (Security Council) Act, 1948 \n \n S.2 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.23 Resolution of Security Council of United Nations Not given effect to by Federal Government by \"\"order published in the official Gazette\"\" Validity Such resolution, particularly one adversely affecting fundamental rights of citizen, would not operate by its own force.\n \n(m) Anti Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997) \n \n Preamble Terrorism is a fast going phenomena Making laths and taking appropriate measures by all civilized States within their Constitutional system to combat terrorism would be in larger public interest.\n \n(n) Public International Law \n \n International obligations to the State ought to be duly honoured.\n \n(o) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) \n \n S.41(1) State Bank of Pakistan Act (XXXIII) of 1956), S.27 Powers of State Bank to give directions to any Banking Company Scope Such powers must necessarily be confined to areas specifically relatable to basic functions of State Bank under State Bank of Pakistan, Act, 1956 and regulatory power available to same in respect of Scheduled Banks under Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 Clause (a) of , S.41(1) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 must be read ejusdem generis with powers under cls. (b) & (c) thereof Directions in public interest can ,only be issued to protect interest of Banking Company and its depositor and to secure proper management of company State Bank does not have any unbridled powers to issue any direction in any area of public interest, particularly when law requires some other agency to do so.\n \n(p) Administrative of justice \n \n Natural justice, principles of Applicability Action in emergency situation Action in such situation might be required to be taken without affording an opportunity of prior hearing to affected party Such defect could be cured by providing a subsequent hearing.\n \n(q) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art.23 Right to acquire, hold and dispose of property ¬Imposition of restrictions on such right Validity ¬Restrictions on Legislature power and action taken thereunder are laid down in the Constitution itself Such right can be regulated only through reasonable restrictions imposed by law in public interest Both validity of law and action taken become justifiable from standpoint of reasonableness as well as public interest If restriction to hold property imposed by law is found reasonable, Court would uphold the same.\n \n(r) Judicial Review \n \n Measures taken in respect of National Security ¬Constraints on power of judicial review enforced in U. K. are not applicable to the Constitutional system in Pakistan ¬Such measures in U. K., belong to area of Royal prerogatives and Courts are not inclined to sit in , the moment a nexus with national security is shown No prerogative in Pakistan exists and all public power has to be exercised in accordance with Constitution and law.\n \n(s) Banker and customer \n \n Bank account Rights and obligations of Bank and depositor Scope When a depositor opens an account with a Bank, there is always an implied contract to the effect that Bank would enable him to withdraw such moneys, which he desires subject to, specified condition of the contract Rights and obligations under such contract may be impaired by an overriding law, but executive directives of State Bank cannot be allowed to affect concluded contract.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.D 2537 of 2001, decision dated: 4-08-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND ZIA PERWEZ, JJ",
    "": "SULEMAN and others ers\nVs.\nMANAGER, DOMESTIC BANKING, HABIB BANK LTD. and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13058",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3102 = 2003 SLD 3102 = 2003 CLD 1822",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- O.XLV, R.4 & S.151 Consolidation of proceedings-¬Inherent powers of the Court No express provisions for consolidation of proceedings existed except under the provisions of O.XLV, R.4, C.P.C., for a specific purpose of pecuniary valuation and not for any other purpose Court had inherent power to consolidate the proceedings, provided other conditions were available.\n \nIndustrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. National Engineering Works and others 1983 MLD 1344 and Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 326 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.7 Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S.39 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151 Consolidation of proceedings by Banking Court ¬Scope Civil Court or Tribunal, in absence of express provision in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, was deemed to possess inherent power in its very constitution, which was necessary to do the right and undo a wrong in the course of the administration of justice Provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 had been made applicable only for the matters in respect to which the procedure had not been provided for in the Ordinances Court had inherent power to determine as to how its proceedings should be conducted.\n \nNaresh Mohan Thakur and others v. Brij Mohan Misra and others AIR 1933 PC 43 ref.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.7 Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S.39 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151 Consolidation of proceedings Inherent power of Court Scope Court, in the absence of express provisions, had inherent power, ex debito justitiae, to consolidate the proceedings.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n --Ss.7, 22 & 27 Jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Nature and scope Such jurisdiction is Bunking jurisdiction' and while exercising the jurisdiction the High Court bears the fictional character, of a Banking Court' as defined in the Ordinance Judgment and orders passed by a Banking Court cannot be assailed before any forum except in accordance with the provisions of S.22, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Principles.\n \nThe jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under the Ordinance is Banking jurisdiction and while exercising .such jurisdiction the High Court bears the fictional character of a Banking Court' as defined: in the Ordinance. It' is a fundamental rule that where an enactment creates a new jurisdiction, prescribes the manner in which that jurisdiction is to be exercised and further specifies the remedy, such remedy is exclusive and the party aggrieved of an order made in exercise of that jurisdiction must seek only such remedy and not others. The jurisdiction conferred by the Ordinance on the forums created thereunder, seems to have been jealously guarded by the Legislature. By virtue of subsection (4) of section 7 in all matters to which under the Ordinance, the jurisdiction of the Banking Court extends, no Court other than the Special Court can have jurisdiction to deal therewith. Furthermore, section 27 attaches finality to the orders and categorically lays down that subject to provision for appeal under section 22, no Court or other authority shall revise, review or permit to be called in question any proceeding, , decree, sentence or order of Banking Court or legality or propriety of anything done or intended to be done by the Banking Court, save the correction of any clerical or typographical mistakes in any , decree and sentence passed by it. Evidently, the Legislature in its anxiety to protect the orders of Banking Court, has gone to the extent of ordaining that no. Authority other than the appellate forum specified in section 22, shall even allow to throw a challenge to the validity of such order. Combined effect of these provisions is that and orders passed by a Banking Court cannot be assailed before any forum except in accordance with the provisions of section 22.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.22 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Interim order Appeal Constitutional petition before High Court ¬Maintainability Statute excluding a right of appeal from the interim order cannot be bypassed by bringing under attack such interim order in Constitutional jurisdiction Party affected has to wait till it matures into a final order and then to attack the same in the proper exclusive forum created for the purpose of examining such order.\n \nSyed Saghir Ahmad Naqvi v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, S&GAD. Karachi and another 1996 SCMR 1165 ref.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.22 Appellate power conferred on the High Court was only to the extent of entertaining appeal against the final order and jurisdiction of the Banking Court Principles.\n \nThe object of enacting the: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 provides speedy measures for recovery of outstanding loans of the Banking Institutions as their recovery suits remained pending in the Civil Courts for years together. If the orders in the nature of interlocutory orders are brought under challenge before the High Court, the object for which the enactment was made would be frustrated. The appellate power conferred on the High Court is only to the extent of entertaining appeal against the final order and of the Banking Court.\n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVII of 2001) \n \n S.22 Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S.39 Appeal Scope Order of Banking Court consolidating the proceedings, being an interlocutory order, which had not decided the entire case, was not subject to the appeal in view of the bar contained in S.22(6), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \n(h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n S.151 Inherent power of Court under S.151, C.P.C. ¬Scope Consolidation of analogous proceedings Scope, purpose and effect Consolidation of the proceedings can be ordered by the Court in exercise of its inherent powers and the consent of the parties is not condition precedent for exercise of such powers Principles.\n \nIn administering justice as prescribed by Code, by passage of time, the Courts have experienced the following shortcomings in the Code: \n \nThere will always be cases and circumstances which are not covered by the express provisions of the Code wherein justice has to be done. The reason is that the. Legislature can foresee only the most natural and ordinary events and no rule can regulate for all times to come so as to make express provision against all inconveniences which are infinite in number and, so that their dispositions shall express all the cases that may probably happen.\n \nThe prescribed rule of procedure may be abused, or so used as to give a mere formality, the significance of substantive effect and thus obstruct, instead of facilitating the administration of justice.\n \nSuch power of Court to prevent abuse of the process of the Court is recognized to exist.\n \nIn a civilized society, legal process is the machinery for keeping order and doing justice. It can be used properly or it can be abused. It is used properly when it is invoked for the vindication of men's rights or the enforcement of justice claims. It is abused when it is diverted from its true course so as to serve extortion or oppression; or to exert pressure so as to achieve an improper end. When it is so abused, it is a tort, a wrong known to the law. The Judges can and will intervene to stop it. They will stay the legal process, if they can, before any harm is done. If they cannot stop it in time, and harm is done, they will give damages against the wrongdoer. Sometimes abuse can be shown by the very steps being taken in the Courts. Further, the ultimate object of all procedural rules is to ensure that there should be a fair trial according to law; the fair trial is not all one sided; it means fairness to both the parties.\n \nThe inherent power of the Court is recognized only to meet those cases for which no provision is made by the Code. It follows, therefore, that where there are express provisions of law applicable to particular case, there is no inherent power in the Court to override them. The words nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect' used in section 151 do not mean that the Code stands repealed where a Court decides to exercise its inherent powers ex debito justitiae to consolidate the proceedings. Such power can be exercised for the ends of justice.\n \nEvery procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by Jaw .\n \nCourts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code, but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle prohibitions cannot be presumed.\n \nIn absence of prohibition in the Code, the Court has inherent power ex debito justitiae to consolidate the two proceedings to meet the ends of justice, to avoid likelihood of conflict of opinion, discourage multiplicity of proceedings, duplication of trial of same issue between the same set of parties, to expedite decision, avoid delay and inconvenience, provided the causes are between the same parties, before the same forum, point in issue, defence are substantially common in all such action, common evidence is to be recorded.\n \nIn deciding whether the two proceedings should by consolidated or not. The whole question is whether or not in along run it will be expeditious and advantageous to all concerned to have the two matters tried together as analogous cases. The consolidation of the proceedings neither affects the identity of the proceedings nor affects the rights of the parties provided under the law its effect is common trial, single decision, separate decrees. The consolidation facilitates the Court in trial as well as the parties.\n \nThe Court has inherent power ex debito justitiae to consolidate suits, where it is in the ends of justice to do so to avoid needless expense and inconvenience to parties. In deciding whether two or more suits should be consolidated or not, the whole question is whether or not, in the long run, it will be expeditious and advantageous to all concerned to have the two suits tried together as analogous cases. Where it appears that there is sufficient unity, or similarity in the matter in issue the suits or that the determination of the suits rests mainly on a common question, it is convenient to have them tried as analogous cases. Such power under, section 151 of the Code to consolidate suits is exercisable even without the consent of parties.\n \nThe consolidation of the suits can be ordered by the, Court in exercise of its inherent powers. The consent of the parties is not the condition precedent for exercise of such powers. The purpose of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of litigation, to eliminate award of contradictory s and to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. These purposes are merely illustrative and not exhaustive of the powers of the Court.\n \nMessrs Pakistan Wires Products (Private) Limited and 5 others v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 59 distinguished.\n \nGoldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. (1977) 2 All ER 566; Narinsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey (83) 5 All. 163; Manzoor Ahmed v. Messrs Facto (Pakistan.) Ltd. and others 1996 MLD 265; Dr. Arslan Razzaq v. Ali Hussain PLD 1993 Lah. 97; Sain Muhammad and 4 others v. Muhammad Younis 1993 CLC 723; Harinarain Choudhary and others v. Ram Asish Shingh and others AIR 1957 Pat. 124. and Pakistan v. Agro Marketing Corporation Ltd. 1981 CLC 443 ref.\n \n(i) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVII of 2001) --\n \n S.22 Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S.39 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 151 Consolidation of proceedings Suit of the appellant against the respondent had been consolidated for the purpose of trial with a miscellaneous application by the respondent against the appellant by the Banking Court ¬Record showed that consolidated proceedings emanated from the provisions of two independent special enactments namely Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan. Ordinance, 1961 (both Banking matters) Both the proceedings were short cause cases, former was analogous to the proceedings under O.XXXIV and O.XXXVII, C.P.C. with assertion variance, whereas the petition under S.39 of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan were para materia to the proceedings under O.XXXIV & O.XXI, Rr.54, 58, C.P.C., both proceedings were pending before the same forum viz. Single Judge of High Court on the original side as Banking Court Validity While exercising the special jurisdiction conferred under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the High Court bore fictional character of a Banking Court as defined in the Statute, whereas under the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961 the High Court also bore the fictional character of District Judge Judge of High Court acting as a \"\"Banking Court\"\" or as a \"\"District Judge\"\" was not a persona designate on whom the jurisdiction vested by law was conferred Leave to defend the suit, in the present case, had been granted, whereas in the miscellaneous application, the reply to show cause had been filed ¬Provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 were applicable to the both proceedings and procedure for trial after the grant of leave in Banking suit and reply to show cause in miscellaneous application were also analogous Perusal of proceedings under appeal showed that both the, proceedings were analogous containing the same cause Evidence in both cases would be common between the same parties ¬Consolidation of the proceedings by Banking Judge, in exercise of inherent power to facilitate the trial and to avoid conflict of decision and multiplicity of proceedings, was not contrary to the law No exception could be taken to the impugned order even on merits.\n \nMessrs Pakistan Wires Products (Private) Limited and 5 others v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 59 distinguished.\n \nKarachi Water and Sewerage Board v. M. A. Majeed Khan and others 2002 CLC 566; Muhammad Ayub Butt v. Allied Bank Ltd, Peshawar PLD 1981 SC 359; Bolan Bank Limited v. Capricorn Enterprise (Pvt.) Ltd. 1998 SCMR 1961; Pakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. National Engineering Works and others 1983 MLD 1344; Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 326; Naresh Mohan Thakur and others v. Brij Mohan Misra and others AIR 1933 PC 43; Syed Saghir Ahmad Naqvi v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, S&GAD, Karachi and another 1996 SCMR 1165; Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. (1977) 2 All ER 566; Narinsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey (83) 5 All. 163; Manzoor Ahmed v. Messrs Facto (Pakistan) Ltd. and others 1996 MLD 265; Dr. Arslan Razzaq v. Ali Hussain PLD 1993 Lah. 97; Sain Muhammad and 4 others v. Muhammad Younis 1993 CLC 723; Harinarain Choudhary and others v. Ram Asish Shingh and others AIR 1957 Pat. 124; Pakistan v. Agro Marketing Corporation Ltd. 1981 CLC 443; Pakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109 and State Bank of Pakistan v. Chiragh Sun Engineering Ltd. 2000 YLR 1198 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 135 of 2003, decision dated: 21st August, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED AND GULZAR AHMED, JJ",
    "": "MARHABA TEXTILE LTD. --Appellant\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13059",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3103 = 2003 SLD 3103 = 2003 CLD 1843",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --S.9 Banking Court, jurisdiction of Scope Jurisdiction of a Banking Court is only attracted where a customer or a financial institution commits a default in fulfillment of any obligation with regard to any finance then the suit in Banking Court can be instituted by presenting the plaint.\n \nSyed Mushtaq Hussain Shah v Riaz Muhammad Hazarvi PLD 1978 Kar. 612 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n Ss.7(4) & 9 Banking Court, powers and jurisdiction of-¬Provision of S.7(4), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 excludes the jurisdiction of any Court with regard to any matter to which the jurisdiction of Banking Court extends under the Ordinance including a decision as to the existence or otherwise of a matter of finance Section 7(4) of the Ordinance is controlled by S.9(1) of the Ordinance which contemplates the presence, of three preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Banking Court viz. that the plaintiff be either financial institution or the customer; that cause of action on default in fulfillment of any obligation and with regard to the finance i.e. subject ¬matter.\n \n(c) Damages --\n \n Breach of contract Commission of tort Principles-¬Distinction between a contract and tort.\n \nThe damages' means pecuniary compensation determined by the Court according to circumstances of each case, payable by the wrongdoer' to the wronged' for the injury, loss, or damage caused by one to the other by breach of legal duty, normally by breach of contract or commission of tort. There is a marked distinction between the damages arising out of a contract and a tort. Even the test by which the amount of damages is to be ascertained in contract and in tort may differ it is to be judged in the circumstances of the case. In tort the intention of wrongdoer is considered to be fair in assessing the quantum of damages. Likewise, in case arising out of breach of contract the evidence of malicious motive may be held not to be relevant but it is admissible in the case of tort.\n \nA contract is founded upon consent: a tort is inflicted against or without consent. A contract necessitates privity between the parties: in tort no privity is needed. A tort must also be distinguished from a pure breach of contract. First; a tort is a violation of right in rem, i.e., of a right vested in some determinate person, either personally or as a member of the community, and available against the world at large: whereas a breach of contract is an infringement of a right in personam, i.e. of a right available only against some determinate person or body, and in which the community at large has no concern. The distinction between the two lies in the nature of the duty that is violated. In case of a tort the duty is one imposed by the law and is owed to the community at large. In the case of a contract, the duty is fixed by the will and consent of the parties, and it is owed to a definite person or persons.\n \nThe Law of Torts by Ratanlal and Dhiraj Law, edited by Justice (R) G.P. Singh, 23rd Edn., p.5 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -\n \n Ss.9 & 7(4) Credit card issued by the Bank falls within the term of \"\"finance\"\" but the present case is based on the tort and not contract, where one party claims that the amount is unpaid and the other party claims repayment, nor the damages have been claimed in terms of S.73 of the Con tract Act, 1872, Banking Court, in circumstances, has no jurisdiction over the matters arising out of fulfillment of the obligation with regard to the finance between the Customer and the Banker (financial), excluding the suit for damages based on tort Such suit with the cause i.e. damages based on tort being a civil matter is triable in term of S.9, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 --Claim of damages by the plaintiff, in the present case, is based on tortious act and not on contract, such suit does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Banking Court Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1291 of 1999, decision dated: 10-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED, J",
    "": "ABDUL REHMAN ALLANA --Plaintiff\nVs.\nCITIBANK --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13060",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3104 = 2003 SLD 3104 = 2003 CLD 766",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss.6 & 9 Suit for recovery of loan amount with liquidated damages and agreed return Refusal of Banking Tribunal to award liquidated damages and agreed return ¬Validity Bank was not entitled to amount of liquidated damages Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 did not empower Banking Tribunal to award amount of return ¬Bank, according to Islamic Mode of financing was not entitled to claim further amount of return, which had already been debited to account of defendant Impugned was in consonance with facts of the case and law on the subject High Court dismissed appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.442 of 1996, heard on 10-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULUTRAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMst. MUHAMMAD KHATOON and 2 others --Respondents\nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments 2001 MLD 1955 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13061",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2088 = 2004 SLD 2088 = 2004 CLD 830",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S8.6 & 9 Suit for recovery of loan amount with liquidated damages Plea of defendant was that entire liability had been cleared, and he produced letter of Manager of plaintiff Bank, who had admitted therein that defendant had paid all liabilities except liquidated damages Banking Tribunal disposed of suit as having been adjusted Validity Banking Tribunal had not found any trial or further proceedings in suit necessary in view of such admission as to clearance of liability Banking Tribunal had exercised discretion on sound principles in declining claim of liquidated damages High Court dismissed appeal. \n \nHabib Bank Limited v. Messrs Farooq Compost Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. and 4 others 1993 MLD 1571; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Faisalabad v. Messrs Asisha Garments through Proprietor and 2 others 2001 MLD 1955; Saudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170 and National Development Finance Corporation v. Messrs Millrock Quarring (Pvt.) Ltd. and 7 others 2002 CLD 1382 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.322 of 1996, heard on 6-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nPERVEZ AKHTAR HUSSAIN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13062",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2089 = 2004 SLD 2089 = 2004 CLD 834",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) ¬ Ss.6 & 9 - Suit for recovery of loan amount with liquidated damages and other charges Refusal of Banking Tribunal to grant liquidated damages and other charges ¬Contention of Bank was that such refusal was violative of mandatory provisions of law and agreement executed between parties Validity Proof of receiving notice by defendant was mandatory for grant of liquidated damages and other charges Bank had failed to produce on record any proof of receipt of notice by respondents irz terms of agreement and under the provisions if law Banking Tribunal had given findings of fact after proper appreciation of material on record, wherein no illegality or infirmity was found High Court dismissed appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.80 of 1996, decision dated: 12-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs DASTGIR COLD STORAGE IRRIGATION WORKSHOP and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13063",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2090 = 2004 SLD 2090 = 2004 CLD 838",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Pleadings Party cannot be permitted to raise new ground of attack or defence by departing from its previous pleas. \n \nMurad Begum's case PLD 1974 SC 322 fol.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S.10 Leave to defend, grant of Failure to raise any serious and bona fide dispute Effect Banking Court would be justified to refuse to grant leave to defend and decree suit against defendant. \n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.15 & 21 Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4 Decree in suit for recovery of loan amount ¬Validity Defendants had admitted availing of loan facility and had not denied execution of all documents annexed with plaint or placed on record Bare assertion of incorrectness of statement of accounts could in no way be, given any weight or made basis for granting leave to defend suit Defendants had not rebutted presumption of correctness attached to statement of accounts certified under Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 Defendants were estopped to wriggle out from their liability on well¬-known principle of estoppel and waiver Banking Court had given finding of fact against defendants after appreciation of documentary evidence High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.\n \nMessrs Chenab Limited Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672; PLD 1985 SC 365; PLD 1996 SC 684; 1999 CLC 137; Muhammad. Iqbal Fasih v. National Bank of Pakistan, Lahore PLD 1980 Lah. 38; Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Jasarat Husain 2002 CLD 93; Haji Muhammad Mirza v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited through attorney Manager 2002 CLD 426; Friendship Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Government of Balochistan through Secretary, Local Government and Rural Development Quetta and others 1998 CLC 1767; Muhammad Ramzan v. Citibank N. A. 2001 CLC 158 and Central Bank of India v. Syed Muhammad Abdul Jalil Shah and others 1999 CLC 671 ref.\n \n(d) Qanun e Shabadat (10 of 1984) \n \n Arts. 18 & 30 Admitted fact need not be proved.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.561 of 1999, heard on 27-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN, JJ",
    "": "TARIQ JAVED and another --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13064",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2091 = 2004 SLD 2091 = 2004 CLD 845",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.18 & 21 Execution of decree Bank guarantee, furnishing of High Court in earlier appeal filed against decree allowed Bank to execute same and recover decretal amount from debtor after furnishing Bank guarantee for payment of amount so recovered in accordance with in such appeal Bank applied for execution of decree, but furnished guarantee for one year ¬Objection of debtor that guarantee was not in terms of order of High Court Executing Court overruled objection Validity Bank showed readiness to furnish guarantee in strict terms of such order High Court disposed of appeal with observations that Bank upon furnishing guarantee in terms of such order would be entitled to execution of decree and recover decretal amount from debtor.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 18 of 1998, heard on 27-01-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "STANDARD CHARTERED BANK through Fareed Khan Verdag (Attorney of the Bank) --Appellant\nVs.\nM. Y. MALIK & COMPANY and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13065",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2092 = 2004 SLD 2092 = 2004 CLD 913",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.5(3) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.24 Application for transfer (consolidation) of suit from Banking Court to the High Court exercising Banking jurisdiction where another suit between the same parties was pending wherein cause of action giving rise to the said suit was one and the same and similar and identical questions and issues were involved for adjudication ¬Contention of the respondent opposing toe transfer of the suit was that in one of the suits evidence of the applicant had been recorded cross examination had been completed and the matter was now fixed for the evidence of Bank's representatives whereas in the other suit application for leave to defend the suit had not yet been decided and in view of such a situation the respondent (Bank) was likely to suffer as consolidation of suits would result in inordinate delay in disposal of the Bank's suit ¬Validity Such were no grounds for refusing permission for two identical suits between the same parties before one and the same Court and situation stated could be brought to the notice of the Judge on the Banking side of the High Court and appropriate measures could be taken to ensure that the suit of the Bank was not unnecessarily delayed or prolonged ¬Application for transfer (consolidation) of suit was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Transfer Application No.5 of 2003, decided on15-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C, J",
    "": "NAZIMUDDIN --Applicant\nVs.\nMessrs THE BANK OF KHYBER and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13066",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2093 = 2004 SLD 2093 = 2004 CLD 918",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 7 & 11 Finance of a certain amount guaranteed by the respondent Bank to the appellants Bank, however, recovering from the appellants through the Banking Court an amount higher than the finance guaranteed Plea of the appellants was that Bank should not recover a higher amount than that financed ¬Bank's record showing a call by the third party of a lower finance amount than what was being recovered from the appellant Failure of the Bank to show any call by third party for any further finance Interim decree was passed in favour of the appellants making them liable to pay only the sum financed under the guarantee by the Bank and not more than that and case was remanded to the Banking Court and leave granted to the appellants to defend against the excess amount being recovered by the Bank.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No.383 of 2001, heard on 5-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mehr ZULFIQAR ALI BABER and another --Appellants\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13067",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2094 = 2004 SLD 2094 = 2004 CLD 922",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.7 State Bank of Pakistan Incentive Scheme (Circular No.36) applicability of State Bank of Pakistan Circular No.36 Plea of appellant Bank was that it was entitled to simple and penal interest which was refused in the decree by the Banking Court Respondents were found entitled for the Incentive Scheme issued under Circular No.36 of State Bank of Pakistan to pay only principal amount plus 5% Respondents found to have deposited with the Bank an amount more than the said requirement under the Incentive Scheme Bank failed to show disability of respondents in qualifying for the Incentive Scheme ¬Held, the total debt of the respondents having been discharged in terms of the Incentive Scheme they were not required to make any further payment to the Bank Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No 504 of 1996, heard on 19-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED - --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs ILAM DIN & COMPANY and 13 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13068",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2095 = 2004 SLD 2095 = 2004 CLD 924",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.24 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29 Appeal ¬Limitation Applicability of S.5, Limitation Act, 1908 Ordinary law provided a time period of 90 days for filing appeal, whereas Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which was a special law provided a period of 30 days for filing appeal Held, where in a special or local law different periods of limitation had been provided the provisions of S.5, Limitation would not be applicable. \n \nBashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.24 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29(2) Appeal ¬Application for condonation of delay Maintainability Section 5 of Limitation Act 1908 was not applicable in view of S.29(2) of Limitation Act 1908 where the ordinary and local law provided a. different time period for filing of appeal. \n \nBashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 17 of 2003, heard on 27-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "SHERA --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13069",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2096 = 2004 SLD 2096 = 2004 CLD 927",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (LVlII of 1984) S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Amount asserted by the respondents as having been paid was not denied by the Bank Conceding to the said assertion and not controverting the same, would be deemed to be admission by the Bank Held, in the absence of any application filed by the Bank before the Banking Court to agitate the matter or any plea taken by Bank during the course of arguments, the claim of the Bank that the suit amount had not been properly adjusted was not admissible. \n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Liquidated damages, award of Bank was not entitled to recover the amount of liquidated damages. \n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Future mark up, award of Held, it was a settled law as well as the basic concept of Islamic mode of financing, that the Bank was not entitled to claim future mark¬up Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 did not empower the Banking Tribunal to award future mark up.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.517 of 1996, heard on 28-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nSARWAR and 7 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13070",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2097 = 2004 SLD 2097 = 2004 CLD 934",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) -- S. 7 Suit for recovery by a leasing company decreed by Banking Court Execution of documents was not disputed Full payments were alleged to have been made After adjusting the admitted payments made by the defendants under the two lease agreements and over draft finance facility, it was found that the Court had committed no error in awarding the decree against the other defendants and one defendant was found liable jointly and severally to pay the amount outstanding in respect of one transaction of demand finance facility to which she had stood as a guarantor Judgment and decree of the Trial Court only to the extent of said defendant were modified, and except such modification appeal was dismissed with costs throughout. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.7 & 2(a)(b), (d), (e) Banking Court Jurisdiction Leasing company Contention was that Leasing Company could not grant the overdraft finance facility therefore agreement in this behalf was void Such was not \"\"Finance\"\" to bring the transaction within the jurisdiction of the Banking Court Definitions of \"\"financial institution\"\", \"\"finance\"\" and \"\"customer\"\" had clarified that the defendants were customers and recovery was sought for the finance, resultantly under special law,. Banking Court had the jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No.450 of 2002, decision dated: 22-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "KING TYRES INDUSTRIES LIMITED through Director and 7 others --Appellants\nVs.\nUNION LEASING LIMITED through Manager and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13071",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2098 = 2004 SLD 2098 = 2004 CLD 937",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) Ss. 5 & 6 Suit for recovery Proof of execution of banking documents Bank claimed that the defendant availed the loan facility from the Bank and had not repaid Defendant denied the availing of loan facility and execution of documents Only one witness was produced by the Bank, who deposed about the execution of the documents Onus of issue about proving such documents was on the Bank Statement of the Bank was not corroborated and signatures of defendant were not proved through Handwriting Expert Banking Court thus, had erroneously relied upon such documents Appeal was allowed by the High Court and and decree of the Banking Court were set aside in circumstances. \n \n(b) Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891) \n \n Ss.2(3) & 4 Statements of accounts Presumption of correctness Presumption attached to the statement of accounts is only to the extent that whatever figures are giver. or reflected therein are true and as per the book of account, there is no presumption that the defendant had obtained the loan. \n \n.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.313 of 2002, heard on 22-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NAFEES --Appellant\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Manager and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13072",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2099 = 2004 SLD 2099 = 2004 CLD 940",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) Ss.10 & 11 Suit for recovery of loan against principal company and the guarantors Leave to defend the suit Grant of Banking Tribunal having not found the defendant's separate reply as satisfactory or disclosing good defence, decreed the suit No personal guarantee was available from the defendant to secure the finance availed by the principal debtor under the financing agreement nor there was on the record any concurrence given by the defendant for the liability of the company under the financing agreement Serious and bona fide defence to the suit having been disclosed in circumstances, unconditional leave to defend the suit was granted by the High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 221 of 2000, heard on 3rd July, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "JEHANZEB BURKI --Appellant\nVs.\nREGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION and 3 others --Respondents\nMst. Parveen Amir v. National Bank of Pakistan and 3 others 2002 CLD 509 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13073",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2100 = 2004 SLD 2100 = 2004 CLD 947",
    "Key Words:": "W.P. No.7483 of 2002, decided on 6th May, 2002. S.9 Negotiable Instruments Act (XXIVI of 1881), Ss. 79, 80, 114 & 117 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.34 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.199 & 203 G Constitutional petition ¬Demand of outstanding loan amount with interest/mark up by financial institution Contention of customer was that he had paid more than principal amount, thus, balance amount claimed being \"\"Riba\"\" could not be recovered from him Validity High Court in view of Art.203 G of the Constitution had no jurisdiction to determine validity of charging of interest/mark up Customer had executed different agreements/documents of his own free¬will Interest/Riba, no doubt was un Islamic. but past and closed transactions could not be re opened Customer could file suit for redressal of his grievance before Banking Court, which was efficacious and adequate remedy Constitutional petition was, therefore, not competent High Court directed the customer to discharge his liability strictly in terms of law, rules and terms of agreement by appearing before financial institution, who would settle matter within specified time strictly in accordance with law and rules after hearing and giving him benefits/concessions of incentive schemes, if applicable to his case, and respondent financial institution was directed not to take any action or coercive measure for recovery of outstanding amount till then. \n \nMumtaz Masud's case 1994 SCMR 2287; Muhammad Ramzan v. Citibank N.A. 2001 CLC 158 and Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khakhi v. Syed Muhammad Hashim and 2 others PLD 2000 SC 225 rel.\n \nNisar A. Mujahid for Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "NADEEM RASHEED er\nVs.\nSMALL BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION through Manager and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13074",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMSFNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2101 = 2004 SLD 2101 = 2004 CLD 949",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5 Judgment, validity of Judgment passed under statutory provisions by the Banking Tribunal after the pronouncement of an earlier by a superior Court declaring those statutory provisions as un-Constitutional, is a nullity and is to be set aside. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5 Powers and jurisdiction of Banking Tribunal Banking Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any suit or pass any where the superior Curt has earlier declared the appointment of the Presiding Officer of that Tribunal as un-Constitutional and without lawful authority. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others P LD 1996 Lah.672 ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art.201 Decision of the High Court is binding upon the subordinate Courts Subordinate Courts lack jurisdiction in cases where notifications appointing their Presiding Officers have been declared un-Constitutional by the superior Courts ¬Subsequent s and decrees of the subordinate Courts in the such like cases are liable to be set aside. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.5 All suits deemed to be pending and to be decided afresh pertaining to matters falling under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 shall be entertained by Courts constituted and having jurisdiction under the said legislation.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 138 of 1997, heard on 8-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD AFZAL --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13075",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2102 = 2004 SLD 2102 = 2004 CLD 953",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.5 Fial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Liquidated damages, award of Recovery suit was decreed by the Banking Tribunal without awarding, liquidated damages and future mark up to the Batik Plea of the Bank in appeal was that it was entitled to the award of liquidated damages and future mark up Validity Bank was not entitled to recover the amount of liquidated damages. \n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Future mark up, award of Bank was not entitled to claim future mark up in view of basic concept of Islamic mode of financing Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 did not empower the Banking 7Wbunal to award future mark up.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R. F. A. No. 145 of 1997, heard on 9-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nABDUL WAHEED and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13076",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2103 = 2004 SLD 2103 = 2004 CLD 956",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Liquidated damages, award of Recovery suit was decreed by the Banking Tribunal but declined to award liquidated damages and future mark up to the Bank Validity ¬Bank was not entitled to recover the amount of liquidated damages. \n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Future mark up, award of Bank was not entitled to claim future mark up in view of basic concept of Islamic mode of financing Banking Tribunals Ordinance 1984 did not empower the Banking Tribunal to award future mark up.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 141 of 1997, heard on 9-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nARSHAD ALI --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13077",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2104 = 2004 SLD 2104 = 2004 CLD 958",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.7 Suit for recovery was decreed while adjusting under the Prime Minister's Package Scheme the amount deposited by the respondents alongwith the amount claimed by the Bank Plea of the Bank in appeal was that the of the Banking Tribunal was not sustainable in law In view of the pleadings of the parties before the Banking Tribunal and the payments made by the respondents to the appellant Bank, no such objection was ever taken by the Bank in the Banking Tribunal, which amounted to admission of the said amounts by the Bank No grave legal infirmity was pointed out by the appellant in the impugned of the Banking Tribunal ¬Respondents had rightly liquidated the outstanding loan liability under the Prime Minister's Package Scheme in circumstances. \n \n(b) Banker and customer \n \n New plea Bank had not raised objections to certain averments and payments made by the respondent at any stage of the proceedings at the lower forum Held, the Bank was not allowed to raise a new plea before the appellate forum, which had not been agitated before the lower forum.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 139 of 1997, heard on 9-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMst. AMIRAN BIBI and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13078",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2105 = 2004 SLD 2105 = 2004 CLD 961",
    "Key Words:": "Suit for recovery was decreed against the appellants Plea of the appellants in appeal was that there was no mark up agreement with the Bank thus mark up charged by the Bank was illegal and that the appellants deposited a certain amount to discharge their liability towards the Bank, but that amount was not reflected in. the statements of account of the Bank Bank failed to identify the adjustment of the said amount in the statement of account but relied upon a letter issued through the Bank's official showing that adjustment had been duly made Said letter did not amount to a statement of account Judgment and decree of the Banking Court was upheld to the extent of amount arrived at after deducting the amount claimed by the appellants to be adjusted but subject to the deposit of the former amount within the prescribed period with the Bank failing which the appeal would be deemed to have been dismissed Disallowing the leave to the appellant to appear and defend the suit for determination of two issues, the case was remanded for decision according to law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 63 of 2002, heard on 10-04-2002.Ss.11 & 17",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs S.B. ENGINEERING (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 4 others ers\nVs.\nPRUDENTIAL COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13079",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2106 = 2004 SLD 2106 = 2004 CLD 963",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.7, 10 & 22 Application for leave to defend, dismissal of ¬Suit decreed against the appellant Plea of the appellant was that despite earlier directions of the High Court in the same suit to decide the application for leave to defend the suit after hearing the parties, the Banking Court had decided the said application without providing opportunity of hearing to the appellant a¬ Validity Plea of the appellant had substance as no opportunity of hearing was provided to him by the Banking Court and he was condemned unheard Banking Court had also failed to comply with the directions of the High Court and it was violation of the principles of natural justice Impugned and decree was set aside by the. High Court without direction that suit and the application would be deemed to be pending in the Banking Court. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n Ss.7, 10 & 22 Principles of natural justice, violation of¬--Where the Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to defend and decreed the, suit against the appellant without providing him an opportunity of hearing despite the earlier directions of the High Court in the same suit that sufficient opportunity of hearing was to be provided to the parties, such decree was in violation of the principles of natural justice as the appellant was condemned unheard Impugned and decree was set aside in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.262 of 2003, decision dated: 9-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "ATTA ULLAH KHAN --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13080",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2107 = 2004 SLD 2107 = 2004 CLD 966",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66--¬Execution of decree Auction of mortgaged property Objection of the appellant was that the notice of the proclamation had not been issued to him under O.XXI, R.66 of C.P.C. and that auction schedule was not published Record of the Banking Court showed that notices under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C were issued and the appellant had even filed an objection petition, but due to non-¬prosecution the objection petition was dismissed and the Court-¬auctioneer was appointed to submit the schedule for auction ¬Objections of the appellant were baseless in circumstances ¬Appeal was dismissed in limine. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66--¬Where the record of the Banking. Court showed that notices under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. were issued to the appellant and he had even filed an objection petition, but due to non prosecution the objection petition was dismissed and the Court auctioneer was appointed to submit the schedule for auction, objections of the appellant that the notice of the proclamation had not been issued to him under O.XXI, R.66, CP.C and also that auction schedule was not published, were baseless.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.307 of 2000, decision dated: 9-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR AND NASIM SIKANDAR, JJ",
    "": "Mian MUHAMMAD UNIS QAMAR --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK, N.A. through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13081",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2108 = 2004 SLD 2108 = 2004 CLD 968",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- Ss.3(2) & 7 Suit for recovery decreed in favour of the Bank ¬Plea of the Bank in appeal that the Banking Court while passing the decree had erroneously declined to award interest from the late of disbursement of the principal amount to the respondents end had instead awarded it from the date of filing of the suit ¬Validity View taken by the Banking Court was not consistent with the pleadings of the parties and the statement of account on cord and appeared to be based on the mere assumption that the Bank was entitled to the decree from the date of filing of the suit Proper application of mind was not made by the Banking Court Matter was remanded to the Banking Court by the High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 485 of 1996, heard on 3rd April, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED through Attorneys --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs ITTAFAQ TRADERS and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13082",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2109 = 2004 SLD 2109 = 2004 CLD 970",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.19 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 89 & 90 ¬Execution of decree Sale of property in auction Validity ¬Objections by appellants were that the sale had been made in violation of mandatory rules, as Court auctioneer unauthorizedly reduced in the proclamation of sale the reserved price fixed by the Court, proclamation was not affixed at the site and names of debtors and description of the property were erroneously mentioned in the proclamation Offer to the Banking Court by the appellants to pay 5% of auction price in order to set aside the sale Acceptance of offer by Banking Court but failure of appellants to pay the price within the prescribed time ¬Objections of appellant dismissed by Banking Court and sale confirmed in favour of respondent Where a person had applied under O.XXI, R.89(2) of C.P.C. unless the application was withdrawn, he could not be permitted to take the benefit of O.XXI, R.89(2), C.P.C Appellants having given up their grounds of attack on the sale under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. and had taken recourse to offer for deposit of auction amount instead, in terms of O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. there was no illegality in dismissing their objections and confirming the sale if they had failed to deposit the auction amount within the prescribed time Once having made offer to deposit the auction amount in terms of O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. the appellants were deemed to have given up their plea of O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. Appeal was dismissed by the High Court. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90 ¬Executton of decree Sale of property in auction Validity ¬Where the appellants gave up their grounds of attack on the sale under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. and took recourse to offer for deposit of auction amount instead, in terms of O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. there was no illegality in dismissing their objections and confirming the sale if they had failed to deposit the auction amount within the prescribed time Once having made offer to deposit the auction, amount in terms of O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. the appellants were deemed to have given up their plea of O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. ¬Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E. F. A. No. 331 of 2001, decision dated: 4-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. PARVEEN KAUSAR BHATTI and others ers\nVs.\nCITIBANK, N.A. and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13083",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2110 = 2004 SLD 2110 = 2004 CLD 973",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.10(1) Suit for recovery Failure to file leave to defend within the statutory period Consequence Where some of the defendants failed to file application for leave to defend the suit, as provided under the law, the allegations made in the plaint, shall be deemed to be admitted by the said defendants Suit was decreed in favour of the Bank and against the said defendants. \n \nMessrs Ahmad Autos and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited PLD 1990 SC 497 and Messrs Qureshi Salt & Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi 1999 SCMR 2353 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No.59 of 2002, decision dated: 20-02-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Attorney --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs PROMETALS LTD. and 9 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13084",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2111 = 2004 SLD 2111 = 2004 CLD 974",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.3(2) & 7 West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance (XV of 1960), S.3 ,Suit for recovery was decreed Money decree passed in favour of Bank was based on promissory note Penal interest Legality in the absence of agreement Objection of appellants in appeal was that in the absence of an agreement for charging penal interest, the Bank could only have claimed simple interest and relying on S.3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance 1960 the Bank could not have recovered double the amount from the appellants after having deducted the amount paid by the appellants Record showed that there was no agreement in which appellants undertook to pay penal interest nor it was ever acknowledged by the appellants Penal interest could not be charged without any express contract ¬Held, in the absence of any agreement to pay penal interest, the Bank had no authority to charge the penal interest Amount of penal interest was deducted from the decretal amount in circumstances. \n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Ch. Ram Din & Company and others PLD 1985 Lah. 117 and Allied Bank of Pakistan v. Masood Ahmad Khan 1994 MLD 1557 ref.\n \n(b) West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance (XV of 1960) \n \n Ss.3 & 2(b) Section 3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance 1960, applicability of Suit for recovery was decreed Money decree passed in favour of Bank was based on promissory note One of the objections of appellants in appeal was that under S.3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance, 1960 the Banking Court could not have passed a decree in respect of a debt for a larger sum than twice the amount of the sum found by the Court to have been actually advanced as loan deducting any amount already received by the creditor Interpretation of the word \"\"debt\"\" under S. 2(b) of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance 1960 Exclusion of banking companies and scheduled bank under S.3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance 1960 Section 3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance, 1960 was not applicable to the Bank.\n \nSamandar Khan v. Mst. Maqbool and others 1974 SCMR 388 ref.\n \n(c) West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance (XV of 1960) \n \n Ss.2(b) & 3 Word 'debt' interpretation of Legislature has specifically excluded the debts of the banking companies and the scheduled banks from the application of S.3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance, 1960 Respondent was a banking company and a scheduled bank, thus S3 of West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance 1960 had no applicability on it.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No. 108 of 1997,heard on 16-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHARIF & SONS through Proprietor and another --Appellants\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13085",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2112 = 2004 SLD 2112 = 2004 CLD 978",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.18(6) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001), S.19(7) Decree for recovery of loan under car finance scheme Car forcibly taken into possession by the Bank Application by appellant for return of the car ¬Banking Court consigned the application of the appellant to record on the ground that the car in dispute was sold and Bank¬ had adjusted the sale price to its claim Validity Held, impugned order was not a speaking order, application by the appellant could not be consigned to record merely on the ground that the car in dispute had been sold and the sale amount adjusted Banking Court was bound to decide the application of the appellant in accordance with law Impugned order was set aside by the High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 189 of 2002, heard on 4-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. SHEHNAZ KHALID --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK, N.A. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13086",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2113 = 2004 SLD 2113 = 2004 CLD 980",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.58 & 62 Execution of decree Sale of property under auction Appellant in objection petition had claimed ownership of the property based on a gift made to him orally by the debtor and later executed through a registered memorandum of gift Dismissal of objection petition by Banking Court on the ground that the appellant had failed to place on record the gift document in his favour and also due to the absence of his name in the Revenue Record where some other person's name in the Jamabandi as well as the mutation was mentioned Subsequent placement of memorandum of gift on record by the appellant in the High Court Effect High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant on the grounds that it was necessary to place on record the memorandum of gift earlier before the executing Court and also because the document did not pertain to the same property as the one under auction Simply mentioning of the same Khasra number without the specific number of the property was of no avail, and according to the Revenue Record the gift of the property was not in favour of the appellant but of someon6 else.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 360 of 2001, decision dated: 1st July, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD MUNIR AKRAM alias MUHAMMAD AKRAM --Appellant\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 8 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13087",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2114 = 2004 SLD 2114 = 2004 CLD 982",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 7 & 19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.58 & 62 Execution of decree Sale of mortgaged property under auction No description as to location o f property was given in the proclamation of auction Appellants in the objection petition had claimed ownership of the property and described the same as an undivided one of which debtor could not have been owner of a specific portion until and unless it was partitioned Questions raised by the parties required evidence to come to a correct finding Held, despite the absence of description of the property in the proclamation, no inquiry for the purposes of finding out the exact property that was subject-¬matter of the mortgage and whether that was put to auction, was undertaken by the executing Court and the objection of the appellant was dismissed in a summary manner which was unwarranted Impugned order was set aside with direction to the Executing Court to determine factual controversy based on facts coming on record.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 113 of 2002, decision dated: 1st July, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mian MUHAMMAD BAKHSH and another --Appellants \nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13088",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2115 = 2004 SLD 2115 = 2004 CLD 1023",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) S. 7(2) Enforcement of foreign award Once a foreign award is made it in fact amounts to a foreign and the proceedings before the Court are merely for an affirmation of the award, and only limited objections as to the validity and enforceability thereof are permitted under S 7(2) of the Act.\n \nImtiaz Ahmed v. Ghulam Ali and another PLD 1963 SC 382; Manager Jammu and Kashmir Property in Pakistan v. Khudayar and another PLD 1975 SC 678; Mst. Begum and others v. Mst. Begum Kaniz Fatima Hayat and others 1989 SCMR 883; Jamil Ahmed v. Late Saifuddin 1997 SCMR 260 Nan Fung Textiles Ltd.'s case PLD 1982 Kar.619; B. Upendra Nath Basu v. B. Het Lal and others AIR 1933 All. 380; M. Imamuddin Janjua v. The Thal Development Authority PLD 1972 SC 123; Frederick E. Rose (Commodities) Limited v. Munsoor Ali Tanning Co. NLR 1981 UC 175 Karachi; Conticotton S.A. v. Farooq Corporation 1999 CLC 1018; Messrs European Grain and Shipping Ltd. v. Messrs Polychem Company Ltd. PLD 1990 Kar.254; Nan Fung Textiles Limited v. Sadiq Traders Limited PLD 1982 Kar.619; Alfred C. Toepfer International v. Pakistan Molasses Company 2003 CLD 1666 and A. Meredith Jones & Co. v. Usman Textile Mills Limited 2002 CLD 1121 ref.\n \n(b) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n S. 8(1) Sindh Chief Court Rules, (O.S.), R.297 Foreign award (Switzerland) Evidence Copy of the award had been authenticated by the competent authority of the Canton of Geneva and had been further authenticated to be a genuine document by the Embassy of Pakistan at Berne Such document did not suffer from any illegality or infirmity and was neither violative of S.8(1) of the Arbitration (Protocol & Convention) Act, 1937 nor Rule 297, Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.) Original copy of the award was available with counsel for the plaintiff, which he desired to place on record during the arguments and was directed to file the same day Rights of parties could not be allowed to be defeated on technicalities. \n \nManager Jammu and Kashmir Property in Pakistan v. Khudayar and another PLD 1975 SC 678; Mst. Begum and others v. Mst. Begum Kaniz Fatima Hayat and other 1989 SCMR 883 and Jamil Ahmed v. Late Saifuddin 1997 SCMR 260 ref.\n \n(c) Precedent \n \n---Laws are meant to foster justice and not to thawart the rights of the parties.\n \n(d) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n Ss.5 & 6 Enforcement of a foreign award Territorial jurisdiction of Court Determination Registered office of the defendant was in Karachi; Letter of credit was opened with Pakistani at Karachi and the defendant had themselves filed two suits against the present plaintiff at Karachi for certain claims in respect of the same dispute which was subject matter of Arbitration Contention that Court at Karachi had no territorial jurisdiction was repelled in circumstances. \n \n(e) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n S.5 Limitation Act (IX of 19081, Art. 120 Application for enforcement of a foreign award Limitation Such application is to be registered as a suit and since no period has been fixed for filing such suits under the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1905, the application (suit) shall be governed under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which provides a period of six years for filing such suit. \n \n(f) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n S.7(2) Enforcement of a foreign award Executing Court cannot go beyond the award except as provided under S.7(2) of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 Award in the present case was well reasoned dealing with the matter in controversy and the defendant had failed to assert and agitate all such points in appeal which though filed but was not pursued Objection regarding the arbitrators being guilty of misconduct had no legs to stand. \n \n(g) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) \n \n S.7(2) Enforcement of a foreign award Court, in a foreign award is to act as an executing Court and cannot go beyond the award except as provided under S.7(2) of the Act Court cannot assume the role of an Appellate Court Contention that the Courts in Pakistan have no jurisdiction to enforce a foreign award as Pakistan is not a signatory to the convention and there is no reciprocal arrangement between the Government of Pakistan and Government of Switzerland is without substance as law was amended in Pakistan by Ordinance, LIII of 1962 to this effect. \n \nNan Fung Textiles Limited v. Sadiq Traders Limited PLD 1982 Kar. 619; Alfred C. Toepfer International v. Pakistan Molasses Company 2003 CLD 1666; A. Meredith Jones & Co. v. Usman Textile Mills Limited 2002 CLD 1121; Nan Fung Textiles Ltd. v. H. Pir Muhammad Shamasuddin PLD 1979 Kar 762 and Messrs Yangtze (London) Limited v. Messrs Barlas Brothers Karachi PLD 1961 SC 573 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.381 of 2001, decision dated: 7-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, J",
    "": "COGETEX S.A., A COMPANY DULY IN CORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF SWITZERLAND - --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMAYFAIR SPINNING MILLS LIMITED, A PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE PAKISTAN COMPANIES ORDINANCE, 1984 --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13089",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2116 = 2004 SLD 2116 = 2004 CLD 1077",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9, 10 & 21 Suit for recovery of loans Appeal Financial facilities, as mentioned in suits by Bank, were advanced to defendants, who executed relevant documents and creation of mortgage had not been denied by defendants who failed to liquidate outstanding liabilities Defendants had contended that foreign bills were routed through Bank to foreign corresponding Bank and as Bank had failed to realize proceeds of export bills, Bank was not entitled to recovery of suit amount Said contention which was neither taken by defendants in reply to show cause notices nor was urged before Banking Court could not be raised in appeal Case of Bank was duly supported by certified copies of statements of accounts, which had duly been verified as required by provisions of Banker's Books Evidence Act Defendants though had feebly stated in their replies to the show cause notices that statements of accounts were engineered documents, but they could not show as to how said documents were unreliable Suits filed by Bank, in circumstances were rightly decreed against defendants by Banking Court Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court could not be interfered with in appeal. \n \n(b) New plea/ground \n \n Person would be precluded from raising, altogether a new plea/ground before Appellate/Revisional Court which had not been raised before lower forum.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos. 255 to 257 of 1999, decision dated: 29-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs P&B CARPETS (PVT.) LIMITED and others --Appellants\nVs.\nTHE BANK ALFLAH LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13090",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2117 = 2004 SLD 2117 = 2004 CLD 1088",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.9 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) & O. VII, R. 11 ¬Suit Maintainability Two suits earlier filed by defendants against plaintiff alongwith others having been decreed, plaintiff in his suit filed under S.9 of Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 had challenged said decrees alleging that the decrees had been obtained fraudulently Plaintiff had also sought to restrain defendants from enforcing said decrees and also claimed damages Validity If decrees against plaintiff were obtained by defendants fraudulently, remedy available to plaintiff was to file application under S.12(2), C.P.C. before Court which had passed said decrees Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. had clearly prohibited filing of a separate suit to challenge validity of a , decree or order on ground of fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction Intention of Legislature in amending S.12, C.P.C. by adding subsection (2) was to provide a substitute for such a suit against , decree or order obtained by fraud Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. were applicable with full force to the case of plaintiff Imperative for plaintiff to establish that suits filed by defendants against him were based on malice and that decrees obtained therein were based on fraud Other prayers of plaintiff with regard to compensation etc. were dependent on determination of first prayer of plaintiff with respect to fraud and it could not sustain itself independently ¬Suit filed by plaintiff was barred by S.12(2), C.P.C. and plaint filed by him was liable to be rejected under Order VII, R.II, C.P.C. \n \nBank of India v. Lakshmani Dass AIR 2000 SC 1172; Mst. Fareeda Begum v. Hafiz Muhammad Shamim 1997 CLC 343; Noor Muhammad v. Additional District Judge, Chakwal PLD 1994 Lah. 170; Peer Bukhsh v. The Chairman Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145; Muhammad Yousaf v. Mst. Rafia Begum 2002 CLC 1996; Rahat Mehmood v. Tariq Rasheed PLD 1993 Kar. 648; Sardar Muhammad v. Chaudhry Muhammad Bashir 2000 CLC 1040; Ghazanfar Baig v. Muhammad Salam 2001 YLR 871; Khawaja Muhammad Naseem v. Shafiqur Rehman 1996 CLC 1460; Government of Sindh and another v. Ch. Fazal Muhammad and another PLD 1991 SC 197; Muhammad Akhtar and others v. Abdul Hadi and others 1981 SCMR 878; Abdul Majid and others v. Abdul Ghafoor Khan and others PLD 1982 SC 146; Asif Jah Siddiqui v. Government of Sindh and others PLD 1983 SC 446; Sarwar and 3 others v. Muhammad Saeed ud Din Klan alias Saadat ud Din Khan 1992 CLC 2323; Zafrullah and 3 others v. Civil Judge, Hafizabad and 3 others PLD 1984 Lah. 396; Sardar Bakhah v. Sahib Khatoon 1988 CLC 2037; Iqbal v. Mst. Jainan Babi 1991 CLC 553; Abdul Rauf and others v. Abdur Rahim Khan PLD 1982 Pesh. 172; Mst. Rukhsana Ansar and 2 others v. Mst. Raeesa Khatoon 1993 MLD 1319 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit NO.B 57 of 2002, decision dated: 22-01-2004",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED, J",
    "": "SALEEM RASHID --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs PAK LIBYA HOLDING COMPANY (PVT) LTD. and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13091",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2118 = 2004 SLD 2118 = 2004 CLD 1117",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) ¬ Ss.19 & 2(e) Execution of decree Judgment debtors had not denied that decree holder (Bank) had fulfilled its contractual obligation by rescheduling/ restructuring demand finance facility and by renewing working capital liability of the ¬-debtors Upon grant of rescheduling, restructuring and renewal of said facilities, the executory clauses, if any, of the agreement/ decree were converted into final terms which did not in any way suffer in executability Contention of the objectors that the decree holder bank had failed to perform its reciprocal promises was repelled having no merit. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery) of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.2(e) Renewal/rescheduling/restructuring of financial facilities which has been recognized as \"\"obligation\"\" as defined in S.2(e), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 only ensues upon default, non payment, delayed payment or inability in payment of outstanding liability by a customer who normally seeks such concession upon admission and determination of liability Principles.\n \nRenewal/rescheduling/restructuring of financial facilities only ensues upon default non payment, delayed payment or inability in payment of outstanding liability by a customer who normally seeks such concession upon admission and determination of liability. By soliciting rescheduling or restructuring, as the case may be, a customer, in essence, either requests postponement of repayment of a finance on renewed terms as agreed between the parties or asks for reorganization/ refurbishing of financial basis of a finance and its liquidation. By approving rescheduling/ restructuring/ renewal of a financial facility, the bank forgoes its immediate right of recovery and enforcement of securities against the customer. The effect of rescheduling, restructuring and renewal of finance facility is mutually agreed by the parties to be absorbed by future interest, mark up charges or commissions till the agreed date of liquidation of liability. Rescheduling, restructuring and renewal is also thus a facility or accommodation granted by the bank to a customer. This facility has been recognized as an \"\"Obligation\"\" defined in section 2(e) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss. 3 & 9 Duty of customer Default Effect Customer is duty bound to fulfil obligations to the Financial Institutions ¬Default in discharge of such \"\"obligation\"\" not only incurs the \"\"cost of funds\"\" under S.3(2) of the Ordinance but is also actionable under S.9, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Judgment against a customer under the Ordinance is a pronouncement of default under S.3(3) of duty prescribed under S.3(1) of the Ordinance. \n \n(d) Words and phrases ¬\n \n \"\"Grant\"\" Connotation.\n \nWord \"\"grant\"\" means the giving, bestowing or forwarding of a privilege, right, interest, benefit, subsidy, exemption, concession, approval, sanction or permission. \n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.3 Compromise decree Default Where the ¬-debtors (Customers) were liable to pay instalments of Demand Finance Facility as specified between the Banker and Customer, non payment of the two consecutive instalments of the same amounted to an event of default entitling the decree holder (Bank) seeking execution of the compromise decree. \n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S. 19 Execution of consent decree through enforcement of securities and other modes had been sought by the decree holder after reduction of the amount from the decretal money ¬Endeavours of the debtors to go behind the decree and its amounts by, trying to calculate and recalculate the figures could not be allowed Judgment debtors were bound by their agreements and were debarred under law from going behind the decree passed by consent as compromise entered upon between the Banker and Customer had become final.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M. No.666 B of 2001 in C.O.S. No.28 of 2000, decision dated: 4-07-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED er\nVs.\nSERVICE FABRICS LTD. and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13092",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2119 = 2004 SLD 2119 = 2004 CLD 1136",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XLV of 1979) Ss. 2(f), 3, 6(1)(a) & 8(3) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.53 A Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 97, 100, 103 & O.XLIII, R.1(ii) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3) ¬Execution of decree for recovery of loan Auction sale by High Court as Special Court (Banking) Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell the property in question by third party ¬Maintainability Protection of provisions of S.53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to such third party Scope and extent under O.XXI, 8.103, C.P.C. Party aggrieved by an order made by the Executing Court could not institute a suit as it could bring an appeal under O.XLIII, R.1(ii), C.P.C. Provisions of S.3, Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 were not intended to permit a party to file a separate civil suit in disregard of the provisions, of O.XXI, R.103, C.P.C. and to frustrate the execution of decree passed by the Special Court (Banking) Third party could have pursued his objection petition before the Special Court to its logical conclusion but he was not entitled to institute a separate suit as his objections could be looked into by Special Court Suit property, in the present case, had already been mortgaged by the debtor with the bank passed by High Court did not suffer from any legal infirmity so as to warrant interference by Supreme Court--¬Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.\n \nIn the present case, the suit property was auctioned by the High Court in favour of the auction-purchaser. The third party himself had filed objection petition on the basis of his alleged agreement to sell in respect of the suit property. The same was dismissed by the High Court as withdrawn and the judicial sale of the suit property was confirmed in favour of the auction-purchaser by following the procedure as laid down in C.P.C. In the facts and circumstances of the case it could not be said that the third party could not seek his remedy before the High Court in terms of Order XXI, C.P.C. The provisions of Rule 103 of O.XXI, C.P.C. were amended by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, whereby it was provided that all questions arising as to the title, right or interest, for possession of immovable property between the applicants under Rules 97 and 100 and the opposite party, would be adjudged upon and determined by the Court, and no separate suit would lie for the determination of any such matter. At the same time a corresponding amendment was also introduced in Order XLIII, Rule 1 (ii) C.P.C. whereby an order under Rule 103, C.P.C. was made appealable. The object of these provisions was to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Executing Court to decide the objections in respect of the execution of decree. The case of Mohiuddin Molla (supra) is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. \n \nThird party could not acquire a better title over the suit property than the -debtor under whom he was claiming his inchoate rights. The protection of section 53-A of Act, 1882, was not available to such party the auction-¬purchaser of the suit property which was sold to him by the High Court in execution of a decree. The auction-purchaser had nothing to do with the -debtor and was not claiming his rights through or under him. The -debtor was no more the owner of the suit property which had been auctioned in favour of the auction-purchaser. In these circumstances, the suit for specific performance of the agreements filed by the third party in respect of the suit property was barred by law. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, creates an estoppel between a transferor and a transferee of an immovable property. It does not bind a third party who does not claim under either of them. \n \nSection 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act did not operate to create a form of transfer of property which was exempt from registration. It created no real right. It merely created rights of estoppel between the proposed transferee and transferor which had no operation against third persons not claiming under those persons.\n \nThe part performance under section 53-A of the Act, 1882, conferred upon the transferee the privilege of invoking the doctrine embodied therein only as a shield against any invasion of his rights by the transferor or person claiming under him. \n \nBy the provisions of sections 2(f) and 6(1)(a) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 as they stood at the relevant time, the High Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction was vested with all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of a case in which the outstanding amount of the loan exceeded one million rupees. Subsection (4) of section 6 expressly provided that no Court other than a Special Court would have or exercise any jurisdiction with respect to any matter to which the jurisdiction of a Special Court extended under the Ordinance, including a decision as to the execution of a decree passed by a Special Court. It was further provided that all proceedings, including the proceedings for the execution of a decree within the jurisdiction of a Special Court, by whatever Court passed, pending in any Court would stand transferred to the Special Court. By virtue of section 8(3) of the Ordinance, as it originally existed, a Special Court was required, on the application of the decree holder, to pass an order for execution of the decree as arrears of land revenue or such other manner as it might deem fit. Therefore, there was nothing to prevent the Special Court to follow the procedure provided by the C.P.C. in appropriate cases, for execution of the decree. \n \nUnder Rule 103, Order XXI, C.P.C., a party aggrieved by an order made by the executing Court, could not institute a suit as it could bring an appeal under clause (ii) of Rule 1 of Order XLIII, C.P.C. the provisions of section 3 of the Ordinance were not intended to permit a party to file a separate Civil suit in disregard of the provisions of Rule 103 of Order XXI, C.P.C. and to frustrate the execution of decree passed by the Special Court (Banking). Third party could have pursued his objection petition before the Special Court to its logical conclusion. He was not entitled to institute a separate suit as his objections could be looked into by the Special Court. The suit property had already been mortgaged by the -debtor with the bank Judgment passed by the High Court did not suffer from any legal infirmity so as to warrant interference by Supreme Court. \n \nS.N. Banerji and another AIR 1941 PC 128; P&T Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Karachi v. Ch. Manzoor Ahmed Sahi PLD 1961 Kar. 53; Yeditha Satyanarayanamurty and others v. Tadi Subrahmanyam and others AIR 1959 Andh. Pra. 534; Stuart & Co. v. C. Mackertich AIR 1963 Cal. 198 and Shamim Akhter v. Muhammad Rasheed PLD 1989 SC 575 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 738 L of 2002, decision dated: 20-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL AND FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, JJ",
    "": "Ch. ABDUL MAJID er\nVs.\nSADAQAT SAEED MALIK and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13093",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2120 = 2004 SLD 2120 = 2004 CLD 1146",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------S.5--Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5-Powers and Jurisdiction of Banking Tribunal-Banking Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any suit or pass any where the superior Court had declared certain provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and the notifications appointing the Presiding Officers of that Tribunal as un-Constitutional.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 and Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 759 ref.\n \n(b) Banging Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)---\n \n-----S. 7 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S5--Past and closed cases-Declarations made in the case of Chenab Cement Product (PLD 1996 Lah 672) was not to affect cases past and closed or invalidate the s/decrees, which had become final--Where, however, the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal was not challenged in appeal but was called into question only through a writ petition which was subsequently disposed of, the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal would be considered to be past and closed case and final by virtue of the said of Messrs Chenab Cement Product-When the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal was challenged in appeal and also by a writ petition and the latter was subsequently disposed of, the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal would not be considered to be past and closed case and would not be covered within the scope of the said and would thus be set aside---Held, as the and decree under appeal was passed after the rendering of the said it did not fall within the terms of past and closed cases' nor within the meaning and scope of the in Chenab Cement Product---Decree was set aside anal suit for the recovery was deemed pending before the newly constituted Banking Court, established under S.5 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to be decided afresh.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 and Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 759 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 133 of 1997, heard on 29-07-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nVs.\nBAKHSH"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13094",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2121 = 2004 SLD 2121 = 2004 CLD 1150",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------S.5---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7--Liquidated damages, award of ---Recovery suit partly decreed by the Banking Tribunal that declined to award liquidated damages and future mark-up to the Bank--¬Plea of the Bank in appeal was that it was entitled to the award of liquidated damages and future mark-up---Validity---Bank was not entitled to recover the amount of liquidated damages. \n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)---\n \n----S.5---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7---Future mark-up, award of---Basic concept of Islamic mode of financing was that the bank was not entitled to claim future mark-up---Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 did not empower the Banking Tribunal to award future mark-up.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No. 142 of 1997, heard on 9-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD ANWAR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13095",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2122 = 2004 SLD 2122 = 2004 CLD 1207",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.18(6)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI & R.58--¬Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged property---Appellant in objection petition claiming to be the owner of the mortgaged property on the basis of a sale-deed---Dismissal of objection petition by Banking Court relying on a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) issued by the Settlement Department in favour of someone else---Validity---Banking Court should have conducted an enquiry in order to determine the validity of transfer on PTD---Permanent Transfer Deed alone is no basis to determine that objectors had no locus standi to file objection petition---Proper enquiry is required to determine with certainty that the particular mortgaged property was allotted on PTD---High Court accepted appeal, set aside the impugned order and remanded case to Banking Court for holding proper inquiry and decide objection petition afresh in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.As. Nos.413 and 441 of 1998, heard on 14-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD GHANI, JJ",
    "": "Mian MUHAMMAD USMAN\nVs.\nBANK OF OMAN LIMITED and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13096",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2123 = 2004 SLD 2123 = 2004 CLD 1210",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)-------Ss.21 & 73---Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), Ss.39 & 41---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for infringement of trade mark and damages---Interim injunction--¬Order granting injunction would not be erroneous, where damages were also claimed---Usurping of goodwill of trademark by defendant, who, prima facie, had no right under Copyright Ordinance, 1962, would be unjust. \n \nShahjehan Khan v. Muhammad Tariq 2002 CLC 571; Plasticrafters Ltd. v. Maniar Industries Ltd. 1980 CLC 812; Abdus Subhan v. Khurshid 2000 YLR 2.898 and Exide Pakistan Ltd. v. Pakistan Accumulator (Pvt.) Ltd. 2003 CLD 1117 ref.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)--\n \n----Ss.21 & 73---Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), Ss. 39 & 41---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Suit for infringement of trade mark---Interim injunction, grant, of--¬Pendency of appeal preferred by defendant against order of Copyright Board would not restrict the Court from granting injunction, if plaintiff was otherwise entitled thereto---Person prima facie having no legal right could not be allowed to continue his business.\n \n(c) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)---\n \n----Ss.21 & 73---Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), Ss. 39 & 41---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Suit for infringement of trade mark ---Pendency of appeal filed by defendant against acceptance of rectification application of plaintiff by Copyright Board---Order of the Court granting interim injunction to plaintiff---Effect---Such order Was tentative in nature and would not prejudice either party before Registrar, Trade Marks or before any forum---Defendants would be at liberty to lead evidence to establish their legal right to do business.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 170 of 2003, decision dated: 18-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY AND AMIR HANI MUSLIM, JJ",
    "": "Rio CHEMICAL COMPANY and another\nVs.\nPAKISTAN DRUG HOUSE (PVT.) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13097",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2124 = 2004 SLD 2124 = 2004 CLD 1215",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.22---Appeal---Factual controversy---Investigation by High Court---Jurisdiction-- Suit for recovery of bank loan was filed against the borrowers---Borrowers had accepted the sanction of loan facility by the bank but it was alleged that the bank had failed to open letters of credit in terms of sanction letter--Borrowers placed on record certain pay-in-slips showing that for each letter of credit, the amount covered therein was deposited before the letters of credit could be opened-- Application for leave to appeal was dismissed by Banking Court and the suit was decreed in favour of the bank---Plea raised by the bank was that it could be proved from record that the payments were not made rather the amounts on the letters of credit were paid by the bank to the beneficiary---Validity---Duty of Banking Court was to look into the defence set up by the borrowers and to give its opinion, if the defence did disclose serious and bona fide dispute or not--Banking Court did, not advert to the real controversy while refusing leave to the borrowers---Judgment passed by the Banking Court was non-speaking and the same could not be sustained--High Court declined to undertake such task in appellate jurisdiction-Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court was set aside and case was remanded to Banking Court for re-deciding the application for leave to defend Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- \n \n----S.22---Appellate jurisdiction of High, Court---Partial setting aside of and decree-Two different appeals were filed by different defendants against same and decree---One appeal was allowed. by High Court and the case was remanded to Banking Court---Bank, in the present appeal, had raised objection regarding its being barred by limitation--Validity---As and decree had been set aside by High Court in other appeal, the same and decree could not be sustained against the present appellants who were co-defendants and 3uarantors in the same suit--Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. Nos.235 and 354 of 2002 and E.F.A. Nos.48 and 150 of 2003, heard on 15-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs VICKY TRADING COMPANY and another\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13098",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2125 = 2004 SLD 2125 = 2004 CLD 1220",
    "Key Words:": "(a) West Pakistan Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance (XIV of 1966)-------Ss.8-A & 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199-¬Constitutional petition---Issuance of show-cause notice---High Court normally, would not like to interfere in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction to call in question a show-cause notice as a. matter of rule---Parties had to exhaust the remedy available to them under law and thereafter if felt aggrieved, could invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution--¬However, if show-cause notice had been issued with mala fide intention and which on the face of it had been issued without any lawful authority, then even if alternate remedy was available, High Court could strike down such notice in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction, instead of asking the parties to undergo agony of departmental appeals, revisions, etc.\n \nMuhammad Afzal Khan v. Karachi Development Authority PLD 1984 Kar. 114; Car Tunes v. Income Tax Officer, Circle V 1989 PTD 478; M.R. Sons v. I.T.O. 1989 PTD 1010; Rice Export Corporation v. Karachi Metropolitan Corp. PLD 1990 Kar. 186; Zeshan Builders v. Karachi Building Control Authority 1992 MLD 2259; Mian S.M. Yousuf Baghpatee v. Kar. Building Control Authority and others 1993 CLC 2491; Attock Cement Pak. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Quetta 1999 PTD 1892; Platinum Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Government of Sindh 2003 MLD 279 (Kar.); Shagufta Begum v. I.T.O. PLD 1989 SC 360 ref.\n \n(b) West Pakistan Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance (XIV of 1966)---\n \n----S.8-B---Restriction on alienation of properties---Section 8-B of West Pakistan Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance, 1966, had put restriction on alienation of properties by a person owing the loan immediately after the enforcement of said Ordinance---West Pakistan Co¬operative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance, 1966, had itself provided that alienation of property by defaulters would be as void and same could not transfer any right, title or interest in the property of debtors unless the loan due against debtor had been repaid.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-176 of 1987, decision dated: 18-03-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MOOSA K. LEGHARI AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. BAGHUL and 17 others\nVs.\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER, THARPARKAR and 13 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13099",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2126 = 2004 SLD 2126 = 2004 CLD 1232",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institution (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2(a) & 9---Suit for recovery of amount---Plaintiff, a Financial Institution--- Maintainability of suit---Defendants who fully utilized the charge card facility extended to them allegedly having failed to pay admitted outstanding amount, attorney of plaintiff filed suit for recovery of amount--Suit was resisted by defendants alleging that plaintiffs being not a Financial Institution as defined in S. 2(a) of Financial Institution (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance, 2001, suit filed by them was not maintainable---Validity-Plaintiff by virtue of being subsidiary of a Bank, could not assume the business of the holding company of Banking business, but its business would remain confined to the business for which it was formed as detailed in its Memorandum of Association---Contention that plaintiff being subsidiary of Bank, was a Banking Company was repelled---Plaintiff would not be a Financial Institution, unless it was covered by definition of \"\"Financial Institution\"\" contained in Cl. (a) of S. 2 of Financial Institution (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance, 2001-Agreement arrived at between plaintiff and the Bank showed that plaintiff had transferred/assigned all rights, title and interest with regard to the charged Book-debts to the Bank in the year 2000---Plaintiff subsequently filed suit in the year 2002 when it had no right, title and interest with regard to debts which were already assigned to the Bank-Plaintiff; in circumstances had no cause of action to bring suit for recovery of amount against defendants¬ Party having no cause of action, could not bring suit in respect of assigned/transferred debt---Suit of plaintiff was dismissed. \n \nMuhammad Shafi Siddiqui for Appellants.\n \nZubair Qureshi, Arshad Tayabally, Amicus Curiae for Respondents.\n \nDates of hearing: 30th March and 1st April, 2004.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "ASIM SHAD and another\nVs.\nMS. DINERS CLUB PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13100",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2127 = 2004 SLD 2127 = 2004 CLD 1232",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institution (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2(a) & 9---Suit for recovery of amount---Plaintiff, a Financial Institution--- Maintainability of suit---Defendants who fully utilized the charge card facility extended to them allegedly having failed to pay admitted outstanding amount, attorney of plaintiff filed suit for recovery of amount--Suit was resisted by defendants alleging that plaintiffs being not a Financial Institution as defined in S. 2(a) of Financial Institution (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance, 2001, suit filed by them was not maintainable---Validity-Plaintiff by virtue of being subsidiary of a Bank, could not assume the business of the holding company of Banking business, but its business would remain confined to the business for which it was formed as detailed in its Memorandum of Association---Contention that plaintiff being subsidiary of Bank, was a Banking Company was repelled---Plaintiff would not be a Financial Institution, unless it was covered by definition of \"\"Financial Institution\"\" contained in Cl. (a) of S. 2 of Financial Institution (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance, 2001-Agreement arrived at between plaintiff and the Bank showed that plaintiff had transferred/assigned all rights, title and interest with regard to the charged Book-debts to the Bank in the year 2000---Plaintiff subsequently filed suit in the year 2002 when it had no right, title and interest with regard to debts which were already assigned to the Bank-Plaintiff; in circumstances had no cause of action to bring suit for recovery of amount against defendants¬ Party having no cause of action, could not bring suit in respect of assigned/transferred debt---Suit of plaintiff was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "1st Appeal No.66 of 2002, decision dated: 14-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "ASIM SHAD and another\nVs.\nMS. DINERS CLUB PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13101",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2128 = 2004 SLD 2128 = 2004 CLD 1239",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)------Ss.9 & 10--Recovery of bank loan-Leave to defend the suit, refusal of--Plea of fabricated loan documents--Defendants had not denied availing of loan facilities and also claimed to have paid certain amounts towards discharge of their liability but had denied execution of loan documents in vague and general terms by not raising any specific plea regarding fabrication or forgery of the documents-Defendants had also not denied execution of guarantees and mortgaging documents in favour of bank--Effect---Allegations raised by the defendants were bald and had contradicted their case---Banking Court had rightly refused leave to defend the suit and the suit was rightly decreed in favour of bank---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) ---\n \n---Ss. 9 & 10---Leave to defend the suit, grant of-Amount deposited by defendants was disputed by the bank---Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to defend the suit and decreed the suit in favour of the bank after adjusting the disputed amount in favour of defendants---Effect---Deposit of disputed amount was an issue between the parties and instead of disallowing the amount to the bank, leave should have been granted to the defendants to the extent of the disputed amount--Such dispute should have been resolved after framing of issues and trial--Denial of the amount to the bank at leave granting stage was illegal and unlawful---Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court to the extent of disputed amount was set aside Application for leave to defend the suit was allowed to the extent of amount deposited by the defendants-Case was remanded to the Banking Court for decision after trial Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos. 307 and 336 of 2002, heard on 16-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Zonal Chief and others\nVs.\nMessrs POWER TEXTILE INDUSTRIES LTD. through Chief Executive and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13102",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2129 = 2004 SLD 2129 = 2004 CLD 1263",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII Of 1984)-------S.6---Recovery of bank loan---Non-award of labour charges--¬Banking Tribunal decreed the suit in favour of bank but declined to award labour charges on the ground that no documents regarding availing of such facility were available on record--¬Observation made by Banking Tribunal was not consistent with the documents on record, rather the Tribunal had proceeded on assumption---Effect--Judgment and decree passed by Banking Tribunal was set aside and the case was remanded for decision afresh.\n \nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Farooq Compost Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. and 4 others 1993 MLD 1571; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Faisalabad v. Messrs Asisha Garments through Proprietor and 2 others 2001 MLD 1955; Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170 and National Development Finance Corporation v. Messrs Millrock Quarring (Pvt.) Ltd. and 7 others 2002 CLD 1382 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.578 of 1996, heard on 2-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD ALI RAZA SHAH and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13103",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2130 = 2004 SLD 2130 = 2004 CLD 1269",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)--------S.9---Appeal---Principle of past and closed transaction--¬Setting aside of passed by Banking Tribunal on the basis of passed by High Court in case titled Messrs Chenab Cement Product Private Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others, reported PLD 1996 Lah. 672--¬Validity---Judgment and decree in the instant case was passed by Banking Tribunal before the date of rendering of the in the case of Chenab Cement Products---Appellant had challenged the through filing of present appeal, therefore, decree under appeal was not saved and the same did not fall within the term \"\"past and closed cases\"\"---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Tribunal was set aside and case was remanded to Banking Court constituted under S.5 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-- Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 and Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Writ Petition No. 12374 of 1999 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R. F. A. No.167 of 1997, heard on 30-07-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through MANAGER\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD KHAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13104",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2131 = 2004 SLD 2131 = 2004 CLD 1281",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R. 19--¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Interpretation of S. 19, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Execution of decree and sale of property with or without intervention of Banking Court---Applicability of O. XXI, R. 19, C.P.C.--¬Scope---Objection/claim raised before the Banking Court was to be dealt with under S. 19(7), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to which C.P.C. was not applicable and the condition imposed by the Banking Court directing the objector to deposit a certain amount as 20% under O. XXI, R. 19, C.P.C. was illegal\n \nAccording to subsection (2) of section 19, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 the decree passed by the Banking Court is executable in accordance with the provisions of C.P.C. However, if a Financial Institution intends to sell the mortgaged property on its own under subsection (3) then permission can be granted by the Banking Court to do so. However, for that purpose, if some body has an objection to such an auction/sale then he can file objections/ claims under subsection (7) of section 19 of the Ordinance which clearly ousts the provisions of C.P.C. for the determination of such claims/objections which are to be dealt in a summary manner. Section 19 of the Ordinance also provides certain penalties for false claims on the one hand and a false or incorrect defence by the Financial Institution on the other side. \n \nThe objection/claim raised by the objector before the Banking Court should have been dealt under subsection (7) of section 19 to which C.P.C. was not applicable and the condition imposed by the Banking Court directing the objector to deposit a certain sum of money as 20% under Order XXI rule 19, C.P.C. was illegal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.33 of 2003, heard on 2-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI AND MIAN MUHAMMAD AKRAM BAITU, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NOOR HAYAT INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT NO.I, MULTAN and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13105",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2132 = 2004 SLD 2132 = 2004 CLD 1286",
    "Key Words:": "Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Reorganization and Conversion) Ordinance (LX of 2002)-------Ss. 4 & 5---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199--¬Constitutional petition---Petitioners, debtors of the Bank, sought direction of the High Court to the Zarai Taraqiati Bank to extend to them the benefit of the \"\"Relief Package\"\" announced by the Bank with further relief to return the Pass-Books and issue a clearance certificate and also to return the extra amount paid by the petitioners---Petitioners had fulfilled all the terms and conditions of the \"\"Relief Package\"\" announced by the Bank but the Bank refused to give relief to the petitioners on the pretext that the amount deposited by the petitioners was deposited by the Mobile Credit Officer of the Bank one day late and therefore the Bank had adjusted the amount deposited by the petitioners in the payment of loan---Petitioners however, had submitted to the High Court that they would not press the petition if a direction be issued to the Bank to consider the application of petitioners in view of the \"\"Relief Package\"\" strictly in accordance with law---Counsel of the Bank having no objection to the proposal of the petitioners, Constitutional petition was disposed of by the High Court with direction to the Bank that the concerned Bank functionary shall look into the matter personally and pass an appropriate order strictly in accordance with law after providing proper hearing to the petitioners.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.570 of 2004, decision dated: 8-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SABIR CH., J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and another\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK OF PAKISTAN through Director R.P. and D.C.D. and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13106",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2133 = 2004 SLD 2133 = 2004 CLD 1318",
    "Key Words:": "`Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66 ¬Auction of mortgaged property, validity of Suit for recovery filed against the appellant was decreed ex parte in favour of the Bank Execution petition Sale of mortgaged property by auction Objection petition filed by the appellant against auction of his property was dismissed by the Executing Court through impugned order Appeal was filed by the appellant against the impugned order Objections of the appellant was that the notice under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. was not issued to him before the auction of the property, the publication of sale was made in a different newspaper from the one that the Court had directed and the auction proceedings conducted by the Court and the auctioneer were fraudulent Validity Order to sell the property through auction was found to have been passed by the Executing Court after issuing notice under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. to the appellant, as the appellant had responded to it by filing an application for setting aside the ex parte decree Change of the publication in the newspaper by the Court auctioneer was not an illegality,, as the purpose of the publication was to bring the auction of the property to the knowledge of the public and it was well achieved Notice was also fixed at different conspicuous places and also sent by registered post to the appellant No fraud was found to have been committed in holding the auction not the Executing Court had gone outside the limits prescribed nor the Executing Court had one outside the limits law Executing Court as well as the Court auctioneer had performed all the legal requirements to conduct the auction of the said property Appeal, in the circumstances, was dismissed.\n \nSyed, Munir Hussain Gilani v. Habib Bank Limited, Township Branch, Lahore and another 2002 CLD 315 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.57 of 2003, heard on 9-12-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KASHIF TRADERS and another --Appellants\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13107",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2134 = 2004 SLD 2134 = 2004 CLD 1334",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --Ss. 7 & 22 Suit for recovery was filed by the bank against the appellant on the basis of a facility of loan availed by the latter for purchase of a vehicle Application for leave to defend filed by the appellant was dismissed and the suit was decreed Appeal was filed by the appellant against the said decree on the plea that the grounds taken by him in the application for leave to appear and defend were not determined by the Trial Court Material plea of the appellant was that there was no outstanding liability, as he had received a defective .vehicle from the supplier and heavy expenditure was incurred oh, it, which was subsequently returned to the supplier under the direction of the bank ¬Validity Execution of security documents while availing the said facility and the quantum of the outstanding liability, was not disputed by the appellant No substantial documentary evidence was placed on record by the appellant to prove, that the vehicle was defective and heavy expenditure .was incurred to bring it into road worthy Condition Under the finance agreement it was found that the bank was not liable for any defect in the vehicle and the remedy of the appellant was against the supplier ¬Appeal, in circumstances, was dismissed.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n S.9(1) Filing of suit by authorized persons Where the bank had placed copies of the power of attorneys of its duly constituted attorneys on record, the appellant was not entitled to take the objection that the suit was not filed by authorized persons.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.347 of 1998, decision dated: 26-01-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD GHANI, JJ",
    "": "Haji SAGHIR AHMED --Appellant\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13108",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2135 = 2004 SLD 2135 = 2004 CLD 1356",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -- S.22 Incomplete statement of accounts, validity of Suit for recovery was filed by the bank against the appellants on the basis of alleged default made by the latter against a finance facility availed from the former Application for grant of leave to defend was dismissed and the suit of the bank was decreed by the Trial Court Appeal was filed by the appellants against the said decree Contention of the appellants was that the statement of accounts submitted by the bank alongwith the suit was incomplete and the payments made by the appellants during the course of time to discharge their liabilities were suppressed ¬Validity Complete statement of accounts from the date of availing the finance facility till the date of filing the suit was not placed on the record by the bank Since, finance facility was based on mark up, the bank was not entitled to claim anything in excess of the amount outstanding against appellants Appellants were only liable to pay the outstanding amount after taking into consideration the payments made by them from the date of availing of the facility till the institution of the suit ¬Quantum of liability of the appellants was to be worked out on the basis of receiving evidence particularly the complete statement of accounts Appeal was allowed, in the circumstances.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.10 Bank of Punjab Act (XII of 1989), Ss. 9, 10,11(3) & 25 ¬Leave to appear and defend Contention of the appellants was that the suit was instituted by the bank through a person, in whose favour the power of attorney was executed by the Managing Director, who was not competent to do so as it was only the Board of Directors who could appoint and constitute a valid attorney to act on behalf of the bank and therefore, suit, not having been filed through a duly constituted attorney, was liable to be dismissed Validity According to S.11(3) of Bank of Punjab Act, 1989 the Managing Director of the bank was the Chief Executive Officer and subject to bye laws in this behalf, could direct and control on behalf of the Board the affairs of the bank Section 25 of the said Act contemplated the powers of the Board to make bye laws Managing Director, although was empowered to direct and control the affairs of the bank, was not empowered to constitute someone as attorney to act on, behalf of the bank Such, contention required examination in details with reference to the bye laws, if any, framed under S.25 of the Act in this regard Case was made out, in the circumstances, to rant leave to defend to the appellants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 150 of 1998, heard on 4-11-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD GHANI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ITTEFAQ INDUSTRIES (REGD.) through Managing Partner and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Duly Constituted Attorney --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13109",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2136 = 2004 SLD 2136 = 2004 CLD 1361",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --Ss.9(S) & 12 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.13 Ex parte decree, setting aside of Service of summons, validity of ¬Suit for recovery was filed by the bank against the appellant on the basis of the latter's default in payment of outstanding dues in credit card account Suit of the bank was decreed ex pane against which the appellant filed applications for recalling the ex parte decree and seeking condonation of delay Said applications were dismissed by the Trial Court through impugned order, which was challenged by the appellant in appeal ¬Contention of the appellant was that he was never served with the summons and no copy of the plaint was ever supplied to him therefore, the suit could not have been decreed against him, and his application for setting aside the decree should have been accepted Validity Service of summons was effected in different modes Summons were affixed, were published in English and Urdu newspapers and were served through courier service Plea of the appellant that publication of summons in an Urdu newspaper was defective as the same was not widely circulated would be of no avail as a valid service was effected against him under different modes provided under S.9(5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n--------S.9(5) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII Supply of copy of plaint, requirement of Contention of the appellant was that since no copy of the plaint was ever supplied to him suit could not have been decreed against him, and his application for setting aside the decree should have been accepted Validity If the appellant had not received the summons through ordinary modes of service, he could have obtained a copy of the plaint from the office of the Court upon the publication of the summons in the newspaper Provisions relating to the supply of the copy of plaint under S.9(5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, are a departure from the provisions contained in O.XXXVII, CP.C.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n--- S.24 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5 Condonation of delay ¬Application for setting aside the ex parte decree was not filed by the appellant within the time limitation Another application was simultaneously filed by the appellant to condone the delay¬ Validity Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908, was inapplicable to appeals filed under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the ex parte decree, in circumstances, was not maintainable and the appeal was thus barred by time.\n \n(d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) --\n \n S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.24 Applicability of S.5, Limitation Act, 1908 ¬Scope Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908, was inapplicable to appeals filed under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 183 of 2003, decision dated: 9-12-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "AKHTAR KALEEM --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. through Branch Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13110",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2137 = 2004 SLD 2137 = 2004 CLD 1366",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --Ss. 7, 10 & 22 Leave to appear Substantial questions of law and fact, determination of Suit for recovery filed by the bank against the respondents was decreed by the Trial Court and to some extent also against the appellant who was a surety to the transaction in which finance facility was availed by the said respondents from the bank Appellant moved an appeal against the said decree Contentions of the appellant was that he was only a surety towards the letters of guarantee and not the demand ,finance, therefore, he was riot liable to pay any amount as a guarantor for the said finance facility, secondly, the cash margin was available with the bank but was not adjusted towards demand finance and thirdly, he had mortgaged on property with the bank in this regard and that the letters of guarantee were not properly executed as the said property had already been transferred and the power of attorney of one of the respondents, who was a co owner of the said property, had stood revoked and cancelled Validity All the said contentions made by the appellant gave rise to substantial and significant questions of law and fact, which needed determination through evidence Application for leave to appear and defend was, therefore allowed and the Trial Court was directed to decide the suit after trial.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos.494 574, 575 and 576 of 2002, heard on 5-11-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "ZAFAR ABBAS ANSARI --Appellant\nVs.\nBANK OF KHYBER through Branch Manager and 8 others --Respondents\nFida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan through Legal Heirs and others PLD 1985 SC 341 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13111",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2138 = 2004 SLD 2138 = 2004 CLD 1557",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5 Powers and jurisdiction of Banking Tribunal Scope Banking Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any suit or pass any where the superior Court had declared certain provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and the notifications appointing the Presiding Officers of that Tribunal as unconstitutional and without lawful authority. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.7 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5 Past and closed cases Decree passed by the Banking Tribunal after the pronouncement of the wherein the superior Court had declared certain provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and the notifications appointing the Presiding Officers of that Tribunal as unconstitutional and without lawful authority, was not covered by the saving clause provided in the said as according to the said clause of the of superior Court was not to affect past and closed cases or invalidate the s/decrees, which had become final Case was remanded to the Banking Court.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.98 of 1997, heard on 26-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "FAZAL AHMAD through Hamidah Begum and others --Appellants\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13112",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2139 = 2004 SLD 2139 = 2004 CLD 1560",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 66, 67, 73 & 90 Execution of decree Auction of property Objection petition of appellant that no auction at all was conducted and there were irregularities in proclamation and conduct of sale was dismissed by Banking Court without framing issues and calling evidence Held, where it was alleged that auction had not taken place, there would be no valid sale that could be confirmed and such matter could only be resolved by the Banking Court after framing of issues and enabling the parties to lead evidence. \n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O.XXI, Rr. 66, 67, 73 & 90 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.19(7) Where it was alleged by the appellant that auction had not taken place, there would be no valid sale that could be confirmed by the Court until and unless the matter was resolved by the Court after framing of issues and enabling the parties to lead evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.207 of 2001, decision dated: 30-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. SALMA JAVAID --Appellant\nVs.\nDEUTSCHE BANK A.G., Lahore High Court through Attorney and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13113",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2140 = 2004 SLD 2140 = 2004 CLD 1561",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.7 Question of law and fact Recording of evidence ¬Requirement Suit decreed against the appellant Plea of the appellant that certain amounts deposited with the respondent Bank had not been credited to the account of the appellant ¬Held, where statement of the accounts, available on the record made it apparent that certain amounts, as alleged by the appellant, had not been credited, the question whether the bank was entitled to recover the suit amount, was a serious matter which could not be resolved without recording the evidence ¬Decree was set aside.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.210 of 2002 heard on 23rd April, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF --Appellant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Attorneys --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13114",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2141 = 2004 SLD 2141 = 2004 CLD 1563",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.7 & 17 Liquidated damages were not awarded ¬Misreading and non reading of material on record Effect Suits decreed without award of liquidated damages Plea of appellant that Banking Tribunal erred in law not to grant liquidated damages to the appellant Validity Appellant was supposed to send notices to the respondents in terms of the agreements executed between the parties and under the provisions of law ¬Since appellant failed to bring on record any material to show that the notices sent by the appellant were received by the respondents, the Banking Tribunal had passed the impugned s and decrees in accordance with the material on record and no illegality or infirmity had been committed by the Banking Tribunal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.5 to 7 of 1996, decision dated: 11-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMst. SARWARI BEGUM and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13115",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2142 = 2004 SLD 2142 = 2004 CLD 1565",
    "Key Words:": "Financial institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.9(5) Ex parte decree against the appellants - Service, legality of Plea of the appellants was that they were entitled to service of notice in each of the prescribed modes Advertisement in one of the newspapers did not fulfil the requirements of a notice on the appellants because of the mentioning of incorrect name in the same Held, appellants could not be non suited without first ensuring that proper notice in each of the prescribed modes had been issued to them Impugned order of the Banking Court was set aside and the appellants were found to be entitled to file petition for leave to appear and defend the suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.39 of 2003, heard on 7-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ZAMIN CHEMICALS and another --Appellants\nVs.\nBOLAN BANK LTD. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13116",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2143 = 2004 SLD 2143 = 2004 CLD 1567",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.100 Execution of decree Auction of mortgaged flats Sale of one mortgaged flat was set aside after framing of issues and recording of evidence on the application of respondent who claimed to be its owner on the basis of a registered sale deed ¬Plea of appellant was that the sale of the flat in favour of the respondent was subsequent in time, therefore, auction could not be set aside on, the basis of such sale deed Validity Appellant was unable to show from any documentary evidence that the flat which was claimed by the respondent was the one which was mortgaged with the appellant Held, the respondent was the owner of the fat in his own right, which was an independent property and could not have been sold in execution and the Banking Court had rightly concluded on the basis of proper reading of the evidence on the record Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 180 of 2002, heard on 9-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD., DHOLANWAL BRANCH, Lahore High Court --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs MM CHICKS through Proprietor and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13117",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2144 = 2004 SLD 2144 = 2004 CLD 1571",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.7 & 17 Liquidated damages Refusal by Court ¬Appellant Bank had failed to call upon the respondents to clear the outstanding liability before the institution of the suit Liquidated damages were thus refused Validity Where the suit was decreed in favour of the bank after excluding the amount already deposited by the respondents in the Bank's account along with the liquidated damages being demanded by the bank against the respondents, the bank was not justified in claiming liquidated damages No illegality committed by Banking Tribunal in not granting liquidated damages td the bank. \n \nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Farooq Compost Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. and 4 others 1993 MLD 1571; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Faisalabad v. Messrs Asisha Garments through Proprietor and 2 others 2001 MLD 1955; Saudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170 and National Development Finance Corporation v. Messrs Millrock Quarring (Pvt.) Ltd. and 7 others 2002 CLD 1382 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.317 of 1996, heard on 4-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED through Attorneys --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs ALI INDUSTRIES (REGD.) and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13118",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2145 = 2004 SLD 2145 = 2004 CLD 1583",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.18 Banking documents Where the Letter of Credit is irrevocable at sight, irrespective of the error in the date of opening, the moment it is required to be negotiated, the Bank is under an obligation to pay the amount under the Letter of Credit. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.7 Where, in the absence of insurance documents no substantial question of fact or law regarding negotiation of Letter of Credit by the bank was raised by the appellants in the leave to defend application in the Banking Court, the argument regarding the necessity of insurance documents for negotiation of L/C by batik could not be entertained in appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 318 of 2003, heard on 23rd September, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND CH. IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NAJAM IRON AND STEEL TRADERS through Proprietor and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. AG ZURICH through Chief Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13119",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2146 = 2004 SLD 2146 = 2004 CLD 1586",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S. 19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 58 & 62 Execution of decree Sale of property Appellant, in objection petition claiming ownership of the property on the basis of a registered sale deed Dismissal of objection petition by Banking Court on the ground that the property was mortgaged prior to the execution of sale deed in favour of the appellant ¬Held, the Banking Court, before passing the order of dismissal of objection petition should have investigated the claims and objections to the attachment of property, raised by the appellant, by providing sufficient opportunity to the parties for establishing their respective claims through production of evidence. \n \nMst. Surraya Begum v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and 4 others PLD 1990 Lah. 4 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.19(7) Executing Court is under no obligation to mechanically record the evidence of the objector in each and every case, however, it has to see in individual cases as to whether the case warrants the recording of evidence or not and the objection petition has been filed frivolously, contumaciously and to delay the proceedings or whether it is a genuine application. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.7 & 19 (7) Objection petition Function of the Banking Court is to determine as to whether the objection petition is to be decided after the recording of evidence or only after hearing the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 161 of 1995, heard on 9-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "FRASAT JABEEN --Appellant\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LTD through Manager and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13120",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2147 = 2004 SLD 2147 = 2004 CLD 1589",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5 Powers and jurisdiction Banking Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any suit or pass any where the superior Court has declared certain provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and the notifications appointing the Presiding Officers of that Tribunal as un-Constitutional Any decrees passed by the Banking Tribunal were to beset aside, in circumstances. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 and Syed Frasat Ali Shah v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. 2002 CLD 759 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordnance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S.7 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5 Past and closed cases Declarations made in the Chenab Cement Product neither to affect cases past and closed nor invalidate the s/decrees, which had become final Where, the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal was not challenged by way of instituting the appeal but was called into question only through a Constitutional petition which was subsequently disposed of, the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal would be considered to be past and closed case and final When, however, the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal was challenged by way of instituting the appeal and was also called into question through a Constitutional petition, where the latter was subsequently disposed of, the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal would not be considered to be past and closed case and would thus be set aside Appellant's appeal was against the and decree that was passed before the in Chenab Product's case, and the same was challenged through filing of the appeal as well as Constitutional petition the decree under appeal did not fall within the terms of past and closed cases' accordingly, the suit for the recovery was to be deemed pending before the newly constituted Banking Court, established under S.5 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to be decided afresh. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 fol.\n \nSyed Frasat Ali Shah v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. 2002 CLD 759 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.31 of 1995 and Writ Petition No. 14276 of 1994, heard on 24-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Malik MUHAMMAD YASIN AWAN and 6 others --Appellants\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13121",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2148 = 2004 SLD 2148 = 2004 CLD 1594",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.22 Appellant had admitted his liability towards the principal amount and mark up Mark up amount had also been provided by the appellant in the account statement filed with the leave application Such being the only amount which the bank had claimed and nothing had been added over and above the such amount in the shape of compound mark up on this amount, the appellant was obliged to make payment of the said amount ¬Appeal for the reduction of appellant's liability towards the bank was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.463 of 2002, heard on 29-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs DELITE HOUSE (PVT.) LIMITED and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13122",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2149 = 2004 SLD 2149 = 2004 CLD 1596",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--------Ss.15(11) & 19(7)---Auction of mortgaged-property ---Appellant in objection petition claiming to be the bona fide owner of the mortgaged property in terms of a registered mortgage-deed in her favour by -debtors---Held, mala fides on the part of the -debtors to mortgage property in favour of appellant subsequent to mortgaging the same property in favour of the decree-holder was proved---Judgment-debtors were not competent to further alienate the property in favour of appellant through a mortgage-deed as the same was not free from encumbrances. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 7, 19(7) & 22---Where an earlier objection petition filed by the appellant was dismissed and appeal against the said order had also met with failure, the order of the Banking Court had attained finality and a subsequent objection petition filed by the appellant on the same ground was not competent. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n-----S.7 & 19---Failure of auction purchaser to deposit the sale price within the prescribed period is a matter between the decree-holder and the auction purchaser or the Court, and it does not give any vested right to the appellant who had filed objections against the auction of that property.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.307 of 2003, heard on 17-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR, JJ",
    "": "Mst. RAZIA SULTANA -\nVs.\nHOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION through District Manager and\n5 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13123",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2150 = 2004 SLD 2150 = 2004 CLD 1600",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 58 & 62 Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S.47 Execution of decree ¬Sale of property Appellant in objection petition claiming ownership of the property based on a sale deed executed on 8 2 2001 and registered with Sub Registrar on 27 10 2001 Dismissal of objection petition by Banking Court on the ground that the sale deed was executed after 9 8 1998 the date on which the decree in the suit of recovery was passed Under S.47 of Registration Act. 1908 the registered sale deed operates from the time it is executed and not from the time of its registration ¬Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 came into force on 30 8 2001 whereas the appellant became owner on 8 2 2001 Effect was that the Ordinance would have no retrospective applicability and thus could not be used to attach property transferred after the promulgation of the Ordinance. \n \nAl Haj Chaudhary Muhammad Bashir v. Citibank PLD 1996 Lah. 672 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Preamble Ordinance having no retrospective applicability, could not be used to attach property transferred by the ¬-debtor before promulgation of the Ordinance. \n \nAl Haj Chaudhary Muhammad Bashir v. Citibank PLD 1996 Lah. 672 ref.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.7 Proof of authenticity of a document Where the sale deed is upon Stamp papers issued by the Treasury Office vide a specific serial number and bought from a general attorney of the vendor in the name of specific person for the purpose of execution of sale deed and the document contains an entry at the back of its page, made by the petition writer showing its date of execution It is difficult to believe that the document is a forged one. \n \n(d) Registration Act (XVI of 1908) \n \n S.23 Provision of S.23, Registration Act, 1908 prohibits registration of a document executed earlier to four months from the date of its presentation for registration, but it does not invalidate a document registered in violation of the same. \n \n(e) Registration Act (XVI of 1908) \n \n S.23 Provisions of S.23 of the Registration Act are merely directory and thus do not nullify the document, registered in violation of such provisions nor those can be a means of adjudging a sale transaction in collateral proceedings. \n \n(f) Registration Act (XVI of 1908) \n \n S. 47 Sale deed Effective date Registered sale deed operates from the time it is executed and not from the time it is, registered. \n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Preamble Ordinance is not retrospective in operation.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.822 of 2002, heard on 16-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "M. JAVED BUTTAR AND MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Raja AMIR KHAN --Appellant\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Manager and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13124",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2151 = 2004 SLD 2151 = 2004 CLD 1605",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals, Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7 Judgment passed under certain statutory provisions by the Banking Tribunal after the pronouncement of an earlier by a superior Court declaring those statutory provisions as unconstitutional is a nullity and is to be set aside. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) \n \n S. 5 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.5 Powers and jurisdiction of Banking Tribunal Scope Banking Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any suit or pass any where the supreme Court has earlier declared the appointment of the Presiding Officer of that Tribunal as unconstitutional and without lawful authority. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product Private Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah.672 ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art.201 Decision of the High Court is binding upon the subordinate Courts Subordinate Courts lack jurisdiction in cases where notifications appointing their Presiding Officers have been declared unconstitutional Subsequent s and decrees of such subordinate Courts in those cases are to be set aside. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.5 All suits deemed to be pending and to be decided afresh pertaining to a specific matter, shall be entertained by Courts constituted and having jurisdiction under the latest legislation.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 138 of 1997, heard on 8-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD AFZAL --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13125",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2152 = 2004 SLD 2152 = 2004 CLD 1609",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.7 & 10 Dismissal of suit Court has no jurisdiction to dismiss the suit due to non prosecution on the date of hearing which was fixed for arguments on the application for grant of leave to appear and defend the suit. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.22 Appeal is competent against the order of the Court disallowing application for restoration of the suit when it is in consequence of the order that led to the dismissal of the suit due to non prosecution. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.22(2) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLIII & R.3 ¬Appeal Maintainability Notice of appeal is directory ¬Requirement of sending notice of appeal to the respondent under O.XLIII of C.P.C. 1908 is merely directory and not mandatory as no consequences have been provided entailing dismissal of appeal on that account. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.24 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 163 In case of restoration of suit that was dismissed for non prosecution the time limitation for the purposes of appeal is to be reckoned from the date of the order when the subsequent application for restoration of that suit was dismissed rather than the date when the suit was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.466 of 2002, decision dated: 21st October, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BUKHARI, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs KHAWAJA RADIO HOUSE through Proprietor and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13126",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2153 = 2004 SLD 2153 = 2004 CLD 1611",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.7 Misreading and non reading of evidence When according to the Bank's own showings in its plaint a certain sum of money was paid on behalf of the appellant, the Banking Court cannot, by itself, read a higher amount merely relying upon a letter in which a higher amount was demanded from the bank by the third party. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.7 Misreading of record Where the Banking Court did not advert to the entries in the statements of accounts and gave a mechanical consideration to the whole record, the would suffer from misreading of record of the case \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.7 Recovery of liquidated damages Bank showing in the existing statement of accounts the liquidated damages with respect to the amounts to be recovered Bank is not entitled to recover such amount. \n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Limited Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.581 AND 604 of 2002, heard on 8-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ASSOCIATED CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING through Proprietor and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nTHE BANK OF PUNJAB through Branch Manager and another --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13127",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2154 = 2004 SLD 2154 = 2004 CLD 1620",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banker and customer Documentary letter of credit, establishing of Duty of bank Scope Bank deals only with documents and not with underlying goods or services which may be subject matter of any agreement between a foreign supplier and a local importer of such goods or services Opening of letter of credit by the Bank is only required to see the documents conforming to the letter of credit. \n \nHaral Textiles Limited v. Banque Indosuez Belgium, S.A. and others 1999 SCMR 591 ref.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872) \n \n Ss. 128 & 146 Liability of surety Extent Discharge of liability after entering of new surety Scope Guarantor had resigned from the Board of Directors of the principal debtor New Director had given personal guarantee in favour of bank to secure liabilities of the principal debtor -Former director did not apply to the bank for cancellation and return of his personal guarantee nor he sought any release or confirmation, showing discharge of the liability ¬Effect Such act of the former director could not by mere implication result in discharging the Director from his liability under the personal guarantee executed by him ¬Former director remained liable to repay the amounts owed by the principal debtor in circumstances. \n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.9 & 10 Recovery of bank loan Leave to defend the suit, refusal of Disputes between two groups of share¬holders of the borrower company Defendants were in litigation with each other before Civil Court and also before Companies Judge Effect Such legal proceedings had no bearing on the claim asserted by the bank in its suit against the defendants Leave to defend the suit was rightly refused and suit was rightly decreed by the High Court ¬Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.479 and 484 of 1998, heard on 5-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "S. A. HAMEED and others --Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13128",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2155 = 2004 SLD 2155 = 2004 CLD 1632",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.10(2) Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.59 Leave to appear and defend the suit, grant of Comparison of signatures Opinion of Handwriting, Expert Defendant denied his signatures on guarantee and sponsors' undertaking produced by bank Bank raised the plea of getting opinion of Handwriting Expert Validity Defendant was entitled to leave to appear and defend the suit and was allowed to file written statement Bank could file application for reference of signatures to Handwriting¬ Expert, to have his opinion after issues were framed and case was fixed for evidence Application for leave to appear and defend the suit was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M. No.230 B of 2003 in C.O.S. No.82 of 1998, decision dated: 18-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs PERAL FABRICS LTD. Through Chief Executive and 7 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13129",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2156 = 2004 SLD 2156 = 2004 CLD 1635",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.19 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.58 & 60 Execution of decree Objection petition Investigation of objection Objector claimed to be the owner of attached property in her own right on the basis of unregistered \"\"Iqrarnama\"\" Plea raised by the objector was that ¬-debtor being her husband had transferred the attached property vide \"\"Iqrarnama\"\" in lieu of her dower amount -Banking Court accepted the objection petition and released the property from attachment Validity Banking Court had accepted the petition merely on the basis of \"\"Iqrarnama\"\" and no other evidence was recorded In absence of any other evidence in favour of the objector, the objection petition could not have been accepted Genuineness/veracity of the document was not above board Objection petition was not decided in its true perspective Order passed by the Banking Court was set aside and case was remanded to Banking Court for deciding the same after framing of issue and recording of evidence of both the parties Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F. A.O. No. 103 of 2003, heard on 3rd June, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMst. FARKHANDA and 13 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13130",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2157 = 2004 SLD 2157 = 2004 CLD 1643",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) S.11 Interim decree to the extent of admitted claim ¬Claim of bank was partially admitted and was partially denied by the defendant Banking Court refused leave to defend and decreed the suit to the extent of whole amount as claimed by the bank in plaint Validity Case of defendant fell under the purview of S.11 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Banking Court, instead of out-rightly dismissing the application for leave to defend the suit, should have decided the suit under S.11 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court was contrary to the provision of law and the same was set aside Application for leave to defend the suit filed by defendant and suit of bank were remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R. F. A. No.212 of 2002, heard on 21st May, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ALLAHWALLAH PRINTERS through Managing Partner and 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nTHE BANK OF PUNJAB through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13131",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2158 = 2004 SLD 2158 = 2004 CLD 1643",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) S.11 Interim decree to the extent of admitted claim ¬Claim of bank was partially admitted and was partially denied by the defendant Banking Court refused leave to defend and decreed the suit to the extent of whole amount as claimed by the bank in plaint Validity Case of defendant fell under the purview of S.11 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Banking Court, instead of out-rightly dismissing the application for leave to defend the suit, should have decided the suit under S.11 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court was contrary to the provision of law and the same was set aside Application for leave to defend the suit filed by defendant and suit of bank were remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R. F. A. No.212 of 2002, heard on 21st May, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ALLAHWALLAH PRINTERS through Managing Partner and 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nTHE BANK OF PUNJAB through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13132",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2159 = 2004 SLD 2159 = 2004 CLD 1645",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions 'Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) S.10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11 ¬Plaint, rejection of Non granting of leave to defend the suit Effect Application for leave to defend the suit was dealt with under S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, under which Banking Court was not empowered to straightaway reject the plaint If Banking Court was of the view that substantial questions of law and facts had been raised by defendant, then leave to defend the suit could have been granted to the defendant but the suit or the plaint could not have been dismissed/rejected ¬Defendants, after grant of leave, were within their right to file application under O. VII, R.11 C.P. C. and if the Court could have reached the conclusion that the case fell under any of the clauses' of O. VII, R.17, C. P. C., then the plaint could have been rejected Rejection of the plaint prior to grant of leave was in conflict with the provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Order of Banking Court, whereby plaint was rejected prior to grant of leave to defend the suit, was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R. F. A. No.52 of 2003, decision dated: 15-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Sheikh MUHAMMAD KASHIF --Appellant\nVs.\nASKARI LEASING LIMITED through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer --Respondent\nMessrs Platinum Insurance Company through Chief Executive v. Messrs Highways Bridge, Contractor International (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 1997 MLD 2394 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13133",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2160 = 2004 SLD 2160 = 2004 CLD 1649",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6(2) Liquidated damages and future mark up, recovery of Decree passed by Banking Tribunal did not include such damages and mark up Validity Bank was not entitled to recover liquidated damages as per principle laid down in case titled Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd., Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments etc., reported as 2001 MLD 1955 Under Islamic mode of financing, the bank was not entitled to claim future mark up and Banking Tribunal was not entitled under the provisions of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, to award future mark up ¬Judgment and decree passed by the Tribunal was in accordance with facts and law and did not require any interference by High Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.389 of 1996, heard on 6-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Appellant\nVs.\nZAMAN ALI --Respondent\nAllied Bank of Pakistan Ltd., Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955 fol."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13134",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2161 = 2004 SLD 2161 = 2004 CLD 1652",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) S.19(7) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.11 Second objection petition Principle of res judicata Applicability ¬Objector claimed to be owner in possession of the attached property Objector had agreement to sell in her favour executed prior to passing of attachment order After dismissal of first objection petition, the objector instead of assailing the same, had filed second objection petition on the same premises Banking Court dismissed the second objection petition also Validity When earlier order was not challenged, the same had attained finality Under the principle of res judicata, the second petition on the same premises was barred by law Husband of the objector had admitted deposit of amount on behalf of debtor who had also issued certain cheques Such facts were cancealed from High Court Objector having purchased the property for a considerable amount and the decretal amount was not substantial, High Court granted two months time to the objector to satisfy the decree so as to save her property ¬Appeal was disposed of in above terms.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.209 of 2002, heard on 5-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. ATIA ARSHAD --Appellant\nVs.\nTHE BANK OF PUNJAB and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13135",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2162 = 2004 SLD 2162 = 2004 CLD 1657",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (VIII of 1984) S. 6 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VIII, R.6 ¬-Banking Tribunal Jurisdiction Non claiming of, set off ¬Direction to refund excess amount Suit was disposed of by Banking Tribunal as the total liability had been paid by the defendant Tribunal observed that defendant had paid excess amount, therefore, directed the bank to refund the excess amount l Plea raised by the bank was that, neither the Tribunal had any jurisdiction under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, to make such direction, nor the defendant had claimed any set off or counter claim in his written statement in this behalf Validity Banking Tribunal having no such jurisdiction and defendant also did not make counter claim or set off, the decree to the extent of such direction was set aside Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.388 of 1996 heard on 6-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nALLAH DITTA --Respondent\nAgricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Nawaz Akhtar R.F.A. No.385 of 1996 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13136",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2163 = 2004 SLD 2163 = 2004 CLD 1660",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Appeal---New plea, raising of Altogether a new plea/ground cannot be raised before appellate/ re visional Court, which has not been raised before lower forum. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.9 &, 10 - Recovery of bank loan Leave to defend the suit, refusal of -Failure to establish good prima facie case Banking Court refused the leave and suit was decreed in favour of bank Validity Financial facility; as mentioned in. the suit, was advanced to the defendant, who had executed the, relevant, documents and mortgaged his properties-¬Execution of documents and creation of mortgage was not denied and the defendant had failed, to liquidate the outstanding liabilities Banking Court had rightly decreed the suit and High Court maintained the same Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.255 to 257 of 1999, heard on 29-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ZAKAS (PVT.) LIMTED through Managing Director and others --Appellants\nVs.\nTHE BANK ALFLAH LIMITED- --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13137",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2164 = 2004 SLD 2164 = 2004 CLD 1669",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) S.12 Appeal New plea, raising of Non award of penal interest Failure to claim such interest in pleadings Suit was decreed by Banking Court in favour of bank without awarding penal interest Validity Person cannot be allowed to raise a new plea before Court of appeal Bank was precluded from agitating the non award of penal interest at appellate stage when the defendant had already liquidated the total outstanding liabilities Penal interest could not be a6arded to Financial Institutions as the same amounted to penalty High Court declined to interfere with the and decree passed by the Banking Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \n(b) Appeal (civil) \n \n Raising of new plea Altogether a new plea cannot be raised before Court of appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.509 of 1996, heard on 12-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED through Attorneys --Appellant\nVs.\nAL HUSSAIN MEDICOS through Proprietor and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13138",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2165 = 2004 SLD 2165 = 2004 CLD 1672",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) S.10 Leave to defend the suit, grant of Excessive and unauthorized charge of mark up Borrowers disputed two entries in statement of account Was not clear if the disputed amounts corresponded to the rate of mark up agreed upon between the parties Was also not clear if the disputed amounts had been calculated keeping in view various deposits made by the borrowers from time to time ¬Effect For the resolution of such dispute of excessive and unauthorized charge of mark up, the borrowers had made out a case for grant of leave to defend the suit Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court to the extent of the disputed amount was set aside and case was remanded ¬Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) \n \n S.12 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) Decree, setting aside of Non service of summons Defendant was guarantor and he denied receipt of any summons ¬Judgment was passed against the borrowers hence leave to defend the suit was also refused to the guarantor and the suit was decreed against him also Validity Judgment and decree against the borrowers was set aside to the extent of disputed amount, therefore, the same was also set aside to the extent of guarantor High Court converted the application of guarantor as application under S.12(2), C.P.C. and directed the Banking Court to decide the same on its facts mentioned therein until the application was decided, decree against the applicant would remain suspended ¬High Court further directed that if application under S.12(2), C.P.C. of the guarantor would succeed, then the decree shall stand set aside against him and he would be entitled to file fresh leave application Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.437 of 2002, heard on 3rd June, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NAEEM ASSOCIATES, through Proprietor and 6 others --Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Branch Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13139",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2166 = 2004 SLD 2166 = 2004 CLD 1703",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) Ss.9 & 10 Recovery of bank loan Export refinancing ¬Recovery through buy back agreement Contention of the defendants in application for leave to defend the suit was that the consignments, subject matter of the financing, were dispatched against confirm orders and the consignments were to be delivered through banker of the consignee but the plaintiff Bank failed to repatriate the sale proceeds of the, exported goods through foreign bank Plea raised by the defendants was that the bank was not entitled to recovery of loan Validity When it was not shown that bank had ever agreed for discounting of bill of exchange, the bank did not lose its right to recover the amount in the specific manner as had been agreed between the parties at the time of financing No prohibition existed in any law or instructions of State Bank of Pakistan that export refinancing could not be made by the parties through buy¬back agreement Such agreements/transaction would be protected on the principle that what was not prohibited by law, would be permissible Financing, in the present case, was not against the discounting of the bills but was as per the terms of FAFB and FAPC facilities that were published by the bank in its manual No requirement existed for the provision of the bills of exchange as the financing was in terms of the buy back agreements Application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed Suit was decreed in circumstances. \n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Elegzender and Company and 2 others PLD 1987 Lah. 290; Fine Textile Mills Ltd. Karachi v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163; Bankers Equity Limited and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 931; United Bank Limited v. Ch. Ghulam Hussain 1998 CLC 816; Muhammad Iqbal and others v. The Aultralasia Bank Ltd. 1984 SCMR 919; Messrs Kohinoor Trading (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Mangrani Trading Co. and 2 others 1987 CLC 1533 and Messrs Pakistan International Airlines v. Messrs National Bank of Pakistan and another 1985 CLC 436 ref.\n \nUnited Bank limited v. Messrs. Azmat Trading Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. and 5 others 2001 CLC 1172 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Shahyar Textile Mills Ltd. 2003 CLD 1370 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.4 of 2003, decision dated: 6-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMAHMOOD AHMED and 9 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13140",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2167 = 2004 SLD 2167 = 2004 CLD 1714",
    "Key Words:": "Companies (Court) Rules, 1997 R.78, Form 27 Advertisement of petition in News¬papers Petitioner, vide a preceding order was directed to make arrangements for advertising petition in two specified Newspapers and that if petition was not advertised before the next date of hearing, petition would stand dismissed Said order of the Court having not been complied with, petition was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O. No. 15 of 2003, decision dated: 5-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM CHAUDHARY er\nVs.\nSTYLE ENTERPRISES (PVT.) LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13141",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2168 = 2004 SLD 2168 = 2004 CLD 1714",
    "Key Words:": "Companies (Court) Rules, 1997 R.78, Form 27 Advertisement of petition in News¬papers Petitioner, vide a preceding order was directed to make arrangements for advertising petition in two specified Newspapers and that if petition was not advertised before the next date of hearing, petition would stand dismissed Said order of the Court having not been complied with, petition was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O. No. 15 of 2003, decision dated: 5-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM CHAUDHARY er\nVs.\nSTYLE ENTERPRISES (PVT.) LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13142",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2169 = 2004 SLD 2169 = 2004 CLD 1715",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) Ss.9 & 10(12) Recovery of bank loan Amended application for leave to defend the suit Time barred application Taking of loan was not denied by the borrower Suit was originally filed under the provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, but due to promulgation of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the Court directed the borrowers to file amended application for leave to defend the suit Borrowers did not file the application within time specified by the Court ¬Effect Such application was liable to be ignored and presumption would be that no application for grant of leave to defend the suit was pending Application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed and the case of the plaintiff stood proved by agreements Suit was decreed in circumstances. \n \nDr. Muhammad Munir ul Haq and others v. Dr. Muhammad Latif Chaudhry and others 1992 SCMR 215; Bolan Bank Limited through Attorneys v. Baig Textiles Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 6 others 2002 CLD 557; Banque Indosuez v. Banking Tribunal for Sindh and Balochistan and others 1994 CLC 2272 and Habib Bank Ltd. v. Sarmast Cooking Oil Ltd. 2000 CLC 1502 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) \n \n S.3 Filing of suit in Banking Court Permission of State Bank of Pakistan Pre condition Validity No provision exists in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, that the plaintiff should declare the customer as defaulter and refer the matter to State Bank of Pakistan seeking permission to file suit. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) \n \n S.9 Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Ordinance (L of 2000), S.18 Suit for recovery of bank loan Taking over of assets by Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Validity Acquisition/take over of properties by Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation cannot be questioned in the suit filed for recovery of money. \n \n(d) Contract Act (X of 1872) \n \n S.62 Novation of contract Scope Novation of contract takes place when for an existing contract some new contract is substituted either by the same parties or between different parties, consideration mutually being the discharge of old contract When the contract is novated a fresh contract comes into existence, directly or by implication in place of the original contract Effect of novation is that it extinguishes the original contact and replaces it by another. \n \nHabib Bank Limited v. Al Jalal Textile Mills Ltd. 2003 CLD 1007; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Qayyum Spinning Lt6 2001 MLD 1351 and Dr. M. Aslam Khaki v. Syed Muhammad Hashmi PLD 2000 SC 225 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C. O. S. No. 13 of 2000, heard on 5-08-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED through Attorneys --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs AZIZ TANNERIES (PVT.) LTD. Through Chief Executive/Managing Director and 9 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13143",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2170 = 2004 SLD 2170 = 2004 CLD 1728",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) Ss.9 & 10 Contract Act (X of 1872), S.128 Recovery of bank loan Application for leave to defend the suit ¬Substantial question of law and facts, non raising of Non- impleading of co guarantor Suit, maintainability of ¬Defendant neither denied availing of loan facility, nor she denied her status of guarantor Plea raised by the defendant was that the loan was secured by the bank guarantee provided by another bank and the plaintiff Bank should have encashed the guarantee provided by the other bank, thus the suit was premature Defendant further raised the plea that without impleading the guarantor bank as a party the suit was not maintainable Validity General rule about joint and simultaneous obligation of principal debtor and surety/securities was enunciated in the provisions of S.128 of Contract Act, 1872 If any such clause was otherwise agreed between the parties, the provisions of S.128 of Contract Act, 1872, would be inapplicable and the provisions of the contract would prevail Creditor could not be bound and compelled under S.128 of Contract Act, 1872, to always join in legal action only or all sureties of debt, besides the principal debtor, who under all circumstances, was primarily liable to pay the debt Was the choice and prerogative of the creditor to take recovery action against the principal debtor alone or join any of the guarantors and to leave the enforcement of the surety against any of the co sureties; specially when each of the guarantees of contract was independent in nature and had no overlapping effect on each other Defendant¬ Company did not file any application for leave to defend the suit and the defendant guarantor could not set out the plea that the suit of bank was either pre mature or the plaint did not disclose a cause of action Defendant guarantor failed to raise any substantial question of lain and facts which required recording of evidence Banking Court had rightly rejected, the application for leave to defend the suit and the suit was decreed in favour of the bank Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nUnited Bank Ltd. v. Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. and others PLD 2002 SC 1100 and Shipyard K. Damen International v. Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. PLD 2003 SC 191 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.61 of 2004, heard on 28-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "SAHARA TRADING INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and another --Appellants\nVs.\nBANK ALFALAH LIMITED through Manager Credit and Chief Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13144",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2171 = 2004 SLD 2171 = 2004 CLD 1741",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) S. 10(6) Expression sufficient cause' Scope ¬Application for leave to defend the suit was to be rejected under S.10(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for the failure of defendant to meet with the requirement of Ss. 10(3) & 10 (4) of Financial. Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, as the provisions were mandatory in nature Cushion was available to the defendant, who failed in this behalf, to disclose sufficient cause' for his inability to meet the requirements. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.2(d), 9 & 10 Recovery of bank loan Term finance' ¬Connotation Undue influence, coercion or illegality on part of the bank Proof Defendants in their application for leave to defend the suit, raised the plea that in fact the amounts claimed by the bank were not the finance' as the bank had agreed to enter into a partnership, with the defendants for the purpose of the project, on the basis of equity and such contribution towards equity participation was not the finance' Further plea raised by the defendants was that due to undue influence, coercion or illegality on part of the bank, the defendants were forced to sign finance agreements with the bank Validity Plea was contradictory, because, it was the case of the defendants that the bank did not provide equity as committed, rather compelled the defendants for other kinds of the transactions, which admittedly were covered by the definition of finance given in law, therefore, equity which was not given, could not be pressed during the trial to avoid the consequences of failure to meet the conditions of S.10 of Financial Institutions (recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 High Court declined to hold the transaction as equity in partnership just for the reason that certain transactions were allegedly forced upon the defendants and they were compelled to enter into the transactions by the exercise of undue influence and financial coercion, by the bank -Assertion of the defendants that the bank backed out from equity participation and compelled the defendants to enter into leasing arrangement, was not supported by any contra document as required by S.10(5) of Financial Institutions. (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001- Such assertion could not be considered as substantial questions of facts' to prove with some undisclosed and unspecified oral evidence In the light of large number of documents admittedly executed by the defendants and there being not even a single piece of paper or a word in writing that the defendants ever, at the relevant time, complained of any kind of undue influence, coercion or illegality on part of the bank, how on the basis of uncorroborated averments made in the application, the case of leave could be made out ¬Banking Court had rightly dismissed the application for leave to appear and defend the suit and the suit was rightly decreed in favour of the bank Appeal was dismissed. \n \nHowes v. Bishop (1909) 2 K.B. 390; Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. v. Aboody (1990) 1.Q.B. 923; Goldsworthy v. Brickell (1987) Ch. 338, 401. Bullock v. Lloyd's Bank 1954 3 All ER 726; William v. Johnson 1937 4 All ER 34; Wright v. Carter 1903 1 Ch.27; RP Brocklehurst (deceased) Hall and another v Robert. 1978 1 All ER 768; Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V . v. Burch 1997 1 All ER 144; TSB Bank PLC v. Camfield 1995 1 All ER 951; National Westminster Bank. v. Morgan 1985 AC 686; The Commercial Bank of Australia v. Amadio 1983 151 CLC 447; Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd. v. Marden 1979 Ch. 84; Westminster Bank PLC v. Morgan 1985 AC 486, 704; Barclays Bank PLC v. Coleman 2000 1 ALL VR 385; Royal Bank of Scotland PLC v. Etridge (No.2) 2001 4 All ER 449 and Cornish v. Midland Bank PLC (Humes, third party) 1985 3 All ER 513 ref.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.9 & 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.10 Stay of suit Provisions of S.10 C.P.C. Applicability Pendency of suit filed by customers against bank Plea raised by customers was that in the former suit filed by them leave had been granted to bank, therefore, they should also be granted leave to appear and defend the suit Validity ¬Subsequent suit filed by bank against customers could not be stayed as by virtue of S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the provisions of S.10 C.P.C. had been made inapplicable to the proceedings under the special law Intention of the legislature was that if there was a situation, where two suits were filed, one filed by the customer against the bank and the other by the bank against the customer relating to the same finance, both suits, should be tried independently Leave in either case, as a matter of course, should not be granted, only for the reason of the institution, pendency, or the grant of leave in other case Rather for the leave purpose, the particular case should specifically be adjudged on its own merits and on the yardstick of the law stated in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 If in both the matters, the Court independently found the case fit for leave, the matters could then be tried together for avoiding the conflicting decisions But if in one case, no case for leave was made out, the application for leave to defend the suit could be refused to follow the consequences and the other case should proceed on its own merits Suit filed by bank was not stayed in circumstances. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.2(d), 9 & 10 Contract Act (X of 1872), S.23 Recovery of bank loan Morabaha transactions Object, or consideration of agreement Plea raised by the defendants was that the transactions of Morabaha were invalid, as no physical sale/purchase of goods, which was an essential condition for such transaction, took place, and therefore, it was hit by the provisions of S.23 of Contract Act, 1872 ¬Validity Parties had entered into Morabaha agreements, in which sale/purchase of specific goods was mentioned ¬Defendants were party to such agreements, it was not their case that the agreements were interpolated, fabricated or procured through fraud and misrepresentation, therefore; they could not in law, be allowed to take up a plea, which was disproved by the documents executed by themselves ¬Leave to appear and defend the suit was dismissed in circumstances. \n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.9 & 10 Recovery of bank loan Charging of mark up beyond period of agreements Effect Bank could not charge mark up beyond the period of agreements, therefore, such amount was illegally and unauthorizedly claimed by the bank, which should not have been allowed by Banking Court Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was modified to the extent of such amount which was excluded from decretal amount Remaining and decree passed by Banking Court was maintained Appeal was dismissed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.281 of 2003, decision dated: 6-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "ZEESHAN ENERGY LTD. and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nFAISAL BANK LTD. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13145",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2004 2172 = 2004 SLD 2172 = 2004 CLD 1741",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) S. 10(6) Expression sufficient cause' Scope ¬Application for leave to defend the suit was to be rejected under S.10(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for the failure of defendant to meet with the requirement of Ss. 10(3) & 10 (4) of Financial. Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, as the provisions were mandatory in nature Cushion was available to the defendant, who failed in this behalf, to disclose sufficient cause' for his inability to meet the requirements. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.2(d), 9 & 10 Recovery of bank loan Term finance' ¬Connotation Undue influence, coercion or illegality on part of the bank Proof Defendants in their application for leave to defend the suit, raised the plea that in fact the amounts claimed by the bank were not the finance' as the bank had agreed to enter into a partnership, with the defendants for the purpose of the project, on the basis of equity and such contribution towards equity participation was not the finance' Further plea raised by the defendants was that due to undue influence, coercion or illegality on part of the bank, the defendants were forced to sign finance agreements with the bank Validity Plea was contradictory, because, it was the case of the defendants that the bank did not provide equity as committed, rather compelled the defendants for other kinds of the transactions, which admittedly were covered by the definition of finance given in law, therefore, equity which was not given, could not be pressed during the trial to avoid the consequences of failure to meet the conditions of S.10 of Financial Institutions (recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 High Court declined to hold the transaction as equity in partnership just for the reason that certain transactions were allegedly forced upon the defendants and they were compelled to enter into the transactions by the exercise of undue influence and financial coercion, by the bank -Assertion of the defendants that the bank backed out from equity participation and compelled the defendants to enter into leasing arrangement, was not supported by any contra document as required by S.10(5) of Financial Institutions. (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001- Such assertion could not be considered as substantial questions of facts' to prove with some undisclosed and unspecified oral evidence In the light of large number of documents admittedly executed by the defendants and there being not even a single piece of paper or a word in writing that the defendants ever, at the relevant time, complained of any kind of undue influence, coercion or illegality on part of the bank, how on the basis of uncorroborated averments made in the application, the case of leave could be made out ¬Banking Court had rightly dismissed the application for leave to appear and defend the suit and the suit was rightly decreed in favour of the bank Appeal was dismissed. \n \nHowes v. Bishop (1909) 2 K.B. 390; Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. v. Aboody (1990) 1.Q.B. 923; Goldsworthy v. Brickell (1987) Ch. 338, 401. Bullock v. Lloyd's Bank 1954 3 All ER 726; William v. Johnson 1937 4 All ER 34; Wright v. Carter 1903 1 Ch.27; RP Brocklehurst (deceased) Hall and another v Robert. 1978 1 All ER 768; Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V . v. Burch 1997 1 All ER 144; TSB Bank PLC v. Camfield 1995 1 All ER 951; National Westminster Bank. v. Morgan 1985 AC 686; The Commercial Bank of Australia v. Amadio 1983 151 CLC 447; Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd. v. Marden 1979 Ch. 84; Westminster Bank PLC v. Morgan 1985 AC 486, 704; Barclays Bank PLC v. Coleman 2000 1 ALL VR 385; Royal Bank of Scotland PLC v. Etridge (No.2) 2001 4 All ER 449 and Cornish v. Midland Bank PLC (Humes, third party) 1985 3 All ER 513 ref.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.9 & 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.10 Stay of suit Provisions of S.10 C.P.C. Applicability Pendency of suit filed by customers against bank Plea raised by customers was that in the former suit filed by them leave had been granted to bank, therefore, they should also be granted leave to appear and defend the suit Validity ¬Subsequent suit filed by bank against customers could not be stayed as by virtue of S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the provisions of S.10 C.P.C. had been made inapplicable to the proceedings under the special law Intention of the legislature was that if there was a situation, where two suits were filed, one filed by the customer against the bank and the other by the bank against the customer relating to the same finance, both suits, should be tried independently Leave in either case, as a matter of course, should not be granted, only for the reason of the institution, pendency, or the grant of leave in other case Rather for the leave purpose, the particular case should specifically be adjudged on its own merits and on the yardstick of the law stated in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 If in both the matters, the Court independently found the case fit for leave, the matters could then be tried together for avoiding the conflicting decisions But if in one case, no case for leave was made out, the application for leave to defend the suit could be refused to follow the consequences and the other case should proceed on its own merits Suit filed by bank was not stayed in circumstances. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.2(d), 9 & 10 Contract Act (X of 1872), S.23 Recovery of bank loan Morabaha transactions Object, or consideration of agreement Plea raised by the defendants was that the transactions of Morabaha were invalid, as no physical sale/purchase of goods, which was an essential condition for such transaction, took place, and therefore, it was hit by the provisions of S.23 of Contract Act, 1872 ¬Validity Parties had entered into Morabaha agreements, in which sale/purchase of specific goods was mentioned ¬Defendants were party to such agreements, it was not their case that the agreements were interpolated, fabricated or procured through fraud and misrepresentation, therefore; they could not in law, be allowed to take up a plea, which was disproved by the documents executed by themselves ¬Leave to appear and defend the suit was dismissed in circumstances. \n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.9 & 10 Recovery of bank loan Charging of mark up beyond period of agreements Effect Bank could not charge mark up beyond the period of agreements, therefore, such amount was illegally and unauthorizedly claimed by the bank, which should not have been allowed by Banking Court Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was modified to the extent of such amount which was excluded from decretal amount Remaining and decree passed by Banking Court was maintained Appeal was dismissed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.281 of 2003, decision dated: 6-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "ZEESHAN ENERGY LTD. and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nFAISAL BANK LTD. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13146",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1528 = 2005 SLD 1528 = 2005 CLD 1",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XXI, Rr.84, 65, 54 & 12---Recovery of Bank loan--¬Attachment of mortgaged property---Auction sale---Confirmation of sale and issuance of sale certificate by the Banking Court--¬Validity ---Auction purchaser had not deposited 25% of the purchase money nor the balance was paid in accordance with the provisions of O.XXI, R.84, C.P.C.---If the payment was not made within the period as mandatorily provided by O.XXI, R.84, C.P.C., the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claims to the property and non-deposit of the purchase money would render the sale void---Confirmation of sale and issuance of sales certificate by the Banking Court was declared to be without lawfully authority---High Court, while taking strong exception to the conduct of the respondents in the manner they had conducted the proceedings before the Judge Banking Court, strongly deprecated the same and burdened the respondent with special costs of Rs.50,000 payable to the appellants---Sale proceedings were directed to be conducted by the Executing Court in the light of observations by the High Court in accordance with law.\n \nManilal Mohanlal and others v. Sardar Syed Ahmad and another AIR 1954 SC 349 and Brig. (Retd.) Mazhar-ul-Haq and another v. The Muslim Commercial Bank and another PLD 1993 Lah.706 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.400 of 2003, heard on 16-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND TANVIR BASHIR ANSARI, JJ",
    "": "AJKSUN INTERNATIONAL MANUFACTURERS AND EXPORTERS through Partners and 2 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Attorneys Vice President and Chief Manager and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13147",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1529 = 2005 SLD 1529 = 2005 CLD 20",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)---------Ss.5 & 7---Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance (IX of 1984), Preamble & S.7---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.406/420---Recovery of loan---Bank made a complaint to Federal Investigation Agency (Commercial Circle) against the borrower company and its directors alleging therein that they had misappropriated and removed the hypothecated goods or had caused some one else to do the same/or converted the same to their own use; F.I.R. was registered under Ss.406/420, P.P.C. against the company and its Directors---Application under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. was brought by the petitioner (Director of the Company) for quashing of proceedings as challan was pending before the Special Court, Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984---Validity---Banking Tribunals Act, 1984 was a complete Code unto itself and provided machinery for dealing with the matter of recovery of money and it related to matters including offences created with regard to an effort at thwarting the recovery---Provisions of Banking Tribunals Act, 1984 would prevail over any other law and any criminal act falling within the definition of offence contained in S. 7 of the said Ordinance, would fall within the exclusive domain of the Banking Tribunals Act, 1984 and that too in the manner provided i.e. that the offence would not be cognizable and that the cognizance thereof would be taken by the Banking Tribunals on a written complaint by the Bank which would be bailable as also compoundable ---Principles---High Court, in circumstances, allowed the petition and the proceedings against the petitioner arising out of F.I.R. under Ss.406 & 420, P.P.C., pending before the Special Court in Respect of Offences in Banks, were ordered to be quashed.\n \nIn the present case the occurrence is alleged to have taken place, according to the F.I.R. itself in 1991 and according to the State counsel in 1993. The Bank filed the suit for recovery in 1995 and the same was decreed on 31-1-1996. The complaint was made by the Bank on 27-7-1998 i.e. 2-1/2 years after the suit had been decreed.\n \nThe Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984 is a law which essentially provides for speedy trials for offences mentioned in its schedule. The said provisions do not create any new offence except the one contained in its section 7 which prohibits transfer or creation of -a charge over property owned by an accused without the permission of the Special Court. On the other hand the Banking Tribunals Ordinance (Ordinance No. 1VIII of 1984) was promulgated on 31-12-1994 which was much later than the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, (Ordinance No.IX) of 1984.\n \nSection 5(3), Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 goes on to say that no Court other than a Banking Tribunal shall have or exercise any jurisdiction with respect to any matter to which the jurisdiction of a Banking Tribunal extends under this Ordinance, including a decision as to the existence or otherwise of finance and the execution of a decree passed by the Banking Tribunal.\n \nThe wisdom of providing machinery for the recovery of money under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 becomes evident by a joint reading of the sections 5 and 7. The legislature was cognizant of the fact that in some of the cases there would be customers who would try to defeat the Bank's efforts for recovery of its money. This is why this offence had been created and the same forum which was involved in adjudication of the matter of recovery had been vested with the powers to punish. The legislature is presumed to be cognizant of the existing law, therefore, one cannot lightly and easily ignore the expression of legislative will as has been manifestly expressed in the provisions of the Banking Tribunal Ordinance. The presumption is that the legislature does not make any mistake. The Banking Tribunal Ordinance is a special law relating to the recovery of money from delinquent/ defaulting borrowers. It is a complete Code unto itself and provides machinery for dealing with the matter of recovery of money and it relates to matters including offences created with regard to an effort at thwarting recovery. The provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 will prevail over any other law and any criminal act falling within the definition of offence contained in section 7 of the Ordinance will fall within the exclusive domain of the Banking Tribunal and that too in the manner provided i.e. that the offence will not be cognizable and that the cognizance thereof will be taken by the Tribunal on a written complaint by the Bank. It will be bailable as also compoundable.\n \nPetitioner in the present case was being sought to be prosecuted under the general law but only before the special Forum. Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984 only provided a different forum and did not create a new offence as was the case under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984.\n \nSo far as the import of the words \"\"without prejudice to any other action which may be taken against him under this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force\"\" which occur in section 7 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 is concerned, the Legislature cannot be presumed to have envisioned punishing an offender under this law and then to allow proceedings against him under the general law as well. Attending to the facts of the case F.I.R. having been recorded even after the suit by the complainant Bank was decreed on 31-1-1996 it is noticed that it was admitted and accepted by the counsel for the complainant Bank and the State that the suit was decreed on 31-1-1996.\n \nIt is not the Bank's case that their rights have not been finally adjudicated by the decree in their favour. It thus follows that the Bank was satisfied by what is contained in the decree. Even otherwise the Bank never wanted the Banking Tribunal to have proceeded against the Company and the petitioner. The Bank appears to have deliberately chosen not to proceed against the petitioner. The decree dated 31-1-1996 put an end to all matters regarding recovery.\n \nThe provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 will prevail over the general law, therefore, it was held that the offence complained of had to be dealt with in the manner provided in the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and that the registration of F.I.R. by F.I.A. and the consequent prosecution of the case before the Special Court was without jurisdiction.\n \nPetition was allowed and the proceedings against the petitioner arising out of F.I.R. under sections 406 and 420, P.P.C., now pending before the Special Court in Respect of Offences in Banks, were quashed and the petitioner was acquitted of the charges against him.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Crl. Misc. No.98-Q of 2004, heard on 26-07-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "M. BILAL KHAN AND SH. ABDUR RASHID, JJ",
    "": "AAMER KHURSHID MIRZA\nVs.\nTHE STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13148",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1530 = 2005 SLD 1530 = 2005 CLD 42",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)--------Ss.18, 7 & 21----Execution of decree---Sale of property through public auction---Issuance of sale certificate and order of \"\"Qufal Shikni\"\" of the house---Application objecting to the sale by auction inviting the attention of the Banking Court to a patent illegality amounting to fraud that the entire house was sold through auction on the initiative of the decree-holder Bank as if the entire house belonged to the guarantor although the facts established on the record, and the documents submitted by the decree-holder Bank, were to the contrary---Not only the decree-holder Bank, procured the sale of the entire house by misrepresentation but it was a case where the Court had also committed error apparent on the face of record---Executing Court dismissed the application on the sole ground that the Court could not review its order--¬Validity---Executing Court was under a duty to have retraced its wrong steps without any constraint---Court must see that the Rules of Procedure were not allowed to operate as tyrant master so as to perpetuate an illegality committed by Court--¬High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the sale along with the sale certificate in respect of the disputed property and directed that decree-holder Bank shall be at liberty to seek execution of the decree to the extent of the share of the guarantor ( -debtor) in the disputed property and Bank shall refund the sale proceeds of the house to the auction purchaser.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------\n \n----Ss.18(6) & 21(6)---Appeal---Maintainability---Appeal does not lie against an interlocutory order but as far as an application objecting to the sale of property by auction under the orders of the Court was concerned its dismissal was a final order\"\"--Appeal lies under S.21(6), Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 against the order passed under S.18(6) of the said Act and said application objecting to the sale clearly fell within the scope of S.18(6)(a) and an order passed therein was appealable.\n \nAccording to section 21(6) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 an appeal does not lie against an interlocutory order. But as far as the application of objecting to the sale of disputed property was concerned, its dismissal was a final order. Even according to section 21(6) of the said Act, an appeal lies against the order passed under section 18(6) of the said Act. Clause (a) of subsection (6) of section 18 contemplates investigation of claims and objections in respect of attachment or sale of any property whether mortgaged or not. The, application in the present case clearly fell within the scope of clause (a) of section 18(6) of the Act. and an order passed therein was appealable.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.47 & O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90---Execution of decree--Duty of Court---Auction of mortgaged property---Application objecting to the sale of property by auction---Applicant, in the present case had not incurred any liability in his personal capacity other than as a guarantor--¬Inaction of the applicant not to seek setting aside of the decree or to take any steps against the attachment of the disputed property, could not deprive him of his property, particularly in view of the fact that he stood surety for a maximum amount of Rs.1,32,000 and by sale of the property an amount of Rs.2,60,000 had already been realized---Decree had to be interpreted in the light of the averments of the plaint in which the liability was fixed on the applicant to the extent of the property mortgaged and for a determined amount---While litigant is required to be vigilant, an Executing Court is also not absolved of its duty to ensure that the property being sold could be lawfully put to sale---Application objecting to the sale by auction in circumstances did not attract O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90, C.P.C. but squarely fell under S.47, C.P.C. because the application related to the execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree.\n \nAl Saeed Resin (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Trust Madarabia through Trust Management Service (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore 2003 CLD 457 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.77 of 2000, heard on 4-10-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "TAJAMAL HUSSAIN \nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Attorney and 10 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13149",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1531 = 2005 SLD 1531 = 2005 CLD 50",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)--------S. 9(1)---Institution of suit by Bank ---Competence--¬Legally a Branch Manager is competent and empowered to institute suit by presenting a plaint, which shall be verified on oath by him, before the Banking Court---Any other Officer of the Bank, who is duly authorized by the Board of Directors of the Banking Company, can also institute the suit.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss. 2(a)(c)(d), (e) & 9(1)---Institution of suit in Banking Court---Competence---\"\"Banking Company\"\", \"\"Borrower\"\", \"\"Customer\"\"---Definition---Provision of S.9(1) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 empowers a \"\"borrower\"\" or a \"\"customer\"\" or a \"\"Banking Company\"\" to institute suit in the Banking Court by presenting a plaint---Nobody else, except the said three categories of persons, could file a suit before the Banking Court---Person who had neither advanced nor availed the finance would not fall within the definition of either \"\"Banking Company\"\", or the \"\"borrower\"\" or the \"\"customer\"\" and thus could not be legally impleaded in the suit.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------\n \n----S. 10---Suit for recovery of loan--Public transport financing---Application for leave to defend suit---Bank, in support of the plaints, had annexed different documents, including promissory notes, mark-up agreements, letters of hypothecation, letters of authorities and undertakings/ declarations etc said to have been executed by the applicants---Photocopies .of Registration Books in the joint names of the parties had been placed on, record---Applicants had neither denied their signatures on the said documents, nor the execution of the documents and had only made a bald assertion that the said documents were not executed in accordance with the provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Applicants had not denied the availing of the financial facility and the deposit of certain amounts, including the amount of 10% equity---Documents produced by the bank showed that the vehicles were jointly registered in the names of the Bank and the applicants---Held, applicants were not entitled to leave to defend the suit, in circumstances.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----\n \n----Ss. 7 & 9---Suit for recovery of loan---Public transport financing---Denial of execution of documents by the borrowers---Borrowers had admitted the sanctioning and availing of financial facility, initial deposit of 10% of equity amount by them, joint registration of the vehicles in the names of borrowers and the Bank and that the vehicles were parked with certain dealers---All such admissions would not commensurate with the assertion of denial of execution of documents by the borrowers---Mode adopted by the Banking Court, for itself comparing the signatures, was in accordance with law---Banking Court was empowered, under the circumstances, to itself compare the signatures of the borrowers with the material available on record for resolving the controversy---When the Banking Court had itself compared the signatures and came to the conclusion that the signatures of the borrowers were similar on all the documents, in that case, there was no need to send the documents to the Handwriting Expert, as evidence of the Handwriting Expert was neither the only nor the best method of proving the handwriting or signature of a person and was at best opinion evidence---Banking Court thus, had rightly declined to send the signatures of the borrowers, for comparison, to the Handwriting Expert and no legal error had been committed by the Banking Court, while comparing the signatures itself.\n \nMessrs Waqas Enterprises and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and ,2 others 1999 SCMR 85; Ch. Abdul Hamid v. Deputy Commissioner and others 1985 SCMR 359 and Syed Shabbir Hussain v.. The State 1968 SCMR 1126 fol.\n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----\n \n----Ss. 10, 9, 7 & 21---Suit for recovery of loan---Denial of guarantor to have signed the letters of guarantee--¬Application for leave to defend the suit---Guarantor had simply denied his signatures on the letters of guarantee without placing on record any prima facie proof to that effect, which could furnish a valid ground for the grant of leave to defend the suit to him---Mere bald denial by the guarantor of his signatures on the letters of guarantees was not a. sufficient ground for the grant of leave to defend the suit or acceptance of his appeals, unless it was shown on record that the documents were forged and fabricated and by whom.\n \nGhazala Arif v. Union Bank Ltd. (Now Emirates Bank International), Lahore 2000 CLC 1201 fol.\n \n(f) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------\n \n----Ss. 10 & 21---Leave to defend the suit---Where the applicants had comprehensively failed to raise in their leave applications, serious and bona fide disputes whereby warranting unconditional leave to defend the suits within the parameter set up under the law, Banking Court, in circumstances, while declining to grant leave to defend the suits to the applicants, did not commit any legal error, which required rectification by High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos.461 of 1999, 71 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159 and 160 of 2000, heard on 15-07-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "RUBINA JAMSHED\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13150",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1532 = 2005 SLD 1532 = 2005 CLD 83",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---------Ss.7(a)(b) & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.97 & 99---Recovery suit---Execution of decree--¬Applications by -debtors and third party seeking recalling the order of High Court whereby their property was directed to be put to sale through auction and praying for suspension of said order and stay of proceedings in the main execution petition, which was accepted---Decree-holder filed application for vacation of stay order---Validity---High Court, after recording detailed reasons, observed that -debtors were trying to use the process of law and of Court only, to defeat the and decree earlier passed against them on their admission of liability--¬Applications so filed were frivolous and were intended to obstruct rather to advance or assist the process of law and justice and were liable to be dismissed---Third party, if at all had any right in the property in question same shall only be subject to and after payment and recovery of the decretal amount to the decree-holder---Decree-holder was allowed its prayer to compete in the auction proceedings subject to the condition that its bid will not be less than the amount it had earlier conveyed to the Court auctioneers as reserve price--¬Court auctioneers will proceed to issue a fresh auction schedule and put the suit property to auction recovery of decretal amount.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.Ms. Nos.54-B, 55-B, 52-B, 62-B, 75-B and 86-B of 2004 in Execution Petition No.2 of 2004 in C.O.S. No.9 of 1997, decision dated: 10-11-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR, J",
    "": "ASKARI LEASING LTD., RAWALPINDI \nVs.\nNATIONAL FIBERS LTD. and others\nAmir Iqbal Basharat for Judgment-debtors 2 to 4."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13151",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1533 = 2005 SLD 1533 = 2005 CLD 93",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.284 & 287---Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, R.55--¬Sindh Chief Court Rules (OS), 8.953---Petition for sanction of Court for merger/amalgamation of companies---Compliance of the directions of the High Court before considering the proposed amalgamation appeared to have been fulfilled and nobody had come forward to object to same despite due publicity given to such proposal amalgamation/ merger scheme---High Court accepted the petition accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J. Miscellaneous No.67 of 2003, decision dated: 1st September 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, J",
    "": "In the matter of: A AND J APPAREL (PVT.) LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13152",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1534 = 2005 SLD 1534 = 2005 CLD 93",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.284 & 287---Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, R.55--¬Sindh Chief Court Rules (OS), 8.953---Petition for sanction of Court for merger/amalgamation of companies---Compliance of the directions of the High Court before considering the proposed amalgamation appeared to have been fulfilled and nobody had come forward to object to same despite due publicity given to such proposal amalgamation/ merger scheme---High Court accepted the petition accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J. Miscellaneous No.67 of 2003, decision dated: 1st September 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, J",
    "": "In the matter of: A AND J APPAREL (PVT.) LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13153",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1535 = 2005 SLD 1535 = 2005 CLD 95",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--------S. 19---Contract Act (X of 1872), S.128---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)---Execution of decree---Liability of guarantor--Petitioner being guarantor was aggrieved of execution proceedings initiated against him---Plea raised by the petitioner was that before first proceeding against the principal debtor, no proceedings should have been initiated against him---Validity---Having given undertaking regarding guarantee, it was not open for the petitioner to wriggle out of it and raise such plea---Liability of surety under S.128 of Contract Act; 1872, was co-extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it was otherwise provided by the contract--In absence of any specific stipulation in the contract of loan or any other consideration of equity a guarantor could not take up the plea as raised by the petitioner---Bank had granted loan only on the guarantee and in absence of letter/contract of guarantee the bank might not have sanctioned the loan---Leave to appeal was refused.\n \nGhulam Mustafa. Jatoi v. Additional District and Sessions Judge/Returning Officer, N.A. 158 Naushero Feroze and others 1994 PSC 751 and The Bank of Bihar Ltd., v. Dr. Damodar Prasad and another AIR 1969 SC 297 distinguished.\n \nUnited Bank Ltd. v. Haji Bawa Company Ltd. and 3 others 1981 CLC 89; National Bank of Pakistan v. F.S. Aitzazuddin and 2 others PLD 1982 Kar. 577; Messrs. U.B.L. v. Messrs Sindh Tech. Industries Ltd. and others 1998 CLC 1152; Mrs. Muhammad Shafi through Agent v. Sultan Ahmed 2000 CLC 85 and Habib Bank Limited v. Malik Atta Muhammad and 4 others 2000 CLC 451 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 233-L of 2003, decision dated: 4-08-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR AND TASSADUQ HUSSAIN, JILANI, JJ",
    "": "RAFIQUE HAZQUEL MASIH\nVs.\nBANK ALFALAH LTD. and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13154",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1536 = 2005 SLD 1536 = 2005 CLD 114",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance (L of 2000)---------Ss.10(1) & 19---Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962), Ss.2 & 25---Reference of dispute to Verification Committee by Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation (CIRC)---Scope---CIRC, incorporated as a Corporation could not act as Banking Company for carrying on its business, but provisions applicable to borrowers of respective Banks would continue to apply thereto--¬Principles.\n \nMuhammad Haroon v. The Crown PLD 1951 FC 118 and Inspector General of Police v. Mushtaq Ahmed Warraich PLD 1985 SC 159 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S.25---Circular of State Bank---Validity---Such circular would have force of law.\n \nHashwani Hotels Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 315 fol.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---Ss.15(11) & 27---Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance (L of 2000), Ss.10(1) & 19---State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29, dated 15-10-2002, Cls. 7 & 9(iii)---Suit by borrower against Bank---Reference of dispute by Banking Court to Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation (CIRC) for its settlement in terms of State Bank Circular No.29 dated 15-10-2002---Expiry of time for approaching and availing benefit under \"\"CIRC Settlement Scheme\"\"---Effect---CIRC through such Scheme had invited f6r settlement against non-performance assets in line with State Bank Circular No.25---Once policy was announced and advertised through public notice, then all subsequent matters would have to be dealt with in line with such Circular---Question of pick and choose would not arise with regard to respective clauses of Circular, which would be applied in its entirety---Plaintiff had taken steps necessary to avail benefit under such Circular within time prior to expiry of date for availing benefit---Plaintiff had shown his bona fides by depositing 10% amount in Court--¬Such Scheme specifically referred to action in line with said Circular---Delay, if any, was not attributable to plaintiff, who would be dealt with in same manner and in accordance with same guidelines, whether application was made to Bank or CIRC, both parties to suit---Plaintiff could not be deprived of benefit under such Scheme---In order to avoid further dispute between parties, appointment of Valuer might be made by State Bank in pursuance of S.10(1) of Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance, 2000 in line with State Bank Circular No.25--¬CIRC might withdraw such amount of 10% within 30 days of finalization of valuation or earlier, if agreement for settlement under such Scheme was arrived at and executed between parties---Banking Court modified its order of reference of dispute to CIRC accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-86 of 2001, decision dated: 2-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERWEZ, J",
    "": "TANYA KNITWEAR (PVT.) LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13155",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1537 = 2005 SLD 1537 = 2005 CLD 120",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--------Ss.10 & 17---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)--¬Suit for recovery of loan amount--Liability to pay outstanding claim of Bank not denied by defendant in application for leave to defend, suit---Suit decreed by Banking Court was upheld by High Court---Plea of defendant was that claim of Bank was based on blank papers, which were inadmissible in evidence under law, thus, no decree could be based thereon ---Validity--¬Defendant in leave application had not denied his liability to satisfy claim of Bank---Non-disputing liability by defendant would be sufficient to draw conclusion that decree had been passed on admissible documents---Payment of 50% decretal amount by defendant would show that he had started satisfying decree---No point of public importance was involved in case---Supreme Court dismissed petition.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 332-L of 2004, decision dated: 8-07-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY AND FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, JJ",
    "": "SMOOTH PHARMACEUTICALS (PVT.) and others\nVs.\nBANK OF KHYBER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13156",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1538 = 2005 SLD 1538 = 2005 CLD 122",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinances (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.3, 17, 21 & 22---Suit for recovery of amount---Award of costs and funds--- Suit filed by respondent-Corporation in the capacity of customer of appellant/financial institution was decreed in full with costs and costs of funds from the date of default till realization---Grievance of appellant financial institution was only in respect of awarding of costs of funds which, according to it, could not have been awarded by Banking Court---Validity---Banking Court under S.3(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was empowered to award costs of funds in favour of financial institutions and such privilege or benefit had not been conferred by statute to customer---Impugned and decree of Banking Court to the extent of awarding of costs of funds in favour of respondent/customer, was liable to be set aside, however, to meet the ends of justice case was .remanded to Banking Court to decide within specified period whether in addition to money decree and costs of suit which was maintained, respondent/ customer was also entitled for any further sums towards compensation/mark-up/interest from date appellant had committed default in fulfillment of other obligations or for any other period.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.91 of 2002, decision dated: 1st April, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs LONG TERM VENTURE CAPITAL MODARABA\nVs.\nMessrs STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13157",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1539 = 2005 SLD 1539 = 2005 CLD 126",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---------Ss.7, 9 & 21---Bdnking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), Ss.5, 6 & 9---Contention of the appellant was that suits were filed by the Bank before an incompetent Tribunal (Banking Tribunal), therefore the same could not be transferred by operation of law before the Banking Court, as such s and decrees of the Banking Court are without 'lawful authority---Validity---Held, parties were bound by their pleadings---Appellant having not taken a single ground in the grounds of appeal before the High Court that Banking Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter, plea of the appellant was not sustainable.\n \nMst. Murid Begum v. Muhammad Rafiq PLD 1974 SC 322 fol.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----\n \n----Ss.15, 21, 10, 7 & 9---Appeal---Operative part of the and decree of the Banking Court along with grounds of application for leave to appear and defend the suits made it clear that the Banking Court had passed the impugned and decrees without application of mind which was condition precedent that the judicial officer had to pass the s and decrees after application of mind---High Court accepted the appeals, set aside the impugned decrees and remanded the cases to the Banking Court to decide the same afresh in terms of directions accordingly.\n \nChenab Cement's case PLD 1996 Lah. 572; Soneri Bank Ltd. v. Raja Weaving Mills KLR 1997 CC 742; U.B.L. v. Hinna Export Company 1998 PSC 7,8; Messrs Sind Tech. Industries v. Messrs Investment Corporation 1998 SCMR 1533; A. Habib Ahmad v. Hongkong Banking Company 1999 CLC 1953; Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. A.B.L. 2002 CLD 759; Muhammad Umar Tarar v. Judge Banking Court 2002 CLD 1663; Equity Participation Fund v. Messrs Pakistan Mobile 2003 CLD 206; Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. A.B.L. 2003 CLD 952; Tri-Star Polyester Ltd. v. Citibank 2001 PSC 57; Pakland Cement Company v. Citibank 2001 SCMR 1341; Muhammad Umar v. Muqarab Khan 1968 SCMR 983; Fine Textile Mills Ltd. v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163; Muhammad Ramzan v. Citibank NA 2001 CLC 158; Ghazala Arif v. Union Bank 2000 CLC 1201; Messrs U.B.L. v. Redco Textile Ltd. 2000 CLC 968; M.C.B. Ltd. v. Rizwan Textile Mills 1998 MLD 529; National Bank of Pakistan v. Muhammad Ashraf Sanik PLD 1987 Lah. 17; U.B.L. v. Central Cotton Mills Ltd. 2001 MLD 78; U.B.L. v. Mian Aftab Ahmad 2001 MLD 1332; Ghulam Sarwar v. National Bank 2001 CLC 522; ANZ Grindlays Bank v. Saadi Cement Company PLD 2001 Kar. 2017; Qatar Airways PLC v. ANZ Grindlays Bank 2000 CLC 1455; First Grindlays Modaraba v. Pakland Cement 2000 CLC 2017; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs West Pakistan Tanks 2000 CLC 896; Mst. Murid Begum v. Muhammad Rafiq PLD 1974 SC 322; Tariq Shahbaz Chaudhry v. Bank of Punjab 2004 CLD 207; Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller of Import and Export PLD 1970 SC 158; Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan . PLD 1970 SC 173; PLD 1970 SC 158; PLD 1970 SC 173; Messrs Airport Support Services' Case 1998 SCMR 2268; Agrofoster (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Judge Banking Court PLD 1999 Kar. 398; Citibank v. Tariq Mohsin PLD 1999 Kar. 196; Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Marvi Laboratories 1999 MLD 3456; National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Buildings PLD 1998 Kar. 302; Nasimuddin Sidiqui v. U.B.L. 1998 CLC 1718; U.B.L. v. Sind Tech Industries 1998 CLC 1152; A.B.L. v. Mehran Oils Mills PLD 1988 Kar. 360; A.B.L. v. Messrs Kassam Corporation 1987 MLD 742; Haji Ali Khan v. A.B.L. 1992 CLC 1996 and Trustees of Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213 ref.\n \n(c) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---\n \n----S.24-A---Public functionaries are obliged to pass the order even on the executive side with reasons.\n \nMessrs. Airport Support Services' case 1998 SCMR 2268 ref.\n \n(d) Administration of justice---\n \n---- Each and every case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos. 104 to 107 of 1999, heard on 6-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SUN RISE TEXTILE LTD and 7 others\nVs.\nPRIME COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through VicEPresident"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13158",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1540 = 2005 SLD 1540 = 2005 CLD 165",
    "Key Words:": "Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)-------S.41---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.52--- Execution of decree----Bona fide purchaser---Onus to prove---Purchase of property without original documents---Effect---Disputed property was mortgaged with bank on 30-12-1985 and the same was purchased by the objector on 26-4-1987 from the owner---During execution proceedings, the objector filed objection on the ground that he was the bona fide purchaser of the property---Objection petition was dismissed by Executing Court---Plea raised by the objector was that the protection of S.41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was available to him---Validity---Objector had purchased the property without obtaining the original title documents from the owner thus he failed to prove that the property was purchased in good faith and without making reasonable inquiries in order to get valid title qua the property in question---Case of the objector did not fall under the provisions of S.41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882---It was the duty of objector to prove that the transfer was for consideration and transferee had acted bona fide and in good faith---All such ingredients must concomitantly exist otherwise principle enunciated in S.41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, could not apply---Protection of S.41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was available to transferee of the property who purchased the same after reasonable care---High Court declined to interfere with the order passed by Executing Court ---Appeal was dismissed in limine.\n \nTarachand Mondal and others v. Hazari Shaikh and another PLD 1967 Dacca 203; Syed Sajid Ali Asif through legal heirs v. Mumtaz Ahmad and 3 others PLD 1993 Kar. 520; Sattar Muhammad and 2 ethers v. Hussain and 3 others PLD 1988 Pesh. 48; Ilahi Bakhsh and others v. Hassan Khan and others PLD 1966 (W.P.) Lah. 654; Riazul Hassan v. Muhammad Ayub Khan and another 1991 SCMR 2513; Ilam Din and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 4 others 1984 CLC 221 and Mst. Noor-un-Nisa and another v. Ghulam Sarwar and 6 others 1994 SCMR 2087 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A.O. No.415 of 2004, decision dated: 12-10-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ANWAR KHAN\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13159",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1541 = 2005 SLD 1541 = 2005 CLD 169",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.22(6), 15(11) & 19(7)(c)---Appeal---Scope---Sale of mortgaged property---Execution of decree---Provision of S.22(6) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 restricts the right of appeal but is ex facie not- applicable to orders passed under S.15(11) or 19(7) of the Ordinance---Section 15(11) explicitly refers to disputes relating to sale of mortgaged properties while S.19(7)(c) stipulates that the Banking Court, may, in its discretion, proceed with the sale of mortgaged property if in its opinion the interest of justice so required---Such an order being a final order would be appealable.\n \n(b) Review---\n \n----Scope---Power of review, if available, is not dependant upon the absence of right to appeal.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----S.27---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R.90 & S.12(2)---Banking Court could set aside a sale under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. notwithstanding the bar of S.27, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--¬Principles.\n \nBaghpotee Services (Pvt Ltd v. Allied Bank Ltd 2001 CLC 1363 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.27, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90 & O.XLVII---Execution of decree for sale of mortgaged property---Review application---Provision of O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. provides that an application can only be entertained when the applicant deposits such amount as may be directed by the Court---By moving the Court under O.XLVII, C.P.C. the applicant in the present case, successfully avoided such order of deposit being made and-neither the application nor the impugned order nor the memo of appeal itself showed that at any stage such deposit was volunteered---Fact that a wrong provision of law was invoked due to bona fide error was doubtful, Court therefore was .justified in treating the application as one of review simpliciter under O.XLVII, C.P.C.---Mere reference to a wrong provision of law was inconsequential and the Court was always expected to consider the substance rather than mere form of the application.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.15, 19 & 27---Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance (L of 2000), S.32---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90---Execution of decree--Sale of mortgaged property---Application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C.---Rights and remedies of Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation---Scope--Exclusive jurisdiction of Banking Court could be invoked in such matter. -\n \nSubsection (1) of section 32 of Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance, 2000 provides that in respect of any Non Performing Assets, held by the Corporation it shall be entitled to exercise all rights and remedies available under several laws relating to Banking and the Companies Ordinance and its subsection (3) provides that all acts in exercise of the powers under the Ordinance and the remedies available thereunder shall be performed and pursued in accordance with the provisions of law mentioned in subsection (1). Moreover subsection (2) explicitly declares that the Corporation shall -be entitled to the rights, interest, benefits and privileges of the financial institutions and will also be subject to the legal liability, if any, of such institutions. Exclusive jurisdiction of a Banking Court in such matters could be invoked.\n \n(f) Non-Performing Assets And Rehabilitation of Industrial Undertakings (Legal Proceedings) Ordinance (LVIII of 2000)------\n \n----Ss.4, 5, 6 & 8---Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance (L of 2000), Preamble---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90---Application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C.---Procedure and powers of High Court--¬Scope.\n \nUnder section 4 of Non Performing Assets and Rehabilitation of Industrial Undertakings (Legal Proceedings) Ordinance, 2000 all proceedings relating to matters to which the Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance, 2000 applied were exclusively triable by the High Court and under section 6 even execution proceedings pending before a Banking Court were liable to be transferred to the High Court. It does. not necessarily mean that the High Court can only exercise its original civil jurisdiction and the provisions of the -Banking Laws would not apply. Section 5 which deals with the powers and procedure of the High Court explicitly mentions in clause b(iii) that in exercise of its Banking jurisdiction it will follow the procedure and have the powers of a Banking Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances), Act, 1997 (which now stands replaced) by the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001. Moreover section 8 requires that when proceedings are transferred to the High Court under section 6 they are to be pursued under the respective laws under which they were originally filed.\n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.7(6) & 2(b)---Non-Performing Assets and Rehabilitation of Industrial Undertakings (Legal Proceedings) Ordinance (LVIII of 2000), S.8---,Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance (L of 2000), S.32---Prior to the promulgation of ,Corporation and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance, 2000 the matter in the present case was proceeding under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 and fair assumption was that non performing assets were taken over by the Industrial Restructuring Corporation---Such proceedings continued under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 in view of S.32, Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance, 2000 and S.8 of the Non-Performing Assets and Rehabilitation of Industrial Undertakings (Legal Proceedings) Ordinance, 2000 and upon the promulgation of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 such proceedings were deemed to be transferred to the Banking Court under S. 7(6) of the said Ordinance---Expression \"\"Banking Court\"\" under S.2(b) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 includes a High Court in respect of claims exceeding Rs.50 Million, therefore the proceedings were always pending before the High, Curt, but in exercise of its Banking Court jurisdiction.\n \n(h) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.7, 12, 15, 17 & 27--Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90---Execution of decree--Sale of mortgaged property---Application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C.---Scope--¬Irregularity in the sale was noticed inasmuch as separate sealed tenders were invited but eventually both the properties were sold on the basis of single consolidated. offer---Question was whether the irregularity was material and of such nature which would vitiate the sale---Held, every sale was not liable to be set aside on account of fraud or irregularity, sale could be set aside only when it had been shown that the irregularity was material and had caused serious injury to the applicant---Any deviation from the terms of public notice, in circumstances, was justified.\n \nAsma Zafarul Hassan v. UBL 1981 SCMR 108 ref.\n \n(i) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.7, 15 & 27---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90---Confirmation of sale of mortgaged property--¬Application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C.---Court, apart from protecting interests of the decree holders and debtors is - also required to protect the interests of third parties acquired before confirmation of sale---Such sale could not be declared to be void ab initio for want of notice to the applicant, there being no statutory provision in that regard.\n \nAsma Zafarul Hassan v. UBL 1981 SCMR 108.; Collector of Sahiwal v. Muhammad Akhtar 1971 SCMR 681 and Sindh Employees Social Security Institution v. Dawood Cotton Mill PLD 1977 SC 177 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C. A. No.97 of 2004, heard on 5th July. 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND MUHAMMAD AFZAL SOOMRO, JJ",
    "": "P.Q. CHEMICALS--Applicant\nVs.\nA.W. BROTHERS and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13160",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1542 = 2005 SLD 1542 = 2005 CLD 186",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--------Ss.19(7) & 22(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58 & O.XLI, R.5---Enough evidence in the shape of receipts had been filed before the Banking Court to show the ownership of attached movable property---Prima facie, such property belonged to the appellant and Banking Court did not have any power or lien to take action against such property---High Court directed that Banking Court shall not take further action regarding such property till the next date of hearing.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 55 of 2004, decision dated: 18-11-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY AND AMIR HANI MUSLIM, JJ",
    "": "Mst. IRSHAD YAMIN\nVs.\nCITI BANK N.A. and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13161",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1543 = 2005 SLD 1543 = 2005 CLD 187",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---------S.21---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Appeal--¬Limitation---Condonation of delay---Suit file was kept by the Presiding Officer of the Banking Court in his Chambers for more than eight months and thereafter, without any notice of any date of hearing in the suit or intimating the parties concerned about pronouncement of , same was announced after eight months---In circumstances which were borne out from the record duly supported by the assertion of the appellant in his supporting affidavit and the rejoinder thereto, appellant had succeeded to make out his case for condonation of delay in filing appeal---No party shall be made to suffer due to the act or omission of the Court in the performance of its duties.\n \n(b) Act of Court---\n \n---- No party shall be made to suffer due to the act or omission of the Court in the performance of its duties.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----\n \n----Ss.15, 18 & 21---Suit was decreed against the defendants including the appellant---Appellant was neither the guarantor nor he had executed any document in his personal capacity, to share the liability of the company¬ Letters of hypothecation and letter of memorandum of deposit of title deeds were signed by the Directors of the company including the appellant---Such documents, indeed had been signed by the appellant but in his capacity as Director of the, Company, therefore, on the basis of said two documents the liability of the company could not be shifted to appellant in his personal capacity---Liability of the company could not ipso facto fall upon its Directors, who had no personal liability upon execution of documents on behalf of the company unless they had stood guarantors or executed other documents undertaking such liability as their personal liability in any capacity---Judgment and decree, to the extent it created any liability against the appellant, was set aside by the High Court---Rights created in favour of the decree-holder Bank on the basis of letter of hypothecation and memorandum of deposit of title deeds however shall remain enforced.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.24 of 2001, decision dated: 18-02-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, JJ",
    "": "SAADAT HAYAT KHAN\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13162",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1544 = 2005 SLD 1544 = 2005 CLD 192",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.7 & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XVII, R.1--¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Grant of adjournment---Discretion of Court---Banking Court had discretion to grant adjournment either conditional or unconditional---Witness, in the present case, having come from Rawalpindi to Karachi, adjournment was rightly granted conditionally subject to costs to meet traveling expenses of witness---Discretion having properly been exercised by the Court, same could not be disturbed under Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.7 & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)-----Application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Maintainability--¬Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was maintainable in proceedings emanating from Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C. P. No. 629 of 2003, decision dated: 12-05-2004, hearing DATE : 12-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "AHMED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY through ATTORNEY\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD., Karachi High Court and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13163",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1545 = 2005 SLD 1545 = 2005 CLD 193",
    "Key Words:": "Contract Act (IX of 1872)------S.52---Breach of contract---Suit fog damages by customer against Bank---Plaintiff had claimed that the failure of the Bank to abide by the Financial Settlement Agreement was a material breach that went to the very root of the restructuring and the consideration thereof and such breach by the Bank of the Financial Settlement Agreement had resulted in substantial losses to the plaintiff and it sought various reliefs in that behalf---Validity---Obligations of the customer, specified in the Agreement Were conditions precedent to the performance of any obligations on the part of the Bank---Order in which said obligations were to be performed was very clearly specified in the Agreement--¬Agreement also laid down the time frame in which the customer was required to comply with the said conditions precedent---Provision of S.52, Contract Act, 1872 provided that reciprocal promises had to be performed in the order in which it was expressly fixed by the contract---Customer had failed to comply with the conditions precedent and therefore the question of the Bank allowing any concession to the customer under the Agreement did not arise--Bank, in circumstances, was within its rights not to allow the creation of the charge or to open the L/C---Bank could not unilaterally abide by the terms of the Agreement when the customer had committed repeated acts of default of the Agreement---Bank had already restructured the facility twice before and present was the third restructuring agreed in term of the Financial Settlement Agreement---Main principle for the award of damages was that the same should be proved with certainty which the customer had failed to do---Suit of the customer was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMacgregor on Damages 14th Edn., paras.861 and 862; Law of Damages and Compensation by C. Rao 3rd Edition Page.676; Unreported dated 4-12-2000 in suit No.753 of 1995; Azeem. Food Industries Ltd. v. IDBP 1999 CLC 1915; S.L.I. Corp. Pak v. Bibojee Services Ltd. 1999 MLD 2750; Messrs Vinder Textile Mills Ltd. v. IDBP 1999 YLR 1188; Federation of Pakistan v. Messrs Al-Farooq Flour Mills Ltd. 2000 CLC 215; W.P. LDC v. Aziz Qureshi PLD 1973 SC 222; Muhammad Shafi v. Allah Dad Khan PLD 1986 SC 519; Sandoz Limited 1995 SCMR 1431; Syed Ahmed Saeed Kirmani v. MCB Ltd. 1993 SCMR 441 and Bashir Hussain Siddiqui v. Pan Islamic Steamship Co. Ltd. PLD 1967 222 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suits Nos.375 of 2000 and B-16 of 2001, decision dated: 21st March, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALVI, J",
    "": "BILAL SPINNING MILLS LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nBANK ALFALAH LIMITED through Chief Executive--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13164",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1546 = 2005 SLD 1546 = 2005 CLD 193",
    "Key Words:": "Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S.52---Breach of contract---Suit fog damages by customer against Bank---Plaintiff had claimed that the failure of the Bank to abide by the Financial Settlement Agreement was a material breach that went to the very root of the restructuring and the consideration thereof and such breach by the Bank of the Financial Settlement Agreement had resulted in substantial losses to the plaintiff and it sought various reliefs in that behalf---Validity---Obligations of the customer, specified in the Agreement Were conditions precedent to the performance of any obligations on the part of the Bank---Order in which said obligations were to be performed was very clearly specified in the Agreement--¬Agreement also laid down the time frame in which the customer was required to comply with the said conditions precedent---Provision of S.52, Contract Act, 1872 provided that reciprocal promises had to be performed in the order in which it was expressly fixed by the contract---Customer had failed to comply with the conditions precedent and therefore the question of the Bank allowing any concession to the customer under the Agreement did not arise--Bank, in circumstances, was within its rights not to allow the creation of the charge or to open the L/C---Bank could not unilaterally abide by the terms of the Agreement when the customer had committed repeated acts of default of the Agreement---Bank had already restructured the facility twice before and present was the third restructuring agreed in term of the Financial Settlement Agreement---Main principle for the award of damages was that the same should be proved with certainty which the customer had failed to do---Suit of the customer was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMacgregor on Damages 14th Edn., paras.861 and 862; Law of Damages and Compensation by C. Rao 3rd Edition Page.676; Unreported dated 4-12-2000 in suit No.753 of 1995; Azeem. Food Industries Ltd. v. IDBP 1999 CLC 1915; S.L.I. Corp. Pak v. Bibojee Services Ltd. 1999 MLD 2750; Messrs Vinder Textile Mills Ltd. v. IDBP 1999 YLR 1188; Federation of Pakistan v. Messrs Al-Farooq Flour Mills Ltd. 2000 CLC 215; W.P. LDC v. Aziz Qureshi PLD 1973 SC 222; Muhammad Shafi v. Allah Dad Khan PLD 1986 SC 519; Sandoz Limited 1995 SCMR 1431; Syed Ahmed Saeed Kirmani v. MCB Ltd. 1993 SCMR 441 and Bashir Hussain Siddiqui v. Pan Islamic Steamship Co. Ltd. PLD 1967 222 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suits Nos.375 of 2000 and B-16 of 2001, decision dated: 21st March, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALVI, J",
    "": "BILAL SPINNING MILLS LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nBANK ALFALAH LIMITED through Chief Executive--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13165",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1547 = 2005 SLD 1547 = 2005 CLD 236",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.14, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66, 69, 89 & 90---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property---Application under O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90, C.P.C. by the Judgment-debtors---Consideration of such application by the executing Court ---Principles--¬Proclamation, though did not specify the amount to be recovered yet the -debtors had deposited in shape of a Bank draft of the amount which was claimed in execution petition---Judgment-debtors had also undertaken to pay any additional amount due as determined by the executing Court under the decree and had also undertaken to deposit 5% of the bid money---Such an application, held, lay as a matter of right and the only constraint to consider the application was that the -debtor had also moved an application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. and in accordance with the provisions of O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C., the -debtors were not entitled to prosecute the application under R.90 of O.XXI, C.P.C. but were entitled to a choice to prosecute one of the two applications---Even if the application under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. was deficient insmuch as, that with the said application 5% of the bid moneys for payment to the purchaser was not deposited, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, when another property of the -debtors had already been sold for a sum Which was not disputed, the -debtors were prepared to discharge the entire liability in accordance with orders of the Court and their bona fides to discharge the entire liability, consideration of the said application could be deferred till the deposit of 5% of the sale price by the -debtors and the executing Court could direct deposit of 5% of the purchase money as offered by the -debtors---Such an application could even be considered under the inherent powers of the Court---Under O.XXI, R.69, C.P.C., an executing Court had, in its discretion, necessary power to adjourn the sale and such a power would be available to an Executing Court, even After the sale before the same was confirmed for the simple reason that a Court sale unless confirmed remained inchoate---All the rules in C.P.C. were intended to secure proper administration of justice, it was therefore, imperative that said Rules should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose rather than be allowed to operate as a tyrant master.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.14, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66 & 90---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property---Application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. by the -debtors---Issuance of proclamation and dispatch of notice to the -debtors under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C.--¬Necessity---Neither there was any copy of the notice on the record nor there was any postal receipt therein---No proclamation was drawn up by the Court as required under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C., there was an unsigned paper in the record of the Trial Court describing the conditions of the auction which was a printed pro forma and blanks had been filled in, in ink which was not signed by the Trial Judge---Provisions of O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C., in circumstances, were not complied with.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.14, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66 & 90---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property---Issuance of proclamation---Public notice of the auction by the Court auctioneers had to be issued in a newspaper of the place where the property was situated.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.14, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66 & 90---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property--Issuance of proclamation---Amount to be recovered by the sale of property was not indicated in the public notice by the Court auctioneer---Effect.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------\n \n----Ss.14, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 90 & 60---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property---Application by -debtors under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. supported by a number of affidavits to the effect that the Court auctioneers did not visit the spot and auction was conducted at the places which were not mortgaged with the Bank (decree-holder)---Banking Court had taken the view that since the proceedings of the Court auctioneers were signed by one of the -debtors, auction must have been held at the spot---Validity---Such a matter being a seriously disputed matter could only be resolved by the recording of evidence and not summarily as was done by the executing Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A. O. No. 115 of 2003, heard on 10-11-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ASIF BROTHERS, JHANG SADDAR through Sole Proprietor and another\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13166",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1548 = 2005 SLD 1548 = 2005 CLD 236",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.14, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66, 69, 89 & 90---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property---Application under O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90, C.P.C. by the Judgment-debtors---Consideration of such application by the executing Court ---Principles--¬Proclamation, though did not specify the amount to be recovered yet the -debtors had deposited in shape of a Bank draft of the amount which was claimed in execution petition---Judgment-debtors had also undertaken to pay any additional amount due as determined by the executing Court under the decree and had also undertaken to deposit 5% of the bid money---Such an application, held, lay as a matter of right and the only constraint to consider the application was that the -debtor had also moved an application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. and in accordance with the provisions of O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C., the -debtors were not entitled to prosecute the application under R.90 of O.XXI, C.P.C. but were entitled to a choice to prosecute one of the two applications---Even if the application under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. was deficient insmuch as, that with the said application 5% of the bid moneys for payment to the purchaser was not deposited, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, when another property of the -debtors had already been sold for a sum Which was not disputed, the -debtors were prepared to discharge the entire liability in accordance with orders of the Court and their bona fides to discharge the entire liability, consideration of the said application could be deferred till the deposit of 5% of the sale price by the -debtors and the executing Court could direct deposit of 5% of the purchase money as offered by the -debtors---Such an application could even be considered under the inherent powers of the Court---Under O.XXI, R.69, C.P.C., an executing Court had, in its discretion, necessary power to adjourn the sale and such a power would be available to an Executing Court, even After the sale before the same was confirmed for the simple reason that a Court sale unless confirmed remained inchoate---All the rules in C.P.C. were intended to secure proper administration of justice, it was therefore, imperative that said Rules should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose rather than be allowed to operate as a tyrant master.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.14, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66 & 90---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property---Application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. by the -debtors---Issuance of proclamation and dispatch of notice to the -debtors under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C.--¬Necessity---Neither there was any copy of the notice on the record nor there was any postal receipt therein---No proclamation was drawn up by the Court as required under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C., there was an unsigned paper in the record of the Trial Court describing the conditions of the auction which was a printed pro forma and blanks had been filled in, in ink which was not signed by the Trial Judge---Provisions of O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C., in circumstances, were not complied with.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.14, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66 & 90---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property---Issuance of proclamation---Public notice of the auction by the Court auctioneers had to be issued in a newspaper of the place where the property was situated.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----Ss.14, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66 & 90---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property--Issuance of proclamation---Amount to be recovered by the sale of property was not indicated in the public notice by the Court auctioneer---Effect.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------\n \n----Ss.14, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 90 & 60---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property---Application by -debtors under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. supported by a number of affidavits to the effect that the Court auctioneers did not visit the spot and auction was conducted at the places which were not mortgaged with the Bank (decree-holder)---Banking Court had taken the view that since the proceedings of the Court auctioneers were signed by one of the -debtors, auction must have been held at the spot---Validity---Such a matter being a seriously disputed matter could only be resolved by the recording of evidence and not summarily as was done by the executing Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A. O. No. 115 of 2003, heard on 10-11-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ASIF BROTHERS, JHANG SADDAR through Sole Proprietor and another\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13167",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1549 = 2005 SLD 1549 = 2005 CLD 244",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10---Leave to defend---Court had to be guided by main rationale behind the law and not to oust defendant from the trial when he had an arguable case---If there is any dearth of material or lapse on the part of serious contender of an arguable case, in the absence of any format of any application for leave to defend, the dictates of justice will require that he be confronted with the question of showing a sufficient cause and if he does not, Court is then obliged to proceed in refusing to grant the leave, but not otherwise--¬Principles---Where the Banking Court had passed a decree without fulfilling the envisaged judicial requirements in requiring the defendant to show a sufficient cause, High Court in appeal set aside the decree and directed that the defendant be allowed leave to defend and remitted the case to the Banking Court for proceeding further on merits and in accordance with law.\n \nAccording to section 10(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 in case of failure in complying with the requirements of sections 10(3), 10(4) and 10(5) of the said Ordinance petition for leave to defend is to be rejected. But there is also a proviso in the words that in case the defendant discloses a sufficient cause explaining his inability to comply with such requirement the application under S.10(6) is not to be rejected summarily. This obviously means that a Court has not to come to the conclusion with respect to the non-fulfillment of the conditions laid in section 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 on the basis of what may be prima facie but has also to look at the defendant's sufficient cause.\n \nIn the Civil Procedure Code where suits are instituted upon bills of exchange, promissory notes etc. and under the provisions of Order XXXVII the procedure for leave to defend a suit is given in Order XXXVII, rule 3 which lays down the requirements both legal and formal for this purpose by referring to the form given in the appendix to the Civil Procedure Code.\n \nThe Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, does borrow the idea of a summary trial in financial matters from Civil Procedure Code. But its author, failed to persevere in providing a format to be followed on the procedural side for purposes of filing a petition for leave to defend. Consequently it was left for the case-law to fill in the needs as the law developed. This is the main reason why we have to view the provisions of \"\"sufficient cause\"\" reflected in section 10(6) of Ordinance most seriously.\n \nThe stage when a leave to defend is being sought is not a stage where an action is being tried. A Court at such a stage is required to see whether there was a bona fide allegation of a triable issue, which was not illusory and was plausible.\n \nOne cannot attribute an intention to the legislature of creating a discrimination between Banking Company and a borrower on laying down conditions as are required under sections 10(3) and 10(4) with a blindfold because the intention of the legislature is manifest and its purpose is clear in curbing the trial of illusory, sham and frivolous allegations now quite common in the litigious system. The legislature gave a prescription for weeding out this at the very outset in financial matters because a major portion of financial transaction as covered by Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was to be backed by proper documentation.\n \nTherefore, at the stage of leave to defend whereas, the Court has to be guided by main rationale behind the law. It is not to oust a defendant from the trial when he has an arguable case.\n \nIf there is any dearth of material or lapse on the part of a serious contender of an arguable case, in the absence of any format of an application for leave to defend, the dictates of justice will require that he be confronted with the question of showing a sufficient cause and if he does not a Court is then obliged to proceed in refusing to grant the leave, but not otherwise.\n \nBanking Court had passed a decree without fulfilling the envisaged judicial requirements in requiring the defendant to show a sufficient cause, High Court, in appeal set aside the decree and directed that the defendant be allowed the leave to defend and remitted the case to the Banking Court for proceeding further on merits and in accordance with law.\n \nMessrs C.M. Textile Mills Limited v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587; Fine Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163; Muhammad Anwar v. Hoechst Pharmaceutical Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 1989 MLD 171; Muhammad Arif v. Abdul Qayyum 1991 CLC 442; Sarang v. Haji Mahmood NLR 1994 AC 658; Messrs ARK Industrial Management Ltd. v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited PLD 1991 SC 976; Messrs National Security Insurance Company Limited and others v. Messrs Hoechst Pakistan Limited and others 1992 SCMR 718; Messrs Kohinoor Textile Mills Limited v. Messrs Gliaro ,Textile Mills Limited PLD 1986 Kar. 157(2); Fateh Lal v. Sunder Lal AIR 1980 Rajasthan 220; Anil Gupta v. Messrs Sant Ram Dhuper and Co. and another AIR 1977 Del. 164; Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh AIR 1958 SC 321 (V 45 Complainant 52) and K. V. Periyamiyana Marakayar and Sons v. P.K. Subramania Aiyar and others AIR 1924 Mad. 612 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 119 of 2003, heard on 2-11-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN AND RUSTAM ALI MALIK, JJ",
    "": "Messrs TAXILA COTTON MILLS LTD and 10 others\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD. and 4 others."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13168",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1550 = 2005 SLD 1550 = 2005 CLD 255",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872) Ss.2(d) & 25(1)(2), (3) Contract without consideration is void unless it comes under any of the exceptions set out in S.25(1)(2)(3) of the Contract Act, 1872 Encashment of the guarantees can form consideration under S.2(d) of the Contract Act, 1872 Past consideration is no consideration.\n \nHabib Bank Limited v. Shamim Qureshi PLD 1988 Kar.481; Anwarul Haq v. State Oil Company Limited 1993 CLC 1565; Abdul Karim Jaffarani v. United Bank Limited and 2 others 1984 SCMR 568; Pervaiz Akhter and another v. The Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and 4 others PLD 1990 SC 681; Messrs Tribal Friends Co. v. Province of Balochistan 2002 SCMR 1903 and Ghulam Ali and 2 others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 ref.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872) \n \n S.25 Promise Consideration Conditions necessary to constitute a promise enlisted Provision of S.25, Contract Act, 1872 does not require that in the writing itself the consideration should be described as past service or past debt, when in fact it was such past service or past debt and was rendered or paid as such.\n \nThe conditions necessary to constitute a promise within section 25 of the Contract Act, 1872 are: \n \n(a) that it should be in writing,\n \n(b) be signed by the person to be party therewith,\n \n(c) be a promise to compensate a person wholly or in part who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor.\n \n(d) be a promise to pay wholly or in part a debt, of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law on the limitation of suits.\n \nIt does not require that in the writing itself the consideration should be described as past service or past debt, when in fact it was such past service or past debt and was rendered or paid as such.\n \nKasturchand Jiwaji v. Manekchand Devchand AIR 1943 Bom. 447 ref.\n \n(c) Contract Act (IX of 1872) \n \n Ss.25(2) & 2(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss.3(2) & 7 Payment made on guarantee by the Bank Scope of 5.25(2), Contract Act, 1872 Provision of S.25(2) covers cases where a person without the knowledge of the promisor, or otherwise than at his request, does the latter some service and the promisor undertakes to recompense him for it In such cases promise does not need a consideration to support it Promise does not revive a dead right but resuscitates the remedy to enforce payment by suit Right of the lender to receive payment and obligation of the borrower to repay never dies by lapse of time Payment made by the Bank in the present case was an, act \"\"voluntarily done\"\" for the guarantors which connotes something performed or done of one's own free will and choice and not constraint, or prompted by another ¬Guarantors had made request for an additional amount which was also made Guarantors having accepted the liability, they were estopped by conduct from having volte face and say that agreement was devoid of consideration ¬Suit was decreed in favour of Bank and against the defendants to the tune of the payment made on guarantees jointly and severally with costs and cost of funds as envisaged in S.3(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 from the date of institution of the suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No 113 of 1998, heard on 21st October, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs CONTRACT MANAGEMENT SERVICES through Proprietor and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13169",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1551 = 2005 SLD 1551 = 2005 CLD 281",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.9, 10, 13, 19 & 22 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXII, Rr.4(1)(3)(4), 9(2) & O.VIIl, R.13 Suit for recovery of loan Loan was secured by respondents and predecessor-¬in interest of the appellants from the Bank under credit scheme for their partnership firm Bank secured mortgage deeds from the borrowers Borrowers failed to discharge their liabilities to terms of the agreement with the Bank Predecessor in interest of the appellants and respondents filed joint application for leave to defend before the Banking Court Predecessor in interest of appellants died during pendency of the suit Banking Court decreed the suit against respondents and predecessor in interest of the appellants Bank filed execution petition before the Banking Court wherein the Bank impleaded the appdllants as defendants being legal heirs of the deceased borrower ¬Appellants filed application for setting aside the decree which was dismissed Validity Predecessor in interest of the appellants and respondents were real brothers; they had filed joint application for leave to defend; they had admitted the claim of the Bank and it was in, the knowledge of respondents qua the death 'of the predecessor in interest of the appellants Respondents, in circumstances, were duty bound to intimate the Banking Court and submit list of legal representatives along with the application for leave to defend which was a statutory duty under O. VIII, R.13, C.P.C. Appellants, in view of such facts had not filed the application within the prescribed period and it was not believable that it was not in their knowledge qua the pendency of suit in question as their real uncles (respondents) were party in the suit Appellants had not challenged the impugned decree before the High Court in appeal Failure to bring on record legal heirs of a dead party in a pending proceeding was not fatal to such proceedings No clash of interest between respondents and predecessor in interest of appellants existed in the present case No prejudice had been caused to the appellants ¬Appeal was dismissed as having no merits in circumstances.\n \nSyed Ghias Haider v. Mst. Allah Rakhi 1986 SCMR 853 distingusihed.\n \nHafiz Brothers v. PICIC 2001 SCMR 1; Sohaj Khan v. The Registrar 1988 CLC 973; Bibi Khudeja v. Pir Sarwaruddin Shah 1992 MLD 490; Allah Wasaya v. Irshad Ahmad 1992 SCMR 2184; Syed Ghias Haider v. Mst. Allah Rakhi 1986 SCMR 853; Trustee of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213; Gul Muhammad Khan's case 1998 MLD 2110; Sultan Ahmad's case NLR 1999 AC 748; Muhammad Yaqub's case 1994 MLD 1843 and Abdul Ghafoor's case 2001 MLD .1797 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.479 of 2002, heard on 6-12-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD, ACTG. C.J. AND SYED SHABBAR RAZA RIZVI, J",
    "": "MUBASHAR MANZOOR ALAM and 6 others --Appellants\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13170",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1552 = 2005 SLD 1552 = 2005 CLD 292",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9 & 21 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11 Plaint rejection of No cause of action Absence of written finance agreement between the parties Without deciding the application for leave to defend the suit, Banking Court rejected the plaint for the reason that the plaintiff did not produce written finance agreement with plaint Plea raised by the plaintiff was that the absence of agreement was not a proof of absence of cause of action ¬Validity Averments of plaint which should be deemed correct while considering, if disclosed cause of action or otherwise, and only for the reason that there was no written agreement of finance between the parties, the plaint could not have been rejected In the application for leave to defend the suit, it was not disputed by the defendants that the finance facility was not granted to them Defendants had raised question of written agreement only with regard to mark up and not about availing the finance ¬Banking Court had erroneously applied the provisions of O. VII, R.11, C.P.C. thus the order of rejecting the plaint was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court, for deciding matter afresh Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No 595 of 1999, heard on .4-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs THE ENGLISH ENGINEERING COMPANY and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13171",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1553 = 2005 SLD 1553 = 2005 CLD 295",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LX VI of 2001) S. 12 Ex pane decree Application for setting aside ex parte decree Restoration Application for setting aside ex parte decree was dismissed for non prosecution Borrowers failed to give any reasons for their non appearance or that of their counsel Effect No cause or reason was made out for the absence of borrowers or their counsel Borrowers also failed to explain the reason of such absence which they were supposed to explain High Court declined to restore the application and did not interfere with the and decree passed by the Banking Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 166 of 2003, heard on 17-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ZAMAN and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LIMITED, PHALIA BRANCH through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13172",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1554 = 2005 SLD 1554 = 2005 CLD 312",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) S. 19 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58 ¬Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), Ss.41 & 52 Execution of decree Equitable mortgage Doctrine of lis pendens ¬Applicability Sale of mortgaged property during pendency of suit filed by bank Appellant filed objection during execution proceedings, on the ground that the mortgaged property was sold to him by the owner and protection of S.41, Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was available to him ¬Validity Equitable mortgage was created by deposit of title deeds with the bank Appellant purchased the property on 7 3 1995, when the suit was pending adjudication in a competent Court of law Sale in favour of appellant was hit by doctrine of lis pendens as contained in S.52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Appellant failed to make out a case of his being bona fide purchaser, therefore, he could not seek protection of S.41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ¬Appellant had to be vigilant and was obliged to take full care and caution to ascertain the transferor's power No indication was found on the record that the appellant required his transferor to produce the original title deed for his inspection Even .otherwise the transfer made in favour of the appellant during the pendency of the suit was hit by principle of lis pendens Appellant was not entitled to the protection under S.41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ¬Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 117 of 2003, decision dated: 28-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SARDAR MUHAMMAD ASLAM, JJ",
    "": "Mst. RUKHSANA BUTT --Appellant\nVs.\nJUDGE, BANKING COURT and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13173",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1555 = 2005 SLD 1555 = 2005 CLD 314",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 10 Contract Act (IX of 1872), 5.135 Recovery of bank loan Application for leave to defend the suit ¬Property of minors as surety Property under surety in the name of minors was discharged under S.135 Contract Act, 1872, by Wafaqi Mohtasib and no appeal was filed, that order In application for leave to defend the suit, the guarantor raised such plea but the application for leave to defend was dismissed by the Banking Court and the suit was decreed against the guarantor Validity Surety of properties of minors could not have at all been given by the guarantor,. even if he was their natural guardian and legal guardian Transaction to the extent of the property in the name of minors was void ab initio and had been rightly so held by Ombudsman As the Ombudsman had discharged the guarantor under S.135 of Contract Act, 1872, and the order had not been challenged, the same had become final ¬What could not be done directly, that could not be done indirectly= Even while deciding application for leave to appear and defend the suit, the Banking Court indirectly could not ignore or violate the order of Ombudsman, which, if done, would mean the exercise of jurisdiction, excluded by express provisions of law Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and application for leave to appeal was allowed and matter was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Establishment of Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order (I of 1983) \n \n Art. 29 Order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib Validity ¬Such order, under the provisions of Art.29 of Establishment of Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, cannot be called in question and determined by any Court including Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.42 of 2000, heard on 14-01-2004",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF --Appellant\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through GENERAL ATTORNEY and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13174",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRVNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1556 = 2005 SLD 1556 = 2005 CLD 323",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) Ss. 9 & 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908); O. Vii, R.11 Rejection of plaint Cause of action Determination ¬Application for leave to appear and defend the suit, non¬-deciding of Effect Suit for rendition of accounts was filed by appellants against respondent Bank wherein application for leave to appear and defend the suit was filed by the bank Banking Court without deciding the application for leave to defend the suit, rejected the plaint filed by the appellant on the ground that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action Validity While rejecting plaint for non-disclosure of cause of action, ordinarily the facts stated in the plaint were to be considered as correct and no data and material provided by defence should be looked into As the Banking Court had not allowed the leave application, the plaint could not have been rejected Order passed by Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision on leave application Appeal was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.442 of 2003, decision dated: 29-01-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN --Appellant\nVs.\nSME BANK LIMITED and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13175",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1557 = 2005 SLD 1557 = 2005 CLD 327",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001) S.10(3)(4)(5)(12) Failure to file amended application for leave to defend suit within time specified under S.10(12) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 in accordance with requirements of subsections (3), (4)(a) to (d) and (5) thereof Effect Compliance of requirements for filing of amended application were mandatory in nature as non compliance thereof would entail penal consequences of rejection of leave application ¬Defendant having failed to file amended application without showing any plausible explanation therefore, would stand relegated to the same position as that of defendant, who had not filed such application.\n \nBankers Equity Limited and another v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 931; Bank of Khyber v. Messrs Spencer Distribution Ltd. and 14 others 2003 CLD 1406; Saudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170; Messrs Crystal Enterprises and 6 others v. Platinum Commercial Bank Limited and ,2 others 2002 CLD 868 and National Bank of Pakistan v. First Tawakkal Modaraba and others 2002 CLD 1018 rel.\n \nMessrs Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation v. Syed Ali Azher Naqvi and others in Suit No.B 74 of 2000 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1222 and C.M.A. No.9606 of 1999, decision dated: 25-08-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN (-Å“NBP-) and another --Plaintiffs\nVs.\nNORTHERN POLYETHYLENE LIMITED (-Å“NPL) and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13176",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1558 = 2005 SLD 1558 = 2005 CLD 343",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) Ss.2(2), 47, 0.1, R.10 & O.XXI, R.11 Decree, execution of Objection Necessary parties, non impleading of ¬Original loanee died and suit for recovery of bank loan was filed Bank failed to implead all the legal heirs of the deceased loanee Suit was decreed by Banking Court in favour of bank Objection filed by the appellants before Banking Court was that although they were the legal heirs but they were not impleaded in suit as defendants so decree could not be executed against them Objection petition was dismissed by Banking Court Validity Banking Court failed to follow, not only the law provided under the special statute but also the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, providing as to who were the necessary parties, in a suit against whom a valid decree could be passed Banking Court had also violated the rule of natural justice by passing a decree against persons who were not even party to the suit and such decree was neither executable against them nor the defect could be removed in execution proceedings Order passed by Banking Court was set aside Appeal was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) Ss.2(2), 47, 0.1, R.10 & O.XXI, R.11 Decree,",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "SHAHNAWAZ and others --Appellants\nVs.\nZARI TARAKIATI BANK OF PAKISTAN (ADBP) through Manager --Respondent E.F.A. No.439 of 2003, decided on 21st January, 2004."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13177",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1559 = 2005 SLD 1559 = 2005 CLD 347",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LX VI of 2001) Ss.9 & 10 Recovery of bank loan Liquidated damages Proof Misappropriation of goods imported by defendants against Letter of Credit Suit for damages filed by defendants against bank, pending disposal Defendants admitted opening of Letter of Credit and availing of finance facility Goods were imported and duly reached Pakistan ¬Plea raised by the defendants was that the plaintiff bank had misappropriated the goods Validity Question whether the goods were misappropriated by the bank or were sold by the defendants could not be gone into in the present suit Bank had lodged F.I.R. against defendants for the theft of the goods and the defendants had filed suit for recovery of damages If the suit for recovery of damages would be decreed, the defendants could recover the amount Finance obtained by the defendants was duly secured by separate documents Application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed High Court refused to give liquidated damages as the same were not proved Suit was decreed accordingly.\n \nSaudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Ltd. Islamabad v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan and another 2003 CLD 596 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.77 of 1998, decision dated: 3rd August, 2004",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs HAFIZ BROTHERS and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13178",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1560 = 2005 SLD 1560 = 2005 CLD 361",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984) S.6(6) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act. (XV of 1997), Ss.4 & 7(6) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss.5, 6 & 7(6) Recovery suit ¬Order of Banking Tribunal dated 18 5 1989 directing defendant to deposit certain amount in cash and furnish security for remaining amount Banking Court on defendant's failure to comply with such directions decreed suit on 1 10 2001 under S.6(6) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 Validity Full Bench of High Court in Messrs Chenab Cement's case PLD 1996 Lahore 672 had struck down S.6(6) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984; for being ultra vires the Constitution, after repeal of Ordinance, 1984, all cases pending thereunder stood transferred to Banking Courts established under S.4 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Cases pending under Act, 1997, after its repeal stood transferred to Banking Courts established under S.5 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Banking Court could not validly pass impugned decree after repeal of Ordinance, 1984 and without considering the effect of of the Full Bench High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned decree and remanded case to Banking Court for its decision afresh in terms of Ordinance, 2001.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.849 of 2001, heard on 11-02-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MUHAMMAD ALI AND BROTHERS through Managing Partner and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13179",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1561 = 2005 SLD 1561 = 2005 CLD 373",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.2(e) & 9 Recovery suit Sanction of loan on buy back arrangement\"\" Mark up, charging of Bank could not charge mark up beyond agreed date and over and above agreed mark up amount. \n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs West Pakistan Tanks Terminal (Pvt.) Limited 2000 CLC 896 and ICP v. Messrs Chiniot Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 1998 Kar. 316 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.2(e) & 9 Recovery suit Bank had claimed exaggerated amount of mark up in suit Effect Claim of Bank for future mark up would be declined in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 113 of 1999, heard on 6-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "BASHIR BEGUM and 5 others --Appellants\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13180",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1562 = 2005 SLD 1562 = 2005 CLD 378",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) S.19(7)(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58 Execution of decree Objection application, decision of Non recording of evidence Gift of mortgaged property ¬Objectors claimed that the mortgaged property had been transferred to them through gift in year, 1989 Mortgage of disputed property was created in favour of decree holder ¬bank in year, 1987 Banking Court without recording of evidence, accepted the objection application Plea raised by decree holder bank was that the mortgage was prior to the gift and the same was binding on objectors (donees) who had stepped into the shoes of the mortgagor (donor) ¬Validity Banking Court should have held inquiry into the matter to ascertain, if factually any valid gift was made in favour of the objectors (donees) Such was important factual issue involved in the matter and the same could not be resolved without enabling the parties to produce evidence Order passed by Banking Court accepting the objection application was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.205 of 2002, heard on 17-02-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "BANK ALFALAH LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMiss NAIMA SAEED through Guardian and 7 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13181",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1563 = 2005 SLD 1563 = 2005 CLD 380",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVI of 1962) S. 25 Circular issued by State Bank of Pakistan ¬Validity State Bank could issue instructions to financial institutions including enhancement of interest Such circular would have prospective and not retrospective effect. \n \nHashwani Hotels Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 315; Federation of Pakistan and others v. Shaukat Ali Mian and others PLD 1999 SC 1026 and Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and 2 others v. Salahuddin and 3 others PLD 1991 SC 546 rel.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes \n \n Instructions issued by authorities would always have prospective and not retrospective effect Law framed by Legislature could not be taken to have retrospective effect, unless so mentioned specifically in the law itself by Legislature. \n \nPakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and 2 others v. Salahuddin and 3 others PLD 1991 SC 546 and Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1652 rel.\n \n(c) Administration of justice \n \n Duty of Court Courts are duty bound to decide controversy between parties after judicial application of mind. \n \nMollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 1739 rel.\n \n(d) General Clauses Act (X of 1897) \n \n S. 24 A Provisions of S.24 A of General Clauses Act, 1897 Nature of Such provisions are procedural in character, thus, have retrospective effect Duty of public functionaries under S.24 A of General Clauses Act, 1897; is to decide controversy between parties after application of judicial mind with reasons. \n \nMessrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager; Quaid e Azam International Airport Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268 and Zain Yar Khan v. The Chief Engineer, C.R.B.C., WAPDA, D.I. Khan 1998 SCMR 2419 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.530 of 2003, decision dated: 29-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND FARRUKH LATIF, JJ",
    "": "IJAZ AHMED and another --Appellants\nVs.\nZARI TARAQIATI BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13182",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1564 = 2005 SLD 1564 = 2005 CLD 384",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S. 18 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.60 ¬Execution of decree Objection Charge over mortgaged property Principles Transfer of mortgaged property Bona fide purchasers, plea of Objectors had purchased vide registered sale deed, the properties mortgaged with the bank Plea raised by the objectors was that they were the bona fide purchasers of the mortgaged property Banking Court allowed the objection and released the properties from attachment Validity Once the property was mortgaged, even though, it could be transferred, but such alienation was subject to the charge of mortgage Persons purchasing mortgaged property, could not take the \"\"equitable rule\"\" by avoiding the charge and claiming the transfer to be free from encumbrance Properties in question which were equitably mortgaged, were purchased by the objectors much thereafter Objectors could not frustrate and defeat the mortgage rights of the bank on the ground of being \"\"Bona fide Purchasers\"\" Title documents were not with the sellers ( debtors), which fact was sufficient to hold that, the objectors had bought the properties subject to the risk of mortgage Order passed by Executing Court was set aside and the Court below was directed to execute the decree against the mortgaged properties Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \nMst. Nasiban Bibi v. The Australasia Bank, Lahore 11970 SCMR 657; Mrs. Tehmina Bashir v. Abdul Rauf and another 1995 CLC 973; Tarachand Mondal and others v. Hazari Shaikh and another PLD 1967 Dacca 203; Shukri and 3 others v. Ch. Muhammad Shafi Zaffar and 2 others PLD 1975 Lah. 619 and Habib Bank Limited v. Ajma Corporation 2000 CLC 1425 rel.\n \nRehman Shah v. Muhammad Shah and others 1974 SCMR 255 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.43 of 2002, heard on 14-01-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "CITIBANK N.A. through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD AKBAR and 3 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13183",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1565 = 2005 SLD 1565 = 2005 CLD 389",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S. 7 General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24 A Powers of Banking Court Scope Duty of Banking Court is to decide case with application of judicial mind, which is condition precedent Under S.24 A, General Clauses Act, 1897, public functionaries are duty bound to decide controversy between the parties with reasons Section 24 A of Act, 1897 is procedural in nature and has retrospective effect. \n \nMollah Ejahar Ali's case PLD 1970 SC 173; Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager 1998 SCMR 2268 and Zain Yar Khan v. The Chief Engineer 1998 SCMR 2419 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.495 of 1999, decision dated: 28-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND FARRUKH LATIF, JJ",
    "": "NAEEM YASIN --Appellant\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through MUHAMMAD NASEEM, MANAGER and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13184",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1566 = 2005 SLD 1566 = 2005 CLD 393",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 10 Bankers' Book Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.2 Recovery of bank loan Suit filed by person not duly authorized Treating 'Recovery Certificate' as statement of account Application for leave to defend the suit filed by defendants was dismissed by Banking Court and the suit was decreed Plea raised by the defendants was that the plaint was filed by a person who did not have any authority in that respect and no statement of account was filed by the bank Validity High Court, after careful examination of record, did not find any authorization in favour of the person through whom suit was filed and counsel was engaged to represent the bank Such important ground had not been adverted to by the Banking Court in the passed against the defendants Banking Court had wrongly treated the Recovery Certificate as statement of account although same did not qualify as a statement of account If at all the Recovery Certificate did so qualify, it was not verified in accordance with the provisions of Bankers' Book Evidence Act, 1891 Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and application of defendants for leave to appear and defend the suit was deemed to be pending before Banking Court Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \nBankers Equity Ltd. through Attorney and 5 others v. Sunflo Cit Russ Ltd. PLD 1999 Lah. 450 and R.F.A. No.380 of 1994 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S. 10 Application for leave to appear and defend the suit, dismissal of Non speaking order Banking Court disposed of objection of defendants by observing that \"\"they are of casual and routine type and need not any discussion\"\" and dismissed the application Effect Such finding of Banking Court was not a judicial dispensation because the Court was required to attend the objections raised in the application and if the Court was not persuaded, the reasons should have been recorded.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.385 of 1998, heard on 22-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI, J",
    "": "Messrs RAVI ASSOCIATE (PRIVATE) LIMITED through Director and 10 others --Appellants\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Senior Vice President --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13185",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1567 = 2005 SLD 1567 = 2005 CLD 396",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) S. 12 Ex parte decree, setting aside of Imposition of condition Deposit of costs Extension of time Grievance of defendant was that Banking Court had set aside ex parte decree passed in favour of bank, subject to deposit of Rs.50,000 Validity Court at the time of setting aside ex parte decree, had ample power under S.12 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, to impose condition Banking Court was justified in exercising its discretion according to law and there was no defect in the order calling for interference Time fixed by Banking Court for deposit of costs had already elapsed, therefore, High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction granted 10 days time for deposit of costs fixed by Banking Court Appeal was dismissed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 77 of 2004, decision dated: 21st June, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs CHAUDHRY STEEL MILLS through Managing Partner and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Attorney --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13186",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1568 = 2005 SLD 1568 = 2005 CLD 398",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 9 & 17 General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24 A ¬Suit for recovery of loan amount Partial ex parte decree for Rs.98,260 as against suit amount of Rs.3,10,507 ¬Validity Neither record showed nor Banking Court had mentioned or referred to any document in impugned that on basis of which document Rs.98,260 had been found to be die from defendant Impugned did not show that how amount of Rs.98,260 had been worked out, and why sum of Rs.2,12,241 had been deducted from suit amount nor statement of accounts had been referred to Impugned was silent as to why Bank was not entitled to recover total suit amount ¬Impugned was sketchy, slip shod and devoid of reasons, which could not be called a 'judicial order\"\" Even an executive authority was bound to give reasons for making order as per S.24 A of General Clauses Act, 1897 ¬Passing of such perfunctory order was deprecated High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned /decree, resultantly suit would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court for its decision afresh in accordance with law. \n \n(b) Judgment \n \n Sketchy and slip shod Validity Judgment, which was sketchy, slip shod and devoid of reasons would not at all be a speaking and could not be called a judicial order\"\" within parameters set up by law Passing of perfunctory order was disapproved Such would not be sustainable in law, thus, would be liable to be set aside.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.557 of 2002, decision dated: 21st October, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD MUNIR LODHI and 16 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13187",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1569 = 2005 SLD 1569 = 2005 CLD 401",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) S. 51 & O.XXI, R.37 Execution of decree Warrant of arrest, issuance of Pre conditions Banking Court refused to withdraw the warrant of arrest on the ground that the property mortgaged by debtor could not be auctioned Plea raised by the debtor was that the Banking Court had issued warrant of arrest without justification Validity Pre conditions under S.51 C.P.C. for issuance of warrant of arrest were that debtor should be proved to have made attempt to leave the limits of Court to obstruct the decree of execution thereof or dishonestly transferred the property after the institution of the suit to avoid the decree or had the means to pay the decree and neglected to do the same ¬Without satisfaction of said pre conditions no mechanical order for detention in prison could be passed Property mentioned in Fard Taleeka filed by decree holder bank was sufficient to satisfy the decree Banking Court had issued the warrant of arrest without any justification and the same was set aside Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \nPrecision Engineering Limited and others v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lah. 290 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.510 of 2003, heard on 9-02-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "AFTAB SALEEM CHOUDHARY and another --Appellants\nVs.\nSONERI BANK LIMITED through ATTORNEYS --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13188",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1570 = 2005 SLD 1570 = 2005 CLD 404",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XL VI of 2001) Ss. 9 & 10 Recovery of bank loan Conditional grant of leave to defend the suit Non fulfilment of condition imposed by Banking Court High Court acting as Banking Court allowed application for leave to appear and defend the suit subject to deposit of certain amount within a specified date Borrowers did not deposit the amount, resultantly the leave granting order was withdrawn by the Banking Court Validity Neither before Banking Court, nor before Division Bench of High Court even a word had been stated by the borrowers as to why the condition imposed by Banking Court was not complied with Borrowers also failed to give any reason whatsoever for the non compliance of the condition Judgment and decree passed by High Court did not have any error of law or fact Appeal was dismissed in limine.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.397 of 2003, decision dated: 22-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SARDAR MUHAMMAD ASLAM, JJ",
    "": "Messrs FINE TEXTILE INDUSTRIES through Managing Partner and 7 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMTIED, FAISALABAD --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13189",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1571 = 2005 SLD 1571 = 2005 CLD 436",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.7(4) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.379/406/420 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Constitutional petition Quashing of F.I.R. F.I.R. registered with police on written application of one of the officers of the Bank was sought to be quashed on the ground that case could not be registered against petitioner as according to S.7(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, cognizance of offence under the said Ordinance could only be taken by a Banking Court and that too on the complaint in writing of person authorized by the bank in that behalf Validity Registration of case with the police on written application of Bank's Officer, was not in accordance with law on the subject because cognizance of offence in case could only be taken by Banking Court and that too on the complaint in writing by a person authorized by the Financial Institution/Bank Continuance of F.I.R. in the case would amount to nothing, but mere abuse of process of law F.I.R., was quashed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1181 and C.M. No.2 of 2004, decision dated: 23rd December, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "Mian ASIM FARID and another ers\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 4 others --Respondents\nIjaz Ahmad, S.I. with Record."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13190",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1572 = 2005 SLD 1572 = 2005 CLD 436",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.7(4) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.379/406/420 ¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Constitutional petition Quashing of F.I.R. F.I.R. registered with police on written application of one of the officers of the Bank was sought to be quashed on the ground that case could not be registered against petitioner as according to S.7(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, cognizance of offence under the said Ordinance could only be taken by a Banking Court and that too on the complaint in writing of person authorized by the bank in that behalf Validity Registration of case with the police on written application of Bank's Officer, was not in accordance with law on the subject because cognizance of offence in case could only be taken by Banking Court and that too on the complaint in writing by a person authorized by the Financial Institution/Bank Continuance of F.I.R. in the case would amount to nothing, but mere abuse of process of law F.I.R., was quashed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1181 and C.M. No.2 of 2004, decision dated: 23rd December, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "Mian ASIM FARID and another ers\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13191",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1573 = 2005 SLD 1573 = 2005 CLD 438",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.19 & 12 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) ¬Agency, principles of Execution of decree Limitation ¬Application under S.12, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 read with S.12(2) , C.P.C. during execution proceedings, for recalling of the decree on the ground that the applicant was unaware of the suit and decree and was fraudulently kept out of the proceedings by the Bank with whom the applicant's address at Canada was available and that he came to know of the decree from his general attorney who was Director of the borrower company also Applicant had filed the application with a delay of about 18 months Banking Court dismissed the application on merits as well as for being barred by limitation Validity Held, Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. were not applicable to the proceedings under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ¬Applicant, however, had not been able to show or prove the plea of fraud or misrepresentation Provision of S.12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 provided period of 21 days from the date of decree o from date of the knowledge of the decree, for the application seeking an order to set aside the decree, as such by applicant's own admission that his general attorney was aware of the proceedings and only from him he had come to know about them, his application under S.12 of the financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was beyond period of limitation as he could not be presumed to be unaware of the proceedings against him as under the principles of Agency, knowledge of a duly appointed agent was the knowledge of his principal and vice versa.\n \nM/s. Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and 6 others v. National Development Finance Corporation, Karachi PLD 2002 SC 500; M/s. Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and others v. National Development Finance Corporation 2002 CLC 166; M/s. Gold Star International and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 2000 MLD 421; M/s. Pakistan Kuwait Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited v. Bank Al Falah Limited and 11 others 2003 CLD 676; M/s. Mushtaq & Co. through Managing Partner and 3 others v. M / s. National Bank of Pakistan 2004 CLD 1573; United Bank Ltd. v. M/s. Zafar Textile Mills Ltd. 2000 CLC 1330 and Life Paper Store through Managing Partner Sh. Ghulam Hussain and 3 others v. Bank of Punjab and 3 others 2001 YLR 77 ref.\n \nM/s. Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and 6 others v. National Development Finance Corporation, Karachi PLD 2002 SC 500 distinguished.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Preamble Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2) ¬Provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. have no applicability to the proceedings arising under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \nM/s. Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and 6 others v. National Development Finance Corporation, Karachi PLD 2002 SC 500 distinguished.\n \nM/s. Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and 6 others v. National Development Finance Corporation, Karachi PLD 2002 SC 500; M/s. Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and others v. National development Finance Corporation 2002 CLC 166; M/s. Gold Star International and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 2000 MLD 421; M/s. Pakistan Kuwait Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited v. Bank Al Falah Limited and 11 others 2003 CLD 676; M/s. Mushtaq &, Co. through Managing Partner and 3 others v. M/s. National Bank of Pakistan 2004 CLD 1573, United Bank Ltd. v. M/s. Zafar Textile Mills Ltd. 2000 CLC 1330 and Life Paper Store through Managing Partner Sh. Ghulam Hussain and 3 others v. Bank of Punjab and 3 others 2001 YLR 77 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.283 of 2003, decision dated: 14-12-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "Dr. ASAD PERVAIZ SHEIKH --Appellant\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13192",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1574 = 2005 SLD 1574 = 2005 CLD 444",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.18 & 22 Documents on record revealed that three separate loan accounts were being maintained by the three Sponsor Directors of Company in their respective names and they were separately disbursed the amount of facility by the Bank and that they had also signed and executed separate agreement and security documents for respective facility allowed to them Contention of the defaulting Director was that all three accounts be considered as one transaction and the payment made against such three transactions be considered as payment of total dues to the Bank and Bank having received amount in excess to what was found due in settling the account of one of the Directors, the Director in default was entitled to adjustment from said excess payment in the account of other Director Validity Held, three accounts of the Sponsor Directors could not be considered as one transaction and that one Director was not entitled to adjustment from the alleged excess payment in the account of one Director Bank had not filed suit against the said other Director and there was no lis before the Court in respect of her loan No principle of law existed on the basis of which the amount in one account could be transferred for the settlement of another account more so when conscious payments had been made in specific account.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance(XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.9 & 22 Facility of finance, in the present case, was granted for a period of six months which as per Bank's own pleadings was maturing on 16 6 1994 and the amount payable on maturity by the borrower to be the Bank was to Rs.3, 759, 795 inclusive of all charges Breakup of the account filed by the Bank showed that the Bank had continued to charge mark up beyond the agreed period and it also reflected charging of mark up over mark up--- Validity Held, charging of mark up beyond agreed period and mark up over mark up were not allowed by law, similarly no extension roll over or renewal was allowed law without actual disbursement and such extension, over or renewal was without consideration and thus void.\n \nTextile Management (Pvt.) Limited v. N.I.T. 2002 CLD 276; Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Jasarat Hussain 2002 CLD 93; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Faisalabad v. M/s. Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955; National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Buildings Products Ltd. PLD 1998 Kar. 302; United Bank Limited v. Ch. Ghulam Husaain 1998 CLC 816; United Bank Ltd. v. M/s. Gravure Packaging (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 YLR 1549 and Habib Bank Limited v. M/s. Qayyum Spinning Limited 2001 MLD 1351 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.59 of 2002, decision dated: 15-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND GULZAR AHMED, JJ",
    "": "MUSHTAQ AHMED VOHRA --Appellant\nVs.\nCRESCENT INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13193",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1575 = 2005 SLD 1575 = 2005 CLD 444",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.18 & 22 Documents on record revealed that three separate loan accounts were being maintained by the three Sponsor Directors of Company in their respective names and they were separately disbursed the amount of facility by the Bank and that they had also signed and executed separate agreement and security documents for respective facility allowed to them Contention of the defaulting Director was that all three accounts be considered as one transaction and the payment made against such three transactions be considered as payment of total dues to the Bank and Bank having received amount in excess to what was found due in settling the account of one of the Directors, the Director in default was entitled to adjustment from said excess payment in the account of other Director Validity Held, three accounts of the Sponsor Directors could not be considered as one transaction and that one Director was not entitled to adjustment from the alleged excess payment in the account of one Director Bank had not filed suit against the said other Director and there was no lis before the Court in respect of her loan No principle of law existed on the basis of which the amount in one account could be transferred for the settlement of another account more so when conscious payments had been made in specific account.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance(XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.9 & 22 Facility of finance, in the present case, was granted for a period of six months which as per Bank's own pleadings was maturing on 16 6 1994 and the amount payable on maturity by the borrower to be the Bank was to Rs.3, 759, 795 inclusive of all charges Breakup of the account filed by the Bank showed that the Bank had continued to charge mark up beyond the agreed period and it also reflected charging of mark up over mark up--- Validity Held, charging of mark up beyond agreed period and mark up over mark up were not allowed by law, similarly no extension roll over or renewal was allowed law without actual disbursement and such extension, over or renewal was without consideration and thus void.\n \nTextile Management (Pvt.) Limited v. N.I.T. 2002 CLD 276; Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Jasarat Hussain 2002 CLD 93; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Faisalabad v. M/s. Aisha Garments and others 2001 MLD 1955; National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Buildings Products Ltd. PLD 1998 Kar. 302; United Bank Limited v. Ch. Ghulam Husaain 1998 CLC 816; United Bank Ltd. v. M/s. Gravure Packaging (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 YLR 1549 and Habib Bank Limited v. M/s. Qayyum Spinning Limited 2001 MLD 1351 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.59 of 2002, decision dated: 15-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND GULZAR AHMED, JJ",
    "": "MUSHTAQ AHMED VOHRA --Appellant\nVs.\nCRESCENT INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13194",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1576 = 2005 SLD 1576 = 2005 CLD 451",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.12(2) Application under S.12(2), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 for setting aside the decree was accepted and applicants were required to file the leave application within ten days; case for the pronouncement of the order on the said application, though was fixed for 19 11 2003, but according to the applicant, for certain reason, file of the case was kept by the Presiding Officer till 2 12 2003, when he signed the and the copy of the order thereafter delivered to the applicant, who had applied for the certified copy of the order on 19 11 2003 Applicant, filed the leave application within 10 days of the said date but was rejected by the Banking Court, on the ground that it was barred by time, being beyond 10 days of the order dated 19 I1 2003 Contention of the applicant was that the order was not announced on 19 1,1 2003 as it was not signed the same day, and the Presiding Officer, cleared the file on 2 12 2003 and therefore, the time shall run from that date Validity High Court, on appeal, summoned the record for verification but the same was not of much assistance Possibility therefore, could not be ruled out that the Presiding Officer, though had fixed the case for pronouncement of the order on 19 11 2003, but he might have dictated the order subsequently and signed the same on 2 12 2003, whereafter, copy was supplied to the applicants the next day High Court, while declining to hold an inquiry, which might include the recording of the statements of the Presiding Officer and also of the other staff of the Court, applied the rule of probability, that the applicants had applied for the copy on the next date i.e. 20 11 2003, which was supplied to them on 2 12 2003 Applicants, therefore learnt about the acceptance of their application, on that date and thus the time of the leave application shall commence from that date Application of the applicants, in circumstances, was within time and therefore, the impugned order was liable to be set aside Applicants having also been somewhat negligent in the matter as they could have approached the Presiding Officer through their counsel to know about the situation, High Court imposed a fine of Rs.10, 000, which as conceded by the counsel of the Bank, should be deposited by the applicants with Shaukat Khanum Memorial Hospital.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.318 of 2004, heard on 13-12-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Messrs BERRY FOOD INDUSTRIES and others --Appellants\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13195",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1577 = 2005 SLD 1577 = 2005 CLD 491",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) Ss. 9 & 20 Suit related to transactions having taken place in a foreign country under the law of that State and default was also committed there but after plaintiffs' failure to get the decree of foreign Court satisfied there, cause of action accrued to him for suing the defendant (guarantor) in Pakistan as by that time he had shifted to Pakistan Validity Held, transaction in question was governed by the law of the foreign country/State and forum to enforce the rights and obligations in consequence of the transaction, was also available there and Court in Pakistan had no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit for the only reason that the defendant had allegedly shifted to Pakistan Foreign Courts did not lose their authority or competency to proceed with the suit against him nor the Courts of Pakistan had jurisdiction over the matter for that reason Principles.\n \nAdmittedly the transaction/contract had taken place in a foreign country and the alleged default also occurred there. Even the plaintiff had filed a suit there under the law of that State and obtained a , thus there could be no denial of the fact that the transaction was governed by the law of that country/State and forum to enforce the rights and obligations in consequence of the transaction was also available there.\n \nCivil Procedure Code, 1908 extends upto the territories of Pakistan as a procedural enactment. It cannot take place of substantive laws on a particular subject. Obviously the transactions and acts governed by the procedural as well as substantive law of any other State or country, do not come within the scope of Civil Procedure Code. Nor the Courts at Pakistan have jurisdiction to decide the causes and issues governed by the law of any other country or State applying sections 9 and 20 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 which relate to the cases and matters within the cognizance of Courts in Pakistan.\n \nAs the contract/ transactions which is the subject¬-matter of present suit is governed by procedural and substantive laws of foreign country and statutory forum to decide the controversy and enforce the rights under those transactions is also available there, Pakistan Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit for the only reason that the defendant had allegedly shifted to Pakistan. Courts of foreign country do not lose their authority or competency to proceed with the suit against defendant. Nor the Courts at Pakistan have the jurisdiction over the matter for that reason. \n \nThe plaintiff had not stated the actual terms of the contract of credit facility in the plaint nor he had produced the documents containing the terms of the contract. Also, plaintiff did not size the guarantor while filing suit/claim against the principal borrower. It is not known what prevented it from suing the guarantor, whether there was any impediment in its way under the relevant laws of the State. The effect of omission to sue the guarantor is also not known: Thus the present suit is also not a fair and bona fide exercise on the part of the plaintiff.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.76 of 2003, heard on 4-11-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SADIQ LEGHARI, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nALI MUHAMMAD --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13196",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1578 = 2005 SLD 1578 = 2005 CLD 503",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 21 Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S.316(1) Recovery of bank loan Failure to seek permission from Company Judge Bank filed suit against defendant company and its Directors/guarantors for recovery of bank loan Defendant company was wound up by Company Judge and Provisional Manager was appointed Company Judge permitted bank to file application for seeking permission to continue proceedings before Banking Court against the defendant company for recovery of bank loan but no such application was filed by the bank Suit was decreed by Banking Court in favour of the bank Plea raised by Directors/guarantors was that without seeking permission as mentioned in S.316(1) of Companies Ordinance, 1984, the Banking Court could not pass any decree Validity When winding up order was made or Provisional Manager was appointed, the proceedings in the suit or other legal proceedings would remain stayed only against company under S.316 (1) of Companies Ordinance 1984, and could not further proceed except with the leave of the Court If any party wished to commence or continue with the proceedings, then it had to file .application under S.316(1) of Companies Ordinance, 1984, before Company Judge Seeking his permission to commence, proceed and continue with the proceedings against the company and the Court might grant such permission, subject to certain terms Company Judge granted permission to the bank and the Banking Court which was seized of the suit for recovery, to continue and proceed with the proceedings, thus the Banking Court was justified in passing the and decree against the defendants Proceedings could not commence or proceed only against the defendant company, while the proceedings against the other persons arrayed in the suit as defendants in the capacity of guarantors/mortgagors/beneficiaries, apart from the company, could be commenced proceeded with and continued even without the leave of the Court ¬Directors/guarantors had failed to make out a case calling for interference by High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in the and decree passed by Banking Court Judgment and decree was legally passed by the Banking Court, having the jurisdiction in the matter High Court did not find any legal infirmity in the and decree passed by Banking Court, thus the same was maintained Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.508 of 2000, heard on 14th December 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. TANIS AKHTAR --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN, through Manager and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13197",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1579 = 2005 SLD 1579 = 2005 CLD 510",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 2(a)(c) & (d) & 15 \"\"Financial institution\"\" ¬\"\"Customer\"\" Defendant, a public limited company had provided Shipment Export Finance Guarantees (which was its business) to the plaintiff which the plaintiff failed to pay back Defendant had stood guarantee for the plaintiff as against mortgage of his property made by the plaintiff through deposit of title deeds Plaintiff had not alleged that defendant company was not authorized to carry on such business Contention of the plaintiff was that it was not a \"\"customer\"\" and the Export Finance Guarantee Agency was not financial institution\"\" as defined in the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ¬Validity Held, under S.2(a)(iii), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances Ordinance, 2001, Financial institution\"\" included any company authorized by law to carry on any similar business as the Federal Government might, by notification in the official Gazette, specify ¬Provision of S.2(d)(iii) of the said Ordinance related to facility of guarantees, indemnities, letters of credit or any other financial engagement which a financial institution might give, issue or undertake on behalf of the customer with corresponding obligation by the customer to the financial institution Defendant company, in circumstances, was a financial institution\"\" and the plaintiff was \"\"customer\"\" within the meaning of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. Nil of 2004, decision dated: 18-11-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, J",
    "": "MASROOR AHMED ANSARI --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs PAKISTAN EXPORT FINANCE GUARANTEE AGENCY (PEFGS) --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13198",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1580 = 2005 SLD 1580 = 2005 CLD 515",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.18(3) & 3 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 ¬Constitutional petition Execution of decree Mortgaged property Rights and obligations of tenant Banking Court or an auction purchaser can be put in possession of the mortgaged property only when debtor or a person acting on his behalf cannot do so Provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 do not contain a clear and specific provision regarding rights and obligations of a tenant of a mortgaged property Tenant of such property enjoys independent legal rights and cannot be treated as person acting on behalf of landlord/ debtor Provision of S.3, Banking Companies/Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 stipulates that its provision shall be in addition to and, save to the extent expressly provided in the Act, not in derogation of any law for the time being in force In absence of any explicit provision the legislative intent, cannot be so construed as to deprive tenants of their rights to occupy property guaranteed under law.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P. No.D 1405 of 2000, decision dated: 12-11-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. MUBARAK SHAH er\nVs.\nTHE BANKING COURT JUDGE NO.III and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13199",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1581 = 2005 SLD 1581 = 2005 CLD 518",
    "Key Words:": "State Bank BPD Circular No. 29 dated 15 10 2002 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151 Judgment¬ debtors had moved an application under S.151, C.P.C. praying therein that they be allowed to sell/dispose of their property/commercial building and a portion of another property and decree holder be directed to release the original documents of the said properties for the said purpose, and consider the amount deposited by the buyer with the decree holder bank directly, as payment against the instalments Validity Record showed the material as a result whereof a settlement was arrived at between the parties and according to said agreement relief under BPD Circular No.29 of State Bank of Pakistan dated 15 10 2002 was granted to the debtors, and as against Rs.117 million they were asked to pay only Rs.49.327 million for which all the debtors jointly and severally agreed to pay Terms and conditions as agreed upon by the parties clearly showed that the properties as mentioned in the Schedule including the present properties stood duly mortgaged with the decree holder bank and title deeds were to be released in respect of all the properties together only if the instalment payments had been made as per terms of the contract Decree holder bank having declined to accept the proposal made on behalf of the debtors, did not want to deviate from the terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties, appli¬cation by the debtors was dismissed. \n \nAsim Mansoor Khan and Bashir Ahmed Khan along with Khurshid Ahmed, Executive Vice President, Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. for Plaintiffs.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ex. No.235 of 2000, heard on 16-08-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, J",
    "": "ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD. --Plaintiffs\nVs.\nMessrs PAKSACO LIMITED and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13200",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1582 = 2005 SLD 1582 = 2005 CLD 521",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.10 Leave to defend Banking Court shall give leave to defend the suit, if a serious and bona fide dispute was raised Banking Court, in the present case, had arrived at the conclusion that \"\"it appears that in the affidavit the defendant has shown prima facie defence in order to obtain leave to defend\"\" but granted leave to defend application \"\"conditionally subject to deposit of the suit amount, within 10 days\"\" Validity Legislature, in its wisdom had not attached any condition under S.10, Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, on the exercise of discretion of Banking Court while granting leave to defend the suit, provided that a serious and bona fide dispute was raised by the defendant Once the case was found fit for granting leave no condition of furnishing security could be attached, as that would tantamount to reading more than what actually the Legislature had mentioned in the provision Banking Court was accordingly directed to decide the suit -Principles. \n \nAgrofoster (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others v. Judge, Banking Court No. 5, Karachi and another PLD 1999. Kar 398 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P. No. D 2044 of 2001, decision dated: 29-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J. AND MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ALI ENTERPRISE er\nVs.\nSPECIAL BANKING COURT NO.III and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13201",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1583 = 2005 SLD 1583 = 2005 CLD 529",
    "Key Words:": "(a) State Bank of Pakistan Scheme For Financing/Purchase of Locally Manufactured Machinery, 1985 State Bank of Pakistan Circular No. 1 dated 13 3 1988 --¬Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art: 199 Constitutional petition Machinery Definition Machineries/ equipments to be included in the locally manufactured machinery ¬Scope Only those machineries/equipments which were to be used or were involved in the sugar manufacturing process could be included in the Scheme If machineries/equipments did not form .part of the sugar manufacturing process, then irrespective of the fact that any machinery was essential for erecting or setting up a sugar processing plant, would not bring the machineries within the scope of the Scheme and finance could not be provided therefor Contention that in the absence of the three items of machineries/equipments the sugar manufacturing plant could not be set up on account of which then three items had assumed great importance requiring to be financed under the LMM Scheme was without any substance Cost of erection and commission charges were not to be financed under the LMM Scheme and finance facility therefore was not in accordance with the Scheme State Bank of Pakistan had not acted illegally and in contravention of the provisions of law in excluding the machinery/equipments from the Scheme withdrawing the finance facility from the Scheme and converting the same to LCY GTF mark up in respect of said machinery /equipments; and imposition of fine ¬Certificate issued by the Heavy Mechanical Complex would not in any manner establish that any machinery /equipment was integral part of the manufacturing process without which manufacturing of sugar would not have been possible Principles.\n \nThe question to be decided in the present case is as to what machineries/equipments were to be included in the LMM Scheme (Scheme For Financing Purchase of Locally Manufactured Machinery). From a bare perusal of the provisions of the scheme, it is to be noted that finance was to be provided for purchase of locally Manufactured plant and machinery, including accessories thereof, which were used or involved in the actual manufacturing process in the manufacturing industries under LMM Scheme. In order to include the machineries/equipments under LMM Scheme, it was incumbent for the manufacturer to establish that they were integral or essential part or were involved in the sugar manufacturing process. It is also clear that erection and commission charges were not to be financed under LMM Scheme and a provision was made whereby in case of turnkey projects, manufacturers were required to give separately the erection charges for their exclusion from financing under the LMM Scheme. From the above, it is absolutely clear that only those machineries/equipments which were to be used or were involved in the sugar manufacturing process could be included in the LMM Scheme. If these machineries/equipments did not form part of the manufacturing process, then irrespective of the fact that they were essential for erecting or setting up a sugar processing plant, would not bring them within the scope of the scheme and finance could not be provided for them. The Certificates issued by HMC do not in any manner establish that these three machineries/equipments were integral part of the manufacturing process without which manufacturing of sugar would not have been possible. What can be made out from the Certificates issued by HMC is that these three machineries/equipments were essential for erection or setting up of a sugar manufacturing plant. The contention that in the absence of the three items of machineries/equipments the sugar manufacturing plant could not be set up on account of which these three items of machineries/equipments had assumed great importance requiring to be financed under the LMM Scheme, is without any substance. The requirements of the scheme are very clear and unless the machineries/ equipments formed part of the manufacturing process in manufacturing industries they could not be financed under the LMM Scheme irrespective of the fact that in the absence of the three items of machineries/equipments the sugar manufacturing plant could not be set up and commissioned. From a perusal of the Scheme, it is also beyond any doubt that cost of erection and commission charges were not to be financed under the LMM Scheme and finance facility therefore was not in accordance with the LMM Scheme. \n \nState Bank of Pakistan had not acted illegally and in contravention of the provisions of law in excluding the three machineries/equipments from the LMM Scheme, withdrawing the finance facility from the LMM Scheme and converting the same to LCY GTF mark up in respect of the three machineries/equipments; and imposition of fine. \n \nHBFC v. Shehinshah Humayun Cooperative House Building Society and others 1992 SCMR 19; Zaman Cement Company Private Limited v. Central Board of Revenue 2002 SCMR 312; Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi PLD 1969 SC 407; The Engineer in Chief, Branch and another v. Jalaluddin PLD 1992 SC 207; Abdul Haque Indhar and others v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Forest, Fisheries and Livestock Department Karachi and 3 others 2000 SCMR 907; Muhammad Mumtaz Masud and 2 others v. House Building Finance Corporation and 2 others 1994 SCMR 2287; Mst. Saboohi v. Ghulam Dastagir 1995 MLD 1402 and Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid e Azam International Airport Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268 ref.\n \n(b) Interpretation of documents \n \n Document containing terms and conditions and laying down a policy and the agreement entered into between the parties Principles of interpretation.\n \nThe Courts while interpreting and examining the terms and conditions of a document laying down a policy and the agreement entered into between the parties are required to give plain meaning to the language and words used in the policy document/agreement for determining the intention of the framers of the policy/parties to the agreement. It is not the job of the Courts to give or imply a meaning or anything which cannot be supported by the language and the words of the document merely because one of the parties thought that it would be unreasonable, illogical and unjust to imply the meaning sought by the party who had framed the policy. \n \nIn construing the deeds; the words are to be taken in their literal, plain and ordinary meaning. Such plain and ordinary meaning is to be avoided only if it leads to ambiguity or absurdity enabling the Court to modify the ordinary and plain meaning to avoid such ambiguity and absurdity. \n \nIn construing contracts the real question was the meaning of the language and further that grammatical meaning was the meaning to be adopted unless there was reason to the contrary. \n \nHBFC v. Shehinshah Humayun Cooperative House Building Society and others 1992 SCMR 19 and Zaman Cement Company Private Limited v. Central Board of Revenue 2002 SCMR 312 ref.\n \n(c) State Bank of Pakistan Scheme For Financing/Purchase of Locally Manufactured Machinery, 1985 \n \n State Bank of Pakistan Circular No.1 dated 13 3 1988 ¬Interpretation of the Scheme.\n \nThe plain and ordinary meanings of the words used in the State Bank of Pakistan Scheme For Financing/Purchase of Locally Manufactured Machinery, 1985 do not result in any ambiguity or absurdity. It was the clear and unambiguous intention of the framers of the scheme not to include the items of machineries/equipments which did not form integral part of the manufacturing process and such interpretation does not operate against the rules of interpretation of documents. The contention that it would be very unreasonable, illogical and unrealistic to exclude the three items of machineries/ equipments from being financed under the LMM Scheme as in their absence sugar processing plant could not be erected or set up carries no weight as while interpreting the contents of the documents, the Courts are required to ascertain the intention from the words used therein and it is not open to them to see the reasonableness logic or the advantages which would have accrued to a party if the interpretation sought by it had been accepted. The fact, that the framers of the LMM Scheme did not include the above three items of machineries/equipments for being financed under the LMM Scheme does not create or amount to absurdity or unreasonableness as it was a policy decision which is clearly spelt out from the words used in the policy document as well as from the contents of the agreement entered into between the manufacturer and the financial institution. \n \nHBFC v. Shehinshah Humayun Cooperative House Building Society and others 1992 SCMR 19 and Zaman Cement Company Private Limited v. Central Board of Revenue 2002 SCMR 312 ref.\n \n(d) State Bank of Pakistan Scheme For Financing/ purchase of Locally Manufactured Machinery, 1985 \n \n State Bank of Pakistan Circular No. 1 dated 13 3 1988 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 Constitutional petition Machinery Definition Amendment in the definition by State Bank of Pakistan Circular No. 1 dated 13 3 1988 for which the financial facility could be granted ¬Contention of the manufacturers was that finance facility for the machinery in question was duly allowed to other such like manufacturers which had been declined to them Locus poenitentiae, principle of Applicability Manufacturers availing the Scheme (as amended) could not claim the benefit of the principle of locus poenitentiae Principles. \n \nAbdul Haque Indhar and others v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Forest, Fisheries and Livestock Department Karachi and 3 others 2000 SCMR 907 ref.\n \n(e) Locus poenitentiae, principle of ¬\n \n Applicability Principles.\n \nPrinciple of locus poenitentiae is the power of rescinding till a decisive step was taken emphasizing that it was not a rigid principle of law that an order once passed became irrevocable and past and closed transaction. For this concept to be applicable it is a requirement that the order or decision in respect of which irrevocability is claimed must have been a legal and valid order. In respect of an illegal order the principle of locus poenitentiae would not be available. \n \n(f) State Bank of Pakistan Scheme For Financing/Purchase of Locally Manufactured Machinery, 1985 \n \n State Bank of Pakistan Circular No.1 dated 13 3 1988 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Constitutional petition Maintainability Grievance of the petitioners was violation of the Policy/Scheme made by the State Bank of Pakistan as well as violation of agreement entered into between them and the Financial corporation which was an official functionary and the grievance of the petitioners was on account of violation of the Scheme/Policy as well as the terms and conditions of the agreements, which did not require minute and detailed inquiry or examination and could be decided on the basis of the documents/material on record Constitutional petition was assailed on the ground that the grievances/disputes involved were the outcome of violation of the terms and conditions of agreements entered into between the parties and submitted that it was settled principle of law that violation of the terms and conditions of agreement or the grievances/ disputes arising out of the agreements entered into between the parties would not entitle the aggrieved party to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court for redress of his grievances/disputes Validity Held, while routine contractual disputes between private parties and public functionaries were not open to scrutiny under the Constitutional jurisdiction, breaches of such contracts, which did not entail inquiry into or examination of minute or controversial questions of fact, if committed by Government, Semi Government or Local Authorities or like controversies if involving declaration of obligations, flowing from a Statute, rules or instructions, could adequately be addressed to for relief under the Constitutional jurisdiction Constitutional petition was maintainable. \n \nMessrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid e Azam International Airport, Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268 fol.\n \nMuhammad Mumtaz Masud and 2 others v. House Building Finance Corporation and 2 others 1994 SCMR 2287 and Mst. Saboohi v. Ghulam Dastagir 1995 MLD 1402 ref.\n \n(g) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) \n \n Art. 199 Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court ¬Contractual obligations Maintainability of Constitutional petition Scope.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C. Ps. Nos. D 2276; D 2277 and D 2278 of 1992, heard on 23rd April, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J. AND GHULAM RABBANI, J",
    "": "Messrs SAKRAND SUGAR MILLS and others ers\nVs.\nMessrs STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13202",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1584 = 2005 SLD 1584 = 2005 CLD 565",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes Fiscal statutes Not applicable to past and closed chapter and concluded transactions Such statutes are prospective in nature, unless specifically provided otherwise Principles illustrated. \n \n(b) Sale of Goods Act (III of 1930) \n \n S.9 Enhancement or reduction in price after supply of car to the buyer Effect Neither seller in case of enhancement would have right to claim difference in price from buyer nor buyer in case of reduction would be entitled to claim such benefit Any subsequent change in price would not affect such transaction.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision Application No.238 of 2000, decision dated: 10-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUJEEBULLAH SIDDIQUI, J",
    "": "S.M. YAQOOB --Applicant\nVs.\nPAK SUZUKI MOTOR CO. LTD. through Managing Director/ Chief Executive, Karachi High Court --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13203",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1585 = 2005 SLD 1585 = 2005 CLD 569",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S. 9(2)(3) Customer had admitted having availed financial facilities but denied their aggregation as presented by the Bank Transfer entries seen in the statements of accounts neither showed the accounts wherefrom these originated nor the accounts to which the transfers were directed Statement of account was a basic document that was filed by a financial institution in discharge of its statutory duty under S.9(2), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Filing of such a document was not a formality alone but the performance of a mandatory obligation to support the claim made in the plaint Format in a statement of account was also necessitated by S.9(3) of the Ordinance which also required the plaint to specifically state the particulars namely amount of finance availed, amount repaid, dates of payment, and outstanding amounts of finance and other amounts payable by a Customer Presentation of a fully integrated picture of the transactional history in a customer's account was meant to enable a Banking Court to transparently determine the correct financial liability of a customer who, as in the present case, had admitted having availed financial facilities but denied their aggregation as presented by the Bank Principles.\n \nRecord in the present case showed that the transfer entries seen in the statements of accounts neither showed the accounts wherefrom these originated nor the accounts to which the transfers were directed. Furthermore, as the statements of account lacked headings and proper column spacing, therefore these transfer entries became indistinguishable between credits and debits. In a recovery suit the statement of account is a basic document that is filed by a financial institution in discharge of its statutory duty under section 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The filing of such a document is not a formality alone but the performance of a mandatory obligation to support the claim made in the plaint. This document should be laid out in a format that is comprehensible to any reasonable person reading it in the ordinary course. It must be set out in a mode that clearly describes the nature of the account entries arranged in a manner that distinguished the various categories of amounts, for example credits, debits or amounts outstanding. The clarity of the format in a statement of account is now also necessitated by the provisions of section 9(3) of the Ordinance. That provision requires the plaint to specifically state the particulars namely amount of finance availed, amount repaid, dates of payment, and outstanding amounts of finance and other amounts payable by a customer. It appears to be the statutory scheme that the foregoing contents of the table under section 9(3) of the Ordinance that are derived from the accounts of the Bank must be verifiable with reference to its statement of account furnished under section 9(2) of the Ordinance. The presentation of a fully integrated picture of the transactional history in a customer's account is meant to enable a Banking Court to transparently determine the correct financial liability of a customer who, as in the present case, had admitted having availed financial facilities but denied their aggregation as presented by the respondent Bank. \n \nMessrs. C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited v. I.C.P. 2004 CLD 587 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.9(2)(3) Statement of account filed in a Court Legal status and effect.\n \nMere production of a certified copy of the account was not by itself sufficient to charge a person with liability. The copy produced was tantamount however, to production of entries from the original books of account. Those entries could have been admissible in evidence only for the purposes mentioned under the Qanun e Shahadat and to the extent therein provided. Qanun e Shahadat 'requires that corroboration is necessary of the entry to charge a person with liability, but as to what should be the nature or the extent of the corroboration no hard and fast rule can be laid down, for, that must depend on the circumstances surrounding each transaction and the reliability of the manner in which the account has been kept.\n \nIf the statement of account is presented in a disorganized and incomprehensible manner then it becomes necessary that its contents should have strong corroboration, before the account may receive judicial acceptance. Statutory provisions of sections 9(2) and 9(3) of the Ordinance clearly indicated legislative intent that the statement of account constitutes 'a fundamental document to sustain a bank's financial claim. To fulfil this role the contents of a statement must possess clarity, detail and completeness. These attributes would also serve the evidentiary presumption given by the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891. Needless to say the foregoing emphasis is necessary to facilitate expeditious and transparent determinations by the Banking Courts on the important question of quantum of liability that invariably arises in cases where liability as claimed in a suit is disputed by the customers. \n \nMessrs Muhammad Siddiq Muhammad Umar and another v. The Australasia Bank Limited PLD 1966 SC 684 ref.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n-----S. 9(4) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) S.10----Banking suit Doctrine of sub judice Applicability Scope ¬Provision of S. 9(4), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 expressly excludes the application of the doctrine of sub judice enshrined in S.10. C.P.C. Effect of such exclusion is that a prior suit between the parties filed before a Banking Court or elsewhere does not impact upon the progress of a subsequent suit between the same parties although common questions of fact and law arise for determination Clear implication of S. 9(4) of the Ordinance is to exclude the consideration of conflicting findings from the array of criteria used to control and guide the progress and prosecution of suits under the Ordinance. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S. 9(4) Plea of consolidation of suit for damages with Banking suit Not tenable Principle.\n \nIn a suit for damages against a financial institution the grant of leave to defend follows as a matter of course on the substantial question of fact whether the loss claimed is proved by evidence. On the other hand a substantial question of law or fact does not readily arise in a banking claim unless the customer shows, inter alia, consideration or consent to be lacking or the entries in a statement of account to require corroboration. Therefore unless leave is granted in the banking suit as a whole consolidation of two disparate proceedings would operate not to facilitate the adjudication of the two suits but rather to retard progress of one for the sake of the other. This is against the statutory scheme for early disposal of suits filed by financial institutions under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \nThere is no provision in the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 empowering the Banking Court to order consolidation of proceedings. Such an order can only be passed in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of a Banking Court upon considerations that are discretionary in nature and that 'would clearly vary from case to case. In the present case no ground was made out for Banking Court to have directed consolidation of the proceedings pending before it. \n \nMalik Jehangir Khan v. Banking Tribunal No. 1.\n \nKarachi Division, Karachi and 4 others 2002 CLD 1466: First Women Bank Limited v. Registrar, High Court of Sindh Karachi and others 2004 SCMR 108 and Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213 distinguished.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S. 2(c) Customer includes a surety or indemnifier ¬Objection based on the status of a mortgagor does not bear any relevance.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.311 of 2004, heard on 13-12-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "Messrs UNITED DAIRIES FARMS (PVT.) LIMITED and 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13204",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1586 = 2005 SLD 1586 = 2005 CLD 581",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.10 & 21 Application for grant of leave to defend the suit New plea Defendants were not allowed to raise altogether a new plea which was not the subject matter of their applications for the grant of leave to defend suit, for the first time before the High Court. \n \nAnwar Ali and others v. Manzoor Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 1770 and Amir Shah v. Ziarat Gul 1998 SCMR 593 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.10 & 9 Application for leave to defend the suit ¬Defend had raised a specific plea that plaintiff had charged mark up on mark up which was illegal and against the directives of the State Bank of Pakistan Impugned showed that although the said plea was raised by the defendant before the Banking Court yet the Court failed to give any findings on the statements of account; rather the said crucial plea had been brushed aside by the Banking Court by merely observing that \"\"moreover presumption of truth is attached with the statements of account Effect ¬Held, it was legal obligation of the Banking Court to have rendered some findings on the question of charging mark up one way or the other: it appeared that Banking Court, without the application of its judicial mind and in complete oblivion of the impact of the objection, had, in a stereo type manner, observed that the presumption was attached to the statements of account Entries in the statements of account if dubious and challenged by the other party could not be taken as sufficient to prove bank's claim and no presumption of truth or correctness could be attached to such types of copies of statements of account Impugned of the Banking Court could hardly be called and termed as judicial order/ within the parameters set up by law and was in violation of the principles laid down on the subject and it definitely suffered from misreading of the record of the case High Court set aside the impugned s and remanded the cases to the Banking Court on the limited question of charging of mark up over mark up in the accounts of the defendants. \n \nGouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller of Import and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158; Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173; Messrs Yussra Textile Corporation and 2 others v. PICIC Commercial Bank Limited 2003 CLD 905; Messrs Associated Construction Engineering through Proprietor and 2 others v. The Bank of Punjab through Branch Manager and another 2004 CLD 1611 and Muhammad Ashraf v. Habib Bank Limited through Attorneys 2004 CLD 1561 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss.10 & 21 Application for leave to defend suit ¬Defendant had asserted that the Financial Institution had recovered the total decretal amount in one case and decree stood partially satisfied in other case and had charged mark up over the mark up Defendant, in circumstances, had been able to make out a case for the grant of leave to defend the suit only on the limited question of charging/debiting of mark up over mark up in the accounts High Court as such granted unconditional leave to defend the suit to the defendants on the limited question as to whether Financial Institution had charged mark up over mark up in the accounts of the defendants Suits filed by the Financial Institution shall be deemed to be pending before the Banking Court, constituted and established under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which was directed to be decided afresh only on the questions formulated after giving opportunities to the parties to produce evidence in accordance with law within a period of three months.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos.325 and 326 of 1999, decision dated: 10-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MOHIB EXPORTS LTD., and 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nTRUST LEASING CORPORATION LTD. through Chief Executive --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13205",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1587 = 2005 SLD 1587 = 2005 CLD 588",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXXVII, R.3---Suit for recovery---Leave to defend the suit by the defendant---Imposition of terms on the leave---Principles.\n Principles settled for the leave and the imposition of terms on the leave are following:\n (i) The Court should consider the facts disclosed in the affidavit filed by a defendant along with application for seeking leave to appear and defend the suit;\n (ii) If such facts show a plausible defence or a substantial question of fact or law needing trial or investigation, the defendant will be entitled to the leave to defend the suit;\n (iii) If the defence set-up is vague or unsatisfactory or doubtful or not genuine, leave should not be refused altogether but the applying defendant should be put on terms either to furnish security or to deposit the amount claimed; or\n (iv) If the allegations in the affidavit are illusory or improbable not raising a triable issue as to the consideration for the Bill, leave can be refused by the Court.\n Despite the finding of existence of a \"\"plausible defence\"\" or a \"\"substantial question of fact or law\"\" or a \"\"triable issue\"\" in the case, the Court could subject the grant of leave on the term of cash deposit in the Court by the defendant for the reason that \"\"conduct of the defendant was not entirely free from suspicion.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Fine Textile Mills Ltd. Karachi v. Haji Umer PLD 1963 SC 163 fol.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "----O. XXXVII, R.3---Suit for recovery---Leave to defend suit---Grant or refusal---Basis---Facts and the questions as disclosed in the affidavit and application to seek leave to appear and defend the suit, form the basis for grant or refusal of the leave and/or to allow the leave upon terms or otherwise---Imposition of a term is the Court's discretion to be exercised judiciously upon the facts of the case before it---Such exercise should not be arbitrary, perverse or unduly harsh so as to amount denial of the defence to a deserving defendant---Principles.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": " Agrofoster (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others v. Judge Banking Court No.5, Karachi and another PLD 1999 Kar.398; Haji Abdul Wahid v. Hoechst Pakistan Limited and another 1993 CLC 1291; Ehsanul Haq Kiani v. Allied Bank of Pakistan, Karachi and 2 others 1984 SCMR 963; Fine Textile Mills Ltd. Karachi v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163; Haji Karim and another v. Zakir Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100; Mian Rafique Saigol and another v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. and another PLD 1996 SC 749; Messrs Ark Industrial Management Ltd. v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. PLD 1991 SC 976; Haji Sh. Muhammad Hussain & Co. Ltd. and 9 others v. City Bank N.A. Alfalah Building Lahore 1985 CLC 2467 and Messrs National Security Insurance Co. v. Messrs Hoechst Pakistan Ltd. and others 1992 SCMR 718 ref.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "----O. XXXVII, R.3---Negotiable instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), S.118---Suit on the basis of dishonoured cheque---Application for leave to defend suit by the defendant---Defendant in his application and affidavit had admitted that the parties had a business relationship whereunder the plaintiff invested a certain amount in cash with the defendant and the defendant had also admitted the amount of balance payable by him to the plaintiff---Defendant claimed issuance of the cheques in question \"\"as security for the amount invested\"\"---Cheques were admittedly dishonoured as not arranged for by the defendant and his son had issued more cheques in favour of the plaintiff in order to satisfy plaintiff's business creditors---Execution, issuance and the dishonouring of the cheques thus ceased to be the litigated questions upon admission of the defendant---Trial Court as such concluded that defendant's defence deserved a trial and while exercising its discretion, in view of the facts, granted leave conditionally upon his furnishing of a surety bond for the suit amount---Validity---Defendant having not produced any document in support of his plea of the investment by the plaintiff in business transaction, examining the record to assess whether exercise of discretion of subjecting the leave to a condition by the District Judge, was improper, perverse and arbitrary---Plea of defendant, in fact, proved the existence of a financial transaction between the parties by admitting payment of money by the plaintiff---Issuance of cheques by the defendant was also a proof that the plaintiff's money was backed by the defendant's cheques---Nature and the value of the defence plea terming the cheques as securities and the effect thereof could only be determined upon investigation in a trial particularly in the perspective of the admitted execution and issuance of cheques by the defendant and dishonouring the same---Blank and unsubstantiated oral pleas of the defendant were not adequate at the revision stage to displace the initial presumption attached under S.118, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 that the negotiable instruments were made, drawn, accepted or endorsed for a consideration---Defendant had yet to discharge his onus of proof that the cheques made and drawn by him were not for consideration---Trial Court, in circumstances, validly and reasonably exercised the discretionary powers vesting in it to grant leave to defend the suit conditionally upon the submission of surety bond equal to the disputed amount by the defendant and was justified to reject the review application against said order---Such order of the Trial Court did not deserve interference by the High Court in revision---High Court allowed another opportunity of a trial to the defendant to furnish a surety bond for the suit amount by granting further time uptil 31-1-2005 and modified the order of the Trial Court accordingly and if the defendant failed to furnish surety bond up to the specified date, order of the Trial Court would remain in the field and Trial Court shall proceed to decide the suit expeditiously in accordance with law.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": " Agrofoster (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others v. Judge Banking Court No.5, Karachi and another PLD 1999 Kar.398; Haji Abdul Wahid v. Hoechst Pakistan Limited and another 1993 CLC 1291; Ehsanul Haq Kiani v. Allied Bank of Pakistan, Karachi and 2 others 1984 SCMR 963; Fine Textile Mills Ltd. Karachi v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163; Haji Karim and another v. Zakir Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100; Mian Rafique Saigol and another v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. and another PLD 1996 SC 749; Messrs Ark Industrial Management Ltd. v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. PLD 1991 SC 976; Haji Sh. Muhammad Hussain & Co. Ltd. and 9 others v. City Bank N.A. Alfalah Building Lahore 1985 CLC 2467 and Messrs National Security Insurance Co. v. Messrs Hoechst Pakistan Ltd. and others 1992 SCMR 718 ref.\"",
    "URL Link:": "Civil Revision No.1381 of 2003, decision dated: 14-01-2005.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "Court Name:": "Muhammad Yousaf Kazmi for Petitioner.\n Hamid Ali Mirza for Respondent.",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sheikh MUHAMMAD AYUB\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD YOUSUF",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13206",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1588 = 2005 SLD 1588 = 2005 CLD 602",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 7, 9 & 16---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for recovery of loan against borrower and the guarantors---Bank moved application for grant of interim relief regarding appointment of the Local Commission for the preparation of inventory of the machinery, fixtures, stocks, etc. which was allowed but the request for attachment of the properties of the defendants had not been pressed by the Bank's counsel---Bank had confined itself to the relief that defendant be restrained from alienating all those properties, which were mortgaged/pledged and hypothecated with the Bank and guarantors be restrained from encashing two TDRs mentioned in the applications---Held, as far as the restraint about the sale of the mortgaged/pledged properties/assets belonging to defendant was concerned, applicant/Bank had a prima facie case, because admittedly, said properties were the securities for the repayment of the finance, and thus if during the pendency of suit, those were allowed to be alienated, the Bank shall be exposed to irreparable loss and the balance of convenience also lay in favour of the Bank and against the defendant, therefore, defendant was restrained from alienating the said properties in any manner whatsoever, without first obtaining the permission of the High Court---No details of properties of the guarantors having been furnished by the Bank, the Bank could not be clothed with the omnibus order, restraining the guarantors from transferring/alienating any of their properties/assets, therefore to that extent, the relief claimed by the Bank was declined---Property/assets of the defendant (borrower) being quite sufficient rather more than the claim of the Bank, relief against the guarantors was declined by the High Court. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n----Ss. 7, 9 & 16---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.94(e), 151 & O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank against principal borrower and guarantors---Bank moved application seeking relief to the effect that guarantors be restrained to encash the TDRs issued by a foreign branch of the plaintiff bank---Said TDRs did not belong to the guarantors rather were owned by some other foreign company who was not party to the lis and the TDRs in question were not shown to be under the lien of the plaintiff Bank for repayment of the finance in issue---Issue for determination was whether, in circumstances, Pakistani Court, while exercising its special jurisdiction under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 or in the exercise of its general powers conferred by C.P.C., could issue an extra territorial injunction, restraining the defendants from the encashment of the TDRs issued by plaintiff's branch at Dubai which were lying there---Principles.\n The claim of the plaintiff in the present case is that the TDRs are under the lien of the bank for the repayment of the finance and if the guarantors during the pendency of the suit, are allowed to encash, the TDRs, the Bank shall be exposed to irreparable loss and balance of convenience also tilted in its favour. In reply to the above, it has been explained by guarantors that these TDRs do not belong to them, rather are owned by a company registered in the Ireland and is operating inter alia in Dubai, for the last ten years. These TDRs are not under the lien of the plaintiff/bank for the repayment of the aforesaid finance, but those have been furnished as security by the aforesaid company against counter guarantees for some other company.\n The important legal point, which has cropped up in the present matter is, whether High Court, while exercising its special jurisdiction under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, or in the exercise of its general powers conferred by C.P.C., can issue an extra territorial injunction, restraining the defendants from the encashment of the TDRs issued by the plaintiff's branch at Dubai, and are lying there. \n On the principle of ex debito justitiae, which means, in accordance with the requirement of justice, the Pakistani Courts in appropriate cases, can grant interim relief in the nature of extra territorial jurisdiction, under its inherent jurisdiction to do justice, however, the propriety thereof, shall be dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. But before such power should be exercised, the rules of International Law; the principles of the conflict of laws; the Municipal law of the country, where the subject matter about which injunction is being sought and issued and whether such an injunction shall command respect and enforceability in the country, where it has to take the effect, should also be necessarily kept in view.\n Such an interim relief/injunction thus can be issued, in \"\"personam\"\" against a persoone, who has been validly and properly joined and arrayed as a party to the legal proceeding, pending before the Courts in Pakistan, and under the law, the Courts otherwise have the jurisdic-tion over the party. It can undoubtedly be issued against a party, who is legally joined and has also submitted to the jurisdiction of Pakistani Courts, such a person/party can obviously be directed through an injunctive order to perform or restrain from performing any act, related/ connected to a subject matter, which even is outside the jurisdiction of the Courts in Pakistan.\n The TDRs in question are not shown to be owned by guarantors, rather by a company registered in the Ireland and is operating inter alia in Dubai, and is not a party to the present lis; even on the principle of injunction in personam, it cannot be issued to such a company, which is the owner of the TDRs, but not a defendant to the case. Secondly, it is not prima facie proved on the record that the said TDRs are under the lien of the bank for the satisfaction of the finance in issue. No letter of lien in this regard has been placed on record. Even otherwise, it has been explained by the defendant's side that the claim of the bank stands substantially reduced, as against the value of the project, which remains to be the prime security for the discharge of the liability by defendant. Moreover Manager of the Assets and Recovery of plaintiff/bank, has candidly conceded that the value of the land and building of the defendant presently shall be around 40 million and if the machinery etc. is added, it shall increase to 144/145 million. Thus the above property/assets of the principal debtor seem quite sufficient, rather more than the claim of the plaintiff/bank. Therefore, a prima facie case for the grant of an interim injunction has not been made out and in the facts of the case, the applicant also failed to establish in its favour the other two essential ingredients, requisite for the grant of the interim relief. The application of the bank in this behalf was dismissed.\n Balagamwala Oil Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Shakarchi Trading A.G. and 2 others PLD 1990 Kar. 1 fol.\n Republic of Haiti v. Duvlier (1990) 1 OB 202 (C.A); Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (1990) Chy. 48 (C.A.); Deby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (No.6) (1990) IWLR 1139, 1149; and Babanaft International Co. S.A. v. Bassame (1990) Ch. 13 at 38.41 (C.A.) ref.\n Salman Akram Raja for Applicant.\n Amir Iqbal Basharat for Respondents Nos.1 to 4 and 7.\n Qasir Javed for Respondents Nos. 5 and 6.\n Zafar Iqbal, Manager of Assets and Recovery in person.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.Ms. Nos.299-B and 308-B of 2004 in C.O.S. No.23 of 2004, decision dated: 14-12-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED--Applicant\nVs.\nMessrs ZUCHINI INDUSTRIES PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13207",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1589 = 2005 SLD 1589 = 2005 CLD 610",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 14, 15, 18 & 21---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Borrower had mortgaged his property as security and the title deeds were in the possession of the Bank---Banking Court granted decree to the Bank which attained finality and the mortgaged property was sold in execution thereof through open auction---Auction sale was confirmed and total price was paid by the auction purchaser and sale certificate and warrant for possession had also been issued by the Court---Application under S. 151, C.P.C. was filed by the objectors claiming that the debtor was not owner of the property on the date when the property was mortgaged with the Bank, the mortgage itself was illegal and invalid and that they were vendees of the title of the property for valuable consideration in good faith and prayed for setting aside the auction---Banking Court found that the sales claimed by the objectors to have been made in their favour had been brought about in collusion with the debtor who supported them at the bar---Validity---Held, contention of the objectors impugning the validity of the mortgage had no tenability as the objectors had no locus standi to agitate the matter nor in the process of execution of the decree the Court could go behind the decree---Had the objectors made due inquiry and demanded the title documents of the property from the debtor they would have learnt about the mortgage and had not gone ahead for the purchase of the same as the original title documents were still lying with the decree holder/Bank---Plea of bona fide purchase was not placed on a sound footing as the inquiry made by the objectors about the title of the suit property should not have been confined merely to the examination of the revenue papers---Banking Court in dismissing the application of the objectors had acted in consonance with the law and no illegality had been committed in passing the impugned order---Appeal was dismissed by the High Court.\n Mst. Nasiban Bibi v. The Australasia Bank, Lahore and 2 others 1970 SCMR 657 fol.\n Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Messrs Malik & Company through Proprietor Malik Naim Ahmad and 2 others 2002 CLD 606; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs M.M. Agencies and 5 others 1991 CLC 1763; Zarif Khan and others v. Muhammad and others PLD 1983 Pesh. 58; Messrs United Bank Ltd., Karachi v. Mst. Asma Zafarul Hassan 1980 CLC 565; Alamanayakunigari Nabi Sab v. Murukuti Papiak and others AIR 1915 Mad. 972; Mst. Nasiban Bibi v. The Australasia Bank, Lahore and 2 others 1970 SCMR 657 and Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Syed Ataullah Shah and 2 others 2003 CLD 888 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 319 of 2003, heard on 25-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD JAMEEL and another\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13208",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1590 = 2005 SLD 1590 = 2005 CLD 610",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 14, 15, 18 & 21---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Borrower had mortgaged his property as security and the title deeds were in the possession of the Bank---Banking Court granted decree to the Bank which attained finality and the mortgaged property was sold in execution thereof through open auction---Auction sale was confirmed and total price was paid by the auction purchaser and sale certificate and warrant for possession had also been issued by the Court---Application under S. 151, C.P.C. was filed by the objectors claiming that the debtor was not owner of the property on the date when the property was mortgaged with the Bank, the mortgage itself was illegal and invalid and that they were vendees of the title of the property for valuable consideration in good faith and prayed for setting aside the auction---Banking Court found that the sales claimed by the objectors to have been made in their favour had been brought about in collusion with the debtor who supported them at the bar---Validity---Held, contention of the objectors impugning the validity of the mortgage had no tenability as the objectors had no locus standi to agitate the matter nor in the process of execution of the decree the Court could go behind the decree---Had the objectors made due inquiry and demanded the title documents of the property from the debtor they would have learnt about the mortgage and had not gone ahead for the purchase of the same as the original title documents were still lying with the decree holder/Bank---Plea of bona fide purchase was not placed on a sound footing as the inquiry made by the objectors about the title of the suit property should not have been confined merely to the examination of the revenue papers---Banking Court in dismissing the application of the objectors had acted in consonance with the law and no illegality had been committed in passing the impugned order---Appeal was dismissed by the High Court.\n Mst. Nasiban Bibi v. The Australasia Bank, Lahore and 2 others 1970 SCMR 657 fol.\n Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Messrs Malik & Company through Proprietor Malik Naim Ahmad and 2 others 2002 CLD 606; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs M.M. Agencies and 5 others 1991 CLC 1763; Zarif Khan and others v. Muhammad and others PLD 1983 Pesh. 58; Messrs United Bank Ltd., Karachi v. Mst. Asma Zafarul Hassan 1980 CLC 565; Alamanayakunigari Nabi Sab v. Murukuti Papiak and others AIR 1915 Mad. 972; Mst. Nasiban Bibi v. The Australasia Bank, Lahore and 2 others 1970 SCMR 657 and Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Syed Ataullah Shah and 2 others 2003 CLD 888 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 319 of 2003, heard on 25-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD JAMEEL and another\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13209",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1591 = 2005 SLD 1591 = 2005 CLD 615",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----Ss. 10, 12 & 21---Dismissal of application for leave to defend suit for non-prosecution as neither the defendants nor their counsel entered appearance to prosecute the application---Neither in the grounds of appeal nor at the time of hearing of appeal the appellant (defendant) had pleaded any cause not to talk of \"\"Sufficient Cause\"\" for the non-appearance of the defendants or their counsel---No application under S.12, Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1979, seeking restoration of their leave application and explaining the causes for non-appearance and absence of their counsel had been moved---Banking Court, in circumstances, had committed no legal error, while passing the impugned and decree, qua the appellants (defendants) which were maintained by the High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.95 of 2000, decision dated: 12-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "JAVED AHMAD and another\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and 12 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13210",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1592 = 2005 SLD 1592 = 2005 CLD 624",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------Ss. 9, 10, 18 & 21---Suit for recovery of loan---Defendants had not filed applications for leave to appear to defend the suit---Banking Court dismissed the suit ex parte and also decreed against the defendants---Bank and defendants, during pendency of appeal before the High Court, arrived at an agreement to allow the defendants to discharge their liabilities in easy instalments---Defendants had paid two instalments to the Bank along with down payments which they had mentioned in the agreement arrived at between the parties---Relevant documents were placed on record---Contention of the defendants was that in view of the subsequent events the decree against them had become redundant as the Bank had settled the dispute with them and High Court had ample jurisdiction to look into the subsequent events at the time of deciding the case between the parties---Bank contended that defendants had not settled the dispute with the Bank therefore, appeal had not become redundant---Validity---High Court had ample jurisdiction to look into the subsequent events at the time of deciding the case---Bank, after having secured the decree had settled the dispute by way of agreement, therefore, appeal of defendants was accepted---No one could be allowed to approbate and reprobate---Bank, however, was well within its rights to secure the decretal amount from the defendants in terms of the agreement arrived at between the parties---If the defendants failed to honour their commitment the Bank would be at liberty to avail appropriate remedy under the law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.111 of 2003, decision dated: 17-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI, JJ",
    "": "Dr. MUHAMMAD ASHRAF\nVs.\nTHE BANK OF PUNJAB through Manager and 9 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13211",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1593 = 2005 SLD 1593 = 2005 CLD 626",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---S. 10---Suit for recovery of loan---Grant of leave to defend the suit---Defendant had sought unconditional leave to defend the suit urging that she being widow of the deceased guarantor, who was alleged to have executed the personal guarantee, no personal liability could be foisted on his legal heirs---Held, such controversy could only be resolved and decided at trial after looking at the guarantee---Unconditional leave to defend the suit was granted accordingly.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---S. 10---Suit for recovery of loan---Grant of leave to defend the suit---Defendant, a guarantor, had challenged the maintainability of the suit against him and disputed his signature on the letter of guarantee---In order to adjudicate the issue raised and to resolve factual and legal controversies leave to appeal was granted unconditionally.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----S. 10---Suit for recovery of loan---Grant of leave to defend the suit---Contention of the defendant was that his signatures on the letter of guarantee were forged and sought unconditional leave to defend the suit---Reports of Handwriting Experts were also on the record which created a doubt on the guarantee---Held, issue in question could only be determined and adjudicated at the trial---Defendant was granted leave to defend the suit accordingly.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---S. 10---Suit for recovery of loan---Grant of leave to defend the suit---Contention of the defendants was that legal heirs were not liable under the purported guarantee which was alleged to have been executed by their father---Held, such an issue could be decided at trial---Matter in question being pending for quite some time for consideration, leave to appear and defend the suit was granted to the defendants accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.366 of 1999, C.M.As. Nos.6245, 9127 of 2001, 299, 300 and 301 of 2002, decision dated: 17-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "Messrs HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs PAN ISLAMIC STEAMSHIP CO. LIMITED and 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13212",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1594 = 2005 SLD 1594 = 2005 CLD 629",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---Ss. 7, 9 & 21---Suit for recovery of loan filed before Banking Tribunal under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984---Contention of the defendants was that suits were filed before incompetent Tribunal, therefore same could not be transferred by operation of law before the Banking Court and thus s and decrees of the Banking Court were without lawful authority---Validity---Defendants had not taken any ground in the grounds of appeal before the High Court that the Banking Court lacked jurisdiction in the matter---Defendants (appellants), in circumstances were not allowed to raise the plea that Banking Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter.\n Mst. Murid Begum v. Muhammad Rafiq PLD 1974 SC 322 and Tariq Shahbaz Chaudhry v. Bank of Punjab 2004 CLD 207 ref.\n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----Ss. 7, 9, 10 & 15---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24-A---Operative part of the s and decrees of the Banking Court along with grounds of application for leave to defend the suits clearly showed that Banking Court had passed the impugned s and decrees without application of mind which was condition precedent for the Judicial Officer to pass the s and decrees after application of mind---High Court accepted the appeals, set aside the impugned decree and remanded the cases to the Banking Court to decide the same afresh according to law---Principles.\nGouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller of Import and Export PLD 1970 SC 158; Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 173 and Messrs Airport Support Services' case 1998 SCMR 2268 ref.\nChenab Cement's case PLD 1996 Lah.572; Soneri Bank Ltd. v. Raja Weaving Mills KLR 1997 CC 742; U.B. L. v. Hinna Export Company 1998 PSC 78; Messrs Sind Tech. Industries v. Messrs Investment Corporation 1998 SCMR 1533; A. Habib Ahmad v. Hongkong Banking Company 1999 CLC 1953; Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. A.B.L. 2002 CLD 759; Muhammad Umar Tarar v. Judge Banking Court 2002 CLD 1663; Equity Participation Fund v. Messrs Pakistan Mobile 2003 CLD 206; Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. A.B. L. 2003 CLD 952; Tri-Star Polyester Ltd. v. Citibank 2001 SCMR 410; Pakland Cement Company v. Citibank 2001 SCMR 1341; Muhammad Umar v. Muqarab Khan 1968 SCMR 983; Fine Textile Mills Ltd. v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163; Muhammad Ramzan v. Citibank N.A. 2001 CLC 158; Ghazala Arif v. Union Bank 2000 CLC 1201; Messrs U.B.L. v. Redco Textile Ltd. 2000 CLC 968; M.C.B. Ltd. v. Rizwan Textile Mills 1998 MLD 529; National Bank of Pakistan v. Mohammad Ashraf Sanik PLD 1987 Lah. 17; U.B.L. v. Central Cotton Mills Ltd. 2001 MLD 78; U.B.L. v. Mian Aftab Ahmad 2001 MLD 1332; Ghulam Sarwar v. National Bank 2001 CLC 522; ANZ Grindlays Bank v. Saadi Cement Company PLD 2001 Kar. 2017; Qatar Airways PLC v. ANZ Grindlays Bank 2000 CLC 1455; First Grindlays Modaraba v. Pakland Cement 2000 CLC 2017; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs West Pakistan Tanks 2000 CLC 896; Agrofoster (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Judge Banking Court PLD 1999 Kar. 398; Citibank v. Tariq Mohsin PLD 1999 Kar. 196; Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Marvi Laboratories 1999 MLD 3456; National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Buildings PLD 1998 Kar. 302; Nasimuddin Sidiqui v. U.B.L. 1998 CLC 1718; U.B.L. v. Sindh Tech Industries 1998 CLC 1152; A.B. L. v. Mehran Oil Mills PLD 1988 Kar. 360; A.B.L. v. Messrs Kassam Corporation 1987 MLD 742; Haji Ali Khan v. A.B. L. 1992 CLC 1906 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.104 to 107 of 1999, heard on 6-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "KHALID SHAHBAZ CHAUDHRY and 4 others\nVs.\nPRIME COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through VicEPresident"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13213",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1595 = 2005 SLD 1595 = 2005 CLD 643",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----Ss. 9, 10, 14 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan against principal borrower and the guarantors---Guarantors had created mortgage by the deposit of title documents, and the execution of the registered mortgage-deed---Finance was further secured by the hypothecation of certain paddy stocks lying in the godown of one of the guarantors---Hypothecated stock was destroyed by fire and Bank invoked the insurance clause but the insurance company refused the claim challenging the bona fides of the fire incident---Effect---Claim under the insurance clause was an independent and separate agreement, which could not be made the basis to restrict the Bank to recover the amount only through the said process, especially when the insurance company had refused to pay the insurance claim on the ground that the incident of fire was a manoeuvred one and the claim was not bona fide---Contention that because of the Act of God, the principal borrower was exonerated from the liability and thus the guarantors stood discharged as sureties/mortgagors, was repelled.\n Messrs United Bank Limited v. Messrs Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. 1988 CLC 1660 and Messrs Agro Food Limited through Chief Executive and 4 others v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2002 CLC 1290 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.80 and 82 of 2003, heard on 4-10-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND TANVIR BASHIR ANSARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NAEEM BHATTI and others\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13214",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1596 = 2005 SLD 1596 = 2005 CLD 647",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S. 9---Suit for recovery of loan---Common issue in both the suits (one by the bank and the other by defendants) was about the accounts with the assertions that borrowers had made excess payments to the bank and in that regard both the parties had led evidence in both the suits while the Bank had claimed that the borrowers had to pay certain amounts for which the Bank had filed the suit for recovery in the Banking Court which was at the stage of hearing of application for leave to defend by the defendants (borrowers)---Counsel of both the parties suggested to the High Court that a Chartered Accountant be appointed to take accounts of both the parties and determine their respective liabilities---Prayers in both the suits would now be confined to the accounts and rest of the prayers would not be pressed by both the parties except with regard to the properties mortgaged by the Bank which too would be subject to the proposed report of the Chartered Accountants---High Court, by consent, appointed Chartered Accountants to undertake exercise of determination of liability of the parties after taking accounts from both the parties and to submit their report within two months from the date of communication of the order.\nSaalim Salam Ansari for Plaintiff (in Suit No.-B-20 of 2002) and Saalim Salam Ansari for Defendant (in Suit No.-B-39 of 2003).\nArshad Tayebaly for Plaintiff (in Suit No.-B-39 of 2003) and Arshad Tayebaly for Defendant (in Suit No.-B-20 of 2002).",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suits Nos.B-20 of 2002 and B-39 of 2003, decision dated: 19-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J",
    "": "NAZIMUDDIN --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs THE BANK OF KHYBER and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13215",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1597 = 2005 SLD 1597 = 2005 CLD 649",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----Ss. 9 & 19(1)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.2---Suit for recovery of amount---Execution of decree---Suit was decreed in terms of compromise between the parties---Both parties had stated that amount due under the decree had been paid by -debtor to decree-holder Bank subject to condition that all or any payment under insurance claims filed by -debtors against Insurance Companies would be recovered by decree-holder-Bank---Nothing was due from -debtors to decree-holder-Bank under the decree---Payment of decretal amount subject to said condition of recovery by decree-holder from Insurance Companies was recorded in terms of O.XXI, R. 2, C.P.C. and guarantees and securities would stand discharged and document would be returned to -debtor by decree-holder-Bank---Decree had been satisfied accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.11 of 2000 and C.M. No.1518 of 2004, decision dated: 6-12-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through General Attorney--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs MUBARAK TEXTILE MILLS LTD. through Managing Director/Chief Executive and 7 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13216",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1598 = 2005 SLD 1598 = 2005 CLD 650",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----Ss. 12 & 22---Power to set aside decree by the Banking Court---Scope---Banking Court, on an application under S.12, Financial Institutions, (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 by defendant, may set aside a decree passed upon the failure of such defendant to move an application for leave to defend within the prescribed period, in the eventuality that the summonses were not served or there were other sufficient grounds for the failure to file an application for leave to defend---Leave to defend in the present case, was in fact filed, which failed to find favour with the Court ---Said application showed no allegation that the summonses were not served or there was any other reason or cause for non-filing of an application for leave to defend which, in fact ,had been filed---Plea that defendant being minor at the time of the execution of the mortgage deed in favour of the Bank, the deed was void and his property could not be put to auction having been belied by the record and being beyond the ambit of S. 12, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was not tenable and was a sufficient ground for dismissal of the application and appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.263 of 2004, decision dated: 11-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARDAR MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "BABAR ALI\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD ASHRAF and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13217",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1599 = 2005 SLD 1599 = 2005 CLD 653",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------S. 9---Procedure of Banking Court---Scope---Borrower or a customer or Banking Company may institute a suit in the Banking Court by presenting a plaint and thereupon the defendants be served through bailiff, by registered acknowledgment due notice, by courier and by publication in the newspapers---If the defendant, after the service of summons, does not obtain leave from the Banking Court, he shall not be entitled to defend the suit and in default of doing so the allegations of fact in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and Banking Court may pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff.\n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----S. 9---Procedure of Banking Court---Defendant-bank had failed to file any application, seeking leave to defend the suit and Banking Court, instead of proceeding against the Bank, for not filing the leave application penalized the plaintiffs by rejecting their plaint---Validity---Held, Banking Court did not adopt the procedure, as prescribed in the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 and had in fact, gone outside the scope of S. 9(4) of the said Act---Approach of the Banking Court was perfunctory and casual as S. 9(4) of the Act provided that defendant shall not be entitled to defend the suit, unless he obtained leave from the Court---Banking Court, in the present case, instead of giving premium to the plaintiffs for the neglect of the Bank, for not filing leave application, rejected the plaint in complete oblivion of the facts of the case and law on the subject---Banking Court therefore, had completely by-passed the procedure, as provided under S. 9 of the Act and had evolved its own procedure---Banking Court, which was creation of a Statute; was bound by the provisions of that Statute---Impugned of the Banking Court was set aside by the High Court in appeal being contrary to the provision of the Act.\n Messrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245 and Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/ Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645 ref.\n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R.11---Procedure of Banking Court---Record, in the present case, revealed that the suit was not fixed for \"\"hearing\"\" as contemplated under the law and only the matter regarding the deposit of certain money and the production of receipts thereto was fixed before the Court---Plaint of the plaintiff, in circumstances, could not have been rejected by the Banking Court on the date so fixed---Judgment of the Banking Court was set aside by the High Court in appeal.\n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11---Procedure of Banking Court---Rejection of plaint---Scope---Banking Court was not completely divested of exercising the powers under O.VII, R. 11, C.P.C.---Such powers could not be exercised before deciding the application for leave to defend the suit.\n Messrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245 and Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/ Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.488 of 2001, heard on 25-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MANZOOR AHMAD and another\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager Nankana Sahib Branch and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13218",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1600 = 2005 SLD 1600 = 2005 CLD 660",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9, 16 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 100, 101, O.XLIII, Ss. 63 & 104---Property attached in execution of decrees---Section 63, C.P.C. makes it clear that the provision thereof applied where property is under attachment in the execution of decrees of more Courts than one---Spirit and the purpose embodied in S. 63, C.P.C. is motivated to preclude and avoid conflicting decisions over the divergent claims and the objections filed by various persons, qua the same property, which was under attachment of different Courts---Question of choice of forum would only arise if at the relevant time the property stood attached by two different Courts in execution of two separate decrees---Record, in the present case, showed that on the date of the passing of the impugned order and filing of the applications by the appellant, the property was attached only by the Banking Court in the execution of one decree and order of attachment passed by the High Court was no longer in the field on withdrawal of the execution proceedings---Banking Court, in circumstances, could not abdicate its jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the applications filed by the appellant---Impugned order was set aside by the High Court in appeal and case was remanded to the Trial Court for adjudication of all the applications filed by the appellant on their own merits\n Trust Modaraba through Trust Management Services, Lahore v. Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. through Chief Executive and 4 others PLD 2005 Lah. 5 fol.\n Shahzad Mazhar for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.247 of 2003, heard on 28-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "BANKERS EQUITY LIMITED through Manager\nVs.\nALLIED BANK LIMITED and 12 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13219",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1601 = 2005 SLD 1601 = 2005 CLD 663",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---Ss.12, 10 & 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.13---Suit for recovery of loan---Applications for leave to defend suit---Setting aside of ex parte decree---Record revealed that case was adjourned by the Banking Court directing the plaintiff/Bank to file replies to the applications of the defendants---Bank failed to file replies to the applications for leave to defend the suit on that date---Banking Court, in circumstances, erred in law to pass the ex parte decree against the defendants on the said adjourned date which was not a date of hearing---Subsequent order of dismissal of application by defendants for setting aside the ex parte decree therefore, was not sustainable in the eye of law---When the basic order was without lawful authority, then the superstructure built on it would fall on the ground automatically---High Court, in appeal, set aside the ex parte decree meaning thereby, that the applications by defendants for leave to defend and suit of the Bank would be deemed to be pending adjudication before the Banking Court.\n Messrs Kapur Textile Mills Limited through Chief Executive v. Bankers Equity Limited through Chief Executive 2002 CLD 298; Khalid Pervaiz v. United Bank Limited 2002 CLD 399 and M. Afzal v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and another 2003 CLD 765 distinguished.\n Crescent Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd., Faisalabad v. Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 1982 Lah. 1; Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and 2 others PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 104; Manager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678; Irshad Ali's case PLD 1975 Lah. 7 and Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.348 of 2002, decision dated: 3rd February, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD IQBAL and 2 others\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13220",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1602 = 2005 SLD 1602 = 2005 CLD 668",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)------O. IX, R.6---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.129(e)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Non-appearance of respondent and his counsel in response to notices issued to them---Office report confirmed issuance of the notices---Effect---Presumption would be that notices had been served upon such persons---High Court proceeded ex parte against respondent.\n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n----S. 37---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.50---Pecuniary liabilities/obligations of deceased debtor arising out of contract---Right of creditor to enforce such contract against legal heirs of deceased debtor---Scope and extent---Legal heirs would not be personally liable to liquidate liabilities of their predecessor-in-interest---Coercive measures for recovery of outstanding amount could not be adopted against a person who had not secured loan himself---Pecuniary obligations undertaken by deceased would bind his legal heirs to the extent of estate of deceased inherited by them---Amount due in the account of deceased debtor could be recovered from mortgaged property, if any, or/and from the estate left by him---Amount outstanding against deceased could not be recovered from his son under threat of arrest and adoption of other coercive measures---Such recovery, if made, would be illegal and creditor would be liable to refund recovered amount to the son of deceased debtor---Principles illustrated.\n Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Sanaullah Khan and others PLD 1988 SC 67 fol.\n(c) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n---S. 126---Guarantor/surety---Affidavit of a party stating therein to be guarantor---Evidentiary value---Such affidavit, if denied by its signatory and not proved in accordance with law, would be of no help to creditor---Person by simply executing an affidavit would not become guarantor, unless he executed letter of guarantee within contemplation of law of guarantee---Principles.\n Petitioner in person.\n Nemo. for Respondents.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.26478 of 1997, decision dated: 28-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "NAZEER AHMAD\nVs."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13221",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1603 = 2005 SLD 1603 = 2005 CLD 693",
    "Key Words:": "Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961)-------S.39---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979), Ss. 6(4)(a), Proviso & 2(f)(i)---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances Act (XV of 1997), S. 2(f)(i)---Recovery of loan---Right of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, a Banking Company, to apply to the District Judge for the recovery of the loan advanced to an industrial concern was expressly saved by Proviso to S. 6(4)(a) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 and therefore the jurisdiction of Special Court constituted under S. 2(f)(i), Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 and the jurisdiction vesting in Special Court under Proviso to S. 6(4)(a) of the said Ordinance would not affect the jurisdiction of the District Judge to which the Banking Company had applied for the recovery of the loan etc.---Principles.\n Yousaf Ali Khan, Barrister-at-Law, Lahore v. Messrs Hong Kong Shangai Banking Corporation, Karachi and another 1994 SCMR 1007; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Nadeem Flour Mills and others 1981 SCMR 143 and Mst. Yasmeen Nighat and other v. National Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 1988 SC 391 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Quetta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P. No.268 of 1998, decision dated: 31st May, 1999.",
    "Judge Name:": "IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY AND RAJA FAYYAZ AHMED, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through ManageR\nVs.\nFIDA ALI ALLIBHOY and 11 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13222",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1604 = 2005 SLD 1604 = 2005 CLD 705",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banker and customer------Damages against bank---Acts and deeds of branch managers---Responsibility of bank---Different branches or branch office of a bank are not separate or distinct personality and they cannot be considered as a separate entity---All officers of a banking company transacting business at any particular branch or branch office are acting on behalf of the banking company which is answerable for their acts while they are acting in normal course of duties---Bank is vicariously liable for the acts of its officers and cannot evade responsibility for damages---No exception can be taken to the acts where it can be established that the complaining party himself is a privy to forgery or beneficiary and had knowledge of the same.\n \n(b) Banker and customer---\n----Non-clearance of bank cheque---At the time of issuance of cheque, the payee got endorsement from Bank Manager with regard to availability of amount in the account---Bank Manager also endorsed that the cheque was good for payment---Later on, at the time of presentation of the cheque, the bank refused to encash the same---Payee invoked jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib, who directed the Bank to release the amount mentioned in the cheque to the payee---Plea raised by the Bank was that the Manager was not competent to make such endorsement on the cheque---Validity---Branch Manager, who was the highest officer in the branch, and was supposed to deal with all the affairs of the branch, not only endorsed on the reverse of the post dated cheque \"\"good for payment\"\" but also put seal of the Bank on it---Branch Manager also gave assurance on the letterhead of the Bank that the cheque would be certainly encashed on the date mentioned thereon---Endorsement on the back of the cheque alongwith the assurance given by the Bank on its letterhead for the encashment of the cheque on due date was a guarantee given by the Bank that the cheques would be encashed on the date, irrespective of whether amount would be available in the account or not---Plea of the Bank that the officer, who made the endorsement was not authorized by the Bank, was not acceptable---Every prudent businessman had to take reasonable care while dealing with any individual and a businessman in normal course had to rely upon the Manager of the branch who was holding the highest post in the branch and to accept his commitment as a commitment on behalf of the Bank---Bank could not deny its liability towards its customers who deal with the officers of the Bank by taking the plea that the officer was not authorized by the Bank as it was not possible for a customer that on each and on every occasion he should ask from officer of the Bank about his authority---Bank did not allege that the payee was party to the alleged or unauthorized acts of its Manager---It was normal course of events and perfectly reasonable for a businessman to rely upon a representation made by a Manager of the Bank rather to investigate the extent of the powers of the Manager---Manager was expected to be conscious of the limits of his authority---Jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution being discretionary, interference could be refused even if the order was illegal but otherwise just and fair---High Court declined to interfere with the order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib in favour of the payee---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199.\n Ch. Muhammad Nawaz v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1975 Baghdad-ul-Jadid 11; Value Gold Ltd. and 2 others v. United Bank Limited PLD 1999 Kar.1 and Bank of Baroda, Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank Ltd. and others AIR (31) 1944 PC 56 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.3145 and 3146 of 1993, decision dated: 19-11-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nWAFAQI MOHTASIB (OMBUDSMAN)"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13223",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1605 = 2005 SLD 1605 = 2005 CLD 720",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)------S.32---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3---Suit for recovery of amount upon cheque---Disputed cheque was issued by a Company registered under Companies Ordinance, 1984, but suit was filed against its directors without impleading the Company as party---Defendants/Directors did not deny issuance of cheque, but they were granted conditional leave to appear and defend suit----Suit decreed by Trial Court was upheld by High Court---Validity---Defendants were admittedly Directors/shareholders of the Company---Non-mentioning of the name of Company as a party in the plaint was not fatal as defendants had admitted their liability---Maintainability of suit could have been objected to after abiding by leave granting order---Leave granting order had attained finality for having been upheld by High Court in revision filed by defendants---No illegality had been committed by High Court in maintaining /decree of Trial Court---Supreme Court dismissed petition and refused leave to appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.1273/L of 2002, decision dated: 13-05-2002.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAVED IQBAL AND TANVIR AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Sh. MUHAMMAD IRFAN and others\nVs.\nSITARA COMMISSION SHOP and others\n Col. (Retd.) Ashfaq Ahmed and others v. Sh. Muhammad Wasim 1999 SCMR 2832 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13224",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1606 = 2005 SLD 1606 = 2005 CLD 723",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr.1 & 2---Suit for recovery of amount---Father of appellants opened an account with Bank and appellants were also allowed to operate said account---Father of appellants died and appellants continued operating said account and at their request said account was converted in the name of company with the name and style of their late father and huge transactions were carried out in said account---Prior to death of father of appellants, a construction company/Principal Debtors was awarded a contract for development of a Housing Scheme and said Company/Principal Debtors furnished a Performance Guarantee in favour of Authority under control of which Housing Scheme was to be developed, which was issued by Bank on behalf of Principal Debtors---Father of appellants who at the relevant time was alive, stood guarantor for Principal Debtors and executed Guarantee Bond---Subsequently certain cheques issued by appellants were dishonoured by the Bank and on inquiry appellants were informed that suit amount had been deducted from their account on account of liability towards Principal Debtors as their late father stood guarantor thereof---Suit for recovery of said deducted amount filed by appellants having been dismissed by the District Judge, appellants filed appeal before High Court which was allowed and Bank was directed to make payment of amount deducted from account of appellants along with interest---On filing petition for leave to appeal, Supreme Court remanded case to High Court with direction to determine question of jurisdiction of Banking Court---Transaction i.e. the act of deduction of amount by Bank from account of appellants not falling within definition of 'Loan' or 'Finance' for which a suit under S.9 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 could be filed---Banking Court, in circumstances had no jurisdiction in the matter---Contention that since account in question was opened by late father of appellants, Bank had a lien over same, was repelled because neither late father of appellants nor appellants had authorized the Bank to deduct from their account---Account in question was operated by appellants in their personal capacity and nothing was on record that any amount was left by deceased---Merely because appellants were doing business in the name of Company, it could not be held that amount belonged to their deceased father---If any pecuniary obligation arose out of a contract by deceased it would only bind legal representatives to the extent of estate left by deceased---Where a security was delivered to a Bank for specific purpose, if it was inconsistent with the right of lien and impliedly if it was an agreement to the contrary, a Bank could not exercise lien over such property---Deduction of amount by the Bank from account of appellants, was illegal as neither the Bank had a lien over the money belonging to appellants nor they could be held responsible for personal acts of their late father---Appellants would be entitled to disputed amount with mark-up from date of institution of suit till date of realization of decretal amount.\n PLD 1980 Kar. 115; AIR 1960 Punjab 632; AIR 1966 Madras 265; Chettinad Mercantile Bank Ltd., by its Agent and Secretary T. Subramania Ayyar v. PLA Pichammai Achi and another AIR 1945 Mad. 447; Fancy Investments Ltd. Karachi v. United Bank Limited and 2 others PLD 1982 Kar. 200; Sh. Abdul Majid v. Syed Akhtar Hussain Zaidi PLD 1988 SC 124 and Muhammad Abdullah Sufi v. Messrs Muhammad Bux & Son and others PLD 1957 (W.P.) Karachi 445 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Quetta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.58 of 1999, decision dated: 14-12-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMANULLAH KHAN AND FAZAL-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs QASIM & CO. through L.Rs.\nVs.\nMessrs BOLAN BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13225",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1607 = 2005 SLD 1607 = 2005 CLD 833",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 8 & 7---State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29 of 2002, dated 15-10-2002, Cl.17---State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular Letter No.8 of 2003 dated 10-3-2003, Cl.3--¬Recovery of Loan---Decision of SBP Committee on dispute between the plaintiff-Bank and the defendant borrower--¬Scope---Decision of the SBP Committee constitutes a binding resolution between the plaintiff-Bank and the defendant borrower in terms of para.3 of BPD Circular Letter No.8 of 2003 dated 10-3-2003---Said Circulars issued by the State Bank of Pakistan had the force of law with binding effect on the banks---Once the dispute has been resolved and terms of settlement have been specified by the SBP Committee then by the provision of Clause 3 of State Bank BPD Circular Letter No.8 of 2003, then reference to BPD Circular No.29 of 2002 is pointless exercise---Decision of the SBP Committee, in the present case was clear in stating that the security documents which included shares, were to be returned to the defendant upon full payment of the settlement amount--¬Realization by sale of said shares prior to any event of default by the Bank, was contrary to the decision of SBP Committee---Demand by the plaintiff-Bank based upon the premature threat of sale of shares as security without the commission of default by the defendant was in derogation of settlement terms decided by the SBP Committee and. therefore unlawful---Bank could not become nudge in its own cause to unilaterally modify the decision of the Committee--¬If the Bank was aggrieved thereby its grievance could be determined by a competent forum---No such action having been taken by the Bank, in the present case, the SBP Committee's decision was binding on the Bank. \n \nHashwani Hotels Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 315; United Bank Ltd. v. M/s. Azmat Textile Mills Ltd. 2002 CLD 542 and Tristar Industries (Pvt.) Ltd, v. State Bank of Pakistan and another 2004 CLD 257 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M. No. 13-B of 2005 and C.O.S. No.34 of 2002, decision dated: 22-02-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Plaintiff\nVs.\nFRIENDS SPINNING MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 10 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13226",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1608 = 2005 SLD 1608 = 2005 CLD 836",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. I, R.10--¬Impleading of a necessary party---Creation of charge on property by the defendant---Dispute as to when the defendant who created the charge died was indeed a question that required consideration for the purpose of determination of the validity of the charge by the defendant---Person who was successor (husband) of the said defendant and was to step into her shoes and might avail the plea, that would have been availed by the deceased defendant, was ordered to be arrayed as newly added defendant. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 7(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VI, R.17 & S.151---Amendment of pleadings---Where the plea raised is supplementary and not destructive that could be allowed to be raised and even the limitation would not come in way to raise such plea---Only consideration should be that the plea should not be inconsistent or divergent to the pleas raised in the plaint earlier.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M.As. Nos.2548 and 2424 of 2004 in Suit No.B-101 of 2000, decision dated: 17-02-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs ZAMCO (PVT.) LIMITED and 9 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13227",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1609 = 2005 SLD 1609 = 2005 CLD 854",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.9 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.III, R.4, O.VI, Rr.14, 15 & O.VII, R.11 Suit by Bank for recovery of amount Non recording in plaint the names of principal officers and general attorney of Bank Non verification of plaint by any officer of Bank Non signing of Wakalatnama by any officer of Bank Application by Bank seeking removal of such defects Banking Court rejected plaint treating institution of suit as nullity Validity Such defects were merely irregularities and could not entail maximum penalty of dismissal of suit or rejection of plaint Such defects could be remedied at any stage of proceedings ¬Banking Court upon filing of appropriate application ought to have allowed Bank to cure such defects by calling upon concerned attorney of Bank instead of non suiting it on such irregularities Banking Court had wrongly dismissed such application and committed grave legal error in passing impugned High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned directing Banking Court to allow Bank to cure such defects by calling concerned officer/attorney to put signatures on relevant documents and then decide suit in accordance with law.\n \nIsmail and another v. Mst. Razia Begum and 3 others 1981 SCMR 687; Muhammad Sarwar alias Feroze Ali v. Abdul Ghani and 7 others 1980 CLC 946; Ghulam Mohy ud Din and another v. Noor Dad and 4 others PLD 1988 SC (AJ&K) 42; Toor Gul v. Mst. Mumtaz Begum PLD 1972 SC 9 and Liaqat Hayat and 5 others v. Muhammad Sarwar alias Feroze Ali and 2 others 1985 SCMR 1386 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.209 of 1997, heard on 10-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs ESS EMM ESS CORPORATION PAKISTAN LIMITED through Chairman and\n5 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13228",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1610 = 2005 SLD 1610 = 2005 CLD 861",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S. 22 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5, 29(2) & Art. 156 ¬Appeal before High Court against /decree of Banking Court Condonation of delay Application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 Maintainability Under ordinary law, period of 90 days was prescribed under Art. 156 of Limitation Act, 1908 for filing first appeal before High Court Present appeal was governed by provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which was a special law and S.22(1) thereof prescribed a period of 30 days for filing such appeal Such special law had provided different period of limitation than ordinary law for filing present appeal Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 would not apply to present appeal ¬Such application was, thus, misconceived and not maintainable. \n \nAllah Ditta v. Farooq Ahmad and 3 others PLD 1979 Lah. 917; Bashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.22(1) Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5 Appeal ¬Condonation of delay of more than 3 months Plea of appellant was that respondent with his conscious mala fide effort who kept secret service to appellant; and that Banking Court without recording a declaration regarding due service of appellant passed impugned /decree Validity ¬Such plea would not disclose sufficient cause for not preferring appeal within period prescribed under law and for condonation of delay within parameters set up under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 High Court dismissed such application Resultantly appeal was dismissed being barred by time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.312 of 2002, decision dated: 26-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13229",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1611 = 2005 SLD 1611 = 2005 CLD 868",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9 & 10 Suit for recovery of loan amount Bank at the request of borrowing company opened Letter of Credit for import of goods, while other defendant stood guarantor for repayment of amount Goods arrived in Pakistan, but defendants, did not repay the amount Banking Court decreed suit after dismissing leave application of defendants Plea of defendants was that goods were of perishable nature, which perished due to delay in its arrival, thus Bank could not claim amount from them ¬Validity Bank had paid amount to corresponding Bank abroad and goods had reached Pakistan As per documents placed on record, defendants as principal and surety respectively were bound to pay suit amount to Bank upon demand Constitutional petition appended with appeal showed that goods were not released on account of tripartite dispute between defendants inter se and Customs Department, which claimed that goods belonged to another person, who owed money to Department Such Constitutional petition was decided with consent, whereby guarantor defendant agreed to release of goods to borrowing company Department had consented to such arrangement on basis of letter addressed to Bank requesting for release of goods to borrowing company High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.291 of 1998, heard on 16-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BUKHARI, JJ",
    "": "ZAFAR & COMPANY through Sheikh Riaz ud Din and another --Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13230",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1612 = 2005 SLD 1612 = 2005 CLD 870",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.22 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5 Appeal ¬Condonation of delay Ex parte decree was passed on 10 12 2001 Appeal was filed on 25 2 2002 Plea raised by appellant in application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 was that he came to know about decree on 20 2 2002 and he filed appeal immediately after obtaining necessary documents Validity Such plea did not disclose sufficient cause for not preferring appeal within prescribed period of limitation and for condonation of delay within parameter set up under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 High Court dismissed such application being devoid of merits and also appeal being time barred. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.22 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5, 29(2) & Art. 156 ¬Appeal before High Court against /decree of Banking Court Condonation of delay Application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 Maintainability Under ordinary law, period of 90 days was prescribed under Art. 156 of Limitation Act, 1908 for filing first appeal before High Court Present appeal was governed by provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which was a special law and S.22(1) thereof prescribed a period of 30 days for filing such appeal Such special law had provided different period of limitation than ordinary law for filing present appeal Section 5 or Limitation Act, 1908 would not apply to the present appeal Application under S.5, Limitation Act, 1908 was thus, misconceived and not maintainable.\n \nAllah Ditta v. Farooq Ahmad and 3 others PLD 1979 Lah. 917; Bashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 124 of 2002, decision dated: 26-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "SIKANDAR HAYAT --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13231",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1613 = 2005 SLD 1613 = 2005 CLD 874",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.22 Appeal Settlement between parties regarding Subject matter of appeal Effect Appeal had become infructuous as no Live issue was left to be decided High Court disposed of appeal with observation that if appellant felt that some issues were still undecided, then he could make application within a period of 3 months to reactivate proceedings in appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M. No. 1 of 2005 in F.A.O. No.35 of 2002, decision dated: 7-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs INDUS VALLEY RICE MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Attorneys --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13232",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1614 = 2005 SLD 1614 = 2005 CLD 875",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 7, 10, 12 & 22 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5 ¬Appeal Appellants had filed application under S.5, Liimitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay, which application was not decided by the Banking Court earlier through a separate order Said application had completely been blacked out from the proceedings Effect Held, if any miscellaneous application was filed by the parties; it was incumbent upon the Court to decide the said application, either way, through a specific order and then to decide the main case Failure of Court to decide such application accordingly would vitiate the main . \n \nPak Carpet Industries Limited v. Government of Sindh and 2 others 1993 CLC 334; Muhammad Yaqub v. Baqir and 2 others 1993 CLC 1319; Khair Deen v. Rehm Deen and 4 others 1996 CLC 1731 and Gul Muhammad through Legal Heirs v. Karachi Development Authority and another 1998 MLD 150 ref.\n \n(b) Administration of Justice \n \n If any miscellaneous application was filed by the parties, it was incumbent upon the Court to decide the said application, either way, through a specific order and then to decide the main case Failure of Court to decide such application accordingly would vitiate the main . \n \nPak Carpet Industries Limited v. Government of Sindh and 2 others 1993 CLC 334; Muhammad Yaqub v. Baqir and 2 others 1993 CLC 1319; Khair Deen v. Rehm Deen and 4 others 1996 CLC 1731 and Gul Muhammad through Legal Heirs v. Karachi Development Authority and another 1998 MLD 150 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.267 of 2004, decision dated: 28-02-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs M.A. CHAUDHRY and 3 others --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, FAISALABAD through General Attorney --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13233",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1615 = 2005 SLD 1615 = 2005 CLD 884",
    "Key Words:": "(a) State Bank of Pakistan F.E. Circular No.68 dated 19 9 1984 Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 14, 19, 23 & 31 Qanun e¬Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 115 Foreign Private Loans for Financing Foreign Currency Cost of the Project covered by Government of Pakistan Industrial Policy Statement, 1984 ¬Agreements for Foreign Private Loans which conformed to the Standard terms as set out in the Annex II of the Policy Statement, 1984, were to be automatically approved and registered by the State Bank of Pakistan Vital condition for registration of the agreement was that the foreign exchange shall be used for the import of plant and machinery Record showed that foreign currency loan obtained from the foreign lenders was surrendered to the State Bank of Pakistan and not used for the import of plant and machinery Letter of credits were not opened in the currency borrowed, the foreign exchange loans were not utilized for the import of plant and machinery Letter of credits were retired by the company from their own sources on cash basis and foreign currency of the State was utilized State Bank of Pakistan had been consistently urging for observance of the said condition Effect Held, principle of promissory estoppel was not available to the company No representation or inducement was made by the State Bank to the company nor any steps were taken consequent thereto so as to irrevocably commit the property or the reputation of the party invoking it Party which had indulged in fraud or collusion for obtaining some benefits under the representation could not be rewarded by the enforcement of the promise as fraud and deceit vitiate the most solemn proceedings Principles. \n \nGovernment of Pakistan N. Premier Sugar Mills and others PLD 1991 Lah. 381: Khan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot (represented by 6 others v. Messrs Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd. Lahore PLD 1971 SC 550; Muhammad Farooq and another v. Mst. Mussarat 2001 YLR 2660; Pakistan through Ministry of Finance Economic Affairs and another v. Fecto Belarus Tractors Limited PLD 2002 SC 208; Fatima Enterprises Ltd. v. The Chief Manager, State Bank of Pakistan, Deposit Account Department, Multan and 4 others 1999 SCMR 1497 Gatron (Industries) Limited v. Government of Pakistan 1999 SCMR 1072; Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1652; Muhammad Sadiq Khan v. Federation of Pakistan PLJ 1983 FSC 25; Muhammad Afzal and others v. Riaz Mahmood, Additional District Judge, Lahore PLD 2004 Lah. 115, Brig. Muhammad Bashir v. Abdul Karim and others PLD 2004 SC 271; Tata Cellular v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 11; Messrs Pfizer Laboratories Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1198 SC 64 and Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid e Azam International Airport, Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268 ref.\n \n(b) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972) \n \n S. 3 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Intra¬-Court appeal Contention of the appellant was that Constitutional petition for enforcement of the contract was not maintainable Point having not having been urged before the Single Judge, same could not be allowed to be raised for the first time in Intra Court appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I.C.A. No. 11 of 2002 in Writ Petition No.26347 of 1998, decision dated: 30-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, TANVIR BASHIR ANSARI AND MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN through Governor --Appellant\nVs.\nSHAHTAJ SUGAR MILLS LIMITED and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13234",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1616 = 2005 SLD 1616 = 2005 CLD 893",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.9(2) Bankers Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4 Suit for accounts and damages by borrower Non filing of statement of accounts along with plaint Effect Break¬up of statement of plaintiffs claim given in body of plaint quantifying mark up illegally charged by Bank Validity ¬Purpose of S.9(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was to inform defendant either by way of incorporating statement of account in body of plaint or in a conventional manner by filing along with plaint Where plaintiff with sufficient details gave such break up in body of plaint, then such purpose of S.9(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would be substantially served Statement of borrower/customer would not be authenticated in terms of Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891 as in the case of financial institution. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss.9(2) & 10 Suit for accounts and damages by borrower Objections raised by Bank as to maintainability of suit on various counts Validity Banking Court might embark upon to hear merit of such objections only after leave to defend suit was obtained by Bank. \n \nMuhammad Yousaf v. ADBP 2002 CLD 1270; Baba Fareed Ghee Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and 3 others v. National Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 669 and Banker Equity Limited through Principal Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Ltd. and 7 others 2003 CLD 931 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Banking Suit No.90 and C.M.A. No.8669 of 2001, heard on 12-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "BELA AUTOMOTIVES LIMITED --Plaintiff\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13235",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1617 = 2005 SLD 1617 = 2005 CLD 898",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 2(c)(d), 7, 9 & 22 Suit for recovery of difference of profit amount due and agreed upon between the customer (plaintiff and leasing company (defendant) on the certificates of investment \"\"Customer\"\" and 'finance\"\" ¬Definitions Certificates of investment issued to the customer in themselves were promissory notes/or instruments/participation term certificates on one side, and on the other side those were financial engagements with the Leasing Company for which the company had undertaken on behalf of the \"\"Customer\"\" to indemnify him, and, therefore, the plaintiff (customer) was covered by the definition of \"\"customer\"\" to that extent under S.2(c), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 -Certificates of investment issued by the company were financial engagements of the customer with the company, his amount was utilized by the company and company had undertaken to either pay the amount with profit or to indemnify the customer to the extent of his rights on the basis of said certificates Banking Court, therefore, had the jurisdiction; to take the case of the parties to its logical conclusion and to do justice to the parties in accordance with law, specially in circumstances that the parties had consented to the jurisdiction of the Banking Court High Court on appeal, remanded the case to the Banking Court with direction that it shall proceed with the cases, from the stage immediately before the stage of passing of the impugned order (holding that it had no jurisdiction in the matter) till its final end. \n \n(b) Jurisdiction \n \n Court of law has to assume jurisdiction regarding a cause when its territorial/financial jurisdiction is clearly mentioned in the law and in such circumstances, no other Court or any other forum has the jurisdiction to deal with such a cause Principles.\n \nA Court of law has to assume jurisdiction regarding a cause when its territorial/financial jurisdiction is clearly mentioned in a law and in such circumstances, no other Court or any other forum has the jurisdiction to deal with such a cause. It is, however, the basic duty of a Court of law to do justice to the parties in the light of the circumstances of a case. A party may acquiesce in the jurisdiction of a Court for certain matter which has been brought to that Court by the opposite party, although the Court may not accept its jurisdiction for that matter. But when the jurisdiction of the Courts/forums is not clear, in the circumstance of a case, and one Court/forum has refused to assume jurisdiction and has declared that any other Court/forum has the jurisdiction for such matter, the latter Court/forum may seriously consider the question of jurisdiction at the very start of the proceedings and may decide the question of its jurisdiction in clear terms, without leaving the parties to a dispute in darkness for later stages of the Court/forum without any objection to it. It becomes the duty of such Court/forum to do justice to the parties and to right a wrong on the basis of the merits of a case, as the Courts are established for doing the justice and undoing the wrong.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.Bs. Nos. 54 to 56 of 2004, decision dated: 7-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "TARIQ PARVEZ KHAN AND MUHAMMAD SALEEM KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Brig. (Retd.) HAMID UD DIN --Appellant\nVs.\nASKARI LEASING LIMITED and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13236",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1618 = 2005 SLD 1618 = 2005 CLD 904",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.10 & 22 Suit for recovery of loan Application for leave to appear and defend the suit Defendants, who had obtained loan from the plaintiff Bank, had brought nothing on record with the application for leave to defend the suit to show that the Bank had suppressed any material fact ¬Branch Manager of the Bank had signed the plaint on behalf of the Bank, who was authorized to sign the plaint under the law Banking Court had rightly drawn inference that the entire amount claimed by the Bank stood established as payable as execution of finance agreement had not been denied and signatures on any of the documents annexed with the plaint had also not been denied Banking Court, held, had rightly found that no substantial questions of law or facts were raised in the application for leave for defend for which evidence was needed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.404 of 2002, heard on 8-02-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MUHAMMAD NAWAZ BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NEW QURESHI AGRO TRADERS through Managing Partner and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13237",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1619 = 2005 SLD 1619 = 2005 CLD 912",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) Ss.5 & 12(2) Appeal Delay of 2 1/2 years, condonation of Impugned / decree was passed on 7 2 2002 ¬Appellant applied for certified copies thereof on 14 2 2002, which were prepared on 21 2 2002 and delivered to him on 27 9 2004 Appeal was filed on 9 10 2004 Time consumed till date of delivery of such copies sought to be excluded in computation of period of Limitation Validity No material had been placed on record to show that Copying Agency, in fact, did not give any actual date for delivery of such copies Appellant had not appended with appeal receipt issued by Copying Agency at the time of receiving \"\"Sawal Form\"\", which was the only prima facie evidence to indicate as to whether any actual date was given or not Limitation period for filing of appeal, would not be computed from date of delivery/ collection of such copies Appellant would not be entitled to exclusion of period consumed between preparation of copies till delivery thereof High Court dismissed appeal being grossly barred by time. \n \nProvince of Punjab through Secretary, Health Department, Punjab, Lahore v. Dr. Muhammad Afzal Shah Hashmi 1991 MLD 806 ref.\n \nMuhammad Nawaz v. Abdus Salam and another PLD 1997 SC 563 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.22 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29(2) Appeal ¬Condonation of delay Application under S.5 of Limitation Act Not competent. \n \nAllah Ditta v. Farooq Ahmad and 3 others PLD 1979 Lah. 917; Bashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105; Messrs Conoco Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 others v. United Bank Limited, Lahore and another 2004 CLD 472; Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 rel.\n \nNemo for Appellants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos.454 and 455 of 2004, heard on 23rd February, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "SHAHZAD HASSAN BHATTI and 6 others --Appellants\nVs.\nPLATINUM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13238",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1620 = 2005 SLD 1620 = 2005 CLD 918",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) S.19 Dismissal of execution application due to non¬ appearance of decree holder and his counsel Plea for restoration of such application was that counsel of decree¬ holder was busy before High Court Banking Court disallowed application for restoration Validity ¬Appearance before another Court or even before Higher Court would never be treated as a good ground for non¬ appearance before another Court, where case was fixed Where counsel had other engagements before High Court, then some alternate arrangements should have been made to appear before Banking Court No representative of decree holder was present before Banking Court on relevant date Banking Court in such circumstances was fully justified to dismiss application for restoration High Court dismissed appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.243 of 2003, decision dated: 23rd February, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "THE BANK OF PUNJAB through Branch Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs S.A. CORPORATION through Managing Partner and 2 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13239",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1621 = 2005 SLD 1621 = 2005 CLD 920",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss.9 & 10 Suit for damages Dismissal of suit without deciding leave application Validity Duty of Banking Court was to decide leave application on its own merits before embarking upon the suit If Banking Court was of the view that substantial questions of law and facts were raised by defendant Bank, then at best leave to defend could have been granted to Bank, but in no way suit could have been dismissed at such point of time Impugned was violative of provisions of S.10 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned , resultantly suit and leave application would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court, which shall decide firstly Leave application and thereafter suit in accordance with law. \n \nMessrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245 and Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.475 of 1999, decision dated: 8-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "M. SHAHID SAIGOL --Appellant\nVs.\nAL TOWFEEK INVESTMENT BANK LTD. through Branch Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13240",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1622 = 2005 SLD 1622 = 2005 CLD 923",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.9 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.7 Suit for recovery of loan amount Non appearance of defendant, when case was fixed for plaintiffs evidence Banking Court, without proceeding ex parte against defendant, recorded plaintiff's evidence and decreed suit Validity ¬Banking Court ought to have passed ex parte order against defendant before recording plaintiffs evidence either on same day or on succeeding date Defendant had been denied unlawfully his right to cross examine plaintiffs witness and lead his affirmative/ rebuttal evidence ¬Banking Court had also not decided all issues involving question of jurisdiction Banking Court should have provided at least one opportunity to defendant to produce evidence Banking Court had committed legal error while passing impugned decree Defendant had been condemned unheard High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned /decree with directions to Banking Court to decide suit afresh after providing opportunity to defendant to cross examine plaintiff's witness and produce his evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 500 of 1999, heard on 17-02-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MONIM MANSAB BOKHARI and 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13241",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1623 = 2005 SLD 1623 = 2005 CLD 927",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.10(1) & 12 Ex parte decree due to non appearance of defendant after filing application seeking leave to defend suit Application for setting aside such decree under S.12 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Not maintainable in law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.44 of 2005, decision dated: 8-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Mst. TAHIRA YASMEEN and another --Appellants\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK through Branch Manager and 6 others --Respondents\nMst. Saeeda v. Habib Bank Limited and others 2002 CLD 1739 distinguished."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13242",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1624 = 2005 SLD 1624 = 2005 CLD 930",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss.9 & 10 Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54 --Suit for declaration and permanent injunction-- Failure of defendant to appear before Banking Court, or file leave application or refusal of 'Banking Court to grant leave to defend suit Passing of decree on such failure of defendant Validity Claim for declaration could not be equated with a suit founded on a negotiable instrument ¬Decree in such like suit could not be passed straightaway ¬On defendant's failure to apply for leave to defend suit, Banking Court would be legally obliged to decide suit after calling upon plaintiff to produce evidence in support of his claim Where defendant did not appear or he was not granted leave, Banking Court would not be absolved of its duty to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of each case. \n \nMessrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n S.10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3 Qanun e Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 133 Failure of defendant to file application for leave to defend suit ¬Effect Defendant would not be allowed to lead his own evidence, but he would be entitled to cross examine plaintiff's witnesses.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.375 of 2004, heard on 8-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASLAM TAHIR --Appellant\nVs.\nUNION BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13243",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1625 = 2005 SLD 1625 = 2005 CLD 934",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 10 & 17 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIX, R.1 Suit for recovery of loan amount Pleas raised by defendant in leave application were that he had signed blank documents; that Bank had charged excessive mark¬up; that Bank had not .filed suit through authorized person; and that he would make application to Bank for settlement of loan Banking Court decreed the suit with costs and mark up after rejecting leave application Validity Neither execution of documents nor availing of financial facility had been denied by the defendant Defendants had executed loan documents on 7 4 1993 i.e. before coming into force of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 Such documents would be valid and legal as perforce of S.17(3) of the Act even if certain columns thereof were left blank at relevant time Bank had placed on record photo copy of power of attorney authorizing its attorney to institute suit, which, prima facie, established that attorney, who had signed plaint and instituted suit, had lawful authority to undertake such acts Defendant had not rebutted such authority Impugned did not suffer from any legal errors/defects High Court dismissed appeal. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n S. 10 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIX, R. 1 ¬Suit for recovery of loan amount Availing of financial facility and execution, of documents admitted by defendant Plea of defendant was that Bank had not filed suit through authorized person Validity Bank could not be non suited on the said ground in view of such admission.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.76 of 1998, heard on 17-02-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "AAMIR ALI AHMAD and others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Attorneys --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13244",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1626 = 2005 SLD 1626 = 2005 CLD 938",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S.21 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5, 29(2) & Art. 156 ¬Appeal Time barred appeal Condonation of delay ¬Application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 ¬Maintainability Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 being a special law and having provided a different period of limitation for filing first appeal before High Court against /decree of Banking Court, such application would be incompetent and not maintainable High Court dismissed appeal being barred by time. \n \nAllah Ditta v. Farooq Ahmad and 3 others PLD 1979 Lah. 917; Bashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 506 of 1999, heard on 9-02-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs FRESH JUICES LTD. through Director/Chief Executive and 14 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13245",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1627 = 2005 SLD 1627 = 2005 CLD 941",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Qanun-e Shahadat (10 of 1984) Art. 84 Visual comparison of disputed signatures by the Court in the absence of counsel for the parties and without their association with the task of assisting the Court in such comparison was contrary to law. \n \nDr. Major Abdul Ahad Khan through his legal representatives v. Muhammad Iqbal through his legal representative PLD 1989 Kar. 102 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 7, 10 & 21 Qanun E Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 84 & 59 Application for grant of leave and defend the case ¬Allegation of fraud about signatures and thumb impressions on the documents by the defendants Visual comparison of disputed signatures and thumb impressions by Court without the opinion of expert and assistance of counsel of the parties Effect If the Court does not seek the opinion of an expert, it should express so in the order and the decision must reflect, the adequate skill, expertise, competence and knowledge of the Court in the field, on the basis of which, the comparison has been made and the conclusion drawn is rested Expertise of examining the finger prints (thumb impressions) is ordinarily not a skill of Judge and therefore, necessarily, the opinion of the expert should have been resorted to, but the Court, in the present case, has absolutely ignored the request of defendants to seek the opinion of the expert vis a vis their signatures and thumb impressions upon the disputed documents Such omission on the part of the Court has resulted into injustice to the case of the defendants, who, at the leave granting stage, have been beseeching the Court in that behalf Attending circumstances of the case required that the defendants should have been given some opportunity to establish that a fraud has been committed with them and no presumption in law in the nature of negative proof could have been raised against them before that Questions involved in the case were substantial questions of law and facts, falling within the domain of serious and bona fide dispute as well, resultantly the Court, should have proceeded with the matter and adjudicated the case, after having granted the leave to appear and defend the suit to the defendants ¬Judgment and decree of the Banking Court, to the extent of the defendants was set aside by the High Court in appeal and the defendants were granted leave to appear and defend the suit.\n \nUnder Article 84 of the Qanun E Shahadat, 1984, the Court is entitled to make an independent comparison of the hand writing, apart from the opinion of an expert and in every case, it is not necessary that the matter should be referred to an expert. There is also no denying the legal position that the evidence of a hand writing expert is a weak and decrepit and therefore, must yield to the positive evidence. However, the provisions of Article 59 of Qanun e Shahadat still enable the opinion of the persons, who have the necessary study, skill and the expertise in a specific field of knowledge, and their views are relevant to resolve the proposition of science, art, hand writing, finger impressions, etc. Obviously, the Article is incorporated in the Order, 1984, with a definite object to facilitate the job of the Court, while analyzing and evaluating the question relating to a specialized study/area, which includes the hand writing issues.\n \nThough the opinion of the expert is not binding upon the Court, yet it shall be helpful for the Courts in understanding the niceties and the implications of the subject, so that, in the light of such supporting material, as may be provided by an expert, in the shape references, charts, graphs and the enlargements, with the specific identification about the similarities and dissimilarities of the writing, that enables the Court to form a fair view as far as possible. However, if the Court is not pleased to seek the opinion of an expert, then it should express so and the decision must reflect, the adequate skill, peritus, competence and knowledge of the Court in the field, on the basis of which, the comparison has been made and the conclusion drawn is rested. Because in the modern times, the forging of the handwriting has become, a sophisticated art and at times, the forgery is so accurately done that a person may be deceived and become doubtful of his own writing. Therefore, it shall be highly unsafe, rather may lead to miscarriage of justice, if the Court without the competence and adequate skill, renders its decision on the basis of visual comparison alone, without there being even the assistance of the counsel for the parties. Therefore, the decision of the Court about the disputed signatures could not sustain. \n \nThe study relating to the finger prints has acquired nearly the status of an exact science. Number of countries of the world, are regulating their immigration system on the basis of the prints. And by now, it is authentically opined by the experts on the subject that no two human beings have the same finger prints. Thus by using this special knowledge, it can safely be ascertained, whether the finger print of a person on a document, pertains to him, or not. The expertise of examining the finger prints is ordinarily not a skill of a Judge and therefore, necessarily the opinion of the expert, should be resorted to. But the Court, had absolutely ignored the request of the appellants to seek the opinion of the expert, vis a vis their thumb¬-impression upon the disputed documents. The omission on part of the Court had resulted into injustice to the case of the appellants, who, at the leave granting stage, had been beseeching the Court in this behalf. But only on account of the assumption about the similarity of the signatures on the mortgage/guarantee documents, by comparing those with the power of attorney in favour of the counsel the entire case had been decided and the plea of the appellant had been repelled. The attending circumstances of the case, the appellants should have been given some opportunity to establish that a fraud had been committed with them. For the reason, that the appellants were identified by J.C., D.C. Office at the time of the registration of the mortgage deeds, and that his affidavit had not been produced and procured by the appellants, no presumption in law in the nature of negative proof could have been raised against them. In fact, if the matter was tested at the trial, it obviously should have been the first duty of the respondent/bank to prove the documents in any of the modes permissible under the law. \n \nIn the circumstances, there were the questions involved in the matter, which were substantial questions of law and fact, falling within the domain of serious and bona fide dispute as well, resultantly, the Court, should have proceeded with the matter and adjudicated the case, only after having granted the leave to the appellants.\n \nThe and decree of the Banking Court, to the extent of the appellants was set aside, the appellants were granted leave to appear and defend the suit.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672; Zar Wali Shah v. Yousaf Ali Shah and 9 others 1992 SCMR 1778; Ch. Riayasat Ali v. Mst. Hakim Bibi and others 2000 YLR 2789; Noor Ahmed v. Meraj Bibi 1994 CLC 479; Dr. Major Abdul Ahad Khan v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1989 Kar. 102; Muhammad Kabiruddin v. Muhammad Muniruddin 1993 CLC 747; Muhammad Anwar v. Hafizuddin 1984 CLC 2871; Muhammad Ali Hemani v. Mst. Altaf Fatima 1987 CLC 282; Abdul Razzak. v. Mst. Fatima Bai 1981 CLC 1083; Sarojini Dassi v. Hari Das Ghose AIR 1922 Cal. 12; Vadrevu Annapurnamma v. Vardrevu Bhima Sankararao AIR 1960 A.P. 359; Nadir Ali and others v. Muhammad Adam Khan 1985 CLC 373; Nazir Cotton Mills Limited v. Islamic Investment Bank Limited 2002 CLD 612; Matwarli Khan v. Shah Zaman PLD 1965 AJ&K 26; Abdul Hamid v. H.M. Qureshi PLD 1957 SC 145; Mistri Muhammad Hassan v. Haji Said Muhammad 1986 CLC 1241; Muhammad Hussain v. Secretary of State and others AIR 1939 Lah. 330; Teja Singh v. Firm Kalyan Das Chet Ram and others 1925 Lah. 575; Messrs Ram Copal Jiwan Singh v. Sardar Gurbux Singh Jiwan Singh and others AIR 1955 Punjab 215; National Bank of Pakistan v. Mrs. Abida Mustajab Hasan and others 1985 CLC 1074; Ch. Abdul Hamid v. Deputy Commissioner and others 1985 SCMR 359; Ghulam Siddique v. Mst. Ajhaib and others 2002 CLC 1244; Syed Ali Nawaz Shah Gardezi v. Lt. Col. Muhammad Yusuf Khan PLD 1962 Lah. 558; Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Amir Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 464; S.M. Zahir v. Pirzada Syed Fazal Ali Ajmeri 1974 SCMR 490 and Ali Ahmed alias Ali Ahmed Mia v. The State PLD 1962 SC 102 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 7, 10 & 21 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Preamble Application for grant of Leave to defend the suit Allegation of unauthorized amendment by the plaintiff (Bank) in the plaint being a serious and substantial question of fact, had far reaching and serious implication i.e. about the very power of the Court to adjudicate the matter and pass the impugned decree Such question though could be raised at any stage of the proceedings, because consent of the parties could neither confer nor oust the jurisdiction, but any decree passed without jurisdiction was nullity in eyes of Law Such aspect of the matter had not been dealt with by the Banking Court, when an objection in this behalf, had been categorically taken in the application for leave to defend, after the promulgation of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Held, substantial questions of law and facts were involved in the case falling within the domain of serious and bona fide dispute as well Banking Court, in circumstances should have proceeded with the, matter and adjudicated the case, only after having granted leave to defendants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.768 of 2002, decision dated: 28-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Mst. RIFFAT JEHAN and another --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and 10 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13246",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1628 = 2005 SLD 1628 = 2005 CLD 953",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 21 State Bank of Pakistan SBP Circular No.29 of 2002 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.8 & S.151 ¬Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 181 Suit for recovery of outstanding loan Pending petition for leave to defend the suit by the defendants, they applied for amicable settlement of repayment of their outstanding loan by availing State Bank of Pakistan Circular No.29 of 2002, re structuring package with concurrence with the parties whereunder a specific amount was paid by the defendants High Court (Banking Court) had been adjourning the suit awaiting settlement between the parties out of Court and ultimately the suit was dismissed on account of lack of instructions to its counsel regarding settlement of repayment of the loan Banking Court while dismissing the suit had observed that in case of restoration of the suit, all the applications filed by the defendants shall be deemed to be pending and shall be reactivated automatically Bank moved petition for revival of the suit on account of default of defendants and to stick to repayment Schedule, as settled Contentions of the Bank were that with the concurrence of the parties, the\n \n \noutstanding loan was restructured by giving Schedule for its repayment in instalments by which the defendants did not abide hence, the suit be ordered to be revived and that since dismissal of the suit was on account of lack of instructions, it was not under O.IX, R.8 C.P.C., hence its revival, be ordered under S.151, C.P.C. which would be governed by residuary Art. 181, Limitation Act, 1908 whereunder Limitation was three years from the date of knowledge Validity Held, an incorrect order of dismissal of suit, could be rescinded/recalled by invoking the jurisdiction by the Court under S.151, C.P.C. keeping aside the technicalities Dismissal of suit being not legally justified and dismissal of the suit being not under O.IX, R.8 C.P.C., and for revival of suit, invoking the jurisdiction of S.151, C.P.C., there being no controlling provision in the Limitation Act, 1908, the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 would be applicable which provided a period of three years from the date of knowledge Original cause of action which accrued to the Bank on non payment of the finance facility availed by the defendants, was not only recurring but also remained undecided, as the suit was dismissed incorrectly Non observance of repayment of 'schedule gave the Bank cause for revival of the suit which in itself was sufficient for restoration of the suit -defendants could not be permitted to take benefit of then: own default by saying that the suit be not revived Principles. \n \nA Qazi Muhammad Tariq v. Hasin Jahan and 3 others 1993 SCMR 1949 Muhammad Afzal v. Small Business Finance Corporation and 4 others 1997 CLC 1080; Muhammad Bakhsh and others v. Ghulam Yasin and others 2000 MLD 466; Muhammad Sadiq v. Mst. Bashiran and 9 others PLD 2000 SC 820 and Haji Ahmad Associates v Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan Limited 200T YLR 126 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 17 of 2000, decision dated: 19-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN, J",
    "": "ZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED (ZTBL) through Branch Manager --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs ZASHA LIMITED and 7 others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13247",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1629 = 2005 SLD 1629 = 2005 CLD 958",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 15 & 19 Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.58 ¬Judgment debtor, in the present case, had mortgaged the property in favour of Leasing Company for the purpose of securing finance facility and had executed memorandum of delivery of title deeds coupled with physical deposit of title documents of the property with the said Leasing Company ¬Said mortgage was also acknowledged with the SCCP and Form X in that behalf was also on record Leasing Company for the recovery of its finances brought a suit against the Company and the mortgagor, which was decreed by the Banking Court Leasing company had moved an application under S.15, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 for procuring the possession of the property which application was not yet disposed of rather the Banking Court had directed for the sale of the property through a Court auctioneer, who was also appointed ¬Another Bank, had also obtained a decree against the debtor in a case wherein she had stood as a guarantor/surety for another company for repayment of the finance by the said company Said Bank, for seeking the execution of its decree filed petition and the property mortgaged with the Leasing Company was attached by the Court Leasing company filed objection to the said attachment which was dismissed Validity Held, irrespective of the dates of the two decrees, the property was mortgaged in favour of the Leasing Company and while considering the objections, the effect of the mortgage including its validity should have been kept in view by the Court, rather than the timing of the decrees Rights of mortgagee should have priority in the cases where the owner of that property had also stood as a simple surety ¬Where another financial institution had also filed a suit against the common defendant/ debtor, but only in the capacity as a simple surety/guarantor and had procured a decree against him/her, such a decree had to give way to the rights of mortgagee/decree holder under the general as also the special law, and should await execution till such time the rights of mortgagee under the law as well as under the decree, were first satisfied Court in execution of another decree, could not attach the mortgaged property, causing prejudice to the rights of the mortgagee and preventing him from enforcing his rights by way of the sale of the property, particularly through the process of execution High Court in appeal, approved the order of the Banking Court for sale of the mortgaged property through public auction and directed that if there was any surplus in the proceeds of sale after the satisfaction of the decree in favour of the Leasing Company, such surplus amount shall remain attached and shall be paid to the Bank Principles. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) \n \n Ss. 15 & 19 Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.58 ¬Mortgage Effect of mortgage and legal consequences which flow therefrom stated.\n \nUnder the general law i.e. section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, \"\"the mortgage\"\" creates a specific interest in the immovable property, providing security for the performance of a duty or the payment of a debt, as against none in favour of a person who only is a surety or the guarantor simpliciter. Thus, where the law has ordained to create an interest of the mortgagee in the mortgaged property, it means that such interest shall have full legal effect and the consequences and shall be enforceable as a right. Moreover, in the cases pertaining to the mortgages created for the purpose of securing the finances allowed by the financial institutions, section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance No.XLVI of 2001, has created a further right in favour of the mortgagee. \n \nBesides, certain rights of the mortgagee are further recognized by section 19 subsections (3)(4)(5) and (6) of the said Ordinance. \n \nThese rights undoubtedly, are conferred by the special law upon a mortgagee of a property and cannot be nullified and defeated, for the reason that another financial institution has also filed a suit against the common defendant/ debtor, but only in the capacity as a simple surety/guarantor and has procured a decree against him. Such a decree has to give way to the rights of the mortgagee/decree holder under the general as also under the special law, and should await execution, till such time, the rights of the mortgagee, under the law as well as under the decree, are first satisfied. If these aspects of the case have not been kept into view by the Court while passing the impugned order, the same is liable to be set aside. \n \nThe Court in execution of another decree, cannot attach the mortgaged property, causing prejudice to the rights of the mortgagee and preventing him from enforcing his rights by way of the sale of the property, particularly through the process of execution.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.272 of 2004, decision dated: 15-12-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "UNION LEASING LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nPAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LIMITED through Deputy Managing Director and 8 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13248",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1630 = 2005 SLD 1630 = 2005 CLD 982",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O.XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2 Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 73 ¬Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), S.118 Suit for recovery of amount on the basis of promissory note Defendant had not taken the stance in the application for leave to defend the suit that the suit of the plaintiff was time barred Parties were bound by their pleadings Objection qua the Limitation taken by the defendant in the written statement being an afterthought, Trial Court was justified not to frame issue with regard to the preliminary objection that the suit was time¬-barred Pro note in the present case was allegedly executed on 9 5 1999 and the suit was filed on 8 5 2002 and according to Art 73, Limitation Act, 1908, the suit was not time barred. \n \nMst. Murad Begum and others v. Muhammad Rafiq and others PLD 1974 SC 322 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code IV of 1908) \n \n O. XXXVII Rr. 1 & 2 Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.16 Suit for recovery of amount on the basis of promissory note Defendant had taken stand in the application for leave to defend as well in the written statement, that the pro note was executed by the defendant in favour of plaintiff under coercion, therefore, it was moral obligation of the defendant to prove the fact that the pro note was executed under coercion in view of S.16 of the Contract Act, 1872 Defendant had accepted the execution of the pro note receipt with the objection that the same was executed under coercion, meaning thereby that the execution of document was admitted by the defendant but could not prove the incident of coercion Defendant having failed to produce a single witness to prove the alleged coercion, said issue was rightly decided against the defendant by the Trial Court.\n \nMuhammad Rafiq v. Muhammad Nawaz 2001 CLC 318; Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Hashim Paracha and another PLD 1987 Kar. 76; Shabbir Anwar v. Sh. Tariq Mehmood and 2 others 2002 CLC 1102 and Farid Akhtar Hadi's case 1993 CLC 2015 ref.\n \n(c) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) \n \n S. 118 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2-¬Suit for recovery of money on the basis of promissory note Initial presumption under S.118, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is that negotiable instrument is made, drawn, accepted and endorsed for consideration Such presumption although is rebuttable, yet onus is on the person denying consideration to allege and prove the same Defendant was obliged to prove that promissory note/receipt was without consideration which he failed to discharge, which is condition precedent in view of S.118, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Defendant's claim that no payment was made before the witnesses, was of no consequence inasmuch as the pro note can be executed to secure the payment of monetary obligation - Decree of the Trial Court against the defendant was not interfered with by the High Court in appeal. \n \nHaji Karam's case 1973 SCMR 100; Muhammad Boota's case 1979 SCMR 465; Muhammad Rafique's case 2001 CLC 318 and Muhammad Yousaf;s case PLD 1993 Lah. 244 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.411 of 2004, heard on 10-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN SAQIB NISAR, JJ",
    "": "Malik MUHAMMAD AMIN --Appellant\nVs.\nZAHID MEHMOOD --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13249",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1631 = 2005 SLD 1631 = 2005 CLD 987",
    "Key Words:": "(a) State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29 of 2002 dated 15 10 2002 - Para. 17 State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.8 of 2003 dated 12 3 2003 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 Constitutional petition Valuation of securities provided for the outstanding amount to the creditor Bank Valuation had been made by professional approved valuators engaged by the Bank which valuation was affirmed by the State Bank of Pakistan Committee formed under para. 17 of the BPD Circular No.29 of 2002 Validity Decision of State Bank of Pakistan Committee was binding on the parties under BPD Circular No.8 of 2003 and the Committee had acted strictly in accordance with BPD Circular No.29 of 2002 and there was nothing on record to dislodge the view taken by the Committee. \n \n(b) State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29 of 2002 dated 15 10 2002 \n \n Paras.10 & 17 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 ¬Constitutional petition Valuation of securities provided for the outstanding amount to the creditor Bank Contention of the petitioner was to the effect that terms of Circular No.29 of 2002 set out in para.10 were unreasonable anal arbitrary and it was urged that classification operated to the petitioner's prejudice, because its FSV was marginally less than the outstanding amount which disentitled the petitioner to pay 75% of the outstanding amount in settlement Contention of the petitioner had come as a surprise to the Court because the same was not set out in the petition Nevertheless, the argument was facile ¬Where the forced sale value (FSV) of the security was less than the outstanding amount, then to effect settlement a sum equal to FSV was to be recovered from the customer in cash If FSV was higher than the outstanding amount then the customer would have to pay 75% or more of the outstanding amount to reach settlement Where, however, the FSV was higher than the outstanding amount, the SBP Committee had discretion to order settlement at higher than 75% of the outstanding amount In fact the floor percentage would come into active consideration where the disparity of FSV over the outstanding amount was substantial, rather than marginal as in the present case In all cases of classification it was common that difficulty, was experienced in cases on borderline between separate classes, but that did not mean that the classification was illegal So long as rational criteria distinguished the classes that were formed with nexus to the object of the law, the classification so made was valid So too was the classification done by BPD Circular No.29 Present dispute was lingering for more than one year after the SBP Committee decision whereas the object of BPD Circular No.29 was to conclude settlements speedily rather than drag matters Petitioner was directed by the High Court to pay the amount of FSV less the disputed valuation amount of pledged stock to the Bank within two weeks Failing settlement for the petitioner's default, Bank shall be entitled to also recover the disputed amount from the petitioner in accordance with law. \n \n(c) State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29 of 2002 dated 15 10 2002 \n \n-----Paras. 17 & 10 Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199 ¬c:onstitutional petition Valuation of securities provided for the outstanding amount to the creditor Bank Petitioner, the borrower had questioned the value ascribed to pledged goods ¬Valuators had described the pledged goods as scrap and value determined was said to be excessive Such point sought an adjustment rather than revision of value, however it raised a question of fact which could not be examined by the High Court in. Constitutional jurisdiction Bank and the borrower were thus directed to revisit the matter and settle the issue by mutual consent keeping in view the hardship encountered by the petitioner being a border line case due to. FSV amount.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4735 of 2004, decision dated: 11-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "BADAR TEXTILES MILLS (PVT.) LTD. --Appellant\nVs.\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13250",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1632 = 2005 SLD 1632 = 2005 CLD 990",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) S. 10 Leave to appear and defend the suit Plea of being a sleeping partner Validity Such plea was rightly rejected by Banking Court and the suit was rightly decreed in favour of bank Appeal was dismissed. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) \n \n S. 9 Recovery of bank loan Decreeing of suit straightaway ¬Plea raised by the defendants was that after dismissal of application for leave to appear and defend the suit, the Banking Court had straightaway decreed the suit in favour of bank ¬Validity Instead of decreeing the suit straightaway, at least an opportunity should have been provided to the defendants to contest the matter on merits and decree should not have been passed as a matter of course without adverting to the record and looking into the defence of defendants With the consent of the counsel of bank, the and decree was set aside and the matter was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos.607 and 704 of 2002, heard on 3rd December, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Ch. MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN --Appellant\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through City Branch, Gujranwala and 4 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13251",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1633 = 2005 SLD 1633 = 2005 CLD 993",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ¬ S. 9 Recovery of bank loan Amount deposited by defendants, non adjustment of Father of defendants died on 17 3 1996 who had secured loan facility from plaintiff bank Statement of account revealed that amount outstanding against the father of defendants on 31 3 1996 was Rs.4,53,071.86---Statement of account also revealed that on 19 9 1997, the defendants had deposited Rs.65, 000 in the account of their father under incentive scheme Defendants also deposited Rs.2,00,000 in obedience of order of High Court Effect Banking Court erred in law not to give benefit of Rs.65,000 deposited by the defendants under the incentive scheme Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was modified after deducting the amounts already deposited by the defendants Appeal was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 39 of 1999, heard on 19-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs GHULAM HUSSAIN & COMPANY and 6 others --Appellants\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13252",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1634 = 2005 SLD 1634 = 2005 CLD 995",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) Ss. 9, 10 & 17 General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24-A ¬Decree passed by Banking Court without application of mind ¬Validity Such decree was not in consonance with law After addition of S.24 A in the General Clauses Act, 1897, public functionaries were bound to decide controversy between parties after application of mind with reasons High Court accepts appeal and set aside decree, resultantly suit and leave application would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court for decision afresh after application of mind in accordance with law.\n \nMollah Ejahar Ali's case PLD 1970 SC 173 and Messrs Airport Support Service's case 1998 SCMR 2268 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.792 of 2002, heard on 31st May, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "IMTIAZ SALEEM AHMAD --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK through Branch Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13253",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1635 = 2005 SLD 1635 = 2005 CLD 998",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 10 Recovery of bank loan Factual controversy ¬Loan for a sum of Rs.5 million was secured by the defendants but the bank claimed recovery of Rs.29 million Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to defend the suit and the suit was decreed to the extent of Rs.29 million Bank failed to explain as to how a claim of Rs.29 million had been raised against the defendants when the mark up had been separately calculated Counsel for the bank conceded that evidence would be required to support the claim of the bank Plea raised by the defendants was that facility of Rs.5 million was availed and the same had been repaid Effect Banking Court had proceeded in the matter without even examining the plaint High Court in view of the admission of defendants passed interim, decree for recovery of Rs.5 million with proportionate mar up at the agreed rate Leave to appear and defend the suit was allowed to the defendants for the remaining amount Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.636 of 1999, heard on 20-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SARDAR MUHAMMAD ASLAM, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SUNRISE TEXTILE LIMITED through Chief Executive and 7 others --Appellants\nVs.\nDOHA BANK LIMITED through BRANCH MANAGER --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13254",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1636 = 2005 SLD 1636 = 2005 CLD 1001",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S. 18(6) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58 ¬Execution of decree Objection application, dismissal of Non¬-reading of evidence Effect Banking Court decided application of objector without application of mind, as the documents attached by decree holder bank in the suit as well as in the reply of objection application were not mentioned by Banking Court in its order Courts were bound to decide the cases after application of independent mind Order passed by Banking Court not containing any such reason, the same was set aside ¬ Application was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh -Appeal was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 180 of 2000, decision dated: 18-02-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Pirzada AHSAN UD DIN --Appellant\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB and 6 others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13255",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1637 = 2005 SLD 1637 = 2005 CLD 1003",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------Ss. 15 & 18---Execution of decree---Decree also awarded to decree-holder benefit of S.15 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Judgment-debtor applied for return of security documents after paying decretal amount with costs---Executing Court through an interim order refused to give benefit of S.15 of the Act as same was not attracted to such case, and finally directed decree-holder to return documents to -debtor---Validity--Any error or illegality in such decree could not be termed so as to render same nullity or void or inexecutable in eye of Law---Executing Court could not go behind decree and nullify same, which had attained finality for having not been challenged in appeal---No appeal was allowed under special law against such interim order, which decree-holder could challenge in appeal against final order affecting its rights---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned order with directions to Executing Court to determine liability of -debtor in terms of such decree and after payment of amount so determined, -debtor would be entitled to return of security documents.\n \nFakir Abdullah and others v. Government of Sindh through Secretary to Government of Sindh, Revenue Department and others PLD 2001 SC 131 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n---S. 51 & O.XXI, Rr.10, 17---Execution of decree---Jurisdiction of Executing Court---Scope---Executing Court could refuse to execute decree, which was void, nullity, inexecutable or passed without Jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.16 of 2002 in E.P. No.76 of 1997, heard on 23rd June, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "SONERI BANK LIMITED through Duly Authorized Attorneys \nVs.\nIDREES AHMAD SIDDIQI and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13256",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1638 = 2005 SLD 1638 = 2005 CLD 1006",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and nuances) Act (XV of 1997) S. 9 State Bank of Pakistan Circular No. 19, dated 5 6 1997 ¬Recovery of bank loan Incentive scheme Wrong calculation by bank During pendency of suit filed by bank, the defendants deposited the amount under 'Incentive Scheme' issued by State Bank of Pakistan vide its Circular No. 19, dated 5 6 1997 After the amount had been deposited by the defendants, the bank raised additional claim on the ground that at the time of settlement of loan under the scheme, less liability was calculated inadvertently Validity Defendants were invited by the Bank to avail of the benefit of incentive scheme Defendants in response to the scheme, made a settlement with the Bank As a consequence of the settlement the defendants had deposited the amount in terms thereof and after performance of their part of settlement, the Bank could not claim any further amount from them due to its own mistake Banking Court had committed no illegality while passing the and decree and High Court declined to interfere in the same Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 14 of 1998, heard on 27th October 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs SHIFA MEDICO and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13257",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1639 = 2005 SLD 1639 = 2005 CLD 1009",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S. 15 State Bank of Pakistan Circular No. 32, dated 26 2 1995 Decree Mark up for cushion period of 210 days ¬Public functionaries, acts of Grievance of bank was that Banking Court in its decree passed in favour of the bank did not grant mark up for cushion period of 210 days Validity Bank was entitled to the mark up from the date of institution of the suit to payment Bank did not file the suit immediately after the cut off date as mentioned in finance agreement, therefore bank was responsible not to agitate the matter before the Banking Court well in time No body should be allowed to get the benefits of his misdeeds and no body could be penalized by the inaction of public functionaries Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was in consonance with S.15 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, and there was no infirmity or illegality in the same-appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nRahim Bux and others v. The State PLD 1998 Kar. 119 and Ahmad Latif Qureshi v. Controller of Examination, Board Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore and another PLD 1994 Lah. 3 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.58 of 1999, heard on 13-01-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "BANK OF PUNJAB through Attorney --Appellant\nVs.\nBANKING COURT IV, Lahore High Court and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13258",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1640 = 2005 SLD 1640 = 2005 CLD 1011",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ----S. 12 Ex parte decree, setting aside of Limitation Judgment debtor filed application after having knowledge about decree from his friend, but omitted to mention name and particulars of his friend therein Banking Court for such omission dismissed application as being time barred Validity---Presumption drawn by Banking Court on basis of such omission was illegal and unwarranted Question of limitation was a mixed question of law and fact If debtor had to be non suited on such ground, then Banking Court should have enabled parties to lead their evidence High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned order and remanded matter to Banking Court for decision of question of limitation after recording evidence of parties. \n \n(b) Limitation --\n \n Question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact ¬Before non suiting a party on such ground, Court should allow parties to lead their evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 10 of 2004, heard on 17-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "SAULAT ALI and another --Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Chief Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13259",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1641 = 2005 SLD 1641 = 2005 CLD 1014",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001) Ss. 9 & 10 Recovery of bank loan Liquidated damages ¬Proof Buy back price agreement-- Availing of finance facility was admitted by the defendants Statement of accounts showed the withdrawal of loan amount by the defendants out of sanctioned amount from time to time Effect Finance facility being buy back amount included the mark up charged by the bank on the principal amount High Court allowed the amount of buy back but the sum exceeding the buy back and liquidated damages were not allowed Suit was decreed accordingly. \n \n2005 CLD 1019\n \nLahore\n \nBefore Mian Saqib Nisar and Abdul Shakoor Paracha, JJ\n \nMUNEER FLOUR MILLS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and 4 others Appellants\n \nVs.\n \nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Chief Manager and 2 others Respondents\n \nFirst Appeal from Order No. 135 of 2004, decided on 24th May, 2004.\n \n(a) Civi1 Procedure Code (V of 1908) \n \n O. XVII, R.5 Adjournment of case for a particular purpose by Reader of the Court, when Presiding Officer was on leave ¬Validity Case for a particular purpose could either be fixed by Court itself or by any duty Judge Reorder, under C.P.C., or Special Law, had no power to adjourn case for any particular purpose. \n \n2005 CLD 1021\n \nLahore\n \nBefore Ch. Ijaz Ahmad and Mian Hamid Farooq, JJ\n \nMst. SADIA BIBI and 2 others Appellants\n \nVs.\n \nMessrs ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED Respondent\n \nRegular First Appeal No. 148 of 1999, decided on 15th December, 2003.\n \nBanking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) \n \n Ss. 9 & 10 Recovery of bank loan Death of original loanee ¬Liability of legal heirs of deceased loanee Application for leave to defend the suit Arguable plea, non raising of Suit for recovery of loan was filed against the legal heirs of the original loanee as he had died Suit was decreed by the Banking Court in favour of the bank Validity Loan was secured by the original loanee, therefore, the legal heirs were not in a position to deny execution of documents by the original loanee Legal heirs had inherited the property of the original loanee and they had not raised any arguable plea before Banking Court in their application for leave to defend the suit Banking Court had rightly dismissed the application anal the suit was rightly decreed in favour of the bank as no infirmity or illegality was committed by the Banking Court-- Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 76 of 1998, decision dated: 5-08-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED --Plaintiff\nVs.\nHAFIZ BROTHERS and others ----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13260",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1642 = 2005 SLD 1642 = 2005 CLD 1023",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) Ss. 9 & 10 Recovery of bank Loan Fraud committed by bank manager, allegation of Loan was availed by the defendant for purchase of tractor Grievance of the defendant was that the manager had misappropriated the tractor Defendant approached High Court in Constitutional jurisdiction wherein High Court arrived at the conclusion that he had applied for purchase of tractor which was duty sold to him High Court, in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction, also found that invoice was given to the defendant which was signed by him and according to the gate pass, the defendant himself took the tractor out of factory premises, thereafter the defendant sold the tractor to another person and the sale receipt was also signed by him ¬Defendant had raised the same contentions in his application for leave to defend the suit validity Constitutional petition was dismissed by High Court and no appeal was filed against that which had become final and conclusive Not open to the defendant to raise the same contention before the Banking Court in his leave petition as that matter stood finally and conclusively decided Banking Court had rightly rejected the application of the defendant for leave to defend the suit and the suit was rightly decreed against the defendant Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.637 of 2002, heard on 10-11-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "ALLAH RAKHA --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13261",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1643 = 2005 SLD 1643 = 2005 CLD 1029",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) Ss.205, 476(1)(a) & 484 Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss.10 & 20 ¬S.R.O.323(I)/2002, dated 14 6 2002 Order imposing penalty by Executive Director (E&M) of the Commission ¬Executive Director imposed a cumulative penalty of Rs. 75,750 upon the Companies under subsection (5) of S.205 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 for contravention of provisions of subsection (2) of S.205 of the Ordinance Such imposition of penalty had been challenged on ground of jurisdiction, contending that Executive Director did not have jurisdiction to pass the impugned order Validity Powers and functions of Commission though had been delegated to the Executive\n2005 CLD 1034\n \nSupreme Court of Pakistan\n \nPresent: Nazim Hussain Siddiqui, Javed Iqbal and Hamid Ali Mirza, JJ\n \nHAMZA BOARD MILLS LIMITED and 7 others Appellants\n \nVs.\n \nHABIB BANK LIMITED and another Respondents\n \nCivil Appeal No.511 of 1995, decided on 22nd October, 2001.\n \nOn appeal from the dated 3 5 1995 of Lahore High Court, passed in C.O. No. 133 of 1994).\n \nCompanies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) \n \n Ss.305 & 309 Winding up of company Liability of bank, adjustment of Restoring the pervious status of company Company was ordered to be wound up as the liabilities of bank were not paid Company had adjusted all its liabilities with the bank and from the date when the winding up order was passed, the financial rights and obligations of the company remained the same as were on that date Plea raised by the company was that the winding up order of the company was liable to be set aside and the company was entitled to function as it was doing before Validity There was nothing on record substantiate the plea raised by the company and it was not clear whether other creditors of the company would be affected or not by restoring the previous status of the company Order of winding up of the company passed by Companies Judge was set aside by Supreme Court and the matter was remanded to High Court for decision afresh on merits regarding restoring the previous status of the company or otherwise Appeal was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Revision No.68 of 2002, decision dated: 11-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ETRAT H. RIZVI, COMMISSIONER (INSURANCE AND SCD) AND M. ZAFAR UL HAQ HIJAZI, COMMISSIONER (COMPANY LAW)",
    "": "PRUDENTIAL INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED and 4 others --Appellants\nVs.\nEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (E&M) SEC --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13262",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1644 = 2005 SLD 1644 = 2005 CLD 1044",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997) S.33 Listing Regulations, Regln. 21(2) Application for de Listing of Modarba from Stock Exchange Appellant, a Modarba applied for de Listing from Stock Exchange ¬Previously, appellant had written to Stock Exchange and informed it of its decision to discontinue its membership as a Listed Modarba Stock Exchange refused to accept decision of appellant saying that it was not bound to do so and directed the appellant to pay listing fee Appellant refused to pay listing fee and applied to the Commission for its de Listing Commission directed the Stock Exchange to de List the appellants from its Exchange within fifteen days from the date of approval by appellant's share holders and that appellants to pay fee and penalties imposed by Stock Exchange for violating provisions of Regln. 21(2) of Listing Regulations for not providing required information to the Stock Exchange Appellant not satisfied with order of Commission preferred appeal before Appellate Bench ¬Validity No justification existed for forcing appellant to remain listed on Stock Exchange Stock Exchange acceded to direction of Commission to de list the appellant Only reason for not de Listing appellant was that Stock Exchange had not received the approval of the Board of Management Company of the appellant Appellant was directed to provide requisite approval to Stock Exchange upon which Stock Exchange would de list appellant from its Exchange without delay Directions given by Commissioner to appellant for payment of fee and penalties imposed by Stock Exchange for violation of Regln. 21(2) of Listing Regulation beyond the, year 2000, were set aside.\n \nNaveed Altaf Hussain and Naseem Ahmed for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No. 13 of 2003, decision dated: 24-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "ETRAT H. RIZVI, COMMISSIONER (INSURANCE AND SCD) AND ABDUL REHMAN QURESHI, COMMISSIONER (ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING)",
    "": "BRR INTERNATIONAL MODARABA --Appellant\nVs.\nCOMMISSIONER (SECURITIES MARKET) SEC and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13263",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1645 = 2005 SLD 1645 = 2005 CLD 1053",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------S.6---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Banking Tribunal decreed suit partly, but refused to allow liquidated damages and compound interest---Validity---Impugned decree was strictly according to statement of accounts of defendant maintained by Bank itself---High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.373 of 1996, heard on 10th September , 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "M. JAVED BUTTAR AND MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nFOUNTAIN DAIRY FARM through Proprietor and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13264",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1646 = 2005 SLD 1646 = 2005 CLD 1076",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Leave to defend suit, application for---Plea of defendant was that suit had not been filed by a duly authorized person; and statement of accounts was not correct---Banking Court dismissed leave application---Validity---Suit could only be filed through a duly authorized person---Bank had not placed on record power of attorney allegedly executed in favour of person named in plaint---Basis of debit entries in statement of accounts were terms and conditions of credit card, which was not before the Banking Court---Banking Court had not recorded any clear finding on averments made in leave application---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned /decree, allowed leave application unconditionally and remanded suit to Banking Court for fresh decision in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.247 of 1998, heard on 5-11-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD GHANI, JJ",
    "": "FAISAL RAUF MALIK and 2 others\nVs.\nMessrs CITIBANK N.A."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13265",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1647 = 2005 SLD 1647 = 2005 CLD 1083",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-------S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Declaratory suit---Rejection of plaint---Application for leave to appear and defend the suit, non-deciding of---Borrowers filed suit for declaration alleging that the bank did not disburse the amount as claimed by it---Banking Court without granting leave to the bank, rejected plaint for the reason that it did not disclose any cause of action---Validity---Banking Court had erroneously applied the provisions of O.VII, R.11 C.P.C. and the order passed by Banking Court suffered from serious infirmity, and the same could not be sustained, resultantly the same was set aside---Matter .was remanded to Banking Court where the application of bank for leave to appear and defend the suit would be deemed to be pending and the Banking Court would decide such application---High Court allowed that Banking Court might also consider the question about maintainability of declaratory suit if raised by the bank--Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to appear and defend the suit, grant of---Pendency of declaratory suit filed by borrowers against the bank---Plea raised by the bank was that on account of grant of leave to the bank in declaratory suit, the borrowers were not entitled to grant of leave automatically---Validity---It was for the Banking Court to apply its independent mind to both the cases and decide the matter in accordance with law---Any order passed by High Court in declaratory suit filed by borrowers would not affect the case of the bank in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.486 of 2002, heard on 24-11-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MALIK ISRAR SALIM & BROTHERS through Proprietor\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD. and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13266",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1648 = 2005 SLD 1648 = 2005 CLD 1088",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.12---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29---Appeal---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Provisions of Limitation Act, 1908---Applicability---Appeal was filed after the period of limitation and along with application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, was filed for condonation of delay-Plea raised by the respondent was that the appeal was filed under S.12 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, which was a special statute, therefore, provisions of Limitation Act, 1908, were not applicable---Validity---Appeal was filed under the provisions of special law. wherein specific period had been prescribed---In view of the provisions of S.29 of Limitation Act, 1908, the delay could not be condoned under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A. O. No.88 of 1995, decision dated: 12-01-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Mst. BILQEES KHANUM and 5 others\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13267",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1649 = 2005 SLD 1649 = 2005 CLD 1094",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Application for leave to appear and defend the suit, dismissal of---Defendants contented that they did not mortgage their property in favour of bank and mortgaged instruments were fake and were result of collusion between bank and borrowers---Banking Court dismissed their application and the suit was decreed in favour of the bank---Validity---Banking Court had only considered the question about mortgage of property by borrowers and there was no application of mind to the case of the defendants---Banking Court did not consider whether the defendants had mortgaged their property and if substantial proof was available on record, leave should have been refused---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for deciding the application for leave to appear and defend the suit filed by the defendants---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.413 of 1999, heard on 31st May, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "TALAT TEXTILES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 5 others\nVs.\nALTOWFEEK INVESTMENT BANK LTD. Through Manager, VicEPresident and Attorneys and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13268",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1650 = 2005 SLD 1650 = 2005 CLD 1098",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount-Leave. to defend suit, application for---Defendant claimed to have adjusted entire loan amount---Banking Court dismissed leave application---Validity---Banking Court had referred to an overdraft facility in impugned , but had not examined statement of accounts showing same having been adjusted on a date, when credit balance was also recorded---Banking Court was bound to call upon Bank to explain as to how an overdraft had been given after adjustment of earlier facility to defendant against whom a criminal case had been registered a few days earlier by same officers named in plaint, who had made entries in statement of accounts accusing her of fraud and misappropriation---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned /decree, allowed leave application, resultantly defendant would file written statement.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.427of 2000, heard on 6-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND FARRUKH LATIF, JJ",
    "": "Messrs F.S. TRADERS, Lahore High Court and another\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13269",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1651 = 2005 SLD 1651 = 2005 CLD 1101",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.305 & 309---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33---Winding up of company---Appeal against---Appellant-Company had failed to hold 11 Annual General Meetings from 1992 onwards; its business had also been suspended since. 1993 and it had failed to comply with various other mandatory legal requirements---In the light of all said facts Additional Registrar concerned approached the Commission for grant of sanction in terms of S.309 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 for winding up of company---Commissioner, after hearing appellant granted sanction under clause (b) of S.309 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 for winding up of Company---Appellant-Company admittedly had failed to hold its Annual General Meetings under both previous and new managements---Provisions of S.305 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 did not require that default committed by Company should be wilful---Though it was contended that management of Company intended to revive the Company, but no plan for such revival had been presented---Even management had accepted that Company existed only on paper---Holding of Annual General Meetings later on, could not be considered as rectifying the dire situation in which Company stood today---Order of winding up of Company passed by Commissioner being reasonable, was upheld and appeal against that order was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.1 of 2004, heard on 6-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ETRAT H. RIZVI, AND SHAHID GHAFFAR, COMMISSIONERS",
    "": "KARIM SILK MILLS LIMITED\nVs.\nCOMMISSIONER (ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING) SEC and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13270",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1652 = 2005 SLD 1652 = 2005 CLD 1104",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.15(1) & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.141& 151---Execution of decree-Auction of mortgagee land--Entitlement of auction-purchaser would extend to land owned by -debtor and mortgaged with decree¬-holder---Possession of land obtained by auction-purchaser in excess of his entitlement would be liable to be restored to its owner---Principles illustrated.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.187 of 2002, heard on 14-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL HAFEEZ \nVs.\nMUHAMMAD NADEEM and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13271",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1653 = 2005 SLD 1653 = 2005 CLD 1108",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Plea not raised in application for leave to appear and defend the suit---Loan facility was availed by defendants on 7.7.1993 and mother of appellants mortgaged her property as a security of loan availed by defendants---Application for leave to appear and defend the suit was dismissed by Banking Court and the suit was decreed in favour of bank---Plea raised by appellants was that their mother had died on 6.2.1988, the mark-up was overcharged, the loan facility was enhanced and one of the appellants was abroad during the relevant period---Validity---No death certificate of the mother of appellants was placed on record to prima facie show that she died on 6.2.1988, resultantly simple allegation in that regard was unfounded---Allegation of overcharging of mark-up was not raised in leave application, therefore, High Court did not consider the allegation---Regarding enhancement of loan facility, there was a letter available on record whereby the enhancement was requested and was sanctioned by the bank---Appellant claiming to be abroad, did not place on record any documentary evidence showing his absence from the country---Banking Court had rightly concluded that the appellants had failed to raise any bona fide dispute and therefore, were not entitled to seek the leave to appear and defend the suit---Application was properly dismissed by the Banking Court and the and decree had been passed, which did not suffer from any legal or factual infirmity calling for interference in appeal---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.267of 2000, heard on 10-11-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SHALIMAR METAL INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 3 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13272",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1654 = 2005 SLD 1654 = 2005 CLD 1111",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90---Applications to set aside auction sale on deposit of amount and on ground of irregularity---Disposal of---Relief under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. could not be claimed, unless application under R.90 thereof had been withdrawn.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.572 of 1999, heard on 6-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND FARRUKH LATIF, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ADAN STEEL CASTING and 3 others\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13273",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1655 = 2005 SLD 1655 = 2005 CLD 1114",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-------S.3---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.9---Recovery of bank loan--- Charging of mark-up not agreed in finance agreement---Awarding of cost of funds---Retrospective effect---Banking Court decreed the suit in favour of bank but disallowed the mark-up and costs of fund to the bank---Validity---Provision of costs of fund in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, would not have retrospective effect to the suits which were instituted before the repealed law---Bank had failed to show if the mark-up was chargeable under arty agreement or agreement between the parties---If there was no agreement for the charge of mark-up, the bank was not entitled to claim the same---Banking Court had rightly refused the claim of mark-up to the bank and no illegality was committed in the passed by Banking Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.264 of 2002, heard on 16-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager---Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs FOOTCARE (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and\nothers"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13274",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMRlNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1656 = 2005 SLD 1656 = 2005 CLD 1116",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.10 & 21---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.114---Leave to defend suit, application for---Plea not raised in such application before Banking Court---Effect---Parties would be bound by their pleadings---Fresh plea raised by appellant before High Court during arguments would not be sustainable in the eye of law in view of principles of estoppel and waiver.\n \nGovernment of Pakistan v. Premier Sugar Mills and others PLD 1991 Lah. 381; Messrs Standard Hotels (Private) Ltd. v. Messrs Rio Centre and others 1994 CLC 2413 and National Bank of Pakistan and others v. Karachi Development Authority and others PLD 1999 Kar 260 ref.\n \nMst. Murad Begum and others v. Muhammad Rafiq and others PLD 1974 SC 322 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)--\n \n----S.9(1)---Institution of suit on behalf of Bank---Branch Manager of concerned Bank would be competent to file such suit. \n \nMuhammad Ramzan's case 2001 CLC 158 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.619 of 1999, heard on 3rd June, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ALKASHMIR TRADERS and 6 others\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through Muhammad Jarar"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13275",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1657 = 2005 SLD 1657 = 2005 CLD 1119",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9(5), 10 & 12---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.27---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Defendant denied to have been served through any mode adopted by Banking Court, and that two days after obtaining knowledge about decree from a Bank official, he filed application for its setting aside---Banking Court dismissed application as being time-barred and also on the ground that substituted service had been effected on defendant through publication in English and Urdu newspapers and through bailiff of Court and also by assuming that summons through registered post A/D had been delivered to defendant irrespective of return of A/D receipt thereof---Validity---Banking Court had passed ex parte order without adopting all the four modes of service mentioned in S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Impugned order did not show that defendant had been served through courier---Banking Court had not ordered for service of defendant through affixation in view of bailiff's report that personal service had not been effected---Affidavit of defendant denying receipt of summons through registered post A/D had not been rebutted by counter-affidavit of plaintiff---In such situation, there was no reason to disbelieve defendant and presume otherwise particularly in absence of return of A/D receipt by Post Office----Defendant had claimed to be not well-educated and conversant with English language---Newspaper in Urdu language had no circulation in the village, where defendant was residing---Banking Court had not satisfied itself that substituted service through publication in newspapers was sufficient by ensuring that newspapers had been dispatched by office of concerned newspapers at defendant's address under postal certificate and that such certificate was available on record---Defendant's application ex facie was within time and he was not required to file application of condonation of delay---Bank official could not take risk of giving an affidavit likely to be used in litigation against Bank---High Court accepted appeal and set aside ex parte decree with observations that defendant could file before Banking Court application for leave to defend suit within ten days.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.7 of 2004, heard on 13-07-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA AND FARRUKH LATIF, JJ",
    "": "SHABBIR AHMAD\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13276",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1658 = 2005 SLD 1658 = 2005 CLD 1123",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10 & 11---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLI, R.23---Recovery of bank loan---Interim decree---Entitlement of financial institution---Determination---Remand of case for deciding factual controversy---Banking Court refused leave to appear and defend the suit and decreed the suit in favour of financial institution---Validity---High Court with the consent of parties passed interim decree in favour of financial institution and remanded the case to Banking Court for deciding three issues involving factual controversy---Entitlement of the financial institution would be determined on the basis of the evidence available or led by the parties---Appeal was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.AS. Nos.92, 93, 351 and 398 of 2003, heard on 9-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND CH. IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "ATLAS INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nMessrs PLASTIC BAGS PACKING (PVT.) LIMITED and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13277",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1659 = 2005 SLD 1659 = 2005 CLD 1126",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------S.9 ---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIX, R.1---Recovery suit instituted by a person, who was neither a Bank Manager nor authorized by Board of Directors---Maintainability---Plaintiffs plea was that such person was its duly constituted attorney, but had not pleaded that he was also a Manager of Bank---Nothing on record was available to show that such person was authorized by Board of Directors to institute such suit on behalf of Bank---Suit instituted by incompetent person would be liable to be dismissed---High Court accepted appeal and set aside decree of Banking Court with directions to examine other issues after first determining, whether suit had been instituted through a duly authorized person.\n \nKhan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot (represented by 6 heirs) v. Messrs Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd., Lahore PLD 1971 SC 550; Abubakkar Saley Mayet v. Abbot Laboratories and another 1987 CLC 367; Government of Pakistan v. Premier Sugar Mills and others PLD 1991 Lah. 381; Messrs Standard Hotels (Private) Ltd. v. Messrs Rio Centre and others 1994 CLC 2413 and Bankers Equity Ltd. through Attorney and 5 others v. Sunflo Cit-Russ Ltd. (formerly known as Sunflo Juices Ltd.) through Managing Director PLD 1999 Lah. 450 rel.\n \n(b) Precedent---\n \n----Decision on an objection raised in a case had to be taken with reference to material available on record of such case, and for such purpose, material on record of any other case could not be imported to be relied upon.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.380 of 1998, heard on 25-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD GHANI, JJ",
    "": "GULERANA and 4 others\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A., Lahore High Court through Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13278",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1660 = 2005 SLD 1660 = 2005 CLD 1129",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.9, 10 & 18---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.176---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908). S.47---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Pledged goods---Application for leave to defend suit---Defendant's plea was that Bank being a Pawnee was not entitled to recover suit amount till return of pledged goods---Banking Court dismissed leave application and decreed suit---Validity---Case of Bank was based on agreements for irrevocable documentary credit, letter of credit, invoices and bill of lading coupled with statement of accounts---Bank had neither pleaded nor filed any document along with plaint to .show pledge of imported goods by defendant with Bank---Defendant could not establish on record, even prima facie, that goods had been either taken over by Bank or were pledged with Bank either with or without consent of defendant---Such plea would not be sufficient to entitle defendant for grant of leave to defend suit---Banking Court had rightly refused leave to defend suit---Executing Court in view of S.47, C.P.C., could determine all questions arising between parties and relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree-Questions as to whether goods were pledged or not and that what was the status of goods, could be decided by Executing Court, if raised by defendant---High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.\n \nA.M. Burq and another v. Central Exchange Bank Ltd. and others PLD 1966 (W.P.) Lah. 1; Prudential Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hydari Ghee Industries Ltd. and 9 others 1999 MLD 1694 and Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Tayab Sharif 1975 SCMR 393 ref.\n \nMessrs Waqas Enterprises and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and 2 others 1999' SCMR 85 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S. 10---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.84---Suit for recovery of loan amount-Application for leave to defend suit---Defendant denied to have executed finance documents alleging same to be forged---Validity---Admitted signatures of defendant on various documents were compared by Court with his signatures on disputed document and found same to be those of defendant---Defendant, in order to wriggle out of contractual obligation, had frivolously disowned finance documents--Such a bald assertion would be of no avail to defendant in view of other documents on record, which had not been denied by him-Held: Such plea had no substance. \n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n---Ss. 9 & 17---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.17(2)(a)---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Loan documents executed in year 1996 i.e. before promulgation of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Non-attestation of such documents by two witnesses---Effect---Such non-attestation would not invalidate any document as per force of S.17(3) of the Act. \n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n---Ss.9 & 15---Suit for recovery of loan amount based on deficient statement of accounts---Decree passed in favour of Bank on basis of such statement of accounts---Validity--Amounts allegedly deposited by defendant did not find mention in statement of accounts---Bank had neither explained the amount debited in the account of defendant from available record nor produced any supporting documents---Banking Court had mechanically passed decree without determining actual liability---High Court partly accepted appeal in view of sketchy entries in statement of accounts with directions to Banking Court to pass fresh decree after calling upon Bank to explain entries therein and taking into account any deposit made by defendant and not accounted for in statement of accounts and then finally determine liability of defendant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos.299 and 300 of 1999, heard on 15-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs POLYMER INTERNATIONAL through Proprietor and another\nVs.\nMessrs BOLAN BANK LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13279",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1661 = 2005 SLD 1661 = 2005 CLD 1142",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10----Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 208---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Application for leave to defend suit---Termination of agent's authority-Bank claimed that defendant had executed mortgage deed through his general attorney---Defendant's plea was that he had revoked authority of his attorney through registered document prior to execution of mortgaged deed by attorney-Validity---Defendant had not raised pleas or defence being raised on such lines, defendant could not be permitted to prove something, which he had not against attorney or Bank.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.133 & 135---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.84---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Application by guarantor for leave to defend suit---Guarantor not only denied his signatures on guarantee and mortgage documents, but raised plea to the effect that after subsequent increase in finance facility, he stood absolved of his original liability of Rs.20 million---Banking Court passed decree for Rs.32, 211, 284 against guarantor and principal debtor jointly and severally--Validity---Maximum limit of security or guarantee as mentioned in memorandum of deposit of title deeds, guarantee letter and mortgage deed was Rs.20 million---Amount secured or guaranteed to be paid to Bank, thus, would be up to limit of Rs.20 million---Guarantor had executed such documents and his signatures thereon did appear to a naked eye to be similar to his signatures on leave application---Point requiring determination was as to whether there was some evidence on record to bind guarantor to the extent of suit amount---High Court partly accepted appeal by keeping intact impugned decree as against principal debtors while passing interim decree for Rs.20 million as against guarantor and also granting him leave to defend suit to the extent of remaining suit amount with direction to Banking Court to frame issues and proceed further in the matter. \n \nMian Aftab A. Sheikh and 2 others v. Messrs Trust Leasing Corporation Limited and another 2003 CLD 702 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.86 and 179 of 2003, heard on 10-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND FARRUKH LATIF, JJ",
    "": "Malik MUHMAMAD AZAM and others\nVs.\nAL BARKA ISLAMIC BANK B.S.C. (EC) A BANKING COMPANY SHAHRAHEAIWANETIJARAT, Lahore High Court, through Chief Manager and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13280",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1662 = 2005 SLD 1662 = 2005 CLD 1151",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.7---General Clauses Act (X of 1898), S.24-A---Powers of Banking Court---Scope---Banking Court was duty bound to decide case after applying its independent mind. \n \nPLD 1970 SC 173 rel.\n \n(b) Interpretation of document---\n \n----Agreement would be read as a whole and not piece-meal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.613 of 1999, decision dated: 15-12-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nMirza NASIM BAIG and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13281",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1663 = 2005 SLD 1663 = 2005 CLD 1162",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Compromise----Decision of matter on the basis of compromise/agreement between the parties---Status--When a lis is disposed of by the Court on the basis of a compromise between the parties, the order/ shall not be the one passed by the Court on the merits of the case, which always is based upon proper adjudication of the Court about the factual and legal controversy involved in the matter; such decision has altogether a different status, sanctity and legal value---Where, however, the case is decided on account of an agreement/compromise between the parties, even if approved by the Court, the validity of the order/ remains dependent upon its being the lawful agreement---Agreement/compromise, therefore, if challenged as being invalid and if it is so adjudged by the Court, such decision of the Court based upon the agreement shall automatically sink along with the annulment of the agreement/compromise. \n \n(b) Contract----Contract shall only be valid inter se the parties and no stranger thereto can be bound by the terms of the contract until and, unless such stranger has expressly or by necessary implication accepted the contract. \n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXI, R.30---Execution of decree for payment of money---Mortgaged property of a -debtor cannot be sold through private negotiation by the decree holder, in favour of a third party, even if such party claims any prior agreement of sale with the -debtor. \n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---O.XXI, Rr. 65 & 66---Execution of decree---When the Executing Court, has decided to attach and sell the property of a debtor under O.XXI, R.65, C.P.C. the sale has to be conducted, if it is not prescribed otherwise, through a public auction---When the Executing Court, in the present case, had taken a conscious decision to sell the property by auction and notice under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. was issued to the , debtor, which had neither been suspended nor set aside by the High Court, in the appeals of the other respondents, the Bank under the law had no power to circumvent the authority and the mode chosen by the Executing Court for the disposal of the property and to agree for selling the same in favour of other respondents, through private means. \n \n(e) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----S. 18---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.19----Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged property under S.18 Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 or S.19, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 though is permissible and can be made by the decree holder, with or without the intervention of the Court, but subject to essential conditions that the sale should be either through the sealed tenders, or by public auction---Purpose behind the conditions is that no room should be left to defraud and cause prejudice to the rights of the -debtor, who is the owner of the property and the sale proceeds are to be appropriated to his debt and credit---Sale made on the basis of the compromise between the parties was not covered by S.18 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 or S.19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. \n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S. 12(2)---Case of the applicant squarely fell within the purview of S.12(2), C.P.C. inasmuch as the order of the Court had been procured by the concealment and also not putting the Court to the full facts that the private sale could not be negotiated between the Bank and the other respondents, which agreement was unlawful and therefore, any order based thereupon shall not be within the jurisdiction of the Court---Resultantly, the order was set aside with the result that the main appeals stood restored. \n \n(g) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----Ss. 18 & 21---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 19 & 22---Execution of decree---Appeal---Main grouse/complaint in the appeals were that though the appellants had entered into an agreement of sale with the -debtors/owners of the property, yet in violation of the terms under the agreement, the property was being put to auction and when they brought these objections before the Executing Court, the Court had absolutely ignored the same and directed for the auction of the property---Validity---Such action of the Court obviously tantamount to condemning the appellants unheard and therefore, such order being violative of the principles of natural justice, could not sustain---Appeals were accepted by the High Court, the matter was sent to the Banking Court, where the objections of the appellants, shall be deemed to be pending, with the direction to decide the same in accordance with law---Appellants had paid certain amount to the decree holder, when the said order had been set aside, the decree holder/Bank was obliged to return that amount to the appellants, which should be done within three weeks from the date of the present .",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M. No.646-C of 2002 in E.F.A. No.215 of 2001, decision dated: 17-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN SAQIB NISAR, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RAFIQ\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13282",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1664 = 2005 SLD 1664 = 2005 CLD 1170",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)--------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.89---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)--Execution of decree---Setting aside of sale---Judgment-debtor filed application under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. but failed to deposit the amount due even within extended time---Effect---Even the application which was submitted under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. was not competent as the amount due against -debtor was not deposited by him---High Court had rightly dismissed the appeal filed by ¬-debtor---Sale having been confirmed and such fact had been conceded by -debtor, therefore, -debtor was not entitled to any relief under Art.185(3) of the Constitution---Leave to appeal was refused.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2278-L of 2004, decision dated: 28-07-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY AND FALAK SHER, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ABDUR RAZZAQ & COMPANY, through Mian Abrar AhmeD\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13283",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1665 = 2005 SLD 1665 = 2005 CLD 1173",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------Ss. 12 & 11---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss. 18 & 22---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 19 & 24---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 181---Execution of decree passed under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 on 1-12-1994--- Bank brought the execution application on 17-5-2000---Limitation---Contention of the appellant was that the provisions of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans. Advances. Credits and Finances) Act. 1997 having no retrospective effect. under S.22 of the said Act, no fresh period of limitation shall be available to the decree-holder for filing an execution petition, which earlier had not been filed within three years and the decree in question was already barred by time---Validity---Held, with a view to protect and safeguard the rights and the interest of those, who, under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1984, had unlimited period to initiate and pursue their cases, but might get affected because of S.22(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits, and Finances) Act, 1997, if proviso was not there, the same was added---With such legal consequences, the cases falling' within the purview of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1984, were termed as \"\"past transaction\"\" and by fiction of law a fresh cause of action was deemed to have accrued in their favour for the purpose of Limitation Act, 1908---Case of the Bank was squarely covered by proviso to S.22(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 and a fresh period of limitation i.e. three years under Art. 181, Limitation Act, 1908 shall be available to the Bank to file the execution application---Principles.\n \nUnder section 12 of the Banking Companies Ordinance No. 1VIII of 1984, the application of the Limitation Act, 1908 was excluded qua any suit, application or other proceedings filed by the banking companies under the Ordinance, with the result that there shall be no limitation for seeking the execution of a decree under the above Ordinance. Therefore, if the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 had not come in force, the decree holder could avail unlimited period to initiate the execution process. And it is well-settled, that once a vested right has been created to a litigant at the time of the commencement of the lis, such right cannot be taken away except by the express provisions of the law. Now if the contention of the appellant is accepted, that the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (No XV of 1997) is inapplicable, the legal consequences would be that the execution application shall never be barred by time. \n \nThe correct legal position is, that the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 (XIX of 1979) and the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (LVIII of 1984), have been repealed by the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (No.XV of 1997), and all the cases pending before the defunct forums stand transferred to the \"\"Banking Court\"\" constituted under the Act. By virtue of section 22(1) of the Act 1997, the Limitation Act, 1908 remains excluded for any suit, application or the proceedings, which are so transferred to the latter forum. But under subsection (2), the Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to all the cases which are instituted or filed in the \"\"Banking Court\"\" after the coming into force of the Act, however with the exception regarding those cases, which are covered by the proviso to subsection (2), i.e. in relation to the past transactions, for which, a fresh cause of action is deemed by law to have accrued in favour of the concerned party to initiate their cause/case within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act of 1908. The true import of section 22(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, when read along with its proviso, therefore, is that for all the cases, instituted before a Banking Court after the commencement of the Act 1997, which undoubtedly includes an execution application, the Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply. However, with a view to protect and safeguard the rights and the interest of those, who under the Ordinance LVIII of 1984, had unlimited period to initiate and pursue their cases, but may get affected because of subsection (2) of section 22, if the proviso was not there, that the same was added. With such legal consequences, the cases falling within the purview of the Ordinance, 1984, were termed as the \"\"past transaction\"\" and by fiction of law a fresh cause of action is deemed to have accrued in their favour for the purpose of the Limitation Act, 1908.\n \nThe case of the Bank is squarely covered by proviso to subsection (2) of section 22 and a fresh period of limitation i.e. three years under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, shall be available to the Bank to file the execution application. Admittedly, the Act 1997 came into force on 31-5-1997 and the application was filed on 17-5-2000, which was within time. \n \nKhalid Qureshi and 5 others v. United Bank Limited 2001 SCMR 103 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Fakir Spinning Mills 1998 CLC 812 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F. Appeal No.334 of 2001, decision dated: 28-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AKHTAR --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13284",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1666 = 2005 SLD 1666 = 2005 CLD 1173",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------Ss. 12 & 11---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Ss. 18 & 22---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 19 & 24---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 181---Execution of decree passed under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 on 1-12-1994--- Bank brought the execution application on 17-5-2000---Limitation---Contention of the appellant was that the provisions of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans. Advances. Credits and Finances) Act. 1997 having no retrospective effect. under S.22 of the said Act, no fresh period of limitation shall be available to the decree-holder for filing an execution petition, which earlier had not been filed within three years and the decree in question was already barred by time---Validity---Held, with a view to protect and safeguard the rights and the interest of those, who, under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1984, had unlimited period to initiate and pursue their cases, but might get affected because of S.22(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits, and Finances) Act, 1997, if proviso was not there, the same was added---With such legal consequences, the cases falling' within the purview of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1984, were termed as \"\"past transaction\"\" and by fiction of law a fresh cause of action was deemed to have accrued in their favour for the purpose of Limitation Act, 1908---Case of the Bank was squarely covered by proviso to S.22(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 and a fresh period of limitation i.e. three years under Art. 181, Limitation Act, 1908 shall be available to the Bank to file the execution application---Principles.\n \nUnder section 12 of the Banking Companies Ordinance No. 1VIII of 1984, the application of the Limitation Act, 1908 was excluded qua any suit, application or other proceedings filed by the banking companies under the Ordinance, with the result that there shall be no limitation for seeking the execution of a decree under the above Ordinance. Therefore, if the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 had not come in force, the decree holder could avail unlimited period to initiate the execution process. And it is well-settled, that once a vested right has been created to a litigant at the time of the commencement of the lis, such right cannot be taken away except by the express provisions of the law. Now if the contention of the appellant is accepted, that the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (No XV of 1997) is inapplicable, the legal consequences would be that the execution application shall never be barred by time. \n \nThe correct legal position is, that the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 (XIX of 1979) and the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (LVIII of 1984), have been repealed by the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (No.XV of 1997), and all the cases pending before the defunct forums stand transferred to the \"\"Banking Court\"\" constituted under the Act. By virtue of section 22(1) of the Act 1997, the Limitation Act, 1908 remains excluded for any suit, application or the proceedings, which are so transferred to the latter forum. But under subsection (2), the Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to all the cases which are instituted or filed in the \"\"Banking Court\"\" after the coming into force of the Act, however with the exception regarding those cases, which are covered by the proviso to subsection (2), i.e. in relation to the past transactions, for which, a fresh cause of action is deemed by law to have accrued in favour of the concerned party to initiate their cause/case within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act of 1908. The true import of section 22(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, when read along with its proviso, therefore, is that for all the cases, instituted before a Banking Court after the commencement of the Act 1997, which undoubtedly includes an execution application, the Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply. However, with a view to protect and safeguard the rights and the interest of those, who under the Ordinance LVIII of 1984, had unlimited period to initiate and pursue their cases, but may get affected because of subsection (2) of section 22, if the proviso was not there, that the same was added. With such legal consequences, the cases falling within the purview of the Ordinance, 1984, were termed as the \"\"past transaction\"\" and by fiction of law a fresh cause of action is deemed to have accrued in their favour for the purpose of the Limitation Act, 1908.\n \nThe case of the Bank is squarely covered by proviso to subsection (2) of section 22 and a fresh period of limitation i.e. three years under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, shall be available to the Bank to file the execution application. Admittedly, the Act 1997 came into force on 31-5-1997 and the application was filed on 17-5-2000, which was within time. \n \nKhalid Qureshi and 5 others v. United Bank Limited 2001 SCMR 103 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Fakir Spinning Mills 1998 CLC 812 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F. Appeal No.334 of 2001, decision dated: 28-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AKHTAR --Appellant\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13285",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1667 = 2005 SLD 1667 = 2005 CLD 1182",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.12(2)---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Service of summons/notices issued in suit through bailiff, courier service and other modes not denied by defendant---Publication of summons of suit in various newspapers particularly in newspapers where defendant was residing---Application for setting aside of decree was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.45 of 2002, decision dated: 12-02-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, JJ",
    "": "Brig. (Retd.) KIIALID MAHMOOD\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13286",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1668 = 2005 SLD 1668 = 2005 CLD 1186",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----S.9-Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Leave application raising objections qua statement of accounts i.e. neither showing disbursement of amount nor executed and verified in according with Banker's Books Evidence Act, 1891, rather containing incorrect and bogus entries---Banking Court decreed suit without rendering any finding on statement of accounts---Validity--Defendant had not admitted claim of Bank---Statement of account being sketchy, brief, devoid of details, contrary to law and not indicating disbursement of amount---High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned /decree with direction to Bank to file complete and detailed statement of accounts regarding account of defendant before Banking Court, who would decide suit in accordance with law. \n \nBankers Equity Limited through Principal Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 931 and Messrs C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chairman and 5 others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.354 of 2000, heard on 29-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ICEPAC LIMITED and 2 others\nVs.\nMessrs PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL LEASING CORPORATION LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13287",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1669 = 2005 SLD 1669 = 2005 CLD 1194",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------S.9---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24-A---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Leave application---Defendant's plea was that documents filed with plaint including finance agreement were fake and bogus, and statement of accounts was incorrect---Banking Court dismissed leave application and decreed suit without dealing with defendant's pleas---Validity---Banking Court was obliged under law to deal with and decide such pleas through a reasoned ---Bank had not properly documented suit---As per directive of High Court, Bank placed on record additional documents including approval of finance, sanction advice and complete statement of accounts---Banking Court while deciding leave application had been deprived of examination of such documents---Had such documents been on record earlier, fate of leave application and suit might have been different---High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned /decree with directions to Banking Court to decide case afresh in accordance with law after considering such additional documents and those, if filed by defendant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.418 of 2001, heard on 5-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs G.A. STEEL REROLLING MILLS through Managing Partner and another\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED, through Registered Office"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13288",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1670 = 2005 SLD 1670 = 2005 CLD 1198",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to appear and defend the suit, grant of---Non-deciding of application for production of cheques---Running finance facility of Rupees One Million availed by defendants was enhanced to Rupees Two Million---Defendants had executed agreement of finance, promissory notes, guarantees, letters of hypothecation. and letter of continuation as required by bank---In suit for recovery of bank loan filed by bank, defendants along with application for leave to appear and defend the suit, also filed another application for production of cheques---Banking Court without deciding application for production of cheques, dismissed application for leave to appear and defend the suit and passed decree in favour of bank---Validity---Sanctioning and availing of finance facility was not disputed and liability so established could not escape defendants---There was no serious \"\"and triable issue for which leave could be granted by Banking Court---Even non-decision of application for production of cheques, besides competency of any such application at that stage, was of no material effect in presence of claim of bank supported by other documents brought on record---No illegality was committed by Banking Court in dismissing application for leave to appear and defend the suit and passing decree in favour of bank---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nMessrs Taj Zarai Industries through Sole Proprietor and another v. Habib Bank Limited through Manager-Sub-Manager/General Attorneys 2003 CLD 109; Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Secretary, Ministry of Labour and others 1984 SCMR 1014; T.R. Pratt (Bombay) Ltd. v. E.D. Sasson & Co. Ltd. and another AIR 1936 Born. 62; A.R. Mohamed Siddik and others v. The Trans Oceanic Steamship Co. Ltd. and another 1988 CLC 299 and Trading Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Messrs Amin Hayat Corporation Ltd. and 2 others 1992 SCMR 783 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.64 of 2003, decision dated: 9-12-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR, JJ",
    "": "SMOOTH PHARMACEUTICALS (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive, \nand 3 others \nVs.\nBANK OF KHYBER through Chief Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13289",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1671 = 2005 SLD 1671 = 2005 CLD 1201",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------Ss.9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Recovery of bank loan---Rejection of plaint---Non-deciding of application for leave to appear and defend the suit---Plaint filed by bank was rejected under O. VII, R.11, C.P.C., without first deciding the application---Validity---Banking Court did not adopt procedure as prescribed in Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, and had gone outside the scope of provisions of law---Banking Courts, which were created and established under special law, were creature of the statute and were bound by the provisions and procedure prescribed under the particular statute---Without deciding leave application, Banking Court was not empowered to reject the plaint or dismiss the suit---Judgment passed by Banking Court was violative of S.9(4) read with S.10 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, and had bypassed the procedure prescribed for Banking Court---High Court set aside the passed by Banking Court remanded the matter to Banking Court for decision of application for leave to appear and defend the suit first and then the suit---Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \nMessrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245 and Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.394 of 1998, heard on 13-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Zonal Head and Constituted Attorney\nVs.\nMessrs SURAJ GHEE INDUSTRIES LIMITED through Executive Director\nand 5 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13290",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1672 = 2005 SLD 1672 = 2005 CLD 1204",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 12 & 22---Appeal---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Limitation---Appellant being guarantor was proceeded against for recovery of bank loan---Notices to appellant and borrower were directed to be issued by Banking Court through four different modes---Bailiff deputed to execute summons, effected the service through fixation---Summons. sent under postal cover acknowledgement due were refused to be accepted but those dispatched through private courier service were delivered---Publication in press was not only published in two newspapers but were also dispatched at the address of appellant---No proof was available on file that appellant or his family members did not read the notices so published, in spite of receipt of those newspapers at his residence---Banking Court passed ex parte decree on 26-1-2002 against the borrower and appellant---Contention of the appellant was that during execution proceedings, he came to know about the decree on 8-5-2002, and application for setting aside the decree was filed on 1-6-2002---Banking Court dismissed the application being barred by limitation---Validity---Period of limitation provided under S.12 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was 21 days--Appellant was required to explain each day's delay, which was not done by him by giving reasons therefor--No application seeking condonation of delay along with affidavit swearing correctness of reasons for the condonation of delay was filed by appellant---Appellant was not only personally served but. he was also aware of the pendency of the suit against him and he intentionally avoided appearance before Banking Court where he was supposed to file a petition seeking leave to defend the suit within ten days of summons---Application of appellant for setting aside ex parte decree was correctly dismissed as the same did not furnish sufficient cause in support of the relief prayed for---Banking Court correctly concluded the lis and did not commit any illegality---High Court declined to interfere in the and decree passed by the Courts below---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.83 of 2004, decision dated: 7-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED SHABBAR RAZA RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD LATIF\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED, through General Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13291",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1673 = 2005 SLD 1673 = 2005 CLD 1009",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) S. 15 State Bank of Pakistan Circular No. 32, dated 26 2 1995 Decree Mark up for cushion period of 210 days ¬Public functionaries, acts of Grievance of bank was that Banking Court in its decree passed in favour of the bank did not grant mark up for cushion period of 210 days Validity Bank was entitled to the mark up from the date of institution of the suit to payment Bank did not file the suit immediately after the cut off date as mentioned in finance agreement, therefore bank was responsible not to agitate the matter before the Banking Court well in time No body should be allowed to get the benefits of his misdeeds and no body could be penalized by the inaction of public functionaries Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was in consonance with S.15 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, and there was no infirmity or illegality in the same-appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nRahim Bux and others v. The State PLD 1998 Kar. 119 and Ahmad Latif Qureshi v. Controller of Examination, Board Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore and another PLD 1994 Lah. 3 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.58 of 1999, heard on 13-01-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "BANK OF PUNJAB through Attorney --Appellant\nVs.\nBANKING COURT IV, Lahore High Court and others --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13292",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1674 = 2005 SLD 1674 = 2005 CLD 1242",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.9---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.19 & 21---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Maintainability---Acknowledgement of liability---Contention of defendants was that the stamps were not crossed thus the suit was barred by limitation---Validity---Defendants in their letter had accepted and acknowledged the liability of bank---Suit was not time-barred on the basis of Ss.19 and 21 of Limitation Act, 1908. \n \nMuhammad Ramzan's case 2001 CLC 158 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to appear and defend the suit, grant or-Factual controversy---Bank did not bring anything on record so as to show that any written request was made by defendants for delivery of goods or any receipt from defendants so as to show that the goods were handed over to them---Such factual dispute was raised in application for leave to appear and defend the suit---Banking Court dismissed the application and decreed the suit in favour of bank---Validity---Factual controversy was not decided by Banking Court and there was no document on the record on the basis of which High Court could decide the factual controversy with regard to the goods whether they were given back to defendants on their request by bank or not---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and defendants were granted conditional leave---Matter was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \nGouranga Mohan Sikdar v. Controller of Import and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158 and Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.480 of 1999, heard on 19-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD, ACTG. C.J. AND MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI, J",
    "": "Messrs RISING SUN COMPANY through Partner Mr. Farooq Ahab and another\nVs.\nBANK OF OMAN LTD., Lahore High Court through General Manager and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13293",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1675 = 2005 SLD 1675 = 2005 CLD 1247",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------S.6(2)--41nancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Notice under S.6 (2) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 was given to borrower which was replied by borrower but the suit was decreed against borrower on 2-10-1996---Plea raised by borrower was that the was passed by Banking Tribunal, after certain provisions of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, had been declared un-Constitutional by High Court in case titled Messrs Chenab Cement Products (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others, reported as PLD 1996 Lah. 672---Effect---As the was passed by Banking Tribunal when the notification appointing presiding officers of Banking Tribunals were declared un-Constitutional and without lawful authority, therefore, at the time of passing of , the Banking Tribunal had no jurisdiction---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Tribunal was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court constituted under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.501 of 1998, heard on 7-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SAHARA MOTORS (PVT.) LIMITED through Managing Director\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through General Attorneys and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13294",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1676 = 2005 SLD 1676 = 2005 CLD 1251",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of-Scope--wrong noting of date of hearing---Non framing of issues---Suit was decreed ex parte as the defendant or his counsel failed to appear before the Court on the date of hearing---Defendant filed application for setting aside the decree on the ground that date of hearing was wrongly noted---Application was dismissed by Banking Court---Validity---Stance taken by the defendant and his counsel did not support each other besides the fact that no proof regarding incorrect noting of date by the counsel was appended with the application i.e. file of brief or daily diary kept for entry of daily cases by counsel and no affidavit of clerk of counsel was brought on record---Affidavit of counsel was in clear contradiction to the judicial file of Banking Court wherein case was adjourned in presence of the same counsel---Plea of misunderstanding of the date fixed or its incorrect information to the defendant was not only fake, but was also fabricated/afterthought and was not enough to restore his application and that too, after the period of limitation---Defendant failed to give any sufficient cause or plausible reason for his or his counsel's absence on the date-In view of contradiction between the stance in application, to the one taken by his counsel in his affidavit, the Banking Court correctly did not feel necessity to further process the petition by framing of issues and recording of evidence---Order passed by Banking Court was justified and being in consonance with the record deserved no interference by High Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.161 of 2004, decision dated: 7-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED SHABBAR RAZA RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "ZUBAIR AHMED\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED, Karachi High Court through Chairman and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13295",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1677 = 2005 SLD 1677 = 2005 CLD 1301",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 33(f) & 305---Winding up of company---Auction of assets of company by official liquidators-Confirmation of sale and transfer of bid right in favour of another party---Objection petition by the Company alleging that property was sold at. a price entirely disproportionate to the actual value and bid could not be transferred without registration of sale in favour of original bidder---Validity---Sanctity to judicial sale of property is to be maintained as far as possible, however, the Courts have also a duty to ensure that such sales should be seen to have been made in the most fair, transparent, judicious manner and above any suspicion so that the interests of all the stake holders are properly safeguarded---Court cannot ascertain the genuineness or otherwise of the offer---When a bid was withdrawn and Company Judge had made it clear that the said bid could not be considered alive, thereafter there were no valid reasons or exceptional circumstances for the revival and acceptance of the offer of same bidder with a nominal increase and to confirm the sale---Matter of' withdrawal of bid by the bidder had become a past and closed transaction---Objection taken by the petitioners against the confirmation of sale in favour of the said bidder and its subsequent transfer of the bid rights in favour of another party were not attended to in their proper perspective---Such transfer could not be made without the registration of sale in favour of the said bidder---Auction-purchaser had sold his rights without payment of entire sale price and thus without becoming the owner---Proceedings of re-auction of the assets of the Company by the joint official liquidators suffered from the same defects and infirmities which was noticed by the High Court in respect of earlier auction and re-auction was ordered---Orders of confirmation of sale by the High Court were not sustainable at law in circumstances-Case was remitted to the High Court for a re-sale---Reasons.\n \nPer Faqir Muhammad Khokhar, J.---\n \nIn the present case Chief Executive of the Company was behind the bars on account of criminal proceedings initiated by the National Accountability Bureau. It appears that the other share-holders/Directors of the Company had either gone into hide or had left the country. There was no one else who could safeguard their interests effectively in the matter of sale of assets of the Company through auction. In such a situation, the joint official liquidators were required to exercise due diligence and to take utmost care for ensuring fair and transparent sale of the mills. The joint official liquidators did not fix any reserve price keeping in view the value of the assets to be sold.\n \nThe Company Judge made it clear that a particular bid could not be considered to be alive. Thereafter, there were no valid reasons or exceptional circumstances for the revival and acceptance of the offer of the same bidder with a nominal increase of 10 million rupees and to confirm the sale. In the present case, the matter of withdrawal of bid by the bidder had become a past and closed transaction.\n \nOne bidder had made an offer of Rs.25,00 million for the purchase of total project of the Company with a down payment of Rs. 150 million. The said consortium was directed by the High Court to tender the earnest money in the Court on the next date of hearing. Thus reasonable time was not given to the said consortium to tender the earnest money.\n \nThe joint official liquidators did not carry out the order by the High Court in its letter and spirit for conducting the auction of the Company. The available record would not show that any independent valuer of high repute and integrity with necessary expertise in the relevant field was appointed to carry out the valuation of assets of the mills before putting the same to auction. The mere publication on one occasion in two English newspapers and one urdu daily newspaper was not sufficient to ensure the widest possible participation of the prospective bidders. The project to be sold was not a small entity. Therefore, the advertisement was also to be placed in newspapers with an international circulation. The desirability of circulating the invitation through Stock Exchange was also to be considered. The publication in the newspapers of national circulation on at least two occasions with not less than seven days interval might have attracted more participants for the bidding.\n \nSanctity to judicial sale of property is to be maintained as far as possible. However, the Courts have also a duty to ensure that such sales should be seen to have been made in the most fair, transparent, judicious manner and above any suspicion so that the interest of all the stake-holders are properly safeguarded. Court cannot ascertain the genuineness or otherwise of the offer. But the fact remains that the bidder had offered a bid of Rs.2500 million for purchase of assets with a down payment of Rs. 150 million. Even some other bidder had offered the bids for the purchase of three units separately which came to be higher than that of the respondent. Another bidder had also offered a bid of Rs.2001 millions.\n \nThe official liquidator is vested with power under section 333(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 \"\"to sell the movable and immovable property and things in action of the Company by public auction or private contract, with power to transfer the whole whereof to any person or company or to sell the same in parcels\"\" under the said section, the Court has been vested with complete discretion to sanction the sale or not. Such discretion must be exercised judiciously having regard to the interest of the Company and its creditors.\n \nMoreover, the objections taken by the petitioners against the confirmation of sale in favour of respondent and its subsequent transfer of the bid rights in favour of another party were not attended to in their proper perspective. The proceedings of re-auction of the assets of the Company by the joint official liquidators suffered from the same defects and infirmities as were noticed by the High Court in respect of earlier auction of the Company. Orders passed by the Company Judge of the High Court were not sustainable at law.\n \nSupreme Court allowed the appeal, consequently, the impugned orders were set aside and the case was remitted to the High Court, for a re-sale of the assets of the Company in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible. The Company Judge shall be at liberty to make such arrangements and to take such measures for the management and administration etc. of the mills during the interregnum as it may consider appropriate in the best interest of the Company and the creditors.\n \nMessrs Sarbaz Cement Ltd. v. Bankers Equity Ltd. and others 1996 SCMR 88; Hudaybia Textile Mill Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1987 SC 512; Messrs Ittehad Cargo Service v. Messrs Syed Tasneem Hussain Naqvi PLD 2001 SC 116; S.Sounderajan and others v. Kaka Mahomed Ismail Saheb of Messrs Roshan & Co. AIR 1940 Mad. 42; United Bank Limited v. Messrs A.Z. Hashmi (Pvt.) Ltd. 2000 CLC 1438 and Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Shandin Limited 2001 CLC 1267 ref.\n \nPer Sardar Muhammad Raza Khan, J.---\n.\nThe main point that falls for determination is as to whether the impugned auction in favour of respondent and thereafter its transfer in favour of another party been made in a fair and transparent manner. Whether serious efforts had been made by the auctioneer or by the Court to fetch maximum price of the assets, keeping in view the larger interest of creditors as well as the Company under liquidation.\n \nComing to the events related to auction proceedings, it was contended that according to the Joint Official Liquidators report the highest bid of rupees 3000 million of one bidder and rupees 2.001 billion of another bidder was ignored and that of rupees 1.01 billion was recommended. In the given conditions, the objections raised by the former management were accepted by the Court holding that the sale price was not acceptable and wider publicity needed to be given.\n \nIn the second auction vide report the bid offered by a joint venture was accepted for a sum of rupees 1.071 billion and due to negotiations after the sale, the bid was increased to 1.08 billion i.e. 108 crores of rupees.\n \nTo this also the former management/ appellant raised serious objections that (i) wide publicity was not given (ii) no publication was made through APTMA, Stock Exchange, Gulf News Magazine and other commercials on Electronic Media (iii) the offer again was disproportionate to the actual value (iv) this report also suffered from exactly the same illegalities committed in earlier report disapproved by the Court (v) offer of highest bidder as 2001 million and rupees 1800 million was ignored illegally (vi) even NAB Authorities addressed a letter to the official liquidator informing that the value of assets was five billion and it should not be sold at throwaway price (vii) no reserve price was ever fixed before auction (viii) Court never made any assessment of value of assets before inviting bids (ix) interest of share-holders not at all considered (x) the amount of liabilities and the interest of all the creditors was not taken into consideration.\n \nA huge concern like the one in dispute, before auction, was not sufficiently advertised and publicized. No reserve price was ever fixed by the Court meaning thereby that it did not even attempt to determine the approximate value of company by judicial application of mind. The Experts submitted their report which was confirmed by Chartered Accountants holding the approximate value of the Company at Rs.3.2 billion. The Bank also assessed the value at Rs.4.00 billion. All these references should have guided the Court, as different pieces of evidence, to fix the value of the Company at some approximate level and to have fixed the same as reserve price. It was not so done.\n \nThere was a nominal difference between the price obtained in the first auction and then in the second auction. Similar objections were available in the second auction on the basis of which the first auction was set aside by accepting such objections as valid. While going through the process of auction and ultimately while accepting the same, the main consideration before the Court was to abide by some procedure in routine and no primary consideration was about market value. The valuation by NAB Authorities might not be taken as an absolute evidence towards market value yet it was rupees five billion which could have persuaded the Court to think twice before accepting an offer of rupees 1.081 billion, totally disproportionate to other expected prices.\n \nAll the four bidders withdrew their bids. The withdrawal of earnest money was also admitted. At this stage when once all the bidders had withdrawn including the highest bidder of rupees 1.071 billion, there was no reason to allow the bidder to re-enter the arena, not by auction but by negotiations.\n \nThe fresh offer of the bidder of rupees 1.081 billion given after withdrawal, ought to have been made in presence of the other bidders, if best way of re-auction was not selected. The conditions of this last offer are such that it amounted altogether to new bid. Former management was not allowed sufficient time to fulfil terms of offer or highest bid while, on the other hand the bidder was given convenient terms by allowing 30 days for initial deposit of 25% while against the offer of former management they were directed to deposit rupees 125 million in 2 to 7 days. Bidder was allowed five years to repay though under Order XXI, Rr.84 and 85, C.P.C. total auction price needs to be deposited within 15 days.\n \nNo time was allowed to one bidder for practically justifying her offer of rupees 250 crores. Official Liquidators excluded two bidders on the plea that the earnest money was offered partly through cheque and partly through draft despite the fact that the genuineness of such payments could have been ascertained through the Bank. Payment by cheques and Bank drafts can be accepted with the only reservation that the auctioneer or the Court should verify the genuineness thereof from the Bank. No such effort was made in the present case.\n \nThe transfer of rights by the bidder in favour of another party could not be made without the registration of sale in favour of the said bidder. The auction-purchaser had sold his rights without payment of entire sale price and thus without becoming the owner. The transferee was a young company incorporated on 20-10-2000 and financially not sound. The arguments qua further transfer in its favour are mostly of academic nature because once it is held that the bid in favour of the said auction-purchaser was not valid and proper, the transfer automatically goes therewith.\n \nIf the Company is sold at the given price and the Court did not act in the best interest of all the persons interested in the property and the assets of the Company under liquidation are not kept under consideration, then the purpose is not served and no breaches can be condoned.\n \nThe impugned orders were set aside and the case was remanded to the High Court with direction that the assets of the Company be put to resale through auction. The Company Bench shall keep the market value in view and the same, in the given attending circumstances, shall be fixed as reserve price. It shall of course, be at liberty to make such arrangements and take such measures for management and administration etc. of the Mills during interregnum as it may consider appropriate for the best interest of the Company and the creditors.\n \nSagar Mahila Vidyalaya's case AIR 1991 SC 1826; Messrs Ittehad Cargo Service's case PLD 2001 SC 116 and Mst. Asima Zafarul Hassan's case 1981 SCMR 108 distinguished.\n \nMessrs Sarbaz Cement Ltd. v. Bankers Equity Ltd. and others 1996 SCMR 88; Hudaybia Textile Mill Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1987 SC 512; Messrs Ittehad Cargo Service v. Messrs Syed Tasneem Hussain Naqvi PLD 2001 SC 116; S.Sounderajan and others v. Kaka Mahomed Ismail Saheb of Messrs Roshan & Co. AIR 1940 Mad. 42; United Bank Limited v. Messrs A.Z. Hashmi (Pvt.) Ltd. 2000 CLC 1438; Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Shandin Limited 2001 CLC 1267; Mubarak Ali Khan's case PLD 1982 SC 315; K. Saraswathy's case AIR 1989 SC 1553; Specialty Trader's case 1987 CLC 2109; Chemicals and Allied Product's case 1988 Company Cases 842 and Messrs H.P. Financial Corporation 1990 ISJ (Banking) 395 ref.\n \nPer Sardar Muhammad Raza Khan, J. agreeing with Faqir Muhammad Khokhar, J.\n \n(b) Letters Patent (Lahore)------\n \n------Cl. 26---Point of difference or for making reference to one or more Judges---Form---Clause 26, Letters Patent in terms does not provide for any form stating point of difference or for making reference to one or more Judges---Point or points of difference can well be found out by the Referee Judge or Judges upon perusing  s of dissenting Judges and final decision of the case rests on opinion of all Judges hearing the case.\n \nMubarak Ali Khan's case PLD 1982 SC 315 ref.\n \nPer Mian Muhammad Ajmal, J., Contra----Minority view.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.1540 of 2000 and C.P.L.A. No.124-L of 2001, decision dated: 25-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL, SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN AND FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, JJ",
    "": "MOHIB TEXTILES MILLS LIMITED through Director/SharEholder/Representative, Former Management of the Company and others\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, Karachi High Court and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13296",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1678 = 2005 SLD 1678 = 2005 CLD 1352",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Administration of justice-------Incidental observation was not sustainable.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Procedure of Banking Court---Scope---Provision of S.9, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 provided that there should be a default in fulfilment of an \"\"obligation\"\" essentially by a \"\"customer\"\" or by a \"\"Financial Institution\"\" with regard to any \"\"Finance\"\" and only then the cause was to be adjudicated upon and decided by the Banking Court constituted under the Ordinance.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.2(c)---\"\"Customer\"\"---Definition---Provision of S.2(c), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 defines the customer as a person to whom finance has been extended by a financial institution and includes a person on whose behalf a guarantee or letter of credit has been issued by a financial institution as well as a surety or an indemnifier---Section 2(c) of the Ordinance also refers to a person to whom \"\"Finance\"\" has been extended.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.2(d)--- \"\"Finance\"\"---Definition---Provision of S.2(d) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which defines finance\"\" contains six clauses yet it is not exhaustive owing to the use of word \"\"includes\"\"; nevertheless, in examining the scope of \"\"finance\"\", focus is to be laid on the said clauses unless any other situation emerges from the Ordinance itself :.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.2(e)---\"\"Obligation\"\"-Definition---Term obligation defined in S.2(e), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would revolve around matters incidental/ancillary to finance and duties of customer.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 2(c)(d)(e)(i)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9---Encashment of cheque of plaintiff, a limited company, containing one signature alone, although it was agreed practice that a cheque of the plaintiff-Company was to be honoured only when it was signed by two authorized signatories and in consequence of such encashment Rupees one lac was drawn from the Bank---Agreed practice of encashment on the basis of two signatures and the fact that Rupees one lac had been drawn from the account of the plaintiff-Company was not disputed---Serious contest, however, was on the point that the matter essentially fell within the jurisdiction of Banking Court and the suit before a, Civil Court was not competent---Validity---Held, no accommodation or facility as contemplated under S.2(d)(i) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, could be spelt out from the subject-matter and even other clauses of S.2 of the Ordinance were not attracted since neither the dispute related to facility of guarantor etc. or financial enjoyment given by the financial institution on behalf of the customer nor a Benami loan or facility of credit or charge cards was involved--Plaintiff f was not borrower nor had he obtained a loan within the meaning of the Ordinance---None of said factors was attracted to the subject-matter, for the case simply related to negligence on the part of the Bank by overlooking the agreed and settled principle that the cheque could only be encashed when it was signed by two authorized signatories, irrespective of the fact that it was presented by a culprit or a gentleman---On the whole it led to an inevitable conclusion that definition of finance\"\" was not attracted to the cause of action in the present case---Term \"\"obligation\"\" defined under S.2(e) of the Ordinance would again revolve around matters incidental/ancillary to finance and duties of a customer, but the plaintiff-Company did not fall within the jurisdiction of \"\"customer\"\"---Present matter, therefore, did not fall within the jurisdiction of Banking Court but was wholly out of the scope of Banking laws and jurisdiction of Civil Court for the matter would not be effected---Suit, in circumstances, was maintainable in the Civil Court and did not fall within the jurisdiction of Banking Court constituted under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \nNadeem Ghani v. United Bank Limited 2001 CLC 1904; Karachi Electric Provident Fund v. National Investment (Unit) Trust 2003 CLD 1026; Bank Alfalah Limited v. Iftikhar A. Malik 2003 CLD 363 and Nasimuddin Siddiqui v. United Bank Limited 1998 CLC 1718 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C. Revision Application No.96 of 2004, decision dated: 2-02-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "WAHID BUX BROHI, J",
    "": "Messrs PEL APPLIANCES LIMITED--Applicant\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13297",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1679 = 2005 SLD 1679 = 2005 CLD 1359",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---------Ss. 2(c), 9 & 10---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 128---Suit for recovery of loan---Petition for leave to defend suit---Customer---Definition---Guarantor---Liability---Scope---Suit can be instituted against the defendant if he falls within the definition of \"\"customer\"\"---Liability of the guarantor/surety is co-extensive with that of principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract---Guarantor and principal debtor are jointly and severally liable to pay the outstanding amount to the creditor---Guarantor cannot shirk from the liabilities incurred by him through the execution of documents---In the absence of specific stipulation in the contract of loan or any consideration of equity, a guarantor cannot take up the plea that the Bank should enforce the liability against the principal debtor before proceeding against the guarantor; reason being that the Bank grants loan . only on the guarantee and in absence of letter/contract of guarantee. the Bank may not have sanctioned the loan---Availing of finance was not denied; finance was secured by the finance agreement, promissory note, personal guarantees and other documents, execution of which, was also not denied---Personal guarantees of the predecessor-in-interest of defendants, in the present case, were appended with the plaint---Defendants being the customers as defined in S.2(c) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, suit against them was maintainable---Petition to appear and defend the suit of defendants was, therefore, dismissed.\n \nRafique Hazquel Masih v. Bank Alfalah Ltd. and others 2005 SCMR 72 and Messrs Platinum Insurance Company Limited, Karachi through Managing Director v. Daewoo Corporation, Sheikhupura through Director Administration and Finance PLD 1999 SC 1 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---Ss. 9(2) & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.14 & O.XIII, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Plaintiff had failed to show any good cause for not appending the personal guarantee allegedly executed by the predecessor-in-interest of defendants---Defendants could not be taken by surprise---Mere inadvertence of the plaintiff Bank was no ground for receiving the document---Such document could not he looked into at such stage---Petition for leave to defend the suit, in circumstances, was allowed---Principles.\n \nIn the present case personal guarantee was not appended with the plaint nor the same was relied upon in the list under Order VII, rule 14, C.P.C. Documents may be filed either under Order VII rule 14, C.P.C. along with the plaint or under Order XIII, rule 1, C.P.C. at the first hearing of the suit or under Order XIII, rule 2, C.P.C. at a subsequent hearing. The plaintiff had neither appended the copy of the personal guarantee of deceased defendant with the plaint nor relied upon the same in the list filed under Order VII, rule 14, C.P.C. Under section 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 the plaint shall be supported by the statement of account and all other relevant documents relating to the grant of finances. Copies of the plaint, statement of account and other relevant documents are to be filed with the Banking Court. The personal guarantee of deceased defendant had been filed at a belated stage. His signatures on the personal guarantee could not be compared with his actual signatures as he was dead. Under Order XIIL, rule 1, C.P.C. the parties or their pleaders have to produce at the first hearing all the documentary evidence of every description in their possession or power on which they intended to rely and which had not been filed in the Court. Under rule 2 of the same Order no documentary evidence in possession or power of any party, which should have been produced, shall be received at any subsequent stage of the proceedings unless good cause is shown. Private documents were ordinarily not allowed to be produced at belated stage. The genuineness of the documents was also not beyond doubt and the specimen signatures of the defendant for comparison could not be obtained since he was dead.\n \nIn the present case the plaintiff in fact had failed to show any good cause for not appending the personal guarantee allegedly executed by the predecessor-in-interest of defendants. The defendants could not be taken by surprise. Mere inadvertence of the plaintiff was no ground for receiving the document. It could not be looked into at this stage. In this view of the matter the petition for leave to defend the suit was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.4 of 1994, heard on 18-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, J",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager---Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs MALIK FOOD INDUSTRIES LIMITED through Director/Chief Executive/SharEholder and 13 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13298",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1680 = 2005 SLD 1680 = 2005 CLD 1367",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10---Leave to defend, grant of---Requirements---Leave to defend cannot be granted mechanically in each case and even if the leave to defend is granted, it has to be restricted to the specific issue raised by the defendant in his application for leave to defend---Concept of leave to defend requires that the defendant should come up with a positive defence of a particular fact which has to be supported by certain documentary evidence to convince the Court that there was sufficient ground for granting leave to defend---Mere denial of the execution of a deed will not be sufficient for the exercise of such discretion by the Court---Principles.\n \nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is a special statute and the Banking Courts are bound to follow summary procedure which is otherwise supported by the time tested Order XXXVII of the C.P.C. The leave to defend cannot be granted mechanically in each case and even if the leave to defend is granted, it has to be restricted to the specific issue raised by the defendant in his application for leave to defend. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 specifies certain special rules of evidence comprising of certain presumptions in favour of the plaintiffs and estoppels against the defendants. The concept of leave to defend requires that the defendant should come up with a positive defence of a particular fact which has to be supported by certain documentary evidence to convince the Court that there was sufficient ground for granting leave to defend. The mere denial of the execution of a deed will not be sufficient for the exercise of such discretion by the Court. Had there been any positive fact alleged in the application for leave to defend, the Court would have required the defendant to prove such fact but the mere denial required negative evidence and the negative proof of fact is difficult. The verbal denial of the agreement was disproved by the documentary evidence produced by the Bank and thus, the documentary evidence negated and nullified the oral negative assertion. The Courts have the authority in such cases to compare, prima facie, the signatures of the persons appearing on the loan documents and there, the Court had exercised the said discretion effectively.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----\n \n----Ss.22 & 24---Appeal---Condonation of delay---Impugned was passed on 22-9-2004 and the certified copies were issued on 9-12-2004 whereas the appeal was filed on 8-1-2005 which means that the appeal was filed on 31st day after the receipt of certified copies---Allegation that the application for copies was submitted on 22-9-2004 and not on 27-9-2004 was not supported by any documentary evidence except an affidavit and that too, by the counsel for the appellant, that the contents of the application were correct and nothing had been concealed from the Court---Any documentary proof or the copy of the application containing the date of application should have been produced which could indicate the date of receipt of application and the probable date on which the copy was likely to be ready---No such documentary evidence was furnished---Appellant, had to prove the delay of each single day to be entitled for condonation but in the present case, there were mere statements or denials, without any proof which could not be relied upon---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No.2 of 2005, decision dated: 21st March, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "EJAZ AFZAL KHAN AND MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13299",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1681 = 2005 SLD 1681 = 2005 CLD 1383",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---------------O.XXIX, R.1---Subscription and verification of pleadings---Company---Articles of Association of the Company contained a clause authorizing the Chief Executive/Director of the Company to sign and verify the plaint-Chief Executive under OXKJX, R.1, C.P.C. was authorized to sign and verify the plaint.\n \nIftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot v. Ghulam Nabi Corporation Limited PLD 1971 SC 550 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n \n--S.9-Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.9---Suit for compensation and damages--Plaintiff, a company had applied to the Bank for opening of Letters of Credit; Bank charges were paid by the plaintiffs including the swift charges; plaintiffs were informed by the Bank that the letters of credit were opened and the copies of the relevant documents there provided to the plaintiffs; plaintiffs communicated the required information of letters of credit to the suppliers abroad, but the suppliers informed the plaintiffs that they had not received the letters of credit---Plaintiffs brought the facts to the Bank's notice mentioning the numbers of letters of credit in their letter and further told the Bank that the plaintiffs would be put to severe damage and their business would be affected---Evidence available on record showed that in spite of payment of all charges the letters of credit were not opened by the Bank, but copies of fake letters of credit were given to the plaintiffs----Plaintiffs could not fulfil their promises to the foreign suppliers as they had supplied the information received from the Bank to the foreign suppliers that the letters of credit were opened and the goods be sent---Bank having not opened letters of credit as admitted by the Bank, the plaintiffs had suffered loss to their reputation, business and goodwill due to acts of the Bank and thus they were entitled to compensation and damages---Plaintiffs, however, could not produce any evidence showing the specific financial loss of business because of the acts of the Bank, but had suffered loss of reputation and goodwill---Plaintiffs, therefore, were entitled to damages and compensation as claimed---High Court, in view of all the circumstances, decreed the suit for Rs.100,00,000 as damages to meet the ends of justice.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1221 of 2002, decision dated: 18-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAHMAT HUSSAIN, JAFFERI, J",
    "": "Messrs VICTOR ELECTRONICS APPLIANCES INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13300",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1682 = 2005 SLD 1682 = 2005 CLD 1383",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---------------O.XXIX, R.1---Subscription and verification of pleadings---Company---Articles of Association of the Company contained a clause authorizing the Chief Executive/Director of the Company to sign and verify the plaint-Chief Executive under OXKJX, R.1, C.P.C. was authorized to sign and verify the plaint.\n \nIftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot v. Ghulam Nabi Corporation Limited PLD 1971 SC 550 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n \n--S.9-Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.9---Suit for compensation and damages--Plaintiff, a company had applied to the Bank for opening of Letters of Credit; Bank charges were paid by the plaintiffs including the swift charges; plaintiffs were informed by the Bank that the letters of credit were opened and the copies of the relevant documents there provided to the plaintiffs; plaintiffs communicated the required information of letters of credit to the suppliers abroad, but the suppliers informed the plaintiffs that they had not received the letters of credit---Plaintiffs brought the facts to the Bank's notice mentioning the numbers of letters of credit in their letter and further told the Bank that the plaintiffs would be put to severe damage and their business would be affected---Evidence available on record showed that in spite of payment of all charges the letters of credit were not opened by the Bank, but copies of fake letters of credit were given to the plaintiffs----Plaintiffs could not fulfil their promises to the foreign suppliers as they had supplied the information received from the Bank to the foreign suppliers that the letters of credit were opened and the goods be sent---Bank having not opened letters of credit as admitted by the Bank, the plaintiffs had suffered loss to their reputation, business and goodwill due to acts of the Bank and thus they were entitled to compensation and damages---Plaintiffs, however, could not produce any evidence showing the specific financial loss of business because of the acts of the Bank, but had suffered loss of reputation and goodwill---Plaintiffs, therefore, were entitled to damages and compensation as claimed---High Court, in view of all the circumstances, decreed the suit for Rs.100,00,000 as damages to meet the ends of justice.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1221 of 2002, decision dated: 18-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAHMAT HUSSAIN, JAFFERI, J",
    "": "Messrs VICTOR ELECTRONICS APPLIANCES INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13301",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1683 = 2005 SLD 1683 = 2005 CLD 1391",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------S.6(4)---Execution proceedings---Future mark-up on decretal amount not awarded in decree---Executing Court demanded such mark-up and counsel for -debtor undertook to pay same---Validity---Executing Court could not go behind the terms of decree, which had attained finality---Admission made on wrong point of fact or ignorance of a legal right would have no binding effect on person making same---Judgment-debtor could not be compelled to pay such mark-up merely on statement of his counsel---High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned order.\n \nMessrs Asian Associated Agencies Ltd. Karachi v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Industries Government of Pakistan 1999 MLD 2825; Barkhurdar v. Muhammad Razzaq PLD 1989 SC 749; Shahzadi Sharaf Sultan and another v. Brig. Shahzada Sher Muhammad Jan PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lah. 606 and Ahmad Khan v. Rasul Shah and others PLD 1975 SC 311 rel.\n \n(b) Execution---\n \n----Executing Court could not go behind the terms of decree.\n \nMessrs Asian Associated Agencies Ltd. Karachi v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Industries Government of Pakistan 1999 MLD 2825 rel.\n \n(c) Banking, Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss.6 &. 9--Recovery of Bank loan---Future mark-up, award of---Scope---Banking Tribunal had no power to award such mark-up at the time of passing decree.\n \n(d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Art.31---Admission made on wrong point of fact or in ignorance of a legal right---Evidentiary value---Such admission would have no binding effect on person making same.\n \nBarkhurdar v. Muhammad Razzaq PLD 1989 SC 749; Shahzadi Sharaf Sultan and another v. Brig. Shahzada Sher Muhammad Jan PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lah. 606 and Ahmad Khan v. Rasul Shah and others PLD 1975 SC 311 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.562 of 2000, heard on 22-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "UNITED LEATHER EXPORTS through Haji Muhammad Iqbal and 4 others \nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13302",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1684 = 2005 SLD 1684 = 2005 CLD 1394",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---------S.18---Execution of decree---Rejection of execution petition sought by -debtor on the ground that he had liquidated entire liability under incentive scheme of 1997---Banking Court dismissed such application, against which no appeal was filed, thus, such order had attained finality-Second application by -debtor that he had liquidated liability under incentive scheme of 2001---Plea of Bank was that -debtor had jailed to adhere to stipulations of second incentive scheme to pay determined amount in two equal instalments---Executing Court dismissed second application---Validity---Executing Court had not committed any legal error while passing impugned order---High Court dismissed appeal.\n \nAgricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager v. Mst. Amiran Bibi and 3 others 2004 CLD 958 and United Bank Limited v. Messrs Ilam Din & Company and 13 others 2004 CLD 992 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.28 of 2005, decision dated: 1st March, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs RAVI INTERNATIONAL TRADERS through Sole Proprietor and another--Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Manager/Attorney"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13303",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1685 = 2005 SLD 1685 = 2005 CLD 1397",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Company (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----------S.21---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Appeal---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Ordinary and special law---Distinction---Provisions of Limitation Act, 1908---Applicability---Appeal was barred by limitation and appellants sought condonation of delay under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Validity---Under the ordinary law, a period of 90 days had been prescribed under Art.156 of Limitation Act, 1908, for filing of appeal before high Court---Present case was governed by a special law and S.21(1) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances), Act, 1997, had prescribed a period of 30 days for filing first appeal before High Court against and decree passed by Banking Court---As special law had provided different period of limitation for filing first appeal in high Court Man the ordinary law, therefore, S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, was neither applicable nor attracted---Application filed by appellants under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, for condonation of delay was incompetent and not maintainable, thus was dismissed---With the dismissal of application, the appeal was barred by time and could not proceed further- having been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the relevant law---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n \nAllah Ditta v. Farooq Ahamd and 3 others PLD 1979 Lah. 917; Bashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105; Messrs Conoco Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 others v. United Bank Limited, Lahore and another 2004 CLD 472; Sheikh Muhammad Kashil v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.149 of 2001, heard on 25-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AWAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS (AS THEN WERE) through MahmooDuLAlvi and\nanother\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13304",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1FpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1686 = 2005 SLD 1686 = 2005 CLD 1400",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---------Ss. 15(11), 19(7) & 22---Appeal---Interim order of Executing Court passed either under Ss.15(11) or 19(7) of Financial Intuitions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Appeal against such orders would be competent---Principles.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.10 & 19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.47---Execution of decree passed on account of non-filing of leave application---Objection petition regarding pledged stocks---Bank produced letters showing admission of -debtor to have taken delivery of pledged stocks-'-Judgment-debtor alleged such letters to be forged and fabricated---Executing Court dismissed objection petition on basis of such letters---Validity---Executing Court had not considered properly and legally such plea of -debtor in its true perspective---Documents produced by both parties needed to be deeply examined and proved---Executing Court without. holding an inquiry, examining legality, validity and genuineness of such documents and in complete oblivion of facts of the case had rendered impugned order---Executing Court could not have decided objection petition without affording reasonable opportunities to both parties for producing evidence---Judgment-debtor had been condemned unheard---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned order and remanded case to Executing Court for its decision after affording reasonable opportunities to both parties to establish their respective claims.\n \nMst. Syrraya Begum v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and 4 others PLD 1990 Lah. 4 ref.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.47---Execution proceedings-Investigation of claims and objections---Recording of evidence---Necessity---Not an obligation of Executing Court to record evidence in each and every case---Duty of Executing Court to see and decide in individual cases as to whether same warranted recording of evidence or not or was capable to be decided after hearing parties; and that objection petition was filed frivolously, contumaciously and to delay proceedings or same was a genuine application.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.701 of 2002, heard on 20-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN & CO. RICE DEALERS through Muhammad Hussain and 8 others \nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Attorneys and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13305",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1F5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1687 = 2005 SLD 1687 = 2005 CLD 1405",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.11(2)(i)---Execution of decree---Property mortgaged with Bank by -debtor---Objection petition---Objector claimed to be allottee of property after cancellation of allotment made earlier in favour of -debtor---Dismissal of execution petition after acceptance of objection petition---Validity--Statement of Patwari supporting such plea of objector could not be discredited by bank during cross-examination---Bank could not produce sufficient evidence to rebut statement of Patwari---Execution petition could not be dismissed as same could be executed through other modes provided under law---Banking Court should have allowed fair chance to Bank to get decree executed---High Court partly accepted appeal and set aside impugned order qua dismissal of execution petition.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.331 of 2002, heard on 18-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN, KHUDIAN BRANCH, DISTRICT, KASUR through Manager\nVs.\nMst. BEGUM and 33 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13306",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1F5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1688 = 2005 SLD 1688 = 2005 CLD 1408",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----------Ss. 17 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 47---Suit for recovery of loan was decreed---Execution proceedings---Judgment-debtor filed application under S.47, C.P.C. raising grievance that in view of the terms and conditions agreed inter se the parties for the grant of finance facility, the balance amount due under the decree was recoverable from the Bank and the executing Court had not calculated the amount and fixed the liability of the Judgment-debtor---Such application was dismissed by the Banking Court---Validity---Liability of the -debtor as well as that of the Bank was finally adjudicated upon by the Court passing the decree---Executing Court could not go behind the decree and -debtor could not raise issues, on the basis of the original transaction which were adjudicated upon by way of the of the said Court---Only exercise, now required to be undertaken, was the calculation of the amount due from the -debtor in terms of the of the Court passing decree---Bank had submitted a statement evidencing the amount due from the -debtor in terms of of the Court---Objection to be raised before the executing Court would be limited to the deviation, if any, from the passed by the said Court---Executing Court could decide the objection, if any, thereby determining the amount due from the -debtor before proceeding further in the matter.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F. A. No.10 of 2005, decision dated: 7-06-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Sheikh MUHAMMAD ALAMGIR\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13307",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1F5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1689 = 2005 SLD 1689 = 2005 CLD 1411",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---------Ss.9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.10 & 11---Suit. for recovery of money by Bank---Leave application-Pendency of suit for damages previously instituted by defendant against Bank, wherein matter in issue in Bank's suit was directly and substantially in issue---Dismissal of leave application and passing of decree in favour of Bank---Validity---Sections 10 & 11, C.P.C., would not apply to such case---Provisions of S.9(2) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 excluded applicability of S.10, C.P.C., in relation to suits filed under the Act---High Court set aside decree passed in favour of defendant in suit for damages---Defendant had admitted availing of finance and execution of documents, but had claimed to have liquidated liabilities---No case was made out for grant of leave to defend suit---Bank had filed suit for recovery of Rs.84, 71, 000 wherein principal amount was Rs.5,100 Million---In view of pendency of suit for damages, High Court granted conditional leave and to secure principal amount directed defendant to furnish bank guarantee to the tune of Rs.2. Millions and submit surety bond for sum of Rs.3.1 Millions within two months---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned /decree and granted such conditional leave directing Banking Court to decide suit after fulfilling such condition by defendant, otherwise leave application would be deemed to be dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.480 of 2000, heard on 17th March , 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs RAVI ENTERPRISES through Proprietor and 2 others--Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13308",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1F5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1690 = 2005 SLD 1690 = 2005 CLD 1411",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---------Ss.9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.10 & 11---Suit. for recovery of money by Bank---Leave application-Pendency of suit for damages previously instituted by defendant against Bank, wherein matter in issue in Bank's suit was directly and substantially in issue---Dismissal of leave application and passing of decree in favour of Bank---Validity---Sections 10 & 11, C.P.C., would not apply to such case---Provisions of S.9(2) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 excluded applicability of S.10, C.P.C., in relation to suits filed under the Act---High Court set aside decree passed in favour of defendant in suit for damages---Defendant had admitted availing of finance and execution of documents, but had claimed to have liquidated liabilities---No case was made out for grant of leave to defend suit---Bank had filed suit for recovery of Rs.84, 71, 000 wherein principal amount was Rs.5,100 Million---In view of pendency of suit for damages, High Court granted conditional leave and to secure principal amount directed defendant to furnish bank guarantee to the tune of Rs.2. Millions and submit surety bond for sum of Rs.3.1 Millions within two months---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned /decree and granted such conditional leave directing Banking Court to decide suit after fulfilling such condition by defendant, otherwise leave application would be deemed to be dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.480 of 2000, heard on 17th March , 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs RAVI ENTERPRISES through Proprietor and 2 others--Appellants\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13309",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1F5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1691 = 2005 SLD 1691 = 2005 CLD 1417",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.10 & 15---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Time-barred leave application---Condonation of delay, application for---Banking Court decreed suit after refusing leave to defend without deciding condonation application---Validity---Condonation application was crucial in nature, which should have been decided by Banking Court through a reasoned order and in accordance with law---Banking Court had committed legal error as there was no findings in final on condonation application---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned and remanded case to Banking Court with directions to decide both such applications and suit through reasoned order after hearing parties.\n \nPak Carpet Industries Limited v. Government of Sindh and 2 others 1993 CLC 334; Muhammad Yaqub v. Baqir and 2 others 1993 CLC 1319; Khair Deen v. Rehm Deen and 4 others 1996 CLC 1731 and Gul Muhammad through Legal Heirs v. Karachi Development Authority and another 1998 MLD 150 rel.\n \n(b) Administration of justice-------\n \n--Non-disposal of pending miscellaneous application while deciding main case---Effect---Duty of Court was first to decide such application through a specific order and then main case---Failure to decide such application would vitiate main .\n \nPak Carpet Industries Limited v. Government of Sindh and 2 others 1993 CLC 334; Muhammad Yaqub v. Baqir and 2 others 1993 CLC 1319; Khair Deen v. Rehm Deen and 4 others 1996 CLC 1731 and Gul Muhammad through Legal Heirs v. Karachi Development Authority and another 1998 MLD 150 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 249 of 1998, heard on 15-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "AZRA MANZOOR QURESHI\nVs.\nFAYSAL BANK LIMITED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13310",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1F5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1692 = 2005 SLD 1692 = 2005 CLD 1421",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.10---Leave to appear and defend the suit, grant of --Bona fide defence-Payment in excess of liability---Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to appear and defend the suit and resultantly, suit was decreed in favour of bank---Contention of defendants was that they had paid in aggregate an amount in excess of their liability,---Validity---Claim of bank, as set out in plaint, appeared to be in excess of the sum justified by the agreements filed with plaint---Bank wanted to file certain documents before High Court but the defendants has no opportunity for controverting or commenting on the documents in their application for leave to appear and defend the suit---Filing of such application by bank indicated that the plaint and documents filed therewith were not sufficient to justify the passing of a decree as prayed for in the plaint---Defendants had disclosed a bona fide defence in their application seeking leave to appear and were, therefore, entitled to grant of leave to defend the suit---Leave to appear and defend the suit was granted in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.400 of 1998, heard on 11-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "NUSRAT TEXTILE MILLS LTD. and 8 others\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LTD. through Attorney"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13311",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1F5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1693 = 2005 SLD 1693 = 2005 CLD 1421",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.10---Leave to appear and defend the suit, grant of --Bona fide defence-Payment in excess of liability---Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to appear and defend the suit and resultantly, suit was decreed in favour of bank---Contention of defendants was that they had paid in aggregate an amount in excess of their liability,---Validity---Claim of bank, as set out in plaint, appeared to be in excess of the sum justified by the agreements filed with plaint---Bank wanted to file certain documents before High Court but the defendants has no opportunity for controverting or commenting on the documents in their application for leave to appear and defend the suit---Filing of such application by bank indicated that the plaint and documents filed therewith were not sufficient to justify the passing of a decree as prayed for in the plaint---Defendants had disclosed a bona fide defence in their application seeking leave to appear and were, therefore, entitled to grant of leave to defend the suit---Leave to appear and defend the suit was granted in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.400 of 1998, heard on 11-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "NUSRAT TEXTILE MILLS LTD. and 8 others\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LTD. through Attorney"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13312",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1F5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1694 = 2005 SLD 1694 = 2005 CLD 1425",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.9 & 10---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.133---Suit for damages---Dismissal of leave application---Refusal of Court to allow defendant to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses and to object to admissibility of documents produced in evidence---Suit decreed partially on basis of such ex parte evidence---Validity---Defendant could not be treated as dead person for the remaining proceedings in the suit---After dismissal of leave application, defendant could not file written statement and was precluded from producing his own witnesses, but he was entitled to cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses---Banking Court, on its own, ought to have allowed defendant to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses and to object to admissibility and enforceability of documents proposed to be produced by plaintiff---Defendant had been condemned unheard---Impugned suffered from serious legal defects---High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned /decree with directions to Banking Court to decide suit afresh after calling upon plaintiff to produce evidence in support of his claim and providing adequate opportunity to defendant to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses and raise objection regarding admissibility and authenticity of documents, if produced by plaintiff; however, defendant for failing to seek leave to defend suit would not be allowed to lead evidence or produce any document.\n \nMessrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353; Haji Usman v. Haji Shafi-ur-Rehman 1988 CLC 1443 and Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Muhammad Ismail and others PLD 1989 Lah. 193 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VIII, R.10---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.133---Striking off defence of defendant for failure to file written statement---Effect---Defendant would still have right to participate in the remaining proceedings in the suit. and would be entitled to cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses.\n \nHaji Usman v. Haji Shaft-ur-Rehman 1988 CLC 1443 and Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Muhammad Ismail and others PLD 1989 Lah. 193 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.AS. Nos.902 and 901 of 2001, heard on 17-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs RAVI ENTERPRISES through Proprietor and another\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through Provincial Chief and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13313",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1F5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1695 = 2005 SLD 1695 = 2005 CLD 1432",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)------S.22(3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.141 & O.VI, R.14---Execution of decree---Objection petition, non-signing of---Property was auctioned in execution of decree but decree-holder objected to the sale price same being less---Objection petition was dismissed by Banking Court for the reason that the same had not been signed by decree-holder---Plea raised by the decree-holder was that it was a curable irregularity---Validity---Power of attorney in favour of counsel for decree-holder who appeared before Banking Court was duly signed by the authorized person and was available on record---Non-signing of objection petition either by any duly authorized representative of decree-holder or by duly appointed counsel was just an irregularity which occasioned due to inadvertence---Non-signing of objection petition was not intentional/deliberate and Executing Court should have allowed one chance to decree-holder for curing the defect by allowing decree-holder to sign the objection petition already pending or to file fresh objection petition duly signed for its determination on merits---To all proceedings of civil nature, under the provisions of S.141, C.P.C., the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908; were applicable---Defect of non-signing of objection petition could be cured under O.VI, R.14, C.P.C., being bona fide omission and same- was not tainted with bad faith---Order passed by Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nIsmail and another v. Mst. Razia Begum and 3 others 1981 SCMR 687; Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din and another v. Noor Dad and 4 others PLD 1988 SC (AJ&K) 42; Taj Muhammad v. Muhammad Azam Sattar and another 1998 CLC 787; Ali Muhammad and 2 others v. Gulfam and another PLD 1983 Kar. 99 and Messrs Pakland Scientific Production v. Messrs Pioneer Insurance Company Ltd. and another PLD 1991 Kar. 414 ref.\n \nFaqir Muhammad and others v. Mst. Muhammad Bibi and others PLD 1991 SC 590 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.22(3)---Execution of decree---Objection petition-Procedure--Sum motu powers of Executing Court-Non-signing of objection petition by decree-holder---Effect---No specific form for raising objections had been laid down under S.22(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---By filing objection petition not signed by decree-holder, there was no violation of law---Sale of mortgaged property in absence of any of the parties to the suit through alleged fraudulent auction could have been objected to verbally without any written application whereas the Executing Court was competent to take suo motu notice and could competently examine the legality or otherwise of auction proceedings.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A.No.92 of 2005, heard on 12-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED SHABBAR RAZA RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nMessrs FUJI RUBBER INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 3 others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13314",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1F5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1696 = 2005 SLD 1696 = 2005 CLD 1437",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----------S.10-Application for leave to appear and defend the suit--Non-filing of complete documents---Defendants alleged that amounts already paid by them were not adjusted by Baltic and were included in the liability---Defendants further alleged that manager of the branch of the Bank had misappropriated their finances---Documents relating to such allegations were not appended with application for leave to appear and defend the suit filed before Banking Court, hence the application was dismissed--Validity--Defendants should have placed all the documents before Banking Court as in their- absence, the Banking Court, while deciding application of defendants, of examination of those documents appropriate was stage---Had those documents been before Banking Court, it was appropriate possible that Banking Court might have been persuaded to grant the leave to appear and defend the suit to defendants---Defendants should have filed all the documents along with their leave application, which they failed to do so-High Court, in the interest of justice, declined to penalize the defendants on account of such error---Such documents gained more importance in view of the allegations of defendants that upon filing a complaint by them, the manager was dismissed from service and F.I.R. was registered on those charges---Pay-in-slip produced by defendants showed that they had deposited some amount and the same had not been adjusted in their account-high Court set aside the order passed by Banking Court and remanded the matter to Banking Court for deciding application for leave to appear the suit afresh---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Courts of law are expected to be more vigilant conscious and considerate while deciding the valuable rights of parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.551 of 2001, heard on 12-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ROYAL ENGINEERING through Sole Proprietor and 3 others\nVs.\nMessrs HABIB BANK LTD. through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13315",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1697 = 2005 SLD 1697 = 2005 CLD 1442",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--------Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of Bank loan---Leave to appear and defend the suit, grant of---Raising of triable issues---Banking Court dismissed application of borrower for grant of leave to appear and defend the suit without giving any reason---Borrower had raised number of triable issues like charging of compound interest and denial of liability to repay entire finance amount instantly, without timeframe as provided in the original finance agreement---Validity---Plaint filed by financial institution narrated total amount of finances advanced to borrower as Rs.4,44,400 and suit for recovery of Rs.5,01,110 without adjusting the amount of Rs.2,42,220 repaid by borrower and without working out interest/mark-up payable, was not at all justified-Borrower had made out triable issues which required recording of evidence---Order dismissing application of borrower by Banking Court, holding that the same was liable to be dismissed under S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was not only sketchy and non-speaking but also did not furnish a lawful basis for refusal of the relief prayed without going into the stance canvassed by the borrower in his application---Borrower had made out a case for grant of leave to defend the suit, passed by Banking Court was set aside and leave to appear and defend the suit was granted unconditionally---Case was remanded to Banking Court for its decision in accordance with law---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A.No.278 of 2004, heard on 5-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED SHABBAR RAZA RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "EHSAN ULLAH\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED (ZTBL) through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13316",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1698 = 2005 SLD 1698 = 2005 CLD 1445",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XXI, R.90---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.166---Objection petition---Limitation, extension of ---Period of thirty days from the date of sale have been provided under Art.166 of Limitation Act, 1908, for filing of objection under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C.---Executing Court has no power to extend the time for doing an act which has been determined and fixed by law.\n \nMessrs Maqi Chemicals Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 3 others v. Habib Bank Ltd. through Manager and 2 others 2003 CLD 571 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----\n \n----S.18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.166---Execution of decree---Objection petition---Non-deposit of 20% of auction money---Failure to arrange 20% of auction money within specified period---Effect---Judgment-debtors filed objection petition against auction of mortgaged property but failed to deposit 20% of auction money as mandated under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C.---Banking Court dismissed the objection petition for non-deposit of such amount within the specified period---Plea raised by the -debtors was that Executing Court did not extend the period for deposit of such amount as they could not arrange the amount within the period specified by the Executing Court---Validity---Executing Court directed debtors to deposit 20% of auction money within specified date, despite that -debtors could not take advantage of the extended period and failed to deposit the requisite amount---No valid and legal ground was put forth by the -debtors before Executing Court for extension of time---Even according to the stance of -debtors, they could not arrange for the amount to be deposited---Such plea could not be considered as valid and legal ground for extension of time---Deposit of amount of 20% was sine qua non for entertaining the objection petition---Judgment-debtors were precluded from raising the pleas, which they took in their objection petition, as the petition was not entertained by Executing Court on account of their own acts and omissions and they could blame nobody except themselves---Order passed by Executing Court did not suffer from any legal defect/error and the same was maintained---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMessrs Dawood Flour Mills and others v. National Bank 1999 MLD 3205 and Messrs Noor Hayat Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive v. Judge Banking Court No.1, Multan and 5 others 2004 CLD 1281 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A.O. No.97 of 2001, decision dated: 29-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs CHAUDHRY WEAVING FACTORY and 2 others through Partner\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through VicEPresident/General Attorney\nand another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13317",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1699 = 2005 SLD 1699 = 2005 CLD 1450",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.10 &. 17---Recovery of bank loan---Partial decree---Entitlement to mark-up for the period of rescheduled facility--Application for leave to appear and defend the suit, non-deciding of-Suit filed by hank was decreed by Banking Court partially without deciding application of defendant for leave to appear and defend the suit--Contention of bank was that decretal amount could not have been reduced without any just cause/reason and hank was entitled to recover mark-up beyond initial period of 362 days as the facility was rescheduled and availed by defendants---Validity---Under law in case of acceptance of application of defendant, the controversy between the parties was to he put to issues and in case of its rejection. the suit of hank was to be decreed to the extent it (bank) was entitled to the amount--Bank had claimed in the plaint that after expiry of fixed period, for which the finance was advanced, the same was rescheduled and defendants had been taking. benefits of the same---Repayment by defendants during the period beyond the time frame of original finance was enough proof of rescheduling of finance facility availed by them-Documents along with plaint included reply of defendants through their counsel to the legal notice issued by bank, acknowledging their outstanding liability which was prayed by them to be adjusted within the time prayed to be extended by the bank---All such matters remained undecided by Trial Court including non-determination of liability of defendants to liquidate their liability, in spite of repeated notices by the bank---Banking Court did not opt a lawful procedure for decision in the case and under misconceived manner/view of deciding the lis, disposed of the same through non-speaking/sketchy ---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and matter was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.T.A. No.364 of 2004, heard on 29-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED SHABBAR RAZA RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "ASKARI COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Attorneys---Appellant\nVs.\nIMPERIAL HOSIERY (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 11 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13318",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1700 = 2005 SLD 1700 = 2005 CLD 1450",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.10 &. 17---Recovery of bank loan---Partial decree---Entitlement to mark-up for the period of rescheduled facility--Application for leave to appear and defend the suit, non-deciding of-Suit filed by hank was decreed by Banking Court partially without deciding application of defendant for leave to appear and defend the suit--Contention of bank was that decretal amount could not have been reduced without any just cause/reason and hank was entitled to recover mark-up beyond initial period of 362 days as the facility was rescheduled and availed by defendants---Validity---Under law in case of acceptance of application of defendant, the controversy between the parties was to he put to issues and in case of its rejection. the suit of hank was to be decreed to the extent it (bank) was entitled to the amount--Bank had claimed in the plaint that after expiry of fixed period, for which the finance was advanced, the same was rescheduled and defendants had been taking. benefits of the same---Repayment by defendants during the period beyond the time frame of original finance was enough proof of rescheduling of finance facility availed by them-Documents along with plaint included reply of defendants through their counsel to the legal notice issued by bank, acknowledging their outstanding liability which was prayed by them to be adjusted within the time prayed to be extended by the bank---All such matters remained undecided by Trial Court including non-determination of liability of defendants to liquidate their liability, in spite of repeated notices by the bank---Banking Court did not opt a lawful procedure for decision in the case and under misconceived manner/view of deciding the lis, disposed of the same through non-speaking/sketchy ---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and matter was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.T.A. No.364 of 2004, heard on 29-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED SHABBAR RAZA RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "ASKARI COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Attorneys---Appellant\nVs.\nIMPERIAL HOSIERY (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 11 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13319",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1701 = 2005 SLD 1701 = 2005 CLD 1454",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.8---Dismissal of suit---Date not fixed for hearing---Borrower filed suit against financial institution and the same was dismissed for non-prosecution on the date when it was fixed for reply on the application for leave to appear and defend the suit---Validity---Date which was fixed for filing of reply of application for leave to appear and defend the suit was not the date fixed for hearing---Suit could not be dismissed on the dale which was not a 'date of hearing'---Banking Court proceeded to dismiss the suit in complete oblivion of the established legal position on the subject---Banking Court committed legal errors, while dismissing suit of borrower on the date when it was fixed for filing of reply to application for leave to appear and defend the suit.---Order passed by Banking Court was not sustainable in law as the same suffered from legal defects---High Court restored the suit filed by the borrower and remanded the case to Banking Court for deciding application for leave to appear and defend the suit afresh-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n(b) Void order---\n \n----When basic order is illegal and void, all the ensuing orders will have no legal effect.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.426 of 2004, decision dated: 11-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD IFTIKHAR through Special Attorney\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Chairman and another\nYousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and 2 others PLD 1958 SC 104 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13320",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1702 = 2005 SLD 1702 = 2005 CLD 1457",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.126 & 128---Suit for recovery of amount of bank guarantee---Issuance of bank guarantee to ensure payment to creditor of defendant---Bank on demand of creditor paid amount 2overed by guarantee---Plea of defendant was that bank guarantee had expired much before its encashment was claimed by creditor---Banking Court dismissed leave application of defendant and decreed suit---Validity---Creditor had claimed encashment of bank guarantee within time---Matter had remained pending with Bank for some time, but as contract of bank guarantee was independent in nature, Bank had to encash the same---Bank under terms of guarantee was obliged to enforce same irrespective of existence of any dispute between defendant and his creditor---Bank guarantee had been encashed within period/life of guarantee and even the claim lodging date---High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.365 of 2004, decision dated: 16-12-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "SHAHEEN CALICO PRINTING WORKS (REGD.) through Partner and 3\nothers \nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13321",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1703 = 2005 SLD 1703 = 2005 CLD 1459",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)--------Ss.15 & 21---Decree for recovery of loan amount with mark-\nup---Sole plea raised by defendant. before High Court was that Bank was not entitled to recover amount for cushion period of 210 days---Validity---Amount for cushion period, though claimed by Bank, had neither been added in statement of accounts nor Banking Court had decreed same---Defendant raised further plea that mark-up could not be granted till realization of suit amount---Held: not open to defendant to raise such further plea after having admitted that his only grievance was regarding charging of amount of cushion period---Such further plea was devoid of merits---Banking Court had not committed any illegality while passing impugned ---high Court dismissed appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.698 of 2002, decision dated: 21st March, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs WAQAR CORPORATION and through Sole Proprietor 2 others\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKSITAN through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13322",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1704 = 2005 SLD 1704 = 2005 CLD 1462",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Allotment of plot to principal borrower by Development Authority---Bank allowed finance for construction of shop to be raised by the Development Authority which stood guarantor for its repayment---After payment of finance, said Authority cancelled such allotment---Principal borrower denied his liability to repay such amount on the ground that after construction of shop, he was to be delivered its possession which had not been done by the Authority---Banking Court dismissed leave application filed by principal borrower and decreed the suit---Validity---Execution and validity of loan agreement and security documents had not been denied---Principal borrower along with the Authority had mortgaged shop for purpose of securing finance from Bank---Principal borrower had to discharge such liability---Dispute between principal borrower and the Authority about cancellation of such allotment, if any, would not prevent Bank to demand and recover its finance---High Court upheld impugned decree with modification that decree though joint and several with the Authority would first be satisfied from sale of mortgaged property, if same was not fully satisfied, only then principal borrower and the Authority, would be jointly and severally liable to repay the remaining amount of decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.293 of 2003, decision dated: 23rd December, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL HAMEED & COMPANY through Sole Proprietor\nVs.\nBANK OF THE PUNJAB and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13323",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1705 = 2005 SLD 1705 = 2005 CLD 1464",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.21---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5, 29(2) & Art.156---Appeal before High Court against /decree of Banking Court---Condonation of delay---Application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Maintainability---Under ordinary law, period of 90 days was prescribed under Art.156 of Limitation Act.1908 for filing first appeal before High Court---Provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 being a special law would govern the appeal, and S.21(1) thereof prescribed a period of 30 days for filing such appeal---Such special law had provided different periods of limitation than ordinary law for filing the appeal---Held: S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 would not apply to the present appeal---Such application was misconceived and not maintainable.\n \nAllah Ditta v. Farooq Ahmad and 3 others PLD 1979 Lah. 917; Bashir Ahmad and another v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105; Messrs Conoco Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 others v. United Bank Limited, Lahore and another 2004 CLD 472; Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645 and Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.577 of 1999, heard on 29-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager and Attorney\nVs.\nMessrs MALIK CARPET INDUSTRIES and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13324",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1706 = 2005 SLD 1706 = 2005 CLD 1468",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.58, 59, 89 & 91---Transfer of Property Act (V of 1882), Ss.41 & 54---Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged property---Objection petition by holder of agreement to sell claiming to be bona fide purchaser of such property---Dismissal of objection petition---Validity---Mere assertion of right on basis of agreement to sell would not furnish adequate basis and locus standi to objector to claim any indefeasible right in such property---Objector, before entering into such agreement, had neither claimed/inspected original title documents of property nor explained that how and when objector acquired any interest in such property---Judgment-debtor had not raised objection to sale by auction---Court sale would never attain finality, if same was allowed to be assailed and annulled on such flimsy claims---Any -debtor could induce any one to enter into agreement to sell in order to frustrate decree or sale conducted in execution thereof---Objector had not complained that he was not afforded opportunity to establish his claim or he wanted to produce any evidence or further investigation was required in the matter---Objector could not be regarded as bona fide purchaser of property---Objection petition had been rightly dismissed---High Court dismissed appeal.\n \nHudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 1987 SC 512 rel.\n \nShaukat Ali Mian v. Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. through Chief Executive and 4 others 2002 CLD 1071 distinguished.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.19----Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.89---Execution proceedings---Objection to sale of property---Amount deposited by objector along with objection petition---Dismissal of objection petition---Banking Court ordered return of such money to objector with mark-up---Validity---Decree-holder-Bank had made use of such amount---Impugned order was just and equitable---High Court dismissed appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeals Nos.283 and 313 of 2004, decision dated: 22-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND FARRUKH LATEEF, JJ",
    "": "MATLOOB AHMED\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13325",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1707 = 2005 SLD 1707 = 2005 CLD 1471",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---------S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R.11 & O.X, Rr.1, 2---Suit for rendition of accounts against Finance Corporation---Rejection of plaint---Filing of written statement and statement of accounts by Corporation after granting of leave to defend suit.---Rejection of plaint after recording better statement of plaintiff--Validity-Banking Court after filing of written statement ought to have framed issues and called upon parties to produce evidence in support of their respective claims---Banking Court had deviated from procedure provided under law-High Court set aside impugned /decree with directions to Banking Court to decide suit after framing issues and recording evidence of parties in accordance with law.\n \nLt.-Col. (Retd.) Mahmood Akhtar v. Bank of Punjab through Manager 2004 CLD 821 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.493 of 2001, heard on 7-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "SHABBIR AHMED MALIK\nVs.\nSMALL BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION, OKARA, through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13326",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1708 = 2005 SLD 1708 = 2005 CLD 1473",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---------Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of amount provided by Bank for purchase of vehicles---Leave to defend suit, application for---Defendant pleaded non-performance of contract on the part of Bank due to non-supply of vehicles by distributor---Banking Court dismissed leave application and decreed suit while observing that Bank had disbursed amount of finance by crediting same in the name of distributor, who had to supply vehicles to defendant---Validity---Banking Court for supply of vehicles, though placed total responsibility upon distributor, but had not impleaded him in suit---For non filing of documents before Banking Court, though filed along with appeal, defendant would not be burdened with liability of costs of vehicles, possession whereof was not prima facie delivered to him---Banking Court had decided leave application in complete oblivion of real aspect of the case---High Court accepted appeal and remanded case to Banking Court for its decision afresh.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.529 of 1999, heard on 28-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs PRIME ROAD WAYS through Manager and 2 others\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LTD. through Regional Chief and Authorized Attorneys and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13327",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1709 = 2005 SLD 1709 = 2005 CLD 1477",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.47 & O.XXI, Rr. 58. 60---Execution proceedings---Objection petition---Banking Court. instead of making an investigation into assertions made by applicant, dismissed objection petition on extraneous considerations and personal assumptions---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned order and remanded case to Banking Court for its decision afresh.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.55 of 2004, decision dated: 11-02-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERWAZ AND ATA-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. IRSHAD YAMIN\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13328",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1710 = 2005 SLD 1710 = 2005 CLD 1479",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.22---Appeal against decree for recovery of Bank loan---Joint request of parties for decision of appeal in terms of compromise agreement---Such compromise to satisfaction of High Court was according to law and adjusted entire claim in appeal---High Court disposed of appeal in terms of such compromise while making same as integral part of its order.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.639 of 2002 and C.M. No.1-C of 2004, decision dated: 14-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs OVERSEAS BLUE STAR GHEE MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive/Managing Director and others\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through Principal Officers/ Managers/General Attorneys and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13329",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1711 = 2005 SLD 1711 = 2005 CLD 1480",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---------S.47---Questions to be determined by Court executing decree---Scope---Executing Court had power to decide all questions between parties relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree.\n \nMian Sohail Ahmad for Appellants.\n \nNemo for Respondent-Bank.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.302 and C.Ms. Nos.3-C, 4-C of 2004, heard on 24-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs Haji MUHAMMAD BOOTA through Sole Proprietor and 3 others\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13330",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1712 = 2005 SLD 1712 = 2005 CLD 1481",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----------Ss.9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XIV, R.2---Qanun-e-S ha had at (10 of 1984), Art.133---Suit for declaration, permanent injunction and damages---Leave application, non-filing of---Framing of preliminary issue qua maintainability of suit on basis of objection raised in written statement by Bank---Dismissal of suit as being non-maintainable in its present form---Validity---Defendant, after service, would neither be entitled to defend suit nor be permitted to submit written statement as of right, unless he obtained leave from Court to defend suit by filing leave application---Bank, in the present case could file written statement only after obtaining leave to defend suit---Claim for declaration could not he equated with suit based on a negotiable instrument---On such failure of Bank, Banking Court instead of receiving written statement from Bank, ought to have called upon plaintiff to produce evidence in support of his claim as in such suit decree could not he passed straightaway---Issue of maintainability of suit could not be decided without calling upon plaintiff to produce evidence-Impugned suffered from serious legal defects---High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned with directions to Banking Court to decide suit afresh after calling upon plaintiff to produce evidence in support of his claim and also providing opportunity to Bank to cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses and raise objections regarding admissibility and authenticity of documents, if any, produced by plaintiff ; but Bank, for its such failure, would not be entitled to lead evidence or produce any document.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.133---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Failure of defendant to file leave application and obtain leave from Court to defend suit-Effect-Decree in such suit could not be passed straightaway as claim for declaration could not be equated with suit based on a negotiable instrument---On such failure of defendant, Banking Court would be obliged to decide such suit after calling upon plaintiff to produce evidence in support of his claim---Defendant, for such failure, would not be entitled to lead evidence or produce any document, but could cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses and raise objections as to admissibility and authenticity of documents, if any, produced by plaintiff---Principle illustrated.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.253 of 2001, heard on 24-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL SATTAR RANA\nVs.\nMANAGER, NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13331",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1713 = 2005 SLD 1713 = 2005 CLD 1486",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9--Suit by borrower for declaration, rendition of accounts and permanent injunction---Suit by Bank for recovery of loan amount---Banking Court through a consolidated decreed Bank's suit and in view of such decree dismissed borrower's suit---Validity---Both such suits had never been consolidated---Banking Court was bound to render separate findings, though in single , on each case separately---Banking Court while dismissing borrower's suit in such manner without rendering indel3endent findings had committed legal error---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned regarding dismissal of borrower's suit, which would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court for its decision in accordance with law.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Suit by borrower against Bank---Application for leave to defend suit by Bank---Dismissal of suit without deciding leave application---Validity---Banking Court was obliged to decide leave application on its merits before embarking upon merits of suit---Impugned was violative of provisions of S.10 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned , resultantly suit along with leave application would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court for its decision in accordance with law.\n \nMessrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245 and Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Brach/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.728 of 2002, heard on 14-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ABDUL SATTAR COTTON AND OIL INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD.\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through President and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13332",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1714 = 2005 SLD 1714 = 2005 CLD 1489",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)-------S.10---Leave application together with written statement, filing of---Grounds for grant of leave to defend suit were that justice could only be done by hearing both parties---Complicated questions of law and fact were involved in the case and contention raised in written statement would call for thorough probe---Banking Court decreed suit after dismissing leave application for lacking requisite information under S.10(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Provisions of S.10(6) of the Ordinance were mandatory---Leave application not complying with requirements of S.10(3)(4) & (5) of the Ordinance, would not he taken/treated as leave application and presumption would be that no leave application had been filed---Impugned did not suffer from any legal defect/error---High Court dismissed the appeal.\n \nMst. Alam Bibi v. Akbar Ali and others 2001 MLD 2007; Haji Ali Khan & Company, Abbottabad and 8 others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Abbottabad PLD 1995 SC 362 and Province of the Punjab through Member, Board of Revenue, (Residual Properties), Lahore and others v. Muhammad Hussain through Legal Heirs and others PLD 1993 SC 147 ref.\n \nBank of Khyber v. Messrs Spencer Distribution Ltd. and 14 others 2003 CLD 1406 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Written statement, filing of---Pre-conditions---Written statement could be filed only after grant of leave to defend suit---Leave application would be in the form of written statement, but not written statement---Banking Court after granting leave application would treat same as written statement---Written statement filed without grant of leave to defend suit could not be considered---Banking Court while deciding suit would take into consideration only contents of leave application.\n \n(c) Discretion---\n \n----Discretionary orders of Subordinate Courts could not be interfered with, unless found fanciful and. arbitrary.\n \nShahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another PLD 1970 SC 139 fol.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.10 & 22---Plea not raised in leave application before Banking Court---Effect---Such plea could not be raised before High Court in appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.14 of 2004, decision dated: 14-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "SHAHID FAROOQ SHEIKH\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13333",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1715 = 2005 SLD 1715 = 2005 CLD 1494",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)-------S.10(1)---Written statement, filing of---Non filing of application for leave to appear and defend the suit---Effect---Defendant throughout the proceedings did not file any application seeking leave to defend the suit---Defendant was not granted leave to defend the suit at any stage. yet it filed written statement, which under the law, could only be filed when a defendant was granted leave to defend the suit.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10---Application for leave to defend, non filing of-Whether written statement to be treated as application for leave to defend---After service on defendant had been effected, he would not be entitled to defend the suit unless he had obtained from the Court leave to defend the suit through filing application as provided under S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Application for leave to defend only in that eventuality, would be treated as written statement---When defendant was served, he was only required to file application for leave to defend the suit within the prescribed period and he was not permitted to submit the written statement as of right---Under the statute, the defendant was not required to file written statement straightaway---Written statement filed by defendant could not be entertained and considered as leave application and the defendant was not entitled to grant of leave to defend the suit-Banking Court had rightly refused to grant defendant leave to defend the suit---Judgment passed by Banking Court was maintained by High Court---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)---\n \n--Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit, refusal of---Passing of decree without recording of evidence---Banking Court did not grant leave to defend the suit to defendant as no such application was filed---Suit was straightaway decreed in favour of bank, without recording of evidence---Validity---When the defendant failed to file the requisite application for grant of leave to defend the suit within the prescribed period, Banking Court instead of receiving written statement, should have called upon the Bank to prove its case by producing evidence---Decree could not have been passed straightaway, as in suit for declaration and permanent injunction, as claim of declaration could not be equated with the suit founded on negotiable instruments---Banking Court deviated froth the procedure provided under the statute, forgetting that Banking Court being the creature of the statute was bound by the provisions of that statute---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court without recording of evidence was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh after recording of evidence produced by bank only---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nCitibank v. Tariq Mohsin Siddiqi and others PLD 1999 Kar. 196; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. through Iftikhar-ul-Haq and Khalid Ishaq v. Mohib Fabric Industries Ltd. through Chief Executive 2004 CLD 716; Bankers Equity Limited through Principal Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 931 and Messrs Huffaz Seamless Pipe Industries Ltd. Karachi v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Karachi 2001 CLC 713 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.497 of 2004, decision dated: 25-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "ASKARI COMMERCIAL BANK LTD.\nVs.\nSEHRISH TEXTILE MILLS LTD. through Chief Executive"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13334",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1716 = 2005 SLD 1716 = 2005 CLD 1494",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)-------S.10(1)---Written statement, filing of---Non filing of application for leave to appear and defend the suit---Effect---Defendant throughout the proceedings did not file any application seeking leave to defend the suit---Defendant was not granted leave to defend the suit at any stage. yet it filed written statement, which under the law, could only be filed when a defendant was granted leave to defend the suit.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10---Application for leave to defend, non filing of-Whether written statement to be treated as application for leave to defend---After service on defendant had been effected, he would not be entitled to defend the suit unless he had obtained from the Court leave to defend the suit through filing application as provided under S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Application for leave to defend only in that eventuality, would be treated as written statement---When defendant was served, he was only required to file application for leave to defend the suit within the prescribed period and he was not permitted to submit the written statement as of right---Under the statute, the defendant was not required to file written statement straightaway---Written statement filed by defendant could not be entertained and considered as leave application and the defendant was not entitled to grant of leave to defend the suit-Banking Court had rightly refused to grant defendant leave to defend the suit---Judgment passed by Banking Court was maintained by High Court---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)---\n \n--Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit, refusal of---Passing of decree without recording of evidence---Banking Court did not grant leave to defend the suit to defendant as no such application was filed---Suit was straightaway decreed in favour of bank, without recording of evidence---Validity---When the defendant failed to file the requisite application for grant of leave to defend the suit within the prescribed period, Banking Court instead of receiving written statement, should have called upon the Bank to prove its case by producing evidence---Decree could not have been passed straightaway, as in suit for declaration and permanent injunction, as claim of declaration could not be equated with the suit founded on negotiable instruments---Banking Court deviated froth the procedure provided under the statute, forgetting that Banking Court being the creature of the statute was bound by the provisions of that statute---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court without recording of evidence was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh after recording of evidence produced by bank only---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nCitibank v. Tariq Mohsin Siddiqi and others PLD 1999 Kar. 196; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. through Iftikhar-ul-Haq and Khalid Ishaq v. Mohib Fabric Industries Ltd. through Chief Executive 2004 CLD 716; Bankers Equity Limited through Principal Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 931 and Messrs Huffaz Seamless Pipe Industries Ltd. Karachi v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Karachi 2001 CLC 713 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.497 of 2004, decision dated: 25-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "ASKARI COMMERCIAL BANK LTD.\nVs.\nSEHRISH TEXTILE MILLS LTD. through Chief Executive"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13335",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1717 = 2005 SLD 1717 = 2005 CLD 1500",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----------S. 21---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5, 29 & Art.156---Appeal---Limitation---Condonation of delay---\"\"Ordinary\"\" and \"\"special law\"\"---Distinction---Provisions of Limitation Act, 1908---Applicability---Appeal was barred by limitation and appellants sought condonation of delay under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Validity---Under the ordinary law, a period of 90 days had been prescribed under Art.156 of, Limitation Act, 1908, for filing of appeal before High Court:--Present case was governed by a special law and S.21(1) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, had prescribed a period of 30 days for filing of first appeal before High Court against and decree passed by Banking Court---Special law having provided different period of limitation for filing first appeal in High Court than the ordinary law, S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, was neither applicable nor attracted---Application filed by appellants under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, for condonation of delay was incompetent and not maintainable, thus was dismissed---With the dismissal of application, the appeal was barred by time and could not proceed further having been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the relevant law---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n \nAllah Ditta v. Farooq Ahmad and 3 others PLD 1979 Lah. 917; Bashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105; Messrs Conoco Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 others v. United Bank Limited, Lahore and another 2004 CLD 472; Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.148 of 2001, heard on 25-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AWAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS (AS THEN WERE) through MahmooDuLAlvi and another\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13336",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1718 = 2005 SLD 1718 = 2005 CLD 1503",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.18 & 19(7)---Execution of decree---Objection petition---Attachment of property---Non-application of judicial mind---Contention of objector was that he was bona fide purchaser of property attached in execution proceedings---Objection petition was dismissed by Banking Court under S.18 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Banking Court misconstrued S.18 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which was neither attracted nor applicable in circumstances of the case---Banking Court while dismissing the objection petition did not read the provisions of S.18 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, on the basis of which objection petition was dismissed---Such course exhibited the non-application of judicial mind and Banking Court should have at least read the provisions of S.18 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and had applied the correct law on the facts and circumstances of the case---Although it was pleaded by objector that he was bona fide purchaser of the property, yet the plea was neither dealt with nor decided by Banking Court---No finding of Banking Court, was available in the order regarding the plea raised by the objector---Banking Court ought to have dealt with the plea and decided the same, either way, in accordance with law---Order passed by Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for deciding the objection petition afresh---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.127 of 2005, heard on 18-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD JAMIL CHAUDHERY\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Manager and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13337",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1719 = 2005 SLD 1719 = 2005 CLD 1506",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Declaration of title---Dismissal of suit---Failure to give reasons---Pendency of suit for recovery of bank loan---Borrower filed declaratory suit in Banking Court, prior to the suit filed by bank against the borrower---Banking Court dismissed the suit of borrower on the ground that he could seek any relief from the Court where the suit for recovery of bank loan was pending against him by way of submission of application for grant of leave under S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Banking Court had passed the without application of mind, therefore, the passed by Banking Court in suit filed by borrower was not sustainable in the eyes of law---Judgment and decree passed against the borrower was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh in accordance with law---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nMollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 rel.\n \nS. M. Nasim for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.512 of 2002, heard on 2-06-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN SAQIB NISAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ARSH MASROOR PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive\nVs.\nMessrs ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Manager and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13338",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1720 = 2005 SLD 1720 = 2005 CLD 1508",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.103---Execution of decree---Objection during execution---Factual controversy-Determination-Non-framing of issue---Objection petition was filed on the ground of bona fide purchasers of the property mortgaged with financial institution---Executing Court, without framing of issues, just on the basis of verification from the Development Authority, allowed the objection petition---Validity---All questions as to the title, right and interest etc. in immovable property between decree-holder and opposite party, should be adjudged and determined by Executing Court under O.XXI, R.103, C.P.C. and fresh suit in that behalf was barred---If there was any question of fact, which was involved in the matter, the same should have been resolved, by Executing Court in the manner as was the subject-matter of the suit---Questions which needed resolution by Executing Court were whether defence of bona fide purchasers was applicable to the objectors, if so, whether the objectors in fact were the bona fide purchasers, particularly in the situation when they did not obtain the order inquiring about the original title documents---Executing Court did not advert to such aspects of the matter and had allowed the objection petition only on the basis of some verification by the Development Authority---Such verification was insufficient to give the benefit of bona fide purchaser, if it was otherwise available to the objectors under the law---Executing Court had disposed of the matter in the manner not permissible under the law---Order passed by Executing Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to Executing Court for decision afresh after framing of issues and recording of evidence---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.511 of 2003, heard on 26-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "SME BANK LTD. (FORMER REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION) through Branch Manager\nVs.\nMessrs CONTINENT LEATHER (PVT.) LTD. through Director and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13339",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1721 = 2005 SLD 1721 = 2005 CLD 1511",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)-------S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90---Execution of decree---Setting aside of sale---Factual controversy---Failure to record evidence---Judgment-debtor objected sale through auction on the ground that no auction was held at the spot and the property was sold at a very low price---Banking Court summarily disposed of objection petition and without any material/evidence available on record had abruptly concluded that market value of the property was more and it was sold at throw away price---Validity---Findings of Banking Court that objection petition required summary disposal and the property was sold at a very low price, were not supported and substantiated by record and it was not discernible from the order or material available on record on what material the Banking Court found that the property was worth more than that on which it was auctioned---Figure quoted by -debtor was denied by the decree-holder as well as the auction purchaser---Banking Court while taking the plea of -debtor as gospel truth, without any evidence on record, erroneously came to the conclusion that the market value of the property was not less than the amount quoted by -debtor---Order of Banking Court was devoid of reasons and was passed without due application of judicial mind---Banking Court neither adverted to nor decided the actual controversies raised by the parties through filing objection petition and their replies---Barking Court could not have decided the objection petition, unless and until reasonable opportunity for producing evidence was afforded to both the parties---Banking Court ought to have investigated claims of the parties and decided their objections to the sale of property by providing sufficient opportunity to the parties and decided their objections to the sale of property by providing sufficient opportunity to the parties for establishing their respective claims through production of evidence---Order passed by Banking Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh after recording of evidence adduced by parties---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nPunjab Province (now Province of West Pakistan) v. Kh. Feroze Din Butt and another PLD 1960 (W.P.) Lah. 791; Brig. (Retd.) Mazhar ul Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Islamabad and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706; Syed Munir Hussain Gilani v. Habib Bank Limited, Township Branch, Lahore through Attorney and another 2002 CLD 315; Messrs Dawood Flour Mills and others v. National Bank of Pakistan 1999 MLD 3205; Messrs S.P.R.L. Rehman Brothers and another v. Judge Banking Court No.II, Lahore and another 2000 MLD 1957; Messrs Majid & Sons and another v. National Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 1742 and Mrs. Shahida Saleem and another v. Habib Credit and Exchange Bank Limited and 4 others 2001 CLC 126 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXI, R.90---Sale through auction---Objection petition, decision of---Procedure---Recording of evidence---Principles---Executing Court is not under obligation to mechanically record evidence of objector in each and every case when objection petition is brought before it---Executing Court has to see in individual cases whether the case warrants recording of evidence or not and that the objection application has been filed frivolously, contumaciously and to delay the proceedings or it is a genuine application---Executing Court was to decide as to whether the objection petition is to be decided after recording the evidence or only after hearing the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.As. Nos.33 of and 34 2004, decision dated: 16-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "NASIR MUSHTAQ SHEIKH\nVs.\nPLATINIUM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through General Attorney and 6 others\n--Respondents Nos.2, 4, 5 and 7 ex parte."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13340",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1722 = 2005 SLD 1722 = 2005 CLD 1525",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to appear and defend suit---Appellants had contended that though under agreement, Bank was liable to make disbursement of the whole amount of facility, but same was not made in lump sum but in instalments and that they had been making certain payments to and deposits with the Bank but same were not adjusted against their liability according to payments made by them which was an example of lapses and omissions on the part of the Bank---Bank could not controvert said position---Bank could not satisfactorily explain as to what mark-up could be charged for that period when amount was not disbursed---Allowing the appeal, impugned was set aside---Leave was granted to appellants and matter was remanded to Trial Court accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.6 of 2002, heard on 20-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "ASAD PERVAIZ and another\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13341",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1723 = 2005 SLD 1723 = 2005 CLD 1527",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan ---Application for passing consent decree in terms of agreement and to modify decree passed by Trial Court---Bank in its application had prayed that consent decree could be passed in terms of agreement by modifying decree passed by Trial Court---Submission of Bank was that instead of dismissal of appeal, consent decree in terms of settlement agreement be passed---Upon filing of copy of settlement agreement, appeal was dismissed as no live issues were left to be decided---Applicant's case was not that some issues in appeal were still undecided, after dismissal of appeal, that too in presence of counsel of parties, no consent decree as prayed ,for, could be passed when no appeal was pending before High Court as it stood dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.P.A. No.817 of 2002 and C.M.A. No.2-C of 2005, decision dated: 21st June, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "CITIBANK, N.A. through Branch Manager\nVs.\nMAJID NAEEM"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13342",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1724 = 2005 SLD 1724 = 2005 CLD 1537",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Claim of mark-up---Suit filed by Bank was decreed by including mark-up from date of institution of suit till realization of decretal amount---Amount of mark-up claimed by Bank after expiry of agreement till institution of suit, was excluded---Grievance of Bank was that mark-up should have been included because there was a stipulation in the agreement between parties for payment of mark-up---Bank, however had not been able to show the time from which the respondents were obliged to pay mark-up after expiry of agreement---Effect---Mark-up could not be allowed without any specific stipulation in the agreement in that behalf---In absence of any error in the of Court below, appeal against said , was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 267 of 2002, heard on 6-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager\nVs.\nSHAH JEHAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13343",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1725 = 2005 SLD 1725 = 2005 CLD 1539",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Mark-up---Claim for---Suit filed by Bank was decreed with mark-up at stipulated rate till realization of decretal amount---Decree passed in favour of Bank appeared to be destitute of factum of mark-up, but appellant had claimed that decree had made a mention of it---Executing Court, had to remain within the periphery of decree and could not go beyond the same---Executing Court could summon record for inspection and ascertaining whether full part of i.e. including portion relating to mark-up had been reflected by Banking Court in its decree sheet and if not, then refrain from taking any further action in the matter confining itself to what was stated in the decree---Case of -debtors was that they had paid the amount reflected in the decree sheet; if that was so then they had fulfilled requirement of decree until decree was amended---Bank should choose to move Banking Tribunal for purposes of amendment in the decree, the -debtors would also have the opportunity of addressing the Court in that connection so that the ends of natural justice were met.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.150 of 2005, heard on 1st June, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "ZARI TARAQIATI BANK LTD. through Manager\nVs.\nSyed NUSRAT ALI SHAH and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13344",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1JpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1726 = 2005 SLD 1726 = 2005 CLD 1541",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XVII, R.3---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to defend suit---Dismissal of suit---Defendant was granted leave to defend suit and plaintiff Bank was directed to file reply, but plaintiff failed to comply with direction of the Court---Omission on part of plaintiff Bank to comply with Court's order, led Trial Court to proceed under O.XVII, R.3, C.P.C. against plaintiff Bank and suit filed by plaintiff Bank was dismissed---Validity---Order XVII, R.3, C.P.C. was permissive and not mandatory and Court was supposed to proceed to decide suit on merits in the light of material on record---Decision under O.XVII, R.3, C.P.C. must be a decision on merits on consideration of entire material on record and after hearing arguments of the parties---Impugned and order was the result of hasty decision which was not only deficient in its contents, but also bad in law---Law favoured decision of case on merits and not on mere technicalities---Interest of justice required the decision to be based on merits---Accepting appeal, impugned and order were set aside and case was remanded to Trial Court to decide afresh on merits.\n \nGovernment of N.W.F.P. and others v. Fazal Maula and others PLD 1993 Pesh. 192 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No.36 of 2003, heard on 30-06-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ-UL-HASSAN KHAN AND EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nHAZRAT HUSSAIN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13345",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1J5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1727 = 2005 SLD 1727 = 2005 CLD 1543",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan.---Banking Court decreed suit, but declined to award liquidated damages to the Bank---View taken by Chairman, Banking Tribunal in his was not shown to have been suffering from any misreading of record or same was contrary to law---Tribunal, in declining liquidated damages, had exercised discretion on sound principles---No justification was available to interfere with the of Chairman, Banking Tribunal.\n \nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Farooq Compost Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. and 4 others 1993 MLD 1571; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Faisalabad v. Messrs Asisha Garments through Proprietor and 2 others 2001 MLD 1955; Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170 and National Development Finance Corporation v. Messrs Millrock Quarring (Pvt.) Ltd. and 7 others 2002 CLD 1382 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.321 of 1996, heard on 6-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nVs.\nGHULAM MURTAZA and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13346",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1J5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1728 = 2005 SLD 1728 = 2005 CLD 1544",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 145, 151, O.XXI & O.I, R.10---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 14---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution proceedings---Impleading of party, application for---Appellant had challenged application filed by Bank under 0.1, R.10, C.P.C. to implead appellant in execution proceedings contending that 0.1, R.10, C.P.C. was not applicable in execution proceedings---Validity---Provisions of 0.1, R.10, C.P.C. were not applicable in execution proceedings---Impugned order was set aside---Bank, however, was well Within its rights to file an application against appellant under S. 145, C.P.C. read with S. 151, C.P.C. and Banking Court would decide the same in accordance with law---Application for condonation of delay in filing appeal was allowed in view of S.14 of Limitation Act, 1908.\n \nRamchandra Barik and others v. Dibakar Das AIR 1944 Patna 278; Rasib Khan v. Abdul Ghani PLD 1995 SC (AJ&K) 83; Dr. Maj. Abdul Ahad Khan v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1989 Kar. 102; Sherin v. Fazal Muhammad 1995 SCMR 584 and Bashir Ahmad v. Muhammad Sharif PLD 2001 SC 228 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.30 and C.M. No.3-C of 2003, decision dated: 24-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN, JJ",
    "": "Chaudhary ATHAR ZAHOOR --Appellant\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT NO.2, Lahore High Court and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13347",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1J5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1729 = 2005 SLD 1729 = 2005 CLD 1562",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Return of plaint---Judgment passed by Chairman Banking Tribunal whereby plaint filed by Bank was ordered to be returned, had been assailed by Bank in first appeal---Validity---Impugned was not maintainable because Tribunal and law under which it was functioning, had ceased to be operative---Banking Court, presently were functioning under the prevailing law-Appellant should have made a move before Banking Court for proceedings in the suit which was to heard and decided by it in accordance with law.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 and Syed Farasat Ali Shah v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited 2002 CLD 759 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.194 of 1997, heard on 14-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED through Attorneys\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD ARIF NAZIR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13348",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1J5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1730 = 2005 SLD 1730 = 2005 CLD 1564",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Claim for mark-up---There being no buy-back agreement between the parties, Banking Court was justified not to grant Mark-up to Bank---No infirmity and illegality was found in impugned and decree, furthermore by efflux of time same had already been satisfied---Appeal having no merit, was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.86 of 1997, heard on 15-09-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND BASHIR A. MUJAHID, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED through Manager and Attorney\nVs.\nMessrs SHAFIQUE PLASTIC and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13349",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1J5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1731 = 2005 SLD 1731 = 2005 CLD 1565",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to defend the suit---Availing the facility of loan was not denied by the defendants---Only ground urged by the defendants for grant of leave to defend was to the effect that stocks of the defendants pledged with the Bank lying in the godown were stolen/ misappropriated at the instance of the Bank Manager---Defendants had been nominated as accused in the criminal case got registered in connection with the misappropriation/ theft of stocks and they were on bail-Such plea of defendants thus, could not advantageously be used by them with reference to the recovery of the amount in question through the suit of the Bank which had been decreed by the Trial Court on refusal to grant leave to defend the suit---Validity---Judgment of the Trial Court showed that the defendants were quite lethargic and indolent towards pursuing their application for leave to defend the suit which otherwise did not disclose any triable issue---Trial Court had examined the matter in its true perspective with reference to the material available on the file and rightly passed the impugned and decree, to which no exception could be taken---Bank, however, submitted that the house of the defendants shown to be mortgaged with the Bank shall not be put to auction and the decretal amount will be firstly attempted to be realized from auctioning the other property of the defendants duly mortgaged with the Bank .and in case the decretal amount was not satisfied from said auctioning, then and then only house of the defendants shall be put to auction---Said statement of the Bank was made part of the order of the High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.188 of 2004, decision dated: 4th July. 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIR AHMAD SIDDIQUI AND MUHAMMAD NAWAZ BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KHALID OIL MILLS through Sole Proprietor and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager/Attorney"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13350",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1J5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1732 = 2005 SLD 1732 = 2005 CLD 1567",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Suit by Bank was decreed and decree-holder had sought execution of decree by arrest and detention of appellants/ -debtors as they did not appear despite they were served through registered post and it was reported that two -debtors were living in Karachi and one of them had died and two -debtors were employed abroad---Appeal to the extent of deceased -debtor had become infructuous-Appeal was not pressed to the extent of two -debtors who were working abroad---Only one of the -debtors, who was Chief Executive of Company, was available who would appear before Executing Court in response to show-cause notice---Decree-holder had no objection provided said -debtor would furnish adequate security to the satisfaction of Executing Court for his appearance---Appeal was disposed of with consent of parties in terms that said -debtor would appear before Executing Court within specified period, and would submit security to the satisfaction of Executing Court for his appearance when required.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.285 of 2002, heard on 5-11-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD GHANI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD IQBAL and others --Appellants\nVs.\nBOLAN BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13351",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1J5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1733 = 2005 SLD 1733 = 2005 CLD 1569",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---------Ss. 9 & 10---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S. 3---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to appear and defend suit---Charging of mark-up---Appellant had admitted liability to pay amount, but his grievance was qua the rest of the decretal amount which had been awarded by Banking Court as mark-up---Appellant had contended that decree had been passed under S.3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which did not provide for allowing mark-up, rather only costs of funds could have been awarded to the Bank---Contention of appellant was repelled because suit had been brought by the Bank under Provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 wherein Court had ample power to grant mark-up from date of institution of suit till realization of amount---Provisions of S.3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which was a subsequent Legislation, were inapplicable to the case.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.23 of 2002, decision dated: 12-05-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs A.M. RICE CORPORATION through Sole Proprietor and another\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Manager as Attorney"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13352",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1J5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1734 = 2005 SLD 1734 = 2005 CLD 1571",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 11 & 22---Interim decree--Appeal---Competence---Limitation---Provision of S.11 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, specifically refers to that part of the claim which is undisputed between the parties---In the present case the principal amount was admitted by the defendant in his application and on the strength of the admitted documents the Trial Court ordered for payment of specified amount---Such order was passed on the admission made in writing in the application moved by defendant himself and based on the admitted documents---Said order was only with respect to the admitted amount while the remaining claim was kept pending for further adjudication---Order of the Trial Court, in such a situation, fell within the definition of \"\"interim decree\"\" as envisaged by S.11(2) of the Ordinance and attracted the said provision and thus was an appealable order---Order of Trial Court attained finality and could not be disturbed in appeal presented by circumventing the period of limitation, after moving a subsequent application during proceedings in execution and then approaching the High Court in appeal---Appeal against such order was to be filed within 30 days as provided under S.22, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----\n \n-------S. 22---Appeal---Maintainability---Interlocutory order---Impugned order passed by the Banking Court in execution application whereby the Court allowed attachment of the property of the appellant could not be treated as a final order\"\" as envisaged under the provisions of S.22(1)(6) of the Ordinance and no appeal lies against such an interlocutory order.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I.A. No.35 of 2004, decision dated: 17-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATA-UR-REHMAN AND ZIA PERWAZ, JJ",
    "": "NAZIR AHMED VAID and others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK AG ZURICH"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13353",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1J5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1735 = 2005 SLD 1735 = 2005 CLD 1574",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---------Ss. 9 & 22---State Bank of Pakistan BPD, Circular No.29 of 2002---Suit for recovery of loan---Appeal to High Court---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court in favour of Bank, had been challenged by appellants in appeal contending that Bank had illegally compounded the mark-up---Only objection regarding mark-up taken by appellants was to the effect that same was against Injunctions of Islam and that they had moved State Bank of Pakistan under the incentive scheme and matter was under active consideration and some amount had been deposited as well---Validity---High Court declined to consider the contention about mark-up and observed that if the appellant had applied to the State Bank of Pakistan to get the benefit of-Incentive Scheme, the Executing Court would duly consider said matter before proceeding to execute decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.250 of 1999, decision dated: 15-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Haji ABDUL REHMAN and 5 others\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13354",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1J5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1736 = 2005 SLD 1736 = 2005 CLD 1576",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of amount---Execution proceedings---First appeal---Original owner of property in question having died, his property devolved upon his widow, four sons and two daughters---Widow of deceased inherited 1/8th share while sons and daughters had inherited their due shares according to Islamic Law of inheritance--Property in question, in circumstances could not be sold as a whole and the Court should have determined shares of appellants/share-holders and only could have put on sale shares of those appellants against whom decree was passed, and not the entire property---Impugned order was set aside and matter was sent back to Banking Court for determining exact share of each appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.358 of 2002, heard on 23rd June, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. PARVEEN KAUSAR and 6 others\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Authorized Officer"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13355",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1737 = 2005 SLD 1737 = 2005 CLD 1586",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to appear and defend suit---Application filed by appellants for leave to appear and defend suit by Bank, was dismissed by Banking Court for non-prosecution on date which was fixed for reply and for arguments thereon and suit was accordingly decreed---Until and unless reply was filed and appellants had the knowledge of position taken by Bank in reply, it was not possible for appellants to argue their leave application---As matter was fixed for the reply of respondent and leave application was not fixed for hearing, application could not be dismissed for non-prosecution on said date---Impugned and decree were set aside and application of appellants for leave to appear and defend suit would be deemed pending before Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.418 and Regular First Appeal No.419 of 2002, heard on 4-12-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs WARRIOR CHEMICAL (PVT.) LTD. and 5 others\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13356",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1738 = 2005 SLD 1738 = 2005 CLD 1588",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Claim for liquidated damages---Suit for recovery of Rs. 1, 79, 200 and for liquidated damages at the rate of 20% instituted by Bank was disposed of by Banking Tribunal in view of adjustment having already been made under Prime Minister Package Scheme---Appellant-Bank had contended that claim for liquidated damages had illegally been declined by Banking Tribunal---As against a sum of Rs.1,10,000, which had been availed by respondents as loan, a sum of Rs.1,17,625 had been deposited by them---Taking the view that Prime Minister's Package was attracted and covered the situation, the rest of the claims made by appellant-Bank were declined by Banking Tribunal---No illegality had been committed by Banking Tribunal in that regard.\n \nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Farooq Compost Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. and 4 others 1993 MLD 1571; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited Faisalabad v. Messrs Asisha Garments through Proprietor and 2 others 2001 MLD 1955; Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170 and National Development Finance Corporation v. Messrs Millrock Quarring (Pvt.) Ltd. and 7 others 2002 CLD 1382 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.515 of 1996, heard on 12-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nNADIR alias NADIR ALI and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13357",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1739 = 2005 SLD 1739 = 2005 CLD 1603",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to defend suit---Appellants were impleaded as guarantors on the basis of personal guarantees executed by them to secure the liability of principal debtor---Case of appellants was that they had not issued any personal guarantees to secure the liability owed to Bank by principal debtor---Such fact was not denied by the Bank---Appellants having raised a serious and bona fide defence to suit filed by Bank, application of appellants seeking leave to appear and defend suit could not have been dismissed---Allowing appeal, appellants were allowed leave to defend suit filed by the Bank accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos.532 of 1999 and 913 of 2001, heard on 2-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Syed KHALID HASSAN and anotheR--Appellants\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 12 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13358",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1740 = 2005 SLD 1740 = 2005 CLD 1605",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Original counsel of appellants having died, they requested to make alternate arrangement---Another counsel appointed by appellants having been elevated to the Bench, case was adjourned and office was directed to send notices to appellants directly as well as through agency of Senior Civil Judge concerned and notices were sent accordingly to the parties---Some of appellants were served according to report of process server, whereas some of the appellants had left their place of residence---Despite service appellants did not enter appearance---Appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.309 of 1998, decision dated: 15-01-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs THE JHANG TEXTILE INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive of the Company and others\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13359",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1741 = 2005 SLD 1741 = 2005 CLD 1606",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10, 22 & 24---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 132(c)---Suit for recovery of loan---Limitation---Leave to appear and defend suit---Appellants had contended that suit filed by Bank was barred by time as period of limitation was three years, but suit had not been filed before expiry of said period---Bank had referred to Art. 132(c) of Limitation Act, 1908 and had submitted that where immovable property was charged by way of deposit of title documents with the object to enforce the payment of money, the limitation was 12 years and that Bank had sanctioned the loan of appellant on deposit of Pass Book---Said Pass Book was not the title document of the nature envisaged in Art. 132 of Limitation Act, 1908 to attract the provision---Appellants having raised a substantial question of law and fact i.e. limitation, for determination of that, they were entitled to grant of leave---Impugned and decree, were set aside and leave to appear and defend suit was granted and appellants were allowed to file written statement within specified period and case was remanded to Banking Court for deciding same, in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.510 of 2002, heard on 15-01-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs RASOOLAN BIBI and 5 others\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Joint Director"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13360",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1742 = 2005 SLD 1742 = 2005 CLD 1620",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Suit for recovery of loan---Transfer of suit---Petition for---Petition submitted for entrustment of two suits between parties to one Banking Court was allowed---Suit pending before Banking Court was withdrawn from that Court and was entrusted to another Banking Court so that suit filed by petitioner against Bank and one filed by Bank against petitioner, should be heard together.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "T.A. No.4-C of 2004, decision dated: 15-01-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN CHAUDHRY, J",
    "": "Messrs ALRAIEE TRADERS through Sole ProprietoR\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through Officer/ Manager/Attorney and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13361",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1743 = 2005 SLD 1743 = 2005 CLD 1621",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Delay in filing appeal---Condonation of---Appellant filed application for obtaining copy of impugned of Banking Court at a time when period of limitation for filing appeal had already run---Even thereafter appeal was not filed promptly and considerable time was allowed to elapse---Hardly any ground was made for seeking condonation of delay---Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908, being not applicable to the appeal, same was liable to be dismissed being clearly time-barred.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 600 of 1996, heard on 3rd April, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "SHAUKAT HUSSAIN\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13362",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1744 = 2005 SLD 1744 = 2005 CLD 1622",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 12 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Suit filed by Bank having been decreed ex parte, appellant: moved application under S.12 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 claiming that they were neither loanees, guarantors nor mortgagers because the property which was allegedly shown to have been mortgaged by them as sureties/mortgagers was not owned by appellants at the time, when alleged mortgage was claimed to have been created and that they had already sold mortgaged property and documents in that behalf were forged by respondent (attorney), who though earlier had the power of attorney, but because of sale of entire property by appellants such power of attorney stood cancelled by accomplishment of the job---Question whether appellants were owners of property in question and whether property could be mortgaged by respondent (attorney) required evidence, but Court below without framing of issues and holding trial in that behalf, had summarily rejected application which order was not in consonance with law---Impugned order was set aside and matter was remanded to the Court below for decision afresh upon application of appellants filed under S.12 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 by framing issues and recording of evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 113 of 2003, heard on 27th October. 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "ABDUR RAUF and another\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. through Manager and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13363",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1745 = 2005 SLD 1745 = 2005 CLD 1633",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Facility extended to respondent was for a sum of Rs.4,52,000 and he had paid Rs. 70, 000---By adjusting said amount, Banking Court, proceeded to decree suit for Rs.5,18,313 and declined to decree the insurance charges and claim for liquidated damages---Validity---Nothing was brought on the file to prove insurance cover/claim---Discretion so exercised by Banking Court hardly called for interference by Appellate Court.\n \nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Farooq Compost Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. and 4 others 1993 MLD 1571; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments through Proprietor and 2 others 2001 MLD 1955; Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170 and National Development Finance Corporation v. Messrs Millrock Quarring (Pvt.) Ltd. and 7 others 2002 CLD 1382 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.226 of 1996, heard on 10-03-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nVs.\nSHAFQAT MAHMOOD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13364",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1746 = 2005 SLD 1746 = 2005 CLD 1634",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------- Ss. 9 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Appeal---Appellants/alleged borrowers had instituted a suit seeking a declaration against the Bank to the effect that they had not taken any loan and any entry in that regard in the Bank record was liable to be ignored as being based on forgery and fraud---Plaint of appellants was rejected by the Banking Court---Validity---Plaint of the appellants, prima facie, did disclose a cause of action, thus O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. could not have been applied to the same---Rejection of plaint by the Banking Court could not be blessed with sanctity and impugned was set aside---Case was remanded to the Banking Court for disposal according to law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 175 of 2002, heard on 4-07-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIR AHMAD SIDDIQUI AND MUHAMMAD NAWAZ BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL WAHAB and anotheR--Appellants\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Chairman and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13365",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1747 = 2005 SLD 1747 = 2005 CLD 1636",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------- Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Suit f or recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Appellant who had admitted to discharge liability under decree passed against it, had requested that instead of delivering possession of property in question, it be permitted to pay decretal amount in instalments to save valuable property and its business over said property which was the only means of its subsistence---Appellant was allowed to make payment in instalments accordingly with the observation that in case there was default in payment of any single instalment, respondent would be entitled to take over possession of property in question.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.805 of 2002, decision dated: 24-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "PEARL AND BEADS MANUFACTURING COMPANY through Chief Executive\nVs.\nUNION BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13366",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1748 = 2005 SLD 1748 = 2005 CLD 1638",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 15, 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2), & O.XXI Rr.90, 97, 99 & 103---Suit for recovery of amount---Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged property---Appeal against of Banking Court---Suit was decreed and decretal amount was recovered by sale of mortgaged property and sale certificate was also issued---Appellants had filed application for setting aside and decree of Banking Court and also sought to assail sale of mortgaged property on ground that certain mortgaged property was owned by them---Appellants had also claimed that they were in uninterrupted possession of suit property and had also matured their title---Appellants had failed to show any bona fide legal interest in mortgaged property which could substantiate their claim---Appellants did not object to proceedings either at the time of creation of mortgage or at time of filing of suit by respondent-Bank or at time of execution proceedings---Appellants had not been able to put forward any legal basis for the claim except that they claimed to be in possession of property, mortgaged land---Appellants having failed to indicate any infirmity in the impugned order, appeal against said order was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.239 of 2004, heard on 23rd December, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "TANVIR BASHIR ANSARI AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHARIF and 6 others\nVs.\nSheikh RAB NAWAZ and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13367",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1749 = 2005 SLD 1749 = 2005 CLD 1651",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of amount---Determination of value of hypothecated goods by Banking Court---Appellant had contended that definite value of hypothecated goods as determined by Banking Court, did not find support from the report of Local Commissioner and that Banking Court ought to have asked for list of hypothecated goods from Bank itself, but that having not been done, there had been misreading of record and matter called for re-consideration---High Court agreeing with the contention of appellant, remitted case to Banking Judge with directions to re-determine such aspect of case in the light of record and in the alternative Bank was directed to pass on hypothecated goods so that there was no infirmity left in giving effect to the orders through execution proceedings---Banking Court was allowed one month's period for purposes of determining said issue and until then execution proceedings against appellant would be kept in abeyance.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E F.A. No. 139 of 2005, decision dated: 13-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "SHABBIR AHMAD\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Chief Manager and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13368",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1750 = 2005 SLD 1750 = 2005 CLD 1654",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Appeal to High Court---Suit filed by Bank was decreed by Banking Court observing that two defendants having not inherited anything from the deceased ex-Managing Director of the Company, they had no personal liability especially when they were neither guarantors nor had they signed any document---Grievance of Bank was against that part of and decree which had restricted liability of said two defendants to the property inherited by them from deceased ex-Managing Director---Judgment and decree impugned in appeal were 'based on consent of counsel for the Bank---Concession in question purely related to a question of fact---As far as liability of the two defendants to satisfy decree was concerned, it was a consent decree, which was not appealable.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 161 of 1999, heard on 14-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nAWAN TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13369",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1751 = 2005 SLD 1751 = 2005 CLD 1654",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Appeal to High Court---Suit filed by Bank was decreed by Banking Court observing that two defendants having not inherited anything from the deceased ex-Managing Director of the Company, they had no personal liability especially when they were neither guarantors nor had they signed any document---Grievance of Bank was against that part of and decree which had restricted liability of said two defendants to the property inherited by them from deceased ex-Managing Director---Judgment and decree impugned in appeal were 'based on consent of counsel for the Bank---Concession in question purely related to a question of fact---As far as liability of the two defendants to satisfy decree was concerned, it was a consent decree, which was not appealable.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 161 of 1999, heard on 14-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nAWAN TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13370",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1752 = 2005 SLD 1752 = 2005 CLD 1655",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------- Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of 'loan---Execution of decree---Suit by Bank was decreed and in satisfaction of decree, three mortgaged flats were directed to be put to auction---Appellant and respondents filed objections that they had already purchased flats being unaware that those were under lien of the Bank---Objection had been dismissed and Court, without giving any reason had directed to sell one of the flats through auction which belonged to the appellant---Appellant had stated that such order was discriminatory and would cause prejudice to rights of appellant who was at par with other objectors---No reason was shown on basis of which flat of appellant could be directed to be put to auction first--- Court should have directed the objectors, either to deposit decretal amount proportionately to save their property or properties belonging to all of them should have been put to auction simultaneously---High Court accepting appeal set aside impugned order and remanded matter to Banking Court for passing a fresh order with regard to execution of decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.218 of 2001, decision dated: 10-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "ZAFAR IQBAL KHAN\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through Manager and duly Authorized Attorney and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13371",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1753 = 2005 SLD 1753 = 2005 CLD 1655",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------- Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of 'loan---Execution of decree---Suit by Bank was decreed and in satisfaction of decree, three mortgaged flats were directed to be put to auction---Appellant and respondents filed objections that they had already purchased flats being unaware that those were under lien of the Bank---Objection had been dismissed and Court, without giving any reason had directed to sell one of the flats through auction which belonged to the appellant---Appellant had stated that such order was discriminatory and would cause prejudice to rights of appellant who was at par with other objectors---No reason was shown on basis of which flat of appellant could be directed to be put to auction first--- Court should have directed the objectors, either to deposit decretal amount proportionately to save their property or properties belonging to all of them should have been put to auction simultaneously---High Court accepting appeal set aside impugned order and remanded matter to Banking Court for passing a fresh order with regard to execution of decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.218 of 2001, decision dated: 10-04-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "ZAFAR IQBAL KHAN\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through Manager and duly Authorized Attorney and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13372",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1754 = 2005 SLD 1754 = 2005 CLD 1660",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Ordinance (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 7, 9, 10 & 12---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to defend suit---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Suit by Bank, was decreed ex parte against defendants---Application filed by defendants under S.12 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits & Finances) Ordinance, 1997 for setting aside ex parte decree was rejected by Court holding that Court had no jurisdiction to review its own order, or decree---Validity---Present was not the case of review, rather it was for setting aside ex parte decree and defendants on showing \"\"sufficient cause\"\" for their non-appearance, could seek its setting aside---Non-appearance of defendants on date of hearing was not deliberate, but was of a bit of negligence on their part in pursuing their application for leave to appear and defend and for such negligence, awarding a decree for colossal amount would be too harsh---Allowing appeal, application for setting aside ex parte order was accepted with the result that ex parte and decree would also stand set aside---Leave application was directed to be decided within specified period.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 372 of 2001, heard on 21st April, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AWAN ELECTRONICS (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 2 others\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13373",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1755 = 2005 SLD 1755 = 2005 CLD 1662",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S. 9---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199--- Constitutional petition---Competency---Petitioner had raised factual controversy in the Constitutional petition, which could not be undertaken by High Court in exercise of said jurisdiction---Appropriate forum for redressal of grievance of petitioner was the Court of plenary jurisdiction, which was competent to resolve factual controversy, after calling upon parties to prove their respective claims after recording evidence---Petitioner being a customer, could file suit for redressal of alleged grievance before Banking Court under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Efficacious and adequate remedy being available to petitioner, Constitutional petition, was not competent.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 11139 of 1999, heard on 11-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD YASIN\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD. through Zonal Chief and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13374",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMS1NTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1756 = 2005 SLD 1756 = 2005 CLD 1663",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------- Ss. 10, 2(d), 9 & 21---Appeal---Application for leave to defend the suit---Dismissal of such application on valid reasons while discarding the agreement which was executed between the -debtors but the Corporation (plaintiff being not party to the same was not bound by it to accept the liabilities determined by the -debtors in the said agreement---After the admission of the claim of the plaintiff/corporation by the -debtors, High Court, in appeal, declined to set aside the impugned and modify the decree to the extent of six -debtors (as per the agreement) alone as no such claim was raised in the application for leave to defend the suit but was raised for the first time before the High Court in appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 128 of 2001, heard on 18-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND IJAZ AHMAD CHAUDHRY, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SUN RISE INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. through Chief Executive and others\nVs.\nTRUST LEASING CORPORATION LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13375",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1757 = 2005 SLD 1757 = 2005 CLD 1667",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to appear and defend suit---Defendant sought leave to appear and defend suit---Defendant had been unable to raise any defence which could justify grant of leave to appear and defend suit---Judgment and decree of Banking Court, were not open to exception---Application to appear and defend suit was rightly dismissed by Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.687 of 2002, heard on 26-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL RAZZAQ --Appellant:\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13376",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1758 = 2005 SLD 1758 = 2005 CLD 1669",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Bank had filed appeal alleging that suit was wrongly dismissed by Court below against first defendant---Chairman Banking Tribunal taking note of stance of defendant: that no documents whatsoever had been executed/signed by him, recorded findings that it was other defendant who was beneficiary of finances and first defendant had nothing to do with any transaction---Court in circumstances had taken the view that no liability could be created qua first defendant---Suit was accordingly decreed against defendants except first defendant ---Validity---Such was a finding of fact to which no exception was possible, in circumstances---High Court, without making any further comments, observed that appeal filed by Bank was bereft of any merit.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.62 of 1997, heard on 2-06-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through General Attorney/Principal Officer\nVs.\nSHAFI„¢S PAK ASSOCIATES (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13377",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1759 = 2005 SLD 1759 = 2005 CLD 1663",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---State Bank of Pakistan Circular No. 19 dated 5-6-1997---Suit for recovery of loan---Appeal to High Court---In the matter of one of the appeals, appellant-Bank had very candidly conceded that respondents having made a deposit in accordance within the terms of State Bank's Circular No. 19 dated 5-6-1997 it had neither filed any suit nor undertaken any recovery proceedings---Appellant-Bank had filed suits for recovery of loan amounts against respondents, whereas respondents had filed suits for injunctions against appellant-Bank---Case of respondent was that State Bank's Circular No. 19 dated 5-6-1997, in terms had applied to Chairman of the Bank, who had allowed settlement and that respondents were directed to deposit principal amount plus 5% in each case and said amounts were deposited---Banking Court dismissed suits filed by the Bank and decreed suits of respondents---Contention of Bank was that Chairman, A.D.B.P., had no jurisdiction in the matter inasmuch as loans did not quaky for said relief and that only seven years' old loan could be settled in said manner---All loans in case were seven years old on 5-6-1997 which was the date of Circular No. 19 and period of seven years was to be counted from dates of disbursements---No other points having been urged all appeals filed by Bank, were dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos. 103 to 108 of’ 2004, heard on 14-10-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nVs.\nChaudhry REHMAT ALI through Legal Heirs and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13378",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1760 = 2005 SLD 1760 = 2005 CLD 1685",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 22---Appeal---New plea, raising of---Borrowers did not raise the plea before Banking Court that they had made the payments according to the finance agreement, nothing was due against them and the bank could not go beyond the agreement of finance---Bank pleaded that at the end of agreement period, it was automatically renewed and remained enforced until such time till it was terminated by the Bank by notice to the customer---Validity---Borrowers did not urge the plea which had now been raised before High Court for the first time---Litigant could not be allowed to raise altogether a new and different plea before appellate/revisional Court, which had not been raised before lower forums---Borrowers were precluded from raising the solitary ground before High Court for the first lime--Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was not open to exception and the Court did not commit any illegality in passing the same---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 795 of 2002, heard on 16-06-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Ch. MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and another\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through its Manager\nAnwar Ali and others v. Manzoor Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 1770 and Amir Shah v. Ziarat Gul 1998 SCMR 593 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13379",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1761 = 2005 SLD 1761 = 2005 CLD 1688",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to defend suit---Application for leave to defend suit was submitted 33 days after service on defendants through notice in the newspapers---Application for leave to defend suit was dismissed being barred by time because period of 30 days was available to defendants---Application seeking condonation of delay was not filed by defendants---Process server had reported that defendants being not available, service was effected through fixation and it was not believable that registered notice had taken 20 days to reach the defendants---In absence of any illegality in the impugned and decree, same would not warrant interference in appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.361 of 2004, decision dated: 11-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "MAZHAR IQBAL and another\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LTD. (ZTBL) --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13380",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1762 = 2005 SLD 1762 = 2005 CLD 1689",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----S.9---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 128 & 135---Recovery of bank loan---Guarantor, liability of---Principles---Compromise between the bank and principal debtor---Appellant being guarantor of principal debtor contended that as the matter had been compromised between the bank and principal debtor, therefore, his liability as guarantor stood discharged in view of S.135 of Contract Act, 1872---Validity---Appellant was precluded from taking advantage and benefit of S.135 of Contract Act, 1872---Banking Court had rightly found that in view of S.128 of Contract Act, 1872, the liability of borrower and the guarantor was co-extensive---Judgment passed by Banking Court was legal, apt to the facts and circumstances of the case and Banking Court did not commit any legal error/defect justifying the interference by High Court---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was maintained by High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nFederation of Pakistan v. National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi and another 1981 CLC 847 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 52 of 2005, heard on 18-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "BASHIR AHMAD MUGHAL --Appellant\nVs.\nS.M.E. BANK LIMITED through General Manager and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13381",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1763 = 2005 SLD 1763 = 2005 CLD 1692",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 19 & 22---Execution of decree---Order dismissing objection petition before Executing Court had been assailed by appellants Bank had candidly stated that objection petition filed by appellants could be heard and decided by Executing Court after affording opportunity of hearing to the appellants---Impugned order, was set aside, in circumstances with the result that objection petition filed by appellant would be deemed pending which would be heard and decided afresh in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 131 of 2000, heard on 10-01-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SHAMSHAD AKHTAR and 4 others\nVs.\nDOHA BANK LIMITED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13382",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1764 = 2005 SLD 1764 = 2005 CLD 1693",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit, grant of---Triable issue---Territorial jurisdiction of Banking Court---Borrower in his application for leave to defend the suit contended that the loan was disbursed by the bank in a foreign country, therefore, the Banking Court in Pakistan had no jurisdiction---Bank did not deny disbursement of the loan in foreign country but asserted that the borrower had permanently returned to his hometown, therefore, the Banking Court had jurisdiction---Leave application was dismissed and the suit was decreed in favour of the Bank---Validity---Plea of jurisdiction raised by the borrower was specifically denied by the bank and thus the material controversy between the parties emerged which was necessarily to be decided by Banking Court---Banking Court by not touching the dispute of jurisdiction and ignoring to give any finding on the issue, had committed grave legal error---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.751 of 2002, heard on 16-06-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ALATTAR SPORT DRESSES TRADING through Chief Executive and another\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13383",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1765 = 2005 SLD 1765 = 2005 CLD 1697",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XLVII, R.1---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 ---Review of ---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Seeking two remedies simultaneously---Principle---Withdrawal of civil suit after dismissal of Constitutional petition---Constitutional petition was dismissed by High Court for the reason that the petitioner had elected to avail the remedy of civil suit and it could obtain adequate and effective relief in the suit---Constitutional petition and civil suit were proceeding between the same parties and on identical subject-matter---After dismissal of the Constitutional petition, the petitioner withdrew the civil suit and sought review of the passed by High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction---Validity---Subsequent withdrawal of civil suit was not a ground to seek review of ---Petitioner, in appropriate circumstances could avail of extraordinary remedy under Art.199 of the Constitution as well as the alternate remedy---High Court declined to consider the petitioner entitled to discretionary relief under Art.199 of the Constitution, while availing the remedy of civil suit wherein effective and adequate relief could be obtained by the petitioner---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMunicipal Committee Multan through its Chairman v. Burmah Shell Storage and Distributing Co. of Pakistan Ltd. and another PLD 1976 Lah. 726 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Review Petition No.61 of 2004, decision dated: 21st June, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "SARGODHA TEXTILE MILLS LTD. through General ManageR\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Manager and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13384",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1766 = 2005 SLD 1766 = 2005 CLD 1700",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S. 22---Appeal against of Banking Court---Bank while placing on record photocopy of compromise, had stated that claim of Bank stood settled---Subject-matter of appeal having amicably been settled between parties, and no live issues were left to be decided by High Court, appeal thus had become infructuous---If appellants felt that some issues were still undecided, in that case they could file appropriate application to re-activate proceedings in appeal within specified period.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 506 of 2001, decision dated: 22-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ZAHEER ASSOCIATES through Sole Proprietor and 2 others\nVs.\nALTOWFEEQ INVESTMENT BANK LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13385",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1767 = 2005 SLD 1767 = 2005 CLD 1701",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.9, 10 & 22---Appeal---New plea, raising of---Recovery of bank loan---Time-barred application for leave to defend the suit---Borrower admitted availing of two loan. facilities and also admitted outstanding amount which he was prepared to liquidate---Proclamation was published in press on 30-1-2004 and application to defend the suit was filed by borrower on 10-3-2004---Banking Court, instead of dismissing the application being time-barred, decided the application on merits and dismissed the same, resultantly the suit was decreed in favour of bank---Plea raised by the borrower was that no proper statement of accounts in support of plaint was placed on record by bank---Validity---Application of borrower deserved to be dismissed on the short ground that the same was filed out of time---Banking Court had adverted to every aspect of the case and rightly came to the conclusion that the borrower failed to raise substantial question of law and facts. in which evidence needed to be recorded---Borrower failed to make out a case for grant of leave to defend the suit and the Banking Court rightly dismissed his application---Litigant could not be allowed to raise altogether a new and different plea before appellate/ revisional Court, which plea had not been raised before the lower forums---Plea raised by the borrower was neither mentioned in the application for leave to defend the suit nor the same was raised before the Court below---Banking Court did not commit any legal error in passing the decree and High Court declined to reverse the and decree passed by Banking Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 198 of 2005, decision dated: 26-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "YASIR CHAUDHRY\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED (ADBP) through Branch Manager\nAnwar Ali and others v. Manzoor Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 1770; Amir Shah v. Ziarat Gul 1998 SCMR 593 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13386",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1768 = 2005 SLD 1768 = 2005 CLD 1705",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9(5) & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Application for leave to defend the suit---Computation of limitation period---Application filed by borrowers was dismissed being barred by limitation---Plea raised by the borrowers was that service effected through publication should not be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing period of limitation for filing leave application---Validity---Such plea was misconceived as S.9 (5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, provided that service duly effected in any one of the modes mentioned therein would be deemed to be valid service and it could neither be urged nor held that leave application filed by borrowers was within time---Banking Court did not commit any illegality in passing the and decree against the borrowers---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nWest Pakistan Water and Power and Development Authority v. Sohrabji & Sons and another 1986 CLC 2593; Faiz Muhammad and 2 others v. Ramzan Ali and 3 others 1989 MLD 2525; Messrs Simnwa Polypropylene (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Messrs National Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 1510 and Khawaja Muhammad Bilal v. Union Bank Limited through Branch Manager 2004 CLD 1555 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.120---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Maintainability---Limitation---Contention of borrower was that compromise was effected between the parties on 22-3-2001, and the suit was filed on 23-10-2004, thus the suit was time-barred---Validity---Suit filed from the date of accrual of cause of action was not out of time---Suit was maintainable in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 144 of 2005, heard on 18-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "ARSHAD AHMED and 2 others\nVs.\nTRUST COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13387",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1769 = 2005 SLD 1769 = 2005 CLD 1723",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and finances) Act, (XV of 1997)------- Ss. 22 & 13---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.85 & S.19---Banker and customer---Suit for recovery of amount by Bank through Custodian of Enemy Property---Limitation---Parties were maintaining a mutual open and current account---Suit was governed by Art.85 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and the prescribed period of limitation was three years commencing from the close of the year in which the last item admitted or proved was entered in the account---Statement of accounts, in the present case, showed that the last transaction between the parties was made on 4-9-1965 and, thus limitation for the suit commenced on 1-1-1966, therefore the suit filed on 26-6-1974 was patently time ¬barred---Documents, execution of which was doubtful, could not constitute an acknowledgment so as to extend the period of limitation because same had already expired on 1-1-1969---Section 19, Limitation Act, 1908 provided an acknowledgment to be valid having the effect of extending limitation which must be made before expiration of the period prescribed for the suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.63 of 1995, heard on 27-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD GHANI, JJ",
    "": "Vs.\nMessrs Haji Sheikh FAIZ MUHAMMAD DIN MUHAMMAD, IMPORTERS AND\nEXPORTERS through Managing Partner and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13388",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1770 = 2005 SLD 1770 = 2005 CLD 1728",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------- Ss. 15, 19 & 22---Civil. Procedure Code (V of 1.908), S.51 & O.XXI, R.37---Powers of Court to enforce execution---Scope---Decree-holder/Bank initiated execution proceedings and debtor's property was put to auction which could not be sold---Banking Court issued notice to the -debtor under O.XXI, R.37, C.P.C., which was succeeded by warrants of arrest of the -debtor---Judgment-debtor filed an application for the withdrawal of the warrants of arrest, but the said application was dismissed---Validity---Banking Court, while issuing the warrants of arrest of the -debtor, had completely ignored the settled law and without adhering to the provisions of S.51, proviso, C.P.C. and in complete oblivion of the law on the subject proceeded to issue warrants of arrest of the ¬ debtor---Banking Court, without satisfaction of conditions laid down in S.51, C.P.C., could not issue mechanical order for detention of a -debtor in prison---High Court, in appeal set aside the order of Banking Court to the extent of issuance of warrants of arrest of the -debtor and observed that in case the Bank's application, under S.51, C.P.C. for arrest and detention of -debtor, was pending or filed in future, the same shall be decided by the Banking Court in accordance with law and on its own merits in view of the provision of S.51, C.P.C.\n \nHaji Fazal Elahi & Sons through Muhammad Tariq v. Bank of Punjab and another 2004 CLD 162; Mirza Shahid Baig v. National Bank of Pakistan and 8 others 2002 CLD 623; Muhammad Anwar v. Shaukat Ali and another 2000 CLC 1086 and Precision Engineering Ltd. and others v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lah. 290 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S.51, proviso---Powers of Court to enforce execution---Prerequisites.\n \nProviso to section 51, C.P.C. envisages that execution by detention in prison shall not be ordered unless Execution Court is satisfied that the -debtor had means to pay the decretal amount and he has refused to pay the amount or that he is leaving the territorial limits of the Court or would defeat decree by transferring the property during the pendency of the lis. The detention of a -debtor, in execution of the decree, cannot be ordered unless and until the said prerequisites of section 51, C.P.C. are proved.\n \nGhulam Hussain v. Riaz Ahmad 1987 CLC 1227; Munsif Dad v. WAPDA PLD 1991 Azad J&K 8; Syed Shaffat Hussain v. Kamran Khokhar 2000 MLD 801; Precision Engineering Ltd. and others v. Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lah. 290 and Muhammad Anwar v. Shaukat Ali and another 2000 CLC 1086 ref.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)---\n \n----S.22---Appeal---Plea not raised before the Banking Court and said Court having not dealt with and decided the said plea, appellant was precluded from agitating the same before the High Court in appeal---Litigant could not be allowed to raise altogether a new and different plea before the appellate or revisional Court which was not raised before the lower forums.\n \nAnwar Ali and others v. Manzoor Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 1770 and Amir Shah v. Ziarat Gul 1998 SCMR 593 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.168 of 2005, heard on 7-07-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "BASHIR AHMAD\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT-I, GUJRANWALA DIVISION GUJRANWALA and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13389",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1771 = 2005 SLD 1771 = 2005 CLD 1728",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------- Ss. 15, 19 & 22---Civil. Procedure Code (V of 1.908), S.51 & O.XXI, R.37---Powers of Court to enforce execution---Scope---Decree-holder/Bank initiated execution proceedings and debtor's property was put to auction which could not be sold---Banking Court issued notice to the -debtor under O.XXI, R.37, C.P.C., which was succeeded by warrants of arrest of the -debtor---Judgment-debtor filed an application for the withdrawal of the warrants of arrest, but the said application was dismissed---Validity---Banking Court, while issuing the warrants of arrest of the -debtor, had completely ignored the settled law and without adhering to the provisions of S.51, proviso, C.P.C. and in complete oblivion of the law on the subject proceeded to issue warrants of arrest of the ¬ debtor---Banking Court, without satisfaction of conditions laid down in S.51, C.P.C., could not issue mechanical order for detention of a -debtor in prison---High Court, in appeal set aside the order of Banking Court to the extent of issuance of warrants of arrest of the -debtor and observed that in case the Bank's application, under S.51, C.P.C. for arrest and detention of -debtor, was pending or filed in future, the same shall be decided by the Banking Court in accordance with law and on its own merits in view of the provision of S.51, C.P.C.\n \nHaji Fazal Elahi & Sons through Muhammad Tariq v. Bank of Punjab and another 2004 CLD 162; Mirza Shahid Baig v. National Bank of Pakistan and 8 others 2002 CLD 623; Muhammad Anwar v. Shaukat Ali and another 2000 CLC 1086 and Precision Engineering Ltd. and others v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lah. 290 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S.51, proviso---Powers of Court to enforce execution---Prerequisites.\n \nProviso to section 51, C.P.C. envisages that execution by detention in prison shall not be ordered unless Execution Court is satisfied that the -debtor had means to pay the decretal amount and he has refused to pay the amount or that he is leaving the territorial limits of the Court or would defeat decree by transferring the property during the pendency of the lis. The detention of a -debtor, in execution of the decree, cannot be ordered unless and until the said prerequisites of section 51, C.P.C. are proved.\n \nGhulam Hussain v. Riaz Ahmad 1987 CLC 1227; Munsif Dad v. WAPDA PLD 1991 Azad J&K 8; Syed Shaffat Hussain v. Kamran Khokhar 2000 MLD 801; Precision Engineering Ltd. and others v. Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lah. 290 and Muhammad Anwar v. Shaukat Ali and another 2000 CLC 1086 ref.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)---\n \n----S.22---Appeal---Plea not raised before the Banking Court and said Court having not dealt with and decided the said plea, appellant was precluded from agitating the same before the High Court in appeal---Litigant could not be allowed to raise altogether a new and different plea before the appellate or revisional Court which was not raised before the lower forums.\n \nAnwar Ali and others v. Manzoor Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 1770 and Amir Shah v. Ziarat Gul 1998 SCMR 593 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.168 of 2005, heard on 7-07-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "BASHIR AHMAD\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT-I, GUJRANWALA DIVISION GUJRANWALA and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13390",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1772 = 2005 SLD 1772 = 2005 CLD 1733",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Suit filed by plaintiff had been decided in a cursory manner merely on the plea raised by widow of deceased defendant which appeared to be inconsistent with defence earlier raised by her deceased husband---Defendant, while he was alive, had also filed an application for leave to appear and defend suit wherein he stated that f inane facility was obtained with consent of the plaintiff; but real beneficiary was someone else and said application filed by the deceased had also not been decided---Judgment of Banking Court being devoid of any reason, was set aside and case was remanded for decision afresh in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.796 of 2001, heard on 27-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "ASHAR ELAHI --Appellant\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LTD. through President and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13391",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1773 = 2005 SLD 1773 = 2005 CLD 1733",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Suit filed by plaintiff had been decided in a cursory manner merely on the plea raised by widow of deceased defendant which appeared to be inconsistent with defence earlier raised by her deceased husband---Defendant, while he was alive, had also filed an application for leave to appear and defend suit wherein he stated that f inane facility was obtained with consent of the plaintiff; but real beneficiary was someone else and said application filed by the deceased had also not been decided---Judgment of Banking Court being devoid of any reason, was set aside and case was remanded for decision afresh in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.796 of 2001, heard on 27-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "ASHAR ELAHI --Appellant\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LTD. through President and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13392",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1774 = 2005 SLD 1774 = 2005 CLD 1735",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10, 15 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to appear and defend suit---Appellant, primarily aggrieved of action of Bank under S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 putting property of appellant on sale, had instituted suit seeking declaration and in that suit Bank filed leave application which was -allowed and preliminary issue with regard to maintainability of suit was framed---Banking Court dilating on that, had rejected plaint of appellant, primarily on ground that appellant had earlier filed a suit of same nature in which relief of declaration sought in present matter was not claimed though same was available to him at that time and that second suit was barred under provisions of O.II, R.2, C.P.C.---Appellant had filed the present appeal---Bank had contended that it had also filed a suit against appellant for recovery of its dues and that Bank would not invoke and pursue provisions of S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Appellant, in such view of the matter had sought permission of Court to withdraw the suit---Said withdrawal was allowed and suit filed by appellant was dismissed as withdrawn accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.26 of’2004, heard on 28-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Haji MUHAMMAD KHADIM --Appellant\nVs.\nCITIBANK, N.A. through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13393",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1775 = 2005 SLD 1775 = 2005 CLD 1737",
    "Key Words:": "Auction-------Every bidder would have right to raise his offer earlier to offer acceptance of any other by Court.\n \nMuhammad Afzal Sindhu for Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O. No.113 of 1999, and C.Ms. Nos.796-L, 857-L of 2004, decision dated: 10-12-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nCRESCENT SPINNING MILLS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13394",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1776 = 2005 SLD 1776 = 2005 CLD 1739",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Compromise between parties---Counsel for parties had stated that an agreement had been arrived at between parties and said agreement had been filed before Executing Court which had been partly acted upon and would be fully implemented in terms stated therein---Appeal was disposed of in terms of said agreement.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.460 of 1999 and C.M. No.407 of 2002, decision dated: 21st April, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SARDAR MUHAMMAD ASLAM, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SHAHID IMRAN, LEATHER INDUSTRY and 3 others\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through VicEPresident and General Attorney"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13395",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1777 = 2005 SLD 1777 = 2005 CLD 1740",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to appear and defend suit---Dismissal of application--.-Son of defendant appeared before the Court on the date fixed for hearing the application for leave to appear and defend suit but his presence was not marked and leave application was dismissed for non-prosecution and suit by plaintiff was decreed---Validity---Son of defendant was verbally authorized to appear on behalf of defendant and only request was made by him to keep matter pending till counsel for defendant would come and argue leave application, but Court had hastily turned down the request and passed decree--- Court, in circumstances, should have kept matter pending and should not have hastily dismissed leave application for non-prosecution when son of defendant was present in the Court---Said application could have been adjourned subject to payment of costs, and no harsh action should have been taken---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and order of dismissal of leave application for non-prosecution was also set aside---Leave application of defendant was to be deemed pending which would be decided in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.200 and C.M. No.438-C of 2004, heard on 26-05-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "GHULAM RASOOL --Appellant\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED (ZTBL) through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13396",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1778 = 2005 SLD 1778 = 2005 CLD 1742",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances), Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for, recovery of loan---Compromise---Parties having compromised, filed application that appeal be decided in terms of said compromise---High Court accepting said application, modified and decree passed by Banking Court in terms of said compromise and compromise was made a part of the decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.616 of 1999 and C.M. No.1-C of 2004, decision dated: 11-02-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA AND PERVAIZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs REDCO TEXTILES LIMITED and 7 others --Appellants\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13397",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1779 = 2005 SLD 1779 = 2005 CLD 1743",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Appellants during course of hearing had made offer to compensate respondent-auction ¬purchaser in lieu of his giving up sale and stated that appellants would pay Rs.2,00,000 to auction-purchaser as compensation and said auction-purchaser would also be entitled to withdraw amount of 4,50,000 deposited by him with the Court, besides that appellants would also satisfy the decree by paying decretal amount to decree-holder---Said offer had been accepted by auction-purchaser as well as the Bank---Appellants were to deposit amounts according to their offer within specified period and in case said amounts were not deposited appeal would be deemed to have been dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.211 of 2002, decision dated: 22-03-2004",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RAMZAN JAVED and anotheR--Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13398",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1780 = 2005 SLD 1780 = 2005 CLD 1745",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Suit by Bank was decreed by Banking Court and decree holder (Bank) initiated execution proceedings through arrest and detentions of appellants/ -debtors---Executing Court issued warrants of arrest of appellants/ . debtors---Appeal was partially allowed and Appellate Court, after setting aside and decree of Banking Court, remanded case to Banking Court with certain directions---As and decree, out of which execution petition arose, was set aside, the execution petition had become infructuous and orders passed therein whereby warrants of arrest of appellants/ ¬ debtors were issued, had lost their efficacy and in that perspective, present appeal had become infructuous and could not proceed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.239 of 2000, decision dated: 15-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs PLASTIC CRYSTAL through Sole Proprietor and another\nVs.\nMessrs BOLAN BANK LIMITED through General Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13399",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1781 = 2005 SLD 1781 = 2005 CLD 1746",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.9---suit for recovery of loan amount with marls-up---Amount availed by borrower was less than what was mentioned in Finance Agreement. --Held: Mark-up amount would stand reduced proportionately.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Banker's Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4---Suit for recovery of loan amount-Application for leave to appear and defend suit---Discrepancies in statement of account.---Effect---Determination of actual amount due would not be possible without recording evidence---Granting leave to defend to defendant would be necessary for ascertainment of accounts---Such application was accepted in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.382 of 2001, heard on 30-06-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AMTUL REHMAN INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive/ Managing Director and 2 others --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13400",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1782 = 2005 SLD 1782 = 2005 CLD 1749",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Dismissal of suit---Suit having been dismissed for non-prosecution, plaintiff filed application for restoration of suit, but said application was disallowed and plaintiff had filed appeal against the dismissal order---Date on which suit was dismissed being not the date of hearing, suit could not have been dismissed---Possibility of noting a wrong date as claimed by plaintiff could not be ruled out---If the Court wanted to non-suit: plaintiff; it should have made some inquiry and at least plaintiff or clerk of counsel of plaintiff who was informed about the date, should have been examined---Negligence though being on the part of plaintiff, suit was restored with costs---Suit would be deemed pending for retrial at the stage when it was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 105 of 1999, heard on 3rd June, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "CHIC TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LIMITTED through Chief Executive\nVs.\nALLIED BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13401",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1783 = 2005 SLD 1783 = 2005 CLD 1751",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, (XV of 1997)----------S. 17---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss.20 & 118---Blank and semi blank banking documents, signing of---Borrower neither denied his signatures on such documents nor execution thereof, but raised plea that he was made to sign them under undue influence---Validity---Borrower, in view of S.20 read with S.118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, was estopped to challenge legality, genuineness and enforce- ability of such documents---Such plea was repelled---Principles.\n \nBank of Khyber v. Messrs Spencer Distribution Ltd. and 14 others 2003 CLD 1406; Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Hashim Paracha and another PLD 1987 Kar. 76; S.K. Abdul Aziz v. Mahmoodul Hassan and 3 others 1988 CLC 337; Haji Karim and another v. Zikar Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Messrs Gujrat Friends Traders and others PLD 1988 Lah. 166; Messrs United Bank Limited v. President Bazm-e-Salat and another PLD 1986 Kar. 464; Bazm¬-e-Salat and others v. Messrs United Bank Limited PLD 1989 Kar. 150; Prudential Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hydari Ghee Industries Ltd. and 9 others 1999 MLD 1964 and Messrs Bank of Oman Limited v. Messrs East Asia Trading Co. Ltd. and 4 others 1987 CLC 288 fol.\n \n(b) Pleadings---\n \n---Litigant could not be allowed to raise before Appellate/ Revisional Court altogether a new and different plea, which had not been raised before lower forums---Principles illustrated.\n \nAnwar Ali and others v. Manzoor Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 1770 and Amir Shah v. Ziarat Gul 1998 SCMR 593 rel.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.9---Suit for mandatory injunction by borrower/customer against Banking Company---Maintainable.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.36 and 163 of 1998, heard on 25-05-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD MUSHTAQ and others\nVs.\nMessrs UNITED BANK LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13402",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1784 = 2005 SLD 1784 = 2005 CLD 1760",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19---Execution of money decree---Sale of car for satisfaction of decree---Plea of decree-holder Bank was that disputed car purchased by deceased -debtor in his daughter's name after institution of suit by Bank was a benami transaction---Daughter claiming to be real owner of car produced statement of account showing payment of its price through cheque to Modaraba Company and its Registration Book standing in her name---Banking Court declared such transaction to be benami---Validity---Deceased -debtor in his letters addressed to Modaraba Company, after institution of suit, had stated that he owned no vehicles, thus, wanted to purchase car for his own use, but wanted its transfer in his daughter's name---Statement of account produced by daughter related to her Foreign Currency Dollar Account, which did not reconcile with cheque issued by her in local currency---Nothing on record to show that daughter had ever negotiated with Modaraba Company either in writing or orally to show her intention of purchasing disputed car---Such circumstances indicated that disputed car in fact had been purchased by deceased for his own use---High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.\n \nJane Margrete Willian v. Abdul Hamid Mian 1994 CLC 1437 and Muhammad Sajjad Hussain v. Muhammad Anwar Hussain 1991 SCMR 703 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.55 of 2003, heard on 29-06-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD AND MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI, JJ",
    "": "RABIA IKRAM and 5 others\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13403",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1785 = 2005 SLD 1785 = 2005 CLD 1764",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.2(e)(d), 9 & 10---Suit against Bank for recovery of amount---Refusal of bank to encash bank guarantee issued in plaintiffs favour---Application for leave to defend suit---Plea of Bank was that plaintiff was neither its customer nor issuance of such guarantee would constitute 'finance\"\" as defined in S.2 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Definition of \"\"customer\"\" as given in Ordinance, 2001 included a person on whose, behalf a guarantee was issued, but omitted therefrom the person in whose favour guarantee was given---Defendant had raised substantial question of law and fact entitling it leave to defend suit---Defendant was granted leave to defend suit on furnishing its own guarantee ensuring satisfaction of decree, if passed against it.\n \nKarachi Electric Provident Fund v. National Investment (Unit) Trust and others 2003 CLD 1026; National Electric Company of Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited v. Prime Commercial Bank Limited 2003 CLD 856; Messrs National Motors Ltd. v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd., Karachi 1982 CLC 236 and Qatar Airways PLC v. ANZ Grindlays Bank 2000 CLC 1455 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "P.L.A. No.11-B and C.O.S. No.3-B of 2005, decision dated: 25-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED, J",
    "": "PAKISTAN WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (WAPDA) through Authorized Signatory--Plaintiff\nVs.\nAMERICAN EXPRESS BANK LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13404",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1786 = 2005 SLD 1786 = 2005 CLD 1781",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, Rr. 10 & 11---Suit for recovery of damages against Bank and insurance company---Return of plaint.---Appellant. had claimed that lie availed various financial facilities from Bank and in that regard he pledged his stock of 'pesticides as primary security which remained under control and possession of the Bank and that said shock was insured with the Company approved by the Bank after making payment of premium amount---Appellant had alleged that said stock was stolen against which F.I.R. was registered, but claim or appellant with regard to stolen stock, was declined by the Insurance Company without any justification---Application of Insurance Company for deletion of its name from array of respondents was dismissed---Bank filed application for rejection of plaint under O. VII, R.11, C.P.C. and Banking Court allowed said application vide impugned order and returned plaint to appellant holding that Banking Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon matter of damages claimed by appellant---Validity---Loan facility provided by the. Bank, was availed by appellant and Insurance company had nothing to do for recovery of said loan facility---Suit filed by Bank against appellant for committing default in return of said finance facility had already been decreed---Insurance Policy in respect of goods, which were to be imported against L/C opened by the Bank on behalf' of borrower, was not covered by definition of \"\"Borrower\"\" as given in. Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and an indemnifier was not an indemnifier in the sense in which it had been used in the definition of word \"\"borrower\"\"---Banking Court, had no jurisdiction to entertain claim of appellant as it was not the case of appellant that Bank had committed any default in discharge of finance facility to appellant: or any obligation thereto---Damages having not been claimed by appellant on the basis of default in finance facility provided to him, Banking Court had rightly found that it had no jurisdiction in the matter---In absence of any infirmity or illegality in impugned order passed by Banking Court, same was maintained and appeal against was dismissed by the High Court.\n \n1988 CLC 1969; PLD 2001 Lah. 313; 2003 CLD 1843; 2004 CLD 239 and 1988 CLC 1668 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.8 of 2005, heard on 4-07-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND IJAZ AHMAD CHAUDHRY, JJ",
    "": "ADIEU (PVT.) LIMITED through Directors/ Chief Executives\nVs.\nPLATINUM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through President/Chairman/Chief Executive/ Managing Director and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13405",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1787 = 2005 SLD 1787 = 2005 CLD 1787",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 10 & 21---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to defend suit---Total sanctioned loan was not disbursed and the Bank unilaterally reduced the finance of Rs.19.900 million to 5.99 million ---Un disbursed amount was recalled---Bank invited quotations for supply and manufacture of machinery, the quotation of one party was accepted by the Bank and the amount was directly disbursed to the manufacturer---Contentions of the borrowers carried weight that the relationship of the lender and borrower was governed by financing agreement and the mark-up etc., could only be claimed when there was actual sale and purchase---Nothing was available on record to prove as to who was responsible for non-delivery of the machinery---Banking Court, while passing the impugned decree had failed to attend to questions as to whether delay caused in mare facture of the machinery, was attributable to the Bank's non-disbursement, or the borrower's neglect and whether any actual transaction took place between the parties---Commitment charges could be claimed only when a party failed to honour its commitment under a contract---Borrowers, in the present case, were willing to avail the finance and perform their contractual obligations but the Bank recalled its undisbursed finance---Partial disbursement to manufacturer who had not delivered the machinery to the borrowers, could not make the borrowers liable to pay, unless it was proved that the borrowers were responsible, due to their non-performance of contractual obligation, for non-delivery of machinery---Such questions were sufficient for the grant of leave to defend the suit, as the controversy between the parties needed to be resolved, after proper trial---Banking Court, while passing the impugned decree, had not discussed all such questions at all---Leave to defend the suit, in circumstances, had to be granted to the borrowers---High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the decree of 'the Banking Court and granted leave to defend the suit subject to the condition that a sum of Rs.8,00,000, already deposited by the borrowers, shall remain as security---Trial Court was directed to decide the suit within a period of three months positively.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.79 of 2000, heard on 28-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MENAHIL TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 3 others\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13406",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1788 = 2005 SLD 1788 = 2005 CLD 1790",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.2, 9 & 10---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, (XV of 1997), Ss.2, 9 & 10---Punjab Small Industries Corporation was not only covered under the definition of the 'Banking Company\"\" as given in Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, but also fell in the definition of \"\"Financial Institution\"\" as provided under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court, in the present case, had returned the plaint in the suit against the Corporation holding that Banking Court could not deal with the case against Punjab Small Industries Corporation, same being not a Banking Company \"\"---Validity---Held, Banking Court had committed grave legal error in rendering said , which needed to be rectified---High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the of Banking Court and observed that appellant's suit for redemption and the corporation's application for the grant of leave to defend the suit shall be deemed to be pending before the Banking Court, which shall decide after hearing the parties and in accordance with law.\n \nPunjab Small Industries Corporation and 2 others v. Haji Cold Storage and another 2004 CLD 1424 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 183 of 2005, heard on 20-07-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs AMJAD POLYTHENE BAG INDUSTRIES through Sole Proprietor\nVs.\nPUNJAB SMALL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION through Managing Director"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13407",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1789 = 2005 SLD 1789 = 2005 CLD 1794",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 20---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.439 & 561-A---private complaint---Offence under S.20, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Before any prosecution can be launched against persons of said offence, it would have to be shown that said persons were involved in the offence in question viz. violation of the letter of hypothecation etc. and leasing out of the mortgaged properties and that the persons with a guilty mind had indulged in such offence---Nothing, in the present case, was available on record to establish as much and when the persons (accused) had already resigned as directors of the Company before the offence in question was committed, they could not be implicated in the same---High Court, in circumstances, quashed the proceedings under the private complaint against the said persons---Principles.\n \nSection 20(1)(a) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which creates the offence in question provides that whoever dishonestly commits a breach of the terms of a letter of hypothecation, a trust receipt or any other instrument or document executed by him as security of repayment of finance, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description. Similarly, section 20(1)(c) provides that whoever subsequent to the creation of a mortgage in favour of a Financial Institution dishonestly alienates or parts with the possession of the mortgaged property without permission of the Financial Institution shall also be similarly punished. In the present case, admittedly the applicants had resigned as Directors of the Company much before the alleged offences under section 20(1)(a) of the Ordinance were committed after the private complaint. Similarly it would be seen that section 20(5) of the Ordinance clearly stipulates that where the person guilty of an offence is a Company or other body corporate, the Chief Executive or by whatever name he be called and any director or officer involved shall be deemed to be guilty of such offence and shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished accordingly. Before any prosecution can be launched against the such persons, it would have to be shown that they were involved in the offence in question viz. violation of the letter of hypothecation etc. and leasing out of the mortgaged properties. Needless to say it would further have to be shown that the applicants with a guilty mind had indulged in such offence. There is nothing on the record to establish as much and indeed when the applicants had already resigned as directors of the Company before the offence in question was committed, they could hardly be implicated in the same.\n \nTehmina Bashir v. Abdul Rauf 1995 CLC 973; Taj Muhammad v. The State PLD 1979 Quetta 176 and Muhammad Ibrahim v. Muhammad Hanif 1983 PCr.LJ 1051 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Revision Application No.120 of 2004, decision dated: 28-06-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY AND AZIZULLAH M. MEMON, JJ",
    "": "IRSLAN SIDDIQ and 3 others--Applicants\nVs.\nTHE STATE and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13408",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1790 = 2005 SLD 1790 = 2005 CLD 1799",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------Ss.12 & 6---Suit for recovery of loan---Limitation---Law of limitation did not apply to the suits filed under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984.\n \nMuhammad Ramzan and 4 others v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan 2004 CLD 1376 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss.6 & 9---Suit for recovery of loan---Three Directors of the borrowing Company had executed various documents at the time of availing of the loan, including the personal guarantees of said three Directors of the borrowing Company---Said three Directors were sued as such, in their personal capacity---Company's failure to liquidate their liabilities, resulted into institution of suit for recovery against them---Leave to defend the suit was granted to defendants---None of the three Directors, had appeared as a witness---Solitary witness from the borrowers' side was one who was a stranger to the transaction and his statement had no evidentiary value---Said witness had shown his inability to tell the area of the borrowers' Mills, the number of Directors of the borrower Company or the source from where the funds for the establishment of the Mills were arranged---Said witness, in his statement, had admitted that he had once visited the city where the Company was located that too a year earlier---Bank, on the other hand, had produced three witnesses who had produced all the relevant documents in original in support of the assertions made in the plaint---Banking Tribunal had passed the decree after considering all these facts and High Court did not find any infirmity in the and decree of the Tribunal and dismissed the appeal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.572 of 2001, heard on 18-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs TERMIZI OIL INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED through Director and 3 others\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Senior VicEPresident Regional Office, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13409",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1791 = 2005 SLD 1791 = 2005 CLD 1823",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)--------Ss.10 & 21---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to defend the suit---Said application was dismissed for non-prosecution and, simultaneously, the decree was passed in favour of the Bank---Defendant did not file any appeal but moved an application for setting aside ex parte decree on the ground that the date was erroneously. noted as 14-10-1998 instead of 24-9-1998; along with application, affidavit of the counsel of the defendant was also filed---Banking Court had dismissed the application, primarily, misconceiving that there was no affidavit of the above fact---Validity---Whether the date was erroneously noted or otherwise was a question of fact, and if there was any doubt in the mind of the Court that the plea of the appellant, was not fully substantiated from the available record, even, on account of the affidavit of the counsel to the above effect, the Court should have allowed the parties to produce the evidence---Considering the contents of the application accompanied by the affidavit of the counsel, which had not been positively controverted by the Bank, a sufficient cause for the restoration of the application for leave to appear and defend, was made out by the appellant and his application in this behalf should have been allowed---High Court, in circumstances, allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the dismissal of the appellant's application for leave to defend the suit for non-prosecution, with the result that the ex parte decree of the Banking Court also stood set aside---Application of the appellant should be deemed pending before the Banking Court which would be decided in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.327 of 2000, heard on 22-06-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Syed RASHID HUSSAIN --Appellant\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Managing Director and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13410",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1792 = 2005 SLD 1792 = 2005 CLD 1825",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------Ss. 5, 6 & 9 --- Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.84---Suit for recovery against the borrower and guarantor---Guarantor denied to have stood guarantor of the borrower or to have executed and signed the guarantee papers and alleged that guarantee documents were result of forgery and fraud on the part of bank---Alleged guarantor stated to have no connection with the borrower personally or with her business and further raised objection that in such cases the bank was expected to assess and verify the credibility and financial worth oj' the alleged guarantor before accepting him as such but the bank did not bother to do the same---Alleged guarantor took a specific plea that it was unbelievable that lie would execute alleged guarantee on 13-8-1985 after expiry of the maturity date viz. 26-12-1984 by which date amount due from the borrower on account of L.Cs. opened on her request was to be repaid---Guarantor also pleaded that it looked incredible that he would execute one and the same guarantee in respect of two finances, the subject-matter of two suits and that stamp papers used for guarantee appeared to have been purchased on 8-3-1986 whereas the date of alleged guarantee on the said stamp papers was shown to be 13-8-1985 which itself was sufficient to show the falsehood of the claim of the bank---Validity---Held, that plaintiff had failed to prove the case justifying a decree against the alleged guarantor particularly in view of specific plea taken by him that he neither executed the guarantee documents nor stood as guarantor for repayment of the loan obtained by the borrower, having no means to stand as guarantor, it was under the circumstances necessary for the bank to have examined his wroth before accepting him as a guarantor---Nothing was available on record to rebut the plea of the guarantor that he was an employee in a private firm on a monthly salary of Rs.4,500 and had no other moveable or immovable property---Mere fact that the borrower was paternal-aunt of the alleged guarantor was not sufficient to establish that he stood as a guarantor for the borrower---Banking Tribunal should have taken the burden upon itself of comparing the admitted signatures of the alleged guarantor on his identity card, passport and affidavit filed in Court with the disputed signatures on the form of guarantee---Expert opinion had its own importance, nevertheless under Art.84, Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, Court was not prohibited or debarred from comparing the admitted and disputed signatures under the particular circumstances of a case---Appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case had led the Banking Tribunal to rightly hold that Bank had not been straightforward in explaining the circumstances in which the alleged guarantor had allegedly executed guarantee on behalf of the borrower---Claim for liquidated damages, in absence of any evidence and proof as required under the law, was also rightly declined by the Banking Tribunal---No illegality or material irregularity having been found by the High Court in the findings recorded by the Banking Tribunal, appeal was dismissed.\n \nMst. Fatima v. Abdul Razzak 1988 SCMR 1449 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I.A. No.53 of 1996, decision dated: 9-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED --Appellant\nVs.\nSAKEENA and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13411",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1793 = 2005 SLD 1793 = 2005 CLD 1830",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)-------S. 9---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.8---Suit for recovery of balance amount under decree of Banking Court---Defendant for availing finance facility from other Bank offered to plaintiff-Bank during execution of decree to accept payment of Rs.40 million in satisfaction of its claim---Plaintiff accepted such offer and sent letter dated 17-I0-2002 to other Bank confirming its assent to release security documents subject to payment of Rs.40 million---Other Bank through letter dated 22-10-2002 forwarded to plaintiff pay order for Rs.40 million as full and final settlement of liabilities of defendant---Plaintiff encashed pay order, released security documents and issued NOC for vacation of charge---Plaintiff ; thereafter, filed suit on the ground that plaintiff, through letter dated 19-10-2002, had informed defendant regarding issuance of its letter to other Bank on the express condition that defendant would pay residual balance of Rs.3.20 million within 12 months---Validity---Nothing on record was available to show that defendant had accepted claim of plaintiff conveyed through letter dated 19-10-2002---Such letter would carry no weight as the same could, at the most, be considered a. proposal without its acceptance in express terms---Acceptance of any consideration offered with proposal, would amount to acceptance---Plaintiff by accepting conditional offer, getting pay-order encashed and releasing documents unconditionally had abandoned its claim for residual amount and right to recover same stood waived---Suit was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Contract Act (LY of 1872)---\n \n----S.8---Acceptance of any consideration offered with proposal would amount to acceptance.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.292 of 2004, heard on 19-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "SAYID PAPER MILLS (PRIVATE) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 2 others\nVs.\nTRUST INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED through Chief Executive"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13412",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1794 = 2005 SLD 1794 = 2005 CLD 1834",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 2---Suit for recovery of loan---Banking Court in its had remarked that \"\"in spite of failure of the plaintiff to prove any issue, Court had to act on the principles of equity which demanded justice; that record produced in Court had shown including loan ledgers and bounded computerized statements though ruled out of consideration, but still in addition to the already produced documents clearly showed that borrower had benefited itself from the finances provided by the bank; that though the other issues had failed but the advances could not be denied by the borrower; that execution of documents had not been denied but had been shrouded; that by being shrouded, the execution of documents could not be thrown aside; that factum of availing advances could not be disputed by virtue of lack of or improper statements; that statements though irregularly prepared, could not give scot free licence to the borrowers to gallop the public money and that plaintiff was not entitled to claim any mark-up or liquidated damages and that bank was entitled to the principal amount\"\"---Validity---Held, from perusal of the of the Banking Court, it was absolutely clear that the Trial Court had committed grave illegalities---Impugned was full of contradictions, arbitrary, whimsical and against the principles of administration of justice as the same had been written in a careless manner inasmuch as the conclusions drawn and findings given on the issues framed and the relief granted could not have been granted being absolutely contrary to the evidence and findings---High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the and remanded the case to Trial Judge for re-writing the in accordance with law of evidence and Banking laws after providing opportunities to the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I.A. No.52 of 2004, heard on 25-11-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD C.J. AND MAQBOOL BAQAR, J",
    "": "Messrs SARA CORPORATION and others --Appellants\nVs.\nMessrs HABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13413",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1795 = 2005 SLD 1795 = 2005 CLD 1837",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11--- Rejection of plaint---Cause of action, absence of---Deficiency in court-fee---Payment of fixed court-fee --- Scope --- Suitfor rendition of accounts was filed by borrowers against financial institution---Banking Court rejected the suit on the ground that the borrowers having admitted their liability, there was no cause of action left and deficiency in court fee was not provided---Validity---Borrowers were only required and liable to pay that much amount to which the financial institution was entitled, according to the terms of the agreement between the parties and so truly reflected in statement of accounts---If it was otherwise, there was no obligation of the borrowers to pay the amount only because same was mentioned in the accounts statement---Such was the complaint of borrowers before Banking Court, which was not attended to in accordance with law---Banking Court should have considered the contents of the plaint in terms of the agreement and only then had decided the competency or validity of suit or institution of the same with oblique motive---On the suit for rendition of account, fixed court fee was payable---If it was so affixed, there was no question of any deficiency, resulting into the rejection of plaint---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R. F.A. No.303 of 2004, heard on 13-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND TANVIR BASHIR ANSARI, JJ",
    "": "Ch. FEROZ DIN and another\nVs.\nHOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13414",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1796 = 2005 SLD 1796 = 2005 CLD 1847",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S. 21---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29(2)---Appeal---Condonation of delay---Provision of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 not applicable to an appeal under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997.\n \nSiddiq M. Malik and others v. Al-Baraka Islamic Investment Bank, B.S.C. and another 2002 CLD 1694 and Majeed Akbar Farooqi v. Bank of Punjab 2002 CLD 778 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S. 21--- Appeal---Condonation of delay---Judgment/decree were passed on 25-6-1998---Application for certified copies was made on 16-9-1998, which were supplied on 21-9-1998---Appeal was filed on 26-9-1998---Plea of appellant was that he met with an accident on 2-6-1998 and was advised bed rest from 21-6-1998 for six weeks and then from 2-8-1998 for another seven weeks; and that bar oj' limitation would not operate as impugned / decree were void---Validity---Had appellant met with an accident on 2-6-1998 resulting into fracture of his three ribs, then he should have been in hospital on 2-6-1998---Two certificates of private medical practitioners did not show hospitalization of appellant and if so, for what period---Copies of /decree were made available on 21-9-1998, but there was no explanation of period from 21-9-1998 to 26-9-1998---Judgment1decree passed by a Court of law could not be ignored by raising a plea that same being void, thus, bar of limitation would not apply---High Court dismissed appeal as barred by time.\n \nMessrs Conforce Ltd. v. Syed Ali Shah and others PLD 1977 SC 599 rel.\n \n(c) Limitation---\n \n----Void /decree---Bar of limitation---Applicability---Judgment/decree passed by a Court of law could not be ignored by raising a plea that same being void, bar of limitation would not operate.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.344 and C.M. 2-C of 1998, heard on 30-03-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED, JAMSHED ALI AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MUDASSAR WEAVING FACTORY through Sole Proprietor and another\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through General Manager\nMessrs Conforce Ltd. v. Syed Ali Shah etc. PLD 1977 SC 599 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13415",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1797 = 2005 SLD 1797 = 2005 CLD 1850",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.30---Money decree, execution of---Payment in instalments---Scope---Executing Court could not allow debtor to pay decretal amount in instalments.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E. F.A. No.255 of 2004, heard on 15-07-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED\nVs.\nGUL BADEEN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13416",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2005 1798 = 2005 SLD 1798 = 2005 CLD 1852",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. VII. R.I I---Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000), Ss.28 &. 29---Suit under Ss.28 &. 29, Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000 in the High Court---Rejection of plaint---Principles---Application for rejection of plaint is to be considered and decided on the assumption that whatever is stated in the plaint is true, therefore, the defects that. may be made a ground of decision. by the Court must float: on the surface of plaint or the plaintiffs case as presented to the Court---Where the plaintiffs, for dearth of their own record, had relied on the documents attached with the written statement filed by the defendant, High Court examined the plaint and documents filed therewith and also the documents attached with the written statement in order to comprehend the case of the plaintff s and also to assess the defects alleged therein.\n \n(b) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)----\n \n----Ss.28 & 29---Transfer of Managed Establishments Order P.O.12 of 1978, Schedule---General Rules for Estimating Break-up Value of Industrial Projects, para. A---Suit under Ss.28 & 29 of Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000 by the previous owner of the company with application for injunction against further action by the Privatization Commission inviting expression of interest: from the public about the sale of shares of the company---\"\"Specified persons\"\" (previous owners)---Right of \"\"specified persons\"\" described in Schedule of Transfer of Managed Establishments Order, 1978 and grant: them a right to match the highest bid received by the Federal Government for the transfer of shares or proprietary interests of the managed establishment. relevant to them---Application of plaintiffs for revision/adjustment of' matching price on the ground that value of shares of the company had deteriorated considerably after the highest bid per share which was received in 1991---Validity---Held, at a practical level of 'appreciation and resolution of claim of the plaintiffs, the most obvious way to evaluate/assess the alleged diminution in the value of the assets and/or shares of 'the company was to put them up for bidding by interested third parties---Bids would bring out the real value of' such assets or shares and vindicate or disprove the stand taken by the plaintiff s---Prayer made in the stay application and the suit however, showed that the plaintiffs were averse to such a course of action; and an injunction was sought against further action by the Privatization Commission inviting expression of interest from the public about the sale of shares or the company---Blocking the bidding for the said shares by any interested party shall have the effect of preventing market valuation of the shares and/or assets of the company and further delaying sale of 'the shares until an undefined accounting exercise for valuation was agreed, initiated, undertaken and completed---If so allowed, the pendency of the suit might have the effect of both depriving the Privatization Commission of new buyers for the shares or assets of the company apart from compelling it to accede the demands of the plaintiffs---If such a situation was allowed to be created that would constitute an abuse of the process of Court---Plaintiffs were asserting a legal right to pre-empt the sale of' the company's shares which right could not be exercised in a manner that blocked the sale without making a deposit of the price, inter alia, by disputing the same on hitherto new and untested grounds---To maintain their pre-emptive claim, the plaintiffs must demonstrate their seriousness to honour and capacity to carry out the sale' transaction---High Court, in circumstances, directed the plaintiffs to make down payment of earnest money of Rupees seventy-five million representing about 9% of the total sale consideration payable by the plaintiffs at the matching price of the share of the company---To make a down payment of the said amount would be a minimal evidence of the plaintiffs' bona fides and capacity to pursue its objections---Said amount shall be deposited by the plaintiffs with the Deputy Registrar of the High Court within two weeks of a certified copy of present order becoming available to the parties---Said amount shall, in consultation with the counsel for the parties, be invested in an income yielding scheme till further orders---High Court observed that direction for deposit in Court was given to the plaintiffs as an interim measure to secure the interests of the parties---Sale proceedings of the shares of the company offered by the Privatization Commission pursuant to its public notice shall continue for the determination of the highest bid---Such bid shall be convened to the high Court for bringing on record the market valuation of the shares of the company and in the meanwhile the present suit would progress for the determination of the existence of the plaintiffs' claimed right to adjustment of the matching price for the shares under sale of the company and whether such right, if at all in existence, was lost by virtue of the Supreme Court or otherwise by any bar under law or by the efflux of time---Such questions might not require an elaborate enquiry yet they did require determination which was not possible to be done summarily---Pleadings of the parties having already been filed, High Court directed the parties to propose preliminary issues that arose for determination by the High Court with respect to the existence or otherwise of the necessary conditions for the continuation of the present suit---Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.2 and C.Ms. Nos.438-L and 1 of 2005, decision dated: 18-07-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "Mian FAROOQ AHMED SHEIKH and 8 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nPRIVATIZATION COMMISSION through Chairman and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13417",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2825 = 2006 SLD 2825 = 2006 CLD 18",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-------Art. 199---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.20---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 10 & 15---Constitutional petition ---Vires of a Federal Law applicable to whole Pakistan---Territorial jurisdiction of High Court, where neither aggrieved person or respondent resided nor property situated---Extent---Provision of S.20, C.P.C. could not be pressed into service or read in Art. 199 of the Constitution---Constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court not contingent upon residence of an aggrieved person---Writ could be issued against any person/authority/functionary of the State performing function irrespective of its nature relating to the affairs of Federation, Province or Local Authority within territorial jurisdiction of such High Court---Principles.\n \nUnder Article 199 of the Constitution, writ can be issued against any person, who is performing in the Province any function irrespective of its nature relating to the affairs of the Federation, Province or a Local Authority within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court. In the present case, petitioner had challenged the vires of section 10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 i.e. the law equally applicable to the Province of Balochistan, which is the main relief claimed' in the constitutional petition, whereas the other relief for declaring public auction notices as illegal, void or setting aside auction proceedings carried out in the exercise of the powers conferred under section 15(4), are ancillary to the main relief, as such, Balochistan High Court has the jurisdiction in the matter, which cannot be ousted only on the ground that the properties auctioned and purchased happened to be situated outside its jurisdiction or that respondents were residing outside its jurisdiction, because the jurisdiction conferred on a High Court is not contingent upon residence of an aggrieved person, but it requires that a person/ authority/ functionary of State against whom order was sought to be issued should be operating or be amenable to the jurisdiction of High Court, therefore, the provision of section 20, C.P.C. cannot be pressed into service or read in Article 199; as vires of the Federal Law has been challenged, which is applicable to whole of the Pakistan.\n \nThe dominant object for filing of present petition was to challenge the validity and vires of section 15 of Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, thus, Balochistan High Court had the jurisdiction in the matter.\n \n1996 CLC 539; 1995 CLC 1027; PLD 1988 SC 387 and PLD 1987 SC 334 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 15---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), 5.18---Non-payment of Bank loan---Sale of mortgaged property without intervention of Court---Plea of borrower was that provision of S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would not apply to loan obtained by him in year 1997, when no such provision was available in Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Validity---Non-payment of loan. would be a continuing breach of duty/obligation and a continuing default---Contractual obligation of borrower to repay loan would not expire, but would continue till its payment as per terms of agreement---No question of retrospectivity would arise as long as such liability remained undischarged.\n \nPLD 2001 SC 607 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) ---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 15---7Mnsfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.69---Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S.40---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.4, 25 & 175---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4---Non¬payment of Bank loan---Sale of mortgaged property with or without intervention of Court---Option of Bank---Scope---Provision of S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Statute providing more than one remedies against a defaulter or different statutes providing various modes for recovery could not be termed as an arbitrary and unreasonable provision of laver--Provisions of S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were neither innovation nor novel nor alien to statute book, but similar provisions were also available in other statutes prevalent in Pakistan and India---Question of creating a parallel judicial system would not arise as provision of S.15 of the Ordinance, did not completely oust jurisdiction of Banking Court, but gave choice to Bank either to press into service such provision or to bring suit under S.9 thereof---Provisions of S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were neither unreasonable and arbitrary nor violative of principles of natural justice or Arts. 4, 25 and 175 of 11he Constitution--- Reasons.\n \nIt has not been provided by the law that there can be only one remedy available for recovery of loans, advances etc. from defaulters namely recourse through Courts. Any statute may in appropriate cases provide for more than one remedy against a defaulter for recovery of the dues or it may be that various modes for recovery have been or can be provided in different enactments. Special remedies may be available in favour or against a particular class of person. Where in a statute or special enactment two or more remedies have been provided against the same defaulter, the powers so conferred and exercisable ipso facto cannot be termed as an arbitrary and unreasonable provision of law and more particularly when guidelines to control the discretionary powers to be exercised have been given, which need not necessarily be specifically enumerated in the very section or provision conferring such powers. The guidelines can be gathered from the other provisions of the statute, the preamble and the surrounding circumstances.\n \nThe provisions contained in section 15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 are neither innovation nor novel as similar provisions already exist in a number of statutes, such as section 69 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, wherein a mortgagee can sell mortgaged property without intervention of the Court and he may not file a suit for that purpose in a Court of law, but this does not mean that it cannot be done at all. If the mortgagee finds any difficulty in proceeding without assistance of the Court, he may take a decision to go to a Court of law, but it is a decision of the mortgagee and at this stage no quasi-judicial function is involved. Similar provisions are also available in section 40 of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, 1961, empowering Bank to take over the management of hypothecated goods etc., in case the industrial concern makes any default in payment or fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Bank.\n \nIn India, section 20 of State Financial Corporation Act (LXIII of 1951) also contains similar provisions giving right to Financial Corporation to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concern as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realize the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation where an industrial concern, which is under a liability to Financial Corporation under an agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or meeting with its obligation in relation to any guarantee given to the Corporation or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of agreement with Financial Corporation. Subsection (5) of section 29 provides that where Financial Corporation has taken any action against an industrial concern under the provisions of subsection (1), the Financial Corporation shall be deemed to be the owner of such concern for the purpose of suits by or against the concern and shall be sued and be sued in the name of the concern.\n \nSufficient safeguards and guidelines have been provided in section 15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. Proviso to subsection (4) of section 15 of the Ordinance provides that before taking action under said subsection, the financial institution shall cause to be published a notice in one of the reputable English Daily Newspaper widely circulated and one in Urdu Newspaper in the Province in which the mortgaged property is situated specifying particulars of the mortgaged property including name and address of the mortgagor, details of the mortgaged property, amount of outstanding mortgaged money and indicating intention of the financial institution to sell the mortgaged property. Besides sending such notices to all persons, who have an interest in the mortgaged property as mortgagees has been made mandatory. Likewise subsection (9) thereof provides that any surplus left after paying in full all the dues of the mortgagees shall be paid to the mortgagor. Further safeguard has been provided under subsection (10) thereof, whereby it has been made mandatory for a financial institution, which has sold mortgaged property to file proper accounts of the sale proceeds in a Banking Court within 30 days of the Sale.\n \nUnder section 9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, a customer can file a suit against the financial institution in the Banking Court, and by virtue of subsection (12) of section 15 thereof, neither Banking Court nor High Court shall grant an injunction restraining the sale or proposed sale of mortgaged property, unless it is satisfied that no mortgage in respect of immovable property has been created or all moneys secured by mortgage of property have been paid or mortgagor or objector has deposited in Banking Court in cash outstanding mortgaged money. The words \"\"proposed sale\"\" suggest that these provisions are also applicable to a pre-sale dispute and not confined to post-sale dispute. Similarly subsection (11) of section 15 of the Ordinance stipulates that all disputes relating to the sale of mortgaged property under this section including dispute amongst mortgagees in respect of the distribution of sale proceeds shall be decided by Banking Court, thus, the jurisdiction of Banking Court has not been completely ousted and the customer can even after issuance of notices provided under subsection (2) thereof approach to Banking Court in case he disputes his liabilities, therefore, the question of creating a parallel judicial system does not arise. However, it has been left to the choice of Bank either to press into service the provision of section 15 or to bring a suit as provided under section 9 of the Ordinance. Similar provisions in the shape of section 69 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are prevalent in the country for the last more than hundred years, as such it cannot be said that the provisions providing sale of mortgaged property without intervention of the Court incorporated in Ordinance, 2001 are unreasonable and arbitrary, particularly keeping in view the circumstances as highlighted in a   of Supreme Court reported in PLD 2001 SC 607, which necessitated for the enactment of such provisions.\n \nSimilarly, while couching language of section 15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, Legislature has kept in mind the principles of natural justice as before taking action under section 15(4) thereof, the Bank is required to issue three notices; first notice demanding payment of mortgaged money outstanding within 14 days from service of notice and failing payment of amount within due date to send a second notice of demand for payment of amount within 14 days. In case, the customer continues to default in payment 'despite second notice, the financial institution has to serve a final notice on the mortgagor demanding payment of mortgaged money outstanding within 30 days from service of the final notice on the customer.\n \nAccording to Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, a statement of accounts carries presumption of truth, therefore, if any liabilities have been shown in said statement, the same would be presumed to be true, unless contrary is proved. Therefore, on the basis of statement of account, the Bank can issue demand notice as envisaged in subsection (2) of section 15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, if it decides to proceed under section 15(4) thereof to sell the mortgaged property without intervention of the Court.\n \nThus, the provisions of section 15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 are neither innovation nor alien to the statute book nor aimed to militate Articles 4 and 175 of the Constitution nor the same can be termed to be arbitrary, discriminatory and despotic provisions.\n \nPLD 1998 SC 1445; PLD 1999 SC 1126; PLD 1996 Lah. 672; PLD 1957 SC 157; PLD 1988 SC 416; 1992 SCMR 563; PLD 20()3 Kar. 127; 2002 CLD 962; 2004 CLD 1600; AIR 1942 All. 50; AIR 1973 Dehli 28; AIR 1976 Andh. Para. 93; AIR 1982 Gujarat 198; AIR 1993 SC 935; AIR 1988 SC 686 and PLD 2000 Lah. 508 ref.\n \nAIR 1990 Gujarat 105; AIR 1955 Mad. 455; PLD. 2001 SC 607; PLD 1997 SC 582 and PLD 1989 Quetta 8 rel.\n \n(d) Administration of justice---\n \n----Every procedure would be understood as permissible unless prohibited by law--Every Court must, in absence of an express provision to the contrary, be deemed to possess itself inherent powers to do right and undo wrongs---Principles.\n \nCourts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure has to be taken as prohibited, unless it is expressly provided for, but are to act on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible, till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle, prohibition cannot be presumed. Every Court must, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, be deemed to possess inherent in itself such powers as are necessary to do right and to undo wrong in the course of administration of justice.\n \nAIR 1955 Mad. 455 fol.\n \n(e) Interpretation of statute---\n \n----Validity of a statute---Presumption---Courts would presume validity of a statue---Burden would lie on a person questioning validity of a statute to show transgression of constitutional principle--- Principles.\n \nThere is a presumption in favour of the validity of a statute, and Courts of law have to presume that the particular law is intra vires and not ultra vires. It is also to be presumed that the power conferred shall be exercised for the purpose for which it has been conferred and shall be exercised reasonably. Presumption is in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him, who questions its validity to show that there has been a transgression of constitutional principles.\n \n(f) Interpretation of statute---\n \n----Reasonableness of a law, determination of---No absolute standard existed for such determination, but would be judged with reference to prevailing circumstances, when particular evil was sought to be remedied.\n \n(g) Natural justice, principles of-\n \n----Principles of natural justice in administrative decision are the principles to act fairly---Authority could proceed in accordance with provisions of law--Action in breach of principles of natural justice could be challenged, but would not vitiate legal provision under which authority took such action.\n \nAIR 1990 Gujarat 105 fol.\n \n \n(h) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n \n----Ss. 3(3) & 15(2)--- Default\"\" as used in S.3(3) and S.15(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Distinction---Definition of the word as given in S.3(3) not applicable to the word used in 5.15(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Reasons.\n \nThe word \"\"default\"\" used .in section 15(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 does not have the same meaning as defined in section 3(3) thereof in view of the language used therein, which provides \"\"for purpose of this section, a   against a customer under this Ordinance shall mean that he is in default of his due duty under subsection (1)\"\". The words \"\"for the purpose of this section\"\" make it manifest that the definition of \"\"default\"\" given in subsection (3) of section 3 only relates to section 3 and is not applicable to the word \"\"default\"\" used in subsection (2) of section 15, which provides that in case of default in payment by customer, the financial institutions may serve a notice on the mortgagor demanding payment of mortgaged money outstanding. The words \"\"default in payment\"\" used in subsection (2) is in respect of mortgaged money outstanding against a customer, which has been defined 'in subsections (1)(b) of section 15, according to which \"\"mortgaged money\"\" means any finance or other amounts relating to a finance, penalties, damages, charges or pecuniary liabilities, payment of which is secured for the time being by the document by which mortgage is effected or evidenced including any mortgage deed or memorandum of deposit of title deeds. Thus, the words \"\"default in payment of mortgaged money.\"\" used in section 15 of Ordinance, 2001 cannot be given the same meaning as defined in section 3(3) thereof.\n \n(i) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 15---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.25---Classification of customer under Ss.9 & 15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Reasonable -- - Principles.\n \nProvisions of section 15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 are applicable only to the class of those individuals, who have mortgaged their properties in order to obtain finance facilities/ loans, but failed to repay the amount as agreed and are defaulters, whereas for other classes of customers, whose loans are not based on mortgage, the Bank has to file suit under S.9 thereof, which is a reasonable classification.\n \n(j) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 25---Reasonable classification---Purpose---Maintenance of equilibrium between two contending interests at stake---Principles.\n \nAbsolute and un-restricted individual rights do not exist in a modern State and there is no such thing as absolute and un-controlled liberty. The collective interest of the society, peace and security of State and the maintenance of public order are of paramount importance in an organized society, if the State is in danger, the liberties of the people are themselves in danger. It is for these reasons that an equilibrium has to be maintained between the contending interests at stake, (1) the individual liberties and the fundamental rights of citizens and the other need to impose social control and reasonable limitation on the enjoyment of those rights in the interest of collective good of the society.\n \n(k) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)----\n \n---Art. 25---Equality of citizens before law --Connotation.\n \nArticle 25 of the Constitution guarantees equality of all citizens before law and their entitlement to get equal protection, but equality of citizen does not mean that all law must apply to all the subjects or that all the subjects must have the same rights and liabilities. Therefore, treating of a class of citizens differently from another class, which was not similarly situated, would not offend against the fundamental rights of equal protection of law. However, such classification should be reasonable.",
    "Court Name:": "Quetta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.321 of 2003, decision dated: 27-07-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJA FAYYAZ AHMED, C.J. AND AKHTAR ZAMAN MALGHANI, J",
    "": "Sh. ABDUL SATTAR LASI er\nVs.\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad High Court High Court and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13418",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2826 = 2006 SLD 2826 = 2006 CLD 52",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -------Ss. 27 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.9 & S.151---Dismissal of suit by Banking Court for non-prosecution as the plaintiff and his counsel were absent ---Plaintiff filed application under O.IX, R.9, C.P.C. read with S.151, C.P.C. before the High Court for recalling the said order---Maintainability---Provision of S.27, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 are subject to S.22 of the Ordinance under which an appeal is provided against final order of the Banking Court, therefore, the procedure has been provided in the Ordinance itself to deal with the final order---Procedure as laid down in OJX, R.9 read with S. 151, C.P.C. was not applicable---Banking Court, in the present case had finally disposed of the suit as dismissed for non-prosecution, as such after passing said order, the suit was no more pending before the Banking Court---Order of the Banking Court being final order, same should have been challenged before the Appellate Court and not before the High Court---Application of the plaintiff under O.IX, R.9 read with S.151, C.P.C. was not maintainable which was dismissed by the High Court.\n \nDate of hearing: 11th October, 2005.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Miscellaneous Application No.8611 of 2004 in Suit No. B-66 of 2001, decision dated: 19-10-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAHMAT HUSSAIN, JAFFERI, J",
    "": "Messrs MAKRAN FISHERIES (PVT.) LIMITED\nVs.\nPLATINUM CO."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13419",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2827 = 2006 SLD 2827 = 2006 CLD 55",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962}-----Ss.3(a) & 25(A)---State Bank of Pakistan BCD Circular No.6 of 1990, cl. (5)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Information to State Bank of Pakistan---Grievance of petitioner was that State Bank of Pakistan had provided information to his Bank, which was collected in response to BCD Circular No.6 of 1990, resulting serious damage to his business---Validity---State Bank of Pakistan had developed a mechanism for collecting information from all Banks/NBFI's pertaining to their customers and their status available with them---Purpose of BCD Circular No.6 of 1990, was that from one source any financial institution might in its turn collect information about the financial status of a customer/their customers with other Banks enabling them to decide the course of their business transaction with them---Such mechanism could save financial institutions falling prey to defaulters and axis only aimed at to conduct transparent business and to provide financial institutions, who were holding depositor's funds, to took before they leap' with regard to financial commitment---Practice of collecting such information was in existence in number of countries---Only requirement of BCD Circular No.6 of 1990, was to intimate the authorities about default and liabilities of borrowers vis-à-vis Bank and not vice versa---Bank while informing State Bank of Pakistan, about financial status of petitioner, had not violated any provisions of the Circular---Constitutional petition axis dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P. No.D-870 of 2004, decision dated: 9-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATA-UR-REHMAN AND ZIA PERWAZ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ABDUL AZIZ NAWAB KHAN & COMPANY\nVs.\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, MINISTRY OF FINANCE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13420",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2828 = 2006 SLD 2828 = 2006 CLD 61",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XXV of 1997)-------Ss. 9 & 16---Suit for recovery of loan---Defendant had raised material point of fact that great flood had devastated house in dispute and due to that damage, house had become unsuitable for residence---Banking Court on said material fact had not framed any issue and decided the suit without framing that important issue---Such factual controversy was to be shaped into an issue as it was to affect materially the fate and decision of the case and parties were to be granted opportunity to produce their evidence thereon---That having not been done, Banking Court had not passed in accordance with law--Impugned and decree was set aside and matter was referred back to Banking Court for further proceeding after framing issue on the said material point of fact---Parties would be granted fresh opportunity also to bring their evidence and after that case would be decided on merits.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.59 of 2002-BWP, decision dated: 27-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. HAKIM ALI AND MUHAMMAD, JEHANGIR ARSHAD, JJ",
    "": "Syed SABIR HUSSAIN\nVs.\nHOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORAITON, BAHAWALPUR through District Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13421",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2829 = 2006 SLD 2829 = 2006 CLD 67",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Territorial jurisdiction of Banking Court---Contention of defendant that Court at Lahore had no jurisdiction in, the matter as defendant/Factory was situated at Sialkot and documents were executed there, had no merits in view of lease agreement which had provided: \"\"Lease Agreement has been entered into at Lahore and parties are agreed that Courts at Lahore shall have exclusive jurisdiction in any and all litigations arising from or in connection with this Lease Agreement\"\"---Having admitted the execution of agreement at Lahore and having agreed that the Court at Lahore would have jurisdiction in the matter, it could not be successfully pleaded on behalf of defendant that Court at Lahore had no jurisdiction to entertain, try or adjudicate the matter---Decree granted by Banking Court for a sum of Rs.8,00,700, however was not consistent with previous findings of the Court as Court had specifically noted that claim of plaintiff- Corporation was accepted and was to be decreed to the extent of lease rentals on the machinery and not finance facility relating to the car---As per operative part of order of Banking Court, decree granted for Rs. 8,00,700 covered also an amount of Rs.1,51,750 as rentals of the car---Such was result of an error having crept in the order which needed to be corrected---To make the decretal amount consistent with the findings and , it was directed that decree granted by Banking Court would be for Rs. 6, 48, 950 (8, 00, 700 minus 1, 51,750).\n \nTahir Tariq Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and 2 others v. N.D.F.C. through Chairman 2001 YLR 846 and Bankers Equity Ltd. v. Iqas Weaving Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 CLC 169 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 137 of 1998, heard on 20-10-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR, JJ",
    "": "ZAIB COLD STORAGE AND ICE FACTORY through Sole Proprietor and another\nVs.\nMessrs PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL LEASING CORPORATION\nLIMITED (PILCORP) --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13422",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2830 = 2006 SLD 2830 = 2006 CLD 69",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----- Ss. 10, 13 & 21---Leave to defend suit, grant of---Unconditional grant of leave to defend suggested a bona fide triable issue to have been disclosed by the defendant before the Banking Court and in such circumstances, it was pre-emptory and onerous for the Banking Court to have applied a condition of bank guarantee of the entire principal amount without giving prior notice to the defendant or granting of hearing on the question to the parties---By connecting the liability for default in progress of the suit with the quantum of liability in fact operated as a review of the order granting unconditional leave to defend when no such relief was either prayed or otherwise urged in the arguments by the plaintiff --Judgment and decree which was entirely based upon the failure of the defendants to satisfy the subsequent condition of furnishing bank guarantee and not on the merits of the dispute on which leave to defend had been granted, was set aside by the High Court--High Court allowed the appeal of the defendant and directed the parties to appear before the Banking Court for hearing and disposal of the case within a period of six months.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.366 of 2002, heard on 6-10-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL AND MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs M.O.A. TEXTILES (PVT.) LIMITED and 3 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13423",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2831 = 2006 SLD 2831 = 2006 CLD 72",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Suit for declaration by borrower- window---Incentive Policy of House Building Finance Corporation to remit loan of widows---Borrower's claim for remission in pursuance of such policy---Non-consideration of borrower's application by Corporation, rather initiation of recovery process against ,her---Borrower's suit decreed by Banking Court finding that she had applied in pursuance of such scheme and being a window was entitled to benefit thereof---Plea of Corporation that no such application was made by borrower--Validity---Mere such assertion of Corporation could not be given credence in presence of specific assertion made in the plaint, evidence led by borrower and finding of Banking Court believing her version---High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.226 of 2003, heard on 21st October, 2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND M. AKHTAR SHABBIR, JJ",
    "": "HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION through District/Branch Manager\nVs.\nMst. KHAIRAN Bibi --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13424",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2832 = 2006 SLD 2832 = 2006 CLD 73",
    "Key Words:": "State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No. 29 dated 15-9-2002-------State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.7 dated 4-3-2003---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Default---Due to the Bank's apportionment of the payments made by the petitioner, default was shown in the petitioner's statement of accounts, in fact the overall obligations of the petitioner under the repayment schedule had been fully met and there was no default by the petitioner that would qualify it for classification in the loss category under BPD Circular No.29 of 2002---Dispute involved a question of fact and it was inappropriate for enquiry in Constitutional jurisdiction---Constitutional petition was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 19454 of 2004, decision dated: 29-09-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "ASLAM TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED through General ManageR\nVs.\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN through Governor and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13425",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2833 = 2006 SLD 2833 = 2006 CLD 81",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29(2)---Appeal---Condonation of delay---Application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Maintainability---Limitation in such case was prescribed by Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and not by Limitation Act, 1908, thus, provisions of S.5 thereof would not attract to such case---High Court dismissed appeal being time-barred.\n \nAllah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 and Abdul Rasheed and another v. Bank of Punjab through Branch Manager 2004 CLD 800 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.457 of 2003, heard on 22-09-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nREHMANIA TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13426",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2834 = 2006 SLD 2834 = 2006 CLD 82",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001}-----Ss. 9, 10, 12 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to appear and defend suit---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Defendant appeared before Trial Court, filed application for leave to appear and defend suit, but thereafter he became absent, and was proceeded against ex parte---Application for leave to appear and defend suit was dismissed for non-prosecution and suit was accordingly decreed---Defendant filed application under S.12 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 for setting aside ex parte order stating that no notice/summons were received by him---Defendant had alleged that plaintiff despite having knowledge of his correct address, had given wrong address in the plaint due to which summons were never issued and served on him on his correct address---Plaints resisted claim of defendant and submitted that defendant resided at address as given in plaint and he further contended that even in the present appeal and affidavit submitted by defendant, he had given same address--Claim of defendant, in circumstances was baseless and he had taken false plea---Defendant had filed present appeal only to delay execution proceedings and to pressurize the plaint---Appeal filed by defendant being without any justification was dismissed with costs.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.213 of 2003, decision dated: 9-12-2003.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "ADIL MAHMOOD\nVs.\nATLAS LEASING LIMITED and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13427",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2835 = 2006 SLD 2835 = 2006 CLD 115",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---------S.11---Recovery of bank loran---Undisputed amount---Defendants admitted that they were ready to pay principal amount but not the disputed amount of mark-up claimed by bank---Effect---If dispute between the parties did not extend to whole of the claim and part of the claim was undisputed, under the provisions of S. 11 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, Banking Court should pass interim decree in respect of undisputed amount and should decide with respect to the disputed amount after granting leave to the defendants and framing of issues---Defendants having admitted claim of bank to the extent of principal amount, the case fell under S.11 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Interim decree was passed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----\n \n----S.10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit, grant of---Dispute with regard to mark-up---Defendants admitted claim of bank to the extent of principal amount but disputed the charging of mark-up on the ground that in sanction advice bank was to recover ruling rate of commission and not mark-up---Defendants in their leave application, specifically raised the plea that the bank was not entitled to charge mark-up, as there was no agreement between the parties---Banking Court, without giving any finding on such primary controversy, dismissed the application and decreed the suit in favour of bank---Validity---Judgment passed by Banking Court was silent about such crucial aspect of the case---Banking Court did not touch such matter and failed to render any findings on the questions of mark-up and its rate---Banking Court was under obligation to, at least, give some findings on such controversy but it had skipped over the real controversy---Banking Court failed to advert and decide the material controversy between the parties and decided the suit in complete oblivion of the record of the case---Judgment passed by Banking Court was set aside and defendants were granted unconditional leave to defend the suit---Case axis remanded to Banking Court in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 145 of 2005, heard on 3rd October, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "RAFAQAT ALI and 2 others\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13428",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2836 = 2006 SLD 2836 = 2006 CLD 119",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.84---Execution of decree---Re-auction of property---Obtaining illegal order from Court---Auction purchaser failed to pay the auction money and appellants being the second highest bidders applied Banking Court for deposit of auction money---Banking Court passed an order for deposit of auction money but objection was raised to such deposit of money and Banking Court allowed objection petition and ordered for resale of the property---Contention of appellants was that they, in compliance of Court's order, had made a deposit of the amount and should not be made to suffer---Validity---Executing Court had to follow the procedure provided in O.XXI, Rr.82 to 94 C.P.C.---Auction ¬purchaser having failed to deposit auction money, Banking Court would hold fresh auction of the property for satisfaction of the decrees, in accordance with law---Contention of the appellants had no substance as they themselves applied to the Court for making deposit ---If an illegal order was obtained from the Court on the application per invitum, no indefeasible right could be claimed by appellants on such basis---Sale in favour of appellants had thus rightly been cancelled---Appellants might also take part in re-auction and the amount already deposited by them (if they succeed in fresh auction) could be adjusted-or they might apply for the return of the same---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMultan Khan v. Cantonment Board, Nowshera through Cantonment Executive Officer, Nowshera and 4 others 1995 CLC 1297 and Messrs United Bank Ltd., Karachi v. Mst. Asma Zafarul Hassan 1980 CLC 565 distinguished.\n \nFeroze Din Faiz v. Chaman Lal and others PLD 1953 Lah. 83 and Manilal Mohanlal Shah and others v. Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad and another AIR. 1954 SC 349 ref.\n \nHudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1987 SC 512 and Afzal Maqsood Butt v. Banking Court No.2, Lahore and 8 others PLD 2005 SC 470 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.585 of 2002, decision dated: 22-11-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND MIAN SAQIB NISAR, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SALEEM and another\nVs.\nSAJIDA PARVEEN and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13429",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2837 = 2006 SLD 2837 = 2006 CLD 123",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)------S.6(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.6(a)(b)---Suit for recovery of loan---Service of show cause notice under S.6(2), Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984---Two defendants were residing abroad---Process server reported that said defendants had left the address at which some other person was residing---Report by the postal authorities on registered A/D was, that the addressee had left the premises---Trial Court, after perusing the said report should have proceeded against the said defendants ex parte under O.IX, R.6(a), C.P.C. or had issued second summons to the defendants under O.IX, R.6(b), C.P.C.---In case of the former action, the Court was to decree the suit against the said defendants on their failure to file reply to show-cause notice under S.6(2) of the Ordinance---Trial Court had not passed any specific order with regard to the non-appearance of defendants and non-submission of the reply to the show-cause notice---Trial Court was under an obligation to record due service before proceeding ex parte against defendants---Decree passed by Court was not sustainable as it was obligatory on the Court, to apply the proper provisions of law even if a party had not brought such requirement to the attention of the Court---High Court in appeal, set aside the impugned order decree of the Banking Court and remanded the case to the said Court for passing an appropriate order qua non-appearance of the tug defendants in response to the notice issued to them.\n \nAkbar and 2 others v. Abdul Ghafoor and 3 others 2000 SCMR 1000 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)----\n \n---S.6---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R.11 & S.151---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.176---Suit for recovery of loan---Contesting defendants had moved tux) applications one under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. and the other under S.176, Contract Act, 1872 read with S.151, C.P.C. for furnishing the accounts of the pledged stock---Banking Court decreed the suit without deciding the pending applications---Disposal of the suit without disposal of the said applications was violative of law---Impugned and decree by the Banking Court was set aside by the High Court in appeal and case was remanded to the Banking Court for decision of the matter, after disposing the pending applications.\n \nMessrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245 and Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.887 of 2001, heard on 22-03-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "SHARAFAT HAFEEZ GOREJA and 5 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through President"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13430",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2838 = 2006 SLD 2838 = 2006 CLD 127",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit---Serious and bona fide dispute---Defendants in their leave application specifically pleaded that bank was in possession of pledged goods and despite repeated requests, bank failed to sell the pledged goods with the result that on one hand outstanding liabilities against them accumulated and on the other hand their business suffered serious set back---Banking Court appointed Local Commission who prepared inventory of pledged goods but without deciding the fate of the goods, leave application was dismissed and the suit was decreed in favour of bank---Plea raised by defendants was that before passing the decree, some order regarding pledged goods should have been passed by Banking Court---Validity---Banking Court was obliged to pass an effective order regarding the fate of pledged goods but while bypassing such crucial issue, Banking Court proceeded to dismiss the application, which disclosed serious and bona fide disputes between the parties---More than 3 ½ years had elapsed---Defendants had no objection to sale of the pledged goods---During all such long period the condition of the goods must have deteriorated resulting in depreciation of its value---High Court observed that if Banking Court had applied its judicial mind and at least attended to its oun order sheet, both the parties would have been saved from suffering losses as in case of sale of pledged goods, the liabilities of defendants would have reduced and on the other hand bank would have got at least some portion of the suit amount---Banking Court while rendering , had misdirected itself and failed to decide the crucial questions between the parties and decided the case only for the purpose of disposal---High Court depreciated such action on the part of judicial officer and set aside the same---Case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \n(b) Judicial order---\n \n----Composition---Judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its judicial mind to the issues and points of controversy involved in the case---Any judicial order which is not a speaking order and devoid of reasons is not sustainable in law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.801 of 2002, decision dated: 24-10-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs FYBRON (PVT.) LIMITED through Managing Director and 2 others\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Zonal Chief"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13431",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2839 = 2006 SLD 2839 = 2006 CLD 132",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)--------S.12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Change of address---Documents produced by defendants in support of setting aside of decree---Scope---Defendants, in response to the process issued by Banking Court, did not appear and the suit was decreed ex parte against the defendants---Defendants filed application for setting aside ex parte decree, on the ground that the process was issued on wrong address---Plea raised by the defendants was that new address of defendants axis in the knowledge of the bank but the same was concealed---Banking Court dismissed the application and ex parte decree was maintained--Validity---Letters between the parties produced by' defendants, contained the new address thus defendants were prejudiced by ignoring to consider the documents produced by them---Bank did not categorically deny those letters in any way---Documents which had substantial bearing on the fate of the case were neither discussed nor considered by Banking Court and were completely brushed aside while deciding application of defendants---Banking Court omitted to read/consider the documents produced by defendants in support of their claim, while giving its findings on the controversies involved between the parties---If material document or material evidence was not considered by lower Courts, then High Court could interfere in the matter---Order dismissing application under S.12 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, suffered from misreading and non-reading of documentary evidence and the same was set aside---High Court remanded the case to Banking Court for deciding application afresh---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nBrig (Retd.) Mazhar-ul-Haq and another v. M/s. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Islamabad and another PLD 1993 Lah.706; Abdul Kadir and others v. Abdul Karim and another 1986 CLC 1895; Abdul Majeed and others v. Senior Member, Federal Land Commission, Rawalpindi and others 1991 CLC 1243; Messrs Wahid Ice and Cold Storage Plant through Proprietor v. National Bank of Pakistan, I.I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi PLD 1996 Kar. 529 and Muhammad Iftikhar and another v. District and Sessions Judge, Faisalabad and 7 others 2003 CLC 254 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) ----\n \n---S.12---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Miscellaneous applications, non-deciding of---Defendants filed application for setting aside ex parte decree along with application for condonation of delay---Banking Court dismissed the application for setting aside ex parte decree but did not pass any order on the application for condonation of delay---Effect---Application for condonation of delay was not disposed of and thus the same would be deemed to be Pending---Bank raised objection that the application under S.12 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, was barred by time, though there were no findings to such effect in the order---If any miscellaneous application was filed by parties, it was incumbent upon the Court to decide such application either wiry through a specific order and then to decide main case and failure to decide such application would vitiate the main ---Order passed by Banking Court was set aside in circumstances.\n \nPak Carpet Industries Limited v. Government of Sindh and 2 others 1993 CLC 334; Muhammad Yaqub v. Baqir and 2 others 1993 CLC 1319; Khair Deen v. Rehm Deen and 4 others 1996 CLC 1731 and Gul Muhammad through Legal Heirs v. Karachi Development Authority and another 1998 MLD 150 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.33 of 2003, decision dated: 25-10-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs BASHIR LEATHER INT. (PVT.) LIMITED and 2 others\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13432",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2840 = 2006 SLD 2840 = 2006 CLD 139",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----------S.21---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLI, R.19---Appeal, restoration of---Sufficient cause---Pre-occupation of counsel before other Court-Non-filing of affidavit of counsel---Effect---Appeal against and decree passed by Banking Court, was dismissed on account of non-prosecution---Application for restoration of appeal was filed---Applicant did not specifically plead as to before which Court, his counsel was busy and at what point of time---Even counsel for applicant did not furnish his affidavit and appellant felt contended only by filing his affidavit in routine---Effect---Affidavit of applicant was of no avail to him, as he could not depose about alleged engagements of his counsel before other Benches of High Court and before Supreme Court, especially when applicant had stated in the application that he could not be informed by his counsel belonging to outside city and for such reason case remained unattended by him---If such statement of applicant be taken as true, then his affidavit appeared to be false, as he could not depose about alleged pre-occupation of his counsel before any of the Courts as he was not in knowledge of fixation of the appeal---Applicant along with the application, had filed a photocopy of single page of a diary statedly belonging to his counsel; it was not discernible from that Page whether the diary, in fact, belonged to his counsel---Even otherwise in absence of daily cause list and affidavit of counsel, such photocopy of diary could not be relied upon, more importantly, when valuable right had accrued favouring the other Ply---Applicant failed to even prima facie prove as to whether his counsel was busy before other Benches of High Court and at what point of time---All such details were lacking in the application and affidavit filed by applicant---No case was made out by applicant warranting re-admission of appeal--- High Court thus declined to exercise discretion in his favour--Application was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XLI, R.17---Prosecution of appeal---Duty of appellant---Mere fact that a litigant having engaged a counsel to appear on his behalf does not absolve him of all the responsibilities---Litigant is also under duty to see that his appeal is properly and diligently prosecuted.\n \nRafiq Ahmad Khawaja v. Abdul Haleem 1982 SCMR 1229 ref.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-\n \n----Ss.21 & 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29---Appeal---Limitation---Condonation of delay--Appeal filed against and decree passed by Banking Court, was barred by limitation---Appellant filed application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, for condonation of delay---Validity---Under. ordinary law, a period of 90 days had been prescribed for filing of first appeal before High Court, while the present case was governed by the provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, which was a special law and its S.21(1) had prescribed a period of 30 days for filing the first appeal before High Court, against the and decree passed by Banking Court-As the special law had provided different period of limitation for filing the first appeal in High Court, than the ordinary law, therefore, S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, was neither applicable nor attracted---Delay was not condoned in circumstances.\n \nAllah Ditta v. Farooq Ahmad and 3 others PLD 1979 Lah. 917; Bashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105; Messrs Conoco Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 others v. United Bank Limited, Lahore and another 2004 CLD 472; Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M. No.792 of 2004 in Regular First Appeal No.419 of 2001, decision dated: 27-10-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Syed ZULFIQAR ALI SHAH--Applicant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Attorney and 7 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13433",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2841 = 2006 SLD 2841 = 2006 CLD 144",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.58, 60 & 62---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), Ss.41 & 52---Execution of decree---Sale of property---Objector claimed to be bona fide purchaser of property on basis of registered sale-deed---Decree was passed on 9-6-1998---Execution proceedings were started on 19-10-1998---Agreement to sell in, favour of objector was executed on 23-12-1998 and sale-deed was registered on 29-8-2000---Banking Court accepted objection petition and set aside sale by treating sale-deed to be effective from 23-12-1998---Validity---Sale-deed registered on 29-8-2000 could not be considered as operative from 23-12-1998---Without recording evidence and proving ingredients of S.41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, objector could not be held as bona fide purchaser on mere oral assertions---Banking Court had neither determined locus standi of objector nor took into consideration the provisions of S.52 of Act, 1882 barring transfer of property during pendency of lis--High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned order and remanded case to Banking Court for its decision afresh after framing of issues arising out of objection petition' and recording of evidence.\n \nKanwal Nain and 3 others v. Fateh Khan and others PLD 1983 SC 53 fol.\n \n(b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)---\n \n----S.41---Bona fide purchaser, claim of--Proof-Such claim could not be determined on mere oral assertions---Recording of evidence would be essential for determination of such claim.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.14 of 2004, decision dated: 28-09-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD, JEHANGIR ARSHAD, J",
    "": "BANK OF PUNJAB, Lahore High Court through Manager\nVs.\nRaja AMEER KHAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13434",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2842 = 2006 SLD 2842 = 2006 CLD 163",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 7(2), 9 & 27---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151, O.IX, R.9 & O.XVII, R.3---Suit for recovery of loan---Dismissal of suit for non-prosecution---Closing of evidence---Application for restoration of suit---Suit was dismissed for non-prosecution and application was filed by plaintiff for recalling of order of dismissal of suit ---Validity---Suit was adjourned on many dates and on last date of hearing suit was dismissed as plaintiff on the said date remained absent and he failed to file affidavit-in- evidence---Procedure to decide suit in the manner provided in O.XVII, R.3, C.P.C. was available with Banking Court and order passed by Banking Court, could only be attacked by filing an appeal and not otherwise since S.27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, had specifically barred Banking Court from revising or reviewing its own order, in particular when order would operate as decision of suit in terms of O.XVII, R.3, C.P.C.---Impugned order though was passed on account of non-appearance of plaintiff, but such order being clothed with mandatory provisions of O.XVII, R.3, C.P.C., it would amount only to considering of merits of impugned order which exercise could only be undertaken in appeal---Application filed by plaintiff for recalling of order of dismissal of suit and restoring suit dismissed for non-prosecution by plaintiff, was dismissed.\n \nShahid Hussain v. Lahore Municipal Corporation PLD 1981 SC 474; Messrs Baghpatte Services (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Allied Bank Limited 2001 CLC 1363; Rahim Bux and 2 others v. Mst. Nasir Khanum and another 1980 CLC 595; Nila v. Punun AIR 1936 Lah. 385; Har Dayal v. Ram Golan AIR 1944 Oudh 39 = AIR 1936 Lah. 385 and Lal Chand v. Kaka Ram AIR 1927 Lah.562 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M.A. No.1439 of 2004 in Suit No.B-25 of 2002, decision dated: 29-08-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMAD, J",
    "": "Shaikh KAMRAN MAQBOOL--Applicant\nVs.\nBOLAN BANK LIMITED through Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13435",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2843 = 2006 SLD 2843 = 2006 CLD 167",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---------S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Recovery of damages for torts--- Return of plaint-Plaintiff was aggrieved of non-encashment of his cheque by bank, despite availability of funds in his account---Suit for recovery of damages for torts was filed before Banking Court, which suit was returned to plaintiff---Validity---Plaintiff neither fell within the definition of 'borrower' and 'customer' nor he obtained any finance' or 'loan' as defined under the provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Suit filed by plaintiff was simple suit for recovery of damages on the basis of torts, which was excluded from the jurisdiction of Banking Court---Plaint was rightly returned to plaintiff for filing before appropriate forum---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.245 of 2001, heard on 1st December, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Mehr ASHIQ HUSSAIN\nVs.\nCITIBANK, N.A. through Chief Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13436",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2844 = 2006 SLD 2844 = 2006 CLD 169",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.9(2) & 22---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S. 3---High Court appeal---Maintainability ---Bank had filed appeal against order whereby Single Judge of High Court while granting leave to defend suit filed by Company against Bank for accounts, injunction, declaration and damages had framed issues---Maintainability of said appeal was objected to on the ground that in terms of S.22(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 an appeal could only be filed against a , decree, sentence or a final order, passed by a Banking Court and not against interim order---Single Judge, through impugned order had merely granted to the appellant leave to appear and defend suit and had framed issues for final adjudication of the suit---Said order passed by Single Judge, could not be said a final order\"\"---In view of provisions of S.22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which had placed a clear bar on filing of an appeal against an interlocutory order which did not dispose of entire case before Banking Court, appeal being not maintainable was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Sp. H.C.A. No.175 and C.M. No.1349 of 2004, decision dated: 1st April, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J. AND MAQBOOL BAQAR, J",
    "": "Messrs HABIB BANK LTD\nVs.\nMessrs BELA AUTOMOTIVES LTD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13437",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2845 = 2006 SLD 2845 = 2006 CLD 171",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) ------Ss.9 & 10---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Recovery of bank loan---Declaratory suit---Procedure---Bank filed suit for recovery of bank loan in which leave was granted to the borrower and the suit was dismissed---Banking Court, in suit for declaration, filed by borrower declined to grant leave to defend the suit to bank and suit filed by borrower was decreed---Plea raised by bank was that after acceptance of leave application of borrower, suit of bank could not have been dismissed straightaway---Validity---Dismissal of suit filed by Bank, after acceptance of borrower's leave application was in derogation of the provisions of S.10 (10) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court was obliged to decide borrower's leave application on its own merits before embarking upon the issues involved in the suit---If Banking Court was of the view that substantial questions of law and facts were raised by borrower, leave to defend the suit could have been granted to him but in no way, at that point of time, suit filed by bank could have been dismissed---Banking Court did not adopt the procedure as prescribed in the statute and had gone outside the scope of S.10 (10) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Even if Banking Court was persuaded to accept borrower's leave application, the Court, instead of straightaway dismissing bank's suit, in obedience to the provisions of S.10 (10) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, should have treated his leave application as written statement, framed the issues, recorded the evidence and thereafter decided the suit, in accordance with law---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh in accordance with law--Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \nAgricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager v. Malik Iftikhar Ahmed 2002 CLD 1280 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs PAKSACO Limited 2005 CLC 422 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n \n---S.5-Banking Court---Scope---Banking Court being creature of statute, is bound by the provisions and procedure provided under that particular statute.\n \nLt.-Col. (Retd.) Mahmood Akhtar v. Bank of Punjab through Manager 2004 CLD 821 rel.\n \n(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----Ss.42 & 54---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss.9 & 10---Declaratory suit---Procedure---Dismissal of leave application---Plaintiff (borrower) filed suit for declaration against defendant (bank) wherein Banking Court declined to grant leave to defend the suit to defendant and suit filed by plaintiff was decreed---Plea raised by defendant was that after rejection of leave application of defendant, declaratory suit could not have been decreed---Validity---After rejecting defendant's leave application in the suit for declaration and permanent injunction, decree could not have been passed straightaway, as the claim of declaration could not be equated with the suit founded on negotiable instruments---When defendant failed to obtain leave to defend in plaintiff s suit for declaration and permanent injunction, Banking Court was legally obliged to decide the suit after calling upon the plaintiff to produce evidence in support of his claim---Banking Court thus deviated from the procedure provided under the special statute---In such types of suits, even if a defendant failed to file application for leave to defend the suit or its application was dismissed and leave was refused, Banking Court was legally obliged to decide the suit after recording of plaintiff s evidence in support of his claim, thereby providing adequate opportunity to defendant to cross-examine the witnesses---Even if defendant in such a case, did not appear before Banking Court or he was not granted leave, the Banking Court was not absolved of its duty to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of each case---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \nMessrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos.234 and 235 of 2005; heard on 8-09-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "ZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Manager\nVs.\nSyed FURRAKH HUSSAIN SHAH"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13438",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2846 = 2006 SLD 2846 = 2006 CLD 178",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.7, 17 & 3---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.132 & 135---Suit for recovery of loan---Contract of guarantee---Responsibility of guarantor---Scope---Contract of guarantee, in the present case, showed that defendants had signed and guaranteed the loan agreement not being the guarantors only but as a principal debtor---Liability to pay said defendants shall not stand discharged merely by resorting to S.133, Contract Act, 1872---Liability of defendants, besides being guarantor, was also in their capacity as principal debtor---Subsequent agreements would not absolve the defendants of their liability because defendants had bound themselves by virtue of the contract of guarantee that their liability shall remain unaffacted even in the event of modification, variation of the terms of facility, compositions or other arrangements' with the customer of the Bank---Contract of guarantee was itself an independent agreement, the terms whereof had bound the parties in isolation with main agreement---Provisions of Ss.133 & 135 Contract Act, 1872, visualized consent -or assent of the guarantors at the time of variance only and the same could not be waived by the guarantors in advance.\n \nMian Aftab A Sheikh v. Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. 2003 CLD 702 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.692 of 2002, heard on 13-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "AMIR JAVED and another--Appellants\nVs.\nALBARAKA ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13439",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2847 = 2006 SLD 2847 = 2006 CLD 183",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----S.19---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24-A---Execution proceedings---Incentive scheme, benefit of---Non-speaking order---Judgment debtor filed application for allowing benefit of incentive scheme during execution proceedings---Banking Court dismissed the application without giving its own finding---Judgment debtor, to prove his entitlement to benefit of incentive scheme, produced a letter issued by the bank-Validity-Banking Court although had narrated contents of application filed by debtor and stance of bank, yet the Court failed to give its own findings except to state that offer made by -debtor was not acceptable to the bank---Such order of Banking Court was perfunctory, devoid of reasons and showed complete non-application of judicial mind---Letter produced by debtor had a substantial bearing on the fate of the case---Order passed by Banking Court was set aside and case was remanded to Banking Court for deciding -debtor's application afresh, in accordance with record of the case and after taking into consideration contents of the letter produced by -debtor---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nAdamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The Province of East Pakistan and others PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 272; Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller Import and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158; Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 and Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Secretary, Ministry of Labour and others 1984 SCMR 1014 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.841 of 2002, heard on 7-11-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs FAISAL M. B. CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive\nVs.\nEQUITY PARTICIPATION FUND through VicEPresident, E.P.F."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13440",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2848 = 2006 SLD 2848 = 2006 CLD 186",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -----Ss.9, 17 & 19---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Prayer of legal heirs of deceased loanee to decree suit allowing them to pay suit amount in three instalments---Banking Court passed decree prescribing schedule of instalments subject to the condition that in case of default to pay any instalment, entire remaining amount would become recoverable along with mark up till realization---Non-payment of second instalment in time---Issuance of statement of accounts by Bank showing balance as nil after receipt of entire amount from debtors---Execution petition by Bank claiming mark up on entire decretal amount from date of decree till its realization for -debtor's failure to pay second instalment in time---Validity---Banking Court in its decree had clarified that in case of default, Bank would be entitled to recover entire remaining balance with mark up and not entire decretal amount---Mark up would be calculated from the date when remaining balance became due and not from date of passing of decree---Bank had wrongly calculated mark up on entire decree amount---Bank, after issuance of statement of accounts showing balance as nil, would not be estopped to claim mark up on debtor's failure to pay second instalment in time---Bank, in circumstance, was entitled to claim mark up on remaining balance from date when second instalment became due till its realization.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1941 of 2003 decided on 3rd March, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN AND SH., JAVAID SARFRAZ, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD MAJID through Legal HeirS\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMTED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13441",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2849 = 2006 SLD 2849 = 2006 CLD 202",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit by customer against Bank---Customer, who was holding a Fixed Deposit and Savings Bank Account with the Bank, was informed by Bank that disputed amount was being appropriated towards alleged dues of two firms---Customer initially filed suit for declaration to the effect that he was not liable for any claim against said firms and that he was not connected with the firms in any manner and was not liable for any dues/outstanding against same---Said suit subsequently was transferred to Banking Court which decreed the same---Validity---Bank had referred to some undertaking given by customer binding himself for repayment of dues of said firms---Plea of Bank was that customer had given an authority to the Bank to appropriate amount in question against dues of said firms by executing a letter of lien---Statement of customer was recorded in the Court, but he was not at all confronted with said letter of lien---Signatures of customer were compared on request of the Bank--Account opening form was dated 4-11-1970 while alleged letter of lien bore the date as 29-10-1971---Signatures on said two documents were examined with the assistance of counsel for parties and dissimilarity was found in the same---Evidence of customer had been recorded, while evidence of the Bank had been closed after giving about eight years period to do the needful and case remained pending for 13 years---In view of such conduct of the Bank, no prejudice was caused to the merits of case---Appeal by Bank, against of Banking Court, was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and another PLD 1996 Lah. 672 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.75 of 2004, heard on 21st November, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SH. HAKIM ALI, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED through Manager\nVs.\nKHAN DUR MUHAMMAD KHAN TAREEN through Legal Heirs and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13442",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2850 = 2006 SLD 2850 = 2006 CLD 217",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----S.10-Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit, grant of---Substantial question of law and facts---Statement of account deficient in material particulars---Banking Court dismissed leave application filed by defendants and decreed the suit in favour of bank---Plea raised by defendants was that the statement of account filed by bank with plaint was deficient in material particulars and claim of bank consisted of illegal mark-up charged under various finance agreements---Validity---Statement of account was replete with various debit entries of substantial amounts which were merely identified as 'to transfer'---No explanation as to where and on what authority such amounts were transferred could be gleaned from the record nor the same had been supplied by the bank on being confronted with the same---Statement of accounts showed that defendants had admittedly deposited Rs. 13,68,406.67---Debit entries of mark-up had also not been explained by bank with reference to the documents sued and relied upon---Contention of defendants that claim of bank consisted of illegal mark-up charged under various finance agreements rather than the amount actually disbursed to them or mark-up due thereupon in accordance with the terms of finance agreements must necessarily be examined in the context of the statement of accounts---Infirmities were floating in the present case on the surface---Serious disputed questions of facts and law had arisen in the case which could only be adjudicated after recording of evidence as the claim of bank needed to be proved---Application for leave to defend the suit could not have been dismissed outrightly and defendants were entitled to unconditional leave to defend the suit---High Court granted unconditional leave to defend the suit to the defendants, set aside the passed by Banking Court and remanded the case to Banking Court for decision afresh after framing of issues and recording of evidence--Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.38 of 2002, heard on 20-12-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND SHEIKH AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "HABIB-UR-REHMAN and another\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT No.4, Lahore High Court and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13443",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2851 = 2006 SLD 2851 = 2006 CLD 217",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----S.10-Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit, grant of---Substantial question of law and facts---Statement of account deficient in material particulars---Banking Court dismissed leave application filed by defendants and decreed the suit in favour of bank---Plea raised by defendants was that the statement of account filed by bank with plaint was deficient in material particulars and claim of bank consisted of illegal mark-up charged under various finance agreements---Validity---Statement of account was replete with various debit entries of substantial amounts which were merely identified as 'to transfer'---No explanation as to where and on what authority such amounts were transferred could be gleaned from the record nor the same had been supplied by the bank on being confronted with the same---Statement of accounts showed that defendants had admittedly deposited Rs. 13,68,406.67---Debit entries of mark-up had also not been explained by bank with reference to the documents sued and relied upon---Contention of defendants that claim of bank consisted of illegal mark-up charged under various finance agreements rather than the amount actually disbursed to them or mark-up due thereupon in accordance with the terms of finance agreements must necessarily be examined in the context of the statement of accounts---Infirmities were floating in the present case on the surface---Serious disputed questions of facts and law had arisen in the case which could only be adjudicated after recording of evidence as the claim of bank needed to be proved---Application for leave to defend the suit could not have been dismissed outrightly and defendants were entitled to unconditional leave to defend the suit---High Court granted unconditional leave to defend the suit to the defendants, set aside the passed by Banking Court and remanded the case to Banking Court for decision afresh after framing of issues and recording of evidence--Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.38 of 2002, heard on 20-12-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND SHEIKH AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "HABIB-UR-REHMAN and another\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT No.4, Lahore High Court and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13444",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2852 = 2006 SLD 2852 = 2006 CLD 224",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---S.10-Application for leave to defend suit---Dismissal of application---Effect---Duty of Banking Court.\n \nWhen leave to defend application is dismissed in a suit filed by a banking company, then the allegation of facts in the plaint are to be deemed to be true and Banking Court may pass decree in favour of plaintiff on the basis thereof. However, Banking Court in the interest of justice may require any other material to satisfy itself of claim in suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.31 of 2003, heard on 7-10-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND SYED ZAWWAR HUSSAIN, JAFERY, JJ",
    "": "ORIX LEASING PAKISTAN LIMITED\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD HANEEF and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13445",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2853 = 2006 SLD 2853 = 2006 CLD 227",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) ------Ss.127, 305 & 306---Winding up of company---Inability of company to pay its debts---Loan obtained by company was secured by mortgage of property and registration of charge in favour of petitioner under S.127 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Acknowledgment of outstanding liabilities by company in its letters addressed to petitioner---Non-payment of debt by company within thirty days in spite of having received petitioner's notice---Non-production for Court's inspection by company its balance sheets for last three years and proof of submission of statutory returns to Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan---Effect---Simple denial of liability by company in an evasive manner would not make debt disputed---Mere disputing debt in words would not be sufficient ground to resist winding up order---Commercial solvency of company had not been proved by submission of duly audited annual balance sheets---Company was commercially insolvent and was unable to pay its debts---High Court ordered winding up of company in circumstances.\n \nTrade and Industry Publication Limited v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 768; Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Golden Plastic (Pvt.) Limited 1991 MLD 124; PICIC v. Indus Steel Pipe Limited 1993 MLD 94; Sindh Glass Industries Limited v. National Development Finance Corporation and others PLD 1996 SC 601; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Hamza Board Mills and others PLD 1996 Lah. 633; Banker's Equity Limited v. Balochistan Coaters Limited PLD 1997 Kar. 416; ICP v. Sindh Tech. Industries Limited 1997 MLD 2609; International Finance Corporation v. Hala Spinning Ltd. PLD 2000 Lah. 323; Deutsche Bank A.G., Lahore v. Messrs Farm Aids (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 others 2004 CLD 449; Ghulam Hussain Ahmedalli and Co. v. Canhag Private Ltd. (1972) 42 Company Cases 136; G. Calridge and Company Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Investments Ltd. (1977) 47 Company Cases 428, (1962) 1 All ER 121 (Re. Tweeds Garages Ltd.); All Woolen Mills Limited v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 1990 SC 763 and Messrs Platinum Insurance Company Ltd. v. Daewoo Corporation PLD 1999 SC 1 ref.\n \nUnion Bank Ltd. v. Pak Wheat Products PLD 1970 Lah. 235 and United Western Bank Ltd. and Paramount Enterprise v. Re Champse (1985) 57 Companies Cases rel.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n---Ss. 305 & 306---Winding up of company---Inability of company to pay its debts---Simple denial of liability by company in an evasive manner---Effect---Such denial would not be sufficient to make debt disputed---Mere disputing debt in words would not be sufficient ground to resist winding up order.\n \nUnion Bank Ltd. v. Pak Wheat Products PLD 1970 Lah. 235 and United Western Bank Ltd. and Paramount Enterprise v. Re Champse (1985) 57 Companies Cases rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O. No.2 of 2001, decision dated: 15-12-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "FAYSAL BANK LIMITED through AttorneY\nVs.\nIRAM GHEE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. Through Chief Executive ---Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13446",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2854 = 2006 SLD 2854 = 2006 CLD 232",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----S.19-Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged property---Suit by mortgager to declare such property as not mortgaged in favour of Bank---Dismissal of mortgagor's suit by Trial Court remained upheld up to Supreme Court---Mortgagor's objection as to non-existence of mortgage---Executing Court rejected such objection and confirmed sale in favour of purchaser---Validity---Controversy as to existence or otherwise of mortgage had been finally resolved at the level of Supreme Court---Executing Court was justified in not allowing mortgagor to raise such issue de novo---Decree under execution had been passed jointly and severally against all defendants including mortgagor---Factum of mortgage having been recognized, misdescription in decree regarding mortgagors would be a clerical mistake---High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.\n \nAsim Mansoor Khan for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.41 of 2005, heard on 13-07-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED, C.J. AND ZIA PERWAZ, J",
    "": "MARIANNE KHAN\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13447",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2855 = 2006 SLD 2855 = 2006 CLD 242",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66, 67, 90, 92 & 93---Execution of decree---Sale by auction, setting aside of---Return of money deposited by auction-purchaser---Despite being unsuccessful on two dates, bank was successful in auctioning the mortgaged property on the third date---Before putting mortgaged property to auction neither publicity was made nor the reasons were brought on the Court file as to why auction proceedings on two dates could not be held---Executing Court confirmed the sale through auction but -debtor filed objection application which was dismissed by Executing Court---Validity---Such auction was not conducted by bank in accordance with the settled principles of law, justice and equity, hence confirmation of sale by Executing Court could not be blessed with sanctity and the same was set aside---Bank was directed to return the auction price already deposited by him along with 20% of the same or the due mark-up (whichever was higher)---High Court directed the -debtor to deposit decretal amount within one month, failing which bank would be at liberty to sell mortgaged property with or without intervention of Court with reference to S.19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.167 of 2005, heard on 24-11-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIR AHMAD SIDDIQUI AND MUHAMMAD NAWAZ BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NOOR HAYAT INDUSTRIES (PVT) LTD. through Chief Executive\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Manager and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13448",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2856 = 2006 SLD 2856 = 2006 CLD 244",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10(12)---Non filing of amended leave application within period specified in S.10(12) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Effect---No consequence provided for such omission---Such provision could be treated as directory.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n--Preamble-Object of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 stated.\n \nScheme of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is that suits involving financial matters between financial institutions and customers should be decided expeditiously in a summary manner, and all vexatious and mala fide pleas of defence should be curtailed so that proceedings may be completed within shortest possible time. In order to achieve the scheme, section 10 has been framed to put check upon the defence led by the defendant.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10(3)(4)(5)(6)---Non-compliance with requirements mentioned in S.10(3)(4)(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Effect---Such provisions were mandatory and non-compliance thereof would entail rejection of application for leave to defend suit---Principles.\n \n(d) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Where a statute enables a person to take legal proceedings under certain specified circumstances, then statute demands that such circumstances must be accurately obeyed.\n \nStatutory Laws by Craies 6th Edition at page 226 rel.\n \n(e) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Non-compliance with requirement of a plain statutory enactment, prescribing how a thing is to be done, would invalidate thing if done in any other manner, provided such enactment is absolute, but not if same is merely directory.\n \n(f) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Mandatory or directory provision---Test---If non-compliance of provision entails a penal consequence, then same would be mandatory, otherwise same would be directory.\n \nNiaz Muhammad v, Fazl Raqib PLD 1974 SC 134 rel.\n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n--S.9---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Agreement between parties allowing concession to defendant subject to the condition that in case of his failure to make two agreed quarterly payments during a year, such package would stand withdrawn along with all concessions in mark-up and Bank would be entitled to claim entire outstanding amount including penal interest etc.---Failure of defendant to make such agreed payments---Defendant seeking enforcement of such agreement---Validity---Such agreement would not be enforceable as defendant had not complied with its terms.\n \n(h) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----\n \n---S.10-Defence ----S.10---Defence of defendant before grant of leave to defend suit---Validity---Defendant could not move Court to decide any of his rights of defence before grant of such leave---Principles.\n \nBefore grant of any leave to defend suit, defendant cannot move the Court to adjudicate upon any of his rights of defence. The law specifically prohibits taking into consideration the defence of defendant before leave to defend is granted, because a specific procedure has been provided under the law that the defence of any nature involving legal or factual controversy pertaining to the case can be considered only after fulfilling the conditions of section 10 of the Ordinance. Thus, before grant of leave to defend, the application would not be - maintainable and would be liable to be dismissed.\n \n(i) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n \n----S.10(11)-Application for leave to defend suit, rejection of---Contents of plaint verified on oath and supported by documents---Suit to be decreed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-71 of 2000, decision dated: 7-11-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAHMAT HUSSAIN, JAFFERI, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs SABCOS (PVT.)----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13449",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2857 = 2006 SLD 2857 = 2006 CLD 255",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)------S.9---Recovery of damages---Malicious prosecution---Banking Court---Jurisdiction---Grievance of plaintiff was that he did not stand guarantee for the loan advanced to a third party and he was maliciously impleaded in the suit for recovery of bank loan---None of the documents were signed by plaintiff and witnesses admitted in their cross-examination that plaintiff did not sign any document in their presence---Banking Court decreed the suit for damages in favour of plaintiff---Plea raised by bank was that plaintiff being not a borrower or customer and matter having not arisen out of a finance agreement, Banking Court had no jurisdiction in the matter---Validity---Primary question to be determined in the present case, was as to whether or not plaintiff stood guarantee and consequently was a borrower as defined in the banking laws---Such question was to be decided by Banking Court and no other Court---Plaintiff categorically denied having stood guarantee or having signed any of the documents---High Court did not find any error in the findings of Banking Court that plaintiff had never stood guarantee in the matter---Borrower had also repaid its loan---Suit was maliciously filed against plaintiff and the damages granted by Banking Court were reasonable---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.114 of 1997, heard on 28-09-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND, JAZ AHMAD CHAUDHRY, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED and another\nVs.\nMian AHMAD HASSAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13450",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2858 = 2006 SLD 2858 = 2006 CLD 258",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) -----S.19-Acknowledgement in writing of liability after expiry of limitation---Validity---Such acknowledgement would not be of any consequence.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.8-Applicability of provision of S.8 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Bank by virtue of said provision could effect recovery of finance from borrower, which had been written off or adjusted for political reasons other than bona fide business transaction.\n \n(c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) -\n \n----S. 5---Time barred appeal-Non-filing of application for condonation of delay under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Effect---Time barred appeal could not be entertained in absence of such application---Appellant not choosing to make such application, could not be allowed to put a premium on his negligence.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.40 of 2005, heard on 2-08-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED, C.J. AND Z. PERWAZ, J",
    "": "Sahibzadi SHAH BANO KHAN\nVs.\nMessrs CITIBANK N.A."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13451",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2859 = 2006 SLD 2859 = 2006 CLD 261",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--------Ss.9(5) & 10(2)-Application for leave to defend suit---Limitation---Service of defendant through proclamation in newspapers was effected on 30-1-2004 and through bailiff on 6-2-2004---Filing of leave application on 10-3-2004---Validity---Defendant was required Jo file such application within thirty days of the date of first service of summons by anyone of the modes laid down in S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---No good ground for condonation of delay was shown---Leave application was dismissed for having been filed out of time.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n--Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount--Application for leave to defend suit---Availing of loan facility and outstanding amount not denied by defendant---Willingness of defendant to pay outstanding amount---Validity---Defendant had failed to raise substantial questions of law and facts requiring recording of evidence---Leave application was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery, of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n \n--Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Application for leave to defend suit---Dismissal of such application--Plea of defendant was that statement of accounts was not in consonance with averments contained in plaint---Validity---Defendant had not raised such plea in leave application---High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.\n \nAnwar Ali and others v. Manzoor Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 1770 and Amir Shah v. Ziarat Gul 1998 SCMR 593 rel.\n \n(d) Pleadings-\n \n----Litigant could not be allowed to raise altogether a new and different plea before Appellate and Revisional Court, which had not been raised before lower forums.\n \nAnwar Ali and others v. Manzoor Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 1770 and Amir Shah v. Ziarat Gul 1998 SCMR 593 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.198 of 2005, decision dated: 26th May; 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Mst. HAJRA BIBI\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED (ADBP) through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13452",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2860 = 2006 SLD 2860 = 2006 CLD 364",
    "Key Words:": "Non-Banking Finance Companies (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003-----R. 5(5)---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33---S.R.O.161(1)/2004, dated' 17-3-2004---Rejection of application for renewal of Investment Advisory Licence---Scope---Appellant corporation had alleged that it was not granted art opportunity of being heard before rejection of application--Power to renew or refuse renewal of Investment Advisory Licence under R.5(5) of Non-Banking Finance Companies (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003 had been delegated by the Commission to Executive Director (Specialized Companies Division) under S.R.O. 161(1)/2004 dated 17-3-2004---No decision or order of competent Authority was available on record which was conveyed to the appellant---Assistant Director did not have the power or authority to refuse renewal of licence---Decision conveyed by Assistant Director being not a lawful order, Specialized Companies Division was advised to place the matter before Executive Director concerned who was competent and had been duly allowed by the Commission to decide such matters---Application pending before the Commission since long, should have been disposed of within specified period after providing proper opportunity of hearing to the appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.22 of 2004, decision dated: 22nd September. 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID GHAFFAR AND ABDUL REHMAN QURESHI, COMMISSIONERS",
    "": "LIMITED\nVs.\nASSISTANT DIRECTOR (SPECIALIZED COMPANIES DIVISION) SEC and\nanother"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13453",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2861 = 2006 SLD 2861 = 2006 CLD 366",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)-------Ss. 20(6)(b) & (g) & 33---Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969), Preamble---S. R. 0.205(1)/2004, dated 19-4-2004---Complainant had alleged that various shares held by her were handed over to appellant for sale and appellant sold the same, but he did not give complainant the sale proceeds thereof--Appellant took the stance that his agents who used to run his brokerage house, had absconded with all relevant record---Said assertions of appellant were rejected by the Joint Director who ordered appellant to return either the shares claimed by the complainant or an amount equivalent to the value of shares in question on specified date---Appellant being aggrieved with the findings of Joint Director, had challenged them in appeal---Prime argument of appellant for rejecting claim filed by complainant was that as his agents who used to run his brokerage house had absconded with all relevant record, no other means were available for verifying the claim of complainant-Validity-Said reasoning of appellant was untenable and unacceptable as claim of complainant could not he rejected on the ground that appellant's agents had run away with the record---Appellant as a principal was fully responsible for the actions of his agents and he could not plead innocence on the basis of his differences with his agents---Contention of appellant that complaint was a civil matter and should be referred to the Civil Court, was only an attempt on his part to avoid his obligation---Case was a straight-forward one, where appellant's brokerage firm sold shares belonging to complainant and then failed to hand over sale proceeds to her---Commission was fully competent to regulate business of Stock Exchanges and its members and brokers under the law and to protect the interest of investors---S.R.0.205(I)/2004 dated 19-4-2004 having given powers of adjudication to Director, he was competent to pass impugned order.\n \n2003 CI,D 293 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.17 of 2004, heard on 10-09-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ETRAT H. RIZVI AND ABDUL REHMAN QURESHI, COMMISSIONERS",
    "": "Mian KHALID BASHIR\nVs.\nIMTIAZ HAIDER, DIRECTOR (SECURITIES MARKET DIVISON) SEC and 2\nothers"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13454",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2862 = 2006 SLD 2862 = 2006 CLD 377",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----S.19---Execution of decree---Auction of mortgaged property--Objection petition stating that mortgaged property had been exchanged through a decree of civil court, and that objector had deposited with decree-holder/Bank more than Rs.16,00,000---Bank claimed outstanding amount to be Rs.40,00,000---Decision of executing court that Bank was estopped to claim Rs.40,00,000 for having itself fixed Rs.16,00,000 as reserve price of mortgaged property for its auction---Validity---High Court, with consent of parties, accepted appeal, set aside impugned order and remanded case to executing court for its decision in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.305-B of 2005, decision dated: 20-01-2006",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND SHEIKH AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD AKRAM and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13455",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2863 = 2006 SLD 2863 = 2006 CLD 394",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of I984)-------Ss.6 & 9---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.73 & 74-Suit for recovery of loan amount and liquidated damages---Claire for liquidated damages was solely based on the terms of the loan agreement executed between the parties---No assertion had been made in the plaint about the nature of losses or actual damages suffered by the Bank due to non-fullfilment of obligation by the borrower or violation of the terms of the loan agreement executed by the borrower in favour of the Bank---Effect---Whole claim of the Bank regarding liquidated damages against the borrower was based on the breach of the terms of loan agreement and no other particulars or actual losses or damages had been unfolded in the plaint---Party could not be permitted to lead evidence beyond its pleadings and even if some evidence was recorded beyond the pleadings or contrary to the pleadings same could not he looked into or considered for granting relief---Non-awarding of claim of liquidated damages, which was solely based on the breach of terms of loan agreement was fully justified in circumstances---Principles.\n \nMessrs Khanzada Muhammad Abdul Haq Khan Khattak & Co. v. WAPDA through Chairman WAPDA and another 1991 SCMR 1436; Messrs H1TEC Metal Plast (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Habib Bank Limited PLD 1997 Quetta 87; Saudi Pak Industrial and Commercial Investment Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Allied Bank Limited 2003 CLD 596; 1987 CLC 158; 1998 CLC 1017 and Habib Bank Ltd. v. Farooq Compost Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. and 4 others 1993 MLD 1571 ref.\n \n(b) Pleadings----\n \n----Party could not be permitted to lead evidence beyond its pleadings and even if some evidence was recorded beyond the pleadings or contrary to the pleadings, same could not be looked into for granting relief.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.11 of 1992, decision dated: 22nd November. 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND MRS. YASMEEN ABBASI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs UNITED BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nMessrs M. ESMAIL AND COMPANY (PVT.) LIMITED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13456",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2864 = 2006 SLD 2864 = 2006 CLD 528",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 22---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Judgment and decree of Banking Court was assailed through a constitutional petition---Validity---Judgment, decree and trial order of the Banking Court being appealable before the High Court under S.22, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, petitioner could not invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution in the presence of an alternate and efficacious remedy.\n \nMessrs Unicorn Enterprises v. Banking Court No.5, City Court Building, Karachi and 2 others 2004 CLD 1452 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.22---Constitution of Pakistan. (1973), Art.199---Appeal to High Court against of the Banking Court---Limitation---Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be allowed to be invoked to circumvent the law of limitation and if the petitioner fails to avail the alternate and efficacious remedy available under law in time through his own negligence he cannot seek relief under Art.199 of the Constitution---No explanation for the delay having been offered, constitutional petition was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P.No.587 of 2003, decision dated: 8-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED, C.J. AND MAQBOOL BAQAR, J",
    "": "GHULAM MUSTAFA BUGHIO and another\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT NO.4, Karachi High Court and another--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13457",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2865 = 2006 SLD 2865 = 2006 CLD 530",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 19 & 22---State Bank of Pakistan B.P.D. Circular No.29 dated 15-10-2002---Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged property---Application by Judgment-debtors for allowing them to pay off these dues to the Bank as determined by the State Bank of Pakistan in terms of its B.P.D. Circular No.29 of 2002---Judgment-debtors, despite several extensions of time, failed to deposit even the 10% down payment of the amount that they were required to pay in terms of the State Bank Circular No.29---Application of -debtors was rightly dismissed by the Banking Court in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 17 of 2005, decision dated: 31st January, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAWWAR HUSSAIN, JAFFERY AND MAQBOOL BAQAR, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL SHAFIQUE and another\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13458",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2866 = 2006 SLD 2866 = 2006 CLD 539",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -----Ss.9, 10, 22 & 24---Suit for recovery of Bank loan---Date of default by the borrower---Determination---Bank had served legal notice upon the borrower on 13-10-2000 which led to the conclusion that borrower had already committed default, which necessitated the Bank to serve legal notice---Contents of the legal notice in the present case, did not show any date of default and it had casually been stated therein that borrower failed to pay the agreed instalment as per terms of the finance---Statement of accounts showed that borrower paid the first instalment on 12-1-2000 and thereafter he did not pay any amount, and thus committed default---No other document was available on the record, which would go to show that the date of default was 9-5-2002 and not 12-1-2000 as alleged by the Bank---Plaintiff had to succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the other party---Bank having failed to substantiate its sole contention that date of default was 9-5-2002 and not 12-1-2000, its appeal against the order of the Banking Court was dismissed by High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.744 of 2002, heard on 31st January, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "BANK OF PUNJAB\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD RAMZAN 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13459",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2867 = 2006 SLD 2867 = 2006 CLD 554",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---------Ss.22 & 18---Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), Ss.12 & 11---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.181---Execution of decree passed under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984---Limitation---Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 having been repealed on promulgation of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, a fresh cause of action and limitation of three years had accrued to the decree holder for execution in terms of S.22(2) of the new Act.\n \nMuhammad Akhtar v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan 2005 CLD 1173 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.781 of 2001, decision dated: 23rd February, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHEIKH AZMAT SAEED AND MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs CHENAB FLOUR MILLS (PVT.) LTD. Through Director/Chief Executive and others\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13460",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2868 = 2006 SLD 2868 = 2006 CLD 568",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Stay order-------Operation of stay granted by superior Court---Just as law would operate from the moment it was enacted and ignorance was no defence, a stay granted by a superior Court would operate from the time, the order was made and ignorance of the order, would not permit a lower Court to render the order of a superior Court ineffective or a nullity---Any or all proceedings taken by the Trial Court after order of High Court staying proceedings before it, were a nullity and totally without jurisdiction.\n \nDin Muhammad Khan v. Abdul Rehman Khan 1992 SCMR 127 and Akhtar Hussain and 4 others v. The State 1993 SCMR 1523 ref.\n \n(b) Jurisdiction---\n \n---Jurisdiction of a Court was always the core question, which had to be dealt with immediately to the exclusion of all other business, because that was what would decide the competence or otherwise of a Court or Tribunal to proceed further in the matter.\n \nTown Committee, Gakhar Mandi v. Authority Under the Payment of Wages Act, Gujranwala and 57 others PLD 2002 SC 452 and Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Tahir Edible Oil (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2003 CLC 416 ref.\n \n(c) Words and phrases---\n ----Term Per incuriam, defined and explained.\n \n(d) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Legislature was presumed to be cognizant of existing law---Presumption being that Legislature would not make any mistake, and expression of Legislative will, could not lightly and easily be ignored.\n \n(e) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)---\n \n--Ss. 5 & 7---Recovery of money---Machinery for dealing with the matter of recovery of money---Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 was a special law relating to the recovery of money from delinquent/defaulting borrowers---Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 a complete Code unto itself and had provided machinery for dealing with the matter of recovery of money and it related to matters including offences created with regard to an effort at thwarting recovery---Provisions of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 would prevail over any other law and any criminal Act falling within the definition of offence contained in S.7 of the Ordinance, would fall within the exclusive domain of Banking Tribunal and that too in the manner that offence would not be cognizable and that cognizance thereof would be taken by the Tribunal on a written complaint by the Bank which would be bailable and also compoundable.\n \nAamer Khurshid Mirza v. The State 2005 CLD 20; Messrs Chenab Cement Products (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking, Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lahore 672 and Nayyar Islam's case PLD 2001 Lah. 533 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.3021, 3635, 3636 and 3835 of 2005, decision dated: 7-06-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. ABDUR RASHID AND M. BILAL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "AAMIR KHURSHID MIRZA\nVs.\nTHE STATE and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13461",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2869 = 2006 SLD 2869 = 2006 CLD 606",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.9---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.84---Recovery of Bank loan---Factual controversy---Dispute about signatures---Comparison of signatures by Court---One of the defendants denied his being director of the borrower company and also denied having executed any document in favour of bank---Plea raised by the contesting defendant was that his signatures on the documents were forged---Validity---Evidence of the witness of bank was not confidence-inspiring---Such witness was not aware of the facts of the case and had deposed on the basis of record available with him---No officer, who was dealing with the matter, was examined---Such witness, in his cross-examination deposed that the guarantees were not executed before him and he was not witness to the transaction and was not aware whether the person visited the bank or not---None of the documents produced by the bank were prepared in his presence---Disputed signatures of the defendant were not similar to admitted signatures---Flow of both the signatures were different, style was different and characteristics and the way, particularly alphabets were altogether different---Even if report of Handwriting Expert was ignored, the evidence of bank was not sufficient to prove execution of documents by the defendant---Documents filed by bank with plaint were not executed by the defendant and he was not liable for the amount claimed in the suit---Suit was dismissed against the defendant in circumstances.\n \nAnwar Khan v. Mst. Nafis Bano 2005 SCMR 152; Anwar Khan v. Mir Wall PLD 58 Lah. 447 and M. Umar Shah v. Bashir Ahmed 2004 SCMR 1859 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Summary Suit No.1182 of 1999, decision dated: 17-01-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs USMANIA CORPORATION (PVT.) LIMITED and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13462",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2870 = 2006 SLD 2870 = 2006 CLD 612",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Finance Agreement---Financial facility provided by way of participation in equity of company against assurance of payment of minimum dividend @ 13% per annum for a period of four years---Guarantors had agreed to buy back the shares acquired by appellant and had also guaranteed the payment of said minimum rate of dividend at 13% per annum after grace period of one year---Leave to defend was refused but later on Court allowed counsel for respondents to record statement/ acquiescence and suit was decreed---Decretal amount had been paid and dispute with regard to residual amount was challenged by appellant---Question was as to whether after having refused to grant leave to defend, recording such statement, was permissible under the law and if that was so whether liability under said statement was liable to be altered---Validity---Case was remanded to trial Court for verifying the liability after statement of respondent's side---If no concession was offered by appellant through any statement the trial Court would allow appellant to rebut the statement made by counsel of respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.449 of 2001, heard on 16-02-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI NAWAZ CHOWHAN AND M.A. SHAHID SIDDIQUI, JJ",
    "": "EQUITY PARTICIPATION FUND\nVs.\nMessrs PAKIZAN OIL MILLS (PVT.) LTD. and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13463",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2871 = 2006 SLD 2871 = 2006 CLD 622",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19(7)---Execution of decree---Banking Court, acting as an executing Court, while hearing objection petition, has no jurisdiction to direct the objection petitioner to make a deposit of 20% of the sale price as a condition precedent for hearing the objection petition---Imposition of such condition by the Banking Court was illegal.\n \nMessrs Majid and Sons and another v. National Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 1742 and Messrs Noor Hayat Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive v. Judge Banking Court No.1, Multan and 5 others 2004 CLD 1281 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeals Nos.403 and 386 of 2003, decision dated: 23rd February, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Syed MUHAMMAD EHSAN ALI\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13464",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2872 = 2006 SLD 2872 = 2006 CLD 625",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 7(4)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.379, 406 & 420---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Quashing of F.I.R.---Registration of F.I.R. and taking of cognizance---Distinction---High Court, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, quashed F.I.R. on the ground that it was registered in violation of the provisions of S.7(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---No order for quashing of F.I.R. could be passed nor the same could be approved in absence of any finding that the offences mentioned in F.I.R. were false and malicious and in absence of a finding that if a particular forum or mode had been prescribed with respect to taking of cognizance of an offence then the same also implied prohibition regarding the registration of F.I.R.---Registration of F.I.R. and taking of cognizance of cases were two distinct and independent concepts under the criminal law---If the intention of law-maker was to put any clog on the registration of F.I.R. then the Legislature would have said so specifically and that if the law put a condition only on the taking of cognizance then it could never be read to imply prohibition on registration of FIRs.---High Court did not pass legal and valid order---Supreme Court converted petition for leave to appeal into appeal and set aside the order passed by High Court---Appeal was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.356-L of 2005, decision dated: 15-12-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY AND CH. IJAZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and others\nVs.\nMian ASIM FAREED and OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13465",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2873 = 2006 SLD 2873 = 2006 CLD 625",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 7(4)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.379, 406 & 420---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Quashing of F.I.R.---Registration of F.I.R. and taking of cognizance---Distinction---High Court, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, quashed F.I.R. on the ground that it was registered in violation of the provisions of S.7(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---No order for quashing of F.I.R. could be passed nor the same could be approved in absence of any finding that the offences mentioned in F.I.R. were false and malicious and in absence of a finding that if a particular forum or mode had been prescribed with respect to taking of cognizance of an offence then the same also implied prohibition regarding the registration of F.I.R.---Registration of F.I.R. and taking of cognizance of cases were two distinct and independent concepts under the criminal law---If the intention of law-maker was to put any clog on the registration of F.I.R. then the Legislature would have said so specifically and that if the law put a condition only on the taking of cognizance then it could never be read to imply prohibition on registration of FIRs.---High Court did not pass legal and valid order---Supreme Court converted petition for leave to appeal into appeal and set aside the order passed by High Court---Appeal was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.356-L of 2005, decision dated: 15-12-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY AND CH. IJAZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and others\nVs.\nMian ASIM FAREED and OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13466",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2874 = 2006 SLD 2874 = 2006 CLD 679",
    "Key Words:": "State Bank of Pakistan BCD Circular No.34 dated 26-11-1984-------Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Contentions of the petitioner, an account holder of \"\"Profit/loss Sharing System\"\" were that he had made an investment with the Bank in its monthly Scheme and at that time he earned a rate of profit of 9.0% on the said Scheme without deduction of Zakat; that thereafter, from time to time, the Bank reduced the profit rate resulting, at the time of filing of the present constitutional petition to a diminished profit per month and that the present constitutional petition was filed by the petitioner for advancing personal right and for protecting public interest to enforce the promise of profit/loss sharing by the Bank---Validity---Financial statements of the Bank did not provide information that was specific and relevant for purposes of State Bank of Pakistan BCD Circular No.34 dated 26-11-1984 criteria and calculations---Ambiguity of representation in the financial statements, for example clubbing of mark-up and interest income, non-disclosure of administrative costs as a specific head and so forth was, therefore, misleading and invited careful scrutiny---Report by the financial Controller of the Bank which had declared that lowering of the profit rates distributed to the depositors of the Bank was, inter alia, on account of lowering of treasury bill rates, inter-bank rates and monetary policy enforced by the State Bank of Pakistan, which undermined the Bank's Stand that State Bank of Pakistan BCD Circular No.34 was the sole criterion for profit rate determination on its deposit accounts which also invited scrutiny--Analysis requisite for examining such pleas as well as the Bank statements was, however, an enterprise that required detailed information and expertise, neither of which was possessed by the High Court; but more importantly, under the law such an exercise was both the function and duty of the State Bank of Pakistan---High Court, in circumstances declined to explore the matters that fell within the domain of an expert statutory institution---Duty of Court was to ensure that the legal criteria and procedure for the declaration of rates of profit by the Bank on its PLS deposit were fully met---High Court, for the purpose of safeguarding investor's rights, referred the matter to the State Bank of Pakistan to ensure that the provisions and objectives of its BCD Circular No.34 were duly met which included the maximization of the non-interest income from the deposits made by the Banks/D.F.Is. as well as strict check on the costs allocated to the non-interest income calculation---Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.14700 of 2004, heard on 20-12-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "Sh. ANAYAT ALI \nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13467",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2875 = 2006 SLD 2875 = 2006 CLD 684",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)------Ss. 195, 473 & 476---Loans to Directors---Examination of annual accounts of the Company for relevant year showed that Company had provided loans to its Directors, without taking approval of Commission for making said loans to Directors; and that no particulars had been filed with Registrar of Companies in that respect---Enforcement Department, in circumstances apprehended violations of statutory provisions of S.195 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Show-cause notice was issued under Ss.195 & 476 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 to Chief Executive and Directors of the Company---Legal Advisor of the Company admitted that the Company had failed to file particulars of loans of said Directors with the Registrar and he requested to take a lenient view of the matter and to allow some time to the Company for doing the needful---Validity---Company had breached the mandatory requirements of S.195 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, however due to minor nature of default and keeping in view the fact that Company was a newly¬listed-Company, lenient view of the matter was taken and instead of imposing any fine, invoking powers contained in S.473 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, Company was directed to file particulars of loans provided to Directors with the Registrar and send a copy of the same with the directions that Company would, in future comply with provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/233/669/2005-7868 dated February 3, 2006, decision dated: 9-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "DR. SAJID QURESHI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (CLD)",
    "": "In the matter of: Messrs NETSOL TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13468",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2876 = 2006 SLD 2876 = 2006 CLD 687",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S. 126-'Guarantee'-Connotation-'Guarantee' is an under-taking by a third party for one of the parties to the contract whereby the third party binds itself to see that the promise or condition would be fulfilled according to covenant. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) --\n \n----S. 9---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.128---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185 (3)---Recovery of bank loan---Liability of guarantor/ surety---Suit was decreed in favour of bank against the borrower and guarantor---Petitioner being guarantor was aggrieved of the and decree passed by High Court in exercise of banking jurisdiction---Validity---Liability of guarantor/surety was co-extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it was otherwise provided by the contract as envisaged in S.128 of Contract Act, 1872---Guarantor and principal debtor were jointly and severally liable to pay the outstanding amount to the creditor---Guarantor could not shirk from the liabilities incurred by him through the execution of documents---Creditor's in an action against guarantor was merely required to show existence of liability of the principal debtor and occurrence of default or breach of terms leading to the liability---Defence based on technicalities, loss of procedure or covenants to which guarantor was not a party, could not be pressed into service by guarantee---No infirmity or illegality in the passed by High Court having been found by the Supreme Court and no question of law of public importance having been raised by the petitioner, leave to appeal was refused. \n \nRafique Hazquel Masih v. Bank Alfalah Ltd. and others 2005 SCMR 72 = 2005 CLD 95; M/s. Platinum Insurance Company Ltd. v. Daewoo Corporation PLD 1991 SC 1; Ram Sagar Singh v. Yogendra Narain Prasad Singh AIR 1975 Pat. 239; Ashrafi Rai v. Parsbadilal AIR 1959 M.P. 26; Dalchand v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1976 Raj. 112; Madho Sah v. Sitaram Sah AIR 1962 Pat. 405; Arumugham Chettiar v. Sadasiram AIR 1971 Mad. 321; Nagpur Nagrik Sahakari Bank Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1981 A.B. 153; Budh Singh v. Mukhund Murailal AIR 1975 A.B. 201; Kali Cheran v. Abdul Rehman AIR 1918 PC 226; Central Exchange Bank Ltd. v. Mst. Zaitoon Begum and 2 others PLD 1968 SC 83 and Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Ratilal Tribhovandas Thakar AIR 1941 Bom. 108 rel.\n \n(c) Pleadings---\n \n----Parties are bound by their pleadings. \n \nMst. Murad Begum's case PLD 1974 SC 322 rel.\n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 185---New plea---Fresh plea cannot be raised before Supreme Court. \n \nJohn E. Brown Lee. v. Vivan Mac Milian AIR 1940 PC 219; Ashfaque-ur-Rehman v. Ch. Muhammad Afzal PLD 1971 SC 766 and Ganga Nath Sen v. Ram Jit Ray ILR (1942) 1 Cal. 11 rel.\n \n(e) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S. 141---Surety's right---Scope---So long as principal debtor is liable, the guarantor also agrees to be liable---Right has been conferred on surety by S.141 of Contract Act, 1872, to the benefit of every security which creditor has against principal debtor at the time when the contract of surety is entered into. \n \nCitibank N.A. Newdehly v. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Co. Ltd. Kanpur AIR 1982 Dehly 487 rel.\n \n(f) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n--Art. 185(3)---Petition for leave to appeal---Concurrent findings of fact by the Courts below---Scope---Supreme Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below while exercising power under Art.185(3) of the Constitution. \n \n Humayun and others v. The State 1986 SCMR 1987 and Evacuee Trust Property Board v. Muhammad Sharif 1984 Pakistan Supreme Court Cases 1501 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P. No. 1441-L of 2004, decision dated: 7-02-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAVED IQBAL AND CH. IJAZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "Messrs STATE ENGINEERING CORPORATION LTD. \nVs.\nNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13469",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2877 = 2006 SLD 2877 = 2006 CLD 706",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----S.9---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S. 22---Recovery of bank loan---Time-barred suit---Interest bearing loan---Provisions of S.22 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Applicability---Interest bearing loan was granted to defendants in years, 1977-1980 and the suit was filed on 31-5-2000---Banking Court declined to grant leave to defend the suit and decreed the suit in favour of bank---Plea raised by defendants was that suit was barred by limitation---Validity---Loans became time-barred as per provisions of Limitation Act, 1908, prior to enactment of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Right of bank to recover amount of finance stood extinguished due to bar of limitation as provisions of Limitation Act, 1908, were applicable to interest bearing loans---Bank failed to file suit against defendants within the period of limitation---Rights, which were past and closed transaction, could not be revived---Fresh cause of action under the provisions of S.22 of repealed Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, arose only in cases where loans were granted on mark-up basis according to Islamic Banking to overcome hardship and inconvenience in cases where no limitation was provided by Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 and Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984---After coming into force of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, provisions of its S.22 were not made applicable to all cases instituted or filed in Banking Court---Loans disbursed under non-Islamic Banking System, wherein period of limitation was provided, fell outside the purview of S.22 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Rights extinguished could not be revived resorting to S.22 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and the suit was dismissed---Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \nKhalid Qureshi and 5 others v. United Bank Limited 2001 SCMR 103 and N.D.F.C. v. Anwar Zaib White Cement and others 1999 MLD 1888 ref.\n \n(b) Banker and customer---\n \n----When guarantee is for a limited amount, guarantor cannot be held liable for anything more than what he has guaranteed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.66 of 2002, heard on 6-07-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SHAHEEN NOON and another\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13470",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2878 = 2006 SLD 2878 = 2006 CLD 726",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----S.18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.10 & 11---Execution of decree---Principles---Overt act of decree-holder is required for execution. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n--S.19---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.18---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.181---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.48 & O.XXI, Rr.10 & 11---Execution of decree---Limitation---Decree was passed by Banking Court on 3-2-1998 and first application for execution of the decree was filed in the year, 2003---Validity---Decree-holder was required to make application (written or oral) for execution of decree in question and provisions of Limitation Act, 1908, would apply thereto and there was no escape from the fact that such application would be governed by Art.181 of Limitation Act, 1908 i.e. three years---First application for execution could have been filed by decree-holder by or before 2-2-2001, i.e. within three years of the decree and thus the right of decree-holder to file execution petition had lapsed during the currency of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, prior to its repeal vide Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, on 30-8-2001---Vested right was created in favour of -debtor and there was nothing in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which could be pressed into service so as to extend period of limitation---Execution petition filed by bank was barred by limitation---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Sher v. Muhammad Khan PLD 1975 Lah. 1016 and Muhammad Jalat Khan and another v. Ghulam Sarwar 1986 CLC 552 ref.\n \nUnited Bank Ltd. Bank Square Branch Lahore v. Fateh Hayat Khan Tiwana and 7 others 2004 CLD 223 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Petition No.36-B of 2003 in C.O.S. No.147 of 1997, decision dated: 25-11-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHEIKH AZMAT SAEED, J",
    "": "NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LEASING CORPORATION LTD.\nVs.\nMessrs SUNSHINE CLOTH LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13471",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2879 = 2006 SLD 2879 = 2006 CLD 734",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 21---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to defend suit---Dismissal of application---Leave to defend application pleaded that appellant did apply for sanction of loan and did execute a number of inchoate documents in order to avail facility of loan and loan though was sanctioned, but was never disbursed to appellant and that amount of loan was disbursed to another person by the Bank Manager against which complaints were made by appellant to different high-ups, but no action was taken against the Manager of the Bank---Appellant had further contended that an amount of Rs.6,00,000 was deposited by him on account of threats of arrest to him and his family members---Trial Court relying upon copies of two documents allegedly executed by appellant, dismissed leave to defend application and decreed suit filed by the Bank---Appellant had impugned said order and decree of Trial Court in appeal---Said two documents, were never produced by the Bank with plaint and appellant had not been provided opportunity to either rebut or explain his position in regard to said documents which were filed by the Bank---Relying upon such documents, without providing opportunity to appellant to either rebut or explain his position in regard to said documents, ex facie was contrary to the procedure---Order dismissing application of appellant to defend suit and impugned , which were nullity, were set aside with the direction that matter would be heard afresh by the Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.D-30 of 2003, decision dated: 16-02-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY AND AMIR HANI MUSLIM, JJ",
    "": "ALMADINA ELECTRIC STORE, DAHARKI, through Proprietor\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13472",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2880 = 2006 SLD 2880 = 2006 CLD 743",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) ------Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Ex parte decree---Duty of Banking Court---Nor-speaking order---After dismissal of application for leave to defend the suit, Banking Court, without looking into the genuineness of claim of bank, decreed the suit in favour of bank---Validity---Banking Court, after dismissing application for leave to defend the suit, was not absolved from its primary duty of seeing and judging the genuineness of the claim of bank---Banking Court was required to apply its mind to the facts of the case and documents before it---Courts were expected to be more vigilant, cautious and considerate while deciding the valuable rights of the parties---Judgment passed by Banking Court was in complete oblivion of the dictum of law laid down by Supreme Court in its s---Banking Court did not care even to examine the documents available on record, nor it had seen that the plaint was supported by statement of accounts to meet the mandatory requirement of S.9 (1) and (2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Judgment and decree under appeal was non-speaking and lacked the element of reasoning---Banking Court did not discuss in the the grounds urged before it by the defendant---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court were set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for re-writing the through a speaking order---Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Al Jalal Textile Mills Ltd. 2003 CLD 1007; Haji Ali Khan and Company v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 1995 SC 362 and Messrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 1999 SCMR 2353 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.161 of 2002, heard on 28-02-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs S.A CORPORATION through Partners and 2 others\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13473",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2881 = 2006 SLD 2881 = 2006 CLD 746",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S.73, illustration (n)---Breach of contract---Damages---Quantum, ascertaining of---Principles---General damages arising in usual course of events from breach of contract are recoverable in ordinary circumstances---Special damages are awarded in cases, as may reasonably be supposed to have been in contemplation of both parties at the time of contract---Law does not record consequential damages arising of delay in respect of money. \n \nHadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341; Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow and Sons Ltd. (1932) A.C. 452; Commell Lairds & Co. v. Manganese Bronze and Brass Co. (1993) 2 K B. 141; Graham v. Campbell (1877) 7 Ch. D.494; Urquhart Lindsay & Co. v. Eastern Bank Ltd. (1922) 1 K.B. 318 and Syed Ahmad Saeed Kirmani v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 1993 SCMR 441 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9 (1)---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.73, illustration (n) ---Recovery of damages---Breach of contrast---Plaintiffs were holding credit cards issued by defendant-Bank---Grievance of plaintiffs was that on their visit abroad, when they presented the cards at different places, despite availability of credit in their accounts, the cards were not accepted and they were humiliated---Plaintiffs claimed damages on such act and negligence of the bank as they suffered mental agony due to refusal of payment on the cards---Validity---After the cards were refused at the first place, the plaintiffs had learnt that the cards were not in operation-Plaintiffs themselves presented the card at different places knowing fully that they were not activated and refusal was likely, therefore, humiliation as claimed of reputation was only a consequence of deliberate act of plaintiffs-Had the plaintiffs been more cautious, they might not have used the cards after refusal once or the second time but it appeared that they continued to present the same wherever they visited---Though plaintiffs suffered mental torture, agony and humiliation but claim of plaintiffs for damages was hit by the provisions of S.73 of Contract Act, 1872, as elaborated in illustration (n) thereto---As the breach of contract was established, suit was decreed in favour of plaintiffs only to the extent of amount paid by them to defendant for availing the facility---Suit was decreed accordingly\n \nDr. Professor Haroon Ahmed v. Messrs British Airways and others PLD 2004 Kar. 439 and Messrs Victor Electronics Appliances Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. Habib Bank Limited and another 2005 CLD 1383 distinguished.\n \n(c) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n \n--S.73---Banker and customer---Breach of contract---Credit card, use of---Principles---Transaction involving use of credit card.: contemplates payments against goods purchased or service rendered to the card holder---Company issuing the card makes payment on behalf of the card holder---Respective amounts are then debited to the account of card holder who is allowed specific period for payment as per contract---In case of deferred payments by instalments interest may be payable on the outstanding amount, which may also include additional incentives to the card members to encourage use of credit cards-As such it basically makes the transaction one of a promise to pay money against future unforeseen transactions for purchase of goods or services under agreement between the issuer of the card and its holder.\n \n(d) Words and phrases---\n \n----Ruin---Meaning. \n \nChambers 20th Century Dictionary, Edition 1983 and New Shorter Oxford Dictionary ref.\n \n(e) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S.73---Breach of contract---Damages, determination of---Totally ruined---Effect---In a situation as described by the words totally ruined' such a consequence cannot be anticipated without loss of reputation and consequent mental torture, agony, humiliation in addition to financial losses that may be suffered as a result of failure to meet financial obligations because of breach of promise to make payment on which promissee relied to meet his obligation---Law expressly bars award of damages in such an eventuality.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-55 of 2002, decision dated: 10-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERWAZ, J",
    "": "AZIZULLAH SHEIKH and another--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nUNION BANK LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13474",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVVMTFNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2882 = 2006 SLD 2882 = 2006 CLD 800",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.9---Suit for recovery of finance provided for purchase of vehicle---Default in payment of instalments by customer---Suit by Bank for recovery of balance amount after taking possession of vehicle---Maintainability---Agreement between parties provided that on failure of customer to pay any instalment on its due date, Bank would become entitled to demand immediate payment of entire balance amount and take possession of vehicle and sell the same---Bank, after taking possession of vehicle sold same and credited its sale proceedings to customer's account---Bank, after taking possession of vehicle, was not left without any remedy regarding recovery of balance amount---Customer in leave application had not denied execution of documents, availing of finance facility and delivery of possession of vehicle to him---Suit was decreed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 89 of 2006, heard on 7-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "HAROON RASHID\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13475",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2883 = 2006 SLD 2883 = 2006 CLD 804",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----Ss. 3, 9 & 22---Suit ,for recovery of loan---Guarantors of loan whether liable to pay cost of funds.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 5 of 2006, heard on 4-04-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITD\nVs.\nNATIONAL ENGINEERING COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13476",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2884 = 2006 SLD 2884 = 2006 CLD 806",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----Ss. 15, 19 & 22---Recovery suit was decreed against the -debtor and during execution proceedings property admittedly belonging to the -debtor was directed by the Banking Court to be auctioned---While terms and conditions of the auction were in the process of being settled -debtor filed objection petition challenging terms and conditions which was rejected by the Banking Court not only that application seeking postponement of the sale so as to enable -debtor to deposit the decretal amount was also turned down---Contention of the -debtor was that reserve price was not fixed by the Court nor the time and venue of the auction was determined by the Court and all these matters had been delegated to and left at the discretion of the Court auctioneer---Record, however, showed that in fact reserve price had been fixed and approved by the Court by an earlier order factum whereof was reflected from the order impugned and there was evidence on the record that venue of the auction was also fixed by the Court being at site---Only the date and time had not been fixed with exactitude---Validity---High Court, in appeal directed the Banking Court to fix the date and time of the auction and thereafter to proceed with auction proceedings in accordance with law and declined to pass any further order in this regard---Held, no provision existed in law which enabled the debtor to seek postponement of the auction of the property in order to satisfy the decree and there was nothing in law that impeded satisfaction of the decree by the -debtor in accordance with and subject to limitation provided by law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 118 of 2006, decision dated: 29-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHEIKH AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SURIYA KHANUM and 2 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13477",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2885 = 2006 SLD 2885 = 2006 CLD 808",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9, 3 & 22---Finance agreement---Cost of fund, award of---Suit for recovery of amount was decreed with costs and costs of fund from the date of institution of the suit till realization---Bank filed appeal against the decree claiming the funds from the date of the default which according to it was 9-9-1992---Validity---Finance Agreement was dated 16-9-1991, which according to the Bank expired on 9-9-1992 and which allegedly was the date of default---Bank remained indolent for 10 years and filed suit for recovery on 20-1-2003---No legal justification was available for awarding the costs of funds from the alleged date of default i.e.9-9-1992---Judgment-debtor could not be penalized for the inaction of the Bank---Trial Court had already granted the costs of fund from the date of institution of the suit---Bank admitted that decree already stood satisfied-Appeal of the Bank having no merit was dismissed by the High Court with direction to the Bank to release the security documents of the -debtor within ten days from the date of present order.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 270 of 2005, decision dated: 29-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MUHAMMAD ARSHAD, JEHANGIR, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nPAKISTAN BELTING (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13478",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2886 = 2006 SLD 2886 = 2006 CLD 810",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1980-----Ss.142 & 476---Change of registered office---Information to Registrar---Delay in sending information---Company which had changed its registered office, was required to inform the Registrar on prescribed Form 21 within specified period, had informed Registrar with a delay of 17 days from period as provided under S.142 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Default having not been committed wilfully, taking lenient view of the matter, penalty was condoned for said default with a warning to all concerned officers of the company to be careful in future in compliance of mandatory provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice under section 142 read with section 476 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, decision dated: 18-04-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIR AHMED SHAHEEN, REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES",
    "": "In the matter of: Messrs SASTA PHONE (PRIVATE) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13479",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2887 = 2006 SLD 2887 = 2006 CLD 812",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.15(6) & 19(3)(5)---Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged property---Application of decree-holder seeking possession of mortgaged property---Plea of -debtor that before auction of mortgaged property, Banking Court could not order for delivery of its possession to decree-holder---Validity---Section 19(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 by reference incorporated certain provisions of S.15 including its subsection (6) which made them applicable to sale of mortgaged, pledged or hypothecated property by financial institution in exercise of powers conferred by S.19(3) of the Ordinance---Cumulative effect of Ss.15(6) & 19(5) of the Ordinance would be that financial institution in order to succeed in such application, would have to show that property was mortgaged; that mortgagor or his agent/servant or any person put in possession by mortgagor did not voluntarily give possession thereof; that financial institution had sought sale or purchase or . had purchased mortgaged property; and that financial institution had filed application for obtaining possession of such property---Only upon fulfilment of all such conditions, Banking Court would be competent to order for delivery of possession of mortgaged property to financial institution or purchaser---Where any or more of such conditions were lacking, then Banking Court would have no such power---Not necessary before passing order for delivery of possession that mortgaged property must have already been sold, but same would include mortgaged property yet to be sold and its sale was sought by financial institution---All such conditions being sine qua non for passing an order for delivery of possession, were available in the present case---Application of decree-holder was accepted I n circumstances---Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 9 of 2006, decision dated: 6-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HUMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "QAISER MAJEED\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, RAIWIND BRANCH, DISTRICT Lahore High Court through Manager and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13480",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2888 = 2006 SLD 2888 = 2006 CLD 816",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----Ss.2(c), 9 & I0---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Suit for recovery of amount of bank guarantee---Applications for leave to defend suit by private defendant and Bank followed by amended applications under S.10(12) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court without first deciding such applications ordered for return of plaint for its presentation to proper Court as plaintiff being beneficiary of bank guarantee did not fall in definition of \"\"customer\"\" as defined in S.2(c) of the Ordinance---Validity---Nowhere was provided under S.10 of the Ordinance that while hearing leave application, Banking Court could either reject or return plaint---If Banking Court was of the view that defendants had raised substantial questions of law and facts, then leave could have been granted, but plaint could not be rejected or returned at such point of time---Banking Court being a creature of statute would be bound by the provisions and procedure provided thereunder---High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned order, resultantly leave applications and suit would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court for their decisions in accordance with law.\n \nMessrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245; Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645; Falcon Ventures Pvt. Ltd. through Chief Executive Iftikhar Ahmad v. Punjab Banking Court No.II, Lahore and another 2004 CLD 726 and Manzoor Ahmad and another v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager Nankana Sahib Branch and 3 others 2005 CLD 653 rel.\n \nMessrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353 and Haji Ali Khan and Company, Abbottabad and 8 others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Abbottabad PLD 1995 SC 362 distinguished.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n \n----S.5---Banking Court---Creature of statute---Bound by the provisions and procedure provided under such statute.\n \nMessrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245: Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645; Falcon Ventures Pvt. Ltd. through Chief Executive Iftikhar Ahmad v. Punjab Banking Court No.11, Lahore and another 2004 CLD 726 and Manzoor Ahmad and another v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager, Nankana Sahib Branch and 3 others 2005 CLD 653 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 19 of 2006, heard on 9-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SUI NORTHERN GAS PIPELINES LTD. Through Deputy Chief (Legal)\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD., AVARI HOTEL BRANCH, Lahore High Court through Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13481",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2889 = 2006 SLD 2889 = 2006 CLD 822",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---- - - -Ss . 9(5), 10 & 12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Non¬appearance of defendant and non filing of leave application despite issuance of summons to him through all prescribed modes of service---Return of registered envelope by postal authorities with refusal report---Application by defendant for setting aside ex parte decree filed after one year and eight months of its passing on the ground that he had left earlier house and shifted to a new house, where no notice was sent---Validity---Service duly effected in any of the modes provided in S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would be deemed to be a valid service---Defendant had not conveyed his new address to plaintiff-Bank, which was in the knowledge of his earlier address also given in his Identity Card---Defendant in application stated that he came to know of suit, when his father went to old house along with two named persons, but no affidavit to such effect of such persons had been filed to support such assertion---Such application was barred by time---Defendant failed to explain as to why, despite service through newspapers, he did not file leave application---Such application was dismissed with costs.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 274 of 2005, decision dated: 16-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "TAHIR MUBEEN\nVs.\nPUNJAB SMALL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION\nand others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13482",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2890 = 2006 SLD 2890 = 2006 CLD 826",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----Ss.2(c)(d), 9 & 10-Suit against Bank for recovery of amount of traveller cheques---Application for leave to defend suit by Bank that plaintiff had not purchased traveller cheques from Bank, which were lost/stolen, thus, no privity of contract existed between parties; and that Bank was neither a \"\"customer\"\" nor had granted \"\"finance facility\"\" to plaintiff---Banking Court decreed suit after finding that relationship of \"\"customer\"\" and \"\"financial institution\"\" did exist between the parties---Validity---Leave application gave rise to questions of law and facts to the effect as to whether plaintiff was \"\"customer\"\" within meaning of S.2(c) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001; whether any 'finance\"\" within scope of S.2(d) of the Ordinance was granted to plaintiff, whether Banking Court had jurisdiction to try suit; whether traveller cheques would fall within term of finance\"\" as defined in S.2(d) of the Ordinance; whether Bank was liable to make good the loss of travellers cheques purchased by plaintiff from its original holder---Banking Court had not dealt with such questions in its true perspective---Bank had made out a case for grant of leave to defend suit, which should have been granted on furnishing bank guarantee---High Court accepted appeal, set aside impugned decree and accepted leave application subject to furnishing of bank guarantee equal to suit amount with direction to Banking Court to decide suit after framing issues and recording evidence of parties within specified time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 491 of 2004, heard on 7-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "AMERICAN EXPRESS BANK LIMITED through Chief Manager and another\nVs.\nTAHIR AMIN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13483",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2891 = 2006 SLD 2891 = 2006 CLD 829",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----S.12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Defendant alleged to be permanent resident of Village \"\"H\"\" as shown in NIC and voter list, not knowing English except putting his signatures, and not having knowledge about decree---Validity---Defendant while dealing with Bank gave address of Flat at place \"\"K\"\", on which summons in suit were issued to him through prescribed modes---Defendant, after alleged change of address had not informed Bank about his new address---Defendant in his application had not disclosed that in what capacity he was occupying Flat at place \"\"K\"\"; when did he vacate the Flat; who occupied Flat and in what capacity---In normal course of behaviour, if one shifts from premises in his occupation (whether rented or self-owned), particularly while facing disputes and litigation, he would inform new occupant of premises about his new address, so that important letters/notices may either be redirected to him on new address or at least his new address may be disclosed to the carrier---Defendant for having concealed all such material facts could not take benefit of his own casual attitude---Defendant in earlier appeal showed his address as mentioned in the title of suit---Firmness and fluency of defendant's signatures on his NIC and other documents executed in favour of Bank made his plea to be false that he could not read and write English---Held: No case was made out by defendant for getting the ex parte decree set aside.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 15 of 2006, decision dated: 22-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED, JJ",
    "": "MUBARAK ALI\nVs.\nFIRST PRUDENTIAL MODARABA through Chief Executive"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13484",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2892 = 2006 SLD 2892 = 2006 CLD 832",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----Ss. 9, 18 & 21---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.65---Auction under order of the Banking Court---Once a bid has been accepted, and no objections are filed within given time, the auction is to be deemed to have been confirmed under O.XXI, R.65, C.P.C.---Courts cannot be turned into auction house---Bid had been sanctified in High Court appeal coupled with the fact that objector had already withdrawn his bid amount prior to filing of appeal before the High Court and had not disclosed such fact---Procedure adopted by the Banking Court did not suffer from any illegality or perversity---High Court having found no merit in the appeal, dismissed the same.\n \nMuhammad Akhlaq Memon v. Zakaria Ghani PLD 2005 SC 819 and 2005 SCMR 1237 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No. 6 of 2005, decision dated: 13-12-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND SYED ZAWWAR HUSSAIN, JAFERY, JJ",
    "": "Messrs IRISMA INTERNATIONAL and 3 others\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED, Karachi High Court and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13485",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2893 = 2006 SLD 2893 = 2006 CLD 836",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--------S.9(5)---Substituted service---Press publication---Selection of newspapers---Failure to dispatch newspapers under postal cover---Banking Court after publication of citation in two newspapers, one English and the other Urdu proceeded ex parte against defendants and decreed the suit in favour of bank---Plea raised by defendants was that the newspapers in which publications were printed, did not have circulation in their area and no copy of newspapers was dispatched to them under postal cover---Validity---Defendants were not educated as one of them had thumb-marked his power of attorney in favour of their counsel and others had signed it in broken Urdu---High Court, in circumstances, assumed that the English newspaper was not being read and had no circulation in the area where they resided---Urdu newspaper was a local newspaper and had no circulation in any other district, especially in the rural area of the district of residence of defendants---High Court declined to accept that the service of defendants was effected in accordance with law, especially when newspapers in which citations against defendants were published were not dispatched through post at their addresses---Defendants were thus not served with the process properly in circumstances.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----\n \n----S.12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Improper service of summons---Banking Court, after publication in press proceeded ex parte against defendants and decreed the suit in favour of bank---Defendants filed application for setting aside ex parte decree but the same was dismissed by Banking Court---Plea raised by defendants was that they were not properly served with the process of Court---Validity---Defendants were not real loanees, guarantors or mortgagors but were heirs/legal representatives of the loanee, thus they were to be substituted/ impleaded in the suit with all clarity and their service should have been effected lawfully through any of the modes known to law---Defendants were not personally served and their service through substituted means was defective---Ex parte decree was incorrectly passed without proper service of defendants/heirs of deceased loanee and they were illegally non-suited by dismissal of their application for setting aside ex parte decree---Banking Court had passed ex parte decree incorrectly without proper service of defendants/heirs of deceased loanee and they were non-suited by dismissal of their application---Ex parte decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and the case was remanded to Banking Court for decision of suit in accordance with law---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 241 of 2005, decision dated: 6-04-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED SAJJAD HUSSAIN SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MONAZAM BIBI and 2 others\nVs.\nZARI TARAQIATI BANK LTD. Through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13486",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2894 = 2006 SLD 2894 = 2006 CLD 839",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.10, 15(11) & 19(7)---State Bank of Pakistan B.C.D. Circular No.29---Execution---Objection---Conditional leave granting order--Non-fulfilment of the condition imposed by High Court---Banking Court dismissed the leave application and decreed the suit in favour of bank but the decree was set aside by High Court and leave to defend the suit was granted subject to deposit of certain amount---Condition imposed by High Court having not been complied with, therefore, application to defend the suit was dismissed and the suit was decreed in favour of bank and execution proceedings were initiated---Judgment-debtors filed objection application and sought settlement of their matter as per terms of State Bank of Pakistan BCD Circular No.29---Banking Court dismissed the objection application on the ground that -debtors had already failed to comply with the direction of High Court---Validity---Ground on which Banking Court dismissed the objection application of -debtors was not sufficient to knock them out and to dismiss their application, as the same had to be decided on its own merits---If -debtors did not comply with the terms of the order of High Court and failed to deposit the requisite amount, they had faced the consequences, as their leave application was disallowed---On the basis of such non-deposit, -debtors objection application could not be dismissed---Banking Court was obliged under law to at least give some findings on the controversies raised in the objection petition---Banking Court did not advert to any of the controversies raised by the parties and issues involved in the case and proceeded to dismiss the objection petition with additional ground that -debtors were prolonging the matter in execution of decree---Order passed by Banking Court, dismissing objection application was devoid of reasons and was set aside---Objection application filed by -debtors filed under Ss.15(11) & 19(7) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 214 of 2005, heard on 13-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs S.B. ENGINEERING (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 4 others\nVs.\nPRUDENTIAL COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. Through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13487",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2895 = 2006 SLD 2895 = 2006 CLD 842",
    "Key Words:": "(a) State Bank of Pakistan BCD Circulars Nos.13 & 32 of 1984-----Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.3---Banking systems---Interest based and mark-up based---Distinction---Salient features---Prior to introduction of Islamic system of financing in year, 1984, bank financing was purely based on interest---Borrower's liability was calculated simply by applying agreed rate of interest to the duration borrower retained the loaned amount---Interest based financing was purely time related---With introduction of Islamic system of financing through BCD Circulars Nos.13 and 32 issued by State Bank of Pakistan in year, 1984, interest based financing was abolished with effect from year, 1985 and permissible modes of financing, including mark-up in price was introduced; only exception being that where it was a case of on-lending of foreign loans by financial institutions, interest was allowed to be charged-As a result of introduction of mark-up based financing in year, 1984, under BCD Circulars 13 and 32, all financial institutions in Pakistan were prohibited from charging any additional sum on account of delay caused by customer in repayment of its obligation created under an agreement based on mark-up---Even where financial institutions had themselves extended time of repayment with the consent of its customer, it was unlawful to charge additional mark-up for such extended period---Obligation under mark-up based agreement once fixed could not be enhanced so as to entitle a financial institution to charge any sum over and above the original contracted amount---Mark-up beyond original contractual period or charging of mark-up upon mark-up both being in the nature of interest and violative of restrictions contained in BCD Circulars Nos. 13 and 32 were invariably declared by Courts as unlawful---Only original contracted marked up price was allowed to be recovered---After introduction of Islamic system of financing, whenever there was any attempt on the part of a financial institution to charge additional mark-up in violation of restrictions contained in both the Circulars of State Bank of Pakistan, the same was declared by Courts as unlawful and it was on account of such restrictions that BCD Circular No.32 contained an advice to all financial institutions to initiate recovery proceedings of their stuck up finances without loss of time as any delay would not bring any financial benefit to financial institutions---As a result of such new system of financing, financial institutions were prevented from charging any additional sum to which they were earlier entitled under interest based financing---Any delay in repayments did not bring any monetary gain to financial institutions.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n \n--S.3---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.15---Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), S.6---Recovery of loans---Powers of Courts---Comparison---Grant of mark-up over mark-up---Courts were empowered to grant mark-up over and above contractual liability under both Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, which was a source of further return to financial institution on their finances, whereas Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, withdrew power of Courts to grant mark-up with the power to award only \"\"Cost of Funds\"\"---Such \"\"Cost of Funds\"\" meant only to compensate financial institutions for the cost that they had to bear for their stuck up finances---Replacing Court's power to award mark-up with power to award \"\"Cost of Funds\"\" was intended to get rid of perception that by allowing mark-up beyond contracted period in reality was reintroduction of interest based financing---Apparently for such reason, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, took away power of Courts to grant mark-up beyond contracted period and replaced it with power to award only 'Cost of Funds'---Position which emerged after promulgation of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, is that in addition to contractually chargeable mark-up, a financial institution cannot now claim from Court any additional mark-up except the cost which it had to bear for its finance stuck up with its defaulting customer---Concept of earning further income in shape of mark-up was replaced with the concept of compensating financial institution with 'Cost of Funds' and that too is determinable by State Bank of Pakistan as envisaged by S.3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Change in law i.e. withdrawal of Court's power to award mark-up beyond contracted period under provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, with award of 'Cost of Funds' under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was clearly intended to remove perception that award of mark-up beyond contracted mark-up is in the nature of interest.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.18---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.3---Execution of decree---Recovery of Cost of Funds-Relief not granted in decree---Jurisdiction of Executing Court---Decree against -debtor was passed at the time when Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, I997, was in force---Grievance of -debtor was that instead of recovery of continuous mark-up beyond contracted mark-up, Executing Court should recover 'Cost of Funds' as provided in S.3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Notwithstanding harshness of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, which permitted award of continuous mark-up beyond contracted mark-up, Executing Court could not extend benefit of new law by replacing mark-up awarded by Court under the existing law at the time of passing of decree, with award of only 'Cost of Funds' permitted under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Such replacement would amount to empowering Executing Court to amend the decree---Appeal was disposed of accordingly.\n \nAIR 1927 Lah. 659; AIR 1933 All. 252; AIR 1938 Sind 185; AIR 1943 Sindh 247; AIR 1943 Pesh. 33; AIR 1946 Sindh 150; AIR 1977 MP 112; AIR 1985 Punjab & Haryana 143; AIR 1942 Mad. 442 and PICIC v. Government of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 496 ref.\n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----\n \n----S.18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.82, 84 & 85---Execution of decree---Sale through auction---Delay in deposit of sale price---Contention of -debtor was that delay in deposit of sale price by unction-purchaser could not be attributed to him and mark-up for such period should not be included in decretal amount---Validity---Once assets of -debtor were sold in Court proceedings and time was prescribed for auction-purchaser to deposit sale proceeds in Court, then any delay on the part of auction-purchaser to deposit purchase price for any reason not attributable to -debtors, could not be made basis to call upon -debtor to pay any mark-up also for such delayed period---No principle of law had permitted such recovery---Stipulated period within which auction-purchaser ought to have deposited balance sale consideration was to be regarded as the period on which recovery of decretal amount was effected---Any indulgence to unction-purchaser with active or passive consent of decree-holder would not make -debtor liable to pay mark-up beyond the date when auction-purchaser was required to deposit money into Court---Mark-up was to be charged from -debtor from date of filing of suit till the date when auction-purchaser was required to make payment of entire sale consideration---Bank was not entitled to recover from -debtor, mark-up for the period of delay caused by auction-purchaser in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution No. 68 of 1999, decision dated: 31st March, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD.\nVs.\nKarachi High Court PIPE MILLS LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13488",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2896 = 2006 SLD 2896 = 2006 CLD 863",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of I908)-------O.XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), S.118---Suit for recovery of amount on basis of pro note---Leave to appear and defend suit---Case of plaintiff was that he had business dealings with the brother-in-law of defendant and suit amount was due from the brother-in-law and that defendant in consideration of amount due from his brother-in-law, had executed pro note in question---Suit having been decreed, defendant had filed appeal against and decree of the Trial Court---Execution of pro note had fully been proved on the record by the witnesses and the report of Handwriting Expert---No doubt presumption was that pro note was executed for consideration as was the import of law embodied in S.118 of Negotiable Instruments Act. 1881 but such presumption was rebuttable---Admittedly no consideration was paid to the defendant in the facts and circumstances of the case---Allegation was that there was some liability owed to plaintiff by brother-in-law of the defendant, but there was no specific finding to the effect that such liability stood established on record---Details and nature of such liability were conspicuous by their absence in evidence produced on record on behalf of plaintiff in rebuttal of a denial of consideration by defendant on oath when he appeared as a witness---No specific issue in that regard had been framed which had resulted in the prejudice to both the parties who did not produce evidence to prove/disprove consideration for the pro note in question---Judgment of the Trial Court, in circumstances could not sustain and the matter needed to be decided afresh, particularly with reference to the payment of consideration, if any, of the pro note in question---Accepting appeal impugned order of the Trial Court was set aside by the High Court and case was remanded to the Trial Court to decide question of consideration, if any, of the pro note.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 18 of 2005, decision dated: 29-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHEIKH AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SABIR\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD AKRAM"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13489",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2897 = 2006 SLD 2897 = 2006 CLD 869",
    "Key Words:": "Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961)-----S.39-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.47---Execution of decree---Executing Court---Powers---Incentive scheme, benefit of--- During execution proceedings, -debtors filed constitutional petition for seeking benefit of incentive scheme---High Court directed -debtors to pursue their remedy before Executing Court---Application of -debtors was accepted by Executing Court and they were allowed benefit of incentive scheme---Plea raised by decree-holder was that Executing Court could not go beyond the decree---Validity---High Court in no way directed Executing Court to accept contention of -debtors that they were entitled to the benefit of incentive scheme---Observation indicated that Executing Court was required to proceed in accordance with law---Executing Court had to restrict itself to execution of decree and could not go beyond the terms of decree---Executing Court exceeded its jurisdiction and took cognizance of the matter which was not within its purview-Executing Court adverted to serious procedural lapses and deviations effecting rights of parties---. Order passed by Executing Court was set aside and matter was remanded to Executing Court to determine rights, obligations and liabilities of parties---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nMst. Naseem Akhtar and 4 others v. Shalimar General Insurance Company Ltd. 1994 SCMR 22 and Nawazish Latif Bhatti v. A.B.L. 2004 CLD 92 fol.\n \nSheikh Muhammad Ikram and another v. Government of Pakistan 2001 MLD 1996; Dr. Idrees v. National Logistic Cell. 2002 CLC 1609; Muhammad Younas v. National Insurance Corporation 2002 CLC 757; Brig. (R.) Muhammad Aslam Khan v. The Government of AJ&K 1983 CLC 1204; Mst. Yasmeen v. National Insurance Corporation 2004 CLC 979; Messrs Intercity Transport Service v. Judge Banking Court 2004 CLD 466; Silver Oil Mills v. Union Bank Ltd. 2003 CLD 1658; Ghulam Muhammad v. ADBP 2003 CLD 267; Messrs PILC v. Nooriani Industries 2003 CLD 259; Kiran Sugar Mills v. BEL 2003 CLD 1159; Allied Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Aiysah Garments 2001 MLD 1955 and 2004 CLD 1155 and 827 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No.112 of 2003, heard on 3rd April, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, J",
    "": "Attorney\nVs.\nMessrs KAUSAR ICE FACTORY and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13490",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2898 = 2006 SLD 2898 = 2006 CLD 877",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 200I)-----Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to defend suit---Appeal---Plaintiff/Bank through convincing and reliable evidence proved that finance facility was availed by defendant under the Prime Minister Transport Scheme and he failed to repay the amount of finance facility---Vehicle in question was admittedly impounded by plaintiff and was sold/auctioned by it and amount thereof was adjusted towards outstanding amount of finance facility---Appeal was accepted to the extent that plaintiff-Bank was not entitled to mark-up till passing of the decree---After deducting mark-up of said period, remaining amount would stand decreed against defendant in favour of plaintiff.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No.38 of 2005 with C.M. No.120 of 2005, decision dated: 7-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "TALAAT QAYUM QURESHI AND MUHAMMAD QAIM, JAN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "SHAHAB SAQIB\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13491",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2899 = 2006 SLD 2899 = 2006 CLD 879",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-----S.5---Decree, setting aside of---Review of ---Jurisdiction of Banking Tribunal---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Tribunal was set aside on review application---Validity---Power of review was not available to Banking Tribunal under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984---Even if Banking Tribunal was of the view that the and decree sought to be reviewed suffered from any mistake apparent on the face of record, the Tribunal should have tried the suit on. merits instead of dismissing the same after recalling of decree---In absence of specific power available to Banking Tribunal under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, order passed in review application was set aside---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \nMuzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1981 SC 94; Messrs Baghpotee Services (Private) Ltd. and others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. 2001 CLC 1363; Messrs Shah Jewana Textile Mills Ltd. Lahore v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 2000 Lah. 162 and Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited v. Digital Radio Paging (Pvt.) Ltd. and 4 others 2000 CLC 1153 ref.\n \nSaudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited and Saudi Pak Kalabagh Livestock Company Limited and in R.F.A. No.19 of 1997, decided on 19-12-2001 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 20 of 1997, heard on 13-04-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND MUHAMMAD, JEHANGIR ARSHAD, JJ",
    "": "SAUDIPAK INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT COMPANY (PVT.) LIMITED (SAUDI - PAK) - - ---Appellant\nVs.\nSAUDIPAK KALABAGH LIVESTOCK COMPANY LTD. and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13492",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2900 = 2006 SLD 2900 = 2006 CLD 882",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.12---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12 (2)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5--:Ex parte decree---Miscellaneous application, non-deciding of---Defendant filed application under S.12 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and S.12 (2) C.P.C., for setting aside ex parte decree--Along with such application an application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, was also filed for condonation of delay---Main application was dismissed primarily on the ground that defendant's application for setting aside ex parte decree was hopelessly barred by time---Banking Court while deciding defendant's application under S.12 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and S.12 (2) C.P.C. completely ignored the pendency of defendant's another application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Effect---Order passed by Banking Court suffered from misreading of record of the case and the Court did not notice pendency of defendant's application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---If any miscellaneous application was filed by parties then it was the duty of the Court to fast decide that application either way, through a specific order and then to decide the main case---Banking Court committed clear illegality, when it failed to decide defendant's application for condonation of delay---Banking Court without deciding defendant's application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, had dismissed the principal application, therefore, the order could not be allowed to remain in field---Application of defendant for setting aside the ex parte decree was deemed to be pending and the order passed by Banking Court was set aside---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nMessrs Mahmood Brothers through Mahmood Ahmed and another v. National Bank of Pakistan through Manager and another 2004 CLD 771 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 470 of 2005, heard on 10-04-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Agha ABBAS HAIDER KHAN\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager\nMessrs M.A. Chaudhary and 3 others v. National Bank of Pakistan, Faisalabad through General Attorney 2005 CLD 875 fol."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13493",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2901 = 2006 SLD 2901 = 2006 CLD 885",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finance Act (XV of 1997)-------S.21---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.48---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.181---Execution of decree---Limitation---Decree dated 22-6-1981---First execution petition filed on 11-6-1983 was dismissed on 2-9-1989 for non-filing of \"\"Fard Taliqa\"\"---Second execution petition was filed on 17-4-1990---Maintainability---First execution petition would be governed by Art.181 of Limitation Act, 1908 providing three years, while subsequent applications would be governed by S.48, C.P.C, providing six (6) years---Where no execution petition was filed within three years from date of decree, then first petition filed after three years would be barred by time and decree-holder could not avail benefit of extended period provided under S.48, C.P.C.---Where first execution petition was filed within three years and dismissed due to any reason, then decree-holder could file any number of petitions within six years, but any petition filed beyond six years would be barred by time---First execution petition having been filed within three years, any number of subsequent petitions could have been filed uptil 21-6-1987---Second petition filed on 17-4-1990 was beyond time.\n \nK.M. Munir and 2 others v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 1999 CLC 555 ref.\n \nMahboob Khan v. Hassan Khan Durrani PLD 1990 SC 778 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Mian Aziz ud Din and 7 others 1996 SCMR 759 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.146 of 2000, heard on 13-04-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "KHALID LATIF\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LTD.HAH ALAM MARKET, Lahore High Court and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13494",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2902 = 2006 SLD 2902 = 2006 CLD 889",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10 & 11---Leave to defend suit---Agreement between Bank and customer existed about the finance facility, followed by the finance agreement, executed by the parties along with irrevocable general power-of-attorney, which resulted in exchange of letters between the parties and due to non-compliance of some of the legal formalities, the matter could not be finalized and the loan was not disbursed by the Bank---Valuable rights of the defendant (Bank) were involved which required adjudication on the issue as to whether on account of acts and omission by the defendant, the plaintiff (customer) had sustained damages as claimed in the suit---Defendant (Bank), in circumstances, was entitled to the relief of unconditional leave to defend the suit of the customer and application of the defendant under S.10, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was to be treated as written statement of the defendant.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-21 and C.M.A. No.8680 of 2005, heard on 18-01-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL, J",
    "": "Dr. MUHAMMAD TARIQ SIDDIQUI--Plaintiff\nVs.\nUNION BANK LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13495",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2903 = 2006 SLD 2903 = 2006 CLD 927",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.14, 12, 9 & 22---Transfer of Property Act (IV of .1882), S.56---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0.11, R.2, 0.XXXIV, R.14 & S.11---Appellant. in the present case, was not party to the suit and respondent had never relinquished any part of its claim against the appellant at the time of institution of said suit---Mere fact that at the time of institution the respondents had not impleaded/arrayed the present appellant as one of the defendants in the suit, would not justify a conclusion that the claim against the appellant based on equitable mortgage vis-a-vis the memorandum of deposit of title deeds executed by him was relinquished---Creation of equitable mortgage and execution of deed and deposit of title documents had given an independent ca ise of action to the respondents for obtaining a decree against the appellant for sale of mortgaged property---Provisions of 0.11, R.2 and S.11, C.P.C. would have no relevancy or applicability to the facts of the present case---Decree passed in earlier suit being not a money decree against the appellant the respondent had independent right against him to file a separate suit for recovery of decretal amount from him to the extent of equitable mortgage created by him in its favour, if it so chose---Plea with reference to O.XXXIV, R.14, C.P.C. would also be not relevant in circumstances.\n \nHussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others PLD 1970 SC 1;Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD 1987 SC 512; National Bank of Pakistan v. S.A. Sattar and others PLD 1962 Kar. 271; Hatimbhai v. Karimbhai 1993 MLD 988; Abdul Hakim and 2 others v. Saadullah Khan and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 63; Aziz Ahmad and others v. Mst. Hajran Bibi and another 1987 SCMR 527: M.K. Abbasi v. United Bank Ltd. 1983 CLC 482; Allah Dad v. Mehmood Shah 1990 CLC 33; Azirannessa Bewa v. United Bank of India Ltd. PLD 1963 Dacca 13; Messrs Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Messrs Usman Sons Ltd. and others PLD 1969 Kar. 123; Maqsood Ahmed and others v. Salman All PLD 2003 SC 31; Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. v. The Banking Tribunal for Sindh and Balochistan and two others 1990 MLD 309; Phani Bhusan Mukherjee and others v. Rajendra Nandan Goswami and another AIR 1947 Calcutta 11; Saadullah Khan and six others v. Mir Piayo Khan and 14 others PLD 1970 Pesh. 150; Rafia Begum v. Mirajuddin and others PLD 1959 W.P. (Lahore) 890; Muhammad Tariq v. Bank of Punjab and another 2004 CLD 162; Muhammad Sarwar Khan v. Habib Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 881; First Grindlays Modaraba v. Pakland Cement Ltd. and two others 2000 CLC 2017; Abdul Basit Zahid and another v. Modaraba Al-Tijarah and another 2002 CLD 46 and National Bank of Pakistan v. First Tawakal Modaraba 2002 CLD 1018 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.8---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), S.9---Modaraba Ordinance (XXXI of 1980), S.25---Suit for recovery of loan by a Modaraba company---Special and subsequent amendment (Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001), supersedes the provisions of earlier special enactment (Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances. Credits and Finances) Act, 1997)---Plaintiffs, therefore. had the option to file suit for recovery under S.9(1) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act. 1997 (now S.8(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001), in addition to the right available to them under S.25 of the Modaraba Ordinance, 1980.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-----\n \n----S.17---Financial Institutions (Recover) of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.18---Registration Act (XVI of 1908), Ss.17 & 49---Banking documents---Recovery of loan---Section 17, Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans. Advances. Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 a special law, contains an overriding provision in its subsection (4) affecting all the provisions of general law providing therein that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, the Banking Court shall not refuse to accept in evidence any document creating, or purporting to create, or indicating the creation of mortgage, charge, pledge or hypothecation in relation to property merely because it is improperly stamped or is not registered and no such document shall be impoundable by Banking Court---Memorandum of deposit of title deeds therefore, would not be affected by the provisions of S.17 read with S.49 of the Registration Act, 1908 due to its non-registration, as equitable mortgage was created on deposit of original title deeds of the property with the Modaraba and Memorandum of deposit of title deeds executed between the parties later on carried only a recital of such fact.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "1st Appeal No. 42 and C.M.A. No.936 of 2004, heard on 21st April, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED, JJ",
    "": "MUBARAK ALI\nVs.\nFIRST PRUDENTIAL MODARABA through Chief Executive"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13496",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2904 = 2006 SLD 2904 = 2006 CLD 938",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-----S. 13---Cheque, a negotiable instrument---Scope---Term negotiable instrument as defined in Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, means a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable either to order or to bearer---Term 'cheque' has been expressed as 'bill of exchange- drawn on a specified branch and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3---Recovery of amount on the basis of cheque---Conditional leave to defend the suit---Deposit of indemnity bond as bank guarantee---Validity---Condition of furnishing surety in the form of indemnity bond as ,bank guarantee having a firm identity was more than what was required, because purpose of execution of indemnity bond was to oblige the indemnifier against loss sustained by him from the conduct of person for whom he stood surety---Whereas in the present case it was yet to be determined as to where the fault lay---Order of Trial Court was modified to the extent that defendant was not required to furnish surety in the form of indemnity bond---High Court allowed the defendant to defend the suit as already leave had been granted to him but without any condition---Revision was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.A. No.21 of 2001, decision dated: 21st March, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. YASMEEN ABASEY, J",
    "": "MANAGER, MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED and another--Applicants\nVs.\nBABAR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13497",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2905 = 2006 SLD 2905 = 2006 CLD 940",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.3 (2) & 9---Recovery of bank loan---Mark-up beyond agreed period---Cost of funds---Loan facility was advanced from one branch of the bank and subsequently transferred to its head office---Bank claimed amount beyond mark-up chargeable on principal over and above the period for which the amount was originally sanctioned---Validity---Such claim of mark-up was not recoverable---Mere transfer of liability from branch to main account of borrower at head office did not constitute a fresh transaction based on appropriate sanction with agreed mark-up but was a mere book entry from one account to another---Such transfer of account did not entitle bank to claim mark-up accrued at initial bank beyond the agreed period of sanction and claim for recovery of additional amount was not maintainable---While bank was not entitled to recover mark-up/interest at a fixed rate for the years, it would be unjust if bank was deprived of cost of funds and the claim was rejected outright---Cost of funds was incurred on the amount advanced to borrowers and was to be determined by State Bank of Pakistan after taking into consideration all necessary factors involved in such regard---Accordingly the cost of funds for the years before promulgation of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, could also be determined by State Bank of Pakistan---Bank was entitled to recover the amount of cost of funds so determined by State Bank of Pakistan on the principal amount---Suit' was decreed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-40 of 2002, decision dated: 23rd October, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERWAZ, J",
    "": "PRIME COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nAGRICIDE (PRIVATE) LIMITED and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13498",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2906 = 2006 SLD 2906 = 2006 CLD 946",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----S. 9(5)---Summons served upon defendant through registered post only---Effect---Section 9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 provides that process to defendant be issued through bailiff as well as through registered post acknowledgment due and by publication---Process sent to the Financial Institution only through registered post had bypassed the procedure prescribed by the Ordinance.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.II---Rejection of plaint before granting leave to defend the suit---Validity---Banking Court was obliged under the law to firstly decide defendants' application for leave to defend the suit---Court, by rejecting the plaint before deciding leave application, had violated the provisions of section 10(8) of the Ordinance---If Banking Court was of the view that substantial questions of law and facts had been raised by defendants then leave to defend the suit could have been granted to the defendants but plaint could not have been rejected---Defendants, after granting of leave, were within their right to file application under O.VII, R.II, C.P.C. and if the case fell under the provisions of O.VII, R.II, C.P.C. then Banking Court had jurisdiction to reject the plaint---Rejection of plaint prior to grant of leave was in conflict with express provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---High Court set aside the /decree, with the result that leave application of Bank would be deemed to be pending before the Banking Court.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art.201---Decision of High Court is binding on all the Courts subordinate .to it, to the extent it decides a question of law.\n \nMessrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245 and Sheikh Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Office 2004 CLD 1645 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 271 of 2005, heard on 2-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AZWAR SIDDIQUI\nVs.\nCHIEF EXECUTIVE UNION LEASING LTD. and 21 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13499",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2907 = 2006 SLD 2907 = 2006 CLD 950",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0.1, Rr.3 & 10(2)---Suit by Bank against its customers, one of them was already dead---Deletion of name of dead customer from array of defendants by Banking Court---Dismissal of suit---Appeal by Bank impleading therein dead customer---Maintainability---Appeal to the extent of such customer was incompetent.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) --\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Framing of issues after acceptance of application for leave to defend suit---Dismissal of suit without recording evidence of parties---Validity---Banking Court had not adopted procedure prescribed by S.10(10) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Plaintiff had been condemned unheard---High Court set aside impugned , resultantly suit would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court for its decision after recording evidence of parties.\n \nLt.-Col. (Retd.) Mahmood Akhtar v. Bank of Punjab through Manager 2004 CLD 821 rel.\n \nIftikhar Ullah Malik for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 347 of 2003, heard on 12-04-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "ZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager\nVs.\nMessrs A-ONE CHICKS AND FEEDS (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive\nand 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13500",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2908 = 2006 SLD 2908 = 2006 CLD 954",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.22 & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.84, 85 & 86---Court auction---Deposit of 1 /4th of auction amount on date of sale---Deposit of remaining 3/4th auction amount after more than two years from date of sale---Validity---Court would not be competent to extend time fixed by a statute---Provision of O.XXI, R.58, C.P.C. relating to deposit of sale price was mandatory as non-compliance thereof entailed penal consequences as provided under O.XXI, R.86, C.P.C.---No abnormal or extraordinary circumstances had been shown by purchaser---Executing Court before allowing such deposit had not issued notice to other party in whose favour valuable rights had accrued by that date---Order allowing such deposit of 3/4th of auction money was illegal, thus, was set aside.\n \nAfzal Maqsood Butt v. Banking Court No.2, Lahore and 8 others 2005 CLD 967; Aiksun International Manufacturers and Exporters, Allama Iqbal Market, Paris Road, Sialkot City through its Partners and 2 others v. Habib Bank Limited through Vice-President and 2 others 2005 CLD 1 and Al-Hassan Feeds and another v. Untied Bank Ltd. Jinnah Road, Abbottabd and 6 others 2004 CLD 275 ref.\n \nMessrs Maqi Chemicals Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 3 others v. Habib Bank Ltd. through Manager and 2 others 2003 CLD 571 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 484 of 2005, decision dated: 16-04-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KARISHMA FASHION BOUTIQUE, through Sole Proprietor and another --Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Authorized Attorneys/Manager and another--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13501",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2909 = 2006 SLD 2909 = 2006 CLD 970",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.15 (5) & 19 (5)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.72 (1)---Execution of decree---Purchase of property by decree holder---Permission of Executing Court---Scope---Provisions of special law and general laws---Distinction and applicability---Decree holder participated in auction and was the highest bidder---Judgment debtor filed application for setting aside of auction on the ground that decree holder did not seek permission of Court under O.XXI, R.72, C.P.C. in participating auction proceedings---Application was dismissed by Executing Court on the ground that decree holder was not required under Ss.15 (5) & 19(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, to seek any such permission---Validity---When a mortgaged property was proposed to be sold either with intervention of Court or without intervention of Court, under the provisions of 5.15 (5) or 19 (5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, in that case legislature had conferred discretion upon decree holder to participate in public auction without obtaining permission of Executing Court and to purchase mortgaged property at the highest bid---In respect of purchase of property by decree holder under O.XXI, R.72 (1) C.P.C., no holder of decree could, without express permission of Executing Court, bid for or purchase property, which was sold in execution of a decree---Provisions of Ss.15 (5) & 19 (5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, with regard to purchase of property by decree holder without permission of Executing Court, were contrary to the provisions of O.XXI, R.72 C.P.C., therefore, the provisions of special enactment would override the provisions of C.P.C., which would give way to the contrary provisions of special statute---Decree holder was not under any legal obligation to obtain permission of Executing Court for purchase of mortgaged property, rather it could in its discretion, participate in public auction and purchase mortgaged property at highest bid, which discretion was exercised by decree holder---Order passed by Executing Court was legal and did not call for any interference by High Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nRana Muhammad Shafi and another v. M. Javed Iqbal Siddiqui, Judge Banking Court No.1, Gujranwala and 2 others 2002 CLD 1269; Agha Attaullah v. Presiding Officer, Banking Court and others 2002 CLD 1550; Nawazish Latif Bhatti v. Allied Bank of Pakistan, Ltd. 2004 CLD 92; Messrs Nizamuddin and Company and 4 others v. The Bank of Khyber 2003 CLD 914 and Muhammad Hassan v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. through Branch Manager and 3 others 2003 CLD 1693 distinguished.\n \nHudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1987 SC 512 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 467 of 2002, heard on 9-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "FARRUKH ABBAS\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN, MANDI BAHAUDDIN BRANCH"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13502",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2910 = 2006 SLD 2910 = 2006 CLD 976",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)------Ss. 284 & 288--Application under Ss.284 and 288 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 submitting therewith scheme for discharging the liability of the creditors---High Court, in view of mandatory requirement of approval of the scheme by 3/4th of the creditors, appointed official Assignee as the Chairman of the meeting and fixed 60% of the creditors as quorum of the meeting---Official Assignee after holding the meeting of creditors submitted a report expressing therein that the creditors had opposed the scheme---Petitioner's counsel did not dispute the position as given by the official Assignee---High Court, in view of the fact that scheme was not approved by the creditors as required by law, dismissed the petition.\n \nMansoorul Arfin for Petitioner.\n \nArshad Tayebally for PICIC.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J. Misc. Nos. 21 and 31 of 2004, decision dated: 3rd March, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SADIQ LEGHARI, J",
    "": "SPECTRUM FISHERIES LTD.\nVs.\nPICIC COMMERCIAL BANK"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13503",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2911 = 2006 SLD 2911 = 2006 CLD 977",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10 & 11---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Application for leave to defend suit---Defendant admitting plaintiff's claim to some extent, but disputing remaining amount consisting of cushion period mark-up, mark-up over mark-up beyond contractual period, godown staff salaries and insurance charges for being excessive and illegally charged---Validity---Bank was granted interim decree to the extent of its claim admitted by defendant---Regarding rest of the claim of Bank, defendant had some case to be further investigated---Defendant was granted unconditional leave to defend suit, which would be decided after framing of issues and recording evidence of parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 57 of 2006, heard on 12th April. 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs IQBAL TRADERS through Partners and 12 others\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Attorney"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13504",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1FpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2912 = 2006 SLD 2912 = 2006 CLD 982",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Suit for recovery of loan---Cost of fund, award of---Scope---Commissioner appointed by Court had determined the outstanding liability of the defendant company in terms of finance agreement executed between the parties as Rs.29,479,061 out of which an amount of Rs.25.341.588.42 was determined to be outstanding towards the principal amount whereas a sum of Rs.4.137,437 constituted the mark up for the period as agreed between the parties---Contention of the Bank's counsel was that defendant company in their balance sheet pertaining to the years in question had shown an amount of Rs.37,160,064 as outstanding against the defendant company towards the plaintiff Bank---Effect---Held. such entry/admission was of no consequence as admittedly in terms of the finance agreement between the parties. only an amount of Rs.29.479.061 was due and payable by the defendant--Plaintiffs suit therefore was decreed against the defendant in the sum of Rs.29,479,061 with cost of funds payable by the defendant for the period commencing from 1-7-2003 till the payment/realization---Such cost shall be paid by the defendant in the specified amount as determined by the Court year-wise.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-33 of 2003 and C.M.A. No.4829 of 2005, decision dated: 28-09-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAQBOOL BAQAR, J",
    "": "SAUDIPAK COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through duly Constituted Attorney--Plaintiff\nVs.\nPROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED through Chief Executive--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13505",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1F5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2913 = 2006 SLD 2913 = 2006 CLD 984",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) ------Ss.9 & 12---Suit by Bank---Ex parte decree, passing of---Setting aside of ex parte decree on application of legal heirs of defendant for being dead before filing of suit---Amended plaint by Bank impleading therein widow and children of deceased--Issuance of summons to widow and children, but their non-appearance in Court resulted in passing of second ex parte decree---Application by widow and children for setting aside second ex parte decree for having no knowledge thereof---Dismissal of application by Banking Court while considering issuance of summons to widow and children at their given address as sufficient service under law---Validity---Impugned did not state that service in any of the prescribed modes had been effected on widow and her children---Impugned had been passed on assumption that widow had been allegedly served through affixation-Two children contended to be major, thus, had to be served personally or through a male relative. and their service through mother was insufficient---Widow and children further contended that time , for such application was to be computed from date of knowledge of ex parte decree and alleged knowledge of pendency of suit was irrelevant. wherein they had not been impleaded as party---Such contentions of widow and children required adjudication, which had escaped notice of Banking Court---High Court set aside impugned and remanded case to Banking Court for its decision fresh.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal from Order No. 108 of 2006, decision dated: 19-04-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHEIKH AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "AHMAD ILYAS and others\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13506",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1F5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2914 = 2006 SLD 2914 = 2006 CLD 987",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10 & 22---Appeal---Only point canvassed before the High Court was that the Banking Court discriminated the appellant/guarantor by refusing the leave to defend the suit when in similar circumstances leave was granted when the respondent/Bank had also initiated criminal proceedings---Validity---Civil liability and criminal liability were distinct and separate, and each case was to be dealt with on its own facts and circumstances---Guarantee executed in the present case, was not disputed---No contentious point of fact and law having been raised by the appellant, Banking Court had rightly dismissed the application for leave to defend the suit and granted the decree in, favour of the Bank.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.12 and C.M.A No.431 of 2001, decision dated: 13-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN., JJ",
    "": "NAJAMUS-SAQIB\nVs.\nMessrs ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD. and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13507",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1F5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2915 = 2006 SLD 2915 = 2006 CLD 987",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10 & 22---Appeal---Only point canvassed before the High Court was that the Banking Court discriminated the appellant/guarantor by refusing the leave to defend the suit when in similar circumstances leave was granted when the respondent/Bank had also initiated criminal proceedings---Validity---Civil liability and criminal liability were distinct and separate, and each case was to be dealt with on its own facts and circumstances---Guarantee executed in the present case, was not disputed---No contentious point of fact and law having been raised by the appellant, Banking Court had rightly dismissed the application for leave to defend the suit and granted the decree in, favour of the Bank.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.12 and C.M.A No.431 of 2001, decision dated: 13-04-2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED AND KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN., JJ",
    "": "NAJAMUS-SAQIB\nVs.\nMessrs ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD. and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13508",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1F5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2916 = 2006 SLD 2916 = 2006 CLD 1011",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss.20 & 118---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)---Recovery of bank loan---Financing agreement---Authenticity---Blank columns---Re-scheduling of loan---Banking Court as well as Appellate Court decreed the suit in favour of bank and dismissed the appeal respectively---Plea raised by defendants was that at the time of signing of financing agreement many columns were left blank and bank created a fictitious rescheduling agreement just to enhance its claim---Validity---Re-scheduling agreement was not only signed but defendants also affixed their thumb-impressions on it which were never denied---Contention of defendants that the genuineness and authenticity of re-scheduling agreement was not above board as relevant columns were left blank and filled in subsequently by the bank was repelled with observation by the Supreme Court even if it was admitted, then why the re-scheduling agreement was acted upon and pursuant thereof ten instalments had been paid and outstanding liability was reduced---In fact, instalments were made as per re-payment schedule which was inseparable part of re-scheduling agreement---Main object to get the renewed agreement was restructuring of finance facility and not liquidation of the liability---Re-scheduling agreement was authentic, genuine and executed between the parties and acted upon---No benefit could be given to defendants in view of the provisions of Ss.20 & 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, on the ground that the agreement was not completely filled in when executed as it would have no substantial bearing on the validity of the agreement---Signatures on various documents annexed with the plaint were not disputed by defendants which led the Supreme Court to draw the only unescapable conclusion that claim of bank was genuine and based on authentic documents---No illegality or infirmity could be pointed out by defendants in the and decree passed by High Court, which being well based did not warrant interference---Leave to appeal was refused.\n \nMuhammad Sarfraz Khan Rana v. Government of the Punjab PLD 1990 Lah. 88; M.P. R.M. Irulandi Mudaliar v. Syed Ibrahim AIR 1962 Mad. 326; National Bank of Pakistan v. Azizullah Hassan 1984 MLD 1035; Messrs Mach Knitters (Pvt.) Ltd. v. A.B.P. 2004 CLD 535; Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot v. Ghulam Nabi Corporation PLD 1971 SC 550; United Bank v. Business Investment Ltd. 1982 CLC 1101; Karim v. Zikar Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100; National Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Muhammad Younus Butt 1980 CLC 90; Chandan Lal v. Messrs Amin Chand Mohal Lal AIR 1960 Punjab 500 and Sundar Singh v. Khushi Ram AIR 1927 Lah. 864 ref.\n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S.20---Inchoate stamp instruments---Where one person signs and delivers to another, paper stamped in accordance with law, either wholly blank or having written thereon, incomplete negotiable instrument, in order that it may be made, or completed into negotiable instrument, he thereby gives prima facie authority to person who received that paper to make or complete it, as case may be, into negotiable instrument for any amount.\n \n(c) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----5.118---Presumptions as to negotiable instruments---Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 provides that presumptions are attached to negotiable instruments, which, inter alia included that negotiable instrument was made or drawn on such date.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.1207-L of 2005, decision dated: 16-02-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAVED IQBAL AND CH. IJAZ AHMED, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ARSHAD and anothers\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A., ALFALAH BUILDING, Lahore High Court-"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13509",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1F5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2917 = 2006 SLD 2917 = 2006 CLD 1099",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 19(2) & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.85, 89, 65, 66 & 67---State Bank of Pakistan\n2002---High Court appeal---Decree for sale of property by auction with order of the Court---Execution of decree---Award of compensation to purchaser of -debtor's property---Order of Single Judge of High Court, exercising Banking jurisdiction in execution proceedings setting aside sale of -debtor's assets to appellant on the ground that appellant had failed to deposit the balance 75% amount of the purchase money within time and that the parties i.e. the creditors (including the decree holders) and the -debtor were interested to settle their dispute under the State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29--Validity-Held, order providing for the deposit of money within 15 days was suspended before the expiry of the period and continued to remain so till it was set aside by the Supreme Court and, therefore, the appellant could not be said to have violated the order and committed default in making the payment---Court was also competent to extend the time prescribed by it particularly when matter was still pending before it---Sale, in circumstances was not liable to be set aside on the ground for non-deposit of balance amount---State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29 of 2002 had a statutory force and when the decree-holders were also willing for a settlement with the -debtor (and on being given a chance they had reportedly settled the matter), it was fair to afford them a chance to do so---Purchaser/appellant at the same time also needed to be compensated and it would be highly unjust to push the appellant out without any fault on its part---If the -debtor wanted to save his property from being sold, it must compensate the purchaser/appellant---Order XXI, R.89, C.P.C. also provided for compensation for the purchaser at the rate of 5% of the amount deposited by it---Judgment-debtor accordingly was directed by the High Court to deposit 5% of the amount deposited by the appellant, within one month from the date of present , to be paid to the appellant---Amount deposited by the appellant (25% of the negotiated price) had been invested by the official Assignee, which shall also be returned to it along with the profit---If the -debtor failed to deposit the amount within the stipulated period of one month, the appellant/purchaser shall deposit the balance amount of the purchase mow 'ii within 15 days thereof and the sale shall be confirmed in its name---Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C.As. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2006, decision dated: 25-05-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED, C.J. AND ALI SAIN DINO METLO, J",
    "": "Messrs EURO-PLUS MONS BELGIUM through Country Chief\nVs.\nMessrs KIRAN SUGAR MILLS LTD. through Nauman Shaikh and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13510",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1F5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2918 = 2006 SLD 2918 = 2006 CLD 1099",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 19(2) & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.85, 89, 65, 66 & 67---State Bank of Pakistan\n2002---High Court appeal---Decree for sale of property by auction with order of the Court---Execution of decree---Award of compensation to purchaser of -debtor's property---Order of Single Judge of High Court, exercising Banking jurisdiction in execution proceedings setting aside sale of -debtor's assets to appellant on the ground that appellant had failed to deposit the balance 75% amount of the purchase money within time and that the parties i.e. the creditors (including the decree holders) and the -debtor were interested to settle their dispute under the State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29--Validity-Held, order providing for the deposit of money within 15 days was suspended before the expiry of the period and continued to remain so till it was set aside by the Supreme Court and, therefore, the appellant could not be said to have violated the order and committed default in making the payment---Court was also competent to extend the time prescribed by it particularly when matter was still pending before it---Sale, in circumstances was not liable to be set aside on the ground for non-deposit of balance amount---State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29 of 2002 had a statutory force and when the decree-holders were also willing for a settlement with the -debtor (and on being given a chance they had reportedly settled the matter), it was fair to afford them a chance to do so---Purchaser/appellant at the same time also needed to be compensated and it would be highly unjust to push the appellant out without any fault on its part---If the -debtor wanted to save his property from being sold, it must compensate the purchaser/appellant---Order XXI, R.89, C.P.C. also provided for compensation for the purchaser at the rate of 5% of the amount deposited by it---Judgment-debtor accordingly was directed by the High Court to deposit 5% of the amount deposited by the appellant, within one month from the date of present , to be paid to the appellant---Amount deposited by the appellant (25% of the negotiated price) had been invested by the official Assignee, which shall also be returned to it along with the profit---If the -debtor failed to deposit the amount within the stipulated period of one month, the appellant/purchaser shall deposit the balance amount of the purchase mow 'ii within 15 days thereof and the sale shall be confirmed in its name---Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C.As. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2006, decision dated: 25-05-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED, C.J. AND ALI SAIN DINO METLO, J",
    "": "Messrs EURO-PLUS MONS BELGIUM through Country Chief\nVs.\nMessrs KIRAN SUGAR MILLS LTD. through Nauman Shaikh and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13511",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1F5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2919 = 2006 SLD 2919 = 2006 CLD 1107",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 17 & 22---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.61---Appeal---Decree for recovery of Bank loan---Denial of defendant to have signed personal guarantee---Defendant's application seeking comparison of his admitted signatures with disputed signatures through Finger Print Expert---Omission of Banking Court to get such comparison---Offer of Bank not to enforce personal guarantee of defendant---Liability of Bank had been settled by principal borrower in terms of Circular of State Bank---Held, defendant was, not personally liable for satisfaction of decree in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.499 of 1999, heard on 22-05-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Sh. ARSLAN AZMAT and 2 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through General Attorneys and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13512",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1F5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2920 = 2006 SLD 2920 = 2006 CLD 1109",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 200I)-------Ss.39 & 81---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXX1X, Rr. 1 & 2---High Court appeal---Interim injunction, grant of---Registered trade mark---Prior use and acquiescence---Effect---Similarity in trade mark---\"\"Zanifiex\"\" was the trade mark of the medicine registered in the name of plaintiff but subsequently defendant got its medicine registered against Trade Mark \"\"Zanaflex\"\" and marketed the same---High Court declined to grant interim injunction to plaintiff on the ground that plaintiff approached the Court with delay and that product of defendant had come into the market prior to that of the plaintiff---Validity---Observation of High Court that delay in filing of suit by plaintiff provided sufficient time to defendant to manufacture and sell their drugs in market and to establish their business under the name and style of \"\"Zanaflex\"\" did not hold water as within a few days of the start of manufacturing and marketing activities by defendant, Ministry of Health had directed the defendant to change its name due to its similarity with the name of plaintiff's product, despite such notice, defendant continued to carry on its business activities---Plaintiff being the first to apply for registration of Trade Mark \"\"Zan flex\"\" before Registrar of Trade Marks and also its drug being registered earlier than that of defendant before Ministry of Health, was entitled to the first use of the Trade Mark \"\"Zaniflex\"\"-All three ingredients required for the issuance of an interim injunction under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C., i.e. presence of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable damages were in favour of plaintiff---Defendant coulI1 not be granted any bonus for its own deliberate persistence in continuing with the use of its trade mark---Division Bench of High Court, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, set aside the order passed by the single Judge of High Court---Interim injunction was allowed in circumstances.\n \nT.G. Balaji Chettar v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. Bombay AIR 1967 Mad. 148; Abdul Aziz v. Seven Up Co. Karachi and another PLD 1978 Kar. 10; Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba (also Trading as Toshiba Corporation) PLD 1991 SC 27; Mohan Goldwater Breweries (Private) Ltd. v. Khoday Distilleries Private Ltd. and another (Trade Mark Opposition, High Court Mad.) IPLR v2 n2 July, 77; Glaxo Laboratories Ltd. England v. Assistant Registrar, Trade Marks, Karachi PLD 1977 Kar. 858; The Sanitas Co. Ltd. v. Condy 4 RPC 530; Ruston and Honrby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co. AIR 1970 SC 1649; Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. AIR 2001 SC 1952; The Welcome Foundation Ltd. v. Karachi Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. 2000 YLR 1376; Sandoz Ltd. v. Pakistan Pharmaceutical Products Ltd. 1987 CLC 1571; Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Ch. Muhammad Altaf PLD 1991 SC 27; Dawood Cotton Mills v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Karachi PLD 1960 (WP) Kar. 547; Seven Up Co., Karachi and others PLD 1978 Kar. 10; Sivakami Chi v. Narayana Chettiar AIR 1939 Mad. 495; Messrs. Tabaq Restaurant v. Messrs Tabaq Restaurant 1987 SCMR 1090; Ferozuddin v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1975 Kar. 486 and Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume XXXVIII at page 594 ref.\n \nCIBA Ltd. Basle Switzerland v. M. Ramalingam and S. Subramaniam Trading in the name of South Indian Manufacturing Co. Madura and another AIR 1958 Bom.56 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.36 of 2005. decided on 17-02-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND MUHAMMAD ATHER SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Messrs PLATINUM PHARMACEUTICALS COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED\nVs.\nSTAND PHARM PAKISTAN (PRIVATE) LIMITED and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13513",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1F5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2921 = 2006 SLD 2921 = 2006 CLD 1129",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 10 & 22---Application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution---Counsel, in order to explain his absence on the relevant date had brought on record the copy of the order sheet and endeavoured to show that the application for leave could not have been dismissed for non-prosecution nor the resultant decree (ex parte) could be passed---Validity---Held, in view of proceedings reflected from the interim orders as also the contents of affidavit of the Advocate, the Banking Court should have granted at least one adjournment instead of dismissing the application for leave for non-prosecution---High Court observed that it could not be overlooked and ignored that the suit had remained pending since long and thus imposed costs of Rs.50,000 subject to the payment of which the order dismissing the application and consequential decree was set aside.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.46 of 2006, heard on 10-05-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "ASIM HUSSAIN QADRI and others\nVs.\nDEUTECHE BANK and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13514",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1F5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2922 = 2006 SLD 2922 = 2006 CLD 1140",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) -------O.XIII, R.4---Photocopies of documents---Endorsement of exhibit marks on such documents---Contents of such documents not disputed by parties---Relevant portion of such document requiring examination by Court finding mention in plaint and not denied by defendant---References were freely made to such documents by parties during course of arguments---Record showing such documents exhibited by plaintiff-Such documents, held were part of evidence on record.\n \n(b) Tort---\n \n----Banker and customer---Damages, claim for---Supply of goods other than those contracted for---Issuance of Letter of Intent by plaintiff for purchase of goods---Opening of Letter of Credit by Bank at plaintiffs request in favour of supplier---Receipt of shipping documents by Bank including Bill of Lading, Commercial Invoice and Packing List--Plea of plaintiff was that Bank having negotiated Letter of Credit despite the term \"\"Synthetic Resin\"\" added to Bill of Lading showing discrepancy in description of contracted goods, had violated provisions of Uniform Customs and Practice of Documentary Credits (UCP-400)---Validity---Under UCP, description of goods in commercial invoice alone must correspond with description in Letter of Credit, while in all other documents, goods might be described in general terms not inconsistent with such description---Duty of negotiating Bank was to examine all documents by exercising reasonable care---Description of goods in Letter of Credit and commercial invoice was identical---Letter of Credit finding mention of identical description, but prefaced by term \"\"Synthetic Resin\"\"---Bank could not refuse to negotiate Letter of Credit, if description of goods in Bill of Lading was inconsistent with description mentioned in Letter of Credit---Report of Surveyors dealt with goods and not such documents-Plaintiff had not objected to shipping documents initially, but had raised such objection after having examined goods---Grievance of plaints was with regard to breach of contract by supplier for not supplying goods as agreed and described in Bill of Lading, Letter of Credit and Commercial Invoice---Bank in view of autonomy principle was neither concerned with underling contract between buyer and seller nor responsible for breach of any term thereof or quality of goods---Held: bank had neither acted negligently nor had failed to perform its duty or obligation enjoined by law or the UCP---Plaintiffs suit was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n(c) Pleadings---\n \n----Discrepancies in documents, plea of---Such plea neither pleaded in plaint nor mentioned by plaintiff in his statement made before Court---Held, such plea could not be considered or adjudicated upon.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.12 of 1994, decision dated: 21st January, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHEIKH AZMAT SAEED, J",
    "": "HAROON RASHID CHAUDRI--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERICAL BANK through Manager--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13515",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2923 = 2006 SLD 2923 = 2006 CLD 1147",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.7 & 9---Recovery of tortuous damages, suit for---Not entertainable by Banking Court.\n \nMehr Ashiq Hussain v. Citibank N.A. through Chief Manager and another 2006 CLD 167 and Messrs PEL Appliances Limited v. United Bank Limited 2005 CLD 1352 fol.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n \n----Ss.7 & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VIl, R.10---Suit filed in High Court involving several reliefs including recovery of tortuous damages---Striking out from plaint relief of tortuous damages for not forming a claim in suit to be filed under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Pecuniary benchmark for suits triable before High Court being Rs.50 million or excess thereof---After deletion of relief of damages, remaining relief prayed in suit being less than Rs.50 million would be urged before Banking Court---High Court returned suit to Banking Court concerned for its hearing.\n \nMehr Ashiq Hussain v. Citibank N.A. through Chief Manager and another 2006 CLD 167 and Messrs PEL Appliances Limited v. United Bank Limited 2005 CLD 1352 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.12 of 2004, heard on 16-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "Messrs M.M.K. RICE MILLS\nVs.\nGRAYS LEASING and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13516",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2924 = 2006 SLD 2924 = 2006 CLD 1155",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.3---Amount due in Credit Card cases---Mark-up, charging of---Scope---No mark-up is charged on such amount, rather service fee 3% per month is charged on each retail transaction from its date till statement is made---Service fee is chargeable only after lapse of timefrarne for repayment of facility availed---Rate of service fee is less than costs of funds as per S.3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n \n(b) Execution\n \n----Executing Court cannot go behind the decree passed.\n \nS. Abid Mumtaz Tirmazi for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 59 of 2003, heard on 16-05-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED SAJJAD HUSSAIN SHAH, JJ",
    "": "RAHEEL IKHLAS\nVs.\nMessrs CITIBANK, N.A."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13517",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2925 = 2006 SLD 2925 = 2006 CLD 1161",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of1997)-------Ss. 7 & 21---Financial Instihutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001), Ss.7 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.73(1), Proviso (c)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition--Maintainability---Execution proceedings---Ratable distribution of sale proceeds amongst decree-holders---Scope---Petitioner ' and respondent both advanced loan facility to company and on its default suits for recovery of loan were filed against the company by petitioner and respondent---Respondent filed an application for execution in the executing Court praying that entire sale proceeds be paid to it---Petitioner filed application for ratable distribution of proceeds between both decree-holders---Banking/Executing Court allowed respondents application and dismissed that of the petitioners---Validity---Assets were received as result of sale of property of the company on joint application of both decree-holders and when assets were received in Court both execution applications were pending---Under provisions of S.73, C.P.C. assets were liable to be ratably distributed between both the decree-holders---Respondent's assertion that application for ratable distribution was to be filed before receipt of assets in Court was repelled---Constitutional petition was not maintainable as remedy of appeal was available under S.22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Constitutional petition which was filed within 30 days, was converted into appeal/F.A.O. and was allowed.\n \nGobinda Sankar Dikshit Firm v. Mst. Shah Mahmud Palwan and another PLD 1959 Dacca 939; Vishnubhotla Ramayya v. Sajja Namayya and others AIR 1943 Madras 165 Messrs Unicorn Enterprises v. Banking Court No.5, City Court Building, Karachi and 2 others 2004 CLD 1452; M.A. Kareem Iqbal v. Presiding Officer, Banking Court No.III and 4 others 2003 CLD 1447 and Chief Executive and 3 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. through Chief Manager/Manager, Shadman Colony Branch, Lahore and another 2002 CLD 1407 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.2241 of 2003 converted into F.A.O. 84 of 2006, heard on 3rd May, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MUHAMMAD, JEHANGIR ARSHAD, JJ",
    "": "INVESTMENT CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN and 5 others\nVs.\nJUDGE, BANKING COURT NO.1, MULTAN and 9 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13518",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2926 = 2006 SLD 2926 = 2006 CLD 1181",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.7(4)---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 56---Dispute between bank and borrower---Declaratory suit, dismissal of--Two suits were filed before Banking Court, one by borrower seeking declaration against hank and the other by bank for recovery of loam--Suit filed by borrower was dismissed while that of bank was decreed---Validity---Controversy canvassed in the suit filed by borrower was to be settled on the petition for leave to appear/defend the suit filed by bank, thus cognizance of such suit being prohibited by S.56 of Specific Relief Act, 1877, was rightly refused to be independently adjudicated upon.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n \n--S.7(4) & 9---Recovery of bank loan---Claim of set off ---Disputed encashment of cheques---Grievance of borrower was that his two cheques, reported last were encashed by bank, despite his stoppage of payment---Borrower had not only admitted sanctioning of finance facility in his favour in the plaint filed by him but was also accepted in his petition for leave to appear/defend the suit and also had admitted in memorandum of appeal before High Court---Banking Court in view of such admission of borrower, decreed the suit in favour of bank---Validity---Banking Court entertained, adjudicated and decided disputes by deriving their jurisdiction from S.7(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, regarding matters arising out of disputes covered by the Ordinance---Encashment of two disputed cheques front the account of borrower, in spite of stoppage of payment, was not a dispute arising out of finance facility, thus was not covered by S.7(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Suit filed by borrower was not triable by Banking Court and was aptly dismissed---Plea of unauthorized encashment of disputed cheques was in form of set off which could not be raised in recovery suit under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, especially earlier to filing of written statement---High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, declined to interfere in the and decree passed by Banking Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.128 and 129 of 2005, heard on 24-05-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED SAJJAD HUSSAIN SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs A-UMAR FABRICS through Proprietor and 2 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through General Attorney/Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13519",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2927 = 2006 SLD 2927 = 2006 CLD 1191",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) ------S.25-A---Credit Information Bureau---Import, object and scope---Credit Information Bureau is a project of State Bank of Pakistan for collecting data---Primary purpose of collecting information is to equip all banks and NBFIs, with their customers and their financial status, available with them---Object is to enable banks/DFIs to decide course of their business transaction with their customers in the light of such informations so that they may not be deceived by defaulters---Placement of name of a company/customer is to caution lending institutions about default---Despite placement of name of a customer on Credit Information Bureau list, lending institution is at liberty to extend financial assistance to a borrower---Power to call for information and collect data vests with State Bank of Pakistan under S.25-A of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962.\n \n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n--Ss.3-A & 25-A---Credit Information Bureau---Defaulter of leasing company---Placing name of defaulter of leasing company on Credit Information Bureau List---Validity---State Bank of Pakistan can collect information under S.25-A of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, only from banking companies---Leasing company does not fall within the definition of 'banking company'---Banking Company is under the control of State Bank of Pakistan, while leasing company, as against banking company, is under the control of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, which is empowered to direct for submission of information through prescribed returns and statements to State Bank of Pakistan, so as to introduce a uniform set of regulations to improve effective management capabilities---Information called by Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and submitted to State Bank of Pakistan at the instance of the Commission cannot be avoided---State Bank of Pakistan collects credit information from all banks under S.25 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, while from NBFIs on the direction of the Commission and by virtue of provisions of S.3-A of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962---Directions of Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan are binding in nature and there is no illegality in furnishing information by a leasing company to State Bank of Pakistan.\n \n(c) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S.25-A---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.18---Credit Information Bureau list---Blacklisting a person---Effect and procedure---Act of blacklisting or depriving a company from privilege and advantages of entering into a lawful relationship with bank for the purpose of gain, is violative of Art.18 of the Constitution---Consequences of blacklisting a person, are of great magnitude and warrant that before taking such action there should be a fair and proper trial through impartial Court or Tribunal by providing such person reasonable opportunity to defend the allegations made against him---Effect of placement of a person's name on the list that facility of finance is extended to such person, only after recording reasons, according to para.2(a)(ii) : of Prudential Regulations, is negating the facility to borrower in the ordinary course---If name of a person is brought on the list without any verification, it adversely affects reputation as well as business of such person ---Placement of a person on Credit Information Bureau List of defaulters, places a restraint on his business to enter freely into a contract with banks etc., therefore, before such placement, concerned individual is entitled to a notice---State Bank of Pakistan which regulates the affairs of banks etc. has the responsibility at least to see genuineness and truthfulness of claim of a Banking company or NBFI regarding default of a borrower.\n \n(d) Banking Companies Ordinance (LXII of 1962)---\n \n----S.25-A---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.4, 18, 25 &199---Constitutional petition---Freedom of trade, business or profession---Placing name on Credit Information Bureau List---Grievance of petitioners was that despite settlement of dues, their names were not removed from Credit Information Bureau List---Validity---Action of State Bank of Pakistan regarding placement of petitioners on Credit Information Bureau List without notice and without ascertaining genuineness of the information was violative of Arts. 4, 18 and 25 of the Constitution---Such placement of petitioners' names on Credit Information Bureau List was without lawful authority and with no legal effect, thus the order was set aside---High Court allowed the authorities to verify genuineness and correctness of information---High Court further allowed the authorities that if they were satisfied that information received was correct, after due notice to petitioners, could place the names of petitioners on Credit Information Bureau List---Petition was allowed accordingly.\n \nSayed Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others v. Trust Investment Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 1830; Badshah Begum and others v. the Additional Commissioner (R), Lahore Division and others 2003 SCMR 629: New Jubilee Insurance Company, Karachi v. National Bank of Pakistan Karachi PLD 1999 SC 1126; Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and others v. Abid Akhtar and others 2003 SCMR 1547 and Abdul Aziz Nawab Khan and Company v. Federation of Pakistan, Minister of Finance and others 2006 CLD 55 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 2916 to 2919 and 7916 of 2005, decision dated: 15-05-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "Messrs YOUSAF SUGAR MILLS\nVs.\nTRUST LEASING CORPORATION and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13520",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2928 = 2006 SLD 2928 = 2006 CLD 1201",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances)Ordinance (XXV of 1992)-------Ss.9 & 16---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66---Demand of claims of arrears from decree-holder---Appeal to High Court---Instant appeal had been filed against order of Banking Court whereby observations regarding recovery of charges/claims of arrears had been given to the effect that respondent/industrial estate could demand claims of arrears from appellant/bank decree-holder---Respondent Industrial Estate, could have a right to claim arrears against -debtor and could have a right to recover same either from the person or property of -debtor in accordance with terms and conditions of lease deed/agreement deed between respective parties, but respondent in the case had not specifically mentioned amount of arrears and had not shown chargeability of said amount against property in question---Without mentioning any encumbrance to which property was liable and without mentioning the amount of such encumbrance and without adding it to the amount already outstanding and making a total amount for which sale was ordered, in the proclamation and consequent warrant of auction, neither the decree-holder nor the auction purchaser, were to be taxed for the purpose of such encumbrance and its amount---Encumbrance was not brought to the notice of decree-holder or to the notice of auction purchaser before or at the time of auction---Observation of execution Court regarding claim of respondent from the appellant, was not based on solid ground---Omissions by the Court, could not prejudice the parties and, appellant could not be declared liable to pay charges/ arrears out of amount of auction money, specially in the circumstances that further huge amount of decree-holder, was still outstanding against -debtor---Observations regarding the rights of respondent to demand claims of arrears were set aside, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.B. No. 12 of 2005, decision dated: 23rd June, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SALIM KHAN AND HAMID FAROOQ DURRANI, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nS.I.E. and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13521",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2929 = 2006 SLD 2929 = 2006 CLD 1213",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)------O.IX, R.13---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.181---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Parent application for setting aside of ex parte decree, dismissal of ---Second application seeking restoration of parent application---Limitation---Second application would be governed by Art.181 of Limitation Act, 1908 providing a period of three years---Second application filed after 35 days of dismissal of parent application was, held, to be within time.\n \nAhmad Ali v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies PLD 1971 Kar. 182 and Muhammad Khan v. Additional District Judge and 2 others PLD 1985 Pesh. 8 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----S.12---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.13---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Parent application for setting aside of ex parte decree, dismissal oil-Second application seeking restoration of parent application supported by affidavit-Non-¬filing of counter affidavit by plaintiff---Absence of rebuttal to applicant's such affidavit-Second application was accepted in circumstances, resultantly parent application was restored to its original number.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 63 of 2006, heard on 21st June, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SHEIKH AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "NASIM NIZAMI\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13522",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2930 = 2006 SLD 2930 = 2006 CLD 1216",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S. 17---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, R.8(iv)---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33---Imposition of penalty for failure to maintain high standard of integrity, due skill and care in conduct of business---Appeal against---Respondent Department had contended that appellant had been penalized for failure to maintain high standard of integrity, due skill and care in conduct of its business---Validity---No reason was to believe that there was a lack of integrity on part of appellant while executing the trade or that it had acted in bad faith---Besides, volume of trade in question was so insignificant that any intended manipulation could not have materialized---Appellant, in any case, could not be penalized for market manipulation---Finding given by respondent/Joint Director that appellant had indulged in manipulative, fraudulent and deceptive practices, was contrary to conclusion arrived at in impugned order---If appellant had indeed indulged in manipulative, fraudulent and deceptive practices then it should have been proceeded against under S.17 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, rather than for violation of Code of conduct---Appellant, however, had not acted skilfully while trading on behalf of its client---Surrounding circumstances, had shown that no lack of integrity was on part of appellant---Since volume of trades was not significant, taking lenient view, fine of Rs.25,000 imposed on appellant was set aside directing appellant to be cautious in future and take necessary measures to abide by the standards set forth for responsible trading.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.42 of 2005, decision dated: 30-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "RASHID I. MALIK AND SALMAN ALI SHAIKH, COMMISSIONERS",
    "": "DJM SECURITIES (PVT.) LIMITED\nVs.\nJOINT DIRECTOR (SECURITIES MARKET DIVISION) SEC"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13523",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2931 = 2006 SLD 2931 = 2006 CLD 1220",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 200I)-------Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of loan amount, suit for-Leave to appear and defend suit, application for---Suit for damages by defendant pending against plaintiff-Bank---Validity---Pendency of such suit would not be a valid ground for allowing leave application.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 33-A of 2006, decision dated: 27-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MUHAMMAD, JEHANGIR ARSHAD., JJ",
    "": "Messrs ANSARI COTTON, GINNING AND PRESSING FACTORY (PVT.) LTD. through Directors and 5 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13524",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2932 = 2006 SLD 2932 = 2006 CLD 1223",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.18---Decree for recovery of loan amount, execution of---Two loans under two distinct accounts against separate deeds sanctioned in -debtor's .Warne---Amount of sanctioned loan under each account was less than Rs.1,00,000---Settlement/Incentive Scheme issued during pendency of execution prescribing three different categories with regard to investment slabs---Issuance of two notices to -debtor about two accounts for availing incentive under scheme---Judgment-debtor cleared both accounts under category \"\"A\"\" of scheme---Refusal of Bank to return charge documents to -debtor treating his case under category \"\"B\"\" making him liable to pay Rs.51,000 more on the ground that he was given total loan amount beyond Rs.1,00,001 against both accounts---Validity---Words used in incentive scheme were \"\"loan amount\"\" being relatable to each account and not to each individual---Judgment-debtor's case was covered by category \"\"A\"\" and he was not liable to pay anything more to Bank---High Court directed Bank to return charge documents to -debtor relieving him of liabilities of both loan accounts.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 144 of 2006, decision dated: 29-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED SHABBAR RAZA RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "SHARAFAT ALI\nVs.\nHOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION through District Manager, Sargodha"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13525",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2933 = 2006 SLD 2933 = 2006 CLD 1226",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)-------S.82-A(3)---Jurisdiction of Banking Mohtasib---Scope---Receipt of cash amount by Manager during banking hours within Bank premises against issuance of deposit slips without opening account of customer---Complaint before Mohtasib against such act of Manager---Maintainability---Only transaction and not persons would determine jurisdiction of Mohtasib---Impugned act was an act of maladministration and banking malpractice---Banking Mohtasib had jurisdiction to entertain such complaint.\n \n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) ---\n \n----Ss.82-D(3) & 82-F---Complaint, investigation of-Bunking Mohtasib, powers of ---Scope---No bar on Mohtasib to adopt any procedure for disposal of complaint---Mohtasib for such purpose could call for information relevant documents and record evidence of parties.\n \n(c) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----Ss.82-D & 82-F---Banking Mohtasib---Complaint by customer---Receipt of amount by Manager within Bank premises during banking hours against issuance of deposit slips without opening account of customer---Liability of Bank to compensate customer for amount misappropriated in such manner by its Manager---Validity---Such transaction was a normal banking transaction as deposit slips were signed by Cashier and another Officer of Bank and duly stamped---Bank had admitted five out of six such deposit slips---Payment of compensation by Bank to 140 customers out of 145 customers further proved involvement of its staff in malpractices and fraudulent acts---Such deposits made by customer had not been accounted for in record of Bank---Bank was, held, to be vicariously liable for fraudulent acts of its Branch Manager.\n \nKooragang Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Richardson and Wrench Ltd. (1981) 3 W.L.R. 493; Armagas Ltd. v. Mundogas S.A. (H.L.(E)) (1986) 2 WLR 1063; The King v. City of Westminister Assessment Committee (1941) 1 KB 53 and State Bank of India v. Smt. Shyama Devi 1990-1991 Banking Laws Cases (Volume 1) page 349 ref.\n \n(d) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----Ss.82-D & 82-F---Complaint by customer---Investigation proceedings, conclusion of---Banking Mohtasib obtaining information from an Officer of Bank and giving due weight to his statement---Validity---Mohtasib was obliged to irform and provide Bank an opportunity to cross-examine such Officer before drawing inference against Bank on basis of his statement---Bank had right to controvert statement of such Officer through evidence---Such act of Mohtasib was, held, to be violative of principles of natural justice.\n \nMuhammad Jamil Asghar v. The Improvement Trust Rawalpindi PLD 1965 SC 698; Abdus Saboor Khan v. Karachi University and another PLD 1966 SC 536; Mehr Dad v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and another PLD 1974 SC 193 and Chief Commissioner Karachi and another v. Dina Sohrab Katrak PLD 1959 SC 45 ref.\n \n(e) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) --\n \n----S.82-E(1)(c) ---Complaint---Amount received by Manager from customer not shown in record of Bank---Customer's claim for compensation/damages against Bank---Validity---Banking Mohtasib without legal proof could not award such amount to customer---Mohtasib could award compensation for loss actually sustained by customer, but not in the form of damages---Damages could not be awarded without proper proof and determination---Damages could be granted by Civil Court.\n \n(f) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)--\n \n----Ss.82-D & 82-F---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Banking Mohtasib, order of---Validity---Such order, if suffered from jurisdictional defect and was violative of principle of natural justice, could be challenged before High Court.\n \nMuhammad Abdullah v. The Road Transport Corporation and others PLD 1964 Lah. 743; Allah Bakhsh and another v. Muhammad Ismail and others 1987 SCMR 810; Collector of Customs, Lahore and others v. Universal Gateway Trading Corporation and another 2005 SCMR 37; Farzan Raza Naqvi and others v. Muhammad Din and others 2004 SCMR 400; Naeem Jafar v. Senior Superintendent of Police and 2 others 1997 MLD 1198; Aslam Hassan Qureshi.v. Government, State Bank of Pakistan and 4 others 2004 CLD 1407; Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. and another v. Khawaja Muhammad Munir and another 2000 SCMR 702; Abdur Rehman v. Haji Mir Ahmad Khan and another PLD 1983 SC 21; Anjuman Arhtian (Regd.) Khanpur v. Province of Punjab PLD 1990 Lah. 32; General Manager PC Hotel v. Farhat Iqbal PLD 2003 SC 952; Muhammad Samiullah Khan v. Addl. District Judge. Sargodha PLD 2002 Lah. 56; Federal Land Commission v. Mst. Gul Bibi and others 1983 SCMR 818: Syed Akhtar Hussain Zaidi v. Muhammad Yaqinuddin 1988 SCMR 753; Khairuddin and others v. Settlement Commissioner and others 1988 SCMR 988; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Ejaz Ahmad Abbasi and another 1990 SCMR 1713 and Banking Law Theory and Practice by Gupta at pp.1320, 1321, 1329 to 1333 ref.\n \nTown Committee Gakhar Mandi v. Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, Gujranwala and 57 others PLD 2002 SC 452 and Government of Pakistan and another v. Hudabia Textiles Mills, Faisalabad 2001 SCMR 209 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 293 of 2006, decision dated: 16-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HUMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED through ManageR\nVs.\nBANKING MOHTASIB PAKISTAN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13526",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2934 = 2006 SLD 2934 = 2006 CLD 1299",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19---Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged property sought by -debtor through private negotiations---Validity---Prerogative of decree-holder to seek execution and satisfaction of decree through the mode he chooses---Judgment-debtor could not be permitted to sell mortgaged property through private negotiations---High Court rejected such prayer of -debtor. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----S. 19---Decree for recovery of loan amount, execution of---Mortgaged property---Prayer of guarantor that first property of principal borrower be put to auction for satisfaction of decree---Validity---Status of guarantor was independent---Such prayer was not allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeals Nos. 278 and 341 of 2006, decision dated: 27-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Malik KHALIL AHMED\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13527",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2935 = 2006 SLD 2935 = 2006 CLD 1312",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.17 & 22---Recovery of loan amount, decree for---Suit decreed by Banking Court in terms of earlier orders of High Court ---Validity---Banking Court neither misapplied nor disregarded such orders---High Court dismissed appeal against said order of Banking Court. \n \nMessrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and others v. Messrs National Development Finance Corporation 2002 CLC 166 and Syed Manzoor Hussain v. ADBP and another 2005 CLD 183 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A. O. No. 188 of 2004, decision dated: 5-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "KALEEM ULLAH --Appellant\nVs.\nZARAI TRAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13528",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2936 = 2006 SLD 2936 = 2006 CLD 1338",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 200I)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.54 & 55---Suit for permanent and mandatory injunction in Banking Court---Leave to defend suit---Rejection of plaint---Appeal against---On filing suit for permanent and mandatory injunction, respondent-Corporatim filed application for grant of leave to defend suit---Banking Court while hearing and deciding said application rejected the plaint-Contention of counsel of respondent-Corporation was that since appellants had obtained loan of Rs.3,00,000 out of which only some amount had been returned, appellants had no cause of action---Validity---Though loan worth Rs.3,00,000 was obtained by appellants from the Corporation, some of which was also returned, but coercive process for much higher amount was initiated against appellants and the guarantor, which pushed them to institute suit---Held, appellants would pay balance principal amount of loan within specified period and if so done, order passed by Banking Court rejecting plaint, would stand set aside; in that case, application filed by respondent-Corporation for leave to defend would stand accepted unconditionally, whereafter Banking Court would proceed to decide the suit in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F. A. No.468 of 2002, heard on 19-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHAFIQUE and another\nVs.\nSMALL BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Manager and\nanother"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13529",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2937 = 2006 SLD 2937 = 2006 CLD 1340",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 19 & 22---Execution of decree---Objection to---Appeal to High Court---Sale of mortgaged property was confirmed in favour of auction purchaser and sate certificate was also issued in his favour despite the fact that said auction purchaser had not deposited purchase money within stipulated period---Objection petition filed by petitioner/ -debtor for investigation of claims was dismissed by Banking Court ---Validity---Executing Court had no power to extend the time for doing an act which had not been determined and fixed by law---Even otherwise auction purchaser did not adhere to the terms and conditions, upon which auction was held---Sale in favour of auction purchaser, in circumstances, could not be upheld---Same stood vitiated and was set aside---Counsel for decree-holder had stated that in case -debtor would pay a sum of R4.12,00,000 out of decretal amount of Rs.31,69,807.13, decree would be satisfied---Counsel for appellant/ -debtor had no objection to that course of action and submitted that appellant was ready to pay a sum of Rs.12,00,000 within a period of one month---Appeal was allowed accordingly and impugned order was set aside.\n \nMessrs Maqi Chemicals Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 3 others v. Habib Bank Ltd. through Manager and 2 others 2003 CLD 571 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 141-C of 2000, heard on 10-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HUMID FAROOQ AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "Syed SHAHZAD HUSSAIN\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. through Regional Collection Manager\nand 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13530",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2938 = 2006 SLD 2938 = 2006 CLD 1352",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.64, O.XXI, RE 58 & 66---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882); S.41---Money decree, execution of---Attachment of property---Private sale of attached property by -debtor---Objection petition by purchaser claiming protection under S.41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882---Validity---Such private sale was void---Judgment-debtor¬was not ostensible owner, but he, in capacity of real owner, had sold property contrary to express provisions of law---Provision of S.41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would not attract to such case---Dismissal of objection petition by Banking Court without recording evidence was, proper and legal.\n \nMessrs Ashrafi (Private) Ltd. through Managing Director Sharafat All Abbasi v. Abdul Majeed Bawany through L.Rs. 1991 MLD 1101 and Frasat Jabeen v. United Bank Ltd. through Manager and 2 others 2004 CLD 1586 rel.\n \n1987 SCMR 208; Ch. Muhammad Saleem v. Fazal' Ahmad and 2 others 1997 SCMR 315; Khair Din and another v. Mst.Lenab Bibi and 2 others PLD 1973 Lah. 586 and Messrs State Associates v. Messrs Farben Industrial Development 1991 CLC 424 distinguished.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R. 13(2)(j)---Money decree; execution of---Sale of other properly of -debtor instead of mortgaged property---Scope---Decree-holder not bound under law to first sell mortgaged properly and then recover decretal amount from other properties of ¬debtor---Decree could be executed through any of the modes laid down in C.P.C.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F. A. No. 89 of 2005, heard on 3rd April, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD KHALID and 2\nothers\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED BRANCH MURIDKEY through Manager and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13531",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2939 = 2006 SLD 2939 = 2006 CLD 1370",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19(7)---Money decree, execution of---Mortgaged property, sale of-Petitioner on basis of gift deed registered in year 1994 claimed to be owner of property as -debtor could not mortgage the same in year 1997---Denial of objector's claim by decree-holder-Proof-Objector claiming to be beneficiary of gift deed was under legal obligation to establish through evidence its valid execution by -debtor---Objector did not produce any independent witness, but appeared as his own witness and produced gift deed---Objector did not summon stamp vendor and scribe of gift deed---Objector to prove execution of the deed neither summoned nor produced record of Sub-Registrar---Gift deed was presented and attested before Local Commissioner, but he being an important witness was not produced---Marginal witnesses of gift deed were neither summoned nor produced in evidence---Neither- -debtor/donor appeared in witness box in support of gift nor his signatures were got compared by 1-land Writing Expert---Objector did not summon any one from Development Authority to prove documents relied upon by him---Objector had failed to prove execution and existence of valid and legal gift deed qua mortgaged property, thus, same was a void document---Objection petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nWajid Ali Khan v. Sheikh Murtaza Ali and 2 others 2003 SCMR 1416 rel.\n \n(b) Islamic Law---\n \n----Oral gift---Proof---Essential to establish offer of gift, its acceptance and delivery of possession.\n \n(c) Gift---\n \n----Party based its case upon gift deed, but failed to prove its execution---Effect---Such party later on could not fall back upon oral gift---Principles.\n \nArnir Shah v. Ziarat Gul 1998 SCMR 593; Mst. Jannat Bibi v. Sher Muhammad and others 1988 SCMR 1696; Binyameen and 3 others v. Chaudhry Hakim and another 1996 SCMR 336 and Anwar Ali and others v. Manzoor Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 1770 rel.\n \n(d) Registration Act (XVI of 1908)---\n \n----Ss.17 & 28---Gift deed, registration of---Property purported to be transferred by such document not jailing within territorial jurisdiction of Sub-Registrar, who registered the sarne---Such registration would be without jurisdiction and void.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 345 of 2006, decision dated: 28-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SHEIKH AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "ERUM JAFARI\nVs.\nKASB BANK through Manager and\n10 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13532",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2940 = 2006 SLD 2940 = 2006 CLD 1370",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19(7)---Money decree, execution of---Mortgaged property, sale of-Petitioner on basis of gift deed registered in year 1994 claimed to be owner of property as -debtor could not mortgage the same in year 1997---Denial of objector's claim by decree-holder-Proof-Objector claiming to be beneficiary of gift deed was under legal obligation to establish through evidence its valid execution by -debtor---Objector did not produce any independent witness, but appeared as his own witness and produced gift deed---Objector did not summon stamp vendor and scribe of gift deed---Objector to prove execution of the deed neither summoned nor produced record of Sub-Registrar---Gift deed was presented and attested before Local Commissioner, but he being an important witness was not produced---Marginal witnesses of gift deed were neither summoned nor produced in evidence---Neither- -debtor/donor appeared in witness box in support of gift nor his signatures were got compared by 1-land Writing Expert---Objector did not summon any one from Development Authority to prove documents relied upon by him---Objector had failed to prove execution and existence of valid and legal gift deed qua mortgaged property, thus, same was a void document---Objection petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nWajid Ali Khan v. Sheikh Murtaza Ali and 2 others 2003 SCMR 1416 rel.\n \n(b) Islamic Law---\n \n----Oral gift---Proof---Essential to establish offer of gift, its acceptance and delivery of possession.\n \n(c) Gift---\n \n----Party based its case upon gift deed, but failed to prove its execution---Effect---Such party later on could not fall back upon oral gift---Principles.\n \nArnir Shah v. Ziarat Gul 1998 SCMR 593; Mst. Jannat Bibi v. Sher Muhammad and others 1988 SCMR 1696; Binyameen and 3 others v. Chaudhry Hakim and another 1996 SCMR 336 and Anwar Ali and others v. Manzoor Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 1770 rel.\n \n(d) Registration Act (XVI of 1908)---\n \n----Ss.17 & 28---Gift deed, registration of---Property purported to be transferred by such document not jailing within territorial jurisdiction of Sub-Registrar, who registered the sarne---Such registration would be without jurisdiction and void.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 345 of 2006, decision dated: 28-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SHEIKH AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "ERUM JAFARI\nVs.\nKASB BANK through Manager and\n10 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13533",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2941 = 2006 SLD 2941 = 2006 CLD 1376",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of I984)-------Ss. 227, 229 & 476---Failure to make payments to Provident Fund Trust---Imposition of penalty---Company had not made payments to Provident Fund Trust as required under provisions of S.227 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Objective of provisions of S.227 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 was to secure the amounts collected from the employees of the Company as contribution to Provident Fund for the benefits of employees of the company---Law required that all moneys contributed by employees as well as Company if any, including the profit thereon, must be deposited within fifteen days of contribution to be invested in securities referred to in cls.(a) to (c) of subsection (2) of S.227 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---When a Trust had been created by a company with respect to any Provident Fund, Company had an obligation to pay contributions including its own contribution to the trustee within fifteen days from date of collection---Amounts collected from the employees as contributions to a Provident Fund were in the nature of Trust moneys in the hand of the company and same must be paid to the trustees within stipulated time---Company on the pretext of higher returns, could not withhold such moneys---Law did not permit any company to utilize the funds of Provident Fund for its commercial purposes---Company, by not making payment within stipulated time, h d breached mandatory requirements of S.227 of Companies Ordinance, 1984--Fine of Rs.5,000 on Company and each of its Directors was imposed under S.229 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Company, its Chief Executive and Directors, were directed to make good the loss suffered by Provident Fund due to lack of payment, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/233/351 /2002-10672-10679, dated May 17, 2006, decision dated: 30-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "TARIQ BAKHTAWAR, DIRECTOR ENFORCEMENT",
    "": "In the matter of: Messrs MEHRAN SUGAR MILLS LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13534",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2942 = 2006 SLD 2942 = 2006 CLD 1384",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Suit for recovery of loans against guarantors-Non¬filing of complete statement of accounts-Effect-Plaintiff's application for submission of detailed statement of accounts was allowed with an opportunity given to guarantors to file further leave application---Leave application so moved after statement of accounts was brought on record, was declined and suit was decreed---Validity---Grievance of guarantors was that certain amounts were paid by principal debtor to plaintiff but these amounts had not been adjusted in statement of accounts hence the suit amount was not due to plaintiff whereas plaintiff asserted that he had subsequently filed another detailed statement of accounts before the Banking Court with its permission but perusal of record did not disclose any such permission---In view of the inaccuracies, inadequacies, unauthorized entries as pointed out in statement of accounts and in order to ascertain as to what was the amount due to the plaintiff from principal debtor regarding which defendants were guarantors, the leave should have been allowed and the evidence should have been recorded.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 603 of 2002, heard on 24-05-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALL, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD MUMTAZ and 2 others\nVs.\nPAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION\nLIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13535",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2943 = 2006 SLD 2943 = 2006 CLD 1393",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.17 & 27---Execution application after satisfaction of decree---Maintainability---Costs of funds, recovery of---First execution application was dismissed for non-prosecution---Second execution petition was dismissed for the reason that bank had issued a certificate regarding recovery of decretal amount---Subsequently decree-holder filed third execution petition seeking recovery of' costs of funds, which petition was also dismissed by Executing Court---Validity---Conduct of decree-holder bank showed that it felt satisfied from the order passed in second execution petition and did not challenge the same at any point of time---Executing Court did not go beyond the decree---If any loss was caused to decree-holder, it was because of negligence, carelessness and conduct of its own functionaries, who could not point out, at the time of dismissal of second execution petition, that costs of funds were still to be recovered or/and also failed to file appeal against such order---Decree¬ holder did not even choose to assail such order in the instant appeal---Order passed by Executing Court was legal and did not require interference by High Court, thus the same was maintained---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 359 of 2006, decision dated: 5-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN \nVs.\nMessrs OVERSEAS TRADING SERVICES\n(PVT.) LTD. through Managing\nDirector and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13536",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2944 = 2006 SLD 2944 = 2006 CLD 1396 = 2007 PLJ 106",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.22 & 24 (2)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts.181 & 183---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.48---Execution of decree---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Sufficient cause---Suit for recovery of bank loan was decreed on 27-11-1997 and execution petition was filed on 18-10-2003---Reason for filing the application with delay was non-availability of information as to the assets and properties of -debtors---Executing Court dismissed the petition being barred by limitation---Plea raised by decree-holder was that time-barred execution petition could be entertained on showing sufficient cause---Validity---Banking Court passed the decree wherein decretal amount was ordered to be recovered from the assets, properties and persons of -debtors---Justification for filing execution petition at a belated stage was attributed to the non-availability of information, as to the assets and properties of ¬debtors---Such justification was of no avail to decree-holder as Trial Court had ordered execution of decree from the persons of -debtors, besides their properties and assets---Decree¬-holder could have resorted to execution of decree through arrest and detention of -debtors---If no application for execution of decree was made within the period of three years prescribed by Art.I81 of Limitation Act, 1908, any application made thereafter, would be barred and no benefit under S.48 C.P. C. could be availed in. such cases---High Court did not see any infirmity or illegality in the order passed by Executing Court and the same was in accordance with law, following the dictum of s passed by superior Courts---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Mian Aziz-ud-Din and 7 others 1996 SCMR 759 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.22(2)---Terns \"\"all cases\"\"---Applicability---Execution proceed¬ings---Scope---Tenn \"\"all cases\"\" referred in S.22 (2) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, relates to any suit, application or other proceedings filed or transferred to Banking Court, under the Act (repealed)---Term \"\"all cases\"\" is not restricted to suits only and includes execution application as well.\n \nMehboob Khan v. Hassan Durrani PLD 1990 SC 778 rel.\n \nShamas Mehmood Mirza for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 499 of 2005, decision dated: 13-02-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HARNID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED \nVs.\nMessrs FIVE STAR TRAVELS and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13537",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2945 = 2006 SLD 2945 = 2006 CLD 1400",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. XLI, R.22---Leave to defend suit---Three applications by three different defendants, filing of =--Passing of decree against all defendants after dismissal of application filed by first defendant---Validity---Suit could not be decreed during pendency of leave application---Before proceeding with suit, Banking Court was under legal obligation to decide pending leave applications---Second and third defendants had been condemned unheard---Decree passed during pendency of leave applications of said two defendants was nullity under law---Decree had become final against first defendant for non-filing appeal or cross-objection thereagainst-:-High Court set aside decree against second and third defendants and directed Banking Court to decide first their leave applications and then the suit.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S.2(2) & O.XLI, R.22---Decree, variation in---Scope---Decree could not be varied in absence of appeal or cross-objection---Decree passed against a party would become final for non filing of appeal or cross-objection against the same.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 477 of 2005, decision dated: 25-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. SHAMIM AKHTAR and 2 others\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13538",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2946 = 2006 SLD 2946 = 2006 CLD 1403",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Application for---Applicant's plea was that no notice was served upon him as he was not residing at the address given in plaint---Dismissal of application by Banking Court while relying upon summons reportedly received by applicant's nephew and proclamation made in two newspapers---Validity---Registered envelope had not returned to Banking Court either served or unserved---Nephew of applicant was not produced by arty party as no opportunity was granted for production of evidence---Such application could not be decided simply after hearing parties---Banking Court by declining to afford opportunity to parties for recording evidence had exercised its discretion in arbitrary and fanciful manner---High Court set aside impugned order and directed Banking Court to decide such application after framing issues and recording evidence of parties.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----S.12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Application for---Banking Court not obliged under law to record evidence of parties in each and every application---Discretion of Banking Court to record evidence or not, as circumstances of case required.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 21 of 2004, heard on 26-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "ZAHID MAHMOOD through Attorney\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13539",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2947 = 2006 SLD 2947 = 2006 CLD 1406",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Application for leave to defend suit---Absence of defendant's admission regarding liability to pay amount---Effect---Banking Court while hearing leave application would be bound under law to deal with grounds raised therein by defendant---Principles.'",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 201 of 2005, heard on 27-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs PAK RAVI DAIRY and 2 others\nVs.\nTRUST LEASING CORPORATION LIMITED through Chief Executive"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13540",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2948 = 2006 SLD 2948 = 2006 CLD 1409",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, (XV of1997)------Ss. 21, 10 & 9---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Application for leave to defend-Plaintiff-Bank filed suit for recovery of loan against defendants---Defendants filed application seeking leave to defend the suit mainly on ground that statement of accounts was not in accordance with law and the same did not reflect actual \"\"amount due\"\" recoverable---Trial Court while dismissing application for leave to defend, decreed the suit---Validity---Statement of accounts furnished by plaintiff-Bank in support of its claim bore unauthorized entries, inasmuch as mark-up had incorrectly been charged---Entries in computerized statement of accounts not only did not show details of amount transferred but they did not even reveal as to which account and for what purpose the amounts from account of defendant. were transferred---Defendants could not be saddled with such colossal liability on basis of sketchy, incomplete and untrustworthy statement of accounts---Statement of accounts , furnished by plaintiff was not a prima facie proof of defendant's liabilities by any stretch of imagination---Plaintiff-Bank was entitled to claim lawful outstanding amount from defendants but it could not be allowed to recover amounts from a customer at its own whims, on the basis of conjectures and which is not at all \"\"due\"\"---Trial Court while rejecting leave application had mainly relied upon the admission trade by defendants in application for leave to defend, that they would pay outstanding amount in instalments within two years; but Court skipped over crucial aspect that defendants had showed their willingness to pay \"\"amount due\"\" and \"\"lawful amount\"\"---Defendants were granted leave to defend suit to determine \"\"amount due\"\" and \"\"lawful amount\"\" recoverable from them---Defendants however, were to deposit half of the decretal amount in order to defend suit---Judgment and decree passed by Trial Court were set aside---Appeal was partly allowed.\n \nMessrs C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chairman and 5 others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 19 of 1999, heard on 26-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs LIKE SPORTS through Managing Partner and 5 others\nVs.\nMessrs ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Attorneys"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13541",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2949 = 2006 SLD 2949 = 2006 CLD 1424",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.12 (2) & 73 (3)-Recovery of loan-Consent decree, setting aside of---Rateable distribution of assets---Government dues---Suit filed by bank was decreed in favour of bank on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties---Customs authorities filed application under S.12 (2) C.P.C. for setting aside of the decree on the ground that earlier application under S.73 (3) C.P.C. was filed for sale of assets for recovery of state dues, which application remained undecided and the suit was decreed---Plea raised by Customs authorities was that compromise between the parties ousted the authorities, resultantly their dues remained unpaid---Validity--Grant of loan, execution of documents and existence of valid mortgage in favour of bank was neither disputed nor denied---Bank approached High Court in its original banking jurisdiction. for recovery of its dues and the Court decreed the suit according to the provisions of law---Bank neither misstated any fact nor concealed anything from the Court to obtain the decree---Parties had settled their dispute amicably, whereby the bank, instead of pursuing recovery of total decretal amount, accepted the agreed amount as full and final settlement of its claim---Decree could not be said to have been obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, merely on the ground that a third party had also a valid claim against -debtors---Decree could be set aside under S.12 (2.1, C.P.C., where it was proved that decree-holder had misstated facts or concealed facts or element of fraud and misrepresentation was involved---Judgment-debtor was a company, which was not in the process of winding up but a going concern---No sale proceeds were deposited with Court to qualify the applicant to claim priority in rateable distribution of decree---Application was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nSaiyed Abu-Miyan v. Haji Abdul Ghani and others PLD 1974 Karachi 39; Mst. Hasina Khatoon and 2 others v. United Bank Limited and 6 others\"\" 1993 MLD 1088 and Central Cotton Mills and another v. Atlas Bot Lease Co. Limited and 2 others 1998 SCMR 2352 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M.A. No.420-C of 2006 in R.F.A. No. 639 of 2002, decision dated: 6-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ORE MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs OVERSEAS BLUE STAR GHEE MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive/Managing Director and 2 others\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through Principal Officers/Managers/General Attorneys\nand 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13542",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2950 = 2006 SLD 2950 = 2006 CLD 1427",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.9 & 10---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 (Si 54---Declaration and injunction---Dismissal of suit as well as application for leave to defend the suit-Effect-Declaratory suit was filed by borrower and hank filed application under S. I0 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, seeking leave to defend the suit---Banking Court dismissed application of bank and also disposed of suit of borrower on the ground that same could not be proceeded---Validity---Approach of Banking Court in simultaneously dismissing application for leave to defend and suit was not recognized under the law and was in complete departure from the procedure prescribed under law---After dismissal of bank's leave application, suit could not have straightaway been decreed or dismissed without affording opportunity to borrower to produce evidence in support of his claim---Even after rejecting of bank's leave application in suit for declaration and permanent injunction, decree could not have been passed straightaway as the claim of declaration could not be equated with the suit founded on negotiable instruments---When bank failed to obtain leave to defend the suit, Banking Court was legally obliged to decide the suit after calling upon the borrower to produce evidence in respect of his claim---In such like cases, even if a defendant had not appeared before Banking Court or was not granted leave, the Court was not absolved of its duty to apply its judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of each case---Bank had neither filed appeal nor cross-objections against order of dismissal of leave application and seemed to be satisfied, therefore, order rejecting its leave application had attained finality---High Court declined to interfere in the order of Banking Court to the extent of dismissal of leave application but set aside the order dismissing the suit of borrower---Case was . remanded to Banking Court by the High Court for decision afresh after recording of evidence-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nMessrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353; Gouranga Mohan Sindar v. The Controller Import and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158 and Mollah Ejahar All v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10 (11)---Recovery of loan---Decree, passing of---Principle---Banking Court in exercise of powers under S.10 (11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, may pass a decree in favour of bank, where the suit is based on negotiable instruments.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 213 of 2006, heard on 6-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "SHAHID MAHMOOD\nVs.\nBANK ALFALAH LIMITED through Manager, \nSargodha Road Branch, Sheikhupura"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13543",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2951 = 2006 SLD 2951 = 2006 CLD 1432",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19(7)---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.108(j)---Decree, execution of---Mortgaged property, attachment and sale of---Property under lease for 99 years---Objection by lessor that without his permission, lessee ( -debtor) could not mortgage leased property---'No Objection Certificate' issued by lessor in favour of lessee for mortgage---Plea of decree-¬holder/Bank that on basis of such certificate, property had been validly and legally mortgaged in its favour by Lessee---Validity---Lessee was entitled and competent to mortgage its rights in property, which confined to lease-hold rights according to such certificate---Lessee could mortgage only lease hold-rights, but not the property---Lessee on basis of lease deed could not claim ownership of property, which vested with lessor---Bank, while granting finance to lessee had not minutely examined contents of such certificate, for which Bank should suffer---Such mortgage in favour of Bank was by an unauthorized person---Such property could not be sold in execution of decree against lessee---Bank in execution of its decree, could sell only lease-hold rights of lessee---Property was released from attachment in circumstances.\n \nGhulam Rasul and others v. Muhammad Anwar and others 1969 SCMR 254 and Mst. Nawab Bibi v. Mst. Rafiq Bano PLD 1971 SC 481 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.338 of 2005, decision dated: 20-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "PUNJAB SMALL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION through Regional Director, Gujranwala\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. Through Manager and Attorney and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13544",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1JpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2952 = 2006 SLD 2952 = 2006 CLD 1437 = 2007 PLJ 98",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 200I)------S.19--Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.53---Decree, execution of---Attachment of property---Objection petition by nephew of -debtor claiming to be owner of attached property---Production of PT-I Form and allotment letter by objector in support of claim---Dismissal of objection petition by Banking Court on the ground that allotment letter for not being a title deed would not confer upon objector any right in property---Subsequent registration of sale-deed in favour of objector by owner of property---Validity---Impugned order had rightly been passed as sale-deed was not in existence at the time of its passing---Had sale-deed been produced before Banking Court. result would have been dferent---Objector was neither mortgagor nor guarantor nor -debtor ---Attached property was not furnished as security for repayment of finance---Judgment-debtor was neither owner nor had any nexus with attached property---Parties to such sale-deed were not -debtors---Objectors case would not fall within scope of 'fraudulent transfer\"\" as envisaged under S.53 of Transfer of Property Act. 1882---Such property which was attached under misconception and dis¬information, was not liable to be attached---High Court accepted objection petition and released property from attachment.\n \nAsghar Hameed Bhutta for Appellant.\n \nMuhammad Shujah Baba for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 20th July, 2006.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.237 of 2006, decision dated: 3rd August, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD IMRAN SHEIKH\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. through Authorized Attorneys -Ëœand another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13545",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1J5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2953 = 2006 SLD 2953 = 2006 CLD 1451",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-----O. XXI, Rr. 66 & 90---Auction of immovable property---Reserve price---Court auctioneer---Powers---Sale of property by auction was confirmed on the price less than the reserve price---Judgment-debtor filed objection and sought setting aside of sale on the ground that the price of property was more than what was reserved by the Executing Court but Court auctioneer sold the same against the price less than the reserve price---Objection petition was dismissed by Executing Court and sale was confirmed in favour of auction purchaser---Validity---Bid had to start from the reserve price and Court auctioneer had no authority either to reduce the reserve price or to accept any bid below the reserve price, which had the sanctity of the Court, who fixed the reserve price---Purpose of fixing reserve price in proclamation was that the Court had to safeguard the rights of -debtor and the bid was to start from that figure---Court auctioneer committed material irregularity while conducting the sale and accepting bid below the reserve price, inasmuch as the order of the Court fixing the reserve price was completely ignored---Sale was declared illegal by the High Court on account of such material irregularity, and was set aside---Such a sale, in normal circumstances, after its confirmation was not set aside but if sale itself became invalid, its confirmation would also be invalid---Objection petition of -debtor was remanded to Executing Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nBrig. (Recd.) Mazhar-ul-Haq and another v. M/s. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Islamabad and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706; Mrs. Aziz Fatima and 3 others v. Mrs. Rehana Chughtai and 3 others 2000 CLC 863; Mrs. Shahida Saleem and another v. Habib Credit and Exchange Bank Limited and 4 others 2001 CLC 126 and Afzal Maqsood Butt v. Banking Court No. 2, Lahore and 8 others 2005 CLD 967 ref.\n \nJavaid Jalal for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.97 of 2003, heard on 4-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "NOOR BADSHAH\nVs.\nHOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION through District Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13546",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1J5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2954 = 2006 SLD 2954 = 2006 CLD 1467",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-----S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.84 & 85---Execution of decree---Setting aside of sale by auction---Non ¬deposit of 25% auction price on the same day---Effect---Extending time to deposit auction price---Executing Court, jurisdiction of---Appellant being the highest bidder deposited 25% of auction price six days after auction and remaining 3/4th was deposited within nine days from the auction---Executing Court declined to confirm the auction in favour of appellant, as he did not deposit 25% of auction price on the same day---Plea raised by appellant was that the full amount was deposited within fifteen days as per the requirement of O.XXI, R.85, C.P.C.---Validity---Payment made after six days could not be considered and taken to be immediate payment, as envisaged under O.XXI, R.84, C.P.C.---Such provisions of law was mandatory, as penal consequence of its non-compliance had itself been provided under that provision of law, which stated that if purchaser had committed default in immediate payment of 25% of the sale price, the property would forthwith be resold---Initial payment of 25% having not been made within the period prescribed under O.XXI, R.84, C.P.C., even Executing Court had no power to extend the time for doing an act, which was determined and fixed by law---Order passed by Executing Court was in accordance with law and no interference was called for by High Court---Appellant could not point out arty grave legal infirmity in the order passed by Executing Court, so as to warrant dislodging the same---High Court maintaining the impugned order, dismissed the appeal.\n \nMessrs S.P.R. L. Rehman Brothers and another v. Judge Banking Court No.II, Lahore and another 2000 MLD 1957 and Messrs Maqi Chemicals Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and 3 others v. Habib Bank Ltd. through Manager and 2 others 2003 CLD 571 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.290 of 2005, decision dated: 20-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "ARSHAD CHAUDHRY\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT NO.I, Lahore High Court and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13547",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1J5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2955 = 2006 SLD 2955 = 2006 CLD 1486 = 2007 PLJ 1",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908). O.IX. Rr.3, 4 & 7---Pendency of defendant's application for setting aside order of ex parte proceedings---Proceedings fixed for filing reply to such application by plaintiff----Dismissal of suit on such date for non-appearance of arty party---Dismissal of plaintiffs application for restoration of suit---Validity--Suit was not fixed for \"\"hearing\"\" on such date, thus, same could not be dismissed for non- prosecution---Banking Court on such date could dismiss defendant's application for non prosecution, but could not dismiss suit' which was not fixed for \"\"hearing\"\"---High Court set aside order of dismissal of suit and accepted application for restoration of suit, resultantly defendant's application would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court.\n \nQaim Ali Khan v. Muhammad Siddique 1987 SCMR 733 fol.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.IX, R.9---Dismissal of suit for non-prosecution for second time---Application for an order to set dismissal aside---Essential considerations---Previous dismissal and restoration of suit would be no ground for rejecting subsequent application for restoration of suit, if case for restoration of suit was made out under law.\n \nSeth Shivrattan G. Mohatta and another v. Messrs Muhammadi Steamship Co. Ltd. PLD 1965 SC 669; Babu Jan Muhammad and others v. Dr. Abdul Ghafoor and others PLD 1966 SC 461 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Champhar (Pakistan) Ltd. and 2 others 1988 MLD 984 fol.\n \nTafazal H. Rizvi for Appellant.\n \nRana Mehmood Ahmed Khan for Respondents Nos.1 and 2.\n \nSyed Samar Abbas, Chief Manager, Allied Bank, Respondent No.3.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.229 of 2006, decision dated: 7-08-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MINN HAMID FAROOQ AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NAVEED HUSSAIN\nVs.\nSMALL BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION/SME BANK LTD. and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13548",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1J5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2956 = 2006 SLD 2956 = 2006 CLD 1502",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9 (5)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.13. Form-4 of Appendix-B---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Setting aside of ex parte decree---Service on defendant. mode of--Non-compliance of mandatory provisions of S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Plaintiff-Bank filed suit for recovery of loan on 17-6-2004 which was registered on same day and issuance of summons in Form-4 of Appendix-B, C.P.C. along with proclamations in newspapers were ordered for service of defendants by Banking Court, for 27-7-2004---Defendants having failed to turn up on date fixed for hearing. Banking Court decreed the suit on 23-8-2004---Defendants moved application before Trial Court on 26-10-2004 for setting aside ex parte decree but the same was dismissed on ground of limitation---Defendant contended that ex parte decree was passed against them without fulfilling the requirements of S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, hence the same was liable to be set aside---Validity---Held ex parte decree was passed by Trial Court without resorting to all modes of service prescribed under S.9(5) of the Ordinance---No genuine effort was made by the Court for effecting service on defendants as prescribed by relevant law---Ex parte decree which was passed in violation of principles of natural justice as well as mandatory provisions of S.9(5) of the Ordinance was a void document liable to be set aside even without recording evidence---Application filed by defendants for setting aside of ex parte decree was not to be dismissed on ground of being barred by limitation as no limitation was prescribed for void decree, document or order--Allowing appeal ex parte decree was set aside by the High Court.\n \nPLD 2002 SC 101 and PLJ 2005 SC 709 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9(5)---Practice and procedure---High Court while deprecating procedure adopted by Banking Court, observed that instead of passing order in their own handwriting, Banking Courts used stereotype pro forma for summoning defendants which did not contain all modes for effecting service of defendants as prescribed under S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001---Banking Courts were directed by High Court to record orders regarding summoning of defendants in their own handwriting and ensure that all modes as prescribed in S.9(5) of the Ordinance were adopted---Unless all modes of service as prescribed under S.9(5) of the Ordinance were adopted, no valid service was to be deemed to have been effected on defendants---High Court further directed that it was mandatory requirement of S.9(5) of the Ordinance that publication of proclamation was to be made in newspapers with wide circulation within its territorial limits instead of publishing same in unknown newspapers or those with limited publication (Circulation)---Publication of proclamation in unknown newspapers or in those with limited circulation amounted to keep defendants in ignorance about institution of suit---Ex parte decree passed on basis of such type of proclamation was not to be graced with legal sanctity.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 155 of 2005, heard on 28-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MUHAMMAD, JEHANGIR ARSHAD, JJ",
    "": "HUSSAN ARA and 8 others\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13549",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1J5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2957 = 2006 SLD 2957 = 2006 CLD 1506",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S. 2---Appeal---Counsel for appellant conceded that appellants had no case to pursue the appeal, however with reference to position of one appellant, who since had died, it was contended that impugned against deceased appellant was unjustified as she was not original borrower, but had executed some documents in favour of the Bank to secure payment from other appellants--Submission of counsel for appellants was that liability of deceased appellant would be confined only to the extent of liability created against her through execution of documents---Validity--Impugned and decree, in circumstances could be executed against deceased appellant only to the extent of her liability in view of documents executed by her.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.67 and C.M.A. No.1161 of 2005, decision dated: 31st August, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND SYED ZAWWAR HUSSAIN, JAFFERY, JJ",
    "": "NAJMUL HASSAN ATA and 4 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through President and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13550",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1J5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2958 = 2006 SLD 2958 = 2006 CLD 1508",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.17 & 19 (2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908). O.XXI. R.66---Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged property or hypothecated goods---Executing Court, discretion of---Appellant was impleaded in the suit being guarantor and decree was also passed against her---Grievance of appellant was that for execution of decree hypothecated goods should be sold at the first instance---Validity---Held, it was left to the discretion of Executing Court to execute a decree through any manner or mode prescribed under Civil Procedure Code, 1908, or any provision of law or any manner deemed fit by it---Judgment-debtor was in no way, in a position to suggest a decree-holder to execute the decree in a particular manner and according to her wishes, rather it was the discretion of the decree-holder bank to get the decree executed through any of the modes of execution provided under the law---Appellant who was one of the -debtors, could not be allowed to plead that firstly hypothecated goods he sold instead of the mortgaged property moreso when the stance of the bank was that no list of hypothecated goods was provided to the decree-holder--Order passed by Executing Court did not suffer from illegality and High Court declined to interfere in the same, which order was maintained-Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 346 of 2006, decision dated: 28-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Mst. MUNAWAR KHANUM \nVs.\nMessrs HABIB BANK LIMITED and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13551",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1J5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2959 = 2006 SLD 2959 = 2006 CLD 1521",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--------S.47---Decree not challenged in appeal---Objection regarding validity of decree raised before Executing Court---Not open to Executing Court to go behind decree. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.19 & 22--Appeal against order of Executing Court---Plea raised before High Court not raised by appellant before Executing Court---High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 145 of 2003, heard on 6-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mirza MUNAWAR BAIG\nVs.\nHABIB CREDIT AND EXCHANGE BANK and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13552",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1J5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2960 = 2006 SLD 2960 = 2006 CLD 1534",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)------Part-IV-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.409, 420, 463, 468 & 471---Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Petitioner had called in question act of omission on the part of respondent by not performing his obligation in refunding 'Term Deposit Receipt' for a sum of Rs.20,00,000-Question of genuineness of said 'Term Deposit Receipt' was a question of fact, which could not be ascertained unless an inquiry in that respect was conducted---Petitioner had remedy of either filing a suit under the relevant law or a complaint before the Banking Mohtasib---Alternate remedy was available to petitioner to approach either the Court of competent jurisdiction or Banking Mohtasib under the provisions of Part IV-A of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962---Constitutional jurisdiction being an extraordinary jurisdiction, could be invoked only to meet extraordinary situation---Such jurisdiction was never meant to be treated as adequate or alternate remedy provided by law---Constitutional petition was not competent in view of availability of alternate remedy. \n \nCh. Muhammad Ismail v. Fazal Zada, Civil Judge, Lahore PLD 1996 SC 246; Mst. Kaniz Fatima through L.Rs. v. Muhammad Salim and 27 others 2001 SCMR 1493; Umar Hayat Khan v. Inayatullah Butt and others 1994 SCMR 572; Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq and others 2006 SCMR 276 and Mahmud Khan and another v. Government of the Punjab through District Collector, Lahore 2005 YLR 1 133 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 18112 of 2005, decision dated: 6-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE and others\nVs.\nMANAGING DIRECTOR, BANK OF PUNJAB and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13553",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1J5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2961 = 2006 SLD 2961 = 2006 CLD 1537",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2(b)(ii), 9 & 23---Suit for recovery of loan---Interim order---Application for---Plaintiff filed application to restrain defendants from halting, snatching, taking possession and/or causing hindrance of whatsoever nature in the operation of the buses plying on route---With consent of parties, to safeguard the interestof all interested parties in the matter, High Court appointed. Official Assignee as Receiver of 25 buses and directed that plaintiff would continue to operate buses under the supervision of Official Assignee or his nominee; that plaintiff would submit fortnightly account with Official Assignee and would deposit 50% of receipts with Official Assignee that Official Assignee would make necessary arrangement for inspection of said buses and that Official Assignee would take assistance ofdefendants, if any, required in discharge of his duties as Receiver.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Banking Suit No.15, C.M.As. Nos.2170 and 3060 of 2006, decision dated: 13-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "Rana MUNEER AHMED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nKASB BANK LIMITED and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13554",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1J5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2962 = 2006 SLD 2962 = 2006 CLD 1540",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVII of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.19---Suit for recovery of loan---Limitation for---Effect of acknowledgment in writing---Appeal to High Court---Banking Court having dismissed suit filed by plaintiff-Bank, on ground of limitation plaintiff had filed appeal against of Banking Court---Contention of plaintiff-Bank was that suit was very much in time in terms of S.19 of Limitation Act, 1908 as acknowledgment of liability was made by the counsel of defendant borrower through reply within period of limitation---Effect of acknowledgment in writing was clearly spelled out in S.19 of Limitation Act, 1908---Present suit was filed on 28-10-2003 on the basis of acknowledgment dated 17-11-2001-Earlier acknowledgment was made on 14-12-1998 and before limitation expired, another acknowledgment dated 17-11-2001 was made by the counsel of defendant---Suit filed by plaintiff on 28-10-2003, in circumstances was well within limitation---Conclusion drawn by the Trial Court/Banking Court on the face of record could not be sustained---Order of Banking Court was set aside in. circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.31 of 2006, decision dated: 9-08-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND MUNEEB AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED--Appellant\nVs.\nMOHSIN BAIG"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13555",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2963 = 2006 SLD 2963 = 2006 CLD 1540",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVII of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.19---Suit for recovery of loan---Limitation for---Effect of acknowledgment in writing---Appeal to High Court---Banking Court having dismissed suit filed by plaintiff-Bank, on ground of limitation plaintiff had filed appeal against of Banking Court---Contention of plaintiff-Bank was that suit was very much in time in terms of S.19 of Limitation Act, 1908 as acknowledgment of liability was made by the counsel of defendant borrower through reply within period of limitation---Effect of acknowledgment in writing was clearly spelled out in S.19 of Limitation Act, 1908---Present suit was filed on 28-10-2003 on the basis of acknowledgment dated 17-11-2001-Earlier acknowledgment was made on 14-12-1998 and before limitation expired, another acknowledgment dated 17-11-2001 was made by the counsel of defendant---Suit filed by plaintiff on 28-10-2003, in circumstances was well within limitation---Conclusion drawn by the Trial Court/Banking Court on the face of record could not be sustained---Order of Banking Court was set aside in. circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.31 of 2006, decision dated: 9-08-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND MUNEEB AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED--Appellant\nVs.\nMOHSIN BAIG"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13556",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2964 = 2006 SLD 2964 = 2006 CLD 1540",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVII of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.19---Suit for recovery of loan---Limitation for---Effect of acknowledgment in writing---Appeal to High Court---Banking Court having dismissed suit filed by plaintiff-Bank, on ground of limitation plaintiff had filed appeal against of Banking Court---Contention of plaintiff-Bank was that suit was very much in time in terms of S.19 of Limitation Act, 1908 as acknowledgment of liability was made by the counsel of defendant borrower through reply within period of limitation---Effect of acknowledgment in writing was clearly spelled out in S.19 of Limitation Act, 1908---Present suit was filed on 28-10-2003 on the basis of acknowledgment dated 17-11-2001-Earlier acknowledgment was made on 14-12-1998 and before limitation expired, another acknowledgment dated 17-11-2001 was made by the counsel of defendant---Suit filed by plaintiff on 28-10-2003, in circumstances was well within limitation---Conclusion drawn by the Trial Court/Banking Court on the face of record could not be sustained---Order of Banking Court was set aside in. circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.31 of 2006, decision dated: 9-08-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND MUNEEB AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED--Appellant\nVs.\nMOHSIN BAIG"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13557",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2965 = 2006 SLD 2965 = 2006 CLD 1543",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------S.5---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of' 1997), S.7--Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.8---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Non-avail¬ability of alternate remedy---Dismissal of suit for non¬-prosecution-Restoration-Date of hearing---Suit filed by bank was dismissed for non-prosecution by Banking Court and application for restoration of the suit was also dismissed---Contention of the bank was that the date on which the suit was dismissed was not the date fixed for hearing for any specific purpose---Validity---Proceedings before Banking Court were not fixed for hearing for any specific purpose as borrower had been seeking adjournments---Date on which suit was dismissed was not a date of hearing within the contemplation of law---Except on a date of hearing, action to dismiss a suit in default could not be taken against plaintiff---Order passed by Banking Court was misdirected as it failed to apply the relevant law and proceeded on point that was extraneous to the question determined by it---Judicial duty to exercise' discretion reasonably. fairly and relevantly was breached---Prima facie, appeal against the order of dismissal of application for restoration for suit dismissed for non-prosecution was not competent under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---As no other remedy was available, therefore, constitutional petition filed by bank was maintainable---Delay and avoidance tactics by borrower could not operate to deprive bank of a determination of present petition including question of relief by adjudication on merits---Order passed by Banking Court was set aside and case was remanded to Banking Court for decision on merits after hearing the parties in accordance with statute and rules of natural justice---Petition was allowed accordingly. \n \nAbdul Ghani v. Muhammad Shaft 1990 CLC 1473 and Abdul Karim and 2 others v. Rehm Ali 1991 MLD 63 rel.\n \n(b) Laches---\n \n----Question of laches is to be dealt with on, the touchstone of natural justice. \n \nPakistan Post Office v. Settlement Commissioner 1987 SCMR 1119 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1457 of 2000, heard on 18-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "CITIBANK N.A. through Manager and duly authorized Attorney of the BanK\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT-III, Lahore High Court and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13558",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2966 = 2006 SLD 2966 = 2006 CLD 1546",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 9 & 10--Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Leave to defend suit, application for-Non-filing of documents and statement of account along with plaint in its support, but filing them along with reply to leave application---Absence of proof in support of authority of person, who filed suit on behalf of plaintiff-Bank--Neither plaint nor was there any proof on record that such person was either Branch Manager or Principal Officer of the Bank---Defendant was entitled to leave to defend suit on such grounds. \n \nA.M. Burq and another v. Central Exchange Bank Ltd. and others PLD 1966 (W.P.) Lah. 1 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.431 of 2003, heard on 14-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MUZAMIL BROTHERS and another\nVs.\nSAUDIPAK COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13559",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2967 = 2006 SLD 2967 = 2006 CLD 1553",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.2(c) & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9 & O.VII, R.10---Suit for declaration---Return of plaint- -Plaintiff sought declaration to the effect that his shares lying with Stock Exchange and handed over by Stock Exchange to Bank without his permission and knowledge as security in respect of alleged finance advanced to him, were liable to be returned to him as free from encumbrance---Validity---Plaintiff had denied to have been extended any finance by Bank nor did he stand as a surety or indemnifier for such finance---Contents of plaint showing denial of plaintiff to be a customer---Plaint was returned to plaintiff for its presentation before Court of competent jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A. O. No. 285 of 2003, decision dated: 12-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ALA BANDIAL AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "ZAEEM A. MALIK through Attorney\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13560",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2968 = 2006 SLD 2968 = 2006 CLD 1553",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.2(c) & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9 & O.VII, R.10---Suit for declaration---Return of plaint- -Plaintiff sought declaration to the effect that his shares lying with Stock Exchange and handed over by Stock Exchange to Bank without his permission and knowledge as security in respect of alleged finance advanced to him, were liable to be returned to him as free from encumbrance---Validity---Plaintiff had denied to have been extended any finance by Bank nor did he stand as a surety or indemnifier for such finance---Contents of plaint showing denial of plaintiff to be a customer---Plaint was returned to plaintiff for its presentation before Court of competent jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A. O. No. 285 of 2003, decision dated: 12-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ALA BANDIAL AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "ZAEEM A. MALIK through Attorney\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Manager and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13561",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2969 = 2006 SLD 2969 = 2006 CLD 1568",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S. 10---Suit for rendition of accounts and recovery of damages---Dismissal of suit without deciding application for leave to defend the suit---Plaintiff/appellant filed suit for rendition of accounts and for recovery of damages against defendant-Bank/respondent---Defendant-Bank filed application for leave to appear and defend the suit and plaintiff filed his reply to the same---Banking Court without deciding application for leave to defend the suit, dismissed the suit---Validity---Without first deciding application for leave to defend the suit on its own merits, Banking Court was not to embark upon deciding the suit and dismiss the same---Dismissal of suit by Banking Court was violative of provision of S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Judgment passed by Banking Court was set aside---Appeal was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 439 of 2005, decision dated: 27-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MUHAMMAD, JEHANGIR ARSHAD, JJ",
    "": "Mian AMIR SALEEM\nVs.\nSTANDARD CHARTERED GRINDLAYS BANK (FORMER ANZ GRINDLAYS BANK) through Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13562",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2970 = 2006 SLD 2970 = 2006 CLD 1569",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S. 18---State Bank of Pakistan Circular No.19---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)---Execution of decree---Change of decretal amount---During execution proceedings, Executing Court in view of the Circular No.19 issued by State Bank of Pakistan, changed the decretal amount---Validity---Leave to appeal was granted by Supreme Court to consider, whether terms and conditions as enumerated in Circular No.19 issued by State Bank of Pakistan had been misinterpreted and misconstrued by the High Court; whether any amendment, deletion, insertion, addition or extension in stipulated period mentioned in Circular No.19 issued by State Bank of Pakistan could have been made by High Court; whether package, dated 15-2-1999, was given to respondent pursuant to Circular No.19 issued by State Bank of Pakistan and any further relief under the Circular could have been given by High Court after expiry of the Circular when it was no more in existence; and whether Circular No.19 issued by State Bank of Pakistan could have changed or modified the decree passed on 12-4-2001, by Banking Court, which had attained finality.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.142 of 2006, decision dated: 7-08-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWED IQBAL AND KARAMAT NAZIR BHANDARI, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD.\nVs.\nBLUE STAR HOTEL (PVT.) LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13563",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2971 = 2006 SLD 2971 = 2006 CLD 1571",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---S. 2(c)---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12---Suit for recovery of Bank loan---\"\"Indemnifier\"\" and \"\"customer\"\"---Liability of---Scope---Plaintiff/respondent filed suit for specific performance against the defendant (one of the five defendants) regarding property mortgaged with another Bank---On consenting statement of the defendant suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff subject to payment by the latter of loan amount due to Bank---Bank which was defendant in earlier suit, subsequently filed suit for recovery of loan against the said defendant and plaintiff (in earlier suit) who was \"\"indemnifier\"\" of loan amount---Banking Court decreed the suit to the extent of the defendant but as to plaintiff (in earlier suit), the Court deleted his name from array of defendants as not being 'customer' of the plaintiff-Bank-Plaintiff-Bank contended that as per definition of 'customer' given in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, an 'indemnifier' was also a customer and, therefore, deletion of name of plaintiff (in earlier suit) was illegally ordered by Banking Court---Validity---Deletion of name of plaintiff (in earlier suit) by Banking Court was not legally tenable in view of definition of word 'customer' given in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Appeal filed by plaintiff-Bank was allowed and case was remanded to Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 449 of 2003, heard on 18-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Chief Manager, I.D.B.P.\nVs.\nMessrs MADNI RICE MILLS through Proprietor and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13564",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2972 = 2006 SLD 2972 = 2006 CLD 1574",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 15(6)---Suit for recovery of Bank loan---Execution proceedings---Judgment-debtor's failure to pay decretal amount---Attachment of properties other than those mortgaged by -debtors---Scope---Suit filed by plaintiff-Bank/appellant's (decree-holder) was decreed against defendants/respondents and during execution proceedings, executing Court attached properties mortgaged by defendants/ -debtors--Plaintiff/decree-holder, later on, filed application for attachment of property of -debtors which was not mortgaged with plaintiff-Bank---Executing Court attached the property and its possession was delivered to plaintiff/decree-holder---Defendants/ -debtors filed application for restoration of possession of property on ground that property in question had never been mortgaged; that decree could be satisfied after sale of property mortgaged and attached by -debtors; that -debtors gave undertaking not to sell property in question and to settle accounts---Executing Court accepted application filed by -debtors---Validity---Under S.15(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, decree-holder could only get possession of property which was mortgaged in his favour by ¬debtor---Property in question was not mortgaged with plaintiff therefore, there was no legal justification for delivering possession of property to decree-holder/plaintiff---Judgment-¬debtors/defendants had already mortgaged their property and the same had been attached during execution proceedings, therefore, it was proper to sell mortgaged property and recover decretal amount---Appeal calling into question the order passed by executing Court was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A. O. No. 319 of 2005, decision dated: 6-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through duly authorized person Mr. Zahid Waheed Khan\nVs.\nMessrs LUCK FRUIT PRODUCTS and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13565",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2973 = 2006 SLD 2973 = 2006 CLD 1587",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S. 9(3)---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend suit--Non-compliance of mandatory requirements of S.9(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Effect---Plaintiff-Bank/respondent filed suit for recovery of loan amount against defendants/appellants who filed application for leave to defend the suit which was dismissed by Banking Court---Defendants contended that plaint did not fulfil the mandatory requirements of S.9(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, hence the same was liable to be dismissed and that plaintiff-Bank illegally clubbed two finances and charged exorbitant and illegal mark-up thereupon---Validity---Plaintiff did not comply with mandatory provisions of S.9(3) of the Ordinance, but this fact was not adjudicated upon by Banking Court---Objections regarding amount due and amount paid by defendants were also not adverted to---Contention of defendants that letters written by way of settlement were neither admissions nor admissible in evidence hence the same could not be relied upon, had not been considered by Banking Court---Plausible defence had been set up by defendants with respect of part of claim which was disputed, consequently defendants were entitled to grant of leave to defend the suit in respect thereof---Defendants were granted leave to defend suit subject to deposit of admitted liability of a certain amount with Trial Court---Case was remanded.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 447 and C.M. No.2 of 2005, decision dated: 11-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "HEALTHCO SURGICAL SUPPLIES and 4 others\nVs.\nSTANDARD CHARTERED BANK (FORMERLY CHARTERED GRINDLAYS BANK, ANZ GRINDLAYS BANK)"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13566",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2974 = 2006 SLD 2974 = 2006 CLD 1590",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----S. 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.5---Suit for recovery of Bank loans---Limitation---Application for condonation of delay---Doubtful date of delivery of copy---Effect---Plaintiffs/appellants filed appeal against and decree passed by Banking Court, along with application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, for condonation of delay---Defendant/respondent urged for dismissal of appeal as being barred by time---Validity---Copy was applied for on 11-3-2006 which was prepared on 21-3-2006--Against Column of date of delivery, date 21-3-2006 was mentioned which was then scored out and overwritten as 9-5-2006 and such fact made date of delivery doubtful---Plaintiffs failed to produce slip/chit issued by copying agency which ordinarily bore the expected date of delivery of copy applied for---Bare assertion made in application which was not even supported by affidavit of counsel who applied or received copy, was not to be considered sufficient---Appeal was prima facie barred by time and delay in filing of appeal was not satisfactorily explained---Application for condonation of delay and appeal were dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.268 and C.M. No.1-C of 2006, decision dated: 25-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Messrs WORLD CLOTHING COMPANY through Managing Partner and 2 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through GeneraL Attorneys/Manager---Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13567",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2975 = 2006 SLD 2975 = 2006 CLD 1592",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery, of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.3(2)---Civil S.3(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 13, 20 & 44-A---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.117---Suit for recovery of Bank loan---Judgment passed by foreign Courts---Execution in Pakistan---Scope---Suit based on foreign as a cause of action and suit' based on original cause of action---Maintainability---Res judicata, principles of-:-Applicability-Plaintiff-Bank's Dubai Branch extended financial facility to defendant's company and following default in payment, the Bank filed recovery proceedings against defendants vide -a suit---Courts at Dubai decreed suit against defendants in absentia---On defendant's failure to satisfy s issued by foreign Court, the plaintiff-Bank filed recovery suit against defendants before the Banking Court in Pakistan---Banking Court decreed the suit against defendants---Defendants contended that foreign s constituted res judicata and excluded determination of original cause of action by Banking Court in Pakistan; that claim on foreign s was to be unsuccessful because statutory tests of recognition and enforceability of foreign were not applied by passed by Court in Pakistan; that claim based on original cause of action was not available because it went beyond the scope of suit which was squarely based on foreign s and that suit based on foreign cause of action three aspects namely jurisdiction over subject-matter and over the parties and territorial jurisdiction were to be taken into consideration---Plaintiff-Bank argued that a suit based on a foreign cause of action was maintainable before Courts in Pakistan under provisions of S.20, C.P.C.---Validity---On obtaining a foreign three courses were open to decree-holder, that is, he could execute decree through proceedings under S.44-A of C.P.C. without filing a suit, or, if was after fulfilling conditions of S.13, C.P.C., he could file suit on the basis of foreign keeping in view the provisions of Art.117 of Limitation Act, 1908; or he could file a suit on original cause of action as it did not come to an end after passing of foreign if same was recorded in accordance with provisions of S.13, C.P.C.---In suit based on foreign cause of action Trial Court was not to deal with question of jurisdiction in summary manner rather three aspects of jurisdiction, that is, territorial jurisdiction, jurisdiction over subject-matter and over the parties were to be taken into Consideration, and record requisite evidence---Objection of jurisdiction was a substantial question of law, determination of which depended upon ascertainment of certain jurisdictional facts---For ascertainment of such facts, recording of requisite evidence was not to be ruled out---Suit filed by Plaintiff-Bank in Pakistan revolved around two types of actions; firstly, the foreign as a cause of action and secondly, the original cause of action---Scope and frame of suit, precluded Bank from advancing second type of action---Quantum and calculation of relief prayed and plea on point of limitation showed that suit as a whole had substance and effect only with reference to foreign s---Bank was to first show whether it could maintain its claim on original cause of action---For action on the basis of foreign , the test of recognition and enforceability of foreign mentioned in S.13 of C.P.C. needed to be applied and satisfied before a decree on foreign was to be passed---Foreign when given in absentia then it was to require its scrutiny on the touchstone of rules of natural justice as applied in Pakistan---Case was to be decided afresh after taking into consideration different facts of jurisdictional objections raised by appellant. \n \nEmirates Bank International Ltd. v. Messrs Usman Brothers and 9 others 1990 MLD 1779; Nusrat Mehdi Chaudhri Y. Habib Bank Limited and another R.F.A. No.303 of 2003 and National Bank of Pakistan and 4 others v. Gammon Pakistan Limited PLD 1990 Kar. 209 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----Ss. 13 & 44-A---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.117---Suit for recovery of Bank loan---Judgment passed by foreign Courts---Execution in Pakistan---Scope---Res judicata, principles of---Applicability---Limitation---Upon obtaining a foreign three courses were open to decree-holder, that is, that he could obtain execution of foreign by proceeding under S.44-A of C.P.C., if the country from where decree had been obtained was United Kingdom or any reciprocating territory and in that case decree-holder could obtain execution of that decree from District Court of concerned District in Pakistan and he need not file a suit; that decree-holder could file a suit in Pakistan on the basis of foreign treating it as cause of action; and in that case if conditions prescribed in S.13, C.P.C. were fulfilled, the would be conclusive between the parties, otherwise it was 'res judicata' between them and as such Courts, in Pakistan were bound by its findings, such suit, however, was to be filed within a period of six years from the date of as provided under Art.117 of Limitation Act, 1908 and that third course open to decree-holder was that he could file a suit on original cause of action as it did not come to an end after passing of foreign but remained intact until and unless that foreign was satisfied---Conditions mentioned in S.13, C.P.C. if were not satisfied, .then foreign decree would be open to collateral attack in Pakistan. \n \nEmirates Bank International Ltd. v. Messrs Usman Brothers and 9 others 1990 MLD 1779 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 170 of 2003, heard on 3rd April, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "NAEEMULLAH MALIK\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13568",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2976 = 2006 SLD 2976 = 2006 CLD 69",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.15(4)(6)(10), 2(b), 7(2), 22 & 16(10)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10, O.XXI, Rr.58, 59, 60 & 66---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Auction of mortgaged property---Notices---Challenge to---Non-observance of mandatory provisions of S.16(10) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Wrongful assumption of jurisdiction by High Court---Effect---Banking Court initiated action against petitioners on application filed under S.15(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, by Bank with prayer that direction be issued to occupant of property to hand over vacant possession to the Bank---Bank claimed that it was entitled under S.15(6) of the Ordinance to sell mortgaged property without intervention of Court by public auction and Bank had served notice on mortgagors in this regard---Petitioners, however, were not impleaded as party but occupant of property was arrayed as party---One of the petitioners after knowing pendency of matter, filed application under O.I, R.10, C.P.C. for becoming party to proceedings---Contending that word 'suit' was covered by definition provided in S.2(b) of the Ordinance, 2001, while other proceedings including those under S.15(6) of the Ordinance were covered by word 'case' which could be filed in the Banking Court irrespective of amount of money involved, since petitioners had not challenged the jurisdiction of 'Banking Court', they could not challenge the same before High Court---Validity---In notices issued under S.15(4) of the Ordinance, 2001, besides detail of mortgaged property, name of mortgagor and outstanding amount against each property was to be given but contrarily, in notices, separate amount had not been given against each property, therefore, notice in newspaper was to be taken as a whole and amount involved was to be considered as Rs.1046 Million, which identified jurisdiction of the Court---Civil jurisdiction of Banking Court in respect of finance was only up to Rs.50 Million while for trial of offences under the Ordinance, 2001, it was unlimited---In the present case, Banking Court had assumed jurisdiction without looking into mandatory provisions of law regarding publication of notices under S.15(4), its effect including determination of financial liability of customer and financial statement under S.15(10) of the Ordinance---Such consideration was necessary to confer jurisdiction upon a particular Court---Banking Court had failed to file proper accounts of sale proceeds within 30 days of sale as required by S.16(10) of the Ordinance, 2001---Petitioners while calling in question the order passed by Banking Court contended; that Banking Court was not the \"\"Court\"\" as envisaged under S.15(6) of the Ordinance, 2001, as word \"\"Court\"\" mentioned in the Ordinance, had been defined under S.2(b) which meant \"\"High Court\"\" as through notices of Bank as well as advertisement, amount due from petitioners was more than Rs.50 million; that C.P.C. was applicable by virtue of S.7(2) of the Ordinance, 2001 but Bank failed to comply with Order XXI, Rule 66, C.P,C.; that alleged auction of property in question was not public auction as property had been thrown away much below market value and that Bank had failed to file statement of accounts as required under S.15(10) of the Ordinance, 2001---Respondents, including auction-purchaser contended that instead of filing constitutional petition, petitioners were to avail remedy of appeal under S.22 of the Ordinance, 2001, against auction order passed by the Banking Court; that definition of word 'Court' as given in S.2(b) of the Ordinance, 2001, was applicable only when a suit was filed before Banking Court but in proceedings under S.15, 'Court' meant 'Banking Court' only and not 'High Court'; that Bank had issued combined notices to petitioners as required under S.15 of the Ordinance, 2001 and against each property separate application under S.15(6) of the Ordinance, 2001, had been filed; petitioner though did not challenge jurisdiction of Banking Court at earliest opportunity, but he could challenge the same before High Court as he was not impleaded as a party when auction under S.15(6) of the Ordinance was initiated rather he appeared on his own accord before Court with application under O.I, R.10, C.P.C.---Grave illegality had been committed by Bank against its customer---Banking Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter and order passed by it suffered from principle of corum non judice, hence, was liable to be set aside---Petition was allowed. \n \n2002 CLD 441; 2003 CLD 699; 2002 YLR 969; 2002 CLD 264; PLD 2002 SC 452; 2006 CLD 812; 2004 CLD 215; 1987 PLC 605; PLD 1986 Lah.184; PLD 1983 Kar. 112; AIR 1965 Kar.99: AIR 1965 SC 834; PLD 1972 SC 337; 1983 CLC 3075; PLD 1987 SC 512; 1987 CLC 1338; 1994 SCMR 1555; PLD 1985 SC 104; PLD 1982 SCMR 633; SLJ 1997 550; SBLR 2004 Sindh 623; 2003 CLD 689; 2002 CLD 441; 2002 YLR 696; 1999 SCMR 900; 2002 CLC 147; 2006 AC 44; 2004 UC 310; 2002 CLC 1438; 2001 CLC 1267; PLD 1987 SC 512; 2004 SCMR 1965: PLD 1983 Kar.122 and 2006 SCJ 509 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n--S. 15(6)---\"\"Banking Court\"\"---\"\"Connotation\"\"---Word 'Banking Court' used in S.15(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, could be 'High Court' only due to involvement of more than Rs.50 Million and not the \"\"Banking Court\"\". \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 2(b)---Words 'suit' and 'case'---Distinction---Words 'suit' and 'case' had no difference within the meaning of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 2(b), 15(6) & 22(6)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973). Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Challenge to---Jurisdiction of High Court---Held, in case of grave violation in observance of substantive provisions of law, even consent could not confer jurisdiction upon a forum which was never vested in it---Constitutional petition was maintainable where Banking Court had wrongly assumed jurisdiction ---Bank, in the present case had gravely violated law to its own benefit and order passed by Banking Court fell within S.22(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 as not being appealable.\n \nAli Sajjad for Petitioners.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.Ps. Nos. D-217 to D-219 of 2005, decision dated: 12-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND MUNIB AHMED KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Sheikh ABDUL SATTAR LASI and another\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13569",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2977 = 2006 SLD 2977 = 2006 CLD 90",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Ordinance (XXV of 1997) -------Ss.7 & 21---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.185(3) & 199---Suit for recovery of loan--Appeal to High Court---Constitutional petition to High Court---Scope---Consent of parties, would not confer jurisdiction upon the High Court which it did not inherently possess---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court being appealable under the relevant laws, only remedy available to respondent was to assail such and decree before a Division Bench of High Court---Invocation of constitutional jurisdiction against execution proceedings before a single Judge of High Court was neither warranted by law nor permissible---Contention that order impugned in constitutional petition being void and without lawful authority, non-availing of alternate remedy of appeal was of no consequence, was repelled because and decree passed by Banking Court with exclusive jurisdiction was neither void nor without jurisdiction---Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and was accepted.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.808-K of 2002, decision dated: 17-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS, SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN AND SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. and others\nVs.\nAHMED ALI and another\nFarzand Raza Naqvi v. Muhammad Din 2004 SCMR 400 and Mst. Kaniz Fatima v. Muhammad Salim 2001 SCMR 1493 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13570",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 2978 = 2006 SLD 2978 = 2006 CLD 99",
    "Key Words:": "State Bank of Pakistan B.C.D. Circular No.34 dated 26-11-1984-------Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Reduction in profit rate by the Bank---Petitioner/ investor, in the year 2000 made investment of Rs.2.00 million with the Bank in its monthly income scheme under \"\"Profit/Loss Sharing System\"\"---At time of making investment, petitioner earned a rate of profit of 9.0% on the Scheme earning Rs.16, 000 per month income without deduction of Zakat; thereafter from time to time Bank reduced profit rate, resulting in the year 2004 profit payment was diminished to Rs.4,463 per month---Plea of Bank was that it had informed the petitioner that Profit/Loss Sharing System' under which petitioner had made investment, did not contain any contractual commitment for a fixed or other rate of profit to be paid by the Bank on its monthly income Scheme and that profit rate on Profit/Loss Scheme' deposit accounts were declared by the Bank with the prior approval of State Bank of Pakistan in terms of its BCD Circular 34 date 26-11-1984---Petitioner had reiterated his basic point that it was contrary to reason that rising profits of the Bank should be reflected in declining profits rates on its Profit/Loss Scheme Accounts'---Petitioner had sought careful scrutiny of the record submitted, but had not raised any specific objection to the Bank's financial statements and P.L.C. profit rate calculated under BCD Circular No.34---Financial statement of Bank had shown that its profit after tax had risen considerably in the year 2004 and net mark up/interest income of Bank had also increased during the same period---Financial statements of the Bank did not provide specific and relevant information for the purpose of BCD Circular No.34 criteria and calculation---State Bank of Pakistan being author of BCD Circular No. 34 and its governing statutory authority, same played a regulatory role to ensure compliance of\n \n \nthe circular, for the purpose of safeguarding investors' rights---High Court referred the matter to the State Bank of Pakistan to ensure that provisions and objectives of said Circular were duly met.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 14700 of 2004, decision dated: 20-12-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "Sheikh INAYAT ALI\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13571",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2772 = 2007 SLD 2772 = 2007 CLD 103",
    "Key Words:": "Non-Banking Finance Companies (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003-------Rr. 5(2)(e), 7(2)(g), 38, 49(3)(4) & 63-Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S.282-B---Making excessive investment--Imposition of fine---Investment Company which was registered under Non-Banking Finance Companies (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003 was obliged to adhere to the investment limits specified in the Rules, but company had invested in various companies more than twenty five per cent of its net assets in contravention of R.49(4) of Non-Banking Finance Companies (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003---Directors of company, who had admitted making excessive investment, had failed to provide any justifiable explanation for the same---Company, in circumstances had contravened R.49(3)(4) of Non-Banking Finance (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003---Said Rules being not applicable at the time of investment by a closed end fund, Directors, who were members of the Board at the time the violation was committed, were answerable for any such default and remained responsible for their acts during the period of their appointment as Directors and show-cause notice issued to them was valid and appropriate---All those companies in which company had been holding investments were one Group of Companies, which had shown that company had been holding strategic investments in said Group of Companies as a major share-holders in the interest of the Group and not in the interest of general public whose funds had been pooled into the Company---All the Directors were employees/ Directors of different Group of said Companies---Directors of Company in circumstances had committed wilful default under R.49(3) & (4) of Non-Banking Finance (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003---Fine of Rs.200,000 on each Director was imposed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.NBFC/MF-D/248/2006, dated April 25, 2006, decision dated: 29-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MS., JAWERIA ATHER, DIRECTOR (NBFCD)",
    "": "Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan\nSAFEWAY MUTUAL FUND LIMITED (SMFL): In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13572",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2773 = 2007 SLD 2773 = 2007 CLD 157",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S. 19(1)(a)---Appreciation. of evidence---Misappropriation of hypothecated stock by the debtor---Prosecution had established that without clearing the amount due against the company, the hypothecated stock, which was kept as security for the loan, had been removed and sold without authority, consent and knowledge of the Bank---Such stock was in the possession and control of the company as such the company had misappropriated the stock---Prosecution had proved the case against accused beyond any reasonable doubt---No illegality or irregularity was found in the impugned and also no misreading or non-reading of evidence was there---Impugned order, in circumstances did not require interference.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Accountability Appeal No.39 of 2001, decision dated: 7-11-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAHMAT HUSSAIN, JAFFERI AND MUHAMMAD AFZAL SOOMRO, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL QADIR TAWAKAL\nVs.\nTHE STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13573",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2774 = 2007 SLD 2774 = 2007 CLD 163",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10---Suit for recovery of finance---Impleading of party--Appellant moved application under O.I, R.10, C.P.C. to be impleaded as a party to the suit and had alleged that he was the real owner in possession of land in respect of which respondent had created a mortgage; and that respondent by fraud and forgery had fabricated and manufactured sale-deed of land alleged to have been executed in his favour by appellant--Application of appellant for impleading him as party, was dismissed by Banking Court and constitutional petition filed by appellant against dismissal order was pending adjudication---Banking Court having passed decree in favour of Bank and against respondents, appellant in said changed circumstances filed appeal against and decree of Banking Court and also challenged order of Banking Court, whereby his application for impleading him as party was dismissed---Bank had raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of said appeal contending that appellant as an aggrieved party had also availed appropriate remedy of filing objections under S.47, C.P.C. before Banking Court/Executing Court and said objections had been entertained by the Court, which were pending in which stay order had also been granted in favour of appellant, restraining sale of property in auction in execution of decree in favour of Bank---Contention of respondent was that both remedies could not be availed by appellant--Appellant, in circumstances did not press his appeal, however, he had stated that during pendency of his suit, auction of disputed property be stayed---On objections of appellant, Banking/Executing Court had taken cognizance of the matter and had granted stay order to appellant---If any order adverse to interest of appellant was passed, such order could be challenged by him before appropriate forum in proper proceedings---Stay order, however could not be granted to appellant in the present appeal which was dismissed as withdrawn by the appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.366 of 2004, decision dated: 6h November, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN, JJ",
    "": "Sheikh RIAZ ALI\nVs.\nMessrs NIB (NDLC-IFIC) through Branch Office and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13574",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQ1NTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2775 = 2007 SLD 2775 = 2007 CLD 170",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10---Lease financing facility---Suit for recovery---Application for grant of leave to defend the suit---Defendant had also filed suit for declaration, specific performance and rendition of accounts against the plaintiff-Bank which was pending---Bank, instead of granting finance to the defendant, in fact, had delivered assets (in the present case vehicles) to the customers---Out of 25 vehicles, agreed to be leased out to the defendant, delivery of nine, vehicles had not been effected by the Bank and Receiver had been appointed in the suit filed by the defendant, 'in respect of 16 buses which were delivered to the defendant---Specified directions had been issued to the Official Assignee---Defendant, in lease financing facility, was required to disclose amount of finance granted to him and amount of finance paid by him---High Court, in circumstances, without going into the question whether the defendant was entitled for leave, granted leave to defend the suit as substantial questions of law had been raised viz., whether the time was essence of lease financing agreement executed between the plaintiff-Bank and the defendant; whether the plaintiff-Bank delivered lease assets/buses well in time to the defendant; whether delay committed by the plaintiff-Bank in payment of amount caused financial loss and damaged business credibility of the defendant; whether without delivery of 25 vehicles, the plaintiff could claim rental of the said 25 buses and whether the plaintiff under Islamic Financing System was entitled for proportionate rental.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-19 and C.M.A. No.5819 of 2006, decision dated: 31st October, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "KASB BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nRana MUNIR AHMED KHAN--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13575",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2776 = 2007 SLD 2776 = 2007 CLD 172",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recover} of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.89---Execution of decree---Objection petition---Summary disposal---Auction proceedings---Property in question was sold to the highest bidder and on 12-7-2005, sale certificate was issued---On 20-8-2005, appellants filed objection petition under O.XXI, R.89 C.P.C. claiming themselves to be the actual owners and offered to deposit 5% along with decretal amount---Executing Court summarily dismissed the objection petition on the ground that sale certificate had already been issued in favour of auction¬-purchaser-Plea raised by appellants was that they attained knowledge of sale only two weeks prior to filing of objection petition, thus their petition was within time-Validity-As the question whether appellants had the knowledge of auction of property in question or not and whether the application should have been filed within thirty clays, even if they had no knowledge, was a question of fact which needed determination and for that an inquiry should have been conducted by the Court---High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, set aside the order passed by Executing Court and objection petition was remanded to be decided afresh--Appeal was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No, 486 of 2005, heard on 16-10-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. NOOR BEGUM through Legal Representatives\nVs.\nMessrs ZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LTD. and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13576",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2777 = 2007 SLD 2777 = 2007 CLD 175",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 16(1), 23(1)(2) & 9(5)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVIII, R.5 & S.151---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.52---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Application for attachment of property before pronouncing ---Scope---Transaction of sale not made to defeat or delay prospective decree or to defeat right of creditors---Effect---Plaintiff Bank filed suit for recovery of loan amount against defendants and also joined different banking-companies as defendants having Pari Pasu charge on assets of the defendants---During pendency of suit plaintiff filed application under S.16 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, read with O. XVIII, R.5 & S.151, C.P.C. to attach property of defendants---Plaintiff contended that on having information that defendants intended to sell property in question, notice was served on them to the effect that sale was in violation of S.53 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as defendants were heavily indebted to plaintiff and that in case property was not attached it was to become difficult for plaintiff to adjust liability---Defendant Banking Company argued that with its permission defendants agreed to sell property in question on which four defendant-Banking Companies had their Pari Pasu mortgage charge; that by sale of said property, defendants were to be in a position to adjust part of their liabilities; that property in question was not mortgaged with plaintiff-Bank and that plaintiff-Bank had only 7% share in total liability against defendants, hence plaintiff was not entitled for attachment of property in question---Validity---Under S.16(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, financial institution could after filing of suit, file an application to restrain customer from transferring, alienating, parting with possession of property which was mortgaged, pledged, hypothecated or assigned or which was subject to any obligation---Since property in question was neither under mortgage of plaintiff, nor plaintiff had any charge over it nor same was subject to any obligation in favour of plaintiff, therefore, application under S.16(1) of the Ordinance was not maintainable---Under Ss.16, 23(1) & 23(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, before pronouncement of and interim decree or otherwise, Plaintiff-Bank could ask for attachment of property of customer over which it had charge and customer could not transfer it but after passing of decree---Customer could not deal with any of his property except with prior written permission of Banking Court---Bank, however, could apply for attachment of property other than one over which Bank had charge under. O.XXXVIII, R.5, C.P.C.---Under S.53 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, transaction for sale of immovable property by debtors could not be held void or voidable transaction at the option of creditors, if the same was carried out in normal course of business bona fide and not with intent to defeat or delay creditors-Plaintiff in order to bring his case within ambit of S.53 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was to establish that transfer of property was made with intent to defeat right of creditors-Plaintiff in order to attract provisions of S.53 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, should have filed suit seeking declaration that transaction was void but no such relief had been asked for by plaintiff in his suit---Notice for sale of property in question was. published much prior to filing of suit and as such it did not lie in mouth of plaintiff to say that defendants were disposing of property with intent to obstruct or delay execution of any decree that might be passed against them---Object of O.XXXVIII, R.5, C.P.C. was not to paralyse the normal and bona fide transaction and unless it was established that defendants were about to dispose of property with intent to defeat or delay decree that might be passed, normally ,Court was not to pass order for attachment of property before ---Defendant Banking Company's charge on property was prior in time to that of plaintiff's and on principle of qui prior est tempore portior estjure (he has a better title who was first in time), plaintiff had no prima facie case---Balance of convenience also was in favour of defendants as by disposal of mortgaged property, outstanding dues of defendant Banking Companies who had charge on property could be adjusted, whereas to restrain sale of property was to result in increasing liabilities of defendants---Application for attachment of property was dismissed.\n \nMessrs Virasat Ullah and another v. Messrs United Bank Ltd. Lahore PLD 1975 Lah. 17 rel.\n \n(b) Maxim---\n \n---Qui prior est tempore portior estjure: \"\"He has a better title who was first in time\"\".---Applicability. \n \n(c) Civil Procedure Case (V of 1908)---\n \n---O.XXXVIII, R. 5---Scope, object and application of O.XXXVIII, R.5, C.P.C.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-37 of 2005, C.M.As. Nos. 262, 1117, 1118, 1119, 1120 and 1121 of 2006, decision dated: 31st August, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "SAUDI PAK COMMERCIAL BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nA.H. INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD. and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13577",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2778 = 2007 SLD 2778 = 2007 CLD 183",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 12---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.129 (e)---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Remanded case---Service of notice---Postal receipt---Presumption---Non-compliance of order passed by High Court---Case was earlier remanded by High Court in presence of both the parties and it was directed that the suit should be decided in two months time---In post remand proceedings, defendants did not attend the Court and were proceeded ex parte and decree was passed---Plea raised by defendants was that they were not served in accordance with law---Validity---Defendants, in view of the direction of High Court, did not make any inquiry from Banking Court as to whom the case was remanded with a direction to decide it within two months---Notices were issued to defendants as well as their counsel, under registered cover/Acknowledgement Due, as also through courier service and through process server---Certified copies of the receipts were available on record which showed that counsel of defendants had received the notice sent to him through courier service---Statutory presumption was attached to postal receipts that a notice under registered cover had reached its destination---Process server reported that house of defendants was locked and notice was affixed on outer door of the house---Defendants claimed to have been informed by Lambardar of their village about factum of passing of ex parte decree---Fact that Lambardar came to know about the decree and not the defendants being strange, High Court declined to interfere with and decree of Banking Court--Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.236 of 2005, heard on 31st October, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "UMER HAYAT through Legal Heirs\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LTD. through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13578",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2779 = 2007 SLD 2779 = 2007 CLD 185",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.17 & 22--Appeal---Consolidated ---Scope---Borrowers against financial institution filed two suits, whereas suit for recovery was filed against them---Banking Court, in recovery suit, on 1-3-2006, passed a consolidated and decreed the suit in favour of financial institution, while the two suits filed by borrowers that were dismissed being infructuous--Plea raised by borrowers was that as their suits were fixed on 8--3-2006, therefore, no regarding both the suits could have been passed on 1-3-2006---Validity---Banking Court while deciding three suits on 1-3-2006, and disposing of borrowers two suits, on 8-3-2006, had committed grave legal error, which vitiated the s and decrees---High Court remanded the cases to Banking Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos.308 to 310 of 2006, decision dated: 4-10-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs A.B. FABRICS and 3 others\nVs.\nNDLC-IFIC BANK LTD. (NIB) through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13579",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2780 = 2007 SLD 2780 = 2007 CLD 185",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.17 & 22--Appeal---Consolidated ---Scope---Borrowers against financial institution filed two suits, whereas suit for recovery was filed against them---Banking Court, in recovery suit, on 1-3-2006, passed a consolidated and decreed the suit in favour of financial institution, while the two suits filed by borrowers that were dismissed being infructuous--Plea raised by borrowers was that as their suits were fixed on 8--3-2006, therefore, no regarding both the suits could have been passed on 1-3-2006---Validity---Banking Court while deciding three suits on 1-3-2006, and disposing of borrowers two suits, on 8-3-2006, had committed grave legal error, which vitiated the s and decrees---High Court remanded the cases to Banking Court for decision afresh---Appeal was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos.308 to 310 of 2006, decision dated: 4-10-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs A.B. FABRICS and 3 others\nVs.\nNDLC-IFIC BANK LTD. (NIB) through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13580",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2781 = 2007 SLD 2781 = 2007 CLD 188",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9. 10, 12 & 18---Ex parte decree---Duty of Court---Blank banking documents---On enforcement of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, out of four defendants only one filed fresh application for leave to defend the suit, which was dismissed by Banking Court and the suit was decreed against all defendants---Plea raised by defendants was that no decree could have been passed by Banking Court on the basis of blank documents submitted by the bank---Validity---Demand Promissory Notes and the agreements of finance were blank: most of them were even without date; in plaint the bank had not set out a case regarding running finance on the basis of such agreements---From the statement of accounts, it seemed to be a case of running finance; plaint was not initially supported by complete statement of accounts---Such were some of the anomalies and deficiencies, which floated on the face of bank's case and should have been considered by Banking Court, while passing the decree---Irrespective of the fact that there was no leave application on behalf of defendants and if filed the same had been dismissed, decree should not have been passed by the Court in a mechanical manner, specially for the omission of plaintiff to support its claim by filing complete statements of account, along with the suit---Such was very material and crucial aspect of the case but Banking Court had not even adverted to the same---Defendants after filing of complete statement of account by bank, under the new law, were entitled to an opportunity given to them expressly by the Court to file an amended leave application but from the record it transpired that it was not so done---High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, set aside the and decree passed by Banking Court and remanded the case for decision afresh with a permission to defendants to file fresh application for leave to defend the suit---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.545 of 2003, heard on 30-10-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs LIAQAT FLOUR AND GENERAL MILLS through Partners and 3 others\nVs.\nMessrs MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. - --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13581",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2782 = 2007 SLD 2782 = 2007 CLD 192",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Property owned by respondent (3) having been attached, respondents (5 to 9) filed objections against said attachment, contending that respondent (3) had surrendered his share in the suit property in favour of their predecessor-in-interest---Validity---Question of title in respect of attached property could not have been summarily decided by Executing Court---Document had to be produced and proved in accordance with law, to be considered for decision of the matter--High Court, allowing appeal, set aside the impugned order with the result that objection petition filed by respondents (5 to 9) would be deemed to be pending before the Banking Court---Executing Court would frame appropriate issue arising out of said pleadings and after recording evidence of parties, would decide the matter within prescribed period of time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.271 of 2006, heard on 14-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD.\nVs.\nMessrs SHARIA HABIB CORPORATION through Proprietor and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13582",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2783 = 2007 SLD 2783 = 2007 CLD 192",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Property owned by respondent (3) having been attached, respondents (5 to 9) filed objections against said attachment, contending that respondent (3) had surrendered his share in the suit property in favour of their predecessor-in-interest---Validity---Question of title in respect of attached property could not have been summarily decided by Executing Court---Document had to be produced and proved in accordance with law, to be considered for decision of the matter--High Court, allowing appeal, set aside the impugned order with the result that objection petition filed by respondents (5 to 9) would be deemed to be pending before the Banking Court---Executing Court would frame appropriate issue arising out of said pleadings and after recording evidence of parties, would decide the matter within prescribed period of time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.271 of 2006, heard on 14-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD.\nVs.\nMessrs SHARIA HABIB CORPORATION through Proprietor and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13583",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2784 = 2007 SLD 2784 = 2007 CLD 193",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22-Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Objection to sale of mortgaged property---Suit filed by respondent-Bank having been decreed, mortgaged property was ordered to be sold in execution of said decree---Appellant filed objections to the proposed sale which were dismissed by Executing Court---Respondent-Bank was called upon to produce original documents relating to the mortgage of the suit property, but it failed to comply---No one having turned up for respondent-Bank on the date fixed for hearing despite repeated calls, Bank was proceeded against ex parte---Plea of appellant was that she was bona fide purchaser of mortgaged property and said property had been mortgaged with another Bank; that after entering into a registered agreement with owner of said property, she cleared said loan and the Bank informed the Authority of said payment and as such charge was lifted---Appellant had further contended that thereafter a private person obtained a stay order against said sale which ultimately was vacated by the Court and Authority effected mutation of said property in her favour in its record---Appeal filed by appellant was allowed and impugned order was set aside with the result that objection petition filed by appellant would be deemed to be pending before the Judge Banking Court which would seek reply from the decree-holder Bank, on appropriate issues and decide the matter after recording evidence of the parties within prescribed time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.329 of 2005, heard on 13-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "NAJMA KAUSAR\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. through Branch Manager/Principal Officer and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13584",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2785 = 2007 SLD 2785 = 2007 CLD 196",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.128---Suit for recovery of amount of loan for lease of certain equipment---Application for leave to defend suit---Respondent (2) took on lease certain equipment from respondent (1) to which appellant and respondent (3) stood guarantors and executed documents---Subsequently respondent (2) having committed default and failed to liquidate outstanding amount, suit was filed by respondent (1)---Both respondent, borrower and guarantors filed separate applications seeking leave to defend suit---Banking Court after finding that appellant failed to raise arty plausible cause, proceeded to dismiss his said application on merits, while application of respondents (2 and 3) was dismissed for non-prosecution and suit was decreed against appellant and respondents (2 and 3) jointly and severally vide impugned ---Contention of counsel for appellant/guarantor was that though appellant had executed personal guarantee in favour of respondent (1) but decretal amount be firstly recovered from respondent (2)/principal debtor who was in possession of the leased machinery---Execution of guarantee by appellant favouring respondent (1) was admitted---Under provisions of S.128 of Contract Act, 1872. liability of the surety was co-extensive with that of principal debtor---Appellant had not been able to demonstrate from the available record that it was otherwise provided in the letter of guarantee---Impugned was not only in accordance with record of the case, but same was also in consonance with the law on the subject.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 376 of 2006, decision dated: 17-10-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "SAJID HUSSAIN GILLANI\nVs.\nSAUDI PAK LEASING COMPANY LTD. and 2 others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13585",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2786 = 2007 SLD 2786 = 2007 CLD 208",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58---Execution of decree for recovery of loan amount---Intervenor claimed to be owner of machinery installed in -debtor's factory---Bank claimed such machinery to be owned by debtor, over which Bank had floating charge---Order of Court directing Official Assignee to examine intervenor's claim--Intervenor examined himself in support of his claim---Bank neither examined any witness nor produced any material before Official Assignee to rebutt intervenor's claim---Validity---Official Assignee was not required to examine proprieties of documents, unless a specific plea of forgery was raised by contesting party---Objection as to inadmissibility of documents was not raised before Official Assignee-Judgment-debtor under Deed of Floating Charge was not required to obtain NOC from Bank for installing machinery in his factory---Deed of Floating Charge could bind debtor, but not intervenor, who was a stranger to such contract- -Report of Official Assignee showed that machinery of intervenor was not claimed by -debtor; and that auction-purchaser had stated before him that any decision in regard to machinery of intervenor would be binding on him---Bank's objections against such claim of intervenor were overruled in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1719 of 1997, Execution No.92 of 1998, References Nos.1, 2 of 2005, 3 of 2006, C.M.A. Nos.1269 and 1270 of 2005, decision dated: 6-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J",
    "": "Messrs ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs GHARO TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. and 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13586",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2787 = 2007 SLD 2787 = 2007 CLD 214 = 2007 PLJ 404",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9. 15 & 19---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree--Sale of mortgaged property without intervention of the Court---Issuance of sale certificate---Application for--Applicant/auction purchaser had sought issuance of sale certificate in respect of mortgaged property purchased by her through auction---Property in question which was mortgaged with decree-holder Bank, was sold by Bank without intervention of the Court in favour of applicant/auction purchaser---Since sale without intervention of the Court was effected after passing of decree, matter fell squarely within the purview of S.9 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---In case of a sale of mortgaged property by a financial institution without intervention of the Court, mode of transfer of title would be through the execution of a deed of conveyance by the said financial institution and not by the Court through a sale certificate. \n \nUnited Bank Limited v. Defence Housing Authority 2004 CLD 215 ref.\n \nAmir Zahoor Chohan for Applicant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Petition No.26-B of 1998, C.O.S. No.92 of 1997 and C.M. No.133-B of 2004, decision dated: 20-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED, J",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through General Attorney--Decree Holder\nVs.\nMessrs CHAUDHRY APPARELS LIMITED through Chief Executive and 11 othersJudgment-debtors"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13587",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2788 = 2007 SLD 2788 = 2007 CLD 217",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Leave to defend suit, application for---Granting of facilities and execution of security documents, and amount of facilities disbursed to defendants not denied by them---No question of law or fact was raised by defendants for grant of such application, which was dismissed in circumstances. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908 ), O. VIII, R.5---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.113---Leave to defend suit, application for---Defendants in original leave application admitted signing and, delivery to plaintiff memorandum of deposit of title deed and letter of continuity of mortgage of property, but in subsequent amended leave application, such documents were alleged to be forged---Effect---Both such pleas were mutually destructive as if one was believed to be true, then other would obviously be false---Both such pleas being so diagonally opposed to each other they could not co-exist at one and same tune---Such pleading was not permissible in law--Party to proceedings once having made art admission in pleadings would not be allowed to wriggle out of same as other party acquired valuable right in terms of O.VIII, R.5, C.P.C., and Art.113 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984--Plea of defendants that such documents were forged could not be accepted, and admission in original leave application would be binding on them---Leave application was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nAllied Bank of Pakistan Limited v. Mrs. Fahmida 2004 CLD 110; Imtiaz Ahmed v. Platinum Commercial Bank Limited 2004 CLD 481; Messrs Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Pan Islamic Steamship Company Limited 2005 CLD 626: Mushtaq Ahmed Bohra v. Crescent Investment Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 444; Kamran Zali v. Union Bank Limited 2002 CLD 876; Muhammad Yaqoob v. Feroze Khan and others 2003 SCMR 41; Mst. Baswar Sultan v. Mst. Adeeba Alvi 2002 SCMR 326; Haji Suleman Ali Muhammad v. Ahmed Ali and another PLD 1982 Kar. 111; Ghulam Abbas v. Manzoor Ahmed and another PLD 2004 Lah. 125; Kamran Zali v. Messrs Bhitai Rubber Industries Ltd. 2001 CLC 492: Khuda Buksh v. Banking Court No.11, Multan 2000 CLC 1013; Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Messrs Tahir Traders PLD 1986 Kar. 369; Messrs Quetta Silk Centre v. Muslim Commercial Bank 2003 CLD 254 and Emirates Bank international Ltd. v. Messrs United Export Limited PLJ 1994 Kar. 222 ref.\n \nSecretary Government (West Pakistan) N.W.F.-P. Department of Agriculture and Forest v. Kazi Abdul Kalil PLJ 1978 SC 314; Mst. Baswar Sultan v. Mst. Adeeba Alvi 2002 SCMR 326; Messrs Haji Suleman Gowawala and Sons Ltd. v. Usman and 13 others 1985 CLC 132; Qaid Jauhar v. Mst. Hajiani Hajra Bai 2002 CLC 551 and Suleman Ali Muhammad v. Ahmed Ali PLD 1982 Kar. 111 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 2---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.126---Surety for principal borrower company---Person becoming surety for such principal need to be either its shareholder or Director or to have requested for facility or beneficiary of same. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---S. 10---Leave to defend suit, application for---Charging of illegal mark-up, question of---Validity---Such question was not a substantial question of fact or law, and alone on its basis, leave to defend would not be granted. \n \n(e) Death Certificate---\n \n---Variation in death certificate would not make same a reliable document. \n \nAzizur Rahman for Plaintiff.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-101 of 2000, decision dated: 6-10-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED, J",
    "": "Vs.\nMessrs ZAMCO (PVT.) LTD. and 10 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13588",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2789 = 2007 SLD 2789 = 2007 CLD 229",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10(3)(4)---Suit for recovery of bank loans---Application for leave to defend the suit---Defence established its case to the extent of part of claim---Effect---Bank filed suit for recovery of amount along with compensation and cost of funds against defendants---Defendants filed application for leave to defend the suit which was dismissed by Trial Court and suit filed by plaintiff was decreed--Defendants contended that Trial Court had incorrectly invoked subsections (3)(4) of S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 as the same had been complied with and there were triable issues requiring the recording of evidence, therefore, leave ought to have been granted in the case-Validity-Record revealed that defendants had failed to make out a plausible defence with regard to certain unpaid overdue rental amount---Balance claim of plaint g pertained to late payment charges and cheque return charges---Unpaid overdue rental amount was prima facie a penalty---Balance claim of plaintiff pertaining to late payment charges and cheque return charges needed to be proved in evidence by plaintiff---Plaintiff, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was entitled to an interim decree as to unpaid overdue rental amount along with cost of funds and defendants were entitled to unconditional leave to defend the suit as, to balance claim of plaintiff---Appeal was accepted accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.202 and C.M. No.2 of 2006, decision dated: 4-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "CRYSTAL SEEDS (PVT.) LTD. LAHROE through Chief Executive and 2 others\nVs.\nCRESCENT COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED Lahore High Court through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13589",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2790 = 2007 SLD 2790 = 2007 CLD 232",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2, Ss.151 & 10---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), S.34---Suit for declaration and injunction against bank--Application for injunction to restrain bank from selling mortgaged property---Decision of interlocutory application filed by defendant before deciding the application for leave to defend---Scope---Service of notices under S.15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Procedure--Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaration that notices issued by defendant-bank under S.15(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for sate of their mortgaged properties were illegal, void and of no legal effect---Plaintiffs also filed application under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2 read with S.151, C.P.C. to restrain defendant (Bank) from selling properties mortgaged with it---Plaintiffs contended that before deciding any application filed by them, Court teas first to decide application for grant of leave to defend the suit that defendant charged mark-up in excess of what was agreed upon between parties; that defendant bank's facility was fully secured and notices in question had been issued mala fide and without lawful authority-Validity--Application on behalf of defendant was normally not entertained without first deciding whether defendant was entitled to grant of leave or not, but if plaintiff had filed application and delay in deciding application might cause prejudice to defendant while hearing such application on its merits, defendant's contention could be looked into---Even application under S.10, C.P. C. and application under S.34 of Arbitration Act, 1940, filed by defendant without deciding the application for leave could be heard and decided on its merits---Subsection (12) of S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, provided that neither Banking Court nor High Court was to grant an injunction restraining the sale or proposed sale of mortgaged property unless Court was satisfied that no mortgage in respect of immovable property had been created; or all money secured by mortgage of mortgaged property had been paid; or mortgagor or objector deposited in Banking Court in cash, the outstanding mortgage money--Section 15 of the Ordinance, required that in case of default in payment by customer, financial institution might send a notice to mortgagor demanding payment of mortgaged money outstanding within 14 days from service of notice and second notice in this regard was to be served within next 14 days---Mortgagor if jailed to pay amount after service of second notice, Uteri financial institution had to serve a final notice demanding payment within 30 days from service of notice on customer---Upon service of final notice, financial institution acquired right to recover rent and profit from mortgaged property till the time notice was withdrawn and to sell mortgaged property without intervention by public auction--Three notices served upon plaintiffs would satisfy requirements' of S.15(2) of the. Ordinance---Plaintiffs were not entitled to grunt of relief prayed in application for grant of u junction order against defendant--Interest of justice. however,, was to be served if defendant-Bank first sold one property of plaintiffs in the first instance and if from proceeds of sale, outstanding due could not be satisfied, then to put second mortgaged property for sale---Application was dismissed. \n \nMuhammad Azwar Siddiqui v. Chief Executive Union Leasing Ltd. 2006 CLD 946; Sh. Abdul Sattar Lasi v. Federation of Pakistan and another 2004 CLD 252: Sheikh Abdul Sattar v. Federation of Pakistan 2006 CLD 18 and Muhammad Hussain v. SME Bank Ltd. and another 2005 CLD 323 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---S. 15---Scope and object of S.15, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was a special law framed for expeditious recovery of dues of financial institutions--Legislature, in S.15 had used negative language--Negative, prohibitory and exclusive words or terms were indicative of Legislative intent that statute was to be mandatory-Court, while interpreting a taw, had to find out intention of law-makers from words used in statute and as such while interpreting S.15(12) of the Ordinance it had to be interpreted in a way which advanced intention of law-makers and not in a way to defeat the very object of special law---Subsection (12) of S.15 of the Ordinance, was a mandatory provision restraining Courts from granting injunction to restrain proposed sale of mortgaged property except when condition of clauses (a), (b) & (c) of subsection (12) of S.15 of the Ordinance were attracted. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2, Ss.151 & 10---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), S.34---Suit for declaration, and injunction-Interlocutory application on behalf of defendant was normally not to be entertained without first deciding whether defendant was entitled to grant of leave or not, but if plaintiff had filed an application and delay in deciding application might cause prejudice to defendant while hearing such application on its merits, defendant's contention could be looked into---Even application under S.10, C.P.C. and application under S.34 of Arbitration Act, 1940, filed by defendant could be heard and decided without deciding application for grant of leave to defend the suit. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 15(12)---Sale of mortgaged property---Grant of injunction---Scope.\n \nSubsection (12) of section 15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, provided that neither Banking Court nor High Court was to grant an injunction restraining the sale or proposed sale of mortgaged property unless Court was satisfied that no mortgage in respect of immovable property had been created; or all money secured by mortgage of mortgaged property had been paid; or mortgagor or objector deposited in Banking Court in cash, the outstanding mortgage money---Section 15 of the Ordinance, required that in case of default in payment by customer, financial institution might send a notice to mortgagor demanding payment of mortgaged money outstanding within 14 days from service of notice and second notice in this regard was to be served within next 14 days--Mortgagor if failed to pay amount after service of second notice, then financial institution had to serve a final notice demanding payment within 30 days from service of notice on customer---Upon service of final notice, financial institution acquired right to recover rent and profit from mortgaged property till the time notice was withdrawn and to sell mortgaged property without intervention by public auction---Three notices served upon plaintiffs would satisfy requirements of section 15(2) of the Ordinance. \n \n(e) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Court while interpreting a law has to find intention of law-makers from words used in the statue. \n \n(f) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Special law---Provision of law has to be interpreted in a way which advanced intention of the law makers and not in a way to defeat the very object of a special law.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-25 and C.M.A. No.4138 of 2006, decision dated: 31st August, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD KHALID and 2 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nK.A.S.B. BANK LTD. through Managing Director--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13590",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2791 = 2007 SLD 2791 = 2007 CLD 244",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Appellant Bank filed suit for recovery of loan pleading that three financial facilities were provided to respondent (1) who executed charge documents, while respondents (2) who were guarantors of respondent (1), executed personal guarantees---Banking Court passed interim decree for recovery of loan against respondent (1), but decreed appellant's suit against respondents (2 and 3) for recovery of amount to the extent of their guarantee---Validity---Impugned order was devoid of reasons and lacked alt characteristics of valid a; ~d legal and of judicial order---Impugned was sketchy, slipshod and devoid of reasons and was not at all a \"\"speaking order\"\" and could not be called a judicial order\"\" within the parameters set up by law---Tenor of impugned amply manifested. non-application of judicial mind and casual and cursory approach of Banking Court---Judicial order\"\" must be speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court had applied its judicial mind to the issues and points of controversy involved in the cases---Impugned which was not a speaking order and was devoid of reasons, was not maintainable in law which was set aside. \n \nAdamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The province of East Pakistan and others PLD 1959 SC (Pak) 272; Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller Import and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158; Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 and Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Secretary, Ministry of Labour and others 1984 SCMR 1014 ref.\n \nShams Mehmood Mirza for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.42 of 2003, heard on 16-10-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED, Lahore High Court\nVs.\nMessrs CREATIVE ENTERPRISES (PVT.) LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13591",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2792 = 2007 SLD 2792 = 2007 CLD 272 = 2007 PLJ 415",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.133---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Mortgage not to be taken as security for repayment of second financial facility granted to principal debtor after death of mortgagee---Fresh documents executed at the back of surety without his consent---Effect---Plaintiff-Bank filed suit for recovery of certain sum against defendants including principal debtor and legal heirs of deceased mortgagor and guarantor--Defendants/legal heirs of deceased mortgagor and guarantor filed application for leave to defend but principal debtor did not file any such application---Banking Court decreed the suit--Defendants contended that memorandum of deposit of title deed was allegedly executed on 22-11-2000 for facility which was discharged on 30-11-2000 and their predecessor-in-interest died on 29-1-2001, therefore, said memorandum of deposit of title deed stood terminated and no fresh loan could be allowed on strength of alleged document: that subsequent to adjustment of first loan facility neither predecessor-in-interest of defendants nor they themselves executed any document to secure second finance facility which was allegedly availed by principal debtor on 3-3-2001 and that under S.133 of Contract Act, 1872, predecessor of defendants stood discharged from guarantee--Plaintiff-Bank submitted that continuing guarantee had been executed by predecessor of defendants and it was binding on legal heirs and that defendants informed the Bank about death of their predecessor when second facility had already been sanctioned---Validity---Mortgage allegedly created on 22-11-2000 could not be taken as security for repayment of second financial facility granted to principal debtor, after death of mortgagor-Plaintiff-Bank could not invoke bank guarantee dated 22-11-2000 as the same lost its efficacy after adjustment of first financial facility---Plaintiff-Bank had provided second financial facility to principal debtor, fresh documents and fresh agreement for financing were executed after death of guarantor/surety---Admittedly at the time of granting of second facility predecessor of defendants had already died and no liabilities could be created against a dead person---Original. agreement dated 22-11-2000 for which predecessor of defendants executed guarantee and created mortgage stood varied without consent of surety, therefore, surety stood discharged under S.133 of Contract Act, 1872---Principal debtor when executed fresh documents at the back of surety and without his consent, latest agreement was not to bind surety or his legal heirs as they were not signatory to those documents---Judgment passed by Banking Court suffered from Legal errors hence the same was set aside by High Court in appeal. \n \nDr. M.A. Qadir Khan v. The Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd. and another PLD 1984 Kar.211; National Development Leasing Corporation Limited v. Messrs National Fibres Limited and others 2003 CLC 637 and N.D. Leasing Corporation v. National Fibres Ltd. 2002 CLD 643 rel.\n \nAli Akbar Qureshi for Appellants.\n \nTahseen Ullah Butt for Respondent No. 1.\n \nDate of hearing: 19th September, 2006.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.691 of 2002, heard on 19-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "NAGHMA ARSHAD TOOR and 2 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and another through Sole Proprietor"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13592",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2793 = 2007 SLD 2793 = 2007 CLD 295",
    "Key Words:": "State Bank of Pakistan B.P.D. Circular No.29 of 2002, dated 15-10-2002------Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Representation by the borrower to the effect that Forced Sale Value (FSV) of the assets charged to the Bank was Rs.1.0 million rather than Rs.10.0 million, Dispute Resolution Committee of State Bank of Pakistan, by its letter modified its decision and reduced settlement amount from Rs.9.154 million to Rs.5.533 million---Question before the High Court was whether Dispute Resolution Committee, in exercise of its authority under B.P.D. Circulars No.29, had jurisdiction to review its decision---Bank had defended the refusal by the Bank to comply the revised decision of said Committee on the grounds firstly, that it had no jurisdiction to review its earlier decision and that revision was based on a mistaken view of Forced Sale Value of the charged property---Contention of borrower was that as petitioner was under a duty to provide security for Rs.1.0 million, value of his charged property should be treated at that level---Provisions of B.P.D. Circular No.29 were concerned with Forced Sale Value of the charged security given by a borrower, rather than the value of such security that was necessary to avail the facility---Contention of petitioner was based on the latter premise---Such rationale, however, was not relevant for purpose of settlement amount worked out by Dispute Resolution Committee---Constitutional petition being meritless, was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1085 of 2006, decision dated: 14-04-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "Messrs CONS (PRIVATE) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 2 others\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Regional Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13593",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2794 = 2007 SLD 2794 = 2007 CLD 304",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to defend suit---Appellants were served. only one day prior to date fixed for hearing of the case---Appellants did not file application for leave to defend suit, suit was decreed as prayed for---Appellants were to make an application for leave to defend suit within 30 days and from the date of service of notice, appellants had 28 days to do the needful when Banking Court proceeded to decree the suit---Validity---Impugned order could not be maintained---Appeal was allowed, and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside---Suit filed by appellants, in circumstances, would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court and appellants would file application for leave to defend suit within specified period.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.433 of 2006, heard on 28-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "MEER JAVED ASGHAR and 2 others\nVs.\nCITIBANK N.A. through Attorney"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13594",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2795 = 2007 SLD 2795 = 2007 CLD 312",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 19 & 22---Suit, for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Suit filed by Bank having been partially decreed by Banking Tribunal regular first appeal was filed by Bank against that order contending that an amount of Rs.2,11, 000, had wrongly and illegally been denied in the decree---Decreed sum. in (he meantime, was paid by -debtors and execution petition was disposed of accordingly by the Banking Court---When. however appeal came up for hearing before High Court. case was remanded to the Banking Court concerned. and after remand, the Banking Court took up the matter and disposed of the case having become infructuous---Validity---Reason that prevailed with Banking Court was the disposal of execution petition, which had been consigned to record due to satisfaction of the decree---Fact which had been overlooked by the Banking Court was concerned with grievance of Bank qua that part of the claim which had not been decreed---Said appeal having been remanded to Banking Court. matter required to be heard and determined by the Banking Court on its merits in accordance with law---Banking Court had clearly erred in law in disposing of the suit as having become infructuous---Impugned order, was not maintainable and remand order passed in regular first appeal, stood revived---Parties were directed to cause their presence/representation before Banking Court, for proceedings in the suit in accordance with law. \n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah.672 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.256 of 2005, heard on 27-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD ASIF and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13595",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2796 = 2007 SLD 2796 = 2007 CLD 320",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S. 9---Uniform Customs and Practice (for Documentary Credit Letters), (UCP 500), Art.2---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Agreements mentioned in letters of pledge not filed with plaint nor produced in evidence---Statement of account on letter head of plaintiff bank---Suit filed without statement of accounts---Effect---Documentary credit letter---Requirements of establishing existence of valid loan facility---Scope---Plaintiff-bank filed suit asserting therein that defendant company requested plaintiff for financial assistance and in response thereto two letters of credit were established whereby defendant No.1 was beneficiary that consolidated letter of pledge regarding stock was executed in favour of plaintiff that defendants Nos.2 & 3 were authorised vide resolutions of company to negotiate financial arrangements and sign documents; that as defendants Nos.2 to 8 signed letters of personal guarantee, therefore, executants were liable, severally and jointly, for liabilities of defendant No.1; that subsequently it was found that no stocks existed; that defendant No.1 being borrower was liable to pay liability as per terms of letter of credit---Defendants contended that amounts disbursed to defendant No.1 were on the request of opener of letter of credit: that defendant No.9 in order to ensure dispatch of goods, made letter of credit conditional; that correspondence as well as agreement between defendant No.1 and defendant No.9 revealed that pledge was created at desire of defendant No.9; that amounts disbursed were subject matter of Red Clause letter of credit, therefore, a beneficiary in such transaction was not personally liable;, that balance sheets of defendant No.1 did not reflect existence of any loan and that suit was not properly instituted---Validity---Assertions of plaintiff (bank) were not supported by any documentary evidence---Plaintiff witness in cross-examination had admitted that there was no sanction letter on record about disbursement of loan against pledge stocks and letters of personal guarantee of Directors and also that there was neither finance agreement between plaintiff and defendant No.1 nor a promisory note executed--Admittedly agreements mentioned in letters of pledge were not filed with plaint nor the same were subsequently produced in evidence---Contractual obligations of defendants in respect of pledge of stock, arid personal guarantees could be fixed only on basis of agreements which were mentioned in letters of pledge/guarantee but the same were not available and were not produced by plaintiff-In absence of such crucial documents defendants could not be burdened with any responsibility---Plaintiff-bank could establish existence of valid loan facility by bringing on record the application for loan facility, sanction letter, agreement of finance and statement of account showing entries of debit and credit and disbursement of amount of finance which elements were missing in the case---Letters of pledge were not' independent agreement but had been executed on basis of certain agreements which were specially mentioned in letters of pledge---Plaintiff witnesses had deposed nothing about these agreements and plaint was silent in this respect-Statements of account which were produced in evidence showed NIL balance---Statement of account on letter head of plaintiff bank filed with suit had no evidentiary value for reasons that the same had not been produced in evidence and secondly it could not be termed as statement of account as it lacked in element of debit and credit entries, account profile, levy of mark-up periodically and balance in relevant column---Such certificate could not be termed as statement. of account---In order to charge a person with liability, the entries in statement of account were to have corroboration---Statement of account by all means was to possess clarity, details and completeness---Under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, a suit without statement of account was not competent and plaint which was not supported by a statement of account merited rejection---Letter addressed by defendant No.1 to plaintiff (bank) did not show arty admission on the part of defendant No.1 about its liability towards plains ff rather it was stated in the letter that amounts received were against red clause, thus, such letter had no value---Under Art.2 of Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits Letter was an offer whereby issuing bank on request of applicant authorised another bank to effect payment, accept and pay bills of exchange or negotiate document, provided the terms and conditions of credit were complied with which meant that buyer (the applicant of credit) applied to a bank in his country (the issuing bank) to open and issue in favour of setter (the beneficiary) a letter of credit to pay the beneficiary such amount on his fulfilment of terms and conditions specified in the letter of credit---Banks involved in documentary letters of credit transaction were agents of the parties and charged their commission for services they rendered---In documentary letter of credit, the banks dealt in documents and parties dealt in goods---Opening Bank in letter of credit, containing red clause, advises the advising bank to grant advance payment to the exporter to enable him to produce goods or raw material for preparation of exportable items for shipment---Advising bank then reimburses itself by negotiating the documents by exporter and if beneficiary fails to ship goods or fails to present documents or otherwise fails to repay the funds advance. the advising/confirming bank will write to issuing bank for reimbursement of amounts advanced---Goods, subject matter of Letter of Credit, were exported to foreign buyer which fact stood proved through export proceeds/realisation vouchers---Plaintiff on the contrary failed to produce agreement of finance and other agreements which were made basis of letters of pledge and letters of personal guarantee--Plaintiff had not extended any loan facility to defendant No.1 on the basis of pledge of stock---Real transaction was payment under letters of credit of which plaintiff was corresponding bank and defendant No.1 was beneficiary; in such transaction, if arty amount remained to be recovered, it was recoverable from advising bank---Plaint had been signed by two officers of plaintiff bank and power of attorney on behalf of these officers of the bank were already on file---Suit was properly instituted---Plaintiff had failed to prove that amounts subject matter of agreements mentioned in letters of guarantee were still outstanding as neither agreements nor the statement of account had been filed in this regard---Suit was dismissed. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---S. 9---Suit without statement of account was not competent and plaint which was not supported by a statement of account merited rejection under S.9 of the Ordinance. \n \n(c) Banker and customer---\n \n----Expression---'Documentary credit\"\"---Meaning---Normal transac¬tion of documentary credit was fundamentally a contract by which a payment teas to be made in exchange for documents---Transaction of documentary credit embodied three agreements to which parties were (a) buyer and issuing bank; (b) issuing bank and intermediary bank; (c) intermediary bank and beneficiary. \n \n(d) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S. 134---Liability of guarantor and principal borrower---Scope---Section 134 of Contract Act, 1872 envisaged that liability of guarantor was co-extensive with that of the liability of principal borrower---Guarantor was liable as long as claim against principal debtor survived.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 93 of 1998, decision dated: 27-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "MASHREQ BANK PSC through Constituted Attorney--Plaintiff\nVs.\nFAROOQ HABIB TEXTILE MILLS LTD. Through Director/Chief Executive and 8 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13596",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2797 = 2007 SLD 2797 = 2007 CLD 320",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S. 9---Uniform Customs and Practice (for Documentary Credit Letters), (UCP 500), Art.2---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Agreements mentioned in letters of pledge not filed with plaint nor produced in evidence---Statement of account on letter head of plaintiff bank---Suit filed without statement of accounts---Effect---Documentary credit letter---Requirements of establishing existence of valid loan facility---Scope---Plaintiff-bank filed suit asserting therein that defendant company requested plaintiff for financial assistance and in response thereto two letters of credit were established whereby defendant No.1 was beneficiary that consolidated letter of pledge regarding stock was executed in favour of plaintiff that defendants Nos.2 & 3 were authorised vide resolutions of company to negotiate financial arrangements and sign documents; that as defendants Nos.2 to 8 signed letters of personal guarantee, therefore, executants were liable, severally and jointly, for liabilities of defendant No.1; that subsequently it was found that no stocks existed; that defendant No.1 being borrower was liable to pay liability as per terms of letter of credit---Defendants contended that amounts disbursed to defendant No.1 were on the request of opener of letter of credit: that defendant No.9 in order to ensure dispatch of goods, made letter of credit conditional; that correspondence as well as agreement between defendant No.1 and defendant No.9 revealed that pledge was created at desire of defendant No.9; that amounts disbursed were subject matter of Red Clause letter of credit, therefore, a beneficiary in such transaction was not personally liable;, that balance sheets of defendant No.1 did not reflect existence of any loan and that suit was not properly instituted---Validity---Assertions of plaintiff (bank) were not supported by any documentary evidence---Plaintiff witness in cross-examination had admitted that there was no sanction letter on record about disbursement of loan against pledge stocks and letters of personal guarantee of Directors and also that there was neither finance agreement between plaintiff and defendant No.1 nor a promisory note executed--Admittedly agreements mentioned in letters of pledge were not filed with plaint nor the same were subsequently produced in evidence---Contractual obligations of defendants in respect of pledge of stock, arid personal guarantees could be fixed only on basis of agreements which were mentioned in letters of pledge/guarantee but the same were not available and were not produced by plaintiff-In absence of such crucial documents defendants could not be burdened with any responsibility---Plaintiff-bank could establish existence of valid loan facility by bringing on record the application for loan facility, sanction letter, agreement of finance and statement of account showing entries of debit and credit and disbursement of amount of finance which elements were missing in the case---Letters of pledge were not' independent agreement but had been executed on basis of certain agreements which were specially mentioned in letters of pledge---Plaintiff witnesses had deposed nothing about these agreements and plaint was silent in this respect-Statements of account which were produced in evidence showed NIL balance---Statement of account on letter head of plaintiff bank filed with suit had no evidentiary value for reasons that the same had not been produced in evidence and secondly it could not be termed as statement of account as it lacked in element of debit and credit entries, account profile, levy of mark-up periodically and balance in relevant column---Such certificate could not be termed as statement. of account---In order to charge a person with liability, the entries in statement of account were to have corroboration---Statement of account by all means was to possess clarity, details and completeness---Under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, a suit without statement of account was not competent and plaint which was not supported by a statement of account merited rejection---Letter addressed by defendant No.1 to plaintiff (bank) did not show arty admission on the part of defendant No.1 about its liability towards plains ff rather it was stated in the letter that amounts received were against red clause, thus, such letter had no value---Under Art.2 of Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits Letter was an offer whereby issuing bank on request of applicant authorised another bank to effect payment, accept and pay bills of exchange or negotiate document, provided the terms and conditions of credit were complied with which meant that buyer (the applicant of credit) applied to a bank in his country (the issuing bank) to open and issue in favour of setter (the beneficiary) a letter of credit to pay the beneficiary such amount on his fulfilment of terms and conditions specified in the letter of credit---Banks involved in documentary letters of credit transaction were agents of the parties and charged their commission for services they rendered---In documentary letter of credit, the banks dealt in documents and parties dealt in goods---Opening Bank in letter of credit, containing red clause, advises the advising bank to grant advance payment to the exporter to enable him to produce goods or raw material for preparation of exportable items for shipment---Advising bank then reimburses itself by negotiating the documents by exporter and if beneficiary fails to ship goods or fails to present documents or otherwise fails to repay the funds advance. the advising/confirming bank will write to issuing bank for reimbursement of amounts advanced---Goods, subject matter of Letter of Credit, were exported to foreign buyer which fact stood proved through export proceeds/realisation vouchers---Plaintiff on the contrary failed to produce agreement of finance and other agreements which were made basis of letters of pledge and letters of personal guarantee--Plaintiff had not extended any loan facility to defendant No.1 on the basis of pledge of stock---Real transaction was payment under letters of credit of which plaintiff was corresponding bank and defendant No.1 was beneficiary; in such transaction, if arty amount remained to be recovered, it was recoverable from advising bank---Plaint had been signed by two officers of plaintiff bank and power of attorney on behalf of these officers of the bank were already on file---Suit was properly instituted---Plaintiff had failed to prove that amounts subject matter of agreements mentioned in letters of guarantee were still outstanding as neither agreements nor the statement of account had been filed in this regard---Suit was dismissed. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---S. 9---Suit without statement of account was not competent and plaint which was not supported by a statement of account merited rejection under S.9 of the Ordinance. \n \n(c) Banker and customer---\n \n----Expression---'Documentary credit\"\"---Meaning---Normal transac¬tion of documentary credit was fundamentally a contract by which a payment teas to be made in exchange for documents---Transaction of documentary credit embodied three agreements to which parties were (a) buyer and issuing bank; (b) issuing bank and intermediary bank; (c) intermediary bank and beneficiary. \n \n(d) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S. 134---Liability of guarantor and principal borrower---Scope---Section 134 of Contract Act, 1872 envisaged that liability of guarantor was co-extensive with that of the liability of principal borrower---Guarantor was liable as long as claim against principal debtor survived.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 93 of 1998, decision dated: 27-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "MASHREQ BANK PSC through Constituted Attorney--Plaintiff\nVs.\nFAROOQ HABIB TEXTILE MILLS LTD. Through Director/Chief Executive and 8 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13597",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2798 = 2007 SLD 2798 = 2007 CLD 332",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for grant of leave to defend---Service of defendant---Appellant and his mother were proceeded against ex parte and ex parte decree was passed against appellant and application filed by appellant for setting aside ex parte decree was dismissed by Banking Court---Appellant, had contended that, though address of appellant was given correctly in the plaint, but it came to be recorded wrongly in the process issued by Banking Court and that, in circumstances there was no due service in law and in fact---Validity---Name of Block of residential area was stated as \"\"USMA\"\", in the plaint whereas in the process, it was mentioned as \"\"UZMA\"\"; it could not be said, in circumstances that appellant was duly served---Allowing appeal, impugned order and ex parte decree were set aside by High Court---Appellant could file application for grant of leave to defend in terms of S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, within specified period.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 292 of 2006, heard on 13-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD YASIN\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager and another--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13598",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2799 = 2007 SLD 2799 = 2007 CLD 334",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 9(3), 152, 73 & 263---Application for rectification of register of members of Company---Summary jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Contentious issues involved between parties---Resolution---Petitioner filed application under S.152 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, seeking rectification of register of members of company which was a public company limited by shares and was incorporated on 18-2-1990---Petitioner alleged that respondent arid members of his family had been allotted shares without any contribution in cash or kind to the assets of company; that after transfer of originally allotted 14000 shares earlier held by previous management of another person and his family, said respondent got himself issued 250,000 shares of Rs.100 each without any subscription to company in cash or kind; that respondent committed a fraud on company by severing its assets in the form of declaration of a daily newspaper by delivering it to his son without having transferred arty benefit to the company; that all transactions were against mandatory provisions of S.73 of Companies Ordinance, 1984; that Registrar of Companies, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan unlawfully accommodated returns of allotment of shares of value of Rs.2, 50.00, 000; that two returns of allotment filed with Registrar were liable to be rejected and quashed being not reflective of actual receipts of assets by company either in form of cash or in form of any property; that respondent in utter disregard of relevant provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984, further raised the issued capital of company and had rather received additional amount from different persons without permission and consent of existing Directors; that respondent was continuously further reducing the ratio of shares holding of those who were not members of his family and in order to materialize his designs had arranged to further increase the authorized capital from Rs.40 million to Rs.50 million; that respondent was guilty of breach of trust in transferring the assets of company in the form of declaration of daily \"\"Newspaper\"\" to his son without any consideration and without any authorization from company and that issue of rectification of Register of members in the given situation was capable of disposal in a summary manner---Petitioner sought direction to Registrar of Companies to rectify/delete the name of respondent and his family members which he had got entered in the record of company without any receipt of cash or other consideration---Registrar of Companies stated that since transferor never complained to him regarding non-payment of consideration against transfer of shares therefore no action was taken in that regard---Respondent had objected to maintainability of present petition 'under S.152 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 on ground that in view of facts given and allegations made in petition, it could not be disposed of in a summary manner--Respondent claimed that he and his family members were genuine investors and share-holders of company who purchased shares from old management for a valuable consideration in pursuance of an agreement dated 3-9-1998; that none of these shares was issued by company without consideration, that petitioner could not challenge issuance of shares to previous management nor their transfer of shares in favour of respondent inasmuch as if at all any consideration was to be paid by respondent, it was payable to previous management/share-holders as neither company nor petitioner was in any manner a party to agreement dated 3-9-1998; that respondent, who was a genuine investor in view of agreement dated 3-9-1998 purchased entire holding of company and declaration of daily \"\"Newspaper\"\" and that petitioner became share-holder of company to the extent of shares worth Rs.1000 only on 25-12-1999---Respondent submitted that complicated issues of fact involved in the case could be resolved only in a regular trial and that jurisdiction of High Court under S.152 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 though very wide, could not be resorted to in such situation---Validity---Power vested in High Court under S.152 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 was to be exercised where legal title of applicant was clear---Summary jurisdiction of High Court in complicated or doubtful case, as contemplated in S.9(3) of Companies Ordinance, 1984, could not be resorted to---Petitioner was not correct in claiming that his only objection of lack of receipt of consideration for issuance of shares both in cash or otherwise could be resolved in summary jurisdiction-Part of shares were purchased from previous management for which there was no question of any payment to company while rest of them were issued by company for which adequate payment was actually made to company---Defence taken by respondent with regard to transaction involving transfer of declaration of daily \"\"newspaper\"\" was a factual controversy which could not be resolved in summary jurisdiction---Case of respondent that company even wider previous management had nothing to do with declaration of daily \"\"Newspaper\"\" and its transfer in favour of his son was not related to dispute between present parties again needed to be resolved after recording of evidence and appreciation of documents executed in that behalf---Validity---Irrespective of correctness or otherwise of allegation that present petitioner was re-agitating all issues, which were earlier resolved by Inspector under S.263 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, the fact remained that on a detailed inquiry said Inspector by way of his report did not agree to any of allegations set out for investigation by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan---Dispute between parties, even if looked at from simplest possible angle as petitioner desired, could not be resolved in summary jurisdiction inasmuch as receipt of consideration by Company whose entitlement to such receipt was disputed by defence, still needed recording and appreciation of documentary evidence before coming to a conclusion---Petition wider S.152 of Companies Ordinance. 1984 could not be entertained till the time the contentious issues between parties were resolved by a competent forum---Contentious issues once settled by a competent forum, the petitioner could always approach High Court for exercise of jurisdiction under S.152 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Proceedings intended by way of present application could riot culminate into a direction for rectification as prayed for without holding of a long drawn trial which obviously was not possible in summary jurisdiction of High Court---Petition was decided accordingly. \n \nKhurshid Ahmad Khan and another v. Pak Cycle Manufacturing Company Limited PLD 1987 Lah.1 rel.\n \nSh. Mushtaq Ahmad v. Shaukat Soap Factory and others 1987 CLC 2079; Zakir Latif Ansari and another v. Pakistan Industrial Promoters Ltd. and 2 others 1988 CLC 1541 and Rohail Hashmi and others v. Nabeel Hashmi and others 2003 CLD 201 ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n---Ss. 152 & 9(3)---Summary jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Power vested in High Court under S.152 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 was to be exercised where legal title of applicant was clear; in a complicated or doubtful case, summary jurisdiction of High Court as contemplated in S.9(3) of the Companies Ordinance. 1984 could not be resorted to.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O. No. 1 of 2002, decision dated: 31st August, 2004.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR, J",
    "": "INAYATULLAH KHAN NIAZI\nVs.\nADDITIONAL REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES and 2 others\nKhurshid Ahmad Khan and another v. Pak Cycle Manufacturing Company Limited PLD 1987 Lah. 1 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13599",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2800 = 2007 SLD 2800 = 2007 CLD 349",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------Ss.5, 9 & 13---International Chamber of Commerce Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 1993 Revision, ICC Publication No.500---Bill. of Exchange, return off--Necessity---Where payment was backed by a credit established by importer's Bank under Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 1993 Revision, ICC Publication No.500, then bill of Exchange would be required to be returned prior to any action for recovery of amount. \n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Shahyar Textile Mills Ltd. 2003 CLD 1370 rel.\n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n---Ss.5, 9 & 13---Holder of hilt of Exchange in due course executed in respect of Letter of Credit---Validity---Transactions against Irrevocable Letter of Credit---Nature and effect--Such transactions enjoy sanctity of transactions between Bank to Bank in the course of international trade pertaining to terms covering Irrevocable Letter of Credit-Holder of Bill of Exchange in due course executed in respect of Letter of Credit would stand on higher pedestal than a simpliciter beneficiary under a Letter of Credit---Importance and significance of such transactions stated.\n \nTransactions against Irrevocable Letters of Credit are Bank-to-Bank transactions so far as the question of rights, obligations and payment is made by one Bank to another. They enjoy the sanctity of the transactions between the Bank and Bank in the course of international trade pertaining to terms covering the Irrevocable Letter of Credit. \n \nThe effect of Irrevocable Letter of Credit is to substitute the issuing Bank in place of a buyer. The issuing Bank, thus, undertakes to buy the shipping documents. This undertaking is absolute and so as the documents of title to the goods conform to the terms and conditions of the contract as specified in the Letter of Credit, it is an obligation of the Bank to accept the documents regardless of any dispute between the seller and the buyer as to the quality of goods shipped under the Letter of Credit. This transaction between two Banks is independent of any dispute between the seller and the buyer. International Commerce involving transactions based on Letter of Credit are Carried on the footings that conform credits by Bankers of that charter. They do not call for any interference by the Court of law and derive their strength based on recognized banking practices, such charter does not involve interference by the Court of law except only in exceptional circumstances where a clear case of fraud is involved challenging the validity of Letter of Credit on a ground akin to fraud or concealment of material facts. Holder of Bill of Exchange in due course executed in respect of Letter of Credit stands on higher pedestal than a simpliciter beneficiary under a Letter of Credit, so that the interest of innocent parties, who may hold drafts drawn upon the Letter of Credit is protected. It would be a bad day in the business world, if for every breach of contract between the buyer and the seller, a party may come to a Court of equity and enjoin payment on drafts drawn upon a Letter of Credit issued by a Bank which owes no duty to the buyer in respect of the breach. \n \nHaral Textiles Limited v. Banque Indosuez Belgium 1999 SCMR 591 fol.\n \n(c) Letter of credit---\n \n----Irrevocable Letter of Credit---Export of goods on collection basis, but not under Irrevocable Letter of Credit---Effect---Such transaction would attract Articles of International Chamber of Commerce Uniform Rules for Union Rules for Collections, 1995. Revision, ICC Publication No.522---Obligations of Bank in transaction under Irrevocable Letter of Credit stated.\n \nWhere goods are exported on collection basis and not under an Irrevocable Letter of Credit, then such transaction would attract Article of ICC Uniform Rules for URC 522 as set forth under ICC Publication No.522. This publication provides a separate set of rules entirely different from the set of rules contained in ICC Publication No.500. While tinder an Irrevocable Letter of Credit, the Bank is obliged to make payment at site within the stipulated period for negotiation and reimbursing the Bank with the amount in pursuance of Articles.8 and 9 of UCP 500, and Article 1(b) thereof specifically provides that Bank has no obligation to handle either a collection or any collection instruction or subsequent related instructions. In such transactions, the collecting Bank does not extend any guarantee or assurance to make any payment and the possibility of dishonour of the negotiable Bill of Exchange on presentation exists. Even provision has been made for such a situation as to protest. Article 24 shows that in the absence of specific instructions regarding protest in the event of non-payment or non-acceptance, the Bank concerned with the collection has no obligation to have the documents protested for non-acceptance. The collecting Bank under the circumstances, is under no obligation either to follow up the recovery or take any step, until clearly so instructed and that only to the extent of protest. The Bank in absence of instructions is not expected to act in any manner, as the same would amount to acting without instructions. Collection for amount and remittance of payment attracts the provisions of section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, which makes it obligatory upon exporter to repatriate the Foreign Exchange within the stipulated period and failure to do so entail penal action. The repatriation of foreign exchange also have the consequence of settlement of the outstanding liability of exporter with the Bank. Under the circumstances, the conditions laid down in UCP 522 and the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 being the special law pertaining to export made on collection/ consignment basis are attracted. These applicable provisions of the law are totally 'different from transaction covered by (CC Publication 500. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 15---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss.5, 9 & 13---International Chamber of Commerce Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 1995 Revision, ICC Publication No.522, Arts. 1(b), 8, 9 & 24---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Suit by borrower against Bank---Sale of mortgaged property by Bank to recover amount advanced to borrower for export of goods on collection basis---Borrower seeking temporary Injunction against such sale---Validity---Foreign Bank as collecting agent was holding Bill of Exchange for collection and after collection for subsequent disbursement in pursuance of instructions as collecting agent of borrower---Borrower had not taken any step to seek recovery or any instruction for return of documents or repatriate amount in foreign exchange---In case of failure in receipt of remittance in foreign exchange, amount advanced by defendant Bank was duly secured by way of mortgage of property---Such amount was already settled and disclosed in documents covering export and mentioned in documents forwarded for collection---Such action of defendant-Bank was not violative of any provisions of law---Question of granting restraining order would not arise in such circumstances--Application of borrower for grant of temporary injunction was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nAbdul Sattar Shah Zaidi v. University of Karachi 1993 CLC 2026; Khawaja Muhammad Akbar v. Khawaja Fateh Muhammad 1993 MLD 76; Nazimuddin Siddiqui v. United Bank Limited 1998 CLC 1718; National Bank of Pakistan v. Khalid Mehmood 2002 CLD 658; Mian Munir Ahmed v. The State 2004 PCr.LJ 2012; Abdul Shakoor Kaloodi v. The State SBLR 2002 Sindh 1263; Asim Textile Mills Ltd. v. National Accountability Bureau PLD 2004 Karachi 638; Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Sanaullah Khan PLD 1988 SC 67; Abdul Latif v. The Government of West Pakistan PLD 1962 SC 384; Mrs. Mussarat Shaukat Ali v. Mrs. Safia Khatoon 1994 SCMR 2189; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Azmat Trading Co. 2001 CLC 1172; Nazimuddin v. The Bank of Khyber 2005 CLD 647; Habib Bank Limited v. Ahmed food Industries 2002 CLD 668; Aslam Industries Ltd. v. Pakistan Edible Corporation 1993 SCMR 683; Mrs. Aziz Fatima v. Mrs. Rehana Chughtai 2000 CLC 863; National Bank of Pakistan v. Shahyar Textile Mills Ltd. 2003 CLD 1370; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Fateh Apparel and others in Execution No.32 of 2001; Muhammad Irshad v. Deputy Director Adjudication 2003 CLD 917; East West Trading Company v. State Bank of Pakistan 2000 MLD 15; Sh. Abdul Sattar Lasi v. Federation of Pakistan 2006 CLD 18; Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 582; Dr. Tariq Nawaz v. Government of Pakistan 2000 SCMR 1956; Messrs Chawla International v. Habib Bank Limited 2003 CLD 956; Lips Records (P.) Ltd. v. Hadiqa Mahmood Kiani PLD 2002 Karachi 141; Muhammad Abid v. Nisar Ahmed 2000 SCMR '780: Ghulam Hassan v. Jaunshaid Ali 2001 SCMR 1001; market Committee v. Cantonment Board 2000 MLD 396; Managing Director Ravi Rayon Limited v. Province of Punjab 2001 MLD 577; Shakil Waaqas v. General Manager/Marketing P.R. PLD 2001 Kar.185; Hala spinning Mills Ltd. v. International Finance Corporation 2002 SCMR 450; Valuegold Limited v. United Bank Limited PLD 1999 Karl; Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Limited v. Pepsico Inc. PLD 2004 SC 860; Nizamuddin v. Central Government of Pakistan 1983 CLC 924; The Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Chaudhry Harvesting Company Lahore PLD 1993 Lab. 328; Javed Iqbal Khan v. Federal Employees B. & G.I. Funds 2002 SCMR 557; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Saadi Asmatullah 1999 SCMR 2874; Chairman, Minimum Wage Board v. Fayyaz Khan Khattak 1999 SCMR 1004; Chief Land Commissioner v. Maula Dad 1978 SCMR 264: Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Pazhong Traders 1986 CLC 1086; Zubair Muhammad v. United Bank Limited 2004 CLD 112; Bank Alfalah Limited v. Iftikhar A. Malik 2003 CLD 363; Messrs M.A. Majeed Khan v. Karachi Water and Sewerage Board PLD 2002 Kar. 315; Messrs Al-Madan Coal Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Regional Development Finance Corporation 2005 CLD 287; Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Hashim Paracha PLD 1987 Kar. 76; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Blessed International (Pvt.) Limited 2003 CLD 39; United Bank Limited v. Central Cotton Mills Ltd. 2001 MLD 78; Pakistan Industrial' Credit and Investment Corporation Limited v. Government of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 496; MCB v. Syed Ahmad Saeed Kinnani 1991 CLC 140; United Bank Limited v. Azmat Trading Co. 2001 CLC 1172; Rashid Ahmed v. The State 2003 YLR 2432; Polymer International v. Bolan Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 1129; Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Muhammad Zaman Khan 1997 SCMR 1508 and Abdul Saleem v. Federation of Pakistan and others CP No.D-195 of 2006 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-37 and C.M. As. Nos.3878, 3879 and 4504 of 2006, decision dated: 15-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERWAZ, J",
    "": "ABDUL KADIR JANGDA and 7 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nMY BANK LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13600",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2801 = 2007 SLD 2801 = 2007 CLD 365 = 2007 PLJ 429",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-------S.19---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.27(b)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.83 & 90---Execution of decree-Sale of property other than by auction---Objection to sale---Mortgaged property was put to auction for ten times but could not he sold out---Judgment debtor filed application in Executing' Court, seeking sale of property without auction, as he had a potential buyer---Executing Court with' the consent of decree holder and debtor, sold the property in Court---After sale of property, appellant filed objection petition before Executing Court on tine ground that the debtor had already executed agreement to sell in his favour thus the property could not be sold out---Validity---Banking Court had been given the discretion under S.19 (2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, to execute decree in a manner it considered appropriate at the request of decree holder---Property, in the present case, could not be sold. despite several attempts by Court Auctioneer---Efforts made by Executing Court, whereby a price was obtained which apart from satisfying decretal amount was also acceptable to debtors, could not be said to be unreasonable-Sale dial not at all cause any prejudice to the appellant as a suit for specific performance was pending---Sale would not at all derogate from the terms of agreement subject to its proof in civil Court and the agreement would be enforceable subject to terms of S.27 (b) of Specific Relief Act, 1877, against the subsequent purchaser as well---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nNavalkha and Sons v. Sri Ramanva Das and others AIR 1976 SC 2037 and Mohiuddin Molla v. The Province of East Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1962 SC 119 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)=19\\n\\r\\n\\rFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)=19\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=27(b)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No. 60 of 2006, heard on 20-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "VITA PAKISTAN PVT. LTD. through Director\nVs.\nTRUST INVESTMENT BANK LTD. Through Branch Manager and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13601",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2802 = 2007 SLD 2802 = 2007 CLD 423",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9, 19 & 22--Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.26---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution proceedings for realization of decretal amount---Sale of mortgaged property---Suit for recovery of loan filed by Bank on basis of mortgage of property was decreed---Decree-holder Bank initiated execution proceedings for realization of decretal amount through sale of mortgaged property---Objector assailed the sale of mortgaged property through auction and filed application seeking stay of auction proceedings under O.XXI, R26, C.P.C. contending that property in question was gifted away by objector 2 to her arid five others through gift-deed duly executed and registered with the Sub-Registrar---Onus to prove execution of alleged gift-deed was on the objector as execution of the gift-deed was denied by Bank, but objector failed to discharge the onus---Objector simply appeared as her own witness and no independent witness was produced by her to prove execution of said gift-deed and produced certain documents in evidence, including alleged gift-deed but she did not summon the stamp vendor and scribe of the gift-deed---Even the record of Sub-Registrar was neither summoned nor produced in evidence in order to prove execution and registration of deed---Local Commissioner before whom gift-deed was allegedly presented and attested, was also not produced in evidence---Marginal witnesses of the gift-deed were neither summoned nor produced in evidence in order to prove execution and genuineness of gift-deed---Objector in circumstances, had failed to prove execution of valid gift-deed and same was not proved---Subsequent letters, even if admitted, would not advance case of the objector as those were based on gift-deed, execution of which had not been proved---Case of objector being not based upon oral gift, but from the very inception she was only relying upon the gift-deed, it could neither be argued nor held that even if gift-deed was not proved, oral gift could be accepted----Objector having failed to prove execution and existence of valid and legal gift-deed qua the mortgaged property, impugned order was legal which did not call for any interference by the High Court in appeal---Impugned order was maintained. \n \nWajid Ali Khan v. Sheikh Murtaza Ali and 2 others 2003 SCMR 1416; Abdul Majeed and 6 others v. Muhammad Subhan and 2 others 1999 SCMR 1245; Amir Shah v. Ziarat Gul 1998 SCMR 593; Mst. Jannat Bibi v. Sher Muhammad and others 1988 SCMR 1696; Binyameen and 3 others v. Chaudhry Hakim and another 1996 SCMR 336; Anwar Ali and others v. Manzoor Hussain and another 1996 SCMR 1770 and Muhammad Mushtaq and another v. Bashir Ahmad Chaudhry and another PLD 1991 Lah.400 rel.\n \nAish Bahadur Rana.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 345 of 2006, decision dated: 28-06-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Mst. IRAM JAFFARY and others\nVs.\nK.A.S.B. BANK and 10 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13602",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2803 = 2007 SLD 2803 = 2007 CLD 428",
    "Key Words:": "Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)-------S.3(2)---Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.). R.731---Admiral4i suit---Violation by defendant-vessel of terms of carriage contract contained in Charter-party agreement---Arrest of defendant vessel, application for---Rice loading on defendant-vessel was completed 13 days before, which was stilt unable to commence voyage provided in such agreement due to its arrest in another case and inability to obtain release by providing security---Validity---Defendant-vessel had history of getting arrested---Long detention of rice loaded on vessel would putrefy as there was no chance of its obtaining release within a reasonable time---Charterer being an exporter of rice could not justifiably be allowed to jeopardize its commercial. venture just because vessel in which cargo was to be carried decides to undertake voyage at its own leisure and thus abandon its implied 'undertaking of completing voyage with all reasonable dispatch---Object of charterer in chartering vessel was entirely frustrated-Defendant vessel for not having earned freight was not entitled to payment of freight as voyage never started---Defendant-vessel might be entitled to payment of compensation for which no lien on cargo could be claimed--Plaintiff claimed cost of loading and unloading of cargo---High Court directed defendant-vessel to discharge plaintiffs cargo, ordered arrest of vessel for payment of compensation claimed by plaintiff with direction that vessel would be free to sail from port subject to deposit of claimed compensation with or furnish equivalent security to the satisfaction of Nazir of the High Court.\n \nScrutton on Charterparties and Bill of Lading 20th Edn., in Article 52 and Ex party Nvhom Re Child (1873) 29 Law Times 634.rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Adm. Suit No.26, C.M. As. Nos.995 and 1010 of 2006, decision dated: 22-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED, J",
    "": "RAJBY INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LIMITED--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nM.V. ANNIE SIERRS through Master or any Person Incharge of Vessel\nand 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13603",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2804 = 2007 SLD 2804 = 2007 CLD 457",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Procedure of Banking Court--Scope---Suit for recovery of damages on account of defamation---Maintainability---Claim in tort would not be within jurisdiction of Banking Court---Plaint in such case would be returned to plaintiff for its presentation before a Court of competent jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 368 of 2006, heard on 7-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ASMAR TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive \nVs.\nASKARI COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. Through Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13604",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2805 = 2007 SLD 2805 = 2007 CLD 459",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.29---Suit for damages and redemption of pledged stocks---Decree on basis of compromise--Non-return of other pledged goods by Bank despite part payment of decretal amount-Execution of decree for recovery of remaining amount-Dismissal of objection petition by Executing Bank---Validity---Bank on basis of decree was not under any liability to return any other pledged goods to -debtor, which were duly paid and were in custody of Bank---Compromise agreement and. decree were silent regarding such other pledged goods---Executing Court could not go behind decree and grant relief of return of such other goods---Bank under compromise agreement was not responsible for any shortfall or damage due to storage and deterioration of pledged goods and on account of which, Bank was not liable to compensate -debtor-High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.As. Nos. 130, 522, 523 and 524 of 2006, heard on 6-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MAKMA STEEL CRAFTS (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 13 others\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13605",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2806 = 2007 SLD 2806 = 2007 CLD 466",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19 ---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908). O.XXI, R90---Execution of decree---Auction of property-Non-filing of objection petition against auction---Duty of Court---Scope---Court had inherent jurisdiction to suo motu examine whether a serious attempt had been made to sell property at a reasonable price and that auction had been conducted in accordance with law---Purchase of property in auction by decree-holder and its immediate sale in favour of third party at a price several times higher than court-auction price--High Court set aside such sale in circumstances---Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 249 of 2004, decision dated: 23rd November, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "Rana MUHAMMAD NASEEB KHAN\nVs.\nZARAI TARUKIYATI BANK OF PAKISTAN and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13606",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2807 = 2007 SLD 2807 = 2007 CLD 469",
    "Key Words:": "Financial institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----Ss. 9 & 10(1)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VIII. R.6---Suit for recovery---Application for leave to defend suit---Reply was filed on basis of which defendant claimed set off through civil miscellaneous application-Validity-Set off in terms of O.VIII, R.6, C.P.C. could. not be competently claimed by defendant without grant of leave to defend the suit---Plea of set off whether legal or equitable, whether it is in respect of ascertained amount or an unascertained sum of money primarily constitutes a defence in the suit itself---Section 10(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 provided' that where summons have been served as prescribed in S.9(5) of ,the Ordinance defendant shall not be entitled to defend the suit unless he obtained leave from Banking Court---What was being claimed by defendant as legal set off or an equitable set off, etc. was a defence and for purposes of raising any defence in a suit filed in terms of S.9 of the Ordinance, obtaining of leave to defend was a condition precedent for setting up the same.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 597 and C.M. No.100-C of 2006 in C.O.S. ‘No.6 of 2005, decision dated: 11-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Messrs JAVED NAZIR BROTHERS (PVT.) LIMITED and 3 others\nVs.\nMessrs ALBARAKA ISLAMIC BANK, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13607",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2808 = 2007 SLD 2808 = 2007 CLD 471",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9 & 10---Recovery of loan amount, suit for---Leave to defend suit, application for--Defendant's plea was that in compliance of Court's order, he had deposited balance amount outstanding against him, thus, no amount was outstanding against him---Validity---Defendant had raised a bona fide defence, for which recording of evidence was essential to determine outstanding liability, if any---Such application was accepted in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 109 of 2003, heard on 6-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ISHFAQ & COMPANY through Proprietor and 3 others\nVs.\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Authorized Attorney/Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13608",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2809 = 2007 SLD 2809 = 2007 CLD 473",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan----Execution of decree---Jurisdiction of executing court---Appeal---No Court under the garb of substantive justice, could be allowed to exceed its jurisdiction or violate the settled legal principles as regards jurisdiction of the executing court; that it could not go behind the and decree wider execution. \n \nSardar Ahmed Yar Khan Jogezai and 2 others v. Province of Baluchistan 2002 SCMR 122; Messrs Haji Ahmed & Co. v. Muhammad Siddiqui and others PLD 1965 Kar. 293; Ghanaya Lal and others v. Punjab National Bank Ltd., Lahore AIR 1932 Lah. 534; Abdul Khaliq v. Haji PLD 1983 Lah. 445; Taponmal v. Kundomal Gangaram AIR 1960 SC 388; Reference No.1 of 1988 made by the President of Pakistan under Article 1986 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1989 SC 75; Province of Punjab v. Burewala Textile Mills Ltd. 2001 SCMR 396; 2003 SCMR 318 ; 2001 SCMR 1001 and 1997 SCMR 209 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "1st Appeal No.85 of 2004, decision dated: 26-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND SYED ZAWWAR HUSSAIN, JAFFERY, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD. and another--Appellants\nVs.\nWASIM ENTERPRISES and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13609",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2810 = 2007 SLD 2810 = 2007 CLD 477",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 19(7). 15(11), 21 & 22(1)(6)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.14-Appeal-Limitation-Principles-Suit for recovery was decreed---Objection petitions against sale of mortgaged properties were not allowed---Appeals dismissed on points of limitation---Appellant's contention that since subsection (6) of S.22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 takes an order under its S.19(7) out of the pale of interlocutory order the period of limitation had to be prescribed separately for it, had no force---Section 22 is to he read together with its subsection (6) which gives interpretation that right of appeal has been conferred upon an aggrieved person in matter of a , decree, sentence or final order passed by Banking Court, an ex parte decree and an order passed under S.15(11) or S.19(7)---Controlling provision would, of course, be subsection (1) of S.22 of the Ordinance which provides that appeal has to be filed in the High Court within 30 days of the passing of orders or s or decrees or sentences---Appeals having not been filed within stipulated period were hopelessly time bar-red-Time spent on prosecuting constitutional petitions against order in question could have been excluded on the analogy of section I4 of Limitation Act, 1908 but delay in filing of appeals after withdrawal of constitutional petitions had not been satisfactorily explained. \n \nAllah Bakhsh Gondal for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.Os. Nos. 325, 326 and 327 of 2006, decision dated: 1st November, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Mst. NAJMA MANSOOR\nVs.\nMessrs NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION through Authorised Officer and 7 others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13610",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2811 = 2007 SLD 2811 = 2007 CLD 480",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)--------Ss. 7, 9 & 21---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to appear defend suit---Defendants filed application for leave to appear and defend suit within prescribed period, but said and dismissed by Banking Court, despite serious factual and legal objections were raised by defendants in their application---Provisions of S.10 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, provided that leave to appear and defend suit should have been granted to defendant, if serious and bona fide dispute had been raised which included both legal and factual points of controversy--Objections about valid institution of suit and also the absence of the statement of account, raised in the case were vital, on the bases of which, the Court should have granted leave to the defendants---If the Court was not inclined to take action against plaintiff Bank for non f fling of statement of account, then at least, defendants should have been asked to file the amended leave application, so as to raise necessary plea about the account statement after it was submitted incomplete---Court while refusing leave, had not considered the contents of the plaint about the disbursement and the repayment chart given therein---Impugned and decree were set aside defendants were permitted to file amended leave application, only to the extent of challenging figures therein and not permitting them in any manner to raise any new plea, within a period of two months---Banking Court would decide leave application within two months. \n \nMessrs Ittefaq Industries (Regd.) through Managing Partner and 2 others v. Bank of Punjab through duly constituted Attorney 2004 CLD 1356 and Bankers Equity Limited through Principal Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 931 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 683 of 2001, heard on 4-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NENSER DRUGS (PVT.) LIMITED and 3 others\nVs.\nTHE BANK OF PUNJAB"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13611",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2812 = 2007 SLD 2812 = 2007 CLD 486",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to defend suit---One of the material grounds urged by borrowers in defence was that they had been defrauded by the Mobile Credit Officer of the Bank---Borrowers had brought on record the report of ,an inquiry conducted against said Mobile Credit Officer-Inquiry showed that the record of Bank relating to the last loan allegedly advanced to the borrowers had reflected foulplay on the part of sub-Manager, Accounts Officer and Cashier of the Bank---Contention of borrowers was that finding recorded by the functionary of the Bank was by itself sufficient for granting unconditional leave to them to defend the suit---Banking Court, however brushed aside said inquiry report---Bank was not in a position to argue that in the given circumstances borrowers had not made out a case for grant of leave to defend the suit--- Borrowers, in circumstances had made out a good case for grant of leave to defend suit in respect of the loan about which fraud was alleged to have been committed---No defence had been made or urged on behalf of borrowers with regard to other loans--Impugned and decree, were set aside and application of borrowers were allowed and leave was granted to them to defend the suit as regarded the loan about which fraud was alleged to have been committed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 311 of 2003, heard on 9-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "GHULAM RASUL and 2 others\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13612",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2813 = 2007 SLD 2813 = 2007 CLD 488",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to defend suit---Appeal---Facility for purchase of tractor granted to respondent was liable to be liquidated in agreed instalments, which were duly paid by respondents---Claim of appellant-Bank was restricted to imposition of penalty on account of delayed, payment of instalments---Validity--- Bank could only initiate steps for recovery of outstanding instalments---Respondents had diligently discharged their liability by depositing the instalments and liquidating the liability---Leave to defend suit, had been correctly refused to the Bank by Banking Court---In absence of any illegality in the impugned order and decree, appeal was dismissed. \n \nAskari Commercial Bank Limited and others v. Pakland Cement and others PLD 2000Kar, 246 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 485 of 2005, heard on 5-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "ZARAI TRAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager---Appellant\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD MEHMOODUL HASSAN KHAN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13613",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2814 = 2007 SLD 2814 = 2007 CLD 492",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----Ss.9, 10 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Application for leave to defend suit raising objection as to jurisdiction of Banking Court to entertain such suit---Plaintiff conceding to the objection--Return of plaint to plaintiff without decision of leave application--Appeal against such order by defendant---Validity---Defendant was neither asked nor did he specifically consent to return of plaint nor was heard---No reason was recorded by Court on absence of its jurisdiction and consequent return of plaint---Acceptance of such concession or objection without scrutinizing legality thereof was a course contrary to law---Such objection of defendant and confessional statement of plaintiff thereto could not absolve court of its duty to decide question of 'existence or non-existence of its jurisdiction with reasons and reference to law---Defendant's objection on Court's jurisdiction would not be relevant, if under law court had jurisdiction as law on the subject had to be given effect to-Objection or concession contrary to law would not bind any party nor would principles of estoppel apply thereto---Plea on jurisdiction raised by defendant was a plea of defence of suit---Defendant without first obtaining leave from court could not defend suit--High Court set aside impugned order, resultantly suit would be deemed pending before Banking Court, which would first consider and decide leave application and then proceed to decide question of jurisdiction or/and suit in accordance with law.\n \nMessrs Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. through Deputy Chief (Legal) v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. Awari Hotel Branch, Lahore, through Manager and another 2006 CLD 816: Muhammad Afzal v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan and another 1967 SC 314; Multan Electric Power Company Ltd. v. Muhammad Ashiq and others PLD 2006 SC 328; Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab v. Allah Ditta and another 1990 CLC 821; S.M. Akil Fakree v. Muhammad Qamar-uz-Zaman PLD 1982 Karachi 745; Habib Bank Limited v. Olympia Hosiery Works 1988 CLC 1340; Messrs United Distributors Pakistan Limited v. Ahmed Zarie Services and another 1997 MLD 1835; Messrs Platinum Insurance Company through Chief Executive v. Messrs Highways Bridge, Contractor International (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 1997 MLD 2394; Messrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245 and Falcon Ventures (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive, Iftikhar Ahmed v. Punjab Banking Court No.11, Lahore and another 2004 CLD 726 rel.\n \n(b) Jurisdiction---\n \n----Estoppel, principle of---Applicability---Objection or concession as to jurisdiction of Court would not bind any party---Principle of estoppel would not apply thereto---If under Law Court had jurisdiction then objection on its jurisdiction would not be relevant, as law on the subject would be given effect to. \n \nMuhammad Afzal v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan and another 1967 SC 314; Multan Electric Power Company Ltd. v. Muhammad Ashiq and others PLD 2006 SC 328 and Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab v, Allah Ditta and another 1990 CLC 821 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Summonses. issued to defendant---Scope---Such summonses would allow defendant a limited right to enter Court for seeking its leave to defend suit--- Defendant only on getting such leave would get right to enter suit for its defence---Principles.\n \nS.M. Akil Fakree v. Muhammad Qamar-uz-Zaman PLD 1982 Kar. 745; Habib Bank Limited v. Olympia Hosiery Works 1988 CLC 1340; Messrs United Distributors Pakistan Limited v. Ahmed Zarie Services and another 1997 MLD 1835; Messrs Platinum Insurance Company through Chief Executive v. Messrs Highways Bridge, Contractor International (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 1997 MLD 2394: Messrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor 'and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245; Falcon Ventures (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive, Iftikhar Ahmed v. Punjab Banking Court No.11, Lahore and another 2004 CLD 726 and Messrs Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. through Deputy Chief (Legal) v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. Awari Hotel Branch, Lahore, through Manager and another 2006 CLD 816 rel.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---S.10---Leave to defend suit---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Scope---While exercising leave jurisdiction, Court can only decide whether substantial questions of Law and facts have been raised in leave application or not, and whether leave is to be granted or not---Leave application would be rejected, if same did not show existence of triable defence questions---Court at leave stage would not decide such question, but on granting of leave, such application would be deemed to be a written statement and questions raised therein would be transposed into issues and decided as such---Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 104 of 2006, decision dated: 6-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "PASSCO\nVs.\nOMER BILAL TRADERS (PVT.) LIMITED\n--Respondent No.1 Ex parte."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13614",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2815 = 2007 SLD 2815 = 2007 CLD 501",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 7, 9, 10 & 22---Suit for damages against bank---Plaintiff have to produce the evidence even if the defendant-Bank failed to file any application for leave to defend the suit --Banking Court was legally obliged to decide the suit for damages after recording the evidence of plaintiffs in support of their claim, thereby providing adequate opportunity to the Bank to cross-examine witnesses---Even if the defendant did not appear before the Bunking Court or it was not granted leave to appear and defend the suit, Banking Court was not absolved of its duty to apply its mind to facts and circumstances of the case and could not pass a decree straightaway as claim for damages could not be equated with a suit founded on a negotiable instruments. \n \nSaudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD. 1170; Usman v. Haji Omer Haji Ayub and Haji Razzaq PLD 1966 SC 328 and Messrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11, Ss.4(1) & 141---Partnership Act (IX of 1932), S.69(2)---Suit for damages against Bank by customer---Rejection of plaint---Procedure to be followed---Defendant filed written statement and moved application for leave to defend the suit and rejection of plaint taking the ground that plaintiffs being an unregistered firm, was debarred from filing the suit in view of S.69, Partnership Act, 1932---Banking Court allowed the application for leave to defend the suit, and after that defendants filed application for rejection of plaint and written statement---Validity--Held, if the Court reached the conclusion that the cases fall under any of the clauses of O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., plaint could be rejected, but in no way before the grunt of leave to defend the suit---Banking Court, while exercising its civil jurisdiction had to follow the procedure laid down in regard to the suits in the C.P.C., except to the extent of any contrary provision appearing in the Ordinance as the general provisions of C.P.C. would give way to the contrary provisions of the Ordinance which would override to the extent of repugnancy---Provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 read in juxtaposition with S.69(2), Partnership Act, 1932 would show that provisions of the Act were not repugnant to the provisions of the Ordinance and did not provide for the exclusion of the provisions of Partnership Act, 1932---Provisions of Partnership Act, 1932, therefore, could be made applicable to the cases tried and adjudicated under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court, in circumstances, had rightly rejected the plaint in view of S.69(2), Partnership Act, 1932 and committed no legal error in exercising the powers under O. VII, R.11, C.P.C.\n \nSaudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170; Usman v. Haji Order Haji Ayub and Haji Razzaq PLD 1966 SC 328; Messrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353; Haji Ali Khan and Company, Abbottabad and 8 others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Abbottabad PLD 1995 SC 362; Messrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245 and Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1987 SC 512 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 47 of 2004, decision dated: 27-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Chaudhry MUKHTAR AHMAD\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13615",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2816 = 2007 SLD 2816 = 2007 CLD 501",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 7, 9, 10 & 22---Suit for damages against bank---Plaintiff have to produce the evidence even if the defendant-Bank failed to file any application for leave to defend the suit --Banking Court was legally obliged to decide the suit for damages after recording the evidence of plaintiffs in support of their claim, thereby providing adequate opportunity to the Bank to cross-examine witnesses---Even if the defendant did not appear before the Bunking Court or it was not granted leave to appear and defend the suit, Banking Court was not absolved of its duty to apply its mind to facts and circumstances of the case and could not pass a decree straightaway as claim for damages could not be equated with a suit founded on a negotiable instruments. \n \nSaudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD. 1170; Usman v. Haji Omer Haji Ayub and Haji Razzaq PLD 1966 SC 328 and Messrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11, Ss.4(1) & 141---Partnership Act (IX of 1932), S.69(2)---Suit for damages against Bank by customer---Rejection of plaint---Procedure to be followed---Defendant filed written statement and moved application for leave to defend the suit and rejection of plaint taking the ground that plaintiffs being an unregistered firm, was debarred from filing the suit in view of S.69, Partnership Act, 1932---Banking Court allowed the application for leave to defend the suit, and after that defendants filed application for rejection of plaint and written statement---Validity--Held, if the Court reached the conclusion that the cases fall under any of the clauses of O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., plaint could be rejected, but in no way before the grunt of leave to defend the suit---Banking Court, while exercising its civil jurisdiction had to follow the procedure laid down in regard to the suits in the C.P.C., except to the extent of any contrary provision appearing in the Ordinance as the general provisions of C.P.C. would give way to the contrary provisions of the Ordinance which would override to the extent of repugnancy---Provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 read in juxtaposition with S.69(2), Partnership Act, 1932 would show that provisions of the Act were not repugnant to the provisions of the Ordinance and did not provide for the exclusion of the provisions of Partnership Act, 1932---Provisions of Partnership Act, 1932, therefore, could be made applicable to the cases tried and adjudicated under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court, in circumstances, had rightly rejected the plaint in view of S.69(2), Partnership Act, 1932 and committed no legal error in exercising the powers under O. VII, R.11, C.P.C.\n \nSaudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170; Usman v. Haji Order Haji Ayub and Haji Razzaq PLD 1966 SC 328; Messrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2353; Haji Ali Khan and Company, Abbottabad and 8 others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Abbottabad PLD 1995 SC 362; Messrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245 and Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1987 SC 512 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 47 of 2004, decision dated: 27-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Chaudhry MUKHTAR AHMAD\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13616",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2817 = 2007 SLD 2817 = 2007 CLD 508",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S. 19---State Bank of Pakistan BCD Circular No.13 of 1984---State Bank of Pakistan BCD Circular No.32 of 1984--Execution of decree--Award of mark-up on decretal amount--Mark-up awarded by Banking Court on decretal amount under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, should not be confused with the mark-up chargeable under buyback agreement---Award of mark-up by Banking Court in cases filed' under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 on the decretal amount was a legal obligation independent of contractual mark-up which a financial institution was entitled to charge its customer under a buyback agreement---Award of mark-up by Banking Court on decretal amount, in circumstances, could not be avoided on the ground that decretal amount already contained the element of mark-up charged under a buyback agreement---State Bank of Pakistan B.C.D. Circulars Nos.13 and 32 of I984, prohibited Financial Institutions from charging mark-up upon mark-up, but such restrictions related to the contractual obligations created under an agreement of finance---Where recovery suit was filed under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, S.15 thereof, would empower Banking Court to award mark-up to financial institution on the decretal amount from the date of filing of the suit till the recovery of entire decretal amount, in that manner in. addition to the contractual obligation to pay mark-up which was determined when decree was passed, a legal obligation was created upon a customer of financial institution to pay mark-up on the decretal amount from the date of filing of the suit till its recovery---Under repealed laws two stages existed to which mark-up was lawfully charged; first, the contractual mark-up termed as contractual obligation charged for the contractual period, and the other termed as legal obligation chargeable on the decretal amount---Both were not to be confused with each other as the right to claim each of those, would arise independently under separate provisions of laws.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n---Prospective and retrospective nature of statute---New laws were generally prospective, not retrospective in their operation and would not affect pending cases so as to impose new duties or attach new disabilities---Matters of procedure were different, as laws affecting procedure, were always retrospective, however, where new law intended to take away vested rights or intended to create new disabilities or obligations, it had to be in language which expressly or through clear intendment take away or affect such rights, obligations and liabilities. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n---Ss. 3(2) & 19---Execution of decree---Right to claim mark-up---Section 3(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, clearly made a customer of a financial institution liable for any civil or criminal liability that he might have incurred under the contract or rules or any other law for the time being in force---Section 3(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 clearly preserved the, right of litigant that already existed at the time of promulgation of said Ordinance---In the present case the recovery suit from which execution application had arisen, was filed in 1999 when Banking Companies (Recovery of oans. Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 was in force, section 15 of which provided for grant of mark-up on the decretal amount from the date of filing of the suit till its recovery---Right to claim mark-up, in circumstances remained enforceable in the present case---Award of mark-up in the present case on the decretal amount within the scope of S.15 of repealed Act, 1997, could not be termed as a nullity in the eyes of law and in the cases like present one prime consideration was to see, what was the law that was in force at the time of filing of the suit and notwithstanding its repeal during pendency of the suit, such provisions of the repealed enactment which created rights, obligations and disabilities, had to be given effect to. \n \nPLD 1961 SC 523 and AIR 1957 SC 540 ref.\n \n(d) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--\n \n----S.74---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908). S.47---Execution of decree---Points to be considered---Compensation for breach of contract---Section 74 of Contract Act, 1872 would apply, even to compromise decrees as the court while decreeing a suit on the basis of a compromise, would record only the compromise if its terms were lawful---Sum could have been named in a compromise agreement, which a party was required to pay in case it committed its breach---Such stipulation was not lawful, however, the right to claim such named amount on account of breach of a contract was circumscribed by S.74 of Contract Act, 1872---Section 74 of Contract Act, 1872 provided that it was for the Court to determine what would be the reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount named in the contract to be awarded for breach of a contract---Judgment-debtor could raise an objection in execution proceedings as to the extent any sum named in a compromise decree was to be paid on account of his committing breach of a term of the compromise---Such objection was well within the purview of S.47 of C.P.C.---Rate of mark-up settled under compromise agreement being not more than what was provided originally under the agreement of finance, could not be termed as unreasonable so as to reduce it to any extent within the meaning and scope of S.74 of Contract Act, 1872. \n \nHabib Bank Limited v. Karachi Pipe Mills Limited 2006 CLD 842: AIR 1927, Lah. 659; AIR 1933 Allah. 252; AIR 1938, Sind 185; AIR 1943 Sind 247; AIR 1943 Pesh. 33; AIR 1946 Sind 150; AIR 1977 MP 112; AIR 1985 Pun. and Har. 143 and PLD 1961 SC 523 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Application No. 46 of 2003 and C.M.As. Nos.648 and 114 of 2006, decision dated: 15-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB, J",
    "": "Messrs NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nMessrs MARHABA TEXTILE LTD. and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13617",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2818 = 2007 SLD 2818 = 2007 CLD 521",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.9 & 10-Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit---Denial of loan---Grievance of defendant was that bank had used documents of loan which had already been paid off---Validity---Certificate of mortgage pertained to year, 1992, and pertained to different loan which was not the subject matter of the suit filed by bank--Bank's case was not that the mortgage was created in year, 1992 and was to continue for future loans including loans in issue---Defendant had denied execution of loan agreement and other charge documents---Defence of defendant had not been considered in its true perspective so as to conclude whether defendant was entitled to leave to defend the suit whether conditional or otherwise---Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court could not be sustained and was set aside---Case was remanded to Banking Court, where application for leave to defend filed by defendant would be deemed pending and would be adjudicated upon afresh after hearing both the parties ---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.441 of 2006, decision dated: 11-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "HAMAYUN\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13618",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2819 = 2007 SLD 2819 = 2007 CLD 523",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Appeal---Limitation---Appeal though was filed within time, but copy of impugned of Banking Court was not attached by appellant with memo. of appeal, and was filed after about 3 years from passing of impugned and decree by the Banking Court---Appeal in circumstances, would be deemed to be barred by limitation which was accordingly dismissed along with pending application.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No. 37 of 2001, decision dated: 8-03-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAWWAR HUSSAIN, JAFFERY AND MAQBOOL BAQAR, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL SULTAN K. MERCHANT\nVs.\nMessrs FIRST GENERAL LEASING MODARAABA and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13619",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2820 = 2007 SLD 2820 = 2007 CLD 524",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Entitlement to upto date mark-up---Compromise decree, inclusive of mark-up having been passed against -debtors, decree holder Bank filed execution petition against -debtors---Judgment-debtors filed application stating therein that Bank was entitled only to recover decretal amount, which having been paid by -debtors, execution petition be disposed of and consigned to record after making observation that decree had been fully satisfied--Banking Court having dismissed said application appeal was filed by the -debtors---Propriety---Suit was decreed under repeated Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 whereunder future mark-up or upto date mark-up was neither allowed nor was recoverable from ¬-debtor---Compromise decree had shown that no such mark-up was allowed to the decree-holder---Execution petition on the basisof upto date mark-up could not be allowed in view of settled principle that an executing court could not go behind the decree and it was obliged to execute the decree as it was.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.4 of 2005, heard .on 14-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "SAEED AKHTAR\nVs.\nPERVAIZ HANIF--Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13620",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2821 = 2007 SLD 2821 = 2007 CLD 527",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-------S. 22-Application for registration of Trade Mark---Applicants claimed that sweet balls under the Trade Mark \"\" CHOKLIK\"\" were being produced and sold by them since the year 2005 throughout Pakistan---Applicants through their application dated 22-8-2006 applied to the Trade Marks Office for registration of \"\"CHOKLIK\"\"---Applicants had alleged that in order to confuse (he purchasers and general public respondents commenced manufacturing, marketing and selling sweet balls and candy under the name \"\"CHOCOLIQ\"\" which was confusingly and deceptively similar to applicant's mark \"\"CHOKLIK\"\"-Validity--Two names \"\"CHOKLIK\"\" and \"\"CHOCOLIQ\"\", no doubt were phonetically similar, but in order to establish passing off by respondent, it was imperative upon applicants to establish that they were the prior user of the name \"\"CHOKLIK\"\", but plaintiff had not been able to establish their presence in the market with the name of \"\"CHOKLIK\"\"--Applicants though had claimed having used name \"\"CHOKLIK\"\" since 2005, but they could not produce any material in support of their claim, whereas respondents through various Sales Tax Invoices, prima facie had established that they were producing their products under trade mark \"\"CHOCOLIQ\"\" since 3-6-2005---Applicants, at the best could claim (heir user from the date of their application which was 28-8-2006 for registration of trade mark \"\"CHOKLIK\"\"---Application was dismissed in circumstances,",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1488 of 2006, decision dated: 29-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAQBOOL BAQAR, J",
    "": "SHAHI ENTERPRISES (PVT.) LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nD.F.I. (PVT.) LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13621",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2822 = 2007 SLD 2822 = 2007 CLD 530",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 12 & 22--- Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199 & 185(3)---Ex parte and decree---Setting aside of---Jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Petitioner against whom suit for recovery of loan was filed by Bank, despite service of notice through bailiff, by registered post and publication of summonses in two newspapers; neither appeared before the Banking Court nor filed any application for leave to defend the suit---Suit was decreed against petitioner and petitioner, instead of challenging ex pane and decree by way of appeal, preferred miscellaneous application under S.12 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for setting aside and decree, which was declined by Banking Court---Said order being in the nature of final determination of the liability of petitioner and upholding the ex pane decree passed against him, remedy of statutory appeal was available before the High Court, but petitioner chose to file a constitutional petition before High Court. which was dismissed' being without any merits and substance---Validity---Statutory remedy provided by law having not been availed by petitioner, he could not be allowed to bypass such course and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court which could only be availed after exhausting all available remedies provided under law--Since order passed by the Banking Court was neither void nor without jurisdiction, recourse to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court was totally unwarranted and uncalled for which was rightly not exercised. in favour of petitioner---Where in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, petitioner himself chose a wrong ' forum knowing fully well, the remedy available to him under the law, there was no fault with the of the High Court and no ground existed for grant of leave to appeal. \n \nGhulam Qadir Jatoi, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 329-K of 2005, decision dated: 17-07-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN AND SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, JJ",
    "": "GHULAM SARWAR\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13622",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2823 = 2007 SLD 2823 = 2007 CLD 555",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Leave to ,appear and defend suit---Appeal---Application for leave to defend suit filed by appellant was dismissed and suit filed by Bank was decreed---Appellants had alleged that accounts had not been verified as mandated by law; that statement of accounts was also not in consonance with the disbursements made to the appellants and that defence set up by appellants in application for the grant of leave, had not been dealt with properly, especially qua the effect that a fire broke out in the factory of the appellants which destroyed the hypothecated stocks for which Insurance Company was bound to make payment---Insurance Policy had reflected that the right of the Bank to recover claim was unimpaired---Stance for appellants that recovery had to be made from the Insurance Company, was without substance, in circumstances---Statement of account was in consonance with the claim made by Bank---Preponderance of documents attached with the plaint had clearly reflected that appellants had availed the facility in question---Trial Court appraised the documents appended with the plaint and impugned of Banking Court had dealt with all objections raised by appellants in their appeal--Assertion of appellant that impugned in appeal was not in consonance with requirement of law, was untenable and without substance---Appeal against impugned order was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.197 and 450 of 2004, heard on 21st December, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "IMRAN ENTERPRISES through Proprietor and another\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK through Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13623",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2824 = 2007 SLD 2824 = 2007 CLD 562",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery . of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of Bank loan---Leave to appear and defend suit---Appeal---Plaint filed by Bank showed that two separate finance facilities namely; Export Re-finance Part.2 (E.R.F.) and Finance Against Foreign Bills (F.A.F.B.) were granted to appellants and upon failure of appellants to adjust the liability, suit for recovery of amount under said facilities was filed--Applications filed by appellants seeking leave to defend suit were dismissed and suit filed by Bank was decreed as prayed for---Impugned and decree passed by Banking Court had been challenged by appellants on three grounds; firstly that Bank could not recover the mark-up of cushioned period; secondly, that future mark-up had been awarded without taking into consideration that there were two facilities' with separate rates of mark-up; and thirdly that the payments made by appellants were not being taken into consideration---Validity---Contention of Bank was that no mark-up for cushioned period was included in the claim in that behalf---Bank referred to the statements of accounts appended with the plaint in order to ; establish that there was no debit entry of mark-up for said cushioned period therein-Appellant was unable to point out any specific debit entry for mark-up which pertained to cushioned period---Contention of appellants in that behalf was not found on the record, however there being insertion in the plaint with reference to the inclusion of mark-up of' cushioned period, some sort of defence in that behalf appeared to have been made out insisting grant of leave to defend to the extent of the claim of mark-up of cushioned period, however not unconditional---Appellants were entitled to leave to appear and defend suit with respect to alleged mark-up for cushioned period subject to condition of furnishing the Bank guarantee of said amount---Future mark-up. as per second ground of appellants, only had been awarded on the contracted rate and since there were two separate facilities with separate rates of mark-up, future mark-up must necessarily be awarded in terms thereof as had rightly been contended by appellants---Third ground had revealed that matter of adjustment of payments, if any, made by appellants, was within the jurisdiction of the Executing Court and same could not form a subject-matter of present appeal---Appeal was partially accepted and decree of Banking Court was modified accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.541 of 1999, decision dated: 17-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "ELGIN LEATHER INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED and others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Manager, Officer of Branch and Joint Attorney and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13624",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2825 = 2007 SLD 2825 = 2007 CLD 571",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.2(d) & 9--- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII & R.10, O.XLIII, R.1(a)---Tort---Banker and customer---Suit for recovery of damages for malicious prosecution by successors of customer---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Return of plaint by the Banking Court---Appellants filed suit for recovery of amount as damages for malicious prosecution against Bank on the ground that the suit for recovery filed by Bank against, their predecessor, was frivolous and they in the capacity of legal heirs suffered losses---Validity---Appellants in their personal capacity had not entered into a banking transaction with the Bank, nor they had availed any finance from it---Appellant's case was not that they were the \"\"customer\"\" as finance was never extended to them by the Bank and they were neither \"\"surety\"\" nor 'indemnifier\"\"---No finance\"\" as defined in S.2(d) Financial institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was provided to appellants---Banking Court had rightly returned the plaint in appellants' suit in exercise of its powers under O. VII, R.10, C.P.C. to be presented before appropriate forum--Impugned and decree, not suffering from any illegality same could not be unsettled.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.143 of 2004, heard on 29-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "M. MANZOOR AHMAD PARACHA and 5 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD, through President and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13625",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2826 = 2007 SLD 2826 = 2007 CLD 604",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Suit for recovery of finances-Suit was decreed by Banking Court with assumption that appellant as guarantor of loanees did not file any petition for leave to appear---Appellant contended that she had filed petition for leave to appear which was incorrectly not attended to by the Banking Court while decreeing the suit against her---Decree to the extent of appellant was set aside by High Court with the consent of parties--Appellant's petition for leave to appear would be deemed to be pending before Banking Court for decision afresh in accordance with law within specified time.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.205 of 2006, decision dated: 10-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED SAJJAD HUSSAIN SHAH, JJ",
    "": "ROBINA QADEER\nVs.\nPLATINUM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through VicEPresident/Manager Credit"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13626",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2827 = 2007 SLD 2827 = 2007 CLD 609",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loans-Application for leave to defend suit---Defendant-Company which had availed different finance facilities from plaintiff-Bank, having failed to adjust or settle its liabilities, the Bank filed suit for recovery of amounts of loan along with mark-up and costs of funds etc.---Defendant filed application for leave to defend suit---Main ground of defence of defendant in said application was the alleged concealment by plaintiff-Bank of liability of the amount owed by the defendant-Company to third party to whom plaintiff-Bank had given NOC for creating a second charge on mortgage assets of defendant-Company---Validity---While observing due diligence at the time of taking over management of company, defendant management ought to have inspected register of mortgage and charges wherein obligation owed by the company to Bank/third party, was duly recorded---Defence plea of defendants admits their own fault due to their omission to inspect said register---Neither plaintiff-Bank nor defendant to be held responsible for said failure---Without existence of contract or legal duty of disclosure, non-mention of liabilities owed by the company to third party, could not be deemed to be obligation of plaintiff as a creditor of the defendant-Company---What aggrieved the defendants was the consequence of their own fault and not a breach of any duty owed by the plaintiff---No ground having been made out for grant of leave to defend, application for leave to defend suit was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.S-40 of 2002, decision dated: 15-07-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "Vs.\nGHAZI PAPER MILLS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13627",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2828 = 2007 SLD 2828 = 2007 CLD 618",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)------Ss.6 & 11---Execution petition by Bank claiming future mark¬up-Validity-Future mark-up or up to date mark-up was neither allowed nor recoverable from -debtor---No such mark-up was allowed to Bank under compromise decree---Execution petition on basis of such mark-up could not be allowed---Execution petition was dismissed in circumstances. \n \n(b) Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)----\n \n----S. 11---Executing Court--Powers of ---Scope---Executing Court cannot go behind the decree, but is obliged to execute decree as it is.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.4 of 2005 heard on 14-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs -ËœZAHID INDUSTRIES through Managing Partner and 10 others--Appellants\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD: through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13628",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2829 = 2007 SLD 2829 = 2007 CLD 625",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-- ----S.19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VI, R.17---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition--Amendment of pleadings---Purchase of encumbered property---Summary dismissal of objection petition---Petitioner being purchaser of mortgaged property, before putting the same in auction, filed objection petition before Executing Court--Auction took place and petitioner sought amendment of his objection petition, which petition was summarily dismissed by the Court---Validity---Serious allegations were levelled in respect of Court auction which if found true, would merit serious consideration and might justify -acceptance of petitioner's objection petition---Allegations made by petitioner needed to be probed in order to ensure that petitioner would not be deprived of his rights on the basis of auction report which\"\" might be untrue---Factual controversy, which necessarily arose from allegations made in amendment application, could not be determined without allowing amendment in objection petition---Petitioner had a valid and subsisting interest in the property, which he was entitled to assert and protect even if the property was encumbered and was liable to be brought to sale in execution of decree---Reasons given by Executing Court for dismissing petitioner's application were not sustainable thus order dismissing the application was set aside and application under O.VI, R.17, C.P.C. was allowed--Petition was allowed accordingly. \n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Court, duty of---Scope---Principal obligation of Court is to ensure that matters pertaining to valuable property rights of parties are properly adjudicated.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.10789 and E.F.A. No.129 of 2006, heard on 5-10-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Malik GHULAM SHABBIR\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through Manager and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13629",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2830 = 2007 SLD 2830 = 2007 CLD 634",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Consolidation of suits---Two suits were pending before Banking Court, one filed by bank and the other filed by borrower---Defendants in both the suits had been granted unconditional leave to defend---Borrower filed application for consolidation of both the suits on the ground that their subject-matter was same, similar evidence was required for their decision and there was likelihood of conflict of s if separately tried but Banking Court dismissed the application---Validity---Trial of both the suits between the parties through consolidated trial was not only expedient in the interest of justice but was in the interest of parties and was necessary to avoid, possibility of conflict of s---Order passed by Bunking Court was declared void and non-existent in the eyes of law-High Court directed Banking Court to hold trial of both the suits after consolidation and framing of consolidated issues in accordance with law---Petition was allowed in circumstances. \n \nMessrs First Woman Bank Limited v. Registrar High Court of Sindh, Karachi and 4 others 2004 SCMR 108 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1286 of 2006, decision dated: f9-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN, J",
    "": "M.L. TRADERS through Proprietor and others\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT NO.IV, Lahore High Court and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13630",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2831 = 2007 SLD 2831 = 2007 CLD 648",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Suit against Bank--Application for redemption of mortgaged property---Appeal against of Banking Court---Appellant filed suit for declaration against Bank---Bank filed application for leave to defend suit which was granted and Bank filed written statement---Bank contended in the written statement that appellant was defaulter of Rs.2,61,447 up to 30-6-2000 and appellant who conceded liability to pay said amount, prayed to Banking Court that appellant be allowed two years period for repayment of said amount in the form of quarterly instalments---Banking Court allowed appellant to make payment of amount in question in quarterly instalments and appellant deposited said amount in instalments accordingly and moved application for redemption, of mortgaged property---Bank contested said application through written reply and contended that appellant was required to pay further amount of Rs.1,29,307 as outstanding plus Rs.15,198 against tubewell amount---Banking Court dismissed application of appellant for redemption of mortgaged property---Validity---Bank had categorically stated in its application for leave to defend suit that appellant was a defaulter to the tune of Rs.2,61,447 and said amount was paid by appellant in accordance with order of the Banking Court in instalments---Counsel for Bank had failed to show as to how appellant was liable to pay further amount as claimed by the Bank---Appellant who had complied with and decree of Banking Court and paid agreed amount in instalments, could not be held defaulter for amount as claimed by the Bank---Order of Banking Court dismissing application of appellant for redemption of mortgaged property, was set aside and case was remanded to Banking Court for passing order of redemption of mortgaged property, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.195 of 2005, heard on 11-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "ELAHI BANISH\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13631",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2832 = 2007 SLD 2832 = 2007 CLD 652",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------S.6---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLI of 2001) S.13---Civil. Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.13---Suit for recovery of finances--Service of notices to defendants in prescribed manner--Reply to show-cause notice was received only from four defendants out of nine, while remaining defendants were proceeded against ex parte---None having turned up from said defendants, reply to show-cause notice was rejected and suit was decreed ex parte---Application seeking setting aside of ex pane decree, moved by legal representatives of one such defendant. was allowed and impugned decree was set aside---Reply to show-cause notice had been filed by the legal representatives of one defendant---Remaining three defendants were proceeded against ex parte and suit was decreed as prayed for---Validity---Record revealed that application to set aside ex parte decree was filed only by the legal representatives of one defendant but Chairman Banking Tribunal set aside the entire decree---Chairman Banking Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned and decree hence .set aside by High Court---Suit would be deemed to be pending before Banking Tribunal-Petitioners were directed to file leave application in terms of section 10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 within 10 days.\n \nMessrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.106 of 1997, decision dated: 5-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SHAHEEN FOODS LIMITED through Chief Executive and 8 others\nVs.\nREGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION LIMITED through Managing Director and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13632",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2833 = 2007 SLD 2833 = 2007 CLD 656",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10, 15 & 22---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54--Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Application for leave to defend suit---Rejection of application---Appeal---Application filed by defendant Bank for leave to defend suit was dismissed and suit filed by plaintiff was decreed against defendant Bank by the Banking Court taking the view that plaintiff was liable to pay amount of Rs.75,26,635 as full and final liquidation of the liabilities and defendant Bank was entitled to draw the same amount---Defendant Bank had filed appeal against of Banking Court contending that Banking Court had proceeded arbitrarily in rejecting application for leave to defend the suit as per record, liability of plaintiff was Rs.1,17,41,508.95 till 16-1-2003 and that any dispute about. correctness thereof could be determined only by granting leave to defend suit and after due trial of the suit ---Validity--Availing of financial liability had not 'been denied by the plaintiff---Whole issue was about the correct determination of quantity of liability and amount due---Defendant Bank had come up with the plea through his application for leave to defend the suit that liability of plaintiff was to the extent of Rs.1,17,41,508.95, but as per version of plaintiff said amount was Rs. 75,26,634.48 and said amount was in fact outstanding against plaintiff---Approach adopted by Banking Court was untenable, factually and legally as assertion made by defendant Bank and grounds for leave to defend urged in the application, warranted due consideration and such a summary disposal of the suit was not called for when there was a serious dispute and controversy involved was about the amount due from plaintiff---Judgment of Banking Court was not maintainable to the extent of dismissal of application for leave to defend the suit---Said application would be deemed to be pending, which would be heard and decided by Banking Court in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.234-A of 2003, heard on 18-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Manager\nVs.\nMessrs SAWAN IMPEX through Sole Proprietor"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13633",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2834 = 2007 SLD 2834 = 2007 CLD 667",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.9-Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4---Suit for declaration by plaintiff disclaiming to have obtained loan from Bank-Proof-Onus was on Bank to prove that disputed loan was advanced to plaintiff----Bank did not produce original application of plaintiff for obtaining of finance, sanction letter, finance agreement, cheque showing withdrawal of loan or any document securing finance-Even photocopies of such documents were not placed on record---Un-attested documents produced by Bank relating to another loan account would have no evidentiary value---Mutation allegedly securing finance by mortgaging land was not produced in evidence---Bank had not pleaded that cheque through which disputed amount was allegedly withdrawn by plaintiff had been lost---Plaintiff could not be burdened with disputed loan in absence of its record-- Bank had failed to prove that original record was lost---Mere oral assertion of Bank's witnesses would not be enough to prove loss of record---Bank regarding loss of record had neither made report to its Regional Manager nor lodged F.I.R.--\"\"Bank had not obtained permission from Court to produce secondary evidence---Loss of record had not been proved, thus, secondary evidence, if led any, would become valueless---Bank did not prove that plaintiff had obtained alleged loan from Bank---Suit was decreed against Bank in circumstances. \n \nMst. Khurshid Begum and 6 others v. Chiragh Muhammad 1995 SCMR 1237 and Mukhtar Ahinad through Legal Heirs v. Muhammad Yunus and 4 others 2001 CLC 1796 rel.\n \n(b) Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891)---\n \n---S.4-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XIII, R.4---Documents relating to entries in Bankers' Books not attested by Bank, but exhibited in evidence---Validity---Such documents would have no evidentiary value. \n \n(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Arts.76 & 77---Leading \"\"secondary evidence relating to original documents, which were lost or destroyed---Scope---Such evidence could be given after seeking permission of Court and fulfilling conditions laid down in Art.77 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. \n \nMst. Amir v. Soini 1997 MLD 2376 rel.\n \n(d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (I0 of 1984)---\n \n----Arts.76 & 77---Transaction drawn in the form of a document---Oral evidence to prove such transaction---Scope---Such oral evidence could not be led, unless original document was shown to have been lost or could not be procured/produced and that too after obtaining permission of Court for production of secondary evidence. \n \nMst. Amir v. Soini 1997 MLD 2376 rel.\n \n(e) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Arts.76 & 77---Loss of document not proved---Secondary evidence, if led any, would become valueless. \n \nMst. Khurshid Begum and 6 others v. Chiragh Muhammad 1995 SCMR 1237 and Mukhtar Ahmad through Legal Heirs v. Muhammad Yunus and 4 others 2001 CLC 1796 rel.\n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XIII, R.4---Document not duly proved, though exhibited without objection---Evidentiary value---Such document could not be read in evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.189 of 2004, heard on 16-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND MUHAMMAD, JEHANGIR ARSHAD, JJ",
    "": "GHULAM NAZAK\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13634",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2835 = 2007 SLD 2835 = 2007 CLD 673",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Application for leave to defend suit-Pleas raised by defendant, inter alia, were regarding illegal charging of mark-up and excessive charging of mark-up---Banking Court without giving findings on such pleas dismissed leave application and decreed suit---Validity---Bank in statement of accounts had charged mark-up after 30-4-1997, whereas plaintiff claimed that period of finance expired on 30-4-1997---Statement of accounts suffered from other discrepancies and glaring legal infirmities---Plaintiff had made out a case for grant of leave to defend suit--Plaintiff had disputed amount of mark-up and admitted remaining decretal amount---High Court accepted leave application only to consider question of mark-up, subject to deposit of remaining decretal amount by plaintiff within specified time, failing which leave application would be deemed to be dismissed---High Court remanded case to Banking Court for its decision after framing issue on question of mark-up and recording evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.94 of 2003, heard on 23rd November, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs S.S. GINNERS through Ch. Muhammad Younus and 6 others\nVs.\nMULSIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13635",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2836 = 2007 SLD 2836 = 2007 CLD 678",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 18---Suit for recovery of loan---Mortgage of property---Insurance charges---Mortgage deed clearly stated that in case of failure of mortgagor to pay any premium of the insurance, the Bank may pay the same on behalf of mortgagor and recover the same from defendants---Execution of mortgaged deed having not been denied, Bank, on the strength of said clause of deed, could recover the insurance charges from the defendants---Requirement-Bank, however, in addition to the amount of insurance charges, had also debited the, salary of the staff, inspection charges and other miscellaneous expenses in the account of the borrower---Record showed that although the amount of all those charges was debited in the account of borrowers, yet the Bank did not file any supporting documents in order to show that such and such amount was paid by the Bank, to the insurance company as premium, on behalf of the mortgagors and, that such and such amount was paid as salary---No document on record even prima facie showed that the said amount was, in fact, paid to the insurance company/concerned persons---Held, Bank should have filed the vouchers, receipts or some other documents manifesting that the said amount was, in fact, paid to the insurance company---In the absence of any supporting documents, the Bank was not entitled to recover the said amount merely on the ground that the same found mention in the statement of accounts, which was not authenticated by documents/receipts---Banking Court, therefore, had rightly declined to allow the amount to the Bank. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 18---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), Ss.2(8) & 4---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Statement of account submitted by Bank --\"\"Certification\"\" of such statement---Requirements---If the 'certificate' on the 'statement of accounts' by Bank was not in accordance with the provision of S.2(8), Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 the same was not 'certified copy' as contemplated by law and such copy of, statement could not be considered as prima facie evidence of the existence of entries in the statement of account by the Bank---Such copies of the 'statement' of the Bank could not be received as evidence of matters, transaction and accounts as required under S.4, Bankers' Books Evidence Act. 1891 and on the basis of such statement of accounts, which was not the 'certified copy', the defendants could not be held liable to pay the amounts claimed by the Bank. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---Ss. 89 & 18---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), Ss.2(8) & 4---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Submission of Bank statements, by Bank---Certificate to be given at the foot of such' statements so as to make it a 'certified copy'---Requirements enumerated.\n \nIt flows from the bare perusal of the provision of section 2(8); Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 that a certificate, which is to be given at the foot of copy of statement of account, so as to make it certified copy of the statement of Accounts, must state the following facts:-\n \n(i) it is true copy of the such entry;\n \n(ii) such entry is contained in one of the ordinary's books of bank;\n \n(iii) it was made in the usual and ordinary course of business:\n \n(iv) such book is still in the custody of the bank;\n \n(v) it must be dated; and\n \n(vi) subscribed by the principal accountant or manager of the bank with his name and official title. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 18---Suit for recovery of loan---Finance agreement---Dispute as to date of expiry of Finance agreement---Finance agreement which bears cuttings, overwriting, manipulations and interpolation in that behalf, can be struck down.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.128 of 2004, heard on 30-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager\nVs.\nMessrs MUJAHID NAWAZ COTTON GINNERS through Partners and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13636",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2837 = 2007 SLD 2837 = 2007 CLD 683",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.3---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12 (2)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185 (3)---Leave to appeal Supreme Court to resolve the contradictory views expressed by Lahore High Court and Sindh High Court as reflected in s in cases titled Gold Star v. Muslim Commercial Bank, reported as 2000 MLD 421, Mian Munir Ahmed v. United Bank Limited and 3 others reported as PLD 1998 Kar. 278 and Messrs Tawakal Export Corporation and 5 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. reported as 1997 CLC 1342. \n \nGold Star v. Muslim Commercial Bank 2000 MLD 421; Mian Munir Ahmed v. United Bank Limited and 3 others PLD 1998 Kar. 278 and Messrs Tawakal Export Corporation and 5 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. CLC 1997 Page 1342 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n---S.3---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1968), S.12 (2)---Decree setting aside of---Provisions of S.12 (2) C.P.C.---Applicability---Application filed by appellant, under S.12 (2) C.P.C. decree was dismissed by Banking Court being not maintainable under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Order passed by Banking Court was maintained by High Court-Validity-Provisions of Procedure Code, 1908 continued to be applicable being Civil ousted by the provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Order passed by High Court was set aside and application preferred on behalf of appellant under S.12 (2) C.P.C. would be treated as pending before High Court and to be disposed of in accordance with law on the merits by Banking Court-Appeal was allowed.\n \nGold Star v. Muslim Commercial Bank 2000 MLD 421; Mian Munir Ahmed v. United Bank Limited and 3 others PLD 1998 Kar. 278; Messrs Tawakal Export Corporation and 5 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. CLC 1997 1342 and Muhammad Ayub Batt v. Allied Bank Ltd. PLD 1981 SC 359 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.592 of 2003, decision dated: 19-09-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAVED IQBAL AND HAMID ALI MIRZA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD YAQOOB and others\nVs.\nMessrs UNITED BANK LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13637",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2838 = 2007 SLD 2838 = 2007 CLD 687",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 12---Service on defendant---Modes---Procedure---Deviation of Banking Court from procedure laid down in S.9(5), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and passing ex parte decree against the defendants---Effect---High Court observed that it was expected from a judicial officer, especially of the rank of a District Judge, to be extremely careful, conscious and abreast of the provisions of law, while deciding valuable rights of the parties, which, in the present case, to say the least, the Judge Banking Court failed to abide by---High Court set aside the impugned order of the Banking Court, accepted the defendant's application and remanded the case---Defendant's having already filed the application for leave to appear and defend the suit, which shall. be deemed to be pending before the Banking Court, who, at the first instance, shall decide the same then the suit, if need arose, after hearing the parties in. accordance with law.\n \nSection 9(5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 envisages that when a plaint is presented to the Banking Court, it shall issue summons, which shall be served on the defendant through the bailiff or process server of the Banking Court, by registered post acknowledgement due, by courier and by publication in one English language and one Urdu language daily newspaper, and service duly effected in anyone of the aforesaid modes shall be deemed to be valid service for purposes of the Ordinance. In the present case, the Banking Court, on 27-10-2003, issued summons to the defendants only through registered envelopes and by proclamation in two newspapers. Placing the provision of section 9(5) of the Ordinance in juxtaposition with order dated 27-10-2003, it leads to the irresistible conclusion that the Judge Banking Court issued summons to the appellants contrary to the said provision of law. Section 9(5) of the Ordinance provides that the summons shall be issued to a defendant through four modes of service, viz. bailiff or process server, by registered post acknowledgement due, by courier service and by publication in two newspapers, while the Judge Banking Court thought it fit in his own wisdom to issue summons only through two modes. Banking Judge has no jurisdiction to deviate from the procedure laid down in section 9(5), and adopt his own procedure. The Court, thus, failed to resort to the procedure prescribed in the special statute (Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001) and has unnecessarily bypassed the procedure of service prescribed therein, while the Judge Banking Court, who is the creature of the said statute, is bound to adopt and obey the said procedure. In view whereof, the procedure adopted for service of the defendants was defective, violative of law and had definitely caused prejudice to the defendants. Although postal receipts, which were on record, showed that the summons were sent by registered post, yet no acknowledgment is on record showing that the defendants were served through postal service. Judge Banking Court; failed to issue summons as prescribed under the law and the defendants were not served in accordance with law, therefore, it would have been in the fitness of things and interest of justice if the Judge Banking Court would have set aside the ex parte decree.\n \nAs the basic order dated 27-10-2003 for issuance of summons was contrary to the mandatory provision of law, therefore, all subsequent orders passed and the superstructure made thereon would automatically fall to the ground. \n \nJudge Banking Court without adverting to the material aspect of the case, qua the service of the defendants, has erroneously held that the defendants were served. While rendering the said findings, the Judge was completely oblivious of the fact that he himself failed to summon the defendants through the process prescribed by the special statute. The Judge Banking Court, at the first instance, should have adopted the procedure as prescribed under section 9(5) of the Ordinance. Secondly, in the present scenario, he should not have passed the ex parte decree only on the basis of publication in the newspapers and if he erroneously passed the decree, then he ought to have set aside the same when such an application was brought before him. This sort of hasty and illegal decisions cannot be countenanced under any stretch of imagination. It is expected from a judicial officer, especially of the rank of a District Judge, to be extremely careful, conscious and abreast of the provision of law, while deciding valuable rights of the parties, which in the present case, to say the least, the Judge Banking Court failed to abide by. \n \nA Judge must wear all the laws of the country on the sleeve of his robe and failure of the counsel to properly advise him is not a complete excuse in the matter. \n \nHigh Court set aside the impugned order and accepted the defendants' application for setting aside of the ex parte and decree and remanded the case, and allowed the appeal with specified terms. \n \nMuhammad Azwar Siddiqui v. Chief Executive Union Leasing Limited and 2 others 2006 CLD 946; Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and 2 others PLD 1958 SC 104 and Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education Lahore through Chairman and another v. Mst. Salma Afroze and 2 others PLD 1992 SC 263 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.162 of 2006, heard on 18-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "NAZIR HUSSAIN and another\nVs.\nBANK OF PUNJAB through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13638",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2839 = 2007 SLD 2839 = 2007 CLD 694",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.9-Suit for recovery of loan---Dismissal of suit for non-appearance of plaintiff---Application for setting aside dismissal order---Suit filed by plaintiff having been dismissed for non-prosecution, plaintiff filed application under O.IX, R.9, C.P.C. for setting aside order dismissing suit---Validity---On the date when suit was dismissed same was not fixed for hearing, but in fact same was listed for further order on application of plaintiff that it did not want to press the suit against defendant ---Suit could not be dismissed on date fixed for hearing interlocutory application---Application filed by plaintiff was granted and suit was restored to its original number.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1797 of 1999, decision dated: 3rd November, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Plaintiff\nVs.\nABSON INDUSTRIES and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13639",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2840 = 2007 SLD 2840 = 2007 CLD 698",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----Ss. 19 & 9---Auction sale of mortgaged property---Court auctioneer himself admitted in his report that at the time of auction, neither any of the representatives of the, decree-holder nor of -debtors were present, but two officers of the decree holder arrived at 10.35 am along with six prospective bidders. seeking to participate in the auction proceedings but were denied the participation in the auction---Order of the executing Court to the effect that the refusal of the Court auctioneer to allow the prospective bidders arranged by the decree holder to participate in the auction was improper and in the prevailing circumstances and the facts surrounding the auction, completion of the auction proceedings in thirty minutes (between 10 a.m. to 10.30 a.m.) was neither possible nor probable and thus the possibility that no auction was held and the report was collusively completed was justified---No exception could be taken to the order of the executing Court to accept the objection petition against the auction proceedings. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---Ss. 19 & 9---Court auction of mortgaged property---Bid in auction is only an offer and without the confirmation of sale, it does not create any right in the property in favour of successful bidder. \n \nNasir Mushtaq Sheikh v. Platinum Commercial Bank Limited E.F.A. No.33 of 2004; Afzal Maqsood Butt v. Banking Court No.2 Lahore 2005 CLD 967 and Messrs Rasu Food Industries and another v. Messrs Pakistan Industrial Leasing Cooperation Limited and others 2005 SCMR 1643 ref.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---Ss. 19 & 9---Order of Court auction of mortgaged property---Such sale not confirmed by the executing Court---Decretal debt amount having been settled by the -debtors in the meanwhile and property redeemed, the execution proceedings completed on satisfaction of the decree---Bidder, in such auction, could not be held entitled to any legitimate relief under law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.420 of 2004, heard on 15-02-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "Mian MUHAMMAD AKHTAR\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Duly Authorized Attorney/Representative and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13640",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2841 = 2007 SLD 2841 = 2007 CLD 702",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9 & 15---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), Ss.79 & 58---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---.Constitutional petition---Suit for recovery of loan---Sale of mortgage property---Mortgage---Waiver/renouncement of---Principles---Property in question was initially mortgaged through registered deed dated 16-3-1986 in favour of petitioner/Bank and said property underwent further mortgage on 16-5-1986, besides four equitable mortgages by deposit of title deeds---Mortgage so created was never terminated by operation of law or through deliberate act of the parties---Termination, if any, had to be proved/established but in the present case there was no evidence with the Banking Court to return any such finding---When a person is possessed of any right, question of its waiver/renouncement had to be proved by evidence and while electing from any of the two interpretations one involving loss of the right and the other preserving of that right, his conduct was to be construed on the basis of preserving his rights---Relinquishment/desertion of mortgagee rights inspite of holding the documents of the property under mortgage and institution of suit for recovery of the advanced finance facility, even though in 1995, would not lead to loss of mortgagee rights---Petitioner-Bank had not issued any N.O.C. in favour of respondents for creation of second mortgage and the petitioner-Bank being not party to said transaction, would not be bound by it---Second mortgage could have been created by the owners, till the time their title in the property become extinct---Provision of S.79, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 had enacted an exception to the rule of priority, making the subsequent/intermediate mortgage as part of the first mortgage, if the advanced amount was within the fixed minimum limit, provided the subsequent/ intermediate mortgagee had the notice of first mortgage---Subsequent mortgage had no notice of mortgage of the petitioner-Bank and as such it could hardly be held that later mortgage was void or had become part of first mortgage under the ordinary law of the land, as mortgagor/owner could further mortgage/sell out his property but subject to earlier mortgage/charge/ encumbrance.\n \nNazeef v. Abdul Ghaffar and others PLD 1966 SC 267 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199-Constitutional petition---Order impugned was patently illegal as the entire controversy was not compre¬hended---Such an order could not be allowed to continue.\n \nSyed Ali Abbas and others v. Vishan Singh and others PLD 1967 SC 294; Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali and others v. Chief Settlement Commissioner PLD 1973 SC 236; Khuda Bakhsh v. Khushi Muhammad and 3 others PLD 1976 SC 208 and Ch. Muhammad Amin v. Mushtaq Ahmad and others PLD 1980 Lah. 784 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.16432 of 1996, heard on 20-02-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nKALCO PHARMA LIMITED through Chief Executive and 14 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13641",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2842 = 2007 SLD 2842 = 2007 CLD 710",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9, 14 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.X XIV, R.5---Suit for recovery of loan---Impleading of guarantors and mortgagors as defendants---Mortgage deed was appended with the plaint---Said defendants never entered appearance and suit was decreed---Execution of decree--Application under O.XXXIV. R.5, C.P.C. by defendants was refused---Validity---Decree revealed that it was for recovery of money only, inter cilia, against the said defendants---Executing Court, no doubt, had the jurisdiction to examine all the documents on record to ascertain true import of the decree but it could not travel beyond the decree---Contentions raised by the defendants (guarantors and mortgagors) pertained to interpretation of a document filed before the Banking Court where the defendants never entered appearance or replied to the show-cause notice and decree was eventually passed---To permit the defendants to raise said issue at the appeal stage before the High Court would amount to a retrial of the suit which was not possible in execution proceedings and the Court executing the decree could not sit in appeal against the decree sought to be executed before it---Application of the defendants under O.XXXIV R.5, C.P.C. in circumstances, was rightly dismissed by the impugned order.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.564 of 2006, decision dated: 25-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "MAZHAR HUSSAIN and another--Appellants\nVs.\nZARAI TARIQATI BANK LIMITED (ADBP) through Manager and 16 others\nArshad Ali Mohar for other --Respondents."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13642",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2843 = 2007 SLD 2843 = 2007 CLD 712",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 15 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.84, 85, 89, 90, 91 & 92---Confirmation of sale---Procedure---O.XXI, Rr.85, 89, 90, 91 & 92, C.P.C.---Applicability---Auction sale of mortgaged property---Sate was conducted in execution of the decree with the intervention of the Banking Court and Banking Court opted to follow the procedure laid down in C.P.C. for such purpose and preliminary process was followed and consequently the sale was conducted---Objections to sale were filed and auction purchaser also filed application for confirmation of sale and delivery of possession---Sale having been completed, subject to the deposits to be made in terms of Rr.84 and 85 of O.XXI, C.P.C., Provision of R.92 of O.XXI, C.P.C. would come into play which laid down that where no, application was made under Rr.89, 90 & 91 of O.XXI, C.P.C. or where such application was made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale would become absolute---Once a sale had been completed then, unless and until same was set aside in terms of Rr.89, 90 or 91 read with R.92(2) of O.XXI, C.P.C., the executing Court was bound to pass an order for confirmation of the sale whereupon it was to become absolute---Executing Court, in the present case, while dismissing the execution application and other application for non-prosecution, was oblivious of the said mandatory provision of law, and instead of passing proper orders under O.XXI, R.92, C.P.C., proceeded to dismiss all the applications for non-prosecution---Apart from such glaring illegality, the auction purchaser filed an application for confirmation of sale and delivery of possession and Banking Court, on the date fixed for reply and arguments proceeded to dismiss the execution application as well as the objections for non-prosecution---Such order of the Banking Court, from whatever angle seen, was wholly without jurisdiction---Second application was to be treated to be in continuation of the process already commenced in the matter of execution of the decree passed in favour of the decree-holder Bank. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9, 15 & 19--Auction sale of mortgaged property in execution of decrees---Executing Court proceeded, in the first instance, to hold the objection petition to be time barred with reference to sale that took place and thereafter in somewhat mechanical manner proceeded to dispose of the other objections---Order passed gave the impression that the Executing Court having already held the objections to be barred by time proceeded with the same mind set while rejecting the other objections---Banking Court, after correctly holding that the second execution application could be entertained, the logical conclusion was that it was in continuation of the first application---Objections had been filed in time and withdrawn Contention was that since a fresh execution application had been filed, a fresh objection petition would also be, filed being under the impression that a fresh process for execution in the matter would be started and objections would be filed accordingly---Such was not to be so, notwithstanding the fact that the application for restoration was withdrawn, order dismissing the execution application as also the objections for non-prosecution were without lawful authority---Objections filed were deemed to be pending, the replies had already been filed and these objections needed to be decided afresh---Appeal was allowed, impugned order passed by Banking Court was set aside---Execution petition already filed by the decree-holder as also the objections filed by the appellants shall be deemed to be pending---Executing Court shall take up the said objections and decide the same after hearing all concerned--Parties for such purpose shall appear before the Banking Court accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.53 of 2006, heard on 6-03-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ALI ABBAS (PVT.) LTD. and 2 others\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13643",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2844 = 2007 SLD 2844 = 2007 CLD 718",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----S. 10---Suit by borrower/customer against Financial Institution---Precondition Defendant was required to obtain leave to defend the suit for which purpose the application was filed-Banking Court, instead of considering the said application and deciding the question of grant or refusal of leave, dismissed the suit itself---Validity--Order of dismissal of the suit by the Banking Court, held, was not sustainable---High Court, while granting leave to defend the suit, for which the plaintiff had no objection, remanded the case to Banking Court accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F. A. No. 544 of 2006, heard on 28-02-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HAYAT\nVs.\nZARAI TARQIATI BANK LTD. Through Chairman and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13644",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2845 = 2007 SLD 2845 = 2007 CLD 720",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)-------S.12(5)-Appeal---Admission of appeal to full hearing by Appellate Court without requiring appellant to deposit decretal amount or furnish security---Legality and effect---Duty of Appellate Court was to take note of provision of S.12(5) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979---Admission of appeal to hearing in such manner was an act of the Court---Appellant could not be made to suffer for such omission of Appellate Court. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)---\n \n----Ss.7 & 12---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.89---Execution of decree for recovery of loan amount with interest---Appeal against decree, pendency of---Appellate Court allowed execution to continue, but refused to confirm sale till decision of stay application---Sale of mortgaged property by executing Court-Auction purchaser got himself impleaded as respondent in appeal--High Court disposed of stay application with direction to appellant to deposit decretal amount---High. Court on deposit of decretal amount accepted appeal and set aside auction with direction to appellant to pay amount of interest---Validity---Judgment-debtor had not applied for setting aside of sale under O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C.---Auction proceedings had been allowed to be carried out subject to direction of High Court, which obviously included purchase of property by auction-purchaser---High Court in view of its such order could pass any order regarding auction proceedings---High Court was well within its authority to accept payment already made by -debtor and remaining amount to be paid within prescribed period in total satisfaction of decree---Decretal amount had been paid to Bank, while remaining amount of interest ordered to be paid by High Court, had been paid---Impugned of High Court did not suffer from any legal infirmity---Supreme Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.35 of 2003, decision dated: 15-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "TASSADUQ HUSSAIN, JILLANI, NASIR-UL-MULK AND SYED, JAMSHED ALI, JJ",
    "": "RAB NAWAZ CHAUDHRY\nVs.\nBegum NUSRAT MAQBOOL and another\nHudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD 1987 SC 512 distinguished."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13645",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2846 = 2007 SLD 2846 = 2007 CLD 726",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.65, 66 & 67---Sindh Chief Court Rules (OS), R.351--Auction sale of mortgaged property in execution of decree in a suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Contentions of -debtor and one of the bidders in auction were that publication and conduct of the sale was violative of the mandate of O.XXI, Rr.65, 66 & 67, C.P.C., as reserved price was not mentioned in the sale proclamation and the Banking Court having rejected the earlier bids as being inadequate, ought to have ordered re-auction, and by not doing so, and instead, allowing the Official Assignee to negotiate enhancement of the bid amount not only with the original bidders but also with any party who may be interested in purchasing the property, had not only violated the mandate of law but had committed a jurisdictional error by abdicating its authority to the Official Assignee---Validity---Judgment-debtors, in the present case, were duly served before the appointment of Official Assignee as Commissioner to sell the property, and appearance had been entered on behalf of the -debtor company, before passing of such order; neither the company submitted valuation of its assets nor it objected to non-disclosure of reserved price of its property in the sale proclamation; it was at least on two occasions that the Court rejected the offers made by various bidders and directed the Official Assignee to seek improvement in the bid amounts, but no objection was then raised by the -debtors, or by the bidder; they also did not object to the order whereby the Official Assignee was directed to negotiate the sale of the property with bidders or any other party interested in buying the property, although the order was passed in presence of their counsel; bidder had not only submitted its bid in response to the sale proclamation in question without any reservation and/or raising any objection with regard to the sale proclamation or otherwise but also participated in the meetings held by the Official Assignee and had enhanced its bid/offer; bidder however, failed to enhance its offer in yet another meeting of bidders for enhancement of bids, and in the said meeting counsel of the bidder, for the first time objected to offer made by the highest bidder being considered and thus the -debtor and bidder having acquiesced in the proceedings conducted and exercise undertaken in relation to the sale of the property, were estopped from raising any objection to that extent---No prejudice had been caused to the -debtor company as the sale proclamation under objection, contained adequate description and particulars regarding the property and as a result of the various orders passed by the Banking Court and efforts made ,by the Official Assignee by holding negotiation with the original bidders and the subsequent entrants including the successful bidder---Offer for the purchase of the property had been enhanced from Rs.17.50 crores of the objecting bidder to Rs.46 crores, ultimately offered by the successful bidder and accepted by the Court---Objecting bidder failed to match the offer made by the successful bidder---Held, in circumstances, it did not lie in the mouth of objecting bidder that the property had been sold at an inadequate price, even otherwise inadequacy of price per se was no ground for setting aside a sale---By floating of bid no legal right whatsoever had accrued in favour of the objecting bidder---Provisions of O.XXI, R.65, C.P.C. and Rule 351, Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S) did prescribe the mode of disposal by public auction but neither of said provisions expressly or by necessary implication had prohibited any other mode of disposal---If the Court had deviated from the prescribed mode of disposal to serve the ends of justice, no exception could be taken to it---Court was competent, under its inherent powers, to accept, after due notice to party, when satisfied as to offer being reasonable and that the Court was competent to take all steps to execute its own mandate and orders---Court, in such-like eventualities was required to safeguard primarily the interest of -debtor and further to see that auction proceedings had been conducted in fair and transparent manner and no bar whatsoever had been imposed on the Court if some beneficial devices were evolved to get maximum price and to achieve the said purpose---Court may make any amendment, deletion, insertion or change in the advertisement qua auction---Requirements which were not complied with in the case when settling the sale proclamation were intended for the benefit of -debtor and could be waived by him, as those were not matters which went to the root of the Court's jurisdiction or constituted the foundation or authority for the proceedings nor involved public interest; clearly those were irregularities and could not be described as errors which rendered the sale void---Objections, both by -debtor and the bidder having no force were repelled. \n \nMst. Asma Zafarul Hassan v. Messrs United Bank Ltd. and another 1981 SCMR 108; Captain-PQ Chemical Industries (Pvt.)' Ltd. v. Messrs A.W. Brothers and others 2004 SCMR 1956 and S.A. Sundararajan v. A.P.V. Rajendran 1982 PSC 1293 rel.\n \nMessrs. SPRL Rehman Brothers v. Banking Court No.II Lahore 2000 MLD 1957; Messrs Naqi Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Habib Bank Limited 2003 CLD 571; Muhammad Hassan v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 2003 CLD 1693; Hydaybia Textile Mills Ltd. v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 1987 SC 512; Ch. Abdul Majeed v. Sadaqat Seed Malik 2002 CLD 463; Messrs Shandia Saleem and another v. Habib Credit and Exchange Limited and 4 others 2001 CLC 126; Brig. (Retd.) Maqbool Haq v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 Lah. 706; Mst. Asma Zafarul Hassan v. Messrs United Bank Ltd. and another 1981 SCMR 108; Ghulam Abbas v. Zuhra Bibi and another PLD 1972 SC 337; Captain-PQ Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs A.W. Brothers and others 2004 SCMR 1956; S.A. Sundararajan v. A.P.V. Rajendran 1982 PSC 1293; Messrs United Bank Ltd. Karachi v. Mst. Asma Zafarul Hassan 1980 CLC 565; Rasheed Ehsan and others v. Bashir Ahmed and another PLD 1989 SC 146 and UBL v. Zahid Hamid Chaudhry in Execution No.7-B of 2003 distinguished.\n \nGhulam Abbas v. Zuhra Bibi and another PLD 1972 SC 337; Brig. (Retd.) Maqbool Haq v. M/s Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 Lah.706; AIR 1973 SC 2593; 2000 CLC 63; Manilal Mohanlal Sha and others v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad and another AIR 1954 SC 349; Sayed Brothers, Lahore v. District Council, Layallpur and another PLD 1953 Lah.83; PLD 1977 Lah. 542 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Nasir Industries, Karachi and others 1982 CLC 388 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.84---Auction sale of mortgaged property in execution of decree in a suit for recovery of loan by the Bank---Objection was that successful bidders had failed to deposit 10% of their bid of Rs.30 crores, along with their bid, as required in terms of the sale proclamation, and they had further failed to deposit 25% of the sale price immediately upon acceptance of their offer and the remaining 75% within 15 days, thereafter---Bidders' offer thus had been rendered nullity---Validity---Court had accepted two deposits made by the bidders and approved a further deposit to be made within time prescribed by the Court---Bidders having faithfully complied with Court's order, they could not be penalised for the violation of R.84, O.XXI, C.P.C., maxim Actus Curiae neminem gravabit' will come to their rescue. \n \nRasheed Ehsan and others v. Bashir Ahmed and another PLD 1989 SC 146 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19--Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.85 & 86--Auction sale of mortgaged property in execution of a decree in suit for recovery of loan by the Bank---Provisions with regard to the payment of 75% of balance purchase money contained in O.XXI, R.85, C.P.C. are mandatory and not merely directory---Non-compliance of said provisions renders the sale void and in such circumstances the Court is under obligation to resale the property in terms of R.86, 4.XXI, C.P.C.---Principles.\n \nFeroze Din Faiz v. Chaman Lal and others PLD 1953 Lah. 83; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Nasir Industries, Karachi and others 1982 CLC 388; Sayed Brothers, Lahore v. District Council, Lyallpur and another PLD 1977 Lah. 542; Balram v. 11am Singh AIR 1996 SC 2781 and Manilal Mohanlal Sha and others v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad and another AIR 1954 SC 349 rel.\n \nAl-Hassan Feeds v. United Bank Ltd. and 6 others 2004 CLD 275 distinguished.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19---State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29---Auction sale of mortgaged property in execution of a decree in suit for recovery of loan by the Bank was set aside by the High Court---Judgment-debtor could approach the decree-holder Bank and CIRC for settlement of their respective dues in terms as envisaged in State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29 and CIRC Scheme and in case such settlement was reached, binding and collusive agreements shall be executed between the -debtor company and the decree-holder, within fifteen days---In case either no settlement was reached, or agreements were not executed, the Official Assignee shall issue fresh proclamation for the sale of the property, after seeking approval of the proposed proclamation from the Court-Official Assignee was directed to refund the amount deposited by bidder in the execution of decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Executions Applications Nos.88 of 1999 and 42 of 2002, decision dated: 17-12-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAQBOOL BAQAR, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs KIRAN SUGAR MILLS (PUBLIC) through Managing Director-"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13646",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2847 = 2007 SLD 2847 = 2007 CLD 778",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)------S. 22(1)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5, 29(2) & Art.156---Time-barred appeal--Provisions of S.5 Limitation Act, 1908 cannot be invoked for condonation of delay---Held, time allowed for filing first appeal under S.22(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, a special statute, was 30 days---Same being different from that given in Art. 156 Limitation Act, 1908, S.5 of the Act stands excluded by virtue of S.29(2) Limitation Act, 1908s. \n \nAllah Ditta v. Farooq Ahmad and 3 others PLD 1979 Lah.917; Bashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105; Messrs Conoco Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 others v. United Bank Limited, Lahore and another 2004 CLD 472; Sheikh Muhammad Kahsif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer 2004 CLD 1645; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239; Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances), Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n---Ss. 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R.11---Rejection of plaint for disclosing no cause of action---Powers of court to reject plaint of its own accord---Plaintiffs filed suit against Bank pleading that they had not obtained any loan against the specified account---Leave to defend suit was granted--Averments made in the plaint showed that plaintiffs had' received from bank an amount of Rs.1,30,000 as loan under the Specified Account number---Banking Court rightly held that plaint did not disclose any cause of action as plaintiffs had admitted availing of loan facility to the tune of Rs.1,30,000 against the same loan account-Contention that bank did not file any application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. had no force because provisions of said Order nowhere ordained that a defendant must file an application for rejection of plaint and the court, before whom the lis was pending, was divested of powers from rejecting plaint of its own accord---Order VII, R.11 C.P.C, amply manifests that plaint could be rejected in certain eventualities, rather it was the duty of court to examine the plaint to determine as to whether plaint should be rejected or not---Order of Banking Court whereby plaint was rejected after granting leave to defend suit did not call for interference in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.16 of 2005, decision dated: 11-12-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND IQBAL HAMEED-UR-RAHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SHAMIM TAHIRA and others\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIYATI BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD. through Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13647",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2848 = 2007 SLD 2848 = 2007 CLD 835",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLI, R.20---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.146---Partnership Act (IX of 1932), S.25---Appeal---Decree for recovery of loan amount passed jointly and severally against borrower firm, its two partners and mortgagor of mortgaged property---Appeal against decree by one partner without impleading borrower-firm, its second partner and mortgagor---Plea of appellant before Banking Court and Appellate Court was that he had ceased to be partner of borrower firm, thus, was not liable to discharge its financial obligations---Application by appellant to implead omitted defendants as pro forma respondents---Validity---Impugned decree was not divisible---Partner of a partnership firm would be liable for re-paying its debts---If appellant's claim was accepted, then mortgagor not being partner of firm would certainly be affected by such ---If impugned decree was affirmed, then mortgagor might have right before Executing Court to apply for attachment and sale of appellant's property before mortgaged property was put to auction---In alternative, mortgagor would have right to recover from appellant (in full) and from second partner (ratably) amount realized from sale of mortgaged property and applied towards satisfaction of decree---Second partner would be also affected, if impugned decree was affirmed as his liabilities as partner of firm would be increased without a chance to claim ratable contribution from appellant under 5.146 of Contract Act, 1872---Second partner and mortgagor had a valid interest in contesting appeal, thus, they were necessary parties---Failure of appellant to implead second partner and mortgagor within period of limitation rendered appeal as incompetent---High Court dismissed appeal along with such application.\n \nMst. Murad Begum and others v. Muhammad Rafiq and others PLD 1974 SC 322; Mst. Magbool Begum and others v. Gullan and others PLD 1982 SC 46; Abdul Qadir and 5 others v. Muhammad Umar and others PLD 1987 Lah. 232; Muhammad Suleman v. Abdul Rashid and 13 others PLD 1987 Lah. 387; Sher Muhammad and 27 others v. Muhammad Mumtaz-ul-Islam through Legal Heirs and 6 others 2001 MLD 1964; Mst. Jannat Bibi and others v. Barkat Ali and others 1987 MLD 15; Muhammad Ibrahim and another v. Jalal Din 2000 CLC 165; Said Muhammad and others v. M. Sardar and others PLD 1089 SC 532; Mst. Sardar Begum v. Muhammad Anwar Shah and others 1993 SCMR 363 and Punjab Road Transport Board through its Chairman, Lahore v. Abdul Ghafoor and 6 others PLD 1989 SC 541 ref.\n \n(b) Partnership Act (IX of 1932)---\n \n---S.25---Partner of partnership firm would be liable for re-paying its debts. \n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XLI. R.20---Decree passed jointly and severally against several defendants--Appeal against decree by one defendant without impleading others-Application by appellant after period of limitation for impelading omitted necessary defendants---Validity Such decree was not divisible and failure of appellant had rendered appeal as incompetent--Appeal was dismissed along with such application. \n \nMst. Murad Begum and others v. Muhammad Rafiq and others PLD 1974 SC 322; Mst. Magbool Begum and others v. Gullan and others PLD 1982 SC 46; Abdul Qadir and 5 others v. Muhammad Umar and others PLD 1987 Lah. 232; Muhammad Suleman v. Abdul Rashid and 13 others PLD 1987 Lah. 387; Sher Muhammad and 27 others v. Muhammad Mumtaz-ul-Islam through Legal Heirs and 6 others 2001 MLD 1964; Mst. Jannat Bibi and others' v. Barkat Ali and others 1987 MLD 15; Muhammad Ibrahim and another v. Jalal Din 2000 CLC 165; Said Muhammad and others v. M. Sardar and others PLD 1989 SC 532; Mst. Sardar Begum v. Muhammad Anwar Shah and others 1993 SCMR 363 and Punjab Road Transport Board through its Chairman, Lahore v. Abdul Ghafoor and 6 others PLD 1989 SC 541 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.244 of 2006, heard on 11-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "SHOAIB AHMED FARIDI\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13648",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2849 = 2007 SLD 2849 = 2007 CLD 841",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90---Execution proceedings--Application for setting aside of sale of property---Maintainability---Judgment-debtor in his appeal had assailed order whereby Banking Court confirmed sale of his property ---Property in question, initially was put to auction, but on account of postponement of confirmation of the bid at the request of -debtor, highest bidder withdrew his offer--Fresh auction of property was held and bidder, who offered to purchase property at Rs.1,64,00,000 was declared the highest ---Another person though offered to purchase property for a sum of Rs.1,95,00,000, but he having failed to deposit 25% of price offered by him, was not considered and Banking Court confirmed the sale in favour of the bidder, who in the mean time had enhanced his offer from Rs.1,64,00,000 to Rs. 1,73,25,000---Neither did said bidder defaulted in making payment of the purchase price at any stage nor had -debtor at any point in time earlier or through appeal even alleged any fraud and/or irregularity either in the publication of sale proclamation or in the conduct of sale proceedings---Application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. filed by -debtor before High Court in appeal, besides being barred by limitation was, not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed--Appeal along with application, was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist A. No.17 of 2004, decision dated: 2-02-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAWWAR HUSSAIN, JAFRI AND MAQBOOL BAQAR, JJ",
    "": "ASKARI & CO. and 2 others\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. and another\nHudabla Textile Mills and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1987 SC 512 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13649",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2850 = 2007 SLD 2850 = 2007 CLD 845",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -------Ss.9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Suit filed by Bank was decreed with mark-up and it was specifically directed that decretal amount would be recovered by sale of house/bungalow and other properties mentioned in the plaint---Decree was put into execution and property was attached---Defendant filed objection petition against attachment of her property which was attached by the Banking Court--Defendant claimed that she was not liable to pay decretal amount and was not party to the suit or to the loan agreements; and that her property could not have been attached in execution of said decree---Validity---Decree had to be executed as directed in the decree itself i.e. the properties mentioned in the to be read with the plaint, were to be sold and if thereafter some deficiency was found, then other assets of the -debtors, were to be attached and sold---Said process having started, impugned order whereby other property of defendant was directed to be sold, was set aside---Executing Court would carry on the process as directed in the decree and if some deficiency was found, would take up objections filed by appellant lady and decide same in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.278 of 2004, heard on 27-03-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Mst. FAIZ ASGHAR through Legal Heirs\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Manager and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13650",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2851 = 2007 SLD 2851 = 2007 CLD 847",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9, 10, 15(11)(12), 21, 23 & 28---Suit for recovery of loan---Maintainability---Trial Court, in a suit earlier filed by the plaintiff ordered the plaintiff to deposit amount in question within fifteen days with the Nazir of that Court and in case of default the defendant could auction the property---Instead of depositing the amount, plaintiff withdrew said suit---Court did not allow the plaintiff with regard to permission to file fresh suit---Subsequently, Judicial Miscellaneous application was filed by the plaintiff under S.15(11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 with the same prayer, which was dismissed as withdrawn---Fresh suit by the plaintiff was based on the same cause of action which was included in earlier suit---Fresh suit which was not maintainable, was dismissed along with listed application. \n \nGul Sahib Din and others v. Malik Sultan Jan and others PLD 1982 SC 254; Hashim Khan v. National Bank of Pakistan PLD 2001 Supreme Court 325; Ghulam Rasool v. Shana 2001 MLD 661; Messrs Artisans Craftsman Rehabilitation Society v. Mst. Asif Jahan Begum 1990 MLD 1702; Abdul Malik v. Muhammad Urfan 1989 CLC 2363; Ch. Muhammad Ali v. Sardar Muhammad Kazim Ziauddin Durrani 1999 CLC 1437 and Hussain Bakhsh's case PLD 1970 SC 1 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B/1197 of 2006, decision dated: 10-10-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PARWAZ, J",
    "": "Mst. FARHA ZIA and another--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nMessrs MYBANK LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13651",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2852 = 2007 SLD 2852 = 2007 CLD 852",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 12(2), 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree;--First appeal---Counsel for decree-holders had no objection, if impugned order was set aside and matter was sent back to the Trial Court which would decide the case after framing of issues and recording evidence of the parties on the point; whether service of defendants was effected upon a correct address or otherwise-Parties had agreed that till the disposal of application of defendants under S.12(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 by the Banking Court, they would not alienate or encumber the property, which the Bank/decree-holder claimed to have been mortgaged with it; whereas decree-holders would not get the ' decree executed against defendants till such decision.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.171 of 2005, decision dated: 5-10-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NAEEM and another\nVs.\nBANK OF KHYBER through Branch Manager and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13652",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2853 = 2007 SLD 2853 = 2007 CLD 853",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.9, 17 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Plot leased out by lessor in favour of borrower-company for setting up joint venture---Company obtained loan from Bank by mortgaging leased plot---Execution of consent decree obtained by Bank against company in suit---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C., by lessor that leased plot could not be sold out in execution of decree as company had no saleable and marketable interest therein---Plea that company before mortgaging plot had obtained 'No Objection Certificate' from lessor---Validity---Lessor being a shareholder and Director in company would be legally bound by contracts, acts and deeds executed and performed by and on behalf of company---Lessor could not be heard to say that he was not impleaded in suit---Lessor could not make out a case of commission of fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction on the part of company, when suit was decreed in favour of Bank---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No.677-K of 2004, decision dated: 16-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS AND MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, JJ",
    "": "PAKISTAN STEEL MILLS CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD.\nVs.\nPAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LIMITED\nand another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13653",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2854 = 2007 SLD 2854 = 2007 CLD 872",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.10 & 12---Ex parte decree---Service of process---Passing of decree before 'termination of limitation for filing of application for leave to defend the suit---Bank filed suit against two persons, one had died much before filing of the suit while the other was not served in accordance with the provisions of S.10 (2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Report of process server was dated 17-10-2005, while case was taken up on 20-10-2005 and on the same day, the suit was decreed ex parte---Application filed by defendant for setting aside ex parte decree was dismissed by Banking Court---Validity---Application for leave to defend was to be filed, under S.10 (2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, within thirty days of the date of first service by any one of the modes---Banking Court failed to mention any such date of service---Even if it was deemed that deceased defendant was alive and' there' was due service of the process, the defendants in the suit had thirty days to file application for leave to defend---When Banking Court passed the decree, still 27 days were available to defendants to file application for leave to defend, thus ex parte decree was without jurisdiction---High Court set aside ex parte decree passed by Banking Court and remanded the case for decision afresh-High Court directed the defendant to file application for leave to defend the suit within ten days---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.250 of 2006, heard on 7-03-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "SALEEM AHMED\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13654",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2855 = 2007 SLD 2855 = 2007 CLD 875",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.58---Execution proceedings---Objection petition---Summery disposal---Property in question was mortgaged with another bank and was got redeemed after payment of outstanding liability of the other bank by some arrangement between another person and appellant---During execution proceedings, the Court Auctioneer failed to auction the properties mortgaged with decree holder bank and the property in question was got attached by the orders of Banking Court--Appellant filed objection petition with regard to the status of property in question but Banking Court summarily dismissed the objection petition---Validity---All transactions between appellant and other bank regarding redemption of property in question took place prior to the purported attachment of disputed property by Banking Court---Other person who had entered into the arrangement for redemption of the property sought decree in a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, which decree had attained finality-Such was a controversy of the nature which required proper investigation as to claim of appellant and property determination could be made only by framing proper issues, enabling the parties to lead evidence in support of their respective stances---Summary dismissal of objection petition in the peculiar facts and circumstances was not warranted---Such dismissal of objection petition was unsustainable in law and the order passed by Banking Court was set aside---Case was remanded to Banking Court for deciding objection petition afresh after recording of evidence-Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \nShaukat Ali Mian v. Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. through Chief Executive and 4 others 2002 CLD 1071; Mirza Naseem Ahmad and 4 others v. Dr. Sadiqa Sharif and 12 others 2003 CLD 88; Muhammad Saleem v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and 12 others 2003 CLD 280 and Fazla v. Mehr' Din and 2 others 1997 SCMR 837 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.33 of 2002, heard on 21st February, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, JJ",
    "": "Mian HABIB ULLAH\nVs.\nBANK OF KHYBER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13655",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2856 = 2007 SLD 2856 = 2007 CLD 879",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXI, R.29---Banker and customer--Applications for stay of execution pending suit between decree holder and -debtors---Certain relaxations during the course of execution had been granted and no sound efforts had been made to pay off the debts---Court, though could stay the proceedings under O.XXI, R.29, C.P.C. but that could be subject to sufficient security to satisfy the existing decretal amount with future claim in respect of mark-up, which aspect was missing in the present case---Record showed that execution was filed in 1998 while the applications under O.XXI, R.29, C.P.C. had been filed after about seven years, which apparently was late in time---Judgment¬-debtors could make certain efforts if they were inclined to satisfy the decree but the same was not done--Adjustment which had been claimed in respect to sale proceed of pledged shares did not belong to either of the -debtors---Applications for stay of execution proceedings had no force in circumstances---Official Assignee was allowed to proceed further in terms of the order already passed by the Court. \n \nAIR 1928 Cal. 222; AIR 1936 Mad. 102; PLD 1957 Dhaka Page 603: AIR 1931 Bom.247; AIR 1935 Rangoon 151 and 1972 SCMR Page 236 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Application No.29 of 1998 in C.M.As. Nos.664, 684, 685, 709, 712 and 714 of 2006, decision dated: 10-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "PRUDENTIAL COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through Attorneys--Decree Holder\nVs.\n WEST PAKISTAN TANKS TERMINAL (PVT.) LTD. and 5 othersJudgment-debtors"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13656",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2857 = 2007 SLD 2857 = 2007 CLD 932",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -------Ss.9 & 19---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Rule of exhaustion of available remedies---Applicability---Scope--- Execution proceedings---Order of arrest of -debtor by Banking Court---Judgment-debtor assailing the execution proceedings on the ground that decree had been satisfied---Jurisdiction and process of Banking Court was extended to the decree-holder as a matter of course without application of mind to the causes and grounds for the past abortive execution proceedings by the Bank---Constitutional petition contained facts that prima facie suggested an abuse of process of Court by a decree-holder and correspondingly attracted the supervisory constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Facts of the case also involved the enforcement of constitutional safeguards of the personal liberty of a citizen/ -debtor---Case of the petitioner contained elements that made the writ jurisdiction to be appropriate, efficacious and speedy namely against the impugned action---Record. showed that the coercive process of the Banking Court had been exercised as a threat rather than for enforcement as a judicial order---High Court, therefore, showed inclination to grant hearing in. the matter to save time, focus the proceedings of Banking Court on lawful exercise of its jurisdiction and for the fair enforcement of the parties rights and obligations under law---Counsel of the Bank/decree-holder had assured that his client shall not press for the petitioner to be arrested until the latter's objection to the maintainability of the execution petition were decided by the Banking Court---High Court, in view of the assurance of the counsel directed that the assurance should be duly honoured in proceedings before the Banking Court where objections of the petitioner to maintainability of the execution proceedings shall be heard and decided in accordance with law before any coercive action was taken against the petitioner and disposed the constitutional petition accordingly.\n \nMuslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and others v. Ahmed Ali and another 2007 SCMRE 38 distinguished.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n-- Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Rule of exhaustion of available remedies---Applicability---Scope---Rule of exhaustion of available remedies, though was not prescribed by Art.199 of the Constitution, however, it was salutary criterion by which High Court regulated its proceedings.\n \nMuslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and other v. Ahmed All and another 2007 SCMR 38 ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Abuse of process of Court by a decree-holder affecting liberty of -debtor/citizen attracts the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court and matter contains elements that make the constitutional jurisdiction to be the appropriate, efficacious and speedy remedy against the impugned action.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.17694 of 2005, decision dated: 26-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "YOUSAF TRADERS.\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13657",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2858 = 2007 SLD 2858 = 2007 CLD 936",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.51 & O.XXI, R.37---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Issuance of warrants of arrest of -debtor by the Banking Court at the very outset in execution proceedings of an ex parte decree without prescribed notice and without conducting inquiry contemplated under S.51 and O.XXI, R.40, C.P.C.---Ground given in the order of arrest so early in the execution process was that -debtor was likely to leave the country at any time---Validity---Held, an order for issuance of warrants of arrest was illegal unless preceded by an enquiry expressing satisfaction of executing Court that conditions for arrest as specified in S.51, C.P.C. were duly met---Failure by the Banking Court to have conducted the requisite enquiry and to have omitted to apply its judicial mind to the criteria and the factual material for ordering arrest of a -debtor constituted a fatal error that vitiated the order of arrest---High Court declared the order of arrest to be illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect---Petitioner was directed to face the execution proceedings before the Banking Court which shall proceed strictly in accordance with law in the matter of realization of the decretal amount from the -debtors---Principles.\n \nAn order for issuance of warrants of arrest would be illegal unless preceded by an enquiry expressing satisfaction of executing Court that conditions for arrest as specified in section 51, C.P.C. are duly met.\n \nIn the first instance, notice has to be given to the -debtor to explain as to why he should not be detained in prison. On his appearance the Court has to make an inquiry, record evidence, give opportunity of evidence in rebuttal and thereafter to pass an order on the request for detention in prison, in accordance with law. During these proceedings the -debtor can be asked, to furnish security for appearance, which does not mean security for the payment of decretal amount. Without making any inquiry the Court cannot straightaway order detention in civil prison. Likewise, unless the prerequisites of section 51 of C.P.C. are proved to exist, detention in prison cannot' be ordered. The preconditions, as highlighted hereinabove, are that -debtor should be proved to have made attempt to leave the limits of Court, to obstruct the decree or execution thereof or to have dishonestly transferred the property after the institution of the suit to avoid the decree or had the means to pay the decree and neglected to do the same. Without satisfaction of these preconditions no mechanical order for detention in prison can be passed.\n \nPrecision Engineering Ltd. v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 200 Lah. 290; Aftab Saleem Chaudhry and another v. Soneri Bank Limited 2003 CLC 401; Bahsir Ahmed v. Judge Banking Court No.1 2005 CLC 1728; Abdul Qayyum Arif v. Agha Gul 2002 YLR 2541 and Qamar Zaman v. Judge Family Court 2003 YLR 2415 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.12753 of 2006, decision dated: 22-02-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "KAMRAN ELAHI.\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13658",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2859 = 2007 SLD 2859 = 2007 CLD 952",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan against debtor and guarantors was decreed---Appeal--Appellants had admitted the sanction of the loan in question and the agreement of finance the execution whereof was also admitted---None of the documents sued or relied upon by the Bank had been denied---Appellants had admitted that finance facility in question was availed and funds thereof paid to the suppliers of the machinery---Machinery was in fact delivered to the appellants---Appellants stated that machinery which was insured as per finance agreement, had been stolen---Finance agreement, however, revealed that after delivery of the machinery, entire risk of any loss or damage thereto shall be on the account of the appellants---Held, theft of the machinery after delivery as alleged, was not only on account of the appellants but also the same, in no manner, mitigated the liability of the appellants towards the Bank in respect of the finance in question---Finance agreement though mentioned that machinery shall be insured but nothing in the said agreement envisaged the extinguishment of the liability of the appellants on account of any loss of the machinery whether the same was insured or not and also that insurance company was neither a borrower nor a customer as defined by law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.448 of 2004, decision dated: 8-03-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NAWAZ ENTERPRISES through Sole Proprietor and another\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13659",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2860 = 2007 SLD 2860 = 2007 CLD 957",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)------S.46-Drugs Act (XXXI of 1976), Ss.7 & 23---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Suit for infringement of trade mark-Interim injunction, grant of----Plaintiff claimed to be manufacturing and selling drug under trade name \"\"MIBS\"\"---Permission to manufacture and sell medicine under such trade name granted to plaintiff was withdrawn by Controller of Drugs, which order was challenged in appeal, but no interim or final relief had been granted---Such trade name was not registered in plaintiffs name---Controller of Drugs had permitted defendant to manufacture and sell medicine under such trade name, which registration was still intact--Defendant had applied for registration of such trade name and copyrights---Controller of Drugs had advised plaintiff to change trade name of its drug, which was similar to trade name being used by defendant-Under S.23 of Drugs Act, 1976, no drug could be imported, manufactured or sold by any person in absence of a valid registration/permission, granted under S.7 thereof---No prima facie case and balance of convenience existed in favour of plaintiff---Balance of convenience would lie in favour of defendant for being manufacturer of drug under such trade name under a valid permission/registration---Application for interim injunction was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nLaw of Trade Marks and Passing off by P. Naryanan Forth Edn., p.42 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 916 of 2005, decision dated: 13-09-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. ALI ASLAM, JAFRI, J",
    "": "GETZ PHARMA (PVT.) LTD. through Authorized Officer--Plaintiff\nVs.\nFAROOQ & SONS through Proprietor and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13660",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2861 = 2007 SLD 2861 = 2007 CLD 991",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-------S.17---Trade mark, registration---Scope---Particular trade mark, if common to trade used by more than one person, would become publici juris and alltraders in field could claim their right therein---Principles.\n \nThe registrations of trade mark, which are identical or nearly resemble each other in respect of the same kind of goods or description of goods, are permissible to be registered favouring different proprietors. When a particular trade mark is common to the trade used by more than one person, it becomes publici juris and all traders in the field can claim their right in the said trade mark. The deception and confusion should be such, which affects a wary person. \n \n(b) Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.10(2), 22, 25, 26 & 46---Infringement of trade mark, suit for---Plaintiffs trade mark was not registered---Defendant had commenced business earlier than plaintiff, but its trade mark was registered later on---Held, plaintiff could claim a right of passing off action. \n \nPLD 1987 SC 1090; PLD 1991 SC 921; 2000 YLR 1376; PLD 2000 Kar. 192; 2001 SCMR 967; PLD 2001 SC 14; 2004 CLD 171; Formica Corporation v. Pakistan Formica Ltd. 1989 SCMR 361; Abdul Wasim v. Messrs Haiko through Sole Proprietor 2002 CLD 1623; Oil and Gas Development Corporation v. Lt.-Colonel Shujjauddin Ahmed PLD 1970 Kar, 332 and Bayer A.G. and another v. Master International (Pvt.) 2003 CLD 794 ref.\n \n(c) Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)---\n \n----S.10(2)---Trade Mark \"\"Master\"\"---Word \"\"Master\"\" has become common to trade, thus a public property in local and universal use.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1161 and C.M.A. No.7175 of 2004, decision dated: 16-02-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL, J",
    "": "Messrs MASTER TEXTILE MILLS LTD. Through Duly Authorized Signatory--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMASTER FABRICS through Managing Partner and 5 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13661",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2862 = 2007 SLD 2862 = 2007 CLD 1002",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19(7)---Execution of decree-As soon as the claim of the decree-holder Bank stands satisfied by sale of the mortgaged property in execution proceedings, then such Bank has no legal obligation to chase the undoing of any irregular private sale of property made by the -debtor. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.23(2)---Provisions of S.23(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 treat post decretal transactions of properties by -debtors to be void.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.12 of 2006, decision dated: 6-04-2007. .",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "RAFIQ AHMED SANAURI through Attorney and 3 others\nVs.\nUNION BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13662",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2863 = 2007 SLD 2863 = 2007 CLD 1005",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 7, 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Petition for leave to defend suit---Defendants who admitted the sanction and availing of the facility claimed in the suit was objected to contending that securities outside the scope of the Bank commitment letter had been wrongly alleged in the suit---Validity---Objection of the defendants however, failed to account for that the security creating instruments were executed by the defendants and no substantial ground todislodge the said documents had been given in the petition for leave to appeal and that the commitment letter relied upon could not operate to prevent a creditor bank from improving its security position. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.7, 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Mark-up accruing under the fresh finance agreement was claimed, which had accrued during the default period of the defendant company during which the Bank exercised forbearance to sue---Such accrual of mark-up was therefore for a period past and beyond the bona fide facility period and constituted mark-up on mark-up, which was contrary to law and must be struck down. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.7, 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Principal amount remained outstanding against the defendant company and its sureties and encumbrances, for payment---Judgment and decree in the sum against the defendants along with cost of funds and costs were passed against the defendantsjointly and severally.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.13 and. P.L.A. No.39-B of 2006, decision dated: 16-02-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "Messrs SAUDI PAK COMMERCIAL BANK\nVs.\nMessrs LUCKY TEXTILE (PVT.) LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13663",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2864 = 2007 SLD 2864 = 2007 CLD 1013",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.65---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185 (3)---Execution of decree---Sale of property---Matching bid---Entitlement of debtors---After getting the property auctioned, Banking Court gave three days time to debtors to match the highest bid---Instead of debtors, a third party on their behalf offered price higher than that of the highest bidder---Banking Court confirmed the sale in favour of auction purchaser---Plea rained by debtors was that confirmation of sale in favour of auction purchaser was in violation of O.XXI, R.65, C.P.C.--Validity---Procedure provided under O.XXI, R.65, C.P.C. might not be strictly applicable in respect of execution of a decree passed by Banking Court in preference to the procedure provided under S.18 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, which was a special law---Provisions of S.18 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, having overriding effect, had to be essentially followed by Banking Court for the purpose of execution of decree, except in the matter which was not covered by the special provision---Bid offered by a third person would have no legal effect as he had no locus standi to participate in the matching bid---Judgment-debtors, on the basis of matching bid offered by a stranger to the proceedings, could not claim first right of purchase and maintain appeal before High Court or Supreme Court---Leave to appeal was refused. \n \nMohib Textile Mills Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan 2005 SCMR 1237 and Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Zakaria Ghani PLD 2005 SC 819 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.64-K of 2006, decision dated: 17-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS AND MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs IRISMA INTERNATIONAL, Karachi High Court and 3 others.\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED, Karachi High Court and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13664",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2865 = 2007 SLD 2865 = 2007 CLD 1017",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Partnership Act (IX of 1932), S.69(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R.11---Suit filed by unregistered firm---Maintainability---Rejection of plaint, application for---Maintainability of suit was objected to on the grounds that suit filed by unregistered firm was barred under S.69(2) of Partnership Act, 1932---Defendants moved application under O. VII, R.11, C.P.C. for rejection of plaint---Plaintiff during pendency of said application filed application seeking amendment of plaint by substituting name of plaintiff for that of its partners---Application filed by plaintiff for amendment of plaint by substituting name of plaintiff for that of its partners was allowed--Application filed by defendants for rejection of plaint was disposed of observing that at the time of framing of issues, a preliminary issue would be framed as to whether partners of unregistered firm could file a suit against the third party; and arguments on that legal issue would be heard after settlement of issues---Plaintiff would amend the title of the plaint accordingly---Ad interim order issued, would continue with restriction contained therein. \n \nArdeshir Cowasjee v. KBACA PLD 2003 Kar.314; Abdul Hamid v. Riaz Brothers Commission Agents 1986 CLC 242 and Aslam Awan v. Ras Tariq Chaudhary 1985 CLC 2514 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Banking Suit No.B-49 and C.M.As. Nos.582, 864, 929, 930, 931 and 932 of 2007, decision dated: 23rd April, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J",
    "": "Messrs Karachi High Court UNIQUE EXPRESS through Managing Partner\nVs.\nMessrs KASB BANK LIMITED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13665",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2866 = 2007 SLD 2866 = 2007 CLD 1022",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.VII, R.11---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.73---Suit for damages and compensation by customer on the allegation of breach of contract by the Bank---Contention, of the customer was that defendant (Bank) having not got the written statement signed through its second attorney, plaint was liable to be rejected---Validity---Held, even where the pleadings were not signed, same could not be rejected on such hyper-technical ground---Such lapse could be remedied by permitting the party to sign it---In the present case, the moment such lapse or objection was raised, same was instantly remedied by the Bank and the Court rightly exercised its discretion and allowed the other attorney of the Bank to sign the written statement in red ink---No prejudice having been shown to have been caused to the customer, no exception therefore, on such hyper-technical ground could be entertained. \n \nIsmail and others v. Mst. Razia Begum and others 1981 SCMR 687 and Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din v. Noor Dad 1988 PLD 42 SC (AJ&K) ref.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n---S.73---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), S.117---State Bank of Pakistan Prudential Regulations for Consumer Financing, 2003, 0-1 to 0-5 and Reglns. 7 & 8---Banker and customer---Suit for damages and compensation by customer against Bank---Issuance of credit card by Bank to customer---Contention of the customer was that while travelling, throughout the journey abroad his credit cards were not accepted for payment each time the same was presented, he not only felt greatly insulted, disgraced, defamed and humiliated, as if he was using stolen cards---Customer claimed to have suffered mental torture and agony and claimed damages---Bank, in its written statement denied the allegation and blamed the customer or their agent Bank, who did not pay the renewal charges in time despite having been raised through invoices---Breach of any of the contracts, either between the card holder and or retailer, cardholder and issuer and/or between the issuer and the retailer and/or all of three, in absence of any special enactment, would be governed by S.72 of the Contract Act, 1872---Generally, failure to pay money may not entail anything more than interest, however, litmus test prescribed per S.73 of the Contract Act, 1872 was whether the loss was within the contemplation of the parties or not---If a valid card was dishonoured, the card holder may claim expenses incurred to bail him out of the situation, including the cost of borrowing if any---Cost of protesting, consequential fall out, expenses in communication, because the financial consequences, which may occur, in the particular circumstances, would be within the contemplation of parties, at the time when the contract was made between the issuer and the card holder---Credit card or similar card being not negotiable instruments, measure of damages as prescribed under S.117, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could not be called in aid---Customer in the present case, admittedly was holding charge cards, which required the balance to be paid in full each month unlike credit card, which allowed the consumers to revolve their balance at the cost---Statement of accounts on record showed renewal fee claimed in April and then in May was not paid in time, therefore, customer could not claim performance of agreement to provide financial cover or services without performing reciprocal obligation on his part to pay the renewal fee in time---When a person himself failed to perform his part of the obligation, he could not compel reciprocating party to discharge its part of duty---Principles. \n \nHadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341; Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow and Sons Ltd. (1932) A.C. 452; Commell Lairds & Co. v. Manganese Bronze and Brass Co., (1993) 2 K.B. 141; Graham v. Cambell (1877)7 Ch. D.494 and Urquhart Lindsay & Co. v. Eastern Bank Ltd., (1922) 1 K.B. 318 ref.\n \n(c) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S.117---Rules as to compensation---Credit or other similar cards could not be equated with negotiable instruments, therefore measure of damages as prescribed under S.117, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could not be called in aid in matters relating to such cards. \n \n(d) Credit Card---\n \n----Nature and implication of transaction arising out of issue and use of credit cards detailed.\n \nCredit, charge and debit card in present day is a common and convenient device to acquire goods, services and withdrawal of cash on credit locally and internationally. It has become synonymous to cash and international currency.\n \nCredit card is defined in the Blacks Laws Dictionary (sixth edition) as \"\"Any card, plate, or other like credit device existing for the purposes of obtaining money, property, labour or service on card. The term does not include a note, cheque, draft, money order or other like negotiable instrument. Federal and often State statutes regulate the issuance and use of credit cards\"\". On the web also numerous definitions are available some of which are as follows;\n \nA plastic credit card bearing an account number assigned to a card holder with a credit limit that can be used for purchase of goods and service and to obtain cash disbursement on credit, for which a card holder is subsequently billed by an issuer for repayment of the credit extended at once or on an instalment basis. (www. Istumertccuicarclserutce.com/glossury and www. merchantseek.com/gossury).\n \nA credit card system is a type of retail transaction settlement and credit system named after the small plastic and issued to user of the system. A credit card is different from a debit card in that the credit card issuer lends the customer money rather than having the money removed from an account.\n \nDebit card is defined as \"\"A plastic card used to initiate a debit transaction. In general these transactions are used primarily to purchase goods and services and to obtain cash for which the card holder assets account is debited by the issuer\"\" en.wikipedia.org/wiki/credit-card. A credit card is a system of payment named after the small plastic card issued to user of the system. A credit card is different from a debit card in that it does not remove money from the users account after every transaction. In the case of credit card, the issuer lends money to the consumer (or the user). It is also different from a charge card (though this name is used by the public to describe credit card), which requires the balance to be paid in full each month. In contrast, credit card allows the consumer to revolve their balance, at the cost. (htp//en.wikipedia/wiki/crdit-card). \n \nA credit card is a device usually rectangular plastic card with magnetic strip or Chip or other security feature generally issued by a banker to its customer for repetitive use to procure merchandise, service or withdraw money on credit to the extent of authorized limit. Card is issued to the customer against reciprocal arrangement to reimburse the issuer either in lump sum on each use, periodically or in instalments as and against such charges, renewal fee, interest rate or line of credit as may be agreed between them. It is convenient method of payment as an alternative to conventional mode like cash, cheque, pay order, demand draft etc. \n \nOnce a card is issued may it be credit, charge or debit card, three separate contracts come into being. Firstly between the issuer and the cardholder under which the issuer agrees to make payment to the retailer of goods, service or cash dispensers (Automated Teller Machine abbreviated as ATM), which a card holder acquires, avails or .withdraws because of use of the card. Reciprocally the cardholder agrees to reimburse the issuer for payment or liability incurred by the issuer to the merchant of goods, service or cash dispenser because of use of the card. Secondly, by accepting card the retailer of goods, service or cash dispenser enters into agreement with the card holder to provide service, goods or cash against the card. Thirdly, between the retailer of goods, service or cash teller, and the card issuer under which, the retailer of goods, service or cash teller agrees to honour the card. \n \nOnce card is issued and as long as it is valid the issuer enters into a contract to provide financial cover and service against the use of the card of the services or goods availed by the card holder. In the event, a valid card is denied, the card issuer becomes liable for breach of contract to provide cover for availing goods or service. In case the retailer of goods or service declines to honour the valid card, he may not only be exposed to damages but also he would be liable to reimburse loss as may be claimed and recovered by the card holder from the issuer. \n \nAlthough, dishonour of card has close semblance to dishonour of a negotiable instrument, parameters to claim compensation in respect of negotiable instruments are circumscribed in section 117 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Credit or other similar card could not be equated with negotiable instruments, therefore, measure of damages as prescribed under section 117 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be called in aid. In absence of any special enactment defining rights and obligations of issuer and card holder breach of obligations arising out of use of card would be regulated by general law of damages contained in section 73 of the Contract Act. \n \nUse of credit and other like cards has become widespread and common. It has virtually substituted cash and other conventional modes of payment, increasing dependence on such type of card caries with it concomitant conveniences and inconveniences. Controversies arising out of blockage, freezing, misuse, excessive billing, over charging, dishonouring of cards are but few instances that are subject matter of litigation worldwide and Pakistan is no exception. There is no reason why damages or injury that may arise out of breach of agreement to honour the card may not be considered as naturally arising according to the usual course of things form the breach of contract and thus could be recoverable in the ordinary circumstances. Likewise, a party to contact of credit card may also recover special damages provided a case is made out. Special damages are awarded in cases, as may reasonably be supposed to have been in contemplation of both parties at the time of contract. Burden is on the person alleging loss, damages or injury.\n \nUnlike other countries (Consumer Credit Act, 1974. in United Kingdom) relationship, between the card holder, card issuer and the retailer of service or goods is not yet formally regulated in Pakistan under any statute. However, the State Bank of Pakistan has issued Prudential Regulations for Consumer Financing (2003). Regulations 0-1 to 0-5 and Regulations R-7 to R-8, deal with credit card. The embryonic Prudential Regulations hardly provide sufficient matrix to deal with complex situation that may arise out of issuance and use and dishonour of such cards, it is high time to legislate on the subject. Until legislation is made, State Bank may at least consider framing more comprehensive regulations regulating rights and obligations inter se the card holders, issuers and goods or service providers. \n \n(e) State Bank of Pakistan Prudential Regulations for Consumer Financing, 2003---\n \n----Regulations 0-1 to 0-5 and Regulations R-7 to R-8---Credit card---High Court deserved that unlike other countries relationship, between the card holder, card issuer and the retailer of service or goods is not yet formally regulated in Pakistan under any statute---State Bank of Pakistan Prudential Regulations for Consumer Financing which deal with credit card hardly provide sufficient matrix to deal with complex situation that may arise out of issuance and use and dishonour of such cards---It is high time to legislate on the subject---Until legislation is made, State Bank may at least consider framing more comprehensive regulations regulating rights and obligations inter se the card holders, issuers and goods and service providers.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Spl. H.C.A. No.92 of 2006, decision dated: 22-03-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND MUHAMMAD AFZAL SOOMRO, JJ",
    "": "AZIZULLAH SHAIKH, BAR AT LAW and another\nVs.\nUNION BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13666",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2867 = 2007 SLD 2867 = 2007 CLD 1071",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss. 9, 10, 18 & 21---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.11 & O.XOXVII---Procedure of Banking Court---Scope---Grant of leave to defend suit---Principles---Execution of decree--:Appeal---Principles of res judicata--Applicability---Plea about the pledge of goods by the appellants with respondent-Bank and misappropriation of such goods by the Bank had not been raised at all---If any plea was not raised .or raised but rejected, it would not be permissible for the Banking Court to grant the leave---If the requisite pleas were not raised, the stage for the determination of the controversy between the parties was passed---When a leave application was refused on the pleas raised therein, to all intents and purposes, such pleas were the issues directly and substantially in issue in the suit, which, when rejected, were the one heard and finally decided by the Court within the meaning of S.11, C.P.C., so as to attract res judicata in the subsequent suit---Such principle shall also be true for the pleas which might and ought to have been made grounds of defence or attack in leave application, but were not so made, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue, for attracting the rule of constructive res judicata---Decrees passed in the suit of such a nature, to all intents and purposes, thus shall operate as res judicata in the suits to follow---In the present case, parties were heard in the regular first appeal which was dismissed as a notice case---Rule of res judicata was not involved in appeal against execution of decree as the question involved was that of jurisdiction of Executing Court-Pledge or otherwise of the goods was a disputed question of fact between the parties, having legal consequences, which should have been raised by the appellants in the leave application, but it was not done, however, when it was propounded for the first time in appeal, which was a continuation of the suit, said plea was rejected on the factual premises and the legal proposition which the appellants raised was not accepted, therefore, said question stood conclusively determined by the Court and it was not within the jurisdiction and the competence of the Executing Court to re-adjudicate, whether the goods were pledged by the appellants with the respondent-Bank or not, and about their misappropriation---Such question however, could not be dealt with and adjudicated under S.19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Stages of such litigation highlighted by High Court.\n \nThe procedure for the adjudication of the cases pertaining to the \"\"finances\"\" between the Banking Company and the customer before the Banking Court is of a special and specific nature, which is quite akin to the summary procedure provided for the adjudication of the suits filed under Order XXXVII,-C.P.C. The object of summary procedure of both the laws is to provide efficacious remedy to the plaintiff and avoid prolongation of commercial litigation. In such cases, the defendant is not as a matter of right entitled to appear and defend the cause against him, but if he desires to be heard, he must apply to the Court for the permission to appear and defend. In his leave application, the defendant must disclose all the grounds, which entitles him to such leave, specially in the cases pertaining to the recovery under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), the law applicable at the relevant time, the leave could only be granted to the defendant if \"\"a serious and bona fide dispute\"\" was raised, which should, essentially be spelt out from the specific and clear pleas/grounds taken in the leave application. If any plea was not raised or raised but rejected, it would be impermissible for the Banking Court to grant the leave. In the present case, the plea about the pledge of goods by the appellants with the respondent-Bank and the misappropriation of such goods by the Bank had not been raised at all. Obviously such plea which had to be founded on the factual premise at the first stage, could not be allowed to have been raised in appeal, yet when this plea for the first time was taken before High Court, High Court while taking a liberal view in the matter, considered the above and in unambiguous, unequivocal and categorical terms, rejected the plea. \n \nWhen, a leave application is refused on the pleas raised therein, to all intents and purposes, such pleas are the issues directly and substantially in issue in the suit, which when rejected are the one heard and finally decided by the Court within the meaning of section 11 of the C.P.C.; so as to attract res judicata in the subsequent suit. This shall also be true for the pleas which might and ought to have been made grounds of' defence or attack in the leave application, but were not so made, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue, for attracting the rule of constructive \"\"res judicata\"\". Therefore, the decrees passed in the suits of the nature mentioned above, to all intents and. purposes, shall operate as res judicata in the suits to follow. Besides, it was not well conceived to argue that the dismissal of regular first appeal was in limine, rather from the record of that case it transpires that the parties were heard and the appeal was dismissed as a notice case. Be that as it may, the rule of res judicata was not involved in the present case, rather the question was about the jurisdiction of the Executing Court. \n \nThe proposition of the pledge or otherwise of the goods was a disputed question of fact between the parties, having legal consequences, which should have been raised by the appellants in the leave application, but it was not done; however, when it was propounded for the first time in appeal, which is a continuation of the suit, this plea was rejected on the factual premises and the legal proposition which the appellants raised was not accepted, therefore, this question stood conclusively determined by the Court and it was not within the jurisdiction and the competence of the Executing Court to re-adjudicate, whether the goods were pledged by the appellants with the respondent-Bank or not; and about their misappropriation. There are two stages in a litigation. The first, where all the points of controversy, may be legal or factual, inter se the parties passes through the process and phase of judicial determination. It is this stage where the plaintiff of the case mandatorily has to raise all the necessary pleas in order to succeed in the matter. And the defendant is obliged to do the same in defence for defeating the cause of the plaintiff. In the cases pertaining to Order XXXVII, C.P.C. and those under the Special Banking Laws, this stage includes the adjudication of the pleas raised in the leave application of the defence. This can be defined as the \"\"determination stage for resolving the dispute between the parties\"\", which goes up to the forum of appeal etc. Therefore, if the requisite pleas are not raised here, the stage for the determination of the controversy between the parties is passed. The second stage is confined only to the execution of the decree, which means the enforcement of the decree by the process of the Court, so as to enable the decree-holder or the -creditor to recover the fruits of the s. At this stage, not only the powers of the Executing Court are subservient to the of the Court, which has determined the dispute between the parties and pronounced its verdict, but the parties are also precluded to raise any controversy, which they failed to propound at the determination stage, or if raised, had failed to succeed in this behalf. Besides, it is settled law that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree; and undoubtedly, it cannot question the legality or the correctness of the decree; grant the relief to a party, which is not granted in the and decree and above all to adjudicate upon a controversy, which has already been settled by the Court at the determination stage or in the hierarchy thereto. Despite the fact that the plea of pledge of goods was not raised in the leave application, which is the fundamental lapse and default on part of the appellants, but when set out in the appeal, such plea was rejected which has attained finality and thereafter, the Executing Court was left with no power at all to enter into the area, whether the goods were pledged or not etc. \n \nUnder the provisions of section 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the aforementioned question cannot be dealt with and adjudicated by the Executing Court. \n \nA.M. Burq and another v. Central Exchange Bank Ltd. and others PLD 1966 (W.P) Lah. 1 ref.\n \nHabib Bank Limited v. Orient Rice Mills Ltd. and others 2004 CLD 1289; Messrs Crystal Enterprises and 6 others v. Platinum Commercial Bank. Ltd. and 2 others through General Attorney 2002 CLD 868; Messrs Polymer International through Sole Proprietor and another v. Messrs Bolan Bank Ltd. through General Manager 2004 CLD 1637 and A.M. Burq and another v. Central Exchange Bank Ltd. and others PLD 1966 (W.P) Lah.1 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.125 of 2007, decision dated: 17-04-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN, JJ",
    "": "MODerN KNITTING AND WOOLLEN SPINNERS (PVT.) LTD and another\nVs.\nMANZUR AHMED SHEIKH and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13667",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2868 = 2007 SLD 2868 = 2007 CLD 1120",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.47 & O.XXI, Rr.97, 103---Execution of decree---Objection---Title of suit property---Determination---Suit property was claimed to be owned by objector/petitioner, instead of -debtor---Executing Court, after framing of issues and recording of evidence, dismissed objection petition on the ground that name of objector/petitioner was entered in the sale-deed through forgery and interpolation---Validity---Objector/petitioner failed to produce any worthwhile evidence in support of his case---Executing Court also found that name of objector/petitioner had been inserted in the sale deed later on---Relevant record showed that property in question was purchased by -debtor and entries of record had been changed after rubbing the original writing---Judgment passed by Executing Court was well reasoned and there was no illegality or infirmity in it---Executing Court had rightly decided the issues and findings of the court on all issues were affirmed---Judgment--debtor was aunt of objector /petitioner and she had not paid decretal amount and it seemed that appeal had been filed only to avoid payment of decretal amount---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.368, 594 of 2005, decision dated: 8-03-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "SHAHID HAMID HUSSAIN\nVs.\nTRUST LEASING CORPORATION LIMITED through Chief Executive and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13668",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2869 = 2007 SLD 2869 = 2007 CLD 1164",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 10 & 15---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.151 & 152---Suit for recovery of loan by the Bank---Petition for leave to appeal---Grant and availing of the facilities in question had not been disputed; there was also no dispute inter se the plaintiff and defendants with regard to payments made by the defendants nor was it alleged that such payments were not reflected in the statement of accounts and to all intents and purposes, liability to the extent of loan amount had been admitted in the petition for leave to appeal---Defendants had merely claimed that value of the pledged goods alleged to have been lost and no longer available were also liable to be adjusted against the claim of the plaintiff-Bank---Bank's case was that it was entitled to recover its debts in their entirety---Validity---If the pledgee sued for recovery of the original debt, he was required to keep the pledged goods intact to be returned to the pledger, who always had the right to redeem the same and in the eventuality of sate after reasonable notice, the amount realized therefrom was to be adjusted against the debt due---Question of such adjustment would only arise when and if the goods were actually sold---Where, however, the pledged goods were lost, damaged or otherwise not available for delivery to the pledger, in equity, the pledgee could not seek recovery of the debt secured thereby and pledger was entitled to an equitable set off by way of adjustment of the value of the lost pledged goods and could always sue the pledgee for damages for the loss suffered on account of the damaged or lost pledged goods---To deprive the pledger of such right of equitable set off and adjustment could result in grave hardship and inequity as the pledgee might obtain a decree for the debt due for an amount which might be equal to or less than the value of goods pledged and in execution seek recovery thereof against the person and other properties of the pledger leaving him to seek his remedy at a later date---Inequity, thus was more likely to occur in suits instituted under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 where the pledgee financial institution might obtain a decree for recovery through dismissal of a leave application filed by the pledger customer who was then left to seek his remedy through a long cause suit in the same court as he would be required to prove his claim through evidence---Where pledged goods were lost or damaged, the value thereof must be set off and adjusted against the claim of plaintiff financial institutions---Merely because the pledged goods were lost or the pledgee was unable to return the same, however, did not in every eventuality confer upon the pledger a right to an equitable set off nor same was always a complete defence to a suit for recovery of debt secured by the pledge---Liability of pledgee in such eventuality was circumscribed by Ss.151 & 152, Contract Act, 1872---Where equities of the case did not appear to be in favour of the defendants, they were therefore, disentitled to seek the relief of equitable set off, particularly in view of their own acts and omissions---Principles.\n \nA.M. Burq and another v. Central Exchange Bank Ltd. and others PLD 1966 (W.P.) Lah.1; Messrs Muhammad Siddique Muhammad Umar and another v. The Australasia Bank Ltd. PLD 1996 SC 684; Central Bank of India v. Syed Muhammad Abdul Jalil Shah and others 1999 CLC 671; Mst. Talat Nasreen v. United Bank Ltd. and others 2003 CLD 94; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Bright Leather Works and 3 others 1980 CLC 1170; Messrs Taj Sea Food Industries and 2 others v. Messrs United Bank Ltd. and 2 others PLD 1982 Kar. 902; Messrs Crystal Enterprises and 6 others v. Platinum Commercial Bank Ltd. and 2 others 2002 CLD 868: Habib Bank Ltd. v. Kashif Steel Industry and others PLD 2001 Lah. 224; Messrs Fybron Pvt. Ltd. through MD and 2 others v. National Bank of Pakistan through Zonal Chief 2006 CLD 127; Prudential Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hydaw, Ghee Industries Ltd. and 9 others 1999 MLD 1694 and Messrs United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Amin Corporation Ltd. and others PLD 1983 CLC 1559 ref.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n---Ss. 172. 148, 160 & 176---Pledge---Bailment---Default---Rights inter se the parties---Pledge, in terms of 5.172, Contract Act, 1872 is defined as the bailment of goods as security for payment of debt or the performance of a promise---Section 148, Contract Act, 1872 defines bailment as the delivery of goods by one person to another for some purpose upon the contract that they shall, when the purpose is accomplished, be returned or otherwise disposed of according to the directions of the person delivering them---Pledge is a sub-specie of bailment and the purposes for the delivery of goods by way of bailment is the security for payment as mentioned in S.172, Contract Act, 1872 and rights inter se the parties are primarily governed by Chapter IX of the Contract Act, 1872 i.e. from S.148 to S.181---Section 160, Contract Act, 1872 cast a duty for the return of the goods to the pledger when the purpose for which the goods were delivered is accomplished (in case of pledge, repayment of the debt)---In case of default by pledger in making payment of the debt secured by pledge, rights of the pledgee are enumerated in S.176 of the Contract Act, 1872, which include the right to sue for recovery of the debt due retaining the pledged goods as collateral security or he may sell the goods pledged after giving pledger reasonable notice of such sale. \n \n(c) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----Ss. 152 & 151---Loss of goods pledged---Section 152, Contract Act, 1872 requires the pledgee to take care of the goods pledged as a man of ordinary prudence would under similar circumstances take care of his own goods of the same bulk, quality and value as the goods pledged---No other duty in this behalf is cast upon the pledgee except as may be agreed upon between the parties by such contract---Where a loss has been occasioned to the goods and the pledgee has taken care of the same as a man of ordinary prudence would look after his own property and no obligation under a contract, if any, has been violated, then perhaps the liability for such loss may not visit the pledgee nor would the pledger be entitled to any claim of set off against recovery of the debt secured: there must be dereliction of duty either statutory or contractual by the pledgee before he could be held liable under the law---In case of loss or damage of pledged goods, it is always for the pledgee to show that it has fulfilled his obligations both statutory and contractual which is an onerous burden and may require the recording of evidence.\n \nPrudential Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hydari Ghee Industries Ltd. and 9 others 1999 MLD 1694 and Messrs United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Amin Corporation Ltd. and others PLD 1983 CLC 1559 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 10 & 15---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Petition for leave to defend suit by defendants-Mortgage-Financial facilities were granted and availed by the defendants---Record showed that facilities were to be secured by mortgage of the properties---Original title deeds of the said properties were admittedly with the plaintiff-Bank---Factum of the mortgage was duly borne out from the revenue record---Properties in dispute, therefore, had been duly mortgaged with plaintiff-Bank in circumstances---No defence whatsoever had been set up with respect to the amount for which the plaintiff was entitled to an immediate interim decree---Claim of defendants with reference to the equitable set off the pledged goods did not appear to be well founded in fact, in law or in equity and the defence taken was at best illusory---Held consequently, it would be appropriate for the defendants to furnish bank guarantee for the amount claimed as set off if they seek leave to defend the suit---Leave to defend the suit was granted with reference to the amount of the claim subject to defendants' furnishing the bank guarantee for specified amount within 30 days from the day of present order. \n \nMst. Talat Nasreen v. UBL and others. 2003 CLD 94; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Kashif Steel Industry and others PLD 2001 Lah.224; Messrs Crystal Enterprises and 6 others v. Platinum Commercial Bank Ltd. and 2 others 2002 CLD 868: Mian Aftab A. Sheikh and 2 others v. Messrs Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. and another 2003 CLD 702; Bashir Ahmed Mughal v. S.M.E. Bank Ltd. through General Manager and 2 others 2005 CLD 1689.; Messrs Fybron Pvt. Ltd. through Managing Director and others v. National Bank of Pakistan through Zonal Chief 2006 CLD 127; A.M. Burq and another v. Central Exchange Bank Ltd. and others PLD 1996 (W.P.) Lah.1; Messrs Muhammad Siddique Muhammad Umar and another v. The Australasia Bank Ltd. PLD 1996 SC 684; Central Bank of India v. Syed Muhammad Abdul Jalil Shah and others 1999 CLC 671; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Bright Leather Works and 3 others 1980 CLC 1170; Messrs Taj Sea Food Industries and 2 others v. Messrs United Bank Ltd. and 2 others PLD 1982 Kar. 902; Prudential Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hydari Ghee Industries Ltd. and 9 others 1999 MLD 1694 and Messrs United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Amin Corporation Ltd. and others PLD 1983 CLC 1559 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.29 of 2006 and C.M. No.920-B of 2007, decision dated: 25-04-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED, J",
    "": "FAISAL BANK through duly appointed Attorneys--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs ZIMINDARA RICE MILLS and 21 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13669",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2870 = 2007 SLD 2870 = 2007 CLD 1179",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9. 10 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Suit for rendition of accounts---Leave to appear and defend suit---Rejection of plaint---Application for leave to appear and defend suit was allowed, issues were framed---Trial. Court, without recording evidence, vide impugned order, rejected plaint under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. holding that cause of action, did not subsist against the Bank---Plaint had been rejected on account of lack of cause of action, which, on the basis of contents of the plaint and settled principles regarding the rejection of plaint was not a valid order---Question of maintainability of suit for rendition of accounts filed by appellant, was neither raised by Bank before Banking/Trial Court nor same was ground for the rejection of the plaint----Issue about maintainability of the suit had already been framed---Contents of plaint had disclosed a cause of action---Impugned order was set aside and case was remanded to Banking Court for fresh decision---Banking Court, while deciding question of maintainability of suit would take into account the respective pleas of the parties and dispose of the matter in accordance with law. \n \nM/s Friend Engineering, Corporation v. Government of Punjab and 4 others 1991 SCMR 2324 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.466 of 2003, heard on 29-05-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "PIONEER STEEL MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED\nVs.\nUNION BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13670",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2871 = 2007 SLD 2871 = 2007 CLD 1191",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Suit for recovery of loan---Petition for leave to appear and defend suit---Execution proceedings---Challenging decree on plea of fraud and misrepresentation---Petition under S.12(2), C.P.C.--- Plaintiff/ National Development Finance Corporation extended finance facilities to defendant company and repayment of amount of the facilities was secured through personal guarantee of Directors of the company---Defendant-company having failed to repay amount, plaintiff-Corporation brought suit against defendants/ Directors of the company for recovery of amount---One of the Directors of the company filed petition for leave to defend suit, which application .was rejected and suit filed by plaintiff-Corporation was decreed---When execution proceedings of the decree started, legal heirs of. one of the Directors of the company filed petition under S.12(2), C.P.C. which petition having been dismissed, petitioners/legal heirs filed appeal against such dismissal---Said appeal was accepted, order dismissing their petition under S.12(2) C.P.C. was set aside and case was remanded for decision afresh to the extent of liability of predecessor-in-interest of petitioners/legal heirs---One of the sons of deceased appeared as witness and closed their case and no evidence was produced on behalf of decree-holder Corporation---Evidence of son of deceased had revealed that predecessor-in-¬interest of petitioners who was one of the Directors of defendant-company had died about two years before passing of decree and that fact was very much in the knowledge of Director of the company who earlier had filed petition for leave to defend the suit of plaintiff-Corporation--Neither in application for leave to defend suit nor in any other document, Directors/defendants had disclosed the fact of death of father of petitioners/ legal heirs of deceased---No decree could be obtained against a dead person--Petit-toners/legal legal heirs of deceased, were not in the know of the proceedings---Petition filed by petitioners/legal heirs of deceased, was accepted and and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside to the extent of deceased Director of the defendant-company.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M. No.9 of 2004 in B.O.S. No.26 of 1997, decision dated: 26-03-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD QAIM, JAN KHAN, J",
    "": "NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION and others\nVs.\nMian ABDULLAH INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13671",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2872 = 2007 SLD 2872 = 2007 CLD 1194",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.12---Application for setting aside of ex parte decree---Delay of 11 years in making application---Plea in application that address of defendant given in plaint was wrong as he had changed his residence prior to filing of suit by Bank---Proof---Nothing was available on record to show that defendant had informed Bank regarding change of his residence---Address provided by borrower to Bank would be considered address of borrower---Report of Bailiff showed that he had affixed notice outside defendant's office for being closed---Personal notice issued to defendant showed that same was affixed outside his office due to his non-presence there---Execution proceedings were being conducted for a long duration, wherein notices had been issued to defendant and schedule of auction had been published---Liquidation proceedings between defendant and Bank were pending before Company Judge---During pendency of liquidation proceedings, suit or execution of decree could not proceed without permission of Company Judge---Defendant had made such application after issuance of warrants of his arrest without explaining such delay---Application for setting aside ex parte decree was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.127 of 2007, decision dated: 5-06-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND IQBAL HAMEED-UR-RAHMAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs NAQVI DEVELOPERS and others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED\nMessrs Bashir Leather Int. (Pvt.) Limited and 2 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited through Manager 2006 CLD 132 distinguished."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13672",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2873 = 2007 SLD 2873 = 2007 CLD 1205",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.10 & 9---Petition for leave to defend suit---Mere dismissal of petition for leave to defend the suit, does not entitle plaintiff to a decree as prayed in the plaint---Plaintiff on dismissal of petition for leave to defend the suit, is not absolved of its responsibility to prove its case. \n \n(b) Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---Ss.18 & 9---Mark-up, claim of-Held, in a banking transaction, based on Islamic modes of financing only those claims of creditor are permissible which are expressly stipulated in the agreement--Claim of mark-up, based on agreement, can be levied and charged only for the period of agreement/contract---Any mark-up' beyond the period of transaction is not legal---Principles. \n \n(c) Contract Act (IX of 1872) ---\n \n----S.126---Surety ship/guarantee, contract of---Construction---Principles---Contract of surety ship/guarantee is to be construed according to the terms mentioned therein and must be construed strictly so that no liability is imposed on the surety, which is not clearly and distinctively covered by the terms of agreement. \n \nBlest v. Brown 1862 4De GF&J 367 ref.\n \n(d) Contract Act (IX of 1872) ---\n \n----S.126----Contract of guarantee---Nature---Contract of guarantee, is required under law to be specific, identifiable, devoid of uncertainty and must refer to a particular transaction or transactions---Illustration.\n \nFurther the contract of guarantee, is required under law to be specific, identifiable devoid of uncertainty and must refer to a particular transaction or transactions.\n \nIt is possible for the guarantee to be limited as to the type of principal transaction guaranteed. If the principal transaction intended to be the subject of the guarantee is not clearly identified, the guarantee may be void for uncertainty, such as where a guarantee for the performance of the lessee's obligations under a lease could reasonably refer to two leases. Where the guarantee refers to a particular transaction, the surety will not be liable for a 'different transaction or one outside the scope of that guaranteed, such .as where the guarantee relates to a transaction or a given amount but the transaction proceeds for a larger amount, or where the creditor advances monies to the principal under a different facility to the one identified in the guarantee, or where the guarantee is limited to banking transactions and facilities and the creditor owed money in respect of debt discounting goods. \n \nLaw of Guarantees (Second Edition), pp.164 and 165 by Geraldine Mary Andrews and Richard Millett quoted.\n \n(e) Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.18 & 9---Suit for recovery of loan-Letters of guarantee placed on record, did not cover the loans subject-matter of the suit, for various reasons: firstly the agreements referred in the letters of guarantee were neither the subject-matter of the suit nor the same were placed on record; secondly the execution of. letters of personal guarantee and establishment of letters of credit was at different period of times; thirdly the amounts mentioned in the guarantee were altogether different from the one subject-matter of the letters of credit and lastly the guarantee agreement found no support from the plaint---No liability, therefore, could be imposed upon defendants' on the basis of these letters of guarantee.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.28 of 2004, decision dated: 2-04-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK--Plaintiff\nVs.\nEAST AND EXPORTS (PVT.) LTD. and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13673",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2874 = 2007 SLD 2874 = 2007 CLD 1232",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10--Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Leave to defend suit---Condonation of delay---Plaintiffs counsel after submitting replies and partly arguing matter recorded to Court a statement requesting for acceptance of leave application---Banking Court decreed suit after dismissing leave application to be time¬-barred---Validity---Counsel had made such statement with prior consent of plaintiff---Plaintiff had made such concession with awareness of attending circumstances of case---Such concession by itself would constitute a sufficient cause within meaning of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Banking Court had not exercised its jurisdiction properly---High Court set aside impugned /decree and granted to defendant leave to defend suit before Banking Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.349 of 2006, heard on 20-03-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nAHMED ZIA and 10 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13674",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzRFNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2875 = 2007 SLD 2875 = 2007 CLD 1239",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)------Art. 185(3)---Remand order passed by High Court---Validity---Supreme Court would not interfere with such order. \n \nRehmatullah's case 1968 SCMR 337 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n---S.25---State Bank of Pakistan having powers to control advances made by Banking Companies. \n \n(c) Administration of justice---\n \n---Judicial Officers are duty bound to decide cases/applications/objections after judicial application of mind.' \n \nGouranga Mohan Sikdar's case PLD 1970 SC 158 and Mollah Ejahar Ali's case PLD 1970 SC 173 rel.\n \n(d) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---\n \n---S.24-A---Public functionaries are duty bound to decide applications of citizens after judicial application of mind.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.272 of 2007, decision dated: 10-05-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, CH. IJAZ AHMED AND HAMID ALI MIRZA, JJ",
    "": "WAJID SAEED KHAN.\nVs.\nABDUL QADOOS KHAN SWATI and others\nAirport Support Services v. The Airport Manager 1998 SCMR 2268 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13675",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2876 = 2007 SLD 2876 = 2007 CLD 1311",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.9 & 12---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.III, R.4---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Withdrawal of power of attorney by defendant's counsel without prior notice to defendant---Ex parte decree against defendant for his non-appearance after issuance of summons and proclamation for his service---Validity---Withdrawal from prosecution as contemplated by O.III, R.4, C.P.C. was not a unilateral act of a party to suit---Counsel before withdrawing from prosecution was bound to intimate defendant through a notice---Non-appearance of defendant after such intimation. could be considered as wilful default on next date---non-compliance with provision of O.III, R.4, C.P.C. had rendered whole proceedings coram non judice---Defendant had been penalized for such act of his counsel and the court---Issuance of substituted service and ex parte decree on basis of such service was a nullity in the eye of law---Ex parte decree was set aside in circumstances.\n \nHudaybia Textile Mills's case PLD 1987 SC 512; Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. v. Banking Tribunal for Sindh, Balochistan and 2 others 1990 MLD 309 and U.B.L's case 1998 CLC 179 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.9(3)---Summons and proclamation for service of defendant could be issued simultaneously---Principles. \n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss.5 & 9---Suit for recovery of loan amount--Institution of suit in High Court in its original jurisdiction---Effect---Provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 would not apply to High Court for not being a court created thereunder. \n \n(d) Banking Companies. (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.7(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Preamble---Proceedings before Banking Court---Civil Procedure Code, 1908, applicability of---Scope---Court would be bound to apply provisions of C.P.C. in a situation for handling of which no corresponding provision existed in Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advanced, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997. \n \nHudaybia Textile Mills's case PLD 1987 SC 512 and Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. v. Banking Tribunal for Sindh, Balochistan and 2 others 1990 MLD 309 ref.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.V, R.20---Substituted service, ordering for---Essentials---Provision of O.V, R.20, C.P.C., was mandatory, thus, its non-compliance would render whole proceedings as coram non judice---Court for ordering such service must record definite finding that defendant was avoiding service---Such findings ordinarily were recorded on basis of report of Process-Server, who had taken pains in searching defendant. \n \nMajor Syed Walayat Shah's case PLD 1971 SC 184 ref.\n \nSikandar Mehmood's case PLD 1998 Lah.118 and Mst. Sardaran Begum's case 1993 CLC 2303 rel.\n \n(f) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of application for---Delay, condonation of---Defendant's plea was that he came to know about decree, when he received notice in execution application---Such plea was supported by defendant's affidavit and was not denied by plaintiff---Delay was condoned in .circumstances. \n \n(g) Power of Attorney---\n \n----Power of attorney showing executee to have powers to file appeal, review, revision and perform all other necessary acts for prosecution of suit---Effect-- Authority of executee to file application for setting aside ex parte decree would be deemed to have been delegated impliedly.",
    "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Miscellaneous No.20 of 2005, decision dated: 8-06-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "GHULAM MUSTAFA MUGHAL, J",
    "": "NATLONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, BRANCH MIRPUR--Applicant\nVs.\nMIAN MUHAMMAD SUGAR MILLS, BHIMBER, AZAD KASHMIR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13676",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2877 = 2007 SLD 2877 = 2007 CLD 1324",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract-------Exclusive jurisdiction clause in an agreement---Such clause in a contract is part of consideration of the agreement between the parties on the basis of which parties enter into a contract and such consideration should not be ignored lightly particularly merely at the whims of one of the parties to the contract. \n \n(b) Contract---\n \n----Intention of parties---Determination of---Held, to discover the intention of parties to a contract documents/agreement as a whole has to be read.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--\n \n----O. VII, Rr.10 & 11---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Agency contract between a foreign principal and agent in Pakistan---Termination of such contract---Suit for declaration and recovery---Application by defendant (foreign company) under O. VII, Rr.10 & 11, C.P.C. for stay of the suit and to direct the plaintiff to file his claim for adjudication before a foreign court on the basis of foreign jurisdiction clause in their Agency. contract---Contentions of the defendant were that clause of the Agency contract, conferring exclusive jurisdiction to a foreign Court (Germany) by treating like a foreign arbitration clause, the suit was liable to be stayed; that claim of the plaintiff as per laws of Pakistan was barred by time, however, in terms of the German laws was not hit by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908 and that the plaintiff, if had any claim could get the relief claimed from the court at Germany; that there was no reciprocal agreement between Government of Pakistan and Germany and accordingly, if any decree was passed by the Pakistan court, same could not be executed in Court of Germany and for the recovery of the amount in decree, if any, the plaintiff would have to approach the court of Germany---Plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that clause of exclusive jurisdiction was uncertain and vague and accordingly the jurisdiction of the court on such vague clause could not be ousted; that said clause of the Agency Contract was a void clause and proceedings could not be stayed on the basis of such void clause under S.28, Contract Act, ,1872; that High Court (Pakistan) .not only had jurisdiction, but in fact the appropriate court to adjudicate the matter as regard the termination letter of the Agency and other correspondence were in English and Courts in Pakistani were better experienced in dealing English language and its interpretation than the German Courts. where German language was court language; that Courts in Pakistan were more economical and cost effective than the Courts in Germany and all evidence was available in Pakistan; that sales of defendant's goods were procured in Pakistan and all expenses were incurred by plaintiff in Pakistan and that Courts rarely disturb the plaintiffs choice of forum and would not do so unless the balance of factors was strongly in favour of the defendant---Validity---Held, with the advancement of science and technology the question of convenience and inconvenience of parties was not so material to wriggle out from. the validly constituted agreement between them---No reciprocal agreement between Germany and Pakistan being in existence, as such even if any decree was passed by High Court of Pakistan same could not be executed in the Court of .Germany as foreign ---Application guider O.VII, Rr.10 & 11, C.P.C. by the defendant in circumstances, was granted and the proceedings in the suit were stayed by the High Court with the observations that plaintiff, if so advised, could approach for adjudication of his claim before the Court at Germany. \n \nM.A. Chowdhury v. Messrs. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. and 3 others PLD 1970 SC 373; CGM (Companies General Maritime; v. Hussain Akbar 2002 CLD 1528; M/s Travel Automation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Abacus International (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others, 2006 CLD 497; Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansules Ltd. (The \"\"Spiliada\"\") (1987) 1 Lloyd's p.1; Evans Marshall and Co, Ltd v. Bertola S.A. and another (1973) 1 WLR 349; Standard Insurance Co. v. Pak Garments Ltd. .1998 SCMR 1239; State Life Insurance Corporation v. Rana Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others v. T. K. Nanjunda Setty and Sons and others AIR 1964 Mysore 147 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.146, C. M.As. Nos.5848 and 2448 of 2006, decision dated: 23rd January, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "LIGHT INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD through Director--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs ZSK STICKMASCHINEN GmbH and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13677",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2878 = 2007 SLD 2878 = 2007 CLD 1336",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Privatization Commission Ordinance (XXV of 200l)-------S.2(a)---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.2(h), 10 & 31---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Rejection of bid---Validly enforceable contract---Bids were incited through newspapers for sale of properties---Petitioners submitted their bids in response to said advertisement---Petitioners were incited ,for further negotiation with the Committee constituted by Privatization Commission and .after negotiation, petitioners improved their bids, on which said bids were recommended by the Committee to Sindh Cabinet Committee on Privatization, which rejected bid of petitioners---Petitioners, in their constitutional petitions had challenged said rejection contending the same to be illegal, arbitrary and violative of rules of natural justice---Petitioners had also claimed that a 'concluded contract' had come into being and that they had acquired some nested rights in the subject properties---Petitioners had contended that High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, was competent to review administrative action of authorities being violative of principles of natural justice and liable to be struck down---Validity---Inciting bid was in fact an invitation to offer, which, unless accepted and confirmed by competent authority, would create no enforceable contract nor would it create any right in favour of highest bidder---Unless an offer was accepted unconditionally no enforceable contract would come into being---Where acceptance was contingent or conditional, then it would amount to a counter proposal---Unless the contingency was met or condition was complied with or the counter proposal was unconditionally accepted, it could not be said that a valid contract was born---Competent authority in the present case was Sindh Cabinet Committee on Privatization and Sindh Privatization Commission had acted merely as an agent to said competent authority---Mere making highest bid by itself would not constitute any valid and enforceable contract unless there was unqualified acceptance by competent Authority which, in the present case, was missing---High Court could not exercise extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction in favour of petitioners in the facts and circumstances of the case. \n \nBalochistan Construction Company v. Port Qasim Authority 2001 YLR 2716; Pacific Multinational Ltd. v. LG. of Police PLD 1992 Kar. 283; Abdulah and Co. v. Province of Sindh 1992 MLD 293; Dada Bhoy Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1995 Kar. 33; Muhammad Ashraf v. Privatization Board 2002 MLD 550; Pakistan Steel Products v. Indus Steel Pipes Limited 1996 CLC 118; Munshi Muhammad v. Faizanul Haq 1971 SCMR 533; Pervez Qureshi v. Settlement Commissioner, Multan and Bhawalpur and others 1974 SCMR 337; Afzal Maqsood Butt v. Banking Court No.1 PLD 2005 SC 470; Petrosin Products (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2001 CLC 1412; Bagh Constriction Company v. Federation of Pakistan 2001 YLR 2791 and City School (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Privatization Commission of Pakistan 2002 CLC 1158 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--\n \n----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Executive and administrative action and decision tainted with mala fide, arbitrariness, and lacking transparency and fair play, in appropriate cases could be subjected to judicial review. \n \nIttehad Cargo Services v. Syed Tasneem Hussain Naqvi PLD 2001 SC 121 and Messrs Airport Support Service v. Airport Manager 1998 SCMR 2268 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.Ps. Nos. D-609 and D-902 of 2006, decision dated: 13-10-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND MAQBOOL BAGAR, JJ",
    "": "Dr. TARIQ MEHMOOD MEMON\nVs.\nPROVINCE OF SINDH through Chief Secretary and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13678",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2879 = 2007 SLD 2879 = 2007 CLD 1346",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 19, 15, 9 & 22---Sale of mortgaged property in execution proceedings---Confirmation of said sale by the High Court---Sale was set aside by Supreme Court on appeal---Contention of the debtor (who had paid to the Bank Rs.26.4 million out of Rs.32.418 million) was that sale having been set aside, auction purchaser had no right to retain the possession of the property---Validity---Held, order under which the property was sold and delivered to the said auction-purchaser having been set aside by the Supreme Court, by all means, the debtors were entitled to be restituted.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.330 of 2006, heard on 20-06-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD WASEEM IFTIKHAR AHMAD and another\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation and 6others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13679",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2880 = 2007 SLD 2880 = 2007 CLD 1348",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 7, 10 & 14---Suit far recovery of loan amount with mark¬up---Defendant company had not disputed any entry which showed disbursement of the amount and had also not claimed that any amount which defendants repaid was not reflected in the statements but had disputed all entries with. regard to marls-up appearing in the statements of account---Determination of incidence of mark-up---Procedure---Outstanding balances of each of the four accounts held by the defendants without the incidence of mark-up could be arrived at by first deducting repayments from the disbursed amounts and then deduction of .all entries of mark up; thereafter mark-up permissible under the law could be added to the aggregate of outstanding balances of the four accounts in order to arrive at the final liability of defendant. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----Ss. 7, 10 & 14---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Defendant had not disputed any entry which showed disbursement of the amount and had also not claimed that any amount which it repaid was not reflected in the statements of account---Application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed and suit: was decreed with cost of funds at the rate notified by the State Bank of Pakistan:--Recoveries were ordered to be effected first through sale of mortgaged properties belonging to the defendant-company, in case the value of mortgaged properties was not sufficient to cover the decretal amount, then recoveries were to be made from the assets of the rest of the defendants except one who stood guarantor to company's liability and a consent order was passed in the connected suit whereby it was agreed by the parties that recovery of the decretal sum shall not be made from the guarantor but shall first be made from the rest of the defendants and only if any sum still remained to be recovered out of the decretal amount only then recovery shall be made from the guarantor---Executing Court; in view of such consent order, shall glue effect to it while executing the present decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-27 of 2005, C.M.As. Nos. 11151 and 11152 of 2006, decision dated: 22-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB, J",
    "": "Messrs SAUDIPAK COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nMessrs PAN PACIFIC (PRIVATE) LTD. and 9 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13680",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2881 = 2007 SLD 2881 = 2007 PCRLJ 1299",
    "Key Words:": "Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)----Preamble---Complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 cannot be entertained where the matter of possession of the relevant property is being regulated by a civil or revenue court---Principles.\nZahoor Ahmad and 5 others v. The State and 3 others PLD 2007 Lah. 231 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Intra-Court Appeal No.77 of 2007, decided on 17th April, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "Before Mian Hamid Farooq and Iqbal Hameedur Rahman, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL HAQ and others----Appellants\nVs\nADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE and others----Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13681",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2882 = 2007 SLD 2882 = 2007 CLD 1352",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 2(d)(e)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art, 199---Constitutional petition--Alternate remedy, availability of---Car financing---Default in payment of instalments---Confiscation of car by Bank---Contentions of respondent Bank were that petitioner had alternate remedy available by way of filing a civil suit before the Banking Court; that High Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter and petition was liable to be dismissed anal that there was factual controversy in the case, as matter was not only qua the payment of some instalments---Petitioner's contention was that there was no factual controversy and case was a simple matter of payment of four instalments, which were dire against the petitioner, which he was ready to pay instantly---Validity---Held, as far as filing of suit before the Banking Court was concerned, it would take years and years and the car, which had been taken into custody by the Bank, would be damaged---Petitioner being ready to pay outstanding instalments to the Bank, no factual controversy was involved in the case, there/ore, petitioner was directed by the High Court to pay four outstanding instalments to the Bank within two days and the Bank thereafter would release the car forthwith to the petitioner and in future if any default was made in payment of instalments by the petitioner, the Bank would have a right to confiscate the car. \n \n2004 CLD 257; 2005 CLD 1662 and. Muhammad Aslam v. Senior Member (Colonies) Board of Revenue, Punjab and others 2004 SCMR 1587 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.5693 of 2007, decision dated: 29-06-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHAWAJA MUHAMMAD SHARIF, J",
    "": "SHAUKAT ALI\nVs.\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN and 2others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13682",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2883 = 2007 SLD 2883 = 2007 CLD 1354",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.10 & 7---Respondent-Bank filed a suit against appellants for recovery of loan---Application for leave to defend -suit was dismissed and claim of Bank was decreed---Contention raised by appellants was that the Loan in question had been secured through hypothecation of stock which was lost---Said stock had been insured and Bank was also a beneficiary of such insurance, therefore, Bank was only entitled to receive claim from Insurance Company and that future mark up could not have been granted---Contentions were repelled as appellants were unable to show from the documents admittedly executed between the parties that liability of appellants would cease in case of loss of hypothecated goads---Defence taken by appellants, at the best was illusionary as receipt of loan amount was not disputed nor it had been disputed at the bar that a certain sum was otherwise due from the appellants---High Court, however, deemed it appropriate that appellants be granted leave to defend .suit subject to deposit of liability of Rs.2,40,000.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.506 of 2006, heard on 6-02-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMNIAD IRFAN QAMAR and another\nVs.\nS.M.E. BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13683",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2884 = 2007 SLD 2884 = 2007 CLD 1356",
    "Key Words:": "(a) State Bank of Pakistan B.P.D. Circular No. 29, dated 15-10-2002--------Cl.12---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.13---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Settlement of dispute under incentive scheme--Defendant had not paid 10% of the amount, as required under B.P.D. Circular\nNo.29, had not accepted the forced sale value determined by the valuer and no agreement in terms of Cl. 12 of B.P.D. Circular No.29 was entered into between the parties---Bank had rightly refused to accept the request made by the defendant for settlement of claim under the incentive scheme.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----S.10---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Leave to defend suit---Defendants had not denied the financial facilities granted to them by the Bank and/or received by them, the execution of documents had also not been denied by the defendants---Defendants, in circumstances, were not entitled to leave to defend the suit. \n \nTanya Knitwear (Pvt.) Ltd. v. United Bank Limited and others 2005 CLD 114; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Pakasaco Limited 2005 CLD 422; P.Q. Chemicals v. A.W. Brothers and others 2005 CLD 169; Captain P.Q. Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs. A. W. Brothers and others 2004 SCMR 1956; Muhammad Ayub Khan and others v. Muhammad Farooq Textile Mills Ltd. and others 2004 PLC 250; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Azmat Textile Mills Limited 2002 CLD 542; Hashwani Hotels Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 315; Perma Constrict (Pvt.) Limited v. Habib Jute Mills Ltd. 2002 CLD 166 and Messrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Ltd. and 6 others v. National Development Finance Corporation, Karachi PLD 2002 SC 500 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suits Nos.1445 of 1999, C.M.As. Nos. 7805, 7806 of 2002, 4494 of 2003, 147, 148 of 2004, 7956 of 2006 and B-2 of 2004, decision dated: 27-03-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs A.I. BROTHERS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13684",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2885 = 2007 SLD 2885 = 2007 CLD 1362",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90---Execution of decree-- Auction of -debtor's property---Applicant claiming to have purchased property from debtor objected to its auction on ground of certain irregularities and fraud--Confirmation of sale of property and dismissal of objection petition by Executing Court---Validity---Parties settled their dispute before Appellate Court in the terms that auction purchaser would be compensated by paying .him specified amount over and above auction price, resultantly court sale would stand cancelled; that in suit for specific performance pending between applicant and debtor, names of auction purchaser and decree holder-Bank joined as party would stand deleted; and that applicant and debtor would have no objection, if auction purchaser applied for refund of stamp duty paid by him---High Court on such terms disposed of appeal while cancelling court sale in favour of auction purchaser.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 111 of 2006, decision dated: 22-02-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN, JJ",
    "": "SHAFAT ARMED\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD IRSHAD and 3others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13685",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2886 = 2007 SLD 2886 = 2007 CLD 1365",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.16(3)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 561 A---Car financing---Default in lease---Recovery/re-possession of car from lessee by Agent of Leasing Company---Validity---Head, before taking any action for recovery/re-possession of the car from the lessee no notice or intimation was given by the Leasing Company or by its Agents nor any reasonable opportunity at any time was given to the alleged defaulter in lease, therefore the action by both the Leasing Company and its Agents was totally unjustified and they had wrongly exercised direct power to recover the lease article in terms of S.16(3)(a), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Lessee may seek its remedy as provided by proviso to subsection (3) of S.16 of the Ordinance---Petition for quashing of proceedings under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. was disposed of by the High Court by setting aside the order of the Magistrate to that extent---High Court, however, observed that situation coming out in the petition was alarming one as a company or body could not be authorized to take law in its own hands on its own justification without any notice etc: as, sometimes, it could create serious problem if any resistance was offered by the borrower/customer---High Court directed that matter be referred to the Provincial Home Secretary to realize the situation and see as to what extent recovery force could be applied in such-like cases and who would be responsible if any untoward incident was caused to either party and iii such a situation what would be the role and excuse of police---Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan was also directed to check Memorandum and Articles of the Association of both the companies to have a check on misuse of their Memorandum and Articles of Association as simple mentioning of any name or object in their memorandum would not empower the concerned company to take refuge from any illegality under its memorandum.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.118 of 2006, decision dated: 22-06-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "BABER SHEIKH--Applicant\nVs.\nTHE STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13686",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2887 = 2007 SLD 2887 = 2007 CLD 1369",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.9---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), Ss.41 & 59 A---Suit for recovery of -loan amount by Bank---Mortgaged property---Applicant as purchaser of property through a court decree claimed to be bona fide purchaser having no knowledge- about mortgage'--Validity---Property being mortgaged, when not redeemed, would always be subject to recovery of loan by enforcing mortgage-- Applicant could not take up plea of bona fide purchaser, even if he had bought property through a court decree-- Amount paid by applicant to transferor was neither towards return of loan amount of Bank nor was paid to Bank---Applicant for commission of any fraud or misrepresentation by transferor might take legal proceedings against him---Property mortgaged for discharge of loan could not be absolved of charge/encumbrance on account of such plea of applicant---Suit was decreed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.460 of 2000, heard on 14-04-2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J",
    "": "DOST MUHAMMAD \nVs.\nHOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13687",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2888 = 2007 SLD 2888 = 2007 CLD 1371",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9(5), 12 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Appellant against whom ex parte decree was passed, had pleaded non-service of summons in the suit filed by respondent-Bank against him---Banking Court had referred to service of nonce of proceedings on the appellant by publication in two Dailies---Reference had also been made to the report of Postal Authority on registered A.D. notice which had noted that appellant/addressee, had refused to accept service---A.D. Form contained another note by the Postman recording that appellant had moved and was available at a different address---Process server's report had created doubt as to service being effected on appellant in compliance with provisions of S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Case was one wherein appellant could at best be deemed to have been served through notice by publication alone---Bailiff did not serve summons and conflicting reports of the Postman, had rendered service of appellant by registered A.D. to be doubtful---Rejection in limine of appellant's application for setting aside ex parte decree passed against him, filed tinder S.12 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 by impugned order, was inappropriate---Impugned order was set aside and matter was remanded to the Banking Court for consideration afresh after granting hearing to the parties and providing opportunity to lead evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.7 of 2003, heard on 22-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JJ",
    "": "Mst. ZARINA SHAMIM\nVs.\nZARAI TARQIATI BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13688",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2889 = 2007 SLD 2889 = 2007 CLD 1374",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----Ss. 9, 10 &. 14---Suit for recovery of loan by the bank---Application for leave to defend suit---Defendant seeking deduction of amounts which it claimed were based on, wrong debit entries---Neither such objection was raised in the leave to defend application nor even at argument stage---Detailed statement of account was filed by Bank along with its affidavit; statement of account showed debit entries of finances which were availed by the defendant company from time to time and credit entries of repayment made to the Bank; after adjusting the repayments a specified sum was left as outstanding amount and-this amount was without the incidence of mark-up and claim of mark-up had been filed which showed carious debit entries for charging mark-up from time to time---High Court, after determination of outstanding amount on the basis of the amount actually availed and the repayments made by the defendant company as reflected in the debit and credit entries wherein none of the debit entries had been identified by the defendant company to be erroneous, application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed and suit was decreed against the defendants in a specified amount along with cost of funds, chargeable at the State Bank's approved rates uptill such time the entire decretal amount was recovered---Recoveries were ordered to be effected first through sale of mortgaged properties to the defendant company and in case the value of mortgaged properties was not sufficient to cover the decretal amount, then recoveries were to be made from the assets of the other defendants. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----S. 9---Suit for recovery of loan by the Bank---Claim of mark-up---Scope and extent---Plaintiff--Bank can claim mark-up on a facility only to the extent agreed upon under the contract of finance and that too which is arrived at after deducting the rebate on mark-up.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-31 of 2005 and C.M.A. No.296 of 2006, decision dated: 22-01-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB, J",
    "": "Messrs SAUDI PAK COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs MARVI AGROCHEM (PRIVATE) LTD. and 9 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13689",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2890 = 2007 SLD 2890 = 2007 CLD 1407",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Lease--- ---- \"\"Financial lease\"\" and \"\"operating lease\"\"---Distinction illustrated.\n \nDistinction between 'Financial Lease' as opposed to 'Operating Lease' can be summarized as follows:--\n \nFinancial Lease\nOperating Lease\nFinancial lease is a long term ¬lease on fixed assets, the same may not be cancelled by either party.\nOperating Lease is a non-pay out lease which may be cancelled by the lessee prior to its expiration.\nIn financial lease the leasing company buys the equipment and leases it to the lessee.\nThe sum of all the lease payments by the lessee does not necessarily fully provide for the recovery of the assets cost.\nIt is a full payout lease involving obligatory payment by the lessee to the lessor that exceeds the purchase price of the leased property and financial cost.\nIn operating lease sphere of operation is limited which generally cover those goods which could be, needed by different users.\nFinancial Lease is a lease that transfers substantially all the risks and rewards incident to ownership of an asset. Lessor is only a financier and is not interested in the assets.\nIn Operating Lease, the lessor will have the continuing interest in the leased equipment and thereby undertakes to bear the maintenance etc. Lessor retains the usual risks and rewards that come from the ownership of the assets.\nThe Financial.Lease is not cancellable by the lessee prior to its expiration date:\nThe Operating Lease is cancellable by the lessee prior to its expiration.\nThe Financial Lease provides for maintenance services at the cost of lessee.\nThe lessor provides service, maintenance and insurance.\nThe asset is fully amortized over the life of the lease.\nUnder such lease the equipment cost is not fully amortized over the leased tenure.\nThe lessee has the use of the asset for 75% or more of the estimated economic life of the leased property.\nSuch lease is usually for a short period i.e. less than 75% of the estimated life of the assets, which period may not be adequate to recover to the full extent the investment in the asset.\nThe present value al the beginning of the, lease term of the minimum amounts payable under the lease (exclusive of amounts payable for insurance, maintenance and similar normal outgoings) is at least equal to 90% of the cost of the leased assets net of investment grants.\n \nThe lessor makes payment for the cost of the asset and remains the owner of such equipment and. permits the use of equipment to the lessee for a specified period of tune against the rentals.\n \nDuring the period of lease, the lessee must fulfil the obligations irrespective of the fact. whether the asset remains in use or becomes obsolete.\n \nIn case of default committed by the lessee in payment of lease money the lessor has recourse to the leased asset as the owner.\n \n \n \nThe operating lease is anon-pay-out lease in which the lessor's obligations may include services attached to the leased property such as maintenance, repair and technical advice. A good example of an operating lease is a lease for telephone service wherein the Telephone Department renders all such services for the leased telephone equipment against fixed uniform rentals from the users. Furthermore, the Operating. Lease generally cover those goods which could be needed by different users which includes goods that are not peculiar to one kind of industry i.e. the things that many different kinds of lessees can use, like air conditioners, which could be used in offices, hospitals, laboratories and cars etc. Thus the equipments/machineries, like the buses cannot be included in the category far Operating Lease. \n \nNormally the rentals or charges for any machinery is maximum for a new machine and may decrease over the period of its use. \n \nLease Financing and Hire Purchase 4th Edn. by Dr. J.C. Verma ref.\n \n(b) Lease---\n \n----Financial Lease---Rentals or charges' for any machinery is maximum for a new machine and may decrease over the period of its use. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9, 10 & 15---Suit for recovery of financial lease money of buses leased to defendants---Default by lessee---Remedies available to the lessor---Record showed, that defendants defaulted to pay several instalments as per lease agreement and failed to get the insurance polices of the leased vehicles renewed on expiry of the insurance policies---Such being obligations on the part of defendants and by their acts and omissions, plaintiff/Bank became entitled to act in pursuance of the terms agreed to between the parties and effect recovery of the amount in pursuance of the provisions of Financial institutions (Recovery ofFinances) Ordinance, 2001---Principles.\n \nHadley v. Baxendale (1854), 9 Ex. 341; 156 E.R. 145; Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman-Industry Ltd. (1949) 2 KB 528; (1949) 1 All.ER 997; Humphrey Motors Ltd. v. Ells, (1935) SCR 249; Financings Ltd. v. Baldock, (1963) 1 All.ER 443; Buchanan v. Byrnes (1906), 3 CLR 704; Hughes v. N.Ls. (Pvt.) Ltd. (1966) WAR 100; Pigott Construction Co. v. W.J. Crowe Ltd. (1961), 27 DLR (2d) 258; Alkok v. Grymek, (1968) SCR 452; Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., (1962) 2 Q.B. 26; Cehave N.V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H., the Hansa Nord'; (1976) Q.B.44; Johnson v. Agnew, (1980) AC 367; (1979) 1 All. ER 883; Moschi v. Lep Air Services Ltd., (1973) AC 331; (1972) 2 All.ER 393; Red Deer College v. Michaels, (1976) 2 SCR 324 and Keneric Tractor Sales Ltd. v. Langille, (1987) 2 SCR 440 ref.\n \n(d) Lease---\n \n----Financial lease---Default by lessee---Damages---Remedies available to the lessor.\n \nThe modern view is that when one party repudiates the contract and the other party accepts the repudiation, the contract is at this point terminated or brought to an end. The contract is not, however, rescinded in the true legal sense, i. e. in the sense of being void ab initio by some vitiating element. The parties are discharged of their prospective obligations under the contract as from the date of termination but the prospective obligations embodied in the contract are relevant to the assessment of damages. Such is the law for contracts generally and it is this law which should apply equally to breaches of chattel lease. \n \nHadley v. Baxendale (1854), 9 Ex. 341, 156 E.R. 145; Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industry Ltd. (1949) 2 KB 528; (1949) 1 All. ER 997; Humphrey Motors Ltd. v. Ells, (1935) SCR 249; Financings Ltd. v. Baldock, (1963) 1 All. ER 443; Buchanan v. Byrnes (1906), 3 CLR 704; Hughes v. N.Ls. (Pvt.) Ltd. (1966) WAR 100; Pigott Construction Co. v. W.J. Crowe Ltd. (1961), 27 DLR (2d) 258; Alkok v. Grymek, (1968) SCR 452; Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., (1962) 2 Q.B. 26; Cehave N.V. v. Brerner Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H., the 'Hansa Nord'; (1976) Q.B.44; Johnson v. Agnew, (1980) AC 367; (1979) 1 All. ER 884; Moschi v. Lep Air Services Ltd., (1973) AC 331; (1972) 2 All. ER 393; Red Deer College v. Michaels, (1976) 2 SCR 324 and Keneric Tractor Sales Ltd. v. Langille (1987) 2 SCR 440 ref.\n \n(e) Lease--\n \n----Operating lease---Default in payment or discontinuation of lease by lessee---Remedies available to the lessor.\n \nWhere an operating lease is extended under a written contract extending over a fixed tenure the .remedy available to the lessor in case of default in payment or discontinuation of the lease by the lessee would be to lease out the property elsewhere and to recover the amount of difference, if any, from the lessee for the .un-expired period of lease under written contract in addition to the higher lease charges for the period that the property remained with the lessee. \n \n(f) Lease---\n \n----Financial lease---Main business of lessor not hiring of machinery but that of providing finance for purchase of chattels or machinery to be Leased---Default by lessee-~-Remedies available to the lessor.\n \nCases involving financial lease, where the main business of the lessor is not that of hiring of machinery but it is that of providing finance for purchase of chattels or machinery to be leased out on lease suitable to the particular needs and requirements of the specific lessee. Default in such cases of financial lease can be distinguished from that in case of an operating lease. However as in such cases the lessor indulges only to the extent of financing which is his main vocation, the ordinary course to be followed to minimize the losses would be to dispose of the chattel or machinery. The amount of sale proceeds be adjusted towards the unpaid instalments due for the entire tenure of the lease under contract. The' balance outstanding, if any, may be recovered from the lessee to secure the agreed amount of return and the finance, as already stipulated under the terms of the agreement between the parties. \n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of .Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----S. 10---Suit for recovery of advanced amount by Bank---Application for leave to defend suit by defendants---Validity---All he figures had been settled and worked out by the parties in their agreement in specific detail at the time of agreement which also provided for agreed loss in case of default and from such amount of agreed losses the defendants were entitled to adjustments out of auction proceeds of items, hence no ground for grant of leave to defend the suit was made out.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M.As. Nos. 476 and 477 of 2006 in Suit No.B-33 of 2005, decision dated: 27-07-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERWEZ, J",
    "": "KASB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs TRANS LIMA PRIVATE LIMITED and 4others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13690",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2891 = 2007 SLD 2891 = 2007 CLD 1424",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.9 & 17---Suit for recovery of Loan by Bank---Production of incomplete accounts of the subject-matter loan fails to meet the object of Financial 6tsfitutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Principles. \n \nMessrs United Dairies Farms (Pvt.) Ltd. and 4 others v. United Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 569 fol.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----Ss.9 & 17---State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29, dated 15-10-2002---Plea of relief under BPD Circular No.29---Validity---Suit for recovery of local by Bank---Original statement of accounts filed with the suit was incomplete in material particulars both with regard to the amount and the date of disbursement of loan to the defendant company---Correct version of the account filed later by the Bank conflicted with the contents of the plaint---Date of disbursement of finance,. in an ordinary case, may be significant, inter alia, for ascertaining the effective date for applying or calculating the quantum of mark-up, however, in the facts of the present case, the date of disbursement of loan assumed greater importance because under the agreed terms contained in the sanction advice that date determined the date of repayment of the loan and consequently .the date of commission of default, if any, by the defendant-Company---Supplemental statement of account had furnished the basis for the defendant-Company to advance its plea under BPD Circular No.29---Rights of a customer of a financial institution, in the present case, the defendant-Company, to be considered for settlement under BPD Circular No.29 was backed by law---Prima facie, such a right of the defendant-Company overrides its contractual obligation and hence the claim of Bank as framed in the present suit is admissible---Continuing default committed prior to 15-10-1999 qualified the case of a defaulting customer for classification and relief under State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29---Principles. \n \nUnited Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Azmat Textile Mills Ltd. 2002 CLD 542 and Hashwani Hotels Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 315 fol.\n \n(c) State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No. 29, dated 15-10-2002---\n \n----Legal effect of circular guidelines by the State Bank of Pakistan. \n \nUnited Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Amat Textile Mills Ltd. 2002 CLD 542 and Hashwani Hotels Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 315 ref.\n \n(d) State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No. 29, dated 15-10-2002---\n \n----Whether an unperformed re-schedulement can oust a defaulting customer from qualifying for relief under Circular No.29 is a question which, if raised., would also require consideration. \n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----Ss.9 & 17---State Bank of. Pakistan BPD Circular No.29, dated 15-10-2002---Suit for recovery of Loan by Bank---Defendant-Company seeking leave to defend the suit and relief under BPD Circular No.29---Record showed that the original statement of account submitted by the Bank was wrong in material particulars---Such a statement of account formed a foundational document to sustain a claim for recovery made by a financial institution---Bank, in the present case, was allowed to cure the defect contained in the original statements of account filed with the suit---Had the cured defect been superficial or of a technical nature, the objection to leave to defend the suit might have deserved indulgence--Plaintiff-Bank sought to recover public money advanced to its customers, therefore, technical and superficial objections could not be allowed to arrest the progress of the suit as contemplated by law--Defect in the plaint did affect the progress of the suit and the petition for leave to appeal on its merits---Suit as a banking claim, in circumstances, was not enough to sanctify the basis given or the quantum claimed in such a suit---Suit should not progress on account of a defective document attached to it, but prima facie, such a defective document could not bar a suit that had. otherwise been filed within time---Classification rendered with regard to defective documents by the Bank had confirmed inconsistency between the plaint, the charge documents and the supplemental statement of account with regard to the amount of Loan disbursed and .the date of its disbursement---Such information had material bearing on the right of defendant-Company to oppose the claim filed in the suit---Such right was derived from BPD Circular No.29 which had both substantive content ,and also effect---Defence was eclipsed by the irregularity m a suit document for failing to meet the statutory mandate under S.9(1)(2)(3) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--Removal of defects v2 documents by the Bank had exposed the incorrectness of the plaint anal new situation clearly presented a different claim of the plaintiff-Bank apart from fortifying a new defence plea under BPD Circular No.29---Change in the claim justified the grant of a right to the defendants to present their defence afresh and thus their new plea was admissible---High Court granted leave to appear and defend the suit inter alia to show that the defendant-Company qualified for relief under BPD Circular No.29 and therefore, the suit could not proceed unless the case of defended company was first considered and disposed of on merits wider the said circular by the plaintiff-Bank---Grant of leave to the defendant was on the condition that the defendant-Company shall furnish security in the amount of the mark-up price under the finance agreement through a surety bond to the satisfaction of the Registrar of the High Court. \n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Duty. of Court---Duly is cast on the Court to decide all claims filed before it strictly in accordance with law, even though these n ray be undefended---Court, in discharge of said duty, has to direct the Bank to also justify its position for claiming interest as part of marked-up price under its Islamic Finance agreement, and in any event for claiming a decree for an amount exceeding the marked-up price agreed in that financial agreement. \n \nMessrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Laboratories v. MCB 1999 SCMR 2353 fol.\n \n(g) State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No. 29, dated 15-10-2002---\n \n----BPD Circular No. 29 has substantive content and effect.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "COS No.56 of 2002 and P.L.As. Nos.48-B, 42-B of 2003, 60-B of 2006, decision dated: 23rd July, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs MODerN LEATHERS and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13691",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2892 = 2007 SLD 2892 = 2007 CLD 1555",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 19 & 22---Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance (L of 2000), S.10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66 & 89---Execution of decree---Confirmed sale of mortgaged property through public auction under order of the court---Objection of -debtors was about nominal sale, consideration as against the two offers made by them before the Court in terms of applications but no allegation was made about collusive, mala fide or illegal acts having been committed during the process of such sale---Judgment and decree under execution passed in suit followed by preparation of final decree-was not challenged in appeal by the -debtors---Such conduct of -debtors showed that not only the said decree had attained finality and was to be satisfied by the -debtors but they had also, at the earlier stage of the proceedings, accepted such liability to be paid to the Bank---Record showed that prior to the sale of the properties, another property was sold in the execution proceedings of the same decree, but the -debtors did not object to such sale though the Court which had also attained finality---Possession. of the two properties in question was admittedly obtained by the Nazir of the High Court much prior to the sale of these properties in favour of the auction-purchasers which was more .than sufficient notice of the execution proceedings to the -debtors, but even then they did not opt to attend/pursue or contest execution proceedings---During the period when the properties in question were competently sold through CIRC and soon thereafter the .market value of the immovable properties in the urban areas of the city, particularly in the areas where the properties in question were situated, had multiplied in no time; and it was in, such circumstances that the -debtor had given a second thought and opted to challenge confirmed transaction of sale of properties in favour of auction purchaser on the pretext of two applications---Grievance about low price raised by the -debtors, seemed to be unjustified and an afterthought in circumstances and their case was clearly hit by the ratio of Supreme Court in the case of Hudaibia Textile Mills Ltd v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 1987 SC 512. \n \nMessrs Ripple Jewellers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. First Women Bank 2003 CLD 1318; Mrs. Shahida Saleem and another v. Habib. Credit and Exchange Bank and 4 others 2001 CLC 126; Mazarul Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim; Commercial Bank Ltd. and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706; Messrs National Electric Co. of Pakistan v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and 2 others 1996 CLC 192; Nani Gopal Paul v. Prasad Singh and others AIR 1995 SC 1971; Messrs Nizamudin & Co. and 4 others v. Messrs Bank of Khyber 2003 CLD 914; Talib Hussain and others v. Board of Revenue 2003 SCMR 549; Messrs Majid & Sons and another v. National Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 1742; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Ajma Corporation and others 2000 CLC 1425; Messrs Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate, Jaipur v. The Commer. Of L-T; New Delhi AIR 1977 SC 1348; Mst. Amina Begum and others v. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir PLD 1978 SC 220; Muhammad Sadiq and others v. Ali Asghar Khan and others 1995 CLC 522; United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others AIR. 2000 SC 1165; Mst. Manzoor Jahan Begum and others v. Haji Hussain Baksh PLD 1966 SC 375; United Bank Limited v. Messrs A.Z. Hashmi (Pvt.) Ltd. and 8 others 2000 CLC 1438; Messrs United Bank Ltd Karachi v. Mst. Asma Zafarul Hassan 1980 CLC 565; Trust leaving v. Messrs Regent Dying 2005 CLC .1368; Messrs Chawla International v. Habib Bank Limited and others 2003 CLD 956; Azhar Haider Shah v. The State 1988 SCMR 108; Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon v, Zakarin Ghani and others PLD 2005 SC 819; Mst. Asma Zafarul Hassan v. Messrs United Bank Ltd. and another 1981 SCMR 108; P.Q. Chemicals v. A.W. Brothers and others 2005 CLD 169 and Hudaibia textile Mills Ltd. v. ABL PLD 1987 SC 512 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special H.C.A. No.303 of 2006; decided ors 31st August, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND MUHAMMAD ATHER SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Messrs EAST YARN TRADING COMPANY and 2 others\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13692",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2893 = 2007 SLD 2893 = 2007 CLD 1555",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 19 & 22---Corporate and Industrial Restructuring Corporation Ordinance (L of 2000), S.10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66 & 89---Execution of decree---Confirmed sale of mortgaged property through public auction under order of the court---Objection of -debtors was about nominal sale, consideration as against the two offers made by them before the Court in terms of applications but no allegation was made about collusive, mala fide or illegal acts having been committed during the process of such sale---Judgment and decree under execution passed in suit followed by preparation of final decree-was not challenged in appeal by the -debtors---Such conduct of -debtors showed that not only the said decree had attained finality and was to be satisfied by the -debtors but they had also, at the earlier stage of the proceedings, accepted such liability to be paid to the Bank---Record showed that prior to the sale of the properties, another property was sold in the execution proceedings of the same decree, but the -debtors did not object to such sale though the Court which had also attained finality---Possession. of the two properties in question was admittedly obtained by the Nazir of the High Court much prior to the sale of these properties in favour of the auction-purchasers which was more .than sufficient notice of the execution proceedings to the -debtors, but even then they did not opt to attend/pursue or contest execution proceedings---During the period when the properties in question were competently sold through CIRC and soon thereafter the .market value of the immovable properties in the urban areas of the city, particularly in the areas where the properties in question were situated, had multiplied in no time; and it was in, such circumstances that the -debtor had given a second thought and opted to challenge confirmed transaction of sale of properties in favour of auction purchaser on the pretext of two applications---Grievance about low price raised by the -debtors, seemed to be unjustified and an afterthought in circumstances and their case was clearly hit by the ratio of Supreme Court in the case of Hudaibia Textile Mills Ltd v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 1987 SC 512. \n \nMessrs Ripple Jewellers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. First Women Bank 2003 CLD 1318; Mrs. Shahida Saleem and another v. Habib. Credit and Exchange Bank and 4 others 2001 CLC 126; Mazarul Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim; Commercial Bank Ltd. and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706; Messrs National Electric Co. of Pakistan v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and 2 others 1996 CLC 192; Nani Gopal Paul v. Prasad Singh and others AIR 1995 SC 1971; Messrs Nizamudin & Co. and 4 others v. Messrs Bank of Khyber 2003 CLD 914; Talib Hussain and others v. Board of Revenue 2003 SCMR 549; Messrs Majid & Sons and another v. National Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 1742; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Ajma Corporation and others 2000 CLC 1425; Messrs Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate, Jaipur v. The Commer. Of L-T; New Delhi AIR 1977 SC 1348; Mst. Amina Begum and others v. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir PLD 1978 SC 220; Muhammad Sadiq and others v. Ali Asghar Khan and others 1995 CLC 522; United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others AIR. 2000 SC 1165; Mst. Manzoor Jahan Begum and others v. Haji Hussain Baksh PLD 1966 SC 375; United Bank Limited v. Messrs A.Z. Hashmi (Pvt.) Ltd. and 8 others 2000 CLC 1438; Messrs United Bank Ltd Karachi v. Mst. Asma Zafarul Hassan 1980 CLC 565; Trust leaving v. Messrs Regent Dying 2005 CLC .1368; Messrs Chawla International v. Habib Bank Limited and others 2003 CLD 956; Azhar Haider Shah v. The State 1988 SCMR 108; Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon v, Zakarin Ghani and others PLD 2005 SC 819; Mst. Asma Zafarul Hassan v. Messrs United Bank Ltd. and another 1981 SCMR 108; P.Q. Chemicals v. A.W. Brothers and others 2005 CLD 169 and Hudaibia textile Mills Ltd. v. ABL PLD 1987 SC 512 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special H.C.A. No.303 of 2006; decided ors 31st August, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND MUHAMMAD ATHER SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Messrs EAST YARN TRADING COMPANY and 2 others\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13693",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2894 = 2007 SLD 2894 = 2007 CLD 1578",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90---Decree, execution of---Auction of property---Application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C., filed after 2-1 /2 years of auction without application for condonation of delay and without deposit of 20% of the sum realized at sale---Maintainability---Such application could not proceed for want of compliance of mandatory provisions of law.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code N of 1908), O.XXI, R.90---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Decree of Banking Court, execution- of---Appeal. against decree, dismissal of---Sale of property in auction---Application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. filed after 2-1/2 years of auction---Dismissal of such application by Banking Court---Constitutional petition challenging order of Banking Court---Plea of -debtor was that decree of Banking Court, after its affirmation in appeal, merged into decree of Appellate Court, which could be executed---Validity---Decree under execution was passed under provisions of special statute--Suit, after passing of decree by Banking. Court would stand automatically converted into execution proceedings---Summoning of record by High Court for hearing appeal would not result into discontinuation of execution proceedings, rather execution would continue on basis of photocopies of relevant record required under law to be .retained by Banking Court---No fresh execution application would be needed even after merging of decree of Banking Court into appellate decree, which would stand automatically converted into execution proceedings---Provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would override general provisions of C.P.C., conflicting .with Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Impugned execution proceedings regarding sale of property .through auction were not suffering from any illegality or jurisdictional error---High Court dismissed constitutional petition in circumstances.\n \nHudabia Textile Mills Ltd. And another. v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and another PLD 1987 SC 512 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n \n---S.19---Decree of Banking Court, execution of----Essentials---Filing of separate application and issuance of fresh notice would riot be needed for execution of decree.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n \n----S.7(2)---Provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would override general provisions of C.P.C., which were contrary to the Ordinance.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n \n----Ss.15, 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Decree, execution of---Appeal against decree, dismissal of---Sale of property---Registration of sale-deed after confirmation of sale in favour of auction-purchaser---Application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. by -debtor after 2-1 /2 years. of auction---Dismissal of such application by Banking Court---Constitutional petition challenging order of Banking Court---Maintainability---Mortgagor upon registration of sale-deed in favour of auction-purchaser would divest himself of any right, title and interest in mortgaged property by .virtue of S.15(8) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Right which -debtor had with regard to mortgaged property stood \"\"extinguished long before filing of constitutional petition---Judgment-debtor had contested suit and filed appeal against decree---Judgment-debtor had falsely stated in constitutional petition that he was in judicial , lock-up during pendency, of execution proceedings--- Judgment-debtor had neither paid decrefal amount nor had made any effort to file objection on auction report before its confirmation---Without availing remedy of appeal provided against impugned order under S.22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, constitutional petition. would not be maintainable---Appealable order passed by competent court would not be open to exception in constitutional jurisdiction after expiry of period of limitation prescribed for filing appeal there against---High Court dismissed constitutional petition for being riot competent.\n \nF.A. Khan v. The Government of Pakistan PLD 1964 SC 520;. The Commissioner and another v Mian Sher Muhammad 1972 SCMR 395; Barkat Ram v. Bhagwan Singh and others AIR. 1940 Lah. 394; Gajadhar Prasad-and others v. Babu Bhakta Ratan and others AIR\"\" 1973 SC 2593; Nagina Silk Nlill, Lyallpur v. The Income Tax Officer,. A-Ward Layallpur and Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Pakistan PLD 1993 Lah. 706; Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Muhammad Saeed PLD 1961 SC 192; Fakir Abdullah and others v. Government of Sindh through Secretary to Government of Sindh, Revenue Department, Sindh . Secretariat, Karachi ,and others PLD 2001 SC 131; Ch. Altaf Hussain and others v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, Lahore and others PLD 1965 SC 68; .Ali Muhammad v. Hussain Bakhsh and others PLD 1976 SC 37; Yousofalli Mulla Noorbhoy v. The King PLD 1949 P.0 108; Khuda Bakhsh v. Khushi Muhammad and 3 others PLD 1976 SC 208; Al-Ahram Builders (Private) Limited v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal 1993 SCMR 29; Sadaqat Enterprises v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others -1994 CLC 1802; Khalid Mehmood v. \"\"Collector of Custom, Customs House, Lahore 1999 SCMR 1881; Allan Khan v: S.H.O Police Station Mouladad 1999 PCr.LJ 781; Lt. Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty and others PLD 1961 SC 119; Salahuddin and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. Tokht Bhai and 10 others PLD 1975 , SC 244; .Sind Employees' Social, Security Institution v. Dr. Mumtaz Ali Taj and another PLD 1975 SC 450; Asdullah Mangi and others v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and others 2005 SCMR 445: Fiaz Bakhsh and others v. Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer, Bahawalpur and others 2006 SCMR 219; Rehmat Elahi v. Messrs Hoyo Kabushiki Kaisha PLD 1992 SC 417; Agha Abbas Haider Khan v. Zarai Taragiati Bank Limited through Branch Manager 2006 CLD 764 and Ghulam Mustafa Bughiio and another 2006 CLD 528 ref.\n \nMessrs United Bank Limited. v Banking Court Na-IV, Lahore and others 2004 CLD 1114 and Messrs Unicom Enterprises v. Banking Court. No-5, City Court Building Karachi and 2 others 2004 CLD 1452 rel.\n \n(f) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ---\n \n---Art 199---Appealable order passed. by court of competent jurisdiction---Validity---Such order would not be open to exception in constitutional jurisdiction after expiry of period of limitation prescribed for filing appeal thereagainst.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.15966 of 2005, decision dated: 31st August, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "GHULAM RASOOL BHATTI\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT-II, Lahore High Court and 4others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13694",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2895 = 2007 SLD 2895 = 2007 CLD 1605",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2-- .Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), S.118---Suit for recovery of loan amount an basis of pro note and its receipt---Execution such documents denied by defendant in written statement, but his admission in cross¬ examination to have executed same as guarantee for business with plaintiff---Effect---Where execution of negotiable instrument was admitted, then burden of proof of non-payment of consideration would lie on its executant--Section. 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, provided that until contrary was proved, presumption mould be that negotiable instrument was made/ drawn for consideration---Defendant had failed to prove non -payment of consideration through independent cold cogent evidence---Shit was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Boota v. Fiaz Ahmed 1979 SCMR 465 and Haji Karim and another v. Zakir Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100 rel.\n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n---S. 118---Negotiable instrument---Denial of consideration---Burden of proof---Where execution of negotiable instrument was admitted, then burden of proof of non-payment of consideration would lie on its executant.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.2101 of 2006; decided on 5-03-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHARY, C.J., ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR, KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY, MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI AND MIAN SHAKIRULLAH, JAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AZIZUR REHMAN\nVs.\nLIAQUAT ALI\nMuhammad Boota v. Fiaz Ahmed 1979 SCMR 465 and Haji Karim and another. v. Zakir Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13695",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2896 = 2007 SLD 2896 = 2007 CLD 1620",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-----S.9---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.128---Suit for recovery of loan amount by Bank---Guarantor's denial of his liability for non-fulfillment of conditions precedent by Bank for furnishing of Bank guarantee---Validity---Bank Guarantee was executed a week prior to letter written by Secretary of Borrower Company to Bank containing conditions---Such unilateral conditions proposed by Borrower Company were not. accepted by Bank---Bank Guarantee was self contained document in all respects---If at the time of execution of Bank Guarantee, there was any understanding between guarantor or Borrower Company and Bank for implementation of conditions contained in such letter, then nobody had restrained guarantor from incorporating such terms in Bank guarantee---Borrower Company was an independent legal entity, thus, conditions contained in such letter of its Secretary could not form part of guarantee, separately executed by guarantor---Suit was decreed against guarantor in circumstances.\n \nCustodian of Enemy Property, Islamabad v. Hoshang M. Dastur and 6 others PLD 1977 Kar. 377; Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt:) Ltd. v: Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan and another PLD 2003 SC 215 and Sadar Din v. Mst. Khatoon and others 2004 SCMR 1102 distinguished.\n \n(b) Interpretation of documents---\n \n----Written contract containing clear and unambiguous terms---Validity---Court would be reluctant to add/edit, modify or vary its terms on basis of any other evidence, oral or documentary, unless such intention of both parties was obvious.\n \n(c) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n \n----S.127---Plea of absence of consideration of guarantee---Purchase of project of Borrower Company by guarantor with all its assets and liabilities---Execution of guarantee by guarantor in favour of Bank in capacity as new Director of Borrower Company---Held; execution of such guarantee was not without consideration.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No.238 of 2005, .decided on 9-09-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Mian ABSAR AKHTAR and others\nVs.\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13696",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2897 = 2007 SLD 2897 = 2007 CLD 1639",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions\"\" (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-----Ss.3(3) & 9---Recovery of Bank loan---Cost of funds---Proof---Interim decree was passed against defendant on the basis of his admission made in application for leave to defend---Bank sought final decree and claimed inclusion of cost of funds in the decree passed against defendant---Plea raised by defendant was that without. determination of date of default, cost of funds could not be included in the decree---Validity---When date of default was not disputed formal determination was not necessary and admitted date of default could be taken as date of default---Interim decree though was passed but it was not complied with thus the same could be taken as admitted date of default---State Bank of Pakistan had fixed cost of funds at 6.44%---High Court decreed the suit against defendant including the cost of funds at the rate of 6.44% from the date of interim decree---Suit was decreed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-30 of 2005, decision dated: 14-09-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "KASB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nABDIJL QADIR JANGDA--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13697",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 2898 = 2007 SLD 2898 = 2007 CLD 1639",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions\"\" (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-----Ss.3(3) & 9---Recovery of Bank loan---Cost of funds---Proof---Interim decree was passed against defendant on the basis of his admission made in application for leave to defend---Bank sought final decree and claimed inclusion of cost of funds in the decree passed against defendant---Plea raised by defendant was that without. determination of date of default, cost of funds could not be included in the decree---Validity---When date of default was not disputed formal determination was not necessary and admitted date of default could be taken as date of default---Interim decree though was passed but it was not complied with thus the same could be taken as admitted date of default---State Bank of Pakistan had fixed cost of funds at 6.44%---High Court decreed the suit against defendant including the cost of funds at the rate of 6.44% from the date of interim decree---Suit was decreed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-30 of 2005, decision dated: 14-09-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "KASB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nABDIJL QADIR JANGDA--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13698",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2151 = 2008 SLD 2151 = 2008 CLD 1",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to defend suit---Appeal---Financial facility availed by defendants, was not in dispute and terms and conditions in agreement of loan also stood admitted---Payments made by defendants were also not disputed---Impugned reflected that the total amount due to plaintiff Bank was Rs.4,73,760 out of which, defendants made payment of Rs.4,44,150---Defendants were obliged to pay a further sum of Rs.29,610 to the plaintiff Bank---Appeal was partially allowed and decree was enhanced from Rs.4,44,150 to Rs.4,73,760---Decree sheet was amended accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.237 of 2007, heard on 24-09-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "ZARAI TARIQIATI BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nBASIT ALI and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13699",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2152 = 2008 SLD 2152 = 2008 CLD 36",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan-Application for leave to defend suit---Appeal---On filing suit for recovery of loan by appellant Bank, respondents filed application for leave to defend suit, which was dismissed by Banking Court holding that no substantial question of law and fact had been raised in said application---Banking. Court decreed suit, but without granting mark-up---Appellant Bank was aggrieved by said decree---Respondents had raised material question of law and fact as alleged material discrepancies existed in the plaint and documents referred to---Unconditional leave to defend was granted to respondents qua the question of determination of mark-up payable to the Bank or otherwise.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.69 of 2007, heard on 4-10-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD. through duly constituted Attorney---Appellant\nVs.\nMessrs KAMOKE RICE MILLS through Sole Proprietor and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13700",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2153 = 2008 SLD 2153 = 2008 CLD 53",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90---Execution of decree---Objection petition---Non framing of issues and recording of evidence---In execution of decree passed by Banking Court, a house was auctioned against which appellant filed objection petition but Banking Court summarily dismissed the petition---Plea raised by appellant was that his objection petition could not be dismissed summarily and court should have framed issues on the same---Validity---Appellant was directed to deposit decretal amount which order was not challenged before any forum---Objection petition filed, by appellant was dismissed for non-prosecution and thereafter sale was confirmed and sale certificate was issued in favour of auction purchaser---Non¬compliance of order was fatal and application was rightly dismissed---Order passed by Banking Court was devoid of any illegality or infirmity---Appellant was bound to deposit the amount according to the direction of court---Order passed by Banking Court did not call for any interference---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.41 of 2006, decision dated: 23rd October, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NAVEED IQBAL\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK through Manager and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13701",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2154 = 2008 SLD 2154 = 2008 CLD 56",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -------Ss.9 & 22---Appeal-Suit for recovery of loan---Entitlement to grant of mark-up---Judgment of Banking Tribunal though had found that plaintiff was entitled to mark-up for 210 days \"\"cushion period\"\", but such mark-up was not granted---Mark-up of 210 days had not been granted on account of some typographical error, and decree passed by the Banking Tribunal was modified by the High Court, only to the extent that in addition to amount decreed, plaintiff was also entitled to mark-up of 210 days along with mark-up from the date of and decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I. Appeal No.75 of 1994, decision dated: 31st October, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND SALMAN ANSARI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs UNITED BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nMessrs MUHAMMADI TEXTILE MILLS LTD. and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13702",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2155 = 2008 SLD 2155 = 2008 CLD 57",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997) ------S.34---Listed Companies (Substantial Acquisition of Voting Shares and Takeovers) Ordinance (CIII of 2002), Ss.4, 25 & 26--Acquisition of shares---Inquiry---Protection to investors---Unfair trade practice---Security and Exchange. Commission of Pakistan---Duties---Appellants were proceeded against by Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan on the ground that they had fraudulently sold shares of their company on a very low price of Rs.16 per share and the buyer company further sold the shares to another buyer at a price of Rs.333.33 per share within a period of less than one year---Plea raised by appellants was that transaction was a genuine transaction---Validity---Held, it was one of the duties of Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan to ensure adequate protection. to investors by detecting unfair trade practices in case any unfair practice was detected, it should take all necessary measures to undo the wrong---Such was necessary to maintain confidence of ordinary share-holders of a company who were sitting at a distance waiting to reap fruits of their investments---Investors not being part of every decision making process of the company reposed faith in the management which was expected to make sound commercial decisions for collective benefit of all share-holders---Such faith and trust could not be allowed to be breached with impunity--High Court commended detection of scam by officers of the Commission---Shares of the company were sold below their value that deprived ordinary share-holders of true worth of their shares---Right to claim price differential between two sale transactions belonged to such share-holders who in proportion to their respective shareholdings held in the company as on the date when shares were initially sold and not to those who purchased the shares in the company after the initial sale---High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction declined to interfere with the order passed by Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nCollector Central Excuse and Land Customs v. Rahim Din 1987 SCMR 1840; Exide Pakistan v. Deputy Collector Adjudication 2004 PTD 1449; Muhammad Zaman v. Collector of Customs 1981 CLC 991; Muhammad Amin v. The Province of Sindh 1992 MLD 671 and Islamabad Club v. Punjab Labour Court PLD 1980 SC 307 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No.4 of 2007, decision dated: 12-10-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED, AND FAISAL ARAB, J",
    "": "Sheikh ABDUL WAHID and 7 others\nVs."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13703",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2156 = 2008 SLD 2156 = 2008 CLD 73",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.92 & 95---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts.138 & 180---Decree, execution of---Mortgaged property, sale of---Sale certificate in favour of purchaser, confirmation of---Purchasers' application under O.XXI, R.95, C.P.C. seeking possession of property after 10 years of sale certificate---Maintainability---Article 180 of Limitation Act, 1908 would govern such application, which prescribed for its filing a period of three years to commence from date when sale became absolute---Date on which ; sale would become absolute was provided in O.XXI, R.92, C.P.C.---Article 138 of Limitation Act, 1908 would not apply to execution proceedings---Purchaser might file suit for possession as contemplated by Art.138 of Limitation Act, 1908, if limitation prescribed thereby were available---Such application filed after 10 years of issuance of sale certificate being barred by time, was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.553 of 2006, heard on 25-10-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Syed TATHEER HUSSAIN\nVs.\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13704",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2157 = 2008 SLD 2157 = 2008 CLD 75",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Review------Special statute---Power to review---Scope---Exercise of powers under special enactment does not imply a power to review earlier orders in exercise of inherent powers unless power of review' is specifically conferred by such statute. \n \nMessrs Baghpatee Service (Pvt.) Ltd. and 6 others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. 2001 CLC 1363 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIII, R.3 & S.151---Consent decree, setting aside of---Decision on merits---Scope---Suit filed by bank was decreed in favour of bank on the basis of joint statement submitted by counsel' of both the parties---After over two years of passing of consent decree, bank, filed application for either changing material dates in 'the compromise or for setting aside of decree and decision of case on merits on the ground that statement filed by their counsel was without authority---Bank did not institute any action against counsel who had allegedly filed compromise---Effect---Such consent order which was based on record, where change of dates might seriously prejudice the right of opposite party could not be reviewed or interfered with by High Court, after a long delay of more than two years---No violation of any State Bank Circular was pointed out by the bank---Such was beyond the scope of S.151, C.P.C. to review such case on merits---High Court did not find any ground or error in the consent order passed earlier which could call for correction as compromise was based on the statement of both the parties---Neither any ground for recall or order of compromise decree was made out nor powers of review were available---Application was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nMetal Containers Employees Union v. Ali Anwar Changhro 2001 YLR 1818; Messrs Baghpatee Service (Pvt.) Ltd. and 6 others :v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. 2001 CLC 1363; Hashwani Hotels Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 315; Messrs Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Schon Textiles Ltd. 2001 YLR 1244: Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Jasarat Hussain 2002 CLD 93; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Faisalabad v. Messrs Aisha Garments, etc. 2002 AC 104; Textile Management (Pvt.) Ltd. v. N.I.T. 2002 CLD 276; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Messrs Modern Metallic Services 2003 CLD 1352; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Mrs. Fahmida and others 2004 CLD 110; Nasir Mushtaq Vohra v. Crescent Investment Bank Ltd. 2005 SLJ 35; United Bank Ltd. v. Ch. Ghulam Hussain 1998 CLC 816; Habib Bank Ltd. v. A.B.M. Graner (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2001 Kar. 264; 2001 MLD 1351; 2001 YLR 1549; Addul Basit v. Bank of Punjab 2003 CLD 751; Yussra Textile Corporation v. PICIC Commercial Bank Ltd. 2003 CLD 905; Habib Bank Ltd. V. Al-Jalal Textile Mills Ltd. 2003 CLD 1007; National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Building Products Ltd. PLD 1998 Kar. 302; I.C.P. v. Messrs Chiniot Textile Mills Ltd': PLD 1998 Kar. 316; United Bank Ltd. v Central Cotton. Mills Ltd. 1999 CLC 1374; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Pakistan National Textile Mills 2001 MLD 1137; United Bank Ltd. v. Mian Aftab Ahmed 2001 MLD 1332; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Balochistan Gum Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 YLR 81; Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Razwan Textile Mills Ltd. 1998 MLD 529; Muhammad Yusaf v. A.D.B.P. 2002 CLD 1270; Gul Habib v. Habib Bank Ltd. PLD 1983 Pesh. 31; Muhammad Sulleman v. Habib Bank Ltd. 1988 CLC 969; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Al-Mansoor Ltd. PLD 1989 Pesh. 191; Bakers Equity Ltd. v. Bentonite Pakistan Ltd, 2003 CLD 931; International Traders v. Union Bank Ltd. 2003 CLD 1464; Bank of Khyber v. Spencer Distribution Ltd. 2003 CLD 1406; Central Bank of India v. S. Muhammad Abdul Jalil Shah 1999 CLC 971; Muhammad Siddiq Muhammad Umar v. Australasia Bank Ltd. PLD 1966 SC 684; Citibank N.A., A Banking Company v. Riaz Ahmed 2000 CLC 847; First Grindlays Modaraba v. Pakland Cement Ltd. 2000 CLC 2017; Sh. Muhammad Naeem v. Habib Bank Ltd. 2003 CLD 606: Citybank v. Tariq Mohsin Siddiqui PLD 1999 Kar. 196; Askari Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Pakland Cement PLD 2000 Kar: 246; Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. 2001 CLC 1551 and Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1981 SC 94 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.24 of 2003, decision dated: 23rd October, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERWEZ, J",
    "": "TANYA KNITWEAR (PVT.) LTD. and others\nVs.\nFIRST WOMEN BANK LTD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13705",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2158 = 2008 SLD 2158 = 2008 CLD 98",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.13---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.89(5)---Suit for recovery of loan amount by Bank on basis of foreign ---Leave to defend suit, application for---Denial of defendant to have executed guarantee in foreign country for not being present there at relevant time---Foreign bearing legend both in Arabic and English versions to the effect \"\"Photo Copy Attested\"\", \"\"Syed Afzal Hussain Shah Consular Officer\"\"---Validity---Such attestation or certificate did not meet requirements of Art.89(5) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Question requiring determination as to whether person issuing such certificate was legal keeper of such document or having legal custody of its original and if not, what was its effect---After determination of such primary fact, court would have to determine as to whether such foreign was conclusive within meaning of S.13, C.P.C.---Foreign was silent regarding denial of execution of guarantee by defendant and his absence from foreign country when guarantee was stated to be executed by him---Defendant made out a plausible defence entitling him to grant of leave to defend suit---Leave application was accepted in circumstances.\n \nNusrat Mehdi Chaudhri v. Habib Bank Ltd. and another 2006 CLD 405 and Naeemullah Malik v. United Bank Ltd and two others 2006 CLD 1592 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.716 of 2001, heard on 31st October, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "ZAHID AFZAL DAHA\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13706",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2159 = 2008 SLD 2159 = 2008 CLD 101",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10---Leave to defend suit, refusal of---Effect---Leave to defend having not been granted court could not consider plea raised by defendant in their objection. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10---Leave to defend suit, refusal of---Power of court to pass decree against defendant in such case---Scope---Court might require any other material to satisfy itself of plaintiffs claim and would not be absolved from its primary duty of seeing and finding genuineness of plaintiff's claim.\n \nJan Asif Mehmood for Plaintiff.\n \nMuhammad Saleem Thepdawala for Defendants Nos.1, 2 and 4.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-33 of 2005, decision dated: 24-10-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "KASB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs TRANS LIVIA PRIVATE LIMITED and 5 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13707",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2160 = 2008 SLD 2160 = 2008 CLD 186",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Preamble-Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 being a special law, every provision contained therein has to be strictly construed and meticulously adhered to.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----S.15---Sale of mortgaged property without intervention of the Court---Manner and mode---Non-compliance of statutory requirements---Effect---Parameters prescribed by statute being mandatory are required to be followed as directed---Even a minor lapse or departure therefrom shall make the whole transaction questionable and vitiate entire proceedings of sale---Principles.\n \nThe manner and mode of auction without intervention of Court has been clearly spelt out in section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. It is initiated by resorting to the provisions as contained in section 15(2) by serving notice upon the mortgagor, calling for payment. It clearly envisages service upon \"\"customer\"\" as defined in the Ordinance. Thereafter another notice demanding payment has to be issued within 14 days of service and lastly, in case, of contumacious default in payment, the Financial Institution is required to serve a final notice within 30 days. The proviso to section 15(4) of the Ordinance makes it imperative that before venturing upon the exercise of sale by auction of mortgaged property, a notice is required to be published in. an English and Urdu daily \"\"Newspaper\"\", in the Province where the mortgaged property is located. The proclamation is required to contain the name, and address of the mortgagor, the details of the mortgaged property, the amount of outstanding mortgage money and intention of sale of mortgaged property. This exercise also entails a requirement of sending notice to all persons, who, to the knowledge of Financial Institution, have an interest in the mortgaged property as mortgagees. After fulfilling these requirements the Financial Institution, has power to sell the mortgaged property and thereafter, file proper accounts of sale proceeds, with the Banking Court, within 30 days of sale. \n \nRecord in the present, case showed that the property mortgaged by the customer measured 184 Kanals and 6 Marlas, agricultural land. Whereas in the proclamation of sale, property was shown to be 114 Kanals 3 Marlas. Therefore, there was clear misdescription, resulting in non-compliance of statutory requirements as contained in section 15(4). There was not only non-adherence to description of property, but this lapse had also impacted the other ingredients of sale, as contained in proclamation of sale. Because the reserve price fixed was Rs.5,20,000 for 114 Kanals and 3 Marlas of land. Obviously, if the area of land was more than 114 Kanals 3 Marlas, the reserve price would correspondingly increase. Thus, the entire proceedings of sale were not in accordance with the requirements of law. The \"\"Financial Institution\"\" itself exercises. powers of sale, therefore, it is required to adopt a procedure, which is transparent, above-board, and also, strictly in consonance with the provisions of section 15. Even a minor lapse or departure shall make the whole transaction questionable and vitiate entire proceedings of sale. Therefore, to safeguard the interest of \"\"customer\"\", the parameters prescribed by statute are mandatory and thus required to be followed as directed. \n \nThe objection petition indicated that the respondent faltered in these requirements by misdescribing the area of land. This lapse alone is enough to vitiate the entire process of auction and sale.\n \nTherefore, the objection petition was rightly allowed and auction proceedings set aside. The impugned order therefore, was un-exceptionable.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "FAO No.214 of 2007, decision dated: 29-11-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SHAMIM AKHTAR\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD RIAZ and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13708",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2161 = 2008 SLD 2161 = 2008 CLD 315",
    "Key Words:": "Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961)-------S.39---Transfer of Property. Act (IV of 1882), S.100---Interim attachment---Creation of charge---Proof---Applicant filed objection to attachment of property on the ground that prior to release of funds by bank, borrower had already transferred the property to applicant---Effect---On the day when credit agreement between bank and borrower was executed, the owner was no more owner of the property and the same could not be made subject-matter of any credit agreement---Property in question was never offered as security in terms of S.100 of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, 1961---Bank did not produce any document to show that at any point of time charge was created against the property or the same was simply mortgaged with bank---Even no document had been filed to show that while obtaining loan, borrower claimed, property in question and on such basis loan was granted---Property in question was attached without any cause and jurisdiction, thus High Court released the same from interim attachment---Application was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous Application No.18 of 1989, decision dated: 17-01-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nMessrs HUB STEEL MILLS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13709",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2162 = 2008 SLD 2162 = 2008 CLD 326",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.22(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLIII, R.3(1)---Appeal against interim order passed by Banking Court---Service of notice of appeal upon respondent without memo. of appeal and impugned order---Effect---Parties were aware of impugned order, which was seriously contested by them before Banking Court---Service of notice had not been disputed---Neither appeal had been admitted nor any order had been passed without hearing respondent, who had already received notice of appeal---High Court fixed appeal for Katcha Peshi while directing appellant to provide memo. of appeal along with all annexures within three days to respondent---Objection as to non-service of memo. of appeal raised by respondent was overruled in circumstances.\n \nSindh Industrial Trading Estate Limited and 3 others v. Noorani Enterprises, 1996 CLC 570; National Investment Trust Limited v. Waqar Saigal and 6 others PLD 2001 Lah. 516; Messrs Haji Suleman Gowawala & Sons Ltd. v. Usman and 13 others 1985 CLC 168; Nazir Ahmed Jagirani Balouch v. Province of Sindh and another 1987 CLC 1750; Ali Asbestos Ltd. and 4 others v. Bank of Credit and Commerce 1997 MLD 2003; Messrs Cooperative House Building Society Limited, Lahore through Secretary v. Messrs Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. through Chief Executive and 4 others PLD 2000 Lah. 232 and Raja Hamayun Sarfraz Khan and others v. Noor Muhammad 2007 SCMR 307 ref.\n \nMrs. Dino Manekji Chinoy and 8 others v. Muhammad Matin PLD 1983 SC 693 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.22(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLIII, R.3(1)---Appeal against interim order of Banking Court---Non-compliance of provisions of O.XLIII, R.3, C.P.C. before filing of appeal by appellant---Effect---Purpose of such provisions was to provide an ample reasonable opportunity to respondent to contest appeal on merit---Such purpose could be served even by issuing pre-admission notice to respondent. \n \n(c) Administration of justice---\n \n----Party could not be non-suited on account of non-observance of any procedural requirement---Principles.\n \nIt is always desirable that the procedural requirement as laid down in any procedural law is complied with, unless it is shown that non-observance of any procedural requirement run prejudicial to the right and interest of the other side, a party cannot be non-suited. \n \n(d) Administration of justice---\n \n----Technicality of taw is to be avoided---Procedural law is to be construed to foster the cause of justice and not to strangulate same.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C.A. No.228 of 2007, decided 26-10-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND MUHAMMAD AFZAL SOOMRO, JJ",
    "": "SIKANDER TRADING COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED and 6 others\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13710",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2163 = 2008 SLD 2163 = 2008 CLD 341",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Petition for leave to appeal---Ex parte ---Setting aside of---Defendant filed amended petition for leave to defend and matter was accordingly adjourned for filing reply by the Bank---Since no one appeared on behalf of plaintiff-Bank on the date when case was called out twice, suit filed by plaintiff Bank was dismissed for non-prosecution and plaintiff-Bank filed application for setting aside dismissal-in-default order, which application was dismissed by the Banking Court with observation that under S.22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, order of dismissal was final and that court was not permitted to revise or review or recall the same---Validity--Banking Court was possessed with the competence to recall or set aside an order passed on account of non-appearance of a party---Trial Court ought to have recalled the ex parte order instead of non-suiting the Bank on technicalities---Dismissal of application for recalling of order was totally uncalled for when the proceedings to take place were limited only to filing of reply to the amended petition for leave to defend, all the moreso when said application was filed on the same day. \n \nMessrs Baghpotee Services (Private) Ltd. and others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. 2001 CLC 1363; Muhammad Iftikhar through Special Attorney v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited through Chairman and another 2005 CLD 1454; Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Tariq Saeed and another 2004 CLD 920 and Muhammad Naveed Hussain v. Small Business Finance Corporation/SME Bank Ltd. and 2 others 2006 CLD 1486 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.213 of 2006, heard 21st January, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR AND KH. FAROOQ SAEED, JJ",
    "": "MCB BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nMessrs BAIGA PAINTS through Proprietor and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13711",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2164 = 2008 SLD 2164 = 2008 CLD 351",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.9, 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66 & 90---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Objection petition---Appeal to High Court---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank was decreed and decree-holder/Bank went in execution and successfully obtained sale order of mortgaged property---Court Auctioneers appointed by the executing court conducted auction of mortgaged property and respondent being highest bidder succeeded in purchasing the same---Court Auctioneers submitted their report before the executing court and -debtor filed objection petition to said execution and auction proceedings---Validity---Undisputedly, publicity of the auction allegedly held, was not properly done as its notice was not publicized in any of the newspaper---Court Auctioneers felt satisfied with circulation of few pamphlets which according to their report were only pasted outside the Court Room and at the place of auction---Display of those pamphlets, if were really published, was not shown to have been done at public places of the adjoining villages/towns---Court Auctioneers had referred to publicity by the beat of drums, but nothing was in the report to show as to what places and by whom it was undertaken---Pamphlets published by the Court Auctioneers were also vague---Copy of the pamphlets placed on record had shown that neither the proper specification of land subject of auction nor the place of auction had been mentioned with clarity---All said points were specifically pointed out in the objection petition filed by the appellant, but executing court through sketchy/unreasoned impugned order, dismissed same with a solitary unbased finding that publicity was properly done for the auction conducted for decreed amount---Such determination through the order impugned was not justifiable on the touchstone of any canon known for administration of justice---Judgment of the Banking Court could, in no manner, come within the arena of judicial decisions as no kind of reason had been mentioned therein for throwing the objections of the appellant out of the file---Impugned order being illegal, was set aside with the result that objection petition filed by the appellant would be deemed to be pending before Executing Court which would be decided afresh in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.110 of 2003, decision dated: 21st April, 2005.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN AND SYED SHABBAR RAZA RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs JAMI (PVT.) LIMITED\nVs.\nUNION BANK LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13712",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2165 = 2008 SLD 2165 = 2008 CLD 356",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S.3---Proposal---Acceptance or rejection---Principles---Communi¬cation of proposals and acceptance of proposals are to be deemed by an act or omission of party proposing or accepting by which he intends to communicate such proposal or acceptance---Mere acceptance without communicating the same cannot be binding. \n \nDr. Azeem Shad v. Municipal Committee, Multan PLD 1968 Lah. 1419 and Powell v. Lee (1908) 99 L T 284 rel.\n \n(b) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)---\n \n----S.3---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Intra-court appeal---Public contract---Judicial review---Powers. of High Court---Scope---Property in question was put to auction by Privatization Board and respondent was the highest bidder but the Board being not satisfied with the price offered re-auctioned the property---Validity---Privatization Board, in its meeting, had decided to re-auction the property in question which meant that its earlier decision of accepting bid of respondent had been rescinded---Decision of re-auction was taken in the large interest of Government and could not be termed as mala fide or unreasonable---Confirmation of bid depended on discretion of Government as was spelt out from advertisements---No objection could be raised if bid was found to be below the price which Government expected the property would fetch High Court, under its constitutional jurisdiction, could only review a public contract only on the touchstone of reasonableness, relevance, fairplay, natural justice, equality and non-discrimination---Respondent did not challenge re-auction before the High Court on any of the such grounds-No writ could have been issued on the touchstone of reasonableness and fairplay as issuance of the same would tend to confer undue advantage on the respondent--High Court, in intra-court appeal, set aside . the passed by single Judge. \n \nProf. Muhammad Usman and others v. Punjab University Academic Staff Association and another 1991 SCMR 320; The Central Bank, Heotmal Ltd. v. Vyankatesh Bapuji AIR (36) 1949 Nagpur 286; Haridwar Sindh v. Begum Sumbrui and others AIR 1972 SC 1242; Javaid Iqbal Abbasi & Company v. Province of Punjab and 6 others 1996 SCMR 1433; Messrs Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasanagar Municipal Corporation and others AIR 2000 SC 2272; Mst. Surraya Begum and others v. Mst. Suban. Begum and others 1992 SCMR 652; Pakistan v. Messrs H. Pir Muhammad Shamsuddin PLD 1962 M.P.) Kar. 810; Chairman and others v. Mst. Qaisra Elahi and others 2005 SCMR 678; Messrs Ittehad Cargo Service and 2 others v. Messrs Syed Tasneem Hussain Naqvi and others PLD 2001 SC 116; Ch. Muhammad Yunus v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Communication, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others PLD 1972 Lah. 847; Pakistan v. Golam Moinuddin Ahmed PLD 1966 Dacca 570; Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad v. Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore and another PLD 1991 SC 505 and City Schools (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore Cantt. v. Privatization Commission, Government of Pakistan and others 2002 SCMR 1150 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I.C. A. No.131 of 2004, heard on 1st November, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "M. BILAL KHAN AND TARIQ SHAMIM, JJ",
    "": "PUNJAB PRIVATIZATION BOARD, GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB through Secretary\nand 3 others\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD YOUNAS MALIK and another\nCh. Muhammad Sadiq Addl. A.G."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13713",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2166 = 2008 SLD 2166 = 2008 CLD 356",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S.3---Proposal---Acceptance or rejection---Principles---Communi¬cation of proposals and acceptance of proposals are to be deemed by an act or omission of party proposing or accepting by which he intends to communicate such proposal or acceptance---Mere acceptance without communicating the same cannot be binding. \n \nDr. Azeem Shad v. Municipal Committee, Multan PLD 1968 Lah. 1419 and Powell v. Lee (1908) 99 L T 284 rel.\n \n(b) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)---\n \n----S.3---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Intra-court appeal---Public contract---Judicial review---Powers. of High Court---Scope---Property in question was put to auction by Privatization Board and respondent was the highest bidder but the Board being not satisfied with the price offered re-auctioned the property---Validity---Privatization Board, in its meeting, had decided to re-auction the property in question which meant that its earlier decision of accepting bid of respondent had been rescinded---Decision of re-auction was taken in the large interest of Government and could not be termed as mala fide or unreasonable---Confirmation of bid depended on discretion of Government as was spelt out from advertisements---No objection could be raised if bid was found to be below the price which Government expected the property would fetch High Court, under its constitutional jurisdiction, could only review a public contract only on the touchstone of reasonableness, relevance, fairplay, natural justice, equality and non-discrimination---Respondent did not challenge re-auction before the High Court on any of the such grounds-No writ could have been issued on the touchstone of reasonableness and fairplay as issuance of the same would tend to confer undue advantage on the respondent--High Court, in intra-court appeal, set aside . the passed by single Judge. \n \nProf. Muhammad Usman and others v. Punjab University Academic Staff Association and another 1991 SCMR 320; The Central Bank, Heotmal Ltd. v. Vyankatesh Bapuji AIR (36) 1949 Nagpur 286; Haridwar Sindh v. Begum Sumbrui and others AIR 1972 SC 1242; Javaid Iqbal Abbasi & Company v. Province of Punjab and 6 others 1996 SCMR 1433; Messrs Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasanagar Municipal Corporation and others AIR 2000 SC 2272; Mst. Surraya Begum and others v. Mst. Suban. Begum and others 1992 SCMR 652; Pakistan v. Messrs H. Pir Muhammad Shamsuddin PLD 1962 M.P.) Kar. 810; Chairman and others v. Mst. Qaisra Elahi and others 2005 SCMR 678; Messrs Ittehad Cargo Service and 2 others v. Messrs Syed Tasneem Hussain Naqvi and others PLD 2001 SC 116; Ch. Muhammad Yunus v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Communication, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others PLD 1972 Lah. 847; Pakistan v. Golam Moinuddin Ahmed PLD 1966 Dacca 570; Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad v. Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore and another PLD 1991 SC 505 and City Schools (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore Cantt. v. Privatization Commission, Government of Pakistan and others 2002 SCMR 1150 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I.C. A. No.131 of 2004, heard on 1st November, 2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "M. BILAL KHAN AND TARIQ SHAMIM, JJ",
    "": "PUNJAB PRIVATIZATION BOARD, GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB through Secretary\nand 3 others\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD YOUNAS MALIK and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13714",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2167 = 2008 SLD 2167 = 2008 CLD 385",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.2(c)(d) & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.9, 96 & O.VII, R.2---Suit for recovery of amount---Jurisdiction of civil court-Suit for recovery of amount with damages/compensation filed by appellants against Bank was dismissed by the Trial Court---Claims relating to advancement of loan, furnishing of Bank guarantee, mark-up extending in favour of the Bank, were triable by Banking Court constituted under, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001; however, any liability claimed by any person, who was not figured or contemplated by word 'customer' and finance as defined in S.2(c)(d) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, could not institute a suit---Bank though. had admitted in the written statement that account was opened by the appellants, however the amount claimed by appellants was not accepted to be due---Claim and the subject-matter of the suit filed by the appellants was triable by the civil court and same did not fall within the ambit of S.9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Trial Court had properly appreciated the evidence on record and had concluded that the claim put forth was not based on genuine. assertions and the receipts had been made afterwards---Record also showed that the then Manager of the Bank, who had committed fraud, was neighbour of the appellants---Enquiry committee had come to the finding that said record did not tally with their available record --Witnesses produced by the plaintiff had not corroborated the figures of amount claimed---Issues on merits had been rightly decided in favour of the Bank---In absence of any misappreration or misreading of record, appeal against of the Trial Court having no merits, was dismissed with costs.",
    "Court Name:": "Quetta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.14 of 2004, decision dated: 15-11-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MEHTA KAILASH NATH KOHLI AND MUHAMMAD NADIR KHAN, JJ",
    "": "SALEH MUHAMMAD and 2 others\nVs.\nMessrs UNITED BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13715",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2168 = 2008 SLD 2168 = 2008 CLD 427",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.9, 10 & 22---Suit for rendition of accounts---Leave to defend suit---Plaintiff had assailed order/decree passed by the Banking Court, whereby his suit for rendition of accounts was dismissed---Contents of the order reflected that defendant filed an. application for leave to defend the suit, but thereafter failed to appear---Contents of the order were not clear as to whether leave was granted or not, or even if the leave application was considered---Validity---Section 10(8) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, mandated the Banking Court to consider the contents of the plaint, application for leave to defend and reply thereto---Such having not been done, mandatory requirements of law were not fulfilled-Allowing appeal, impugned order and decree were set aside by the High Court---Banking Court would decide leave application as required by law and thereafter, if leave was granted, it would proceed to follow the procedure as contained in S.10(10) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.81 of 2007, heard on 5-09-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "RUSTAM KHAN\nVs.\nZARI TARIQIATI BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13716",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2169 = 2008 SLD 2169 = 2008 CLD 431",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.5, 7 & 12---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Application for setting aside ex parte decree passed in year 1993---Filing of such application in year 2004 in Banking Court at place 7---Transfer of such application by Banking Court at place \"\"I\"\" to Banking Court at place \"\"R\"\" due to lack of territorial jurisdiction---Validity---Provisions of Ss.5 & 7 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would be read together and none of them would be read and interpreted in isolation---Federal Government had power to establish Banking Courts and define their territorial jurisdiction---By virtue of provision of S.7(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, all proceedings pending in any Banking Court constituted under relevant laws would stand transferred to or be deemed to be transferred to Banking Courts having jurisdiction under the Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court at place \"\"I\"\" had exercised its jurisdiction rightly by conveying to applicant that he had approached wrong forum and that he should have approached Banking Court at place \"\"R\"\"---High Court dismissed constitutional petition---Principles.\n \nMuhammad Rezzanullah Khan v. Abdul Khayer and others PLD 1956 Dacca 285 and Messrs Sialkot Dairies Ltd. and 8 others v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager, A.D.B.P. and 3 others 2003 CLD 67 ref.\n \n(b) Interpretation of documents---\n \n----Grammatical and ordinary sense of words would be adhered to, unless same would lead to some absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of written instrument, in which case grammatical and ordinary sense of words may be modified, so as to avoid absurdity and inconsistency, but not further.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.12454 of 2004, decision dated: 20-02-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KH. FAROOQ SAEED, J",
    "": "SAUDI PAK KALABAGH and others\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT and others\nGrevy v. Pearson (1987) 6 H.Z Cas 61 fol."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13717",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2170 = 2008 SLD 2170 = 2008 CLD 436",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.208, 476 & 492---Making investments in associated companies/undertakings, not in accordance with the resolutions approved by the share-holders---Imposition of penalty---Investments in question though were made on the basis of special resolutions resolved in Extraordinary General Meeting of the company, but said resolutions were not approved by the share-holders of the company---To ascertain the extent of violation committed by the company and loss sustained by it in consequence of such investments, necessary proceedings were initiated under S.208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Show¬cause notice was issued to the company and its Directors---Directors of the Company had violated the provisions of 5.208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and had advanced funds in total disregard of the approval of the shareholders---Nature and terms of the investments had been changed to serve the interest of the Directors, rather than the shareholders, which did not carry rationalization and were not acceptable---Violation of S.208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, was established and all Directors were found responsible for said violation; however, instead of imposing maximum penalty of Rs.10,000,000 (Ten Million Rupees) on each pf the Directors as prescribed by subsection (3) of S.208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, a lenient view was taken of the default by imposing a fine of Rs.500,000 on each Director, Chairman and Vice-Chairman.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/233/638/2002-2342-2349, dated 12-12-2007, decision dated: 3rd March, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "TAHIR MAHMOOD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "Messrs BOSICOR PAKISTAN LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13718",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2171 = 2008 SLD 2171 = 2008 CLD 449",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66---Execution of decree---Sale through auction---Inadequate price---Effect---After successive efforts by court auctioneer, property in question was sold through auction-Judgment-debtor sought setting aside of such auction sale on the ground that reserve price of the property was fixed at too low a rate and auction-purchaser did not deposit 1/4th of the purchase price on the fall of hammer---Validity---Mere inadequacy of sale price in court sale was no valid ground for setting aside the sale, moreso when every effort was made to fetch maximum price---Buyer was always reluctant to purchase a property in court sale as it involved litigation, it was time consuming exercise and had the element of uncertainty---Court sales could not fetch market price for such reasons and sale through auction could not be set aside on such score alone-Non-payment of 1/4th amount on the fall of hammer did not vitiate the sale conducted under the provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, as the law had permitted execution of decree according to the manner and desire of decree-holder---Judgment-debtors raised frivolous objections which Executing Court had answered in a lawful manner---Order of Executing Court was devoid of any illegality or legal infirmity---Judgment-debtors had filed objections as and when auction was conducted---Matter regarding sale through auction of property remained pending for about 8 years but -debtors did not come forward even on a single occasion to satisfy decretal amount---Incentive packages which State Bank of Pakistan had announced for payment of long outstanding defaults in bank loans were there, but the . debtors did not even avail such incentives---Objections were filed to delay execution which Was nothing but mala fide on the part of -debtors---High Court declined to interfere with the order passed by executing court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nMuhammad Hassan v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and 3 others 2003 CLD 1693; Mst. Zarina Bibi v. Allied Bank Ltd\"\" 2003 YLR 3274; Messrs Dawood Flour Mills and others v. National Bank of Pakistan 1999 MLD 3205; Afzal Maqsood Butt v. Banking Court No.2 Lahore and 8 others PLD 2005 SC 470 = 2005 CLD 967; Mir Wall Khan and another v. Manager A.D.B.P. Muzaffar Garh and another PLD 2003 SC 500 and Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Dost Muhammad Cotton Mills and 3 others PLD 2000 Kar. 186 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n--S.19---Execution of decree---Sale through auction---Procedure---Auction in the course of execution by Banking Court in appropriate cases can be made through deviation from Civil Procedure Code, 1908. \n \nMuhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Zakaria Ghani and others PLD 2005 SC 819 and Shaukat Ali Mian v. Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. through Chief Executive and 4 others 2002 CLD 1071 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.22---Appeal---Maintainability---Non-issuance of notice to decree-holder---Effect---Notice to decree-holder-Bank, under S.22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, is an essential requirement---Non-compliance of such mandatory requirement renders appeal incompetent. \n \nSardar Riaz Karim for Appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.3 of 2005, decision dated: 4-02-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH AND ZAFAR IQBAL CHAUDHRY, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ASHRAF AGRO and others\nVs.\nH.B.L.---Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13719",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2172 = 2008 SLD 2172 = 2008 CLD 489",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-------Art.199---Constitutional petition---Recovery of borrowed amount---Son of petitioner borrowed amount from bank in which petitioner was only a witness to the documents of loan---Borrower son having failed to fulfil the terms of loan facility had become defaulter, Bank started harassing petitioner being father of the borrower---Petitioner was sent to jail in civil prison where he remained for about 40 days, which was maximum punishment for such default as per law---Petitioner being not borrower, could not have been sent to jail; it was a case of highhandedness on the part of Bank---Petitioner having already shouldered his responsibility being father of the borrower in terms of jail of 40 days, he could not be further punished or harassed---Even if petitioner was a guarantor, in the presence of original borrower the entire responsibility should not have been thrown on his shoulder for being father of borrower-High Court directed that petitioner should not be further harassed by the Bank, which however, would not mean that Bank could not recover the amount from the main borrower---Petitioner would co-operate by informing the address and whereabouts of the main borrower.\n \nMuhammad Riaz v. District Collector, Okara and 3 others PLD 1997 Lah. 980 and Abdul Latif v. Manager Small Business Finance Corporation and others 2003 YLR 1052 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.2190 of 2007, decision dated: 12-03-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KH. FAROOQ SAEED, J",
    "": "Raja MUHAMMAD SHIRAZ\nVs.\nBANK MANAGER, SME BANK LTD., RECOVERY OFFICER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13720",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2173 = 2008 SLD 2173 = 2008 CLD 504",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Karachi Development Authority Order (V of 1957)------Art.40---Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations, 1979, preamble---Land sanctioned by authority for amenity of general public---Effect---Such land could not be utilized for any other purpose nor same could be auctioned to any one---Principles. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.19--Execution of decree---Auction of property---Property mortgaged with Bank not owned by borrower, could not be sold. \n \nKhawaja Shamsul Islam for Appellants.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.34 of 2007, decision dated: 20-02-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND SYED MEHMOOD ALAM RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "Shaikh KAMRAN SALIM and another\nVs.\nPRIME COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13721",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2174 = 2008 SLD 2174 = 2008 CLD 522",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S.205---Non-Banking Finance Companies (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003, R.5---Winding up of Leasing Company, petition for---Long term association of Leasing Company with Bankers Equity Limited (BEL)---Taking over control of BEL by State Bank after discovering fraud in BEL'S management and accounts and its subsequent winding up by order of High Court---Negative equity of Leasing Company for its inability to attract fresh funds from financial institutions due to its past association with Bankers Equity Ltd.---Failure of Leasing Company to raise its equity and rejection of its application by State Bank for grant of licence under R.5 of Non-Banking Finance Companies (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003---Failure of merger of Leasing Company with another leasing company due to its negative equity condition---Leasing income of company being minimal due to acute liquidity problems and suspension of its business since long---Losses' incurred by Leasing Company exceeded its paid-up capital and reserves-Passing of resolution in Annual General Meeting of shareholders of Leasing Company authorizing its Board of Directors to initiate High Court for its winding-up---Inability of Directors to execute a certificate of solvency for purpose of voluntary winding up of Leasing Company---Non-willingness of creditors to initiate a creditors' winding up---High Court accepted such winding up petition in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J.M. No.3 of 2006, decision dated: 15-01-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID ALI Z. QAZI, J",
    "": "INTERASIA LEASING COMPANY LIMITED\nVs.\nBANKERS EQUITY LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13722",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2175 = 2008 SLD 2175 = 2008 CLD 549",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) ------Ss.5(3) & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.24---Transfer application---Prayer for transfer of suit from Banking Court to High Court, where another suit between both parties involving same issues was pending---Validity---Held, trial of both suits would not only be expedient in interest of justice, but would also be in interest of both parties as joint trial of both suits would certainly obviate possibility of a conflict of ---High Court accepted transfer application in circumstances.\n \nMalik Jehangir Khan v. Banking Tribunal No.1 Karachi 2002 CLD 1466; Messrs Shazim International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs First Women Bank Ltd. T.A. No. 10 of 2006; Mybank Ltd. v. Speedway Fondmetall Pakistan Ltd. and others 2007 CLD 1547; Messrs Sialkot Dairies Ltd. v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 67 and Masjid Bilal v. Wali Muhammad and others 2006 CLC 1757 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Transfer Application No.48 of 2007, decision dated: 30-01-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AFZAL SOOMRO, C.J",
    "": "NAZIMUDDIN and another--Applicants\nVs.\nSAUDI PAK COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13723",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2176 = 2008 SLD 2176 = 2008 CLD 552",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.9-Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.126 & 128---Recovery of Bank loan---Liability of guarantor---Scope---Held, even where contract had become unenforceable against the principal borrower yet the guarantor would be liable for surety executed by him.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.53 and C.M.A. No.1980 of 2007, decision dated: 4-10-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND ARSHAD SIRAJ, JJ",
    "": "FIRST WOMEN BANK LTD.--Appellant\nVs.\nMrs. AFIFA IFTIKHAR and 2 others\nMessrs Huffaz Seamless Pipe Industries Ltd. and 2 others v. Messrs Security Leasing Corporation Ltd. 2002 CLD 550 fol."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13724",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2177 = 2008 SLD 2177 = 2008 CLD 566",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 22---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss.20 & 118---Suit for recovery of loan---Appeal---Liability having not been fully adjusted by respondent; appellant Bank proceeded to file suit for recovery of amount of loan with cost of funds which was decreed by the Banking Court, but without cost of fund and appellant Bank had filed appeal---Examination of contents of the plaint stowed that respondent had availed the facility, part payments were made, finance advance was rescheduled---Rescheduling agreement was signed by the respondent and subsequently respondent agreed to make payment according to schedule---No benefit could be extended in favour of respondent in view of provisions of Ss.20 & 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881---Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 provided that where one person would sign and deliver to another, paper stamp in accordance with law, either wholly blank or having writing thereon, incomplete negotiable instrument could be presumed to be made or completed under the said Act---Trial Court had committed grave illegality in passing the on whimsical grounds without adhering to law---Impugned and decree was set aside---Appellant's claim along with cost of funds by way of sale under mortgage decree of the immovable properties, was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "No.D-39 of 2007, decision dated: 20-02-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISAR IQBAL AND SYED MEHMOOD ALAM RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "SAUDI PAK COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. Through duly Constituted Attorneys\nVs.\nQazi EHTISHAMUL HAQ and another First Appeal"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13725",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2178 = 2008 SLD 2178 = 2008 CLD 576",
    "Key Words:": "(a) State Bank of Pakistan Circular No.F.E.5 of 1997-------Circulars of State Bank of Pakistan have to Bank applied as a law and as these have binding effect like other provisions of law, since circulars are issued under the authority and the same must be treated as having the force of law. \n \n2002 CLD 542 rel.\n \n(b) Damages---\n \n----Types of damages---Scope---Damages are usually considered under two heads viz. general or non-pecuniary' loss or damages that is physical injury, pain and suffering, impaired capacity for enjoyment of life or lessened capacity and special or pecuniary damages that are actual, incidental and direct expense, capable of calculation in terms of monetary value, may it be on account of medical treatment, loss in business profit earning or otherwise---In an action for damages either general or special, burden to prove is always on plaintiff---In absence of authentic, oral and documentary supporting evidence, mere statement of party is not sufficient: to establish amount of damages allegedly suffered by him---Person claiming special damages must prove each item of his loss on the basis of evidence---Where a person claims special damages then it is incumbent upon him to show as to under which head of account and how such damages have been sustained---In absence of such proof, special damages cannot be allowed. \n \n1992 CLC 1561 rel.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----\n \n----O.XXIX, R.1---Tort---Mental torture---Corporation---Scope---Private limited company cannot sue for damages of its feelings like mental torture. \n \n(d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Arts. 132 & 133---Failure to cross-examine---Effect---Mere not cross-examining on material facts does not ipso facto constitute establishment of the fact---Party proving a fact has to stand on its own legs and not on the weakness of other side---Without discharging burden of proof of any specified fact, the other side cannot be presumed to have admitted the fact. \n \n2000 CLC 215 and 1991 SCMR 2300 rel.\n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---S.9(1) & (2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIX, R.1---Banking suit---Maintainability---Statement of accounts---Customer company filed suit against banking company without appending statement of accounts and without any resolution of board of directors---Effect---Suit was filed before High Court in its original Banking jurisdiction wherein Bank filed leave to defend application which was granted and the suit proceeded as Banking suit---Plaintiff, in such suit was required under S.9(1) and (2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, to append with plaint a statement of account---Only concession available to customer was that such statement of account was not required to be certified in the manner prescribed under Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891---Plaintiff having failed to file statement of accounts as required, the suit was liable to be dismissed---Plaintiff being a private limited company filed the suit without any Company's Board Resolution---Suit was dismissed in circumstances. \n \n(f) Tort---\n \n----Damage---Corporation---Mental torture---Private limited company cannot sue for damages of its feelings like mental torture.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-50 of 2001, decision dated: 27-03-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "DR. QAMMARUDDIN BOHRA, J",
    "": "Messrs KLB-EHYDER AND COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive--Plaintiff\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through President and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13726",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2179 = 2008 SLD 2179 = 2008 CLD 688",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)------S.9---Recovery of bank loan---Ex paste decree-Notices were issued to defendants by all four modes as provided under S.9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 but defendants did not appear nor they filed any leave to defend the suit application---Effect---Nothing was available on record from the side of defendants to dislodge the claim of plaintiff contained in plaint---High Court under Banking Jurisdiction decreed the suit only against the borrower to the extent of amount claimed in plaint, cost of funds at the prevailing rate from the date of filing of suit till realization of decretal amount and sale of mortgaged and hypothecated property---Suit was decreed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-17 of 2007, decision dated: 3rd April, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "DR. QAMMARUDDIN BOHRA, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nNORTHERN POLYETHELENE LIMITED and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13727",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2180 = 2008 SLD 2180 = 2008 CLD 701",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.9(5)---Valid service---Scope---Even if service is duly effected in any one of the modes (viz. through bailiff or process server of Banking Court, by registered post acknowledgment due, by courier or by publication) the same is deemed to be valid service for the purposes of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. \n \nMessrs Simnwa Polypropylene (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Messrs National Bank of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 476 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances)'Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Revision---Maintainability---Order passed by Banking Court dismissing application for leave to defend, was assailed before High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction---Validity---No provision of any revision application existed against any interlocutory order passed by Banking Court---Revision was not maintainable in circumstances. \n \nBolan Bank Ltd. V. Capricorn Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. 1998 SCMR 1961; United Bank Limited v. Abdul Hamid and others 2001 CLC 460 and Messrs Unicorn Enterprises v. Banking Court No.5, City Court Building, Karachi and 2 others 2004 CLD 1452 (Karachi) rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 200I)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to appear and defend the suit---Condonation of delay---On the day when Banking Court held service good on defendants, one of the defendants suddenly appeared as he was statedly standing outside the court with some work---Even after appearance of that defendant before Banking Court, he chose to wait for another 27 days before filing application for leave to defend along with application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Banking Court refused to condone the delay and dismissed application for leave to defend the suit---Validity---Delay on the part of defendant was without any plausible cause---Defendant was required to explain delay of each and every day and he had also to show that delay had been caused by reason beyond his control---In application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, defendant did not mention any reason for delay of 27 days in filing of that application, after he had appeared before Banking Court---No illegality having been found in the order passed by Banking Court---Revision was dismissed in limine by High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Revision Application No.13 and C.M.A. No.57 of 2008, decision dated: 7-04-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUR RAHMAN FARUQ PIRZADA, J",
    "": "ABDUL RAHIM PATEL--Applicant\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13728",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2181 = 2008 SLD 2181 = 2008 CLD 708",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.20---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Territorial jurisdiction---Determination---Choice of parties---Condition precedent---Borrowers filed suit for rendition of accounts in Banking Court against leasing company---Plea raised by leasing company was that according to lease agreement between the parties Banking Court at place \"\"R\"\" had jurisdiction, therefore, suit filed at place \"\"M\"\" was not maintainable---Validity---Lease agreement did not show its execution at place \"\"R\"\" rather it was executed and signed at place \"\"M\"\"---All necessary ingredients of S.20, C.P.C. had also taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of Court at place \"\"M\"\"---Leasing company failed to point out anything which could even remotely suggest that any partial cause of action had arisen at place 'R\"\"---None of the ingredients of S.20, C.P.C. was available by way of which it could be said that courts at place \"\"R\"\" had jurisdiction to entertain the lis between parties to agreement---Clause of agreement containing jurisdiction of Courts at place \"\"R\"\" could not be enforced under the law---Condition precedent to make a choice from among two or more courts of one court by parties through an agreement was that all the courts including the one chosen by the parties had the jurisdiction under the law---If the chosen court did not qualify the test of jurisdiction, then such agreement could not confer jurisdiction on such Court---Petition was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nState Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393; Zaib Cold Storage and Ice Factory through Sole Proprietor and another v. Messrs Pakistan Industrial Leasing Corporation Limited (PILCORP) 2006 CLD 67 and Banking Equity Ltd. v. Iqas Weaving Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 CLC 169 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.271 of 2008, decision dated: 2-04-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI AND SAIF-UR-REHMAN, JJ",
    "": "AKARI LEASING LIMITED through ManageR\nVs.\nJUDGE, BANKING COURT NO.1, MULTAN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13729",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2182 = 2008 SLD 2182 = 2008 CLD 723",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Appeal to High Court---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Plaintiff-Bank filed suit for recovery of loan against borrowers and appellant was a guarantor of one of the borrowers---Suit having been decreed, plaintiff-Bank initiated execution proceedings against appellant/guarantor and the borrowers---Properties belonging to appellant/guarantor and borrowers, which were mortgaged, were put to auction---Court Auctioneers filled schedule of auction to which appellant/ guarantor filed objections before Banking Court for exclusion of his property from auction schedule, which objection was dismissed---Validity---Properties belonging to borrowers, could not be auctioned due to non participation of bidders in respect of their properties but property of appellant/guarantor was auctioned and was confirmed in the name of successful bidder---Appellant levelled certain allegations against Court Auctioneers---Record had shown that at the time of auction, Court Auctioneers, Bank Officials and appellant were present at the spot---Satisfaction of decree against customer/borrower should be through sale/auction of properties of borrowers/principal debtors, however if thereafter decree was not satisfied., the properties of the guarantor could be sold---Properties belonging to borrowers which were put to auction could not be auctioned due to non-availability of the bidders, thus property belonging to appellant/guarantor was put to auction, which was legal as liability was co-extensive qua principal debtor/borrowers and the guarantor---Properties belonging to principal debtors having remained un-auctioned, Court Auctioneers were left with no choice but to sell the property of appellant/guarantor---No illegality having been committed by the Court Auctioneers, impugned order of Executing Court, held, was unexceptionable.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.85 of 2007, decision dated: 1st April, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ASGHAR HAIDER AND HAFIZ TARIQ NASIM, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD YAHYA AKBAR\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK through Manager and 6 others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13730",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2183 = 2008 SLD 2183 = 2008 CLD 761",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 15(6) & 19---Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979), S.15---Money decree, execution of -Auction of mortgaged property in possession of tenant---Conformation of auction in favour of auction-purchaser-Order of Banking Court directing tenant to deliver possession of such property to auction¬-purchaser---Validity---Statutory tenant had a right to remain on premises and no one could eject/dispossess him without due course of law---Banking Court, in absence of explicit provision could not put auction purchaser into possession of such property---Legislative intent could not be construed to deprive tenant of his right to occupy property guaranteed under law in presence of documentary evidence confirming his status---High Court set aside impugned order in circumstances. \n \nMst. Zarina Khawaja and others v. Agha Mehboob Shah PLD 1988 SC 190; Mst. Mubarak Shah v. Banking Court No.III 2005 CLD 515 and M. Ghana v. M. A. Mullick and 3 others 1973 SCMR 90 rel.\n \n(b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---\n \n---S.15---Statutory tenant, right of---Scope---Such tenant had a right to remain on premises and no one could dispossess/eject him without due course of law.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeals Nos.68 to 73 and 79 of 2006 and C.M.A. No.484 of 2007, heard on 15-02-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND SYED MAHMOOD ALAM RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs CLIMAX PRINTERS through Proprietor and another\nVs.\nMessrs HABIB BANK LTD. and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13731",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2184 = 2008 SLD 2184 = 2008 CLD 765",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10(3)(4) & (5)---Application for leave to defend suit---Non¬compliance with mandatory provisions of S.10(3)(4)(5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would provide for penalty and leave application would merit be rejected---Where the applicants had neither sought amendment of petition for leave to appeal nor had shown any sufficient cause for inability to comply with the mandatory requirements of law, application merited dismissal. \n \nNational Bank of Pakistan through Vice-President, Zonal Chief, Multan v. Effef Industries Limited and 11 others 2002 CLD 1431; Bolan Bank Limited through Attorneys v. Baig Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 6 others 2002 CLD 557; Siddique Woollen Mills and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 1033; Bank of Khyber v. Messrs Spencer Distribution and 14 others 2003 CLD 1406; Zeeshan Energy Ltd. and 2 others v. Faisal Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 1741; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. through Iftikhar-ul-Haq and Khalid Ishaq v. Mohib Fabric Industries Ltd. through Chief Executive 2004 CLD 716 and Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs SABCOS (Pvt.) Ltd. 2006 CLD 244 fol.\n \nMessrs Ittefaq Industries (Regd.) through Managing Partner and 2 others v. Bank of Punjab through Duly Constituted Attorney 2004 CLD 1356; National Bank of Pakistan v. Al-Asif Sugar Mills Limited and others 2001 MLD 1317; Habib Bank Ltd. v. A.M.B. Graner (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2001 Kar. 264; City Bank N.A., A Banking Company through Attorney v. Riaz Ahmed 2000 CLC 847; Bankers Equity Limited through Principal Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 931; Messrs C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chairman and 5 others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587; Habib-ur-Rehman and another v. Judge Banking Court No.4 Lahore and another 2006 CLD 217 and Muhammad Arshad and another v. City Bank N.A. Al-Falah Building, Lahore 2006 CLD 1011 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10--Application for leave to defend suit---Leave petition having been filed on behalf of a company without a valid resolution or authority of the company same cannot proceed. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---S. 10---Application for leave to defend suit---Leave application jointly filed by the defendants, not meeting the requirements of law, was dismissed. \n \n(d) Financial Institutional (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10---Dismissal of leave application does not absolve the plaintiff of its primary responsibility to prove its case. \n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Plaintiff, to establish its claim, has to show within contemplation of S.9, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 that the averments of the plaint are duly supported by statement of account. \n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9, 14 & 15---Creation of equitable mortgage---Requirements---Valid mortgage in. the eyes of law is one which is, in present i.e. disbursement of loan, signing of memorandum and delivery of the deposit of title deed, has taken place at one and the same time---Where, however, the agreement of finance was' signed and executed on 19-7-2003, while memorandum was signed on 28-6-2002, the mortgage did not cover agreement dated 19-7-2003 and the same was not a valid mortgage---Property was under charge, as a charge had been created and registered with Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan, therefore, the property would remain encumbered. \n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Recovery of loan-Plaintiff had established its claim, suit amount was reflected in the statement of account and outstanding amounts were mentioned in the repayment schedule and various documents and letters had proved the existence of loan facility and the disbursement of loan---Suit was decreed for the suit amount along with costs and costs funds with directions to the defendants to make payment accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.34 and PLA No.73-B of 2006, decision dated: 7-03-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "BANK OF PUNJAB through EVP/General Manager--Plaintiff\nVs.\nGENERTECH PAKISTAN LTD. Through Chief Executive and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13732",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2185 = 2008 SLD 2185 = 2008 CLD 775",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.9---Suit for recovery of amount withdrawn by defendant-customer against false entries of fake deposits made in his Bank Account in connivance with Bank Officer---Proof---Defendant claimed to be in possession of photo copies of counterfoil and receipts regarding his deposits with Bank, but did not produce same in Court---Defendant did not produce any document or examine witness to prove that disputed deposit entries were genuine---Defendant during cross-examination admitted withdrawal of suit amount---Defendant in connivance with Bank Officer had withdrawn suit amount from his Bank account without having any credit balance---Suit was decreed in circumstances with cost of funds as envisaged under law.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "1st Appeal No.73 of 2001, decision dated: 21st April, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND SYED MAHMOOD ALAM RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs UNITED BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD IRFAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13733",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2186 = 2008 SLD 2186 = 2008 CLD 778",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Words and phrases------- \"\"Shall \"\"---Meaning. \n \nOxford Dictionary, Thesaurus and Wordpower Guide, at page 1185 ref.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n---Word \"\"shall\"\" used in a statute---Effect stated.\n \nUse of word \"\"shall\"\" does not always mean that the enactment is obligatory or mandatory. It depends upon the context in which the word \"\"shall\"\" occurs and the other circumstances. \n \nIt depends on the language employed in a particular statute as to whether the word \"\"shall\"\" is to be treated as mandatory or directory. \n \nGovernment of Pakistan v. Ghulam Moinul Ahmed DLR 1965 Dac. 377; State of M.P. v. Azad Bharat Finance Co. (1996) 2 SCA 336; Abdul Rahim and 2 others v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1997 Kar. 62; Muhammad Saleh v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 2 others PLD 1972 SC 326; S. Hukam Singh Sham Singh and another v. S. Sardul Singh Kirpal Singh and others AIR 1953 Pepsu 133; State of Haryana v. Raghobir Dayal (1955) ISCJ 332 at 336 and Crawford's Statutory Construction, 1940 Edition, Paragraph 262 at page 519, 1989 ref.\n \n(c) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Intention of statute would be gathered from whole statute. \n \nRani Drigraj Kuer v. Raja Sri Amar Krishna Narain Singh AIR 1960 SC 444 rel.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9(2) &10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11---Suit for recovery of loan amount--- Non filing of statement of account along with plaint---Rejection of plaint, application for---Validity---Mode or manner of filing of statement of account not provided in Ss. 9(2) and 10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Filing of statement of account was a matter of procedural formality as no consequences were provided for failure of strict compliance of S.9(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--Application was dismissed---Principles---Muhammad Yousuf v. A.D.B.P. 2002 CLD 1270 dissented from. \n \nMuhammad Yousuf v. A.D.B.P. 2002 CLD 1270 dissented from.\n \nBela Automotives Limited v. Habib Bank Limited 2005 CLD 893; Messer C.M Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited and 5 others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587; Baba Farid Ghee Industries .v. National Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 669; Bankers Equity Ltd. and 5 others v. Messer Bentonite Pakistan Ltd. and 7 others 2003 CLD 9341; Muhammad Mushtaq and others v. Bashir Ahmed Chudhary and other PLD 1991 Lah. 400; Atta Muhammad Qureshi v. The Settlement Commissioner Lahore and 2 others PLD 1971 SC 61; Niaz Muhammad Khan v. Mian Fazal Raqib PLD 1974 SC 134 and Bela Automatives Limited v. Habib Bank Limited 2005 CLD 893 ref.\n \n(e) Practice and procedure---\n \n----Law always favours adjudication on merits---Technicalities should not be allowed to prevail to defeat ends of justice.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Banking Suit No.90 of 2001 and C.M.A. No.6573 of 2004, decision dated: 25-04-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID ALI Z. QAZI, J",
    "": "BELA AUTOMOTIVES LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13734",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2187 = 2008 SLD 2187 = 2008 CLD 800",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.9 & 19---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged goods through auction---Auction-purchaser was declared higher bidder, sale of mortgaged goods was confirmed in his favour and he deposited the balance sale consideration with the Nazir of the Court---Applicant, who had not participated in the auction and had not assigned any reason for not doing so, filed application for acceptance of his bid after sale of goods was confirmed in favour of auction-purchaser---Applicant had not assigned any reason for not submitting the bid before the Nazir of the Court within time prescribed in the public notice---Validity---Bid which was presented by the applicant to the Nazir of the Court, after the close of the auction, had no legal value and could not be considered as same was violative of the right acquired by auction-¬purchaser---Entertaining such requests after closing of sale, was seriously affecting the working as well as sanctity of the auction by Court and it would not be possible to conclude sale through Court auction and the order of the Court would lose its sanctity-No allegation of any mal practices, irregularities and fraud in the process of auction concluded by the Nazir of the Court was found and no one had questioned the legality of auction---Application was dismissed. \n \nHudaybia Textile Mills and others v. ABL and others PLD 1987 SC 512 and UBL v. A.Z. Hashmi and others 2000 CLC 1483 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-43 of 2007 and C.M. No.4395 of 2005, decision dated: 15-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM ASGHAR SIDDIQUI, J",
    "": "ASKARI COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nZAFAR AHMED and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13735",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2188 = 2008 SLD 2188 = 2008 CLD 823",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.89 & 93---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree--Auction of mortgaged property---Return of purchase money---Suit for recovery of loan filed by plaintiff-Bank having been decreed, Bank had filed execution petition and pursuant to that mortgaged property was directed to be sold---Said property was put to auction, but same was challenged---Banking Court found that property being commercial in nature and its sale price being well below the normal sale price in the market, same could not be confirmed and it was directed that auction purchaser would be returned the bid money and that -debtor would pay 5% of purchase price to auction purchaser in terms of O.XXI, R.89, C.P.C. as well as mark-up at the rate of 5% as purchase money of auction purchaser remained blocked for more than one year---Validity---Judgment-debtor had absolutely no role in the entire, exercise---Property which was sold at a lesser price, its auction was not confirmed---Imposition of any penalty in the shape of interest upon -debtor, in circumstances, was not only unreasonable, but was also unwarranted---Award of purchase money equivalent to 5% and mark-up to the extent of 5% was set aside and appeal was allowed to that extent.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 28 of 2008, heard on 24-03-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ASGHAR HAIDER AND HAFIZ TARIQ NASIM, JJ",
    "": "Syed AMJAD HUSSAIN JAFRI\nVs.\nKASB BANK LTD through Manager and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13736",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2189 = 2008 SLD 2189 = 2008 CLD 840",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss.9 & 10---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.25---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 11 & O.XXI, R.2---Recovery of loan---Principle of res judicata---Applicability---Deciding main suit without deciding pending applications---Decree passed against borrower company was satisfied out of court by new management-At the time of withdrawal of execution proceedings, fresh lease agreement was signed by new management---On failure of new management to satisfy fresh lease agreement, Financial Institution filed suit before Banking Court which was dismissed on the ground of res judicator---Validity---Promise to pay decretal amount in 48 rentals was a valid consideration within the contemplation of S.25 of Contract Act, 1872---Present suit was not based on agreement, which was subject-matter of earlier suit and . default was committed under fresh lease agreement---Banking Court had erroneously found that suit was hit by principle of res judicata and there was bar of O.XXI, R.2, C.P.C.---Judgment passed by Banking Court was not sustainable in the eye of law as the court had proceeded to decide main suit without deciding pending applications---Disposal of suit without disposing of pending applications was violative of law-Judgment and decree passed by Banking court was Set aside and case was remanded to Trial Court for deciding the suit and application for leave to defend the suit on merits within the parameters of law---Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \nUnited Bank Limited through Attorneys v. Messrs Home Aids Corporation through Managing Director and 6 others\"\" 2002 CLD 875 and \"\"Sh. Muhammad Kashif v. Askari Leasing Limited through Manager/Chief Executive of Branch/Recovery Officer\"\" 2004 CLD 1645 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.168 of 2002, decision dated: 19-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH AND ZAFAR IQBAL CHAUDHRY, JJ",
    "": "Messrs PACIFIC LEASING COMPANY LTD. through Executive VicEPresident\nVs.\nMessrs BRITISH BISCUITS COMPANY (PVT.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13737",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2190 = 2008 SLD 2190 = 2008 CLD 844",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Suit for recovery of loan--Application for leave to defend suit---Application for return of plaint---Application filed by defendant for return of plaint having been dismissed by the Banking Court, defendant had filed revision against said order of the Banking Court, while application for leave to defend suit filed by defendant under S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 in which same plea had already been raised, was pending---No application for seeking relief or interlocutory relief was maintainable on the same ground which had already been taken in the application filed wider S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 seeking leave to defend as it would amount to splitting up of the application to seek relief in parts. \n \nMs. Afshan Ahmed v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited and another 2002 CLD 137; Central Cotton Mills Limited and another v. Atlas Bot Lease Co. Limited and 2 others 1998 SCMR 2352; Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan, Member Provincial Assembly N.W.F.P. and another PLD 1995 SC 66; Munawar Hussain and 2 others v. Sultan Ahmed 2005 SCMR 1388; Major (Retd.) Barkat Ali and others v. Qaim Din and others 2006 SCMR 562; Messrs Rady & Co. (Pakistan) Limited v. Messrs Sayed Saigol Industries Ltd. 1981 SCMR 494; National Bank of Pakistan and 4 others v. Gamman Pakistan Limited PLD 1990 Kar. 209 and Muhammad Yasin and 2 others v. Ch. Muhammad Abdul Aziz PLD 1993 SC 395 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 22(6)---Appeal, competency of---Powers available to the court for entertaining an appeal, revision and review, were to be exercised only to the extent conferred by statutory provisions--Inherent powers of the superior courts for examining the jurisdiction on the touchstone of circumstantial limitations were available, but no such ground had been agitated---Under¬ provisions of S.22(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, while providing for the remedy by way of appeal had laid down scope of such appeal---Appeal could only be filed against , decree, sentence or final order. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.4, 5 & 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 20---Jurisdiction of the court---Provisions of S.20, C.P.C. conferred jurisdiction on the courts under three different conditions, namely territorial, accrual of cause of action and residence of parties---Provisions of S.5 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 only pertained to the territorial jurisdiction of the Banking Court, while question of accrual of cause of action and residence of parties had not been touched or dealt with by said section---While giving effect of S.4 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, question of territorial jurisdiction as conferred under S.5 of the Ordinance was attracted, however as S.5 of said Ordinance, was silent on the question of accrual of cause of action, the provisions of S.20, C.P.C. were attracted to the Banking Court---In case where more than one Banking Court had jurisdiction to try the matter, suit could not be rejected on mere ground that any other Banking Court was also competent to try the case.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.D-100 of 2005, decision dated: 14-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ZIA PERWEZ AND NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MEHRAN SOLVENT EXTRACTION (PVT.) LTD. through Directors/Partners and 5 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nI.D.B.P. through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13738",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2191 = 2008 SLD 2191 = 2008 CLD 850",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-------Art.25---'Equality' and 'arbitrariness'---Distinction---Similar treatment--Principle---Concept of equality is negation of arbitrariness---Every power has its extent and legal limits---Exercise of such power should be based on fairness and reasonableness---Persons in similar circumstances should have similar treatment, unless differentiation is based upon valid classification, which should not have taint of arbitrariness and that is the hallmark of ideal dispensation of justice. \n \nJustice (R) Fazal Karim at page-871 of Judicial Review of Public Actions rel.\n \n(b) Protection of Economic Reforms Act (XII of 1992)---\n \n----Ss.4 & 8---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.23, 24, 25 & 199---Constitutional petition---Investment by foreign national Pakistani---Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992---Scope---Right to acquire property-Discrimination-Legitimate expectancy, principle of---Applicability---Petitioner being Pakistani was settled abroad and had acquired foreign nationality also---Petitioner invested in Pakistan through foreign exchange remitted from abroad and purchased lands, which lands were acquired by authorities to be included in a housing scheme---Grievance of petitioner was that his land could not be acquired due to protection available to him under Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992---Petitioner also contended that authorities had exempted many lands owned by other persons but did not exempt his lands---Validity---Even if it be assumed that all owners of lands could not be treated similarly for any reason, petitioner would still be on better footing having brought in foreign exchange, in claiming exclusion of his land, which was purchased by him, from his foreign remittances---Petitioner was clamouring and craving for exclusion of his piece of property, which was not so large as may be likely to in any way disturb the plan, effectiveness and utility of the housing scheme---Previously as well when the property of petitioner was acquired for some other housing scheme, it was excluded; it could not be again acquired for a similar purpose as on such exclusion petitioner had earned a right to hold the same, which also gave rise to a legitimate expectancy that in future his property would not be subjected to similar acquisition---High Court found petitioner entitled to exclusion of his property from the operation of scheme---Petition was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.7160 of 2007, decision dated: 21st May. 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, CJ",
    "": "SULEMAN DAUD\nVs.\nLahore High Court DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY through Director General"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13739",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2192 = 2008 SLD 2192 = 2008 CLD 856",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.7 & 15---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 39, 42 & 54 Suit for declaration, injunction and cancellation---Powers and jurisdiction of Banking Court---Plaintiffs in their suit had impugned the action of selling the property of the plaintiff by the Banking Court in exercise of powers under S.15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and all incidental and consequential relief including damages---Office had raised objections that the relationship between the plaintiffs and defendants being that of customer and borrower, suit was barred under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Section 7(a) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 had given ample powers to the Banking Court and said court possessed all the jurisdiction as vested in civil court under Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and in terms of subsection (4) of S.7 of said Ordinance, no court other than the Banking Court had jurisdiction in respect of the matter covered under the said Ordinance---Relief sought and the claim contained in the suit emanated from the relationship between the borrower and customers and clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the Banking Court---Office objection regarding jurisdiction was sustained in circumstances-Since law favoured adjudication on merits rather than striking off the parties on technicalities, suit was ordered to be transferred to court of Banking jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-55 of 2007, decision dated: 8-10-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "Messrs ALREHMAN CHEMICALS through Proprietor and 2 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nAKHTAR ALEEM SYED and 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13740",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2193 = 2008 SLD 2193 = 2008 CLD 858",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Objection petition--Appeal---Appellant, who was son of deceased -debtor, filed two applications before Banking Court to stop execution proceedings and also to restrain auction of the property mortgaged with the Bank, for recovery of loan granted to respondent---Appellant had alleged that loan was granted to respondent on false documents to which the -¬debtor/father of appellant was not a party and that his father died prior to the institution of the recovery suit--:Appellant had submitted that no and decree could be passed against a dead person---Respondents admitted position as to factum of death of appellant's father prior to the institution of the suit for recovery of the loan---Ex parte proceedings were ordered in slipshod manner and that too against a dead person on the one hand and the applications disclosing the factum of death of father of appellant were not given any weight on the other, whereas it was the bounden duty of the Banking Court to take care of mandatory provisions of Order XXII, C.P.C.---Judgment and decree passed in the case were nullity in the eyes of law and ineffective and inoperative as against the legal heirs of deceased/ -debtor in the case, as same had been passed in relation to property of a dead person which was of no consequence---Since no proceedings could be initiated against a dead person, impugned and decree were set aside by High Court---Suit would be deemed to be pending before the Banking Court---Case was remanded to the Banking Court for its decision afresh accordingly. \n \nMuhammad Naseer v. Mir Azhar Ali Talpur 2001 SCMR 4; Mst. Afshan and another v. IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge Karachi (South) City Courts, Karachi and others 2006 CLC 71 and Mian Muhammad Akram and others v. Muhammad Chiragh and others PLD 2003 Lah. 804 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Appeal No.2 of 2000, decision dated: 12-03-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF BHATTI AND SAGHIR AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD JAVED AKHTAR\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13741",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2194 = 2008 SLD 2194 = 2008 CLD 861",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 255, 260 & 476---Powers and duties of the auditors---Failure of auditors to perform their professional duties With reasonable degree of care and skill---Imposition of penalty---Auditors were alleged to have been making audit reports to the members of the company otherwise than in conformity with the requirement of S.255 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Review of the accounts and underlying records of the company had shown that audited reports were materially misstated--Auditors appeared to have failed to discharge their duties and responsibility laid down in the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Apprehension was that auditors had failed to design audit procedure in a manner so as to have enabled the discovery of violation and had failed to appropriately modify all the relevant reports---Capital requirement for the business of a company was contributed by its shareholders who might not necessarily be the persons managing the company---In the case of a listed company, the general public also contributed towards the equity of the company---Such persons did not have any direct control over the company except that they elected Directors for a period of three years and entrusted the officers of the company to them in the hope that they would manage the company to their benefits---Shareholders, in circumstances were the stake-holders and the ultimate beneficiaries-Practically however, shareholders had no control over the way their company was managed by the Directors appointed by them, it was, in circumstances necessary that there must be some arrangement in place whereby the share holders must get some independent view as to how the Directors have managed the affairs of the company---Law, in circumstances, had provided that shareholders should appoint an auditor, who would be responsible to audit the books of accounts and make out a report to them at the end of each year---Such was the only safeguard provided by the law to the shareholders to ensure that the business was carried on by the Directors in accordance with sound business principles and prudent commercial practices and no money of the company was wasted or misappropriated---Law, in circumstances, had made auditors responsible in case to make out report in accordance with the legal requirement and it was, extremely important for the auditors to be vigilant and perform their duties and obligations with due care while auditing the accounts and books of account---Auditors in the present case had committed a breach of fiduciary duty cast upon them by the shareholders and had signed the audit reports otherwise than in conformity with the requirement of S.255 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and had committed a default in terms of S.260 of the said Ordinance---Auditors having offered to co-operate with the Security and Exchange Commission in the legal course against delinquent management, they were only reprimanded.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.CLD/EMD/FIU/32/2006, dated 3rd March, 2008, decision dated: 3rd April, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "TAHIR MAHMOOD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "Messrs GARDEZI & CO. CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13742",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2195 = 2008 SLD 2195 = 2008 CLD 879",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.494, 68, 69, 70, 86 & 146---Companies (Registration Offices) Regulations, 2003, R.11---Petition by local shareholders for substitution of revised Form-3 to rectify company's record after cancelling earlier Form-3 submitted by foreign shareholders company without deposit of increased capital amount into company's bank account and issuance of direction to Security and Exchange' Commission of Pakistan for issuing commencement of business certificate---Validity---Ministry of Finance had obtained financial due diligence report of foreign shareholders of company; according to which its financial and corporate structure was not sound---Foreign shareholders company had not deposited the required amount of increased capital amount, minimum subscription amount and subscribed amount of 100 shares as stipulated in Memorandum and Articles of Association of company against their names into company's bank account---Foreign shareholders of company had not qualified themselves to be shareholders of company---High Court accepted petition as prayed for.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous No.26 of 2007, decision dated: 25-04-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID ALI Z. QAZI, J",
    "": "Shaikh MUHAMMAD FAZAI, RAHIM and another\nVs.\nANDREW STAERMOSE and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13743",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2196 = 2008 SLD 2196 = 2008 CLD 889",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S. 305---Winding up of Company---Petitioner had sought winding of the company on basis that it was incapable of liquidating its liabilities---Petitioner had contended that the company owed petitioner a sum of Rs.14,25,100 on account of civil works done by the petitioner---Company had accepted its liability---Petitioner had contended that non-payment of amount by the company had entailed winding up of the company under S.305 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Facts on record had established that company was not in a position to liquidate its liabilities---No opposition came from any quarter to contest the assertions made by the petitioner---Petition was allowed as prayed for---Official liquidator duly appointed was directed to take over the control of assets of the company and proceed according to law thereafter.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O. No.55 of 2006, decision dated: 29-01-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, J",
    "": "Rana MUHAMMAD TARIQ ANJUM\nVs.\nMessrs IHSAN PROCESSING MILLS (PVT.) LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13744",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2197 = 2008 SLD 2197 = 2008 CLD 891",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)-------S.5---Admiralty suit--Application for setting aside of Court auction of shipped goods-Non-participation of applicant in auction due to death of his close relative Applicant neither produced documentary proof of death of his relative nor disclosed name and date of death of relative---Validity---In absence of any evidence proving death of his relative, bald statement of applicant could not be treated as gospel truth regarding such death--Applicant for his absence had not shown any reasonable and plausible explanation-Filing of such application seemed to be an attempt of applicant to protract auction proceedings, cause harm, damage and loss to highest bidder---High Court dismissed application in circumstances. \n \n(b) Administrative decision---\n \n----State departments and public functionaries must act in accordance with law, rules and regulations applicable to them in fair and transparent discharge of their duties. \n \n(c) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)--\n \n----S.5-Admiralty suit---Shipped goods, auction of---Forfeiture of security amount deposited by successful bidder in first auction for his failure to lift auctioned goods completely---Re-auction of remaining goods and acceptance of bid offered by second bidder at the rate lower than that offered by successful bidder in firstauction---Application by successful bidder in first auction offering higher rate than that offered by second bidder in re-auction---Validity---Re-auction had been held under orders of the Court and under supervision of Official Assignee and after completion of highest bid---Valuable right had been created in favour ofsecond bidder after acceptance of his bid in re-auction, which could not be snatched leniently---Successful bidder in first auction had not lifted whole quantity of goods on pretext of decrease in its prices in open market and had chosen to get his security forfeited instead of lifting auctioned goods---Such attitude and behaviour of successful bidder had disentitled him to make subsequent higher offer and its acceptance---High Court refused to accept subsequent high offer of successful bidder in first auction and dismissed his application in circumstances. \n \nShaukat Ali v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 432; Messrs Pacific Multinational (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Inspector-General of Police, Sindh and others PLD 1992 Kar. 283; Messrs Arif. Builders and Developers v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 Kar. 627; Pak Shaheen Containers Services v. Trustees of Port of Karachi and others PLD 2001 Kar. 30; Hudaybia Textile Mills v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD. 1987 SC 512; United Bank Ltd. v. A.Z. Hashmi (Pvt.) Ltd. 2000 CLC 1483; Muhammad Akhlaq Memon v. Zakaria Ghani PLD 2005 SC 819; Abdul Hamid v. Riaz Brothers Commission Agent, Hafizabad 1986 CLC 242; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Iqbal I. Chundrigar and another 1983 CLC 1464; Messrs Ahan Saz Contractors v. Pak Chromical Ltd. 1999 MLD 1781; Overseas Containers Ltd. v. Muhammad Iqbal 1988 CLC 461 and Abdul Razak v. Karachi Building Control Authority PLD 1994 SC 512 ref.\n \n(d) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)---\n \n----Ss.5 & 7---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.2---Admiralty suit---Shipped goods, auction of---Intra-Court appeal against such auction by Single Judge of High Court---Maintainability---Request of appellant to treat Infra-Court appeal filed mistakenly as appeal under S.7 of Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980---Validity---Intra-Court appeal had been filed in time---Such request of appellant would not prejudice case of remaining parties---Division Bench of High Court converted Intra-Court appeal into appeal under S.7 of the Ordinance, 1980.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.60 and C.M.A. No.386 of 2008, decision dated: 16-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZULLAH M. MEMON AND ARSHAD NOOR KHAN, JJ",
    "": "PINE COMMERCIAL CORPORATION\nVs.\nRANA BROTHERS and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13745",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2198 = 2008 SLD 2198 = 2008 CLD 901",
    "Key Words:": "Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XVII of 2002)------Ss. 2(xxxii), 3 & 12---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Demand of gas supply for Captive Power Plant of hotel---Refusal of Suit Southern Gas Company (SSGC) to accept such demand of applicant-hotel--Dismissal of appeal and review filed by SSGC against acceptance of such demand of hotel by Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority---Plea of SSGC was that applicant-hotel was not export oriented industry; and that acceptance of its demand was voilative of decision of Economic Coordination Committee of Federal Cabinet and Power Policies prohibiting supply of gas for power generation to Hotels lacking foreign investment of 500 million rupees or above---Validity---Applicant-hotel did not fulfil requirements for grant of gas connection for power generation---Power Policies announced by Government subsequent to rejection of applicant-hotel's demand by SSGC would not govern such matter-As no dispute existed regarding \"\"regulated activity\"\" as defined in S.2(xxxii) of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, all proceedings before authority were irregular and without jurisdiction---High Court accepted constitutional petition with observations that applicant-hotel would be at liberty to make fresh application to Federal Government, which would decide same according to law and its policies. \n \nDistrict Magistrate, Lahore and Commissioner, Lahore Division v. Syed Raza Kazim PLD 1961 SC 178 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-91 of 2006 and C.M.As. Nos.321 of 2006 and 6017 of 2007, decision dated: 21st April, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND SYED MEHMOOD ALAM RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "SUI SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY LTD.\nVs.\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Govt. of Pakistan and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13746",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2199 = 2008 SLD 2199 = 2008 CLD 909",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-------Art.199---Constitutional petition---Tender, bidding in---Qualification---Joint venture---Grievance of petitioner was that authorities did not issue him tender document as he was not found qualified to participate in tender---Plea raised by petitioner was that it was a joint venture and any disqualification in him could be met by his venture partner---Validity---Petitioner and his joint venture partner were both individually disqualified under Pakistan Engineering Council Regulations---Petitioner was disqualified on the ground of lacking financial limit, while his partner was lacking field specialization---Two disqualified persons even in cases of joint venture tender would not be qualified by joining hands---Each contractor must be qualified in his own right before forming a partnership to tender for a joint venture project---Petitioner being disqualified was not entitled to be issued tender documents--- Petitioner himself was at fault and by filing constitutional petition, he had delayed execution of project in question---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P. No.D-535 of 2008, decision dated: 21st April, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND SYED MAHMOOD ALAM RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs HAJI ABDUL BAQI AND BRothers\nVs.\nMANAGING DIRECTOR, Karachi High Court WATER AND SEWERAGE BOARD and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13747",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2200 = 2008 SLD 2200 = 2008 CLD 915",
    "Key Words:": "Imports and Exports (Control) Act (XXXIX of 1950)-------Ss.5A(7), (8) & 5(B)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.249-A---Commercial Court proceedings---Procedure---Order of acquittal in the absence of Prosecutor-Legality---On the information by the appellant that the respondent had illegally retained export proceeds amounting to US$ 7,783,150, the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan filed a complaint against the respondent before the Commercial Court, for violation of the Import and Export Control Act, 1950---Respondent was acquitted by the Commercial Court under S.249-A, Cr.P.C.---Appeal against acquittal---Pleas of the appellant were that as the Prosecutor was yet to be appointed for prosecuting the case before the Commercial Court, and secondly, as there was no application filed by the respondent for acquittal under S.249-A, Cr.P.C., therefore, the order of acquittal could not have been passed---Validity---Where S.5A(7) of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950, and S.249-A, Cr.P.C. being the laws relevant to the proceedings before the Commercial Court, provided that without the presence/appointment of the Prosecutor, case could not be proceeded by the Commercial Court, and where there was also an allegation that an application under S.249-A, Cr.P.C. was not filed, the matter could only be resolved by recording evidence of the parties and that too after granting an opportunity to advance the case of the appellant---Commercial Court had passed the order of acquittal under S.249-A, Cr.P.C., in haste without adverting to the provisions of the law---Appeal was allowed and the case was remanded to the Commercial Court for decision on merits after recording evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No. 1/C of 2007, decision dated: 20-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "HAFIZ TARIQ NASIM, J",
    "": "Messrs STAR AGRO ALLIED MACHINERY INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive \nVs. \nCHAIRMAN, COMMERCIAL COURT, PUNJAB AND N.-W.F.P and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13748",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2201 = 2008 SLD 2201 = 2008 CLD 917",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Petition for leave to defend suit was dismissed by Banking Court and suit was decreed--Appeal by Bank---Question raised by the appellant-Bank was regarding the mark-up payable by the borrower, which had already been manifestly adjudicated upon by the Banking Judge---No interference, in circumstances, was warranted in the of Banking Judge---Appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.17 and C.M.A. No.422 of 2006, decision dated: 13-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND SYED MAHMOOD ALAM, JJ",
    "": "MCB LIMITED\nVs.\nMessrs ATIF CORPORATION through Proprietor and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13749",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2202 = 2008 SLD 2202 = 2008 CLD 935",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984)-------Ss. 2(c) & 11--'Customer'---Definition---Suit for recovery of loan---Employee---Directors of the company, who had defaulted, as per plaint, could not at all be termed as customers within the meaning of S.2(c), Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984---Judgment and decree to their extent was wholly without jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M. 47-B of 1999 in COS No.2 of 1998, decision dated: 29-01-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD YAQOOB and others\nVs.\nMessrs UNITED BANK LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13750",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2203 = 2008 SLD 2203 = 2008 CLD 974",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)------Ss.8 & 10---Prohibition of registration of certain matters and identical and similar trade marks---Trade name applied by both the parties was the same but the goods manufactured by them were absolutely different to each other; one party had applied for bleaching preparations and other substances; while the other had applied for food products etc. ---Principles.\n \nSection 8 of Trade Marks Act, 1940, specifies the reason when registration of certain matters is prohibited.\n \nSection 8 has been enacted with the purpose that if goods manufactured by both parties are examined apparently they are different to each other. Goods manufactured by one party are used for laundry purpose, whereas the goods supplied by the other mostly are edible items. There is no apprehension that it will create any confusion or deception in the mind of general public or purchasers. \n \nSection 8(a) of the Act is designed for the protection of the public against deception or confusion and must, therefore, be given a wide scope and should not be limited to any kind of confusion such as arising by reason of any trade connection between the competing goods. Once it is established on the evidence that deception or confusion is probable, the Registrar is bound to prohibit registration of the proposed trade mark in the public interest. \n \nIn the present case the goods were absolutely of different description and classes and it was hard to believe that it would create an impression in the mind of general public that the goods produced by each of the parties had some connection with each other. \n \nTo protect the public from any confusion or deception due to name of similar nature of product manufactured and supplied in the matter a wide scope has been given under section 8. \n \nSection 10 of Trade Marks Act, 1940 in addition to section 8 of Trade Marks Act lays down 'a rule for prohibiting the registration of identical and similar trade marks. Much emphasis has been laid on non-similarity of goods in different classes, as the very purpose of registration of trade mark is to protect public at large from any confusion to enjoy the product of their own choice and for this very purpose the term \"\"same goods\"\" or \"\"description of goods\"\" have been repeated in section 10 of Trade Marks Act for such products, or goods. \n \nA trade mark at common law is acquired not solely through origination of the mark but through its use in trade. \n \nThe object of giving a particular name to goods is to make known to general public through picture, label, words that the said goods are being manufactured by that particular company. Thus a symbol is given to a product with its description manufactured by a particular company. The term \"\"trade mark\"\" as used in the Act means a trade mark used or proposed to be used in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the goods and some persons having the right, either as proprietor or as registered user, to use the mark whether with or without any indication of the identity of that person. Thus if a particular name is symbolized for a particular goods to promote the interest with the benefits of its use by their consumers, can create a confusion and affect their business in a market with the similar trade mark given to another company for the similar trade mark given to another company for the similar goods, but in case of different nature of goods in different classes no such possibility can occur, as it is expected from the general purchasers to differentiate between the nature of goods placed under the 'mark' for different use. \n \nWhere the parties had identical and similar trade mark but were manufacturing goods absolutely different to each other and by refusing the registration of one party the Registrar of Trade Marks had not applied his judicial mind. High Court remanded the case to the Registrar for re-examination of the case in the light of the goods manufactured by both the parties in different classes and its future effect as to the confusion and deception in the mind of any consumer in case of identical trade marks given to different commodities under different class.\n \nSunkist Growers Inc. v. Messrs Karachi Aerosol Co. Ltd. and another PLD 1987 Kar. 119; Montres Rolex v. Assistant Registrar Trade Marks and another PLD 1993 Kar. 442 and Seven-up Company v. Kohinoor Thread Ball Factory and 3 others PLD 1990 SC 313 ref.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)---\n \n----Ss.8 & 10---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24 A---Rejection of application for registration of trade mark or allowing the opposition without applying judicial mind by the Registrar of Trade Marks was against the principles of natural justice---Principles.\n \nWithout reasoning rejection of application of applicant for registration of the trade mark or allowing the Opposition is against the principles of natural justice. Section 24-A of General Clause Act is very much clear on the point that every order passed must be based on reasoning. It is incumbent upon Judicial Officer that he should look into the evidence and material available with him and give its reasoning to allow or discard the evidence available on the record, with his final conclusion. If the order is lacking with these requirements it cannot be termed to be a judicial verdict and will be deemed to be an administrative order incapable to settle controversy judicially between the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "M.A. No.328 of 2003, decision dated: 12-11-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. YASMIN ABBASEY, J",
    "": "COLGATE PALMOLIVE (PAKISTAN) LTD.\nVs.\nREGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13751",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2204 = 2008 SLD 2204 = 2008 CLD 981",
    "Key Words:": "Tort-------Malicious prosecution---Suit for recovery of damages for malicious prosecution---Defendant whose son was murdered, had right to seek justice---Defendant nominated plaintiff in the F.I.R.; it was up to the plaintiff to prove that said act of defendant had an element of malice---Evidence on record clearly reflected that plaintiff had not been able to prove malice against defendant---Other necessary ingredients which lead to a successful action for grant of damages for malicious prosecution were not fulfilled by the plaintiff as he could not substantiate his assertions with quality evidence---Appellate Court below, in circumstances, had rightly concurred with the findings of the Trial Court, which had dismissed suit filed by the plaintiff--Concurrent findings of the Courts below, could not be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction of High Court, when no jurisdictional error, material illegality or irregularity, misreading and non-reading of evidence had been pointed out.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.753 of 2003, decision dated: 7-02-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, J",
    "": "KHAN AMIR\nVs.\nSARDAR KHAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13752",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2205 = 2008 SLD 2205 = 2008 CLD 983",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)------S.92---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Application for injunction against different pending suits, for mandatory injunction, damages and rendition of accounts under Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001---On comparison of both the. trade marks in question those were found quite disjunctive to each other, they were also distinctive in their appearance as they had been used in different styles, both the parties had no exclusive rights to the word in dispute which was an adjective and was frequently used in so many varieties and respects and there was difference of price of both the items therefore, deception was not conceivable---Only the plaintiff was not using the word in dispute but others were also using the same---Prima facie, case and balance of convenience, in circumstances, would be in favour of the defendant and not the plaintiff as by granting injunction, defendant would suffer irreparable loss while the plaintiff had already been in the field with other competitors---Injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff, could not be granted in circumstances---Principle.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.952 and C.M.A. No.6118 of 2005, decision dated: 4-10-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "Messrs HERO MOTORS LTD. and another--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nBABAR AUTO TRADING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY through Partners, Proprietors, Manager and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13753",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2206 = 2008 SLD 2206 = 2008 CLD 987",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.VII, R.2---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---Money suit---Recovery---Joint liability---Proof---Suit was filed by plaintiff-Bank against his borrower and godown owner with whom stocks of the borrower were pledged---Borrower committed default of the loan and bank auctioned stocks of the borrower---Grievance of bank was that owner of godown failed to deliver full quantity of stocks pledged with him, therefore, bank suffered loss which was sought to be recovered from the borrower as well as from the owner of the godown jointly---Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of bank only against the borrower only---Plea raised by bank was that both the defendants were jointly responsible for the loss caused to the bank, therefore, suit should have been decreed against both the defendants jointly---Validity---Trial Court did not appraise the evidence in its true perspective and wrongly found that there was no privity of contract between plaintiff-Bank and owner of the godown---If there was no privity of contract between plaintiff-Bank and owner of godown, the owner could not be absolved from the responsibility of keeping of particular quantity of the stock at his godown and its return in the manner in which it was kept in his godown to the bank or its nominee---If any shortfall had occurred the owner of godown was responsible for such shortfall and was liable to pay the loss and damages caused to the stock kept by him in his godown-Owner of godown could not be let free in case of any loss or shortfall of the stock kept in his godown---Owner of godown was liable to pay the losses incurred because of his negligence to the stock kept by him at his godown---Trial Court was not justified in absolving owner of godown from such responsibility---High Court modified the and decree passed by trial Court and suit was also decreed against owner of godown---Intra-court appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C.A. No.220 of 1989, decision dated: 30-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZULLAH M. MEMON AND ARSHAD NOOR KHAN, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nMessrs FARRUKH CORPORATION through Sole Proprietory ConcerN„¢s Legal Heirs and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13754",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2207 = 2008 SLD 2207 = 2008 CLD 996",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------S.34---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, R.1---Stay of proceedings---Recovery of money---Dishonoured cheque---Defendant sought stay of proceedings on the basis of arbitration agreement between both the parties---Validity---For deciding application under S.34 of Arbitration Act, 1940, the pleadings in the suit were to be considered---Cause of action pleaded in the plaint was based on dishonoured cheques which was an independent cause of action not related to dispute under arbitration clause in the agreement---Proceedings were not stayed in circumstances. \n \nMessrs Shell Pakistan Ltd. v. Messrs Bhoja Air (Pvt.) Ltd., 2007 MLD 1424; Mst. Suriya Waseem Usmani v. L and M Int. (Pvt.) Ltd. 2002 CLD 624 and Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan v. Asif Cotton Ginners, 1995 CLC 1024 ref.\n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----Ss. 118(a), 79 & 80---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr.1 & 2---Recovery of money---Negotiable instrument---Presumption---Scope---Suit was based on negotiable instruments/dishonoured cheques and presumption would be that the same were issued against consideration unless rebutted by defendant.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S.34, O.XX XVII, Rr.1 & 2---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss.118(a), 79 & 80---Recovery of money---Dishonoured cheques--Amount of decree---Determination---Inclusion of interest in decree---Plaintiff sought recovery of his money on the basis of dishonoured cheques issued by defendants in favour of plaintiff---Despite service of process in the name of defendants, no body appeared on their behalf-Plaintiff sought decree for Rs.3,47,19,000 against defendant company and Rs.20,00,0000 against private defendant---Validity---From pleadings it appeared that amount of Rs.20,000,00 was included in the sum of Rs.3,47,19,000 as private defendant had issued cheque on behalf of defendant-Company as personal guarantee---High Court decreed the suit of plaintiff only in the sum of Rs.34,719,000 against both the defendants jointly and severally but liability of private defendant would not exceed Rs.20 million in any case, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum in accordance with Ss.79 and 80 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, from the date of filing of suit till the date of decree---High Court also included interest in the decree at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of decree to the date of payment in accordance with S.34, C.P.C.-Suit was decreed accordingly. \n \nNaeem Iqbal v. Mst. Zarina 1996 SCMR 1530; Ahmed Autos v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 497 and Mian Muhammad Amjad Amin v. Rana Bashir Ahmed 2004 MLD 988 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1338 of 2007, decision dated: 13-06-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "SHELL PAKISTAN LTD. through Attorney--Plaintiff\nVs.\nAERO ASIA INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13755",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2208 = 2008 SLD 2208 = 2008 CLD 1003",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)-------S. 10---Prohibition of registration of identical or similar trade mark---Powers of Registrar of Trade Marks---Scope---Applicant claiming registration of identical or deceptively and confusingly similar trade mark has to show either \"\"concurrent user\"\" or \"\"other special circumstances\"\"---Initial burden is on the applicant for registration to prove to the satisfaction of the Registrar that it is in his honest and concurrent use or other special circumstances---Phrase \"\"other special circumstances\"\"---Scope---Socio-economic conditions of the use of trade mark is not a relevant consideration---Consent of one party to allow registration of the other---Effect.\n \nThe Registrar on receipt of the application for registration either refuses the application or' accepts it subject to such amendment, modification, conditions or limitations if any, as he may think fit. Section 10(1) Trade Marks Act, 1940 prohibits registration of identical or deceptively similar trade mark, which belongs to a different proprietor in respect of same goods or description of goods. The prohibition to register identical and deceptively similar trade marks in subsection (1) is controlled by subsection (2) of section 10 ibid. Discretion of Registrar to Register more than one identical or similar mark, within the contemplation of section 10(2) of the Trade Marks Act of 1940 is not arbitrary. The applicant claiming registration of identical or deceptively and confusingly similar mark has to show either \"\"concurrent user\"\" or \"\"other special circumstances\"\". Initial burden is on the applicant to prove to the satisfaction of the Registrar that it is in his \"\"honest and concurrent use\"\" or \"\"other special circumstances\"\". The appellants in the present case, did not claim honest and concurrent user, at the best they could press \"\"other special circumstances\"\". Phrase \"\"other special circumstances\"\" as used in subsection (2) of section 10 of the Act has not been defined under the Trade Marks Act of 1940. \"\"Other special circumstances\"\" must be connected with the use of the mark. These include any circumstances peculiar to the application in relations to the subject-matter of the application and this includes use by an applicant of his mark before the conflicting mark was registered or used. Socio-economic consideration of the use of the article is not a relevant consideration. \n \nContention that \"\"Letter of Consent\"\" from the holder of Trade Mark was placed on record does not appeal. As such letter of consent is' subsequent in date. \"\"Letter of Consent\"\" which is dated June 11, 2001 obviously could not be available when the application was dismissed on 3-3-2002 by short order followed by details reasons dated 23-3-2002. \n \nAppellant may apply afresh claiming registration of mark applied for on the basis of letter of consent and the application shall be decided in accordance with law.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeals Nos.43 and 44 of 2002, decision dated: 21st August, 2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. YASMEEN ABBASEY, J",
    "": "ERWIN MULLAR GMBH & CO.\nVs.\nASSISTANT REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS-\nLondon Rubber Co. v. Durex Product Inc. AIR 1963 1882 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13756",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2209 = 2008 SLD 2209 = 2008 CLD 1007",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.47 & O.XXI, R.87---Money decree, execution of--Auction of property---Failure of auction-purchaser to pay purchase money---Issuance of sale certificate in favour of second highest bidder after deposit of purchase money at directive of executing court---High Court set aside such order of executing court and ordered for re-auction of property---Satisfaction of decree by -debtor after entering into compromise with decree-holder---Validity---When sale failed, then executing court had to order resale of property by publishing a proclamation, but could not permit second highest bidder to take benefit of auction and be substituted for auction-purchaser-When -debtor opted to pay off decretal amount, then executing court had no option but to go along with such arrangement---Executing court had power under S.47, C.P.C., to decide all questions relating to discharge and satisfaction of decree---Second highest bidder had no locus standi to challenge satisfaction of decree by -debtor---High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.152 of 2008, decision dated: 16-06-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ASGHAR HAIDER AND KHALIL AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "KHUSHI MUHAMMAD and another\nVs.\nSAJIDA PARVEEN and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13757",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2210 = 2008 SLD 2210 = 2008 CLD 1009",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Partnership Act (IX of 1932)-------Ss. 43, 44 & 46---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XL, R.I---Suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts---Partnership firm was engaged in developing of Housing Scheme---Nazir of the Court appointed to prepare report about the accounts and assets of the partnership concern, submitted that in spite of repeatedly asking the defendants to produce the accounts of the firm, no such accounts and layout Plan of the Scheme were produced, as such, it was not possible for the Nazir to prepare the accounts of partnership---Record showed that the defendants admitted in their written statement and affidavit-in-evidence and cross-examination that they were conducting the affairs of partnership business as managing Partners but in spite of that admission and the direction of the Court they failed to tender accounts to the plaintiffs and in spite of directions of the Court, they as managing partners, failed to provide and submit accounts of the partnership firm, bank statements, approved plan, allotment orders of the plots in the Housing Scheme and monies received from the allottees of the plots and all the accounts in respect of partnership firm but the managing partner fraudulently, mala fide and dishonestly failed to produce all such accounts and documents---High Court, in circumstances, ordered the office to prepare final decree in terms of O.XX, R.13, C.P.C. and appointed the Nazir as Receiver as well as Commissioner to take over the business and all the assets of the partnership firm moveable or immovable and recover from the defendants including unutilized land of the Housing Scheme (Partnership business) and after taking over all the assets and properties of the partnership firm, he was further directed to sell the same through public auction on 'as is where is' basis and to distribute the sale proceeds amongst the partners in accordance with their respective shares. \n \n(b) Partnership Act (IX of 1932)---\n \n----S.30---Admission of minor in partnership---Scope---Minor may be a partner in a firm with the consent of all the partners for the time being and he may be admitted to the benefits of the partnership. \n \nPLD 1955 Lah. 350 ref.\n \n(c) Administration of justice---\n \n----Technicalities not to create hurdles in way of substantial justice-Principles.\n \nCases of parties should be decided en merits. If a party upon evidence brought on record, has established his case on merits, then such party should not be knocked out on technical grounds. The technicalities should not create hurdles in the way of substantial justice. Mere technicalities, unless offering insurmountable hurdles, should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1273 of 2002, decision dated: 23rd June, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID ALI Z. QAZI, J",
    "": "ABDUL GHANI and others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nABDUL RASHID and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13758",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2211 = 2008 SLD 2211 = 2008 CLD 1026",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)------Ss. 33, 22 & 46---Procedure when application for trade mark was allowed---Aggrieved party had to make an application before the High Court or Registrar of Trade Marks for correcting any entry made or error or defect appearing in the impugned order of the Registrar---Where the proper procedure had not been followed by the appellant, High Court remanded the matter to the Registrar of Trade Marks with specific direction.\n \nOnce an application for registration of trade mark is allowed proper procedure has been prescribed for getting it set aside or rectified. Aggrieved party has to make an application before the High Court or Registrar for correcting any entry made or error or defect appearing in the impugned order. In the present case admittedly proper procedure had not been followed by the appellant. Counsel for the respondent conceded that he had no objection if the matter was remanded to the Registrar for rectification of his order if any application for the same was moved by the appellant before the Registrar Trade Marks. \n \nIn view of the legal position matter was remanded by the High Court to the Registrar for, considering application for rectification along with oppositions on record, if any, moved by the appellant, with notice to both the parties and giving them an opportunity of hearing. In case, no application was moved the impugned order would hold the field.\n \nAmina Salman for Appellant.\n \nSaleem Ghulam Hussain for Respondents.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No.42 of 2004, decision dated: 5-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. YASMIN ABBASEY, J",
    "": "CANON KABUSHIKI KAISHA through Authorized Signatory\nVs.\nREGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13759",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2212 = 2008 SLD 2212 = 2008 CLD 1040",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)-------S.3(2)(b)---Admiralty suit, maintainability of---Matter in dispute pertained to agreement relating to carriage of goods in a ship and by virtue of S.3(2)(b), Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980, the matter fell within the Admiralty jurisdiction---Clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 3 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980 was very wide bringing all the matters related to Shipment, Carriage by Sea within the Admiralty jurisdiction--Admiralty suit, in circumstances was maintainable. \n \n(b) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)---\n \n----S. 3(2)(b)---Admiralty suit---Matter in dispute pertained to agreement relating to carriage of goods in a ship---Plaintiff itself had shown, through its correspondence that it was fully aware about the fate of the consignment lying unattended, in the absence of receiver so it tried to shift the same to some other Port of another country but failed, nor it could prove any alleged buyer at the port where the consignment was lying unattended---Defendants had stated that the consignment was in good condition under original seal as was loaded from the Port of Shipment and nothing in rebuttal had been brought by the plaintiff---Ship/owners of Ship were not liable for anything in circumstances. \n \n(c) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)---\n \n----S. 3(2)(b)---Admiralty suit---Record showed that consignee of the goods, had backed out from the contract, as firstly, there were discrepancies in the documents of Shipment which was evident from the letter of the plaintiffs Bank to the plaintiff itself and secondly there was nobody at the port of destination to receive the consignment, when the same landed nor there was any communication from the consignee that it was effected by non-availability of the consignment of the Port---Consignment, in such circumstances, remained unattended and almost abandoned---Consignee having backed out there was liability on the part of defendants. \n \n(d) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)---\n \n----S. 3(2)(b)---Admiralty suit---Consignment, at the port of destination having been refused by the consignee and lying unattended, defendants on justified reasons, had shifted the consignment to another Port but there was no data to disclose, the date on which shifting was effected---Such factual position did not affect the plaintiff as at his request the defendants were even ready to transship the consignment from the Port of destination to another Port of different country but the plaintiff failed to agree to the terms and conditions on the ground that charges were exorbitant-Plaintiff however, could arrange other ship for transshipment of the consignment, which he failed---Excuse that defendants were charging demurrage/storage charges were also not of any help as at one time, the defendants agreed to charge lesser amount, but since there was no settlement on the controversies, therefore, the defendants started asking for total charge---Such factual position did not affect the merits of the case and defendants were not liable for any loss. \n \n(e) Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)---\n \n----S. 3(2)(b)---Admiralty suit---Consignment, at the Port of destination having been refused by the consignee was lying unattended---Ship owners/charters had claimed demurrage/ storage charges but the plaintiff had not been able to establish that they were on higher side---Shifting of the consignment from Port of destination to another Port by the defendants was basically due to fault of the plaintiff as its buyer backed out, otherwise all the incidents would not have happened and since the root cause lay with the plaintiff, therefore the claim of demurrage/storage charges did not give cause of action to the plaintiff----Defendants, though at one stage, for the purpose of settlement of issue waived demurrage/storage charges, but in the absence of any receiver for the consignment at the Port of destination they again started asking the same---From dual stana of the defendants regarding their defence that there was no buyer and secondly the consignment was shifted to other Port erroneously it was obvious that they had failed to give relevant dates---Defendants, in circumstances, were not entitled to claim demurrage/storage charges.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Admiralty Suit No.9 of 2000, decision dated: 13th March. 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "Messrs FINE COTTON TEXTILES --Plaintiff\nVs.\nKHALED IBN AL WALEED through Master/Chief Officer and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13760",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2213 = 2008 SLD 2213 = 2008 CLD 1056",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. VII, R.11---Rejection of plaint in piecemeal---Scope---Plaint could not be rejected in piecemeal---Where even one prayer was maintainable, plaint could not be rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.\n \nYounus Textile Mills v. Muhammad Fazal Tayyab 2004 MLD 1081 rel.\n \n(b) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)---\n \n----Ss. 3, 4, 9 & 13---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9---Libel, suit for damages---Jurisdiction of civil court---Scope---Jurisdiction of civil court to entertain such suit under general law (i.e. S.9, C.P.C.) not specifically ousted by Defamation Ordinance, 2002---Jurisdiction of civil court under S.9, C.P.C. and that of District Judge under Defamation Ordinance, 2002 to entertain such suit was concurrent---Open to plaintiff to choose either to pursue statutory remedy under Defamation Ordinance, 2002 or general law remedy under S.9, C.P.C.---When plaintiff once opted to pursue general law remedy under S.9, C.P.C. then his statutory remedy under Defamation Ordinance, 2002 would be completely barred and vice versa---Principles. \n \nM. Moosa v. Mahomed and others PLD 1959 liar. 378; M. Moosa v. Mahomed and others PLD 1968 SC 25; Government of Punjab v. Mst. Kamina 1990 CLC 404; Ghulam All v. Abdul Hafiz PLD 1962 Lah. 765; Adeeb Javedani v. Yahya Bakhtiar 1995 CLC 1246; Capt. Benaras Khan v. Commodore Akhtar Hanif and another 1988 CLC 1093; Syed Mehmood Ali v. Network Television Marketing (Pvt.) Ltd. and another PLD 2005 Kar. 399; Major (Retd.) Tanvir Hussin Shah v. Government of the Punjab and others 1989 MLD 1086 and Mohiuddin Ansari and another v. Muhammad Arif Siddiqui 1989 MLD 3875; Wolverhampton New Water Works Company v. Hawkesford (1859) 37 LJ 248; Mian Sultan Ali Nanghiana v. Mian Nur Hussain PLD 1949 Lah. 301; Tanveer Jamshed v.Raja Ghulam Haider 1992 SCMR 917 and Mst. Fehmida Begum v. Muhammad Khalid 1992 SCMR 1908 rel.\n \nShafqat-ur-Rehman v. Daud-ur-Rehman PLD 2006 Pesh. 206 not fol.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 9---Enforcement of legal right recognized in general law or created by special law---Remedy under special or general law, availability of---Principles.\n \nIn the first category are the cases, where a legal right is already recognized in common or general law, which is later codified through statute and such statute also provides a remedy. In such cases, unless there is an ouster clause barring jurisdiction of civil courts, both the remedies under the general and special laws would be available, subject to the doctrine of election i.e. the plaintiff/applicant will have to choose as to whether he would pursue the remedy under special or general law; in the second category of cases, the legal right itself is created by the statute, but no remedy is provided under the codified law. In such cases, the statutory right will be enforceable by the procedure given under the general law. \n \nWolverhampton New Water Works Company v. Hawkesford (1859) 37 LJ 248; Mian Sultan Ali Nanghiana v. Mian Nur Hussain PLD 1949 Lah. 301; H.H. Ahmed v. Pakistan PLD 1972 Kar. 366; Pakistan v. H.H. Ahmed 1971 SCMR 626; United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Akbar Agencies Ltd. PLD 1987 Kar. 81 and West Punjab Government v. Pindi Jhelum Valley Transport Ltd. PLD 1953 Lah. 339 rel.\n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n--Arts. 19, 15, 16 & 17---Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), Ss.5 & 2---Defamatory publication---Freedoms envisaged in Arts 15, 16, 17 and 19 of the Constitution are not absolute, but subject to reasonable restrictions---Fundamental duty of every propagator, printer and publisher would be to establish that whatever they published was based upon truth---Principles. \n \n(e) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)---\n \n----Ss. 5 & 2---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Defamatory publication---Grant of temporary injunction against such publication---Scope---Courts though not debarred from granting such injunction, but would be reluctant to grant the same---Where publication was apparently untrue or caused with an attempt to blackmail the plaintiff then such injunction would be granted---Principles. \n \nPuri Terminal Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan 2004 SCMR 1092 ref.\n \nMajid Nizami v. Sheikh Muhammad Rashid PLD 1996 Lah. 410; Sultan Ali Lakhani v. Mir Shakeelur Rehman PLD 1997 Kar. 41; Quarz Hill v. Beall (1882) 20 Ch. D 501; Bonnard v. Perryman (1891) 2 Ch. 269; Harishankar v.Kailash Narain 1981 MPLJ 589; Ratanlal and Dhirajlal on the Law of Torts by Justice G.P. Singh, 24th Edn., P.307 & 308 and Mehrotra's Commentary on the Law of Defamation, Damages and Malicius Prosecution by G.S. Kalra, 5th Edn., p.89 rel.\n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), Ss.5 & 2---Defamatory publication---Temporary injunction, grant of ---Denial of plaintiff's plea by defendant---Pleadings of parties and documents on record not making out a case against defendant---Effect---Such being a case of \"\"word against word\"\" was wanting in evidence---Where prima facie case could not be established without recording evidence, court would refrain from granting such injunction---Where court could not draw any inference from pleadings of parties, then no injunction could be issued---Temporary injunction was refused in circumstances. \n \nMashkoor Khan v. Province of Sindh 1971 SCMR 572; Fazal Din v. Rubina Aurangzaib 1983 CLC 1280 and Balagamwala Oil Mills v. Shakarchi Trading 1991 CLD 2071 rel.\n \n(g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), Ss. 5 & 2---Defamatory publication---Temporary injunction, grant of---Establishment of prima facie case required recording of evidence---Effect---Court would not grant injunction in such case. \n \nFazal Din v. Rubina Aurangzaib 1983 CLC 1280 rel.\n \n(h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002); Ss.5 & 2---Defamatory publication---Temporary injunction, grant of---quantification of damages by plaintiff---Effect---Such quantification would disentitle plaintiff to seek injunction---Where prayer for damages was made in alternative, then plaintiff, despite quantification of damages, could obtain injunction--Illustration. \n \nTahir Zaman v. Jin WEI SBLR 2004 Sindh 222 rel.\n \n(i) Constitution of Pakistan 1973)---\n \n----Art. 204---Contempt of Court Ordinance (IV of 2003), S.3---Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), Ss.5 & 2---Defamatory publication---Contempt of court application for---Order of court restraining defendant from publishing any adverse report against plaintiff-Plaintiff alleged distribution of defamatory pamphlets against him, which fact was denied by defendant in counter-affidavit---Validity---Such being a case of \"\"word against word\"\"-Plaintiff had failed to establish. a prima case as there was nothing on record to show that defendant had violated such order of court---Such application was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.164 of 2007 and C.M.As. Nos.4708, 8186, 1216 of 2007, decision dated: 29-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALIL ALI Z. QAZI, J",
    "": "RAEES GHULAM SARWAR through Attorney--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMANSOOR SADIQ ZAIDI and 4 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13761",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2214 = 2008 SLD 2214 = 2008 CLD 1069",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------S. 80---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.181---Scope of application of S.80, Insurance Ordinance, 2000---Repudiation of claim by Insurance Company on account of concealment of his ailment by policy-holder---Limitation---Policy cannot be called in question on the grounds of misrepresentation, false statement orsuppression of material facts, after two years from the date when the policy was originally effected---Period of two years, even in cases where the policy was revived and renewed, would be counted from original date of the policy in question---Principles.\n \nIn the present case deceased was policy-holder, who insured himself under Policy against a yearly premium commencing from 15-10-1992. The premium was paid till October, 1994, whereafter, it was discontinued. The policy-holder revived the policy on 31-12-1998, after complying with requisite formalities, including a declaration of good health on a printed form. Insured breathed his last on 28-4-2000 and his widow being nominee, lodged the insurance claim of her husband before the appellant, which was repudiated by the Insurance company on account of concealment of his ailment at the time of revival of Policy. \n \nA Policy cannot be called in question on the ground of misstatement, after two years of it's effectiveness, within the contemplation of section 80 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000.\n \nAccording to section 80, Insurance Ordinance, 2000 an Insurance Policy, cannot be called in question on the grounds of misrepresentation, false statement or suppression of material facts, after two years from the date when the Policy was originally effected. The period of two years, even in cases where the Policy was revived and renewed, would be counted from original date of the Policy in question. The application of provisions of section 80 is contingent upon fulfilment of following conditions:--\n \n(i) The inaccurate statement pertains to a matter which is material, or the facts which are suppressed, the disclosure thereof was material. \n \n(ii) The suppression must be fraudulent and made by Policy-holder.\n \n(iii) The Policy-holder, at the time of making the statement had known that statement was false and it was material to disclose the facts suppressed. p. 1076 C\n \nDisclosure of material facts as to ones health, is ticklish issue. What is material again depends upon the circumstances of each case. Good health means reasonably good health. A warranty of good health can never mean that a person has not in him the seeds of disorder. One is born with seeds of mortality in it. A person can be ignorant about his health or about the deadly disease, which has its roots in him. A person has normally a general idea of his health. Then question arises as to when the contract of insurance becomes voidable at the option of insurer. Non-disclosure relates to the facts which are in the knowledge of the person making the statement. A person who is himself unaware of his ill health, can make an innocent statement that he is not suffering from disease/illness. This statement cannot be used against such a person. A statement is fatal only when person making the statement deliberately and wilfully suppresses the material facts, knowing that disclosure of such facts was material and facts were fraudulently suppressed. Three conditions, are essential and necessary for repudiation of insurance contract or to invoke provisions of section 80 of the Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000). \n \nDeceased had not made false statement at the time of revival of the policy and failed to disclose the factum of his heart ailment. The Policy-holder performed laborious duty on a heavy duty vehicle, in extreme weather conditions, in Bahrain. He, in the form pertaining to the history of patient had supplied information, which shows that deceased was confident of his good health. Insurance company on the other hand had failed to adduce any cogent evidence to the effect that Policy-holder was aware of his ailment and had deliberately concealed and made fraudulent misrepresentation. An entry in \"\"Pre Angro Information Form\"\" which had not been entered/incorporated by the deceased himself, does not establish or prove the factum of non-disclosure. \n \nAdmittedly the Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to the present case. The claimant/respondent approached Wafaqi Mohtasib and then contested the order of President before High Court in it's writ jurisdiction. The matter thereafter remained pending before apex Court and on remand during the pendency of writ petition, the Insurance Tribunal was constituted. The writ petition was withdrawn and matter was agitated before Insurance Tribunal. The application was moved before Insurance Tribunal, on its constitution. Held, the application was within limitation as rightly held so by the Tribunal. \n \nNorwich Union Life Insurance Society v. Mst. Zainab Bibi 1981 CLC 1722; State Life Insurance Corporation v. Mst. Sarwat Kazmi 1979 SCMR 295; State Life Insurance Corporation v. Mamoor Khan 1993 CLC 790; Messrs Burjor Ardeshir Industries Ltd. Karachi v. The Employers Liability Assurance Corporation Ltd., Karachi and another PLD 1970 Kar. 462; Mohsin A. Rehman v. Messrs Premier Insurance Company of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 1967 Kar. 204; Mithoolal Nayak v. Life Insurance Corporation of India AIR 1962 SC 814; Santosh Kumar Gupta v. Indian Life Insurance Corporation AIR 2000 Rajisthan 327; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Suit Sosamma Punnah AIR 1945 Ker. 230; Mst. Irshad Begum v. State Life Insurance Co. 2006 YLR 1186 and York v. Yorkshire Insurance 1918 1 KB 662 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.5 of 2008, decision dated: 8-07-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHAWAJA FAROOQ SAEED AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPN.\nVs.\nMst. SADAQAT BANO"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13762",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2215 = 2008 SLD 2215 = 2008 CLD 1079",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)----- Arts.132 & 133---If on a particular point there is no cross-examination, such point stands proved. \n \n(b) Pay-As-You-Earn Scheme Act (XXXI of 1973)---\n \n----S.4---Pay-As-You-Earn Scheme Rules, 1973; R.4---Levy and recovery of penalty and interest thereon on account of shortfall in export earnings of the Industrial Unit without prior notice to the Unit to explain the shortfall and/or to meet the short-fall--Validity-Prior service of notice being a requirement of every statute and principles of natural justice where rights of party were affected, the imposition of penalty and interest thereon was unlawful without service of such notice. \n \n(c) Pay-As-You-Earn Scheme Act (XXXI of 1973)---\n \n----S. 4---Pay-As-You-Earn Scheme Rules, 1973, R.4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.34---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 55---Suit for declaration, injunction and damages---Levy and recovery of penalty and interest thereon on account of shortfall in export earnings by the plaintiff, an industrial unit---Nothing was available on record from the Authorities that such was a wilful default by the plaintiff---Contention of the plaintiff/ industrial unit was that in any event, no penalty could be imposed after taking into consideration all facts and circumstances of the case which was explained by it---Reasons for shortfall had not been denied by the authorities/defendant and same had not been subjected to any cross-examination from the 'Authorities' side-Record showed that Authorities/ defendants had charged interest on the penalty amount, which, by itself, was illegal in as much as interest in the nature of damages could not have been charged on the penalty amount---Provision of S.34, C.P.C. provided awarding of interest pendente lite and from date of decree---Plaintiff thus had been deprived of his lawful money for very long time and discretion had to be exercised by the court in its favour---When the Court was of the opinion that the recovery of any public dues from a party was unjustified, it may, while disposing of the suit, make an order for payment of interest on the amount recovered at the rate of two per cent above the prevailing bank rate---Suit of the plaintiff was decreed by High Court against the Authorities/defendants with interest at 9 per cent. per annum from the date of the suit till payment with costs---High Court also declared Pay-As-You-Earn Scheme Rules, 1973 as ultra vires and in excess of delegated powers---Authorities were restrained from declaring and treating the plaintiff as defaulter on account of amount mentioned in the suit and if the name of the unit (plaintiff) reported in C/B, same should be removed immediately therefrom. \n \nNeelam Textile Mills v. State Bank of Pakistan PLD 1999 Kar. 433; Suleman Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 Lah. 324; Colony Thal Textile Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 Lah. 518 and Pakistan Railways v. Javed Iqbal 1995 SCMR 446 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1628 of 1999, decision dated: 14-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHAWAJA NAVEED AHMAD, J",
    "": "Messrs ISHTIAQ TEXTILE MILLS LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Finance Division and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13763",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2216 = 2008 SLD 2216 = 2008 CLD 1103",
    "Key Words:": "Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-------Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.184(3)---Environmental pollution--Arrangement of supply of clean water to the residents of Islamabad and disposal of waste and rubbish---General complaint that drinking water in Islamabad was polluted which was not upto the required standard and similarly due to other civic problems and cleanliness of the Capital City, there was also complaint of environmental pollution---Held, Supreme Court, in exercise of powers under Art.184(3) of the Constitution, could not make arrangement for removal of filth from public places but could certainly issue directions to the Municipal Committees, Corporations and other concerned agencies in the federal and provincial governments to take necessary steps and adopt measures to stop environmental pollution---Concerned Secretaries in the Federal as well as Provincial Governments shall issue necessary directions to all concerned including public representatives in the local bodies in urban and rural areas to keep proper check and control on the environment problem by deputing special teams to inspect the local areas and take remedial steps and in case of any breach also initiate appropriate action in accordance with law---Compliance reports regarding steps taken and measures adopted by the Secretaries in the Federal and Provincial Governments shall be submitted to the Registrar of Supreme Court within a month for the perusal of the Supreme Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.40 and 246 of 2008, decision dated: 14-04-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, IJAZ-UL-HASSAN KHAN AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ and others\nVs.\nARIF HAMEED MEHAR and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13764",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2217 = 2008 SLD 2217 = 2008 CLD 1114",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXXVII, R.2---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), S.4---Stamp Act (II of 1899), S.2(5)(b) & (20)---Suit for recovery4of amount on basis of Promissory Note (pro note) signed by witnesses---Maintainability---Such document signed by defendant (its maker) contained unconditional undertaking to pay certain amount to plaintiff or to his order---Such document fulfilled all conditions prescribed by S.2(20) of Stamp Act, 1899 read with S.4 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881---Such document was not a \"\"bond\"\" within meaning of S.2(5)(b) of Stamp Act, 1899---Mere signing of such document by witnesses would not change its nature or lose its significance as negotiable instrument within meaning of O.XXXVII, C.P.C.---Suit was maintainable on basis of such document---Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A. No.41 of 2008, heard on 2-07-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "ALTAF HUSSAIN SAJID\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD ARIF"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13765",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2218 = 2008 SLD 2218 = 2008 CLD 1117",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 152 & 9(3)---Rectification of Register of members, application for---Civil suit---Maintainability---High Court being the Court of \"\"original jurisdiction\"\" under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, is empowered under S.152 of the Ordinance to entertain the application for \"\"correction/rectification of the register of members\"\" in the first instance, and thereafter if reached to the conclusion by taking into consideration the application, reply thereto and the documents produced before it, that the matter is out of the purview of the summary procedure as provided under S.9(3) of the Ordinance, it may refer/advise the party to approach the Civil Court for resolution of the controversy in issue---Principles. \n \nMessrs Ammonia Supplies Corporation Private Ltd. v. Messrs Modern Plastic Containers (Pvt.) Ltd and others AIR 1994 Delhi 51; Hamid Husain v. Government of West Pakistan and others 1974 SCMR 356; Sh. Mushtaq Ahmad v. Shaukat Soap Factory and others 1987 CLC 2079; Khurshid Ahmad Khan and another v. Pak Cycle Manufacturing Company Ltd., Shandara and 4 others PLD 1987 Lair. 1; Zakir Latif Ansar and another v. Pakistan Industrial Promoters Ltd. and 2 others 1988 CLC 1541; Syed Shafqat Hussain v. Registrar, Joint Stock Companies Lahore and others PLD 2001 Lah. 523; Messrs Sunrise Textile Limited and others v. Mashreq Bank PSC and other PLD 1996 Lah. 1; Brother Steel Mills Ltd and others v. Mian Ilyas Miraj and 14 others PLD 1996 SC 543; Black's Law Dictionary; Manzoor Ahmad Bhatti and 4 others v. Haji Noval Khan and 5 others 1986 CLC 2560; Syed Shafqat Hussain v. Registrar, Joint Stock Companies Lahore and others PLD 2001 Lah. 523; Zakir Latif Ansari and others v. Pakistan Industrial Promoters Ltd and others 1988 CLC 154; Muhammad Hussain v. Dawood Flour Mills and others 2003 CLD 1429 and Messrs Ammonia Supplies Corporation (P) Ltd v. Messrs Modern Plastic containers Pvt. Ltd and other AIR 1998 SC 3153 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 175(2)---\"\"Original civil jurisdiction of High Court\"\"---Concept and connotation.\n \nThe term \"\"original jurisdiction\"\" means \"\"jurisdiction in the first instance\"\", jurisdiction to take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it, and pass upon the law and facts. \"\"Original Jurisdiction\"\" is the authority of a court to hear a case in the first instance, i.e., to function as a Trial Court and the \"\"Appellate Jurisdiction\"\" is the authority of a court to hear a case that has first been decided by a lower Court. Jurisdiction of a court is never established by the court itself but by some authority external to it either in a Statute or the Constitution. \"\"Original Civil Jurisdiction\"\" of a court is such jurisdiction where it is empowered to entertain suits and such proceedings of civil nature which are initiated before the said court and entertained by it as a court of first instance and are decided by it. Sub-Article 2 of Article 175 of the Constitution enshrines the principle that, \"\"No court shall have any jurisdiction save as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or under any law\"\". The jurisdiction can be conferred on any court including a High court by a statute which may be provided for initiating she proceedings in that court as a court of first instance having power to entertain and decide it. Such Court will thus be vested with original jurisdiction. If it relates to civil disputes, it will be termed as \"\"Original Civil Jurisdiction.\"\" It is also a common proposition that Statutes are promulgated conferring jurisdiction on the High Court to initiate proceedings as a court of first instance for purposes of exercise of jurisdiction.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.820 of 2004, decision dated: 30-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BUKHARI, JJ",
    "": "Lahore High Court RACE CLUB, through Secretary and others\nVs.\nRaja KHUSHBAKHT-UR-REHMAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13766",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2219 = 2008 SLD 2219 = 2008 CLD 1127",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.15(2) & (4)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXJX Rr.1 & 2---Application for grant of injunction---Sale of mortgaged property---Contention of the plaintiff was that publication of defendant (Bank) in the daily newspaper about the sale of the subject property was not in consonance with law and was in contravention of provisions of S.15(2) & (4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 therefore the defendant (Bank) be restrained from auctioning the property in question---Validity---Held, since similar issues had been raised in two cases pending before the High Court (Sindh), the defendant was restrained from auctioning the mortgaged property till the next date of hearing.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-49 of 2008, decision dated: 4-07-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISAR IQBAL, J",
    "": "Messrs CARGO AIDS and 4 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nSONERI BANK LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13767",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2220 = 2008 SLD 2220 = 2008 CLD 1128",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXXVII, Rr.1, 2 & 3---Suit for recovery of amount on basis of cheque---Application for leave to appear and defend suit---Granting leave subject to furnishing a Bank guarantee---Trial Court accepted application and defendant was allowed to appear and defend suit subject to furnishing of Bank guarantee equivalent to the claim of plaintiff---Defendant had challenged condition imposed in impugned order---Grant of conditional or non-conditional leave having direct nexus with plausibility of defence, ultimate success or failure in the suit, was no consideration for refusal or grant of leave, rather, consideration was that the grounds taken in the application for grant of permission to defend the suit, were plausible and defendant had arguable case---On the face of unrebutted assertion of the plaintiff and supported by the documents executed by the defendant from time to time acknowledging his liability to amount claimed against him---Defendant had already received a considerable amount through an agreement to sell---When possession of the land was still with him along with the possession of house handed over to him through Jirga (agreement), which was also leased out by him on account of demarcation of land, which had not been done by any default of either party, it could not be said that the conditions of Jirga (agreement) had not been fulfilled---Exercise of discretion by the Thal Court in granting leave to appear and defend the suit on condition of furnishing Bank guarantee, did not suffer from any infirmity, in the circumstances of the case. \n \nMian Rafique Segal and others v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Limited and others PLD 1996 SC 749 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.605 of 2006, decision dated: 5-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED QALB-I-HASSAN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AZAD\nVs.\nMalik ZAHOOR-"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13768",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2221 = 2008 SLD 2221 = 2008 CLD 1133",
    "Key Words:": "Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance (V of 1970)-------Ss. 6, 11, 14 & 21---Competition Ordinance (LII of 2007), S.59---Trade practices---Monopolistic or restrictive trading behaviour of manufactures---Manipulation of price---Authority during examination of price pattern of Polyester Staple Fibre in the market, noticed that almost same price was being offered in the market by undertakings engaged in production and sale of said fibre---Authority in view of said unity among the undertakings in quoting/charging one price all over Pakistan, observed that possibility was that undertakings had an understanding not to compete with each other in price and also were sharing commercial information---Authority initiating suo motu enquiry under S.14 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970, asked the undertakings to supply certain informations under S.21 of said Ordinance, which, except one undertaking, supplied requisite information, which were examined by the Authority---Comparison of the prices quoted by the undertakings and the prices reported in a Business daily, indicated a wide difference, whereas per Kilogram profit and loss analysis, provided by the undertakings, showed a considerable difference in their cost and expenses structure---Authority, in circumstances, issued a show-cause notice for concerted price fixing behaviour in the Polyester Staple Fibre market being a restrictive trade practice in terms of S.6(1)(a)(i) of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970---In response to the show-cause notice, undertakings made certain submissions---Authority was satisfied that prima facie collusive arrangement existed among Polyester Staple Fibre manufactures/ undertakings; that a negation existed of free play of market forces of supply and demand by undertakings; (iii) that undertakings with their monopolistic or restrictive trade behaviour had manipulated the price of Polyester Staple Fibre manufacturers/undertakings---After promulgation of Competition Ordinance, 2007, the Competition Commission of Pakistan successor of the Authority, decided to fix the matter for hearing---In the case, along with the parallel price fixing, there certainly were some \"\"plus factors'---Price pattern followed was similar, which, in itself, also had an indicative value---Slight variation in price, if any, could be attributed to the variance in the terms and conditions applicable to each party---Such type of price parallelism was normally not possible in a fairly competitive market, where the competitors had quite different installed capacities and 'levels of capacity utilization as well as divergent cost structures---Such facts were indicative of a tied arrangement and it would, be incorrect to state that it was merely a case of price parallelism or that every thing could be justified under one umbrella ground that prices were determined by the \"\"market forces\"\"-Nothing cogent had been provided as to how those market forces worked, whereas there was some reason to believe that market forces could have been impeded by collusive behaviour---In view of submissions made by the undertakings, the Commission was not fully satisfied with the grounds and explanations offered on the part of the concerned undertakings---Commission, in circumstances, inquired whether the parties wouldbe willing to come forward with any assurances in that regard and parties were informed that such assurance, had to be in the form of an undertaking, for and on behalf of the Board of Directors and affidavits of their Chief Executive Officers to the satisfaction of the Commission, inter alia, affirming; that they had not organized themselves in any formal or informal association; in no manner would meet or coordinate to adopt or fix parallel pricing or levels of output---Undertakings also had to categorically state and confirm that they had neither quoted any price in the media nor provided any information in that regard---Since all the parties in the subject proceedings readily consented to comply with the requirement of filing an undertaking and submitting the affidavit of Chief Executive Officer, they were directed to file same within specified period---Commission, after considering the facts of the case, the submissions of the authorized representatives and the fact that the parties voluntarily furnished undertakings, benefit of doubt was given to the undertakings---Said undertakings, however, were cautioned that the Commission would maintain a vigilant eye on their conduct of business and in the event of any violation of law was apprehended or detected, the Commission would proceed against them in accordance with law. \n \nD.G. Khan Cement Co. Ltd. v. MCA 2006 CLD 1237 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "File No.1(1)/Miscellaneous/Dir (Inv)/MCA/2006), decision dated: 10-06-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID A. MIRZA, CHAIRMAN, ABDUL GHAFFAR, RAHAT KAUNAIN HASSAN AND MALEEHA MIMI BANGASH, MEMBERS",
    "": "POLYESTER STAPLE FIBRE COMPANIES: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13769",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2222 = 2008 SLD 2222 = 2008 CLD 1155",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXXVII, Rr.2, 3 & S.96---Suit for recovery of amount on basis of pro note---Leave to defend suit---Trial Court after hearing the parties and evaluating the material on record, dismissed the suit through impugned which was challenged in appeal---Validity---Record had indicated that the Trial Court had not properly appreciated the evidence on record and impugned and decree needed to be set aside---Plaintiff had successfully proved his claim. through cogent and reliable evidence by producing scribe of the pro note who had verified the contents of the pro note duly entered in the relevant register---Trial Court had not adverted to that important fact of proving the execution of pro note and had non-suited the plaintiff on the sole ground that payment before the marginal witnesses at the time of execution of pro note, was not proved---Once the execution of the pro note was proved, then the burden would shift to the defendant to prove that the pro note was without consideration--If, on the record, it was proved that the consideration was admitted to have been passed on to the debtor before the marginal witnesses and scribe of the documents, that would be .sufficient proof of payment of consideration---When the claim of the plaintiff was duly proved by the evidence of prosecution witnesses in support of the pro note with regard to the suit money, the Trial Court was required to have taken into consideration the same and should not have drawn the impugned conclusion---Adverse findings recorded by the Trial Court on various issues in the impugned in the appeal were set aside---Impugned and decree of the Trial Court was set aside and decree for recovery of amount in question, was passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant with simple interest at the rate of four per cent per annum. \n \nSalar Abdur Rauf v. Mst. Barkht Bibi 1973 SCMR 332; Muhammad Boota v. Faiz Ahmad 1979 SCMR 465; Mst. Sajida Abbas Zaidi v. Syed Arshad Ali Jaffri 1990 CLC 1018 and Muhammad Ashiq and others v. Niaz Muhammad and others PLD 2004 Lah. 95 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.15 of 2005, decision dated: 3rd June, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALAM KHAN, J",
    "": "ABDUR REHMAN KHAN\nVs.\nYAQOOB"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13770",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2223 = 2008 SLD 2223 = 2008 CLD 1160",
    "Key Words:": "Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV Of 1997)------Ss. 17, 22 & 23-Appeal---Environmental hazards---Protection--Complaints had started coming in about environmental hazards being caused by the unit of appellant as far back as in year, 1999 and proceedings were conducted by the concerned agency---Environmental Protection Agency, after notifying the appellant of the reports regarding pollution, suggested remedial measures---Order passed by the Agency was maintained by Environmental Protection Tribunal---Validity---Appellants had never seriously questioned the fact that effluents were being polluted; 'it had been intended to take measures for reduction of pollution and even it was suggested that the unit was being wound up but the needful had not been done---High Court did not find any ground to interfere either with the passed by the Tribunal or Environmental Protection Order---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Environmental Appeal No.161 of 2008, decision dated: 19-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND HAFIZ TARIQ NASEEM, JJ",
    "": "PACKAGES LIMITED through Director and Finance Manager\nVs.\nDIRECTOR GENERAL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Lahore High Court and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13771",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2224 = 2008 SLD 2224 = 2008 CLD 1162",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.2(c)(d)(I)(ii), 7(4) proviso & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---High Court appeal---Return of plaint---Banking Court, jurisdiction of---Determination---Pre-conditions---Dispute was with regard to recovery of amount of demand draft prepared by plaintiff from defendant-Bank, which was encashed by other defendants---High Court in exercise of original civil jurisdiction returned the plaint to plaintiff for filing the same before Banking Court---Validity---Banking Court, under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, could assume jurisdiction where a customer of financial institution committed a default in fulfilment of any obligation with regard to finance---Demand draft prepared by defendant-Bank on the request of plaintiff, was the basis of cause of action which touched the business of the Bank used for the purpose of facilitating a party to procure a contract---After failing to procure the contract, demand draft was encashed in favour of other defendant, which fact had determined the status of that other defendant as customer---Jurisdiction of any Court with regard to any matter to which jurisdiction of Banking Court extended including a position as to existence or otherwise of a matter of finance, was excluded under proviso to S.7(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Presence of three preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction of Banking Court, were under S.9(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which contemplated that plaintiff being either financial institution or the customer, (2) the cause of action of default in fulfilment of any obligation (3) with regard to finance i.e. subject-matter---Order passed by High Court did not call for interference---High Court appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nA.R.Y. (Pvt.) Limited v. Muslim Commercial Bank 2003 CLD 1601; Lal Chand and 2 others v. Officer on Special Duty, Federal Land Commission and 3 others 1984 CLC 2396; PLD 1979 Lah. 375; Naseemuddin Siddiqui v. United Bank Ltd. 1998 CLC 1718; A. Habib Ahmed v. The Hong Kong and Shangahi 1999 CLC 1953 and Qayyom and another v. The Regional Manager Agricultural Development of Pakistan and others PLD 1977 Pesh. 72 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)=2(c)(d)(I)(ii),7(4)proviso,9\\n\\r\\n\\rFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)=2(c)(d)(I)(ii),7(4)proviso,9\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.VII,R.10\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.227 of 2002, heard on 11-01-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND SYED MAHMOOD ALAM RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "MAJEED A. TAHIR\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through President and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13772",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2225 = 2008 SLD 2225 = 2008 CLD 1167",
    "Key Words:": "Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Ordinance (XIII of 2002)-------S. 30-A As amended by Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Amendment) Act (II of 2007)-Application for permission to install cable network---Dismissal of application---Appeal---Principles of natural justice, violation of---Appellants submitted application to the Authority supported by two demand drafts for the issuance of licence---Authority, by a short order through a letter communicated to appellants, informing them that there being already functioning four cable networks, no scope existed for the issuance of further licence---Impugned order had been passed at the back of appellants and no notice of hearing had been given to them---Effect---Appellants, who had a right of hearing had been deprived of their right which could not be denied to them, especially in the circumstances when no notice of hearing had been issued to them---Not only in judicial proceedings, but also in administrative actions, petitioner or appellant, as the case may be, was always entitled to a notice or a chance of hearing---Even, in a lis pending in Administrative Tribunals or Quasi-Judicial Tribunals, the right of hearing of a party was a must which was derived from natural justice as no body could be condemned unheard---Impugned order had revealed that same was 'cursory, non-speaking and violative of law and was liable to be struck down---Impugned order was set aside and matter was remitted to the Tribunal constituted under Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 to re-decide the same afresh strictly in accordance with law after giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellants. \n \nBaldvin and Francis Ltd. v. Patents Appeals Tribunal 1959 AC 663 and Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others PLD 1987 SC 447 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.48 of 2007, decision dated: 19-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALAM KHAN, J",
    "": "DERA CABLE NETWORK LTD. through, Chief Executive and 3 others\nVs.\nPAKISTAN ELECTRONIC MEDIA REGULATORY AUTHORITY (PEMRA) through Chairman and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13773",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2226 = 2008 SLD 2226 = 2008 CLD 1170",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.15(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Contention of the plaintiff/borrower was that publication effected by the Bank for auction of the mortgaged property in the newspaper was in violation of relevant law and was liable to be suspended---High Court having found the contention worth-consideration, ordered the Bank to be kept pending---In the meanwhile operation of the notice published in the newspaper was suspended and Bank was restrained from creating third party interest in the property till the next date of hearing.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-48 and C.M.As. No.7011, 7012 of 2008, decision dated: 9-07-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL, J",
    "": "Messrs GOLD STAR PAPER MILLS (PVT.) LTD. and 3 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13774",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQVNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2227 = 2008 SLD 2227 = 2008 CLD 1171",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997}-------S.21(9)---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 54 & 55--Air and noise pollution---Suit for perpetual and mandatory injunction---Jurisdiction of civil court---Plaintiff sought a perpetual injunction against defendant with a purpose to restrain defendant from operating the stone crushing plant near the residential area of plaintiff---Plaintiff also prayed for mandatory injunction to direct the defendant to remove the plant and for cancellation of licence of defendant---Court below concurrently returned plaint to the plaintiff for submission to the appropriate forum as civil court had no jurisdiction in the matter---Both courts below found that in view of the provisions of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, civil court did not have the jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit relating to pollution---Validity---Refusal to exercise jurisdiction by the courts below, indicated lack of appreciation of the nuisance created by a Stone Crushing Plant---Location of the disputed plant near the residential area at the road side was confirmed and it was explained that under the instruction of the concerned Authorities, defendant had taken various steps to comply with the legal provisions for minimizing the pollution, by developing water sprinkling filter system etc., whereby environment had been protected from the air pollution-Effect--Entire effort of local Authorities for the prevention of pollution, had focused on the dust, however, the fact of noise pollution had not been properly evaluated---Noise created by unloading the stone at crushing site and process of crushing as well as granting thereof, would certainly create noise, in addition to dust which could be unbearable for the nearby residents---Deeper appreciation would lead to the conclusion that the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 would not satisfy the protection of all the civil rights of the citizens, which could be adversely affected by an irresponsible entrepreneur---Plaintiff had asked for the prohibitory and mandatory injunction, which was the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil court-Plaintiff had also prayed for cancellation of licence for the installation of Stone Crushing Plant issued by the District Co-ordination Officer---Such part of the prayer of the plaintiff did not fall within the competence of any of the Authorities, Magistrate or Tribunal under Environmental Protection Act, 1997---Additional prayer included in the plaint related to the recovery of damages, which certainly was the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil court---Even otherwise, determination of question, whether an act or omission by the defendant, whereby civil right of a, person or the environment of an area was being adversely affected was a pure question of fact, which could be determined after recording evidence---Return of plaint through the impugned order, was not in conformity with the established practice---Impugned s of both the courts were set aside and matter was remanded to the Trial Court for adjudication of the suit on merit after recording evidence. \n \n(b) Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss. 2(xxxiii) & 21-Purpose of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997---Purpose of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 was to protect, conserve, rehabilitate and improve the environment for the prevention and control of pollution and promotion of sustainable development-Not only noise, but air pollution and other factors disturbing the ecology bio diversity or the health of the citizen, was the major aim of said lain---Scheme of the statute, gave a look of an impressive and protective instrument which eliminated the possibility of exercise of jurisdiction by any other forum including the civil Court; however, the deeper appreciation could lead to the conclusion that the law, did not satisfy the protection of all the civil rights of the citizen which could be adversely affected by an irresponsible entrepreneur whereby nuisance could be caused to the citizens and in addition to the potential damage to health, inconvenience faced by such citizen would go unchecked.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.1075 of 2007, decision dated: 5-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, CJ",
    "": "Haji MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN and another\nVs.\nD.C.O. DIR UPPER and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13775",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2228 = 2008 SLD 2228 = 2008 CLD 1178",
    "Key Words:": "Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-------Ss.16(1) 17 & 22---Appeal---Environmental hazards---Environmental Protection Agency gave three months time to appellant for taking appropriate measures to treat waste water of its unit keeping it within National Environmental Quality Standards---Failing to comply with directions given by the Agency, appellant was proceeded against under S.17 of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, and Environmental Protection Order was passed against appellant---Plea raised by appellant was that proceedings by Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency were not within its knowledge---Validity---Right from year, 1999, appellant's unit was time and again directed by Environmental Protection Agency to control its pollution---Throughout the entire proceedings, appellant fully participated and remained associated with entire process of personal hearing as well as taking of samples etc., therefore, it was incorrect to allege that findings of Environmental Protection Agency were not notified or within the knowledge of appellant---Appellant had not come forward with the contention that its effluents were free from any pollution---Despite lapse of about 9 years, appellant's unit failed to control its effluents as mentioned in Environmental Protection Order---No ground was available to appellant to question validity of Environmental Protection Order---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Environmental Tribunal, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal under section 22 of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, decision dated: 5-03-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAMIR HUSSAIN, CHAIRPERSON, MUSSARAT BAIG, MEMBER TECHNICAL AND MANSOOR AKBAR KOKAB, MEMBER LEGAL",
    "": "PACKAGES LIMITED\nVs.\nENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13776",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2229 = 2008 SLD 2229 = 2008 CLD 1183",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3---Suit for recovery of amount on basis of promissory note and dishonored cheques---Plaintiffs claimed that they extended loan to defendant and on presentation, all the cheques were dishonoured---Suit was not contested by- the defendant on merits---Plaintiffs, in circumstances were entitled to recover the amount covered by the promissory note and the cheques---Suit was decreed accordingly. \n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 84---Non-presentation of cheque---Effect---Unless a cheque was presented for payment within a reasonable time of its issue, no right to recover the amount would accrue.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1347 of 2004, decision dated: 20-02-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM, J",
    "": "ALHAMD EDIBLE OIL INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nSyed WASEEM HYDER--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13777",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2230 = 2008 SLD 2230 = 2008 CLD 1185",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Pakistan Environmental Protection- Act (XXXIV of 1997)-------S.17---Word \"\"contravention\"\"---Connotation---Cognizance by Court or Tribunal---Scope---Word \"\"contravention\"\" connotes act or omission done or committed in past, therefore, no one cart plead that since past is over hence the Courts or Tribunals are functus officio to take cognizance of offence; it is always cognizable when act or omission has actually been done or committed by an offender and so is reported---Cognizance of offence is not warranted for acts or omission or offences likely to be done or committed or merely apprehended to be committed. \n \n(b) Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)---\n \n----S.12---Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Review of IEE & EM) Regulations, 2000, Art.5, Schedule, II, Sr.D---Words \"\"Reconstruction\"\", \"\"maintenance\"\", \"\"rebuilding\"\" and \"\"improvements\"\"---Distinction---Word \"\"reconstruction\"\" means to restore existing road in its original shape, type and in dimensions without touching any addition or subtraction---Even otherwise, adding capacity to roads system is always a new construction, what bears, by its nature, impacts to natural and social environment---Reconstruction is differentiable from \"\"maintenance\"\" or \"\"rebuilding\"\" or even \"\"improvements\"\", what generally refer to superficial changes such as upgrades and resurfacing. \n \nBlack's Law Dictionary Seventh Edition ref.\n \n(c) Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss.12 & 17---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.265-K---Environmental hazards---Environmental Protection Agency, approval of-Project of government---Liability of contractor---Plea raised by authorities was that environmental effect of project during construction was evaluated by a consultant company of government and Secretary of Environment was specialty invited in the meetings of Executive Committee of National Economic Council (ECNIC) of Government of Pakistan, therefore, requirement of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, was not obligatory---Contention of contractor was that since it was a government project, therefore, it was not his liability to obtain 'No Objection Certificate' under S.12 of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997---Validity---Tribunal did not agree with the plea raised by authorities, as specific provisions of enacted law could not be by-passed or deferred by adopting some other unwarranted methods or procedures, no matter such procedures might be more comprehensive and complete than the one required by some enacted provisions of law---Particular act to be done under law must be done in particular and specified manner as provision of law prescribed or required action of that act---Contractor could not absolve himself from liability of executing an unlawful work/project on the plea that contract awarding agency was primarily obliged to comply with the provisions of law---Every executant of an unlawful work was considered equally responsible for penalty as a co-offender as original proponent of unlawful work was considered as an offender---Unlawful work to be accomplished by third party could not be considered lawful for him either on the basis of absence of knowledge about law or any legal flaw in assigned work to him by his master/contract assignee authority---Application was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Environmental Tribunal, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Complaint No. 76 of 2003, decision dated: 20-02-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAMIR HUSSAIN, CHAIRPERSON AND MANSOOR AKBAR KOKAB, MEMBER LEGAL",
    "": "SUMAIRA AWAN, SECRETARY GENERAL\nVs.\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and 10 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13778",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2231 = 2008 SLD 2231 = 2008 CLD 1197",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 15 & 9--Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Sale of mortgaged properties by Bank---Status quo order obtained by the borrowers after the sale of mortgaged property was carried out by the Bank after serving three notices to the borrowers which were admittedly received by them---Application for vacation of status quo order by the auction purchaser---Validity---Representative of the borrowers remained in touch with the Bank during the whole transaction of sale of the mortgaged properties and co-operated with the Bank in that behalf---Substantial amount was outstanding against the borrowers which they had failed to liquidate till present date, which was secured from the sale of the mortgaged properties---Requirements of S.15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were complied with by the Bank before the auction sale of the mortgaged properties---Borrowers, in circumstances, were not entitled to the relief by way .of status quo which was vacated by the High Court---Principles---Auction purchaser was at liberty to approach Banking Court for redressal of his grievance. \n \nMuhammad Khalid and 2 others v. KASB Bank Limited through Managing Director 2007 CLD 232 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-60 of 2007 and C.M.A. No.6338 of 2008, decision dated: 9-07-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL, J",
    "": "Messrs SINDH EXPORT ENTERPRISES through Proprietor, and 2 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nMessrs BANK OF KHYBER through PECHS Branch and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13779",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2232 = 2008 SLD 2232 = 2008 CLD 1202",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 10 & 22---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)---Application for leave to defend suit---Scope---When no such application was filed by the \"\"principal debtor\"\", a guarantor was not automatically entitled for leave to defend the suit---Banking Court shall grant the defendant leave to defend the suit if it is of the view that defendant had raised substantial questions of law or fact in respect of which the evidence needed to be recorded-In the present case, in the estimation of the Banking Court, guarantor in his application for leave to defend the suit, could not raise substantial question of law and fact requiring evidence to be recorded and thus it dismissed his application, against which no exception could be taken, more so when his appeal against the and decree of the Banking Court was dismissed being barred by time---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 22 & 10---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)---Appeal---Limitation---Time barred appeal--Application for condonation of delay---Ground for condonation as urged by the petitioner was that was not announced on the date incorporated in the itself, but it was subsequently rendered, therefore, he could not file the appeal within time and thus it was sufficient cause to condone the delay---Petitioner had not placed on record any material to substantiate his plea---Presumption of correctness in favour of judicial proceedings and credibility was attached to the proceedings before judicial forum---Impugned did not suffer from any legal infirmity and High Court, after adverting to every aspect of the case and considering all the relevant dates, had rightly found that appeal was time barred and dismissed the application for condonation of delay---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. \n \nFayyaz Hussain v. Akbar Hussain and others 2004 SCMR 964 and Abdullah v. Shaukat 2001 SCMR 60 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.549-L of 2008, decision dated: 16-07-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SHEIKH HAKIM ALI, JJ",
    "": "WAQAR JALAL ANSARI\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and another --Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13780",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2233 = 2008 SLD 2233 = 2008 CLD 1206",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordnance (V of 1970)-------Ss. 7, 3, 2 & 6---Concentration of economic power---Unreasonably restrictive trade practices---Powers of the Authority---cope--Provision of S.7(1), Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordnance, 1970 empowers the Authority to prescribe by general order, the practice which shall be deemed to be unreasonably restrictive trade practice---Before making any general order, the Authority has to comply with the provisions of S.7(2)(3) of the Ordinance---Before recording a finding that there has been or is likely to be contravention of the provisions of S.3 of the Ordinance, the Authority must establish that there .exists-c' or will exist an unreasonably restrictive trade practice---To establish the existence of an unreasonably restrictive trade practice, either the Authority has to establish all the ingredients of an unreasonably restrictive trade practice mentioned in S.2(n) or has to resort to the deeming clause of Ss.6 & 7 of the Ordinance---Where admittedly there was no general order prescribing the practice, which shall be deemed to be unreasonably restrictive trade practice, either the Authority was to establish all the ingredients of unreasonably restrictive trade practice, or to prove an agreement mentioned in S.6 of the Ordinance justifying to presume that unreasonably restrictive trade practice has been resorted to or is continuing. \n \nPLD 2007 Lah. 1 ref.\n \n(b) Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordnance (V of 1970)---\n \n----Ss. 3, 6, 12 & 14---Undue concentration of economic power---Unreasonably restrictive trade practices---Powers of the Authority---Scope---Authority, while taking suo motu action under S.14, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 issued show cause notices and directions to Sugar Mills to discontinue and not to repeat the practice of withholding of stock to create artificial shortage of the commodity in the market---Only reason recorded by the Authority was that a very small percentage of total stock was sold in the market---Validity---Held, such reason would not provide a sufficient criteria to hold that unreasonably restrictive trade practice had been resorted to---Authority had not mentioned in the order as to how, much quantity of Sugar was sold in the market in the specified months as compared to earlier months---Collusive arrangement between the undertakings dealing with manufacturers of Sugar had not been satisfactorily proved---Manufacturers, in their reply to show cause notices issued to them by the Authority, had pleaded that a number of the Mills had sold more quantity of Sugar in the market in the later months as compared to the average monthly sale which according to the manufacturers negated the alleged collusive arrangement---Authority had failed to consider such aspect of the matter and there was no evidence that the sale of Sugar was refused by the undertakings despite demand by the dealers---Orders of' the Authority, in circumstances, were liable to be set aside.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.Os. Nos. 166 to 175 of 2005, decision dated: 30-07-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUNIR PARACHA, J",
    "": "HUNZA SUGAR MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED through General Manager Finance, Lahore High Court\nVs.\nMONOPOLY CONTROL AUTHORITY"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13781",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2234 = 2008 SLD 2234 = 2008 CLD 1214",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Petition for leave to defend the suit---Availing or disbursement of the facility of finances had not been denied---Execution of any of the documents relied upon by the Bank was also not denied---Suit was filed by the duly authorized persons of the Bank---Applications for leave to defend suit contained vague and nebulous allegations---Defendants had denied the execution of any guarantee and stated that mortgage documents had been prepared fraudulently through Halqa Patwari---Such denials being without any substance, no plausible defence in law was made out in the petition for leave to defend the suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.47 of 2006, decision dated: 28-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "SAUDI PAK COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through Authorized Officers--Plaintiff\nVs.\nPAK INTERNATIONL EXPORTS through Sole Proprietor and 10 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13782",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2235 = 2008 SLD 2235 = 2008 CLD 1217",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S.28-Restraint of legal proceedings---Scope---Either of the parties to agreement, is prohibited under S.28 of Contract Act, 1872, from restricting other from taking matter to the ordinary tribunals but it does not provide any restriction in respect of consensus between the parties to refer the matter to arbitration or to take up their dispute in a particular Court or tribunal exclusive to other Courts even if they have jurisdiction. \n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S.28---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10, Ss.19 & 20---Return of plaint---Territorial jurisdiction---Determination---Contention of defendant was that according to a specific clause in agreement between the parties, dispute between the parties could only be entertained by Courts at place \"\"L\"\" having the exclusive jurisdiction, therefore, suit filed at place \"\"K\"\" should have been returned to plaintiff---Validity---Such clause in the agreement did not restrict either of the parties to take up the matter to the Court or ordinary tribunals while according to Ss.19 and 20, C.P.C. the suit could be filed at place where the cause of action had arisen or the defendant voluntarily resided or carried on business---By virtue of this clause in agreement, only venue of jurisdiction had been chosen but no restriction in respect of legal remedy was imposed nor there was any limitation in such respect from S.28 of Contract Act, 1872---Jurisdiction could be stretched to either place at \"\"K\"\" or \"\"L\"\" keeping in view the contention of plaintiff but sanctity of agreement had restricted both the parties to avail remedy at place \"\"L\"\" by virtue of its clause---High Court directed the office to return the plaint to plaintiff---Application was allowed accordingly. \n \nState Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393; ; Messrs Kadir Motors (Regd.) Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd. Karachi and 3 others 1992 SCMR 1174; Tahir Tariq Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. National Development Finance Corporation through its Chairman, 2003 CLD 1546; Maqsood Ali Khan v. National Bank of Pakistan 2003 PLC (CS) 226; Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Tahir Edible Oil (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2003 CLC 416 and 2003 CLD 1546 rel.\n \nChokkahnga Pillay v. Velayudha Mudaliar and others 1925 Mad. 117 distinguished.\n \n(c) Interpretation of document---\n \n----Reservations and restrictions imposed in agreement---Scope---When parties enter into an agreement with certain reservations and restrictions, keeping in view for and against prospects and that is not restricted by law, then policy of law requires that spirit of the intention of parties is to be considered as sacrosanct until there is specific legal restriction---Intention of parties should not be killed through technicalities. \n \n(d) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n---Preamble---Object and scope---Law of contract has been promulgated with the spirit that there should be some statutory legal lines between which contracting parties should act and their obligation to each other should not be violated. \n \n(e) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n---S.37---Parties to contract---Obligations---Parties of contract as well as their representatives are bound under S.37 of Contract Act, 1872, to complete the contract in agreed terms. \n \nCommissioner of Income-Tax v. Messrs Siemen A.G. 1991 PTD 488 and Hafeezullah Khan v. Al-Haj Chaudhri Barkat Ali PLD 1998 Kar. 274 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Contract Act, 1872=28,37\\n\\r\\n\\rContract Act, 1872=28,37\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.VII,R.10,Ss.19,20\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Suit No.469 of 2004, decision dated: 4-08-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AHMED KHAN, J",
    "": "TRADESMEN INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13783",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2236 = 2008 SLD 2236 = 2008 CLD 1226",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. VII, Rr.1 & 2---Recovery of money---Negotiable instrument---Summary procedure---Object and scope---Summary procedure for trial of suits have been contemplated by provisions of O.XXXVII, C.P.C.---Such procedure normally applies to commercial transactions and can be filed on the basis of bill of exchange, hundi, promissory note and cheque etc.---Purpose of O.XXXVII, C.P.C. is to ensure decision of dispute on one. hand and to limit right of defence of delinquent defendant to defend suit unless he obtains leave of the court by showing good cause---Such being a special procedure, therefore, every provision enacted is required to be adhered to and strictly followed. \n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXXVII, Rr.1 & 2, Form 4, Appendix B to Schedule & S.115---Recovery of money---Ordinary notice, issuance of--Application for leave to defend the suit---Limitation---Application filed by defendant was dismissed by trial Court being barred by limitation---Plea raised by defendant was that summonses in Form 4 to Appendix B of C.P.C. were not issued and he was summoned through ordinary notice, therefore, application for leave to defend could not be dismissed---Validity---To ensure effective service of defendant, law had made it incumbent and mandatory that summons be issued in Form IV of Appendix B, of C.P.C.---Though the suit was filed under the provisions of O.XXXVII, C.P.C. but summons/notice issued was not in Form IV of Appendix B, therefore, the suit lost its nature and character and was thus required to be tried as a normal suit---Bar of filing of application to obtain leave to defend the suit was wrongly applied---Filing of application being not a requirement, therefore, dismissing the same on the ground of limitation was improper---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside the order passed by Trial Court and directed the trial Court to proceed in accordance with the procedure devised for ordinary civil suits, itself or by a Court of competent jurisdiction---Revision was allowed accordingly. \n \nSh. Abdul Majid v. Syed Akhtar Hussain Zaidi PLD 1988 SC 124 and Zubair Muhammad v. United Bank Limited 2004 CLD 112 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.XXXVII,Rr.1,2,Form4,AppendixBto Schedule,S.115\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.XXXVII,Rr.1,2,Form4,AppendixBto Schedule,S.115\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No.831 of 2008, decided 31st July, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, J",
    "": "WASEEM IQBAL\nVs.\nTANVEER AHMAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13784",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2237 = 2008 SLD 2237 = 2008 CLD 1239",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19(1) & (7)---Civil Procedure code (V of 1908), O.XXI---Objection application---Maintainability---Separate execution proceedings-Applicant sought exclusion of property in question from schedule of decree on the ground that the property was owned by him and defendant was only tenant in the property against whom eviction order had already been passed by Rent Controller---Validity---By application of O.XXI, C.P.C. in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for the purpose of execution of decree, Executing Court was empowered to determine all claims of respective parties, in case, if the party filing objection was not party to original proceedings of suit or the decree was obtained by committing misrepresentation and fraud----Powers of Executing Court, therefore, remained unfettered and vast to determine respective claims of aggrieved party at the time of execution of decree---In the event of passing decree by Banking Court, no separate execution application was required to be filed under S.19(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and suit itself might be treated as execution application---Decree-holder had filed separate execution application which was pending adjudication, therefore, if objection application would be dealt with in absence of original parties to suit, the same would prejudice the case of either of the parties---As separate execution proceedings were pending adjudication, therefore, applicant had all the rights and opportunities to avail before Executing Court---High Court declined to pass any order in objection application filed by applicant---Application was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)=19(1),(7)\\n\\r\\n\\rFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)=19(1),(7)\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.XXI\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-22 of 2005 and C.M.A. No.4607 of 2007, decided 15-08-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "ARSHAD NOOR KHAN, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff„¢\nVs.\nSUHAIL YOUSUF and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13785",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2238 = 2008 SLD 2238 = 2008 CLD 1243",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)------Ss. 46 & 67---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Injunction---Action for infringement--Application for grant of injunction---Principles set out for decision for application for grant of injunction are to the effect that the plaintiff must establish its business consisting of a class of goods; that the goods so sold have created a goodwill in the mind of wary person and that the goodwill owned by the plaintiff on account of the use of similar trademark by the defendant has caused a substantial damage to the plaintiff's business and goodwill. \n \nAbdul Jabbar and another v. Ahmad Jan PLD 1973 Kar. 289; Zafar Farooq v. Raja Dil Nawaz Khan 2000 YLR 2351; Messrs Mehran Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Messrs Chiltan Ghee Mill (Pvt.) Limited and others 2001 SCMR 967; Messrs Tabaq Restaurant v. Messrs Tabaq Restaurant 1987 SCMR 1090; Bayer A.G. and another v. Macter International (Pvt.) Ltd. 2003 CLD 794; Pakistan Soap Factory v. Chittangong Soap Factory and another PLD 1970 SC 460; Oil and Gas Development Corporation v. Ltd. Col. Shujauddin Ahmed PLD 1970 Kar. 332; RPC 1957 P.181; Seven Up Company v. Assistant Registrar of Trademarks II and another 1992 CLC 694; Messrs Ghulam Muhammad Dossul & Co. v. Messrs Vulcan Co. Ltd. and another 1984 SCMR 1024; Abdul Wasim v. Messrs Haico through Sole Proprietor Partner and 2 others 2002 CLD 1623; Formica Corporation v. Pakistan Formica Ltd. 1989 SCMR 361; Ghulam Muhammad Dossal and Co. v. Vulcan Company Ltd. and another 1986 MLD 886; Messrs Team Nayyer (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. Tariq Ahmed Sultani 2008 CLD 94; Messrs Select Sports A.S. Company v. Messrs Tempo Enterprises PLD 1998 Lahore 69; Messrs Hotel Galaxy (Private) Limited through Chief Executive and 2 others v. Messrs Days Inn Worldwide Inc. through Signatory/Chief Executive 2004 CLD 1590; Messrs ADT Services AG through Attorney and another v. Messrs ADT Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. through Promoter and Director and 4 others 2005 CLD 1546 and S. Muhammad Din and Sons v. Sh. Nabi Bakhsh and Sons 1987 CLD 759 ref.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 46 & 67---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2-Action for infringement---Injunction, grant of---pharmaceutical product---Deception of similarity of trade name---Test to determine---Principles.\n \nGeneric name of a pharmaceutical product could not function as a trade name to indicate its origin. Points to be considered by Court in arriving at the conclusion of fact as to whether deception or confusion was likely to be caused, enumerated. Whether the defendant is selling the goods so marked by design calculated to lead the public to believe that they are the plaintiffs goods. Ultimate test in this behalf is whether the mark used by the defendant as a whole is deceptively similar to that of the registered mark of the plaintiff. Court has to compare the two marks with the degree of resemblance which is necessary to exist to cause deception not being capable of definition by laying down objective standard. The 'persons, who would be deceived, are, of course, the purchasers of the goods and it is the likelihood of their being deceived that is the subject for consideration. The purpose of comparison is for determining whether the essential features of the plaintiffs trademark are to be found used by the defendant. When two marks are not identical, the plaintiff would have to establish that the mark used by the defendant so nearly resembles with the plaintiffs registered trademark that it is likely to deceive and to cause confusion in relation to the goods in respect of which it is registered.\n \nAbove rule would be applicable in judging the case of infringement but while dealing with the cases of drugs sold on prescription by the doctors, chemists and druggists, these factors assume much significance. \n \nSo far as the question of the deception and confusion created in the minds of the general public was concerned besides the packing logo and label, prima facie, it was required to be judged with similarity that had affected the business of the parties marketing' the drugs. In the present case, not a single instance had been produced to substantiate that with the use of product any loss has been caused to the plaintiffs business. It is not the plaintiffs case that they had sustained any loss due to the use of the similar product in the market with colour and scheme design and calligraphy marked by the defendant. \n \nThe label and the bottle used by the defendant was strikingly different with dominating features and brightly coloured therefore it would not affect the mind of the public and would not cause loss to the business or goodwill of the plaintiff. \n \nWhere there was no possibility for an average wary customer to be deceived or confused from a product as the same was imported from the foreign country and both the labels were' distinct on account of colour scheme and the variation in the labels of both the parties, grant of injunctive relief as claimed by the plaintiff was declined. \n \nMessrs Hero Motor Ltd by a Single Bench of this Court in Suit No.952 of 2005; Bayer A.G. and another v. Macter International (Pvt.) Ltd. 2003 CLC 794; Abdul Wasim v. Messrs Haico through Sole Proprietor/Partner and 2 others 2002 CLD 1623; 1987 CLC 1448; Mulfani Sohan Halva, Hussain Aghahi Multan v. Registrar of Trademarks, Karachi and another 2001 SCMR 967 and United Kingdom v. Mehran Bottlers (Private) Limited Karachi PLD 2000 Kar. 192 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.932 and C.M.A. No.6872 of 2008, decision dated: 19-08-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL, J",
    "": "SAMREEN LIAQUAT MALIK--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs AQMAR HEALTH FOODS through its Proprietors, Partners, Director, etc.\nand 8 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13786",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2239 = 2008 SLD 2239 = 2008 CLD 1252",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10 (8)---Leave to defend the suit---Preconditions---Essentials for grant of leave are questions of law and fact which require determination through recording of evidence. \n \n(b) Banker and customer---\n \n----Lease finance---Liability of hirer---Scope---Under Lease finance the liability of hirer arises only when leased assets are delivered by hire grantor. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.2 (d)(i)---Word \"\"lease\"\"---Connotation---Essential of valid lease is delivery of leased assets---There is no lease when there is no \"\"lease property\"\"----Lease commences when lease assets are delivered and the date on which parties signed lease agreement is not material in such regard---Legal and valid lease is one where hire grantor has delivered possession of leased assets to hirer---In absence of possession, the rights and obligations of hire grantor and hirer are not created in the eyes of law. \n \nThe Concise Oxford Dictionary; Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition; Lease Finance and Hire Purchase\"\" by Vinod Kothari P.7; Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. v. Wallias\"\" (1956) All ER 866; Associated Japanese Bank (International) v. Credit Du Nord SA and another (1988) 3 All ER 902 and Domestic Electric Rentals Ltd. V. Dowson\"\" (1943) LJ CCR 31 rel.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Recovery of finance---Lease agreement---Non-¬delivery of possession of hired asset---Bank filed the suit on the basis of lease agreement, whereby a car was leased to defendant---Banking Court did not allow application for leave to defend and decreed the suit in favour of bank---Plea raised by defendant was that though he signed lease document but possession of car was delivered to his employer, registration was also in the name of 'his employer who was in fact using the same---Validity---Bank did not prove or establish that leased car was delivered to defendant and remained in his use---Registration book of leased car showed that its possession- was with another person---Banking Court without determining factum of delivery of possession proceeded to pass decree which was not legally sustainable---High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, set aside and decree passed by Banking Court, granted leave to defend the suit to defendant and remanded the case for decision afresh on merits--Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.167 of 2004, heard 27-06-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH AND KHAWAJA FAROOQ SAEED, JJ",
    "": "TARIQ RAFIQUE SHEIKH\nVs.\nCITI BANK N.A. through Authorized Attorney"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13787",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2240 = 2008 SLD 2240 = 2008 CLD 1258",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S. 27---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.57---Restrictive covenant---Scope--Any agreement by which any lawful profession, trade or business is restrained is void under S.27 of Contract Act, 1872, as such the same is subject to an exception contained in S.57 of Specific Relief Act, 1877, according to which agreement restraining carrying on a business after sale of goodwill is exempt from operation of S.27 of Contract Act, 1872---Basic principle was that any restraint on trade clause would be, prima facie, void unless the same was justified to be reasonable between the parties and not inimical to public interest. \n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S. 27---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.57-Restrictive covenant--Applicability---Principles.\n \nFollowing are the principles for application of restrictive covenant:--\n \n(a) a restraint of trade clause is void if unreasonable, however, if the same is reasonable the said clause is valid;\n \n(b) a reasonable restraint of trade clause whereby an employee is prevented from entering into competition with his former employer or entering into an employment in same/ similar business with a competitor of former employer, can be enforced by Court. The said enforcement can include a declaration or injunction or both, as the case may be;\n \n(c) reasonableness of the clause .will vary from case to case and will inter alia, depends upon the following:--\n \n(i) the extent of duration;\n \n(ii) the extent of the geographical territory.\n \n(d) the employer will only be able to obtain an injunction for information, know-how and details of customers/orders acquired by employee the through some classified or secret information. However, no injunction would be obtained if the know-how is not acquired by employee through access of classified or secret information but rather during the normal course of employment;\n \n(e) the restraint of trade clause should only be aimed at protecting interest of the employer and not aimed at penalizing the employee or causing him inconvenience;\n \n(f) the restraint of trade clause should not be vague and generalized but should be rather specific. In case general a vague part of the restrictive covenant is separable from the substantive part, the Court while exercising doctrine of severance and by supplying construction will be empowered to uphold the substantive part of the restrictive covenant. However, where the restraint of trade is not separable in the manner stated above, the Court will reject the entire clause without applying the doctrine of severance;\n \n(g) the restraint of trade clause can only be applicable to the particular type of business in which the employer is actually engaged in and not to any business activity in which the employer would possibly engage in the future. \n \nBNS Air Services (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Anwar Ali and others 1987 MLD 3009; Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd. v. Syed Muhammad Mudassar Rizvi 2003 MLD 1947; Zafar Iqbal Papu v. District Magistrate Karachi East PLD 1988 Kar. 275; Syed Shabih Haider Zaidi v. Shaikh Muhammad Zahoor-ud-Din 2001 CLC 69; Government of Pakistan v. M.I. Cheema Dy. Registrar, Federal Shariat Court 1992 SCMR 1852; Shahab Din v. The State 2004 MLD 1411; Al-Jamiaul Arabia Ahasanul Uloom and Jamia Masjid v. Syed Sibte Hasan 1999 YLR 1634; Section 57 of the Specific Relief Act; Shree Gopal Paper Mills Ltd. v. Surendra K. Ganeshdas Malhotra MR 1962 Cal. 61; Superintendence Company of India (P.) Ltd. v. Krishan Murgal AIR 1980 SC 1717; Sandhya Organic Chemicals P. Ltd. and others v. United Phosphorous Ltd. and another AIR 1997 Gujrat 177; Indo-Burma Oil fields Ltd. v. Burma Oil Company Ltd. AIR 1921 Lower Burma 19; V.N. Desh Pande v. Arvind Mills Company Ltd. AIR 1946 Bombay 423; Niranjan Shanker Goli Kari v. Century Spinning and Manufacture Company Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1098;. AIR 1979 Delhi 232; Nooruddin Hussain v. Diamond Vacuum Bottle Manufacturing Co. Ltd. PLD 1981 Kar. 720; Pak China Chemicals v. Department of Plant Protection 2006 CLD 210; Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. Ltd. (1894) AC 535; British reinforced Concrete engineering Co. Ltd. v. Schelff (1921) 2 Ch. 563; Goldsoll v. Goldman (1915) 1 Ch. 292; Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby (1916) 1 AC 688; Forster and sons Ltd. v. Suggett (1918) 35 TLR 87; Commercial Plastics Ltd. v. Vincent (1965) 1 QB 623; Little Woods Organization Ltd. v. Harris (1978) 1 All. ER 1026; Fitch v. Dewes (1921) 2 AC 158; M&S Drapers v. Reynolds (1957) 1 WLR 9; Marion White Ltd. v. Francis (1972) 1 WLR 1423; Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co. Ltd. (1913) AG 724; Attwood v. Lamont (1920) 3 KB 571 and Alec Lobb Grages Ltd. v. Total Oil (GB) Ltd. (1985) 1 WLR 173 rel.\n \n(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----Ss. 54 & 57---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.27---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Interim injunction, grant of---Restrictive covenant---Applicability---Plaintiff was a manufacturing company and defendant was its ex-employee--Plaintiff sought injunction against defendant on the ground that defendant had executed an agreement undertaking not to work for a period of two years with any competitor of plaintiff, once he would leave the job---Plea raised by plaintiff was that during employment with plaintiff, defendant had acquired confidential information---Validity---Restrictive covenant between the parties was too vague, generalized and hence void---Agreement did not specify as to what particular specialized information had been divulged to defendant, which he would be prevented to use directly or indirectly in employment with another employer---Plaintiff could not particularize as to what particular confidential information was acquired by defendant---As the plaintiff failed to disclose as to what particular trade secret or secret formula or information was specially acquired by defendant other, than in his normal course of employment, therefore, he had failed to make out a prima facie case---Interim injunction was refused in circumstances. \n \nBNS Air Services (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Anwar Ali and others 1987 MLD 3009; Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd. v. Syed Muhammad Mudassar Rizvi 2003 MLD 1947; Zafar Iqbal Papu v. District Magistrate Karachi East PLD 1988 Kar. 275; Syed Shabih Haider Zaidi v. Shaikh Muhammad Zahoor-ud-Din 2001 CLC 69; Government of Pakistan v. M.I. Cheema Dy. Registrar, Federal Shariat Court 1992 SCMR 1852; Shahab Din v. The State 2004 MLD 1411; Al-Jamiaul Arabia Ahasanul Uloom and Jamia Masjid v. Syed Sibte Hasan 1999 YLR 1634; Section 57 of the Specific Relief . Act; Shree Gopal Paper Mills Ltd. v. Surendra K. Ganeshdas Malhotra AIR 1962 Cal. 61; Superintendence Company of India (P.) Ltd. v. Krishan Murgal AIR 1980 SC 1717; and Sandhya Organic Chemicals P. Ltd. and others v. United Phosphorous Ltd. and another AIR 1997 Gujrat 177 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.797 and C.M.As Nos.5097, 7214 of 2008, decision dated: 19-08-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID ALI Z. QAZI, J",
    "": "EXIDE PAKISTAN LIMITED through Finance Director and Company Secretary--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMalik ABDUL WADOOD--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13788",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2241 = 2008 SLD 2241 = 2008 CLD 1281",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66 & 90---Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged property---Objection against such sale---Appeal to High Court---After conduct of auction of mortgaged properties, the decree-holder/Bank and one of -debtors filed objection petitions against sale of said properties alleging that same had been sold away at a throwaway price, whereas the value of the properties was much higher---Banking Court holding that the properties had not been sold properly and lawfully and auction proceedings lacked transparency, set aside the auction conducted by the Court Auctioneer in favour of auction purchasers, with further direction to refund the auction price received from the successful bidders/appellants---Said auction purchasers had filed appeal against of the Banking Court---Both -debtors and decree-holder/Bank had concurrently alleged that properties in question had been sold on a throwaway price and requested not to confirm sale in favour of the appellants/successful bidders---Validity---Held, it was the duty of Executing Court to protect the rights of the parties, which were not to be jeopardized and sacrificed at the altar of execution of decree---In execution of decree, proper price should be fetched through the sale of property and were not to be sold at throwaway and paltry price---Highest bidder, would not earn any edge over on the basis of fake auction or collusive sale and auction was always subject to confirmation of Executing Court---Appeal was dismissed and Bank was directed to refund the amount of sale to auction purchasers accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.22 of 2008, decision dated: 19-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED SHAHEEN MASUD RIZVI AND M.A. ZAFAR, JJ",
    "": "Rana MUHAMMAD IRFAN AKRAM and others\nVs.\nALLIED BANK LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13789",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2242 = 2008 SLD 2242 = 2008 CLD 1285",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Preamble---State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29, dated 15-10-2002---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---State Bank BPD Circular No.29, dated 15-10-2002 was challenged with further prayer that it could not prevail upon the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Held, State Bank BPD Circular No.29, dated 15-10-2002 was a legal document as treated by Superior Courts.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-2238 of 2006, decision dated: 14-03-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AHMAD KHAN AND GHULAM DASTAGIR SHAHANI, JJ",
    "": "AWAMI HIMAYAT TEHREEK PAKISTAN through its Chairman and anothers\nVs.\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad High Court High Court and others\nImran Ahmad, D.A.G. for the State."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13790",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2243 = 2008 SLD 2243 = 2008 CLD 1286",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9 & 19---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution proceedings---Sale of mortgaged property---Application of intervener---Case of intervener was that property sold through auction in execution proceedings was already mortgaged with it since 1983 under a registered mortgage-deed---Effect---As valuable right had been created in favour of auction purchaser, who had .become bona fide owner for value, sale in his favour could not be set aside, however, intervener being prior mortgagee was entitled to receive the amount of sale consideration pursuant to such sale after deducting expenses incurred in the process of sale---Petitioner was directed to return the amount which it had received from the Official Assignee within specified period, to the intervener.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J. Miscellaneous No.76 of 1988, decision dated: 25-10-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB, J",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD AYUB STONE CRUSHER and others\nKhaleeq Ahmed for Intervenor."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13791",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2244 = 2008 SLD 2244 = 2008 CLD 1288",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S.20 & O.XXXVII, R.1---Recovery of money---Dishonoured cheque---Territorial jurisdiction---Place of cause of action---After filing written statement, defendant neither appeared before the court nor produced any evidence in support of his averments made in written statement---One of the objections raised by defendant in his written statement was with regard to territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court---Contention of defendant was that as transaction took place at place \"\"M\"\", therefore, suit at place \"\"K\"\" was not maintainable---Plaintiff produced original cheque and its memorandum in support of his claim---Validity---Suit was based on negotiable instrument and, presumption was that the same was against consideration and defendant did not come forward to rebut the presumption---Plaint as well as contents of affidavit-in-evidence had gone unrebutted and unchallenged---Though defendant had filed written statement but the same could not be considered as defendant did not lead any evidence---In absence of any evidence pleas raised by defendant in his written statement could not be considered---As the cheque was dishonoured at place \"\"K\"\" and the cause of action had accrued at place \"\"K\"\" therefore, according to S.20, Cr.P.C. suit could be filed where defendant resided or cause of action had arisen---Suit was decreed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1642 of 2001, decision dated: 26-08-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "ABRAR AHMED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nShaikh ZAHOOR AHMED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13792",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2245 = 2008 SLD 2245 = 2008 CLD 1288",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S.20 & O.XXXVII, R.1---Recovery of money---Dishonoured cheque---Territorial jurisdiction---Place of cause of action---After filing written statement, defendant neither appeared before the court nor produced any evidence in support of his averments made in written statement---One of the objections raised by defendant in his written statement was with regard to territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court---Contention of defendant was that as transaction took place at place \"\"M\"\", therefore, suit at place \"\"K\"\" was not maintainable---Plaintiff produced original cheque and its memorandum in support of his claim---Validity---Suit was based on negotiable instrument and, presumption was that the same was against consideration and defendant did not come forward to rebut the presumption---Plaint as well as contents of affidavit-in-evidence had gone unrebutted and unchallenged---Though defendant had filed written statement but the same could not be considered as defendant did not lead any evidence---In absence of any evidence pleas raised by defendant in his written statement could not be considered---As the cheque was dishonoured at place \"\"K\"\" and the cause of action had accrued at place \"\"K\"\" therefore, according to S.20, Cr.P.C. suit could be filed where defendant resided or cause of action had arisen---Suit was decreed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1642 of 2001, decision dated: 26-08-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "ABRAR AHMED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nShaikh ZAHOOR AHMED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13793",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2246 = 2008 SLD 2246 = 2008 CLD 1291",
    "Key Words:": "Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance (IX of 1984)-------Ss. 4 & 5---Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962), S.5(b)---Complaint, dismissal of---Deposits of money in bank---Purpose---Deposits of money accepted by a bank from members of public were for the purpose of bank's use in lending or investment and not for the purpose of keeping them apart as trust money--Adjustment of money from the account of petitioner against the credit card liability of the Chief Executive of its associated company did not amount to criminal breach of trust---No exception could be taken to the Order of the Trial Court dismissing the complaint. \n \nS. Pakrashi and another v. Emperor AIR 1941 Cal. 713; Attorney-General of Canada and another v. Attorney-General of the Province of Quebec and another AIR 1947 P.C. 44; Gopesh Chandra Pal and another v. Nirmal Kumar Das Gupta AIR 1950 Calcutta 57 and Santosh Kumar and another v. The King AIR 1952 Cal. 193 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Revision No.127 of 2005, decision dated: 11-08-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI SAIN DINO METLO AND DR. RANA MUHAMMAD SHAMIM, JJ",
    "": "NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING, (PVT.) LTD. through Authorized Officer--Applicant\nVs.\nMirza KAMRAN BAIG and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13794",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2247 = 2008 SLD 2247 = 2008 CLD 1294",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.11 & 19---Interim decree---Execution petition---Interim decree was passed against -debtors---No appeal had been filed against the said interim decree and thus the same had attained finality and was executable as a final decree in terms of S.11(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---High Court allowed the execution petition in circumstances. \n \nKhawaja Muhammad Dawood Sulaimani v. Election Tribunal and others PLD 2003 Lah. 106 and Messrs Madina Rice Mills v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 2004 CLD 1371 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Application No.38 of 2008 and Suit No.B-38 of 2006, decision dated: 1st September, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "SAUDI PAK INDUSTRIAL & AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT CO. (PVT.) LTD. --Applicant\nVs.\nA.H. INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD. and 11 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13795",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2248 = 2008 SLD 2248 = 2008 CLD 1294",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.11 & 19---Interim decree---Execution petition---Interim decree was passed against -debtors---No appeal had been filed against the said interim decree and thus the same had attained finality and was executable as a final decree in terms of S.11(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---High Court allowed the execution petition in circumstances. \n \nKhawaja Muhammad Dawood Sulaimani v. Election Tribunal and others PLD 2003 Lah. 106 and Messrs Madina Rice Mills v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 2004 CLD 1371 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Application No.38 of 2008 and Suit No.B-38 of 2006, decision dated: 1st September, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "SAUDI PAK INDUSTRIAL & AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT CO. (PVT.) LTD. --Applicant\nVs.\nA.H. INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD. and 11 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13796",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2249 = 2008 SLD 2249 = 2008 CLD 1297",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10 & 22---High Court appeal---Leave to defend the suit---Guarantor---Signatures admitted---Plea of fraud---Appellant stood guarantor at the time of signing of loan documents---Bank filed suit for recovery of loan amount and after dismissal of applications for leave to defend the suit, Banking Court decreed the suit in favour of bank---Plea raised by appellant was that his signatures on loan documents were obtained by borrowers by fraud---Validity---Person knowing well about contents of such documents could not put his signatures over them at six places and subsequently taking U turn that his signatures over such documents were obtained by his employees through fraud and cheating--Appellant did not even bother to submit application for leave to defend the suit under his own signatures or even to file his personal affidavit in denial of allegations of bank that letter of guarantee was genuinely and knowingly executed by him---Banking Court, while passing its and decree, had judiciously examined the defence of appellant and rightly concluded that no plausible defence entitling appellant for grant of leave to defend the suit was made out---In view of clear admission about signatures of appellant on letter of guarantee as well as other documents available on record, suit was also rightly decreed---Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere with the and decree passed by Banking Court in favour of bank---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMessrs National Security Insurance Company Limited and others v. Messrs Hoechst Pakistan Limited and others 1992 SCMR 718; American Express Bank Ltd. v. Adamjee Industries Limited 1995 CLC 880 and Messrs Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Pan Islamic Steamship Co. Limited and 6 others 2005 CLD 626 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "I.A. No.8 and C.M.A. No.6243 of 2006, decision dated: 16-11-2006.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Ch. BARKAT ALI through Attorney\nVs.\nMessrs ALZAMIN LEASING MODARABA and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13797",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2250 = 2008 SLD 2250 = 2008 CLD 825",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 208 & 476---Making investment in associated companies and undertakings without taking necessary approval---Imposition of penalty---During examination of annual audited accounts of the company for relevant year it was revealed that company made investment in the shares of another company-Company had also advanced a loan to another company for the purpose of leasing project land---Company stated that amount was invested in wholly owned subsidiary company without taking necessary approval as required under S.208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and that said transaction took place due to understanding that there was S.R.O. whereby the holding company did not require any special resolution for the purpose of investment made in wholly owned subsidiary company---Validity---Default having been admitted, the provisions of S.208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 had been violated and the Directors of the Company were liable for the penalties; however, keeping in view the fact that said amount was advanced to a wholly owned subsidiary company; and that the Commission vide notification had exempted such investments from the scope of S.208 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, a lenient view was taken by imposing a token penalty of rupees three hundred and fifty thousands only on the Directors of the company.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/233/261/2002-3008-14, dated 26-02-2008, decision dated: 19-05-2008,",
    "Judge Name:": "TAHIR MAHMOAD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan\nSAPPHIRE TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13798",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2251 = 2008 SLD 2251 = 2008 CLD 1309",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.11---Execution petition---One of the -debtors had filed objections to the execution stating that he was not a party to the suit and no decree was passed against him or against his property---Plea raised was that decree-holder had malafidely and intentionally impleaded the -debtor as party in the execution proceedings---Validity---Judgment-debtor being not a party to the suit and being not before the Court, no order affecting his rights to property could be passed without affording him the right of hearing---Undertaking for payment was given by other -debtors and the same could only be binding upon them and against their property---High Court upheld the objections raised by the -debtors and it was ordered that the property of the -debtors could not be sold in satisfaction of the decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Application No.1 of 2007 and in Suit No.B-30 of 2006, decision dated: 26-09-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "MY BANK LTD. through President/Chief Executive--Applicant\nVs.\nMessrs RIZWAN & SONS and 12 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13799",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2252 = 2008 SLD 2252 = 2008 CLD 1311",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)---Petitioner had stated that the proceedings in the suit filed by the petitioner involving the same dispute in the Banking Court, had matured for conclusion; and if the execution of the decree passed by the High Court in the suit filed by the respondent against the petitioner under challenge before the Supreme Court in the present petition, was stayed till the decision of the suit of petitioner Bank, he would not press the petition---Counsel for respondent, had stated that respondent would not agitate for the execution of decree pending disposal of the suit filed by the petitioner Bank---Petition was disposed of by the Supreme Court with direction that pending final decision of the suit filed by the petitioner Bank against the respondent in the Banking Court, decree would not be executed.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.343-K of 2006, decision dated: 17-04-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI AND GHULAM RABBANI, JJ",
    "": "ZARAI TARAQIATI BANK\nVs.\nLAEEQ AHMED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13800",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2253 = 2008 SLD 2253 = 2008 CLD 1312",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S.439(6)---Restoration of company---Petition for restoration of company which was struck off by the Registrar of Companies---Plea raised was that name of company was struck off from the register without service of statutory notices and without hearing the petitioner---Validity---Section 439, Companies Ordinance 1984, provides that the Registrar will serve statutory notices upon the company through post---Officer appearing on behalf of the Registrar failed to produce the postal receipts and in absence of postal receipts it could not be said that statutory notices had been served upon the petitioner---Order for striking off the name of the company, without service of statutory notices, was bad in law and could not be sustained---High Court allowed the petition in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J.M. No.20 of 2007, decision dated: 2-10-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "Messrs ZAHOORIA BUILDERS (PVT.) LTD. through Managing DirectoR\nVs.\nTHE REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES, SECP and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13801",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2254 = 2008 SLD 2254 = 2008 CLD 1315",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 5(3)---Transfer application--Applicants had sought transfer of suit pending before Banking Court No.II at 'K' to Banking Court No.V at 'K' where earlier suit relating to same dispute was pending---Respondents contended that in subsequent suit filed by one of the respondents, at this juncture, an application for leave to defend, moved by some of the defendants in the suit, was pending for disposal, therefore, it would not be appropriate that at this stage the said suit be transferred to any other court and that in case leave to defend application, pending in the suit was dismissed then the entire procedure would be in accordance with S.10(10)(11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and therefore transfer bf either suit to one court at this stage would not serve any purpose---Validity---High Court dismissed the transfer application moved by the defendants with the observation that in case leave to defend application moved by the defendants in the suit was granted by the Banking Court then it would be open for applicants to file fresh transfer application.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Transfer Application No.15 of 2008, decision dated: 1st September, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, CJ",
    "": "WASEEM FATIMA and another--Applicants\nVs.\nNETWORK LEASING CORPORATION LIMITED through Chief Executive and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13802",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2255 = 2008 SLD 2255 = 2008 CLD 1317",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Defendant had defaulted and failed to pay amount due---Bank had also alleged that defendant had deposited fake documents of mortgaged property---Defendant was duly served by all modes but no one appeared on his behalf to defend the suit---Statutory period for filing leave to defend the suit had expired---High Court decreed the suit in favour of the Bank in circumstances and observed that plaintiff was at liberty to initiate criminal proceedings against the defendant, if provided by law, for depositing the fake documents.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-11 of 2008, decision dated: 30-07-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "FARRUKH ZIA G. SHAIKH, J",
    "": "SONERI BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nABDUL QADIR JANGDA--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13803",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2256 = 2008 SLD 2256 = 2008 CLD 1324",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)--------S. 82---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Suspension of operation of credit card---Petitioner, who used credit card issued to him by the Bank, having defaulted; Bank suspended operation of said credit card---Petitioner, who had failed to pay the dues, was attempting to avoid his liability---If any dispute was in respect of charging of mark-up or interest over and above the agreement entered between the parties, petitioner's remedy lay before Banking Court and/or if there was any malpractice or any violation of Banking laws, rules, regulations or guidelines or perverse, arbitrary or discriminatory actions by the Bank, the efficacious remedy was available to petitioner before Banking Mohtasib appointed under S.82 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 who had jurisdiction to look into the complaint of aggrieved person and constitutional petition was not an efficacious remedy---Petitioner being defaulter, was not entitled to equitable relief---Constitutional petition was dismissed. \n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n---Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Equitable relief, in exercise of power under Art.199 of the Constitution, could not be granted in aid of injustice.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962=82\\n\\r\\n\\rBanking Companies Ordinance, 1962=82\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=Art.199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-931 of 2008, decision dated: 12-09-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND BIN YAMIN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AAMIR SAEED\nVs.\nMessrs UNITED BANK LTD. through President and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13804",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2257 = 2008 SLD 2257 = 2008 CLD 1329",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10(2)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5--Application for leave to defend suit barred by time--Application for condonation of delay---Scope---Held, if specific time was provided in the statute to do or not to do a certain act, the said acts were required to be done within the period so provided under the statute and after expiry of the limitation period the valuable right accrued in favour of the opposite party which could not be snatched leniently or lightly--After expiry of limitation period, each day's delay is to be explained so as to be assessed by the court that delay in filing the suit or application was beyond the control of defaulting Party---When the reasons for delay were vague, there would be no justification to condone the inordinate delay of 35 days in filing the application---Principles. \n \nMessrs Friends International (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director and others v. ABL Ltd. through Manager and 5 others 2004 CLD 817 and Yasir Chaudhary v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 1701 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-26, C.M.As. Nos.4267, 6165 and 6166 of 2006, decision dated: 10-09-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "ARSHAD NOOR KHAN, J",
    "": "Messrs INTERNATIONAL CHROME TANNERY and 3 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13805",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2258 = 2008 SLD 2258 = 2008 CLD 1336",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S.305---Winding up of company---Object---Conditional order---Duty of Court---Scope---Before passing winding up order, court has to satisfy itself and to form an opinion in terms of S.305(h) of Companies Ordinance, 1984, that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up---Object of proceedings is to find out solvency or insolvency of the company and not to settle claims of creditors---Object of winding up is also not to coerce the company to make payment to unpaid creditor but to secure discontinuation of functions of such company, which has ceased to be commercially solvent and viable. \n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss.305, 306(a) & 314(1)---Winding up of company---Failure to repay debts---Petitioner sought winding up of respondent company on the ground that it had failed to repay its debts---Respondent did not come forward with any defence and amount claimed by petitioner became undisputed---Effect---High Court keeping in view the provisions of S.314(1) of Companies Ordinance, 1984, instead of directly ordering for winding up of the company, directed the company to pay undisputed amount to petitioner within eight weeks, and on failure to pay the amount, the company would' be wound up---Petition was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J.M. No.13 of 2007, decision dated: 16-09-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "FAYSAL BANK LTD. through Attorneys\nVs.\nSOUTHERN NETWORKS LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13806",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2259 = 2008 SLD 2259 = 2008 CLD 1343",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Damages-------Claim for damages---Scope---Claim for damages is not a vested right and grant of damages is subject to proof---Mere filing of a suit for damages cannot be termed as a bona fide dispute. \n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss.305, 306(a) & 314(1)---Winding up of company---Failure to pay debt---Conditional order---Petitioner sought winding up of company on the ground that the company had failed to pay its claim---Validity---Company was not withholding the amount due to any bona fide dispute but with mala fide intention not to pay the admitted amount---Petition was filed for admitted amount and it was not filed just to pressurize the company---Company admitted the claim of petitioner and S.305 (e) of Companies Ordinance, 1984, had given a right to a creditor to seek an order of winding up provided conditions set in Ss.306 and 314 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, were met---Neglect on the part of company to pay the stun due after thirty days of the service of notice deemed that company was unable to pay its debts---Such neglect to pay had furnished a ground for winding up of the company, irrespective of the fact that the company was commercially solvent---High Court exercising discretion under S.314 (1) of Companies Ordinance, 1984, directed the company to pay undisputed amount to petitioner within four weeks and on failure to pay the amount, respondent company was directed to be wound-up---Petition was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J.M. No.24 of 2007, decision dated: 15-09-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "ERIDANIA (SUISSE) SA\nVs.\nRAJBY INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD.\nHumera Abdul Aziz Essa v. ALAbbas Cement Industries Ltd. 2008 CLD 214 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13807",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2260 = 2008 SLD 2260 = 2008 CLD 1347",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.7(4)---Jurisdiction--Admitted documents were to be given preference over and above the evidence which was yet to be produced by other party---If, after the evidence is recorded by competent Court of law it arrived at the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to entertain such dispute in between the parties, the plaint or suit in question may be returned to concerned party with direction to present the same before the competent Court having jurisdiction---High Court dismissed the transfer application, leaving the applicant at liberty to file fresh one as and when fresh cause of action arose in his favour.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Transfer Application No.16 of 2008, decision dated: 25-08-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZULLAH M. MEMON, A.C.J.",
    "": "Rana MUNEER AHMED and another--Applicants\nVs.\nALZAMIN LEASING MODARABA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13808",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2261 = 2008 SLD 2261 = 2008 CLD 1349",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-------S.40(4)---Infringement of trade mark---Distinct business---Plaintiff was owner of registered trade mark known as \"\"Hamdard\"\" renowned in the field of Unani medicines, syrups and other goods---Plaintiff also claimed that it was publishing magazines and journals under the name and title of \"\"Hamdard-e-Sehat\"\" and \"\"Hamdard Naunehal\"\"---Plaintiff assailed registration of \"\"The Daily Hamdard\"\" a newspaper, in the name of defendant---Plea raised by defendant was that publishing of newspaper was distinct business and law had not restricted from using such name irrespective of registration of trade mark \"\"Hamdard\"\" of plaintiff---Validity---Registered trade mark was infringed under S.40(4) of Trade Marks Act, 2002, if any person had used in the course of trade mark in relation to goods or services which were not similar to those for which the trade mark was registered when deceptively similar to trade mark used which lead to confusion or deception---Defendant was although publishing daily newspaper with the name \"\"The Daily Hamdard\"\" and plaintiff was publishing monthly magazines under their trade mark of \"\"Hamdard-e-Sehat\"\" and \"\"Hamdard-e-Naunehal\"\" and although both the publications were differently classified but had often same sale points and outlet points and readers are largely of the same category, therefore, element of deception and confusion could not be ignored---Judgment and decree passed by trial Court was set aside and the suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff to the extent that defendant was restrained from infringing plaintiffs registered trade mark \"\"Hamdard\"\" by using the trade mark word \"\"Hamdard\"\" in his publication--Appeal was allowed in circumstances. \n \nMessrs Dewan Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. M.B. Abbasi and others 2007 CLD 1610; Seven-up Company v. Kohinoor Thread Ball Factory and 3 others PLD 1990 SC 313 and Alpha Sewing Machine v. Registrar of Trade Marks PLD 1990 SC 1074 rel.\n \nSunkit Growers Inc. v. Messrs Karachi Aerosol Co. Ltd. and another PLD 1987 Kar. 119 and Montres Rolex S.A. Geneva, Switzerland v. Assistant Registrar of Trade marks PLD 1987 Kar. 199 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.8 of 2008, decision dated: 30-07-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED QALB-I-HASSAN, J",
    "": "HAMDARD NATIONAL FOUNDATION PAKISTAN\nVs.\nROZNAMA HAMDARD through Chief Editor"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13809",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2262 = 2008 SLD 2262 = 2008 CLD 1353",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)-------Ss. 3 & 20(2)---Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969), S.34---Nature and responsibilities of Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan---Scope. \n \nKhawaja Imran Ahmed v. Noor and another 1992 SCMR 1152 and Shaukat Ali and others v. Government of Pakistan through Chairman Ministry of Railways and others PLD 1997 SC 342 ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss. 4, 5 & 6---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss.3 & 10---Companies Ordinance, 1984 and Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 focus on distinct legislative concerns to be regulated in separate areas on which scope of the law was limited and which squarely fell within the ambit of listing the companies for such exchange.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P. No.1687 of 2005, decision dated: 26-02-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND SYED MAHMOOD ALAM RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "A.M. SIDDIQI and others\nVs.\nTHE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF PAKISTAN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13810",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1825 = 2009 SLD 1825 = 2009 CLD 36",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.7(2)---Powers of Banking Court---Scope---Where the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 itself provides the specific procedure for resolving a proposition, under the settled principles of construction of statutes, the provisions of general law not only to that extent, but even regarding the inherent jurisdiction of the court available under Civil Procedure Code, 1908 shall not be attracted---Principles.\n \nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is a special law covering a particular field of litigation and the courts constituted thereunder are vested with both the civil as well as criminal jurisdiction. Section 7(2) prescribes that the court shall, in all matters with respect to which the procedure had not been provided for in the Ordinance, apply the law laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (Act V of 1908) and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), meaning thereby that where the Ordinance itself provides the specific procedure for resolving a proposition, under the settled principles of construction of the statutes, the provisions of general law, not only to that extent, but even regarding the inherent jurisdiction of the court available under the Civil Procedure Code, shall not be attracted. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 27, Proviso & S.7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.152---Finality of order---Inherent and general powers under S.152, C.P.C.-Applicability---Scope---Cases pertaining to any error in the and decree etc. of the court shall only be regulated by the proviso to S.27, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, rather the general and inherent power under S.152, CAC., which shall not be applicable in the presence of specific provision of proviso to S.27 of the Ordinance---Proviso to S.27 of the Ordinance, however is restricted in empowering the court to correct the typographical error etc. and unlike S.152, C.P.C. does not provide for supplying any accidental slip or omission. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 27, proviso---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.152---Typographical error etc.---Scope---Finality of order-Non-¬specification in the and decree, the date of default by the Banking Court, by no stretch of interpretation, can be construed as 'typographical error etc., rather it is a simple case of slip/omission of the court and had it been the /decree of the Civil Court, the provision of S.152, C.P.C. could be validly invoked---But for the supply of such an omission/slip, Banking Court had no jurisdiction under proviso to S.27, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and impugned order of the Banking Court being beyond the scope of proviso to S.27 could not sustain. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 3 & 27, proviso---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.47---Non-specification in the and decree, the date of default by the Banking Court---Remedy---Executing Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to adjudicate as to from which date the costs of funds should be allowed to the decree holder---Principles.\n \nWhere the Banking Court has not specified in its and decree, the date of default by the debtor, the solution can be achieved by resorting to the provisions of section 47, C.P.C. under which, the court has the power to decide the question about the execution, satisfaction and discharge of the decree and such jurisdiction undoubtedly includes the power of the court to interpret the / decree on the basis of the law applicable, which, in this case, shall be section 3 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. Therefore, if approached, the Executing Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to adjudicate as to from which date the costs of funds should be allowed to the decree holder. \n \nK.A.S.B. Bank Limited v. Abdul Qadir Jangda 2007 C.L.D. 1639; Sh. Abdul Sattar Lasi v. Federation of Pakistan and 6 others 2006 C.L.D. 18; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Pakistan Belting (Pvt.) Limited and 5 others 2006 CLD 808 and Messrs Eclipse Dry Cleaners and another v. Messrs Imperial Chemical Industries Pakistan Ltd. and 2 others 1989 SCMR 1708 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.213 of 2008, heard on 15-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND KH. FAROOQ SAEED, JJ",
    "": "ZARAI TARIQIATI BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager\nVs.\nHASSAN AFTAB FATIANA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13811",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1826 = 2009 SLD 1826 = 2009 CLD 42",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Interim injunction, grant of--Requirements---Burden of proof---Phrase \"\"Irreparable injury\"\"---Connotation---Such party is entitled to relief under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 and 2, C.P.C., which satisfies the court that it has a prima facie case; that balance of convenience is in his favour and irreparable loss and injury can be caused to him if interim injunction is not granted--All three phrases are not rhetoric phrases but elastic words to meet a wide range of situation in given set of facts and circumstances---Burden is always on plaintiff/applicant to satisfy the court that prima facie, case exists in his favour---Court must further satisfy that non-interference by Court would result into irreparable injury to a party seeking relief---Irreparable injury means that injury must be material one, which court cannot adequately compensate by way of damages---Court is expected to exercise sound judicial discretion to find out amount of substantial mischief or injury, which is likely to be caused to other party if injunction is granted. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.15---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), S.118---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Sale of mortgaged property---Interim injunction, grant of---Plaintiff claimed to have entered into sale agreement with regard to property in question and had paid earnest money to owner whereas mortgage of the suit property in favour of bank was later in time---Validity---Presumption as required under S.118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, could be raised that bank had granted finance facility to defendant against creation of mortgage---All contentions of plaintiff required deeper appreciation of evidence, which could be properly thrashed out at the time of trial---Plaintiff had no prima facie, case and balance of convenience was also not in his favour, as such great inconvenience would be caused to defendant-Bank in exercising its legal right to recover its finances and to deal as per law---No irreparable loss would be caused to plaintiff if injunction was refused because loss, if any, could be compensated in shape of damages which had already been claimed by plaintiff in prayer clause of suit---High Court declined to grant interim injunction to plaintiff against sale of mortgage property--Application was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nNasimuddin Siddiqui and another v. United Bank Limited and another 1998 CLC 1718 and Avari Hotels Limited and others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan and 6 others 2000 YLR 2407 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. Nil and C.M.A. No.6621 of 2008, decision dated: 31st October, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID ALI Z. QAZI, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN KHAN--Plaintiff\nVs.\nN.I.B. BANK LIMITED and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13812",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1827 = 2009 SLD 1827 = 2009 CLD 49",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9 & O.VII, R.10---Suit for declaration, permanent injunction, damages for breach of contract and commission of tort by Bank and removal of plaintiffs name from Data Check List---Issuance of clearance certificate by Bank after deposit of outstanding amount against Credit Card issued to plaintiff--Plaintiff s claim for damages against Bank for placing his name on Data Check List---Return of plaint of such suit by Banking Court for lack of jurisdiction---Validity---Jurisdiction of Banking Court would attract in case of commission of default by customer or financial institution in fulfilling any obligation regarding a finance---Defendant-Bank had not included plaintiffs name in Data Check List, which had been prepared by State Bank of Pakistan---Credit Card would. fall within term of finance'---Plaintiff s claim was based on tortuous liability arising out of act and omission of State Bank of Pakistan by placing his name on Data Check List---Banking Court had no jurisdiction over a tort case based upon damages---High Court while dismissing appeal - maintained impugned order in circumstances. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.2(d)---Term finance\"\"---Scope---Credit Card would fall within term \"\"finance\"\". \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9---Suit for damages based upon tort---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Scope---Banking Court had no jurisdiction to try such suit. \n \nAbdul Rehman Allana v. The Citi Bank 2003 CLD Karachi 1843 and Nasimuddin Siddiqui and another v. United Bank Limited and others 1998 CLC 1718 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "1st Appeal No.13 of 2006, decision dated: 8-10-2007.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND ARSHAD SIRAJ, JJ",
    "": "M. NUJEEBULLAH QURESHI\nVs.\nMessrs CITI BANK N.A."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13813",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1828 = 2009 SLD 1828 = 2009 CLD 53",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------Ss.18 & 27---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9, O.VII, R.11(d) & O.XXI, Rr.89, 92---Execution of decree---Auction of property by Banking-Court-Civil suit challenging such auction on the ground that property was undivided, regarding which partition suit was pending; and that property was not mortgaged with decree-holder Bank, rather same was owned by plaintiff, who was not -debtor in decree under execution---Maintainability---Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging and decree or any action of Banking Court---Only remedy available to plaintiff to challenge auction was by filing of objection petition before Banking Court, which had jurisdiction to validate or invalidate auction, if not conducted in accordance with law---Plaint was rejected in circumstances. \n \nPakistan Fisheries Ltd., Karachi and others v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109 and S. M. Shafi Ahmad Zaidi through Legal Heirs v. Malik Hassan Ali Khan (Moin) through Legal Heirs 2002 SCMR 338 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.R. No.1713 of 2007, decision dated: 31st October, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI AKBAR QURESHI, J",
    "": "SHAUKAT HAYAT\nVs.\nSHAKIL AHMAD MUGHAL"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13814",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1829 = 2009 SLD 1829 = 2009 CLD 93",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, (XXXI of 1961)-------S.39 (a)---Order of attachment---Scope---Order of attachment or sale of industrial concern or properties disclosed or undisclosed of persons liable for repayment loan including guarantors can be passed. \n \n(b) Words and phrases---\n \n----\"\"Including\"\"-Connotation--Whenever term \"\"including\"\" is used by legislature, it always means that legislature intended to enlarge meaning of word occurring in body of statute. \n \n(c) Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, (XXXI of 1961)---\n \n----Ss.39 (1) (a) as substituted by Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (Amendment Ordinance, (IV of 1981)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 64---Law Reforms Ordinance, (XII of 1972), S.3---Infra-Court Appeal--Attachment of property---Private alienation---Properties owned by guarantors---After grant of main petition, Single Judge of High Court, ordered to sell through auction, the properties owned by Directors as the properties were given as guarantee---During pendency of proceedings, one of the Directors had transferred house in question vide registered sale-deed to third person---Bank filed application under S.64 C.P.C. but Single Judge dismissed the application and declined to declare private alienation as void---Plea raised by bank was that the property was in custodia legis of High Court for the satisfaction of debt and the same could not be alienated---Validity---As property in question was disclosed by Directors of the company as assets owned by them, therefore, such attachment order was rightly passed by Single Judge, in exercise of powers under S.39 of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961---Before substitution of S.39 (a)(1) of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961, the Court could pass order for attachment or sale of such properties only which were pledged, hypothecated, mortgaged or assigned to the bank as security for loan, whereas after substitution, bank could ask for an order of sale in respect of property mortgaged hypothecated, whether disclosed or undisclosed, owned by the industrial concern or by person liable for payment of loan including guarantors---Object of S.64 C.P.C. was to prevent fraud on creditor/decree holder and to secure in fact the rights of attaching creditor against attached property by prohibiting private alienation pending attachment---Division Bench of High Court set aside the order passed by Single Judge and application under S.64 C.P.C. filed by bank was allowed---Intra-Court Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Sadiq v. Dr. Sabira Sultana 2003 CLC 1; Syed Ashad Ali Sadiq v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and another 1992 CLC 1323; Ghulam Abbas v. Zohra Bibi PLD 1972 SC 337; Dhan Singh and another v. Baboo Ram and others AIR 1981 All. 1 and Abdul Sattar and others v: Sh. Muhammad Zaki and 4 others 1999 YLR 865 ref.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXI, R.54(i)---Condition \"\"by beat of drum or other customary mode\"\"---Compliance---Requirement of \"\"by beat of drum\"\" is satisfied if order of attachment is published in newspaper as the object was to make known to general public about order of attachment passed by court and to put them on notice before dealing with the same.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.276 of 2007, decided 30th September 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND BIN YAMIN, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN \nVs.\nMessrs FRENCH FOOD PRODUCTS (PVT.) LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13815",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1830 = 2009 SLD 1830 = 2009 CLD 102",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.284, 285, 286, 287 & 288---Amalgamation of two companies---Meeting of shareholders and creditors; dispensing with---Government of Pakistan was main shareholder of one company and that company was the only shareholder of second company to be merged---Plea raised by petitioner was that no approval or even notice to shareholders was required to give effect to Scheme of Arrangement as Government of Pakistan, the main shareholder had itself decided amalgamation and merger of one petitioner company into other petitioner company---Validity---All formalities had been completed and no objection was received from any quarter--Approval of only one shareholder i.e. Government of Pakistan was required and government had already granted approval, therefore, there was no impediment against merger of both the companies---High Court approved Scheme of Arrangements for proposed merger of both the companies---Petition was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous Petition No.23 of 2007, decided 10-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID ALI Z. QAZI, J",
    "": "TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN and another: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13816",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1831 = 2009 SLD 1831 = 2009 CLD 115",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 7(4), 2(c)(d) & Preamble---Banking jurisdiction---Scope---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Provision of S.7(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 vests a specific jurisdiction pertaining to the existence of a \"\"finance\"\" and such exercise shall be conducted by a Banking Court having jurisdiction---Jurisdiction available to the party (customer) was Banking jurisdiction and the suit filed by the said party was not tenable under C.P.C.---Principles.\n \nSection 7(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, vests a specific jurisdiction pertaining to the existence of a finance' and such exercise shall be conducted by a Banking Court having jurisdiction. The Preamble of the Ordinance 2001 specifically provides for the procedure. Its bare reading would suggest that in case where default has been committed in fulfilment of any obligation with regard to any finance, the customer may institute a suit in the Banking Court by presenting a plaint which shall be verified on oath, in the case of a Financial Institution a plaint shall be verified by a duly authorized officer of the Financial Institution.\n \nThe definition of the customer as defined under section 2(c) means a person to whom finance has been extended by a Financial Institution and includes a person on whose behalf a guarantee or a Letter of Credit has been issued by a Financial Institution as well as surety or an indemnifier. The expression \"\"Finance\"\" is defined in clause (d) of section 2(d). \n \nThe jurisdiction available to the party was Banking jurisdiction and the suit filed by the party was not tenable in ordinary course of jurisdiction available under the Code of Civil Procedure. \n \nAbdul Rehman Allana v. Citibank 2003 CLD Kar. 1443; Nasim Siddiqui and Others v. United Bank Limited and others 1998 CLC 1718 and Messrs Grain System (Pvt.) Limited Karachi v. Agricultural Development Bank Of Pakistan Islamabad 1993 MLD Lah. 1031 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R.11 & S.11---Rejection of plaint---Res judicata, principle of---Applicability---Until such time the documents relating to earlier proceedings were brought on record in accordance with law and the matter was thoroughly examined with regard to controversy in the two proceedings, it was not possible for the court to reach at the conclusion that the suit involved the same controversy which was decided in the earlier proceedings. \n \nJewan and 7 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others 1994 SCMR 826 ref.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R.11---Rejection of plaint---Cause of action---Elements and ingredients constituting cause of action. \n \nHaji Mitha Khan v. Muhammad Younus and 2 others 1991 SCMR 2030 ref.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. II, R.2---Defect in frame of suit---Procedure---If any defect was found in the frame of the suit or deficiency in court-fee, an opportunity had to be allowed to remove the deficiency---Nature of exception to the right of a party as provided by O.II, R.2, C.P.C. had to be strictly construed---Principle. \n \nMuhammad Azim v. Pakistan Employees Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. Karachi and 4 others PLD 1985 Kar. 481 and Abdul Hakim and 2 others v. Saadullah Khan and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 63 ref.\n \n(e) Jurisdiction---\n \n----Court's jurisdiction is based on the relief claimed and the court has power to pass all such orders as may be required to the satisfaction of the decree unless any such order by express or by necessary implication is prohibited. \n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances)'Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R.11---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Promissory estoppel principle of--Applicability---Rejection of plaint---Plaintiff in order to frustrate the execution of decree could not seek setting aside of the decree as the same would tantamount to review of the consent order---Principle of viability of the contract having been entered under duress cannot be reopened on the basis of undue coercion and duress---Proper remedy for plaintiff was to assail consent decree in appeal---Principle of promissory estoppel being applicable to the compromise, decree, the plaintiff had surrendered all rights and could no longer enforce them after filing of the compromise application in the earlier suit and allegations of the plaintiff amounted to waiver of its rights---Plea raised in the earlier suit in connection with wilfull default under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 also could not be reopened---Plaintiffs suit, in circumstances, was barred by law and plaint was liable to be, rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-13 and C.M.A. No.7925 of 2005, decision dated: 19-09-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL, J",
    "": "ALNOOR FERTILIZERS INDUSTRIES LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13817",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1832 = 2009 SLD 1832 = 2009 CLD 138",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 14---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.73 & O.XXXIV----Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Application by intervener (another Bank) for joining as defendant in the proceedings of the suit---Intervener's contention was that defendant (borrower) had availed financial facilities from it and despite requests to repay its dues it had committed default; that defendant had executed a Letter of Continuity regarding mortgage pertaining to its immovable property wherein, inter alia, the mortgage already created in favour of the intervener was acknowledged as continuing security and that to secure the interest of intervener it was necessary to make it a party to the proceedings to protect its interest---Validity---High Court observed that though detailed hearing and arguments were required to appreciate the contentions of the counsel, however keeping in view the order of the High Court in another case wherein the parties having similar nature of claim had been joined as party to the proceedings no purpose would be served in hearing the controversy in detail, hence application was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-23 of 2005, decision dated: 9-09-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD. through Corporate Centre BrancH--Plaintiff\nVs.\nGALADARI CEMENT (GULF) LTD. and 17 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13818",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1833 = 2009 SLD 1833 = 2009 CLD 140",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 15---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 41---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank--Auction of mortgaged property---Claim of a bona fide purchaser of mortgaged property---Validity---Held, as a general principle if arty immovable property was under a charge or mortgaged and subsequently alienated, the charge and mortgage would follow the transfer except in the case of 'bona fide purchaser' without notice of such charge or mortgage---Duty of Court---Principles--Bona fide purchaser'---Concept.\n \nAs a general principle if any immovable property is under a charge or mortgaged and subsequently alienated, the charge and mortgage would follow the transfer except in the case of bona fide purchaser without notice of such charge or mortgage. Before the equitable defence of bona fide purchaser under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act is accepted, it must be established that such purchaser has exercised due care and diligence to ascertain the clean vendible title of his transfer. Search and reliance solely of the revenue record is not sufficient to attract section 41 of the Transfer of the Property Act. \n \nAny person who acquires property without obtaining the title deed of the original transferor cannot also be said to have exercised due care and caution so as to enable him to take the defence of a bona fide purchaser. \n \nIn the absence of searching in the office of the Sub Registrar of Documents no person can claim to be a bona fide purchaser. \n \nIn the present case, Banking Court solely relied upon the factum that mortgage was not reflected in the revenue record which had been allegedly secured. This view taken by the Banking Court was diametrically opposed and contradicted the settled law.\n \nFurthermore, in the present case in the revenue record the property stood in the name of person whose original documents of title were admittedly with the Bank. Evidently, the Banking Court had ignored this vital aspect of the matter and acted contrary to the settled law. \n \nAdmittedly there was a registered mortgage deed in favour of the Bank. Had a search been carried out in the office of the Sub Registrar of Documents, the factum of the registered mortgage would have been revealed. The Banking Court totally ignored this aspect of the matter and embarked upon adjudicating the application in a manner contrary to the settled law. \n \nMaulana Riaz-ul-Hasan v. Muhammad Ayyub Khan and another 1991 SCMR 2513; Citi Bank N.A. through Branch Manager v. Munir Ahmad Gill and 2 others 2000 YLR 2938; Mst. Nasiban Bibi v. The Australasia Bank Lahore and others 1970 SCMR 657; Muhammad Anwar Khan v. Habib Bank Ltd. and 4 others 2005 CLD 165 and Major Muhammad Tariq v. Citi Bank Housing Finance Company Ltd. through Manager 2002 CLD 1090 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.140 of 2006, heard on 7-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD.\nVs.\nSyed MUHAMMAD HAROON and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13819",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1834 = 2009 SLD 1834 = 2009 CLD 169",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Suit for recovery of loan---Grant of leave to defend suit---Defendant, after service of process an application under S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for grant of leave to defend, which was dismissed for non-prosecution---Defendant filed an application for setting aside the said order and to decide the application on merits---Plea raised was that the counsel for the defendant was busy before the Principal Seat of High Court at Karachi on the said date---Validity---Counsel for the defendant had filed his personal affidavit deposing therein that he had actually made appearance before the Principal Seat of High Court at Karachi---Petition was allowed, application under S.10 of the Ordinance, was restored for its disposal subject to payment of costs.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-277 of 2006, decision dated: 12-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZULLAH M. MEMON AND ABDUL RASHEED KALWAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MUMTAZ TRADERS and 3 others\nVs.\nMessrs HABIB BANK LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13820",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1835 = 2009 SLD 1835 = 2009 CLD 171",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29--Appeal---Condonation of delay, application for---In the present case, if the period of limitation was computed from the date of signing of decree and the period consumed in obtaining certified true copy of the and the decree i.e. two days, was also excluded, still the appeal was time-barred by one day---Held, fact that S.5, Limitation Act, 1908 was not applicable in the appeal, having been preferred under a special statute, same was dismissed by High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.12 of 2008, decision dated: 23rd September, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, C.J AND ZAFAR AHMED KHAN SHERWANI, J",
    "": "Messrs S. MALIK TRADERS and another\nVs.\nSAUDI PAK LEASING COMPANY LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13821",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1836 = 2009 SLD 1836 = 2009 CLD 172",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.5(3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.24---Transfer of suit from Banking Court to High Court in its Banking jurisdiction was sought on the plea that another suit was pending in the High Court between the same parties and leave to defend the suit had been granted in the said suit and copy of leave granting order was also submitted---Counsel for other party had conceded that it would be appropriate if both the suits were tried by the same court, i.e. the High Court---Suit pending before Banking Court, with consent of the parties, was ordered to be transferred to the High Court accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Transfer Application No.23 of 2008, decision dated: 17-11-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, C.J",
    "": "Messrs ALAZIZ ROUTE TRANSPORT COMPANY and 3 others--Applicants\nVs.\nMessrs ASKARI LEASING LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13822",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1837 = 2009 SLD 1837 = 2009 CLD 173",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9(1)---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.73---Suit for recovery of damages with interest---Breach of contract---Damages, claim for---Party claiming damages had to firstly plead and then prove by sufficient, trustworthy, independent and cogent evidence that the concluded agreement existed between the parties, the other party committed breach of contract, such breach entitled the first party to damages and the foremost factor was quantum of damages---Principles for ascertaining the quantum of general and special damages stated. \n \nGohar Ali v. Sher Zaman Khattak Civil Appeal Nos. 2763 and 2764 of 2001; Ahmed Saeed Kirmani v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 1993 SCMR 441 and Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Sh. Nawab Din PLJ 2002 Lah. 1998 (sic) ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9(1)---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.73---Suit for recovery of damages with interest---Breach of contract---Damages, claim for---Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence to show that in fact they suffered any loss due to breach of contract---Solitary statement of one plaintiff was not sufficient to decree the colossal suit amount as plaintiffs' witness did not state anything about damages---Plaintiffs through his failure to produce evidence totally failed to prove that due to breach of contract they were in fact entitled to damages and to what extent, which were sine qua non for the grant of damages under S.73, Contract Act, 1872---Held, plaintiffs, in circumstances, had not proved that they suffered any loss and also failed to prove, through production of evidence on record, that they were entitled for decree of the total amount claimed in the suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.299-K of 2007, decision dated: 22-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ AND SYED ZAWWAR HUSSAIN, JAFFERY, JJ",
    "": "AZIZULLAH SHEIKH and another\nVs.\nSTANDARD CHARTERED„¢BANK LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13823",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1838 = 2009 SLD 1838 = 2009 CLD 189",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-------S.9---Qanun-e-Shandat (10 of 1984), Art.59---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12 (2)---Decree, setting aside of---Fraud and misrepresentation---Comparison of signatures---Report of Forensic Science Laboratory---Suit filed by bank was decreed against petitioner in her capacity of guarantor---Petitioner assailed and decree on the ground that she did not sign any document in favour of bank, including mortgage deed and general power of attorney---Validity---Banking Court must have referred the same to handwriting expert for obtaining his opinion whether purported signatures on disputed documents were in handwriting of petitioner or were forged or manipulated by somebody else---Such important aspect of the case not only escaped attention of Banking Court but High Court also did not take notice thereof--Any person could not be made liable for making payment which he or she was otherwise not legally bound to pay but was pressurized and forced to pay on the ground of some forged or manipulated documents---Supreme Court, in view of persistent, strong and vehemence denial of petitioner of her signatures on mortgage deed, power of attorney etc. made comparison of her denied signatures with her admitted signatures and further directed comparison by handwriting expert to conclusively hold that disputed documents had signatures of petitioner---Supreme Court also directed that proceedings against petitioner would be taken after the report of handwriting expert was received by concerned Banking Court in terms of the report---Appeal was allowed. \n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Liability of arty party---Determination---Duty of Court---Party has right to seek and demand every possible assistance from Court of law and to hold him/her responsible only when he / she is found to have acted contrary to law.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos.343-K and 344-K of 2007, decision dated: 21st July, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD AND SHEIKH HAKIM ALI, JJ",
    "": "Mst AKHTAR BEGUM\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13824",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1839 = 2009 SLD 1839 = 2009 CLD 204",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Plaintiff had obtained certain buses on lease from leasing company under an agreement---Suit for recovery of amount by leasing company---Plaintiff, the lessee, had prayed for confirmation of ad interim order restraining the leasing company from snatching/forcibly taking away the buses plying on route till disposal of suit for recovery---Contentions of the plaintiff were that in case the leasing company succeeded in taking away/snatching the buses in question from the plaintiff, the plaintiff will not be in a position to pay the lease rentals in respect thereof to the leasing company and that City District Government under a separate agreement was liable to pay an amount equal to six per cent of the mark-up on the lease rentals to the plaintiff which it had failed to pay and therefore, the plaintiff was unable to pay the lease rentals regularly to the leasing company---Validity---Plea by leasing company that said company had no concern with- the agreement between City District Government and the lessee was correct, however, if at the present stage the protection provided to the plaintiff by way of interim order was recalled, the plaintiff shall be seriously prejudiced and shall suffer irreparable loss and injury as the leasing company will take over the buses and will auction the same which will not only cause financial losses to the plaintiff but at the same time the leasing company may also not be in a position to recover its dues---High Court, in the interest of both the parities, observed that plaintiff shall continue to ply buses on the route---If leave to defend was granted to the leasing company without protecting the plaintiff, their cause will be frustrated which will not be in interest of anyone---High Court, in circumstances, confirmed the ad interim injunction order, subject to deposit of monthly instalments minus the mark-up of 6% to be paid by the City District Government and laid down the terms of payment---If however, the plaintiff failed to deposit any of the above amounts within the, stipulated time, the stay order shall stand vacated without any further notice/order and the leasing company would be at liberty to take over the possession of the buses and to deal with the same in accordance with law and contract between the parties---Plaintiff was also required to deposit the arrears for the default period within three months---Order accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-13 and C.M.As. Nos.2232, 2233, 4071 and 4072 of 2008, decision dated: 8-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "Messrs ALAZIZ ROUTE TRANSPORT CO. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs ASKARI LEASING LTD. and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13825",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1840 = 2009 SLD 1840 = 2009 CLD 209",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.9---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.190---Constitutional petition---Recovery of outstanding loans including credit card loans by Bank through its recovery staff with help of police and private person by raiding houses of its loaners---Validity---Bank for such recovery could approach only Banking Court---Bank assured High Court that in future guidelines provided by State Bank of Pakistan for realizing such loans would be followed in letter and spirit---High Court restrained Bank from harassing and/or creating disturbances in way of its loaners or their family member. \n \nGohar Iqbal for Petitioners.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-1346 to D-1354 of 2008, decision dated: 12-11-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND SYED MAHMOOD ALAM RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "ZAHEERUDDIN BABER\nVs.\nSTATION HOUSE OFFICER and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13826",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1841 = 2009 SLD 1841 = 2009 CLD 226",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.129 & 137---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.57---Suit against guarantor by Bank for recovery of finance advanced to principal debtor---Limitation---Letter of guarantee containing a clause binding guarantor till receipt of notice of discontinuation thereof---Notice demanding loan amount from guarantor served upon him before one year of filing of such suit by Bank---Denial of receipt of such notice by guarantor---Refusal of court to grant leave to guarantor to defend suit---Effect---Such guarantee letter would govern rights of parties and liability of guarantor to pay suit amount---Guarantor's liability would start from date of demand made by Bank---Limitation would start to run from service of notice of demand upon guarantor---If such notice presumed not to have been served upon guarantor, filing of suit against him would tantamount to service of such notice---Guarantor's liability to pay suit amount would continue by virtue of guarantee letter read with S.137 of Contract Act 1872 even though suit against principal debtor had become barred by Limitation Act, 1908---Suit was decreed against guarantor in circumstances. \n \nUnited Bank Limited v. Business Investment Ltd. and 3 others 1982 CLC Kar. 1101; Messrs Huffaz Seamlen Pipe Industries Ltd. and 2 others v. Messrs Security Leasing Corporation Ltd. 2002 CLD 505; Messrs United Bank Limited v President, Bazm-e-Salat and another PLD 1986 Kar. 464 and United Bank Limited v. Haji Bawa Company Ltd. and 3 others 1981 CLC Kar. 89 rel.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----Ss.126 & 128---Guarantee, contract of---Surety's liability, determination of---Scope--- Such liability would be determined on basis of such contract.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.53 of 2007, decision dated: 7-11-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL, J",
    "": "FIRST WOMEN BANK LTD.\nVs.\nMrs. AFIFA IFTIKHAR and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13827",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1842 = 2009 SLD 1842 = 2009 CLD 232",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 2(b)(ii)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.152---Suit for declaration, rendition of accounts, injunction, specific performance of contract redemption/release of securities/guarantees, damages and other reliefs---Any clerical or arithmetical omission or error in the order can be corrected by invoking the jurisdiction of Court under S.152, C.P.C. and the same cannot be said to be reopening the case---Specific intent cannot be corrected.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M.A. No.9231 in Suit No.B-13, C.M.A. No.9233 in Suit No.B-14, C.M.A. No. 9235 in Suit No.B-15 and C.M.A. No. 9237 in Suit No.B-16 of 2008, decision dated: 30-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "Messrs ALAZIZ ROUTE TRANSPORT CO.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs ASKARI LEASING LTD. and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13828",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1843 = 2009 SLD 1843 = 2009 CLD 312",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.3, 9 & 17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.151, 152 &\n153---Decree for recovery of loan amount---Cost of funds, non-awarding of---Application by Bank for amendment of decree to include therein such cost sought in suit---Dismissal of such application by Banking Court---Validity--Awarding of cost in terms of S.17 read with S.3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was mandatory---Banking Court in its had not observed that Bank was not entitled to such cost from date of default till realization of decretal amount---Bank was entitled to such cost---High Court accepted appeal in Circumstances.\n \nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Iftikhar Ahmed and 7 others 1993 CLC 535 ref.\n \nSyed Saadi Jafri Zainabi v. Land Acquisition Collector and Assistant Commissioner PLD 1992 SC 472 and Messrs Habib Bank Limited v. Sajjad Haider and another Ist Appeal No.24 of 2007 of this Court rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "1st Appeals Nos.49 and 50 of 2008, decision dated: 26-11-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": ", ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, C.J. AND GHULAM DASTAGIR SHAHANI, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED \nVs.\nTAUQEER AHMED SIDDIQUI and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13829",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1844 = 2009 SLD 1844 = 2009 CLD 329",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10--Application for grant of leave to defend suit---Defendant, in the present case, was served on four different dates and the period in between did not run in months, but in days, therefore, such issue could also be framed---Plaintiff had also claimed damages, which were required to be quantified by leading evidence; there were other questions, which were raised in the leave to defend application---Parities were also to lead evidence on the question inclusive of the issue of buy back price---High Court allowed the application in circumstances A and directed the matter to be posted for issues.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-55 and C.M.A. No.9275 of 2008, decision dated: 20-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J",
    "": "Dr. SHAKEEL AHMED SIDDIQUI and another--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nPAK LIBYA HOLDING COMPANY (PVT.) LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13830",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1845 = 2009 SLD 1845 = 2009 CLD 330",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.19 & Art.181---Decree for recovery of loan amount, execution of---Limitation---Execution petition filed on 30-11-1998 for execution of dated 13-5-1990 and decree dated 22-5-1990---Plea of decree-holder Bank was that Deputy Director and Managing Director of -debtor-company in their letters dated 7-12-1991 and 13-1-1992 and Annual Reports for years 1990 to 1998 and 2001 had acknowledged their liability towards Bank---Validity---Bank could file execution petition within three years of accrual of right to apply, which right had accrued on date of passing of ---Such letters and Annual Reports signed by such representatives of company for being in writing and containing acknowledgement of debt owed by company to Bank could be treated as clear, unequivocal and unconditional acknowledge¬ment in terms of S.19 of Limitation Act, 1908---Each Annual Report from year 1990 onwards had given a fresh start to period of limitation on its signing by representatives of company---Execution petition was, held to be within time. \n \nMessrs M. G. Kadir and Co. v. Abdul Latif PLD 1970 SC 708; Abdul Latif v. Messrs M. G. Kadir and Co. PLD 1964 (W.P.) Kar. 558; Deputy Custodian of Enemy Property v. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. 1986 CLC 2808; Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. Deputy Custodian of Enemy Property 1989 ALD 468; Rajah of Vizianagaram v. The Official Liquidator Vizianagaram Mining Company Limited AIR 1952 Mad. 136; National Bank of Pakistan v. Azizuddin 1996 SCMR 759; Habib Bank Limited v. Five Star Travels 2006 CLD 1396; National Development Leasing Corporation v. Messrs Sunshine Cloth Limited 2006 CLD 726; Mehboob Khan v. Hassan Khan Durrani PLD 1990 SC 778 and Habib Bank Limited v. Zulfiqar Ali Khan 2002 CLD 1758 ref.\n \nMessrs M.G. Kadir and Co. v. Abdul Latif PLD 1970 SC 708; Abdul Latif v. Messrs M.G. Kadir and Co. PLD 1964 W.P. Kar. 558; Deputy Custodian of Enemy Property v. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. 1986 CLC 2808 and Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. Deputy Custodian of Enemy Property 1989 ALD 468 rel.\n \n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---\n \n----S.19---Acknowledgement of debt in absence of debtor's promise to pay same---Validity---Such promise not a requirement of S.19 of Limitation Act, 1908.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Application No.204 of 2000 in Suit No.1102 of 1988, decision dated: 15-12-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Applicant\nVs.\nGAMMON OF PAKISTAN LTD.--Respondent\nAbdul Latif v. Messrs M.G. Kadir & Co. PLD 1964 (W.P.) Kar. 558 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13831",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1846 = 2009 SLD 1846 = 2009 CLD 342",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Service of summons---Service through courier, due to alleged refusal by the addressee, as well as through publication was only presumptive in nature, therefore, if any party had disputed service of summons by such modes, this aspect of the case was to be examined by the Banking Court carefully before recording its conclusion. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10--Application for leave to defend suit---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Scope---Once the applicants had pleaded service of summons in the suit on 19-4-2008, 30 days period of limitation prescribed under S.10(3), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was to be computed from that date, and mere non filing of application on 28-4-2008 or 2-5-2008 would not justify rejection of their applications for leave to defend filed on 30-5-2008, on such ground---Banking Court, in the present case, while dealing with the applications also failed to consider that under the proviso to S.10(2) of the Ordinance, it had ample powers to condone delay, if any, in the filing of leave to defend application if the defendant could satisfy the Court that he had no knowledge of summons through publication in newspapers---Leave to defend applications moved by the defendants being within time, Banking Court should have proceeded and decided the same on merits---High Court,' on failure to do so by the Banking Court, set aside the impugned order with directions to the Banking Court to decide the applications for leave to defend suit in accordance with law. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 10 & 22---Application for leave to defend suit---Rejection of---Appeal to High Court---Scope---Contention was that the fate of the leave to defend the application before the Banking Court needed to be decided by High Court in appeal on merits---Validity---Held, such course if followed by the Appellate Court, unless consented by the parties, may deprive the aggrieved party of his legitimate right to challenge same before the Higher forum---High Court, however, directed the Banking Court to expedite the disposal of suit within specified period.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special First Appeal No.55 of 2008, decision dated: 26-11-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, C.J. AND GHULAM DASTAGIR A. SHAHANI, J",
    "": "Messrs AAMER ENTERPRISES (PVT.) LTD. and 3 others\nVs.\nMessrs UNITED BANK LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13832",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1847 = 2009 SLD 1847 = 2009 CLD 346",
    "Key Words:": "Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1962)-------S.39---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.89, 90, 91 & XXXIV, R.13---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.78---Sale of mortgaged property for recovery of loan amount---Issuance of sale certificate in favour of purchaser on payment of entire sale price and delivery of its possession to him--Applicant as prior mortgagee of such property prayed for recalling of order of its sale---Validity---Purchaser, after purchasing property through Court, had paid its price as bona fide purchaser and was delivered its possession---Order of sale at such stage could not be recalled as none should be injured by an act of Court---Applicant's registered mortgage charge on property was prior in time than equitable mortgage charge of decree-holder---Decree¬-holder had acted in a gross-negligent manner by failing to make inquiry from Sub-Registrar concerned as to whether such property was free from encumbrance or not---Decree-holder was not entitled to deprive applicant as prior mortgagee from sale proceeds of mortgaged property---Such application was accepted in circumstances. \n \nMuhammad Saleem v. Manager, United Bank Limited, PLD 1990 (AJ & K) 29 and Hoechst Pakistan and others v. Maqbool Ahmad and another, 1998 CLC 134 ref.\n \nMessrs Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Maida Limited and others, 1994 SCMR 2248; United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Shaikh Rayon Silk Mills Ltd. 2002 CLC 696; Lloyds Bank, Ltd. v. P.E. Guzdar & Co. AIR 1930 Cal.22 and Kanigalla Prakasa Rao v. Nanduri Ramakrishna Rao and others, AIR 1982 Andhra Prad. 272 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.274, C.M.As. Nos.2251 of 2007 and 600 of 2008, decision dated: 12-12-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND DR. QAMMARUDDIN BOHRA, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD AYUB and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13833",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1848 = 2009 SLD 1848 = 2009 CLD 353",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 10 & 9---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Application for leave to defend the suit by the defendant---High Court, in circumstances, while dismissing the application for leave to defend the suit, appointed a firm of Chartered Accountants as Commissioner to examine the books of accounts of the parties and to determine the outstanding amounts, which the defendants had to pay towards the loan availed by them from the plaintiff/Bank---Commissioner firm was given specific directions by High Court; for examination of books of accounts of the parties in that behalf within specified period.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suits Nos.B-19 and B-32 C.M.As. Nos.8102, 8772 of 2007, decision dated: 20-11-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J",
    "": "PICIC COMMERCIAL BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nABBAS ALI KHAN KAIMKHANI--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13834",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1849 = 2009 SLD 1849 = 2009 CLD 354",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.7(1)(a), 9 & 10---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S.316---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.13---Suit for recovery of loan amount from guarantor on basis of ex parte foreign obtained against him by Bank---Leave to defend suit, application for---Plea of defendant was that suit was not maintainable on basis of such for not being on merits; that principal borrowing company had gone into liquidation under Companies Ordinance, 1984 and Liquidator had invited claims against company; and that according to law of Pakistan original suit was time-barred and thus, present suit was not maintainable on basis of such ---Validity---Foreign had been passed ex parte due to non-appearance of defendant, thus, same could not be treated as on merits---Foreign did not show, whether at relevant time defendant was residing in foreign country and whether any attempt hind been made to serve him personally or not---No notice in foreign suit had been served upon Liquidator to represent company---Bank had obtained foreign by suppressing factum of liquidation of company---Defendant appeared to be non-resident of foreign country and had not submitted to jurisdiction of foreign Court, thus, foreign was not binding upon him---Court in Pakistan could refuse to accept foreign as conclusive, if same fell within any of exceptions of S.13, C.P.C.---Defendant had raised substantial questions of law and facts requiring recording of evidence, thus, granting him leave to defend suit became necessary---Banking Court accepted such application and treated same as written statement. \n \nNaeemullah Malik v. United Bank Limited 2006 CLD 1592; R.E. Mahomed Kassim and Co. v. Seeni Pakir-Bin-Ahmad AIR 1927 Mad. 265; National Bank of Pakistan v. Banking Tribunal No.1 PLD 1994 Kar. 358; Nadeem Ghani v. United Bank Limited 2001 CLC 1904; Messrs Safa Textile Ltd. v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited 2004 CLD 279; Emirates Bank International Ltd. v. Messrs Dosman Brothers and 9 others 1990 MLD 1779 and Abdul Ghani v. Haji Saley Muhammad PLD 1960 (W.P) Kar. 594 ref.\n \nEmirates Bank International Ltd. v. Messrs Dosman Brothers 1990 MLD 1779; Abdul Ghani v. Haji Saley Muhammad PLD 1960 (W.P.) Kar. 594; Fazal Ahmad v. Abdul Bari PLD 1952 Dac. 155 and Grosvenor Casino Limited, Shahrah-e-Kamal Ataturk, Karachi v Abdul Malik Badruddin 1997 SCMR 323 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-13 of 2006, decision dated: 15-12-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD. through Assets Management (ARM) International DivisioN--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD NAVEED SOOMAR and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13835",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1850 = 2009 SLD 1850 = 2009 CLD 361",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XVIII, R.3---Suit for damages against Bank---Adjustment of loan amount by Bank from under lien foreign currency account of plaintiff----Denial of plaintiff to have committed default in repayment of loan amount, thus,, alleged such adjustment by Bank to be in breach of finance agreement---Plaintiff; after closing his affirmative evidence reserved his right to adduce evidence in rebuttal---Bank produced documentary evidence to prove plaintiffs failure to repay loan amount---Non-production of evidence in rebuttal by plaintiff to disprove such documentary evidence of Bank---Effect---Documentary evidence of Bank for remaining un¬rebutted, successfully established plaintiff's default in payment of loan amount---Suit was dismissed in circumstances. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.11 & O.II, R.2---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Suit for damages against Bank---Default in payment of loan amount by plaintiff---Demand of Bank to adjust loan amount from under lien foreign currency account of plaintiff being collateral security---Order of High Court passed in constitutional petition filed by plaintiff restraining Bank from such adjustment---Suit by plaintiff after such adjustment by Bank---Plea of Bank that suit was barred by res judicata and O.II, R.2, C.P.C.---Validity---Plaintiff had challenged vires of BPRD Circular in constitutional petition---Claim of damages would not fall within purview of writ jurisdiction---Question of encashment of collateral security and its adjustment against loan amount were factual controversies---Adjustment from collateral security was permissible according to loan agreement, when there was default---Adjustment from collateral security was permissible according to loan agreement, when there was default---Regular trial would be required to determine question as to whether plaintiff had committed default in repayment of loan amount---Such questions could not be ascertained in writ jurisdiction---Suit was not barred by S.11 & O.II, R.2, C.P.C. \n \nShaukat Ali Mian and another v. The Federation of Pakistan 1999 CLC 607; Sar Anjam v. Abdul Raziq 1999 SCMR 2167; Muhammad Arif v. Mahmood Ali and 4 others 2003 MLD 954; Aki Habara Electric Corporation (PTE) Limited through Authorized Signatory v. Hyper Magnetic Industries (Private) Limited through Chief Executive/Director/Secretary PLD 2003 Kar. 420; Abdul Haque and others v. Shaukat Ali and 2 others 2003 SCMR 74; Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary and 5 others v. Malik Ibrahim and sons and another 2000 SCMR 1172; Nasimuddin Siddiqui v. United Bank Limited 1998 CLC 1817; National Bank of Pakistan v. Khalid Mahmood 2003 CLD 658; United Bank Limited v. Shahid Corporation 1991 CLC 1743 and Messrs PEL Appliances Limited v. United Bank Limited 2005 CLD 1352 ref.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---S.9---Suit for damages against Bank---Adjustment of loan amount by Bank from collateral security of plaintiff---Validity---Adjustment from collateral security was permissible according to loan agreement, when there was default in payment of loan amount by customer. \n \n(d) Words and phrase---\n \n---Word \"\"by\"\" as used in contracts and statutes---Connotation. \n \nMuthua Chettiar v. Naraynan AIR 1928 Mad. 528; Goldman v. Broyles (Tax Cr.App, 141 SW 283); Rankin v. Woodworth (Pa, 3 Pen and W 48); Miller v. Philips (31 Pa (7 Casey) 218 and Conley v. Anderson (NY, 1 Hill 519) ref.\n \n(e) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----Ss.3-A, 25 & 41---Circulars issued by State Bank---Binding effect stated.\n \nThe circulars issued by the State Bank of Pakistan are in the nature of instructions/directions to the Financial Institutions. The Commercial Banks, whether private or government owned, are bound by those instructions. The directions are as consequence of promulgation of statute or an Act of Parliament. Banking company cannot deviate from these instructions or circulars. Banking Company is under obligation to follow these instructions within the contemplation of sections 3-A, 25 and 41 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962. \n \nWajid Saeed Khan v. Abdul Qadoos 1 than Swati and others 2007 CLD 1239; Messrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and others v. Messrs National Development Finance Corporation 2002 CLC 166 and United Bank Karachi v. Messrs Gravure Packaging (Pvt.) Ltd. and 4 others 2001 YLR 1549 ref.\n \n(f) Tort---\n \n----Claim for damages for breach of contract---Proof---Duty of plaintiff to establish damages suffered on each count by producing evidence that loss calculated as claimed was result of breach of contract. \n \nSadaruddin v. Messrs Mitchell's Fruit Farms Ltd., Karachi PLD 1979 Kar. 694; Tariq Cooking Oil v. United Bank Limited and other 2001 MLD 1181; City Bank v. Tariq Mohsin Siddiqi and others PLD 1999 Kar.196 and Jamshed Karimuddin Musalman v. Kunjilal Harsukh Kalar and another AIR 1938 Nag. 530 ref.\n \n(g) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Suit for recovery of damages from Bank for having adjusted loan amount from collateral security of plaintiff in breach of loan agreement---Vague assertion in plaint that plaintiffs wanted to invest such money in business without disclosing its nature---Plaint not showing as to which of the three plaintiffs and to what extent each plaintiff had suffered loss---Evidence to prove such facts not produced by plaintiff----Suit was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nSadaruddin v. Messrs Mitchell's Fruit Farms Ltd., Karachi PLD 1979 Kar. 694; Tariq Cooking Oil v. United Bank Limited and other 2001 MLD 1181; City Bank v. Tariq Mohsin Siddiqi and others PLD 1999 Kar. 196 and Jamshed Karimuddin Musalman v. Kunjilal Harsukh Kalar and another AIR 1938 Nag. 530 ref.\n \n(h) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.5 & 7---Suit for damages against Bank for breach of Moharaba Finance Agreement---Jurisdiction of Banking Court---Scope---Primary responsibility of banker as trustee of account-holder would be to safeguard interest of its customer and save him from any loss---Failure of banker to perform such obligations would give a valid cause to its customer to bring his grievance before Banking Court---Defendant-Bank was under legal and contractual obligation to fulfil agreements of finance---Determination of question arising out of such agreements was covered under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Banking Court had jurisdiction to try such suit. \n \nHabib Bank Limited v. Raj Begum 1990 MLD 804; Abdul Rahim v. United Bank Limited PLD 1977 Kar. 62 and International Finance Corporation v. Halla Spinning Limited PLD 2000 Lah. 323 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.47 of 1999, decision dated: 3rd September, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "Messrs PETROSIN and 2 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nMessrs FAYSAL BANK--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13836",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1851 = 2009 SLD 1851 = 2009 CLD 374",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.15---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Injunction, grant of---Sale of mortgaged property---Scope---Plaintiff was buyer of suit properties from the owner by registered sale-deed---Plaintiff was aggrieved of notices issued by bank with regard to sale of suit properties as the same were allegedly mortgaged with bank---Plea raised by plaintiff was that suit properties were never mortgaged with bank and documents with bank were forged---Validity---Bank had issued notices as required under S.15(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, on the addresses of suit properties which were sealed by Nazir of Court as plaintiff was not residing on those addresses, thus there was no due service in law and fact---Bank did not file proper accounts under S.15(10) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, therefore, bank had violated law to its own benefit and provisions of S.15 (12) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was not attracted---Plaintiff had successfully made out a prima facie arguable case in his favour and balance of convenience was also in his favour as title documents were still in his name--All factual and legal controversies could be thrashed out during trial after recording of evidence and plaintiff might suffer irreparable loss if injunction was not granted---High Court restrained the bank from creating any third party interest in the suit property till disposal of the suit---Application was allowed in circumstances. \n \nPLD 2004 Kar. 304; PLD 1970 SC 180; 2001 CLC 1825; PLD 1990 Kar. 1; 2007 CLD 349; 2007 CLD 232; 1993 CLC 1316; 1990 CLC 1473; 2006 CLD 18; 2003 CLD 931; 2004 CLD 112; 2003 CLD 367; 1998 CLD 1718; 2003 CLD 867, 931; 2007 SCMR 373; Sheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi v. Judge Banking Court 2007 CLD 69; Qaiser Majeed v. National Bunk of Pakistan 2001 CLD 812; Messrs Cargo Aids and 4 others v. Soneri Bank Limited 2008 CLD 1127; Messrs Gold Star Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 others v. National Bank of Pakistan 2008 CLD 1170; Mst. Shahmim Akhtar v. Muhammad Riaz and another 2008 CLD 186; Syed Waseem Hussain v. Pakistan Export Finance Guarantee Limited and 2 others 2008 CLD 756 and Izhar Alam Farooqui, Advocate and another v. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi and others 2008 CLD 149 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1329 of 2008, decision dated: 1st December, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID ALI Z. QAZI, J",
    "": "IFTIKHAR AHMED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMY BANK LTD. through President and 4 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13837",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1852 = 2009 SLD 1852 = 2009 CLD 390",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.196, 212 & 283---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.10---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss. 2(a), 4, 17 & 20---Arbitration agreement on behalf of company signed by a person not authorized through a resolution of Board of Directors---Validity---Such person could not refer dispute to arbitration on behalf of company---Participation of such person in arbitration proceedings would not validate proceedings and award passed therein could not be made rule of Court---Principles. \n \nProvince of West Pakistan (Punjab) through Secretary Irrigation and Power Department and another v. Mian Abdul Hamid & Co. 1985 CLC 1170; Mst. Ghafooran Bi v. Abdul Hafeez and others PLD 1993 Kar. 668; Muhammad Suleman Khawar v. Board of Directors, Sindh Provincial Cooperative Bank Ltd. Karachi and 2 others PLD 1989 Kar. 261; Province of Balochistan v. Tribal Friends Company, Loralai PLD 1986 Quetta 321; Province of Punjab through it's Secretary Communication and Works Department, Lahore v. Messrs M.A. Rashid Saeed Alam Khan PLD 1990 Lah. 25; Muhammad Iqbal v. Riaz Sabir 1984 CLC 2375; A Qutab-ud-Din Khan, v. Ghee Mill Wala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi 2001 MLD 115; Project Director Peoples Programme v. Kh. Muhammad Sarwar 1989 CLC 1030; Messrs International Development Association Limited v. Shaheen Foundation P.A.F. 1986 MLD 1753; Mst. Waqar Bano v. Syed Sher Ali and others 1987 MLD 146; Chief Engineer Building Department v. Pakistan National Constructions 1988 SCMR 723; Haji Ilyas, Haji Esa and 9 others v. Haji Ahmad and 7 others 1987 CLC 2509; Abaid Ullah Khan v. Inayat Ullah Khan 1998 MLD 1718; Messrs James Construction Co. (Pvt.) Limited through Executive Director v. Province of Punjab through Secretary to the Government of Punjab (Communication and Works) Department, Lahore PLD 2002 SC 310; Dr. Khalid Malik and 2 others v. Dr. Farida Malik and 7 others 1994 MLD 2348 and Puppalla Raurupu v. Nagidi Apalaswami AIR 1957 And. Pra. 11 ref.\n \n(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n----Ss. 2(a), 4 & 20---Unsigned arbitration agreement---Validity--Dispute could not be resolved through arbitration on basis of such agreement unless intention of parties to resolve their dispute through arbitration was proved. \n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss.196, 212 & 283---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.10---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss. 2(a), 4 & 20---Execution of arbitration agreement on behalf of company---Scope---Director or General Manager of company or any third person, unless empowered through a resolution of Board of Directors, could not execute such agreement---Principles.\n \nAccording to section 10 of the Contract Act, 1872, an agreement is contract only when it is made by the parties competent to contract. An agreement on behalf of a company has to be signed by a competent/authorized person. Company is an artificial person and it can enter into a contract through its agent, who is appointed according to requirements of Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of the company. Normal mode is through a resolution of Board of Directors of the company. A third party dealing with the agent of company cannot rely upon the apparent authority, but is bound to acquaint himself with memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company. \n \nA Director is an individual and has no power to act on behalf of company. He is one among the body of Directors called Board and alone has no power except the one delegated to him by the Board. General Manager figures nowhere in the affairs of the company. His status is that of an employee and cannot act on behalf of the company. His act binds the company only when his appointment as an agent is made in writing and conferred by the Board of Directors through resolution and under seal. Section 196 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 provides that business of the company is managed by the Board of Directors by means of a resolution passed in the meeting, while section 212 provides that person empowered on behalf of the company to enter into contract has to sign the deed on behalf of the company under his seal.\n \nSection 283 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 envisages that company can refer an existing or existing or future dispute between itself and other person through a written agreement. \n \n(1937) 1 All LR 231 and (1982) 52 Company Cases 293 rel.\n \n(d) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----Ss. 227 & 228---Contract by agent in excess of and beyond his authority would be void. \n \n(e) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n----Ss. 13 & 30---Document, interpretation of---Arbitrator, powers of---Scope---Arbitration could not interpret document in a manner to replace his own view as against express stipulation contained therein.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.284 of 2004, decision dated: 11-11-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH AND HAFIZ TARIQ NASIM, JJ",
    "": "Sh. MUHAMMAD SALEEM\nVs.\nSAADAT ENTERPRISES"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13838",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1853 = 2009 SLD 1853 = 2009 CLD 398",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXXVII, R.2---Suit for recovery of amount---Order for furnishing security to appellant by High Court for decreed amount viz. Rs.25,80,000 which was done by submitting the title deeds of property owned by him together with valuation certificate indicating the value of property as about 40,00,000---Nazir of High Court also submitted the report before the Court informing that value of the property in question ranged between Rs.30,00,000 to Rs.32,00,000---High Court, on the basis of said report of the Nazir of the Court directed that the property offered could not be accepted as security because its value was less than Rs.40,00,000 and consequently directed the appellant to furnish fresh security in the amount of Rs.40,00,000 within one month---Validity---Held, it was totally incomprehensible that when the title documents in respect of the property were admitted to be valued at more than the amount ordered by the Court, how the Court was persuaded to hold that such surety could not be accepted---Valuation certificate furnished by the appellant might have represented an exaggerated value, but the fact remained that the Nazir himself had found the property worth more than the amount directed to be furnished as security---No reason for reviewing the earlier order passed by the High Court had been assigned nor it was shown as to on what basis the figure of Rs.40,00,000 was arrived at---Supreme Court, allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order and directed that the security furnished before the High Court be accepted---Supreme Court, however, observed that greater care was needed to be undertaken by the High Court to help parties in avoiding litigation before the Supreme Court consuming considerable time and expense and causing delay in delivery of justice.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.1712 of 2008, decision dated: 2-12-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMED AND SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY, JJ",
    "": "JAVED PAREKH\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD SAFDAR MALIK-"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13839",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1854 = 2009 SLD 1854 = 2009 CLD 401",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------Ss.4 & 13---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3--- Suit for recovery of amount on basis of Call Deposit Receipts issued by Bank--Application for leave to defend suit---Plea of defendant-Bank was that plaintiff in collusion with its Ex-Manager had stolen such receipts and filled and completed same subsequently; that bank had lodged F.I.R. and filed suit for cancellation of such receipts; and that such receipts were not promissory notes, thus, suit was not maintainable---Validity---Bank had alleged plaintiff to be party to fraud and theft of such receipts---No consideration or payment with regard to such receipts had been made---Lodging of F.I.R. and filing of suit by Bank supported its plea---Fraud alleged by Bank was not merely a bald allegation--Allegation of fraud could not be determined summarily as same would need recording of evidence---When controversy needed its resolution through evidence, then grant of leave would be the right course---Leave application was accepted. \n \nFine Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Elegzender and Company and 2 others PLD 1987 Lah. 290; Messrs Bhera Food Grain Corporation and 9 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank 1987 CLC 1843; Messrs Chaudhri Textile Mills and others v. United Bank Limited 1987 CLC 1957 CLC 1957; Messrs United Bank Limited v. Messrs Okara Trading Company and others 1989 MLD 921; Messrs Bashir Engineering Industries and 3 others v. The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and another 1988 CLC 941; Habib Bank Limited v. Mussarat Ali Khan PLD 1987 Kar. 86; Mian Rafique Saigol and another v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. and another PLD 1996 SC 749; Zohair Akhtar v. Jawad Adil 2006 YLR 1510 and Messrs Ark Industrial Management Ltd. v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited PLD 1991 SC 976 ref.\n \nM. Sarwar Ghani v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 1989 ALD 34 and Abdul Malik K. Lakha through Legal Heirs v. Abdul Karim K. Kara PLD 2004 Kar. 399 rel.\n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----Ss.4 & 13---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, Rr.1 & 2--- Suit for recovery of amount on basis of negotiable instrument---Leave to defend suit, grant of---Scope---Grant of leave to defend suit would be the right course, if defence put up by defendant needed its resolution through evidence---Duty of court explained.\n \nWhile granting leave to defend the suit, the Court is to see that triable issues have been raised and defence put up by the defendant is fair, bona fide and reasonable. While examining so the Court is not to see that the defence put up will succeed at the end of the trial. The Court should act liberally (which does not mean generously) in the matter of granting leave to defend the suit. The facts or the plausible defence, has to be disclosed upon affidavit and appraisal of whole evidence or correctness of averments in affidavit, are not required to be examined with minute details, when the application for leave to defend is under consideration. Leave is refused or it is granted subject to condition when the Court finds the defence is illusory or sham, liability and execution of the negotiable instrument is admitted. When allegation of fraud, forgery or fabrication of negotiable instrument is pleaded, it makes a plausible defence, the applicant/ defendant in such circumstances is granted leave to defend the suit. \n \nWhen the controversy needs its resolution through evidence, then grant of leave to defend the suit is the right course. \n \nFine Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Elegzender and Company and 2 others PLD 1987 Lah. 290; Messrs Bhera Food Grain Corporation and 9 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank 1987 CLC 1843; Messrs Chaudhri Textile Mills and others v. United Bank Limited 1987 CLC 1957 CLC 1957; Messrs United Bank Limited v. Messrs Okara Trading Company and others 1989 MLD 921; Messrs Bashir Engineering Industries and 3 others v. The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and another 1988 CLC 941; Habib Bank Limited v. Mussarat Ali Khan PLD 1987 Kar. 86; Mian Rafique Saigol and another v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. and another PLD 1996 SC 749; Zohair Akhtar v. Jawad Adil 2006 YLR 1510 and Messrs Ark Industrial Management Ltd. v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited PLD 1991 SC 976 ref.\n \nM. Sarwar Ghani v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 1989 ALD 34 and Abdul Malik K. Lakha through Legal Heirs v. Abdul Karim K. Kara PLD 2004 Kar. 399 rel.\n \n(c) Fraud---\n \n----Allegation of---Proof---Such allegation could not be determined summarily as same would need recording of evidence. \n \n(d) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----Ss.4 & 13---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXXVII, R.2---Allied Bank Limited Book of Instructions, Part IV, Cl.35---Suit for recovery of amount on basis of Call Deposit Receipt issued by Bank---Maintainability---Such receipt signed by Branch Manager and an officer of bank contained a promise to pay a certain sum of money on demand to payee only---Such receipt could be issued and delivered to a person not maintaining an account with issuing Bank---Such receipt was a promissory note and negotiable instrument as envisaged in Ss.4 & 13 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 respectively---Such suit was, held, to be maintainable. \n \nA.B.L. Book of Instruction Part-IV, Clause 35 ref.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----Ss. 10 & 151---Stay of subsequent suit or consolidation of former and subsequent suits---Scope---Where nature, procedure and jurisdiction of courts in both suits was distinct, then neither stay of subsequent suit nor consolidation of both suits could be ordered.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.122-C of 2008, heard on 30-09-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "HAFIZ TARIQ NASIM AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "A.B.L. -\nVs.\nKHALID MAHMOOD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13840",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1855 = 2009 SLD 1855 = 2009 CLD 411",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.19(1) & 22---Contention of the appellants was that their application under S.19(1) of the Financial Institutions) Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, along with other applications was disposed of by Banking Court without assigning any reason whatsoever---High Court disposed of the appeal by partially modifying the impugned order to the extent that the application under S.19(1) of the Ordinance read with S.151, C.P.C. moved by the appellants before the Banking Court, shall be heard afresh and be positively disposed of within thirty days from the date of communication of present order of the High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.54 of 2008, decision dated: 26-11-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, C.J. AND GHULAM DASTAGIR A. SHAHANI, J",
    "": "Messrs AAMER ENTERPRISES (PVT.) LTD. and 3 another\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13841",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1856 = 2009 SLD 1856 = 2009 CLD 412",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.10(3)(4)(5)---Application for leave to defend suit---Non-¬complying with mandatory requirements of S.10(3)(4)(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Effect---Such application would become liable to be dismissed under S.10(6) of the Ordinance. \n \nNational Bank of Pakistan through Vice-President, Zonal Chief, Multan v. Effef Industries Limited and 11 others 2002 CLD 1431; Bolan Bank Limited through Attorneys v. Baig Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 6 others 2002 CLD 557; Siddique Woollen Mills and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 1033; Bank of Khyber v. Messrs Spencer Distribution and 14 others 2003 CLD 1406; Zeeshan Energy Ltd. and 2 others v. Faisal Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 1741; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. through Iftikhar-ul-Haq and Khalid Ishaq v. Mohib Fabric Industries Ltd. through Chief Executive 2004 CLD 716 and Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs SABCOS (Pvt.) 21006 CLD 244 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---S.10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIX, R.1---Application for leave to defend suit---Non-filing of resolution of Board of Directors of defendant-company along with leave application---Effect---Lis on behalf of company without such resolution would have no sanctity---Leave application was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nMessrs National Electric Company of Pakistan v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and 2 others 1996 CLC 192; Walton Tobacco Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Azad Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir and others 1993 CLC 66 and Muhammad Umar Mirza v. Wads Iqbal and others 1990 SCMR 964 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.129---Suit for recovery of loan amount--Application for leave to defend suit---Non-denial of such availability of finance facility by principal debtor---Non-¬denial of execution of letter of personal guarantee by defendant---Plea of defendant-guarantor was that rescheduling of finance made after furnishing his guarantee had discharged him of his liability---Validity---Contract of guarantee being an independent agreement created contractual obligations between surety/guarantor and principal creditor independently---Such letter of guarantee covered future transactions, variations, rescheduling and renewal of finance facility---Such guarantee would not discharge defendant-guarantor of his responsibility thereunder---Suit was decreed against guarantor and principal debtor jointly and severally. \n \nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Cargo Despatch Co. Ltd. and 4 others 1987 CLC 1002; Aqal Zaman v. Mst. Azad Bibi and 2 others 2003 CLC 702; S.A. Hameed and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited and others 2004 CLD 1620; Mian Aftab A. Sheikh and 2 others v. Messrs Trust Leasing Corporation Limited and another 2003 CLD 702; PLD 1998 Lah.450; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Usman Textiles and 6 others 2007 CLD 435 ref.\n \nMian Aftab A. Sheikh and 2 others v. Messrs Trust Leasing Corporation Limited and another 2003 CLD 702 rel.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Mark-up claimed from date of expiry of agreement till filing of suit---Validity---Mark-up could be levied legally for period of transaction only i.e. from date of disbursement till expiry of period of agreement---Principles. \n \nMessrs Naeem Associates through Proprietor and 6 others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited through Branch Manager 2004 CLD 1672 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.4 and P.L.A. No.17-B of 2005, decision dated: 19-03-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "H.B.L.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nCRESCENT SOFTWEAR PRODUCTS (PVT.) LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13842",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1857 = 2009 SLD 1857 = 2009 CLD 432",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Suit against Bank by customer---Procedure---Customer and bank both under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, can file suits but procedure specified under Ss.9 (3) and 10 (4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, is in respect to suits which are filed by financial institution and defended by customer---No separate procedure has been provided for customer to file suit---Procedure given in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for filing leave to defend application is for customer but as S.9 (1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, provides that customer can also file a suit against financial institution, therefore, same procedure as applicable to banks, has also to be stretched to the suits filed by customer. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.141---Banking Courts, working of---Civil Procedure Code, 1908, applicability---Almost complete procedure has been provided in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for working of Banking Courts---Wherever specific provisions are not available then by virtue of S.141 C.P.C., the procedure provided in Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is applicable. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Damages, recovery of---Principles---Word \"\"obligation\"\" on non fulfilment of which a suit can be filed, specifically contains word \"\"finance\"\" or any other amount relating to finance or liquidated damages but it does not include general damages on the basis of presumptions or compensatory damages towards mental torture and agony etc. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10---Leave to defend the suit, grant of---Principles---Matter relating to commercial transaction and issue to be decided in speedy way, therefore, specific procedure and system has been provided---Documents executed between parties towards their rights and liabilities are to be produced and followed by money transaction, therefore, they are given weight---Until defendant establishes his case, leave to defend cannot be granted \n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Suit for recovery of general damages---Maintainability---Contrary to summary procedure for finance, a suit for general damages or actual damages needs detailed evidence and issue in that respect cannot be decided only on the basis of documents executed between parties---To prove such type of damages, extraneous evidence to show that claimant has suffered mental torture, agony or damages in respect to loss of reputation is to be brought and supported through different types of evidence with aid and assistance of evidence of other persons having no concern with grant of finance e.g. by experts from medicine and other professions etc.---Standard of evidence required for proving a case under Banking Law, keeping in view documents executed for grant of finance is quite different than quantum of evidence required to prove general damages towards loss of reputation or agony etc.---As far as liquidated damages are concerned and as provided in definition of obligation, such type of damages are different as the same have expressly been stipulated by parties in their contract---In case of breach of contract these are liquidated damages or damages which have been ascertained.\n \nBlack's Law Dictionary ref.\n \n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Rejection of plaint---Recovery of general damages---Scope--Plaintiff filed suit under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for recovery of damages against bank---Validity---Procedure provided under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, could be adopted when there were specific conditions in terms of S.9 (3) and defence under S.10 (4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Issue of damages could not be fixed in any definition nor definition of finance or obligation could be interpreted in a way that it should include general damages---Issue of liquidated damages which could be calculated in terms of agreement could be taken in defence by a customer if a suit was filed by financial institution while that could also be taken if the customer himself wanted to file a suit on the allegation of non fulfilment of obligation---Suit was filed by a limited company and its directors while general damages had been claimed for the company and its directors as well as for legal heirs of some of the directors, which showed that damages had been applied in a remotest way, which were not permitted under the law---Plaint could not be returned to plaintiff as two different causes one relating to Banking Court while another in respect to damages to be entertained by Civil Court---Plaint was rejected in circumstances.\n \nN.B.P. v. Khalid Mahmood 2002 CLD 658; 1998 CLC 1718; Value Gold v. U.B.L. PLD 1999 Kar. 1; 2007 CLD 634; 2003 CLD 1419; 2003 CLD 1843; 2006 CLD 1147; 2006 CLD 167; 1993 SCMR 441; 2003 SCMR 1156; 2003 CLD 1848; 2004 CLD 112; 2007 CLD 457; 2008 CLD 385; 2008 CLD 576; 2006 SCMR 1347; 2000 MLD 850; 2005 CLD 569 (DB) and 2006 CLD 1220 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-20 of 2006, decision dated: 28-11-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "Messrs SHAZIM INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD. and 6 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nMessrs FIRST WOMEN BANK LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13843",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1858 = 2009 SLD 1858 = 2009 CLD 447",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Protection against order for issuance of non-bailable warrants---Suit filed against the petitioner was decreed and and decree passed in the suit having not been challenged by the petitioner, same had attained finality---When execution proceedings for recovery of decretal sum were initiated against the petitioner, he submitted 'application before the Banking Court under S.12(2), C.P.C., which was dismissed---Subsequently, to save himself from the execution of the decree during which order was passed and non-bailable warrants of the petitioner were issued he had filed constitutional petition---Validity---No case for exercise of constitutional jurisdiction was made out in favour of the Petitioner as grant of any relief to him in those proceedings would serve no other purpose, but to perpetuate injustice---Constitutional petition was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-1086 of 2008, decision dated: 31st October, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, C.J. AND KHAWAJA NAVEED AHMED, J",
    "": "SHAKEEL AHMED\nVs.\nBANKING COURT No.II, Karachi High Court and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13844",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1859 = 2009 SLD 1859 = 2009 CLD 448",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.55---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Arrest of ¬-debtor--Conditions--Appeal had arisen from the order passed by the Executing Court, whereby warrant of arrest was issued against -debtor---Mortgaged property was sold and certain amount was recovered and balance amount was to be recovered--Against said outstanding amount -debtor gave an assurance and issued cheques, which could not be honoured---Executing Court passed order of imprisonment of -debtor, who filed appeal against said order, deposited amount with the Nazir of the court and sought his release---Said appeal, however was dismissed for non-prosecution and he filed restoration application, notice of which was issued to the respondents---Counsel for Financial Institution had submitted that the Financial Institution was interested in the recovery of the decretal amount and had no objection, if the appeal was restored and disposed of on merits---In view of statement of the Financial Institution, Court restored the appeal and took up the same for hearing---Held, -debtor could not be ordered to be imprisoned only because he was unable to satisfy the decrees---Order of imprisonment was to be passed only when -debtor became dishonest and concealed his financial resources from which he could satisfy the decree---Out of the balance decretal amount, some amount had been deposited by the -debtor in the court---With regard to the balance amount, with future cost of funds, -debtor would disclose before the Executing Court all his sources of income as well as list of properties which he, his wife or his children owned---All said information would be placed in the shape of an affidavit to be sworn by the -debtor within specified period---Financial Institution would be fully entitled to confirm the genuineness of such affidavit and in case it was subsequently found that Judgment-debtor had concealed his properties or financial resources from which decree could have been satisfied the Executing Court would be free to pass order in term of S.55, C.P.C. and order his arrest.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.55 of 2007, and C.M.As. Nos.1920, 1948 and 2084 of 2008, decision dated: 1st January, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZULLAH M. MEMON AND FAISAL ARAB, JJ",
    "": "Syed AFSAR ALI through AdvocatE\nVs.\nPAKISTAN EXPORT FINANCE GUARANTEE AGENCY LIMITED and another -"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13845",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1860 = 2009 SLD 1860 = 2009 CLD 451",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 2(6), 44 & 44-A---Foreign ---Courses open to decree holder in whose favour foreign has been passed.\n \nSection 2(6) of C.P.C. pertains to a foreign and it refers to decree or order of a foreign Court. Three courses are open to a decree holder in whose favour foreign has been passed. The decree holder can seek execution of the foreign under section 44 or 44-A of C.P.C., where these provisions are applicable. Second available course is filing of the suit on the basis of foreign , treating it to be the cause of action, subject to limitation under Article 117 of the Limitation Act. Thirdly, a suit can be filed in the Court of competent jurisdiction in Pakistan on the basis of original cause. Foreign s can be enforced in Pakistan by filing a suit, in which the cause of action is the foreign Judgment. The Banking Court can entertain a suit in a similar manner. \n \nAl-Attar Sports Dress Trading v. Habib Bank Limited 2005 CLD 1693; Naeemullah Malik v. United Bank Limited 2006 CLD 1592; Habib Bank Limited v. Ali Muhammad 2005 CLD 491; Mian Nazir Ahmad v. Abdur Rashid Qureshi 1986 CLC 1309; Ganguli Engineering Ltd. v. Smt. Sushila Bala Dasi and another AIR 1957 Cal. 103 and Popat Virji v. Damodar Jairam AIR 1934 Bom. 390 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 13---Foreign ---Enforceability of a foreign and being binding in Pakistan---Recognized conditions.\n \nSection 13 of C.P.C. recognizes the enforceability of a foreign in Pakistan provided it fulfils the conditions enumerated therein namely:--\n \n(i) it has been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction;\n \n(ii) it has been given on the merits of the case;\n \n(iii) it is founded on correct view of international law, or does not amount to refusal of recognized applicable law of Pakistan;\n \n(iv) proceedings in which was obtained are not opposed to principles of natural justice;\n \n(v) it has not been obtained through fraud; and\n \n(vi) it does not sustain a claim founded on breach of any law in force in Pakistan.\n \nA foreign , which complies with the above conditions is binding when the matter adjudicated upon was directly adjudicated between the same parties. \n \n(c) Judgment---\n \n----Judgment on merits---Test---Judgment is deemed to be on merits, even in cases where no defence has ever been on the file, yet the court pronounced the on judicial consideration of plaintiff s evidence---When Court, while passing the , has not decided the matter solely due to default in appearance of the defendant, the test to be employed for this purpose is to find out whether the is pronounced as penalty for the conduct of the party or it is based on the consideration of the truth or falsity of the plaintiffs case while the defendant despite opportunity, refrained from contesting the lis. \n \n(d) Judgment---\n \n----Natural justice, principles of---Requirement of providing of opportunity of being heard according to the recognized principles of natural justice---Where the defendants were afforded the opportunity of being heard by the court of first instance but the opportunity was not availed, it was wrong to contend that or order passed without hearing the other side, offended the principles of natural justice---Law required that opportunity be afforded to a party to a Us---If such party, despite such opportunity opts to stay away from the proceedings wilfully, it could not subsequently come forward when an adverse order was passed against it and then challenge such order or on the plea of denial of the right of hearing--Aim of rules of natural justice was to secure justice, which rule was originally based on two principles namely that \"\"no one should be condemned unheard\"\" and that \"\"no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing\"\" and then a third principle/rule emerged that judicial or quasi-judicial forum, must hold enquires in good faith, unbiased and not arbitrary or unreasonably\"\"---Essential point to be kept in consideration to meet the ends of justice would be that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and such measures should be applied that a reasonable man would regard it a fair procedure in particular circumstances and it would be useless to provide further opportunity to a person, who was once provided adequate opportunity and failed to avail the same without any lawful justification---If the court which passed an order or a had acted fairly then it will be considered that there was no breach of principles of natural justice---Proceedings, action or order would not vitiate in such circumstances on the touchstone of principles of natural justice.\n \nChairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Rajmee AIR 1977 SC 965 ref.\n \n(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----Ss. 14 & 13---Foreign , presumption as to---Bench of three Judges of a foreign court of the first instance, headed by the President of the court of commercial plenary jurisdiction, examined the documents, went through pleadings and other relevant record, held the defendants liable for the payment of the suit amount---Court had considered relevant account opening application, trust receipt of debt and copy of the relevant statement of account and then determined the liability of the defendants---Judgment to all intents and purposes, was a on merit---Liability of defendants was directly adjudicated upon; appellate court had also held the defendants only liable for the payment of the suit amount---Certified copies of foreign s along with their translation were available on record---Judgments were presumed to be pronounced by the court of competent jurisdiction within the contemplation of S.14, C.P.C. and defendant had failed to rebut the said presumption---Nothing was available on record to show that foreign , upon which the plaintiff had filed the suit fell within the exception enumerated in S.13, C.P.C.---Judgment was conclusive and binding on the defendants and High Court in Pakistan, while entertaining the claim on the basis of foreign , could not sit in appeal, over findings and conclusions of the fact, recorded by the foreign court. \n \n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 2(6)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.117---Foreign ---Suit on the basis of foreign ---Limitation---Suit on the basis of cause of action upon a foreign is governed by Art.117, Limitation Act, 1908 which provides a period of six years from the date of the foreign . \n \nMalik Matee Ullah for Plaintiff.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.16 of 2001, decision dated: 13-01-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs VIRK HOUSE TRADING COMPANY LTD. --Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13846",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1861 = 2009 SLD 1861 = 2009 CLD 460",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Application for leave to defend suit---Plea of defendants was that mortgage documents regarding suit property were forged as their predecessor was not alive at the time of sanction of loan and execution of documents---Defendants in their separate applications averred three conflicting dates of death of their predecessor---Effect---Date of death of defendants' predecessor being a bona fide question going to the root of the case, could not be resolved without recording of evidence--Applications for leave to defend suit were accepted in circumstances---Principles. \n \n2006 YLR 2477; 2002 YLR 2706; 2002 YLR 2655; 1990 CLC 1443; 1989 SCMR 704; 2003 CLC Lah. 1743; 2002 CLD Lah. 876; 20041 CLD 771 Lah.; 2005 CLD 444; PLD 1988 Kar. 316; 2001 CLC 1551; PLD 1999 Kar. 196; 2001 MLD 1351; 2001 YLR 1549; AIR 1971 Del. 316; PLD 1987 Kar. 518; AIR 1934 Mad. 67 and PLD 1985 SC 1416 ref.\n \n(b) Banker and customer---\n \n----Rescheduling of loan---Effect---Subsequent agreement in absence of mention or reference to previous agreement would not change previous agreement---Loan once rescheduled would carry interest---Mark-up could not be charged upon mark-up in case of recovery of loan under previous agreement---Principle.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C.As. Nos.7, 8, 18 and 22 of 2007, decision dated: 15-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND SYED MEHMOOD ALAM RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "QAMARUZAAMAN KHAN\nVs.\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13847",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1862 = 2009 SLD 1862 = 2009 CLD 507",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 9---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Defendant/ guarantor had died before the filing of the suit for recovery---Application of the plaintiff/Bank seeking permission to implead the legal heirs of the deceased defendant---Validity---Held, any order passed against a dead person being a nullity in law especially when long before the institution of the proceedings against him he had died, application of the plaintiff/ Bank seeking permission to implead the legal heirs of deceased defendant was rightly rejected by the Banking Court. \n \nMehr Muhammad v. Dy. Settlement Commissioner and another 1979 SCMR 182 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIII, R.1(2)(a)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank--Application of Bank seeking permission to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action was rejected by Banking Court---Validity---Expression formal defect\"\"---Connotation---In the present case, it was not in the knowledge of the Bank, at the time of filing, the suit, that defendant/guarantor had died, who had offered his personal guarantee, executed, signed and delivered memorandum of deposit of title deed to the plaintiff/Bank, mortgaged property of a residential house, executed irrevocable power of attorney in favour of Bank---Defendant/guarantor was a necessary party in the suit, and since he had died before filing of the suit, therefore, the suit against him was nullity in the eye of law and his legal heirs could not have been impleaded as party, therefore there was legal and formal defect in the form of the suit---Defect covered in the plaint was bona fide in nature, therefore, refusal to withdraw the suit was likely to lead to multifarious litigation, besides withdrawal did not injure vested rights of opposite party and served ends of Justice---Trial Court, in circumstances, ought to have granted permission to withdraw the suit and file a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter---Constitutional petition of the Bank was allowed by High Court and order of rejection of application to file fresh suit was declared to have been passed without lawful authority and of no legal effect---Application of the Bank to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh suit was accepted accordingly---Principles. \n \nMehr Muhammad v. Dy. Settlement Commissioner and another 1979 SCMR 182; Muhammad Din v. Atta Muhammad and others PLD 1957 (P.W.) Lah. 971; Sardar Muhammad Kazm Ziauddin Durrani and others v. Sardar Muhammad Mom Fakhuruddin Durrani and others 2001 SCMR 148; Atul Krushna Roy v. Raukishore Mahanty and others AIR 1956 Orissa 77 and Aqal Hussain v. Muhammad Sadiq and 7 others 1986 CLC 1316 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1106 of 2004, decision dated: 18-12-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA, J",
    "": "Messrs MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through AttonreY\nVs.\nMessrs NATIONAL SWEET AND CONFECTIONERY WORKS through Proprietor and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13848",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1863 = 2009 SLD 1863 = 2009 CLD 513",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 19 & 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.73 & O.XXXIV, R.13---Sindh Chief Court Rules, R. 337---Karachi Port Trust Act (VI of 1886), S.46---Distinction between S.47 and O.XXXIV, R.13, C.P.C.---Execution of decree---Sale of mortgaged property---Several decree-holders-Application of proceeds---Preferential right of a decree-holder---Principles---Karachi Port Trust being one of the decree-holders whose rights had been protected and safeguarded by virtue of S.46, Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886 and decree being operative in favour of the Trust and the Trust also having been impleaded as party in the execution proceedings in view of R.337, Sindh Chief Court Rules and S. 73, C.P.C. whereas no such protection was available to the other decree holders, as such the Court had rightly given preference to the claim of Karachi Port Trust.\n \nThere is vast difference between section 73 and O.XXXIV, R.13, C.P.C. as by virtue of section 73, C.P.C. it is condition precedent that there must be more than one creditor who are required to file application in writing before the Court for execution of decree for payment of money awarded against the -debtor and in view of fourth condition to clause (c) to section 73, C.P.0 the Court shall have to distribute rateably amongst the decree-holders who, prior to sale of the property, had applied to the Court who passed the decree, for its satisfaction whereas Rule 13 of Order XXXIV, C.P.C. does not speak about the proposition when there are more than one decree-holders, how the mortgage decree is to be executed. Thus the provision of section 73, C.P.C. provides complete code and method for satisfaction of money decree obtained by the different decree-holders to get it satisfied from the mortgage decree passed against the debtor, in other suit after compliance of conditions enumerated in section 73, C.P.C. In the present case admittedly there were more than one decree-holders who possessed money decree in their favour passed in different suits by different courts and the 'court keeping in view the applicability of section 73, C.P.C. proceeded to determine the preferential right of the decree holder amongst several decree-holders and after pondering the relevant law in favour of the various decree-holders opined that Karachi Port Trust, in view of S.46 of Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886 had a preferential right to get the decree in its favour satisfied, being government dues. \n \nSection 46 of the KPT Act, 1886 provides that for all the amount of tolls, dues, rates and charges leviable under this Act in respect of any goods, the Board shall have a lien on such goods, and shall be entitled to seize and detain the same until such tolls, dues, rates and charges are fully paid and for the amount of rent lawfully due on buildings, plinths, stacking areas and other premises, the property of the Board, and not paid after bills therefor have been duly preferred, the Board shall have all lien on all goods, therein or thereon, and shall be entitled to seize and detain the same, and that the lien for such tolls, dues, rates and charges shall have priority over all other liens and claims, except a lien for freight, primage and general average, where such lien has been preserved. Section 46 of Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886 therefore fully protects the right of the KPT including the right of recovery of the land and the outstanding dues of the rent including other claims have been protected by way of statute and creates charge over all the goods or the properties. Admittedly the money decree was operating in favour of the KPT, which being Government dues had created lien and charge over the mortgage decree involved in the present suit, in view of section 46 of the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886 and KPT had been joined as party in execution proceedings. Court had rightly given preference to the claim of the KPT for the reasons that the other decree-holders and the bank had not pointed out any statutory protection in their favour.\n \nIt is also an admitted position that Karachi Port Trust was impleaded as a party on its written application in view of rule 337 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules which speaks about becoming a party in the execution application and admittedly the Bank/decree-holder was never impleaded as party in compliance of the Rule 337 as such the Banks had no preferential right against the right of the KPT and the Court rightly observed that the claim of the KPT had statutory protection in view of section 46 of KPT Act. \n \nThe right of the KPT being statutory had been safeguarded and protected by virtue of section 46 of Karachi Port Trust Act and the decree was also operating in their favour and also they had been impleaded as party in the execution proceedings, whereas no such statutory protection had been enlightened for the decree-holders/Bank nor they were impleaded as party in view of rule 337 of Sindh Chief Court Rules and section 73, C.P.C. as such, the Court had rightly given preference to the claim of KPT and there was no illegality or irregularity in the order. \n \nMessrs United Bank Limited v. Muhammad Majeed alias Abdul Majeed, 1991 CLC 1102; Mst. Shanti v. Karachi Transport Corporation and others 2000 CLC 595 and Mst. Sooban Bibi v. Mst. Khatoon and others PLD 2001 Lah. 245 distinguished.\n \nMessrs Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Maida (Pvt.) Limited 1994 SCMR 2248; Oudh Commercial Bank Ltd. V. Secretary of State AIR 1935 Lah. 319(2); Messrs United Bank Limited v. Muhammad Majeed alias Abdul Majeed, 1991 CLC 1102; Mst. Shanti v. Karachi Transport Corporation and others 2000 CLC 595 and Mst. Sooban Bibi v. Mst. Khatoon and others PLD 2001 Lah. 245 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Special H.C.A. No.272 of 2005, decision dated: 20-01-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED AND ARSHAD NOOR KHAN, JJ",
    "": "UNITED BANK LTD.\nVs.\nMrs. JAMEELA MUMTAZ and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13849",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1864 = 2009 SLD 1864 = 2009 CLD 614",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------SS. 9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan--Application for leave to defend suit---Execution of guarantee---Plaintiff had contended that defendant obtained finance by way of lease through personal guarantee of another defendant---Application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed and suit was decreed---Validity---Contention of defendant was that he had never signed a guarantee in favour of the borrower---Said assertion of defendant had been controverted by the counsel for the plaintiff--Alleged guarantee and indemnity which bore the signatures of the defendant had been admitted by him; however his, case was that such signatures had been obtained from him as a witness---Separate part of said document, was specifically identified due to two signatures of witnesses appearing thereat, while signatures admitted by defendant were on place identified for executant viz. the guarantor---Defendant who was in medical profession, was not an illiterate person---No defence worthy of trial having been put forward, application for leave to defend was rightly dismissed and the Trial Court had rightly decreed the suit---No case for interference and invalidation having been made out, appeal was dismissed by High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.348 of 2008, decision dated: 19-11-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "Dr. GHULAM HUSSAIN\nVs.\nORIX LEASING and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13850",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1865 = 2009 SLD 1865 = 2009 CLD 643",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1980------Ss.305 & 309---Winding up of company, petition for---Closure of operations by the company since long--Auditor's report showing an outstanding amount of Rs.2 million against the company---High Court accepted such petition.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J.M. No.25 of 2007, decision dated: 8-07-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED PIR ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "NAJEEB FIBRES (PVT.) LTD.\nVs.\nTANYA KNITWEAR (PVT.), LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13851",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1866 = 2009 SLD 1866 = 2009 CLD 645",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.10---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185 (3)---Recovery of loan---Leave to defend the suit, denial of---Defendants obtained financial facility under Locally Manufactured Machinery (LMM) Scheme and executed required documents---On the specific request of defendants, showing full satisfaction about quantum and quality of machinery supplied to it, bank disbursed amount to manufacturer---In suit filed by financial institution, Banking Court refused to grant leave to defend the suit and passed decree against defendants---Validity---Defendants could not be allowed to blow hot and cold in the same breath as on one hand they secured machinery and asked financial institution to make payment to supplier and when financial institution demanded outstanding liabilities, defendants opted to deny execution of documents---Defence set up in defendants' application for leave to defend the suit was evasive, improbable and no substantial questions of law or facts were raised therein which was rightly rejected by Banking Court---Supreme Court declined to reverse findings of two courts below which were based on facts of the case and law on the subject---Leave to appeal was refused. \n \nMuhammad Arshad v. Citibank N.A. 2005 CLD 1237; Al-Hadayat Textiles v. State Bank of Pakistan, 2004 CKD 435 and Muhammad Arshad v. Citibank N.A. 2006 CKD 1011 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2592-L of 2004, decision dated: 6-01-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, MUHAMMAD FARRUKH MAHMUD AND SABIHUDDIN AHMED, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ALMADAN COAL COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. and others\nVs.\nREGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION--Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13852",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1867 = 2009 SLD 1867 = 2009 CLD 655",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S.128---Liability of surety was co-extensive with that' of principal debtor. \n \nMessrs Abdul Aziz Ramzan Valli and others v. Habib Bank Limited 2000 SCMR 95 and Messrs Huffaz Seamlen Pipe Industries Ltd. and 2 others v. Messrs Security Leasing Corporation Ltd., 2002 SCMR 1419 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S.9---Suit for recovery of loan amount-Leave to defend suit, application for---Plea of defendant that his signature on reverse page of guarantee was not in his personal capacity, but was as Managing Director for and on behalf of principal borrower company---Validity---Status of defendant's signature was not clear---Determination of such plea would require evidence-- While granting leave to defend suit, legislature had not attached any condition on exercise of discretion of Banking Court provided a serious and bona fide dispute was raised by defendant---Defendant was granted unconditional leave to defend suit. \n \nAgrofoster (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others v. Judge, Banking Court No.5, Karachi, PLD 1999 Kar. 398 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.154 of 1999, decision dated: 10-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND BIN YAMIN, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL GHAFFAR ADAMJEE\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD.\nHabib Bank Limited v. Cargo Dispatch Co. Ltd. and 4 others, 1987 CLC 1002 distinguished."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13853",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1868 = 2009 SLD 1868 = 2009 CLD 737",
    "Key Words:": "Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961)-------S.39---Contract: Act (IX of 1872), S.133---Suit for recovery of loan amount against principal borrower and guarantor---Attachment of property belonging to principal borrower---Bank's letter during pendency of suit addressed to defendants intimating them about approval of package by State Bank for rescheduling loan---Deposit of some amount by guarantor on behalf of principal borrower---Cancellation of such package by Bank on default in payment by defendants---Delivery of possession of attached property to principal borrower by Court with consent of Bank, but without consent of guarantor--Guarantor's application for absolving him from liability as guarantor on ground of variation in original loan agreement had been made without his consent---Validity---Guarantor, after rescheduling of loan had for several times requested principal borrower to clear his part of obligation or furnish other guarantee acceptable to Bank and relieve him from responsibility as guarantor---Guarantor had opposed principal borrower's application for de-sealing of attached property, but on Bank's instructions, its counsel had not opposed such application, over which possession thereof was handed over to principal borrower---Attached property was still in possession of principal borrower despite repeated objections of guarantor---Such conduct of Bank and principal borrower would tantamount to variation of terms and conditions of original loan agreement without consent of guarantor---Guarantor's application was accepted by absolving him from his liability under original loan agreement.\n \nAgriculture Development Bank of Pakistan v. Pak Green Fertilizer Co: Ltd. 2000 MLD 1066; United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Sarhad Ghee Mills Ltd. and others 1999 YLR 323; Messrs Platinum Insurance Co. Ltd. Karachi v. Daewoo Corporation Shaikhupura PLD 1999 SC 1; Mian Aftab A. Shaikh and others v. Trust Leading Corporation Ltd. and another 2003 CLD 702; Dr. M.A. Qadir Khan v. Bank of Bhawalpur Limited and another PLD 1984 Kar. 211 and United Bank Ltd. v. Sarhad Ghee Ltd. and others 1999 YLR 232 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C.A. No.287 of 2007, decision dated: 20-02-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND ARSHAD NOOR KHAN, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nHYDERABAD BEVERAGES COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. and 2 others \nH.C.A. No.287 of 2007, decided on 20th February, 2009.\nDr. M.A. Qadir Khan v. Bank of Bhawalpur Limited and another PLD 1984 Kar. 211 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13854",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1869 = 2009 SLD 1869 = 2009 CLD 746",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.63, 73, O. XXI, Rr.90, 92 & O. XXXIV, R.13---Proceedings for execution of two decrees pending before civil court and Banking Court---Decree of civil court in mortgage suit was prior in time to decree of Banking Court---Mortgaged property attached by civil court was subsequently auctioned by Banking Court--Application by holder of civil decree under Ss.63, 151 & O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. for allowing him rateable share in sale proceeds of mortgaged property---Confirmation of sale by Banking Court in favour of auction-purchaser---Validity---Encumbrancer for protection of his right could apply and be joined in proceedings and could press his claim and claim priority, if any---None of claimants had taken steps or joined proceedings of sale---Inter se priority amongst claimants in appropriation of decretal amount could be claimed either on basis of jaw or contract---Banking Court while passing impugned order had violated provision of S.73, C.P.C. and mandatory provision of O.XXI, R.92 thereof---Banking Court prior to recording satisfaction of its own decree ought to have decided applicant's objection regarding rateable distribution of assets of -debtor-High Court set aside impugned order and remanded case to Banking Court for distribution of sale proceeds amongst applicant and Bank on prorata basis. \n \nTrust Modarba through its Trust Management Services v. Trust Leasing Corporation Limited and others PLD 2005 Lah. 5 and Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Limited, Peshawar Cantt. and others v. Government of Pakistan and others 2002 SCMR 496 ref.\n \nMessrs Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Maida Limited and others 1994 SCMR 2248 and Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Limited, Peshawar Cantt. and others v. Government of Pakistan through Collector Customs, Customs House, Jamrud Road Peshawar and others 2002 SCMR 496 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.93 of 2006, decision dated: 26-03-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND SYED MEHMOOD ALAM RIZVI, JJ",
    "": "BERGER PAINTS PAKISTAN LTD.\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13855",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1870 = 2009 SLD 1870 = 2009 CLD 751",
    "Key Words:": "Arbitration (Protocol Convention) Act (VI of 1937)------Ss.5 & 7---Foreign award---Suspension of proceedings---Scope---Award was announced against plaintiff-company and without filing of any appeal plaintiff sought suspension of enforceability of the award---Validity---Question as to whether arbitrators were justified in issuing direction to plaintiff to make payments to defendants was a question which was open to adjudication before proper forum in appeal---High Court while hearing application under S.5 of Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, could not sit in appeal against award passed by arbitrators in terms of arrangement between the parties -Award had become final, the moment it was pronounced unless the party against whom such award was passed had preferred appeal and got the same set aside-Plaintiff -company did not have any cause of action to invoke jurisdiction of High Court under the provisions of Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937---Suit was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.1722 of 2008, decision dated: 3rd February, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J",
    "": "SUI SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nHABIBULLAH COASTAL POWER COMPANY (PVT.) LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13856",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1871 = 2009 SLD 1871 = 2009 CLD 756",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19---Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S.39---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.52 & O.XXXIV, R.13---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), Ss.48, 50 & 78---Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S.50---Execution proceedings---Mortgage of same property by borrower in favour of Bank 'N' through prior registered deed and then in favour of another Bank by deposit of title deed---Sale of property by Banking Court to satisfy decree of said another Bank, but failure of Official Assignee to deliver possession of property to auction-purchaser for being attached by another court---Application by Bank 'N' for recalling such order of sale for having been obtained by concealment of its prior registered charge on property already attached by another Court in execution of decree---Acceptance of such application by Banking Court with direction to said another Bank to return sale proceeds to Bank 'N'---Validity---Registered mortgage in favour of Bank 'N' was prior in time, while simple mortgage by deposit of title deed in favour of said other Bank was later in time and unregistered---Other Bank's case was not that due to fraud, misrepresentation or gross negligence of Bank 'N' the other Bank had been induced to advance money to -debtor on security of already mortgaged property---Registered mortgage would be a notice to entire world of factum of its registration---Other Bank should have made efforts and exercise due care and diligence before advancing amount to -debtor on strength of property over which Bank 'N' had already a registered mortgage---Registered mortgage, even though later in time, would take priority over an earlier unregistered mortgage---Sale proceeds as per O.XXXIV, R.13, C.P.C., would be applied towards satisfaction of a prior mortgagee's debt before a subsequent mortgage could have any interest therein---Other Bank, despite having full knowledge about property being in custody of another Court on basis of attachment, had approached Banking Court for its sale and started inviting purchase offers on its own---Only Banking Court could determine question of priority of interest as between both the Banks and NBP---Such order of sale was not only illegal, but also without jurisdiction---Supreme Court upheld impugned in circumstances. \n \n(b) Registration Act (XVI of 1908)---\n \n----S.50---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.58---Mortgage---Registered mortgage would be a notice to entire world of factum of its registration.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No.88-K of 2009, decision dated: 23rd February, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SABIHUDDIN AHMAD AND SARMAD, JALAL OSMANY, JJ",
    "": "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nMUHAMNIAD AYUB STONE CRUSHERS and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13857",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1872 = 2009 SLD 1872 = 2009 CLD 812",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9, 12 & 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Suit for recovery of loan---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Application for---Suit filed by the plaintiff-Bank against defendant having been decreed ex parte, the defendant had filed application for setting aside such ex parte decree against him which application was accompanied by application under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Said application had been dismissed in absence of the defendant---Validity--Application could not have been decided on the grounds stated in the order without hearing the defendant or his counsel, whose absence had been explained in the affidavit of the counsel filed with the appeal---Impugned order was set aside with, the result that application would be deemed to be pending and would be decided by the Judge Banking Court after hearing the parties.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.295 of 2007, heard on 25-02-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Assistant Vice President/Chief Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13858",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1873 = 2009 SLD 1873 = 2009 CLD 844",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -------Ss.7 & 9---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Petitioner had assailed the alleged seizure of vehicle on account of non-payment of instalment against the financial facility provided to him by the Bank---Suit for recovery of the due amount had been filed by the Bank against the petitioner before the Banking Court; and during pendency of proceedings of said suit alleged act was said to have been committed---Proper forum for the petitioner, in circumstances, would be to approach Banking Court, same being the first available forum---Constitutional petition was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-827 of 2008, decision dated: 29-05-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. YASMIN ABBASEY AND DR. RANA M. SHAMIM, JJ",
    "": "Messrs CHILTAN TRANSPORT COMPANY through ProprietoR\nVs.\nMessrs ORIX LEASING PAKISTAN LTD. through Manager and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13859",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1874 = 2009 SLD 1874 = 2009 CLD 845",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banker and customer-------Running finance facility---Charging of mark-up---Procedure---Mark-up in running finance facility is a revolving credit which renews until exhaustion of amount of credit and customer has the facility to draw it again when limit is reached---Credit is automatically reinstated after each drawing within the limit and limit is renewable credit until it's full utilization. \n \n(b) Banker and customer---\n \n----Revolving credit---Meaning---Revolving credit is system where someone can borrow money at any time up to agreed amount and continue to borrow while still paying off the original loan. \n \nDictionary of Banking and Finance by P.H.Collin rel.\n \n(c) Banker and customer---\n \n----Revolving credit account---Meaning---Loan allows customer to pay less than total amount due every month and whatever balance is carried forward into following month is subject to agreed upon finance charge---No typical charge for line of credit when it is not in use.\n \nDictionary of Banking by Jaffrey L. Seglin and Dictionary of Banking by F E Perry and G. Klein rel.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 22---Recovery of bank loan---Running finance facility---Actual amount---Determination---Grievance of bank was that Banking Court erroneously determined principal amount and mark-up in the decree passed against defendants---Validity---When loan in shape of running finance was sanctioned up to a limit, customer could withdraw amounts according to his own choice and there was no charge amount---Frequent transactions had taken place in such accounts as to payments and withdrawals, therefore, mark-up on such transactions was leviable on daily product basis---Banking Court had fallen into error in working out liability of defendants on the basis of buy back price ignoring recognized mode of financing and levy of mark-up on such transaction---Judgment. and decree passed by Banking Court ignoring recognized mode of charging of mark-up on running finance and decreeing the suit on tine basis of buy back price without determining actual amount disbursed was not legally sustainable and was set aside---High Court remanded the case to Banking Court for decision afresh after determining actual amount disbursed by applying mark-up on daily product basis---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F. A. No.141 of 2003, heard on 3rd December, 2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH AND ALI AKBAR QURESHI, JJ",
    "": "IIABIB BANK LTD.\nVs.\nMessrs DOABA CORPORATION through Proprietor and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13860",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1875 = 2009 SLD 1875 = 2009 CLD 849",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.12---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Plea of defendant was that he had left his city residence address on which was available with Bank; that he was not served with summons at his village residence; that none of the newspapers in English and Urdu were being delivered at his village; that bailiff in his report stated on oath that he had gone to city address given by Bank, where he could not find defendant as some one else was residing there---Validity---Bailiff in his report had specifically stated that no person of name of defendant was residing at address given by Bank---Bank had not challenged defendant's statement on oath regarding non-delivery of such newspapers at his village-Bank had not examined any person from Newspaper Agency to state that such newspapers did reach or were being delivered at defendant's village---Court had not received acknowledgement due receipt of registered post---Defendant could not be presumed to have been duly served with summons in case of non-delivery of newspapers at his village or non-receipt thereof by him at his residence in village---Parties should be given due opportunity to defend lis and put up their case before court and decree be passed on merits---If claim of Bank was genuine and based on valid documents, then they would ultimately be entitled to decree even if defendant was given chance to apply for leave to defend suit---Ex parte decree was set aside in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos.1 39-K and 273-K of 2006, decision dated: 4-01-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA BHAGWANDAS, ACJ, SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD AND HAMID ALI MIRZA, JJ",
    "": "MUBARAK ALI\nVs.\nFIRST PRUDENTIAL MODARABA---Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13861",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1876 = 2009 SLD 1876 = 2009 CLD 856",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891)---Preamble---Recovery of bank loan---Granting of leave to appear in suit---Scope---Provisions of S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, are mandatory---Two separate duties are cast upon plaintiff in suit filed under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, firstly to slate in plaint the finance availed and amount paid back and balance amount outstanding---Plaint must be supported by statement of accounts which, in case of financial institution, must be duly certified under Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891---Such statement of accounts should not only show each individual transaction separately whereby any amount was availed (or otherwise debited) or paid back (or otherwise credited) but also such statement of accounts must support claim in plaint---Each and every entry credit or debit must be satisfactorily identified not only as to its date but also its mode and manner---Such identification must be sufficient to make statement of accounts comprehensive to any reasonable person reading the same---In order to satisfy minimum requirements of S.9(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and to avoid rejection of plaint, statement of accounts appended. therewith must specifically identify amounts advanced or paid to customer or any sum' expended or incurred for or on his behalf as debit entry along with all payments received from customer or on his behalf as a separate credit entries with final balance---Deficiency, if any, in due identification of individual entries may give rise to triable issue subject to a bona fide dispute raised by defendants in respect thereof.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10(4)(6)---Leave to defend---Non-compliance of provisions of S.10(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Effect---No penal consequences come into effect if sufficient cause for non-compliance is disclosed in petition for leave to appear, as has been stated in S.10(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. \n \nBank of Khyber v. Spencer Distribution Ltd. and others 2002 CLD 1406; Allied bank of Pakistan v. Mohib Fabrics Industries Ltd. 2004 CLD 716 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9(1)---Suit for recovery of bank loan--Authority to file-suit----In view of S.9(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, plaint signed by manager of the branch of financial institution is valid in law. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend the suit--Failure to disclose any triable issue---Petition for leave to appear neither fulfilled mandatory requirements of S.10(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, nor triable issue or plausible defence was made out by or on behalf of any of the defendants---Effect---High Court dismissed petition for leave to appear and bank was found entitled to amount of principal plus profit minus payments made by defendants---Suit was decreed accordingly. \n \nBankers Equity Ltd. v. Bentonite Pakistan Ltd. 2003 CLD 931; C.M. Textile Mills Ltd. v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587; United Dairy Farms (Pvt.) Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 569; Habib-ur-Rehman v. Judge Banking Court No.IV, Lahore 2006 CLD 217; F.F.A. No.24 of 2007 Peco International v. Allied Bank Ltd.; United Bank Ltd. v. Ch. Ghulam Hussain 1998 CLC 816; Muhammad Mujtaba and 5 others v. The Bank of Punjab 2004 CLD 712; Nusrat Textile Mills Ltd. and 8 others v. United Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 1421; AIR 1928 PC 80; Mst. Irshad Bibi v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and 3 others 2003 CLD 46; United Leather Exports and 4 others v. National Bank of Pakistan 2005 CLD 1391; Barkhurdar v. Muhammad Razzaq and others PLD 1989 SC 749; 996 MLD 1819; 1996 CLC 202; 1992 CLC 2524; 1996 MLD 1040; 1971 SCMR 432; 2007 CLD 1205; AIR 1981 Mad. 180; 2002 CLD 509; PLD 1984 Kar. 21; PLD 1968 SC 83; 1998 ALD 91(2); AIR 1963 SC 746; AIR 1929 Lah. 203; AIR 1931 Oudh 426; 2005 CLC 731; 2006 SCMR 437; 2000 SCMR 472; 2004 CLD 1356; PLD 1999 Kar. 260; 2006 CLD 217; 1997 .SCMR 943; 2004 CLD 1338: Textile Management (Pvt.) Ltd. v. N.I.T. 2002 CLD 276; PLD 2000 Kar. 246; Messrs State Engineering Corporation Ltd., Islamabad through Manager (Personnel) S.M. Akram Farhat 2004 CLD 1344; Deputy Custodian of Enemy Property v. KESC 1986 CLC 2808; H.B. Ltd. v. Karim Cotton Mills 1998 CLC 1403; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Orient Rice Mills Ltd. 2004 CLD 1289: NBP v. EFFEF Industries Ltd. 2002 CLD 1431; Bolan Bank Ltd. v. Baig Textile Mills Ltd. and others 2002 CLD 557; Saudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company Ltd. v. Mohib Textile Mills Ltd. and others 2002 CLD 1170; Zeeshan Energy Limited v. Faysal Bank Limited 2004 CLD 1741; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Sabcos (Pvt.) Ltd. 2006 CLD 244 and A. Sheikh and two others v. Messrs Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. and others 2003 CLD 702 ref.\n \nSyed Ali Zafar for Plaintiff.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.15 of 2006, decision dated: 4-02-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED, J",
    "": "FAYSAL BANK LIMI„¢TED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nGENERTECH PAKISTAN LTD. and 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13862",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1877 = 2009 SLD 1877 = 2009 CLD 899",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.9---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Availing financial facility from the Bank---Default in payment of outstanding dues---Financial facilities granted by Bank were utilized by all the petitioners, but huge amounts were outstanding against them, which amounts, despite lapse of time, were not adjusted-Petitioners who were defaulters and failed to pay outstanding dues of various kinds of facilities/loans provided by the Bank to them, were attempting to avoid their liabilities---If there was any dispute in respect of charging of mark-up or interest over and above the agreement entered between the parties, petitioners' remedy lay before the Banking Court; and/or if there was any malpractice or any violation of Banking Laws, Rules, Regulations or guidelines or perverse, arbitrary or discriminatory actions by the Bank/ financial institutions, the efficacious remedy was available to the petitioners before the Banking Mohtasib appointed under S.82 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, who had jurisdiction to look into the complaint of aggrieved person---Constitutional petition was not an efficacious remedy---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court was an equitable remedy provided in aid of justice and not in aid of injustice---Petitioners, who were defaulters, could not invoke constitutional jurisdiction to avoid their outstanding liabilities---Litigation in High Court was not only time consuming process, but also had adverse effect on business environment---Constitutional petition was dismissed being not maintainable.\n \nAbdul Salam Memon, Muhammad Awais Bughio, Ms. Abida Parveen Channa, Syed Nasir Abbas Rizvi, Muhammad Iqbal Bhatti, Munir-ur-Rehman, Ms. Samia Durrani holding brief for S. Tariq Hassan, Agha Zafar Ahmed, Kamran Shahzad Siddiqui, Ms. Kiran Ahmed, Mirza Sarfraz Ahmad and Ms. Fatima Jatoi for Petitioners.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.Ps. Nos.D-735, D-779, D-707, D-807, D-997, D-999, D-1131, D-1137, D-1180, D-1203, D-1206, D-1232, D-998, D-1207, D-1208, D-1215 and D-1667 of 2008, decision dated: 18-12-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHIJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND DR. QAMARUDDIN BOHRA, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD MOIN\nVs.\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13863",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1878 = 2009 SLD 1878 = 2009 CLD 922",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S. 15---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.59---State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29, dated 15-10-2002---Execution of decree--Initially, a consent decree for specified amount was passed by High Court in favour of the Bank; -debtors failed to discharge their full liability in terms of such consent decree; process of execution was initiated by the decree-holder for the satisfaction of the remaining decree, but during the pendency thereof, the matter was referred to and settled by the Resolution Committee of the State Bank of Pakistan; in view of the decision of the Committee, a compromise was again entered into between the parties, which when filed in the court, was approved and the execution application was disposed of conferring right upon the decree-holder to have its revival in case of failure of the -debtors to fulfil their obligations under the agreement; as the agreement was not fulfilled therefore, execution application had been revived---Contention of the -debtor was that decree to the extent of interest was void and nullity in the eyes of law and was inexecutable---Validity---Held, -debtors, on the basis of the decision of the State Bank's Resolution Committee, out of their free consent, had entered into an agreement and to make the payments strictly in terms thereof and in case of default to discharge the decree---Judgment-debtors had failed to adhere to the said agreement and in such a situation consent decree revived and it was thus, their legal obligation to make the payments in accordance therewith.---Bank had placed on record the statement of accounts, which showed that the mark-up had been calculated as per day default; -debtors had not established, if the calculations were erroneous, unauthorized or illegal or were against the consent decree, which now should be executed because of -debtors' own default in performance of their duty under the agreement---Only for the reason that certain amounts of mark-up even holding/considering it to be an interest was a part of the consent decree, which was in pursuance of the agreement between the parties, and had not been challenged by them before any forum, would not render the decree as nullity and inexecutable and without prejudice to any one's case, such decree, at the best, may be termed as an illegal decree but not void and that an Executing Court could not go behind a decree---Section 15 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, under which the decree was passed, the court had the jurisdiction to award interest/mark¬up---Judgment-debtors were liable to satisfy the decree in toto and whatever amount was paid by them had been accordingly adjusted considering each of the instalments due in the decree as the principal amount, therefore, S.59, Contract Act, 1872 had no relevance to the proposition involved in the present case. \n \nHabib Bank v. Messrs Qayyum Spinning Ltd. 2001 MLD 1351; Agriculture Development Bank of Pakistan v. Mubarak Dairies Limited and others 2008 CLD 738; Mubarak Dairies Limited and others v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2001 CLC 1096; Happy Family Associates v. Messrs Pakistan International Trading Co. PLD 2005 Lah. 621; Soneri Bank Ltd. through Duly Authorized Attorneys v. Idrees Ahmad Siddiqi and another 2005 CLD 1003 and Precision Engineering Ltd. and others v. the Grays Leasing Ltd. PLD 2000 Lah. 290 ref.\n \nHabib Bank v. Messrs Qayyum Spinning Ltd. 2002 MLD 1351 distinguished.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S. 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.83---Execution of decree-Postponement of sale to enable -debtors to raise amount of decree-Where such request of the -debtors lacked bona fides as various attempts had been made by the court to sell the property but all those failed and never ever before -debtors had come forward to make any such request, if the -debtors, were allowed the alienation by mortgage or lease or private sale, same shall further complicate the matter---Such request of the -debtors, in circumstances, seemed to be an abortive attempt to seek further postponement of the execution of decree and nothing else---Judgment-debtors, therefore, were not entitled to any relief under O.XXI, R.83, C.P.C.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ex. A. No.18-B of 2002 in C.O.S. No.69-B of 2000 and C.M. No.190-B of 2009, decision dated: 2-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. Through VP, SAMG--Applicant\nVs.\nMessrs HIRRA FAROOQ LTD. and 7 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13864",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1879 = 2009 SLD 1879 = 2009 CLD 995",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)------S.22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, R.8 &, Sched.---Execution of wash trades---Imposition of penalty---Client of the company bought and sold shares of two other companies in such a way that his orders for buying and selling matched with each other and did not result in any change in its beneficial ownership---Company had stated that execution of orders was made due to misunderstanding between KATS operator and its client and due to said transactions a warning letter had been issued to KATS operator---Said statement did not adequately explain the position of the company---Company had executed the wash trades on its client's behalf without due care and diligence violating the Code of Conduct laid down under the Third Schedule of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules. 2001, which in turn, was a violation of Brokers Rules---Principally, the company was responsible for each and every trade executed--Company was responsible to put proper system and controls in place to ensure that each order placed trough its terminal did not violate any applicable rules and regulations and instructions issued by the Commission from time to lime---Company had been established to have executed wash trades in its client's account---Company by executing the trades in question had violated clauses A2 and A5 of the Code of Conduct contained in the Third Schedule of the Brokers Rules, which in turn was a violation of Brokers Rules, 2001---Violation of the Brokers Rules, 2001 was a serious matter which would entitle the Commission to suspend the registration of the company; however, taking lenient view, fine of Rs.50,000 was imposed on the company tinder S.22 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.1(01)/Wash/KSE/MSW/SMD/2009/05 dated 20-02-2009, decision dated: 3rd April, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR (SECURITIES MARKET DIVISION)",
    "": "N.U.A. SECURITIES (PVT.) LTD.: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13865",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1880 = 2009 SLD 1880 = 2009 CLD 999",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.305 & 309---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.99, 173(3) Sr. 174---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXVII, Rr. 1 & 2 Winding up of company, petition for---Inability of company to pay amount of award passed by International Court of Arbitration in favour of Ministry of Water and Power, Government of Pakistan---Filing of such petition by Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Ministry of Water and Power through Managing Director of the Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB), but without signatures of President of Pakistan or his authorized agent---Validity---Islamic Republic of Pakistan in capacity of creditor had filed such petition, for which reference or permission from President of Pakistan was not necessary---Under Art.174 of the Constitution, Federation may sue or be sued by name of Pakistan---Signing of proceedings by President himself or his authorized agent was not required by Arts.173(3) & 174 of the Constitution---Private Power and Infrastructure Board being attached with Ministry of Water and Power and having such award in its favour, had rightly filed such petition as creditor on behalf of Pakistan through Managing Director of Private Power and Infrastructure Board---According to Art.99 of the Constitution, all executive actions including contracts made on behalf of Federal Government would be made in the name of President---Specific authorization from President of Pakistan for filing such petition was not required---Objection as to maintainability of such petition was overruled in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J. M No.25 of 2005, decision dated: 8-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN\nVs.\nMessrs SABAH SHIPYARD (PAKISTAN) LTD. and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13866",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1881 = 2009 SLD 1881 = 2009 CLD 1005",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)------S.2---Registration of trade mark---Terms \"\"likely to deceive\"\" and \"\"cause confusion\"\"---Applicability---Infringement of trade mark---Term \"\"likely to deceive\"\" is wide enough to negate that absolute proof is needed to make out a case of infringement of trademark---Plaintiff can establish case of infringement of trade mark, by providing that trade mark has caused confusion or it resembles so nearly with registered trademark that there is likelihood of its deception, without calling witness in witness box, who was so deceived. \n \nMessrs Burney's Industrial and Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Messrs Rehman Match Works PLD 1983 Kar. 357 and Lever v. Goodwin (1887) 36 Ch. D. 1 rel.\n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)---\n \n----Ss.21, 43 & 74-Infringement of trade mark---Recovery of damages---Similarity in design and colour scheme---Plaintiff alleged that trade mark being used by defendant was similar to his mark and the same was causing deception in the minds of plaintiff's buyers---Validity---Defendant. dishonestly followed same pattern and used same colour scheme, opting to make his label identical and similar to that of plaintiff; though both labels were worded different---Label of plaintiff comprised of word \"\"improved\"\" while defendant's label carried word \"\"two camels\"\"-Addresses mentioned in both labels were different but lower portions of both labels were similarly worded---Both labels were comprised of three parts and their colour scheming and size created element of deception---Deception became more conspicuous when label was affixed by defendant at handle of shovel, which was round in shape---If infringing label was fixed at top of handle one of the two camels would become invisible and had given impression of one camel instead of two camels--Unwary purchaser in such case was whether a farmer or a labourer or an illiterate person, as the tool was meant for that class of users, could not distinguish the label by English words used thereon---Such aspect could not be ignored that illiterate purchasers normally purchase product by device or getup Claim of plaintiff for damages was permissible only when damages claimed were asserted in suit under each head separately and proved through cogent evidence --Plaintiff failed to prove damages and his claim was rightly declined by trial Court---High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction partially decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff and restrained defendant from infringing plaintiffs registered trade mark but rejected the claim of damages--Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \nBashir Ahmad v. Registered Firm Hafiz Habibur Rehman and another 1980 CLC 1268; Austin Nichols and Co. v. The Assistant Registrar of \"\"Trade Marks, Karachi PLD 1993 Kar. 129; Messrs K.S. Sulemanji Esmailji and Sons v. Messrs M. Sulemanji and Company Ltd. 1986 CLC 775; Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt. Sharma v. Navaralna Pharmaceutical Laboratories AIR 1965 SC 980; Jamia Industries Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Pak) Ltd. and another PLD 1984 SC 8; National Match Works, Sivakasi, v. S.T. Karuppanna Nadar (died) and others AIR 1979 Madras 1957; Formica Corporation v. Pakistan Formica Ltd.\"\" 1989 SCMR 361; Insaf Soap Factory v. Lever Brothers Port Sunlight Ltd.\"\" PLD 1959 (W.P.) Lah. 381; Bandenawaz Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Karachi and another PLD 1967 Kar. 492 and The Welcome Foundation Limited v. Messrs Karachi Chemical Industries (Private) Limited 2000 YLR 1376 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.108 of 2000, decision dated: 30-03-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "Messrs NATIONAL TOOLS INDUSTRIES (REGD.) through Managing Partner\nVs.\nMessrs AZHAR ENTERPRISES through Proprietor"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13867",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1882 = 2009 SLD 1882 = 2009 CLD 1013",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)------S. 11---Res judicata---Declaration given by Court in respect of issues, which were decided---Validity---Orders of Court must he respected---Such declaration was res judicata. \n \nPir Baksh v. Chairman, Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145 rel.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)----\n \n----Art.199---Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Registration and Control) Ordinance (XLVI of 1961), S. 4---Constitutional petition--Supersession of Governing Body of Association through Notification of Provincial Government---Order of High Court disposing of constitutional petition after setting aside such notification with directions to its Nazir to prepare voters list and conduct of election---Entertainment of interlocutory applications by High Court after passing such order---Objection of petitioner that such order had rendered such applications to be infrucutuous---Validity---Judges having disposed of constitutional petition were not available---Such application had been entertained by Judges other than those having authored such order---Directions contained in such order to hold elections were yet to be brought to their logic end---Such objection was overruled in circumstances. \n \nCapital Development Authority v. Khuda Baksh 1994 SCMR 771 and Abbas Khaleeli v. Saifuddin PLD 1969 Kar. 692 ref.\n \nCapital Development Authority v. Khuda Buksh 1994 SCMR 771 rel.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art.199---Election dispute---Quo warranto, writ of---Scope---person not being a losing candidate, could challenge election by way of such writ. \n \nMuhammad Afsar Khan v. Muhammad Amin Khan Tareen PLD 1983 Pesh 234 ref.\n \nAbdul Wahid v. Din Muhammad PLD 1982 Lah. 168 rel.\n \n(d) Election---\n \n---Election could not be annulled or vitiated in absence of violation of electoral rules/law materially affecting electoral results. \n \nBehram Khan v. Abdul Hameed Khan Achakzai PLD 1990 SC 352 rel.\n \n(e) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art.199---Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Registration and Control) Ordinance (XLVI of 1961), S.4---Constitutional petition---Supersession of Governing Body of Association through Notification of Provincial Government---Setting aside of such notification by High Court with directions to its Nazir to prepare voters list, notify date of election and conduct of election---Entertainment of fresh voters by Court vide order, dated 12-12-2006 after conduct of election on 10-12-2006---Application for setting aside such election on the ground that Nazir had not given in press any public notice for holding of election and inviting interested persons to approach him with evidence of membership---Validity---Preparation of voters list and conduct of elections had been pursued without issuing proper notices in press to all concerned---Record showed that under Court's order, dated 12-12-2006, new voters approached Nazir, who allowed them to become a party to Electoral College---Some 113 members through interlocutory applications had also shown prima facie evidence in terms of membership cards of the Association--If claim of such new voters was entertained and found genuine, then same would not materially affect result of such election---Eligible voters had been disenfranchised without a proper opportunity due to non-issuance of such public notice by Nazir---Entire process of election was violative of natural justice and against welfare of the concerned community---High Court declared such election and voters list prepared by Nazir to be void ab initio for being against concept of due process of law and in breach of natural justice. \n \nGhulam Ghous v. Muhammad Refique Khan PLD 1982 Karachi 872, Hakim Ali v. Deputy Commissioner/Election Tribunal PLD 1982 SC 172; Khushi Muhammad v. Kabir Ahmed PLD 1983 Lah. 250; Behram Khan v. Abdul Hameed Khan Achakzai PLD 1990 SC 352; Mauzam Hanif v. Settlement Officer 2006 SCMR 642; Abbas Khaleeli v. Saifuddin PLD 1969 Kar. 692; Maulana Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 1964 SC 673 and Amina Begum v. Ghulam Dastagir PLD 1978 SC 220 ref.\n \nAhab Shahan Mirani v. President of Pakistan 1998 SCMR 1863 rel.\n \nM. Aqil Awan and M.M. Tariq for Petitioner.\n \nM. Sarwar Khan, Addl. Advocate General, Sindh and Nafis Usmani, A.A.G. along with Muhammad Yousaf Channa, Assistant Social Welfare Department for Respondents Nos.1 and 2.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P. No. D-330 of 2005, C.M.As. Nos. 5573, 5995 of 2005, 697, 868, 1525, 2730, 6893, 8102, 8819, 8880, 8912, 8880, 8912 of 2006, 342, 343, 453, 1296, 7395 of 2007, 70, 71, 1253, 2708, 2709, 5325, of 2008 decided on 30-01-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZULLAH M. MAMON AND KHALID ALI Z. QAZI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs YOUNG MEN„¢S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION (YMCA) through President\nVs.\nGOVERNMENT OF SINDH through Secretary Social Welfare and Women Development Department Karachi High Court and 3 others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13868",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1883 = 2009 SLD 1883 = 2009 CLD 1028",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-------Ss.73(4), 80(4) & 96(1)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.10---Application for revocation of registration of defendant's trade mark and rectification of register, and suit for infringement, passing of, permanent injunction and damages in respect of loss caused to plaintiff due to use of disputed trade mark by defendant---Proceedings initiated by defendant concerning disputed trade mark before District Judge at place \"\"P\"\" prior to filing of such suit/J M by plaintiff before High Court at place \"\"K\"\"---Application by defendant for slay of plaintiffs suit/J M at place \"\"K\"\"-- Validity---Under Ss.73(4), 80(4) & 96(1) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, legislature, with a view to avoid conflict of decision and expedite proceedings concerning disputed trade mark, required parties to file all proceedings in one Court Requirement under Ss.73(4) & 80(4) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 was only pendency of proceedings prior in time concerning disputed trade mark in a Court, where proceedings for revocation or rectification of disputed trade mark could be filed-Provision of S. 10, C.P.C., would not attract to facts of present case--High Court returned Judicial Miscellaneous Application and plaint in such suit to plaintiff for presenting same to Court at place \"\"P\"\" where proceedings prior in time concerning disputed trade mark teas pending---Principles.\n \nDabur India Ltd. v. 1lilal Confectionary (Pvt.) Ltd., PLD 2000 Kar. 139(c); United Distribution Pakistan Ltd. v. Al-Syed Agro Chemicals Services and others 2005 CLC 1659; Dr. Haider Ali Mithani and others v. Ishrat Swatch and others PI,D 1999 Kar. 81; Abdul Ghani and another v. Province of Baluchistan and 2 others PLD 1982 Quetta 63; Thettayil Peter Joseph v. Thettayil Varghese Augustine and another 1991 (2) Arb. LR 286 (Madras); Vikas Manufacturing Co. v. Bharaj Manufacturing Co., Civil 1981 PTD 87 (P&H) and Burma Eastern Ltd. v. Burma Eastern Employees United and others PLD 1967 Deca 190 ref.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n---Right or liability created by a statute must be enforced by availing remedy provided therein. \n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n---S.10---Stay of subsequent suit---Conditions stated.\n \nTo attract provisions of section 10, C.P.C. party has to establish that matters in both suits are directly and substantially the same, and that previously instituted suit between the same parties is pending in a Court competent to grant relief.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C.As. Nos.404 of 2008 and 11 of 2009, decision dated: 10-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND ARSHAD NOOR KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs H&B, GENERAL TRADING COMPANY through Director\nVs.\nMessrs INTERNATIONAL MARKETING COMPANY through Proprietor and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13869",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1884 = 2009 SLD 1884 = 2009 CLD 1038",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Registration Act (XVI of 1908)-------Ss. 47 & 49---Time from which registered document operates---Effect: of S.47 conjectively read with S. 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, means that a document which is compulsorily registerable, does not affect any it immovable properly comprised therein till it has been registered; it takes effect not from the dale of registration but retrospectively from the date of execution. \n \nAIR 1924 Cal. 600; AIR 1926 All. 549; AIR 1938 All. 431 and AIR 1936 Bom. 94 ref.\n \n(b) Registration Act (XVI of 1908)---\n \n----S. 47---Time from which registered document operates---Once the fact of the execution of the document on a particular date is established and/or is not disputed/controverted or disproved by a third party, provision of S.47, Registration Act, 1908 shall squarely attract and apply to the rights of such party as well. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 23(2)---Restriction on transfer of assets and properties-Scope---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance. 2001 had no retrospective effect---Where the sale-deed in the matter was executed on 28-3-2001, the decree in the suit had been passed on 26-6-2001, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance, 2001, which was enforced on 30-8-2001 shall not cover or affect any transaction, which had been accomplished before its enforcement-Principles.\n \nSection 23(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was enforced on 3011r of August, 2001, whereas the sale-deed in the matter was executed on 28-3-2001, the decree in the suit had been passed on 26-6-2001. The Ordinance has no retrospective effect at all and shall not cover or affect any transaction, which has been accomplished before its enforcement. Besides, the provisions of section 23 of the Ordinance cater for two situations; subsection (1) relates to the properties/assets which are under the charge/ lien, -etc.; the alienation, etc. of any such property by the customer after the publication of notice under section 9(5) of the Ordinance is void; while under subsection (2), the -debtor is prohibited to transfer, etc. any of his other properties, which are not under the charge without the prior permission of the Banking Judge after the pronouncement of the decree by the Banking Court including an interim decree and if the transaction is so made, it shall be void. The expression \"\"after pronouncement of the and decree by the Banking Court including an interim decree under section 11\"\" undoubtedly means the and decree passed under the Ordinance, 2001 and not the and decree, which has been passed under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, or any other repealed law on the subject.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No. 107 of 2004, decision dated: 8-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND ALI AKBAR QURESHI, JJ",
    "": "Sheikh MUHAMMAD KHALID\nVs.\nMessrs MALIK FOOD INDUSTRIES through Sole Proprietor and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13870",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1885 = 2009 SLD 1885 = 2009 CLD 1043",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.152, 290, 305 & 306---Winding up of company, petition for---Petitioner's plea was that respondents had fraudulently transferred his shares in their names; and that respondents were conducting affairs of company in a manner oppressive to petitioner being minority shareholder---Validity---Against fraudulent transfer of his shares, remedy available to petitioner was to apply to Court for rectification of register, but not by way of filing such petition--Only members or creditors having interests equivalent to at least 20% of paid-up capital of company could file such petition on the ground that affairs of company were being conducted in a manner oppressive to them---Petitioner on date of filing such petition was not member of company according to record of Security and Exchange Commission---high Court dismissed such petition for being not competent. \n \nAeroflot Russin International Arilines v. Gerry's International Ltd. 2003 CLD 1075 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J. Miscellaneous No. 18 of 2005, decision dated: 8-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "HASSAN ALADAWI and another\nVs.\nMessrs HAMA INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD. and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13871",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1886 = 2009 SLD 1886 = 2009 CLD 1048",
    "Key Words:": "Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV OF 1997)------S. 16---Chilli grinding industrial unit installed in residential urea---Complaint against such unit spreading spices dust and causing severe air pollution---Inspector Environment and Environment Consultant Engineer on inspection found such ruin to be involved in business having adverse effects on health of residents of locality---Order of Tribunal directing shifting of grinding unit---Validity---Appellant had been served with notice before inspection of his unit---Crushing and grinding of chilli had been found creating sever chilli dust as there were holes in roof, walls and doors through which chilli dust was escaping---Inspection of Unit had been curried on direction of Tribunal---Appellant had been involved in a business offending provisions of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997---Permitting to function such unit in residential area for a considerable long time by offending provisions of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 would not serve its purpose and justice--Such illegal activity had to come to an end and should not be allowed to be carried on under shelter of frivolous and technical objections---high Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.\n \nState Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Director General Military Lands and Cantonments, Rawalpindi and 4 others 2005 SCMR 177 and AIR 1995 Orrisa 1984 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.A. No.1 of 2006, decision dated: 23rd February, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "HAFIZ TARIQ NASIM AND SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "ATTIQUE REHMAN and others\nVs.\nENVIRONMENTAL TRII3UNALS and others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13872",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1887 = 2009 SLD 1887 = 2009 CLD 1051",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S.22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, Rr. 4 & 8---Execution of Blank Sales in violation of Regulation---Imposition of penalty---Record had shown that client of the company t which was member of Stock Exchange and was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan sold shares when at time of said sale, said client did not have any pre-existing interest in those shares---Company admitted its mistake and stated that all said trades were erroneously executed by one of its traders---Blank sales could mean a sale by a party that did not own shares or the sale did not constitute a sale with pre-existing interest or was a sale by a party that had not entered into contractual borrowing agreement to meet delivery requirements---Sale by the client of the company without pre-existing interest fell within the ambit of 'Blank Sale' which was prohibited in terms of Regulation 4 of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001---Company by executing Blank Sales in its client's account had violated the Regulations which, in turn, was a violation of Regln. (iii) of Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001---Such violation of the Rules and Regulations was a serious matter which would entitle the Commission to suspend the company's membership, however, in exercise of the powers under R.8(b) of the Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, penalty of Rs.50,000 was imposed on the company with direction to the company to ensure that full compliance he made of all the rules, regulations and directions of the Commission in future for avoiding any punitive action under the law.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.1(13)13S/LSE/MSW/SMD/2008/04 dated 9th March 2009, decision dated: 23rd April, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR (SECURITIES MARKET DIVISION)",
    "": "MAHA SECURITIES (PVT.) LTD.: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13873",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1888 = 2009 SLD 1888 = 2009 CLD 1056",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19(1)(2)(3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.92 & 93---Execution of decree and sale of mortgaged property---Scope of S.19(1)(2)(3) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Law did not permit and it was not just, equitable, fair and proper for the Banking Court to have accepted the bid of Rs.68,80,000 given by the auction-purchaser in November, 2004, while examining the question of confirmation of sale in the year 2009, when before it already the Executing Court had two other offers at much higher sum, and even the auction-purchaser had enhanced his offer from Rs.68,80,000 to Rs.1,00,60,000 and even deposited such sum with the Banking Court and the Banking Court ordered refund of the excess sum of Rs.31,80,000 deposited by auction-purchaser as per his application---High Court set aside the order of flanking Court with the direction that keeping intact, the highest offers in the sum of Rs.13, million arid in the sum of Rs.11 million and the higher offer of auction-purchaser in the sum of Rs.1,00,60,000 the flunking Court shall once again dive all three of them an opportunity to submit their enhanced written sealed offers, it anti, before it at one and the same tune to be /bred by it within one mouth---Such sealed offers shall be opened by the court then and there and to be considered for acceptance and confirmation of sale of mortgaged properly in accordance with law, butt before that the decree holder and the -debtors may also be put to notice of such offers---Law on the subject and reasons elucidated.\n \nA plain reading of section 19(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 reveals that though the execution proceedings before the Banking Court are to be normally regulated under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or any other law for the time being in force, but at the same time the decree-bolder has been given a special privilege to request the Banking Court for enforcement and execration of the decree in such manner as it considers appropriate. Not only this but even under subsection (3) to section 19 the power for sale of the mortgaged properly, without. intervention of the court has been conferred on the decree-holder bank, which option could be exercised by the decree-holder after passing of and decree in his favour. Indeed, in the present case such option was not exercised by the decree-holder Bank, but by invoking the special provision seeking execution of decree in the manner decree-holder considered it appropriate, a statement was submitted before the court, calling upon the auction-purchaser for enhancement of his bid from Rs.68,80,000 to Rs.1,00,60,000 which offer was also promptly accepted by the auction-purchaser. It was on the basis of such mutual understanding between the auction--purchaser and the decree-holder bank in terms of subsection (2) of section 19 that earlier sale of the mortgaged property was confirmed in favour of the auction purchaser. Such order of the Banking Cowl was, however, set aside by High Court in Ist appeal mainly for the reason that one of the participants of the proceedings was not afforded any opportunity for contesting such offer and that another higher offer in the sum of Rs.13 million, worth consideration, was available before the Banking Court at that time.\n \nThis being the position it -toes not appeal to reason that instead of following the spirit of such-order of Appellate Court, Banking Court will go to the extent of accepting a much lesser offer of Rs.68,80,000 by merely making sweeping observations that the court cannot be turned into auction house, least realizing that at the same time it was the basic duty of the Banking Court to have ensured maximum sale proceed of the mortgaged property for the benefit of the decree-holder and the -debtors, whose property was being sold. It is only after the stage of confirmation of sale that even the -debtors and decree-holder are debarred from negotiating compromise on any other terms, to the prejudice of the auction-purchaser, otherwise mere extension of highest offer or its acceptance has not conferred any substantive legal right in favour of the auction-purchaser.\n \nEven otherwise, when three different parties are present/available before the Banking Court without any disqualification to purchase the mortgaged property at the highest price, and the sale of the property has not yet been confirmed in favour of any earlier bidder, why the court would reject higher offer without any cogent reason, thereby depriving the decree-holder and the -debtor/owner of the mortgaged property from the maximum price. Before confirmation of sale, the auction-purchaser has no locus stand' to challenge the cancellation of auction; mere floating of bid, may be highest one, does not create any legal right in favour of the bidder without confirmation of bid and the highest bid only remains an offer. The confirmation of sale in terms of Order XXI, rule 92, C.P.C. is a mandatory requirement which, in one sense, gives cut off time for transaction of legal rights in favour of the auction-purchaser. Rule 93 of Order XXI, C.P.C. lays down that under rule 92 (ibid), the Executing Court has ample power to set aside the sale of any immovable property and in such case, repayment of purchase money is to be made to the purchaser of the property with or without interest, as the court may direct in this regard. In the present case after the offer of the decree-holder Bank contained in its statement, which was accepted by the auction-purchaser vide his application, his earlier offer of lesser sum of Rs.68,80,000, despite higher offer having been made without prejudice to his right as auction-purchaser, has either disappeared or merged into such higher offer. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination Banking Court was justified in obliging the auction-purchaser with the acceptance of his bid in the sum of Rs.68,80,000 and further ordering refund of the excess sum of Rs.31,80,000 deposited by him as per his application. \n \nClear language of subsection (2) of section 19 of the Ordinance, 2001 had virtually diluted its whole effect after the submission of another higher otter by the auction-purchaser in the sum of Rs.1,00,60,000 which was in conformity with the spirit of such provision of law, which lays down that the decree-holder may request the Banking Court for execution of decree in such manner as it considers appropriate. \n \nOrder in 1st appeal was passed by the high Court in the spirit to ensure maximum price of the mortgaged properly from the person interested in buying it, as otherwise the grievance of the other bidders that they were not afforded opportunity of hearing before the Banking Court, could have been redressed, by affording them an opportunity of hearing in the matter before the High Court. Banking Court has not assigned a single reason for non acceptance of the available highest offer of Rs.13 million made by another party, which per statement of decree holder bank, was very much acceptable to them. \n \nImpugned order was illegal, irrational and arbitrary thus it was liable to be set aside. The case was remanded to the Banking Court with the direction that keeping intact the highest offers in the sum of Rs.13 million, other offer in the sum of Rs.11 million and the higher offer of auction purchaser in the sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000, the court shall once again give all three of them an opportunity to submit their enhanced written sealed offer, if any, before it at one and the same time to be fixed by it within one month. Such scaled offers shall be opened by the court there and then to be considered for acceptance and confirmation of sale of mortgaged property in accordance with law. But before that the decree-holder and -debtors may also be put to notice of such offers. \n \nMuhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Zakria Ghani and others PLD 2005 SC 819 distinguished.\n \nAfzal Maqsood Butt v. Banking Court No.2 Lahore and 8 others PLD 2005 SC 470; Settlement commissioner, Multan and Bahawalpur Divisions, Multan and others 1974 SCMR 337; Rehmat Ali and 2 others v. The Revenue Board, West Pakistan Lahore and another 1973 SCMR 342; Ch. Muhammad Ashraf v. Punjab Privatization Board through Secretary Government of Punjab and another 2002 MLD 550; Sheikh Muhammad Rafiq and others v. United Bank Limited and others 1997 SCMR 1149; Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 1987 SC 512; Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Zakria Ghani and others PLD 2005 SC 819; Messrs Irisma International Karachi and others v. United Bank Ltd. Karachi and another 2007 SCMR 1271; Captain PQ Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs A.W. Brothers and others 2004 SCMR 1956; Mrs. Yasmeen Yaqoob v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan and others 2007 CLD 1511; Messrs Askari & Company and 2 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and another 2009 CLC 371: United Bank Limited v. Messrs A.Z. Hashmi (Pvt.) Ltd. 2000 CLC 1438 and Askari Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Zafar Ahmed and others 2008 CLD 800 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "1st Appeals Nos.6 and 8 of 2009, decision dated: 21st April, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, C.J. AND MUHAMMAD KARIM KHAN AGHA, J",
    "": "Messrs BELA LUBRICANT LTD. through Chief Executive and others\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13874",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzQlNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1889 = 2009 SLD 1889 = 2009 CLD 1074",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.89 & 90---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution proceedings--Failure to redeem mortgaged properly---Suit filed by the Bank against defendant borrower, was decreed by the Bunking Court and mortgaged properly was ordered to be sold---While mortgaged property was in the process of being sold in execution proceedings, plaintiff-Bank offered the defendant to get the properly redeemed, but defendant failed to do so---Sale of mortgaged properly in favour of highest bidder was confirmed---Application filed by the defendant for recall of order of sale having been dismissed by the Executing Court, defendant aggrieved with said order, had filed appeal, contending that he was ready and willing to make payment to the plaintiff-Bank, court ought not to have sold the properly---Validity---held, even after the bids were invited, ample opportunity was given to the defendant to gel the mortgaged property redeemed, but the defendant failed to make payment---No other course was left with the Executing Court, but to confirm the bid of the highest bidder; thereafter it was too late for the defendant to seek yet another opportunity to get the sale set aside Court sale should only be set aside when equitable grounds for nullifying the same existed in favour of the person who owned or held any interest in the properly sold---Said equitable grounds were provided by law under the provisions of Rr.89 & 90 of O.XXI, C.P.C.---Defendant having failed to make payment though ample opportunities were given to him at various stages of the proceedings, no legal infirmity existed in the impugned .",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.25 of 2003, decision dated: 20-01-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, C.J. AND FAISAL ARAB, J",
    "": "Mian SARERAZ AHMED ANJUM --Appellant\nVs.\nBANKING COURT No.IV through Presiding Officer and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13875",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1890 = 2009 SLD 1890 = 2009 CLD 1077",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 20 & 41(b)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.15 & 20-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.181---Grant of application under S.20, Arbitration Act, 1940---Conditions--Territorial jurisdiction of court---Extent---Limitation--Principles.\n \nThe conditions that have to be met before an application under S. 20 Arbitration Act, 1940 may be granted are as follows:---\n \n(a) That there should be a pre-existing arbitration agreement between the parties;\n \n(b) That the parties should not have taken any steps under sections 3 to 19 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 prior to the institution of the section 20 application;\n \n(c) That differences or disputes have arisen between the parties to which the arbitration agreement applies;\n \n(d) That the section 20 application is not barred by limitation; and\n \n(e) That the court to which the section 20 application has been made has jurisdiction in the matter to which the agreement relates. \n \nWithin the context of an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 all that the plaintiff needs to establish is the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties and prima facie existence of a dispute between them that is capable of being referred to arbitration in accordance with their agreement. If this burden has been discharged, and provided the other conditions set out above have been met, an order granting the application will follow. \n \n\"\"A court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the agreement relates\"\" can only mean that an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is competent if it is filed in a court that has jurisdiction to entertain a suit the subject-matter of which is the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement. In other words, before entertaining a section 20 application the Court must be satisfied that the disputes referred to arbitration are such as can be made the subject of a suit, and if a suit were filed in respect of the subject-matter, it would lie in it. \n \nQuestion of jurisdiction has to be determined with reference to the provisions of sections 15 to 20, C.P.C. Of these, the provision that is relevant for the present case is section 20(c) of the Code pursuant to which a suit is competent if it is filed in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or a part of the cause of action arose. If a cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of a court, then an application under section 20 can be filed in that court. \n \nIn the present case, the dispute raised by the plaintiff was a breach by the Consortium of its obligation to make payment under the subcontract. Clearly this was a dispute that could be made the subject of a suit. \n \nIn a suit on a contract the cause of action will consist of the making of the contract and of its breach at the place where it is to be performed. Therefore, an action for breach of contract can at the option of the plaintiff be brought either at the place where the contract was made or the place where the breach was committed.\n \nAccordingly, a part of the cause of action arose at place and court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. \n \nThe time within which an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 must be filed is Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908. which provides that such an application should be filed within three years lion) the date on which the right to apply accrues. \n \nWhere a section 20 application has been filed and is maintainable, the court is empowered by section 41(b) of the Arbitration Act. 1940 to make orders in respect of any of the matters set out in Second Schedule of the Act.\n \nWhile there can be no doubt that in appropriate cases the court may make an order in respect of any of the matters set out in the Second Schedule to the Arbitration Act, 1940 including an order securing the amount in difference in the reference, such an order is within the discretion of the court and will not be passed unless the person seeking such relief establishes a strong prima facie case; establishes that the balance of convenience is in his favour and also that he would suffer irreparable injury if the relict sought was not granted. \n \nBeing equitable in nature, it is also imperative that the person seeking such relief comes before the court with clean hands and does not seek to obtain the order on the basis of a misstatement. \n \nWhen order to refer the matter to the arbitration was obtained on the basis of a misrepresentation of the facts this alone disentitles the plaintiff from confirmation of that order. \n \nAli Muhammad v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1996 SC 292; Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Shah, Member Provincial Assembly, N.W.F.P. PLD 1995 SC 66: Dr. Salahuddin v. Revenue Commissioner, Balochistan PLD 1978 Quetta 61; Mien Nawaz Sharif v. Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari 1996 CLC 1714; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393; Kadir Motors (Regd.) Rawalpindi v. National Motors Ltd.. Karachi 1992 SCMR 1174; Chaudhry Mehtab Ahmed v. Mir Shakeel-ur-Rehman 2004 MLD 662; Das Consultants Private Ltd. v. National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. AIR 1981 Cal. 202; Fauji Foundation v. Yousaf 1985 CLC 2799; Saleem Chemical Industries v. Bird & Co. (P) Ltd. AIR 1979 Mad. 16; Ratan Lalji Gulab Chand v. Dali Chand AIR 1954 Hyd. 39; Shipyard K. Damon International v. Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. 2003 CLD 309 and Commodities Trading International Corporation v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. 1987 CLC 2063 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXI, R.46 & O.XXXVIII, R.5---Application seeking garnishee order---Attachment of property before ---Scope---Garnishee order could be passed in execution proceedings under O.XXI, R.46, C.P.C. but only after the debt had been judicially determined---Where the plaintiff had a disputed claims, the order sought fell within the purview of O.XXXVIII, R.5, C.P.C. which empowered the court to order attachment of properly before ---Such an order, however, could not be passed lightly and the person seeking the same must satisfy the court, by affidavit or otherwise, that there was imminent danger of the defendant disposing of the whole or any part of his property or of the defendant removing the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court---Under O.XXXVIII, R.5, C.P.C. it was not only this that the court must be satisfied about but also that the defendant was about to do so with the intention of obstructing or delaying the execution of any decree that may be passed against hint---Attachment be/ore could not be claimed merely on the ground that the defendant was a foreigner and did not own any assets in Pakistan---Where there was nothing on the record to show that any property was about to be .disposed of or taken away with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed in favour of the plaintiff---Application seeking garnishee order was declined. \n \nBalagamwala Oil Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Shakarchi Trading A.G. 1990 Kar. 1; New Bengal Shipping Company v. Eri Lancaster Stump PLD 1952 Dac. 22; H. Nizam Din & Sons Ltd., Karachi v. M. V. \"\"Oroomee\"\" and 4 others PLD 1977 Kar. 722 and Associated Drillers Ltd. Karachi v. Dirk Verstoop B.V. PLD 1979 Kar. 734 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.403 and C.M.A. No.2230 of 2008, decision dated: 29-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SALMAN TALIBUDDIN, J",
    "": "PAKISTAN INSULATIONS (PVT.) LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs RANHILL ENGINEERS AND CONSTRUCTORS DDFC GROUP OF COMPANIES through General Pakistan Operations Manager and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13876",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1891 = 2009 SLD 1891 = 2009 CLD 1106",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 309, 305, 231, 261, 208, 195, 473 & 476---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss.20 & 30(6)(7)---Petition for winding up of unlisted public limited company by Registrar of Companies Securities and Exchange Commission of. Pakistan---Material available on record showed that sanction for winding up proceedings had been grunted without affording an opportunity to the company to make a representation of being heard; that there was no investigation to the affairs of lire company but it was only on an inspection by the State Bank of Pakistan who was not authorised by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan; that company being art unlisted public limited company in which no public money was involved and none from the public had made any complaint nor had come forward against the affairs of the company; that State Bank of Pakistan had only identified the irregularities of the company but had not recommended for the sanction of presentation of petition for (finding up of the company; that Registrar of Companies, in view of S. 231, Companies Ordinance, 1984, had not inspected the books of accounts of the company nor had called for any explanation as provided under S.261, Companies Ordinance, 1984 and had also failed to properly exercise the powers under Ss.20 & 30(6)(7) of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 and that report of the Slate Hank of Pakistan revealed that one of the Directors of the Company had withdrawn an amount from the company which was repaid, he had thus violated S.208, Companies Ordinance, 1984 and was liable for fine---Held, that the petition, for winding up for the company was not maintainable in view of non-affording the opportunity to the company of being heard by tire Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan --Inspection of Lire Slate Bunk of Pakistan, in circumstances, could not be treated as inspection by the Commissioner, therefore, the sanction awarded for presentation of the petition for winding up of the company was against the law and deviated from the provisions of lire Companies Ordinance, 1984---Director who withdrew the money and re-deposited same was imposed a fine of Rs.1,00,000---Order accordingly. \n \nDawood Fibre Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner (Company Law Division) 2006 CLD 283; Karim Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Executive Director (Enforcement and Monitoring) SEC and another 2006 CLD 339; PICIC Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Spectrum Fisheries Ltd. 2006 CLD 440; In the matter of: Messrs Netsol \"\"Technologies Limited 2006 CLD 684; In the matter of: Messrs S.G, Power Limited 2006 CLD 997 and Northern \"\"Tourism Development (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Executive Director (Company Law) SEC and 2 others 2006 CLD 1204 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "J. M. No.10 of 2002, decision dated: 24-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHARREM G. BALOCH, J",
    "": "ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES SECP\nVs.\nSPEEDWAYS FOUNMETALL (PAKISTAN) LIMITED and 7 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13877",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1892 = 2009 SLD 1892 = 2009 CLD 1120",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.284 & 287---Amalgamation of companies---Approval---Scheme for amalgamation was approved and accepted by overwhelming majority of members present in number and value of two companies at two meetings held separately under orders of High Court---Effect---Scheme of amalgamation was found to be fair and reasonable on consideration of various factors which were necessary to be taken into consideration by Chartered Accountants of both the companies---There was no allegation that books of accounts were not reliable---No grounds had been suggested why report of Chartered Accountants should not be accepted---There was no allegation of lack of bona fides on the part of majority of members or minority had been overridden and coerced into accepting scheme of arrangement---High Court accepted proposed scheme of amalgamation of both the companies---Petition was allowed in circumstances. \n \nMahmood Textile Mills Limited v. Registrar Joint Stock Companies NLR 1993 UC (Civil) 49 at 51 paragraphs 5 and 6; Andhra Pradesh-Vijaya Durga Cotton Trading Limited v. Nava Bharat Enterprise (Pvt.) Ltd. (1980) 50 Company Cases 785 at 794-795; J. M. No.25 of 1998 Pakistan Industrial Promoters (Pvt.) Limited and Lever Brothers Pakistan Limited (order dated 30th April, 1999 passed in C. M. A. No.1582 of 1998); Usman Textile Mills Limited 2009 CLD 82; Lipton and another 1989 CLC 818; J.M. No.5 of 2002 in the matter of Abbott Laboratories (Pakistan) Limited and Knoll Pharmaceuticals Ltd.; Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited v. Aslam But Ibrahim 1997 CLC 1873; J.M. No.42 of 2002 Smith Kline and French of Pakistan, Beecham Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited and Glaxo Wellcome Pakistan Limited; J.M. No. 6 of 2006 Pakistan Papersack Corporation Limited, Khyber Papers (Pvt.) Limited and Thal Limited; J.M. No. 23 of 2006 Pharmacia Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited and Parke, Davis & Company Limited ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Judicial Miscellaneous Application No.8 of 2008, decision dated: 16-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID ALI Z. QAZI, J",
    "": "PFIZER LABORATORIES LIMITED and another\nVs.\nPARKE, DAVIS & COMPANY LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13878",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1893 = 2009 SLD 1893 = 2009 CLD 1129",
    "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------Ss.79 & 80---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.34 & O.XXXVII, R.2---Recovery of money---Promissory note---Presumption---Ex parte decree---Interest, imposing of---Plaintiff produced original promissory note, legal notice, postal receipt, application forms for allotment of flat signed by defendant and sub-lease of flats---Defendant had chosen to remain absent and failed to appear in Court and to obtain leave to defend the suit, as provided under O.XX VII, R.2 (2) C.P.C.---Effect--Allegation of plaintiff was deemed to be admitted and he was entitled to decree---Suit was based on promissory note which was negotiable instrument and presumption was that same had been issued against consideration and defendant had not come forward to rebut such presumption---High Court decreed suit in the sum claimed with interest at 6% per annum in accordance with Ss.79 and 80 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, from the date of suit till date of decree---High Court also awarded interest at the rate of 10% per annum from date of decree till the date when payment was realized in accordance with S.34 C.P.C.---Suit was decreed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.905 of 2007, decision dated: 24-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHARREM G. BALOCH, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HANIF SHAIKHANI through Special Attorney --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD KHALID SHAFI--Defendant Summary"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13879",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1894 = 2009 SLD 1894 = 2009 CLD 1133",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)-------Ss. 62 & 13---Copyright---Moral rights, doctrine of---Applicability--Author of the intellectual work when assigns the rights in the intellectual property, does not assign the 'moral rights', it is the moral rights of the author to have her/his name telecast with regard to the work which is his/her creation. \n \nWhale on Copyright by Jeremy Philips Robyn Durie and Ian Karet, Fifth Edition (62); Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, Fifteenth Edition by Kevin Garnett, M.A. (657) and The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, by Laddie Prescott and Vitoria, Third Edition (606) ref.\n \n(b) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)---\n \n----Ss.62 & 13---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Copyright---Moral rights, doctrine of---Interim injunction, grant of---In the present case, agreement between the author of a novel and assignee of copyright thereof, had not imposed any restriction on the author to forego her right to claim authorship of her work---Assignee of copyright while telecasting the drama based on the said novel had failed to mention the name of the author of the novel---Author, in circumstances, had made out a prima facie, case on the premise of moral rights as balance of convenience lay in favour of the author and she would suffer irreparable loss if all the episodes were telecast without display of her name as author of the drama---High Court, accepting the appeal, set aside the impugned order and passed injunctive order in favour of the author to the effect that the assignee will telecast the name of the author as author of the script with regard to the episodes which will be telecast---Principles. \n \nSmt. Mannu Bhandari v. Kala Vikas Pictures (Pvt.) Ltd. and another AIR 1987 Delhi 13; Shakeel Adilzadah v. Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. and 2 others 1989 CLC 2447; V.T. Thomas and others v. Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. AIR 1989 Ker. 49 and Munawwar Jamil v. Mst. Noshi (Nishat) Gillani and 3 others PLD 2000 Lah. 186 ref.\n \n(c) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)---\n \n----S.62--Author's special rights---Moral rights, doctrine of---Concept surveyed. \n \nWhale on Copyright by Jeremy Philips Robyn Dune and Ian Karet, Fifth Edition (62); Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, Fifteenth Edition by Kevin Garnett, M.A. (657) and The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, by Laddie Prescott and Vitoria, Third Edition (606) quoted.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.69 of 2009, decision dated: 18-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. RIFFAT SARAJ through Special Attorney\nVs.\nEYE TELEVISION NETWORK (PVT.) LTD. through Director/Chairperson and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13880",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1895 = 2009 SLD 1895 = 2009 CLD 1133",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)-------Ss. 62 & 13---Copyright---Moral rights, doctrine of---Applicability--Author of the intellectual work when assigns the rights in the intellectual property, does not assign the 'moral rights', it is the moral rights of the author to have her/his name telecast with regard to the work which is his/her creation. \n \nWhale on Copyright by Jeremy Philips Robyn Durie and Ian Karet, Fifth Edition (62); Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, Fifteenth Edition by Kevin Garnett, M.A. (657) and The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, by Laddie Prescott and Vitoria, Third Edition (606) ref.\n \n(b) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)---\n \n----Ss.62 & 13---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Copyright---Moral rights, doctrine of---Interim injunction, grant of---In the present case, agreement between the author of a novel and assignee of copyright thereof, had not imposed any restriction on the author to forego her right to claim authorship of her work---Assignee of copyright while telecasting the drama based on the said novel had failed to mention the name of the author of the novel---Author, in circumstances, had made out a prima facie, case on the premise of moral rights as balance of convenience lay in favour of the author and she would suffer irreparable loss if all the episodes were telecast without display of her name as author of the drama---High Court, accepting the appeal, set aside the impugned order and passed injunctive order in favour of the author to the effect that the assignee will telecast the name of the author as author of the script with regard to the episodes which will be telecast---Principles. \n \nSmt. Mannu Bhandari v. Kala Vikas Pictures (Pvt.) Ltd. and another AIR 1987 Delhi 13; Shakeel Adilzadah v. Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. and 2 others 1989 CLC 2447; V.T. Thomas and others v. Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. AIR 1989 Ker. 49 and Munawwar Jamil v. Mst. Noshi (Nishat) Gillani and 3 others PLD 2000 Lah. 186 ref.\n \n(c) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)---\n \n----S.62--Author's special rights---Moral rights, doctrine of---Concept surveyed. \n \nWhale on Copyright by Jeremy Philips Robyn Dune and Ian Karet, Fifth Edition (62); Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, Fifteenth Edition by Kevin Garnett, M.A. (657) and The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, by Laddie Prescott and Vitoria, Third Edition (606) quoted.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.69 of 2009, decision dated: 18-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH AND SH. AZMAT SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Mrs. RIFFAT SARAJ through Special Attorney\nVs.\nEYE TELEVISION NETWORK (PVT.) LTD. through Director/Chairperson and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13881",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1896 = 2009 SLD 1896 = 2009 CLD 1141",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)------ Art.199---Constitutional petition---Banker and customer---Creation of harassment to petitioner by Bank for being its defaulter---Undertaking of Bank not to take any action against petitioner in case of payment of outstanding loan amount by him---Validity---No presumption would be drawn against future intention of any person/defaulter---High Court directed Bank not to create undue harassment against petitioner; and that Bank, if needed, could take legal action against him yet.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.1326 and Miscellaneous No.6457 of 2008, decision dated: 7-07-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZULLAH M. MEMON, ACTG. C.J. AND KHALIL ALI Z. KAZI, J",
    "": "ANWAR AHMED\nVs.\nMessrs NIB BANK LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13882",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1897 = 2009 SLD 1897 = 2009 CLD 1143",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Rescheduling and restructuring of previous finance---In the cases pertaining to restructuring, the amount is not disbursed, rather is brought forward envisaging as liability of the customer, and therefore, to contend that as no physical disbursement of the amount was made, resultantly, the claim of the Bank was false or unfounded was misconceived and without merit---No fraud or misrepresentation could be attributed to the Bank, if defendants, while rescheduling the previous loan, were asked to execute all the relevant documents in that regard including the guarantees and the finance agreement---Plaint fulfilled the requirements of S.9, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Relevant backdrop of the finance arrangement between plaintiff/Bank and defendant/borrower had been appropriately given in the plaint duly supported by requisite documents---Bald and baseless allegations of fraud could not be termed as the substantial question of facts, in the light of admittedly executed documents on account of which the leave could be solicited or granted-Suit was decreed in favour of Bank in circumstances. \n \nBankers Equity Limited through Principal Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 931; Messrs C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chairman and 5 others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587 and Habib-ur-Rehman and another v. Judge Banking Court No.4, Lahore and another 2006 CLD 217 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 &10---Restructuring/rescheduling of previous finance---Bank was not obliged to have brought on record the statements of accounts prior to the agreement through which the restructuring had been made as this was an admitted amount duly acknowledged by the borrower---No disbursement of the amount involved in the matter was required, case being that of restructuring and not in the nature of a fresh finance in which the disbursement may become relevant---No vice, illegality or error had been pointed out in the statements of accounts appended with the plaint in support thereof either in view of provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 or Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891---Suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff/Bank. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10---Leave to defend suit---When the borrower had defaulted and requested for restructuring of loan which was granted by the Bank, plea for leave to defend suit on its own force was not relevant and thus, was refused. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 10 & 15---Leave to defend suit, grant of---Mortgage---Mortgage deed placed on the record by the Bank envisaged the mortgage for \"\"E\"\" company, whereas ,in the present case the borrower was \"\"T\"\" company---Only for the reason that the Managing Director or the managing structure of said two companies was the same, the mortgage should be presumed was not prima facie, tenable and the question/proposition needed the recording of evidence---Resultantly, to the extent of \"\"E\"\" company leave to defend the suit was granted.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.21 of 2006, decision dated: 20-01-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nTAJ TEXTILE MILLS LTD. through Chief Executive and 5 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13883",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1898 = 2009 SLD 1898 = 2009 CLD 1143",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Rescheduling and restructuring of previous finance---In the cases pertaining to restructuring, the amount is not disbursed, rather is brought forward envisaging as liability of the customer, and therefore, to contend that as no physical disbursement of the amount was made, resultantly, the claim of the Bank was false or unfounded was misconceived and without merit---No fraud or misrepresentation could be attributed to the Bank, if defendants, while rescheduling the previous loan, were asked to execute all the relevant documents in that regard including the guarantees and the finance agreement---Plaint fulfilled the requirements of S.9, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Relevant backdrop of the finance arrangement between plaintiff/Bank and defendant/borrower had been appropriately given in the plaint duly supported by requisite documents---Bald and baseless allegations of fraud could not be termed as the substantial question of facts, in the light of admittedly executed documents on account of which the leave could be solicited or granted-Suit was decreed in favour of Bank in circumstances. \n \nBankers Equity Limited through Principal Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others 2003 CLD 931; Messrs C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chairman and 5 others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587 and Habib-ur-Rehman and another v. Judge Banking Court No.4, Lahore and another 2006 CLD 217 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 &10---Restructuring/rescheduling of previous finance---Bank was not obliged to have brought on record the statements of accounts prior to the agreement through which the restructuring had been made as this was an admitted amount duly acknowledged by the borrower---No disbursement of the amount involved in the matter was required, case being that of restructuring and not in the nature of a fresh finance in which the disbursement may become relevant---No vice, illegality or error had been pointed out in the statements of accounts appended with the plaint in support thereof either in view of provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 or Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891---Suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff/Bank. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10---Leave to defend suit---When the borrower had defaulted and requested for restructuring of loan which was granted by the Bank, plea for leave to defend suit on its own force was not relevant and thus, was refused. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 10 & 15---Leave to defend suit, grant of---Mortgage---Mortgage deed placed on the record by the Bank envisaged the mortgage for \"\"E\"\" company, whereas ,in the present case the borrower was \"\"T\"\" company---Only for the reason that the Managing Director or the managing structure of said two companies was the same, the mortgage should be presumed was not prima facie, tenable and the question/proposition needed the recording of evidence---Resultantly, to the extent of \"\"E\"\" company leave to defend the suit was granted.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.21 of 2006, decision dated: 20-01-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nTAJ TEXTILE MILLS LTD. through Chief Executive and 5 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13884",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1899 = 2009 SLD 1899 = 2009 CLD 1149",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.7---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.489-F---Aims and objects of both the provisions---Banks debarred from taking advantage of S.489-F, P.P.C.--Aims and objects of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and S.489-F, P.P.C. are entirely different and both the enactments cannot be amalgamated or confused with each other by their application at the whims of either party---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, is a complete code providing procedure for the Banking Courts, specially constituted under the said Ordinance for recovery of loans from the defaulters or taking stock of the situation at the instance of the aggrieved party which may be the loanee against the Bank and for the commission of any offence as enumerated under S.7 of the said Ordinance---Banks or their administrations, therefore, are debarred from taking the advantage of S.489-F, P.P.C., through initiation of proceedings against the defaulters merely on the dishonouring of any cheque issued by the loanee who had availed any finance facility, as scheme of both the enactments are poles apart from each other. \n \nMajor (Rtd.) Javed Inayat Khan Kiani v. The State PLD 2006 Lah. 752 ref.\n \n(b) Penal Code XLV of 1860)---\n \n----S.489-F---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.7---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Quashing of F.I.R.---Accused petitioner had taken a loan of Rupees fifty lac from the complainant Bank, but due to recession in business he could not deposit four monthly instalments and on demand of Bank furnished a guarantee cheque of Rupees fifty lac, which was not meant for immediate encashment---However, Bank on the said cheque having been dishonoured got the present case registered against the petitioner under S.489-F, P.P.C. vide the impugned F.I.R.---Validity---Aims and objects of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and S.489-F, P.P.C., being entirely different, could not be amalgamated or confused with each other at the whims of either of the parties--- Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was a complete code providing procedure for the Banking Courts, specially constituted under the said Ordinance, for recovery of loans from the defaulters and dealing with the commission of any offence as enumerated under S.7 of the said Ordinance---Banks or their administrations, therefore, were debarred from taking the advantage of S.489-F, P.P.C. through initiation of proceedings against the defaulters on dishonouring of any cheque issued by the loanee, who had availed any finance facility---Registration of the present case by the complainant Bank through its Manager was a mala fide action against the petitioner, as it could avail remedy through the Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--Registration of case under S.489-F, P.P.C. against the accused petitioner being mala fide and abuse of process of law, could not be allowed to sustain on record---Impugned F.I.R. was consequently quashed and constitutional petition was accepted accordingly. \n \nMajor (Rtd.) Javed Inayat Khan Kiani v. The State PLD 2006 Lah. 752 rel.\n \nShahid Mir for Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1239-Q of 2009, decision dated: 30-03-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "RANA ZAHID MAHMOOD, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD IQBAL\nVs.\nSTATION HOUSE OFFICER and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13885",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1900 = 2009 SLD 1900 = 2009 CLD 1154",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S.245---Failure to submit profit and loss account---Imposition of fine---Company, under S.245 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 was required to prepare and transmit to the members and simultaneously file with the Registrar and the Commission its quarterly accounts for the relevant year---Failure of the company to comply with the said mandatory requirements within the prescribed time, would necessitate action against the responsible directors of the company---Company in the case had failed to comply with said mandatory requirements---Protection of the investors/shareholders was one of the primary objectives of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 as it was shareholder who provided seed for the capital formation of the company---If the interest of the investors would be protected, they would invest more, in return they must be provided adequate and meaningful information---Annual and interim accounts would provide information to the investors about the affairs of the company---Directors of the company had failed to observe mandatory requirements of law and had not circulated the quarterly accounts to the shareholders within: the prescribed time---Past record of the company in that regard was also not satisfactory---Responsibility for preparation/circulation of quarterly accounts rested with the Directors of the company and they had to take appropriate action at appropriate time---Repetition of defaults, had clearly shown that the company was not making any serious efforts to comply with the provisions of the law---Default having been established, company was liable to pay fine, however, taking lenient view instead of imposing the maximum fine, fine of rupees 10,000 was imposed on each Director of the company. \n \nM.I. Panni Present.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.EMD/233/383/2002-1410, dated 22-01-2009, decision dated: 23rd April, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "TAHIR MAHMOOD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "Messrs MUSTEHKAM CEMENT LIMITED: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13886",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1901 = 2009 SLD 1901 = 2009 CLD 1157",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-------Art.133---Fact not cross-examined---Effect---If any evidence is not disputed in cross-examination, then it is deemed to be an admitted fact. \n \nNur Jehan Begum v. Mujtaba Ali Naqvi 1991 SCMR 2300 and Sheraz Tufail v. State 2007 SCMR 518 rel.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----Ss.126 & 127---Interpretation of document---Contract of guarantee---Scope---Plea raised by appellant was that letter produced in evidence was a letter of guarantee---Validity---Guarantee needed involvement of three parties and letter produced in evidence involved only two parties, therefore, it could not fall within the definition of 'guarantee'---Letter in question was given by first respondent after the contract of sale between the other respondent and appellant had already been breached by the first respondent---Single Judge of High Court rightly found that effect of letter in question was substitution of liability from one respondent to other respondent and not a guarantee. \n \nRamchandra v. Shapurji AIR 1940 Bom. 315 and Bagha Co-operative Society v. Debi Mangal Prasad AIR 1937 Pat. 410 rel.\n \n(c) Interpretation of documents---\n \n----Category of document---Determination---Where document can be construed to fall within number of categories then it is up to Court to determine category/nature of document and its labelling is not critical. \n \nMuhammad Rafiq v. Muhammad Nawaz 2001 CLC 318 rel.\n \n(d) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S.4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, R.1---Promissory note-Scope-For a document to be regarded as promissory note, it must fulfil definition as set out in S.4 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. \n \nBrijraj v. Raghunandan AIR 1955 Raj. 85 (Vol. 42, C.N.28) and Gopaldas v. Ramdeo AIR 1957 Raj. 360 (V 44 C 138 Nov.) rel.\n \n(e) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S.4---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.126---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, R.1---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---Infra Court Appeal---Interpretation of document---Incorrect label of document-- Unstamped promissory note---Plaintiff sought recovery of amount against defendants on the basis of two letters claiming the same' to be promissory note---Validity---Letter in question contained an unconditional undertaking, to pay; a sum of money which was certain; a payment that was to be made to a person; and a signature on behalf of executant, therefore, the letter met all requirements of a promissory note---Failure to stamp promissory note would not exclude it from being enforceable---Letter in question was unclear in its labelling and its effect of passing on liability from one defendant to other defendant was not fully appreciated by plaintiff at the time should not debar plaintiff from seeking to recover money rightfully owed to him---Letter in question was whether called a letter of guarantee, a promissory note, an indemnity or by any other nomenclature its intention, as evidenced by correspondence was to create obligation on a defendant to make payment to plaintiff---High Court in High Court Appeal declined to allow defendant, who executed the letter, to wriggle out of his obligation to pay plaintiff under the letter simply because plaintiff based his bona fide demand on unclearly labelled and worded letter but which intention was clear at the time plaintiff sued the executant as opposed to -debtor---High Court set aside the passed by Single Judge of High Court and declared that letter in question was a promissory note and could be relied upon by plaintiff against defendant who executed the same-Infra-court Appeal was allowed accordingly. \n \nState Engineering Corpn. Ltd. v. National Development Finance Corpn. 2006 SCMR 619; Ghulam Rasool v. Nazir of the Sindh High Court 1992 CLC 2490; National Bank of Pakistan v. Alam Industries Ltd. PLD 1992 Kar. 295; Rafique Hazquel Masih v. Bank Alfalah Ltd. 2005 SCMR 72; Adam Ali Agaria v. Asif Hussain 1996 MLD 322; Habib Bank Limited v. Shalimar Silk Mills Ltd. 1993, CLC 1295; Farid Akhtar Hadi v. Muhammad Latif Ghazi 1993 CLC 2015; Rahim Bakhsh v. Allah Jiwaya 1992 CLC 243; United Bank Ltd. v. Pakistan Industrial Credit 7 Investment Corpn. Ltd. 2002 CLD 1781 and Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfith Edition 212 ref.\n \n(f) Administration of justice---\n \n----Technicalities should not be used in order to circumvent true intention of agreement between parties or as an excuse to avoid liability properly and willingly incurred. \n \nRahim Bakhsh v. Allah Jiwaya 1992 CLC 2433 and United Bank Ltd. v. Pakistan Industrial Credit 7 Investment Corpn. Ltd. 2002 CLD 1781 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.150 of 1989, decision dated: 11-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND MUHAMMAD KARIM KHAN AGHA, JJ",
    "": "Messrs MILLWALA SONS LIMITED\nVs.\nMessrs JAYMISSCO and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13887",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1902 = 2009 SLD 1902 = 2009 CLD 1172",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss. 284, 285, 286, 287, 288 & 235(2)---Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, R.61---Companies (Issue of Capital) Rules, 1996---Application for merger of two companies---Parawise comments filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan in relation to the terms of Scheme of the merger contained. three observations i.e. that the swap ratio between the companies under merger had been calculated on the basis of break up value of shares taken on historical basis, it was recommended that the swap ratio should be based upon revaluation of assets for arriving at a realistic figure; that although paid up capital of the two merging entities was being added in consequence of the amalgamation, however, the same treatment could not be given to their authorised capital, the authorised capital of surviving entity should be increased to cover the aggregated paid up capital and that merging company was a loss making entity and therefore, the pubic share-holders of the company wherein it was being merged would suffer a disadvantage on account of the merger which was not in their interest---High Court while appreciating the intent of the points by Commission, conducted hearing after inviting the reply of the companies and these points had been answered through rejoinder in the main petition---Held, observations made by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, although pertinent, were not sufficient to counter the case for merger approved unanimously by the members of both the merging companies in their general meetings---No objection certificates' from all creditors banks of both companies had been placed on record which showed unanimous approval of the creditors for the relief of merger---High Court allowed the merger prayed for.\n \nMahmood Power Generation Limited and Mahmood Textile Mills Limited v. Joint Registrar of Companies and others 2006 CLC 1364 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Case No.48-L of 2008, decision dated: 31st March, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "Messrs NISHAT MILLS LTD.\nVs.\nNISHAT APPAREL LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13888",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1903 = 2009 SLD 1903 = 2009 CLD 1177",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) -------Ss.10 & 18---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.132, 133 & 134---Recovery of bank loan--Application for leave to defend the suit, grant of---Liability of mortgagor and guarantor---Scope---Rescheduling of loan---Blank documents---Bank filed suit for recovery of loan against borrower, guarantors and mortgagors, while declaratory suit was filed by mortgagor against bank---Guarantors stated that they had no knowledge about rescheduling of loan and their consent was not obtained---Mortgagor asserted that words \"\"not accepted\"\" were written on her property documents available with bank---Validity---On account of denial of parties, dispute could not be resolved without recording their evidence---For adjudicating bona fide question raised deep probe and investigation were required---It was also to be decided whether guarantors were bound for thing they had not guaranteed---Liability of mortgagor could only be thrust upon her in view of the documents executed by her---Defendants of both the suits made out prima facie case for grant of unconditional leave as the object received required detailed investigation through recording of evidence---Leave to appear was granted in circumstances. \n \n1981 CLC 847; 1994 CLC 854; AIR 1935 PC 21; AIR 1932 Bom. 168; MR 1918 PC 210; PLD 1968 SC 83; 2009 CLD 460; 2003 CLD 905; 2002 CLD 1707; 2004 CLD 388; 2004 CLD 110; 2005 CLD 581; PLD 1963 SC 163; PLD 1996 SC 749; PLD 1991 SC 976; 1998 MLD 529; 2001 YLR 1244; 2006 CLD 1506; PLD 1997 Kar. 62; 1987 CLC 2364; 2006 CLD 178; 2003 CLD 1406; PLD 1994 Kar. 196; 2006 SCMR 619; PLD 1998 Kar. 278 and 2004 CLD 1741 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M.As. Nos.1605, 1607 and 7711 in Suits Nos.B-1 and B-38 of 2008, decision dated: 20-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MS. SOOFIA LATIF, J",
    "": "Mrs. YUBA JAMIL ANSARI--Plaintiff\nVs.\nBANK ALFALAH LIMITED and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13889",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1904 = 2009 SLD 1904 = 2009 CLD 1185",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.78---Suit for recovery of loan amount---Denial by defendant (Director of borrowing company) to have signed letter of personal guarantee---Proof---None of plaintiffs witnesses had stated that letter of guarantee was signed by defendant in their presence--Plaintiff had not examined either marginal witness or any one in whose presence such letter was executed---Defendant could riot be held liable on basis of corporate record already under challenge in civil suit---Signatures of defendant on admitted documents available on record did not resemble or tally with his signatures on disputed documents---Suit against defendant-guarantor was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nZulfiqar Ali v. Muhammad Sikria 1998 CLC 900; Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Darya Khan Bangash 1994 MLD 1897; Abdul Waheed v. Zahida Parveen and others 2005 MLD 48 and Maqsood Ahmad v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 ref.\n \n(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Art.78---Disputed signatures---Proof---Court in certain eventualities enjoyed plenary power to itself to compare signatures along with other relevant material to effectively resolve such dispute. \n \nMessrs Waqas Enterprises and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and others 1999 SCMR 85 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No.82 of 1998, heard on 24-03-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs PEARL FABRICS LTD. Through Chief Executive and 7 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13890",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1905 = 2009 SLD 1905 = 2009 CLD 1195",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XIII, R.1 & S.151---Suit for recovery of .loan---Leave to appear and defend suit--Application seeking permission to receive additional documents---Plaintiff filed application seeking permission to receive additional documents which had not been filed earlier---Defendant filed application to appear and defend suit---Documents sought to be produced were considered necessary by the plaintiff to its case and it would be in the interest of justice if the same were taken on the record---Effect, however, of doing so would be the grant of defendants' application filed under S.10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to appear and defend suit---That was so because defendants in their counter affidavit had challenged those documents---Since the document on which the plaintiff sought to rely in the suit had to be proved in evidence, application of the plaintiff seeking permission to receive additional documents was allowed---Natural consequence of that would be the grant of application of the defendants to appear and defend suit.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-310 of 2007 and B-8 of 2008, decision dated: 18-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SALMAN TALIBUDDIN, J",
    "": "SAUDI PAK COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through Attorney --Plaintiff\nVs.\nNAZIMUDDIN and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13891",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1906 = 2009 SLD 1906 = 2009 CLD 1197",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.160 & 476---General meeting of the company or meeting of a class of members of the company---Notice of meeting---Violation of provisions in the notice---Imposition of penalty---Enforcement Department of the Securities and Exchange Commission while examining the notice of Extraordinary General Meeting of the company found that said notice did not contain any material facts with regard to special business regarding increase in authorized capital and bonus issue as required under 5.160(1)(b) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---In view of the fact that the company did not disclose material information to the shareholders and failed to place \"\"special business\"\" agenda item before the shareholders for their approval, a show-cause notice was issued to the Directors of the company to explain the situation, but they could not explain satisfactorily---Company had classified both the agenda items under the heading of special business, but had not provided the mandatory material facts to the shareholders as required under S.160 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Company was also required to pass resolution with regard to fractional shares as special business---Notice of the meeting, in circumstances, did not comply with the provisions of S.160 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Provisions of S.160 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 having been violated, Chief Executive and Directors of the company were found liable for the penalties as defined in S.160(8) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984; however, instead of imposing maximum fine on all the Directors, fine of Rs. ten thousand only was imposed on each Director.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice EMD-233/45/2008-1041-1047, dated 20-11-2008, decision dated: 27-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI AZEEM IKRAM, DIRECTOR (ENFORCEMENT)",
    "": "EAST WEST INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13892",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1907 = 2009 SLD 1907 = 2009 CLD 1203",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961)-------S. 39(9)(10)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XX, R.6---Recovery petition by Bank---Interim relief of attachment was granted to Bank, however, while passing the final order though the attachment was specifically confirmed, but no direction regarding any other relief was made particularly the sale direction was conspicuous!\"\" missing---Order of the court in which sale direction was not given, was not executable qua the sale as well when the order provided the acceptance of the recovery petition in general terms and not containing such a direction---Principles.\n \nIn the main recovery petition the Bank had asked for multiple reliefs including the appointment of receiver, etc. and specifically for the sale of the properties and for the attachment thereof. The interim relief of attachment was granted to it however, while passing the final order though the attachment was specifically confirmed, but no direction regarding any other relief was given, particularly the sale direction was conspicuously missing. The word \"\"or\"\" in section 39(9), Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961 is significant and means that the court has the option and the authority to grant either or both the reliefs or otherwise. Therefore, the question which needed determination was, if such an order in which sale direction was not given is executable qua the sale as well, when final order provided the acceptance of the recovery petition in general terms and not such a direction. This provision clearly postulates that the order passed under section 39(9) is composite in the nature i.e. entailing the \"\" \"\" and also a \"\"decree\"\"; the in the context of law is the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of decree, while the decree envisages the relief allowed and is the only instrument having relevance for the execution; the expression in the section \"\"shall be carried into effect\"\" connotes the execution of such a decree and obviously as per the command of section 39(10) of the Ordinance in the manner as has been provided in the Civil Procedure Code. The important aspect, which is to be seen is, whether the final order qualifies the test of a decree, which can be independently executed as required under the law. In this behalf, reference can be made to the provisions of Order XX, rule 6, C.P.C. which prescribes the contents of decree. It is the decree that is to be executed and should clearly specify the relief granted or other determination of the suit. It should be self-contained and capable of execution without reference to any other document. A decree and are distinct and separate documents, though the decree should follow the , but it must specifically contain as to what is the relief which has been allowed to the claimant/plaintiff so that through mechanism of execution (provided in Civil Procedure Code) the fruits thereof can be granted to the decree-holder; final order was a composite order which embodied both the as also the decree, the latter part was the decree and if it (this part) did not specifically provide the relief granted, it shall not conform to the concept of the decree, which could be executed under the law and this was fundamental flaw in the final order as the case was heard on few occasions and during the course of one of the hearings, the Bank, realizing the above fault, had moved an application under section 151 read with section 107(2), C.P.C. seeking direction from High Court to correct and amend the final order suffice it to say that the present proceedings had arisen out of the execution and not on the original side, therefore, the provision of section 107(2), C.P.C. shall be inapplicable; the Bank may, however, choose appropriate remedy if permissible under the law for seeking appropriate amendment of the final order before the proper forum, so as to bring it in lines with section 39(9) of the Ordinance. \n \nMuhammad Suleman v. Wilayatullah Khan and 2 others 1990 CLC 110; Kareem Bux v. P.O. Sindh and others 1998 CLC 27; Muhammad Ilyas and others v. Muhammad Yasin 1985 CLC 1660 and AIR1944 O. 42 ref.\n \n(b) Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961)---\n \n----S. 39(10)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66---Recovery petition---Auction sale of property of -debtor---Notice under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. having not been issued, the entire proceedings of the auction without complying with the mandatory provision of O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. including the sale in favour of auction purchaser, stood vitiated and annulled. \n \nMessrs Ripple Jewellers (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and another v. First Woman Bank through Officers/General Attorney/Principal Officers and 6 others 2003 CLD 1318; Brig. (Retd.) Mazhar-ul-Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. Islamabad and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706; Muhammad Hassan v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd through Branch Manager and 3 others 2003 CLD 1693; Mirza Munawar Baig and 5 others v. Bank Alfalah Limited and 2 others 2007 YLR 126; Mrs. Shahida Saleem and another v. Habib Credit and Exchange Bank Ltd, and others 2001 CLC 126 and Mst. Zainab Bibi v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others 2003 YLR 3274 ref.\n \n(c) Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961)---\n \n----S. 39(9)(10)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.84---Recovery petition--Auction sale of property of -debtor---Whether auction-purchaser could make the payment of 25% of the auction price through cheque---Principles.\n \nOrder XXI, Rule 84, C.P.C. is a mandatory provision because if the amount is not deposited with the Court auctioneer, he is bound to re-sell the property forthwith; this conforms to the spirit of the law that quite a steps and legal formalities are undertaken before the auction and if the successful bidder runs away and the auction remains unsuccessful on that account, again all the legal niceties have to be followed, which shall be an abuse of the process of law and the chance of re-sale there and then shall be gone and frustrated; it is in the above context that the law envisages a cash payment and even otherwise when the law (the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) was enforced, the banking system, as it is today, was not in place, therefore, the payment through cheque could not be conceived, however, because of the changed circumstances, now-a-days it is a real risk and peril to carry huge money, thus, the payment through cheques can be received, this shall not militate against the spirit of Order XXI, rule 84, C.P.C. but the successful bidder along with the cheque should also establish by providing the latest bank statement to the court auctioneer that he has the requisite funds in the account from where the cheque is issued and if it is otherwise, the officer in the light of the command of law should re-sell the property forthwith, otherwise the law for the resale shall be infringed. Auction-purchaser, in the present case, had failed to provide any statement of accounts to establish the availability of such funds on the relevant date. Instead of allowing the same cheque encashed by the court auctioneer, the auction-purchasers themselves, after three days asked the officer to return it and paid him the cash amount, this was so reported by the court auctioneer in his auction report, this clearly showed that auction-purchaser had no sufficient amount in the said account and this was subsequently replaced by the cash. On account of withholding the best evidence i.e. proof about the availability of the funds in the bank account of auction-purchaser from which the cheque was issued, a presumption could be drawn against him in terms of Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984.\n \nAsim Hafeez for Appellants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.390 of 2004, decision dated: 25-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J",
    "": "Messrs SHAH„¢S IMPEX INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Sikander Ali and 2 others\nVs.\nIDBP through Authorized Officer and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13893",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1908 = 2009 SLD 1908 = 2009 CLD 1213",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------S.14---Sales Representative of Insurance Company having qualified during lifetime for three categories of insurance policies---Death of Sales Representative by electric shock---Payment of amount relating to Field Self Subscribed Group Insurance policy to mother of deceased---Claim by mother of deceased for amount of remaining insurance policies i.e. Compulsory Group Insurance and Self Subscribed Compulsory Group Insurance---Insurance Company neither in written reply nor during evidence denied such claim---High Court set aside the order of Appellate Tribunal and accepted the claim in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.10 of 2008, heard on 19-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI AND KH. FAROOQ SAEED, JJ",
    "": "Mst. RUKIA BIVI\nVs.\nSTATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Chairman and\nanother"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13894",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1909 = 2009 SLD 1909 = 2009 CLD 1215",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.11 & O. VII, R.11---Suit for damages and cancellation of loan documents prepared by Bank on basis of blank and fake documents---Documents alleged by borrower to be void were found authentic by Banking Court while decreeing earlier suit of Bank for recovery of loan amount-Non-filing of appeal by borrower against such decree---Validity---Bank at relevant time had authority to obtain signatures of borrower on blank documents---Signing of blank documents by borrower 20 years prior to enforcement of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would amount to his agreeing on implied terms authorizing Bank to fill in the date and amount at a later point of time---Plaint did not disclose a cause of action---Plea raised by borrower in his suit, if entertained, would nullify effect of such decree, which had become final against him---Borrower's suit was hit by principle of res judicata---Plaint in borrower's suit was rejected under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., in circumstances. \n \nAl-Rehman Chemicals v. Akhtar Asaleem Syed 2008 CLD 856; Naeem-ud-Din v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and 2 others 2006 CLD 484; ADBP and others v. Yar Muhammad .and others 2004 CLD 1084; State Bank of Pakistan v. Chiragh Son Engineering Ltd. and another 2000 YLR 1198; Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax Faisalabad Zone v. Messrs Shehzad & Co. Faisalabad 2006 PTD 2436 and Muhammad Mumtaz Masood and 2 others v. HBFC and 2 others 1994 SCMR 2287 ref.\n \nMessrs United Bank Ltd. v. President Bazm-e-Salat and another PLD 1986 Kar. 464; Messrs Bank of Oman Ltd. v. East Asia Trading Co. Ltd. and 4 others 1987 CLC 288; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Waheed Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 1989 Kar. 371; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs M. Ismail Thakur & Sons Ltd. and another 1988 CLC 700 and United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Sartaj Industries through Qaisar Iqbal Managing Painter and 6 others PLD 1990 Lab. 99 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S.11---Res juclicata, principle of---Scope---No suit by itself could be barred as res judicata, by only matters or issues involved therein might be barred---Subject matter of two suits must be directly and substantially in issue to warrant application of S.11, C.P.C.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No.35 of 2003, decision dated: 24-02-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "Messrs NISHAT IMPEX (PVT.) LTD. Through Representative and another--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nMessrs HABIB BANK LTD. through Duly Authorized Attorneys and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13895",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1910 = 2009 SLD 1910 = 2009 CLD 1221",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to appear and defend suit---Return of plaint---Plaintiff had consolidated various cases of action in a para. of the plaint, i.e. that he was threatened and harassed by defendant; and an amount of Rs.10,000 was also paid by the plaintiff in consequence of the conduct of the defendant---Such various causes were inseparable as they all\nhad occurred at one time and at one place which was 'R'---Plaint had merely declared that cause of action had occurred at place but that para. of the plaint was in total disagreement with previous para.---Was not permissible under the law to file two separate suits arising out of the same cause of action before two different courts--All the causes of action had to be adjudicated by one and the same court having territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction---Plaint, in circumstances, was rightly returned by the Trial Court under O. VII, R. 10, C.P.C.---Appeal against said order of the Trial Court, was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.209 of 2007, heard on 12-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI AND KH. FAROOQ SAEED, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD KHURRAM MIRZA\nVs.\nSMALL MEDIUM ENTERPRISES BANK (SME) through Branch Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13896",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1911 = 2009 SLD 1911 = 2009 CLD 1224",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.22--Appeal---Appellant had stated that he did not want to pursue the appeal and wanted to withdraw the same, if the decretal amount was recovered from the appellant through instalments---Counsel for Bank had no objection to the statement of the appellant--Appeal was dismissed as having been withdrawn, however, it was directed that the decretal amount should be recovered by the Bank from the appellant through instalments, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.361 of 2008, decision dated: 19-01-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND HAFIZ TARIQ NASIM, JJ",
    "": "Mian SULTAN AHMED\nVs.\nALLIED BANK LIMITED through Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13897",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1912 = 2009 SLD 1912 = 2009 CLD 1225",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------S.10---Appeal against interlocutory order---Maintainability---After order of company being wound up by Company Judge, appeal against interlocutory order lies before Division Bench of High Court---Where dispute is in respect of winding up proceedings, same lies within the terms of S.10 (1) of Companies Ordinance, 1984, before Supreme Court---Where company ordered to be wound up has paid up capital of not less than Rupees one million, direct appeal lies to Supreme Court and where company to be wound up has paid up capital of less than Rupees one million or having no share capital, such appeal lies only if Supreme Court grants leave to appeal. \n \nIbrahim Shamshi v. Bashir Ahmed Memon 2005 SCMR 1450; Ch. Jamil Ahmed v. Nippon Bobbin Company (Pakistan) Ltd. PLD 1991 Lah. 467; Messrs Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Kamal Enterprises PLD 1995 Quatta 41; Lahore Development Authority v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2003 CLD 1764; Zakauddin v. Dastgir Investment and Management Ltd. (Liquidation) 2004 CLC 1037; Muhammad Bux v. Pakistan Industrial Credit Investment Corporation Limited 1999 SCMR 25; Muhammad Farooq. V. T.J Ebrahim and Company and Alliance Motors PLD 1999 Kar. 246; Mehbood Industries v. PICIC 1988 CLC 866 and Multiline Associate v. Ardeshir Cowasjee 1995 SCMR 362 ref.\n \nFakhruddin Khan v. Messrs Ruby Rice and General 2001 YLR 1997 and Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Co. and others Civil Appeals Nos. 1045 and 1221 of 1999, 378 of 2003, 320 of 2004 and Civil Petition No.2450 of 2001 rel.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S.10---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---Intra-court Appeal---Auction of property---Improvement of bid---Appellant was the highest bidder but Official Assignee got the bid improved in proceedings conducted on the following day---Plea raised by appellant was that such proceedings conducted by Official Assignee were illegal as the same were conducted behind his back---Validity---Signatures of appellant on improvement memo appeared to be different from his signatures on initial offer of appellant and with signatures in supporting affidavit to Intra-Court Appeal and Vakalatnama of appellant---Such fact had created doubt in the mind of Division Bench of High Court---Had the Official Assignee checked the signatures at improvement memo, the controversy would not have arisen-Such aspect of the matter might have escaped notice of Company Judge of High Court, while dismissing application filed by appellant---As the amount received on account of sale auction of the property was to be distributed to affectees, therefore, Division Bench of High Court, in the interest of all concerned, set aside the order passed by Company Judge of High Court and remanded proceedings for improvement of bid which were deemed to be pending Division Bench of High Court directed Official Assignee to call parties afresh for improvement of bid as the appellant had shown his desire to improve his bid---Infra-court Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 33 of 2007, decision dated: 1st April, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND ARSHAD SIRAJ MEMON, JJ",
    "": "Syed WAJAHAT HUSSAIN ZAIDI\nVs.\nMessrs T.J. IBRAHIM & CO. through Official Assignee and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13898",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1913 = 2009 SLD 1913 = 2009 CLD 1250",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)-------S.41---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition----Banker and Customer---Withdrawal of rate of profit at agreed rate and unilateral reduction of return by Banks on \"\"Profit Schemes\"\"---Conditions contained in the Certificates of schemes were concluded contract and the obligations of parties were to be performed according to these conditions---Depositors in the schemes, could invest without being an account-holder, which fact, by itself, signified that conditions contained in the Account Opening Form\"\" had no application to the investments under the Scheme---Fixed deposit for a fixed period on fixed rate of profit on fixed mode of payment, could not be stretched to fall within the \"\"Profit and Loss Sharing System\"\" of the Banks---Principles. \n \nMuhammad Javed Anjum v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Writ Petition No.4095 of 2003 and I.C.A. No.68 of 2004 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S. 41---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.199 & 18---Constitutional petition---Theory of State action and doctrine of public trust'---Applicability---Scope---Banker and Customer---withdrawal of rate of profit at agreed rate and unilateral reduction of return by Bank on Profit Scheme---Grievance of the depositors was not only that Banking Company had breached the terms of contract but the contract involved the public interest and Bank and under the cover of act of omission on the part of State Bank of Pakistan, was running the banking business detrimental to the interest of public as well as the depositors---Whenever it was found that a banking company was conducting its affairs in a manner, detrimental to the interest of its depositors, the State Bank of Pakistan being regulatory body, was bound to issue directions in the public interest---Transaction of banking business, by a company licensed by State Bank of Pakistan to do so, was a \"\"public purpose\"\", and a Bank was performing this function-Delayed action or inaction on the part of State Bank of Pakistan, in the affairs of such companies could be judicially reviewed in the exercise of powers conferred under Art.199 of the Constitution---Principles. \n \nWalk Orient Power and Light Limited v. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Water and Power through Secretary Islamabad and 2 others 1998 CLC 1178; Shehla Zia and others v. WAPDA PLD 1994 SC 693; Messrs Huffaz Seamless Pipe Industries Ltd. v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. and others 1998 CLC 1890 and Network Television Marketing Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan and another 2001 CLC 681 rel.\n \n(c) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S. 41---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Bank under effective control of the State Bank of Pakistan, so far its banking business is concerned, discharges pub is functions, receives and transacts in public money in trust for public interest---Such functions of the Bank in substance are instrumentalities and functions of the State/Federation and are thus, subject to judicial review of High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. \n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court does not extend to enforcement of contractual obligation---Contractual obligation or redressal of breach thereof, can adequately be redressed through a regular suit---Principles---Instances where the High Courts and Supreme Court have passed appropriate directions on the subject in the interest of justice in given situations enumerated. \n \n(e) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Breach of statutory duty and breach of trust---Mandamus, writ of---Issuance---Banker and customer---Withdrawal of rate of profit at agreed rate and unilateral reduction of return by Bankers on Profit Schemes---In the present case, determination of factual controversy was not involved and the only question raised by the depositors was legality or otherwise of the reduction of agreed profit---Such question being legal, had direct bearing on the investment of large number of depositors, therefore; its resolution through invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, was proper and imperative---Present situation was not the breach of contract which was complained of, rather the issue involved was breach of statutory obligation and breach of public trust---Writ of mandamus would lie to compel the performance of public duty, no matter what was the source, it could be statute, contract or charter etc.---Construction of a written contract involved the question of law, true construction of contract was to be decided by courts and none else---Objection to maintainability of constitutional petition, in the present case, was thus, overruled as constitutional jurisdiction of High Court was rightly invoked. \n \n(f) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.23---Constitutional petition---Banker and customer---Unilateral reduction in the agreed rate of profit in \"\"Profit Schemes\"\" floated by Banks, through investment certificates---Contention of the Banks was that reduction in the agreed rate of profit was resorted to in the terms of \"\"Account Opening Form\"\" which authorized the Banks to bring variation in the rate of profit and reduce the same according to changed circumstances---Such plea did not justify the action of the Bank---Bank had widely advertised through scheme payment of profit at a stipulated rate---Certificates purchased by the depositors contained the condition of payment of profit at the said rate--Brochure,. the public notices cited in print media and Certificates (MMC) nowhere provided for reduction of rate of agreed profit unilaterally---Condition, in Account Opening Form, in circumstances, had no precedence over the conditions incorporated in the certificate itself which was paramount document---Investors could purchase certificates, without being an account-holder, therefore, any condition mentioned in the form will not override the express stipulation in the Certificates---Term of unilateral reduction in the agreed rate of profit, mentioned in the \"\"Account Opening Form\"\" was un¬conscionable, discriminatory and against the public policy and was therefore, unenforceable under S.23, Contract Act, 1872---Impugned action of the Banks whereby the rate of return/profit on Investment Certificates had been reduced unilaterally, was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect---Banks were legally bound to pay the depositors the profits, on the agreed terms, as expressly incorporated in the Certificates---Depositors were entitled to profit at the agreed rate, till final payment in respect of their investments. \n \nJ. Spmling Ltd. v. Bradshow (1956) 1 WLR 461 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.11148 of 2003, decision dated: 6-03-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through President and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13899",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1914 = 2009 SLD 1914 = 2009 CLD 1250",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)-------S.41---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition----Banker and Customer---Withdrawal of rate of profit at agreed rate and unilateral reduction of return by Banks on \"\"Profit Schemes\"\"---Conditions contained in the Certificates of schemes were concluded contract and the obligations of parties were to be performed according to these conditions---Depositors in the schemes, could invest without being an account-holder, which fact, by itself, signified that conditions contained in the Account Opening Form\"\" had no application to the investments under the Scheme---Fixed deposit for a fixed period on fixed rate of profit on fixed mode of payment, could not be stretched to fall within the \"\"Profit and Loss Sharing System\"\" of the Banks---Principles. \n \nMuhammad Javed Anjum v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Writ Petition No.4095 of 2003 and I.C.A. No.68 of 2004 rel.\n \n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S. 41---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.199 & 18---Constitutional petition---Theory of State action and doctrine of public trust'---Applicability---Scope---Banker and Customer---withdrawal of rate of profit at agreed rate and unilateral reduction of return by Bank on Profit Scheme---Grievance of the depositors was not only that Banking Company had breached the terms of contract but the contract involved the public interest and Bank and under the cover of act of omission on the part of State Bank of Pakistan, was running the banking business detrimental to the interest of public as well as the depositors---Whenever it was found that a banking company was conducting its affairs in a manner, detrimental to the interest of its depositors, the State Bank of Pakistan being regulatory body, was bound to issue directions in the public interest---Transaction of banking business, by a company licensed by State Bank of Pakistan to do so, was a \"\"public purpose\"\", and a Bank was performing this function-Delayed action or inaction on the part of State Bank of Pakistan, in the affairs of such companies could be judicially reviewed in the exercise of powers conferred under Art.199 of the Constitution---Principles. \n \nWalk Orient Power and Light Limited v. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Water and Power through Secretary Islamabad and 2 others 1998 CLC 1178; Shehla Zia and others v. WAPDA PLD 1994 SC 693; Messrs Huffaz Seamless Pipe Industries Ltd. v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. and others 1998 CLC 1890 and Network Television Marketing Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan and another 2001 CLC 681 rel.\n \n(c) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S. 41---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Bank under effective control of the State Bank of Pakistan, so far its banking business is concerned, discharges pub is functions, receives and transacts in public money in trust for public interest---Such functions of the Bank in substance are instrumentalities and functions of the State/Federation and are thus, subject to judicial review of High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. \n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court does not extend to enforcement of contractual obligation---Contractual obligation or redressal of breach thereof, can adequately be redressed through a regular suit---Principles---Instances where the High Courts and Supreme Court have passed appropriate directions on the subject in the interest of justice in given situations enumerated. \n \n(e) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Breach of statutory duty and breach of trust---Mandamus, writ of---Issuance---Banker and customer---Withdrawal of rate of profit at agreed rate and unilateral reduction of return by Bankers on Profit Schemes---In the present case, determination of factual controversy was not involved and the only question raised by the depositors was legality or otherwise of the reduction of agreed profit---Such question being legal, had direct bearing on the investment of large number of depositors, therefore; its resolution through invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, was proper and imperative---Present situation was not the breach of contract which was complained of, rather the issue involved was breach of statutory obligation and breach of public trust---Writ of mandamus would lie to compel the performance of public duty, no matter what was the source, it could be statute, contract or charter etc.---Construction of a written contract involved the question of law, true construction of contract was to be decided by courts and none else---Objection to maintainability of constitutional petition, in the present case, was thus, overruled as constitutional jurisdiction of High Court was rightly invoked. \n \n(f) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.23---Constitutional petition---Banker and customer---Unilateral reduction in the agreed rate of profit in \"\"Profit Schemes\"\" floated by Banks, through investment certificates---Contention of the Banks was that reduction in the agreed rate of profit was resorted to in the terms of \"\"Account Opening Form\"\" which authorized the Banks to bring variation in the rate of profit and reduce the same according to changed circumstances---Such plea did not justify the action of the Bank---Bank had widely advertised through scheme payment of profit at a stipulated rate---Certificates purchased by the depositors contained the condition of payment of profit at the said rate--Brochure,. the public notices cited in print media and Certificates (MMC) nowhere provided for reduction of rate of agreed profit unilaterally---Condition, in Account Opening Form, in circumstances, had no precedence over the conditions incorporated in the certificate itself which was paramount document---Investors could purchase certificates, without being an account-holder, therefore, any condition mentioned in the form will not override the express stipulation in the Certificates---Term of unilateral reduction in the agreed rate of profit, mentioned in the \"\"Account Opening Form\"\" was un¬conscionable, discriminatory and against the public policy and was therefore, unenforceable under S.23, Contract Act, 1872---Impugned action of the Banks whereby the rate of return/profit on Investment Certificates had been reduced unilaterally, was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect---Banks were legally bound to pay the depositors the profits, on the agreed terms, as expressly incorporated in the Certificates---Depositors were entitled to profit at the agreed rate, till final payment in respect of their investments. \n \nJ. Spmling Ltd. v. Bradshow (1956) 1 WLR 461 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.11148 of 2003, decision dated: 6-03-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through President and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13900",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1915 = 2009 SLD 1915 = 2009 CLD 1271",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XXXVII, Rr.1 & 2---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---Suit for recovery of money on the basis of dishonoured cheque---Unconditional leave---Plaintiff filed suit for recovery of Rs.21 million on the basis of dishonoured cheque issued by defendant in his favour---Defendant had business relationship with plaintiff who was a stock broker and was maintaining account of defendant for purchase of shares under his instructions-Plaintiff purchased shares on behalf of defendant and cheque for consideration of the shares issued by defendant was dishonoured---Single Judge of High Court granted leave to defend the suit on the condition of furnishing of surety for a sum of Rs.21 million---Plea raised by defendant was that in lieu of dishonoured cheque, he had issued pay order to plaintiff---Validity---Whether after the cheque in question was dishonoured, pay order of same amount was issued in respect of the amount pertaining to dishonoured cheque or it was under some other consideration---Such question could only be answered after recording of evidence---After coming to conclusion that defendant had plausible defence, he had become entitled for unconditional leave to defend the suit---Division Bench of High Court modified order passed by the Single Judge of High Court to the extent that defendant was entitled for grant of unconditional leave to defend the suit---Intra-Court Appeal was allowed in circumstances. \n \nMian Rafique Saigol and another v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. and another PLD 1996 SC 749; Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) v. Messrs Sea Gold Traders and 2 others 2003 CLD 392 and Fine Textile Mills v. Haji Umar PLD 1969 SC 163 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "H.C. A. No. 28 of 2008 and C.M.A. No.141 of 2009, decision dated: 20-03-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND ARSHAD NOOR KHAN, JJ",
    "": "NAVEED HAIDER\nVs.\nMessrs NOMAN ABID CO. LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13901",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1916 = 2009 SLD 1916 = 2009 CLD 1276",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.19---Object of S.19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 being to expedite recovery process and protect interests of genuine aggrieved parties prior to execution being permitted---Principles.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.19(7)---Compromise decree, execution of---Amendment/variation of compromise decree by parties out of Court---Validity---Parties by consent, out of Court, could vary/amend their own---Court sanctioned compromise decree not affecting its substance, but simply substituting one form of security With another being sufficient to repay debt---Such variations/amendments would not require seal of Court, but failure to have same endorsed by Court might be fatal to parties or one party seeking to rely thereon---Duty of Executing Court to determine, whether by new agreement, compromise decree had been varied, if so to what extent, and whether mortgage charge stood relinquished without any order of Court and/or parties had agreed for disposal of specified property and thereafter if decree remained unsatisfied, then mortgaged property might be put to auction---Principles. \n \nMuhammad Ashraf v. Arshad Malik 2003 CLD 1310; Noor Hayat Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Judge, Banking Court No.1 2004 CLD 1281; Farasat Jabeen v. United Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 1586; Habib Ullah v. Bank of Khyber 2007 CLD 875; Mehran Solvent Extraction (Pvt.) Ltd. v. I. D. B. P 2008 CLD 844; Muhammad Hussain and Co. v. Habib Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 1400; Nazir Ahmed Vaid v. Habib Bank A.G. Zurich 2005 CLD 1571; Muhammad Alamgir v. Bank of Punjab 2005 CLD 1408; Habib Bank Limited v. Service Fabrics Ltd. 2004 CLD 1117; Intercity Transport System v. Judge, Banking Court No.II 2004 CLD 466; Pakistan Industrial Leasing Corporation Ltd. v. Noorani Industries (Pvt.) Limited 2003 CLD 259; WAPDA v. Abdul Rauf PLD 2002 Lah. 268 and Muhammad Saleem v. Farida Saleem PLD 2006 Kar. 410 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeals Nos. 319, 320, 321, 323, 336 and 337 of 2008, decision dated: 21st May, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND MUHAMMAD KARIM KHAN AGHA, JJ",
    "": "WORLD AUTOMOBILES through Proprietor and others\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. and 4 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13902",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1917 = 2009 SLD 1917 = 2009 CLD 1289",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Speaking order------Not length of order, but its quality is important. \n \n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)---\n \n---Ss. 8(a) & 10(1)---Registration of trademark having name similar to that of an already registered trademark---Determination---Infringement or passing off in respect of earlier trademark---Test stated.\n \nWhether a proposed trademark with a name similar to that of an already registered trademark can also be registered, or be regarded as infringement or passing off in respect of the earlier trademark, the test is whether through a similarity in name and pronunciation, the two trademarks are likely to cause confusion in the mind of the public. \n \nWhere only the prefix of the trademark (which is generic in nature) is similar and the suffixes are largely different, then there is lesser chance of confusion. \n \nEnglish Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chas A. Mendoza 1998 MLD 1234; In the matter of an application by Beck, Koller and Company England Limited for the registration of a Trade Mark, before the Assistant Comptroller 1947 RPC 76; Glaxo Laboratories Ltd. v. Asstt. Registrar, Trade Marks PLD 1977 Kar. 858 and Zenith Laboratory (Pak.) Ltd. v. British Drug Houses Ltd. PLD 1970 Dac. 772 rel.\n \n(c) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)---\n \n----Ss.8(a) & 10(1)---\"\"Gluconorm\"\" and \"\"Clucophage\"\", both medicines being used for treatment of diabetes---Applications for registration of trademark \"\"Gluconorm\"\" opposed by holder of registered trademark \"\"Glucophage\"\"---Validity---Where only prefix of trademark (generic in nature) was similar and suffixes were largely different, then there would be lessor chance of confusion---Both such trademarks contained prefix \"\"Gluco\"\", which would not alone exclude applicant's product from being registered---Suffixes of both such marks being \"\"Phage\"\" and \"\"Norm being entirely different in spelling and pronunciation from each other---Packing boxes of both such medicines were of different colours and showing different spelling of suffixes and chemical names underneath---Person interested in purchasing either of such medicines might have benefit of pharmacist's advice or medical practitioner---Public would not be confused by marks \"\"Clucophage\"\" and \"\"Cluconorm\"\"---Opposition against registration of trademark \"\"Cluconorm\"\" was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nRexona Proprietary Ltd. v. Majid Soap Works PLD 1956 Sindh 1; Zenith Laboratory (Pak) Ltd. v. British Drug Houses Ltd. PLD 1970 Dac. 772; Ram Kumar Jalan v. R.J. Wood & Co. AIR 1941 Lah. 262; Burney's Industrial and Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Rehman Match Works PLD 1983 Kar. 357; Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Muhammad Altaf PLD 1991 SC 27; Seven-Up Company v. Kohinoor Thread Ball Factory PLD 1990 SC 313; Al-Anis Laboratories v. Al-Chemist 1987 MLD 2823; Platinum Pharmaceuticals Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Stand Pharm Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd 2006 CLD 1109; Glaxo Laboratories Ltd. v. Assistant Registrar, Trade Marks PLD 1977 Kar. 858; Indo-Pharma Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticals Ltd. AIR 1998 Mad. 347; J.R. Kapoor v. Micronix India 1994(3) SCC 215; S.B.L. Ltd. v. Himalaya Drug Co. AIR 1998 Del. 126; E.Q. Squibb & Sons Inc. v. Curewel India Ltd. AIR 1987 Del. 197; Hamdard N.F. (Pak.) v. E.I.Du Pont De Nemours & Co. 1987 CLC 1937; Welcome Foundation Ltd. v. Khawar 1989 MLD 2516; Muhammad Yaqoob Lasani Engineering Company v. Punjab Engineering Company 1992 CLC 2036 and Corn. Products v. Shangrila Food Products AIR 1960 SC 142 ref.\n \nBayer A.G. v. Macter International (Pvt.) Ltd. 2003 CLD 794; English Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chas A. Mendoza 1998 MLD 1234; In the matter of an application by Beck, Koller and Company England Limited for the registration of a Trade Mark, before the Assistant Comptroller 1947 RPC 76; Glaxo Laboratories Ltd. v. Asstt. Registrar, Trade Marks PLD 1977 Kar. 858 and Zenith Laboratory (Pak.) Ltd. v. British Drug Houses Ltd. PLD 1970 Dac. 772 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No.35 of 2004, decision dated: 25-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KARIM KHAN AGHA, J",
    "": "LIPHA LYONNAISE INDUSTRIELLE PHARMACEUTIQUE through Authorized Signatory\nVs.\nREGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13903",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1918 = 2009 SLD 1918 = 2009 CLD 1301",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------S. 118---Presumption under S.118, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881---Scope---Such presumption was not a conclusive presumption about the drawing, consideration etc. of the negotiable instrument rather was rebuttable in nature---Matter of presumption shall be determined by the court on the preponderance of the complete evidence on the record---Principles illustrated.\n \nSection 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, does not envisage a conclusive presumption about the drawing consideration etc. of the negotiable instrument, rather without any fear of contradiction, it can be' held to be rebuttable in nature and this is so clear and obvious from the expression used in the section i.e. \"\"until the contrary is proved\"\". The question which shall thus, arises for the consideration is that where a claim is propounded on the basis of a negotiable instrument, is it necessary and imperative in all such cases that the defendant should prove in the negative, that he has not drawn the instrument and that it is without consideration or it is for the plaintiff to discharge the initial burden of proving his case in this regard, especially when the plaintiff has undertaken to prove that the negotiable instrument (cheque) has been duly executed for the consideration not only that issue had been framed in this case, which has placed the onus in this behalf upon the plaintiff, rather he himself led evidence to prove the payment of the money through two witnesses, his own statement and the statement of Bank Manager, therefore, the respondent/plaintiff is precluded in law to urge in this case that it was for the defendant to prove to the contrary. \n \nMatter of presumption shall be determined by the court on the preponderance of the complete evidence on the record. \n \nWithout prejudice to the above, it may further be added that the expression \"\"until the contrary is proved\"\" is couched in the negative and the proof of a \"\"negative fact\"\" has its own limitations and bounds and the law in this behalf does not recognize and require that a litigant should imperatively give the positive evidence of a \"\"negative fact\"\"; this is inconceivable under the law of the proof of a fact. However, the above rule is subject to certain exceptions, where for example that the defendant through positive evidence shall be able to substantiate that on a given date he was not at the place where the execution of the instrument is alleged or the plaintiff has no capacity or the mean to grant the loan, or he or his relative met with some accident or were seriously ill, hospitalized or operated upon which. would preclude the execution of the instrument; these shall constitute an apt illustration of the proof \"\"to the contrary\"\" and may be held to be one category of the cases falling within the purview of section 118; however, the second category, which is perceived by the said section is when after the conclusion of the trial, on the basis of the complete evidence on the record from whichever side it is adduced, that the Court shall be required to determine if the execution and consideration, etc. is proved to be contrary or otherwise. It may be relevant to mention that of course, it shall be permissible in law to prove \"\"to the contrary\"\" by means of cross-examination upon the witnesses of the plaintiff, that the instrument was not drawn and the consideration never passed. The present case falls in the second category and thus, it is on the basis of the total evidence on the record by applying the rule of preponderance (of the evidence) and the possibility that such lis should be decided. \n \n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----S. 118---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII----Presumption as to negotiable instrument of consideration---Scope---Suit for recovery of loan amount on the basis of a cheque, after grant of leave to defendants and holding the trial, had been decreed by the Trial Court---Suit had not been filed within the life time of the defendant; explanation given in the plaint and in the evidence about his promise to repay the amount and that on account of his illness he expressed his inability, had not been established through independent evidence; no written agreement had been produced on the record or even alleged to have been executed between the parties and despite relationship, it was quite improbable that such substantial amount shall be given by the plaintiff only on the basis of mutual trust; no date, month and even the year of the granting of loan had been given in the plaint; however, it was vaguely mentioned that it was during the time when the Mill of defendant was being in process of creation; plaintiff in his cross-examination had stated that Mill of defendant started functioning in 1997-1998 while his witness' had stated that the money was paid through two tranches i.e. 4-4-1999 and 25-4-1999 which meant that it was after the establishment of the Mill, thus had serious reflection upon the motive and the very purpose of the loan; statement of defendant's witnesses with regard to dates of establishment and closure of the Mill of defendant because of losses had not been subjected to cross-examination by the plaintiff which shall be deemed to have been admitted, had belied the execution and consideration of the cheque; capacity of the plaintiff to pay the amount was under challenge but he had not been able to establish that in the year 1997-1998, he had such a substantial amount to pay to the defendant as loan; plaintiff though admitted to be the income tax assessee but expressed lack of knowledge if the amount of loan advanced to the defendant was declared in his income tax return; plaintiff not only in the plaint but also in his own statement while appearing as witness had mentioned that (Punchaiat) had gone to the defendant for the return of money on two occasions, but no independent person in this behalf had been examined, son, cousin and brother-in-law of plaintiff who appeared as witnesses for plaintiff could not be considered to be those respectables, who in the ordinary parlance could be said to constitute Punchaiat; cheque in question had not been filled up by defendant, and as to who had filled the cheque, was not proved on record; signatures of defendant on the cheque had not been asked for the opinion of expert by the plaintiff; Bank Officer was unable to state, if the signatures on the cheque belonged to the defendant or otherwise; exact dates, which had been given by the plaintiffs witness i.e. Rs.20, 000, 00 was paid on 4-4-1999 and Rs.10, 000, 00 on 25-4-1999, were not specifically mentioned in the plaint nor even so specified in the statement of other plaintiffs' witness and no explanation was available on record about such very conspicuous omission; such quality of evidence on the record had excluded the case from realm of the transactions as had been contemplated by the provisions of S.118, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881---Case of the plaintiff that the decision of the matter must exclusively be founded on the presumption of S.118, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, could not be accepted---Presumption, in circumstances, stood repelled and the plaintiff had failed to prove his case---Judgment and decree of the Trial Court was set aside with the result that suit stood dismissed. \n \nSalar Abdur Rauf v. Mst. Barkat Bibi 1973 SCMR 332; Mahmood Hassan Ashraf v. Shakil Ahmad 1973 SCMR 595; Sundarammal v. Subramanya Chettiar and others AIR 1916 Mad. 278; Syed Aijaz Hussain v. Syed Abdul Azeem 2008 CLD 51; Shell Pakistan Ltd. v. Aero Asia International (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and another PLD 2008 Kar. 429; Ali Muhammad Shah v. Ijaz Hussain Shah 2007 MLD 1619; Muhammad Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Liaquat Ali 2007 CLD 1605; Muhammad Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Liaquat Ali 2007 SCMR 1820; Muhammad Ashraf v. Akhlaq Sheeda 2007 CLD 267; Muhammad Arshad and another v. Citibank N.A. Al-Falah Building, Lahore 2006 CLD 1011, Muhammad Akhtar v. Zahar Khan 2006 CLD 737; Sheikh Muhammad Javed Anwar v. Muhammad Ashraf 2006 CLD 107; Muhammad Hussain v. Muhammad Nawaz 2006 YLR 2107; Syed Kausar Abbas Shah v. Sardar Khan 2005 YLR 3321; Sheikh Muhammad Ayub v. Muhammad Yousaf 2005 CLD 588; Muhammad Akbar v. Sheikh Abdul Shakoor 2004 MLD 951; Jam Hameed Shahid v. Liaqat Ali 2004 CLC 219; Messrs Karachi Bonded Stores Limited v. Trustees of the Port of Karachi and others 1999 MLD 3214; Best Foods (Private) Limited v. Tabani Corporation 1991 CLC 1897; Syed Haider Aabdi v. Syed Javed Aabi 1986 MLD2298; Fine Textile Mills Ltd. Karachi v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163; Shell Pakistan Ltd. through Attorney v. Aero Asia International (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive 2008 CLD 996; Muhammad Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Liaquat Ali, 2007 SC 1542; Adil Jamshed v. Muhammad Ubaidullah 2005 CLD 1840 Peshawar; Naseer Ahmad v. Mehr Akhtar Abbas 2005 YLR 3021 Lahore; Hamid Shehzad Managing Director v. Muhammad Sohail Saeed 2005 YLR 3226 Peshawar; Malik Muhammad Amin v. Zahid Mehmood 2005 CLD 982 Lah.; Messrs Mach Knitters (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. CLD 2004 Lah. 535; Irfan Fazal v. Zahid Iqbal 2004 CLC 384; Muhammad Ajmal Khan v. United Bank Ltd 2004 CLD 1577; Kausar Saeed v. Syed Wajahat Hussain 2003 CLD 272; EFU General Insurance Ltd. v. Messrs Security and Management Service (Pvt.) Ltd. 2002 CLD 107; Asif Nadeem v. Bexshim Corporation 2001 CLC 653; S.K. Abdul Aziz v. Mahmood-ul-Hassan 2000 CLC 1967; Khalid Mukhtar v. Sadiqa Tasneem 1996 CLC 741; Khalil-ur-Rehman v. Muhammad Shafi 1993 MLD 1144; State Associates v. Farben Industrial Development S.PA 1992 MLD 1007; Sughiran Begum v. Qadir Bakhsh PLD 1986 Quetta 232; Industrial Mining Enterprises Karachi v. Industrial Mineral Corporation Ltd. 1985 MLD 181 and Karim v. Zikar Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.531 of 2006, heard on 22-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND ALI AKBAR QURESHI, JJ",
    "": "ASIF ALI and 6 others\nVs.\nSAEED MUHAMMAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13904",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1FpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1919 = 2009 SLD 1919 = 2009 CLD 1313",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------S.18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3---Suit for recovery of money on basis of promissory note---Execution of promissory note and its receipt successfully proved by plaintiff---Effect---Burden would' shift on defendant to prove want of consideration in view of presumption provided under S.118(a) of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881---Such burden could be discharged either by leading evidence by defendant or relying on evidence of plaintiff which might be contrary to such presumption. \n \nMst. Sughran Begum and others v. Haji Meer Qaider Bakhsh and others PLD 1986 Quetta 232 and R.F.A. No.15 of 2003 decided on 14-4-2009 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O.XXXVII, Rr. 2 s& 3---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts.102 & 103---Suit for recovery of money on basis of promissory note---Plea of defendant was that promissory note was handed over to plaintiff as security for payment of amount of committee; and that defendant had paid amount to members of committee---Proof---Execution of promissory note and its handing over by defendant to plaintiff had been satisfactorily proved---Nothing on record in support of such plea of defendant---Defendant's evidence had reinforced claim of plaintiff---No evidence contrary to written document regarding disposition of any property would be admitted as between parties thereto---Suit was decreed in circumstances. \n \n(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Arts.117 & 118---Burden of proof in civil matters never remains constant---Principles.\n \nBurden of proof in civil matters never remains constant. It remains on being shifted from one party to another. Even otherwise, when evidence is recorded, burden of proof would lose its importance.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.279 of 2002, heard on 28-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. ALI HASSAN RIZVI AND MUHAMMAD ASHRAF BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "Malik LIAQAT ALI\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD SHARIF"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13905",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1F5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1920 = 2009 SLD 1920 = 2009 CLD 1317",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss.72, 73, 124 & 128---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.86-A---Claim for insurance amount---Reference to Insurance Ombudsman--Appeal to High Court---Husband of the appellant applied for Life Insurance Policy and on which provisional receipt was issued and on presentation of cheque, Policy was finalized---On death of husband of appellant in road accident, appellant lodged her claim for insurance amount---Claim of appellant was repudiated whereupon appellant filed a complaint before Federal. Ombudsman, which was allowed, but on representation by the Insurance Company said order was upset by the President---Order of the President, however was set aside by the High Court and case was remanded to the President for reconsideration---Subsequently when Insurance Tribunals were constituted, appellant withdrew her complaint and filed the application before Insurance Tribunal, which having been dismissed by the Tribunal, appellant had filed appeal before High Court--Validity-Appellant was non-suited on two counts; firstly that application of appellant was time barred; secondly that since the matter had already been adjudicated before Ombudsman, same was hit by res judicata---High Court had already resolved in its two s---Limitation provided under Art.86-A of the Limitation Act, 1908 was with reference to the suits filed by the claimants under the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court before establishment of Insurance Tribunals---Application brought by the appellant was within time and was not barred by time---High Court while dealing with constitutional petition filed by the appellant had not finally decided the issue involved, but had simply remanded the case to the President, without final adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction---Principle of res judicata could not be made applicable in circumstances---Defence taken up by the Insurance Company could not be established on record---Allowing appeal, order passed by the Insurance Tribunal, was set aside and application filed by the appellant was allowed. \n \nPLD 2008 Lah. 461 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.9 of 2008, heard on 10-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHAWAJA FAROOQ SAEED AND MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI, JJ",
    "": "Mst. IJAZ BEGUM\nVs.\nSTATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13906",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1F5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1921 = 2009 SLD 1921 = 2009 CLD 1321",
    "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Act (V of 1940)-------Ss.2, 21, 43 & 74---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Interim injunction, grant of---Infringement of, trade mark---Recovery of damages---Same design and colour scheme---Pendency of application for registration of trade mark-Effect-Plaintiff firm alleged that trade mark \"\"Three Coins Safety Matches\"\" was its exclusive trade mark and defendant-company was infringing its trade mark---Validity--Application for registration of trade mark of plaintiff firm was pending before competent authority and defendant company did not file any opposition before the authority---Defendant company did not even file its own application for registration of disputed trade mark in its favour---Suit filed by plaintiff was maintainable for alleged infringements and prima facie, case was established, balance of convenience was in favour of plaintiff who would suffer irreparable loss if injunction was not granted---High Court granted interim injunction in favour of plaintiff---Application was allowed in circumstances. \n \nTapal Tea (Pvt.) Company Ltd. v. Shahs Tea Company 2002 CLD 113; Messrs Mehran Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Messrs Chiltan Ghee Mill (Pvt.). Ltd. and others 2001 SCMR 967 and P.L. Anwar Basha v. M. Natarajan AIR 1980 Mad. 56 rel.\n \nMessrs Tabaq Restaurant v. Messrs Tabaq Restaurant 1987 SCMR 1090; Anwer v. The Golden Pen Manufacturing Company PLD 1955 Sindh 345 and Dabur India Ltd. v. Hilal Confectionary (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2000 Kar. 139 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1261 and C.M.A. No.7989 of 2005, decision dated: 12-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID ALI Z. QAZI, J",
    "": "ROYAL GROUP through Authorized Attorney--Plaintiff\nVs.\nASIM MATCH (PVT.) LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13907",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1F5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1922 = 2009 SLD 1922 = 2009 CLD 1326",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss.6, 9 & 124--Expiry of licence of Sales Manager of Insurance Company---Renewal--Appeal to High Court against the decision of the Insurance Tribunal---Husband of the appellant, who was Sales Manager with the Insurance Company had licence in his name---Validity of said licence expired on 22-2-2001 which was renewable within a period of one year i.e. till 22-2-2002, however before termination of licence, husband of the appellant passed away---Claim for Group Insurance filed by the appellant 'having been turned down, appellant filed application before the Insurance Tribunal, which was dismissed on the ground that since licence of deceased had expired and it was not renewed, same would be treated to have been terminated and with said termination, claim of insurance had automatically vanished---Validity---Memorandum of understanding between the Insurance Corporation and employees as amended up to date had clearly postulated that \"\"failure to apply for the renewal of lapsed licence within prescribed time, would not be treated as termination of licence\"\"---Licence of the husband of appellant though had expired but during the period of renewal he having died, still three months' time was available to him to have got his licence renewed---Same thus could not be treated to have been terminated---With the repeal of old Insurance Law and by introduction of new Insurance Ordinance, 2000, office of Controller of Insurance had ceased to exist and process of licensing and renewal also stopped for which an interim arrangement had to be made through memorandum, which was also after the death of deceased husband of the appellant---No occasion was, in circumstances, for deceased to have got his licence renewed---Said memorandum had to be issued by Insurance Corporation in order to bridge the gap existing in the law at that time and also to provide remedies to affected persons---Application of the appellant was allowed along with liquidated damages.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.76 of 2008, heard on 10th dune, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHAWAJA FAROOQ SAEED AND MUHAMMAD KHALIL ALVI, JJ",
    "": "MAQBOOL BEGUM\nVs.\nSTATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13908",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1F5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1923 = 2009 SLD 1923 = 2009 CLD 1329",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance (X of 1965)-------S.59---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIX, R.1---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S.17---Appeal by company through a person having authority letter of its Chief Executive Officer---Maintainability---Resolution of Board of Directors of company authorizing its Chief Executive Officer through power of attorney to institute and defend legal proceedings with further powers to delegate such powers to another person---Authority letter not signed by Chief Executive Officer, but signed by someone else on his behalf---Validity---Documents creating rights and liabilities could be signed only by a person duly authorized under a valid document---Person having signed authority letter Was not shown to be sub-delegatee of Chief Executive Officer/attorney of company---Authority letter was not signed by a person authorized by company to act on its behalf or delegate such powers to another person---Chief Executive Officer/attorney of company should have himself either filed appeal or authorized another person to file same---Filing of suit/appeal on behalf of company by an unauthorized person was not an act, which could be ratified by a subsequent resolution---Legal proceedings on behalf of company instituted through a person not duly authorized would be nullity in eye of law---High Court appeal dismissed being not maintainable. \n \nAbdul Rahim and others v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1997 Kar. 62; Dr. S.M. Rab v. National Refinery Limited and another PLD 2005 Kar. 478; Messrs Razo (Pvt.) Limited v. Director, Employees Old Age Benefit Institution 2005 CLD 1208 and Javedan Cement Limited v. Director, SESSI and others 2008 PLC 312 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n---O.XXIX, R.1---Suit or appeal on behalf of company filed by an unauthorized person not an act to be ratified by a subsequent resolution---Such proceedings would be nullity in eye of law---Principles.\n \nFiling of a suit/appeal by an unauthorized person is not an act, which can be ratified or clothed with legality by a subsequent resolution/authorization conferring on him such powers. \n \nThe law requires that the person filing/instituting legal proceedings on behalf of a company should be duly empowered /authorized to do so. Therefore, if any legal proceedings on behalf of a company are filed by a person not duly empowered/ authorized to do so; such legal proceedings would be nullity in the eye of law. \n \n(c) Administration of justice---\n \n----When law required doing of a thing in a particular manner, then same could be done in such manner only or not at all.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No.13 of 2006, decision dated: 23rd May, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J",
    "": "AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (PAKISTAN) LTD.\nVs.\nCOMMISSIONER, SINDH EMPLOYEES SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTION and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13909",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1F5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1924 = 2009 SLD 1924 = 2009 CLD 1336",
    "Key Words:": "Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S. 2(f)---Public auction---Authority reserving right to accept or reject bid/offer without assigning any reason---Scope---Such right and discretion to cancel bid/offer must be exercised fairly and equitably, but before its acceptance by competent authority--Binding contract would come into being after acceptance of bid/offer, .and then authority would have no right and discretion to reject bid/offer---Signing of formal agreement etc., would be procedural requirements---Principles.\n \nAuthority may reserve to itself right to accept or reject, bid/offer without assigning any reason, provided such authority is exercised with circumspection, due care and utmost responsibility. Such reservation of authority to reject the bid does not clothe the public functionary with brazen and arbitrary power to reject the offer merely because it possesses such power and/or that it reserved to itself such power. Such right or reservation to cancel or revoke the bid could be retained till the offer is not accepted by the competent authority as reserved under the invitation or offer. Once that stage is crossed and the competent authority approves the bid/offer, a binding contract comes into being. Signing of the formal agreement etc., is but procedural requirements. \n \nPublic functionary has to exercise its authority with all care and diligence. Once offer is invited on stated terms and conditions, adherence to representation and commitment is obligated upon such functionary. Onerous responsibility is cast upon public functionary to establish and regain its credibility and public trust and confidence in discharge of its public duties and functions, which is fast eroding. There is serious dearth of credibility in the public functionaries. All possible efforts should be made by the public functionary to live up to commitments and representation made by it and adhere to the commitment and live up to the expectation of the common citizen in the realm of contractual obligation committed by it in discharge of its statutory duties. \n \nThe discretion and right reserved to reject bid or offer are to be exercised fairly, equitably and before the acceptance by the competent authority. Once bid is accepted by the competent authority, no more discretion to cancel the auction is retained by the Authority.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.P. No.D-143 of 2007, decision dated: 16-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND SAFDAR ALI BHUTTO, JJ",
    "": "FATEH MUHAMMAD AGHA and another\nVs.\nCITY DISTRICT GOVERNMENT, Karachi High Court through District Coordination Officer and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13910",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1F5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1925 = 2009 SLD 1925 = 2009 CLD 1340",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes-------Law is required to be interpreted in such a manner that it should be saved rather than destroyed---Courts should lean in favour of upholding constitutionality of legislation and it is, therefore, incumbent upon the court to be extremely reluctant to strike down laws as constitutionally such power should be exercised only when absolutely necessary, for injudicious exercise of such power might result in serious consequences. \n \nProvince of East Pakistan v. Sirajul Haq Patwari PLD 1966 SC 854 and Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee 1995 SCMR 362 ref.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n----S.28---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.20 & 9---Principal and agent---Suit of plaintiff (agent) was stayed on the ground that there existed an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause in the agreement---Covenants in the agreement and the contract had addressed the controversy as the same were not contrary to the public policy nor contravened the provisions laid down in S.28 Contract Act, 1872 nor the same violated procedural law---In view of relevant clause of the agreement, contractual relations being subject to foreign law and both the parties having agreed to fulfil all obligations of the contract in foreign court having exclusive jurisdiction, there was no ambiguity in the mind of contracting party---Contention was that relief claimed in the suit could not be granted by the court of foreign jurisdiction which may deprive plaintiff from legitimate judicious advantage---Held, question of inconvenience to be faced by anyone of the parties was negated on account of reciprocal agreement between two parties, decree passed- by High Court in Pakistan could not be executed in the foreign country as foreign ; there being no reciprocal agreement between the two governments to execution of such decrees--Appeal was dismissed. \n \nCGM (Compagnie General Maritime v. Hussain Akbar 2002 CLD Kar. 1528; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393; Standard Insurance Company v. Pak Garments Ltd. 1998 SCMR 1239 and M.A. Chowdhury v. Messrs Misui, O.S.L. Lines Ltd. PLD 1970 SC 373 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.32 of 2007, decision dated: 5-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. QAISER IQBAL AND ARSHAD SIRAJ MEMON, JJ",
    "": "LIGHT INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. Through Chief Executive\nVs.\nMessrs ZSK STICKMASCHINEN GMBH through Attorney and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13911",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1F5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1926 = 2009 SLD 1926 = 2009 CLD 1346",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-------S.10--Application for leave to defend---Maintainability---Suit for recovery of finance was filed against company and its directors--Application for leave to defend the suit was filed by a person who had been authorized by directors through resolution of the company but no power of attorney or any authority existed in his favour on behalf of directors---Validity---Resolution was signed by directors of company and not by them in their personal capacity---Except such resolution no other authority letter or power of attorney had been given by the defendants in their personal capacity, nor any affidavit of defendants was filed in support of petition, therefore, the defendants could not claim to have filed any application on their behalf---Application was considered to have only filed by company being authorized by resolution in circumstances. \n \n1998 CLC 1152 and 2004 CLD 1227 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 10---Application for leave to defend the suit---Mandatory requirements--Application for leave' to defend the suit filed by defendants did not fulfil mandatory requirements of S.10 (3), (4) and (5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and no sufficient cause was shown in their application for their inability to comply with the requirements---Effect---Such application for leave to defend the suit was liable to be dismissed under S.10 (6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. \n \nBank of Khyber v. Messrs Spencer Distribution Ltd. 2003 CLD 1406; Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Mohib Fabric Industries Ltd. 2004 CLD 716; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Sabcos (Pvt.) Ltd. 2006 CLD 244 and Sandi Pak Industrial and Agriculture Investment Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Mohib Textile Mills Ltd. and others 2002 CLD 1170 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9 & 10---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), S.20---Recovery of bank loan---Application for leave to defend the suit---Blank documents---Effect---Defendants claimed that blank documents were got signed by bank at the time of sanction of loan---Validity---If documents were given blank, even then in view of S.20 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, defendants were. estopped to challenge legality, validity and genuineness of such documents---In view of execution of personal guarantees and other documents, defendants could not shirk from liquidating their liabilities and they ' were jointly and severally liable to liquidate the liabilities of company under the provisions of Contract Act, 1872---Defendants failed to raise any serious and bona fide dispute warranting grant of leave to defend the suit---Plaint was verified on oath, therefore, allegations made therein were presumed to be admitted---Bank had produced photocopies of all documents on the basis of which suit was filed, execution whereof had been admitted by defendants in their application for leave to defend the suit---Statement of accounts was duly verified/certified under Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, to which presumption of correctness was attached---There was no rebuttal by defendants of documents placed by bank on record---Suit was decreed in circumstances. \n \nMuhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Hashim Paracha and others PLD 1987 Kar. 76; Abdul Aziz v. Mahmoodul Hassan and others 1988 CLC 337; Prudential Commercial Bank v. Hyderi Ghee Industries Ltd and others 1999 MLD 1694; Bank of Khyber v. Spender Distributors 2003 CLD 1406 and Bazm-e-Salat and others v. Messrs united Bank Ltd. PLD 1989 Kar. 150 rel.\n \nZeeshan Energy Ltd and others v. Faisal Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 1741; Messrs International Traders through Proprietorship and others v. Union Bank Limited 2003 CLD 1464; Messrs Alma Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited 2003 CLD 1770; Karim Bakhsh v. House Building Finance Corporation 2004 CLD 212; Tariq Javed and another v. National Bank of Pakistan 2004 CLD 838; PLD 2008 SC 140; CLD 2005 Law Notes 94; 2002 CLD 876; Mst. Mahmooda Begum and others v. Major Malik Muhammad Ishaq and others 1984 SCMR 890; Mst. Hawa v. Muhammad Yousuf and others PLD 1969 Kar. 324 and Messrs Ideal Life Insurance Co. Ltd. and another v. Mst. Khairunnisa A.G. Mirza 1980 CLC 1375 ref.\n \n(d) Pardanashin lady---\n \n----Evidence---Scope---Legal protection given to paradanashin or illiterate woman cannot be transmuted into legal disability.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-75 and C.M.As. No5.11320, 11321 of 2008, decision dated: 26-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MS. SOOFIA LATIF, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nPARAGON INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 5 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13912",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1F5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1927 = 2009 SLD 1927 = 2009 CLD 1358",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss.42 & 54---Central Depository Company (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 1996, R.7---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.6 (g)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Interim injunction, grant of-Prima facie case---Proof---Suspension of brokerage house operation---Plaintiff was a brokerage house and authorities suspended its operation on the allegation that it traded non-existent shares of a Textile Mill--Authorities contended that Chief Executive Officer of plaintiff was one of the directors of the Mill in question who played major role in floating non-existent shares---Validity---Existence of prima facie case, irreparable damage or injury and balance of convenience were three ingredients under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 and 2 C.P.C. which should have been met for grant of temporary injunction---Plaintiff had to show that for stay to be granted, all said three ingredients were satisfied---Plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case, as there was ample documentary evidence on file to link plaintiff to the Mill in question and in particular, plaints Chief Executive, who was also a director and shareholder in the Mill, who seemed to be playing a prominent role in management of the Mill---To ensure that other innocent customers of plaintiff, who had inadvertently been caught up in the matter through no fault of their own, would not suffer undue hardship, High Court directed the authorities to put in place a mechanism whereby customers of plaintiff could move their accounts to other brokerage houses, if they chose so---High Court declined to suspend notice issued by authorities under R. 7 of Central Depository Company (Establishment and Regulation), Rules, 1996 read with S.6 (g) of Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997--Application was dismissed accordingly. \n \nCollector, Sahiwal v. Muhammad Akhtar 1971 SCMR 681 ref.\n \n(b) Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)---\n \n----S.6 (g)---Securities and Exchange Commission of. Pakistan is essential that public should be protected from any potential fraud---It is also obligation on regulatory body like Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan to act in advance if need be, in order to protect public interest. \n \nAbdul Wahid v. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 2008 CLD 57 and Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Alka Synthetics Ltd AIR 1999 Gujarat 221 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Suit No.1343 of 2008, decision dated: 2-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KARIM KHAN AGHA, J",
    "": "ALMAL SECURITIES AND SERVICES LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nSecurities and Exchange Commission court of Pakistan through Joint Director, Securities Market Division and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13913",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1F5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1928 = 2009 SLD 1928 = 2009 CLD 1367",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (LXVI of 2001)-------S.10---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.4---Application for leave to defend the suit-Limitation---Period of vacations---Effect---Bank contended that notice was published on 19-6-2008 and application was filed by defendant on 2-8-2008, therefore, the same was barred by time---Defendant raised the plea that period of limitation was secured under S.4 of Limitation Act, 1908 and cheques which were alleged to have been dishonoured were reissued and date of final payment had yet to come---Validity---Period during which Court remained closed on account of vacations, such period had to be excluded for computation of limitation as provided by S.4 of Limitation Act, 1908, therefore, application for leave to defend the suit was within time---Question of law and facts in respect of filing of suit before date of repayment and that the instalments were paid or not was to be probed---Defendants succeeded to make plausible case for grant of leave to defend---Application was allowed. \n \nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Shoaib Corporation and another 2004 CLD 631; Asad Pervaiz v. Habib Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 1525; Amtul Rehman Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Habib Bank Limited 2005 CLD 1746; Habib-ur-Rehman v. Judge Banking Court No.4 2006 CLD 217; Mst. Amena Bibi v. Abdul Haqees 2000 SCMR 675; First Grindlays Modaraba v. Pakland Cement Ltd 2000 CLD 2017; Muhammad Sharif v. Rehmat Khan 2003 SCMR 1346, Rubina Jamshed v. United Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 50; Shahid Farooq Sheikh v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd 2005 CLD 1489; Muhammad Shareef v. Muhammad Ramzan 2006 CLC 618; Fazal Karim v. Ghulam Jilani 1975 SCMR 452; Ikramullah v. Sajid Jamal 1980 SCMR 375 and Port Muhammad Bin Qasim v. National Insurance Corporation, Karachi 1983 CLC 3126 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suits Nos.B-44 and C. M.As Nos.6418, 8420, 8421 of 2008, decision dated: 29-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHARRAM G. BALOCH, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD. through Authorized Attorneys--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs WISDOM EDUCATION SYSTEM (PVT.) LTD. and 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13914",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1F5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1929 = 2009 SLD 1929 = 2009 CLD 1373",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9-Suit for recovery of loan--Application for transfer of suit to High Court---Defendants had sought transfer of suit filed by the plaintiff-Bank in Banking Court at place 'G', where C.O.S. filed by the defendants was pending---In the suit filed by the plaintiff-Bank, persons who had been impleaded as guarantors, were not party to C.O.S.---Bank had sued on the basis of finance while defendants had sued the Bank inter alia, for damages---Held, it would not be appropriate to transfer the suit to High Court because of the absence of the said parties in the suit filed by the defendants---Transfer application was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Transfer Application No.26/C of 2008, decision dated: 15-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "Messrs BUTT FLOUR MILLS and others\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT NO.1, GUJRANWALA and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13915",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1930 = 2009 SLD 1930 = 2009 CLD 1374",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss.6, 11, 29, 36 & 63---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Insurance) Rules, 2002, Rr.9 & 13---Failure to maintain statutory deposit---Directive to comply with requirement of law--Appeal to the Appellate Bench of the Commission--After coming into force, Insurance Ordinance, 2000, Insurance Division of Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan sent a notice calling upon the appellant to submit statutory deposit of two and a half million rupees as then required which the appellant deposited---Later when Insurance Division issued circular calling upon all the Insurance Companies to maintain statutory deposit of five million rupees, appellant did not deposit same, claiming to be entitled to exemption from said deposit---Impugned directive was issued to the appellant to comply with the requirements of S.11(1) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, failing which the appellant was directed to cease entering into new contracts of insurance--Appellant aggrieved by impugned Directive filed appeal contending that said Directive was issued without giving the appellant opportunity of hearing---Under provisions of S.63(1) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, direction to cease entering into new contracts of insurance, could be issued, if the company would fail to comply with the condition of registration, even without affording an opportunity of hearing---Conditions for registration laid down in S.11 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 were basic conditions for registration---Companies were required to comply with the requirements within the stipulated period--Argument of the appellant that an opportunity of (fearing should have been given before passing Impugned. Directive, was not sustainable, in circumstances---Appellant had sufficient time to comply with the requirements of law, which appellant failed to do--Appellant was directed to comply with the Impugned Directive---Appeal filed by the appellant being not maintainable, was dismissed, in circum¬stances.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.29 of 2008, decision dated: 12-11-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SALMAN ALI SHAIKH, COMMISSIONER (SCD) AND S. TARIQ A. HUSSAIN, COMMISSIONER (LD)",
    "": "PAKISTAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (GUARANTEE) LIMITED\nVs.\nCHAIRMAN, Securities and Exchange Commission court of Pakistan"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13916",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1931 = 2009 SLD 1931 = 2009 CLD 1383",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Review-----Appeal against dismissal of review application is not competent. \n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n---S. 12(2)--Allegation of fraud---Particular of fraud must be specified in the application with particularity and in absence of any such particulars, plea of fraud could not be considered. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n---S. 15--Auction of property---Process of selling the property to satisfy the decree had gone much ahead---No relief at a belated stage could be granted to the objector. \n \nMuhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Zakaria Ghani and others PLD 2005 SC 819 and Messrs Rasu Food Industries and another v. Messrs Pakistan Industrial Leasing Cooperation Limited and others 2005 SCMR 1643 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Civil Appeal No.D-1 and C.M.A. No. 24 of 2009, decision dated: 7-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "ARSHAD NOOR KHAN AND MUHAMMAD ISMAIL BHUTTO, JJ",
    "": "NUSRULLAH and 2 others\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13917",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1932 = 2009 SLD 1932 = 2009 CLD 1389",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Fraud------Jurisdiction of court---Scope---Every court including a court established under a special enactment would always be competent to take cognizance of any fraud, misrepresentation or lack of jurisdiction in respect of matter pending before or decided by such Court. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Preamble---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Ex parte decree--Application under S.12(2), C.P.C., for setting aside such decree---Maintainability---Every court including a court established under a special enactment would always be competent to take cognizance of any fraud, misrepresentation or lack of jurisdiction in respect of matter pending before or decided by such court---Such application was competent before Banking Court. \n \nEmirates Bank International Ltd. v. Messrs Qasim Brothers and others PLD 1998 Kar. 338; Mian Munir Ahmed v. United Bank Limited and 3 others PLD 1998 Kar. 278 and Messrs Gold Star International and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 2000 MLD 421 ref.\n \nMuhammad Yaqoob and others v. Messrs United Bank Limited and others 2007 SCMR 922 fol.\n \nDr. A. Basit for Appellants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.324 of 1999, heard on 5-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, SH. AZMAT SAEED AND KH. FAROOQ SAEED, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASLAM and another\nVs.\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and 7 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13918",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1933 = 2009 SLD 1933 = 2009 CLD 1392",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLI & O.XLIII, Rr. 1, 2--Appeal---Valid filing of---Scope---Filing of appeal could be done even by counsel for appellant because he could sign memo. but the same could be required to be done under delegated authority---As such authority was missing and was not part of record---Counsel was not authorized in law to file the appeal---Appeal was not validly filed in circumstances. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.22 & 23-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.64, O.XXI, R.58 & O.XXXVIII, R.11--Appeal--Attachment of property---Transfer of title--Appellant claimed that property in question had been validly transferred in his name and the same could not be auctioned during execution proceedings---Validity---Post decretal attachment order was passed under O.XXI, R.58, C.P.C. and the same was not only legally effective but binding as well---Appellant failed to point out any procedural defect in execution proceedings, as such there was no illegality in the same--Passing of two simultaneous orders on the same cause were not illegal---In view of the provisions of O.XXXVIII, R.11, C.P.C. there was also no illegality---Sale-deed in favour of appellant was executed on 11-8-2003, and attachment order passed by Executing Court was earlier in time, therefore, such sale was legally ineffective under S.64, C.P.C., as any transaction subsequent to passing of order of attachment was ipso facto void---Transfer of property in question was legally void and ineffective as it violated the bar contained in S.23 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001--Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nMessrs Tri-Star Polyester Limited and another v. Citi Bank 2001 SCMR 410; Vannarakkal Kallalathil Sreedharan v. Chandramaath Balakrishnan and another (.1990) 3 SC cases 291; Faqir Ali v. Muhammad Hayat PLD 1976. Lah. 298; A.T.K.P.L.M. Muthiah Chetti v. Palaniappa Chetti and others A.O.R. 1928 P.C. 139; Ramji and another v. Ramji AIR 1933 All. 844; Derajat Bank Ltd. Dera Ghazi Khan v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others AIR 1937 Lah. 671; Lachhman Das v. Rup Chand and another AIR 1935 Lah. 57 and State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Dr. A.M. J. Shiraze and 9 others PLD 1983 Kar. 112 distinguished.\n \nSahibzada Anwar Hamid v. Messrs Topworth Investments (MACAU) Ltd. through Chairman and 5 others 2003 YLR 2843; Messrs Standard Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs RIO Centre and others 1994 CLC 2413; Abubakar Salery Mayet v. Abbot Laboratories and another 2987 CLC 367; Government of Pakistan v. Premier Sugar Mills and others PLD 1991 Lah. 381; Khan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot (represented by 6 heirs) v. Messrs Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd. Lahore PLD 1971 SC 550; Bankers Equity Ltd. through Attorney and 5 others v. Sunflo Cit-Russ Ltd. (formerly Known as Sunflo Juices Ltd.) through Managing Director PLD 1999 Lah. 450; Mst. Afroz Begum and 2 others v. Qutabuddin 1989 MLD 2493; National Bank of Pakistan and others v. Karachi Development Authority and others PLD 1999 Kar. 260 and Board of Control of Cricket in Pakistan v. Karachi Development Authority through Director General and 51 others 1997 CLC 795 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "E.F.A. No.30 of 2004, heard on 6-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ASGHAR HAIDER AND IMTIAZ RASHEED SIDDIQUI, JJ",
    "": "CITIZENS INVESTMENT CO.\nVs.\nASKARI LEASING LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13919",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1934 = 2009 SLD 1934 = 2009 CLD 1398",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 8---Suit for recovery of loan---Version of witnesses in respect of the transaction between the parties and procured arrangement was not controverted specifically---Plaintiff/Bank having discharged its burden whereby proving that the transaction between the parties and procured arrangement was unconscionable, without consideration and being not bona fide was also in violation of S.8, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. \n \nTaufiq Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan PLD 1999 Kar. 71.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 8---Suit for recovery of loan---Contention of plaintiff/Bank was that defendant (No.2) was the beneficiary substituted defendant (No.1) for the repayment of the loan by a device not acceptable in accordance with S.8 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, thus, could not be a privity---Contention of the plaintiff that the defendant (No.2) stepped into the contract/package agreement made with the defendant (No.1) was not denied by both the defendants---Held, under such circumstances, it could not be accepted that there was any transaction with the defendant (No.2) independently, but it was introduced by defendant (No.1) to discharge its liability and as such the defendant (No. 2) was not privity to the transaction made with the defendant (No.1). \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 8(2)---Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XXXI of 1961), S.39---Suit for recovery of loan---Contention of the defendants was that suit was not maintainable being without approval of the Board of Directors of the Bank---Board of Directors of the Bank had resolved about the suit in question and said resolution was notified in the official Gazette wherein one \"\"A\"\" was empowered to verify the plaint for the suit and also sworn affidavit and was to produce himself as witness---Held, objections of the defendants on the technical ground was inconsistent with the material and the merits of the case on record and was also inconsistent with the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961---Suit having been filed with approval of the Board of Directors of the Bank, same was maintainable against the defendants. \n \nPLD 1999 Kar. 71 fol.\n \nPLD 2002 Kar. 426 and 1994 CLC 2133 ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 8---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.2(g), 2(j) & 56---Suit for recovery of loan---Settlement packages between the plaintiff/Bank and the defendant (No.1) suffering from illegality---Where there was a contract made enforceable by operation of law the fraudulent beneficiary (defendant No.2) was to compensate---Amount was payable by the consideration not being bona fide and the defendants (1 and 2) jointly and severally had to compensate the Bank for all the dues subject to all deductions, if any, for the amount deposited or accrued interest yield upon that amount deposited---Plaintiff/Bank was entitled to revoke to package arrangements---Settlement packages between the plaintiff/Bank and defendant (No.1) suffered from illegality, therefrom, the collaterals, such as guarantees/personal securities having been released and discharged and the charges, liens, claim etc. on the movable and immovable assets having been released and withdrawn by the Bank in terms of S.8, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and so also in terms of package arrangements made-Principles. \n \nPLD 1976 SC 258 and PLD 1968 Kar. 196 ref. \n \n(e) Banker and customer---\n \n----Interest on fixed deposit---Interest is not static but variable as being fixed from time to time by the State Bank of Pakistan which was binding on both the parties, therefore, no agreement could subsist on the fixed interest basis and as such the rates are variable as fixed by the State Bank of Pakistan-Bank was entitled to reduce the agreed interest on the customer's long term fixed deposit.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-34 of 2004, decision dated: 12-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHARREM G. BALOCH, J",
    "": "Messrs INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN --Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs EURO CERAMICS LIMITED and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13920",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1935 = 2009 SLD 1935 = 2009 CLD 1413",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-------Ss.121 & 124--Application for recovery of balance claim---Insurance appeal---Applicant who was mother of deceased had contended that as per memorandum of understanding her deceased son was entitled to Field Self Subscribed Group Insurance Scheme and upon his death the applicant was entitled to a sum of Rs.3,00,000---Applicant had contended that a sum of Rs.1,50,000 as a balance amount remained unpaid---Insurance Tribunal which was seized of the matter, held applicant entitled to a sum of Rs.1,50,000 by impugned order as claimed by the applicant and Insurance Corporation ad filed appeal against the same---Contentions of the Insurance Corporation were; firstly that Tribunal was not duly constituted and secondly that application filed by the applicant was barred by time and that Tribunal must consist of three members, while impugned order had been passed by an Additional District Judge---Validity---Proviso to S.121 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, had specifically provided that where no such Tribunal was constituted, - Federal Government could issue a notification conferring powers of the Tribunal upon a District, Additional District and Sessions Judge---Said notification had been issued conferring the powers of Insurance Tribunal upon Judicial Officer who passed the order---After death of her son, applicant/mother had been agitating the matter before the Wafaqi Mohtesib and upon the constitution of Insurance Tribunal in 2006, applicant filed application immediately before such Tribunal Insurance Tribunal having not been constituted before 2006, contentions of the counsel for the Insurance Corporation with regard to limitation were without force---Appeal being without any merit was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Insurance Appeal No.104 of 2008, decision dated: 21st May, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SH. AZMAT SAEED AND ABDUL SATTAR GORAYA, JJ",
    "": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Chairman and another\nVs.\nMst. NASEEM BEGUM \nState Life Insurance Corpn. v. Mst. Sadaqat Bano 2008 CLD 1069 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13921",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1936 = 2009 SLD 1936 = 2009 CLD 1416",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S.22---Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001, Rr.8, 12, 13 & Third Sched.---Buying and selling shares illegally--Imposition of penalty--After examination of relevant record it was found that the clients of the company, bought and sold shares in ten different scripts in such a way that orders for buy and sell matched with each other but did not result in any change in the beneficial ownership of the shares---In response to notice issued to the company, it was stated on behalf of the company that its clients were completely unaware of the by-laws and it was ensured that it had taken strong notice of the violation and that same would not be repeated in the future---Company, however again engaged in 1318 shares trades in 83 different scrips--Notice, in circumstances was issued to the company under S.22 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 and R.8 of the Brokers and Agents Registration Rules, 2001 for said violation of Rules-Company had some responsibility towards market and was duty bound to follow the Rules and Regulations and to act with due skill, care and diligence in the conduct of all its business---Company was not expected to create or indulge in any act which, was detrimental to investors' interest or which would lead to interference with the smooth and fair functioning of the market---Company had violated the Brokers and Agents Registration Rules,, 2001 and Code of Conduct, attracting R.8 of the Brokers Rules, 2001 and S.22 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 which was a serious matter, entitling the Commission to suspend the registration of the company---However as the company had assured that in future it would remain careful, taking lenient view, penalty of fine of Rs.300,000 was imposed on the company.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.1(01)/Wash/KSE/MSW/SMD/2009/06, dated 20-02-2009, decision dated: 3rd April, 2009",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR (SECURITIES MARKET DIVISION)",
    "": "AZEE SECURITIES (PVT.) LTD.: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13922",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1937 = 2009 SLD 1937 = 2009 CLD 1422",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 20, 7 & 2(c)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.489-F---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Object and reasons for enacting Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and Penal Code, 1860 were ° different---Cheques issued by customer to Leasing Company in connection with lease of vehicle were dishonoured---Leasing Company got registered F.I.R. against the customer---Validity---Lessee of the vehicle was a \"\"customer\"\" within the meaning of S.2(c) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and case of the lessee clearly fell within the ambit of provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Section 7, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 had conferred criminal jurisdiction to the Banking Court, to try offences punishable under the Ordinance---Whenever an offence was committed under S.20(4) of the Ordinance, Banking Court would take cognizance upon a complaint filed by the authorised person and complaint would be tried by concerned Banking Court, appeal against which was provided before High Court---F.I.R. against the customer under S.489-F, P.P.C. or allowing the same to exist was only wastage of time and abuse of process of law---High Court allowed the constitutional petition of the customer and directed the police not to take law in its own hands in cases covered within the ambit of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.777 of 2007, heard on 5-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. MAHMOOD AKHTAR KHAN, J",
    "": "Malik TARIQ MEHMOOD\nVs.\nMessrs ASKARI LEASING LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13923",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1938 = 2009 SLD 1938 = 2009 CLD 1422",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 20, 7 & 2(c)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.489-F---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Object and reasons for enacting Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and Penal Code, 1860 were ° different---Cheques issued by customer to Leasing Company in connection with lease of vehicle were dishonoured---Leasing Company got registered F.I.R. against the customer---Validity---Lessee of the vehicle was a \"\"customer\"\" within the meaning of S.2(c) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and case of the lessee clearly fell within the ambit of provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Section 7, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 had conferred criminal jurisdiction to the Banking Court, to try offences punishable under the Ordinance---Whenever an offence was committed under S.20(4) of the Ordinance, Banking Court would take cognizance upon a complaint filed by the authorised person and complaint would be tried by concerned Banking Court, appeal against which was provided before High Court---F.I.R. against the customer under S.489-F, P.P.C. or allowing the same to exist was only wastage of time and abuse of process of law---High Court allowed the constitutional petition of the customer and directed the police not to take law in its own hands in cases covered within the ambit of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Principles.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.777 of 2007, heard on 5-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. MAHMOOD AKHTAR KHAN, J",
    "": "Malik TARIQ MEHMOOD\nVs.\nMessrs ASKARI LEASING LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13924",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1939 = 2009 SLD 1939 = 2009 CLD 1425",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.20---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.489-F---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.498---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Section 489-F, P.F.C. and S.20 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, are two independent sections---Section 489-F, P.P.C. is applicable when transaction is between two individuals---Banks are the financial institutions and if an offence regarding dishonest issuance of cheque was committed to satisfy the loan secured from a Banking Institution then S.20 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would be applicable and' the Bank would be required to file complaint before the Banking Court in that case and registration of case before police, its investigation and submission of challan in pursuance thereof, would not be in accordance with law and Trial Court would be debarred from taking cognizance of the offence---Definition of the word \"\"complaint\"\" excludes the report of a police officer from the ambit of S.20 of the aforesaid Ordinance, which carried maximum penalty of one year's rigorous imprisonment and was a bailable offence---Accused could not be remanded to police custody in a bailable offence---Ulterior motive of the police was quite apparent in the registration of the present case---Interim pre-arrest bail already granted to accused was confirmed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous No.9144-B of 2008, decision dated: 29-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM QURESHI, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SALEEM\nVs.\nTHE STATE--Respondent\nCh. Fayyaz Ahmad, D.P.G. with Abdul Hameed, S.-I."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13925",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1940 = 2009 SLD 1940 = 2009 CLD 1428",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)-------S.6-A---Limitation, extension of---Scope---Two years' limitation was extended if the suit of the banking company under the ordinary law had become barred by time---Such extension however, was subjected to a sufficient cause to be shown by the plaintiff in this regard to the satisfaction of the court---If, however, the extension as prescribed by the law was not availed, the suit shall be out of limitation. \n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----Ss. 22(2) proviso & 25---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979), Preamble---Banking Tribunals Ordinance (LVIII of 1984), Preamble---Transfer of cases pending under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 and Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 to courts established under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Limitation---Revival of cause of action---Scope---\"\"Past transactions\"\" not past and closed transactions\"\"---Provisions of S.22(2), Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 by no means give rise to any fresh cause of action for the \"\"interest bearing loan\"\" and therefore, no extension of limitation can be construed in this category of the cases i.e. those earlier covered under the jurisdiction of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 and there was no limitation provided for the suits falling in the purview of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997---Limitation was being provided and enforced for the fresh institution, thus, with an obvious object and view to provide banking companies/institutions with the requisite period of time and in order to avoid the possibility that any suit under Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 may not be claimed to have become time-barred, the proviso to S.22(2), Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 was added to ensure the noted protection---\"\"Past transaction\"\" did not mean the past and closed transaction\"\", but only referred to the past transactions, which expression should be strictly construed in the context having nexus and the relevance to the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 alone---Section 22(2), proviso of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 in no manner and by no means had revived the limitation for the purposes of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 as 'fresh cause of action\"\" shall not be deemed to have arisen for such cases that had become blatantly time-barred even under the said Ordinance---Suit, if only based upon S.22(2), proviso of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 would be barred by time. \n \nKhalid Qureshi and 5 others v. United Bank Limited I.I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi 2001 SCMR 103 ref.\n \nEmirates Bank International Ltd. v. Super Drive-In Ltd. and 8 others 1990 MLD 538; National Bank of Pakistan v. General Tractor and Machinery Co. Ltd. and another 1996 CLC 79; United Bank Limited v. Aftab Ahmad 1998 MLD 1744; First Women Bank Ltd. v. Mrs. Afifa Iftikhar and 2 others 2009 CLD 226; V. Somanath Raju and another v. Konchada Ramamurty Subudhi and others AIR 1957 Orissa 106 and Brojendro Kissore Roy Chowdhury v. Hindusthan Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. AIR 1918 Cal. 707 distinguished.\n \n(c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S. 22(2), proviso---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.130---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts.57, 115 & S.19---Suit for recovery of loan---Making of demand by the Bank---Contention of the plaintiff (Bank) was that the demand had been made to the defendants { and they had acknowledged their liability and had finally refused to discharge their liability a week before the filing of the suit, therefore, three years' time shall commence from the refusal---Validity---Held, on account of vital omissions and lapses on part of the plaintiff (Bank) to give the details and particulars of the demands so made to bring its case within the purview of Arts.57 or 115 of the Limitation Act, 1908 or S.130 or arty other provision of the Contract Act, 1872 rendered the plaintiff s case as barred by time---Principles. \n \n(d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)---\n \n----S. 22(2), proviso---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts.57 & 115---Contentions of the respondents were that Letter of Guarantee would reveal that the status of respondents was not that of guarantors, rather same was of the principal debtors/obligators and therefore, the question of making of demand and their refusal would not have arisen at all; and that neither Art.57 nor 115, Limitation Act, 1908 was applicable to the present case as both related to different circumstances and situations---Validity---Where the guarantor had been described as principal debtor, the question of raising the demand against it was not relevant---Letter of Guarantee having revealed that guarantors were the Principal Debtors, resultantly the plea raised by the Bank that the demands had been made from them but they acknowledged etc., had no force. \n \nMs. Fashions Ltd. and others v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liq) and others 1993 All England Law Reports 769 and Law of Guarantees by Geraldine Mary Andrews and Richard Millet quoted.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.62 of 2003 in C.O.S. No.48 of 2000, decision dated: 6-07-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND ALI AKBAR QURESHI, JJ",
    "": "PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LIMITED\nVs.\nARIF NOOR and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13926",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1941 = 2009 SLD 1941 = 2009 CLD 1440",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10 & 22---Suit for recovery of loan---Leave to defend suit---Banking Court dismissed the leave to defend application in a hasty manner without examining in detail, the defence put up by the defendant and absence of any material with regard to availing the FATR facility---Impugned order passed on the application and the consequent decree, could not be sustained---Judgment and decree passed in favour of plaintiff--Bank, was set aside and case was remanded to Banking Court with the direction to decide the leave to defend application of defendant afresh.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.56 of 2008, decision dated: 17-02-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI AND FAISAL ARAB, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KINZA FASHION (PVT.) LTD. and others\nVs.\nMessrs HABIB BANK LTD. and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13927",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1942 = 2009 SLD 1942 = 2009 CLD 1442",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)-------Ss.33 & 34---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)---Independent Inquiry Committee appointed to investigate the matter, submitted its .report and Commission had passed some interim orders, which were challenged before the High Court---Before approaching High Court, respondents should have waited for alternate remedies available under Ss.33 & 34 of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997---Dispute was highly technical in nature and could amicably be resolved only through special expertise---Very object of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 would be frustrated if initial orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission were directly challenged before the High Court, whereas the law had provided alternate remedy, which, as a rule, would be followed, unless cogent reasons were shown for proceedings otherwise---No such reason having been shown and controversy relating to the crises could more appropriately be appreciated before the hierarchy provided under Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997, petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeal and were allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos.2502, 2503 and 2504 of 2001, decision dated: 25-10-2001.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI AND, JAVED IQBAL, JJ",
    "": "Vs.\nMian NISAR ELAHI and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13928",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1943 = 2009 SLD 1943 = 2009 CLD 1446",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.19 & 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.3 & 5---Execution of decree---First appeal---Limitation---Condonation of delay--Appeal which was filed after 11 days of the expiry of period of limitation, was sought to be admitted for hearing by condoning delay on the ground that decree holder could not file application for certified copy of the impugned order as the file was in the chamber of Presiding Officer for the purpose of writing the order--In order to admit an appeal for hearing filed after the expiry of period of limitation prescribed therefor, two questions were very pertinent for consideration: First, whether the court had power to do so; secondly, whether the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period---Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provided that appeal etc. could be admitted after the period of limitation, when appellant could satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring appeal or making the application, within such period---If a person had sufficient cause for not preferring appeal within the prescribed period of limitation, it would not make any difference, whether the period was prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1908 or by any other law---Sufficiency or insufficiency of cause would depend upon nature of the cause and not upon the law prescribing the period of limitation---It would be anomalous to say that the legislature intended to admit appeals filed after the expiry of period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1908 and not to admit appeals for which the period of limitation was prescribed by any other law---Right of appeal was a very important right originating from the Injunctions of Islam-Suet an important right could not be denied on any technical ground and while interpreting a law, principle of advancement of remedy and suppression of mischief would have to be kept in mind-In the present case, appellant had no sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the period of limitation prescribed thereof---No case for admitting the appeal for hearing was made out even under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908. \n \nFederation of Pakistan v. Public At Large PLD 1988 SC 202; Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence v. The General Public PLD 1989. SC 6 and Abdul Ghaffar and others v. Mst. Mumtaz PLD 1.982 SC 88 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.14 of 2007, decision dated: 3rd March, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI SAIN DINO METLO AND BIN YAMIN, JJ",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD ANEES HAMEED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13929",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1944 = 2009 SLD 1944 = 2009 CLD 1451",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 7, 15 &19---Suit for recovery of loan---Attachment of property---Execution of decree---Objection by -debtors---Order of court to deposit security of equal amount by ¬-debtors---Offer of certain properties as security by the ¬debtors---While evaluating a property, it was also to be kept in mind that mere permission to, use the property for a particular purpose did not necessarily change its value unless it was suitably located---Principles. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 7, 15 & 19---State Bank of Pakistan BPD Circular No.29 of 2002, dated 15-10-2002---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.29 & 23-A---Suit for recovery of loan---Attachment of property---Execution of decree---Objection by -debtors seeking stay of execution---Direction for furnishing security as envisaged under R.23-A, O.XXI, C.P.C.---Failure of -debtors to furnish required security---Effect---Pier. of the -debtors to stay the proceedings under R.29 of O.XXI, C.P.C., till the suit filed by the -debtors against the decree-holder was decided, could not be beneficially examined unless the claim of -debtors against the decree-holder and the object of R.29 of O.XXI, C.P.C. was looked into which appeared to be two fold firstly to enable the -debtor and decree-holder to adjust their claims against each other and secondly to prevent multiplicity of execution proceedings---In the present case, there was no independent recovery claim of the -debtors against the decree-holder but the -debtors in one of their suits had challenged the consent decree by pleading their entitlement under State Bank of Pakistan B.P.D. Circular No.29 of 2002, the benefit whereof was refused to the -debtors, whereas in another suit, satisfaction of the decree by an uncertified adjustment settlement outside the court was claimed-Record showed that all the objections which the -debtors had tried to raise by the application, were raised in their objections to execution and High Court had directed furnishing of security as. envisaged under O.XXI, R.23-A, C.P.C. which order the -debtors, till date, had failed to comply---Even otherwise, while exercising powers under O.XXI, R.29, C.P.C., the executing Court had no power to order stay of execution in a case where the suit against the decree-holder was for declaration that the decree stood satisfied by an Uncertified adjustment outside the court--Application by the -debtors appeared to have been filed not only to circumvent the provisions of O.XXI, R.23-A, C.P.C. or to stealthily seek review of an order, but also to delay the recovery proceedings---No cogent reasons to stay the execution proceedings having been given, application in this behalf was rejected and execution was allowed as prayed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Application No.69 of 2004, decision dated: 12-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAJJAD ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD.--Decree Holder\nVs.\nFATEH TEXTILE MILLS LTD. and 9 othersJudgment-debtors\nFarogh Naseem for judgment-debtors."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13930",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1945 = 2009 SLD 1945 = 2009 CLD 1459",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S. 2(e)---Finance---Definition---Banker and customer---Relationship of---Suit for recovery of loan---Defendants shown as guarantors in the agreement had availed Clean Over Draft Facility, Loan Against Trust Receipt, Local Bill Discounted Letter of Credit, Payment Against Document and Letter of Guarantee---Such transactions pertained to \"\"finance\"\" as defined in S.2(e), Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 and created \"\"Banker and Customer\"\" relationship-Transactions inter se the parties and also the subject-matter of the agreement fell within the ambit of definition \"\"finance\"\" as defined in S.2(e) of the Act. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 2(a) & (7)---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances), Act (XV of 1997), Ss.2(a) & 7---\"\"Financial Institution\"\"---\"\"Banking Company\"\"---Suit for recovery of loan---Plaintiff was a Banking company and transacted the banking business---\"\"Financial Institution\"\" which transacted banking business was the \"\"Banking Company\"\" within the meanings of S.2(a) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Plaintiff ff was banker and defendants were customers---Default of the defendants in payment of the outstanding amount was non fulfilment of obligation---Subject-matter, therefore, exclusively fell within the jurisdiction of Banking Court-No other court except Banking Court, constituted under S.7 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 7---Suit for recovery of loan by Bank---Foreign Courts had decided the matter and held the defendant company and its Directors liable for the payment of amount due with interest---Territorial jurisdiction---Whether s of foreign courts were conclusive and binding---Plaintiff. on having established its claim against the defendants before court of first instance and also Appellate Court in the foreign country, filed suit under the provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (now repealed) for the amount due and with interest in Pakistan currency of the equivalent value---Plaintiff had contended that High Court had the jurisdiction, over the matter and a decree on the basis of foreign decree/ could be passed---Validity---Foreign Court, in the present case, after considering whole evidence and after its due appraisal, had passed the decree---Said s were delivered by Court of competent jurisdiction, on merits of the case and founded on correct view of law .applicable---Judgments of the foreign courts did not breach any law in force in Pakistan and did not offend the principles of natural justice---Said s, were conclusive and binding---One of the defendants on his return from abroad was residing within the jurisdiction of High Court---Other defendants were also residing, working for gain and carrying the business within the jurisdiction of High Court--Plaintiff Bank had its regional office and relevant record of the present controversy had been summoned from abroad by the Plaintiff ff and the same was now in custody of the plaintiffs officials in its regional office---High Court having considered various aspects of the present controversy and having gone through the record had held that High Court had the jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties had territorial jurisdiction---Suit, in circumstances, was competently filed in the High Court and did not suffer from any jurisdictional flaw---Suit having been decreed and finding of High Court regarding the merits of the case were affirmed and upheld in appeal---Question of jurisdiction had been decided in favour of the plaintiff---Decree for the sum due in foreign country or the Pak Rupees equivalent thereof at the time of payment along with interest and other charges from the specified date till the date of realization of the whole amount was, therefore, passed against defendant, who would be jointly and severally liable for satisfaction of the decree, with other -debtors---Costs of the suit and costs of funds were also allowed to the decree-holder/Bank---Failure of the defendants to satisfy the decree within a period of one month from the date of present order would result into execution of decree forthwith, without the need of a formal application for execution of the decree. \n \nMessrs Kadir Motors (Regd.), Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd., Karachi and 3 others 1992 SCMR 1174 and T. Zubair Limited and 2 others v. Judge, Banking Court No.III, Lahore and another 2000 CLC 1405 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.69 of 1999, decision dated: 15-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "UNITED BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nNAEEM ULLAH MALIK and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13931",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1946 = 2009 SLD 1946 = 2009 CLD 1466",
    "Key Words:": "Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance (XLII of 1980)-------Ss.3(2)(b) & 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Suit for damages---Application for, rejection of plaint---Plaintiff filed admiralty suit claiming damages against defendants who were owner and agent of ship \"\"M.T. Vega\"\" and also against defendants who were owner and agent of ship \"\"M.T. Zalea\"\"---According to contract of employment, plaintiff was to serve as Chief Officer on board of the ship \"\"M.T. Vega\"\" and one of the terms of employment was that the plaintiffs services were also assignable to any other ship owned by the owner of ship M.T. Vega---On the basis of said term plaintiff was directed to serve on board of the ship \"\"M.T. Zalea\"\" and while performing his duties there he suffered face and eye injuries---Plaintiff was shifted to a hospital abroad for treatment and from there he was repatriated to Pakistan, where he filed suit against owner and agent of ship M.T. Zalea claiming damages on account of injuries which he sustained on board of ship M.T. Zalea\"\"---Defendants filed application for rejection of plaint on the ground that no cause of action had accrued to the plaintiff against them and also prayed that their names be struck off from the array of defendants as the claim for damages against them did not fall within the scope of admiralty jurisdiction as provided under Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980---Single Judge of High Court had dismissed the application of defendants, holding that suit was rightly filed in Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Court---Defendants had impugned that Order-in-Appeal-Claim of the plaintiff for damages raised in the suit against defendants fell within the ambit of clause (b) of subsection (2) of S.3 of Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts' Ordinance, 1980---Success of the plaintiffs claim for damages against the defendants, would certainly depend on the evidence that was to be led in the suit---Suit should continue to proceed in the Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Court; however, determination of jurisdiction at times would depend upon determination of certain facts, which in turn were to be determined after evidence would be adduced in the case---While finally deciding the suit, it would be open to the trial Court to also decide the question on the basis of contract of employment that was executed between the plaintiff and 'defendant-Conclusion drawn by Single Judge in the impugned order, could not be differed with---Order accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Adm. Appeal No.2 of 2007, decision dated: 9-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAISAL ARAB AND BIN YAMIN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ATLAS CO. SHIPPING LTD. and another\nVs.\nFARID RIZVI and .2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13932",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1947 = 2009 SLD 1947 = 2009 CLD 1471",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Ordinance, (XXV of 1997)-------S.7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.II, R.2---Suit for recovery of loan-Cause of action in the previously instituted .suit for which the plaintiff held a decree and the present suit appeared to be the one and the same and the plaintiff could not competently file two separate suits by splitting up his claim and that too without disclosing the fact of having earlier obtained money decree on same cause or advancing any reason for filing separate suit and that also without permission of the court---Explanation to sub-rule (3) of R.2 of O.II, C.P.C. made it clear that successive breach of one obligation would be deemed to give rise to one cause of action and, in the present case, non-payment of the finance facility was one cause of action entitling the plaintiff to various reliefs and since the plaintiff had omitted to sue for one of the reliefs, therefore, was not entitled to sue on the basis of relief so omitted---Suit consequently was dismissed being barred by 0.11, R.2, C.P.C.---Principles. \n \nAbdul Hakim and 2 others v. Saadullah Khan and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 63; Muhammad Khalil Khan and others v. Mehboob Ali Mian and others and Abdul Ghafoor v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner Karachi 1971 SCMR 602 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.969 of 2000 and C.M. As. Nos.2268 of 2008, 1905 of 2009, decision dated: 15-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAJJAD ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs Karachi High Court TANK TERMINAL (PVT.) LTD. and 4 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13933",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1948 = 2009 SLD 1948 = 2009 CLD 1476",
    "Key Words:": "Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------Ss.126, 131, 135 & 139---Surety bond---Death of surety before any direction or decree was passed for the recovery of the amount from the defendant---Effect---Such bond was the paramount document as rights and obligations of the surety, could be determined on the basis of surety bond alone---In the present case, surety bond had been furnished for the payment of the amount, which the court would determine against the defendant---No amount was determined against the defendant during the life time of the surety---Surety died before any direction or a decree was passed for the recovery of the amount from the defendant---Surety bond was to be construed strictly, according to the terms mentioned therein---Liability of the surety to pay on behalf of the principal debtor as per the surety bond arose only where the decree was passed or the defendant was directed to make payment of the amount---Neither the defendant was directed to pay any amount nor the decree against the defendant was passed during life time of the surety---Decree which was passed after the death of the surety, would neither bind the deceased surety nor his legal heirs---Principles. \n \nParvatibai v. Vinayak Balwant AIR 1939 Bom. 23; Narayan Ramchandra Bhagwat v. Markandya Tukaram and another AIR 1959 Bom. 516 and T.N. and Q Bank v. Official Assignee AIR 1940 Mad. 396 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Contract Act, 1872=126,131,135,139\\n\\r\\n\\rContract Act, 1872=126,131,135,139\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.215 of 2007, decision dated: 13-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "Mst. FAYYAZI BEGUM and 6 others\nVs.\nALI HASSAN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13934",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1949 = 2009 SLD 1949 = 2009 CLD 1480",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)------S. 80---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.181--Appeal---Limitation---Appellant had sought relief from the Federal Ombudsman because Insurance. Tribunal had not been constituted until the notification thereof on 20-6-2006 and once the Tribunal was constituted the appellant approached the Insurance Tribunal---Time elapsed from the date of the appellant's cause of action in the year 2000 until the date she approached the Insurance Tribunal in the year 2006, was not to be counted against the appellant in circumstances--Application filed upon the constitution of the Insurance Tribunal would not be barred by limitation where the appellant had been agitating the matter before Federal Ombudsman---Principles. \n \nState Life Insurance Corporation v. Nasim Begum R.F.A. No.104 of 2008; State Life Insurance Corporation v. Mst. Sadaqat Bano 2008 CLD 1069; R.F.A. No.54 of 2008 and R.F.A. No.70 of 2008 and Writ Petition No.7807 of 2002 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.71 of 2008, decision dated: 6-07-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL AND MUHAMMAD ASHRAF BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "NASREEN BEGUM\nVs."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13935",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1950 = 2009 SLD 1950 = 2009 CLD 1483",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.305, 306 & 325---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss.4 & 9---Companies Court Rule, 1997, R.7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Winding up petition, rejection of---Overriding effect of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Scope---Bank filed winding up petition before Companies Judge on the ground of default in payment of finances---Respondent-company sought rejection of petition on the ground that relation between bank and company was that of customer and financial institution, therefore, only remedy available with bank was to file recovery suit before Banking Court---Validity--Before invoking S.4 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, respondent, in company jurisdiction, had to establish that there was a provision in Companies Ordinance, 1984, which was inconsistent with the provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, it was only then that provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would override inconsistent provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Exclusiveness of jurisdiction of Banking Court was confined to only those matters which were in the jurisdiction of Banking Court---If a company was solvent and was able to pay debts, then winding up order could not be passed against it, even if the company had neglected to pay debts to a particular creditor---Winding up order could only be passed if it was established before the court that company was unable to pay its debts---If a creditor, whether it was a financial institution or not, was to file suit for recovery of its debts, it could invoke jurisdiction of Banking Court or ordinary civil court as the case might be---However if creditor could establish before Company Judge that company was unable to pay its debts, such creditor could invoke jurisdiction of Company Judge under S.305 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, for winding ,up of the company, thus Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and Companies Ordinance, 1984, covered two different situations---Application was dismissed, in circumstances. \n \nMajeed A Tahir v. United Bank Limited 2008 CLD 1162; Abdur Rehman Allana v. Citibank 2003 CLD 1843; Maj. (Retd.) Javed Inayat Khan Kiyyani v. the State PLD 2006 Lah. 752; Messrs Sindh Glass Industries Ltd. v. Messrs National Development Finance Corporation PLD 1996 SC 601 and Messrs Pakland Cement Limited 2002 CLD 1392 ref.\n \nMessrs S. Ghulam Dastagir and Sons v. Union Insurance Company of Pakistan Limited PLD 1995 Lah. 290 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Company Petition No.4 of 2009, decision dated: 24-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUNIR PERACHA, J",
    "": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. through AttorneY\nVs.\nDEWAN SALMAN FIBRE LIMITED and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13936",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1951 = 2009 SLD 1951 = 2009 CLD 1490",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Challenging decree on allegation of fraud and misrepresentation---Suit having been decreed, property mortgaged by the borrower was auctioned in execution of decree, which was successfully purchased by respondent and such sale was confirmed by the Executing Court and possession of the property was delivered to the respondent---Application filed by the appellant under S.12(2), C.P.C., challenging the decree had been dismissed---Validity---Appellant in his said application had merely mentioned that decree was based on fraud and misrepresentation---Necessary ingredients of fraud, if any, had not been pleaded nor the elements of misrepresentation had been mentioned in the application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---If fraud was alleged, its necessary ingredients must be pleaded, so as to subsequently prove the same---General and bald allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, could not form basis to upset a decree, otherwise validly passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction---No case for interference in the impugned order having been made out, appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.314 of 2006, heard on 2-07-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI AND MAZHAR HUSSAIN MINHAS, JJ",
    "": "NASIR RASHEED CHAUDHRY\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13937",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1952 = 2009 SLD 1952 = 2009 CLD 1490",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Suit for recovery of loan---Execution of decree---Challenging decree on allegation of fraud and misrepresentation---Suit having been decreed, property mortgaged by the borrower was auctioned in execution of decree, which was successfully purchased by respondent and such sale was confirmed by the Executing Court and possession of the property was delivered to the respondent---Application filed by the appellant under S.12(2), C.P.C., challenging the decree had been dismissed---Validity---Appellant in his said application had merely mentioned that decree was based on fraud and misrepresentation---Necessary ingredients of fraud, if any, had not been pleaded nor the elements of misrepresentation had been mentioned in the application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---If fraud was alleged, its necessary ingredients must be pleaded, so as to subsequently prove the same---General and bald allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, could not form basis to upset a decree, otherwise validly passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction---No case for interference in the impugned order having been made out, appeal was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.314 of 2006, heard on 2-07-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI AND MAZHAR HUSSAIN MINHAS, JJ",
    "": "NASIR RASHEED CHAUDHRY\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13938",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1953 = 2009 SLD 1953 = 2009 CLD 1493",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.21 & 22---West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.114---Peoples Finance Corporation Act ()OIX of 1972), S.22---Recoveries of dues as arrears of land revenue Authority of Bank---Scope---Authority of the Bank to recover it's dues as arrears of land revenue by invoking provisions of S.22 of Peoples' Finance Corporation Act, 1972 was not disputed---Bank had authority of recovering it's dues as arrears of land revenue, but that authority was not unfettered---Bank could resort to the provisions of West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 only when it's claim had been adjudicated as amount due---Bank, in exercise of recovering the amount due against its borrower, could not be ,equated with the power of judicial forum for the determination of the amount due---Summary power of recovery of the amount due, had been conferred on the Bank by law with a view to obviate cumbersome procedure of execution of decree as contained in O.XXI of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and the Banking laws---Recovery of claims of a bank, without it's determination by the Court of competent jurisdiction had been held illegal---Appellants having proceeded for recovery of their claims in the absence of any proper judicial determination as to the amount due, Banking Court had rightly observed that appellants had arrested the respondent, without any valid authority---Appellants had proceeded under the provisions of West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 without serving upon the respondent, the notice of demand---Appellants had caused arrest of the respondent and he was lodged in jail without complying with mandatory requirements of provisions of West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 which act had offended the rights of the parties and also principles of natural justice---Bank had exercised its jurisdiction in excess and offended the fundamental rights of the respondent---Findings of the Banking Court that the arrest of the respondent under S.22 of Peoples' Finance Corporation Act, 1972 was illegal, was not open to exception---Judgment to that extent was devoid of any illegality or legal infirmity---Banking Court imposed penalty upon Bank, without any explanation and issuing any show-cause notice; it was primary responsibility of the Banking Court to pass the order keeping in view the principles of natural justice---Order passed by the Banking Court in violation of principles of natural justice, was not legally sustainable, which was set aside. \n \nThe Province of West Pakistan v. Muhammad Ayub Khuhro PLD 1967 Kar. 673; Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan v. Sanaullah Khan and others PLD 1988 SC 67 and Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and another v. Abid Akhtar and others 2003 SCMR 1547 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.6 of 2008, decision dated: 20-10-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH AND M.A. ZAFAR, JJ",
    "": "SME BANK LIMITED\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD MEHBOOB"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13939",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1954 = 2009 SLD 1954 = 2009 CLD 1542",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-------Art. 129(e)-Acts performed by public f functionaries---Presumption---Duty of Court---Scope---Acts performed by public authorities deserve due regard by Courts and every possible explanation for their validity should be explored and whole gamut of powers in pursuance to which they act or perform their functions and discharge their duties should be examined---Presumption of regularity is attached to official acts. \n \nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and others v. Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao and others PLD 1992 SC 723; Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others v. Khalil Ahmed and others 1994 SCMR 782; Syed Muhammad Khurshid Abbas Gardezi and others v. Multan Development Authority and others PLD 1983 SC 151; Lahore Improvement Trust v. Custodian, Evacuee Property PLD 1971 SC 811; Chairman Pakistan Railway Board, Chittagong and others v. Abdul Majid Sardar PLD 1966 SC 725 and Federation of Pakistan and others v. Ch. Muhammad Aslam and others 1986 SCMR 916 rel.\n \n(b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---\n \n----S.24-A---Order, quashing of---Reasons stated in order---Validity---If bad reasons are severable from good ones and are not intertwined or inter-linked, an order passed by an administrative authority may not be quashed if otherwise sustainable on remaining valid grounds---Cases involving detention or liberty of citizens fall in a different category. \n \nGovernment of West Pakistan v. Haider Bakhsh Jatoi and another PLD 1969 SC 210; Rafiq Ahmed Sheikh v. The Crown PLD 1951 Lah. 17; Kh. Ahmed Tariq Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan through the, Secretary Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad PLD 1992 SC 646 at P.666; Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto v. the President of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 388 at pages 541-542; Commissioner Sargodha Division v. Khizar Ilayat PLD 1996 SC 793; Brig. (Retd.) F.B. Ali v. The State PLD 1975 SC 706; Swam Singh v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1976 SC 232; State of Orrisa and others v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra AIR 1963 SC 779 at pages 785-786; State of Maharashtera v. B.K. Takkamore AIR 1947 S.C. 1353; Royal Bank of Canada v. I.R.C. (1972) 1 All. E.R. 225 at page 239; Breen v. Amalgamated. Engineering Union and others (1971) 2 Q.B. 175; Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 1 Paragraph 26 P.29 and Administrative Law by H.WR. Wade, Sixth Edition P.338 rel.\n \n(c) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S.27(4)---State Bank of Pakistan Prudential Regulation No.XXI for Fund Management Services---Banking company---Cancelling of licence---Governor State Bank---Powers and duties---Mismanaging of affairs---Siphoning of funds---Chief Executive of Bank, appointing of---Approval of State Bank---Respondent-Bank was involved in mismanagement of affairs of bank and misuse of position by Directors of Bank for their own benefit---Huge amount of bank was siphoned off to the detriment of interest and rights of depositors in collusion with foreign companies in which Directors of the Bank had substantial interests---Chairman of Board of Directors' acted as de facto Chief Executive of Bank without approval of State Bank---Governor State Bank, in exercise of powers under S.27(4) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, cancelled licence of respondent-Bank---Validity---Governor State Bank, while dealing with matter of cancellation of licence was not required to hold full-dress trial like a Court of law---Charges against respondent-Bank were serious enough to warrant cancellation of licence---Governor State Bank had acted fairly and reasonably by observing principles of natural justice and statutory requirements on the basis of relevant material---High Court was not expected to substitute its for that of State Bank as if it was exercising an appellate jurisdiction---In the presence of relevant material including inquiry report of chartered accountants, Governor State Bank of Pakistan was perfectly justified in forming opinion that . affairs of respondent-Bank were being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of depositors---Governor State Bank had necessary expertise in relevant field and he arrived at a conclusion which a reasonable man in his place would do---Once licence was granted, it became a matter of serious concern to cancel the same---Judgment passed by High Court was not sustainable at law and more so when matter of winding up of respondent-Bank had already attained finality with dismissal of appeal and review petition by Supreme Court ---Fact of acquittal of Directors of respondent-Bank from charges of criminal misconduct would not per se nullify order of cancellation of licence passed by Governor State Bank in exercise of his statutory powers conferred under S.27(4) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962---Judgment passed by High Court against order passed by Governor State Bank was set aside---Appeal was allowed. \n \nState Bank of Pakistan v. Indus Bank Limited through Chairman 2001 CLC 1833; Mr. Rafique Ahmed Sheikh v. The Crown PLD 1951 Lah. 17 (22); Maher Alvi v. Pakistan and 5 others PLD 1980 Kar. 609(650); Khalid Malik v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1991 Kar. 1(99); Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and another v. President of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 388 (541-542); Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chairman Fourth Wage Board 1993 SCMR 1533; Kumar v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 3689-(2001)2 S.C.C. 386-2000 SOL Case No.636; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Hamza Board Mills PLD 1996 Lah. 651; Taj Company Ltd. In re: NLR 1996 Un-reported cases 799; Alliance Motors (Pvt.) Ltd. In re: 1997 MLD 1966 (Karachi); New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad Ltd. v. Dye-Chen Corporation (1986) 59 Com. cases 183 (186-187); In re: Messrs Pakland Cement Limited 2002 CLD 1392; Sudersan Chits (India) Ltd. v. Sukumaren Pillai (1985) 57 Corn. Cases 85; Collector Land Acquisition Abbottabad and 2 others v. Lal Khan PLD 2002 SC 277; Syed Ali Abbas v. Vishan Singh PLD 1967 SC 294; S. Vankatachalam Iyyer v. State of Madras AIR 1957 Madras 623(626); Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhri PLD 1957 SC (India) 346 (351-352); Jamil Ahmed v. Province of Sindh 2001 YLR 1837; Reserve Bank of India v. Patiala Central Bank Ltd. AIR 1961 Kerala 268 at P.275; District Magistrate Lahore v. Faqeer Sayyed Fayyazuddin PLD 1965 SC 371 (377-378); Associated Provincial Pictures House Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation 1947 2 All. E.R. 680; The Presiding Officer v. Sadaruddin Ansari and others PLD 1967 SC 569 (579); Krishna Murari Aggerwala v. The Union of India AIR 1975 SC 1877 (1882-1883); H. Lavender and Sons Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government 1970 3 All E.R. 871 (872); Muhammad Jamil Asghar v. The Improvement Trust PLD 1965 SC 698; Hyderi International Finances Limited v. The State Bank of Pakistan PLD 1980 Lah. 658; Saghir Ahmed through L.Rs v. Province of Punjab through Secretary, Housing and Physical Planning, Lahore and others PLD 2004 SC 261 at P.268; Nazir Ahmed v. Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 453; Ram Labhaya v. Dhani Ram AIR 1947 Lah. 296; K.P. Veghaese v. The Income Tax Officer AIR 1981 SC 1922; Radha Corporation and others v. Collector of Customs 1989 SCMR 353; Asian Food Industries Limited v. Pakistan 1985 SCMR 1753 at P.1756; Mrs. Aiman Arshad v. Miss Naeem Khan PLD 1990 SC 612; Koro v. The State PLD 1963 Kar. 256; Craies On Statute Law, Sixth Edition by S.G.G. Edgar at page 150; Crawford Statutory Construction in sections 219 and 221 at pages 393 and 399 and N.S. Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition 2007, in Chapter 16 at Pages 859-861 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.576 of 2003, decision dated: 13-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY AND FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, JJ",
    "": "STATE BANK OF„¢ PAKISTAN\nVs.\nFRANKLIN CREDIT AND INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD. through Attorney"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13940",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1955 = 2009 SLD 1955 = 2009 CLD 1542",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-------Art. 129(e)-Acts performed by public f functionaries---Presumption---Duty of Court---Scope---Acts performed by public authorities deserve due regard by Courts and every possible explanation for their validity should be explored and whole gamut of powers in pursuance to which they act or perform their functions and discharge their duties should be examined---Presumption of regularity is attached to official acts. \n \nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and others v. Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao and others PLD 1992 SC 723; Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others v. Khalil Ahmed and others 1994 SCMR 782; Syed Muhammad Khurshid Abbas Gardezi and others v. Multan Development Authority and others PLD 1983 SC 151; Lahore Improvement Trust v. Custodian, Evacuee Property PLD 1971 SC 811; Chairman Pakistan Railway Board, Chittagong and others v. Abdul Majid Sardar PLD 1966 SC 725 and Federation of Pakistan and others v. Ch. Muhammad Aslam and others 1986 SCMR 916 rel.\n \n(b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---\n \n----S.24-A---Order, quashing of---Reasons stated in order---Validity---If bad reasons are severable from good ones and are not intertwined or inter-linked, an order passed by an administrative authority may not be quashed if otherwise sustainable on remaining valid grounds---Cases involving detention or liberty of citizens fall in a different category. \n \nGovernment of West Pakistan v. Haider Bakhsh Jatoi and another PLD 1969 SC 210; Rafiq Ahmed Sheikh v. The Crown PLD 1951 Lah. 17; Kh. Ahmed Tariq Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan through the, Secretary Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad PLD 1992 SC 646 at P.666; Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto v. the President of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 388 at pages 541-542; Commissioner Sargodha Division v. Khizar Ilayat PLD 1996 SC 793; Brig. (Retd.) F.B. Ali v. The State PLD 1975 SC 706; Swam Singh v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1976 SC 232; State of Orrisa and others v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra AIR 1963 SC 779 at pages 785-786; State of Maharashtera v. B.K. Takkamore AIR 1947 S.C. 1353; Royal Bank of Canada v. I.R.C. (1972) 1 All. E.R. 225 at page 239; Breen v. Amalgamated. Engineering Union and others (1971) 2 Q.B. 175; Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 1 Paragraph 26 P.29 and Administrative Law by H.WR. Wade, Sixth Edition P.338 rel.\n \n(c) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---\n \n----S.27(4)---State Bank of Pakistan Prudential Regulation No.XXI for Fund Management Services---Banking company---Cancelling of licence---Governor State Bank---Powers and duties---Mismanaging of affairs---Siphoning of funds---Chief Executive of Bank, appointing of---Approval of State Bank---Respondent-Bank was involved in mismanagement of affairs of bank and misuse of position by Directors of Bank for their own benefit---Huge amount of bank was siphoned off to the detriment of interest and rights of depositors in collusion with foreign companies in which Directors of the Bank had substantial interests---Chairman of Board of Directors' acted as de facto Chief Executive of Bank without approval of State Bank---Governor State Bank, in exercise of powers under S.27(4) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, cancelled licence of respondent-Bank---Validity---Governor State Bank, while dealing with matter of cancellation of licence was not required to hold full-dress trial like a Court of law---Charges against respondent-Bank were serious enough to warrant cancellation of licence---Governor State Bank had acted fairly and reasonably by observing principles of natural justice and statutory requirements on the basis of relevant material---High Court was not expected to substitute its for that of State Bank as if it was exercising an appellate jurisdiction---In the presence of relevant material including inquiry report of chartered accountants, Governor State Bank of Pakistan was perfectly justified in forming opinion that . affairs of respondent-Bank were being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of depositors---Governor State Bank had necessary expertise in relevant field and he arrived at a conclusion which a reasonable man in his place would do---Once licence was granted, it became a matter of serious concern to cancel the same---Judgment passed by High Court was not sustainable at law and more so when matter of winding up of respondent-Bank had already attained finality with dismissal of appeal and review petition by Supreme Court ---Fact of acquittal of Directors of respondent-Bank from charges of criminal misconduct would not per se nullify order of cancellation of licence passed by Governor State Bank in exercise of his statutory powers conferred under S.27(4) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962---Judgment passed by High Court against order passed by Governor State Bank was set aside---Appeal was allowed. \n \nState Bank of Pakistan v. Indus Bank Limited through Chairman 2001 CLC 1833; Mr. Rafique Ahmed Sheikh v. The Crown PLD 1951 Lah. 17 (22); Maher Alvi v. Pakistan and 5 others PLD 1980 Kar. 609(650); Khalid Malik v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1991 Kar. 1(99); Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and another v. President of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 388 (541-542); Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chairman Fourth Wage Board 1993 SCMR 1533; Kumar v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 3689-(2001)2 S.C.C. 386-2000 SOL Case No.636; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Hamza Board Mills PLD 1996 Lah. 651; Taj Company Ltd. In re: NLR 1996 Un-reported cases 799; Alliance Motors (Pvt.) Ltd. In re: 1997 MLD 1966 (Karachi); New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad Ltd. v. Dye-Chen Corporation (1986) 59 Com. cases 183 (186-187); In re: Messrs Pakland Cement Limited 2002 CLD 1392; Sudersan Chits (India) Ltd. v. Sukumaren Pillai (1985) 57 Corn. Cases 85; Collector Land Acquisition Abbottabad and 2 others v. Lal Khan PLD 2002 SC 277; Syed Ali Abbas v. Vishan Singh PLD 1967 SC 294; S. Vankatachalam Iyyer v. State of Madras AIR 1957 Madras 623(626); Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhri PLD 1957 SC (India) 346 (351-352); Jamil Ahmed v. Province of Sindh 2001 YLR 1837; Reserve Bank of India v. Patiala Central Bank Ltd. AIR 1961 Kerala 268 at P.275; District Magistrate Lahore v. Faqeer Sayyed Fayyazuddin PLD 1965 SC 371 (377-378); Associated Provincial Pictures House Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation 1947 2 All. E.R. 680; The Presiding Officer v. Sadaruddin Ansari and others PLD 1967 SC 569 (579); Krishna Murari Aggerwala v. The Union of India AIR 1975 SC 1877 (1882-1883); H. Lavender and Sons Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government 1970 3 All E.R. 871 (872); Muhammad Jamil Asghar v. The Improvement Trust PLD 1965 SC 698; Hyderi International Finances Limited v. The State Bank of Pakistan PLD 1980 Lah. 658; Saghir Ahmed through L.Rs v. Province of Punjab through Secretary, Housing and Physical Planning, Lahore and others PLD 2004 SC 261 at P.268; Nazir Ahmed v. Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 453; Ram Labhaya v. Dhani Ram AIR 1947 Lah. 296; K.P. Veghaese v. The Income Tax Officer AIR 1981 SC 1922; Radha Corporation and others v. Collector of Customs 1989 SCMR 353; Asian Food Industries Limited v. Pakistan 1985 SCMR 1753 at P.1756; Mrs. Aiman Arshad v. Miss Naeem Khan PLD 1990 SC 612; Koro v. The State PLD 1963 Kar. 256; Craies On Statute Law, Sixth Edition by S.G.G. Edgar at page 150; Crawford Statutory Construction in sections 219 and 221 at pages 393 and 399 and N.S. Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition 2007, in Chapter 16 at Pages 859-861 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.576 of 2003, decision dated: 13-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY AND FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, JJ",
    "": "STATE BANK OF„¢ PAKISTAN\nVs.\nFRANKLIN CREDIT AND INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD. through Attorney"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13941",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1956 = 2009 SLD 1956 = 2009 CLD 1564",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLV of 2001)-------Ss.9, 21 & 22---Suit for rendition of accounts, declaration and permanent injunction---Award of compensatory cost-Plaintiff while seeking declaration from the Banking Court that demand. of defendant-Bank of amount from the plaintiff being baseless, was illegal, reserved in his plaint his right to claim damages for the mental torture caused to him on account of its such baseless and incessant demands---Banking Court decreed suit filed by the plaintiff declaring that claim of defendant-Bank for charges was illegal---Banking Court while declaring so, however, went a step further and awarded sum of Rs.50,000 to the plaintiff as compensatory cost on account of disgrace and mental torture that was said to be caused to the plaintiff on account of illegal demands of the defendant-Bank---Validity of awarding such compensatory cost was called in question by. the Bank in appeal---Provisions of S.21(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, had only prescribed the manner in which any fine or cost, that had already been imposed under some provisions of said Ordinance, was to be applied---Provisions of S.21 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 did not empower the Banking Court to impose costs or fines---Nothing more could be read into the provisions of said S.21(1) of the Ordinance---There had to be first imposition of costs and fines under some other enabling provisions of the Ordinance before provisions of S.21 of the Ordinance could be applied---No legal justification was available with the Banking Court to award any compensatory costs to the plaintiff. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.2(d), 9, 21 & 22---Scope of S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Claim for compensatory cost---Validity---No doubt, the scope of S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was limited only to such suits where a default in the fulfilment of any obligation in relation to a finance had been committed, but that did not mean that no claim at all for damages which was based on personal injury could be agitated before a Banking Court---Personal injury could arise on account of default in fulfilment of any obligation in relation to finance and an aggrieved party could claim damages as well---Claim for damages i.e. a claim for seeking pecuniary compensation was a relative term and such a claim could arise on account of inquiry or loss caused by one to the other by commission of tort or by breach of a contractual obligation---Claim for damages caused on account of commission of tort or by breach of a contract which had nothing to do with the default in the fulfilment of an obligation arising from a financial facility and covered under the definition of \"\"finance\"\" as provided in S.2(d) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, could not be agitated before the Banking Court; however, a claim for damages, on account of any injury or loss caused by a Financial Institution to its customer, which had resulted from any default committed by the Financial Institution on the fulfilment of its obligation in relation to finance, could certainly be taken to the Banking Court for adjudication---Claim for pecuniary compensation could either arise from a tortuous act i.e. not based on any contract or a breach of a contractual obligation not pertaining to accommodation or facility of finance and for those two categories of claim, the Banking Court was not the appropriate forum.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.9, 21 & 22---Award of compensatory costs---Scope---Banking Court decreed suit filed by the plaintiff declaring that claim of defendant Bank with regard to charges was illegal---Banking Court, however while declaring so, went a step further and awarded sum of Rs.50,000 to the plaintiff as compensatory cost on account of disgrace and mental torture---Award of said compensatory costs was completely beyond the scope of the pleadings of the plaintiff---In fact in one of paras of the plaint, the plaintiff had himself stated that he reserved his right to claim damages---No legal justification was available with the Banking Court to travel beyond the scope of the pleadings and award compensatory costs on its own---Court should not pass a decree which was beyond the scope of the pleadings, more particularly when defendant chose not to contest the proceedings---Defendant who was being proceeded ex parte could not be taken by surprise and burdened with a decree which was beyond the scope of the pleadings of the plaintiff-Plaintiff ought to have claimed such compensation in the plaint and sought relief regarding thereto in the prayer clause---In the absence of such pleadings, no decree could be passed on that account---Decree passed by the Banking Court, in so far as it related to award of compensation, was beyond the pleadings of the plaintiff and was liable to be set aside.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "1st Appeal No.33 of 2007, decision dated: 15-01-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "ANWAR ZAHEER, JAMALI, C.J. AND FAISAL ARAB, J",
    "": "CITI BANK N.A.\nVs.\nSyed SHAHANSHA HUSSAIN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13942",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1957 = 2009 SLD 1957 = 2009 CLD 1571",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.10 &15-Auction without intervention of Court---Delivery of possession---Statement of account, non filing of---Objection by occupant of property---Objector sought setting aside of sale on the ground that statement of account was not filed within 30 days as required under S.15(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Validity--- Financial Institutions selling mortgaged property in exercise of powers conferred upon them under S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, were under obligation to file proper account of sale proceeds in Banking Court within 30 days of sale---Purchaser of property for valuable consideration could not be non-suited due to default of financial institutions in filing of statement of account within a period provided by S.15 (10) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---All disputes relating to sale of mortgaged property under S.15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, were to be decided by Banking Court which included disputes pertaining to non-compliance of S.15(10) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Time period provided under S.15(10) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was to run from the date of registration of sale-deed in respect of mortgaged-property in favour of purchaser---Financial institution was required to file under S.15 (9) of Financial Institutions . (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, proper account of sale proceedings in Banking Court about net sale proceeds after taking into consideration all expenses incurred for sale---Conveyance deed was registered on 24-11-2004, whereas financial institution filed written statement on 23-11-2004 in Banking Court i.e. on day before conveyance deed was executed in favour of auction purchaser and further filed statement of accounts on 17-11-2004, i.e. within 30 days from the date when conveyance deed was registered---Financial institution made substantial compliance of S.15(10) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and the same could not be set aside---Objector failed to bring on record that market value of property disposed of by financial institution was more than for which it was sold--Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "1st Appeal No.13 of 2009, decision dated: 25-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN AND MS. SOFIA LATIF, JJ",
    "": "Mst. SURRAYYA BEGUM\nVs.\nSyed WASEEM HUSSAIN and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13943",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1958 = 2009 SLD 1958 = 2009 CLD 1650",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XVII, R.3---Suit for recovery of loan---Closing of evidence---Evidence of the plaintiff was closed by the Trial Court and suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence and to cause the attendance of witnesses---Case was not adjourned upon the request of the plaintiff but it was a routine adjournment---Order sheet established that most of the adjournments in the matter were granted for the reason that the parties sought adjournments for an outside court settlement---Penal provisions of O.XVII, R.3, C.P.C., which had to be strictly construed and applied, were inapplicable to the matter in question---Judgment and decree of the Banking Court was set aside and case was remanded to the Banking Court for adjudication afresh by providing two opportunities to the Bank for producing its complete evidence.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 367 of 2008, heard 3rd March, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND IMTIAZ RASHEED SIDDIQUI, JJ",
    "": "ALLIED BANK LIMITED through Attorneys\nVs.\nMessrs NAEEM ASSOCIATES through Sole Proprietor and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13944",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1JpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1959 = 2009 SLD 1959 = 2009 CLD 1671",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.9-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 55---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 2(7), 9, 14, Arts. 32 & 120---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.10---Suit for declaration, mandatory injunction and recovery of amount as compensation/damages--Limitation---Adjustment of outstanding loan amount by Bank through debit entries made from account of borrower-plaintiff maintained with Bank---Plaintiff filed suit on 25-2-1998 after coming to know on 3-3-1994 about debit entries, dated 8-7-1993 and 12-7-1993---Plaint amended by plaintiff resulted in its return on 31-3-1999 by Banking Court for lacking jurisdiction and was re-presented in High Court on 19-4-1999---Validity---Suit presented in Court lacking jurisdiction would neither be \"\"suit\"\" nor \"\"proceeding in the suit\"\"---Plaint on its return re-presented in Court of competent jurisdiction would be a fresh suit, thus, period of limitation would be computed from date of accrual of cause of action till its re-filing in Court of competent jurisdiction---Plaintiff had amended plaint when period of limitation was about to expire---Plaint was represented in High Court when time for filing suit had already expired---Starting point of limitation was the date on which such adjustment was made---Period of limitation once begun to run would not stop due to subsequent disability or inability to sue--Plaintiff had not sought benefit of S.14 of Limitation Act, 1908 nor was same available to him as element of good faith was lacking---Suit regarding declaratory relief had not been filed within six years from date of such adjustment or date of its knowledge---Plaintiff could challenge such adjustment from his account within two years of his knowledge thereof---Period of limitation for compensation for breach of contract being three years, suit on all three causes of actions had become barred by time on date of re-presentation of its plaint in the High Court-Suit was dismissed for being time barred in circumstances. \n \nHabib Bank Limited v. Messrs Qayyum Spinning Ltd.\"\" 2001 MLD 1351; Mst. Nur Jehan Begum through Legal Representative v. Syed Mujtaba Ali Naqvi 1991 SCMR 2300; Faisal Bank through duly appointed Attorney v. Messrs Zimindara Rice Mills and 21 others 2007 CLD 1164; Messrs Muhammad Siddiq, Muhammad Umar and another v. The Australasia Bank Limited PLD 1966 SC 684; Messrs Continental Syndicate of Trade v. Lloyds Bank Limited PLD 1966 Kar. 556; Central Bank of India v. Syed Muhammad Abdul Jalil Shah 1999 CLC 671; Muhammad Sharif and 3 others v. Mahla through Legal Representative and others 2007 MLD 547; Mst. Munira Rafique Anwar through Legal Representatives v. Khalid Javed Anwar and others PLD 2005 Lah. 662; Sindhi v. Ashiq All and 10 others 2005 YLR 2994; 2000 YLR 2645; Muhammad Jan v. The State 2000 YLR 2094; Eada Khan v. Mst. Ghanwar and others 2004 SCMR 1524; Muhammad and 9 others v. Hasham Ali PLD 2003 SC 271; Muhammad Akram alias Raja v. Muhammad Ishaque 2004 SCMR 1130;. PLD 1959 W.P. Kar. 348 and Umar v. S.A. Rana PLD 1957 W. P. 760 ref.\n \nHawa Bai and 6 others v. Abdus Shakoor and. 8 others PLD 181 Kar. 277 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R.10---Representation of plaint before competent Court after its return from Court lacking jurisdiction would be a fresh suit and not continuation of former suit---Period of limitation in such case would be computed from date of accrual of cause of action till filing of suit in Court of competent jurisdiction---Principles.\n \nWhen the plaint after its return from the Court not having jurisdiction is re-presented before the Court having jurisdiction, the suit will not be continuation of earlier suit. Suit presented to a Court lacking jurisdiction in the matter is neither a \"\"suit\"\" nor \"\"proceedings in the suit\"\". The Court to which such plaint is presented, cannot adjudicate upon the merits of the case nor can it give any, relief to the plaintiff. To treat a plaint a suit, the plaintiff has to show that it is properly stamped and presented before the Court which has the jurisdiction over the parties, subject matter and the territorial jurisdiction. The Court has to see that subject matter of suit is not barred under any law. The absence or presence of these ingredients may result either in return or rejection of the plaint. \n \nThe plaint, on its return is represented in the Court of competent jurisdiction is a fresh suit. The period of limitation will be computed from the date of accrual of cause of action till filing of the suit in Court of competent jurisdiction.\n \nHawa Bai and 6 others v. Abdus Shakoor and 8 others PLD 181 Kar. 277 rel.\n \n(c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---\n \n----S.9---Limitation once begun to run, then no subsequent disability or inability to sue could stop the same---Principles.\n \nOnce the limitation has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it. Provisions of section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1908 clearly provide that limitation once commences, it would continue to run, unless the case falls within any exceptions provided for limitation. \n \n(d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---\n \n----Ss. 2(7) & 14---Benefit of S.14 of Limitation Act, 1908 could be sought by a party through an application to Court, but not otherwise---Principles.\n \nTime consumed in prosecuting another civil proceedings with due diligence can be excluded in computing the period of limitation, where the proceedings are prosecuted in good faith. The plaintiff has to move an application to seek benefits under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court by itself cannot ascertain that proceedings founded upon the same cause of action or the same relief before the Court having no jurisdiction, were prosecuted in good faith. To establish \"\"good faith\"\", its narration is essential requirement and that purposes can be achieved through filing of an application. Moving for amendment at the fag end of the period of limitation cannot be termed as an act .in good faith. \"\"Good faith\"\" as defined in section 2(7) of the Limitation Act, 1908 excludes everything from the purview of good faith, which is not done with due care and attention. What is done without due care and attention cannot be termed to be done in goof faith.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "COS No. 33 of 1999, decision dated: 28-01-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "Messrs TAUNSA GYPSUM (PVT.) LTD---Plaintiff\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13945",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1J5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1960 = 2009 SLD 1960 = 2009 CLD 1682",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)-------S.18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.152 & O.XXI, R.94---Execution proceedings---Petition for correction of sale certificate---Petitioner's plea was that due to typographical mistake, word \"\"sale\"\" instead of word \"\"lease\"\" had been written in sale certificate and auction-purchaser was transferred only lease hold rights, but not proprietary rights, thus, auctioned property was liable to be reverted to its original owner after expiry of lease period---Validity---Earlier application for annulment of confirmation of auction accepted by Executing Court was rejected by High Court in appeal, whereagainst petition for leave to appeal and review petition filed before Supreme Court were dismissed---High Court in its order had observed that no objection regarding ownership of property had been taken earlier during trial of suit or before Executing Court---Property auctioned belonged to petitioner, thus, there was no mistake in sale certificate---Such matter had attained finality and could not be reopened after 21/22 years---Execution proceedings were pending before Banking Court at place \"\"F\"\"---High Court had become functus officio and had no jurisdiction to entertain such petition, which was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nSyed Saadi Jafri Zainabi v. Land Acquisition Collector and Assistant Commissioner PLD 1992 SC 472; Muhammad Shahzad v. Khairati Khan and others 1989 SCMR 189; Zari Tariqiati Bank Ltd. through Branch Manager v. Hassan Aftab Fatiana 2009 CLD 36 and Bank Alfalah Ltd. v. Messrs Bilal Spinning Mills Ltd. 2005 CLD 206 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.M.A. No.64-B of 2005 in Ex. A. No.2-B of 2005, decision dated: 18 May, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "IQBAL HAMEED-UR-REHMAN, J",
    "": "Messrs HUDAYBIA TEXTILES MILLS LTD. through Chief Executive\nVs.\nMessrs ZULFIQAR ASSOCIATES LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13946",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1J5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1961 = 2009 SLD 1961 = 2009 CLD 1687",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss.42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr.1, 2---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Question involved in the application appeared to be two fold, firstly, as to whether in the circumstances non-yielding of profits by the defendant .company corresponding to the investment could be termed as siphoning off the company funds by the Directors of the company in command justifying interference by the court in the internal affairs of the company and that as to whether the plaintiff after having approved the budget and annual accounts containing such capital expenditures, had waived their right to object---Defendants had placed on record documentary evidence to show that all capital expenditures so incurred were unanimously approved by the Board of Directors including the plaintiffs---In order to justify the capital expenditure so incurred the defendants had asserted setting up of a new factory---Plaintiffs/applicants had not questioned the capital expenditure so incurred nor had imputed siphoning off the company's fund under the garb of capital expenditure in the main suit, nor had produced documentary evidence of a solitary example to show that the expenditure so incurred did not reflect the actual purchase/expenses, though one of the plaintiffs was not only a Chartered Accountant by profession, but also Head of audit committee---Even otherwise, allegation of siphoning off the company's fund amounted to imputing fraud upon the Directors of the company in command and would not warrant inquiry or investigation on bald allegations, unless supported by documentary evidence or instances of fraud i.e. siphoning off the company's funds under the garb of capital expenditures were detailed---Directing forensic audit, in circumstances would not only amount to fishing inquiry, but would be against the basic principle relating to the administration of the affairs of the company---Court would not generally intervene at the instance of the shareholders in internal administration of the company and would not interfere with the management of the company by its Directors so long they were acting within the powers conferred on them under the Articles of the company; however, the principle was subject to an important exception i.e. the powers so vested in them must have been exercised honestly, in good faith and in the best interest of the shareholders. \n \nMst. Khurshid Ismail v. Unichem Corp. (Pvt.) Ltd. 1996 CLC 1863; Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Israr-ul-Haq PLD 1981 SC 531; Jam Pari v. Muhammad Abdullah 1992 SCMR 786 and Karachi Pipelines Ltd. v. Government of Sindh 1992 CLC 1668 ref.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S.196---Powers of Directors---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Powers of the Directors as envisaged under S.196 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, subject to the restrictions as contained in the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and in the Articles of the company were extensive with those of the company itself----Once elected and in control, the Directors had almost all the powers over operation of the company, until they were removed, however, such powers. were subject to two limitations; firstly, the Board was not competent to do what the Companies Ordinance, 1984, Articles or special resolution, required to be done by the shareholders in general meeting and secondly, in the exercise of their powers, the Directors were subject to the provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984, Articles and other regulations not inconsistent therewith made by the company in general meeting---While exercising such powers, every Director of the company was expected to discharge the duties of his office honestly, in good faith and in the best interest of the company; and was bound to exercise that degree of care, diligence and skill which a reasonable prudent man would exercise in his own affairs in comparable circumstances---Only acts of the Directors were immune from the judicial scrutiny which were within the sphere of their powers and were performed honestly, in good faith and in the best interest of the company---In case the plaintiffs would place on record any material to prove the contrary, then despite the fact that they could have approved the budget or the annual account containing capital expenses, an investigation as so sought, could very well be directed for the simple reason that there could be a waiver of rights, unless relinquished intentionally or estoppels against fraudulent acts or breach of statutory obligation. \n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S.230---Books of accounts to be kept by company---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Default in keeping the books of accounts properly---Since the law did not draw any distinction between the powers of the Directors; and it was the Rule of Majority which empowered one set of Directors to manage the affairs of the company and rendered the other powerless Directors who were not in command under the law, had also the rights to participate in the meetings of the company and to contribute in the well being by giving their views/expert opinion and as envisaged under subsection (4) of 8.230 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 were entitled to an access to the record of the company exactly in the manner as the Directors in command---Law, in order to secure such right as provided in subsection (7) of S.230 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, directed imposition of penalty on every Director, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Accountant who knowingly failed to maintain such books or papers or place them open for inspection by the Directors during business hours---Since nothing was on record to show that the plaintiffs had ever invoked the provisions of subsection (7) of S.230 of. the Companies Ordinance, 1984, or had placed before High Court any documentary evidence to demonstrate the agitation of such grievance, through any other mode, demand of Forensic audit despite demonstrating the enormous increase in capital expenditure without proportionate increase in profit, appeared to be pre-mature. \n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S.196(2)(j)--Incurring of capital expenditures by Directors of the company---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Clause (J) of subsection (2) of S. 196 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 required a resolution of the Board of Directors for incurring expenditures---Getting ex-post facto sanction of the Board of Directors for the capital expenditure already incurred at the instance of the Chief Executive Officer of the company, not only. appeared to be against the intent of law, but also amounted to \"\"One Man Rule\"\" depriving the company from the expertise of the Directors on Board---Chief Executive Officer of a company though was always backed by the majority of the Directors and all of his actions were approved as and when placed before the Board, but it was also true that even if the approval of Board was obtained in terms of S.196 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 i.e. before incurring such expenses, the result could not be different; as the best available advice of a Director, could be bulldozed by the \"\"Rule of Majority\"\", and there was nothing much which could be done about it---Practice of incurring capital expenditures as pleaded by the defendants, also appeared to be against the \"\"Rule of Transpency\"\" and would deprive a Director from his statutory right to contribute by participating in meaningful meeting resolving to undertake such expenditures---Capital expenditures admittedly were to be incurred on plant, machinery, equipment, free hold land, building, furniture and fixture, vehicles etc.; and from their very nature, they did not appear to be imminent peril requiring instinctive action incapable of deliberate and intelligent action---All applications were dismissed, two being premature and third one being infructuous--Defendant would be at liberty to incur capital expenditures in terms of S.196 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 after obtaining approval from its Board of Directors in a meaningful meeting describing the purpose on which those were to 'be incurred with full justification.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.166 and C.M.As. Nos.2012, 2013, 2486, 2757, 3141 and 4513 of 2009, decision dated: 10-07-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAJJAD ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SULEMAN KANJIANI and 3 others--Plaintiffs\nVs.\nDADEX ETERNIT LTD. through Chief Executive and 4 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13947",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1J5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 1962 = 2009 SLD 1962 = 2009 CLD 1699",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9, 10, 12 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.V, R.20---Suit for recovery of loan--Application for setting aside ex parte decree---Substituted service---Appeal---Suit filed by the plaintiff-Bank having been decreed ex parte, defendant had filed application for setting aside of ex parte decree---Banking Court having dismissed said application, defendant had filed appeal against the of the Banking Court contending that he was not properly served---In the present case, principles underlying provisions of O.V, R.20, C.P.C. would be attracted as order for service by publication was not made simultaneously with the order for issuance of summons in ordinary manner---When all the three modes had not been adopted simultaneously and service had not been effected through the two processes, publication was not to be ordered mechanically without adverting to the reports---Before granting service through publication, it was incumbent upon the court to have applied its mind to the facts of the case and found out that whether in spite of the best efforts of the plaintiff, the defendant could not be sewed for the reasons that he was avoiding service with the object of obstructing the disposal of suit---Before ordering publication, the court should have satisfied itself that all the essential conditions for resorting to that mode of service and to proceed ex parte against defendants existed---Court, Judicial Tribunal or even a quasi-judicial Tribunal, entrusted with duty to determine the valuable rights of the parties arraigned before them were required to act deliberately and after proper application of mind to the matter before them---Question whether the defendant was lawfully served or not, was a mixed question of fact and law which was to be answered independently, of the intention of any party---Defendant had a right to defend his cause and for that purpose, the plaintiff--Bank was under a legal obligation to make best efforts in effecting the service on the defendants through the process of court---Plaintiff--Bank had failed to perform its legal obligation, which amounted to mala fide in law---Defendant having not been duly served, ex parte decree passed against him was not in conformity with law and same could not be sustained---Special circumstances existed for setting aside the ex parte decree and other proceedings and to allow the defendant to defend the suit---Defendant had proved that he was not properly served as neither notice was properly issued for service upon him nor he was ever served with notice of the suit---Ex parte and decree was not binding upon him--Appeal was allowed, impugned order passed by the Banking Court was set aside, with the result that application under S.12 of Financial Institutions. (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 filed by the defendant was allowed and ex parte and decree passed by the Banking Court against defendant, stood set aside.\n \nBrig. (Retd.) Mazhar-ul-Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited Islamabad and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706; Ahmed Autos v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 497 and United Bank Ltd. v. Nishat Chemical Industries Ltd. 1986 CLD 1985 ref.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)---\n \n----S.7(2)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.90, 92, O.XXXIV, R.4, O.XXXVII, Rr.1 & 2---Suit for recovery of loan---Procedure of special court---Suits based on mortgage---Jurisdiction of special court---In exercise of its civil jurisdiction, the special court had to follow the procedure provided in Civil Procedure Code,1908 except to the extent that a contrary provision was found in the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979---Section 7(2) of said Ordinance had expressly laid down that even in suits based on mortgage summary procedure provided for in Order XXXVII, C.P.C. would be followed---In a recovery suit before the special court, defendant could not appear and defend the suit as a matter of right and had first to obtain the leave of the court to defend suit---Except for that deviation, other provisions of C.P.C. would apply to a suit for recovery heard by the special court---Under O.XXXIV, R.4, C.P.C. in a suit based on mortgage a preliminary decree had to be passed necessarily, if the defendant failed to pay the amount due from him, only then the plaintiff could apply the court for final decree---It was the practice of the court while acting as a special court to pass a preliminary decree in suit founded on mortgage---In the present case Banking Court had failed to pass a preliminary decree--In the impugned , it was stated that ex parte decree was the final decree---Defendants, in circumstances were deprived of the opportunity to pay into the court the amount due from them and avoid the court sale in terms of O.XXXIV, C.P.C.---Non-compliance with O.XXXIV, C.P.C. had provided sufficient reason for setting aside the impugned decree--Application under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. could not be entertained unless defendant deposited such amount not exceeding twenty per cent of the sum realized at the sale or furnish such security as the court could direct---While exercising civil jurisdiction, the special court had to follow the procedure laid down in C.P.C. and for the purpose of execution of the decree, it could adopt procedure under O.XXI, C.P.C. and allied provisions of C.P.C.---If conflict existed between the provisions of C.P.C. and the Ordinance, the latter would prevail---Once the special court had chosen to adopt C.P.C., the correctness of orders passed by it in conducting the sale of the property in dispute, would have to be necessarily adjudged on the touchstone of C.P.C. \n \nGanapathia Pillai v. Malaiperunmal Chettiar and another AIR 1925 Mad. 202; Alhamdi Begum v. National Bank of Pakistan PLD 1976 Kar. 723; M. Shafique Shah and others v. Mst. Irshad Begum and others 1981 CLC 369; Messrs Mahmood Brothers and another v. National Bank of Pakistan and another 2004 CLD Lah. 771; Asim Shahzad v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and another 2002 CLD Lah. 1288, Lt. Col. (Retd.) Muhammad Akhter v. Bank of Punjab 2004 CLD Lah.821, Muhammad Saeed Sheikh v. Citibank N.A. 2002 CLD Lah. 1697 and Apex International Associates v. Bank Al-Falah Limited 2002 CLD Lah. 639 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.51 of 2006, decision dated: 4-03-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "AZIZULLAH M. MEMON AND ABDUL RAHMAN FARUQ PIRZADA, JJ",
    "": "Haji MUHAMMAD YAQOOB AKHTAR\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13948",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1J5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2616 = 2010 SLD 2616 = 2010 CLD 1",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.18---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts.17(2)(a) & 79--Money decree, execution of---Sale of mortgaged house--Objector claimed to be owner of a portion of such house on basis of oral gift made by -debtor, who could not mortgage same in favour of the decree-holder (Bank)---Proof--Gift Deed produced by objector was not signed by marginal witnesses; that date of its execution had been changed by overwriting; that a sentence regarding delivery of possession of gifted house had been added between the lines; that same was written on plain paper; that same contradicted applicant's assertion that gift t was made orally as donor expressed his intention of making gift through such deed; that same spoke of gift of whole house, while a portion thereof had been sold through registered sale-deed prior to execution of gift deed; that same suffered from defect of uncertainty for not specifying gamed portion of house; and that signatures of ¬debtor/executant thereon did not resemble and tally with his signatures on plaint and other documents available on record---Objector's application was silent as to place, time, date and names of witnesses of gift---Such gift deed was inadmissible in evidence for not having been attested by two witnesses--Objector had made petition with sole object to defeat decree and deprive decree-holder to realize decretal amount and prolong litigation--High Court dismissed objector's application in circumstances.\n \nAlflah Bank Limited v. Naima Saeed 2005 CLD 375; Shehryar Ali Tippu and 3 others v. Messrs Decora Furnisher PLD 1985 Kar. 47; Safeer Ahmad alias Muhammad Shafique v. Abdul Rashid and another 1992 CLC 1896; Abdul Ghaffar and 6 others v. Ghulam Jahan and 5 others PLD 1975 Pesh. 12; Moulvi Abdullah and others v. Abdul Aziz and others 1987. SCMR 1403; Anwar Sultana and others v. Pakistan Cooperative Housing Ltd. PLD 1964 W.P. Kar. 116; Ghulam Sakina v. Umar Bakhsh and others PLD 1964 SC 456; Irshad Bibi v. Muslim Commercial Bank through Manager and 3 others 2003 CLD 46 and Muhammad Saleem v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 280 ref.\n \n(b) Islamic Law---\n \n----Oral gift---Proof---Easy to allege oral gift, but d cult to prove same. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--\n \n----S.18--Decree for recovery of loan amount, execution of-Sale of mortgaged property---Objection petition by legal heirs of deceased guarantor--Validity--Objectors had unsuccessfully contested suit---Executing Court could not go behind decree---Liability of -debtors was joint and several---Objectors had inherited such property from deceased guarantor, which could be attached and sold through auction for recovery of decretal amount---High Court dismissed objection petition in circumstances.\n \n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S.47---Execution of decree---Executing Court could not go behind decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Application No.14-B of 2007 in C.O.S. No.4 of 1994 and C.M.As. Nos.29-B of 2008 and 24-B, 25-B of 2009, decision dated: 6-03-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN through Attorney--Applicant\nVs.\nKHALID AZIZ MALIK and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13949",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1J5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2617 = 2010 SLD 2617 = 2010 CLD 10",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.20 & 22---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.439---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Criminal revision--Maintainability---Limitation--Scope---Criminal revision application had been directed against passed by Judge Banking Court in criminal complaint under S.20 Finances) the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Ordinance, 2001, whereby respondents/accused were acquitted---Applicant had failed to file appeal against impugned order as provided under S. 22 of the Ordinance---Under subsection (6) of S.22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, interim/ interlocutory order, which did not decide the entire case, no appeal, review or revision would lie nor against an order accepting or rejecting an application for leave to defend or any interlocutory order of the Banking Court---Whereas per subsection (1) of S.22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, against the final order the appeal would be filed within 30 days---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was a special statute and the period of limitation for appeal had not been prescribed in the Ordinance, and in circumstances provisions of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 would not apply but if revision would be converted into an appeal same would be hit by limitation---Even otherwise, in presence of clear provisions of S.22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, revision could not be converted into constitutional petition--Same, in circumstances was not maintainable---Criminal revision application being not maintainable, was-dismissed. \n \nHabib Bank Ltd. v. The State and 6 others 1993 SCMR 1853; Abdul Aziz v. Abdul Hameed and 10 others 2004 YLR 2301; United Bank Limited through Principal Officer/ Attorney/Area Manager Multan Zone, Multan v. The State 2005 YLR 1891 and Jam Sooba v. the State 2004 YLR 2302 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Revision No.108 of 2007, decision dated: 10-01-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED MAHMOOD ALAM RIZVI AND MRS. QAISAR IQBAL, JJ",
    "": "NIB BANK LIMITED--Applicant\nVs.\nTHE STATE and 3 others\nMuhammad Naeem Iqbal for --Applicant."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13950",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1J5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2618 = 2010 SLD 2618 = 2010 CLD 15",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)------Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Contractual obligation---Vested right---Promissory estoppel, principle of--Applicability---Natural justice, principles of---Scope of applicability---Respondent Company invited tenders for setting up a project, appellants furnished performance guarantee equivalent to 10% of contract price but thereafter respondent called for fresh tenders---Plea raised by appellants was that intent to award a contract by itself was a complete contract enforceable at law and that the same operated as promissory estoppel against respondent Company---Validity---Final contract had not come into existence although certain steps towards the same had been taken by respondent Company---Principle of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectancy were not attracted in facts and circumstances of such cases--Mere letters of intent to award contract would not constitute a concluded contract---There might be cases in which a contract might involve number of documents including exchange of correspondence between parties in process of finalization of award of contract---Principle of natural justice was not attracted in absence of infringement of any vested rights of appellants---Bids of appellants had not been confirmed finally, therefore, contract could not be said to have been completed---Even the lowest bid would not confer an absolute title for award of a contract---In mega projects host of other considerations become relevant to avoid any unnecessary risk---General letter of intent merely implied an intention to enter into a contract and authority to contractor to start work before completion of contract in anticipation of signing of contract with a right to contractor for compensation of work, if any, he had already done---Letter of intent could not be treated to be synonymous to a completed contract---Bid of no other bidder had been accepted and respondent Company had decided quite justifiably to re-advertise tenders---Judgment passed by High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution was correct to which no exception could be taken---Appeal was dismissed.\n \nRamna Engineering Pipelines v. Sui Gas Pipelines Limited 2004 SCMR 1274; British Steel Corporation v. Cleveland (1984) 1 A11.E.R. 504; Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Aziz Qureshi PLD 1965 Kar.202; Maj (R) Ahmed Khan Bhatti v. Mst. Masooda Fatima PLD 1981 Kar.398; AIR 1933 P.V.29, Michael Richards Properties Ltd. v. Corporation of Wardens of St. Saviour's Parish (1975)3 All. E.R. 416, Messrs Hotel Summer Retreat, Nathiagali v. Government of N.W.F.P. 1999 MLD 2418; Messrs Dadabhoy Investments (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi through Abdul Dadabhoy v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance PLD 1995 Kar:33; Messrs Poddar Steel Corporation v. Messrs Ganesh Engineering Works AIR 1991 SC 1579; British Steel Corp. v. Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co. Ltd. (1984) 1 All E.R.504; Dresser Rand S.A. v. Messrs Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. AIR 2006 SC 871; Messrs Bagh Construction Company v. Federation of Pakistan 2001 YLR 2791; City Schools (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Privatization Commission, Government of Pakistan and others 2002 SCMR 1150; Lahore Cantonment Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Lahore Cantt. v. Dr. Nusrat Ullah Chaudhry PLD 2002 SC 1068; The Chandpur Mills Ltd. v. The District Magistrate, Tippera PLD 1958 SC 267; Messrs Momin Motor Company v. The Regional Transport Authority, Dacca PLD 1962 SC 1081 Messrs Padmavathi Constructions v. The A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. AIR 1997 A.P. 1; The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh and others AIR 1977 SC 2146; State of Gujarat v. Meghji Pethraj Shah (1994)3 S.C.C. 552; Moulvi Iqbal Haider v. Capital Development Authority PLD 2006 SC 394; Ittehad Cargo Services v. Syed Tasleem Hussain Nagvi PLD 2001 SC 116; Union of India v. Bhimsen Walaiti Ram AIR 1971 SC 2295 and Babu Parvez v. Settlement Commissioner 1974 SCMR 337 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos.1241, and 1242 of 2007, decision dated: 24-09-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, M. JAWED BUTTAR AND MUHAMMAD QAIM, JAN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "PETROSIN CORPORATION LTD.\nVs.\nOIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD. through Managing Director---Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13951",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1J5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2619 = 2010 SLD 2619 = 2010 CLD 15",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)------Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Contractual obligation---Vested right---Promissory estoppel, principle of--Applicability---Natural justice, principles of---Scope of applicability---Respondent Company invited tenders for setting up a project, appellants furnished performance guarantee equivalent to 10% of contract price but thereafter respondent called for fresh tenders---Plea raised by appellants was that intent to award a contract by itself was a complete contract enforceable at law and that the same operated as promissory estoppel against respondent Company---Validity---Final contract had not come into existence although certain steps towards the same had been taken by respondent Company---Principle of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectancy were not attracted in facts and circumstances of such cases--Mere letters of intent to award contract would not constitute a concluded contract---There might be cases in which a contract might involve number of documents including exchange of correspondence between parties in process of finalization of award of contract---Principle of natural justice was not attracted in absence of infringement of any vested rights of appellants---Bids of appellants had not been confirmed finally, therefore, contract could not be said to have been completed---Even the lowest bid would not confer an absolute title for award of a contract---In mega projects host of other considerations become relevant to avoid any unnecessary risk---General letter of intent merely implied an intention to enter into a contract and authority to contractor to start work before completion of contract in anticipation of signing of contract with a right to contractor for compensation of work, if any, he had already done---Letter of intent could not be treated to be synonymous to a completed contract---Bid of no other bidder had been accepted and respondent Company had decided quite justifiably to re-advertise tenders---Judgment passed by High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution was correct to which no exception could be taken---Appeal was dismissed.\n \nRamna Engineering Pipelines v. Sui Gas Pipelines Limited 2004 SCMR 1274; British Steel Corporation v. Cleveland (1984) 1 A11.E.R. 504; Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Aziz Qureshi PLD 1965 Kar.202; Maj (R) Ahmed Khan Bhatti v. Mst. Masooda Fatima PLD 1981 Kar.398; AIR 1933 P.V.29, Michael Richards Properties Ltd. v. Corporation of Wardens of St. Saviour's Parish (1975)3 All. E.R. 416, Messrs Hotel Summer Retreat, Nathiagali v. Government of N.W.F.P. 1999 MLD 2418; Messrs Dadabhoy Investments (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi through Abdul Dadabhoy v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance PLD 1995 Kar:33; Messrs Poddar Steel Corporation v. Messrs Ganesh Engineering Works AIR 1991 SC 1579; British Steel Corp. v. Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co. Ltd. (1984) 1 All E.R.504; Dresser Rand S.A. v. Messrs Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. AIR 2006 SC 871; Messrs Bagh Construction Company v. Federation of Pakistan 2001 YLR 2791; City Schools (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Privatization Commission, Government of Pakistan and others 2002 SCMR 1150; Lahore Cantonment Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Lahore Cantt. v. Dr. Nusrat Ullah Chaudhry PLD 2002 SC 1068; The Chandpur Mills Ltd. v. The District Magistrate, Tippera PLD 1958 SC 267; Messrs Momin Motor Company v. The Regional Transport Authority, Dacca PLD 1962 SC 1081 Messrs Padmavathi Constructions v. The A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. AIR 1997 A.P. 1; The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh and others AIR 1977 SC 2146; State of Gujarat v. Meghji Pethraj Shah (1994)3 S.C.C. 552; Moulvi Iqbal Haider v. Capital Development Authority PLD 2006 SC 394; Ittehad Cargo Services v. Syed Tasleem Hussain Nagvi PLD 2001 SC 116; Union of India v. Bhimsen Walaiti Ram AIR 1971 SC 2295 and Babu Parvez v. Settlement Commissioner 1974 SCMR 337 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos.1241, and 1242 of 2007, decision dated: 24-09-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, M. JAWED BUTTAR AND MUHAMMAD QAIM, JAN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "PETROSIN CORPORATION LTD.\nVs.\nOIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD. through Managing Director---Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13952",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1J5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2620 = 2010 SLD 2620 = 2010 CLD 103",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII off 1969)-------Ss.18 & 22---Listing Regulations of Karachi Stock Exchange, Regulation 16--Contravention or failure to comply with the provisions of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969---Imposition of penalty Meeting of the Board of Directors of the company was being held abroad to consider the financial results for the relevant period-While the meeting was still in progress the Karachi Stock Exchange received verbal representations from its members regarding placement of financial results on the company's website and their subsequent removal--Explanation was sought by the Commission vide letter in that respect and company in its reply admitted that the financial results were placed inadvertently by its Information Technology Department while the meeting was in progress-It was established that financial results were placed by the company on the website for a duration of two hours and thirty-one minutes prior to their dissemination to the Karachi Stock Exchange while the meeting was in progress---Company was one of the most prominent and reputable institutions in the financial and Corporate sector of Pakistan which was the most regulated sector and the company being one of the largest and most prestigious financial market institutions, was expected to be conversant and fully complied with the regulatory requirements---Obligation to strictly comply with the provisions of Listing Regulations was further amplified by the fact that company was also listed on an international stock exchange---It was expected from any institution of company's repute that any disclosure of price sensitive information would be equitable and not in a manner that compromised the investor's confidence or the fairness and transparency of the market---It was the prime responsibility of the company to ensure that appropriate checks and balances ensuring strict compliance to the provisions of Listing Regulations---Company was supposed to maintain high standards of integrity, promptitude and fairness in the conduct of its business, and not to Indulge in any act detrimental to the investor's interest--Company had failed to comply with the provisions of the Listing Regulations by not exercising due care, skill and diligence in conduct of its business and contravened the provisions of Regulation 16 of the Listing Regulations of Karachi Stock Exchange and requirements stated in the correspondence manual of said exchange, made pursuant also to the Listing Regulations-Company misrepresented the facts to the Commission violating the provisions of S.18 of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969-Penalty of Rs.2,000,000 (two million) was imposed on the company and company was advised to take immediate measures and put in place proper checks and procedures to eliminate the occurrence of such instances in future.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Show-Cause Notice No.1(4)/INV/MSW/SMD/2009/05, dated 19-06-2009, decision dated: 31st July, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "IMRAN INAYAT BUTT, DIRECTOR (SMD)",
    "": "UNITED BANK LTD.: In the matter of"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13953",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1J5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2621 = 2010 SLD 2621 = 2010 CLD 130",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 16---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVIII, Rr.5, 6, O.XXXIX, Rr.1, 2 & O.XL, R.1---Suit for recovery of loan---Attachment before , injunction and appointment of receiver---Application for---Counsel for plaintiff-Bank having apprehended that pledged Stock could be interfered with by the defendant had filed application for attachment before , injunction and appointment of receiver--Nazir of the Court was appointed as Commissioner to make inventory of the pledged stock lying at the godown of the defendant and to submit report within specified period.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-80 and C.M.As Nos.5431, 5432 of 2009, decision dated: 25-05-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMAD, J",
    "": "SONERI BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nDEWAN SUGAR MILLS LTD.--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13954",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1J5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2622 = 2010 SLD 2622 = 2010 CLD 131",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S.18-A---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33--Offering shares to general public-Invitation of applications--Submission of more than one application-Penalty for-Appeal against--Ordinary shares of Pakistan Petroleum were offered to general public by Privatization Commission and applications were invited by the offerer in that respect-Appellant submitted two applications through two accounts in two different Banks-Both applications were submitted under the same N.I.C. number and father's name with different addresses and signatures in violation of S.18-A of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969-Both the applications being fictitious, the subscription money of both the applications were confiscated under subsection (2) of S.18-A of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969--Appellant had admitted that one of the applications was made by his brother in his name and his brother had accepted that position--Application money in the impugned order had been confiscated on the ground that said application was fictitious-Order of confiscation could not be interfered with---Other application had been made through the account of the appellant which was bearing the signature of the appellant---No reason was available to believe that the signatures made on said application were not genuine--View taken in the impugned order that said application was fictitious, could not be agreed to-Impugned order was modified to the extent that the shares against said second application be handed over to the appellant.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.2 of 2008, decision dated: 27-08-2008.",
    "Judge Name:": "RAZI-UR-REHMAN AND S. TARIQ A. HUSSAIN, COMMISSIONER (LD)",
    "": "ALI AKBAR JAMANI\nVerses\nJOINT DIRECTOR (SMD)"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13955",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2623 = 2010 SLD 2623 = 2010 CLD 139",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9 & 22--civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151 & O.I, R.10---Suit for recovery of loan amount against principal debtor and mortgator---Death of mortgagor much before filing of suit---Pendency of application by legal heirs of deceased mortgagor for impleading them as -party in the suit---Application by principal debtor under S.151,C.P.C. seeking dismissal of suit to extent of deceased mortgagor for being not maintainable against dead person---Appeal against order of Banking Court dismissing principal's application and accepting legal heirs' application allowing them to join suit---Maintainability---Suit was still pending---Banking Court through impugned order had decided interlocutory application---Banking Court had allowed joining of legal heirs of deceased mortgagor as defendant in suit and had directed filing of amended title of plaint, thus, case had not yet been decided---High Court dismissed appeal for being not maintainable against an interlocutory order.\n \nMehr Muhammad v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner and another 1979 SCMR 182; Hafiz Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd v. Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. 2001 SCMR 1 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.22 of 2009, decision dated: 31st October, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMAD AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Syed NASIMUDDIN\nVs.\nPAKISTAN EXPORT FINANCE GUARANTEE AGENCY LTD. through Chief Executive and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13956",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2624 = 2010 SLD 2624 = 2010 CLD 151",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Words and phrases-------Insolvent', defined and explained. \n \n(b) Words and phrases---\n \n----Insolvency', defined and explained. \n \n(c) Words and phrases---\n \n---- Bankrupt', defined and explained. \n \n(d) Words and phrases---\n \n----Bankruptcy notice', defined and explained.\n \n(e) Words and phrases---\n \n----Adjudge', defined and explained. \n \n(f) Words and phrases---\n \n----Adjudication', defined and explained. \n \n(g) Words and phrases---\n \n----Defaulter' defined and explained. \n \n(h) Words and phrases---\n \n----Government', defined and explained. \n \n(i) Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self Governance) Order, 2009---\n \n----Art. 2(a)---West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.4(7)---\"\"Defaulter\"\"---Defaulter was a person who owed. some dues to Government or its financial institutions and had been declared to be defaulter by the Provincial Government for the purpose to resort various recovery methods under relevant law against him---Defaulter could not be said insolvent, unless had been adjudged insolvent by a competent forum, either on application of the person himself or by his creditors after issuance of notice under law---When a person was adjudged to be insolvent, his assets would vest in the trustees which were being distributed among all his creditors---Person could be declared defaulter by Government through notification for the purpose of recovery of such dues from the defaulter as if such dues were arrears of land revenue---Unless the person was declared and notified to be defaulter by the Government, the person could not be said to be defaulter; and no recovery could be made by extending the special procedure provided for recovery of arrears of land revenue under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967. \n \n(j) Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self Governance) Order, 2009---\n \n----Arts. 37(2)(b) & 71(2)---Writ petition---Election to Assembly---Disqualification of candidate---Under provisions of Art.37(2)(b) of Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self Governance) Order, 2009 a candidate would be disqualified to contest the election to the Assembly, if he had been adjudged by competent forum to be insolvent and he had not discharged himself from insolvency; and a period of ten years had not elapsed since his being adjudged as insolvent---Said Article had clearly envisaged disqualification of an adjudged insolvent from contesting the election for the Assembly and none of the petitioners in the present case had been adjudged to be insolvent by a competent forum and had been declared defaulter by any competent authority--Impugned rejection orders were based merely on lists sent by the financial institutions to the election authorities which were without jurisdiction and void ab initio and were set aside---Petitioners were allowed to contest elections, if they were otherwise qualified.",
    "Court Name:": "Northern Areas Chief Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.56, 57, 62 and 64 of 2009, decision dated: 13-10-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAHIB KHAN AND MUZAFFAR ALI, JJ",
    "": "MIRZA HUSSAIN and others\nVs.\nGOVERNMENT OF GILGIT-BALTISTAN through Chief Secretary Gilgit-Baltistan and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13957",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2625 = 2010 SLD 2625 = 2010 CLD 152",
    "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-------S.18-A---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33---Submission of more than one application for shares of companies offered to the public---Imposition of penalty---Appeal against---Ordinary shares of Habib Bank were offered to general public by Privatization Commission---Appellant submitted more than one application for subscription of said shares in violation of S.18-A of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969---Appellant had admitted submission of multiple applications stating the reason of unawareness of the relevant provisions of law---Appellant also requested that her mistake be condoned and subscription money be refunded or shares be allotted to her---Validity---Section 18-A of Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 was prone to two interpretations---First one was that money received against all applications could be confiscated, where there was more than one application while the other interpretation was that application money in excess of one application ought to be confiscated---In cases of multiple applications the application money for one application or the share (if the application was successful) should not be confiscated---Where an investor proved/established that he/she had acted in bona fide manner or that the contravention was not committed knowingly and wilfully, the subscription money for all applications ought to be returned or the person be given the shares for one application, if he/she was successful and returned the application money for the rest---In the present case appellant did not act in bona fide manner and the contravention was committed knowingly and wilfully as the instruction in that respect was clearly laid down on the form and had been extensively advertised in newspapers--Moreover, the appellant made more than one application through two accounts maintained at two different Banks---Making of two applications from two different accounts, when appellant could have submitted the application from one account, had shown that the act was done knowingly and wilfully and was attempted to defeat the provisions of law---Impugned order, however, was modified with direction that the shares against one application should be given to the appellant and second application money should be confiscated.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.19 of 2008, decision dated: 27-08-2008",
    "Judge Name:": "RAZI-UR-REHMAN KHAN, CHAIRMAN AND S. TARIQ A. HUSSAIN, COMMISSIONER (LD)",
    "": "Ms. SURRIYA RAFIQ\nVerses\nDIRECTOR (S.M.D.), SECP"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13958",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2626 = 2010 SLD 2626 = 2010 CLD 196",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Bank guarantee-----contents of ban guarantee--Scope-Bank guarantee, generally contain in its contents whereby guarantor undertakes to agree irrevocably and unconditionally to the payment to beneficiary-Amount mentioned in bank guarantee and demand of beneficiary is deemed to. be conclusive evidence and beneficiary is considered as sole judge to do so regarding failure of principal to have not complied with or fulfilled requirements of brief/ agreement --There are certain guarantees, which in their contents without mentioning the demand as conclusive evidence or beneficiary to be the sole judge, prescribe certain eventualities on happening whereof beneficiary is entitled to demand encashment of guarantee. \n \n(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---\n \n---Ss.20 & 41---Arbitration---Referring dispute to arbitrator ---Stay of encashing of bank guarantees---Dispute between the parties was with regard to encashing of three bank guarantees provided by appellant to respondent authorities--High Court while referring matter to arbitrator, had gone deep and discussed minutely various clauses, terms and conditions of agreement and other relevant documents and their effect for arriving at its conclusion---Appellant sought stay against encahhing of three bank guarantees--Validity---After referring dispute to arbitrator it was not appropriate and uncalled for High Court to discuss the agreement as such findings of High Court would influence proceedings before Arbitrator--Supreme Court, while disproving such observations of High Court, declined to either affirm or not affirm findings of High Court with comments on merits of the case---Without interpreting terms of agreement, definite conclusion would not be possible as to whether conditions as required for encashing of bank guarantees had been fulfilled or not and by not doing so Supreme Court left it to arbitrator to deal with question of encashment of two guarantees relating to Toll collection according to law while making an award--Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal by holding that authorities were entitled to encashment of pre-bid bank guarantee and restrained them from encashment of other two bank guarantees till the finding given by arbitrator in that respect---Appeal was allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Petition No.1668 of 2009, decision dated: 22-10-2009",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SHAKIRULLAH, JAN AND CH. IJAZ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "STANDARD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (PVT.) LTD.\nVs.\nPAKISTAN through Secretary, M/O Communications, and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13959",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2627 = 2010 SLD 2627 = 2010 CLD 205",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-------Ss.305 & 309--Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33-Winding-up of company--Petition for-Appeal to Appellate Bench of the Commission-Executive Director (Registration) through impugned order granted sanction and authorized the Registrar to present petition before the High Court for winding up of the appellant-company in terms of S.305 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984-Appellant had filed appeal against said order, maintainability of which had been questioned by the authorities--contention of the appellant was that appeal had been preferred against a quasi judicial decision and not an administrative decision which was valid to the extent that administrative orders were not appealable, which had spec4fically been provided by Proviso (a) to S.33 of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997-Contention of the appellant that as opposed to administrative orders all quasi judicial orders were appealable, could not be agreed to because provisos (b) (c) & (d) of S.33(1) of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 had provided situation as where quasi judicial orders passed by the Commission or its authorized officers were not appealable---In the present case proviso (c) of S.33(1) of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 was fully attracted as the impugned order granted sanction to the Registrar, to file winding-up of the appellant-company, which was not appealable order.",
    "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Appeal No.43 of 2009, decision dated: 2-10-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "S. TARIQ ASAF HUSSAIN, COMMISSIONER AND MUHAMMAD SOHAIL DAYALA, COMMISSIONER (S.M.D) (LD)",
    "": "Messrs EXCEL FINANCIAL SERVICES (PVT.) LTD.\nVs.\nEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (REGISTRATION)"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13960",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2628 = 2010 SLD 2628 = 2010 CLD 208",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------S.15--Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.2-A, 3, 4, 9, 18, 23 to 25, 175, 189, & 199---Constitutional petition-Sale of mortgaged property--Vireo of S.15, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 being unconstitutional and offend the provisions of Arts.2-A, 4, 9, 18, 23, 24, 25 and 175 of the Constitution---Validity---Impugned provision was ultra vires the Constitution, offended the fundamental rights of the petitioners and action of Bank by invoking the said provision of law was not legally sustainable which was set aside by High Court and it was declared that remedy of invoking provisions of S. 15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was not available to the Bank; having been declared unconstitutional. \n \nMuhammad Umer Rathore v. Federation of Pakistan 2009 CLD 257 and Maj. Gen.(Retd.) Mian Ghulam Jelani v. The Federal Government through the Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Interior Division, Islamabad PLD 1975 Lah. 63 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.6945, 7091, 5813, 6134, 5655, 5817, 5815, 6025, 6024, 4950, 5814, 5816, 5818, and 6441 of 2009, heard on 20-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "ARIF MUKHTAR RANA\nVs.\nF.O.P"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13961",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2629 = 2010 SLD 2629 = 2010 CLD 274",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.16(3)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973) Art.199---Constitutional petition---Obtaining property through finance lease---Taking over of possession of said property by the Bank---Petitioner was the purchaser of vehicle from Bank after its possession from its defaulting financee---Defaulting financee thereafter filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the auction of the vehicle and for the return of its possession to him---Petitioner who claimed to have purchased the vehicle in question, was impleaded as defendant in the said suit---Submission of petitioner was that a banking suit was maintainable by or against only the parties to a finance, namely, the creditor financial institution and its customer---Petitioner was not a customer, but a third party to whom vehicle in question had been sold by the Bank free from encumbrance---Petitioner had contended that he having no connection with the finance in question, was not liable to be impleaded as a party in the suit---Suit was still at the stage of determination of the dispute raised therein---By order passed by Banking Court, petitioner was asked to produce the vehicle in question in the court for the entrustment of its custody to the entitled person---Counsel for the petitioner had contended that said order of Banking Court had violated the mandatory jurisdictional limits---Validity---Proviso to S.16(3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 had provided compensation as an appropriate mode of relief to a disappointed lease finance rather than the return of the financed asset in question---Keeping that proviso in mind, impleading of petitioner in the suit before the Banking Court, was contrary to law-High Court declared that the impugned order fell into error in concluding that petitioner's impleadment was lawful---Said order was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. \n \nMessrs Data Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and 3 others v. Judge Banking Court No.III, Lahore and 4 others 2008 CLD 1326; Procter and Gamble Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi Bank Al-Falah Limited Karachi and 2 others 2007 CLD 1532; Zaeem A. Malik through Attorney v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. through Manager and 2 others 2006 CLD 1553; M. Manzoor Ahmad Paracha and 5 others v. Habib Bank Ltd. through President and 2 others 2007 CLD 571 and Ghulam Mustafa Khar's case PLD 1989 SC 26 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 8096 of 2009, decision dated: 9-07-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "ZESHAN JAMIL\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT, FAISALABAD and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13962",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2630 = 2010 SLD 2630 = 2010 CLD 293",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.2(a), 2(d) & 9---Banking Court---Determination of jurisdiction---Pre-conditions--For exercise of jurisdiction as Banking Court, it is fundamental, imperative, essential and sine qua non that two conditions must be met, co-exist and fulfilled---Firstly Special Court should have jurisdiction over the subject-matter, which means that cause of action propounded in plaint must be for redressal of grievance regarding enforcement of right or complaint about breach of obligation on the part of defendant but relatable to \"\"finance\"\" as such the same can be termed to be \"\"subject-matter of jurisdiction\"\"---If dispute inter se \"\"financial institution\"\" and \"\"customer\"\" or vice versa is not based upon \"\"finance\"\" and far failure of obligation in relation thereto, the Special Court does not have jurisdiction in the matter---Second facet of jurisdiction is over parties to his, which may be termed as \"\"jurisdiction over the parties\"\" and connotes that Banking Court has only jurisdiction in cases, where relationship of \"\"financial institution\"\" and that of \"\"customer\"\" exists between parties---Considering both aspects of jurisdiction, broad question of jurisdiction is that dispute should be between \"\"customer\"\" and \"\"financial institution\"\" as defined in law, in respect of failure of defendant to fulfil its/his obligations in relation to \"\"finance\"\", which has been specifically, lucidly and clearly mentioned in S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which is key provision of the special law and' can be termed as jurisdictional clause of the enactment---If relationship between parties to suit is not that of \"\"customer\"\" and 'financial institution\"\" and is not about 'finance\"\" Special Court does not have jurisdiction. \n \nQatar Airways PLC v. ANZ Grindlays Bank 2000 CLC 1455; Messrs Shah Jewana Textile Mills Ltd. Lahore through representative v. United Bank Ltd. through Attorney PLD 2000 Lah. 162; Ahmad Murad Malik v. Presiding Officer, Banking Court 2002 CLD 577; Sheikh Nazir Ahmad v. House Building Finance Corporation through General Manager 2002 CLD 1634; Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs The English Engineering Company and 2 others 2005 CLD 292; Manzoor Ahmad and another v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager Nankana Sahib Branch and 3 others 2005 CLD 653; Messrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245; and PASSCO v. Omer Bilal Traders (Pvt.) Limited 2007 CLD 492 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.2(b) & 5---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.175(112)---Banking Court---Status---Though Banking Court has been created under special law but it is not devoid of inherent character and status of Court---Banking Court is created and exercising its powers in terms of Art.175(112) of the Constitution---Banking Court cannot be held to be and/or equated to fora of administrative nature or domestic Tribunal. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Notice, issuance of--Pre-conditions---Duty of Banking Court---At the very inception, Banking Court without issuing notice under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 should take a decision on the basis of parameters laid down for the purpose---No notice should be issued, particularly in case where Court is of the firm view about lack of jurisdiction---If Banking Court is prima facie satisfied with conditions/parameters then required notice must go leaving determination of matter in the light of defence of defendant. \n \nAkhtar Ali Parvez v. Altafur Rehman PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lah. 390; Muhammad Ismail v. Israr Ahmad PLD 1961 (W.P.) Lah. 601; Col. Javed Iqbal Lodhi v. Lt. Col. Nadeem Ahmar and another 2007 CLC 831 and Muhammad Saleh v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 2 others PLD 1972 SC 326: ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Non-issuance of notice in terms of Form IV in Appendix B to C.P.C.---Effect---Defendants were not given notice requiring them to file leave to appear and defend and until they were specifically notified in terms of Form IV in Appendix B to C.P.C., no penal action about alleged lapse of petition for leave to appear could be taken against defendant. \n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Return of plaint---Banking Court, jurisdiction of--Enforcement of right---Recovery of amount of Letter of Credit-Plaintiff was supplier of goods to defendant company, and defendant was customer of bank which issued Letter of Credit in favour of plaintiff on behalf of defendant---Plaintiff sought enforcement of his right on the basis of Letter of Credit established by bank in his favour---Validity---Real dispute of plaintiff was with defendant company, which had opened Letter of Credit in favour of plaintiff for and on behalf of defendant and if the defendant had stopped payment on the basis of Letter of Credit plaintiff at the best could sue defendant for breach of contract and also might recover Letter of Credit from advising bank if liable---Opening of such Letter of Credit in favour of plaintiff neither meant that matter fell within the purview of \"\"finance\"\" nor it had given rise to relationship between plaintiff and defendant as of \"\"customer\"\" and 'financial institution\"\" as defined in Jaw---Claim of recovery of damages as mentioned in plaint was beyond the scope of recovery from bank of defendant even it be enforceable claim simplicter against defendant company---Case of plaintiff did not fall within the ambit of subject-matter/jurisdiction and also jurisdiction of Banking Court over the parties---Plaint was liable to be returned to plaintiff for filing it before Court of competent plenary jurisdiction---Plaint was returned in circumstances. \n \nHaji Alvi Khan and Company, Abbottabad and 8 others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Abbottabad PLD 1995 SC 362; PASSCO v. Omer Bilal Traders (Pvt.) Limited 2007 CLD 492; Zarai Tariqiati Bank Ltd. through Branch Manager v. Hassan Aftab Fatiana 2009 CLD 36; Chaudhry Mukhtar Ahmad v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 2007 CLD 501; Messrs Platinum Insurance Company through Chief Executive v. Messrs Highways Bridge, Contractor International (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 1997 MLD 2394; Messrs United Distributors Pakistan Limited v. Ahmad Zarie Services and another 1997 MLD 1835; Procter and Gamble Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi v. Bank Al-Falah Limited Karachi and 2 others 2007 CLD 1532; Abdul Rehman Allana v. Citibank 2003 CLD 1843 and PICIC v. Frontier Cermics Ltd. and others 2000 CLC 287; Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1987 SC 512; Ali Muhammad and 6 others v. Secretary, Board of Revenue, Sindh, Hyderabad and 9 others PLD 1997 Kar. 747; Sherin and 4 others v. Fazal Muhammad and 4 others 1995 SCMR 584 and Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.2 of 2004, heard on 7-12-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J",
    "": "Mian MEHMOOD AHMAD--Plaintiff\nVs.\nHONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LTD. through Manager\nand 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13963",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2631 = 2010 SLD 2631 = 2010 CLD 293",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.2(a), 2(d) & 9---Banking Court---Determination of jurisdiction---Pre-conditions--For exercise of jurisdiction as Banking Court, it is fundamental, imperative, essential and sine qua non that two conditions must be met, co-exist and fulfilled---Firstly Special Court should have jurisdiction over the subject-matter, which means that cause of action propounded in plaint must be for redressal of grievance regarding enforcement of right or complaint about breach of obligation on the part of defendant but relatable to \"\"finance\"\" as such the same can be termed to be \"\"subject-matter of jurisdiction\"\"---If dispute inter se \"\"financial institution\"\" and \"\"customer\"\" or vice versa is not based upon \"\"finance\"\" and far failure of obligation in relation thereto, the Special Court does not have jurisdiction in the matter---Second facet of jurisdiction is over parties to his, which may be termed as \"\"jurisdiction over the parties\"\" and connotes that Banking Court has only jurisdiction in cases, where relationship of \"\"financial institution\"\" and that of \"\"customer\"\" exists between parties---Considering both aspects of jurisdiction, broad question of jurisdiction is that dispute should be between \"\"customer\"\" and \"\"financial institution\"\" as defined in law, in respect of failure of defendant to fulfil its/his obligations in relation to \"\"finance\"\", which has been specifically, lucidly and clearly mentioned in S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which is key provision of the special law and' can be termed as jurisdictional clause of the enactment---If relationship between parties to suit is not that of \"\"customer\"\" and 'financial institution\"\" and is not about 'finance\"\" Special Court does not have jurisdiction. \n \nQatar Airways PLC v. ANZ Grindlays Bank 2000 CLC 1455; Messrs Shah Jewana Textile Mills Ltd. Lahore through representative v. United Bank Ltd. through Attorney PLD 2000 Lah. 162; Ahmad Murad Malik v. Presiding Officer, Banking Court 2002 CLD 577; Sheikh Nazir Ahmad v. House Building Finance Corporation through General Manager 2002 CLD 1634; Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs The English Engineering Company and 2 others 2005 CLD 292; Manzoor Ahmad and another v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager Nankana Sahib Branch and 3 others 2005 CLD 653; Messrs Waheed Corporation through Proprietor and another v. Allied Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2003 CLD 245; and PASSCO v. Omer Bilal Traders (Pvt.) Limited 2007 CLD 492 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.2(b) & 5---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.175(112)---Banking Court---Status---Though Banking Court has been created under special law but it is not devoid of inherent character and status of Court---Banking Court is created and exercising its powers in terms of Art.175(112) of the Constitution---Banking Court cannot be held to be and/or equated to fora of administrative nature or domestic Tribunal. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Notice, issuance of--Pre-conditions---Duty of Banking Court---At the very inception, Banking Court without issuing notice under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 should take a decision on the basis of parameters laid down for the purpose---No notice should be issued, particularly in case where Court is of the firm view about lack of jurisdiction---If Banking Court is prima facie satisfied with conditions/parameters then required notice must go leaving determination of matter in the light of defence of defendant. \n \nAkhtar Ali Parvez v. Altafur Rehman PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lah. 390; Muhammad Ismail v. Israr Ahmad PLD 1961 (W.P.) Lah. 601; Col. Javed Iqbal Lodhi v. Lt. Col. Nadeem Ahmar and another 2007 CLC 831 and Muhammad Saleh v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 2 others PLD 1972 SC 326: ref.\n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Non-issuance of notice in terms of Form IV in Appendix B to C.P.C.---Effect---Defendants were not given notice requiring them to file leave to appear and defend and until they were specifically notified in terms of Form IV in Appendix B to C.P.C., no penal action about alleged lapse of petition for leave to appear could be taken against defendant. \n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Return of plaint---Banking Court, jurisdiction of--Enforcement of right---Recovery of amount of Letter of Credit-Plaintiff was supplier of goods to defendant company, and defendant was customer of bank which issued Letter of Credit in favour of plaintiff on behalf of defendant---Plaintiff sought enforcement of his right on the basis of Letter of Credit established by bank in his favour---Validity---Real dispute of plaintiff was with defendant company, which had opened Letter of Credit in favour of plaintiff for and on behalf of defendant and if the defendant had stopped payment on the basis of Letter of Credit plaintiff at the best could sue defendant for breach of contract and also might recover Letter of Credit from advising bank if liable---Opening of such Letter of Credit in favour of plaintiff neither meant that matter fell within the purview of \"\"finance\"\" nor it had given rise to relationship between plaintiff and defendant as of \"\"customer\"\" and 'financial institution\"\" as defined in Jaw---Claim of recovery of damages as mentioned in plaint was beyond the scope of recovery from bank of defendant even it be enforceable claim simplicter against defendant company---Case of plaintiff did not fall within the ambit of subject-matter/jurisdiction and also jurisdiction of Banking Court over the parties---Plaint was liable to be returned to plaintiff for filing it before Court of competent plenary jurisdiction---Plaint was returned in circumstances. \n \nHaji Alvi Khan and Company, Abbottabad and 8 others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Abbottabad PLD 1995 SC 362; PASSCO v. Omer Bilal Traders (Pvt.) Limited 2007 CLD 492; Zarai Tariqiati Bank Ltd. through Branch Manager v. Hassan Aftab Fatiana 2009 CLD 36; Chaudhry Mukhtar Ahmad v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 2007 CLD 501; Messrs Platinum Insurance Company through Chief Executive v. Messrs Highways Bridge, Contractor International (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 1997 MLD 2394; Messrs United Distributors Pakistan Limited v. Ahmad Zarie Services and another 1997 MLD 1835; Procter and Gamble Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi v. Bank Al-Falah Limited Karachi and 2 others 2007 CLD 1532; Abdul Rehman Allana v. Citibank 2003 CLD 1843 and PICIC v. Frontier Cermics Ltd. and others 2000 CLC 287; Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1987 SC 512; Ali Muhammad and 6 others v. Secretary, Board of Revenue, Sindh, Hyderabad and 9 others PLD 1997 Kar. 747; Sherin and 4 others v. Fazal Muhammad and 4 others 1995 SCMR 584 and Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.2 of 2004, heard on 7-12-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J",
    "": "Mian MEHMOOD AHMAD--Plaintiff\nVs.\nHONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LTD. through Manager\nand 6 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13964",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2632 = 2010 SLD 2632 = 2010 CLD 324",
    "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------S.4--Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11 & O.XXXVII, Rr.1, 2--Promissory note'--Determination--Rejection of plaint---Delay in filing of application---Recording of evidence---Suit for recovery of money on the basis of pro note was filed on 7-4-2001, and application for rejecting of plaint was filed on 15-9-2008 on the ground that document relied upon by plaintiff was not a promissory note---Validity---Litmus test to determine as to whether a particular document was a 'promissory note' or a 'bond' was the intention of parties and it must be seen whether parties intended that document should be negotiable or that it was merely to serve as evidence of debt--Plaintiff had already concluded his evidence and statement of one defence witness was also recorded---Sole object of filing application for rejecting of plaint seemed to High Court as delaying tactics---No illegality or legal infirmity; in the order passed by trial Court had been pointed out, therefore, no case for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction was made out---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Case No.C.R. No. 222 and C.M.A. No.1 of 2009, decision dated: 22-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "ARSHAD MAHMOOD, J",
    "": "HAQ NAWAZ\nVs.\nABDUL KHALIQ--Defendant\nAbdul Rauf v. Farooq Ahmad and another 2007 CLD 114; Sheikh Muhammad Zafar v. Dr. Jehan Ara Ahmad 2002 CLD 257; Altaf Hussain Sajid v. Muhammad Arif 2008 CLC 1489 and Muhammad Ashiq v. Rana Tariq Mahmood 2006 CLD 865 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13965",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2633 = 2010 SLD 2633 = 2010 CLD 324",
    "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-------S.4--Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11 & O.XXXVII, Rr.1, 2--Promissory note'--Determination--Rejection of plaint---Delay in filing of application---Recording of evidence---Suit for recovery of money on the basis of pro note was filed on 7-4-2001, and application for rejecting of plaint was filed on 15-9-2008 on the ground that document relied upon by plaintiff was not a promissory note---Validity---Litmus test to determine as to whether a particular document was a 'promissory note' or a 'bond' was the intention of parties and it must be seen whether parties intended that document should be negotiable or that it was merely to serve as evidence of debt--Plaintiff had already concluded his evidence and statement of one defence witness was also recorded---Sole object of filing application for rejecting of plaint seemed to High Court as delaying tactics---No illegality or legal infirmity; in the order passed by trial Court had been pointed out, therefore, no case for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction was made out---Revision was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nAbdul Rauf v. Farooq Ahmad and another 2007 CLD 114; Sheikh Muhammad Zafar v. Dr. Jehan Ara Ahmad 2002 CLD 257; Altaf Hussain Sajid v. Muhammad Arif 2008 CLC 1489 and Muhammad Ashiq v. Rana Tariq Mahmood 2006 CLD 865 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Case No.C.R. No. 222 and C.M.A. No.1 of 2009, decision dated: 22-04-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "ARSHAD MAHMOOD, J",
    "": "HAQ NAWAZ\nVs.\nABDUL KHALIQ--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13966",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2634 = 2010 SLD 2634 = 2010 CLD 335",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.9(5) & 22---Suit before Banking Court---Procedure-Disposal of the suit must be preceded by notices and hearing to the defendants---Both said statutory requirements having been discarded by the impugned order, same was set aside by High Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.225 of 2007, decision dated: 2-06-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL AND MUHAMMAD ASHRAF BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "SME BANK LIMITED through Manager and another\nVs.\nRIAZ ALI\nRafique Hazquel Masih v. Bank Alfalah Ltd. and others 2005 SCMR 72 rel."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13967",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2635 = 2010 SLD 2635 = 2010 CLD 337",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19---Execution of decree---Application for---Record had shown that since April, 2009 the execution application had been proceeding for service upon the -¬debtor---Under S.19(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, benefit of execution of a decree had been given to the decree-holder and there was no need to exercise procedure of notice on the -debtor, and the execution proceedings should proceed for attachment---Official Assignee was directed by the High Court to conduct the sale of mortgaged properties pledged with the decree-holder within specified period.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Application No. 5 of 2009 in Suit No.B- 11 of 2008, decision dated: 12-01-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MS. RUKHSANA AHMED, J",
    "": "SONERI BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nABDUL QADIR JANGDA--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13968",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2636 = 2010 SLD 2636 = 2010 CLD 338",
    "Key Words:": "Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)-------S.41---Protection of Economic Reforms Act (XII of 1992), S.10---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.23---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199(1) & (5)---Constitutional petition--Maintainability---Contractual liability---Scope---Grievance of petitioner/retired employees association was that its members were entitled to certain pensionary benefits which were being denied to them under the garb of Revised Pay Package enforced by employer bank---Validity---Alteration of contractual/financial commitment/obligation was restricted under S.10 of Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, to the disadvantage of beneficiaries---No prohibition existed in S.10 of Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, that alteration/novation of contract could be made with the concurrence of employees, rather from clear meaning and interpretation of S.10 of Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, it was open for stakeholders to agree and substitute any agreement/ commitment notwithstanding that the agreement already entered into--Members of petitioner association during the time when they were in employment of the bank subscribed/assented to Revised Pay Package which was acted upon and they derived all benefits on account of such package, which was not shown to be the one hit by provisions of S.23 of Contract Act, 1872--Members of petitioner/retired employees association were estopped by their own conduct to challenge Revised Pay Package; besides rules of acquiescence and waiver were also attracted to discard their stance in such behalf---High Court, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, could not declare Revised Pay \"\"Package to be void or voidable nor High Court could enforce agreement between the parties---Directions contemplated by S.41(2) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, were with respect to activities and operations of banks and institutions for carrying out purpose of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, and matters ancillary thereto---Grievance of petitioner association was not covered by S.41(2) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, and no direction under constitutional jurisdiction could be given to State Bank of Pakistan for further directing employer bank to perform any of the acts as were mentioned in the section---Employer bank was not \"\"person\"\" within the meaning of Art.199(5) of the Constitution and was not performing any functions with affairs of Province, Federation or any statutory body to which a writ could be issued---Constitution petition was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.14499 of 2009, heard on 15-12-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J",
    "": "M.C. B BANK, LTD., through Authorized Representative\nVs.\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN through Governor and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13969",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2637 = 2010 SLD 2637 = 2010 CLD 344",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2(a) (c), 20(4) & 7---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 489-F & 420---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.561-A & 249-A---Quashing of proceedings---Accused being the Chief Executive of the borrower company had availed demand and cash finance against various securities including the mortgage of Unit/Mill of the company and in fulfilment of the obligation and in order to adjust the outstanding liabilities he had issued four post-dated cheques, which were dishonoured--Manager of the Bank then got registered an F.I.R. against the accused applicant under Ss.489-F & 420, P.P.C.---Trial Magistrate and the Sessions Court had refused to acquit the accused under S.249-A, Cr.P.C. vide impugned orders--Neither the police had determined its authority, nor the Trial Court had adverted to its jurisdiction while taking cognizance by accepting the F.I.R. and the challan---Matter was governed by the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which was a complete Code in respect of transactions between the financial institution and the customer, which were defined by S.2(a) & (c), while S.7 of the said Ordinance had provided the powers of the Banking Court---Subsection (4) of S.20 of the same Ordinance had provided the remedy for a financial institution where the cheque was dishonestly issued and the same was dishonoured because of insufficient balance in the account--Proviso of S.7 of the said Ordinance had clearly envisaged that any offence embodied in S.20 committed by the customer of the Bank would only be subjected by the above mandate of law by way of filing direct complaint, as defined in S.4(h), Cr.P.C. in the Banking Court having jurisdiction--Police, therefore, had no authority to book the accused by lodging the F.I.R. and taking cognizance in the matter on the basis of F.I.R. and assuming jurisdiction by the Magistrate was without lawful authority and cm-am non judice---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, being a special enactment had overriding effect on the ordinary law and the borrower or customer of the Bank could not be proceeded under the provisions of Pakistan Penal Code--Only remedy available to the Bank and Financial Institution was to invoke the provisions of S.20 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, by filing a direct complaint in terms of proviso of S.7 of the said Ordinance--Prosecution of accused under Ss.489-F & 420, P.P.C. on the basis of F.I.R. was abuse of process of the, court and without lawful authority---Impugned orders were consequently set side and the proceedings pending in the court of Magistrate were quashed---Petition was allowed accordingly. \n \nMuhammad Iqbal v. S.H.O. Police Station Haji Pura PLD 2009 Lah. 541 and Nizar Ali Fazwani v. Messrs Pak Golf Lease Committee Limited 2009 PCr.LJ 325 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.S-341(Hyd) of 2009, decision dated: 18-12-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "BHAJANDAS TEJWANI, J",
    "": "SABIR AHMED--Applicant\nVs.\nNAZEER AHMED and another\nLiaquat Hussain v. The State 2009 MLD 1167 distinguished."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13970",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2638 = 2010 SLD 2638 = 2010 CLD 351",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.124 & 125---Suit for recovery of loan amount by Bank-Lease agreement containing indemnity clause making defendant liable to make good losses incurred by Bank in case of termination of agreement by him---Termination of agreement by Bank at defendant's request after repayment of disbursed lease amount---Effect---Defendant could not back out of such indemnity provided by him---Bank would be entitled to document charges also, which were not adjustable against lease amount disbursed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No 16 of 2007 decided on 24-09-2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND ATHER SAEED, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD TAHIR MAJEED and another\nVs.\nSECURITY LEASING CORPORATION LTD. and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13971",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2639 = 2010 SLD 2639 = 2010 CLD 355",
    "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)------S.196(4) & 208(3)--Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.34---Shares of associated company sold by directors of company (appellants) to another associated company at a lower price than market price without any special resolution of Board of Directors-Such transaction unscrambled by Board of Directors in its subsequent meeting---Imposition of penalty on appellants for their such illegal act---Validity---Appellants through such act had pocketed huge amount as profit at the cost of shareholders of company-Subsequent \"\"unscrambling\"\" of illegality already committed could not rectify earlier violation of law nor such rectification was recognized by provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Appellants had wilfully and knowingly committed such act, for which maximum penalty as provided in S.208(3) of Companies Ordinance, 1984 had not been imposed upon them High Court dismissed appeal in limine.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Commercial Appeal No.8 of 2009 decided on 31st December, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIR SAEED SHEIKH, J",
    "": "Lt. Gen.(Retd.) ALI KULI KHAN KHATTAK, CHAIRMAN, GENERAL TYRE & RUBBER COMPANY OF PAKISTAN LTD. Karachi High Court and 4 others \nVs.\nAPPELLATE BENCH No.II, Securities and Exchange Commission court of Pakistan , Islamabad High Court High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13972",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2010 2640 = 2010 SLD 2640 = 2010 CLD 360",
    "Key Words:": "Contract Act (IX of 1872)------S.126---Bank guarantee, encashment of--Principles.The contract of bank guarantee is independent contract in terms of section 126 of the Contract Act, 1872 from that of the contract between the employer and the contractor; and that in the bank guarantee the principal debtor is the contractor while the bank is a surety and beneficiary is the employer; and that contract of bank guarantee has to be enforced on the terms stipulated in the bank guarantee itself; and that the bank must honour the guarantee notwithstanding any dispute between the employer and the contractor on the contract made between them. \n \nCollector, Central Excise and Land Customs v. Rahm Din 1987 SCMR 1840; Royal Book Company v. John Wright and Sons Ltd. 1989 MLD 1191; Binyameen v. Hakim 1996 SCMR 336; State v. Zia-ur-Rahman PLD 1973 SC 49; Muhammad Yousuf v. Urooj (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2003 Kar. 16; Mst. Azeemun Nisa Begum v. Ali Muhammad PLD 1990 SC 382; Shahenshah Shahalam Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. Karachi and another v. Housing Building Finance Corporation PLD 1972 Kan 178; Ocean Industries Ltd. v. Industrial Development Bank PLD 1966 SC 738 and Manzoor Textile Mills Ltd. v. Special Judge Banking, Lahore 1996 CLC 422.\n \nUnited Bank Limited v. Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. PLD 2002 SC 1100; Messrs National Construction Ltd. v. Aiwan-e-Iqbal Authority PLD 1994 SC 311 and Shipyard K. Damen International v. Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. PLD 2003 SC 191 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.857 of 2007, decision dated: Ist September, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "GULZAR AHMED, J",
    "": "STANDARD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive Officer--Plaintiff\nVs.\nPAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Communication, Islamabad High Court High Court and 5 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13973",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1969 = 2011 SLD 1969 = 2011 CLD 18",
    "Key Words:": "Prudential Regulations for Consumer Finance of State Bank of Pakistan Regulations------Regln.6-BPRD Circular No.13 of 2008-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition-Consumer financing-Car loan-Repossession of vehicle--Principle-Petitioner got loan from respondent bank for purchase of vehicle--Bank without any prior notice, snatched the vehicle from petitioner on the allegation of default in payment of instalment of loan-Validity-Prudential Regulations for Consumer Financing were framed by State Bank of Pakistan to ensure fair treatment by financing bank with its customers-Prudential Regulations were supplemented by BPRD Circular No.13 of 2008 of State Bank of Pakistan issued in December, 2008, which required a bank to give 14 days' prior written notice before undertaking repossession of leased vehicle-Prior notice had the utility of providing an opportunity to a customer to avoid repossession of his leased asset-Notice relied upon by bank notified termination of finance by demanding entire balance amount of finance from petitioner and had threatened legal action-Such notice neither warned repossession of vehicle nor indicated an outstanding amount for payment to avoid adverse action thus excluding an opportunity for petitioner to regularize car finance-Legal duties/obligations of State Bank of Pakistan were enforceable by High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction-Failure to satisfy Prudential Regulations for Customer Finance of State Bank of Pakistan Regulations; BPRD Circular No.13 of 2008 and also bank's own repossession policy in relation to the action of bank was arbitrary-Respondent bank failed to discharge its duties under the regulatory framework of State Bank of Pakistan High Court referred the matter to State Bank of Pakistan for taking action and granting relief against bank in accordance with law for violation of bank's duties under State Bank of Pakistan's regulatory framework in relation to bank's commercial dealings with petitioner, who was its customer Petition was disposed of accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No.6904 of 2009, heard on 1st June, 2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "Ms. SAFINA ASLAM and others\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK and another\nHashwani Hotels Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 315 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13974",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzR1NTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1970 = 2011 SLD 1970 = 2011 CLD 37",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9-Recovery of bank loan---Restructured finance---Claim of mark-up-Finance facility amount claimed to have been provided by plaintiff--bank to defendants was in the nature of restructured arrangement---No disbursement of funds had taken place pursuant to the agreement of finance---Effect---Claim of mark-up on such restructured amount was not maintainable---Claim for overdue amounts on principal account in respect of restructured finance of defendant company was duly substantiated by several documents executed and actions taken by defendants---In the context of restructured facility the absence of fresh disbursement was immaterial--Suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff accordingly. \n \nBankers Equity Ltd. through Principle Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Ltd. and 7 others 2003 CLD 931; ADBP v. Modern Leathers Ltd. 2007 CLD 1424 and Habib Bank Ltd. v. Taj Textile Mills Ltd. through Chief Executive and 5 others 2009 CLD 1143 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S No.45 of 2008, decision dated: 19-08-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "CRESCENT COMMERCIAL BANK NOW SAMBA BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nGENERTECH PAKISTAN LTD.----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13975",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1971 = 2011 SLD 1971 = 2011 CLD 37",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S.9-Recovery of bank loan---Restructured finance---Claim of mark-up-Finance facility amount claimed to have been provided by plaintiff--bank to defendants was in the nature of restructured arrangement---No disbursement of funds had taken place pursuant to the agreement of finance---Effect---Claim of mark-up on such restructured amount was not maintainable---Claim for overdue amounts on principal account in respect of restructured finance of defendant company was duly substantiated by several documents executed and actions taken by defendants---In the context of restructured facility the absence of fresh disbursement was immaterial--Suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff accordingly. \n \nBankers Equity Ltd. through Principle Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Ltd. and 7 others 2003 CLD 931; ADBP v. Modern Leathers Ltd. 2007 CLD 1424 and Habib Bank Ltd. v. Taj Textile Mills Ltd. through Chief Executive and 5 others 2009 CLD 1143 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S No.45 of 2008, decision dated: 19-08-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "": "CRESCENT COMMERCIAL BANK NOW SAMBA BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nGENERTECH PAKISTAN LTD.----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13976",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1972 = 2011 SLD 1972 = 2011 CLD 75",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.144---Recovery of bank loan---Leave to defend suit---Bank claimed recovery of amount of Rs.117,922.70 with costs of funds at the agreed mark up @ of 0.761 paisa per thousand rupees per day---Defendant took plea in the application for leave to defend that he had not signed the execution of charge and security documents---Defendant also filed an application under S.144, C.P.C. for the refund of Rs.600,000 which was deposited by him in discharge of partial liability determined through ex parte decree passed by Banking Court earlier against him, to stop execution proceedings---Banking Court dismissed both applications of the defendant through consolidated and decree---Validity---Contention of the defendant with regard to execution of charge and security documents was evasive and vague---Statement of account showed that disbursement of facility started in the year 2.000--Mere disputing the validity of the documents by not invoking any legal course to have them adjudged forged and fabricated despite the fact that the suit was filed about 10 years ago, effectively belied the defence/contention of the applicant that documents were not executed by him---Contention of the defendant that application under S.144, C.P.C. should not have been decided along with the petition for leave to defend the suit rather the same should have been decided first, was a mere technical objection without entailing any serious consequences and of no substance, particularly, after rejection of his petition for leave to defend the suit and passing of impugned and decree by the Banking Court---High Court declined to interfere in the and decree passed by Banking Court and dismissed appeal with costs throughout. \n \n2003 CLD 606; 2004 SCMR 1956; 2004 CLD 587 and 2005 CLD 1417 ref.\n \nBank of Khyber v. Messrs Spencer Distribution Ltd. and 14 others 2003 CLD 1410 rel.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 9(1)---Recovery of bank loan---Contention of the defendant was that suit filed was not instituted by the duly authorized person---Scope---Suit was filed and signed by Branch Manager of the Bank who was fully authorized under S.9(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. \n \nFaysal Bank Limited v. Genertech Pakistan Ltd. and 6 others 2009 CLD 856 rel.\n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.144--Recovery of bank loan---Rejection of application to leave and defend suit---Contention of the defendant that application under S.144, C.P.C. should not have been decided along with the petition for leave to defend the suit rather the same should have been decided first was a mere technical objection without entailing any serious consequence and of no substance, particularly after rejection of defendant petition for leave to defend the suit and passing of impugned and decree by the Banking Court---Banking Court had rightly rejected the application under S.144, C.P.C. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of bank loan----Contention of the defendant was that statement of account filed by the bank was not correct, therefore, no decree could be passed on the basis of said statement of account---Defendant had failed to point out any error in the entries of the statement of account and had simply relied on the bank note that present balance not tallying with the merger computational balance; which note was of no consequence particularly when entries contained in the statement of account stood unrebutted and no specific error had been pointed out therein which impliedly amounted to an admission as to its correctness by the other party .",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal Case No.116 of 2005, heard on 24-08-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAUKAT UMAR PIRZADA AND MUHAMMAD NASEEM AKHTAR KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs BERRY FOOD INDUSTRIES and others\nVs.\nMUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13977",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1973 = 2011 SLD 1973 = 2011 CLD 84",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10(4)(5)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts.117 & 120---Bankers' Book Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.4---Recovery of bank loan---Liability, determination of-Shifting of onus---Procedure---Bank sought recovery of bank loan and liability was not disputed by defendants---Effect---Plaintiff-Bank was responsible under S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, in first phase to submit statement of accounts duly certified under Bankers' Book Evidence Act, 1891, with supporting documents and thereafter burden was shifted to defendants to answer the claim keeping in view the provisions of S.10(4) and (5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---In order to avoid delay in disposal, efforts should be made to institute banking suit and file leave to defend in letter and spirit of law along with property documents relating to disbursement of finance facility, payments, repayments and plaint and leave to defend must be equipped with proper break up of amount---Terms of rescheduling/restructuring/settlement of liabilities were accepted and agreed vide letter/agreement which showed that liability was accepted with due care and caution after institution of suit and filing of leave to defend application, therefore, in view of the clear admission of liability, instead of dismissing the application for leave to defend for non-compliance of requirement of S.10(4) and (5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, in all conscience---High Court passed an interim decree against the defendants on the basis of undisputed letter/agreement produced by the plaintiff-Bank along with the replication---Suit was decreed accordingly. \n \nMessrs Taxila Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited 2005 CLD 244; Rafaqat Ali and 2 others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited 2006 CLD 115; Messrs Iqbal Traders v. National Bank of Pakistan 2006 CLD 977 and Messrs Allahwallah Printers v. The Bank of Punjab 2004 CLD 1643 ref.\n \nBehzad Haider for the Plaintiff.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-42 of 2009 in C.M.As. Nos.8027, 2444, 2445, 4684 and 4685 of 2009, decision dated: 16-09-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J",
    "": "MCB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nEASTERN CAPITAL LTD. and 7 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13978",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1974 = 2011 SLD 1974 = 2011 CLD 92",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of bank loan---Application for leave to defend suit---Defendants had executed documents which had not been denied by them-Finance facility had also been extended and renewed on the request of defendants---Contention raised by defendants was that there had been a mis-calculation on the part of defendants and that the defendants had made an excess payment of Rs.201,747---Validity---Statement of account attached with the plaint depicted the availing of the finance facility and thereafter, its subsequent disbursement, extention and renewal were duly reflected in the same which showed credit and debit articles---Perusal of sanction letter revealed that the mark-up had rightly been calculated as agreed in the same---Contention of the defendants that they had made an excess amount of Rs.201,747 to the bank was not sustainable---Defendants could not succeed in raising any question of law and fact which needed recording of evidence---High Court decreed suit along with cost and cost of funds and dismissed application for leave to defend. \n \nMuhammad Ramzan v. Habib Bank Limited 2005 CLD 1376 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 19---Execution of decree---Under S.19(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the -debtors were afforded 30 days to satisfy the decree; thereafter, the suit stood converted into execution proceedings without the need to file a separate execution petition and no fresh notice needed to be issued to the -debtors---Decree-holder should file Particulars of the mortgaged, pledged, hypothecated properties and other assets of the -debtors.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No.5 of 2010, decision dated: 28-06-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "IQBAL HAMEED-UR-RAHMAN, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LTD. through duly Authorized Attorneys--Plaintiff\nVs.\nFAIQA TRADING COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. through Director and Chief Executive Officer and 5 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13979",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1975 = 2011 SLD 1975 = 2011 CLD 157",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 19--Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.48, 151, O.XXI, R.22 & O.XXIII, Rr.1, 2, 3---Execution petition---Objection to execution petition on the ground of limitation---Validity---Judgment-debtors had accepted the terms and conditions of the compromise which formed the basis of consent decree; their guarantees were continuing so they were liable to discharge the outstanding liabilities---Under S.19, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 decree passed by a Banking Court would automatically be converted into execution petition, therefore, limitation in such a case would run from the date of passing of the final consent decree---Execution petition, in circumstances, was not time-barred---Application was dismissed. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19---Judgment and decree by Banking Court--Limitation--Judgment and decree by Banking Court would automatically stand converted into execution petition and limitation would run from the date of passing of the final decree.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Execution Application No.16/B, C.M. No.428-B of 2008 in C.O.S. No.5 of 2002, decision dated: 18-10-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "IQBAL HAMEED-UR-RAHMAN, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through S.V.P. SAMG (North)--Applicants\nVs.\nMessrs TAJ TEXTILE MILLS LTD. through Chief Executive and 4 others--Respondents"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13980",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1976 = 2011 SLD 1976 = 2011 CLD 161",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Application for leave to defend the suit---Question of law and fact---Scope---Defendants admitted availing of finance facilities and also admitted that entire liability was not discharged, however certain payments were made by defendants---Defendants also admitted execution of documents and substantial amount was liable to be paid to bank---Validity---No substantial question of law and fact was raised by defendants, which required any evidence to be recorded by Court---Defendants were supposed to show that entire amount was paid by defendants to bank but defendants failed to make out any substantial question of law or fact which required evidence to be recorded---High Court declined to grant leave to defend the suit to defendants---Suit was decreed in circumstances. \n \nQamaruzzamen Khan v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and others 2009 CLD 460; Messrs Yussra Textile Corporation and 2 others v. PICIC Commercial Bank Limited 2003 CLD 905; Abdul Razzaq v. A.D.B.P. 2002 CLD 1707; Sheikh Muhammad Kashif Zia and another v. Bank of Punjab and another 2004 CLD 388; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited v. Fahmida and 2 others 2004 CLD 110; Messrs Mohib Exports Ltd. and 4 others v. Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. 2005 CLD 581; Messrs ARK industrial Management Ltd. v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited PLD 1991 SC 976; Mrs. Yuba Jamil Ansari v. Bank Al-Falah Limited and another 2009 CLD 1177; Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Pearl Fabrics Ltd. and 7 others 2009 CLD 1185 and Muhammad Khalid Butt v. United Bank Limited 2003 CLD 911 distinguished.\n \nHabib Bank Limited v. Messrs SABCOS (Pvt.) 2006 CLD 244; Zeeshan Energy Ltd. and 2 others v. Faisal Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 1741; Shahid Farooq Sheikh v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited 2005 CLD 1489; National Development Finance Corporation v. Spinning Machinery Company of Pakistan Limited 2002 CLD 53; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. N.T.N. (Pvt.) Limited 2002 CLD 369; Bolan Bank Limited v. Baig Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited and 6 others 2002 CLD 557; Saudi Pak Industrial and Agriculture Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170: National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs A.I. Brother (Private) Limited and others 2007 CLD 1356; Messrs Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Limited v. Messrs Marva Agrochem (Private) Limited and 9 others 2007 CLD 1374; H.B.L. v. Crescent Software Products (Pvt.) Ltd. 2009 CLD 412; International Finance Corporation v. Sarah Textiles Ltd. and 3 others 2009 CLD 761; Faysal Bank Limited v. Genertech Pakistan Ltd. and 6 others 2009 CLD 856; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Paragon Industries (Pvt.) Limited and 5 others 2009 CLD 1346; NIB Bank Limited v. Taha Spinning Mills Limited and others 2010 CLD 635 and United Bank Limited v. Progas Pakistan Limited 2010 CLD 828 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-88 and C.M. No.7881 of 2009, decision dated: 5-11-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Plaintiff\nVs.\nWALI BHAI INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13981",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1977 = 2011 SLD 1977 = 2011 CLD 161",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Application for leave to defend the suit---Question of law and fact---Scope---Defendants admitted availing of finance facilities and also admitted that entire liability was not discharged, however certain payments were made by defendants---Defendants also admitted execution of documents and substantial amount was liable to be paid to bank---Validity---No substantial question of law and fact was raised by defendants, which required any evidence to be recorded by Court---Defendants were supposed to show that entire amount was paid by defendants to bank but defendants failed to make out any substantial question of law or fact which required evidence to be recorded---High Court declined to grant leave to defend the suit to defendants---Suit was decreed in circumstances. \n \nQamaruzzamen Khan v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and others 2009 CLD 460; Messrs Yussra Textile Corporation and 2 others v. PICIC Commercial Bank Limited 2003 CLD 905; Abdul Razzaq v. A.D.B.P. 2002 CLD 1707; Sheikh Muhammad Kashif Zia and another v. Bank of Punjab and another 2004 CLD 388; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited v. Fahmida and 2 others 2004 CLD 110; Messrs Mohib Exports Ltd. and 4 others v. Trust Leasing Corporation Ltd. 2005 CLD 581; Messrs ARK industrial Management Ltd. v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited PLD 1991 SC 976; Mrs. Yuba Jamil Ansari v. Bank Al-Falah Limited and another 2009 CLD 1177; Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Pearl Fabrics Ltd. and 7 others 2009 CLD 1185 and Muhammad Khalid Butt v. United Bank Limited 2003 CLD 911 distinguished.\n \nHabib Bank Limited v. Messrs SABCOS (Pvt.) 2006 CLD 244; Zeeshan Energy Ltd. and 2 others v. Faisal Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 1741; Shahid Farooq Sheikh v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited 2005 CLD 1489; National Development Finance Corporation v. Spinning Machinery Company of Pakistan Limited 2002 CLD 53; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. N.T.N. (Pvt.) Limited 2002 CLD 369; Bolan Bank Limited v. Baig Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited and 6 others 2002 CLD 557; Saudi Pak Industrial and Agriculture Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited Lahore and 3 others 2002 CLD 1170: National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs A.I. Brother (Private) Limited and others 2007 CLD 1356; Messrs Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Limited v. Messrs Marva Agrochem (Private) Limited and 9 others 2007 CLD 1374; H.B.L. v. Crescent Software Products (Pvt.) Ltd. 2009 CLD 412; International Finance Corporation v. Sarah Textiles Ltd. and 3 others 2009 CLD 761; Faysal Bank Limited v. Genertech Pakistan Ltd. and 6 others 2009 CLD 856; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Paragon Industries (Pvt.) Limited and 5 others 2009 CLD 1346; NIB Bank Limited v. Taha Spinning Mills Limited and others 2010 CLD 635 and United Bank Limited v. Progas Pakistan Limited 2010 CLD 828 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-88 and C.M. No.7881 of 2009, decision dated: 5-11-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J",
    "": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Plaintiff\nVs.\nWALI BHAI INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. and 3 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13982",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1978 = 2011 SLD 1978 = 2011 CLD 168",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 9 & 10---Recovery of bank loan---Application for leave to defend the suit---Relationship of banker and customer---Proof---Question of law and fact---Payment of mark-up---Bank sought recovery of bank loan against defendant being defaulter---Defendant denied relationship of banker and customer between them---Validity---Defendant availed finance facility and certain payments were made by defendant to bank on account of mark up, therefore, defendant could not challenge relationship of banker and customer between the parties---Defendant admitted availing of financial facility and also admitted that nothing had been paid towards principal amount which was payable by defendant to bank---Defendant failed to make out any substantial question of law or fact which required evidence to be recorded---High Court declined to grant leave to defend the suit to defendants---Suit was decreed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-69 and C.M.A. No.7872 of 2009, decision dated: 2-11-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J",
    "": "HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nFIRST DAWOOD INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13983",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1979 = 2011 SLD 1979 = 2011 CLD 186",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 2, 9 & 10---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, Rr.10 & 11---Suit against principal debtor and Bank for declaration, permanent injunction and recovery of amount---Failure of principal debtor to discharge his financial obligations with Bank through sale of pledged goods--Plaintiff's plea that he at inducement of Bank agreed, to purchase pledged goods against payment to credit of principal debtor and as such he was indemnifying Bank; that Bank later on illegally stopped delivery of pledged goods despite receiving its price, due to which plaintiff suffered huge loss for failing to fulfil commitment with his customers---Leave applications by defendants seeking rejection or return of plaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction of Banking Court and in alternative unconditional leave to defend suit on grounds that neither plaintiff was customer of Bank nor did any agreement exist between plaintiff and Bank nor had plaintiff claimed any relief against Bank---Validity---Held, it was necessary for invoking jurisdiction of Banking Court that subject-matter of suit should be finance and plaintiff should be a customer of financial institution---Customer would be that person to whom finance was extended by a financial institution or on his behalf a guarantee or letter of credit was issued by a financial institution or who was a surety or an indemnifier---Plaintiff had not claimed that principal debtor had caused any loss to Bank and for payment of such loss, plaintiff was depositing into account of principal debtor---Plaintiff was receiving pledged goods against payment into account of principal debtor, thus, no privity of contract existed between plaintiff and Bank---Bank had not allowed any finance to plaintiff nor plaintiff had executed an agreement of indemnity in favour of Bank on behalf of principal debtor--Not necessary in contract of indemnity for indemnifier to act at request of debtor---In absence of any agreement of indemnity, inference would be that Bank was acting on instructions of principal debtor and was releasing its security of finance against repayment of finance-Bank was not party to any agreement between plaintiff and principal debtor regarding purchasing of pledged goods---Banking Court had no jurisdiction to decide alleged controversy--Plaint was returned for its presentation before competent court in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No.98 of 2010, heard on 28-07-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN, J",
    "": "MAZCO INDUSTRIES LTD. --Plaintiff\nVs.\nHABIB BANK LTD. and others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13984",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1980 = 2011 SLD 1980 = 2011 CLD 243",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss.2(c), 9 & 10(3}--Recovery of bank loan---Muccaddam (custodian), suit against---Pledged stocks were illegally removed by borrower, which were under the custody of Muccaddam---According to agreement between parties, Muccaddam was responsible for all losses, theft, damages, pilferage, demand, expenses, charges, rents, actions and suits etc. which the bank would suffer due to shortage or loss and destruct of the goods for any reason---Bank filed suit against borrower as well as Muccaddam for recovery of bank loan---Validity---Pledged goods were delivered to Muccaddam, which were under its exclusive control under lock and key---In confirmation thereof, Muccaddam along with borrower, had executed stock reports of pledged goods which were removed, the same had caused loss to the bank and Muccaddam did not indemnify the bank---No substantial question of law and facts were raised in respect of which any evidence was to be recorded.---Suit was decreed in favour of bank and against Muccaddam to the extent of value of pledged goods along with costs of funds from the date of default till realization---Suit was decreed accordingly. \n \nBank of Khyber v. Messrs Spencer Distribution Ltd. and 14 others 2003 CLD 1406; Zeeshan Energy Ltd. and 2 others v. Faisal Bank Ltd. 2004 CLD 1741; Muhammad Ramzan and 4 others v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager 2004 CLD 1376: Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Sabcos (Pvt.) 2006 CLD 244; Muhammad Farooq M. Memon Advocate v. Government of Sindh through its Chief Secretary, Karachi 1986 CLC 1408; Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700; Daulat Ali through Legal I-Ieirs and 2 others v. Ahmad through Legal heirs and 2 others PLD 2000 SC 792; Salcem Akhtar v. Nisar Ahmad PLD 2000 Lah. 385 and Mst. Baswar Sultan v. Mst. Adeeba Alvi 2002 SCMR 326 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S.10(3)---Leave to defend the suit---Application, form of---Application was not in the form of written statement, nor any substantial question of law or facts was raised, which required evidence---Application was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No. B-111 of 2010, decision dated: 1st November, 2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J",
    "": "NIB BANK LTD.--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMUHAMMAD YASIR and another----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13985",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1981 = 2011 SLD 1981 = 2011 CLD 254",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVII of 2001)------S. 10(2)---petition for leave to defend suit---Banking Court dismissed defendant's application for leave to defend for being time-barred by computing period of limitation from the date of issuance of notice through courier service and proclamation in newspapers---Validity---Date of knowledge had to be computed from the delivery of notice either through courier service or registered mail---Application of defendant was not time-barred as limitation would run from receipt of notice through courier service or registered mail and not from the issuance of the notice or date of publication of proclamation in newspapers which had been rendered irrelevant for limitation purposes sifter specific date had been notified for appearance of defendant---Trial Court should not have declined leave to defend the suit on a technicality especially when defendant had paid substantial portion of liability---Appeal was accepted and impugned order was set aside---Case was remanded to Trial Court with direction to consider the application for leave to defend the suit to have been granted.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.3 of 2006, decision dated: 20-10-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MANSOOR AKBAR KOKAB AND CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs SITTARA RICE TRADING and another\nVs.\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13986",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1982 = 2011 SLD 1982 = 2011 CLD 262",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 7(2) & 9(1) --Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10 & O.II, R.6---Suit against Bank by customer---Necessary parties---Plea of the defendants (employees of Bank) that they had been added unnecessarily in the proceedings as they could not be joined as defendants in Banking suit and that they be deleted from the array of defendants and matter might be proceeded against the Banking Company/Financial Institution---Plaint(ff asserted that there was no bar of joinder of other parties apart from the Financial Institution and the customer---Validity---Suit had been filed under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which provided a procedure under S.9 of the Ordinance--Provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 were applicable in Banking suit where Ordinance was silent---Section 9 of the Ordinance provided procedure and joinder of defendants was in violation of provision of S.9(1) of the Ordinance, presence of defendants/employees of the Bank, in the proceedings was unnecessary---High Court directed office to delete the names of defendants from the array of defendants with RED INK.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.53 of 2009, decision dated: 10-11-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J",
    "": "MUZAFFAR H. SUFI--Plaintiff\nVs.\nMessrs FIRST WOMEN BANK LIMITED and 2 others----Defendants"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13987",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1983 = 2011 SLD 1983 = 2011 CLD 265",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10--Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to defend suit---Defendant in his application for leave to defend suit had admitted the liability in the sum of Rs.165,257,526.95---Counsel for plaintiff bank submitted that he would be satisfied, if interim decree was passed for the said admitted amount of liability--counsel for the defendant had also no objection for passing interim decree for said admitted amount and had further prayed that his application for leave to defend be allowed---By consent of the counsel, application for leave to defend was allowed and same was converted into written statement---On request of both counsel of the parties, Court appointed a Charted Accountant as Commissioner to resolve the controversy.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.166 of 2009 and C.M.As. Nos.1393, 10552 and 10553 of 2010, decision dated: 15-10-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J",
    "": "MEEZAN BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nDEWAN SALMAN FIBRES LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13988",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1984 = 2011 SLD 1984 = 2011 CLD 267",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9 & 10---Suit for recovery of loan---Application for leave to defend the suit---Counsel for defendant requested for an adjournment contending that in view of Constitutional (18th Amendment) Act, the question would arise as to whether the procedure provided under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was in consonance with the concept of fair trial and due process as enunciated through the said amendment---Said amendment was under consideration by a Division Bench of the High Court and constitutional petition was being heard on day to day basis---Counsel for the defendant, requested that the hearing in the case could be adjourned till such time the Division Bench decided as to whether the procedure of the present proceedings would meet said criteria or not---Defendant in his application for leave to defend suit had admitted its liability towards the plaintiff Bank in the sum of Rs.406,436,00---Counsel for the plaintiff had submitted that interim decree to the extent of said amount be granted---Interim decree in favour of the plaintiff bank for payment of said amount by the defendant to the plaintiff was granted---Hearing in respect of leave to defend application for the remaining amount, was adjourned, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Suit No.B-173 of 2009 and C.M.A. No.1501 of 2010, decision dated: 30-09-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAQBOOL BAQAR, J",
    "": "KASB BANK LIMITED--Plaintiff\nVs.\nDEWAN SALMAN FIBRE LIMITED--Defendant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13989",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1985 = 2011 SLD 1985 = 2011 CLD 269",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Application for leave to defend suit---Security for finance to the principal borrower---Plea of fraud---Appellant (guarantor) had offered security at the time of signing of loan documents---Bank filed suit for recovery of loan amount of Rs.32,326,937 and after dismissal of application for leave to defend the suit, Banking Court decreed the suit against all defendants jointly and severally to the extent of Rs.1,799,723 with future cost of fund---Plea raised by appellant (guarantor) was that he had been made victim as he was induced to create mortgage by fraud and misrepresentation and the said mortgage was created only for the purpose of regulatory requirements without risking his property---Validity---Loan documents showed that the mortgage was created to offer mortgaged property as a security for repayment of liability under the finance and other supplemental agreements---Appellant did not dispute creation of equitable and registered mortgage which unequivocally acknowledged that mortgage had been created in consideration of finance produced or promised by the principal borrower---Appellant could not be allowed to plead any condition extraneous to written terms and agreement between the parties---Appellant might have a remedy against the principal borrower for damages and even otherwise, appellant being surety for the liability of the principal borrower, could proceed against the principal borrower or security lying with the Bank---High Court dismissed the appeal having no merits.\n \nZakas (Pvt.) Limited v. The Bank Alfalah Limited 2004 CLD 1660; Union Bank of India v. Manku Narayana AIR 1987 SC 1078; Haji Fazal Elahi &.Sons v. Bank of Punjab 2004 CLD 162 and Marianne Khan Vs. National Bank of Pakistan 2006 CLD 232 ref.\n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.145---Bank loan---Promise to indemnify surety--Mortgagor by executing a mortgage, committed to the mortgagee/creditor that on failure of the borrower/debtor to clear the liability same be set off against the mortgaged property---All engagement to guarantee for repayment of debt implied a promise on the part of principal borrower to indemnify mortgagor/ guarantor whose mortgaged/charged property was liquidated to satisfy a debt for which the mortgage/charge was created. \n \n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.141---Bank loan---Surety's right to benefit of creditor's securities---Scope---Surety was entitled to the benefit of all security of the debtor held by the creditor. \n \n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.128---Bank loan---Surety's liability---Liability of surety was co-extensive with that of principal borrower, all the sureties stood side ¬by-side and were on equal footing, it gave an option to the creditor to proceed against the securities and on charged property in sequel creditor in its option considered most expedient or less cumbersome to proceed against, unless of course parties to the contract of surety/guarantee/ mortgage stipulated otherwise---Agreement of surety, guarantor mortgagor of a debt could be subject to contingency or limitation to proceed after exhausting remedy against the principal sequence as might be contemplated in such agreement. \n \n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XL VI of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), 8.127---Bank loan---Consideration of guarantee---Plea of the -debtor (guarantor) was that he was neither Director nor beneficiary of the finance availed by principal debtor; therefore he was not liable---Validity---One need not be director, partner and officer or in any manner beneficiary of finance extended to the borrower/debtor---Commitment or promise of creditor to extend finance to the borrower was sufficient consideration for standing guarantor, mortgagor or surety---No law provided that guarantor, and surety or mortgagor should invariably be directed or personal beneficiary for the credit line extended by the creditor to the borrower.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "First Appeal No.14 of 2009, decision dated: 30-09-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUSHIR ALAM AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ",
    "": "IMRAN ALI SOOMRO\nVs.\nSAUDI PAK LEASING COMPANY LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13990",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1986 = 2011 SLD 1986 = 2011 CLD 280",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Auction-------Bidding---Procedure---Bidder has always to start from reserve price and Court auctioneer has nothing to do except the permission of the Court. \n \n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n \n----S. 19---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.66, 89 & 90---Execution of decree---Sale through auction---Auction proceedings---Reserve price, non fixation of---property owned by -debtor was sold through auction under execution of decree passed against him---plea raised by -debtor was that valuable property was auctioned without fixing any reserve price by Executing Court---Validity---Provisions of O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. were mandatory in nature and without full-filing basic requirements, if some auction had taken place that would not be considered to have been lawfully made---Specific order under O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C. was required, of the Court which produced the effect of drawing proclamation envisaging terms and conditions of sale--Intention of law was to fix reserve price in proclamation to safeguard rights of debtor---Executing Court as well as Court Auctioneer committed material irregularity while conducting auction and accepting bid without fixing reserve price of the land, as neither the reserve price was mentioned in the order of auction nor any other terms and conditions were mentioned therein even notice to debtor' was not served---Reserve price which was fixed by Court Auctioneer had no nexus with market price as such the same was without lawful authority and auction which took place was also illegal---Order passed by Executing Court was set aside and auction proceedings were declared illegal and without lawful authority, as the order for putting the property to auction was not speaking one---Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.18 of 2006, heard on 19-05-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. SHAHID SAEED AND MUHAMMAD NASEEM AKHTAR KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AMIN alias JALOO\nVs.\nJUDGE BANKING COURT and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13991",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1987 = 2011 SLD 1987 = 2011 CLD 307",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------Ss. 9, 10 & 22---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Suit for recovery of loan and declaration---Application for leave to defend---Rejection of plaint---Plaintiff/loanee filed two declaratory suits against defendant bank---Bank submitted application for leave to defend the suits---Defendant bank also filed a suit for recovery of remaining finance facility, wherein the plaintiff/loanee also filed his application for leave to defend the suit---Banking Court rejected the plaint of the loanee under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. and accordingly refused leave to defend the suit filed by the bank---Recovery suit filed by the bank was decreed to the extent of entire claim made by the bank without considering the legal and factual issues raised by the loanee in his application to defend suit and without disposing of the application for leave to defend the suit---Validity---Judge Banking Court was under legal obligation to consider all the factual and legal pleas raised in application---Under the law, the Banking Court after considering the same was bound to pass and decree in the favour of the plaintiff, if the application for leave to defend the suit was rejected or the defendant had failed to fulfil the conditions attached to the grant of leave to defend---Any such order/decision should be based on due application of mind and with reasons---Impugned in declaratory suit was without said requirements---Banking Court instead of giving its findings on the application for leave to defend the suit, outrightly refused the leave to defend and in the same breath, the plaint was rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.--- Judge Banking Court was required to pass a decree in case of refusal of leave to defend, under S.10(11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---If at all the suit of the plaintiff was not competent, then same should have been dealt with under the taw---Outright rejection of the plaint in such a cursory manner without discussing and considering the pleas raised by the parties, was nothing, but an exercise of jurisdiction against the law and was a material irregularity and illegality---Cases were sent back to the Banking Court to decide the same according to relevant law.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.Bs. Nos.31, 32 and 33 of 2008 with Civil Miscellaneous No.329 of 2008, decision dated: 30-09-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL AND SYED SAJJAD HASSAN SHAH, JJ",
    "": "ALI KHAN\nVs.\nASKARI LEASING LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13992",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1988 = 2011 SLD 1988 = 2011 CLD 312",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 10---Suit for recovery of loan amount by Bank---Dismissal of application for leave to defend suit of defendant on merits in his absence without placing him ex parte and without reference to ground taken therein--Plea of defendant was that on the relevant date, Banking Court had to decide first the application of Bank for obtaining ex parte order against other defendant, whereas he was told that no proceedings would take place on his leave application on such date---Validity---Impugned order was not a speaking order as Banking Court had not given any reason while dismissing leave application---Defendant had been condemned unheard as he was not given a fair opportunity of hearing on his leave application, which was not fixed for hearing on relevant date---High Court set aside impugned order and remanded case to Banking Court for decision of leave application afresh.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No.7 of 2009, heard on 19-10-2010.",
    "Judge Name:": "TARIQ, JAVAID AND SYED AKHLAQ AHMAD, JJ",
    "": "BHATTI COTTON LINKS through Muhammad Iqbal Bhatti and 2 others\nVs.\nBANKING COURT NO.IV, Lahore High Court and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13993",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 1989 = 2011 SLD 1989 = 2011 CLD 316",
    "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)------Ss. 19 & 22---Execution, proceedings---Sale of mortgaged property---Appellant's property having been mortgaged with the respondent bank, without first seeking the sale of the property for the satisfaction of decree, no warrants of arrest of the appellant could be issued---Order issuing warrant of arrest having been passed without jurisdiction was declared unlawful and was set aside, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No.10 of 2008, decision dated: 3rd February, 2009.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND HAFIZ TARIQ NASIM, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASIF\nVs.\nZARAI TARQIATI BANK LIMITED, PHALIA MANDI, BAHAUDDIN and 3 others\nPrecision Engineering Limited and others v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lah. 290 ref."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13994",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3105 = 2003 SLD 3105 = (2003) 264 ITR 285",
    "Key Words:": "Section 66 of the Karnataka Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1957 - Agricultural income-tax - Composition of - Assessment year 2000-01 - Whether once composition under section 66 is accepted and permission is granted, same has a life of three years including relevant assessment year and said permission cannot be withdrawn or nullified on ground that same is not available to company after 1-4-2000 in terms of amendment in section 66 with effect from 1-4-2000 - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe petitioner owning coffee plantations submitted his income-tax return in terms of the Karnataka Agricultural Income-tax Act and made application under section 66 for composition and the same was accepted. Thereafter, the petitioner wrote letters claiming the benefit for the subsequent assessment years in the light of earlier permission, but the Assistant Commissioner directed the petitioner to file his return for the assessment year 2000-01 in the light of an amendment in section 66 w.e.f. 1-4-2000 in terms of the Act No. 5 of 2000.\nIn the case of the other petitioner, the Assistant Commissioner granted permission under section 66 in the light of an application for the purpose of composition and the petitioner filed Form No. 3 with a demand draft towards composition tax payable for the subsequent years. However, notice was issued by the Assistant Commissioner to produce various documents. The petitioner submitted a reply and endorsement was issued by the Assistant Commissioner rejecting the request of the petitioner.\nOn writ petitions :\nHELD\nA combined reading of section 66(1) with sub-section (5) would show that once the composition is accepted and permission granted, the same has a life of three years including the relevant assessment year. Admittedly, the petitioner had the benefit of permission in terms of section 66. The question is whether the amendment effected to section 66 would in any way alter the situation prior to the amendment dated 1-4-2000. A reading of section 66(5) would show that the permission granted is to continue for the next two years immediately following. The said permission cannot be withdrawn or nullified on the ground that the same is not available to the company after 1-4-2000 in terms of the amendment. The law is fairly well settled that unless retrospective effect is given to a statute, the same is not to be extended in taxing statutes. [Para 6].\nIn the instant case, the petitioners had claimed right in terms of section 66(1) as it stood prior to 1-4-2000, with regard to extension of permission for the subsequent two years. That right could not be rendered ineffective in the light of non-availability of composition to the company by subsequent prospective amendment. The proceedings initiated by the Assistant Commissioner would not in any way provide a retrospective operation to the amendment, that was not the intention of the legislation and that was not the law insofar as retrospective nature was concerned, particularly in fiscal statutes. In these circumstances, the subsequent proceedings were without jurisdiction. That was also supported in the light of the subsequent amendment in the year 2002. The Legislature at any rate had chosen to omit the words 'and shall continue to be in force for the next two years immediately following or until such time as the extent of land holding exceeds the maximum specified in sub-section (1), whichever is earlier' and also the words 'of three years' in section 66(6). A reading of the amended provision would show that the Government never intended to withdraw or nullify the permission granted for the subsequent two years in terms of section 66(5). The argument of the Government that the authorities were right could not be accepted and any acceptance of such submission would result in retrospective nature to the amendment which was not the case in terms of the finding. [Para 10]\nIn these circumstances, the petitions stood allowed. The proceedings initiated by the Assistant Commissioner were set aside. A direction was issued to the Assistant Commissioner not to proceed under the Act until the period of three years in terms of section 66(5) came to an end including the relevant assessment year. [Para 11]\nCASES REFERRED TO\nJ.P. Jani, ITO v. Induprasad Devshanker Bhatt [1969] 72 ITR 595 (SC) [Para 7], S.S. Gadgil v. Lal & Co. [1964] 53 ITR 231 (SC) [Para 8], CED v. M.A. Merchant [1989] 177 ITR 490/ 44 Taxman 274 (SC) [Para 8] and K.M. Sharma v. ITO [2002] 254 ITR 772/122 Taxman 426 (SC) [Para 9].\nG. Sarangan, S. Parthasarathi, Ms. S. Brinda and B.L. Sanjeev for the Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Karnataka High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "W.P. NOS. 32256-257 OF 2000 AND 47091 OF 2001",
    "Judge Name:": "R. GURURAJAN, J.",
    "": "Kaimabetta Estate (P.) Ltd.\nv.\nAssistant Commissioner of Agricultural IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13995",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1995 895 = 1995 SLD 895 = 1955 PLD 66",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Political Parties Act (111 of 1962)-------S. 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 63 & 187---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O. XXIII, R. 6---Appeal against decision of Election Commission---Supreme Court can go into the question of competency of the appeals filed before it under S.8-B/ Political Parties Act, 1962 and can also decide question of vires of S.8-B of the said Act to the limited extent of forums envisaged under S.8-B of the Act which are different from the forum of the Chief Election Commissioner, envisaged in Art. 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--Article 187 confers upon Supreme Court ample power to do complete justice and give finding to that effect about competence of forum.\n \nDetermination of question of forum involves question of jurisdiction. Direct appeals are filed before the Supreme Court under section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962,; which is in conflict with Article 63 of the Constitution providing only one forum of the Chief Election Commissioner without providing further forum of appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction which is conferred upon it by the Constitution or by or under any law as is contemplated under Article 175(2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction and advisory jurisdiction and exercises power to transfer cases as is contemplated under Articles 184 to 186-A of the Constitution. and Article 184(3) of the Constitution this Court can exercise jurisdiction without prejudice to Article 199 if it considers that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II is involved and has power to make an order of the nature mentioned in that Article. Under Article 187 the Supreme Court has power to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, including an order for the purpose of securing attendance of any person or discovery or production of any document. Question for consideration in the present case was whether the Supreme Court could go into the question whether the appeals filed before it under section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 were competent or not and to that extent whether the same provision was ultra vires the Constitution being inconsistent with Article 63 of the Constitution.\n \nIn the 1973 Constitution apart from other jurisdictions, which are mentioned specifically, Article 187 confers upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction and powers to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it. In the present case appeals filed under section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962, were pending before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court could go into the question whether they were competently filed or not and in that context also could go into the question of vires of section 8-B to the extent of forum. The Supreme Court has to go into details of hearing of arguments of both the sides in order to come to conclusion whether appeals were competently filed or not. Article 187 confers upon the Court ample authority and jurisdiction to do complete justice and give finding to that effect about competence of forum.\n \nIn support of the proposition that the Supreme Court has more than ample powers to do complete justice, as contemplated under Article 187 of the Constitution, reference can be made to Order XXIII Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, which also provides that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to. limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. This rule is consistent with the spirit and amplitude of the jurisdiction anti power as conferred upon it by the Constitution.\n \nThe Court can go into the question of competency of the appeals filed before it under section 8-B of the Political Parties Act and the Court can decide question of vires of section 8-B to the limited extent of forums envisaged under section 8-E of the Political Parties Act, which are different from the forum of the Chief Election Commissioner, envisaged in Article 63 of the Constitution as the only forum for determination of question of disqualification.\n \nWaris Meah v. State PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 157; Noora and another v. The%tate PLD 1973 SC 469;'Ch.Zahur Ilahi, MNA v. The State PLD 1977 SC 273; Said Mian v. Mian Said Baghdad 1980 SCMR 420; Hayat Bux and others v. The State 1981 SCMR 1; Muhammad Aslam and another v. Munshi Muhammad Behram and others 1991 SCMR 1971 and Mst. Safyya and another v. Muhammad Rafique, and 6 others PLD 1993 SC 62 ref.\n \n(b) Jurisdiction---\n \n---- Question of jurisdiction being very important and fundamental in nature, if a forum had no jurisdiction, the same could not be conferred upon it by consent of parties---Court has to consider the question of jurisdiction even though not raised by the parties.\n \nRaleigh Investment Company Limited -v. The Governor-General-in ­Council PLD 1947 PC 19 ref.\n \n(c) Estoppel---\n \n----Jurisdiction of Court---Doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied to defeat the provisions of statute or enactment affecting jurisdiction of the Court.--­[Jurisdiction Estoppel].\n \nMuhammad Suleman v. Javed Iqbal PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 64 ref.\n \n(d) Political Parties Act (III of 1962)---\n \n----Preamble & S.8-B---History of Political Parties Act, 1962 with particular emphasis on insertion and import of S.8-B traced.\n \nGhulam Must4a Khar v. Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan and others PLD 1969 Lah. 602 and Ms. Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1988 SC 416 ref.\n \n (e) Political Parties Act (111 of 1962)---\n \n----S. 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.63 --- Disqualification for membership of Parliament on ground of defection---Forums for purpose of determining the question of disqualification---Neither forums can be added nor different forums can be provided against the forum of the Chief Election Commissioner as contemplated by Art.63 of the Constitution.\n \nArticle 63(1)(p), Constitution of Pakistan (1973) envisages that disqualification under any law for the time being in force can be added to the disqualifications mentioned under Article 63(1) of the Constitution, but it is nowhere specifically said in Article 63 that for the purpose of determining the question of disqualification forums can be added or different forums can be provided against the forum of the Chief Election Commissioner, as contemplated under Article 63 of the Constitution.\n \n(f) Political Parties Act (III of 1962)---\n \n----S. 8-B(2)(3)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 63 --- Provision o S.8-B(2)(3), Political Parties Act, 1962 being in conflict with Art. 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973) to the extent of forum, which is Chief Election Commissioner in the Constitutional provision, is ultra vires the Constitution--­Chief Election Commissioner is competent to hear references which can be disposed of by him on merits---Appeal filed before Supreme Court under S.8-B(3) of the Act, therefore, was not competent.\n \nIn Article 63 only the Chief Election Commissioner is declared to be the forum for determining the question of disqualification of a member on reference from the Speaker or the Chairman of the Senate and no further forum of appeal is provided, making decision of the Chief Election Commissioner as final. Section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 provides forums which are different from the forum of the Chief Election Commissioner, as contemplated under Article 63(2) of the Constitution. To that extent, there is conflict between Article 63 of the Constitution and section 8-B of the Political Parties Act. In case there is conflict between the Constitution and subordinate law, then the Constitution shall always prevail to the extent of conflict.\n \nWhere express authorization exists in. favour of two authorities or forums in respect of identical subject, one conferred by superior law would prevail over that conferred by inferior law. The forum of Election Tribunal for decision of election dispute is provided in the Constitution by express provision, which is to be read in conjunction with Article 219(c) of the Constitution, which authorizes the Chief Election Commissioner to appoint the Election Tribunals. It is further mentioned in Article 225 that election petition presented to such Tribunal is to be decided in the manner as may be determined by the Act of Parliament. In this context reference can be made to the Representation of the People Act, 1976, which reiterates the powers of the Chief Election Commissioner to appoint as many Election Tribunals as may be necessary as contemplated under section 57 thereof. It, is further provided that Election Tribunal shall consist of a person, who has been, or is, or at the time of his retirement as a District and Sessions Judge, was qualified to be a Judge of a High Court. Section 67 of the said Act further provides forum of appeal before the Supreme Court against the decision of the Election Tribunal. There is obvious difference between the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 and section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962, in providing the forums as in 'the case of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 there is Constitutional authority as contemplated under Articles 219(c) and 225 of the Constitution and there is no inconsistency in the forums provided both in the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1976. On the other hand, there is very clear inconsistency and conflict in respect of forums provided in Article 63(2) of the Constitution and section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962.\n \nPerusal of section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 shows very clearly that the words \"\"defects\"\" and \"\"withdraws\"\" are not defined in the Constitution or the relevant law. With the result, confusion has arisen not only with regard to the forums but also with regard to the definition of the terms mentioned above. In the result, now reliance is to be placed by the Courts on dictionary meanings for using these terms and considering defection as ground for dissolution of the Assemblies on moral justification. In the tracheotomy of the powers between the Legislature, Judiciary and Executive, it is undeniably the duty of the Legislature to make laws which are comprehensive and perfect in all respects without leaving room for ambiguity, and it is the duty of the judiciary to interpret the Constitution and the laws as they are, without transgressing the limits set on its powers of interpretation by filling in the blanks left by the Legislature.\n \nOn the subject of defection, law is to be framed by the Legislature and has to be construed or interpreted by the Courts as it is. On the subject of defection the law which holds the field is the Political Parties Act, 1962 which cannot be improved by the Courts during interpretation in the sense that some thing can be added to it which is not put there by the Legislature.\n \nSection 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 is ultra vires the Constitution to the extent of forums only, which are in conflict with Article 63 of our Constitution in which forum of the Chief Election Commissioner is specifically provided, which is final as no other forum of appeal is provided therein.\n \nHigh Court is competent forum where vires of section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 can be challenged on other grounds.\n \nThe Chief Election Commissioner is competent to hear references which can be disposed of by him on merits as previously the references were dismissed by him on the short ground of incompetence without going into the question of merits for the reason that defection was not mentioned as ground of disqualification in Article 63 of the Constitution.\n \nAppeals before Supreme Court are incompetent on the' ground that section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 was ultra vires the Constitution to the extent of forums.\n \nIttefaq Foundry v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1990 Lah. 121; Raja Muhammad Afzal v. Ch. Muhammad Altaf Hussain and others 1986 SCMR 1736; State v. Zia-ur-Rehman and others PLD 1973 SC 49 and Fauji Foundation and another v. Shamim-ur-Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457 ref.\n \n(g) Political Parties Act (III of 1962)---\n \n----5. 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.63 & 199---Disqualification on ground of defection etc.---Vires of S.8-B, Political Parties Act, 1962---High Court is competent forum where vires of S.8-B of the Act can be challenged.\n \n(h) Political Parties Act (III of 1962)---\n \n----S. 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.63---Disqualification on ground of defection etc.---Chief Election Commissioner is competent to hear references which can be disposed of by him on merits.\n \nThe Chief Election Commissioner is competent to hear references which can be disposed of by him on merits as previously the references were dismissed by him on the short ground of incompetence without going into the question of merits for the reason that defection was not mentioned as ground of disqualification in Art. 63 of the Constitution.\n \n(i) Political Parties Act (III of 1962)---\n \n----S. 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.63---Disqualification on grounds of defection etc.---Appeal before Supreme Court---Provisions of S.8-B, Political Parties Act, 1962 being in conflict with Art.63, Constitution of Pakistan (1973), to the extent of forums, which is Chief Election Commissioner under Art. 63 of the Constitution, appeal against order of Chief Selection Commissioner before Supreme Court against its finding that it had no jurisdiction to determine vires of Political Parties Act, 1962, was not competent.\n \nPer Sand Snood Jan, J. Contra.---\n \nPer Ajmal Minn, J. Contra.-\n \nMuhammad Hashim Khan and others v. Province of Balochistan and others PLD 1976 Quetta 59; Asif v. Secretary to Government of the Punjab, C and W Department, Lahore and 4 others 1990 PLC (C.S.) 257; Iqan Ahmed Khurram v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1980 SC 153; Sharwai and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others 1991 SCMR 1041; Hamayun Saifullah Khan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Justice, Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 1990 SC 599; Fazlul Quader Chowdhry and others v. Muhammad Abdul Haque PLD 1963 SC 486; Akhtar Ali Parvez v. Altafur Rehman PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lab,. 390; Manager, Khewra Salt Mines, Khewra v. The Mines Employees and Labour Union, Khewra through General Secretary of Union and another PLD 1976 Lab. 601; J.K. Manufacturers Ltd. (formerly J.K. Cotton Manufacturers Ltd.) v. The Sales Tax Officer, Sector II, Kanpur and others AIR 1970 All. 362; Chief Adjudication Officer and another v. Foster (1993) 2 WLR 292; Constitutional Law of Canada by Peter W. Hogg, 3rd Edn. (Student Edn.); Noora and another v. The State PLD 1973 SC 469; Said Mian and another v. Mian Said Baghdad and another 1980 SCMR 420; Muhammad Aslam and another v. Munshi Muhammad Behram and another 1991 SCMR 1971; Mst. Safyya and another v. Muhammad Rafique and 6 others PLD 1993 SC 62; Muhammad Tufail and another v. Mirza Azizullah and 14 others 1994 SCMR 347; Ch. Zahur Ilahi, M.N.A. v. The State PLD 1977 SC 273; Syed Wasey Zafar and 4 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance and others PLD 1994 SC 621; Said Ali Shah v. Abdul Saghir Khan Sherwani PLD 1990 SC 504; Raja Muhammad Afzal v. Ch. Muhammad Altaf and others 1986 SCMR 1736; Reflection on Islam by Hamoodur Rahman (former Chief Justice of Pakistan), p.2 from Ansari's Report; Hakim Khan and 3 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Interior and others PLD 1992 SC 595; Mst. Kaneez Fatima v. Wali Muhammad and another PLD 1993 SC 901; Mishkat-ul-Masabih by Alhaj Maulana Fazlul Karim; The Concept of State in Islam published in Journal Part of PLD 1979 at pp. 1 to ll; Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1988 SC 416; Mrs. Benazir Bhutto and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1989 SC 66; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v.-President of Pakistan and others PLD 1993 SC 473; Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others v. Nawabzada Muhammad Umer Khan 1992 SCMR 2450; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and others v. Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao PL.D 1992 SC 723; Sardar Muhammad Muqeem Khoso v. President of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 412; Rai Rashid Ahmed Khan v. President of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 36; Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Rahim v. The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and another PLD 1992 SC 646; Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne 1910 AC 87; Shri Kihot Hollohon v. Zachilhu and others AIR 1993 SC 412; 1992 Suppl. (2) SC 651; Our Constitution Defaced and Defiled by NA. Palkhivala, Constitutional Reform, Rashaping the British Political System by Rodney Brazier Parliament by Sir Ivor Jennings; Report of the Constitution Commission Pakistan, 1961, para.l9; Ben F. Ray v. Edmund Blair 343 UC 214; Constitutional Law of India by Sarvai, 3rd Edn.; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu 1992 Suppl. (2) SCC; Parkash Singh Badal and others v. Union of India and others AIR 1987 Pun. and Haryana 263; Messrs Haider Automobile Ltd. v. Fakistan PLD 196' SC 623; Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 16, pp.86 = 87; American Jurisprudence, X01.62, p.678; Pakistan v. Ahmed Saeed Kirmani and others PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 397; Lt.-Col. Farzand Ali and tethers v. Province of West Pakistan through rife Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Government of West Pakistan, Lahore PLD 1970 SC 98; Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri and another 1976 SCMR 273; Karachi Bar Association v. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada and another PLD 1988 Kar. 309; M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha and others AIR 1959 SC 395; Special Reference No.l of 1964 AIR 1965 SC 745; Nicholas De B. Katzenbach v. John P. Morgan and Christine Morgan 384 US 641; Mac Q. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma 483 US 348; Constitutional Interpretation by Craig R. Ducat, Fourth Edn. and Harold W. Chase; The Supreme Court, how it was, how it is by William H. Rehnquist (former Chief Justice of the United States); Government of Punjab through Secretary, Home Department v. Zia Ullah Khan and 2 others 1992 SCMR 602; Muhammad Arif and another v. The State and another 1993 SCMR 1589; Pir Sabir Shah v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1994 SC 738; Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service Limited and others v. The Province of West Pakistan and another PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 127; Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Guru Prasanna Singh; The Interpretation of Statutes by Vepa P. Sarathi; General Clauses Acts Central and States by Dr. Vidya Dhar Mahajan and Bindra on Interpretation of Statutes ref.\n \nPer Saleem Akhtar, J. Cont\n \nMuhammad Hashim Khan v. Province of Balochistan PLD 1976 Quetta 59; Muhammad Asif v. Secretary to Government of the Punjab, C&W Department, Lahore and others 1990 PLC (C.S.) 257; Iqan Ahmed Khurram v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1980 SC 153; IA. Sherwani and other v. Government of Pakistan and others 1991 SCMR 1041; Fazlul Quader Chowdhry and others v. Muhammad Abdul Haque PLD 1963 SC 486; The Manager, Khewra Salt Mines, Khewra v. The Mines Employees and Labour Union, Khewra and another PLD 1976 Lab. GOl; Akhtar Ali Pervez v. Altafur Rehman PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lah. 390; Messrs Shafiq Hanif (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Limited, Karachi PLD 1993 Kar.107; J.K. Manufactures Ltd. v. The Sales Tax Officer, Sector II, Kanpur and others AIR 1970 All. 362; Humayun Saifullah Khan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 595; Waris Miah's case PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 157; Noora and another v. The State PLD 1973 SC 469; Ch. Zahur Ilahi v. The State PLD 1977 SC 273; Muhammad Ashraf and another v. The State PLD 1981 SC 265; Muhammad Aslani and another v. Munshi Muhammad Behram and another 1991 SCMR 1971; Mst. Safyye and another v. Muhammad Rafique and others PLD 1993 SC 62; Muhammad Tufail and another v. Mirza Azizullah and others 1994 SCMR 347; Treatise on Constitutional Case Substance 2nd Edn., Vol. 2, p.90; Our Constitution Defaced and Defiled by NA. Palkhivala; Parliament by Sir Ivon Janning; Constitutional Reforms Re-shaping the British Political System by Rodney Brozier; Constitutional Law of India by Servai, 3rd Edn., p.19; Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne 1910 AC 87; Shri Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu and others AIR 1993 SC 412; Ben F. Roy v. Edward Blair 343 US 214; Khawaja Ahmed Rahim Tariq v. The Federation of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 646; Syed Abul A'ala Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan and others PLD 1964 SC 673; Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416; Mrs. Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1989 SC 66; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473; Benazir Bhutto v. Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416; Reference No.l of 1988 made by the President PLD 1989 SC 75; Government of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon PLD 1993 SC 341; Khalid Malik v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1991 Kar. 1; Haider Automobile Ltd. v. Pakistan PLD 1969 SC 623; Ghulam Mustafa Khar v. Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan and others PLD 1969 Lah. 602; Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Rahim v. The Federation of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 646; Sardar Muhammad Muqeem Khoso v. President of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 412; Rai Rashid Ahmad Khan v. President of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 36; New Webster's Dictionary, Deluxe Encyclopaedic Edn.; Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 42; Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edn., p.1277 and Tamil Nadu v. Kodai Kanal Motor Union (Pvt.) Limited PTCL 1987 FC 375 ref.\n \nPer Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, J. Contra.---\n \nFauji Foundation and another v. Shamim-ur-Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457; K. Nagaraj and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another AIR 1985 SC 551; Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service Limited and others v. Province of West Pakistan etc. PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 127; Government of Punjab through Secretary, Home Department v. Zia Ullah Khan etc. 1992 SCMR 602; Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1962 SC 646; IA. Sherwani v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 1041; Muhammad Hashim Khan v. Province of Balochistan PLD 1976 Quetta 59; Iqan Ahmed Khurram v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1980 SC 153; Noor and another v. State PLD 1973 SC 469; Fazlul Quader Choudhry v. Muhamlnad Abdul Haque PLD 1963 SC 486; Waris Miah v. State etc. PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 157; Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan etc. PLD 1988 SC 416; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others v. President of Pakistan and others PLD 1993 SC 473; Constitutional Law of Canada, Third Edn. (1992); Process of Constitutional Decision-Making by Brest; Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 16; Abdul Aziz and others v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 499; Government of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon PLD 1993 SC 341; Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance 1992 SCMR 891; Special Reference No.l of 1957 PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 219; The State v. Ziaur Rehman and others PLD 1973 SC 49; Federation of Pakistan v. Saoed Ahmed Khan and others PLD 1974 SC 151; Shireen Munir and others v. Government of Punjab PLD 1990 SC 295; Parliament by Sir Ivor Jennings, 2nd Edn.; Form of Government by late Justice Hamoodur Rehman and Ansari Commission's Report on Form of Government ref.\n \nPer Ajmal Mian, J: --\n \n(j) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Arts.63(2) & 185(3)---Reference under Art.63(2), Constitution of Pakistan disposed of by the Chief Election Commissioner and no petition for leave to appeal filed- by any of the parties against the said   of Chief Election Commissioner---Judgment of Chief Election Commissioner would acquire finality.\n \n(k) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art.184(3)---Provision of Art.184(3), Constitution of Pakistan when can be pressed into service.\n \nA perusal of Article 184(3) of the Constitution indicates that it can be pressed into service if the following two conditions are fulfilled:--\n \npressed The case involves a question of public importance; and\n \n(ii) The question so involved pertains to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution.\n \nSyed Wasey Zafar and 4 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance and others PLD 1994 SC 621 ref.\n \n(l) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Arts.184(3), 185, 2A, 4, 63 & 66---Supreme Court, in exercise of its original jurisdiction under. .Art .184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan cannot examine the violation of the Arts .2A, 4, 63 & 66 of the Constitution of Pakistan--­Supreme Court, however, has the jurisdiction to examine the violation of said Articles if a matter is brought before it in appellate jurisdiction against a   of the High Court in exercise of inter alia its Constitutional jurisdiction.\n \n(m) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art.63(1)---Grounds mentioned in Art.63(1) are not exhaustive.\n \nA perusal of the opening portion of clause (1) of Article 63 of the Constitution indicates that the grounds mentioned in sub-clauses of this clause are not exhaustive as it has not been provided therein that the same are the only grounds. Additional grounds can be added either by amending the aforesaid clause (1) or by law.\n \n(n) Interpretation of constitution---\n \n---- Approach of the Court while construing a Constitutional provision has to be dynamic, progressive and liberal keeping in view the changed situation, which is intended to be catered for by an existing provision of the Constitution or by a new legislation within the compass of the Constitution---Such approach of interpretation of Constitution cannot be negated by pressing into service the Latin maxim \"\"expressio unius est exclusio alterius\"\": -[Maxim].\n \n(o) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art.63(1)--..-Scope of Art.63(1)---Provision of Art.63(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan does not, in any way, place embargo on the powers of Parliament to provide a law to eliminate the evil of defection.\n \nPer Saleem Akhtar, J: --\n \n(p) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 187---Term \"\"complete justice\"\" used in Art.187, Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---Connotation---Inherent and plenary power of Supreme Court--­Scope.--[Words and phrases].\n \nThe Supreme Court is the apex Court. It is the highest and the ultimate Court under the Constitution. The inherent and plenary power of Supreme Court which is vested in it by virtue of being the ultimate Court, it has the power to do complete justice without in any manner infringing or violating any provision of law. While doing complete justice the Court would not cross the frontiers of the Constitution and law. The term \"\"complete justice\"\" is not capable of definition with exactitude. It is a term covering variety of cases and reliefs which the Court can mould and grant depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. While doing complete justice formalities and technicalities should not fetter its power. It can grant ancillary relief, mould the relief within its jurisdiction depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, take additional evidence and in appropriate cases even subsequent events may be taken into consideration. The Supreme Court is an essence of a continual Constitutional convention. The jurisdiction and the power conferred on the Supreme Court does empower it to do complete justice by looking to the facts, circumstances and the law governing a particular case. Article 187 does not confer' any jurisdiction. It recognises inherent power of an apex Court to do complete justice and issue orders and directions to achieve drat end. Inherent jurisdiction is vested in the High Court and subordinate Courts while dealing with civil and criminal cases by virtue of provisions of law. The inherent jurisdiction of Supreme Court to do complete justice cannot be curtailed by law as it may adversely affect the independence of judiciary and the fundamental right of person to have free access to the Court for achieving complete justice. This enunciation may evoke a controversy that as Article 175(2) restricts Article 187 it will create conflict between the two. There is no conflict and both the Articles can be read together. The conflict in the provisions of the Constitution should not be assumed and if apparently there seems to be any, it has to be interpreted in a harmonious manner by which both the provisions may co-exist. One provision of the Constitution cannot be struck down being in conflict with the other provision of the 'Constitution. They have to live together, exist together and operate together. Therefore, while interpreting jurisdiction and power of the superior Courts one should look to the fundamental rights conferred and the duty cast upon them under the Constitution. A provision like Article 187 cannot be read in isolation but has to be interpreted and read harmoniously with other provisions of the Constitution. Court while hearing- appeal under a statute has the jurisdiction and power to decide the question of vires of the statute under which the appeal has arisen and can even invoke Article 184(3) in appropriate cases.\n \n(q) Interpretation of Constitution---\n \n---- Conflict in the provision of the Constitution---Mode of resolution.\n \nThe conflict in the provisions of the Constitution should not be assumed and if apparently there seems to be any, it has to be interpreted in a harmonious manner by which both the provisions may co-exist. One provision of the Constitution cannot be struck down being in conflict with the other provision of the Constitution. They have to live together, exist together and operate together.\n \n(r) Political Parties Act (111 of 1962)---\n \n----S.8-B---Purpose and object ,of SA-B.\n \nSection 8-B of Political Parties Act, 1962 aims at weeding out disloyalty, treachery and corruption from the rank and file of the elected members to both the Houses. It intends to keep the body politic pure and clean, the trust reposed by the voters intact and discourage, nay, eliminate adventurism for personal gain, benefit and reward. Defection, horse-trading or floor-crossing by the members elected an a party ticket is the \"\"odious type of corruption\"\". Section 8-B or similar legislation wish to achieve pious end by removing evil, cleaning political culture and creating discipline in the elected representatives of the people. Discipline is the cornerstone without which no society can exist, flourish and develop. In all the countries having Parliamentary form of Government, the evil of defection, shifting of loyalties, floor-crossing, varying in degrees and withdrawal of support has been noticed and steps have been taken by legislation or through conventions to check them. The Jurists, Judges and Authors have disapproved it in strong terms.\n \nOur constitution Defaced and Defiled try NA.- Palkliivala; Parlianic:nt by Sir Ivon Janning; Constitutional Reforms Re-shaping the British Political System try Rodney Brozier; Constitutional Law of India by Servai, 3rd Edn., para. 19; Constitution Commission Pakistan 1961; Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne 191(1 AC 877; Shri Kihota Hollohon v. Zeachilhu and others AIR 3.993 SC 412; Servai and Ben F. Roy v. Edward Blair 343 US 214; Khawaia Ahmed Rahim Tariq v. The Federation of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 646; Syed Abul A'ala Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan and others PLD 1964 SC 673; Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416; Mrs. BenazirBhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1989 SC 66 and Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473 ref.\n \n(s) Interpretation of Constitution---\n \n---- Principles.\n \nConstitution should not be interpreted in a narrow, pedantic, technical and restricted manner. Constitution is a permanent, organic and living document. It assimilates the past, present and future for proper governance generation after generation. Approach to such a document should, be liberal, progressive and wide without doing any violence to the intention and language. The fundamental principles embodied in the Constitution and the fundamental rights have to be kept in view.\n \nConstitution should not be interpreted to limit its scope and effect to only contesting parties but one has to keep in mind that",
    "Court Name:": "Service Tribunal, N.W.F.P.",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos.381 and 382 of 1994, decision dated: 16-11-1994.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAJJAD ALI SHAH, C.J., SAAD SAOOD JAN, AJMAL MIAN, AND MUKHTAR AHMED, JUNEJO, JJ",
    "": "Pir SABIR SHAH\nvs\nSHAD MUHAMMAD KHAN, MEMBER PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY, \nN..W.F.P. and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13996",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3104 = 2003 SLD 3104 = (2003) 264 ITR 766",
    "Key Words:": "When a partner applies for certified copy of profit and loss account of assessment of partnership firm or assessment order, same shall be deemed to be made on behalf of assessee firm itself and income-tax authorities cannot refuse to furnish a copy quoting section 138\nSection 138, read with second 140, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Information respecting assessee, disclosure of - Assessment years 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000 - Whether when an existing partner competent to sign and verify return, applies for certified copy of profit and loss account of assessment of partnership firm or assessment order, same shall be deemed to be made on behalf of assessee-firm itself and income-tax authorities cannot refuse to furnish a copy quoting section 138 - Held, yes\nHELD\nA careful reading of section 140(cc ) makes it clear that where managing partner cannot sign or verify the returns, any partner of the firm not being a minor, is also competent to sign and verify the return, in which case, the partner of the firm is deemed to be a competent person to sign and verify the return of the partnership firm also. [Para 5]\nIf that be so, when such a partner applies for the certified copy of the profit and loss account of the assessment of the firm or the assessment order, the same shall be deemed to be made on behalf of the assessee- firm itself and the income-tax authorities cannot refuse to furnish a copy quoting section 138 which bars the authority to furnish copies relating to the assessee except the same is required in the public interest. [Para 5]\nThe provision of section 138 is to maintain the secret of the income-tax of the assessee and any information relating to the returns of the assessee shall not be furnished to third parties. But, when a person himself is competent to sign and verify the returns of the firm in his capacity as an existing partner of the firm, he is entitled to a copy of the returns of the firm, in which case, the question of refusing to furnish copies of the returns of the firm on an alleged ground, viz., want of public interest, is no more available to the income-tax authorities as section 138 itself is not attracted in such cases. [Para 6]\nMurali Kumaran for the Petitioner. K. Subramanian for the Respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "WRIT PETITION NOS. 42073 TO 42075 OF 2003 OCTOBER 9, 2003",
    "Judge Name:": "P.D. DINAKARAN, J.",
    "": "K. Muthukrishnan\nv.\nIncome Tax Officer"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13997",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3105 = 2003 SLD 3105 = (2003) 264 ITR 374",
    "Key Words:": "Section 194C is not applicable to professional fees for services rendered by professionals, e.g., lawyers, chartered accountants, doctors, architects, etc.\nSection 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Deduction of tax at source - Contractors/sub-contractors, payments to - Whether section 194C is not applicable to professional people who render services, e.g., lawyers, chartered accountants, legal advisers, doctors, engineers, architects, consultants, etc., and receive payments from persons who need their services - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, circular dated 8-3-1994 making section 194C applicable to fees for professional services rendered by such professionals is to be quashed - Held, yes\nCirculars and notifications - CBDT Circular dated 8-3-1994\nHELD\nSection 194C really deals with contractors who are businessmen, e.g., building contractor, or contractor who does work of transportation or loading of goods, or for supply of materials. The context of that provision shows that it is not dealing with professionals like lawyers, doctors, accountants, etc., and it does not refer to payment of fees to such professionals. [Para 9]\nIn view of the decisions in Chamber of Income-tax Consultants v. CBDT [1994] 209 ITR 660/ 75 Taxman 669 (Bom.); Madras Bar Association v. CBDT [1995] 216 ITR 240 (Mad.) and All Gujarat Federation of Tax Consultants v. CBDT [1995] 214 ITR 276/ 80 Taxman 460 (Guj.), the impugned circular is to be quashed, so far as it is made applicable to professionals. [Paras 11 and 12]\nCASES REFERRED TO\nAssociated Cement Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1993] 201 ITR 435/ 67 Taxman 346 (SC) [Para 7], Chamber of Income-tax Consultants v. CBDT[1994] 209 ITR 600/ 75 Taxman 669 (Bom.) [Para 11], Madras Bar Association v. CBDT [1995] 216 ITR 240 (Mad.) [Para 11] andAll Gujarat Federation of Tax Consultants v. CBDT [1995] 214 ITR 276/ 80 Taxman 460 (Guj.) [Para 11].\nVikram Gulati for the Petitioner.",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS WRIT PETITION NO. 618 OF 1994 SEPTEMBER 5, 2003",
    "Judge Name:": "M. KATJU AND UMESHWAR PANDEY, JJ.",
    "": "Moradabad Chartered Accountants Assn.\nv.\nCentral Board of Direct Taxes"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13998",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3106 = 2003 SLD 3106 = (2003) 264 ITR 328",
    "Key Words:": "Free accommodation facility provided by employer to its employees on rig in high seas cannot be construed to be perquisite\nSection 17(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Salaries - Perquisites - Assessment year 1994-95 - Whether free accommodation facility provided by employer to its employees on rig, in high seas cannot be construed to be a perquisite - Held, yes\nCASE REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Sedco Forex International Drilling Co. Ltd. [2003] (2004) 264 ITR 320 (Uttaranchal) [Para 5].\nS.K. Posti for the Appellant. O.P. Sapra for the Respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Uttaranchal High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "INCOME-TAX APPEALS NOS. 12, 13 AND 15 OF 2003",
    "Judge Name:": "S.H. KAPADIA, C.J. AND M.M. GHILDIYAL, J.",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nv.\nHyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "13999",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3107 = 2003 SLD 3107 = (2003) 264 ITR 612",
    "Key Words:": "Section 153 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Assessment - Time-limit for completion of - Assessment year 1984-85 - Assessee was assessed for relevant assessment year in status of AOP and tax was charged at maximum marginal rate - Commissioner (Appeals) set aside impugned assessment order and directed ITO to pass a fresh assessment order - Whether since assessment order was set aside by Commissioner (Appeals) by his order dated 21-3-1988 and a fresh assessment could have been made latest by 31-3-1990 under section 153(2A), but no fresh order was made by that date assessee was right in saying that same had become time-barred - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, respondent was to be directed to refund amount prayed for with interest - Held, yes\nCASES REFERRED TO\nHari Nandan Agarwal (HUF) v. ITO [1986] 159 ITR 816/ 25 Taxman 147 (All.) [Para 10] and Purshottam Dayal Varshney v. CIT[1974] 94 ITR 187 (All.) [Para 10].\nV. Gulati for the Petitioners. S. Srivastava for the Respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "CIVIL MISC. WRIT PETITION NO. 483 OF 1994 SEPTEMBER 22, 2003",
    "Judge Name:": "M. KATJU AND UMESHWAR PANDEY, JJ.",
    "": "Harihar Nath Agarwal (P.) Family Trust\nv.\nAssistant Commissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14000",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3108 = 2003 SLD 3108 = (2003) 264 ITR 482",
    "Key Words:": "Section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 - Exemption - House property - Assessment years 1974-75 to 1977-78 - Whether a cinema hall can be treated as a house for purpose of section 5(1)(iv) - Held, no - Whether, therefore, assessee was not entitled to exemption under section 5(1)(iv) in respect of cinema building owned by it - Held, yes\nWords and phrases - Term 'house' occurring in section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957\nHELD\nThe Act has used the words 'house', 'building' and 'property' in different places and, hence, different meanings should ordinarily be ascribed to these words in accordance with the said principles of interpretation. Therefore, it cannot be said that all buildings must be regarded as houses within the meaning of the term used in section 5(1)(iv). [Para 5]\nIn common parlance, a house means a place where people live. Of course, a residential building can also be given for commercial purpose and yet it will remain a house. However, by no stretch of imagination can a cinema hall be regarded as a house. No one ever calls a cinema hall a house. [Para 6]\nThere may be cases where a person uses or has given his residential house on rent, for commercial purpose but it will still remain a house. But if the building is not a house at all, it cannot get exemption. [Para 7]\nA cinema hall is not a building for human habitation or a dwelling or a home. Hence, a cinema hall is not a house at all. To get exemption, it must be a house in the first place, which a cinema hall is not. Hence, the assessee could not get exemption under section 5(1)(iv). [Para 13]\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCWT v. Tulsi Dass [2002] 256 ITR 73 (Raj.) [Para 7], Chapman v. Royal Bank of Scotland [1881] 7QB 136 [Para 10], Shiv Narain Chaudhari v. CWT [1977] 108 ITR 104 (All.) [Para 11] and CWT v. K.B. Pradhan [1981] 130 ITR 393 (Ori.) [Para 11].",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 238 OF 1983 SEPTEMBER 23, 2003",
    "Judge Name:": "M. KATJU AND UMESHWAR PANDEY, JJ.",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nv.\nJai Kishan Gupta"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14001",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3109 = 2003 SLD 3109 = (2003) 264 ITR 273",
    "Key Words:": "Section 32A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Investment allowance - Assessment year 1978-79 - Whether tractor is not a road transport vehicle - Held, yes\nWords and phrases - Meaning of 'road transport vehicle'\nCASES REFERRED TO\nState of Madras v. Marshall Sons & Co. (India) Ltd. [1954] 5 STC 305 (Mad.) [Para 8], Airfreight Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [1999] 95 FJR 395 (SC) [Para 9], Davis v. Sebastian [1999] 6 SCC 604 [Para 9], Aspinwall & Co. Ltd. v. CIT [2001] 251 ITR 323/ 118 Taxman 771 (SC) [Para 10], State of Kerala v. V. Padmanabhan [2003] 129 STC 245 (SC) [Para 10] and Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Mafatlal Industries AIR 1996 SC 1541 [Para 11].\nV.K. Rastogi and A.K. Rastogi for the Respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE NO. 260 OF 1983",
    "Judge Name:": "M. KATJU AND UMESHWAR PANDEY, JJ.",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nv.\nU.P. Paschimi Kshetriya Vikas Nigam Ltd."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14002",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3110 = 2003 SLD 3110 = (2003) 264 ITR 582",
    "Key Words:": "Section 143, read with section 260A, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Assessment - Additions to income - Assessment year 1989-1990 - Assessee was running a rice mill - Assessing Officer framed assessment of assessee under section 143(3) and made certain addition to its income on account of difference in value of paddy shown in bank statement and books of account - Appellate authorities deleted said addition - Whether since there was no material to show that assessee had deliberately overvalued stock for purpose of securing higher credit from bank, so-called discrepancy in bank statement and account books could not be made basis for making addition in declared income of assessee - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was running a rice mill. The Assessing Officer framed the assessment of the assessee under section 143(3) and made certain addition to its income on account of difference of stock of rice and paddy as per bank statement furnished to the bank and as per stock register maintained by the assessee. On appeal the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the said addition holding that there was no significant discrepancy in the stock maintained by the assessee and the bank statement did not suffer from any patent legal infirmity because the assessee had furnished satisfactory explanation. On further appeal, the Tribunal confirmed the impugned order.\nOn appeal :\nHELD\nNo material was produced by the department to show that the assessee had deliberately overvalued the stock for the purpose of securing higher credit from the bank. Therefore, the so-called discrepancy in the bank statement and the account books could not be made the basis for making addition in the declared income of the assessee. [Para 8]\nTherefore, no substantial question of law arose in the instant appeal and the same was liable to be dismissed summarily. [Para 9]\nCASES REFERRED TO\nDevgon Rice & General Mills v. CIT [2003] 263 ITR 391/[2004] 134 Taxman 448 (Punj. & Har.) [Para 4], ITO v. Devi Dayal Rice Mills [IT Appeal No. 227 (Asr.) of 1994, dated 12-11-2001] [Para 6], CIT v. Prem Singh & Co. [1987] 163 ITR 434 (Delhi) [Para 6],CIT v. Vighyan Chemicals Industries [1993] 200 ITR 137 (All.) [Para 6], CIT v. Gopal Rice Mills [1995] 211 ITR 492/[1994] 77 Taxman 58 (All.) [Para 6] and CIT v. N. Swamy [2000] 241 ITR 363 (Mad.) [Para 6].",
    "Court Name:": "Punjab and Haryana High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "IT APPEAL NO. 219 OF 2002",
    "Judge Name:": "G.S. SINGHVI AND S.S. GREWAL, JJ.",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax\nv.\nPunjab Rice & General Mills"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14003",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2017 346 = 2017 SLD 346 = 2017 PTCL 222 = (2017) 115 TAX 165",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=11,11(1),11(2),14,14(8),32\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=11,11(1),11(2),14,14(8),32\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO.1074 OF 2009, DATE of order & hearing: 19.01.2017",
    "Judge Name:": "MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR, HCJ, MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, MR. JUSTICE EJAZ AFZAL KHAN",
    "": "VS\nM/S SAHIB JEE ETC. . --Respondent\nFor the --Appellant: Mr. Khalid Abbas Khan, ASC"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14004",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2017 347 = 2017 SLD 347 = 2017 PTCL 259 = 2017 PTD 1158 = 2017 TAX 218",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=23,Third Schedule\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=23,Third Schedule\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION NO. 2640 OF 2016, DATE of order & hearing: 02.02.2017",
    "Judge Name:": "MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR, HCJ, MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, MR. JUSTICE EJAZ AFZAL KHAN",
    "": "M/S SHIFA INTERNATIONAL HOSPITAL, Islamabad High Court High Court .... ER\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX/WEALTH TAX, Islamabad High Court High Court -. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14005",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVUzSFF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2017 348 = 2017 SLD 348 = 2019 PTD 1108",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(14),7(2)(i),7,8,8(1)(ca),11,11(2),11(3),25,38,72B,73\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(14),7(2)(i),7,8,8(1)(ca),11,11(2),11(3),25,38,72B,73\\n\\r\\n\\rQanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=150,117\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=25,201\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "STA No. 114/IB/2015 (Tax Period - 2011 to 2012), hearing DATE : 06.01.2017, DATE of Order: 09.01.2017",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER, FAHEEM-UL-HAQ KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "VS\nTHE CIR, R.T.O, Islamabad High Court High Court .. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14006",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1929 2 = 1929 SLD 2 = 1929 AIR 353",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "30 January, 1929",
    "Judge Name:": "BOYS, J.",
    "": "Author: Boys J.\nHansraj And Ors. \nvs \nOfficial Liquidators Dehra Dun"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14007",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 261 = 2016 SLD 261 = (2016) 114 TAX 47 = 2016 PTD 2111",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=18,25,25A,25(13)(a),79,80\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Act, 1969=18,25,25A,25(13)(a),79,80\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) W.P No.3 of 2011, DATE of order 06-04-2016, hearing DATE . 25-03-2016",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE",
    "": "M/s Asfaq Trading Company\nvs\nCollector of Customs, Lahore High Court"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14008",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 267 = 2016 SLD 267 = (2016) 382 ITR 114",
    "Key Words:": "Section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with article 12 of DTAA between India and Thailand - Income - Deemed to accrue or arise in India (Royalties) - Whether unless DTAA is amended jointly by both parties to incorporate income from data transmission services as partaking of nature of royalty, or amend definition in a manner so that such income automatically becomes royalty, Finance Act, 2012 which inserted Explanations 4, 5 and 6 to section 9(1)(vi) by itself would not affect meaning of term 'royalties' as mentioned in article 12 of India-Thailand DTAA - Held, yes - Whether, therefore income earned by assessee, a Thailand based company, for rendering digital broadcasting services through its satellite, to both residents of India as well as non-residents, was not taxable in India as royalty under section 9(1)(vi) - Held, yes [Paras 60 and 61] [In favour of assessee]\nFACTS\nâ– \n\nThe assessee, a company incorporated in Thailand, was engaged in the business of providing digital broadcasting services as well as consultancy services to its customers who consisted of both residents of India and non-residents. The assessee provided those services through its satellite 'T'.\nâ– \n\nIn course of assessment, the Assessing Officer opined that income earned by the assessee in India was taxable under section 9(1)(vi) and the assessee would not get benefit of article 12 of India - Thailand DTAA.\nâ– \n\nThe Tribunal noted that this Court in Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. v. DIT [2011] 332 ITR 340/197 Taxman 263/9 taxmann.com 168 held that the receipts earned from providing data transmission services through the provision of space segment capacity on satellites did not constitute royalty within the meaning of section 9(1)(vi). The Court had further held that while providing transmission services to its customers, the control of the satellite always remained with the satellite operator and the customers were only given access to the transponder capacity. Since the customer did not use the satellite or the process of the satellite itself, payment could not be termed as royalty for the use of a process or equipment.\nâ– \n\nRelying upon aforesaid decision, the Tribunal held that receipts of the assessees earned from providing data transmission services did not fall within the term royalty under section 9(1)(vi).\nâ– \n\nOn revenue's appeal:\nHELD\nâ– \n\nThe opening words of section 9; 'the following incomes shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India' indicate at the outset that the provision is a deeming one whereby, income otherwise not accruing in India, will be deemed to have accrued in certain cases. One of such deeming provisions is section 9(1)(vi), which states that income by way of royalty, shall be deemed to have accrued in India.\nâ– \n\nFor income of such nature to be taxable under the Act, two aspects must be examined, first, whether the income partakes the character of royalty as defined in Explanation 2, and second, depending on who it is payable by, whether the conditions governing payment by such person have been met.\nâ– \n\nAs to the second aspect, three categories are intended here, namely, (i) the Government, (ii) residents of India and (iii) non-residents. Once it is established that the income accruing to the assessee is in fact, royalty under the second Explanation, the individual conditions annexed to each of the three above must be met.\nâ– \n\nIn the present case, both residents as well as non-residents have paid the income purported to be taxed by the revenue, which argues that the conditions for both have been satisfied. Briefly, royalty paid by a resident is taxable as long as it is not paid for the purpose of a business or profession carried on outside India or for the purposes of making or earning income from any source outside India. In the case of a non-resident, royalty paid shall be taxable when it is paid for the purposes of a business or profession carried on in India or for the purposes of making or earning any income from any source in India.\nâ– \n\nIn other words, for both residents as well as non-residents, either of two situations must occur; (i) the business or profession for the purpose of which the royalty is paid must be carried on by such person in India or (ii) the royalty must be paid for the purposes of making or earning any income from any source situated in India. [Para 26]\nâ– \n\nSince the underlying premise is that the payment is 'royalty', the Court must first deal with Explanation 2, most pertinently to sub-clauses (iii) and (iva) under which the income in the present case is sought to be taxed. [Para 27]\nâ– \n\nThe two clauses as applicable to data transmission services have been the subject of debate in courts as well as business circles. The debate was finally settled by the delivered in Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd.'s case (supra). In Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd.'s case (supra) this Court held that income from data transmission services would not qualify as royalty in order for it to be taxable under the Act. The Court first recognized that the definition of royalty in the section is with respect to permission granted to use the right in respect of the patent, invention, process, etc., all essentially forms of intellectual property. This permission restricts itself merely to the letting of the licensed asset. The permission does not go so far as to allow alienation of the asset itself. That being said, it is not so restricted as to qualify as a case where the licensor uses the asset himself, albeit for the purposes of his customers.\nâ– \n\nThe Court took note of the features of the agreements between the assessee in that case, which was a foreign company, incorporated in Hong Kong, and its customers, which were TV channels. The agreement was essentially one of allocation of the transponder capacity available on the satellite to enable the channels to relay their signals. The customers had their own relaying facilities. No different from the case at hand, the transponder receives the signal, amplifies it, and downlinks it to facilitate transmission of the signals. The control over the parts of the satellite and naturally the transponder remains with the assessee. At no point does the assessee cede control over the satellite to the customers.\nâ– \n\nLogically therefore, since the transponder is a part of the satellite that cannot be severed from it, there can be no independent control of the transponder without control of the satellite itself. The fact that the transponder automatically responds to the data commands sent from the ground station network and retransmits the same data over a wider footprint area does not mean that control and operation of the transponder is with the customer. Interestingly, this has not escaped the notice of the Assessing Officer, except that the Assessment Order conveniently employs the in-severability of the transponder from the satellite to assert that that the technology of the satellite would qualify as the 'secret process' but conveniently divorces the transponder from the satellite while trying to prove that there is use of the transponder as an equipment. However, equipment as envisaged in the section must be capable of functioning independently, or in other words, must be able to perform an activity by itself without material reliance on another. [Para 28]\nâ– \n\nUndoubtedly, the legislature is competent to amend a provision that operates retrospectively or prospectively. Nonetheless, when disputes as to their applicability arise in court, it is the actual substance of the amendment that determines its ultimate operation and not the bare language in which such amendment is couched. [Para 30]\nâ– \n\nExplanations 4-6 are designed as clarificatory amendments. Unarguably they have all the apparent characteristics of one. The words 'for the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified,includes and has always included' qualify the interpretation in Explanation 5. In Explanation 6, the same words have been modified and they state 'includes and has always deemed to have always included'. This is the standard language used to communicate an intended retrospective effect. [Para 32]\nâ– \n\nThere is a general presumption against retrospectivity of an amendment. This is the principle of lex prospicit non respicit which implies that unless explicitly stated, a piece of legislation is presumed not be intended to have retrospective operation. [Para 33]\nâ– \n\nA clarificatory amendment presumes the existence of a provision the language of which is obscure, ambiguous, may have made an obvious omission, or is capable of more than one meaning. In such case, a subsequent provision dealing with the same subject may throw light upon it. Yet, it is not every time that the legislature characterizes an amendment as retrospective that the Court will give such effect to it. This is not in derogation of the express words of the law in question, (which as a matter of course must be the first to be given effect to), but because the law which was intended to be given retrospective effect to as a clarificatory amendment, is in its true nature one that expands the scope of the section it seeks to clarify, and resultantly introduces new principles, upon which liabilities might arise. Such amendments though framed as clarificatory, are in fact transformative substantive amendments, and incapable of being given retrospective effect. [Para 36]\nâ– \n\nAn important question, which arises in this context, is whether a 'clarificatory' amendment remains true to its nature when it purports to annul, or has the undeniable effect of annulling, an interpretation given by the courts to the term sought to be clarified. In other words, does the rule against clarificatory amendments laying down new principles of law extend to situations where law had been judicially interpreted and the legislature seeks to overcome it by declaring that the law in question was never meant to have the import given to it by the Court. The general position of the courts in this regard is where the purpose of a special interpretive statute is to correct a judicial interpretation of a prior law, which the legislature considers inaccurate, the effect is prospective. [Para 37]\nâ– \n\nThe circumstances in this case could very well go to show that the amendment was no more than an exercise in undoing an interpretation of the court which removed income from data transmission services from taxability under section 9(1)(vi). It would also be difficult, if not impossible to argue, that inclusion of a certain specific category of services or payments within the ambit of a definition alludes not to an attempt to illuminate or clarify a perceived ambiguity or obscurity as to interpretation of the definition itself, but towards enlarging its scope. Predicated upon this, the retrospectivity of the amendment could well be a contentious issue.\nâ– \n\nBe that as it may, this Court is disinclined to conclusively determine or record a finding as to whether the amendment to section 9(1)(vi) is indeed merely clarificatory as the revenue suggests it is, or prospective, given what its nature may truly be. The issue of taxability of the income of the assessees in this case may be resolved without redressal of the above question purely because the assessee has not pressed this line of arguments before the court and has instead stated that even if it were to be assumed that the contention of the revenue is correct, the ultimate taxability of this income shall rest on the interpretation of the terms of the DTAAs. The assessee has therefore contended that even if the question is answered in favour of the revenue, the income shall nevertheless escape the Act by reason of the DTAA. The court therefore proceeds with the assumption that the amendment is retrospective and the income is taxable under the Act. [Para 38]\nâ– \n\nIt is now essential to decide the second question i.e. whether the assessees in the present case will obtain any relief from the provisions of the DTAAs. Under article 12 of the DTAA, the general rule states that whereas the State of Residence shall have the primary right to tax royalties, the Source State shall concurrently have the right to tax the income, to the extent of 15 per cent of the total income. Before the amendment brought about by the Finance Act of 2012, the definition of royalty under the Act and the DTAAs were treated as pari materia.[Para 39]\nâ– \n\nNo amendment to the Act, whether retrospective or prospective can be read in a manner so as to extend in operation to the terms of an international treaty. In other words, a clarificatory or declaratory amendment, much less one which may seek to overcome an unwelcome judicial interpretation of law, cannot be allowed to have the same retroactive effect on an international instrument effected between two sovereign states prior to such amendment. In the context of international law, while not every attempt to subvert the obligations under the treaty is a breach, it is nevertheless a failure to give effect to the intended trajectory of the treaty. Employing interpretive amendments in domestic law as a means to imply contoured effects in the enforcement of treaties is one such attempt, which falls just short of a breach, but is nevertheless, indefensible. [Para 41]\nâ– \n\nAt the very outset, it should be understood that it is not as if the DTAAs completely prohibit reliance on domestic law. Under these, a reference is made to the domestic law of the Contracting States. Article 3(2) of both DTAAs state that in the course of application of the treaty, any term not defined in the treaty, shall, have the meaning which is imputed to it in the laws in force in that State relating to the taxes which are the subject of the Convention.\nâ– \n\nThe treaties, create a bifurcation between those terms, which have been defined by them (i.e. the concerned treaty), and those, which remain undefined. It is in the latter instance that domestic law shall mandatorily supply the import to be given to the word in question. In the former case however, the words in the treaty will be controlled by the definitions of those words in the treaty if they are so provided. [Para 45]\nâ– \n\nThough this has been the general rule, much discussion has also taken place on whether an interpretation given to a treaty alters with a transformation in, or amendments in, domestic law of one of the State parties. At any given point, does a reference to the treaty point to the law of the Contracting States at the time the treaty was concluded, or relate to the law of the States as existing at the time of the reference to the treaty? The former is the 'static' approach while the latter is called the 'ambulatory' approach. One opportunity for a State to ease its obligations under a tax convention comes from the ambulatory reference to domestic law. States seeking to furtively dodge the limitations that such treaties impose, sometimes, resort to amending their domestic laws, all the while under the protection of the theory of ambulatory reference. It thereby allows itself an adjustment to broaden the scope of circumstances under which it is allowed to tax under a treaty. A convenient opportunity sometimes presents itself in the form of ambiguous technical formulations in the concerned treaty. States attempting to clarify or concretize any one of these meanings, (unsurprisingly the one that benefits it) enact domestic legislation which subserves such purpose. [Para 46]\nâ– \n\nThere are therefore two sets of circumstances. First, where there exists no definition of a word in issue within the DTAA itself, regard is to be had to the laws in force in the jurisdiction of the State called upon to interpret the word. The court does not express opinion in this regard since it is not in issue before this Court. This Court's finding is in the context of the second situation, where there does exist a definition of a term within the DTAA. When that is the case, there is no need to refer to the laws in force in the Contracting States, especially to deduce the meaning of the definition under the DTAA and the ultimate taxability of the income under the agreement. That is not to say that the Court may be inconsistent in its interpretation of similar definitions. What that does imply however, is that just because there is a domestic definition similar to the one under the DTAA, amendments to the domestic law, in an attempt to contour, restrict or expand the definition under its statute, cannot extend to the definition under the DTAA. In other words, the domestic law remains static for the purposes of the DTAA. [Para 50]\nâ– \n\nAn interpretive exercise by the Parliament cannot be taken so far as to control the meaning of a word expressly defined in a treaty. Parliament, supreme as it may be, is not equipped, with the power to amend a treaty. It is certainly true that law laid down by the Parliament in domestic context, even if it were in violation of treaty principles, is to be given effect to; but where the State unilaterally seeks to amend a treaty through its legislature, the situation becomes one quite different from when it breaches the treaty. In the latter case, while internationally condemnable, the State's power to breach very much exists; Courts in India have no jurisdiction in the matter, because in the absence of enactment through appropriate legislation in accordance with article 253 of the Constitution, courts do not possess any power to pronounce on the power of the State to enact a law contrary to its treaty obligations. The domestic courts, in other words, are not empowered to legally strike down such action, as they cannot dictate the executive action of the State in the context of an international treaty, unless of course, the Constitution enables them to. That being said, the amendment to a treaty is not on the same footing.\nâ– \n\nThe Parliament is simply not equipped with the power to, through domestic law, change the terms of a treaty. A treaty to begin with, is not drafted by the Parliament; it is an act of the Executive. Logically therefore, the Executive cannot employ an amendment within the domestic laws of the State to imply an amendment within the treaty. Moreover, a treaty of this nature is a carefully negotiated economic bargain between two States. No one party to the treaty can ascribe to itself the power to unilaterally change the terms of the treaty and annul this economic bargain. It may decide to not follow the treaty, it may chose to renege from its obligations under it and exit it, but it cannot amend the treaty, especially by employing domestic law. The principle is reciprocal.\nâ– \n\nEvery treaty entered into be the Indian State, unless self-executory, becomes operative within the State once Parliament passes a law to such effect, which governs the relationship between the treaty terms and the other laws of the State. It then becomes part of the general conspectus of domestic law. Now, if an amendment were to be effected to the terms of such treaty, unless the existing operationalizing domestic law states that such amendments are to become automatically applicable, Parliament will have to by either a separate law, or through an amendment to the original law, make the amendment effective. Similarly, amendments to domestic law cannot be read into treaty provisions without amending the treaty itself. [Para 52]\nâ– \n\nNeither can an Act of Parliament supply or alter the boundaries of the definition under article 12 of the DTAAs by supplying redundancy to any part of it. This becomes especially important in the context ofExplanation 6, which states that whether the 'process' is secret or not is immaterial, the income from the use of such process is taxable, nonetheless. Explanation 6 precipitated from confusion on the question of whether it was vital that the 'process' used must be secret or not. This confusion was brought about by a difference in the punctuation of the definitions in the DTAAs and the domestic definition. [Para 54]\nâ– \n\nThe slight but apparently vital difference between the definitions under the DTAA and the domestic definition is the presence of a comma following the word process in the former. In the initial determinations before various Tribunal across the country, much discussion took place on the implications of the presence or absence of the 'comma'. A lot has been said about the relevance or otherwise of punctuation in the context of statutory construction. In spoken English, it would be unwise to argue against the importance of punctuation, where the placement of commas is notorious for diametrically opposite implications. [Para 55]\nâ– \n\nHowever, the question, which then arises, is as follows. How is the court to decide whether a provision is carefully punctuated or not? The test- to decide whether a statute is carefully (read consciously) punctuated or not- would be to see what the consequence would be had the section been punctuated otherwise. Would there be any substantial difference in the import of the section if it were not punctuated the way it actually is? While this may not be conclusive evidence of a carefully punctuated provision, the repercussions go a long way to signify intent. If the inclusion or lack of a comma or a period gives rise to diametrically opposite consequences or large variations in taxing powers, as is in the present case, then the assumption must be that it was punctuated with a particular end in mind. The test therefore is not to see if it makes 'grammatical sense' but to see if it takes on any 'legal consequences'. [Para 57]\nâ– \n\nNevertheless, whether or not punctuation plays an important part in statute interpretation, the construction Parliament gives to such punctuation, or in this case, the irrelevancy that it imputes to it, cannot be carried over to an international instrument where such comma may or may not have been evidence of a deliberate inclusion to influence the reading of the section. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the process referred to in article 12 must in fact be a secret process and was always meant to be such. In any event, the precincts of Indian law may not dictate such conclusion. That conclusion must be the result of an interpretation of the words employed in the law and the treatises, and discussions that are applicable and specially formulated for the purpose of that definition. [Para 58]\nâ– \n\nOn a final note, India's change in position to the OECD Commentary cannot be a fact that influences the interpretation of the words defining royalty as they stand today. The only manner in which such change in position can be relevant is if such change is incorporated into the agreement itself and not otherwise. A change in executive position cannot bring about a unilateral legislative amendment into a treaty concluded between two sovereign states. It is fallacious to assume that any change made to domestic law to rectify a situation of mistaken interpretation can spontaneously further their case in an international treaty. Therefore, mere amendment to section 9(1)(vi) cannot result in a change. It is imperative that such amendment is brought about in the agreement as well. Any attempt short of this, even if it is evidence of the State's discomfort at letting data broadcast revenues slip by, will be insufficient to persuade this Court to hold that such amendments are applicable to the DTAAs. [Para 59]\nâ– \n\nConsequently, since it has been held that the Finance Act, 2012 will not affect article 12 of the DTAAs, it would follow that the first determinative interpretation given to the word 'royalty', when the definitions were in fact pari materia (in the absence of any contouring explanations), will continue to hold the field for the purpose of assessment years preceding the Finance Act, 2012 and in all cases which involve a Double Tax Avoidance Agreement, unless the said DTAAs are amended jointly by both parties to incorporate income from data transmission services as partaking of the nature of royalty, or amend the definition in a manner so that such income automatically becomes royalty.\nâ– \n\nIt is reiterated that the Court has not returned a finding on whether the amendment is in fact retrospective and applicable to cases preceding the Finance Act of 2012 where there exists no Double Tax Avoidance Agreement. [Para 60]\nâ– \n\nFor the above reasons, it is held that the interpretation advanced by the revenue cannot be accepted. The appeals fail and are dismissed. [Para 61]\nCASES REFERRED TO\nAsia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. v. DIT [2011] 332 ITR 340/197 Taxman 263/9 tamxannn.com 168 (Delhi) (para 1), Dy. CIT v. Panamsat International Systems Inc. [2006] 9 SOT 100 (Delhi) (para 9), ISRO Satellite Centre, In re [2008] 307 ITR 59/175 Taxman 97 (AAR) (para 9),Steffen, Robertson & Kirsten Consulting Engineers & Scientists v. CIT[1998] 230 ITR 206/[1997] 95 Taxman 598 (AAR) (para 12), CIT v.Siemens Aktiongesellschaft [2009] 310 ITR 320/177 Taxman 81 (Bom.)(para 21), Sanofi Pasteur Holding SA v. Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance [2013] 354 ITR 316/213 Taxman 504/30 taxmann.com 222 (AP) (para 21), DIT v. Nokia Networks OY [2013] 358 ITR 259/212 Taxman 68/[2012] 25 taxmann.com 225 (Delhi) (para 22), DIT v. TV Today Network Ltd. [2014] 221 Taxman 123/41 taxmann.com 192 (Delhi) (para 30), Verizon Communication Singapore Pte. Ltd. v. ITO, International Taxation [2014] 361 ITR575/224 Taxman 237 (Mag.)/[2013] 39 taxmann.com 70 (Mad.) (para 31), CIT v. Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 466/227 Taxman 121/49 taxmann.com 249 (SC) (para 34), Govind Das v. ITO [1976] 1 SCC 906 (para 34), CIT v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. [1962] 1 SCR 788 (para 34), L' office Cherifien das Phosphatesv. Yamashita Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. [1994] 1 AC 486 (para 35), R. Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandrasekharan [1995] 79 Taxman 92 (SC)(para 36), CIT v. Gold Coin Health Food (P.) Ltd. [2008] 172 Taxman 386 (SC) (para 36), CIT v. Podar Cement (P.) Ltd. [1997] 92 Taxman 541 (SC) (para 36), United States v. Gilmore & Wall (75 US) 330 (para 37),Peony Park v. O' Malley 223 F2d 668 (para 37), Country of Sacremento v.State 134 Cal App 3d 428 (para 37), Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andalan [2003] 263 ITR 706/132 Taxman 373 (SC) (para 42), CIT v. VR. S.R.M. Firm [1994] 208 ITR 400 (Mad.) (para 44), R. v. Melford Developments Inc. [1982] 36 DTC 6281 (para 47), Holmes v. Phenire Insurance Co. [1899] 98 F 240 (para 55), CGT v. Budur Thippaiah [1976] 103 ITR 189 (AP) (para 55), Hindustan Constriction Co. Ltd. v. CIT[1994] 208 ITR 291/[1993] 68 Taxman 471 (Bom.) (para 55), CIT v. Loyal Textile Ltd. [1998] 231 ITR 573/[1997] 95 Taxman 293 (Mad.) (para 56),Sama Alana Abdulla v. State of Gujarat AIR 1996 SC 569 (para 56),Mohd. Shbbir v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1979 SC 564 (para 56), Lewis Pugh Evans Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen AIR 1929 PC 69 (para 56), Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arbinda Bose AIR 1952 SC 369 (para 56) and Pope Alliance Corpn. v. Spanish River Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd. AIR 1929 PC 38 (para 56).",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "IT APPEAL NOS. 473, 474 & 500 OF 2012 & 244 OF 2014, C.M. APPL. NO. 9724 OF 2014, FEBRUARY 8, 2016",
    "Judge Name:": "S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND R.K. GAUBA, JJ.",
    "": "Director of IncomE tax\nv.\nNew Skies Satellite BV"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14009",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 266 = 2016 SLD 266 = (2016) 382 ITR 6",
    "Key Words:": "Section 12A, read with section 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Charitable or religious trust - Registration of (Deemed registration) - Whether where assessee-society filed an application under section 12A for grant of registration on 24-2-2003 and same was not responded to within six months, registration of application was to be deemed to have taken effect from 24-8-2003 - Held, yes [Para 5] [In favour of assessee]",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1478 OF 2016, FEBRUARY 16, 2016",
    "Judge Name:": "KURIAN, JOSEPH AND ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN, JJ.",
    "": "Commissioner of IncomE tax, Kanpur\nv.\nSociety for Promn. of Edn., Allahabad"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14010",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 265 = 2016 SLD 265 = (2016) 382 ITR 13",
    "Key Words:": "Section 4 , read with sections 184 and 251, of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with section 11 of the Companies Act, 1956 - Firm - Assessable as (Assessment as AOP) - Assessment year 2012-13 - Two firms viz., Krupa Trading and DCP Trading, having six partners each, were partners in petitioner-firm, consisting of 16 partners - According to Commissioner (Appeals) petitioners could not be considered to be a valid partnership firm as total number of partners exceeded twenty, which was beyond maximum number of partners prescribed - By impugned show-cause notice, Commissioner (Appeals) sought to assess total income in hands of AOP and also called upon petitioner-firm to submit explanation as to why an amount of Rs. 96 lakh would not be disallowed as expenditure and added back to its taxable income - Petitioner filed instant writ petition - Whether since petitioner could very well submit their explanation and contest same on merits and in accordance with law before Commissioner (Appeals), there was no merit in instant writ petition - Held, yes [Para 13] [In favour of revenue/Matter remanded]\nFACTS\nâ– \n\nAccording to the petitioner, it was a partnership firm trading in stocks, shares, debentures, manufacturing, buying, selling and transporting of various consumer and industrial commodities. The petitioner filed its return admitting a total income of Rs. 1.74 crore.\nâ– \n\nThe return of income was processed and the income of the assessee was assessed at Rs. 4.37 crore. Aggrieved over the order, they preferred an appeal.\nâ– \n\nAccording to the Commissioner (Appeals) under section 11(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, no company, Association or partnership consisting of more than twenty persons shall be formed for the purpose of carrying on any other business that has for its object the acquisition of gain by the company, association or partnership or by the individual members thereof, unless it is registered as a company under this Act, or is formed in pursuance of some other Indian law. Further, the Commissioner (Appeals) contended that on verification of the records, it was found that two firms, viz., Krupa Trading having six partners and DCP Trading, also having six partners were the 14th and 15th partners in the petitioner-firm, consisting of 16 partners. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the petitioner could not be considered to be a valid partnership firm. The Commissioner (Appeals) issued show-cause notice to the assessee.\nâ– \n\nOn writ:\nHELD\nâ– \n\nIn the show-cause notice, the respondent had called upon the petitioner to show-cause as to why the amount of Rs. 96,60,000 may not be disallowed as expenditure and added back to the petitioner's taxable income for the relevant year, which is under consideration. By the impugned show-cause notice, the respondent had called upon the petitioner to submit his explanation on or before 18-11-2015. Since the petitioner have to explain as to why the said amount may not be disallowed as expenditure and added back to the taxable income of the petitioner, they can very well submit their explanation and contest the same, on merits and in accordance with law before the Commissioner (Appeals). [Para 13]\nâ– \n\nIn these circumstances, there is no merit in the writ petition, which is liable to be dismissed. Liberty is given to the petitioner to submit their explanation before Commissioner (Appeals) and make their submissions with regard to the query, raised in the impugned show-cause notice.\nCASE REVIEW\nCentral Coalfields Ltd. v. CIT (Appeals) [2014] 42 taxmann.com 183 (Jharkhand) (para 12) distinguished.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nDulichand Laxminarayan v. CIT [1956] 29 ITR 535 (SC) (para 6), Central Coalfields Ltd. v. CIT (Appeals) [2014] 42 taxmann.com 183 (Jharkhand)(para 8) and State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan & Co. [1982] 51 STC 381 (Mad.) (FB) (para 9).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "W.P. NO. 37072 OF 2015, M.P. NO. 1 OF 2015, FEBRUARY 11, 2016",
    "Judge Name:": "M. DURAISWAMY, J.",
    "": "Megatrends Inc.\nv.\nCommissioner of IncomE tax, Chennai"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14011",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 264 = 2016 SLD 264 = (2016) 382 ITR 156",
    "Key Words:": "Section 40(a)(iii), read with sections 200 and 40(a)(i), of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Business disallowance - Salary, payable outside India (Delay in deposit of TDS) - Assessment year 1991-92 - Whether where assessee had deducted tax at source from salary paid overseas to its non-resident employees and had paid same to Government account, merely because tax was not paid within time-limit prescribed under section 200(1), said payment could not be disallowed by invoking section 40(a)(iii) - Held, yes - Whether where legislature wanted to make payment of tax within specified time a necessary pre-condition it would have expressly indicated so - Held, yes - Whether condition to deposit TDS within prescribed time could not be read into sub-clause(iii) of clause (a) section 40 as unlike language of item(B) of sub-clause(i) of clause (a) of section 40, same had not been specifically enacted - Held, yes[Paras 18 & 20 ][In favour of assessee]\nCirculars and Notifications : Circular No. 685 dated 17-6-1994;Circular No. 686 dated 12-8-1994\nFACTS\nFacts\nâ– \n\nThe assessee was a non-resident banking company and its principal place of business was situated outside India. The assessee also carried on banking business in India through its branches situated within the country.\nâ– \n\nDuring the relevant period, the assessee seconded some of its employees from overseas to its branches in India. These expatriate employees were employed for the business carried on in India. They received a part of their remuneration by way of salaries and perquisites in India which were duly reflected in the Profit and Loss Account drawn up by the assessee in respect of its Indian operations. The assessee also deducted tax at source on so much of the remuneration that was payable to the aforementioned expatriate employees in India. Undisputedly, such TDS was deposited with the Government.\nâ– \n\nIn addition to the above remuneration, the assessee's head office situated overseas also made certain payments to and/or for the benefit of such expatriate employees. However, the assessee did not account for such payments, which were in the nature of salaries, allowances and perquisites, in its Profit and Loss Account drawn up in respect of its business in India. The assessee neither claimed such payments as a deduction for the purposes of computing its income chargeable to tax in India nor deducted any tax under Chapter XVII B.\nâ– \n\nThe CBDT issued a Circular, i.e., Circular No. 685 dated 17/20th June, 1994 and clarified that all payments made and perquisites provided to employees overseas for services rendered in India are taxable in India irrespective of the place where such payments or perquisites have been made or provided. In order to encourage immediate voluntary compliance, CBDT had decided that penalty proceedings would not be initiated in cases where the employers came forward and paid the entire amount of tax due under section 192 along with interest before 31-7-1994.\nâ– \n\nPursuant to the aforesaid Circular, the assessee deposited the amount of TDS pertaining to the payments made abroad to and/or for the benefit of the employees serving in India during the financial years 1984-85 to 1993-94 and the interest due thereon, with the Income Tax Authorities.\nâ– \n\nThe assessments for the six assessment years from assessment year 1985-86 to 1990-91 stood concluded as on 28-7-1994 and, thus, the assessee could not claim any deduction on account of the payments made in respect of the said years. However, the assessee's appeal in respect of assessment year 1991-92 was pending before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the assessee sought to claim deduction in respect of payments made pertaining to the financial year 1990-91.\nâ– \n\nThe Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the assessee's claim by holding that such claim could not be made in appellate proceedings. He also observed that no deduction could be claimed in view of section 40(a)(iii).\nâ– \n\nOn appeal, the Tribunal held that since no tax had been deducted at source under Chapter XVII B within the prescribed time, no deduction under section 40(a)(iii) was permissible.\nâ– \n\nOn appeal to the High Court:\nIssue to be decided:\n\n\nWhether the provisions of section 40(a)(iii) disentitles an assessee to claim a deduction on account of Salaries paid to its employees overseas if the tax is not paid within the specified time but is paid subsequently?\nHELD\nâ– \n\nIn the instant case, there is no dispute as to the material facts required for allowing the deduction as claimed by the assessee. The TDS paid on the expenses claimed have been duly verified and the tax on the payments made which are chargeable under the head 'Salaries' have been recovered by the Government. The only reason for denying the claim is non-deposit of TDS within the prescribed time. The TDS having been deposited, there is no impediment for assessee to claim the related expense.[Para 7]\nâ– \n\nSection 40 begins with the non obstante clause and, thus, expressly disentitles an assessee to claim deductions which may otherwise be allowable under sections 30 to 38. Thus, even though an amount is deductable in computing the income chargeable under the head 'profits and gains of business or profession', the same would not be deductable if it falls foul of any of the clauses of section 40. A plain reading of section 40(a)(iii) as was in force during the relevant year indicates that no deduction would be allowable in respect of any payments chargeable under the head 'Salaries' if (a) the same are payable outside India and (b) if tax has not been paid or deducted thereon under Chapter XVII B of the Act. The said clause (iii) was substituted by virtue of the Finance Act, 2003 with effect from 1-4-2004. By virtue of the aforesaid amendment, the rigor of sub clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 40 now also extends to any amount payable as salaries in India. Plainly, the principal object of the aforesaid sub clause (iii) is to provide a further disincentive for non-compliance of provisions of section 192. [Para 11]\nâ– \n\nThe provisions of section 192 fall within Chapter XVII B which relates to collection and recovery of tax. Provisions for deduction of tax at source are a part of the machinery provided for collection of taxes payable by a payee (recipient of income) by directly imposing upon the payer an obligation to withhold the tax due and deposit the same with the Government. Such tax is deposited to the credit of the payee and not the payer. In case of salaries, any person responsible for paying the income chargeable under the head 'Salaries' - who would inevitably be the employer - is obliged to deduct the tax chargeable on the income of the employee (payee) under the head 'Salaries'. Thus, in the instant case, the tax deposited by the assessee is clearly in discharge of its obligation under Chapter XVII B. In this view, the condition that the assessee has not deducted and deposited the tax under Chapter XVII B, cannot be accepted. Indisputably, the assessee has deposited the requisite amount which it was required to deposit in respect of amounts chargeable under the head 'Salaries' that was payable to and or for the benefit of employees outside India. The said tax is deposited to the credit of such employees. Thus, for all intents and purposes the same is considered as a part of their Salaries which has not been paid to them but has been deposited directly with the Government.[Para 12]\nâ– \n\nIt is also relevant to mention that Circular No. 685 dated 17/20th June, 1994, in compliance of which the assessee had deposited the amount of tax, was issued under Chapter XVII B; the said Circular granted amnesty from penalties and prosecution to the assessees who complied with their obligation to deposit TDS in terms of section 192 for the preceding years for which they had not done so, on or before 31-7-1994. The said circular clarified the position regarding the applicability of provisions to withhold and deposit tax in respect of payments made abroad and required the employers to immediately comply with the provisions of section 192. Such compliance was also incentivised by granting the amnesty as aforesaid. In the circumstances, it can hardly be disputed that the tax deposited by the assessee was in discharge its obligations, albeit belatedly, as imposed under Chapter XVII B That being so, the assessee had also overcome the rigor of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 40 as the necessary condition for applicability of the said provision, that is, non-deduction and payment of TDS under Chapter XVII B, no longer held good. Having complied with the said obligation, the assessee could not be denied the deduction which was otherwise allowable under section 37.[Para 13]\nâ– \n\nAn absence of a provision similar to the proviso to sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 40 cannot be read as to disentitle an assessee to claim a deduction even though it has complied with the condition under sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 40. A plain reading of proviso to sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 40 indicates that where an assessee has not deducted or paid the tax at source in terms of Chapter XVIIB in respect of any sum as specified under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 40, the assessee can, nonetheless, claim a deduction in the year in which the assessee deposits the tax. This benefit is not available to an assessee in respect of payments chargeable under the head 'Salaries' which fall within sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 40 and not sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 40. Thus, an assessee would not be entitled to claim deduction on account of salaries if it fails to deduct or pay the amount under Chapter XVIIB. In cases where such assessee deposits the amount in a subsequent year, the assessee would still not be able to claim the deduction in the year in which such tax is deposited; his claim for deduction can be considered only in respect of the year to which such expense relates. Therefore, in cases where the assessments stand concluded, the assessee would lose the benefit of deduction for the expenses incurred on account of its failure to have deposited the tax at source. Thus, concededly, in the present case the assessee has lost its right to claim a deduction for a period of six assessment years 1985-86 to 1990-91- even though the assessee has paid the TDS on the expenses pertaining to said period.[Para 14]\nâ– \n\nIf a provision similar to the proviso to section 40(a) (i) was applicable to section 40(a) (iii) then the assessee would have been entitled to claim the entire expenses on account of salaries paid overseas pertaining to financial years 1984-85 to 1993-94 in the financial year 1994-95 relevant to assessment year 1995-96 as the payment for the tax for the aforesaid years was paid on 20-7-1994. However, absence of a provision similar to that under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 40 does not mean that the assessee would also be disentitled to claim deduction on account of salaries in the year to which such expenses pertained even though the assessee has subsequently discharged its obligation to deposit the tax and has thus overcome the rigor of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 40.[Para 15]\nâ– \n\nThe Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that if the tax due on salaries paid overseas is not deposited strictly within the time prescribed under Chapter XVIIB, section 40(a) (iii) would be applicable. This added condition that the tax must be deducted and paid within time, cannot be read in section 40(a) (iii). The plain language of the section 40(a) (iii) does not permit such interpretation. If the parliament so desired, it would have specifically enacted so. This becomes apparent when one reads the legislative amendments made to section 40. [Para 16]\nâ– \n\nIt is at once seen that where the legislature wanted to make payment of tax within a specified time a necessary pre-condition, it had expressly indicated so. The Parliament has expressly enacted that deduction in respect of payments made under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 40 would not be available where such payments were made in India to a non-resident in respect of which tax had not been paid 'before the expiry of time prescribed under sub section (i) of section 200'. However, no such condition for depositing the tax paid within a prescribed time was introduced in sub clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 40. [Para 18]\nâ– \n\nIt is also relevant to note that sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 40 was further substituted by sub-clauses (i), (ia) and (ib) by virtue of Finance Act (No.2) with effect from 1-4-2005. However, the pre-condition for depositing the tax within the time prescribed under section (i) of section 200 was retained in sub-clause (i) and (ia). Thereafter, by virtue of Finance Act (No.2), 2014, sub clause (i) was further amended and the principal condition of depositing tax in respect of payments made in India was amended and instead of the pre-condition of depositing the tax within the time prescribed under section 200 (i), it was now stipulated that the tax be deposited 'on or before the due date specified in sub section (i) of section 139'. [Para 19]\nâ– \n\nIt is apparent that the condition to deposit TDS within the prescribed time cannot be read into sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 40 as-unlike the language of item (B) of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 40-the same has not been specifically enacted. [Para 20]\nâ– \n\nThe contention that no deduction can be claimed by the assessee as the salaries were not reflected in the profit and loss account is unacceptable. The controversy whether an assessee can claim deduction on an expense which is not reflected in its profit and loss account for the relevant period has been authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in its decision in Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (Central) [1971] 82 ITR 363 wherein the Court held that the suggestion that if an assessee under some misapprehension or mistake fails to make an entry in the books of account and although under the law, a deduction must be allowed by the Income Tax Officer, the assessee will lose the right of claiming or will be debarred from being allowed that deduction is unacceptable. Whether the assessee is entitled to a particular deduction or not will depend on the provision of law relating thereto and not on the view which the assessee might take of his rights nor can the existence or absence of entries in the books of account be decisive or conclusive in the matter.[Para 21]\nâ– \n\nThe appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. [Para 23]\nCASE REVIEW\nANZ Grindlays Bank v. Dy. CIT [2004] 88 ITD 53 (Delhi) (para 23)reversed.\nAddl. CIT v. Gurjargravures (P.) Ltd. [1978] 111 ITR 1 (SC) (para 7)distinguished.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Eli Lilly & Co. (India) (P.) Ltd. [2009] 312 ITR 225/178 Taxman 505 (SC) (para 4), Addl. CIT v. Gurjargravures (P.) Ltd. [1978] 111 ITR 1 (SC) (para 7) and Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT (Central) [1971] 82 ITR 363 (SC) (para 21).",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "IT APPEAL NO. 32 OF 2004, MARCH 1, 2016",
    "Judge Name:": "S. MURALIDHAR AND VIBHU BAKHRU, JJ.",
    "": "ANZ Grindlays Bank\nv.\nDeputy Commissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14012",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 263 = 2016 SLD 263 = (2016) 382 ITR 93",
    "Key Words:": "Section 10(33), read with section 147, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Units of UTI/mutual funds (Income from retention/transfer) - Assessment year 2000-01 - Assessee earned dividend income from units of mutual funds and claimed exemption which was allowed during assessment - Assessing Officer initiated reassessment proceedings to disallow exemption for reason that assessee was trading in shares and, thus, dividend income was integral part of trading - In fact, dividend was received by virtue of fact that units of mutual fund were already held by assessee, and said dividend was not income earned on transfer of said units - Whether impugned dividend income was exempt - Held, yes - Whether, further, there was no allegation that assessee had failed to disclose truly and fully any material fact necessary for assessment, initiating reassessment proceedings was not justified - Held, yes [Paras 24, 26 & 29] [In favour of assessee]\nCirculars And Notifications - CBDT Circular No. 14/2001, dated 9-11-2001\nFACTS\nâ– \n\nThe assessee earned dividend income from units of mutual funds and claimed exemption thereon. It also suffered short term capital loss on sale of units of mutual fund. The assessment was completed under section 143(3) and exemption on dividend income was specifically allowed to the assessee.\nâ– \n\nThereafter, the Assessing Officer initiated block assessment proceedings to disallow, loss suffered on sale of units of mutual funds. The Tribunal negated order of the Assessing Officer by following decision in case ofWallfort Shares & Stock Brokers Ltd. v. ITO [2005] 96 ITD 1 (Mum.) (SB).\nâ– \n\nAfter block assessment proceedings attained finality upto the stage of Tribunal, the Assessing Officer issued a notice for reassessment proceedings on ground that assessee wasn't entitled to exemption on dividend income since it had earned dividend income from transfer of units of mutual funds. The assessee was trading in shares and dividend income received was integral part of traded goods and could not be segregated from cost of shares. The Assessing Officer, accordingly, ordered that he had reason to believe that the dividend income of assessee had escaped assessment.\nâ– \n\nOn appeal before the High Court:\nHELD\nâ– \n\nSection 147 deals with income escaping assessment. The said sectioninter alia provides that if the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153 assess or re-assess the said income chargeable to tax. However, this is subject to certain limitations. The first proviso to section 147 inter alia stipulates that where an assessment under section 143(3) or this section has been made for the relevant assessment year, no action shall be taken under this section after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under section 139 or in response to a notice issued under section 142(1) or section 148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment, for that assessment year. [Para 20]\nâ– \n\nIn the present case the assessment had been made under section 143(3). The reassessment proceedings were initiated after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year in question. In such a scenario, as per the first proviso to section 147, no action for initiation of reassessment proceedings could have been taken unless the Assessing Officer had reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment by reason of a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. There is not even an allegation in the reasons stated by the Assessing Officer that there was any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully any material fact, let alone the details thereof. In fact, on a perusal of the said reasons, it is clear that the reason given for initiating re-assessment proceedings under section 148 was that the exemption under section 10(33), and which was amended retrospectively by the Finance Act, 2001 with effect from 1-4-2000, would not apply to any income arising from the transfer of units of a mutual fund. Since the assessee had earned dividend income from transfer of units of mutual funds, it was not entitled to exemption under section 10(33). It was further mentioned in the said reasons that since the assessee was trading in shares, the dividend income received was an integral part of trading goods and could not be segregated from the acquisition of the shares. It was for these reasons and these reasons only that Assessing Officer opined that the dividend income so earned should have been charged to tax as a short-term capital gain and therefore he had reason to believe that income had escaped assessment. A bare reading of the reasons would ex facie show that there was not even an allegation in the said reasons that there was any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose any material fact, let alone the details thereof, which led to any income escaping assessment. Moreover, even on a holistic reading of the reasons recorded it cannot be said that it suggests any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts necessary for assessment. [Para 21]\nâ– \n\nIt is now well settled that the reasons which are recorded by the Assessing Officer for re-opening an assessment are the only reasons which could be considered. No substitution or deletion is permissible. No addition can be made to those reasons and no inference can be allowed to be drawn based on reasons not recorded. The reasons which are recorded by the Assessing Officer for re-opening the assessment are the only reasons which could be considered when the formation of the belief is impugned. The requirement of recording reasons is a check against arbitrary exercise of power, for it is on the basis of the reasons recorded and those reasons alone that the validity of the notice for re-opening an assessment can be sustained. The reasons cannot be allowed to grow with age and ingenuity by devising and/or supplementing additional reasons in replies and affidavits not envisaged in the reasons recorded for re-opening the assessment. To put it simply, the validity of a notice under section 148 has to be tested on the basis of the reasons recorded for initiating the re-assessment proceedings. The reasons recorded cannot be supplemented by affidavits and other material. [Para 22]\nâ– \n\nIn view of the well settled legal position and there admittedly being not even an allegation in the reasons recorded that there was any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully any material fact necessary for assessment, let alone the details thereof, the impugned notice and the impugned order are liable to be quashed and set aside on this ground alone. [Para 24]\nâ– \n\nIn the facts of the present case, even otherwise from the record it is visible that the assessee had disclosed fully and truly all material facts relating to the dividend income received by it. This is clear firstly from the return of income filed by the assessee where in the computation annexed to the return, the assessee had stated that it had earned dividend income which was fully exempt from tax under section 10(33). Secondly, in the profit and loss account, the assessee had disclosed that it had earned dividend income of the aforesaid amount. Thus there being a full and true disclosure of all material facts relating to earning of dividend income from units of mutual funds and the claim for exemption under section 10(33), the impugned notice is without jurisdiction as it fails to satify the criteria as set out in the first proviso to section 147. [Para 25]\nâ– \n\nDuring the assessment proceedings under section 143(3), the Assessing Officer called for particulars and sought explanations from the assessee specifically on the issue of the dividend income earned by the assessee from mutual funds. By its letters the assessee furnished all the information and complied with the requisitions of the Assessing Officer. The dividend income received by the assessee from the mutual funds was clearly disclosed and specifically brought to the attention of the Assessing Officer. After taking these disclosures into account, the Assessing Officer passed his assessment order under section 143(3). In this assessment order, the Assessing Officer specifically refers to the names of the mutual funds, the number of units purchased by the assessee and the dividend received therefrom. In the computation of income, the Assessing Officer has specifically recorded that the dividend income is exempt from tax. All this material would clearly show that the Assessing Officer, during the regular assessment proceedings under section 143(3), had specifically applied his mind to the dividend income earned by the assessee and on due consideration of these facts, he passed his assessment order under section 143(3) forming an opinion that the dividend income earned by the assessee was exempt from tax. This would clearly establish that there was due application of mind to all relevant facts and thereafter an opinion was formed that dividend income earned from the mutual funds are exempt from tax under section 10(33). Therefore initiation of reassessment proceedings has been undertaken merely on the basis of a change of opinion. Thus, the impugned notice is not sustainable also on the ground that it proceeds on a mere change of opinion. [Para 26]\nâ– \n\nVery same Assessing Officer initiated block assessment proceedings against the assessee. Even in block assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer accepted that the dividend income earned by the assessee was exempt from tax under section 10(33). He was however of the opinion that the assessee had indulged in 'dividend stripping' and therefore it was not entitled to claim a deduction of the loss suffered by it when it sold/redeemed the units of the mutual funds. This order of the Assessing Officer in relation to block assessment proceedings was overturned by the Tribunal. It is only when the block assessment proceedings attained finality all the way upto the Tribunal that the revenue sought to re-open the assessment. All these facts would further fortify that the initiation of reassessment proceedings was based only on a change of opinion and which is impermissible in law. [Para 27]\nâ– \n\nThe Assessing Officer could have no reason to believe that the dividend income received by the assessee from the mutual funds had escaped assessment as it is exempt from tax as set out in section 10(33). [Para 28]\nâ– \n\nSection 10 falls under Chapter III and stipulates that in computing the total income of a previous year of any person, any income falling within any of the clauses mentioned therein shall not be included. Section 10(33) provides that any income by way of (i) dividends referred to in section 115-O; or (ii) income received in respect of the units from the Unit Trust of India established under the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963; or (iii) income received in respect of units of a mutual fund specified under section 10(23D), shall be exempt from tax. The proviso to section 10(33) stipulates that this clause shall not apply to any income arising from transfer of units of the Unit Trust of India or of a mutual fund, as the case may be. On an ex facie reading of the said provision, it is clear in the facts of the present case that the proviso to section 10(33) could never apply to the dividend income earned by the assessee. In the facts of the present case, dividend received by the assessee does not arise from the transfer of units of the mutual fund but arises by virtue of the fact that those units were held by the assessee. In fact, on the transfer of the units of the mutual fund, the assessee had sustained a loss for which it claimed a deduction which was initially disallowed by the Assessing Officer in the block assessment proceedings and which order of the Assessing Officer was overturned by the Tribunal. Therefore the Assessing Officer could have no reason to believe that the dividend income earned by the assessee from the mutual funds had escaped assessment. As stipulated in section 10(33), the said income was exempt and therefore could not have been brought to tax. Thus the impugned notice is also without jurisdiction as the Assessing Officer could have had no reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. [Para 29]\nâ– \n\nFor the reasons stated herein, the notice issued under section 148 cannot be sustained. [Para 30]\nCASES REFERRED TO\nWallfort Shares & Stock Broker & Ltd. v. ITO [2005] 96 ITD 1 (Mum.) (SB) (para 12), Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. R.B. Wadkar, Asstt CIT [2004] 268 ITR 332/137 Taxman 479 (Bom.) (para 18), CIT v. K.Mohan & Co. (Exports) (Reg.) [2012] 349 ITR 653/[2013] 214 Taxman 17 (Mag.)/31 taxmann.com 278 (Bom.) (para 18) and Prashant S. Joshi v. ITO [2010] 324 ITR 154/189 Taxman 1 (Bom.) (para 23).",
    "Court Name:": "Bombay High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "WRIT PETITION NO. 2665 OF 2007, JANUARY 18, 2016",
    "Judge Name:": "M.S. SANKLECHA AND B.P. COLABAWALLA, JJ.",
    "": "Nirmal Bang Securities (P.) Ltd.\nv.\nAssistant Commissioner of IncomE tax, Central Circle 41, Mumbai"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14013",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 262 = 2016 SLD 262 = (2016) 382 ITR 19",
    "Key Words:": "Section 159, read with section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Legal representatives (Notice to legal representative) - Assessment year 2008-09 - Notice under section 148 for relevant assessment year was issued upon original assessee when he was already dead - However, department continued with proceedings under section 147 in name of petitioner, as a legal heir of original assessee - Petitioner contended that proceedings initiated were barred by limitation - Whether if department intended to proceed under section 147, it could have been done so prior to period of limitation by issuing a notice to legal representative of deceased assessee and beyond that date it could not have proceeded in matter even by issuing notice to Legal Representatives of assessee - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, subsequent proceedings under section 147 against petitioner were wholly misconceived and were to be quashed - Held, yes [Paras 12 and 18][In favour of assessee]\nCASE REVIEW\nCIT v. Jai Prakash Singh [1996] 219 ITR 737/85 Taxman 407 (SC) (para 14) and Kamlesh Kumar Mehta v. CIT [1997] 106 ITR 855 (Cal.) (para 16) distinguished.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Jai Prakash Singh [1996] 219 ITR 737/85 Taxman 407 (SC) (para 13), Kamlesh Kumar Mehta v. CIT [1997] 106 ITR 855 (Cal.) (para 16) and Braham Parkash v. ITO [2005] 275 ITR 242 (Delhi) (para 17).",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "W.P. (C) NO. 8273 OF 2015, CM NO. 17434 OF 2015 (FOR STAY), FEBRUARY 15, 2016",
    "Judge Name:": "DR. S. MURALIDHAR AND VIBHU BAKHRU, JJ.",
    "": "Vipin Walia\nv.\nIncome Tax Officer"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14014",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 269 = 2016 SLD 269",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21,21(l),21(m),34(5),39(3),129,129(a),214C\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=21,21(l),21(m),34(5),39(3),129,129(a),214C\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) ITA No. 898/IB/2015 (Tax Year, 2013), hearing DATE : 17.02.2016, DATE of order: 10-03-2016",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MIAN SAEED IQBAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "The Commissioner of Inland Revenue, RTO, Islamabad High Court High Court.--Appellant\nvs\nM/s Louts Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., Islamabad High Court High Court--Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14015",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 268 = 2016 SLD 268",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2,13(AA),22A,113,120,122(5A)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=2,13(AA),22A,113,120,122(5A)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) ITA NO. 960/IB/2015 (Tax Year 2014), hearing DATE : 10.02.2016, DATE of Order: 18.03.2016",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "M/s. Adnan Agency, Rawalpindi --Appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Rawalpindi --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14016",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 270 = 2016 SLD 270",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=152\\n\\r\\n\\rCompanies Ordinance, 1984=152\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Rules, 2002=69\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) ITA NO.76/IB/2016 Tax Year 2011, hearing DATE and Order: 17-02-2016",
    "Judge Name:": "IKRAM ULLAH GHAURI, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND, JEHANZEB MAHMOOD, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "M/s. Florence Farmaceutics (Pvt) Ltd., Plot No.266, Industrial Triangle, Kahuta Road, Islamabad High Court High Court.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-ll), Plot No.20, Mauve Area, G9/1, Islamabad High Court High Court & others\n--Respondent by: Mr. Waqas Hanif, DR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14017",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 271 = 2016 SLD 271",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(36),113,122,234A,Clause58(2)(1) ofPartI of Second Schedule,clause58 ofPartI of Second Schedule,clause11(ix) ofPart-IV of Second Schedule,clause(62) ofPartI oftheSecond Schedule\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(36),113,122,234A,Clause58(2)(1) ofPartI of Second Schedule,clause58 ofPartI of Second Schedule,clause11(ix) ofPart-IV of Second Schedule,clause(62) ofPartI oftheSecond Schedule\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) ITA No. 396/IB/2014 (Tax Year 2011), ITA No. 1165/IB/2014 (Tax Year 2012), ITA No. 1166/1B/2014 (Tax Year 2013) hearing DATE : 26-08-2015, DATE of order: 22-12-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, (Legal), Large Taxpayers Unit, Islamabad High Court High Court---Appellant\nvs\nM/s Army Welfare Trust, AWT Plaza, Saddar, RAWALPINDI...--Respondent\nITA NO.427/IB/2014 (Tax Year 2011)\nM/s Army Welfare Trust, AWT Plaza, Saddar, RAWALPINDI\nvs"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14018",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 272 = 2016 SLD 272",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4,111(1)(b),111(1)(d)(1),115(4),122(1),122(5),153,153(1)(a),153(a)(i),169(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=4,111(1)(b),111(1)(d)(1),115(4),122(1),122(5),153,153(1)(a),153(a)(i),169(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=77\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Rules, 2002=37\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) ITA No. 890/IB/2015, (Tax Year 2013), hearing DATE : 15-09-2015, DATE of order: 19-03-2016",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": "Syed Muhammad Murtaza Zaidi, Prop. Supply Pro. Rawalpindi..--Appellant\nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, RTO, Rawalpindi..--Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14019",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 273 = 2016 SLD 273 = 2019 PTD 179",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)- -Ss. 21(c), 111(1)(b), 120, 121(1)(d), 122(1)(5), 153(7)(i) & 177-- Deduction not allowed in computing chargeable income-Best assessment, amendment of assessment-Taxpayer, a motorcycle dealer, filed return of income declaring net profit- Taxpayer's case was selected for audit-Department confronted issues regarding under declaration of amounts received from principal company to taxpayer-Reply of taxpayer having not been found satisfactory, Assessing Officer proceeded to pass order under S.121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Total income of the taxpayer was assessed by making addition under S. 111(1)(b) and S. 21(c) of the Ordinance-Appellate authority confirmed the order passed by Assessing Officer-Validity-Purchases made by the taxpayer were not covered by S. 21(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, as same dealt with the specific expenses-Addition under said provisions of law, could be made on account of purchases-Assessing Officer had not established that taxpayer was a prescribed person under S. 153(7)(i) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for the tax year under consideration; as a result, the addition made under S. 21(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was illegal and stood deleted-Addition made under S. 111(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was also not legally maintainable as said section dealt with the case of any investment made by a person or being the owner of any money or valuable articles, which were not the facts of the present case-Order passed by Assessing Officer had revealed that from the beginning of proceedings through the issuance of show-cause notice till the finalization of assessment, the taxpayer had been confronted and proceeded under provisions of S. 111(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Assessing Officer invoked and applied the provisions of S. 111(1)(d) as well as S.21(c) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which were not applicable to the facts of the case-Addition made under S. 111(1)(b) was also deleted-Order passed by Assessing Officer was not a best assessment; but order passed by him appeared to be an order of amendment of assessment under S.122(1)(5) of the Ordinance-Assessing Officer appeared to be totally confused, while passing the order and making the addition to the income-Order passed by Assessing Officer as well as appellate authority below, being not maintainable, were vacated, in circumstances.\n2013 PTD 837; 2015 PTD (Trib.) 2042; 2013 PTD 682; 2015 PTD 681; 2012 PTD 1444; 2016 PTD (Trib.) 1 and 2015 PTD (Trib.) 804 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21,21(c),111(1)(b),111(1)(d),121(1)(d),122(1),122(5),153(7)(i),169(1)(b),177(10),182(1),182(2),233\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=21,21(c),111(1)(b),111(1)(d),121(1)(d),122(1),122(5),153(7)(i),169(1)(b),177(10),182(1),182(2),233\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "ITA No. 64/IB/2016 (Tax year, 2013), hearing DATE : 04.02.2016, DATE of Order: 17-03-2016",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "M/s. ALHaq Autos, Shop No.4, N124, Circular Road, RAWALPINDI\nVs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, R.T.O., RAWALPINDI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14020",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 274 = 2016 SLD 274",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121(1)(d),177(10)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=121(1)(d),177(10)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) ITA No. 756/IB/2015 (Tax Year, 2012), hearing DATE : 11.02.2016, DATE of order: 09. 03. 2016",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MIAN SAEED IQBAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "The Commissioner of Inland Revenue, RTO, Islamabad High Court High Court..--Appellant\nvs\nMrs. Irum Khushal, House No. 403, St No.12, F10/2, Islamabad High Court High Court..--Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14021",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 275 = 2016 SLD 275",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33(5),34,36(3),73,74\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=33(5),34,36(3),73,74\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Excise Act, 2005=19(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) STA NO. 63/IB/2015 (Tax Period July 07 to June, 08), hearing DATE : 22.12.2015, DATE of order: 15-03-2016",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": "M/s. Select Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. House No.317, Nazim UDDin Road, F11/1, Islamabad High Court High Court --Appellant\nvs\nCommissioner of Inland Revenue, RTO, Islamabad High Court High Court.. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14022",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 276 = 2016 SLD 276",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=67,111(1)(b),111(2),116(3),122(1),122(5),129\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=67,111(1)(b),111(2),116(3),122(1),122(5),129\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Rules, 2002=13\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) ITA NO. 1073/IB/2015 Tax Year 2013, hearing DATE and order: 20-10-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "IKRAM ULLAH GHAURI, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND, JEHANZEB MAHMOOD, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Ms. Fatima Azim, Proprietor Azim Motors Model Workshop, Islamabad High Court High Court-..--Appellant\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-ll), Islamabad High Court High Court--Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14023",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 277 = 2016 SLD 277",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=3,4,6,7,39(3),111(1)(a),182,205,214C\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=3,4,6,7,39(3),111(1)(a),182,205,214C\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) ITA No.594/IB/2015 Tax Year 2012, hearing DATE : 19.11.2015, DATE of Order: 10-12-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND, JEHANZEB MAHMOOD, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "M/s. Taxila Satellite Township, House No.6, St. No.66, F7/3, Islamabad High Court High Court-..--Appellant\nVs\nCommissioner IR (Audit & Enforcement Unit-III), Zone-III, RTO, & Others Islamabad High Court High Court-..--Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14024",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 278 = 2016 SLD 278",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21,21(l),21(c),21(e),120,122(1),122(5),122(9),152,153,153(1)(c),161,162B,174(2),205,214,214C,DivisionIII ofPartV ofChapterXorsection233 ofchapterXII,\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=21,21(l),21(c),21(e),120,122(1),122(5),122(9),152,153,153(1)(c),161,162B,174(2),205,214,214C,DivisionIII ofPartV ofChapterXorsection233 ofchapterXII,\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=8,18,24,25\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) ITA No.740/IB/2015 Tax Year 2013, hearing DATE : 16.11.2015, DATE of Order: 10.12.2015",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND, JEHANZEB MAHMOOD, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "M/s Servico International Pvt. Ltd., House No.366, Street No.33, F11/2, Islamabad High Court High Court-..--Appellant\nVs\nCommissioner IR(Appeals) & Others, Islamabad High Court High Court-..--Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14025",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 279 = 2016 SLD 279",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=57\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=57\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) MA (R) STA.No.45/IB/2015 in STA No.64/IB/2013 (Tax Period 2011), STA No.48/IB/2013 (Tax Period July 2011 to Dec 2011), hearing DATE : 02.02.2016, DATE of Order: 18.03.2016",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Uch Power (Private) limited Islamabad High Court High Court..--Respondent\nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, L.T.U, Islamabad High Court High Court--Applicant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14026",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 280 = 2016 SLD 280",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,8(1)(b),8(1)(ca),8(2),13,25(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=3,8(1)(b),8(1)(ca),8(2),13,25(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rCompanies Ordinance, 1984=25\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) STA NO. 310/IB/2015, Tax Year July 2009 to June 2010, hearing DATE 17.11.2015, DATE of Order 10.12.2015",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND, JEHANZEB MAHMOOD, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "M/s Wateen Telecom (Pvt) Ltd., 4th Floor, New Auriga Complex, Main Boulevard, Lahore High Court-..--Respondent\nVs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Division, LTU, Islamabad High Court High Court.--Appellant"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14027",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 281 = 2016 SLD 281",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=57,57(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=57,57(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) MA (Rect.) STA No.38/IB/2015 In: STA NO.269/IB/2012 (Tax Period June 2011), hearing DATE : 20.01.2015, DATE of Order: 17.03.2016",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "The CIR, LTU, Islamabad High Court High Court --Applicant\nvs\nM/s. WITribe Pakistan Ltd. Islamabad High Court High Court --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14028",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6SFJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2016 282 = 2016 SLD 282",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121,122,122(5),174(2),177(1),177(10),214C\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=121,122,122(5),174(2),177(1),177(10),214C\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "NEW (UN-REPORTED) ITA NO. 1136/IB/2015, Tax Year 2012, hearing DATE : 21.10.2015, DATE of order: 22.02.2016",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": "M/s Waseem Marble Show Room, Range Road, WestridgElll, Rawalpindi..--Appellant\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi and others.. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14029",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6RlNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1966 144 = 1966 SLD 144 = (1966) 60 ITR 52 = (1973) 28 TAX 8",
    "Key Words:": "Section 37(1) , read with section 256 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv), read with section 66, of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Business expenditure - Allowability of - Assessment year 1950-51 - Assessee-company obtained loan which was secured by a charge on its fixed assets of company - Assessee company, for availing loan, incurred expenditure on stamps, registration fees, etc. and claimed it as business expenditure - ITO disallowed claim for deduction of said expenditure on ground that it was incurred in obtaining capital - Whether a loan obtained cannot be treated as an asset or an advantage for enduring benefit of business of assessees and a loan is a liability and has to be repaid and a liability cannot be considered as an asset or an advantage - Held, yes - Whether nature of expenditure incurred in raising a loan does not depend upon nature and purpose of loan - Held, yes - Whether therefore, expenditure incurred by assessee was revenue expenditure liable to be allowed - Held, yes\nSection 256 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 66 of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - High Court - Reference to - Whether in a reference High Court must accept findings of fact made by Tribunal and it is for person who has applied for a reference to challenge those findings first by an application under section 66(1), and if he fails to file an application under section 66(1) expressly raising question under section 66(1) expressly raising question about validity of findings of fact, he is not entitled to urge before High Court that findings are vitiated for one reason or other - Held, yes\nFACTS\nDuring the accounting year it obtained a loan of 40 lakhs of rupees from the Industrial Finance Corporation of India. This loan was secured by a charge on the fixed assets of the company. In this respect the assessee-company incurred expenditure towards stamp duty, registration fees, etc. and claimed it was a business expenditure as mortgage loan expenses. The ITO held that the expenditure was incurred in obtaining capital and should be distinguished from interest on borrowed capital which was alone admissible as a deduction under section 10(2)(iii). According to him, section 10(2)(xv) specifically excludes from consideration assessment year item of capital expenditure. On second appeal, the Tribunal was of the view that the whole of the mortgage loan was used firstly to discharge the loan of Rs. 25 lakhs and the balance for working funds and, as such, the whole of the amount was purely for the purposes of augmenting the working capital of the company and that it could not be stated that it was used for capital purposes. In this view of the matter, it held that the money expended in obtaining the loan was an allowable expenditure.\nOn reference, the High Court held that it was true that the borrowed money was to be repaid and it could not be an enduring advantage in the sense that the money became part of the assets of the company for all time to come; but, it certainly was an advantage which the company derived for the duration of the loan and undoubtedly it could not have been for any purpose other than an advantage to the business. It further held that at least to the extent of Rs. 25 lakhs that amount was expended for purposes of a capital nature clearly in order to bring into existence capital assets, that though it was vaguely stated by the Tribunal that the other sum of Rs. 15 lakhs was utilized as working funds, there was no material whatsoever before the Tribunal to justify its coming the that conclusion. The High Court, thus, restored the ITO's order.\nOn Appeal to Supreme Court :\nHELD\nA loan obtained can not be treated as an asset or advantage for the enduring benefit of the business of the assessee. A loan is a liability and has to be repaid and, it is erroneous to consider a liability as an asset or an advantage. The nature of the expenditure incurred in raising a loan would not depend upon the nature of purpose of the loan. A loan may be intended to be used for the purchase of raw material when it is negotiated, but the company may, after raising the loan, change its mind and spend it on securing capital assets. Therefore, the purpose for which the new loan was required was irrelevant to the consideration of the question whether the expenditure for obtaining the loan was the revenue expenditure or capital expenditure.\nHence (a) the loan obtained was not an asset or advantage of an enduring nature; (b) the expenditure was made for securing the use of money for a certain period and (c) it was irrelevant to consider the object with which the loan was obtained. Consequently, in the circumstances of the case, the expenditure was revenue expenditure within section 10(2)(xv ).\nIn a reference, the High Court must accept the findings of fact made by the Tribunal and it is for the person who has applied for a reference to challenge those findings first by an application under section 66(1). If he has failed to file an application under section 66(1) expressly raising the question about the validity of the finding of fact he is not entitled to urge before the High Court that the findings are vitiate for one reason or the other.\nIn the result, the expenditure in question was not in the nature of capital expenditure and was laid out or expended wholly or exclusively for the purpose of the assessee's business.\nThe assessee's appeal was allowed and the of the High Court set aside.\nNote : The case was decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\nDecision of the Madras High Court in CIT v. India Cements Ltd. [1963] 47 ITR 438 reversed. Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. v. CIT [1931] 6 ITC 28, Western India Plywood Ltd. v. CIT [1960] 38 ITR 533 and Vizagapatnam Sugars and Refinery Ltd. v. CIT [1963] 47 ITR 139.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nAnglo Continental Guano Works v. Bell [1894] 3 Tax Cas. 239, Ascot Gas Water Heaters Ltd. v. Duff [1942] 24 Tax Cas. 171, Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 34 (SC), Atherton v. British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd. [1925] 10 Tax Cas. 155 (HL), Bombay Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1965] 56 ITR 52 (SC), Bryon v. Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co. [1858] 3 D.G. and J. 123, CIT v. Malayalam Plantations Ltd. [1964] 53 ITR 140 (SC), European Investment Trust Co. v. Jackson [1932] 18 Tax Cas. 1 (CA.), Royal Insurance Co. v. Wetson [1897] A.C. 1 State of Madras v. G.J. Coelho [1964] 53 ITR 186 (SC), Scottish North American Trust Ltd. v. Farmer [1911] 5 Tax Cas. 693 (HL), Eastern Investments Ltd. v. CIT [1951] 20 ITR 1 (SC), Dharamvir Dhir v. CIT [1961] 42 ITR 7 (SC), Texas Land and Mortgage Co. v. William Holtham [1894] 3 Tax Cas. 255, Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. v. CIT [1931] 6 ITC 28, Western India Plywood Ltd. v. CIT [1960] 38 ITR 533 (Ker.), Vizagapatnam Sugars and Refinery Ltd. v. CIT [1963] 47 ITR 139 , Shri Annapurna Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT [1964] 54 ITR 592 (Cal.) (AP), Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., In re [1921] 1 ITC 125 , Conclusion in S.F. Engineer v. CIT [1965] 57 ITR 455 (Bom.) and CIT v. India Cements Ltd. [1963] 47 ITR 438 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=256\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1106 OF 1964, DECEMBER 8, 1965",
    "Judge Name:": "K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ",
    "": "India Cements Ltd\nv.\nCommissioner of IncomE tax"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14030",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6RlNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1997 96 = 1997 SLD 96 = (1997) 75 TAX 113 = 1997 PTD 49",
    "Key Words:": "Dividend -- Definition -- Redemption of preference shares -- Shareholders received face value of their fully paid up shares -- High Court's finding that definition of word "dividend" itself envisaged return of profits to shareholder in any form whatsoever which was declared to be "dividend" in law -- Whether correct -- Held yes -- Return to shareholders was no more than what they had invested -- Whether such return could be treated as dividend -- Held no --\n"Dividend" -- Definition -- High Court taking view that definition of expression "dividend" itself envisaged returns of profits to shareholders in any form which was deemed to be "dividend" in law -- Validity -- Leave to appeal was granted to consider whether High Court had correctly interpreted S. 2(6-A) (d), Income-tax Act, 1922 --\nExpression "dividend" -- Interpretation -- High Court's finding that definition of word "dividend" as given in S. 2(6-A) of the Act itself envisaged return of profits to shareholder in any form whatsoever which was declared to be "dividend" in law was\ncorrect -- Where return to shareholders was no more than what they had invested such return did not fall within definition of "dividend" --",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=2(6-A)(d),66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=2(6-A)(d),66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. K-25 to K-29 of 1981 and 113-K of 1982, decision dated: 9-08-1989.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD HALEEM, C.J., ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, SAAD SAOOS, JAN AND ALI HUSSAIN QAZILBASH, JJ.",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF IncomE tax\nv.\nPAKISTAN INSURANCE CORPORATION AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14031",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6TFFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2017 345 = 2017 SLD 345 = 2017 PTD 1244 = (1979) 116 TAX 1",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-S. 2(s)-S.R.O. No. 566(I)/2005 dated 6-6-2005-Smuggled goods- Scope-'Black tea'-Consignment of \"\"black tea\"\" was confiscated on 06-01-2007- Item No.35 of S.R.O. No.566(I)/2005 dated 6-6-2005 stated \"\"Black Tea (except Op-Pekoe)\"\", thus black tea was a restricted/prohibited item and fell within the meaning of smuggled goods in terms of S. 2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969.\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-S. 2(s)-S.R.O. No.566(l)/2005 dated 6-6-2005 (\"\"the SRO.\"\")- Smuggled goods-Scope-'Artificial silk cloth'-Item No.28 of S.R.O. No.566(I)/2005 dated 6-6-2005 pertained to man-made or synthetic fibers/fabric-Cloth, in the present case, was described as artificial silk cloth and was undoubtedly a man-made fabric as it comprises of synthetic fiber and thus was squarely covered by Item No. 28 of the SRO-Cloth in question was of a foreign origin and was a restricted/prohibited item as per Item No.28 of the SRO, therefore, it fell within the meaning of smuggled goods in terms of S. 2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969.\n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-S. 156(1), Cl. 89-\"\"Smuggled goods\"\"-Salient features of Cl. 89 of table provided under S. 156(1) of the Customs Act, 1969-Clause 89(i) dealt with smuggled goods as well as those goods regarding which there was reasonable suspicion that they were smuggled-Person was permitted to acquire possession etc. of such goods only with lawful excuse, the burden of proof of which laid on such person, and in case he failed to do so, it would be presumed that the goods were smuggled entailing the consequences provided in Column 2 of Cl. 89(i).\n(d) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-S. 156(1), Cl. 90-\"\"Smuggled goods\"\"-Salient features of Cl. 90 of table provided under S. 156(1) of the Customs Act, 1969-Clause 90 of\nS. 156(1) dealt with goods that were not smuggled and regarding which there was \"\"fraudulent evasion or attempt at evasion of any duty chargeable thereon\"\"-Burden laid on the person involved in such activities to prove the contrary, in the absence of which it would be presumed that the goods were non-duty paid in terms of Cl. 90-In this regard, first the department had to show that the goods which were of a foreign origin could only be imported on payment of duty or under a licence or their import was prohibited or restricted; it would then be for the possessor of such goods to show that they were lawfully imported either before any restrictions/prohibitions were imposed or in accordance with such restrictions/prohibitions.\nMessrs S.A. Haroon and others v. The Collector of Customs, Karachi and the Federation of Pakistan PLD 1959 SC 177 and Sikandar A. Karim v. The State 1995 SCMR 387 ref.\n(e) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss.2(s) 181-S.R.O. No.574(1)12005 dated 6.6.2005 (\"\"SRO 574\"\")- Smuggled goods, confiscation of-Option to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation of goods-Section 181 of the Customs Act, 1969 allowed an officer passing an order for confiscation of goods to give the owner of the goods an option to pay a fine in lieu of such confiscation-First proviso to S. 181, however, provided that the Federal Board of Revenue may by an order specify the goods or class of goods where such option shall not be given-Board had issued SRO 574 which provided, inter alia, that \"\"no option shall be given to pay fine in lieu of confiscation in respect of... (i) smuggled goods falling under Cl. (s) of S. 2 of the Customs Act, 1969 or (ii) conveyance including packages and containers found carrying offending goods of S.2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969-Since the smuggled goods in the present case were covered under SRO 574, therefore, the imposition of redemption fine at 30% by the Collector Customs (Appeals) and 15% by the Appellate Tribunal was in violation of S. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969 and S.R.O. 574- Appeal was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),2(s)(ii),16,156(1),156(2),156(8),156(89),157,164,181\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Act, 1969=2(s),2(s)(ii),16,156(1),156(2),156(8),156(89),157,164,181\\n\\r\\n\\rImports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO.1050 OF 2009, DATE of decision: 23.02-2017, hearing DATE : 19.01.2017",
    "Judge Name:": "MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR, HCJ, MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, MR. JUSTICE MAQBOOL BAQAR",
    "": "Collector of Customs, Peshawar High Court - .--Appellant\nVS\nWali Khan etc. --Respondent"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14032",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cVV6TFFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1995 898 = 1995 SLD 898 = 1995 PLD 66",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Political Parties Act (111 of 1962)-------S. 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 63 & 187---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O. XXIII, R. 6---Appeal against decision of Election Commission---Supreme Court can go into the question of competency of the appeals filed before it under S.8-B/ Political Parties Act, 1962 and can also decide question of vires of S.8-B of the said Act to the limited extent of forums envisaged under S.8-B of the Act which are different from the forum of the Chief Election Commissioner, envisaged in Art. 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--Article 187 confers upon Supreme Court ample power to do complete justice and give finding to that effect about competence of forum.\n \nDetermination of question of forum involves question of jurisdiction. Direct appeals are filed before the Supreme Court under section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962,; which is in conflict with Article 63 of the Constitution providing only one forum of the Chief Election Commissioner without providing further forum of appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction which is conferred upon it by the Constitution or by or under any law as is contemplated under Article 175(2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction and advisory jurisdiction and exercises power to transfer cases as is contemplated under Articles 184 to 186-A of the Constitution. and Article 184(3) of the Constitution this Court can exercise jurisdiction without prejudice to Article 199 if it considers that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II is involved and has power to make an order of the nature mentioned in that Article. Under Article 187 the Supreme Court has power to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, including an order for the purpose of securing attendance of any person or discovery or production of any document. Question for consideration in the present case was whether the Supreme Court could go into the question whether the appeals filed before it under section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 were competent or not and to that extent whether the same provision was ultra vires the Constitution being inconsistent with Article 63 of the Constitution.\n \nIn the 1973 Constitution apart from other jurisdictions, which are mentioned specifically, Article 187 confers upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction and powers to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it. In the present case appeals filed under section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962, were pending before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court could go into the question whether they were competently filed or not and in that context also could go into the question of vires of section 8-B to the extent of forum. The Supreme Court has to go into details of hearing of arguments of both the sides in order to come to conclusion whether appeals were competently filed or not. Article 187 confers upon the Court ample authority and jurisdiction to do complete justice and give finding to that effect about competence of forum.\n \nIn support of the proposition that the Supreme Court has more than ample powers to do complete justice, as contemplated under Article 187 of the Constitution, reference can be made to Order XXIII Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, which also provides that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to. limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. This rule is consistent with the spirit and amplitude of the jurisdiction anti power as conferred upon it by the Constitution.\n \nThe Court can go into the question of competency of the appeals filed before it under section 8-B of the Political Parties Act and the Court can decide question of vires of section 8-B to the limited extent of forums envisaged under section 8-E of the Political Parties Act, which are different from the forum of the Chief Election Commissioner, envisaged in Article 63 of the Constitution as the only forum for determination of question of disqualification.\n \nWaris Meah v. State PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 157; Noora and another v. The%tate PLD 1973 SC 469;'Ch.Zahur Ilahi, MNA v. The State PLD 1977 SC 273; Said Mian v. Mian Said Baghdad 1980 SCMR 420; Hayat Bux and others v. The State 1981 SCMR 1; Muhammad Aslam and another v. Munshi Muhammad Behram and others 1991 SCMR 1971 and Mst. Safyya and another v. Muhammad Rafique, and 6 others PLD 1993 SC 62 ref.\n \n(b) Jurisdiction---\n \n---- Question of jurisdiction being very important and fundamental in nature, if a forum had no jurisdiction, the same could not be conferred upon it by consent of parties---Court has to consider the question of jurisdiction even though not raised by the parties.\n \nRaleigh Investment Company Limited -v. The Governor-General-in ­Council PLD 1947 PC 19 ref.\n \n(c) Estoppel---\n \n----Jurisdiction of Court---Doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied to defeat the provisions of statute or enactment affecting jurisdiction of the Court.--­[Jurisdiction Estoppel].\n \nMuhammad Suleman v. Javed Iqbal PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 64 ref.\n \n(d) Political Parties Act (III of 1962)---\n \n----Preamble & S.8-B---History of Political Parties Act, 1962 with particular emphasis on insertion and import of S.8-B traced.\n \nGhulam Must4a Khar v. Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan and others PLD 1969 Lah. 602 and Ms. Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1988 SC 416 ref.\n \n (e) Political Parties Act (111 of 1962)---\n \n----S. 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.63 --- Disqualification for membership of Parliament on ground of defection---Forums for purpose of determining the question of disqualification---Neither forums can be added nor different forums can be provided against the forum of the Chief Election Commissioner as contemplated by Art.63 of the Constitution.\n \nArticle 63(1)(p), Constitution of Pakistan (1973) envisages that disqualification under any law for the time being in force can be added to the disqualifications mentioned under Article 63(1) of the Constitution, but it is nowhere specifically said in Article 63 that for the purpose of determining the question of disqualification forums can be added or different forums can be provided against the forum of the Chief Election Commissioner, as contemplated under Article 63 of the Constitution.\n \n(f) Political Parties Act (III of 1962)---\n \n----S. 8-B(2)(3)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 63 --- Provision o S.8-B(2)(3), Political Parties Act, 1962 being in conflict with Art. 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973) to the extent of forum, which is Chief Election Commissioner in the Constitutional provision, is ultra vires the Constitution--­Chief Election Commissioner is competent to hear references which can be disposed of by him on merits---Appeal filed before Supreme Court under S.8-B(3) of the Act, therefore, was not competent.\n \nIn Article 63 only the Chief Election Commissioner is declared to be the forum for determining the question of disqualification of a member on reference from the Speaker or the Chairman of the Senate and no further forum of appeal is provided, making decision of the Chief Election Commissioner as final. Section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 provides forums which are different from the forum of the Chief Election Commissioner, as contemplated under Article 63(2) of the Constitution. To that extent, there is conflict between Article 63 of the Constitution and section 8-B of the Political Parties Act. In case there is conflict between the Constitution and subordinate law, then the Constitution shall always prevail to the extent of conflict.\n \nWhere express authorization exists in. favour of two authorities or forums in respect of identical subject, one conferred by superior law would prevail over that conferred by inferior law. The forum of Election Tribunal for decision of election dispute is provided in the Constitution by express provision, which is to be read in conjunction with Article 219(c) of the Constitution, which authorizes the Chief Election Commissioner to appoint the Election Tribunals. It is further mentioned in Article 225 that election petition presented to such Tribunal is to be decided in the manner as may be determined by the Act of Parliament. In this context reference can be made to the Representation of the People Act, 1976, which reiterates the powers of the Chief Election Commissioner to appoint as many Election Tribunals as may be necessary as contemplated under section 57 thereof. It, is further provided that Election Tribunal shall consist of a person, who has been, or is, or at the time of his retirement as a District and Sessions Judge, was qualified to be a Judge of a High Court. Section 67 of the said Act further provides forum of appeal before the Supreme Court against the decision of the Election Tribunal. There is obvious difference between the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 and section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962, in providing the forums as in 'the case of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 there is Constitutional authority as contemplated under Articles 219(c) and 225 of the Constitution and there is no inconsistency in the forums provided both in the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1976. On the other hand, there is very clear inconsistency and conflict in respect of forums provided in Article 63(2) of the Constitution and section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962.\n \nPerusal of section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 shows very clearly that the words \"\"defects\"\" and \"\"withdraws\"\" are not defined in the Constitution or the relevant law. With the result, confusion has arisen not only with regard to the forums but also with regard to the definition of the terms mentioned above. In the result, now reliance is to be placed by the Courts on dictionary meanings for using these terms and considering defection as ground for dissolution of the Assemblies on moral justification. In the tracheotomy of the powers between the Legislature, Judiciary and Executive, it is undeniably the duty of the Legislature to make laws which are comprehensive and perfect in all respects without leaving room for ambiguity, and it is the duty of the judiciary to interpret the Constitution and the laws as they are, without transgressing the limits set on its powers of interpretation by filling in the blanks left by the Legislature.\n \nOn the subject of defection, law is to be framed by the Legislature and has to be construed or interpreted by the Courts as it is. On the subject of defection the law which holds the field is the Political Parties Act, 1962 which cannot be improved by the Courts during interpretation in the sense that some thing can be added to it which is not put there by the Legislature.\n \nSection 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 is ultra vires the Constitution to the extent of forums only, which are in conflict with Article 63 of our Constitution in which forum of the Chief Election Commissioner is specifically provided, which is final as no other forum of appeal is provided therein.\n \nHigh Court is competent forum where vires of section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 can be challenged on other grounds.\n \nThe Chief Election Commissioner is competent to hear references which can be disposed of by him on merits as previously the references were dismissed by him on the short ground of incompetence without going into the question of merits for the reason that defection was not mentioned as ground of disqualification in Article 63 of the Constitution.\n \nAppeals before Supreme Court are incompetent on the' ground that section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 was ultra vires the Constitution to the extent of forums.\n \nIttefaq Foundry v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1990 Lah. 121; Raja Muhammad Afzal v. Ch. Muhammad Altaf Hussain and others 1986 SCMR 1736; State v. Zia-ur-Rehman and others PLD 1973 SC 49 and Fauji Foundation and another v. Shamim-ur-Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457 ref.\n \n(g) Political Parties Act (III of 1962)---\n \n----5. 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.63 & 199---Disqualification on ground of defection etc.---Vires of S.8-B, Political Parties Act, 1962---High Court is competent forum where vires of S.8-B of the Act can be challenged.\n \n(h) Political Parties Act (III of 1962)---\n \n----S. 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.63---Disqualification on ground of defection etc.---Chief Election Commissioner is competent to hear references which can be disposed of by him on merits.\n \nThe Chief Election Commissioner is competent to hear references which can be disposed of by him on merits as previously the references were dismissed by him on the short ground of incompetence without going into the question of merits for the reason that defection was not mentioned as ground of disqualification in Art. 63 of the Constitution.\n \n(i) Political Parties Act (III of 1962)---\n \n----S. 8-B---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.63---Disqualification on grounds of defection etc.---Appeal before Supreme Court---Provisions of S.8-B, Political Parties Act, 1962 being in conflict with Art.63, Constitution of Pakistan (1973), to the extent of forums, which is Chief Election Commissioner under Art. 63 of the Constitution, appeal against order of Chief Selection Commissioner before Supreme Court against its finding that it had no jurisdiction to determine vires of Political Parties Act, 1962, was not competent.\n \nPer Sand Snood Jan, J. Contra.---\n \nPer Ajmal Minn, J. Contra.-\n \nMuhammad Hashim Khan and others v. Province of Balochistan and others PLD 1976 Quetta 59; Asif v. Secretary to Government of the Punjab, C and W Department, Lahore and 4 others 1990 PLC (C.S.) 257; Iqan Ahmed Khurram v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1980 SC 153; Sharwai and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others 1991 SCMR 1041; Hamayun Saifullah Khan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Justice, Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 1990 SC 599; Fazlul Quader Chowdhry and others v. Muhammad Abdul Haque PLD 1963 SC 486; Akhtar Ali Parvez v. Altafur Rehman PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lab,. 390; Manager, Khewra Salt Mines, Khewra v. The Mines Employees and Labour Union, Khewra through General Secretary of Union and another PLD 1976 Lab. 601; J.K. Manufacturers Ltd. (formerly J.K. Cotton Manufacturers Ltd.) v. The Sales Tax Officer, Sector II, Kanpur and others AIR 1970 All. 362; Chief Adjudication Officer and another v. Foster (1993) 2 WLR 292; Constitutional Law of Canada by Peter W. Hogg, 3rd Edn. (Student Edn.); Noora and another v. The State PLD 1973 SC 469; Said Mian and another v. Mian Said Baghdad and another 1980 SCMR 420; Muhammad Aslam and another v. Munshi Muhammad Behram and another 1991 SCMR 1971; Mst. Safyya and another v. Muhammad Rafique and 6 others PLD 1993 SC 62; Muhammad Tufail and another v. Mirza Azizullah and 14 others 1994 SCMR 347; Ch. Zahur Ilahi, M.N.A. v. The State PLD 1977 SC 273; Syed Wasey Zafar and 4 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance and others PLD 1994 SC 621; Said Ali Shah v. Abdul Saghir Khan Sherwani PLD 1990 SC 504; Raja Muhammad Afzal v. Ch. Muhammad Altaf and others 1986 SCMR 1736; Reflection on Islam by Hamoodur Rahman (former Chief Justice of Pakistan), p.2 from Ansari's Report; Hakim Khan and 3 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Interior and others PLD 1992 SC 595; Mst. Kaneez Fatima v. Wali Muhammad and another PLD 1993 SC 901; Mishkat-ul-Masabih by Alhaj Maulana Fazlul Karim; The Concept of State in Islam published in Journal Part of PLD 1979 at pp. 1 to ll; Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1988 SC 416; Mrs. Benazir Bhutto and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1989 SC 66; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v.-President of Pakistan and others PLD 1993 SC 473; Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others v. Nawabzada Muhammad Umer Khan 1992 SCMR 2450; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and others v. Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao PL.D 1992 SC 723; Sardar Muhammad Muqeem Khoso v. President of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 412; Rai Rashid Ahmed Khan v. President of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 36; Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Rahim v. The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and another PLD 1992 SC 646; Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne 1910 AC 87; Shri Kihot Hollohon v. Zachilhu and others AIR 1993 SC 412; 1992 Suppl. (2) SC 651; Our Constitution Defaced and Defiled by NA. Palkhivala, Constitutional Reform, Rashaping the British Political System by Rodney Brazier Parliament by Sir Ivor Jennings; Report of the Constitution Commission Pakistan, 1961, para.l9; Ben F. Ray v. Edmund Blair 343 UC 214; Constitutional Law of India by Sarvai, 3rd Edn.; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu 1992 Suppl. (2) SCC; Parkash Singh Badal and others v. Union of India and others AIR 1987 Pun. and Haryana 263; Messrs Haider Automobile Ltd. v. Fakistan PLD 196' SC 623; Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 16, pp.86 = 87; American Jurisprudence, X01.62, p.678; Pakistan v. Ahmed Saeed Kirmani and others PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 397; Lt.-Col. Farzand Ali and tethers v. Province of West Pakistan through rife Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Government of West Pakistan, Lahore PLD 1970 SC 98; Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri and another 1976 SCMR 273; Karachi Bar Association v. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada and another PLD 1988 Kar. 309; M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha and others AIR 1959 SC 395; Special Reference No.l of 1964 AIR 1965 SC 745; Nicholas De B. Katzenbach v. John P. Morgan and Christine Morgan 384 US 641; Mac Q. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma 483 US 348; Constitutional Interpretation by Craig R. Ducat, Fourth Edn. and Harold W. Chase; The Supreme Court, how it was, how it is by William H. Rehnquist (former Chief Justice of the United States); Government of Punjab through Secretary, Home Department v. Zia Ullah Khan and 2 others 1992 SCMR 602; Muhammad Arif and another v. The State and another 1993 SCMR 1589; Pir Sabir Shah v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1994 SC 738; Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service Limited and others v. The Province of West Pakistan and another PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 127; Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Guru Prasanna Singh; The Interpretation of Statutes by Vepa P. Sarathi; General Clauses Acts Central and States by Dr. Vidya Dhar Mahajan and Bindra on Interpretation of Statutes ref.\n \nPer Saleem Akhtar, J. Cont\n \nMuhammad Hashim Khan v. Province of Balochistan PLD 1976 Quetta 59; Muhammad Asif v. Secretary to Government of the Punjab, C&W Department, Lahore and others 1990 PLC (C.S.) 257; Iqan Ahmed Khurram v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1980 SC 153; IA. Sherwani and other v. Government of Pakistan and others 1991 SCMR 1041; Fazlul Quader Chowdhry and others v. Muhammad Abdul Haque PLD 1963 SC 486; The Manager, Khewra Salt Mines, Khewra v. The Mines Employees and Labour Union, Khewra and another PLD 1976 Lab. GOl; Akhtar Ali Pervez v. Altafur Rehman PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lah. 390; Messrs Shafiq Hanif (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Limited, Karachi PLD 1993 Kar.107; J.K. Manufactures Ltd. v. The Sales Tax Officer, Sector II, Kanpur and others AIR 1970 All. 362; Humayun Saifullah Khan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 595; Waris Miah's case PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 157; Noora and another v. The State PLD 1973 SC 469; Ch. Zahur Ilahi v. The State PLD 1977 SC 273; Muhammad Ashraf and another v. The State PLD 1981 SC 265; Muhammad Aslani and another v. Munshi Muhammad Behram and another 1991 SCMR 1971; Mst. Safyye and another v. Muhammad Rafique and others PLD 1993 SC 62; Muhammad Tufail and another v. Mirza Azizullah and others 1994 SCMR 347; Treatise on Constitutional Case Substance 2nd Edn., Vol. 2, p.90; Our Constitution Defaced and Defiled by NA. Palkhivala; Parliament by Sir Ivon Janning; Constitutional Reforms Re-shaping the British Political System by Rodney Brozier; Constitutional Law of India by Servai, 3rd Edn., p.19; Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne 1910 AC 87; Shri Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu and others AIR 1993 SC 412; Ben F. Roy v. Edward Blair 343 US 214; Khawaja Ahmed Rahim Tariq v. The Federation of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 646; Syed Abul A'ala Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan and others PLD 1964 SC 673; Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416; Mrs. Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1989 SC 66; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473; Benazir Bhutto v. Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416; Reference No.l of 1988 made by the President PLD 1989 SC 75; Government of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon PLD 1993 SC 341; Khalid Malik v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1991 Kar. 1; Haider Automobile Ltd. v. Pakistan PLD 1969 SC 623; Ghulam Mustafa Khar v. Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan and others PLD 1969 Lah. 602; Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Rahim v. The Federation of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 646; Sardar Muhammad Muqeem Khoso v. President of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 412; Rai Rashid Ahmad Khan v. President of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 36; New Webster's Dictionary, Deluxe Encyclopaedic Edn.; Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 42; Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edn., p.1277 and Tamil Nadu v. Kodai Kanal Motor Union (Pvt.) Limited PTCL 1987 FC 375 ref.\n \nPer Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, J. Contra.---\n \nFauji Foundation and another v. Shamim-ur-Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457; K. Nagaraj and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another AIR 1985 SC 551; Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service Limited and others v. Province of West Pakistan etc. PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 127; Government of Punjab through Secretary, Home Department v. Zia Ullah Khan etc. 1992 SCMR 602; Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1962 SC 646; IA. Sherwani v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 1041; Muhammad Hashim Khan v. Province of Balochistan PLD 1976 Quetta 59; Iqan Ahmed Khurram v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1980 SC 153; Noor and another v. State PLD 1973 SC 469; Fazlul Quader Choudhry v. Muhamlnad Abdul Haque PLD 1963 SC 486; Waris Miah v. State etc. PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 157; Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan etc. PLD 1988 SC 416; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others v. President of Pakistan and others PLD 1993 SC 473; Constitutional Law of Canada, Third Edn. (1992); Process of Constitutional Decision-Making by Brest; Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 16; Abdul Aziz and others v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 499; Government of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon PLD 1993 SC 341; Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance 1992 SCMR 891; Special Reference No.l of 1957 PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 219; The State v. Ziaur Rehman and others PLD 1973 SC 49; Federation of Pakistan v. Saoed Ahmed Khan and others PLD 1974 SC 151; Shireen Munir and others v. Government of Punjab PLD 1990 SC 295; Parliament by Sir Ivor Jennings, 2nd Edn.; Form of Government by late Justice Hamoodur Rehman and Ansari Commission's Report on Form of Government ref.\n \nPer Ajmal Mian, J: --\n \n(j) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Arts.63(2) & 185(3)---Reference under Art.63(2), Constitution of Pakistan disposed of by the Chief Election Commissioner and no petition for leave to appeal filed- by any of the parties against the said   of Chief Election Commissioner---Judgment of Chief Election Commissioner would acquire finality.\n \n(k) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art.184(3)---Provision of Art.184(3), Constitution of Pakistan when can be pressed into service.\n \nA perusal of Article 184(3) of the Constitution indicates that it can be pressed into service if the following two conditions are fulfilled:--\n \npressed The case involves a question of public importance; and\n \n(ii) The question so involved pertains to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution.\n \nSyed Wasey Zafar and 4 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance and others PLD 1994 SC 621 ref.\n \n(l) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Arts.184(3), 185, 2A, 4, 63 & 66---Supreme Court, in exercise of its original jurisdiction under. .Art .184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan cannot examine the violation of the Arts .2A, 4, 63 & 66 of the Constitution of Pakistan--­Supreme Court, however, has the jurisdiction to examine the violation of said Articles if a matter is brought before it in appellate jurisdiction against a   of the High Court in exercise of inter alia its Constitutional jurisdiction.\n \n(m) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art.63(1)---Grounds mentioned in Art.63(1) are not exhaustive.\n \nA perusal of the opening portion of clause (1) of Article 63 of the Constitution indicates that the grounds mentioned in sub-clauses of this clause are not exhaustive as it has not been provided therein that the same are the only grounds. Additional grounds can be added either by amending the aforesaid clause (1) or by law.\n \n(n) Interpretation of constitution---\n \n---- Approach of the Court while construing a Constitutional provision has to be dynamic, progressive and liberal keeping in view the changed situation, which is intended to be catered for by an existing provision of the Constitution or by a new legislation within the compass of the Constitution---Such approach of interpretation of Constitution cannot be negated by pressing into service the Latin maxim \"\"expressio unius est exclusio alterius\"\": -[Maxim].\n \n(o) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art.63(1)--..-Scope of Art.63(1)---Provision of Art.63(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan does not, in any way, place embargo on the powers of Parliament to provide a law to eliminate the evil of defection.\n \nPer Saleem Akhtar, J: --\n \n(p) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 187---Term \"\"complete justice\"\" used in Art.187, Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---Connotation---Inherent and plenary power of Supreme Court--­Scope.--[Words and phrases].\n \nThe Supreme Court is the apex Court. It is the highest and the ultimate Court under the Constitution. The inherent and plenary power of Supreme Court which is vested in it by virtue of being the ultimate Court, it has the power to do complete justice without in any manner infringing or violating any provision of law. While doing complete justice the Court would not cross the frontiers of the Constitution and law. The term \"\"complete justice\"\" is not capable of definition with exactitude. It is a term covering variety of cases and reliefs which the Court can mould and grant depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. While doing complete justice formalities and technicalities should not fetter its power. It can grant ancillary relief, mould the relief within its jurisdiction depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, take additional evidence and in appropriate cases even subsequent events may be taken into consideration. The Supreme Court is an essence of a continual Constitutional convention. The jurisdiction and the power conferred on the Supreme Court does empower it to do complete justice by looking to the facts, circumstances and the law governing a particular case. Article 187 does not confer' any jurisdiction. It recognises inherent power of an apex Court to do complete justice and issue orders and directions to achieve drat end. Inherent jurisdiction is vested in the High Court and subordinate Courts while dealing with civil and criminal cases by virtue of provisions of law. The inherent jurisdiction of Supreme Court to do complete justice cannot be curtailed by law as it may adversely affect the independence of judiciary and the fundamental right of person to have free access to the Court for achieving complete justice. This enunciation may evoke a controversy that as Article 175(2) restricts Article 187 it will create conflict between the two. There is no conflict and both the Articles can be read together. The conflict in the provisions of the Constitution should not be assumed and if apparently there seems to be any, it has to be interpreted in a harmonious manner by which both the provisions may co-exist. One provision of the Constitution cannot be struck down being in conflict with the other provision of the 'Constitution. They have to live together, exist together and operate together. Therefore, while interpreting jurisdiction and power of the superior Courts one should look to the fundamental rights conferred and the duty cast upon them under the Constitution. A provision like Article 187 cannot be read in isolation but has to be interpreted and read harmoniously with other provisions of the Constitution. Court while hearing- appeal under a statute has the jurisdiction and power to decide the question of vires of the statute under which the appeal has arisen and can even invoke Article 184(3) in appropriate cases.\n \n(q) Interpretation of Constitution---\n \n---- Conflict in the provision of the Constitution---Mode of resolution.\n \nThe conflict in the provisions of the Constitution should not be assumed and if apparently there seems to be any, it has to be interpreted in a harmonious manner by which both the provisions may co-exist. One provision of the Constitution cannot be struck down being in conflict with the other provision of the Constitution. They have to live together, exist together and operate together.\n \n(r) Political Parties Act (111 of 1962)---\n \n----S.8-B---Purpose and object ,of SA-B.\n \nSection 8-B of Political Parties Act, 1962 aims at weeding out disloyalty, treachery and corruption from the rank and file of the elected members to both the Houses. It intends to keep the body politic pure and clean, the trust reposed by the voters intact and discourage, nay, eliminate adventurism for personal gain, benefit and reward. Defection, horse-trading or floor-crossing by the members elected an a party ticket is the \"\"odious type of corruption\"\". Section 8-B or similar legislation wish to achieve pious end by removing evil, cleaning political culture and creating discipline in the elected representatives of the people. Discipline is the cornerstone without which no society can exist, flourish and develop. In all the countries having Parliamentary form of Government, the evil of defection, shifting of loyalties, floor-crossing, varying in degrees and withdrawal of support has been noticed and steps have been taken by legislation or through conventions to check them. The Jurists, Judges and Authors have disapproved it in strong terms.\n \nOur constitution Defaced and Defiled try NA.- Palkliivala; Parlianic:nt by Sir Ivon Janning; Constitutional Reforms Re-shaping the British Political System try Rodney Brozier; Constitutional Law of India by Servai, 3rd Edn., para. 19; Constitution Commission Pakistan 1961; Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne 191(1 AC 877; Shri Kihota Hollohon v. Zeachilhu and others AIR 3.993 SC 412; Servai and Ben F. Roy v. Edward Blair 343 US 214; Khawaia Ahmed Rahim Tariq v. The Federation of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 646; Syed Abul A'ala Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan and others PLD 1964 SC 673; Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416; Mrs. BenazirBhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1989 SC 66 and Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473 ref.\n \n(s) Interpretation of Constitution---\n \n---- Principles.\n \nConstitution should not be interpreted in a narrow, pedantic, technical and restricted manner. Constitution is a permanent, organic and living document. It assimilates the past, present and future for proper governance generation after generation. Approach to such a document should, be liberal, progressive and wide without doing any violence to the intention and language. The fundamental principles embodied in the Constitution and the fundamental rights have to be kept in view.\n \nConstitution should not be interpreted to limit its scope and effect to only contesting parties but one has to keep in mind that",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos.381 and 382 of 1994, decision dated: 16-11-1994.",
    "Judge Name:": "SAJJAD ALI SHAH, C.J., SAAD SAOOD JAN, AJMAL MIAN, SALEERN AKHTAR, SAIDUZZATNAN SIDDIQUI, FAZAL ILAHI KHAN, ZIA MAHMOOD MIRZA, FAZAL KARIM, MUHAMMAD MUNIR KHAN, MIR HAZAR KHAN KHOSO, IRSHAD HASAN KHAN AND MUKHTAR AHMED, JUNEJO, JJ",
    "": "Pir SABIR SHAH\nvs\nSHAD MUHAMMAD KHAN, MEMBER PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY,"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14033",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1701 = 2015 SLD 1701 = (2015) 112 TAX 10 = 2015 PTD 1913",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,122,122A,133(5),170(1),170(4),171,171(1),171(2),171(2)(c),177,214-C\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=7\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 48 of 2011, decided on 9-2-2015.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN AND SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JJ.",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVs\nCHICAGO METAL WORKS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14034",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1702 = 2015 SLD 1702 = (2015) 112 TAX 22 = 2015 PTD 2236",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Wealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=2(16)\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Rules, 1957=2(16)(iii),2(1),(5)(ii),8(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rRegistration Act, 1908=17\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "WTA No. 154 of 2002, decided on 2-4-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID KARIM, JJ.",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAXWEALTH TAX\nVs \nMst. ASMA JILANI and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14035",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1703 = 2015 SLD 1703 = (2015) 112 TAX 30",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32(1),32(3A),32a,79,156(1),14,14A,46\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=3,6(1),33(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=148\\n\\r\\n\\rLaw Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.C.A No. 562/2015, decided on. 30-4-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD QASIM KHAN AND SHAHID HAMEED DAR, JJ.",
    "": "HUSSAIN CAN COMPANY\nVs\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14036",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 443 = 2020 SLD 443 = 2020 CLC 291",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan---\n----Art. 199 --- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115 --- Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court ---Scope---Orders amenable to revision under S. 115 of the C.P.C. --- Conversion of Constitutional petition into civil revision --- Scope---- Where an impugned order was revisable under S. 115 of the C.P.C., then a Constitutional petition could be converted into a civil revision under S.115, C.P.C.\nMian Asghar Ali v. Government of Punjab through Secretary (Colonies) BOR, Lahore and others 2017 SCMR 118 rel.\n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n----S. 12---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell immoveable property --- Depositing of entire / remaining sale consideration by plaintiff in court --- Bilateral contracts --- Scope--- Question before High Court was whether plaintiff seeking to enforce agreement to sell in a bilateral contract, was required to deposit entire sale consideration in court --- Contention of plaintiff, inter alia, was that as per contract, defendants failed to perform certain obligatory acts after initial payment, therefore plaintiff could not be made to deposit entire sale consideration until the defendants performed said acts --- Validity---- In bilateral agreement/contract/settlement(s), participating parties promise each other that they will perform or refrain from performing an act and such type of contract was also known as a \"\"two-sides contract\"\" ---- When plaintiff had already performed first part of agreement, it was the defendants who had to perform their part as agreed between them and on refusal of the same, plaintiff approached Court to force them to perform their part --- In such a case plaintiff could not be forced to deposit whole sale consideration, especially when the agreement was bilateral as well as under certain terms and conditions and both the parties had to perform their parts step by step.\nHamood Mehmood v. Mst. Shabana Ishaque and others 2017 SCMR 2022 distinguished.\n(c) Contract---\n----Business contract --- Nature and types of business contracts --- Formation and nature of consideration in business contracts---Contracts based on validity and execution ---Various types of \"\"business contracts/agreements\"\" used, enumerated and meaning thereof explained.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rSpecific Relief Act, 1877=12\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 9756 of 2019, decision dated: 30-10-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, JUSTICE",
    "": "SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, JUSTICE\nIJAZ AHMAD CHAUDHRY\nVS\nLEARNED CIVIL JUDGE AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14037",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 428 = 2020 SLD 428 = 2020 CLC 254",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---\n----S. 2(i)--- Term 'rent'--- Connotation--- Definition of 'rent' contained in section 2(i) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 includes \"\"electricity charges\"\" which are payable by the tenant.\nSher Afgan v. Sheikh Anjum Iqbal PLD 2004 SC 671; Muhammad Afzal v. IInd Addl. District and Sessions Judge and 2 others PLD 2008 Kar. 189; Muhammad Qasim v. VIth Additional District and Sessions Judge Karachi Central and 2 others 2008 CLC 446; Abdul Ghafoor v. Mst. Amtul Saeeda 1999 SCMR 28; Dr. Syed Ateeq Ahmed v. Mst. Nargis Jamal 1989 CLC 160; Syed Adil Hussain v. Mst. Majda 2000 CLC 1982; Syed Kazim Raza Afridi and others v. District Judge and others PLD 2005 Kar. 425; Badruddin v. Muhammad Yousuf 1994 SCMR 1900 and Mst. Rehana Begum v. Mst. Shagufta 1995 SCMR 323 rel.\n(b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---\n---- S. 15--- Default--- Subsequent payment--- Effect--- Once default is committed it cannot be wiped out by subsequent payment.\nReckitt and Colman of Pakistan Ltd. v. Saifuddin G. Lotia and 3 others 2000 SCMR 1924 and Ahmad Ali alias Ali Ahmad v. Nasar-ud-Din and another 2009 SCMR 453 rel.\n(c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---\n---- Ss. 2(i) & 15(2)(ii)--- Ejectment petition---Default in payment of utility bills---Effect---Landlords sought ejectment of tenant on grounds of non-payment of utility bills--- Rent Controller directed tenants to vacate premises but Lower Appellate Court set aside the same--- Validity--- Lower Appellate Court failed to appreciate that it was a statutory tenancy and as such rights and liabilities of both the parties were to be governed by Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979--- Term 'rent' under section 2(i) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 included \"\"water charges\"\", \"\"electricity\"\" charges and \"\"such other charges that were payable by tenant\"\" but were unpaid--- Landlords never pleaded or claimed that tenants were liable to pay electricity charges directly to them instead of paying same to the electric company--- Tenants committed default in payment of electricity charges and because of their default, electricity supply of demised premises was disconnected--- Lower Appellate Court wrongly held that landlords failed in proving that tenants had committed willful default in payment of electricity charges as electricity meter was not in name of landlords and demised premises was handed over to tenants without electricity--- High Court, in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction, directed tenants to vacate demised premises and to handover vacant and peaceful possession to landlords and set aside passed by Lower Appellate Court---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nBadruddin v. Muhammad Yousuf 1994 SCMR 1900; Mst. Rehana Begum v. Mst. Shagufta 1995 SCMR 323; Muhammad Usman v. Dr. Muhammad Hanif 1999 SCMR 2234 and Muhammad Aslam v. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd., 1988 CLC 482 rel.\nMst. Jannat Bibi v. Sher Muhammad and others 1988 SCMR 1696; Muhammad Ashraf v. Abdul Ghafoor and 4 others 1999 SCMR 2633; Muhammad Rafiq and others v. Muhammad Ali and others 2004 SCMR 704; Muhammad Ashraf v. Mst. Noor Jehan 1984 CLC 1938; Mrs. Alima Ahmad v. Amir Ali PLD 1984 SC 32; Pakistan State Oil Company (Ltd.) through Authorized Officer v. Muhammad Rafique and 4 others 2010 CLC 1300; Safeer Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Muhammad Khalid Shafi (decd.) through L.Rs. PLD 2007 SC 304 and Gulshan Ara v. The State 2010 SCMR 1162 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)=2(i),15,15(2)(ii)\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.VI,VII,VIII,R.2,3,4,5,14,15\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. S-90 of 2007, decision dated: 08-07-2019. dates of hearing: 22nd January and 6th March, 2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR, JUSTICE",
    "": "NADEEM AKHTAR, JUSTICE\nNIZAR NOOR AND OTHERS\nVS\nAMEER ALI AND OTHERS\nDistrict Judge, Karachi South.\nVIth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi South."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14038",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 444 = 2020 SLD 444 = 2020 CLC 315",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 & O. VII, R. 11---Temporary injunction, grant of---Rejection of plaint by the Appellate Court---Validity---Incompetent suit should be taken off the file at its inception and plaintiff was to be allowed to retrace his steps---Plaint could be rejected even before summoning the defendants or at any stage of suit proceedings---Plaint could only be rejected when the same was pending or was under challenge---Plaint, in the present case, was not pending before the Appellate Court therefore, Appellate Court was to refrain from making any definite opinion with regard to fate of the suit---Adjudication upon merits of the suit was out of scope of Appellate Court when it was not pending before it---Decision of suit on merits was not permissible while dealing with the decision of Trial Court with regard to application for grant or refusal of temporary injunction---Impugned passed by the Appellate Court being based on lack of jurisdiction was nullity in the eye of law---No prayer was made for rejection of plaint in the prayer clause of memo. of appeal before Appellate Court---Impugned passed by the Appellate Court was set aside---Appeal against ad-interim injunctive order would be deemed to be pending before Appellate Court which would decide the same in accordance with law---Revision was allowed, in circumstances.\nJewan and 7 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others 1994 SCMR 826; Messrs Paper Corner v. Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education 1991 CLC 740; Niamat Ali and 3 others v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and 4 others 2003 YLR 51; Mst. Sarwar Jan and 8 others v. District Judge, Bagh and others 2006 MLD 12; Bakht Zada v. Shah Tamash Khan and 5 others 2016 YLR 2337 and Nanik Ram and others v. Ghulam Akbar and 9 others 2016 MLD 52 ref.\nMessrs Aziz Flour Mills and 2 others v. The Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 1990 CLC 1473 and Muhammad Khalil Solahria v. Faisalabad Development Authority and others 1991 CLC Note 304 rel.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 & O.XLIII, R. 1(r)---Appeal against ad-interim injunctive order---Maintainability---Appeal against ad-interim injunctive order was maintainable.\nUmer Gul v. Malik Abdul Manan and others PLD 1992 Pesh. 76; Pioneer Pakistan Seed Ltd. v. United Distributors Pakistan Ltd. and 5 others 1998 CLC 61 and District Council Haripur through Administrator, Deputy Commissioner, Haripur v. Zaheer Ullah Khan PLD 1994 Pesh. 228 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=S.107(2),O.VII,XLIII,XXXIX,R.1,1(r),2,11\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 64102 of 2019, decision dated: 06-11-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AMEER BHATTI, JUSTICE",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AMEER BHATTI, JUSTICE\nMALIK WASEEM KHOKHAR\nVS\nTAIMURKAMAL AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14039",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 445 = 2020 SLD 445 = 2020 CLC 300",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n----S. 12---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell immoveable property---Requirements---Deposit of balance amount---Object and purpose of direction to deposit balance sale price in Court---Scope---Object and purpose of giving directions to deposit balance sale price in Court was to test bona fides, readiness and willingness of plaintiff besides tentatively assessing his financial ability --- Readiness and willingness of a party to purchase a property was directly linked with such party's financial soundness ---- Terms \"\"ready\"\" and \"\"\"\"willing\"\" to complete sale could not be claimed by a party merely by stating so, but should be demonstrated through tangible evidence, inter alia, by depositing the balance in Court --- Merely furnishing documents of some other immoveable property which belonged to some other person could not be accepted as compliance of order of the Court to deposit balance amount ---Mandatory in a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell immoveable property that the plaintiff / buyer deposit the balance amount in court otherwise non-compliance of such direction to deposit amount, would result in dismissal of the suit.\nAdil Tiwana and others v. Shaukat Ullah Khan Bangash 2015 SCMR 828; Sardar Ali Shah and others v. Ghufran Ullah and others 2011 CLC 1787; Muhammad Shoaib v. Jamila Khatoon 2015 YLR 1213 distinguished.\nHamood Mehmood's case 2017 SCMR 2022 rel.\n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)\n----Ss. 73 & 74 --- Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12---Breach of contract---Consequences --- Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract --- Compensation for breach of contract where penalty was stipulated for---Contract for sale of immoveable property---Earnest money, forfeiture of Discretion of Trial Court ---- Scope--- Advance or earnest money could be forfeited if a purchaser backtracked from his / her contractual commitments --- Parties may determine expected losses and agree for an amount to be paid in breach of contract and earnest money was part of purchase price when transaction went forward, and same was forfeited when a transaction fell though by reason of fault and failure of vendee ---- Discretion, however lay with the Court to interpret and implement a forfeiture clause in an agreement --- Court, if forms an opinion, that amount mentioned in an agreement as liquidated damages for breach, penalty or forfeiture; was unreasonable, then it was not necessary to implement such clause --- Court was not to permit a party to keep the entire amount if it was exorbitantly high and unreasonably harsh.\nMessrs Ravians Paper's case 2004 CLD 984 and Baghpati's case 2017 CLC Note 4 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=12\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=151\\n\\r\\n\\rContract Act, 1872=73,74\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1680 of 2015, decision dated: 18-10-2019. dates of hearing: 12th February and 27th February, 2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMAL ALAM, JUSTICE",
    "": "MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMAL ALAM, JUSTICE\nSHAHZAD NABI\nVS\nNASEER TURABI AND 9 OTHERS\nMs. Leela @ Kalpana Devi, AAG."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14040",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 429 = 2020 SLD 429 = 2020 CLC 275",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n----S. 12(2) & O. XXIII, R. 3---Withdrawal of suit--- Authority--- Plaintiff company was aggrieved of withdrawal of suit on basis of compromise which was result of misrepresentation and fraud---Single Judge of High Court in exercise of powers under S. 12(2), C.P.C. set aside compromise--- Validity--- To obtain withdrawal of suit it was presented to court by representatives of parties as they had entered into compromise out of court--- To dispute alleged compromise, plaintiff had filed application with affidavits of three persons who were among five attorneys appointed by plaintiff company for purposes of suit--- All three persons were associated with a law firm who stated that plaintiff company had always given its instructions directly to the advocate and not to any of attorneys--- Managing Director of plaintiff company also filed affidavit stating that there was no compromise with defendant Shipping Company and no instructions had ever been given to representative to withdraw suit nor representative had any authority to do so--- High Court declined to interfere in order passed by the Single Judge of High Court as there was no out of court compromise and a case of misrepresentation was established---High Court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\nNoor Muhammad v. Muhammad Siddique 1994 SCMR 1248; ANSW Enterprises v. Askari Commercial Bank Ltd. PLD 2001 SC 107; Azhar Asia Shipping Agency v. Ghaffar Corporation PLD 1996 SC 213; and Arokey Limited v. Munir Ahmed Mughal PLD 1982 SC 204 and Shabana Irfan v. Muhammad Shafi Khan 2009 SCMR 40 distinguished.\nLahore Development Authority v. Firdous Steel Mills 2010 SCMR 1097 and Islah High School, Chiniot v. Jawad Hussain 1996 SCMR 193 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=S.12(2),94,151,O.XXIII,XXXVIII,XXXIX,R.3\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 85 of 2018 in J.M. No. 59 of 2017 (Suit No. 1300 of 2017), decision dated: 07-05-2019. dates of hearing: 14th, 28th, November, 5th, 11th, 20th December, 2018.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HASAN AZHER RIZVI, JUSTICE, ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY, JUSTICE",
    "": "SYED HASAN AZHER RIZVI, JUSTICE\nADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY, JUSTICE\nSAGA SHIPPING AND TRADING CORPORATION LIMITED AND 2 OTHERS \nVS\nWALIA STEEL INDUSTRIES PLC THROUGH ATTORNEY AND 5 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14041",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 430 = 2020 SLD 430 = 2020 CLD 151",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---\n----S. 441---Tender bidding process---Term 'legal proceedings'---Applicability---Disability provided in S. 441 of Companies Act, 2017 is with respect to legal proceedings etc., in respect of any contract, dealing or transaction--- Participation in a tender bidding process does not come within the meaning of a \"\"contract\"\", \"\"dealing\"\" or \"\"transaction\"\".\n(b) Words and phrases---\n----'Transaction'---Meanings.\nBlack's Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition) ref.\n(c) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---\n----S. 441---Pubic Procurement Rules, 2004, R. 36---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Legal proceedings---Scope---Petitioner participated in a tender bidding process and sought to scrap procurement process and invite fresh tenders---Plea raised by authorities was that constitutional petition was not maintainable---Validity---If term 'any legal proceedings' was to include a petition, a sub-constitutional legislation could not impose a disability on a person from invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Petition was filed under Art. 199 of the Constitution seeking writs of Mandamus and Prohibition and petitioner attempted to bring to fore aberrations in tender bidding process adopted by procuring agency for procurement of goods---Petitioner did not seek relief of award of contract in its favour and since its participation in tender bidding process could not be termed as \"\"contract\"\", \"\"dealing\"\" or \"\"transaction\"\", therefore, institution of constitutional petition was not hit by S. 441 of Companies Act, 2017---Preliminary objection taken by authorities to maintainability of petition was spurned---Constitutional petition was maintainable in circumstances.\nArshad Mehmood v. Commissioner/Delimitation Authority PLD 2014 Lah. 221 rel.\n(d) Public Procurement Rules, 2004---\n----R. 36(a)---Single Stage One Envelope---Procedure---Procuring agency does not violate any provision of Public Procurement Rules, 2004 by requiring pre-qualified bidders to submit their financial quotations only---Such procedure is in accordance with 'Single Stage One Envelop Procedure' as envisaged by R. 36(a) of Public Procurement Rules, 2004.\nShaheen Construction Company v. Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority 2012 CLD 1445; Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority v. Shaheen Construction Company 2013 CLC 476 and Shaheen Construction Company v. Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority 2012 CLC 1434 ref.\n(e) Public Procurement Rules, 2004---\n----R. 26(3)---Extending validity of bids---Prerequisite---Existence of 'exceptional circumstances' is a prerequisite for requiring bidders to extend validity of their bids---Once a procuring agency complies with requirements of R. 26(3) of Public Procurement Rules, 2004 by recording existence of such circumstances in writing, bidders can be asked to extend validity of their bids---Reasons recorded pursuant to R. 26(3) of Public Procurement Rules, 2004 were justiciable---Recorded reasons have to be such as would make out a case for a necessity in extension in bid validity period.\n(f) Public Procurement Rules, 2004---\n----R. 4---Procuring ethics---Gifts and gratuities by bidders---Effect---Procuring agency, under R. 4 of Public Procurement Rules, 2004 is obligated to 'ensure that procurements are conducted in a fair and transparent manner'---Ethics is basis on which most of procurement related principles, such as fairness, integrity and transparency are based---Procurement agencies must maintain integrity and show transparency in their behaviour---Procuring agency and/or its employees ought not to accept gifts of items sought to be procured through a tender of for that matter, any gifts from suppliers during procurement process---Making of gifts and gratuities by bidders to procuring agencies or their officers during procurement process was most certainly an unethical business practice and same merits condemnation in strongest terms---Gift made by a supplier to procuring agency may not be with intention of securing a contract but it certainly creates perception of being unethical---Prohibition on bidders to make gifts to procuring agencies or their employees and on procuring agencies or their employees from accepting gifts from bidders during procurement process is implicit in R. 4 of Public Procurement Rules, 2004---Such gifts influence procurement decisions in order to secure contracts---Bidders making gifts to procuring agencies or their employees breach requirements of fairness and transparency in R. 4 of Public Procurement Rules, 2004 and expose themselves not just to be taken to task by law enforcing agencies but also to be disqualified from further participation in procurement process.\n(g) Public Procurement Rules, 2004---\n----R. 4---Procuring ethics---Free of cost samples---Scope---When free-of-cost samples are supplied pursuant to terms of letter of intent and contract and not pursuant to an unsolicited offer made by supplier, such supplier cannot be said to have committed an unethical conduct in such respect.\n(h) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---\n----S. 441---Pubic Procurement Rules, 2004, Rr. 31 & 36---Procurement process---Awarding of contract---Objection---Bid/pre-qualification documents---Submission after due date---Principles of natural justice---Applicability---Scope---Petitioner participated in a tender bidding process and sought to scrap procurement process and invite fresh tenders on grounds that successful bidder submitted pre-qualification documents after due date and decision of Grievance Redressal Committee (GRC) was violative of principles of natural justice---Validity---Where a procuring agency required bids or pre-qualification documents to be submitted within a stipulated deadline, a bidder could not be permitted to satisfy essential requirements of tender by supplementing its bid or pre-qualification documents along with documents filed after deadline---If principles of natural justice were violated in respect of any decision, it was indeed, immaterial whether same decision would have been arrived at in absence of departure from essential principles of natural justice---Decision taken in violation of principles of natural justice must be declared to be no decision and same was void---Decision of Grievance Redressal Committee taken in violation of principles of natural justice were void---Fact that decision of Grievance Redressal Committee was not challenged by petitioner would not obviate fact that it was void---High Court declared that pre-qualification of respondent company was in violation of terms and conditions of pre-qualification documents consequently, purchase order awarded to respondent was unlawful and of no legal consequences---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.\nS.I.S. Corporation (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2018 Isl. 150; SIS Corporation (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 CLD 48; Muhammad Ayub and Brothers v. Capital Development Authority PLD 2011 Lah. 16; Ram Gajadhar Nishad v. State of UP (1999) 2 SCC 486; Monarch Infrastructure (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation (2000) 5 SCC 287; Medical Education Registration of U.K. v. Spackman [1943] 2 All ER 337 and Muhammad Swaleh and another v. United Grain and Fodder Agencies PLD 1964 SC 97 rel.\nTrek Technologies Limited v. Icondor Telecom (Private) Limited 2018 CLD 668; Hala Spinning Mills Ltd. v. International Finance Corporation 2002 SCMR 450; Abdul Haque Baloch v. Government of Balochistan PLD 2013 SC 641; China Annag Construction Corporation v. K.A. Construction Co. 2001 SCMR 1877; JDW Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Province of Punjab PLD 2017 Lah. 68; S.I.S. Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2018 Isl. 150; Kitchen Cuisine (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation PLD 2016 Lah. 412; Independent Media Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh 2015 CLD 1448; Shafiq Traders v. Collector of Customs 2007 PTD 2092; Suo Motu Case No. 5 of 2010 PLD 2010 SC 731; SIS Corporation (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 CLD 48; Telkom SA Limited v. Merid Training (Pty) Ltd. Case No. 27984 of 2010; Mia Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan PWD PLD 2017 Isl. 29; Muhammad Ayub and Brothers v. Capital Development Authority PLD 2011 Lah. 16; Ram Gajadhar Nishad v. State of UP (1999) 2 SCC 486; Monarch Infrastructure (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation (2000) 5 SCC 287; Siemens Public Communication Networks Private Limited v. Union of India (2008) 16 SCC 215; AIR CIRO v. Civil Aviation Authority 2017 CLC 126; West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Company Limited (2001) 2 SCC 451; Habibullah Energy Limited v. WAPDA through Chairman PLD 2014 SC 47; Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2014 SC 206; Ramna Pipe and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines 2004 SCMR 1274; Iqtedar Ali Khan v. Department of Mines and Minerals PLD 2004 SC 773; Kay Bee International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Secretary to the Government of Punjab PLD 2002 SC 1074; Ittehad Cargo Service v. Syed Tasneem Hussain Naqvi PLD 2001 SC 116; Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid-i-Azam International Airport, Karachi 1998 SCMR 2268; Huffaz Seamless Pipe Industries Ltd. v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. 1998 CLC 1890 and Pacific Multinational (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Inspector-General of Police, Sindh Police Headquarters PLD 1992 Kar. 283 ref.\n(i) Natural justice, principles of---\n----Scope---In all proceedings by whomsoever held, whether judicial or administrative, principles of natural justice have to be observed if proceedings result in consequences affecting person or property or other rights of parties concerned---Without participation of party effected by an order or a decision amounts to an action without lawful authority---Requirement of maxim Audi Alteram Partem is not confined to proceedings before courts but extends to all proceedings by whomsoever held which may affect a person or property or other rights of parties concerned in dispute---Principles of natural justice must be read into each and every statute unless and until it is prohibited by statute itself.\nCommissioner of Income Tax East Pakistan v. Fazal ur Rehman PLD 1964 SC 410; University of Dacca and another v. Zain Ahmed PLD 1965 SC 90; Abdul Wadood Khan v. Chief Land Commissioner PLD 1983 SC 183; Pakistan Chrom Mines Limited v. War Risk Insurance 1983 SCMR 1208; Pakistan v. Public at Large PLD 1987 SC 304; Abdul Majeed Zafar v. Governor of Punjab 2007 SCMR 330; Ali Muhammad v. The State PLD 2010 SC 623 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=435,435(1)(a)to(f),436,441\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rPublic Procurement Rules, 2004=R.4,26(3),31,36,36(a)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.P. No. 3094 of 2018, decision dated: 16-10-2019. Hearing dated: 27-09-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE",
    "": "MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE\nGEMALTO MIDDLE EAST FZLLC\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, FINANCE DIVISION AND OTHERS\nAsim Shafi Nos. 3 and 4.\nMuhammad KHURSheed, Deputy Director, P.P.R.A."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14042",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 431 = 2020 SLD 431 = 2020 CLC 323",
    "Key Words:": "Sindh Public Procurement Rules, 2010---\n---- R. 47(2)--- Pakistan Engineering Council Engineering Works Bye-Laws, 1987, Byelaw 4(7)--- Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 18 & 25---Procurement of public works---Pakistan Engineering Council licence--- Petitioner was a duly licensed contractor who assailed previous work experience made a condition necessary for contractors to participate in tender--- Validity--- Licence issued by Pakistan Engineering Council did not certify ability of bidder nor was certification in respect of competence and guaranteed satisfactory performance of any works to be performed by contractor for a procuring agency---If procuring agency was of the view that some previous experience of certain works was necessary then incorporation of such condition in tender could not be held to be discriminatory as it was applied to all bidders---Nine bidders had already participated and plea of petitioner was misconceived--- Condition in question was neither discriminatory in nature nor was a restraint on trade as contained by placing reliance on Arts. 18 and 25 of the Constitution--- Once it was made applicable to all, then it could not be set aside on sole ground that it did not entitle a new contractor to enter in bidding process--- Such plea would have sufficed at the most if there were not any other bidder except one or two---High Court declined to interfere in the matter in circumstances--- Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Public Procurement Rules, 2010=R.47(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=18,25\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-842 and C.M.A. No. 3230 of 2019, decision & hearing dated: 12-06-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE, ADNAN-UL-KARIM MEMON, JUSTICE",
    "": "MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE\nADNANULKARIM MEMON, JUSTICE\nMESSRS AM & MJ BUILDERS (PVT.) LIMITED THROUGH DIRECTOR\nVS\nPROVINCE OF SINDH THROUGH SECRETARY AND 4 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14043",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 432 = 2020 SLD 432 = 2020 CLC 331",
    "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n----Ss. 42, 54 & 9---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Suit against dispossession of immovable property---Lessee and lessor---Cancellation of lease---Scope--- Plaintiff a registered trust sought, declaration to the effect that Trust was lessee of the Authorities (defendants) and the authorities had illegally and forcibly dispossessed the Trust, therefore, it was entitled to possession of the suit property---Validity---Unrebutted evidence showed that initially allotment order was given to the Trust specifically for construction of a hospital---Authorities claimed that certain amenity plots were handed over to the Metropolitan Corporation for development of parks---Witness of authorities admitted in cross-examination that no proceedings for cancellation of lease were initiated---Other witness of the authorities admitted in cross-examination that no notice was issued for inviting the public objections prior to conversion of suit property into park---Appraisal of evidence showed that till date the ownership of the Trust in respect of suit property was intact and the suit property though not in possession of Trust was still lying vacant---Authorities failed to point out any plausible documentary evidence to substantiate their arguments that before taking possession of the suit property by the Metropolitan Corporation, a due process was followed and/or any park thereafter was developed---No notification or amended layout plan was filed in evidence to show that the suit property, when transferred to the Metropolitan Corporation subsequently, also vested in it---Registered ownership lease could only be cancelled through a proper procedure and not otherwise---Authorities could not have transferred the suit property belonging to Trust to the Metropolitan Corporation without resorting to the requirement mentioned in the lease agreement---No complaint was lodged against the Trust regarding the usage of suit property for any other purpose than construction of hospital---Trust was owner/sub-lessee of the suit property and after having been illegally dispossessed therefrom by the authorities Trust was entitled to the re-possession of the same---Suit was decreed, in circumstances.\nMuhammad Saleem Asar and others v. Karachi Building Control Authority and others 2008 YLR 233; A. Razzak Adamjee and another v. Messrs Datari Construction Company (Pvt.) Limited and another 2005 SCMR 142; Abdul Haq v. Thakumal and 4 others 2017 YLR 1816 and Amir Jamal and others v. Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq and others 2011 SCMR 1023 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=9,42,54\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 620 of 1994, decision & hearing dated: 06-05-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMAL ALAM, JUSTICE",
    "": "MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMAL ALAM, JUSTICE\nISMAIL MEMORIAL TRUST THROUGH TRUSTEE\nVS\nKARACHI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETIES UNION LIMITED ADMINISTRATORCHIEF OFFICER AND 2 OTHERS\nMuhammad Shaban Solangi Nos.2 and 3."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14044",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 433 = 2020 SLD 433 = 2020 CLC 340",
    "Key Words:": "Gilgit Baltistan Right of Prior Purchase Regulation, 1938---\n----Regln. 5---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11 & O.VI, R. 17--- Pre-emption suit qua sale of a shop---Plaint, rejection of---Amendment of plaint---Scope---Trial Court rejected plaint against which appeal was filed wherein plaintiff moved application for amendment of plaint which was dismissed---Validity---No right of prior purchase did exist with regard to sale of shop, serai or market or other property used as a place for transaction of public business---Trial Court had rightly rejected plaint in the present suit---Petitioner through proposed amendment wanted to fill up defects/lacunas in the suit which was not permissible under the law---If proposed amendment was allowed then it would change the complexion of the suit and new cause of action would be introduced---Parties, in the present suit, were followers of Fiqa Jafaria---Right of pre-emption was not available on the basis of vicinage, contiguity and participation in the amenities attached to the suit property---Suit of pre-emptor was not maintainable, in circumstances---Impugned orders had been passed by the Courts below in accordance with law---Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.\nSection 249(2) of the Muhammadan Law by D.F. Mulla ref.",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "Gilgit Baltistan Right of Prior Purchase Regulation, 1938=5\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.VI,VII,R.11,17\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Revisions Nos. 04 and 05 of 2018, decision dated: 25-04-2019. Hearing dated: 23-04-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "ALI BAIG, JUSTICE",
    "": "ALI BAIG, JUSTICE\nDAULAT NAZIR\nVS\nBAGDUR KHAN AND OTHERS\nA.A.G. and Dy. A.G (Civil) Nos.4 and 5."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14045",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 434 = 2020 SLD 434 = 2020 CLC 353",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Easements Act (V of 1882)---\n----Ss. 60, 61, 62 & 63---Suit for possession against a licensee---Limitation---Rights of licensee could only be protected for a reasonable time enabling him to vacate the premises---Licence continued till the permission of licensor and the moment such permission was withdrawn or extinguished by operation of law or by violation of terms and conditions of license then such right would come to an end---Possession of licensee after termination of license would be that of mere a trespasser and denial of handing over the possession of the property would give a recurring cause of action---Once a licensee was always a licensee---Licensee was entitled to retain possession of the property till continuation of the permission to retain the same---Limitation for a suit for possession against licensee would start when notice of revocation was issued and if a notice was not served then license would become revoked when suit was filed---No question of limitation would arise in case of permissive possession---Plaintiffs were owners of suit property who had revoked the license of defendant one year before filing the suit---Cause of action arose when licence was revoked one year before filing the suit and not from the date of granting the license of property to the defendant---No illegality or irregularity, mis-reading or non-reading of evidence had been pointed out in the impugned s and decrees passed by the Courts below---Revision was dismissed in limine.\nMrs. Irene Wahab v. Lahore Deocesan Trust Association 2002 SCMR 300; Zarshad v. Shah Gul PLD 2003 SC 650; Maqbool Ahmed v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 2063; Dilawar Shah v. Jannat Gul PLD 2004 SC 59; Feroz Din Khan v. Muhammad Latif Khan PLD 2012 SC AJK 13; Government of Sindh through Secretary Education v. Begum Aisha Ahmed Ibrahim Bawani PLD 2018 Sindh 431; Commissioner Multan Division Multan and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others 2015 SCMR 58 and Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another 2014 SCMR 1469 rel.\n(b) Easements Act (V of 1882)---\n----S. 52---'Licence'---Stipulations for a valid licence.\nFollowing are the stipulations for a valid licence:\ni. A right is granted by the grantor,\nii. The right is to do or continue to do something,\niii. The right must be in respect of the immovable property of the grantor,\niv. The act which the grant permits must be such as would be lawful but for the permission, and\nv. The right must not amount to an easement.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Easements Act, 1882=52,60,61,62,63\\n\\r\\n\\rLimitation Act, 1908=28,144\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.R. No. 54567 of 2019, decision dated: 25-09-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. MUHAMMAD IQBAL, JUSTICE",
    "": "CH. MUHAMMAD IQBAL, JUSTICE\nSHAHNAZ BEGUM AND OTHERS\nVS\nOTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14046",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 435 = 2020 SLD 435 = 2020 CLC 392",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)----\n----S. 15---Ejectment petition---Bona fide personal need of landlord---Non-mentioning of good faith by the landlord---Effect---Where landlord was willing to get vacated rented premises without good faith, application of landlord would not be allowed on ground of personal need---If the Rent Tribunal had mentioned in his findings \"\"good faith\"\" of \"\"personal need\"\" of landlord; word \"\"bona fide\"\" was not necessary to be mentioned as said word was synonyms with \"\"good faith\"\".\n(b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---\n----S.15---Ejectment petition---Bona fide personal need of landlord---Contention that landlady did not require the demised premises in good faith but wanted to sell as such purpose did not amount to bona fide need---Validity---Point of selling the premises by landlady was not taken by tenant before two forums below---No such intention was mentioned by landlady in her affidavit in evidence, wherein she had taken plea that she needed the premises to house her daughter---Landlady was not cross-examined on that point; tenant could not take refuge from something mentioned in the pleadings---Landlady was a retired ailing old lady as such her intention that she needed her daughter to be settled in demised premises, appeared to be coherent and reasonable---Owner could sell her/his property at any moment even without getting the same vacated---No doubt under Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, rented premises could not be vacated solely on ground of selling the same but it was nowhere mentioned in the said Ordinance that after getting the premises vacated owner could not sell the same---Landlady had established her personal need---Findings of two courts below did not require any interference.\nPLD 1981 SC 246 rel.\n(c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---\n----S. 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Preamble---Application of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to proceedings under Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Scope---Application under the Ordinance could not be equated with plaint of civil suit---Provisions of C.P.C. were not applicable to the same.\n(d) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---\n----S. 15---Ejectment petition---Default in payment of rent---Contention that period of default in payment of rent was not mentioned in the ejectment application, therefore, tenant was not a \"\"defaulter\"\"---Validity---Admittedly tenant used to pay rent through cheque, which was deposited in landlady's Bank account---Statement of Bank account was annexed by the landlady which showed default of 8 months---Default of tenant was established in view of Bank statement.\n(e) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n----Arts.86 & 87---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.8---Computer generated Bank statement without seal of Bank---Admissibility in evidence---Contention that Bank statements did not bear signature of concerned officials and seal of Bank therefore such statements were not admissible---Landlady's counsel referred to Art.87 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, regarding certified copies of public record---Held, Bank statement was admissible as certified copy under S.8 of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 and not under Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Such certified copy did not require seal of Bank, because Bank statement was not a public record but as per provisions of Art.86 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 was a private document.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)=15,15(2)(vii)\\n\\r\\n\\rQanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=86,87\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. S-2651 of 2017, decision dated: 17-11-2018. Hearing dated: 12-10-2018.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAHIM AHMED SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE",
    "": "FAHIM AHMED SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE\nMUHAMMAD SHAMSHAD SULAIMAN\nVS\nMST. ALMAS BEGUM AND 2 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14047",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 436 = 2020 SLD 436 = 2020 CLC 360",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan---\n---- Art. 199--- Constitutional petition--- Factual controversy--- Privacy of residence--- Encroachment on public property--- Alternate remedy, availability of--- Petitioner was aggrieved of construction of building by respondents as it disturbed privacy of residence and encroached upon public property--- Validity--- Constitutional petition under Art. 199 of Constitution was for enforcement of clear legal right and not otherwise meant for establishing a right which in fact was free from doubt--- Doubtful/disputed question of fact could not be seen under Constitutional jurisdiction as same was not meant for disputes relating to determination of boundaries of property as such remedy was available under general law--- When an alternate remedy was provided, Constitutional jurisdiction could not be exercised--- High Court declined to exercise Constitutional jurisdiction as petition was not only without any merits but was also misconceived--- Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\nSecretary to Government of the Punjab v. Ghulam Nabi PLD 2001 SC 415; Fida Hussain v. Mst. Saiqa 2011 SCMR 1990; Abdul Fatah Bhutto and others v. Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary and three others 2014 CLC 639; Ghulam Muhammad Ali v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Home Department and 7 others 2016 MLD 65; Pir Ishfaq Ahmad v. Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Collector Charrsada and another 2018 CLC 449 and Abdul Qadir Farooqui v. The Federal Ministry of Finance and others 2018 CLC 758 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.I,R.8\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.P. No. 2353-P of 2018 with I.R. and C.M. No. 1508 of 2019, decision & hearing dated: 28-08-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "ROOH-UL-AMIN KHAN, JUSTICE, MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR, JUSTICE",
    "": "ROOHULAMIN KHAN, JUSTICE\nMUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR, JUSTICE\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY AND 8 OTHERS\nShakeel Ahmad Nos.3 and 6."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14048",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 437 = 2020 SLD 437 = 2020 CLC 344",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Local Government Act (XLII of 2013)----\n----S. 36(1)(i)---Disqualification----Town Committee---Election---Pecuniary interest---Candidate being Government contractor had pecuniary interest in affairs of Town Committee where he remained Member/Chairman---Candidate assailed the order of Election Commission wherein he was disqualified from holding office of Chairman/Member of Town Committee----Held, not only could the disqualification be predicated in respect of work to be done or goods to be supplied to a Council but such disqualification was also attracted if a person had otherwise any direct pecuniary interest in the affairs of the said Council-----Section 36(1)(i) of the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013 contained two disjunctive segments and the candidate had been unable to demonstrate before the Election Commission that he had no pecuniary interest in the affairs of the Committee where he remained Member/Chairman---Constitutional petition dismissed.\n(b) Sindh Local Government Act (XLII of 2013)----\n----S. 36(2)(b)----Jurisdiction and power of Election Commission of Pakistan to unseat a Member or Holder of elective office---Scope---Section 36 of Sindh Local Government Act, 2013 expressly provided that the person shall be disqualified from being elected or chosen and/or from being a member of the Council if the disqualifications prescribed in the said provision were attracted---Phrase \"\"being a member\"\" signified that a person who was subsisting as a member could be disqualified by the Election Commission under the provisions of S.36(2)(b) of the said Act.\nAbdul Latif v. Election Commission of Pakistan and another 2018 CLC 227 and Abdul Latif v. Election Commission of Pakistan and another in C.P. No.4355 of 2017 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Local Government Act, ( XLII of 2013)=36(1)(i)(j),36(2)(b)\\n\\r\\n\\rElections Act, 2017=9\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=63(1)(i),218(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.P. No. D-493 of 2018, decision dated: 31-05-2019. dates of hearing: 30th April and 15th May, 2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JUSTICE, AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JUSTICE\nAGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE\nUMAID ALI\nVS\nTHE ELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY AND 4 OTHERS \nAbdullah Hinjrah, Law Officer Election Commission of Pakistan."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14049",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 438 = 2020 SLD 438 = 2020 CLC 365",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---\n----O. XLI, R. 31---Suit for declaration---Judgment in appeal---Points for determination, non-framing of---Effect---Appellate Court was to scan and examine the material available on record as well as evidence adduced by the parties---Compliance of O. XLI, R. 31, C.P.C. was mandatory in nature and Appellate Court could not evade the said provision---Appellate Court had failed to record reasons upon each and every issue framed by the Trial Court; to decide the controversy in the purview of evidence adduced by both the parties; and no reason had been furnished while dismissing the appeal---Appellate Court had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of O. XLI, R. 31, C.P.C. while deciding the matter---No points for determination had been framed by the Appellate Court nor any findings had been recorded on the same---Matter was remanded to the Appellate Court with the direction to decide the same afresh---Revision was allowed accordingly.\n2018 SCMR 76 and 2018 SCMR 1616 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=S.151,O.XLI,R.27,31\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision Application No. 253 of 2018, decision dated: 05-07-2019. Hearing dated: 24-05-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHADIM HUSSAIN TUNIO, JUSTICE",
    "": "KHADIM HUSSAIN TUNIO, JUSTICE\nALI MUHAMMAD AND 4 OTHERS\nVS\nLEARNED ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGEIII, DADU AND 14 OTHERS\nIntizar Hussain QUReshi"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14050",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 439 = 2020 SLD 439 = 2020 CLC 369",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n----S. 115 & O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.43, 54 & 55---Suit for declaration, permanent and mandatory injunction---Order of appellate court suspending operation of the impugned order---\"\"Case decided\"\"---Scope---Petitioners assailed order of Trial Court in appeal whereby their application under O. XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C. in a suit for declaration, permanent and mandatory injunctions was dismissed---Appellate Court issued notices to the respondents and suspended operation of the order of trial court by which the petitioners felt aggrieved---Validity---Nothing was finally decided amounting to a challengeable decision and only the operation of the order of trial court was suspended---Suspending the order of dismissal of an application without passing further order for granting any relief or restoring relief that was granted as an ad-interim relief by the trial court at a stage before the said application was dismissed did not tantamount to automatically revive any relief that could have been granted at ad-interim stage as the same had merged in the final order, therefore, there was no finally settled matter to be agitated before and determined by the High Court in the civil revision, which required the impugned decision to be a \"\"case decided\"\"---Revision petition, being premature, was dismissed.\nMian Muhammad Luqman and 5 others v. Farida Khanam and another 1994 SCMR 1991; Nestle Milkpak Limited v. Classic Needs Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 others 2006 SCMR 21 and Abdul Razzaq and others v. Muhammad Ajmal Khan PLD 2018 Lah. 491 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=S.115,O.XXXIX,R.1,2\\n\\r\\n\\rSpecific Relief Act, 1877=43,54,55\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.R. No. 731 of 2019, decision dated: 18-06-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUSTICE",
    "": "MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUSTICE\nSYED ALI MANZAR ZAIDI AND 6 OTHERS\nVS\nSYED NAFEES HAIDER AND 10 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14051",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 440 = 2020 SLD 440 = 2020 CLC 373",
    "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)---\n----S. 44---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Board of Revenue Act, 1993, S.6(3)---Writ petition---Maintainability---Allotment of Shamilat Deh land---Necessary party---Board of Revenue having not been impleaded in the writ petition---Effect---High Court dismissed writ petition due to non-joinder of necessary party---Validity---Member, Board of Revenue had been impleaded in the writ petition who had passed the impugned order---Any order made or a decree passed by the Member, Board of Revenue would be deemed to be an order or decree of the Board of Revenue---Petitioners were supposed to have impleaded Board of Revenue as a party in the writ petition instead of Member, Board of Revenue alone---Court while exercising writ jurisdiction or even in an appeal had powers to implead the necessary party for doing complete justice but petitioners were negligent in prosecuting their case and they were not entitled to discretionary relief after a period of four years---Impugned passed by the High Court did not suffer from any legal infirmity---No legal question of law of public importance was involved in the petition ---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nZahid Mehmood Shah and 24 others v. Azad Government and 14 others 2011 SCR 159 and Khaliq Nawaz and 3 others v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government and 2 others 2017 SCR 1504 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court (AJ&K)",
    "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.I,R.10\\n\\r\\n\\rAzad Jammu and Kashmir Board of Revenue Act, 1993=6(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil PLA No. 377 of 2019, decision dated: 11-10-2019. Hearing dated: 09-10-2019. (On appeal from the judgment of the High Court dated 26-3-2019 in Writ Petition No. 2334 of 2015).",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM ZIA CHIEF, JUSTICE, GHULAM MUSTAFA MUGHAL, JUSTICE",
    "": "CH. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM ZIA CHIEF JUSTICE\nGHULAM MUSTAFA MUGHAL, JUSTICE\nMUHAMMAD ARSHAD KHAN AND 15 OTHERS\nVS\nMEMBER BOARD OF REVENUE, AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR, MUZAFFARABAD AND 16 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14052",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 441 = 2020 SLD 441 = 2020 CLC 380",
    "Key Words:": "Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---\n----S.5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of dowry articles and dower---Family Court decreed the suit and appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court---Validity---Not possible for wife to keep the record of purchased articles and prepare list of dowry articles and obtain signatures of husband and witnesses---Whosoever alleged existence of a particular fact was to prove the same---Solitary statement of wife was enough to prove dowry articles---When marriage had not been consumated then wife would be entitled to half of the fixed dower only and remaining half should be returned/restored to husband unless he waived such right voluntarily---Impugned s and decrees passed by the Courts below to the extent of dowry articles were modified and amount of dowry articles was reduced---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.\nMuhammad Habib v. Safia Bibi 2008 SCMR 1584; Shakeela Bibi v. Muhammad Israr 2012 MLD 756 and Muhammad Akbar v. Shazia Bibi PLD 2014 SC 693 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Family Courts Act, 1964=5, Schedule\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.P. No. 39 of 2019, decision dated: 23-09-2019. Hearing dated: 16-09-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JUSTICE, ABDUL HAMEED BALOCH, JUSTICE",
    "": "NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JUSTICE\nABDUL HAMEED BALOCH, JUSTICE\nAZIZUR-REHMAN\nVS\nMST. BIBI JAMEELA AND 2 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14053",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 442 = 2020 SLD 442 = 2020 CLC 371",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----\n----O. VII, R.18---Additional evidence----Deed of power of attorney was misplaced at the time of filing of the suit----Tendering of fresh power of attorney when suit was at the verge of finalization----Validity---Any new document, which was not in existence at the time of filing of suit or even at the initial stage of suit, could not be considered as a piece of additional evidence----Law had provided a mechanism for establishing a missing or lost documents and the same course ought to be adopted by plaintiff through examination of witnesses instead of creating a fresh similar document---Application for filing of additional evidence was dismissed.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.VII,R.18\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.M.A. No. 5152 of 2018 in Suit No. 821 of 1999, decision dated: 21-02-2019. Hearing dated: 12-02-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "FAHIM AHMED SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE",
    "": "FAHIM AHMED SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE\nMUHAMMAD NASEEM JAN AND 3 OTHERS\nVS\nMUHAMMAD AZEEM JAN AND OTHERS\nMirza Atif Nos.2 to 3."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14054",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 448 = 2020 SLD 448 = 2020 CLC 384",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---\n----O. XLI, R. 19---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Appeal dismissed in default---Restoration of---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Petition for restoration of appeal was dismissed being time barred---Contention of applicant was that due to illness he could not file petition for restoration of appeal within time---Validity---Applicant and his counsel after filing of appeal did not take interest in proceeding with the matter---Petition for restoration of appeal was moved with delay of fifty days along with an application for condonation of delay---No affidavit of counsel had been filed with the application for restoration of appeal---Alleged medical certificate filed along with the petition was manipulated one---Neither counsel for appellant nor any person as attorney appeared to satisfy the Court that appellant was vigilant in pursuing his case with due care---Counsel for the appellant could himself file application for restoration of appeal with his own affidavit in time---Appellate Court was justified to pass the impugned order for dismissal of appeal for non-prosecution---Delay of each and every day had not been accounted for---Law did favour disposal of cases on merits but it would help the vigilant and not the indolent---No illegality had been committed by the Appellate Court while passing the impugned order---Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=S.115,O.XLI,R.19\\n\\r\\n\\rLimitation Act, 1908=5\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "R.A. No. S-08 of 2018, decision dated: 11-02-2019. Hearing dated: 17-08-2018.",
    "Judge Name:": "KHADIM HUSSAIN M. SHAIKH, JUSTICE",
    "": "KHADIM HUSSAIN M. SHAIKH, JUSTICE\nALAMZAIB\nVS\nPROVINCE OF SINDH THROUGH SECRETARY AND 3 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14055",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 447 = 2020 SLD 447 = 2020 CLC 377",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n-----O.XXIII, R.1(3)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition, withdrawal of---Fresh suit---Bar under O.XXIII, R.1(3), C.P.C.---Applicability---Plaintiff filed constitutional petition but thereafter withdrew the same unconditionally---Plaintiff filed suit with regard to same subject matter---Validity---Held, withdrawal of constitutional petition did not serve to bar the suit under O.XXIII, R.1, C.P.C.\nHashim Khan v. National Bank of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 325; Malik Shahid Mehmood v. Malik Afzal Mehmood and others 2011 SCMR 551 and Shahbaz Khan v. Additional District Judge, Ferozewala and others 2017 SCMR 2005 distinguished.\nAmber Ahmed Khan v. P.I.A. Corpn. PLD 2003 Kar. 405 and Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior and others AIR 1987 SC 88 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.XXIII,R.1,1(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=32,199,226\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 1878 of 2018, decision dated: 30-05-2019. Hearing dated: 09-05-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "YOUSUF ALI SAYEED, JUSTICE",
    "": "YOUSUF ALI SAYEED, JUSTICE\nABDUL QUDUS ALVI\nVS\nTHE NED UNIVERSITY OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY THROUGH REGISTRAR AND 2 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14056",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 449 = 2020 SLD 449 = 2020 CLD 265",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n----S. 118---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2---Summary suits upon bills of exchange---Presumption as to negotiable instrument---Dishonoured cheque---Endorsement for consideration---Burden of proof---Scope---Plaintiff filed suit for recovery of Rs.5,00,000/- on the basis of dishonoured cheque and claimed that the defendant had borrowed the said amount---Defendant contended that he had issued an open cheque on account of fiscal liability but the liability stood discharged on account of certain transactions and he was liable to pay only Rs. 13,000---Trial Court decreed the suit---Validity---Plaintiff had not mentioned any specific date either in the plaint or in evidence as to when the loan amount was advanced to the defendant---Stance of plaintiff was not believable that just on the request of defendant such a huge amount was advanced without any documentation or even issuance of cheque at that time---Parties had no blood or family relation---Plaintiff contended that cheque was a negotiable instrument and since the defendant had not denied its issuance therefore burden of proof of non-payment of consideration was on the defendant---Presumption under S. 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was not a conclusive presumption of drawing consideration of a negotiable instrument, rather it was rebuttable in nature and initial burden of proving that the negotiable instrument was executed against consideration was on the plaintiff---Plaintiff had failed to discharge the initial onus of passing on Rs. 5,00,000/- to the defendant---Appeal was allowed; impugned and decree was set aside and the suit of plaintiff was dismissed.\n \nMuhammad Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Liaqat Ali 2007 CLD 1605; Muhammad Nawaz v. Qazi Muhammad Rashid 2018 CLC Note 34 and Asif Ali and 6 others v. Saeed Muhammad 2010 CLD 1301 ref.\nSalar Abdur Rauf v. Mst. Barkat Bibi 1973 SCMR 332 rel.\n(b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n----S. 118---Presumption as to negotiable instruments---Dishonoured cheque---Endorsement for consideration---Burden of proof---Scope---Presumption under S. 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is not a conclusive presumption of drawing consideration of a negotiable instrument, rather it is rebuttable in nature and initial burden of proving that the negotiable instrument is executed against consideration is on the plaintiff.\nSalar Abdur Rauf v. Mst. Barkat Bibi 1973 SCMR 332 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=118\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.XXXVII,R.1,2\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 100 of 2012, decision & hearing dated: 02-05-2018.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUJAHID MUSTAQEEM AHMED, JUSTICE",
    "": "MUJAHID MUSTAQEEM AHMED, JUSTICE\nGHULAM MURTAZA\nVS\nMUHAMMAD RAFI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14057",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 450 = 2020 SLD 450 = 2020 CLD 219",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)---\n----Ss. 10 & 59---Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001), Preamble---Deceptive marketing practices---Competition Act, 2010 to override other laws---Distribution of false or misleading information---Fraudulent use of another s trademark---Pendency of proceedings before court regarding right to use trade mark---Effect---Complainant urged that the respondent had commenced its housing/real estate development business by adopting a trade/service mark and symbol deceptively similar to that of complainant s registered trade/service mark---Respondent contended that the proceedings under the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 were pending adjudication before High Court, hence the Commission could not proceed in the matter---Validity---Proceedings pending before High Court under the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 pertained to violation of trade mark whereas the proceedings before the Commission were pending adjudication for deceptive marketing practices, which were distinct in nature and were not conflicting---Complainant was a real estate developer which marketed its project under a trade mark duly registered with the tradmarks Registry---Respondent had used the similar name and symbol for marketing and promotion of its real estate project---Respondent had failed to produce any documentary evidence showing authorization for the use of the trade mark---Complainant and respondent were in the business of real estate development in Pakistan---Town marketed by complainant was located in District I whereas town marketed by respondent was located in District G ---Use of similar words and symbols could easily deceive an ordinary consumer/investor and he could assume that the projects in both districts were of the same company or at least of the same group---Both parties were operating in the same line of business therefore both companies were targeting the same set of prospective consumers/investors so chances of deception and resultant harm to the competitor were multiplied---Commission held that the respondent was misleading consumers by using a trade name that was deceptively similar to that of complainant s registered trade mark and symbol and that the respondent had resorted to deceptive marketing practices in violation of S. 10 of Competition Act, 2010---Commission imposed penalty on the respondent for violating the provisions of S. 10 of Competition Act, 2010; directed respondent to inform the public at large that its real estate project was not related to that of complainant and reprimanded it to discontinue the use of trade mark of the complainant and not to use it in future without due authorization--- Show cause notice was disposed of accordingly.\nShow Cause Notice issued for violation of DHL Trademark: In the matter of 2013 CLD 1014 and Show Cause Notice issued to Messrs Visions Developers: In the matter of 2018 CLD 350 rel.\n(b) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)---\n----Preamble, Ss. 59 & 28---Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001), Preamble---Functions and powers of the Commission---Competition Act, 2010 to override other laws---Decision by Tribunal regarding use of a trade mark---Application of other laws not barred---Scope---Question before Commission was as to whether it could proceed in the matter where proceedings under Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 were pending before any Tribunal or Court---Validity---Legislature had entrusted the Competition Commission with the exclusive mandate to provide for free competition in all spheres of commercial and economic activity, to enhance economic efficiency and to protect consumers from anti-competitive practices---Commission was mandated under S. 28(1)(a) of Competition Act, 2010 to initiate proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Act and to make Orders in cases of contraventions thereof---Non-obstante clause of S. 59 of Competition Act, 2010 made it abundantly clear that the provisions and applicability of the Competition Act, 2010 were given an overriding effect over all other conflicting laws in force.\n(c) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)---\n----S. 10---Deceptive marketing practices---Liability of advertiser---Net general impression--- Dominant message--- Scope--- Competition Commission, while evaluating the net general impression or dominant message, delineates and examines the express or implied claims contained in an advertisement or promotional campaign, while holding the advertiser liable for both---Advertiser is liable for all such claims if they are false and/or misleading or lack a reasonable basis for the same---Neither proof of intent to disseminate a deceptive claim nor evidence that consumers have actually been mislead is required for an act or omission to constitute violation of S. 10 of Competition Act, 2010.\nChina Mobile Pak Limited and Pakistan Telecom Mobile Limited: In the matter of 2010 CLD 1478 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=10,10(1),10(2)(a)(b),28,28(1)(a),30,59\\n\\r\\n\\rTrade Marks Rules, 2004=Clause,36,4th Schedule.\\n\\r\\n\\rCompetition Commission (General Enforcement) Regulations, 2007=26(2)(e),30(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "F.No. 316/MEHER DEVELOPERS/COMP/OFT/CCP/2018, decision dated: 22-11-2019. dates of hearing: 25th July and 7th August, 2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "DR. MUHAMMAD SALEEM, MEMBER, DR. SHAHZAD ANSAR, MEMBER, MS. SHAISTA BANO, MEMBER",
    "": "MESSRS MIR HASSAN BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS (PVT.) LIMITED: IN THE MATTER OF"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14058",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 451 = 2020 SLD 451 = 2020 CLD 274",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n----Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of finance facility---Leave to defend---Continuing guarantee---Effect of novation of contract---Scope---Appellants assailed and decree passed by Single Judge of High Court and contended that although Single Judge of High Court held that guarantees executed by two of the appellants were continuing guarantees but failed to take into consideration that the finance agreements were subsequently renewed time and again; that the subsequent finance agreements did not mention the guarantees executed by said two appellants; that said two appellants were discharged from payment of the amount of finance as guarantors on account of novation of contract and that said appellants were entitled at least for grant of leave to defend the suit---Validity---Single Judge of High Court had referred to the continuing guarantees of said appellants but the was silent as to the effect of renewal agreements, which only referred to continuing guarantee of another appellant but not of said appellants---Even the plaint was silent to that effect, which only referred to personal guarantees of said appellants up to the renewal agreement---Effect of the non-mentioning of the personal guarantees of said appellants was required to be determined while passing the impugned ---Said appellants were at least entitled for grant of leave to defend to establish that their guarantees were discharged---Division Bench of High Court allowed the appeal and applications for leave to defend to the extent of said appellants and remanded the matter to the Single Judge of High Court for further proceedings.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n----Ss.9 & 10---Suit for recovery of finance facility---Leave to defend---Scope---Appellants assailed and decree passed by Single Judge of High Court---Validity---Single Judge of High Court had properly appreciated the controversy and rightly dismissed their applications for leave to defend as no substantial question of law and facts requiring recording of evidence was raised and application for leave to defend was not in consonance with the provisions of S. 10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and was rightly refused---Single Judge of High Court had rightly relied upon the statement of accounts excluding a certain sum of amount as markup charged beyond the expiry period and decreed the suit against two of the appellants jointly and severally---Findings of Single Judge of High Court were in consonance with the material available on record and were well founded, warranting no interference---Appeal was dismissed to the extent of said appellants.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)=9,10,10(3)(4)(5),22\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 872 of 2016, decision dated: 02-05-2019. Hearing dated: 28-03-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE, MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUSTICE",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE\nMUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUSTICE\nMESSRS GULISTAN POWER GENERATION LIMITED AND 3 others\nVS\nBANK OF PUNJAB AND 2 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14059",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 455 = 2020 SLD 455 = 2020 CLD 238",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n----Ss. 16 & 9---Suit for recovery---Attachment before , injunction and appointment of Receiver---Adjudication under S. 16 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Scope---Question before High Court was whether an application under S. 16 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 could be filed by customer / borrower ---Held, that in a suit filed under S. 9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, matter had to be proceeded in view of the provisions of said Ordinance and an application under S. 16 of said Ordinance could only be filed by a financial institution and not a borrower---Contention that if there was no bar in general law, then such application could be allowed, was incorrect and application under S. 16 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 filed by a borrower was not maintainable.\nHaji Abdul Wali Khan v. Muhammad Hanif 1991 SCMR 2457 distinguished.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---\n----Ss. 22 & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVIII, R. 5---Suit for recovery---Attachment before ---Appeal---Scope---Nature of adjudication under O. XXXVIII, C.P.C.---Application under O. XXXVIII, R. 5, C.P.C. was an extraordinary relief where if Court was satisfied that other party was likely to defeat decree in future then under such special circumstances, Court may pass order with regard to attachment before Judgment---Necessary ingredients were to be fulfilled before grant of application under O. XXXVIII, R. 5, C.P.C. and merely on apprehension alone, such application could not be granted---Nature of an order under O. XVIIII, C.P.C. was penal in nature and adjudication under O. XXXVIII, C.P.C. had to be done with great care and caution---Order made on an application under O. XXXVIII, C.P.C. seeking attachment before , was interim/interlocutory in nature and was not appealable under S. 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\nNoor Muhammad Lambardar v. Member (Revenue) Board of Revenue, Punjab 2003 SCMR 708 and Bank Al-Falah Ltd. v. Interglobe Commerce Pakistan 2017 CLD 1428 distinguished.\nNational University of Sciences and Technology (NUST) Islamabad through Registrar and 2 others 2011 YLR 1070; Nadeem Akhtar and another v. Messrs Dubai Islamic Bank (Pakistan) Ltd. 2013 CLD 805; Malik Israr Salim v. Citibank N.A., Lahore and another 2003 CLD 588 and Mazhar Butt v. United Bank Limited and another 2012 CLD 285 rel.\nMadhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtre AIR 1978 SC 47; Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and others AIR 1977 SC 85; Noor Muhammad Lambardar v. Member (Revenue) Board of Revenue, Punjab 2003 SCMR 708; Bank Al-Falah Ltd. v. Interglobe Commerce Pakistan 2017 CLD 1428; Asif Kudia v. KASB Bank 2014 CLD 1548; Muhammad Ather Hafeez Khan v. Messrs SSANGYONG and Unsmani JV PLD 2011 Kar. 605; Messrs Iram Ghee Mills v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp. 1999 MLD 1434; Bank Al-Falah v. Messrs Callmate Telips Telecom 2016 CLD 1202; Balochistan Glass Ltd. v. Bank Al-Falah Ltd. 2015 CLD 52; Sirajul Haq v. KDA PLD 1994 Kar. 315; V.M. Abdul Rahman and others v. D.K. Cassim and Sons and another AIR 1933 PC 58; Messrs Qadoos Brothers Poultry Farms through Abdul Qadoos v. Judge Banking Court No.1 Gujranwala and others 2018 CLD 88; Ghulam Sarwar v. Abdul Jalil and 2 others PLD 1991 SC 500; Muhammad Khan v. Zarai Tarakiati Bank Limited through President 2014 CLD 1596; Bank Al-Falah Ltd. v. Interglobe Commerce Pakistan 2017 CLD 1428; Pakistan Fisheries Ltd., Karachi and others v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109; Syed Wajahat Hussain Zaidi and another v. United Bank Limited 2019 CLD 91 and Shehryar Waqas Malik and another v. Muhammad Zafar Ali Khan 2018 CLD 1040 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)=9,16,22,22(6)\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=S.151,O.XVIIII,XXXVII,XLIII,R.3,5\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No. 203 of 2017, decision dated: 28-05-2019. dates of hearing: 2nd, 24th April and 16th May, 2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JUSTICE, MRS. KAUSAR SULTANA HUSSAIN, JUSTICE",
    "": "IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JUSTICE\nMRS. KAUSAR SULTANA HUSSAIN, JUSTICE\nHAJI ABDUL RAZZAK (DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS\nVS\nFAYSAL BANK LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14060",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 456 = 2020 SLD 456 = 2020 CLD 210",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013---\n----R. 5(2)---Public Sector Companies (Appointment of Chief Executive) Guidelines, 2015, Schedules I & II---Appointment of Chief Executive---Procedure---Violations---Petitioner was aggrieved of appointment of respondent as Chief Executive of public sector company on grounds that her appointment was violative of required procedure---Validity---Action of nominating candidates by Board to line ministry was culmination of larger process of selection envisaged by Schedule I to Public Sector Companies (Appointment of Chief Executive) Guidelines, 2015---Recommendation of two names by Board was in clear violation of Public Sector Companies (Appointment of Chief Executive) Guidelines, 2015 which required Board to recommend minimum of three candidates to line ministry for appointment to post of Chief Executive---Recommendation of three names by Board out of short-listed candidates was a mandatory requirement which could not be circumvented by Board by sending names of only two candidates to Chief Minister for appointment---Process for initiating case for appointment to post of Chief Executive of company was not in accordance with manner laid down by Public Sector Companies (Appointment of Chief Executive) Guidelines, 2015 and such aspect of matter completely escaped attention of authorities---High Court declared appointment of respondent to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.\nBarrister Sardar Muhammad v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2013 Lah. 343 rel.\n(b) Administration of justice---\n----When law directs that a particular proceedings would be taken in a particular manner, purport of wording of statute would be taken as indicating intention of lawmaker to exact a strict compliance with its terms.\n6 Bac, Abr. 377 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules 2013=R.5(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199,199(1)(ii)(b)\\n\\r\\n\\rPublic Sector Companies (Appointment of Chief Executive) Guidelines, 2015=ScheduleI,II\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.P. No. 1767 of 2019, decision dated: 19-11-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUSTICE",
    "": "SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUSTICE\nVS\nBOARD OF DIRECTORS THROUGH CHAIRMAN Lahore TRANSPORT COMPANY AND 6 OTHERS\nFaisal Hanif Nos. 1, 2 and 6."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14061",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2020 457 = 2020 SLD 457 = 2020 CLD 249",
    "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)---\n----Ss. 124 & 121---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Appeal to Insurance Tribunal--- Limitation--- Condonation of delay--- Scope---Insurance Ordinance, 2000 was a special law and Insurance Tribunal had been constituted under S. 121 of the same---Provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 had been specifically excluded from its application on matters being governed by special laws---Where a period of limitation was prescribed under specific provisions of a special or local law, then general principles of law of limitation were not applicable and therefore, provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 could not be invoked for seeking condonation of delay in filing of appeal under S. 124 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000.\nGeneral Manager v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others 2012 CLD 1112 and Jubilee General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ravi Steel Company 2016 S C M R 1979 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=121,124,124(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rLimitation Act, 1908=5\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Insurance Appeal/R.F.A. No. 77885 of 2019, decision dated: 23-12-2019.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID WAHEED, JUSTICE, MASUD ABID NAQVI, JUSTICE",
    "": "SHAHID WAHEED, JUSTICE\nMASUD ABID NAQVI, JUSTICE\nSTATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH ZONAL HEADATTORNEY AND ANOTHER\nVS\nMST. NASREEN BEGUM"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14062",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 21 = 1961 SLD 21 = (1961) 40 ITR 586",
    "Key Words:": "Section 43 & 109(2) of the Cochin Income-Tax Act, 1117\nSection 33B of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922\nCASE REVIEW\n \nAfter the decision of the Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Tribune Trust[1948] 16 ITR 214, the decision of the Madras High Court in Sreeramulu v.Commissioner of Income-tax [1939] 7 ITR 263distinguished.\nCommissioner of Income-tax v. Tribune Trust [1948] 16 ITR 214followed and relied upon.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nCIT v. Tribune Trust [1948] 16 ITR 214 ; ILR [1917] Lah. 809 ; 52 CWN 578 ; [1948] 2 MLJ 14 (PC) ; AIR 1948 PC 102, Ramachandra Mardaraja Deo v. Collector of Agricultural Income-tax [1952] 22 ITR 220 ; ILR [1952] Cut. 429, Ram Datta Sita Ram of Basti, In re [1947] 15 ITR 61, Sreeramulu v. CIT [1939] 7 ITR 263 ; ILR [1939] Mad. 358 ; [1939] 2 MLJ 68 ; AIR 1939 Mad. 709 and Venkatachalam Chettiar v. CIT[1935] 3 ITR 55 ; 68 MLJ 227 ; 41 LW 229 ; ILR 58 Mad. 367 ; AIR 1935 Mad. 379.",
    "Court Name:": "Kerala High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "O.P. Nos. 634 TO 640 OF 1958MARCH 16, 1959",
    "Judge Name:": "KUMARA PILLAI AND M.S. MENON, JJ",
    "": "Parvathi Sankaran\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX\nO.P. NOS. 634 TO 640 OF 1958MARCH 16, 1959"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14063",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJ5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 22 = 1961 SLD 22 = (1961) 40 ITR 583 = (1961) 3 TAX 88",
    "Key Words:": "Section 256 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 66(1) of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - High Court - Reference to - Order of Tribunal in an appeal was received by assessee - Thereupon, an advocate filed application before Tribunal for rectification of order in his favour, but eventually a rectification was made against assessee - Thereafter, an application under section 66(1) of 1922 Act was filed which was not signed by assessee but was signed by advocate who had filed vakalat on behalf of assessee in rectification proceeding - Tribunal drew attention of assessee to alleged defect - Subsequently another application was filed duly signed by assessee - Tribunal, however, dismissed said application being time barred - On instant application, it was seen that contents of vakalat form were very comprehensive as assessee gave thereunder authority to advocate to appear not only in rectification proceedings but in all proceedings connected with same - Whether in view of language of vakalat-form, it could be concluded that it would comprehend application under section 66(1) of 1922 Act also - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, order of Tribunal to effect that reference application could not be signed by advocate was unsustainable and, consequently, Tribunal was to be directed to treat application as made within time as required under section 66(1) of 1922 Act and dispose it of in accordance with law - Held, yes\nFACTS\n \nThe order of the Tribunal in an appeal was dated 11-1-1958, and it was received by the assessee on 31-1-1958. An advocate of the court filed an application before the Tribunal for rectification of the order in his favour, but eventually on the 11-3-1958, a rectification was made by the Tribunal which was in fact against the assessee. Thereafter, on 31-3-1958, an application was presented on behalf of the assessee requiring the Tribunal to refer to the High Court certain questions of law as arising out of the order. This application was not signed by the assessee but was signed by the advocate who filed vakalat on behalf of the assessee in the rectification proceeding. The Tribunal drew the attention of the assessee to the alleged defect, in the application not being signed by an advocate properly authorized, and finally the assessee presented another application on 6th May, duly signed by him. The Tribunal held that the latter application was filed thirty-seven days beyond the period of sixty days provided by section 66(1) of the 1922 Act. It was contended before the Tribunal that as the advocate had filed the vakalat in the rectification proceeding, it should be taken that he had an authority to sign the application for reference also. The Tribunal negatived said contention holding that the vakalat filed by the advocate did not contain the necessary authority to sign the application.\nOn application under section 66(3) of 1922 Act :\nHELD\n \nThe contents of the vakalat-form were very comprehensive. The assessee gave authority thereunder to the advocate to appear not only in the rectification proceedings but in all proceeding connected with the same or any order passed therein. The application for reference under section 66(1) of 1922 Act cannot be said to be unconnected with the application for rectification. Both arise out of the same proceedings and on the language of the vakalat-form, it must be held that it would comprehend the application under section 66(1) of 1922 Act also.\nHaving regard to the construction of terms of the vakalat, the order of the Appellate Tribunal was unsustainable. The Appellate Tribunal would treat the application as made within time as required under section 66(1) of 1922 Act and dispose it of in accordance with law.\nNote : Decision was in favour of petitioner/assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\n \nSubramanian Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1953] 24 I.T.R. 89 and Satyanarayanmurthi v. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal [1958] 33 I.T.R. 123 followed andrelied upon.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nSubramanian Chettiar v. CIT [1953] 24 ITR 89 (Mad.) and Satyanarayanamurthi v.ITAT [1958] 33 ITR 123 (AP).",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=66(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1961=256\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "--DECEMBER 10, 1959",
    "Judge Name:": "10-DEC-59, SATYANARAYANA RAJU AND ANANTANARAYANA AYYAR, JJ.",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14064",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 23 = 1961 SLD 23 = (1961) 40 ITR 576",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "--APRIL 3, 1959",
    "Judge Name:": "CHANDRA REDDY, C.J. AND SRINIVASA CHARI, JJ.",
    "": "Raja Rameswar Rao\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14065",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 24 = 1961 SLD 24 = (1961) 40 ITR 567",
    "Key Words:": "Section 3 of the Wealth-Tax Act, 1957 - Charge of tax - Whether entry 86 of List I to Seventh Schedule to Constitution is comprehensive enough to justify imposition of wealth-tax on HUF - Held, yes\nFACTS\n \nThe petitioner/assessee was a Hindu undivided family. The instant petition was filed by assessee, praying for the issue of a writ or direction to call for the records from the Additional Wealth-tax Officer, and quash the assessment order made against it.\nThe petitioner contended that the respondent could not take action under the provisions of the Act, with respect to Hindu undivided family on the ground that the Act, in so far as it enabled the levy and collection of wealth-tax on the capital value of the assets of a Hindu undivided family was beyond the legislative competence of the Union Parliament and consequently any action taken or purported to be taken under the provisions of that Act in so far as they related to Hindu undivided family was lacking in legal sanction and authority.\nHELD\n \nThe expression \"\"individual\"\" used in section 3 of the 1922 Act has been construed to mean and include not only individuals as such, but an association or body of individuals. It cannot be said that an association or body of individuals such as a Hindu undivided family does not fall within the scope and meaning of the expression \"\"individuals\"\" used in the entry. It cannot also be said that there is a well-defined legislative practice pressing against the contention that the expression \"\"individual\"\" cannot take in and comprehend a body of individuals like a Hindu undivided family. Therefore, it can be said that entry 86 of List I to the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is comprehensive enough to justify the imposition of the wealth-tax on the Hindu undivided family.\nIn the result, instant writ petition failed and was to be dismissed.\nNote : Decision was against the petitioner/assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\n \nMahavirprasad Badridas v. Yagnik [1959] 37 ITR 191; Commissioner of Income-tax v.Sodra Devi [1957] 32 ITR 615, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Salem District Urban Bank Ltd. [1940] 8 ITR 269, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Trustees of Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Trust [1932] AIR 1932 Bom. 106 affirmed by P.C. in [1934] 21 ITR 148 and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Madan Gopal [1952] 21 ITR 141 followed andrelied upon.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nBritish Coal Corporation v. The King [1935] AC 500, CIT v. Ahmedabad Mill-owners' Association [1939] 7 ITR 369 (Bom.), CIT v. Salem District Urban Bank Ltd. [1940] 8 ITR 269 (Mad.), CIT v. Trustees of Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Trust AIR 1932 Bom. 106, Currimbhoy Trust v. CIT [1934] 2 ITR 148 (PC), Duggan v. CIT [1952] 21 ITR 458 (Bom.), CIT v. Madras Bar Council [1943] 11 ITR 1 (Mad.), CIT v.Sarwankumar [1945] 13 ITR 361 (All.), CIT v. Sodra Devi [1957] 32 ITR 615 (SC),James v. Commonwealth of Australia [1936] AC 578, Katama Natchiar v. Srimut Rajah Moottoo Vijaya Ragandha Bodha Gooroo Sawmy Periya Odaya Taver [1863] 9 MIA 325, Mahavirprasad Badridas v. Yagnik [1959] 37 ITR 191 (Bom.), Ram Ratan Das and Madan Gopal, In re [1935] 3 ITR 183 (All.), Sokkanadha Vannimundar v. Sokkanadha Vannimundar [1904] ILR 28 Mad. 344 and United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum AIR 1941 FC 16.",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "W.P. No. 1089 OF 1958, JANUARY 19, 1960",
    "Judge Name:": "SESHACHALAPATI, J",
    "": "N.V. Subramanian\nv.\nWealth Tax Officer\nSESHACHALAPATI, J"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14066",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 25 = 1961 SLD 25 = (1961) 40 ITR 561 = (1961) 3 TAX 118",
    "Key Words:": "Section 60 of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922 - Power to Make Exemption Etc. - Assessment years 1947-48 and 1948-49 - Assessee received salary from a company as a managing director - In completing assessment of company, taxing authorities disallowed certain amount of salary paid to assessee - In hands of assessee, his entire remuneration received from company was, however, sought to be taxed - Assessee's case was that salary paid to him in excess of amount allowed as deduction in assessment of company having already been taxed in hands of his employers, was not liable to be taxed over again in his hands - Whether in view of fact that disallowance was not by reason of mode of payment or determination of salary out of profits of business but it was disallowed because it was not an expenditure laid out wholly or exclusively for purpose of business, amount in question was not exempt from tax in hands of assessee - Held, yes\nCircular & Notifications : Notification No. 878F, dated 21-3-1922 issued by Central Government\nFACTS\n \nThe assessee was appointed as a managing director of a company, for which he received certain amount as salary on monthly basis. In completing the assessment of the company the taxing authorities disallowed the salary paid to the assessee in excess of certain amount holding that it was not an expenditure laid out or expended wholly or exclusively for the company's business within the meaning of section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act. In the hands of the assessee, his entire remuneration received from the company was, however, sought to be taxed. The assessee contended that the salary paid to him in excess of amount allowed as deduction in the assessment of the company having already been taxed in the hands of his employers was not liable to be taxed over again in his hands, and in support of that he relied upon Notification No. 878F dated 21-3-1922, issued by the Central Government. The Tribunal was of the view, that on the amounts which were disallowed in the assessment of the company, tax could not be levied over again in the hands of the assessee.\nOn reference :\nHELD\n \nThe profits of the business may normally be ascertained only after deducting therefrom the outgoings for the purpose of earning the profits. The gross receipts of a businessman are not his profits; from the gross receipts deductions of necessity are to be made of the various outgoings which contributed to the earning of the profits. Salary paid to an employee for conducting the business in which the profits are earned if it bears no direct relation thereto must be deducted in ascertaining the profits. It is true that in cases when it is so stipulated the quantum of salary may be determined by reference to the quantum of profits made by an employer. In such cases, the salary may be held to be paid out of profits or determined with reference to the profits of the business. But, in instant case, the salary was paid at a fixed rate per month and was not paid out of or determined with reference to the profits of the business. Nor was it that by reason of the mode of payment or determination of the salary so paid that the deductions had not been permitted. The three conditions under the notification being cumulative, if one or more of the conditions were not fulfilled, evidently, the assessee could not claim the benefit of the notification.\nUndoubtedly, exemption from payment of tax under the notification is claimable in respect of sums paid out of or determined with reference to the commercial profits, but in computing even the commercial profits, the salaries paid to the employees must be taken into account. It is only after the expenses incurred for earning the profits are deducted that the commercial profits of a business can be ascertained, and if, for ascertaining the commercial profits, the salary paid to the employee is deducted, the salary will not be a sum paid out of or determined with reference to the profits of the business.\nIn the instant case, if the salary paid to the assessee was to be deducted from the gross earnings of the company before ascertaining the commercial profits, the payment to the assessee was not out of or determined with reference to the profits of the business. Again the disallowance was not by reason of the mode of payment or determination of the salary out of the profits of the business; it was disallowed because it was not an expenditure laid out or expended wholly or exclusively for the purpose of the business. In that view of the case, the second condition of notification was also not fulfilled. In such circumstances, the amount in question was not exempt from tax in the hands of the assessee.\nNote : Decision was in favour of revenue.\nCASE REVIEW\n \nCommissioner of Income-tax v. M.K. Kirtikar [1959] 36 ITR 360 followed and relied upon.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nCIT v. M.K. Kirtikar [1959] 36 ITR 360 (SC), CIT v. R.R. Jacques (IT Reference No. 30 of 1953) and M.K. Kirtikar v. CIT [1955] 28 ITR 908 (Bom.).",
    "Court Name:": "Bombay High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(xv),60\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE No. 18 OF 1957, JULY 22, 1959",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAH AND S.T. DESAI, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of INCOME TAX\nv.\nMulraj Karsondas"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14067",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1963 41 = 1963 SLD 41 = (1963) 49 ITR 684",
    "Key Words:": "Section 33, read with section 32, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(vib), read with section 10(2)(vi), of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922], read with rule 8 of the Indian Income-tax Rule, 1922 - Development rebate - Assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59 - Assessee acted as agents for distribution of products of a company - It also hired out vehicles for use of officials of said company - During relevant assessment years, for purposes of its business of hiring out vehicles, assessee incurred expenditure in replacement of entire vehicles - Whether entire replacement of vehicles amounted to installation of new plant and machinery and, therefore, assessee was entitled to development rebate - Held, yes - Whether since vehicles were hired out to single customer and to no one else, vehicle could not be regarded as taxi eligible for depreciation at rate of 25 per cent - Held, yes\nSection 57, read with section 56, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 12(3), read with section 12(1), of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Income from other sources - Deductions - Assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59 - Whether merely for reason that section 12(3) of 1922 Act also envisages hiring out machinery and plant as source of income, it does not follow that in every case where hiring of machinery and plant is concerned it should be taken for assessment under section 12 of 1922 Act - Held, yes - Whether fact that section 12(3) of 1922 Act denies development rebate shows that provision applies only in cases where hiring out is otherwise than in course of business - Held yes\nFACTS\n \nThe assessee-firm, besides dealing in electrical goods, acted as agents for distribution of products of a company. It also maintained a fleet of cars and lories which it hires out, solely for the use of officials of said company. The hire receipts from these vehicles had been returned and assessed under the head of business from the assessment year 1954-55 onwards. During the calendar years 1956 and 1957 the assessee purchased and used for this part of its business new cars and lorries. Development rebate under section 10(2)(vi) of the 1922 Act was claimed. In addition thereto, depreciation at the rate of 25 per cent, under the Income-tax Rules was also claimed. The ITO denied the development rebate. In so far as the depreciation was concerned, the granted 20 per cent instead of 25 per cent. The appeal before the AAC failed. On further appeal, the department contended that the income from the hiring of cars was not income which fell for computation under section 10 but under section 12 of the 1922 Act. However, the Tribunal held that section 12 being self-contained in so far as any allowances were permitted, the claim of the assessee to development rebate, which was not one of the items covered by section 12, could not be granted to it. The Tribunal also rejected the appeal in so far as the quantum of depreciation was claimed.\nOn reference :\nHELD\n \nThere was no doubt whatsoever that a part of the business of the assessee consisted in his hiring out cars to the company. It was only in a case where a part of the activity of the assessee yielding income did not come within the scope of any of the other heads set out in section 6 of the 1922 Act that the tax is payable by the assessee under the head of income from other sources under section 12 of the 1922 Act. There was nothing which prevented the assessee from carrying on as a business the hiring out of vehicles. Merely for the reason that section 12(3) of the 1922 Act also envisages hiring out machinery and plant as a source of income, it did not follow that in every case where hiring of machinery and plant is concerned it should be taken for assessment under section 12 of the 1922 Act. Section 12(1) itself excludes such activities from the scope of section 12 of the 1922, if they are included under any of the preceding heads. It followed from the context of the provision that where an assessee carries on the business of hiring machinery, plant or furniture, the income therefrom is computable only under section 10 of the 1922. It is only in cases where such hiring is not the business or part of the business that it comes within the scope of section 12 of the 1922 Act, as income from other sources.\nThe view of the Tribunal that since the case came under section 12(3) of the 1922 Act the allowances in that regard in that regard were confined only to those provided in clauses (iv), (v), (vi ) and (vii) of sub-section (2) of section 10 and that rebate under clause (iv-b) of sub-section (2) of section 10 was not available would undoubtedly be correct if the question came to be considered only under section 12 of the 1922 The very fact that section 12(3)of the 1922 Act denies development rebate shows that the provisions applies only in cases where the hiring out is otherwise than in the course of business. Where replacement of engines of lorries used in the course of business is involved, it amounts to installation of new plant and machinery and that development rebate under clause (iv-b) of sub-section (2) of section 10 is available. In so far as the business of hiring vehicle was concerned, the entire replacement of the vehicles themselves can stand on no interior footing. It followed, therefore, that the assessee was entitled to development rebate.\nIt is not denied that in terms rule 8 applies to the instant case. The relevant clauses thereof are (q) and (r) which specify the class of the asset and the rate which the percentage of allowance is to be calculated. The entry (q ) is \"\"motor-cars\"\" and the entry (r) covers \"\"motor-taxis\"\". The rate of depreciation for motor-cars is 20 per cent while that for motor-taxies is 25 per cent. The claim of the assessee that the vehicles in question should be regarded as taxies eligible for 25 per cent depreciation, seemed to be unacceptable. A taxi as ordinarily understood is a vehicle which is available for every hirer. But in a case where vehicles are hired out to a single customer and to no one else, that vehicles could not be regarded as a taxi. It was also pointed out in the orders of the officers below that these vehicles were not registered as motor-taxis. There was a material distinction between the two items referred to. The refusal of the larger amount of depreciation allowance was fully justified.\nNote: The case has been decided partly in favour of the assessee and partly in favour of the revenue.\nCASE REVIEW\n \nCIT v. Sri Rama Vilas Service [1960] 38 ITR 25followed & relied upon.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nCIT v. Sri Rama Vilas Service [1960] 38 ITR 25 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE No. 44 OF 1961 REFERENCE No. 12 OF 1961, DECEMBER 18, 1962",
    "Judge Name:": "JAGADISAN AND SRINIVASAN, JJ.",
    "": "Fomra Brothers\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14068",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 26 = 1961 SLD 26 = (1961) 40 ITR 552 = (1961) 3 TAX 110",
    "Key Words:": "Section 258 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 66(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Power of High Court to require statement to be amended - High Court in exercise of its power under section 66(4) of 1922 Act remanded case to Tribunal for supplemental statement of case - Petitioner/assessee challenged validity of said order of High Court - Whether in view of fact that direction to Tribunal would not lead inevitably to admitting of fresh evidence, impugned order passed by High Court could be affirmed - Held, yes\nFACTS\n \nThe assessee-firm entered into contracts with the Government for the supply of goods. The supplies to Government were made for Jaipur by the assessee, and payment was by cheques which were received at Jaipur. The contention of the assessee was that this income was received at Jaipur outside the then taxable territories. This contention was not accepted by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The assessee then applied for a reference to the High Court under section 66(1) of the 1922 Act, and by its order, the Tribunal referred the following question for the decision of the High Court \"\"whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the profits and gains in respect of the sales made to the Government of India were received by the assessee in the taxable territories.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "In dealing with the said reference, the High Court passed an order under section 66(4) of 1922 Act directing the Tribunal to find out whether the cheques were sent to the assessee-firm by post or by hand and what directions, if any, had the assessee-firm given to the Department in the matter. The High Court thereafter remanded the case to the Tribunal for a supplemental statement of the case on the lines indicated above.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "On appeal to the Supreme Court:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "HELD",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The case of Jehangir Vakil Mills' [1959] 37 ITR 11 set two limits to the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 66(4) of 1922 Act, and they were that the advisory jurisdiction was confined (a) to the facts on the record and/or found by the Tribunal and (b) the question which would arise from the Tribunal's order. It was not open to the High Court to order a fresh enquiry into new facts with a view to amplifying the record and further that it was equally not open to the High Court to decide a question of law, which did not arise out of the Tribunal's order.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The enquiry must be to see whether the question decided by the Tribunal admits the consideration of the new point as an integral or even an incidental part thereto. Even so, the supplemental statement which the Tribunal is directed to submit must arise, from the facts admitted and/or found by the Tribunal, and should not open the door to fresh evidence.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "It was quite plain that the question as framed in instant case could include an enquiry into whether there was any request, express or implied, that the amount of the bills be paid by cheques. The first limit to the jurisdiction of the High Court was thus not exceeded by the High Court in exercising its powers under section 66(4) of the 1922 Act. The question was wide enough to include the alternative line of approach that if there was a request, express of implied, to send the amount due under the bills by cheque, the post office would be the agent of the assessee, and the income was received in the taxable territory when the cheques were posted.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "If, the direction be interpreted to mean that the Tribunal in giving the finding must confine itself to the facts admitted and/or found by it, the direction could not be described as in excess of the jurisdiction of the High Court. It would have been better if the High Court had given directions confined to the record of the case before the Tribunal; but in the absence of anything expressly to the contrary, it could not be held that the direction would lead inevitably to the admitting of fresh evidence. In the result, the instant appeal failed, and was dismissed.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Note : Decision was in favour of revenue.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "CASE REVIEW",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [1959] 37 ITR 11distinguished.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "CASES REFERRED TO",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "CIT v. Kirloskar Bros. Ltd. [1954] 25 ITR 547 (SC), CIT v. Ogale Glass Works Ltd.[1954] 25 ITR 529 (SC), Shri Jagdish Mills Ltd. v. CIT [1959] 37 ITR 114 (SC), Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1950] 18 ITR 407 (Bom.), Kirloskar Bros. Ltd. v. CIT [1952] 21 ITR 82 (Bom.), Kusumben D. Mahadevia v. CIT [1960] 39 ITR 540 (SC), New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. CIT [1959] 37 ITR 11 (SC), Ogale Glass Works' case (I.T.R. No. 19 of 1949 decided on September 17, 1951) and Sobha Singh v. CIT [1950] 18 ITR 998 (EP).\"",
    "URL Link:": "CIVIL APPEAL No. 30 OF 1958, AUGUST 17, 1960",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=258\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=66(1),66(2),66(4)\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "J.C. SHAH, S.K. DAS AND M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ",
    "Court Name:": "Gopal Singh for the Appellant. K.N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta for the Respondent",
    "Law and Sections:": "Zoraster & Co.\nv.\nCommissioner of Income tax",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14069",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1963 42 = 1963 SLD 42 = (1963) 49 ITR 641",
    "Key Words:": "Section 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Income - Chargeable as - Assessment year 1946-47 - Assessee purchased certain shares of a company with an object to acquire managing agency of that company and sold it during accounting year relevant to assessment year in question making certain profit - However, assessee could not prove that purchase of shares was for purchase of acquiring managing agency - It was found by Tribunal that assessee was not investor but dealer in shares and that in immediately preceding year surplus realized by assessee sale of shares of certain bank was shown by him as profit - Whether, on facts, surplus realised by assessee on sale of shares of company was revenue income liable to tax - Held, yes\nFACTS\n \nOn 1-2-1945, the assessee purchased certain shares of a company and sold it during accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1946-47 making certain surplus. The case of the assessee was that he was not a dealer in shares, and the shares had been purchased merely for acquiring the managing agency of the aforesaid company, and, as the managing agency could not be secured, the shares were sold and the surplus on sale was an accretion of a capital nature and was not a revenue receipt. His case was not accepted by the income-tax authorities and it was held that the surplus was income liable to tax. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the authorities on ground that there was no reliable evidence to prove that the assessee and others had purchased 36,000 shares of company for the purpose of acquiring its managing agency; that the evidence clearly showed that the assessee was not an investor but a dealer; and that in the immediately preceding year, the assessee had purchased shares of a bank and had sold them and realized a profit, which the assessee had himself shown as profit in the return filed by him for that year.\nOn reference :\nHELD\n \nThe finding in the earlier year does not operate as res-judicata in the subsequent year but that is very different from saying that the finding in the earlier year is to be completely excluded from consideration while deciding the point in the subsequent year. As a matter of fact, if in the earlier year it is held that the assessee carried on an activity in the nature of business or trade, then, unless there is material for holding that activity was put an end to, or terminated in some other way, there would be a presumption of continuity and the burden would be on the assessee to displace the inference which might be legitimately drawn from the presumption of continuity. Apart from this, the only basis on which the assessee could claim exemption from tax liability in respect of the aforesaid amount could be if he had succeeded in showing that the purchase of shares was for the purpose of acquiring the managing agency. On this point the Tribunal held that the assessee did not produce any reliable evidence. It was, therefore, open to the Tribunal to take the view that it having remained unproved that the purchase was for acquiring the managing agency and, in view of the other facts and circumstances, the surplus derived by the sale of the shares was taxable income and not capital accretion.\nAccordingly, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, it was held that the net surplus realization by the sale of shares was the revenue income of the assessee liable to tax.\nNote : The case has been decided in favour of the revenue.\nCASE REVIEW\n \nDwarkadas Kesardeo Moraka v. CIT [1962] 44 ITR 529 (SC)followed & relied upon.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nDwarkadas Kesardeo Morarka v. CIT [1962] 44 ITR 529 (SC), Californian Copper Syndicate Ltd. v. Harris (1904) 5 Tax Cas. 159, Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. CIT [1940] 8 ITR 635 (PC) and Sardar India Singh & Sons Ltd. v. CIT [1953] 24 ITR 415 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE No. 123 OF 1957, SEPTEMBER 13, 1962",
    "Judge Name:": "M.C. DESAI, C.J. AND BRIJLAL GUPTA, J.",
    "": "Shyam Sunder Gupta\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14070",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 27 = 1961 SLD 27 = (1961) 40 ITR 517",
    "Key Words:": "Schedule D, Case III, Rule 1(a) and 2, Case VI, Rule 2 - Income-tax Act, 1918\nRules 19, 21 of General Rules Schedule D, Case III, Rule 1(a) and Case VI, Rule 2 - Income-tax Act, 1918\nSections 5(1), 19, 21, 22 & 22(2)(a) of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946\nSection 1 of the Coal Industry (No.2) Act, 1949\nCASE REVIEW\n \nDecision of the Court of Appeal sub nom. Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Whitworth Park Coal Co.(In Liquidation) [1958] Ch. 792; [1958] 2 W.L.R. 815; [1958] 2 All E.R. 91 affirmed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nInland Revenue Commissioners v. Butterley Co. Ltd. [1957] AC 32 ; [1956] 2 WLR 1101 ; [1956] 2 All. ER 197 ; 36 TC 411, Lambe v. Inland Revenue Commissioners[1934] 1 KB 178 ; 18 TC 212 ; [1934] 2 ITR 494 ; Dewar v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1935] 2 KB 351 ; 51 TLR 536 ; 19 TC 561, Grey v. Tiley [1932] 16 TC 414 and Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Whitworth Park Coal Co. ( In Liquidation) [1958] Ch. 792 ; [1958] 2 WLR 815 ; [1958] 2 All. ER 91.",
    "Court Name:": "Chancery Division",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "--NOVEMBER 5, 1959",
    "Judge Name:": "LORD KEITH OF AVONHOLM, VISCOUNT SIMONDS AND LORD RADCLIFFE",
    "": "Whitworth Park Coal Co. Ltd. (In Liquidation)\nv.\nInland Revenue Commissioners\nLORD KEITH OF AVONHOLM, VISCOUNT SIMONDS AND LORD RADCLIFFE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14071",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 28 = 1961 SLD 28 = (1961) 40 ITR 506",
    "Key Words:": "Section 226, read with section 222 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 46(5A), read with section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Collection and recovery of tax - Other modes of recovery - Whether, before Income-tax Officer can take any steps under section 46(5A), of 1922 Act, while proceedings for recovery under section 46(2) of 1922 Act were already on foot, he should record special reasons why adoption of additional mode was necessary - Held, yes - Whether if no such reasons are recorded, it should necessarily follow that later proceedings are not lawful - Held, yes\nFACTS\n \nAssessment against the assessee was completed on 23-3-1953. Notices of demand were issued on 25-3-1953, under section 29 of the 1922 Act. Appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were dismissed on 15-5-1957. In the meantime, a writ petition had been filed in the High Court seeking an appropriate writ to direct the Income-tax Officer not to treat the petitioner as a defaulter and not to start or take any proceedings against the petitioner for the collection of tax pending the disposal of the appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. An interim stay that had been granted in the writ petition was, however, ordered to continue for one month from the date of the order which was 8-3-1954.\nThereafter in December 1954, the Income-tax Officer had issued notice of attachment under section 46(5A) of 1922 Act to several of the assessee's constituents. Subsequently, on 26-7-1957, a notice was issued to the 'I' Bank under section 46(5A) of 1922 Act restraining the Bank from paying moneys standing to the credit of the assessee-company in current account with the bank and calling upon the bank to pay the amounts to the Income-tax Department in discharge of the income-tax demands against the assessee. According to the assessee, the limitation for taking proceedings under section 46 of the 1922 Act against the assessee had expired by the end of 1955 and the proceedings started against the assessee in 1957 were barred. However, case of the Department was that the issue of the notices to other constituents under section 46(5A) in 1954, would enure to the validity of the notice issued to the 'I' Bank in 1957.\nOn writ petition:\nHELD\n \nThe several modes of recovery laid down in section 46 of 1922 Act are those which are intended to be initiated by the Income-tax Officer concerned, though for purposes of putting through the measures of actual recovery, other machinery such as the Collector or the local authority may be employed. What this section contemplates as the commencement of a proceeding is an action initiated by the Department, which may set in motion other agencies for the actual recovery. It seems therefore, that since the procedure for recovery of the amount cannot be set in motion except by the issue of a certificate under section 46(2) of 1922 Act, the issue of such a certificate marks the commencement of the recovery proceedings. It follows then that a proceeding for recovery was validly commenced by the issue of the certificate to the Collector under section 46(2) of the 1922 Act, before the expiry of one year from the last day of the financial year in which the demand was issued under section 29 of 1922 Act. The fact that the Collector failed or was unable to take further action on the certificate or that it proved infructuous did not militate against the view, that the issue of the certificate itself was a proceeding for recovery within the meaning of the Explanation to section 46(7) of the 1922 Act.\nOne of the modes of recovery contemplated by section 46 of the 1922 Act is by requiring any person from whom money is due or may become due to the assessee to pay it over to the Department in full or partial discharge of the income-tax demand against the assessee. Two results are possible : either the party to whom the notice is issued complies with the demand or he denies possession of funds belonging to the assessee. In either case, the notice may be said to discharge itself and no further action by the Department is either called for or is possible. That being so, the action of the Department in issuing the notice under section 46(5A) of 1922 Act does not lose, its character as a recovery proceeding, solely for the reason that no positive results flowed therefrom.\nExplanation to section 46 of 1922 Act lays down that the several modes of recovery specified in this section are not mutually exclusive; recourse of one mode of recovery while tax is being recovered from the assessee by any other mode is permissible, but shall be only for special reasons to be recorded; and the right to recover available under any other law for the time being in force relating to the recovery of debts due to Government is unaffected by the modes of recovery under section 46 of 1922 Act and the adoption of methods outside the Act for recovery does not require the recording of special reasons.\nThe specific reference to the \"\"several modes of recovery specified in the section\"\" earlier in the explanation and to \"\"any such mode of recovery\"\" and \"\"any other modes\"\" in the later part of the section can have no other significance except that the modes of recovery in the later part refer only to the several modes of recovery specified in the section. The last part of the section dealing with \"\"any such mode of recovery\"\" cannot, be read as relating to methods of recovery outside the scope of the 1922 Act. It accordingly follows that before the Income-tax Officer could take any steps under section 46(5A) of the 1922 Act, while proceedings for recovery under section 46(2) of the 1922 Act were already on foot, he should record special reasons why the adoption of an additional mode was necessary.\nIf no such reasons are recorded, it should necessarily follow that the later proceedings are not lawful.\nOn behalf of the Department, it was conceded that no special reasons were recorded by the Income-tax Officer. The result was inevitable that the entire proceedings under section 46(5A) of 1922 Act, whether of 1954 or 1957, stood vitiated thereby. Therefore on this narrow ground the instant petitions succeeded.\nNote : Decision was in favour of petitioner/assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\n \nGeorge v. Income-tax Officer [1958] 33 ITR 22; [1958] 1 MLJ 90; AIR 1958 Mad. 417followed and relied upon.\nCASE REFERRED TO\n \nGeorge v. ITO [1958] 33 ITR 22 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "WRIT PETITION Nos. 603 AND 604 OF 1957, AUGUST 9, 1960",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJAGOPALAN AND SRINIVASAN, JJ",
    "": "GENERAL Commercial Corpn. (P.) Ltd.\nv.\nSecond Additional Income Tax Officer"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14072",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 29 = 1961 SLD 29 = (1961) 40 ITR 501",
    "Key Words:": "Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Business expenditure - Allowability of - Assessment year 1954-55 - Assessee was a leading surgeon - He undertook a tour abroad to study latest technique in surgery and treatment - Whether, expenditure incurred on foreign tour of assessee was not capital in nature, and thus, was allowable as deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was a leading surgeon. He undertook a tour abroad to study the latest technique in surgery and treatment. The whole cost of which he claimed as a deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the 1922 Act. The Income-tax Officer disallowed the claim in its entirety. He held that the expenditure was of a capital nature, incurred by the assessee to secure to himself a benefit of an enduring nature. The Assistant Commissioner differed and found that no portion of the expenditure was of a capital nature. He, however, held that only one-half of the expenditure satisfied the test of having been wholly and exclusively incurred for the purpose of the assessee's profession. The other half was treated as the personal expenses of the assessee while abroad. The Assistant Commissioner, thus, allowed a deduction of half of amount claimed. On revenue's appeal, the Tribunal agreed with the Income-tax Officer, but did not disturb the finding of the Assistant Commissioner, that that half of the expenditure incurred by the assessee did satisfy the other requirement of section 10(2)(xv).\nOn reference :\nHELD\nThe expenditure was not incurred to initiate any new business or profession, nor even to enlarge the scope or character of the profession that the assessee was already practising. He was and continued to be a surgeon. The expenditure was not incurred to obtain any additional qualifications to practise his profession. The Department could claim at best, in the circumstances, of the case, that the assessee incurred the expenditure to maintain his efficiency in his profession. It would, be much less correct to say that the assessee gained an enduring benefit by his study-tour abroad than to say that he took steps to maintain his efficiency in his chosen profession as a surgeon.\nIn aforesaid circumstances, it could be concluded that the outlay on the foreign tour of the assessee was not capital in nature, and therefore, was allowable as a deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act.\nNote : Decision was in favour of assessee.\nCASE REFERRED TO\nAssam Bangal Cement Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 34 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "CASE REFERRED No. 87 OF 1956, SEPTEMBER 15, 1960",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJAGOPALAN AND SRINIVASAN, JJ",
    "": "Dr. P. Vadamalayan\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14073",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 30 = 1961 SLD 30 = (1961) 40 ITR 494",
    "Key Words:": "- Sections 2 & 3(a), (c) Opium and Revenue Laws (Extension of Application) Act, 1950\n- Sections 8(2) & (4) - Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1142",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL No. 304 OF 1956, SEPTEMBER 1, 1960",
    "Judge Name:": "S.K. DAS, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.",
    "": "R.S.A.C. Kasi Iyer\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14074",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1963 43 = 1963 SLD 43 = (1963) 49 ITR 565",
    "Key Words:": "Section 185 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Firm - Position prior to 1-4-1993 - Assessment year 1957-58 - Whether where an existing joint family business is alleged to have been converted into partnership between members of family, genuineness of constitution of partnership has to be established before firm could be registered - Held, yes - Whether it is not necessary that all conditions imposed by section 25A of 1922 Act for valid partition should be complied with as necessary in a case where it is claimed by assessee that an erstwhile joint family business had emerged into partnership as result of agreement between members of the family butthere shall be division between coparceners qua joint family business and division has to be proved like any other question of fact and should not be conclusively presumed from existence of instrument of partnership - Held, yes - Whether fact that entry relating to capital was made not in beginning of year of account but towards its end may not be disabling circumstance impeding rights of registration if parties have otherwise such right - Held, yes\nFACTS\nOne 'S' and his sons were members of HUF which was carrying on the business. 'S' died in 1953 and his sons decided to carry on the business of the HUF. On 16-4-1956, a partnership was executed among them, constituting the family business into a partnership and admitting their brother, minor 'A', to the benefits of the partnership. Each of the three brothers was allotted one-third share in the business in accordance with their shares as coparceners of the undivided family. In the business accounts of the family separate ledger folios had been allotted in the name of each one of the brothers. The partnership deed recited that the excess credit amounts as found in the ledger folio relating to the capital of the family business should be dividend in three equal shares and each of the shares could be credited with their respective shares in the partnership accounts. On 12-4-1957, the last day of the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1957-58, the capital account was divided equally amongst all the three members and an entry to that effect was made in the partnership accounts, stating that it should take effect on and from 13-4-1956, the beginning of the accounting year. The assessee firm applied for the registration for the assessment year 1957-58 which was refused by the ITO on the ground that there was no division of capital till the end of the accounting year; that the customers of the business were not informed of the conversion of the family business into one of partnership, that the notices under section 22(2) of the 1922 Act sent by the ITO to the two partners; were refused on the ground that only the karta, was under an obligation to receive such notice. The refusal of the registration was upheld by the Tribunal.\nOn reference:\nHELD\nSection 5 of the Partnership Act states that partnership results from contract, and not from status, and the members of a Hindu undivided family carrying on a family business as such are not partners in such business. A business of a Hindu undivided family is property and is therefore a divisible asset. In respect of the rights and obligations of a member, they are those of a coparcener. But there is no disability on the part of the members of the family to form a partnership by agreement amongst themselves without detriment to their joint status. In a family of two members one may get a gift of money from his father-in-law and the other may get a bonus from his employer, there is no legal impediment preventing them from starting a partnership business, with the resources thus acquired still maintaining the joint family undisrupted.\nThe conditions necessary for obtaining registration of a firm are laid down in section 26A of the 1922 Act. The essential condition is that there should be an instrument of partnership specifying the individual shares of the partners. But it is implicit in section 26A of the 1922 Act that there must be a genuine or real firm. An instrument of partnership would no doubt be a piece of evidence to support the existence of a firm.. But the instrument cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of a firm having come into existence as disclosed by the instrument. The department was entitled to investigate the question whether or not the firm sought to be registered, real as otherwise non-existing firms would obtain the benefit of registration under the cloak of an instrument of partnership. This is now well settled law and needs no elaboration. Even in a case where an existing joint family business is alleged to have been converted into a partnership business between the members of the family, the genuineness of the constitution of the partnership has to be established before the firm can be registered.\nIn order to enable the members of a HUF family to bring into existence a partnership arrangement in respect of the erstwhile family business, it is certainly not necessary that they should divide all the joint family assets including the business assets; nor is it necessary that there should be a total disruption of their joint status. Section 25A of the 1922 Act provides for assessment after partition of a Hindu undivided family. Where at the time of making an assessment any member of a Hindu family claims that a partition has taken place amongst the members of the family, the ITO should make an enquiry, and if he is satisfied that the property has been partitioned as claimed, he should record an order to that effect. It is not necessary to refer to the consequences of such decisions but what has to be noted is the division contemplated under this provision. Section 25A of the 1922 Act is a physical division of property. Though the Hindu law takes note of severance in status such severance is not enough for a claim under section 25A. That provision will apply only to the case where the joint family itself had ceased to exist, and where there has been a physical division of property. In cases arising under this provision it has been held that the business asset not being capable of physical division into parts as pieces of land or chattels and movables, division can be inferred by reason of entries in the books of accounts of the business. That there can be recognition of a partition, having regard to appropriate entries in the books of account.\nAll the conditions imposed by section 25A of the 1922 Act for a valid partition should not also be complied with as necessary in a case where it is claimed by the assessee that an erstwhile joint family business had emerged into a partnership as a result of the agreement between the members of the family. It is true that so far as the business asset is concerned, coparceners should enter into a contract to form a partnership, and such a contract should necessarily be only in respect of an asset in which each one of them acquires absolute and exclusive rights. Therefore, it is clear that there shall be a division between the coparceners qua the joint family business. The division has to be proved like any other question of fact and should not be conclusively presumed from the existence of an instrument of partnership. In this view of the matter, the fact that the entry relating to the capital was made not in the beginning of the year of account, but towards its end may not be a disabling circumstance impeding the right of registration if the parties have otherwise such a right. Though the Tribunal posed the correct question to be answered for a proper decision in the case, it had gone wrong in thinking that unless and until the entries showing the distribution and allocation of the capital were made, there could not be a partition of the joint family business.\nThe essential steps that have to be taken for forming a partnership from a coparcenary are that the business assets should shed its character as joint family property and that the members of the family should cease to be coparceners in respect of that item of property. In other words, on the event of the partnership the accounts of the family business should be so fully cast, ascertained and settled, between the members, that each member must know what his rights and obligations are in the event of the business itself being wound up and a division of that business is effected. A joint family business cannot acquire the character of a partnership by mere declaration to that effect by the parties interested.\nA separation of the shares and the re-employment of the shares by agreement between the parties for further carrying on the business are the two things that are necessary and indispensable. There need of course be no hiatus between separation and re-employment.\nThere was an evidence that the notices under section 22(2) of the 1922 Act served upon 'S' and 'A' were refused on the ground that the karta alone was entitled to receive it. There was thus material on record which would tend to support the view of the ITO that there was in fact no partnership at all during the relevant period. The belated entry relating to capital which was admittedly made only at the end of the year of account could also be taken into account in determining the question as to whether a partnership was in existence prior to the date of the entry. Registration was properly refused as it was abundantly clear that despite the ostensible indicia of a partnership, brought about by the execution of the partnership agreement, there was no genuine partnership in the year in question.\nNote: The case was been decided in favour of the revenue.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nGulab Singh Johari Mal, Inre [1946] 14 ITR 239 (Lah.), Jakka Devayya & Sons v. CIT [1952] 22 ITR 264 (Mad.), Lachman Dasv. CIT (1920) L.R. 47 I.A 277, Meyyappa Chettiar v. CIT [1950] 18 ITR 586 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE No. 122 OF 1960, AUGUST 20, 1962",
    "Judge Name:": "JAGADISAN AND SRINIVASAN, JJ.",
    "": "S.P. Doraiswami Chettiar & Sons\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14075",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1963 44 = 1963 SLD 44 = (1963) 49 ITR 546",
    "Key Words:": "Section 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Corresponding to section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) - Income - Chargeable as - Assessment year 1952-53 - Whether amount received by assessee as compensation for leasing out land for period of five years for purposes of digging earth and moulding bricks therefrom, etc., was capital receipt - Held, yes\nFACTS\n \nThe assessee HUF was the owner of certain properties and lands. During accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1952-53, the assessee leased certain lands for the purpose of digging earth and moulding bricks.The income-tax authorities as well as the Tribunal held that the amount was a revenue receipts liable to income-tax. The view of the Tribunal was that the amount was in the nature of compensation which the occupier paid to the landlord for entering on the land, digging earth and moulding bricks, etc., and was a sort of rent for allowing the land to be used as wasting asset and the rent bore a close analogy to the royalties received from mineral bearing lands and the fact that the amount was received in a lump sum was immaterial.\nOn reference :\nHELD\n \nIt is well-settled, that it is not the form of the document or the form in which the transaction is couched that is determinative of the matter. It is the real nature of the transaction upon which the answer to the question depends. It is also well-settled that it is also not conclusive whether the receipt in a particular case is a lump sum receipt or is spread over the terms of years or is partly paid by an initial lump sum payment and partly by subsequent annual payments. A lump sum payment may in some cases represent the value of the rights or the property transferred or may merely be a capitalised annual rent for the use of the property during the term of the lease paid in the beginning of the lease. The principle on the basis of which the question has to be decided is whether the document or the transaction embodied in the document is a transfer of any rights and the amount paid is the price of those rights or the transaction is merely the right or the liberty to use the property for a term of years and the amount paid is the price of the use. If it is the former, the receipt is a capital receipt; if the latter, the receipt is a revenue receipt. It is a question of law in every case whether on the language of the document or having regard to the true nature of the transaction it is the one or the other. In the instant case, the transaction was not merely a licence but was in fact and reality a lease. Once this was accepted it necessarily followed that there was a transfer of property involved and not merely the use of property as in a licence. The term was five years. The rights conferred were both the right to enter upon the land, to remain there, to dig earth, to mould bricks, to set up a brick kiln and to bake the bricks and sell them. The right was also there to dig and appropriate earth and use it for moulding bricks and after they have been backed in the kiln on the land to sell them there, that was to say, to remove them or to carry away the earth dug in the form of bricks. The payment in either case was a lump sum payment. No portion of that payment was referable to any single one of the various rights conferred upon the lessee. It followed that the case was fully governed by the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Chintamani Saran Nath Sah Dovv. CIT[1961] 41 ITR 506; [1961] 2 SCR 790 and it must, therefore, be held that the amount was received by the assessee as capital and not as the revenue.\nNote: The case has been decided in favour of the assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\n \nChintamani Saran Natha Saha Deo v. CIT [1961] 41 ITR 506 (SC)followed & relied upon.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nChintamani Saran Nath Sah Deo v. CIT [1961] 41 ITR 506 (SC), Janki Kuer v. CIT AIR 1931 Pat. 264 and Secretary of State v. Sir Andrew Scoble [1903] 4 Tax Cas. 618 [1903] AC 299.",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "IT MISCELLANEOUS CASE No. 176 OF 1958, AUGUST 24, 1962",
    "Judge Name:": "M.C. DESAI, C.J. AND BRIJLAL GUPTA, J.",
    "": "Seth Madan Gopal Bagla\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14076",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 31 = 1961 SLD 31 = (1961) 40 ITR 599 = (1961) 3 TAX 82",
    "Key Words:": "Section 60 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 - Power to Make Exemption Etc. - Petitioner/assessee was employed as manager of 'S' Co. - In assessment year under consideration, he received certain remuneration from his employer - However, in assessment proceedings of 'S' Co., a part of remuneration paid to him was disallowed - Subsequently, assessee was assessed on basis of actual amount received by him - Assessee, relying on Notification No. 878-F, claimed that he was entitled to exclude from his assessable income amount that was disallowed in assessment proceedings of his employer - ITO as well as Commissioner rejected assessee's claim - Whether in view of fact that disallowance in assessment proceeding of employer was not on ground that it was in effect a case of division of profits but on ground that requirements of section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act had not been satisfied, claim of assessee did not fall within scope of Notification - Held, yes - Whether therefore, authorities below rightly rejected assessee's claim -Held, yes\nFACTS\n \nThe petitioner was employed as the manager of \"\"S\"\" Co., a proprietary concern owned by his wife. In the assessment year under consideration he received remuneration from his employer at the rate of one per cent of the annual turnover of the company. However, in the assessment proceeding of \"\"S\"\" Co. some part of payment made to him was disallowed as deduction. Subsequently, the petitioner was assessed on actual receipts. Relying on the notification No. 878F dated 21-2-1922, the petitioner claimed that he was entitled to exclude from his assessable income the amount that was disallowed in the assessment proceedings of his employer. That claim was rejected by the Income-tax Officer. The petitioner invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner under section 33A(2) of the 1922 Act. The petitioner's request was rejected by the Commissioner.\nOn writ :\nHELD\n \nTo satisfy the requirements of the notification conferring the right of exemption, what the petitioner had to prove was (1) that he received remuneration for services rendered to \"\"S\"\", for purposes of the business of \"\"S\"\" Co., (2) that that sum was paid out of the profits of the business of \"\"S\"\" Co., and (3) by reason of such mode of payment disallowance was included in the profits of \"\"S\"\" Co., on which income-tax was assessed and charged under the head of business in the case of \"\"S\"\" Co.\nIt was seen from records that the disallowance of the part of the claim of 'S' Co. was on the ground, that the requirements of section 10(2)(xv ) of the 1922 Act had not been satisfied, and that the disallowed amount had not been an expenditure incurred by 'S' Co., wholly and exclusively for the business of the proprietrix carried on.\nBoth the Income-tax Officer and the Commissioner took the view, that as the disallowance in the assessment proceedings of the employer, 'S' Co., was not on the ground that it was in effect a case of division of profits, but on the ground that the requirements of section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act had not been satisfied, the claim of the assessee did not fall within the scope of the notification. In other words, the finding of the Income-tax Officer and the Commissioner in effect was that the third of the tests was not satisfied and that it was not by reason of such mode of payment the amount of question was not allowed as a deduction in the assessment proceedings of the employer 'S' Co.\nThe Income-tax Officer and the Commissioner correctly construed the order of the Tribunal in deciding what was the ground on which the claim of \"\"S\"\" Co. was disallowed. Even if that was incorrect, it would have been only an erroneous decision. But even independent of that as the disallowance of the claim of 'S' Co. was on a ground other than for which alone the notification in question provided, the authorities was right in negativing the petitioner's claim.\nIn the result, instant petition was to be dismissed.\nNote : Decision was against the petitioner/assessee.\nCASE REVIEW\n \nCommissioner of Income-tax v. Mulraj Karsondas [1960] 40 ITR 561followed andrelied upon.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nCIT v. Mulraj Karsondas [1960] 40 ITR 561 (Bom.) and CIT v. M.K. Kirtikar [1959] 36 ITR 360 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(xv),60\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "WRIT PETITION No. 20 OF 1957, DECEMBER 4, 1959",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJAGOPALAN AND RAMACHANDRA IYER, JJ.",
    "": "V. Narayanaswami Iyer\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14077",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 32 = 1961 SLD 32 = (1961) 40 ITR 590 = (1961) 3 TAX 75",
    "Key Words:": "Section 143 of Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 23(1) of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Assessment - Additions to income - In course of assessment, ITO made an addition to book profits of assessee - ITO further made an addition on account of deposits and advances entered in books of accounts of head office as secret profits - It was seen from records that assessee had money dealings over and above what was reflected in his books of accounts - Whether, on facts, an addition having been made to profits and gains of business carried on by assessee, further addition of sum of Rs. 17,402 representing total of credits in books and deposits in bank in account year was lawful - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee, was a wholesale and also retail piece-goods merchant. In computing the profits from the assessee's business the Income-tax Officer found that the accounts maintained by the assessee were unreliable and the profits had therefore to be estimated. Accordingly he made an addition to the book profits. He further found that certain deposits in banks and certain advances entered in the books of account at the head office were only secret profits. The assessee was assessed on this amount also. In appeal by the assessee to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the estimated addition made by the Income-tax Officer was upheld. He also upheld the addition made by the Income-tax Officer under the category of secret profits.\nOn appeal to Tribunal, it was contended by assessee that additions made on account of secret profit could not be sustained inasmuch as an addition of the profits of the assessee's business had already been made. This contention was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal. It was this contention that was the subject of the instant reference.\nHELD\nWhere the assessee gives no satisfactory explanation of a cash credit or bank deposit it is open to the Income-tax Officer to hold that it represents an income from an undisclosed source. It is not a question of suspicion or conjecture. He can only act on the evidence which is tendered before him, and where the evidence tendered is worthless or not tendered he would be justified in taking the evidence of the books showing the cash deposits as conclusive of the fact that some income was made and related to an undisclosed source. In the instant case, the Income-tax Officer was willing to find in respect of the credits and bank deposits, that \"\"it was clear that the assessee had money dealings over and above what was reflected in his books of account\"\" and he proposed to treat them as secret profits for purpose of income-tax. This finding had been confirmed by the Tribunal. If so no question of double taxation could arise. Accordingly, it was to be held that an addition of the sum having been made to profits and gains of business carried on by assessee, further addition of sum representing total of credits in books and deposits in bank in account year was lawful.\nNote : Decision was in favour of revenue.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nAmina Umma v. ITO [1954] 26 ITR 137 (Mad.), Chatturam Horilram Ltd. v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 709 (SC), Dodworthv. Dale [1936] 20 Tax Cas. 285, Govindarajulu v. CIT [1948] 16 ITR 391 (Mad.), Janab Jamelamma v. ITO [1956] 29 ITR 246 (Mad.), Lakshminarain Bhadani v. CIT [1951] 20 ITR 594 (SC), Rankine v. CIR [1952] 32 Tax Cas. 520 andSpencer v. ITO [1957] 31 ITR 107 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Kerala High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=143\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT REFERRED CASE No. 1 OF 1956(E), MARCH 20, 1959",
    "Judge Name:": "VARADARAJA IYENGAR AND ANNA CHANDY, JJ.",
    "": "S. Kumaraswami Reddiar\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14078",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1986 1203 = 1986 SLD 1203 = 1986 AIR 86",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Calcutta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "3 July, 1985",
    "Judge Name:": "M N ROY, A C GUPTA, JJ",
    "": "Trustees For The Improvement \nvs \nNityananda Paul And Ors."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14079",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 33 = 1961 SLD 33 = 1961 AIR 86",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Calcutta High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "10 June, 1960",
    "Judge Name:": "P MUKHARJI, JUSTICE",
    "": "Basanta Kumar Sen And Anr.\nvs \nCollector of Land Customs\n10 June, 1960"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14080",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 34 = 1961 SLD 34 = (1961) 40 ITR 708",
    "Key Words:": "CASE REVIEW\n \nGovindram Gordhandas Seksaria v. State of Gondal [1950] AIR 1950 P.C. 99 followedand relied upon.\nRaghavan v. Alamelu [1907] I.L.R. 31 Mad. 35 distinguished.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nBiraj Krishna Mukherjee v. Purna Chandra Trivedy [1939] AIR 1939 Cal. 645 ; ILR [1939] 2 Cal. 226, Chinnasamy Ayyar v. Rathnasabapathy Pillay [1904] ILR 27 Mad. 338, Govindram Gordhandas Seksaria v. State of Gondal [1950] AIR 1950 PC 99 ; 52 Bom. LR 450 ; [1950] 2 MLJ 1, Muthayya Chetti v. Narayanan Chetti [1928] AIR 1928 Mad. 317 ; 109 IC 101 and Raghavan v. Alamelu Aramal [1907] ILR 31 Mad. 35.",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "SECOND APPEAL No. 510 OF 1956, JUNE 30, 1959",
    "Judge Name:": "SRINIVASACHARI, J.",
    "": "Venigalla Ramakrishnaiah\nv.\nPillutla Sitaramasastry"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14081",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 35 = 1961 SLD 35 = (1961) 40 ITR 701",
    "Key Words:": "Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Business expenditure - Allowability of - Assessee entered into an agreement with \"\"C\"\" Ltd. for exploitation of timber in certain undeveloped forest and paid Rs. 1.20 lakhs as consideration - He thereafter purchased property outright from \"\"C\"\" Ltd. - However, assessee did not do any exploitation of timber himself - He subsequently entered into another agreement with \"\"I\"\" Ltd. for exploitation of entire area at rates mutually agreed upon between them - Whether on facts, amount of Rs. 1.20 lakhs represented a capital and not a revenue expenditure - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was a 'individual' carrying on inter alia a timber business. In the course of business he entered into an agreement with \"\"C\"\" Ltd. for exploitation of certain undeveloped forest as also the regular plantation areas that belonged to it. Under the terms of this agreement, the assessee was to cut the timber and to make the area fit for plantation. The consideration for the agreement paid was Rs. 1,20,000. The assessee subsequently purchased the above property outright from \"\"C\"\" for a further consideration of Rs. 30,.000 paid in cash. However, the assessee did not do any exploitation of timber himself. He thereafter entered into an agreement with \"\"I\"\" Ltd. for exploitation of the entire are for a Kuttikanam payable to him at rates mutually agreed upon between them. On the basis of above fact, the real controversy in instant case was whether the sum of Rs. 1,20,000 represented a capital or revenue expenditure.\nOn reference :\nHELD\nOn facts of the case, it was to be held that the sum of Rs. 1.20 lakhs represented a capital and not a revenue expenditure.\nNote : Decision was in favour of revenue.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nAssam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 34 , Atherton v. British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd. [1925] 10 Tax Cas 155, Benarsidas Jagnnath, In re [1947] 15 ITR 185 (Lah.), City of London Contract Corp. Ltd. v. Styles [1887] 2 Tax Cas. 239, CIT v. South India Pictures Ltd. [1956] 29 ITR 910 (SC), CIT v. Vazir Sultan & Sons [1959] 36 ITR 175 , CIR v. Granite City Steamship Co. Ltd. [1927] 13 Tax Cas 7, Hood Barrs v. CIR [1958] 34 ITR 238, Kauri Timber Co. Ltd. v. CT [1913] AC 771, Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Darbhanga v. CAIT [1953] 21 ITR 258 (Cal.), Stow Bardolph Gravel Co. Ltd. v. Poole [1955] 27 ITR 146, Vallambrosa Rubber Co. v. Farmer [1910] 5 Tax Cas 529 andVan den Berghs Ltd. v. Clark [1935] 3 ITR (Eng. Cas.) 17.",
    "Court Name:": "Kerala High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE No. 24 OF 1957, JUNE 11, 1959",
    "Judge Name:": "G. KUMARA PILLAI AND M.S. MENON, JJ",
    "": "Koru\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14082",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 36 = 1961 SLD 36 = (1961) 40 ITR 692",
    "Key Words:": "CASE REVIEW\n \nR.N. Bose v. Mahindra Lal Goswami [1958] 33 ITR 435followed and relied upon.\nCASE REFERRED TO\n \nR.N. Bose v. Manindra Lal Goswami [1958] 33 ITR 435 .",
    "Court Name:": "Punjab and Haryana High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "CIVIL WRIT No. 691 OF 1958, FEBRUARY 19, 1959",
    "Judge Name:": "MEHAR SINGH, J.",
    "": "Sumat Parshad\nv.\nIncome Tax Officer"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14083",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 37 = 1961 SLD 37 = (1961) 40 ITR 686",
    "Key Words:": "Section 5(e), (k) of the Madras Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1955\nCASE REVIEW\n \nEastern Investments Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1951] 20 ITR 1 followed andrelied upon.\nObservations in Metro Theatre, Bombay Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1946] 14 ITR 638dissented.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nEastern Investments Ltd. v. CIT [1951] 20 ITR 1 , Metro Theatre Bombay Ltd. v. CIT[1946] 14 ITR 638 and Newtone Studios Ltd. v. CIT [1955] 28 ITR 378.",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "T.R.C. No. 53 OF 1957 JANUARY 19, 1960",
    "Judge Name:": "RAJAGOPALAN AND RAMACHANDRA IYER, JJ",
    "": "G.J. Coelho\nv.\nState of Madras"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14084",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 38 = 1961 SLD 38 = (1961) 40 ITR 624",
    "Key Words:": "Section 49EE of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 - Power to set off in certain cases moneys in possession of Government against tax found due under assessment, etc., thereafter to be made - Whether section 49EE of 1922 Act providing that amount paid by assessees pursuant to voluntary settlement should be retained with Government pending determination of their liability, cannot be regarded as void on ground that it infringes fundamental rights guaranteed under articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of Constitution - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe petitioner was the son and legal representative of one 'M'. The Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by section 5(1) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947, referred to the Commission, cases of escaped income and one such case was of 'M', i.e., father of the petitioner. After the death of \"\"M\"\", the petitioner was brought on record and the proceedings were continued against him.\nThe Commission found that in the relevant period, certain incomes belonging to other persons had also escaped to assessment. The petitioner and others offered to settle the cases against them. They submitted formal application to the Commission for settlement. The Government accepted the proposed settlement and passed an order sanctioning the settlement. It was agreed between the Government of India and the four assessees (including the petitioner) that the tax on the escaped income was to be 75 per cent thereof and Rs. 10,00,000 were to be recovered as penalty. These assessees agreed that they were jointly and severally liable to pay tax and penalty, and the amount was to be paid in four specified instalments. They also agreed not to transfer or encumber the properties and certain shares specified in the schedules to the settlement. Since the terms of the settlement were not complied with, a certificate was issued to the Collector for recovering the amount due under the settlement. Thereafter the petitioner made certain payments aggregating to Rs. 4,00,000, and deposited with the Central Government. Subsequently, the petitioner by his letter, addressed to the Income-tax Department, claimed refund of the amount of Rs. 4,00,000 paid by him, stating that the same had been recovered from him \"\"personally under threats and coercion\"\" and as the settlement in pursuance of which he was made to pay the said amount was no longer enforceable by the Government, the amount was refundable to him immediately. The Income-tax Officer did not carry out the requisition contained in the letter, rather he called upon the petitioner to pay the balance of the amount due with interest. The Income-tax Officer, then served a notice under section 46(5A) of 1922 Act upon certain persons, who were indebted to the petitioner, to pay the amount due by them to the petitioner to the Income-tax Department. Therefore, the petitioner then filed a petition for a direction, order or writ including a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the settlement and the notices issued under section 46(5A) of the 1922 Act and the other proceedings taken in pursuance of the settlement and for a direction, order or writ compelling the Union of India to refund the amount paid by him under the settlement and the amount recovered from the Bank pursuant to the notice under section 46(5A) of 1922 Act, and for a further direction against the Union of India and the Commissioner to return the shares and other documents of title deposited by him as security.\nThe petitioner also contended that section 49EE of 1922 Act provided for compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property within the meaning of article 31(2) of the Constitution violated the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed by that article, in that it did not provide for compensation for compulsory acquisition or requisitioning, and was on that account void. He also contended that section 49EE of 1922 Act discriminated between taxpayers whose cases had not been referred to the Investigation Commission and those whose cases had been referred; and also between taxpayers whose cases were referred and who had settled and made payments and those taxpayers who had not made payments pursuant to the settlements.\nHELD\nPER SHAH, J.\nIf a voluntary agreement be granted, in proceedings for a claim for refund of an amount already paid pursuant to the settlement in full or partial discharge of liability to pay tax, it will be open to the Central Government to rely upon this agreement and to plead that the petitioner was bound thereby. Against the claim made by the petitioner for refund of the amount if the Central Government was entitled to set up the agreement, evidently disputed questions of law and fact would fall to be determined; and normally a petition under article 226 of the Constitution would not be an appropriate proceeding for adjudicating upon disputed questions of fact. Evidently the jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, but it cannot issue a writ operative outside that jurisdiction. Under article 226 a writ may undoubtedly issue in appropriate cases against any Government; but the writ may only issue within the territories and not beyond.\nThe Union of India exercises executive authority over the entire territory of India and the right of a citizen is undoubtedly infringed at the place where he resides; but the source of the authority of the Union is in New Delhi where the administrative officers are located. The infringement of the rights of the citizen at a given place does not invest the High Court having jurisdiction at that place with authority to issue a writ; and the competence of the Union to exercise authority over the place where the rights are infringed also does not invest the High Court with that authority. The jurisdiction to issue a writ must, therefore, be determined by the competence of the High Court to compel performance of its directions in the event of failure to comply with the same; and in the absence of power vested in this court to compel restitution of property collected by the Union in exercise of its executive authority, a petition for a writ against the Union for compelling restitution may not be entertained by High Court.\nThe impugned enactment itself indicates the persons to whom the provisions are intended to apply, and the basis of the classification is that persons falling in this group after accepting liability and agreeing to pay tax and after making payments or furnishing securities in discharge of liability, are now seeking to go back upon their agreements on the plea that the settlements are void. Under the impugned enactment proceedings cannot be initiated or continued for recovery of the amount paid or security furnished pending determination of liability for payment of tax under the normal procedure prescribed by sections 23 and 34 of the 1922 Act. Selection of this group of persons from out of persons who have claims against the Government for special treatment is evidently based upon an intelligible differentia which bears a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved, facilitating collection of tax lawfully due by the taxpayers. Nor is there ground to suppose that there is any discrimination between groups of taxpayers who have entered into settlements with the Government under section 8A of 1947 Act. That group of taxpayers, who, having settled their liability to pay tax have not paid anything towards disclosure of their liability, have not the same characteristics as the group of taxpayers who are covered by the impugned enactment. It cannot be held that the persons who have entered into voluntary settlements and have made payments in pursuance of such settlements are unreasonably discriminated against those who have not made such payment. On the view that there was a tax liability, proceedings have to be taken under the procedure prescribed by the 1922 Act for recovery of the tax due. Those who have not made payments as well as those who have made payments are to be proceeded against under the normal procedure prescribed by section 34 of the 1922 Act, but the payments made pursuant to voluntary settlements are permitted to be retained with the Government pending determination of liability. A person who has made payment in satisfaction of a liability which could not be enforced under the procedure prescribed by a statute may be in a position less advantageous than that of a person who has not made such a payment; and to that extent, when legislation is enacted preventing the former from claiming refund of the moneys paid, his position may be regarded as more onerous. But it could not on that account be held that the classification made between the two sets of persons is unreasonable.\nTax evaders governed by section 49EE of the 1922 Act and the persons who have made payment of tax in advance under section 18A(5) of the 1922 Act do not fall in the same class; they form distinct groups and are not similarly situated. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equal protection of laws, i.e., application of the same laws to persons similarly situated, but the provisions of section 18A(5) and section 49EE of 1922 Act, do not apply to persons who are similarly situated. In the absence of any obligation imposed under any statute or common law to pay interest on amounts lying with the Government pending determination of liability of taxpayers, the absence, of a provision to pay interest on such amounts was not a ground for holding that there is an unreasonable classification.\nBy section 49EE of 1922 Act the Legislature has not attempted to give any binding effect to the result of the investigations made by the Commission, nor are the assessees, who have paid amounts in pursuance of voluntary settlements, sought to be held bound by those agreements. The Legislature had merely authorized the Government of India to hold in reserve the amounts paid voluntarily by those assessees pending determination of their liability, without even seeking to hold them bound by the terms offered by them and accepted by the Government. Such a provision was not intended to implement the provisions of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act.\nEvidently the moneys paid and the securities furnished were the property of the petitioner, and the right of the petitioner to hold the dispose of that property was restricted. But the right conferred by article 19(1)(f ) of the Constitution is not absolute; it was subject, by clause (5 ) of article 19, to any law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of that right in the interests of the general public. It is in the interests of the general public that the tax due by the citizens should be collected; and if, with a view to render effective the collection of tax the liability to pay which was admitted at one time, a provision has been made that the amount paid by the petitioner and others similarly situated should be retained with the Government pending determination of their liability, the law which authorizes such retention does not impose an unreasonable restriction on the right to hold or dispose of property. The restriction is expressly limited in duration, i.e.,till determination of the liability to pay tax. Law does not provide for the transfer of a right to possession of any property to the State is not to be deemed a law providing for compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property. By section 49EE of 1922 Act a restriction was put upon the exercise of the right of the petitioner to his property; that was, he was not entitled to make a claim or to start or continue a proceeding for recovery of that property during a specified period. By the imposition of such a restriction the right to possession of the property was not transferred. Sub-section (3) of section 49EE of 1922 Act expressly provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any legal proceeding in relation to any sum or security paid or furnished to the Central Government under sub-section (1) the period during which the proceeding could not be instituted by reason of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) shall be excluded. Therefore, the right to take proceedings after the completion of the assessment or reassessment proceedings was also preserved.\nThe law which provides for the transfer either of the ownership or of the right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State must, if it is not to be violative of the fundamental right under article 31, provide for compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property. But there is no transfer of a right to possession by virtue of the provisions contained in section 49EE of 1922 Act which restricts the exercise of the right to take proceedings for recovery of the money paid or securities furnished, and there was consequently, no requisitioning of property of the petitioner.\nThe provisions contained in section 49EE of 1922 Act, in so far as it imposes a disability, could not be regarded, as a provision relating to compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, and the validity of such a provision did not depend upon any scheme providing for compensation. The contention of the petitioner that the impugned legislation was void as infringing the fundamental rights guaranteed under articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution must, therefore, be negatived.\nAdmittedly the petitioner had paid the amounts and furnished the securities in pursuance of the settlement towards satisfaction of the liability declared by the settlement on the footing that the moneys paid and the securities furnished were so payable, and in instant petition for the issue of a writ it was not open to the petitioner to ask the Court to enter upon an enquiry whether the moneys paid and the securities furnished did belong to the estate of the deceased father of the petitioner. An enquiry into those questions would raise numerous issues of fact, and a petition for the issue of a writ was not an appropriate proceeding for determination of those issues.\nPER S.T. DESAI (CONCURRENT VIEW)\nThe High Court will only issue a writ against the union if it is satisfied about its enforceability. The writ can only run within the territories of the High Court and the crucial consideration in any such case must be of its effective use and enforceability. In the instant case, the preliminary objection in so far as it is grounded on the contention relating to \"\"location\"\", the result must follow that the objection should be upheld on the ground that even if a writ of mandamus were to issue against the Union of India in this case, it would not be of effective use. To be of effective use it would have to run beyond the limits of territorial jurisdiction and this court was not empowered by article 226 to direct that it should so run.\nSo far as constitutionality of section 49EE of 1922 Act is concerned, the expressed object of section 49EE of 1922 Act which can be gathered from its provisions and the marginal note to the section to which the Court can refer for seeing the trend of the section-is to empower retention by the Government of moneys paid and security furnished by an assessee in pursuance of any settlement relating to assessment or reassessment notwithstanding the fact that the settlement was invalid.\nA law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual or to some individuals if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to such individual or individuals and not applicable to others, such individual or individuals may be treated as a class. In such a case it is upon him who questions such classification on the ground of discrimination to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principle of equality. The legislature may not be bound to extend a legislation to all cases which it might possibly reach. It may take into consideration practical exigencies, it may recognise degrees of harm, and confine the legislation where the need is greatest, and that a law which hits evil where it is most felt will not be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied; that the Legislature may proceed cautiously step by step; and finally that the inequality produced in order to encounter the challenge of the Constitution must be actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary.\nMere differentiation or inequality of treatment or hardship does not per se amount to discrimination within the limitation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. To attract the operation of the clause it is necessary to show that the selection is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object which the Legislature has in view. It was next argued by the respondents-General that the persons selected for operation of section 49EE of were only those who had voluntarily entered into a settlement and of their own volition made payments and given security in pursuance of the settlement. That was the reason applicable to them, and that was the special circumstance, and, therefore,the application of the section to them could not be regarded as hostile discrimination. The test of persons similarly situated, the argument ran, cannot, in these circumstances, support the petitioner's case because it cannot be said that those who made payments and those who did not make payments were similarly situated.\nThe presumption in favour of the constitutionality which permits the court to assume that the law is directed to problems manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds sometimes helps in resolving a difficult case lying on the border line. No classification can be logically complete or accord with a pattern of plumb-line precision. When the impugned legislation indicates a policy and brings within its operation those who are similarly situated and it appears that the policy is the result of specific difficulties and the end to which it is directed is not objectionable on the ground that there is arbitrary or hostile discrimination, the court would not overthrow it simply because it is not couched in all-embracing terms, and resulted in inequality of treatment. These considerations are of greater cogency in the field of taxation where, to say the least, adjustments logical and satisfactory in every way are not to be expected. If the standard adopted and the system employed for any rule affecting the mode or method of recovering tax is supportable on a genuine reason and the mode or method cannot be said to amount to naked discrimination the differentiation that may result should be regarded as merely incidental to the system and not looked upon as unreasonable selection. In any such case the resultant inequality cannot be said to have been imposed by the legislation nor can it be said to flow from any discriminating class legislation favouring some and putting others under a disadvantage.\nIn view of aforesaid, the petition was to be dismissed against the respondent (Union of India).\nNote : Decision was against the petitioner/assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nBaburao Narayanrao Sanas v. Union of India [1954] 26 ITR 725 (SC), Basheshar Nath v. CIT [1959] 35 ITR 190(SC), Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 191, Chiranjitlal Chaudhuri v. UOI AIR 1951 SC 41,Dwarkadas Shriniwas v. Sholapur Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. AIR 1954 SC 119, Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao AIR 1953 SC 210, P.N. Films Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1955 Bom. 381, Inderjeet Singh v. Chief Commercial Manager, E.I. Ry., Calcutta (unreported), Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Indian Staff Association (Calcutta Branches) (unreported), Maqbulunissa v. UOI AIR 1953 All 477, M. Ct. Muthiah v. CIT [1956] 29 ITR 390, Ramesh Chandra v. Director General AIR 1953 Cal. 767, Ramjilal v. ITO [1951] 19 ITR 174 , Ram Krishna Dalmia v.Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538 Rashid & Son v. Income-tax Investigation Commission [1954] 25 ITR 167 (SC), Seth Gopal Das Mohta v. Union of India [1954] 26 ITR 722 , Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Viswanatha Sastri [1954] 26 ITR 713 (SC), State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose AIR 1954 SC 92, Surajmal v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1958 MP 103 Suraj Mall Mohta & Co. v. Viswanatha Sastri [1954] 26 ITR 1 (SC), Tej Bhan Madan v. Government of India AIR 1954 All. 522 and Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. Venkitachalam Potti [1956] 20 ITR 349 (SC).",
    "Court Name:": "Bombay High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "O.C.J. MISC. APPLICATION No. 263 OF 1957, AUGUST 10, 1959",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAH AND S.T. DESAI, JJ.",
    "": "Radheshyam Makhanlal\nv.\nUnion of India"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14085",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1963 45 = 1963 SLD 45 = (1963) 49 ITR 977",
    "Key Words:": "Section 171 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 25A(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Hindu undivided family - Assessment after partition - Assessment year 1952-53 - Whether if income of family in respect of particular year is assessed, tax payable in respect of such income can be recovered from family and from family properties in hands of any of its members although between date of assessment or recovery and date of termination of assessment year there has been partition in course of which family properties have been divided - Held, yes\nSection 222 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [corresponding to section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Collection and recovery of tax certificate proceedings - Assessment year 1952-53 - Whether section 46(2) of 1922 Act does not require that certificate should be forwarded to Deputy Commissioner in any particular form - Held, yes\nFACTS\n \nFor the assessment year 1952-53, the ITO made assessment on 26-3-1957 in respect of the assessee HUF consisting of the petitioner and his son. The tax payable by the assessee-HUF was determined. But according to the petitioner on 28-3-1956, there was a partition of a part of the family assets. On the basis of that incomplete partition, an application had been made by the petitioners for a record of that partition under section 25A(1) of the 1922 Act. The ITO declined to make that record and proceeded to make the assessment for the year 1952-53 as if the family was still undivided. Thereafter again on 29-3-1957 there was further partition of immovable properties under a registered document. The petitioners make an application for an order under section 25A(1) of the 1922 Act but the same was refused by the ITO. On appeal before the Tribunal, the petitioner was able to get the tax payable reduced. But, in the meanwhile, under section 29, a notice of demand had been made by the ITO to the petitioner in his capacity as a karta of the Hindu undivided family demanding the payment of the sum which was the tax which was determined to be paid by him. On the family committing default in the payment of this amount, the ITO forwarded to the concerned Deputy Commissioner a certificate under section 46(2) of the 1922 Act specifying the amount of arrears due from the family in order that the collector might proceed to recover the tax due from the family as if it were an arrear of land revenue. After the receipt of this certificate the movable and immovable properties of the petitioners were attached.\nOn writ petition, the petitioner contended the although there was an incomplete partition on 28-3-1956, on the first occasion and again on 29-3-1957, there was on the date on which the properties of the petitioners were attached by the revenue authorities no family property in their hands which alone had to be proceeded against or the recovery of the tax due from the family.\nHELD\n \nIn the case of a Hindu undivided family, the family is the legal entity which can be regarded as the assessee. The income which may be taxed in the income in the hands of the family and not the income which may have been received by the individual members of the family and in their hands. The family is the unit of assessment and if that family is the assessee and it is determined that that family has to pay a certain sum of money by way of tax, the recovery of that tax after the required notice of demand is issued under section 29 has also to be made from the family since the family is a legal entity which has no physical existence, the only persons from which the tax could be recovered being the persons of which the family consists. In those circumstances ordinarily each member of the family would be liable to pay the tax due from the family and, therefore, liable to be proceeded against for its recovery by the attachment and sale of family property in the hands of teach one of those individual members.\nIt is a firmly established principle of Hindu law that if a debt is payable by a family and after the family has incurred the liability to pay that debt a partition takes place between its members in which, however, no provision is made for the payment of the debt due by it, the creditor who is entitled to cover the debt can proceed to recover it from every one of the members of the erstwhile Hindu joint family to the extent of the family property in the hands of those individual members. The individual members of a Hindu joint family cannot escape from that liability by making a partition is one which the creditor can ignore and he can proceed to recover the debt due from each individual member even after partition provided he does not seek to recover the debt from property other than what was family property which has since been partitioned.\nThere was no reason why one should think that when the Act required a Hindu undivided family to be made the unit of assessment so that the family income might be assessed in order that the tax payable by it may be recovered from the family, it intended to exclude the application of the general principles of Hindu law by which the determination of the liability of the members of a Hindu family to pay a debt binding on the family should be made. It was only by way of abundant caution section 25A(2) of the 1922 Act was introduced into the Act to exclude an argument that once a partition in recorded under section 25A(1) of the 1922 Act the members of the family between whom there was a partition ceased to be jointly and severally liable to pay the tax due in respect of the family income received by them when it was undivided.\nIt could not, therefore, be urged that section 25A(2) of the 1922 Act which was enacted for the purpose of filing up a lacuna is a special or exhaustive provision on the question of recovery of tax from a family which, after the relevant assessment years, has become divided, nor can it be said that by the enactment of section 25A(2) of the 1922 Act it was intended that the general liability of the members of a Hindu joint family created by the Hindu law should no longer be enforceable.\nWhile the charging sections of an enactment like the Act should be so interpreted that if there is a doubt on the question whether a tax is exigible or not that doubt should be resolved in favour of the taxpayer, the machinery section which provide for the recovery of the tax which is charged by the Act have to be interpreted to make the provisions of the Act effectual and operative.\nIf the income of the family in respect of a particular year is assessed, the tax payable in respect of such income can be recovered from the family and from the family properties in the hands of any of its members although between the date of the assessment or recovery and the date of the termination of the assessment year there has been a partition in the course of which family properties have been divided.\nTherefore, it was permissible for the revenue authorities in these cases to attach the movable and immovable properties in the hands of the petitioners for the recovery of tax due from the family whose income was assessed, particularly since it was not disputed in the affidavits produced by the petitioners in these cases that these properties were the family properties when they were partitioned in the years 1956 and 1957.\nIf the partition, which was made in 1956 and 1957, was no partition for the purpose of the Act and if, therefore, the petitioners must be regarded as members of a Hindu undivided family for the purpose of that Act, it was not easy to understand why and for what reason the ITO should treat the petitioners a members of a family which had become disrupted and again issue notices to both of them and why one should think that although for the purpose of the Act, the family was still undivided they should be regarded as divided members and individual they sent to them.\nThe contention next urged that after partition in the family of the petitioners no notice of demand could have been issued by Income-tax, Officer under section 29 of the 1922 Act and that no certificate in pursuance of that notice of demand could have been forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner under section 46(2) of the 1922 Act was so plainly unsustainable that it must fall to the ground.\nIf the petitioner was the karta of the family which was still undivided for the purpose of the Act, a notice of demand issued under section 29 of the 1922 Act to him would be a good notice. If after the issue of that notice the tax was not paid, the family would become a defaulter and all the members of the family would be liable to be proceeded against under section 46(2) of the 1922 Act to the extent of the family assets in their hands, and it becomes unnecessary for the ITO issue notices to each one of them individually. It was, therefore, quite unnecessary in these cases for the ITO to issue one more notice to the petitioner or to issue, in addition to the notices issued to the karta, another notice to another member of the family, viz., the petitioner.\nThe object of the insistence on a certificate required to be forwarded under section 46(2) of the 1922 Act, was that there should be an authoritative intimation to the Deputy Commissioner that a particular sum of money is due from an assessee and still outstanding. Section 46(2) of the 1922 Act does not require that the certificate should be forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner in any particular from. It does not require that the certificate should be in any particular formula. It was not disputed that the certificate originally forwarded after the ITO made his own assessment was a good certificate. All that was necessary for the ITO to do after the Tribunal reduced the tax was to inform the Deputy Commissioner by means of another certificate that the tax payable was less that what originally had been specified. If that has been done as was done by the ITO in these cases, it seemed that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of section 46(2) of the 1922 Act by the ITO.\nThe applications must fail. They were according dismissed.\nNote : The case was decided in favour of the revenue.\nCASE REVIEW\n \nPannalal v. Mst. Naraini [1952] SCR 544 and Sir Sundar Singh Majithia v. CIT [1942] 10 ITR 457 (P.C.)followed & relied upon.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nBankey Lal v. Durga Prasad AIR 1931 All. 512, Lakhmichand Baijnath v. CIT [1959] 35 ITR 416 (SC), Prahlad Rai Bairoliya v. UOI [1956] 30 ITR 678 (Pat.), Sundar Singh Majithia v.CIT [1942] 10 ITR 457 (PC) and Sir Sundar Singh Majithia v. CIT [1942] 10 ITR 457 (PC).",
    "Court Name:": "Mysore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "WRIT PETITION Nos. 322 AND 323 OF 1959 SEPTEMBER 20, 1961",
    "Judge Name:": "A.R. SOMNATH IYER AND B. M. KALAGATE, JJ.",
    "": "WRIT NOS. 322 AND 323 OF 1959 sepTEMBER 20, 1961 \nEsthURi Aswathaiah\nv.\nIncome Tax Officer"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14086",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 39 = 1961 SLD 39 = (1961) 40 ITR 618 = (1961) 3 TAX 63",
    "Key Words:": "Section 254 of Income-tax, Act 1961 [Corresponding to section 33(4) of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Appellate Tribunal - Order of - Appellant assessee-company carried on business of manufacture and selling of sugar - During relevant period, appellant grew its own sugarcane and brought it to factory for manufacturing sugar - On a dispute regarding market price of sugarcane, Tribunal directed ITO to ascertain price in a particular manner - ITO, however, calculated price in a different manner - Appellant company, thus, moved Judicial Commissioner - Judicial Commissioner took view that ITO acted illegally in disregarding order of Tribunal - However, having found this, Judicial Commissioner went on to examine correctness of Tribunal's order and opined that there was error in order of Tribunal - He, therefore, held that there was no manifest injustice as a result of order of ITO - Whether since Judicial Commissioner was not sitting in appeal over Tribunal, it was not open to him to say that order of Tribunal was wrong and, therefore, there was no injustice in disregarding that order - Held, yes, - Whether order of Tribunal having become final, ITO in not carrying out said order failed to perform legal duty imposed on him and such failure was destructive of basic principle of justice - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, a writ was to be issued to direct ITO to carry out directions given to him by Tribunal - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe appellant company carried on the business of manufacturing and selling sugar in various grades and quantities. During the relevant period the appellant company grew its own sugarcane and brought the same along with the cultivator's sugarcane to its factory for manufacturing sugar. For the sugarcane grown on its own farms the appellant company claimed Rs. 1-13-0 per maund as its market value. However, the respondent computed the market value at the rate of Rs. 1-6-0 per maund; thus according to this computation there was a loss and the respondent held in his assessment order that the appellant company was not entitled to claim any deduction of agricultural income for the assessment year.\nThe appellant company then appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who determined the market value of the sugarcane grown on the appellant company's own farms at the rate of Rs. 1-7-9 per maund. This resulted in an agricultural income of Rs. 29,360, which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed to be deducted from the total income of the appellant company.\nNot satisfied with the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the appellant company preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal directed the Income-tax Officer to ascertain the average transport charges per maund from the centres to the factory and to add to it the rate of Rs. 1-4-6 per maund and on that basis work out the market value of the sugarcane grown by the assessee-company in its own farms.\nHowever, while the Tribunal had directed the ITO to ascertain the average transport charges from the centres to the factory, he referred to the cost of transportation from the farms to the factory.\nIn these circumstances, the appellant moved the Judicial Commissioner. The Judicial Commissioner held that the ITO had acted arbitrarily and in clear violation of the directions given by the Tribunal, in other words, he found that the ITO had disregarded the order of the Tribunal, failed to carry out his duty according to law and had acted illegally. Having found this, the Judicial Commissioner went on the examine the correctness of the order of the Tribunal and found that the Tribunal went wrong in not treating the centres as \"\"markets\"\" within the meaning of rule 23 of the Income-tax Rules. He then came to the conclusion that in view of the error committed by the Tribunal, there was no manifest injustice as a result of the order of the ITO; accordingly, he dismissed the application for the issue of a writ made by the appellant-company.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court:\nHELD\nThe Judicial Commissioner was clearly in error in holding that no manifest injustice resulted from the order of the ITO. By that order the ITO virtually refused to carry out the directions which a superior Tribunal had given to him in exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an order of assessment made by him. Such refusal was in effect a denial of justice, and was further more destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based as it is in this country on a hierarchy of courts. If a subordinate Tribunal refuses to carry out directions given to it by a superior Tribunal in the exercise of its appellate powers, the result will be chaos in the administration of justice.\nThe order of the Tribunal was not under challenge before the Judicial Commissioner. That order had become final and binding on the parties, and the ITO could not question it in any way. As a matter of fact the Commissioner had made an application for a reference, which application was subsequently withdrawn. The Judicial Commissioner was not sitting in appeal over the Tribunal, in the circumstances of the case, it was not open to him to say that the order of the Tribunal was wrong and, therefore, there was no injustice in disregarding that order. Such a view was destructive of one of the basic principles of the administration of justice.\nThe ITO instead of ascertaining the average transport charges per maund from the centres to the factory, referred to the transport charges from the farms to the factory and on that footing disregarded the directions of the Tribunal; for the ITO to say thereafter that the order of the Tribunal was not intelligible betrayed a regrettable lack of candour. By the impugned order the ITO failed to carry out a legal duty imposed on him and such failure was destructive of a basic principle of justice, a writ of mandamus should issue ex debito justitiae to compel the ITO to carry out the direction given to him by the Tribunal.\nTherefore, instant appeal was to be allowed and the and order of the Judicial Commissioner was to be set aside. The ITO was to be directed to carry out the direction given by the Tribunal, in its and order.\nNote : Decision was in favour of assessee.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nBimal Chand v. Chairman, Jiagunj Azimgunj Municipality AIR 1954 Cal. 285, Gram Panchayat, Vidul v. Multi Purpose Co-operative Society of Vidul AIR 1954 Nag. 82 and Senairam Doongarmall v. CIT [1956] 29 ITR 122 (Assam).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=254\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL No. 407 OF 1956, SEPTEMBER 2, 1960",
    "Judge Name:": "S.K. DAS, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.",
    "": "Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd.\nv.\nIncome Tax Officer"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14087",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1961 40 = 1961 SLD 40 = (1961) 40 ITR 605 = (1961) 3 TAX 53",
    "Key Words:": "Section 147, read with section 104 of the Income-tax, Act 1961 [Corresponding to section 34, read with section 23A of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Income escaping assessment - Position prior to 1-4-1989 - Appellant-assessee was residing at Lahore during relevant assessment year and was assessed to tax - After partition, he started residing in Delhi - Assessee held shares in a company which had its office at Calcutta - An order under section 23A of 1922 Act was passed in respect of said company-Pursuant to said order, certain amount was included in assessee's income -Thereupon, ITO, Delhi, issued notice to assessee under section 34 of 1922 Act seeking to reopen assessment for relevant assessment year - Said notice was challenged by assessee contending that proceeding under section 34 of 1922 Act was continuation of original assessment, and therefore, ITO Lahore, could only proceed against him and not ITO, Delhi - Whether, since section 23A of 1922 Act does not provide for any assessment being made and it talks of fictional income being included in total income of shareholder for purpose of assessing his total income, assessment, therefore had to be made under other provisions of Act including section 34 of 1922 Act authorising assessment - Held, yes - Whether, therefore, assessment could have been properly made by Income-tax Officer Delhi under provisions of section 34 of 1922 Act - Held, yes\nFACTS\nDuring the assessment year in question, the appellant-assessee was a resident of Lahore and was accordingly assessed to Income-tax. However after partition the appellant shifted to Delhi and was residing there at all material times. The appellant had held certain shares in company at Calcutta. Pursuant to order under section 23A of 1922 Act passed by ITO Calcutta, certain amount of undistributed profit was included in his income. Thereupon the Income-tax Officer, Delhi, issued a notice under section 34 of the 1922 Act to the appellant then residing in Delhi, requiring him to file a revised return. The appellant submitted a revised return under protest and included in it the amount that came to his share pursuant to order passed under section 23A of 1922 Act in case of the company. The Income-tax Officer, Delhi, then reopened the earlier assessment and made a fresh assessment order for the assessment year under consideration, assessing the appellant. The appellant appealed against this order to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but his appeal was dismissed. He then appealed to the Tribunal and the High Court but was unsuccessful. Therefore instant appeal was filed and case of appellant was that the proceedings under section 34 of 1922 Act were only a continuation of the original assessment proceedings and, therefore, it was the officer who made the original assessment order or his successor in office, who alone could start the fresh proceedings. It was hence contended that it was the Income-tax Officer, Lahore, who could proceed against the appellant under section 34 of 1922 Act and the Income-tax Officer, Delhi, had no jurisdiction to do so.\nHELD\nSection 34 of 1922 Act provides that in the cases mentioned in it, the income may be assessed or reassessed and the provisions of the Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice issued under the section had been issued under section 22(2) of the 1922 Act. Now the place where an assessment is to be made pursuant to a notice under section 22(2) of 1922 Act has to be determined under section 64 of 1922 Act. Indeed that is the only provision in the Act for deciding the proper place for any assessment. There is nothing which makes section 64 of 1922 Act inapplicable to an assessment made under section 34 of 1922 Act. Therefore, it was clear, that the place where an assessment under section 34 of 1922 Act can be made has to be decided under section 64 of 1922 Act. Now the appellant was not carrying on any business, profession or vocation. He was working as the Defence Minister of the Government of India and residing in Delhi. He could be properly assessed by the Income-tax Officer, Delhi, under section 64(2) of 1922 Act if the assessment was the original assessment. This was not in dispute. It followed that no objection could legitimately be taken by the appellant to his assessment under section 34 of 1922 Act by the Income-tax Officer, Delhi.\nThere is no limitation of time as to when an order under section 23A of 1922 Act can be made. Therefore, it can be made at a time when the assessment of the income of the shareholder for the year concerned has been completed. There is no reason why that order should not be given effect to by proceedings duly taken under section 34 of 1922 Act.\nIf the income had come into existence, and not been assessed, it has escaped assessment; it is not a case where the income had to be deemed to have escaped assessment. Therefore, the income deemed to have been received by appellant by virtue of the order made under section 23A of 1922 Act, must be held to have escaped assessment, and his income must, therefore, be liable to reassessment under section 34 of 1922 Act.\nSection 23A of 1922 Act does not provide for any assessment being made. It only talks of the fictional income being included in the total income of the shareholders \"\"for the purpose of assessing his total income\"\". The assessment, therefore, had to be made under the other provisions of the Act including section 34 of 1922 Act authorising assessments. Therefore, the assessment in instant case had been properly made by the Income-tax Officer, Delhi under the provisions of section 34 of 1922 Act.\nThe instant appeal, therefore, failed and was to be dismissed.\nNote : Decision was in favour of revenue.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nAmina Umma v. ITO [1954] 26 ITR 137 (Mad.), Chatturam Horilram Ltd. v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 709 (SC), Dodworthv. Dale [1936] 20 Tax Cas. 285, Govindarajulu v. CIT [1948] 16 ITR 391 (Mad.), Janab Jameelamma v. ITO [1956]29 ITR 246 (Mad.), Lakshminarain Bhadani v. CIT [1951] 20 ITR 594 (SC), Rankine v. CIR [1952] 32 Tax Cas. 520 and Spencer v. ITO [1957] 31 ITR 107 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=104,147\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Act, 1922=23A,34\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL No. 317 OF 1955, SEPTEMBER 2, 1960",
    "Judge Name:": "B.P. SINHA, C.J. S.J. IMAM, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO AND, J.C. SHAH, JJ.",
    "": "Sardar Baldev Singh\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14088",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1963 46 = 1963 SLD 46 = (1963) 49 ITR 892",
    "Key Words:": "Section 66 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 16(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Total income - Assessment year 1950-51 - Whether if a particular income has not been included in computation of total income of assessee, that income cannot be included or taken into account for purpose of fixing rate at which other income of assessee has to be taxed, save and except as provided in section 16(1) of 1922 Act - Held, yes - An amount of Rs. 1,10,750 received by assessee was included in computation of her total income and total income was computed at Rs. 1,22,882 - ITO, however, did not compute taken Rs. 1,10,750 but he computed it on difference between 1,22,882 and 1,10,750 at rate applicable to total income of Rs. 1,22,282 on ground that Rs. 1,10,750 had already been taxed in hands of payers - Whether, on facts, it could not be said that Rs. 1,10,750 had not been included in total income of assessee - Held, yes - Whether, since entire amount attracted tax in hands of assessee at rate applicable to total income of Rs. 1,22,882, ITO was not in error in taxing difference between Rs. 1,22,911 and Rs. 1,10,750 at rate applicable to Rs. 1,22,911 - Held, yes\nFACTS\n \nThe assessee, her husband 'M' and son 'T' were members of a HUF. Both 'M' and 'T' carried on the business of managing agency. In 1949 there was a partition of the joint family property and the terms and conditions agreed between the members were reduced to writing in a partition deed. As a result of this partition, the assessee became entitled to receive 0-2-8 shares from her husband, and 0-2-8 share from her son, out of their respective shares of 8 annas in the managing agency business. In the relevant previous year to the assessment year 1950-51 the assessee received Rs. 1,10,750 (Rs. 55,374-11-5 from each) as her share of 0-2-8 in pursuance of the aforesaid partition. In the said assessment year she filed a return and therein disclosed Rs. 1,22,911 as her income, which included the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1,10,750. Both 'M' and 'T' in their respective assessments claimed the said sum paid to the assessee as her share as an allowable deduction. Their claim for deduction was disallowed with the result, that the said amounts were included in their respective incomes and it was taxed in their hands. In the case of the assessee, no tax was levied on the amount of Rs. 1,10,750 but the difference between Rs. 1,22,911 and Rs. 1,10,750 was taxed in her hands at the rate applicable to Rs. 1,22,911. The AAC affirmed the order of the ITO.The Tribunal held that the amounts paid were not admissible deductions. In the case of the assessee, the Tribunal held that the amount received by her from the payers, was not includible even for rate purposes. On reference, the High Court held that what the parties really intended was that only a portion of the managing agency commission should be the income of 'M' and 'T' and the remaining portion should be the income of the assessee. In this view of the matter, the High Court held that 'M' and 'T', were entitled to claim deductions in respect of the amounts paid by them to 'B'. The ITO, thereafter, initiated action under section 34(1)(a) of the 1922 Act against the assessee with a view to reassess the sum of Rs. 1,10,750 which had not been taxed in the hands of the assessee and actually levied tax on the aforesaid amount under section 34(1)(a) of the 1922 Act. On appeal, the AAC held that the assessee had declared the aforesaid amount in her return and, therefore, section 34(1)(a) of the 1922 Act had no application to the facts of the case. The Tribunal referred the matter to the High Court.\nOn reference :\nHELD\n \nIf a particular income has not been included in the computation of the total income of an assessee, then that income cannot be included or taken into account merely for purposes of fixing the rate at which the other income of the assessee has to be taxed, save and except as provided in sub-section (1) of section 16 of the 1922 Act.\nIn the instant case, the order of the ITO clearly showed that the amount of Rs. 1,10,750 had been included in the computation of the total income of the assessee and the total income of the assessee had been computed at Rs. 1,22,882 but tax, however, was not levied or computed on the amount of 1,10,750 because the said amount had already been taxed in the hands of the payers by the ITO who dealt with the assessment cases of the payers. It was, therefore, clear that the tax was not levied on amount of 1,10,750 not because it was not part of the total income of the assessee but because the same amount having been taxed in the hands of the payers. The ITO did not proceed to tax it again in the hands of the assessee. That being the position emerging from the order of the ITO, it was not possible to accept the contention that the said amount of Rs. 1,10,750 and odd had not been included in the total income of the assessee. The total income of the assessee having been computed at Rs. 1,22,882, the entire amount attracted tax in the hands of the assessee at the rate applicable to the said total income of Rs. 1,22,882. It thus followed that the tax on the sum of Rs. 11,632, which formed part of the total income of Rs. 1,22,882 was payable at the rate applicable to the total income of Rs. 1,22,882. The ITO, therefore, was not in error in taxing the sum at the rate applicable to Rs. 1,22,882.\nIt was difficult to accept the alternate contention of the assessee that because no tax was computed on the said amount of Rs. 1,10,750 by the ITO, it must be assumed that the ITO had not included that amount in the total income of the assessee when the order in express terms said that that amount had been included in the total income of the assessee. Similarly, it was also not possible to accept the other contention of the assessee that because the ITO had taken proceedings under section 34(1)(a ) of the 1922 Act, it must be assumed that the Income-tax Officer had not included the said amount of Rs. 1,10,750 in the total income of the assessee for the same reasons.\nNote: The case has been decided in favour of the revenue.\nCASE REVIEW\n \nCIT v. N.M. Raiji [1949] 17 ITR 180 (Bom.) distinguished.\nCASES REFERRED TO\n \nCIT v. N.M. Raiji [1949] 17 ITR 180 (Bom.).",
    "Court Name:": "Bombay High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "IT REFERENCE No. 43 OF 1961, SEPTEMBER 28, 1962",
    "Judge Name:": "Y.S. TAMBE AND V.S. DESAI, JJ.",
    "": "Commissioner of INCOME TAX\nv.\nBai Bhagirathibai"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14089",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1963 47 = 1963 SLD 47 = (1963) 49 ITR 881",
    "Key Words:": "Section 159 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 24B of the Indian Income- tax Act, 1922] - Legal representatives - Assessment year 1951-52 - Whether a proceeding against one of several legal representatives alone on ground that he represented estate of deceased is not rendered defective or bad by mere omission to implead others as well - Held, yes - Whether liability of legal representative under section 24B of 1922 Act to pay tax which might have been assessed but not paid by deceased or which might be assessed after his death is absolute but is however limited to extent to which estate of deceased is capable of meeting charge - Held, yes\nFACTS\nOriginally two brothers 'C' and 'V' constituted a HUF. They became divided in the year 1942. Thereafter, each of them was assessed to income-tax as an \"\"individual\"\" in regard to their respective incomes. 'C' died issueless on 24-2-1951, leaving behind his wife 'p'. The succeeded to his properties as a limited heir under the Hindu law. 'P' however surrendered her husband's estate on 17-3-1951 in favour of 'V'. For the assessment year 1952-53, 'v', was assessed as the legal representative of 'c' for the period between 1-1-1951 to 16-3-1951, and as the karta of the Hindu undivided family consisting of himself and his two sons, 'R' and 'T' for the rest of the year. 'P' died in June 1952 and 'V' died in January 1956. Thereafter on 26-3-1946, the assessment of 'P' for the assessment year 1951-52 was sought to be reopen. A notice under section 34 of the 1922 Act was issued to 'R' on the ground that a sum had escaped tax. In response to this notice 'R' filed his return describing his status therein that estate of late 'C' formerly by legal representative late 'P' now by legal representative, 'V'. He also contended that since 'V' and 'P' had died, issue of notice was invalid. The ITO overruled the objection and completed the assessment by including the aforesaid sum as undisclosed income under section 12 of the 1922 Act. On appeal, both AAC and the Tribunal upheld the reassessment.\nOn reference :\nHELD\nIt is the representation of the estate of the deceased that invests a person with a representative character. Heirs who succeed to the estate, an executor or administrator in whom the estate vests virtue (sic ) and even an intermeddler in possession of the state purporting to be a heir at law though not in fact all alike, effectively represent the estate to the outside world. This is plain enough and is not controvertible. The heir of the deceased in possession of the estate is a legal representative whether under the definition in the Civil Procedure Code or in its popular sense.\nThe liability of a legal representative under section 24B of the 1922 Act to pay the tax which might be assessed but not paid by the deceased or which might have been assessed after his death is absolute, but is however limited to the extent to which the estate of the deceased is capable of meeting the charge. Where a deceased person leaves behind several heirs to succeed and after his death the estate is not represented by any executor or administrator duly appointed, all the heirs together constitute the body of legal representatives who can properly represent the estate. It is not necessary that all of them should be jointly in possession of the totality of the estate. Each one of the heirs is undoubtedly a legal representative and the representative character attributable to each of them cannot be taken away merely because there are other persons of the same class who can answer the said description. But in respect of proceedings for or against the estate the ordinary and normal rule is that all of them should join or be joined together or at least all of them should be parties to the proceedings. But it may so happen that a third party suing the estate may not know or be aware of the existence of several heirs together constituting the legal representatives of the estate against which relief is sought. Any action against the estate by a third party impleading only one of several legal representative cannot be said to be incompetent by the mere omission to implead all the heirs. If in such a case the person impleaded puts forward the plea that there are other legal representatives who ought to be joined in the action, and that he alone cannot represent the estate the default on the part of the person suing in not taking note of the plea, and not taking the proper steps to have all of them before the Court may be fatal to the maintainability of the action. But if the legal representative impleaded does not put forward any such plea but merely contents himself by saying that he is not the legal representative and the person suing bona fide believes that he is the legal representative and prosecutes the action, the proceedings would be valid. An assessment proceeding cannot be rendered invalid or void by merely pointing out to the fact that all the legal representatives in a case where there are many were not present before the Assessing Officer because no notices were issued to all of them. It is to be presumed in every case where the department proceeds against one of the legal representatives alone that it is under the bona fide belief that the person proceeded against is the only person who can validly represent the estate. It is only in a case where the department fails to take note of facts placed before it to show that there are other persons besides the person proceeded against who are also legal representatives that it can be said that the proceedings are defective, on the ground that the estate is not fully and completely represented. There can hardly be any case of fraud and collusion between the department and the person not proceeded against. The department is entitled only to make the assessment or collect the tax levied and it is not likely that a person of ordinary prudence or commonsense would agree to his being treated as a legal representative so as to cause prejudice to the estate.\nA proceeding against one of several legal representatives alone on the ground that he represented the estate of the deceased is not rendered defective or bad by the mere omission to implead the others as well. It is one thing to say that an estate is represented jointly by all the heirs of the deceased person, and a totally different thing to say that the proceeding against one of them alone in a representative capacity should be held to be bad on the ground that the person impleaded along cannot fully represent the estate. It is not as if that the representatives character is distributed, fractionally among all the legal representative giving rise to the conception of a fractional representation, because of the fact of impleading one of them alone. The representative character of one of several co-heirs is always there and he can represent the estate so that any decision rendered in the proceedings against him would bind not merely himself but the estate also as such. In a case where fraud and collusion are established between the person impleaded and the adversary the proceedings are vitiated not so much because that there has been no full representation of the estate but because fraud is a circumstance which would not vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in a Court of law. In the instant case, it was not the contention of 'R' that he was only one of the legal representatives and should not be discriminatingly proceeded against in the absence of his brother, 'T'. His contention was that the estate of the deceased had become altered in its character by becoming part and parcel of the joint family estate of himself and his brother. For the purpose of an escaped assessment against 'C's estate the subsequent character of the property in the hands of 'V' or 'R' was of no consequence as the only question was the legal representative liable to be proceeded against under the Act. 'R' admitted that he was the karta of a joint family of himself and his brother. If that was the true position his brother also was effectively represented in these proceedings. Whichever way one looked at the matter, it was obvious that the estate of 'C' was properly represented in the proceedings under section 34 of the 1922 Act.\nNote: The case has been decided in favour of the revenue.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nAddl. ITO v. E. Alfred [1962] 44 ITR 442 (SC), E. Alfred v. Addl. ITO [1956] 29 ITR 708 (Mad.), E. Alfred v. First Addl. ITO[1957] 32 ITR 401 (Mad.), Muniyammal v. Third Addl. ITO [1960] 38 ITR 664 (Mad.).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE No. 158 OF 1960, SEPTEMBER 4, 1962",
    "Judge Name:": "JAGADISAN AND SRINIVASAN, JJ.",
    "": "V. Ramanathan\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14090",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYSFNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1963 48 = 1963 SLD 48 = (1963) 49 ITR 842",
    "Key Words:": "Section 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Income - Chargeable as - Assessment year 1943-44 - Whether when interest due on a previous advance is capitalised and fresh promise is made for payment of aggregate, there is no payment of interest any more than there is any payment of old principal - Held, yes - Whether it makes no difference whether fresh promise takes form of a promissory note or a bond or a mortgage, whether simple or usufructuary - Held, yes\nFACTS\nThe assessee was a money-lender by profession and adopts the cash system of accounting. He has adopted the financial year as the accounting year. One 'S' was his debtor and 'S' went on executing bonds, promissory notes and mortgages in his favour from time to time. Two of these mortgages included not only cash advanced by the assessee at the time of the execution but also amounts due under previously executed promissory notes, bonds and mortgages (i.e., principals together with interest due up to the dates of the execution). On 2-3-1936, the assessee obtained a decree against 'S', together with future interest in proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act and in execution of it, the property of 'S' was sold and the assessee realized certain amount. For the assessment year 1943-44, the income-tax authorities and the Tribunal ascertained the amount of interest included in the sum by deducting from it the aggregate of the principals advanced by him to 'S' from time to time and also some interest said to have been realized by him from 'S'.\nOn reference :\nHELD\nActually, no interest seemed to have been realized in cash by the assessee from 'S' previously. In some assessment orders for the previous assessment years the income-tax authorities treated capitalized interest as interest realized and assessed the assessee on the amount of it. So long as no interest was realized but was only capitalized by being added to the principal and being made the subject-matter of a new promissory note, bond or mortgage, there was nothing to be assessed. Both logic and precedents were against the view that capitalized interest was liable to be assessed. When a debtor, from whom principal and interest thereon aredue to the creditor, makes a fresh promise in the form of a fresh promissory note, bond or mortgage to repay the principal and the interest within a certain time and to pay future interest on the aggregate, he certainly does not repay the interest that had accrued previously. When he makes a fresh promise to pay the old principal and interest it means that they have not been paid. When he undertakes to pay them at a future date, it is quite the opposite of saying that they were paid to him on the date of the promise itself. Making a promise is certainly not payment and, similarly, repeating a promise does not amount to implementing it. When the interest due on a previous advance is capitalised and a fresh promise is made for payment of the aggregate, there is no payment of the interest any more than there is any payment of the old principal. It makes no difference whether the fresh promise takes the form of a promissory note or a bond or a mortgage, whether simple or usufructuary. In none of the cases is the capitalisation of interest equal to payment of it. When a usufructuary mortgage contains a stipulation, as the two mortgages under consideration contained, that the usufruct of the property would be set off only against the future interest and not against any part of the principal, the realisation of usufruct by the mortgage may include realisation of the future interest but not the past interest which had already been capitalised. Neither the old principal nor the old interest was paid through the usufruct; the usufruct was in lieu of only the future interest on the aggregate of the old principal and the old interest, payable under the fresh contract of the mortgage. It was, therefore, held that when the assessee accepted from 'S' the two usufructuary mortgages he did not thereby receive payment of any interest. He received interest only when he realized the amount and odd in the liquidation proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act. The assessable income was rightly calculated by the Tribunal by deducting from the sum realized the aggregate of the principals advanced by the assessee to 'S' from time to time in the past.\nNote : The case has been decided in favour of the revenue.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nCIT v. Maharajadhiraja Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga [1933] 1 ITR 94 (PC), CIT v. Raja Bahadur Kamakhaya Narayan Singh [1948] 16 ITR 325 (PC), Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Oswald [1945] 13 ITR (Suppl.) 39 (HL), Raja Raghunandan Prasad Singh v. CIT [1933] 1 ITR 113 (PC).",
    "Court Name:": "Allahabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "IT MISCELLANEOUS CASE No. 182 OF 1953, AUGUST 20, 1962",
    "Judge Name:": "M.C. DESAI, C.J. AND BRIJLAL GUPTA, J.",
    "": "Fakir Chand\nv.\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14091",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYRlF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1793 = 2015 SLD 1793 = 2015 PTD 550 = 2015 PTCL 472 = (2015) 111 TAX 18 = 2015 PCTLR 1",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Remedial/curative provisions---Scope---Remedial enactment is intended to provide relief which was not already provided for---Such remedy is to obviate a defect, anomaly or hardship and is designed to bring existing law in line with intention of legislature---Remedial enactments may also be explanatory in nature or may intend to clarify an existing enactment---Such enactments are liberally construed in favour of assessee---Remedial/curative enactments operate prospectively and 'retrospective legislation is looked upon with disfavour' unless language explicitly indicates intention of legislature to be otherwise---In case of declaratory or clarificatory or remedial enactment any doubt is to be resolved in favour of retrospective operation---Retroactivity cannot operate to destroy, affect or disturb vested rights or if it may cause to create new liabilities---Enactment though remedial in nature does not apply retrospectively to alter or effect proceedings and orders which have been determined by having attaining finality---Unless otherwise provided explicitly, the 'remedial' enactment operates retrospectively in those cases wherein proceedings are pending at the time of amendment---In absence of express words, passed and closed transactions cannot be reopened by operation of an enactment which is of a 'remedial' nature.\n \n Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-II, Regional Tax Office, Multan v. Mrs. Ambreen Fawad Co. Pak Arab Fertilizers Limited, Multan 2014 PTD 320; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shahnawaz Ltd., and others 1993 SCMR 73; Commissioner of Income/Wealth Tax Companies Zone-I, Lahore v. Hafeez Valqa Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore 2005 PTD 2403; C.I.T./W.T., Faisalabad Zone v. Shahzad and Company, Faisalabad 2006 PTD 2436; Dawood Cotton Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2000 PTD 285 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Nasir Ali and another 1999 SCMR 563 = 1999 PTD 1173 rel.\n \n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n----Ss. 12(12) as amended by Finance Act (III of 1998), S. 133(4)---Curative/remedial enactment---Retrospective effect---Dispute in question pertained to implication of insertion of proviso to S. 12(12) of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Assessee raised the plea that proviso in question was remedial in nature therefore, it was entitled to avail its benefit---Validity---Proviso inserted vide Finance Act, 1998, was remedial enactment and at the time when it came into force, appeal of assessee was pending before Appellate Tribunal---High Court did not support the plea of authorities that assessment order had attained finality, therefore, assessee was not entitled to the benefit under provisions to S.12(12) of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Appeal of assessee was pending, therefore, benefit of proviso was applicable as appeal created by statute was continuation of original proceedings---High Court directed that assessee was entitled to benefit of being treated in the light of proviso inserted in S. 12(12) of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, through Finance Act, 1998---Reference was decided accordingly.\n \n Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 82, (at pages 918 to 922); Understanding Statutes, Canons of Construction by S.M. Zafar, (at pages 202-203 of the revised Eidition, 2008); Craies on Statute Law by S.G.G. Edgar, Seventh Edition (at page 60); Interpretation of Statutes, by D.M. Bukhshi, reprint Edition 2010 (at page 577) and Construction of Statutes by Ear I.-T Crawford, 1940 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=12(12)\\n\\r\\n\\rFinance Act, 1998=133(4)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "T. R. No. 29 of 2004, heard on 6th November, 2014. DATE of hearing: 6th November, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATHAR MINALLAH AND NOOR-UL-HAQ N. QURESHI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs TRAVEL WALJIS (PVT.) LTD.\nVs.\nCOMMISSIONER APPEALS, INCOME TAX, ISLAMABAD and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14092",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1FTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 8 = 2015 SLD 8 = (1978) 111 TAX 153 = 2015 PTCL 456",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114,120,121(1)(d),122,122(3),133(5),174(2),177,177(6),177(10)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Case No: PTR No. 483 of 2010, decided 3-12-2014. DATE of hearing: 3-12-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JJ.",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX\nVs\nDOABA PLASTICS INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14093",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1FpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1774 = 2015 SLD 1774 = (1978) 111 TAX 160 = 2015 PTCL 33",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=15,156,181,196\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Custom Ref. Application No. 109/2013, decided 29-10-2014. DATE of hearing: 29-10-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JJ.",
    "": "WANG XIAOWEI\nVs\nASSISTANT COLLECTOR CUSTOMS, FAISALABAD and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14094",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1FpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1795 = 2015 SLD 1795 = (1978) 111 TAX 169 = 2015 PTD 863",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114(6),115(4),133(1),144,148,148(1),148(7),115(4),160(3),162,169(3),205,Clause(9,PartII,Second Schedule\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "PTR N0. 276 of 2014, decided 10-11-2014. DATE of hearing: 10-11-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JJ.",
    "": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE \nVs\nPEPCO PAKISTAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14095",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1FpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1777 = 2015 SLD 1777 = (1978) 111 TAX 179 = 2015 PTCL 43 = 2015 PCTLR 345",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(kk),156(1),156(2),168,171,186(1),187,196\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Custom Reference No. 12/2012, decided 1-12-2104. DATE of hearing: 1-12-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID .LAMIL KHAN, JJ.",
    "": "KAMRAN AYUB CHUGHTAI\nvs\nTHE SUPERINTENDENT CUSTOMS etc."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14096",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1FpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1796 = 2015 SLD 1796 = 2015 PTCL 132 = 2015 PTD 2480 = (1978) 113 TAX 33",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Peshawar",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,157,156(1)(8),(89),187,193-A(2),215\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=2(16),2(17),22,23\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=153\\n\\r\\n\\rImports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=391),3(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Custom Appeal No. 119/PB of 2011, decided on 3rd December, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MR. GULAB SHAH AFRIDI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)",
    "": "s by: Mr. Naseer Khan Superintendent Customs.\nMS. Khyber Tea & Food Company, Peshawar others\nVs.\nThe Collector of Customs (Appeals), Peshawar and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14097",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1F5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1779 = 2015 SLD 1779 = (1978) 111 TAX 1",
    "Key Words:": "(A) Federal Excise Act, 2005 - Sections 3, 8 & 14 - Federal Excise Rules, 2005, Rule 40A & 43C - SRO 550(I)/2006, dated 5-6-2006 - Default in payment of federal excise duty on various receipts including late payment charges for arranging financial facilities to clients on overdue amounts by Respondent/Taxpayer who derived income in business as stock broker - Show Cause Notice and passing of order-in-original by DCIT for recovery of federal excise duty along with default surcharge and penalty - In appeal, CIR(A) held that vide SRO 550(I)/2006, dated 5-6-2006, stock brokers are required to pay federal excise duty on their brokerage services only in respect of purchase or sale of shares in stock exchange and late charges earned for arrangement of financing facilities are distinctly different from brokerage and commission in respect of purchase or sale of shares in stock exchange, therefore, other income i.e. late charges will 110 attract federal excise duty in Sales Tax mode under Notification 550(I)/2006, dated 5-6-2006 read with rule 43C of Federal Excise Rules, 2005 - CIR(A) further held that if for argument stake it is assumed that mark-up on financial services are covered even then same will not attract federal excise duty in sales tax mode as same are exempt under Federal Excise Rules, 2005 meaning thereby that services rendered by them do not fall under Rule 43C of Federal Excise Rule, 2005 - Justification for CIR(A) to exclude services of arrangement of financing facilities from value of service provided to clients by Respondent in light of Federal Excise Act, 2005 - Validity - Whether hearing and factual grant of opportunities and adjournment fully justified officer to step in additional time limits, which is beyond 120 days and also construed valid reason; hence it is held that Order-in-Original is within days of statutory time limit and plea of taxpayer is rejected on this score - Held yes - Whether where departmental practice had followed particular course in implementation of some rule whether right or wrong, it would be extremely unfair to make departure from it and thereby disturb rights that have been settled by long and consistent course of practice - Held yes - Whether source of income is relevant for determining first whether it is assessable or not and if it is not exempt from tax, next step is to decide under which head of income it has to be assessed and relevant provisions of law are attracted - Held yes - Whether income wrongly included by DCIR/OIR/Assessing Officer under one head can be taken out from that head, and included under correct head in appeal proceedings - Held yes - Whether section 3 as charging section creates charge on all excisable goods and services subject to conditions laid down\nin sub-clauses (a),(b), (c) and (d) - Held yes - Whether it is a basic rule in a democratic form of Govt. that no tax can be levied or collected except under constitutional authority of the Constitution of 1973 of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which lays down that no tax shall be levied for purposes of Federation except by or under authority of Act of Parliament - Held yes - Whether a person is liable to pay duty on goods and services even if he uses then for his own use or gives them to any person free of cost - Held yes - Whether before person can be made liable to payment of tax or FED levy he must be shown clearly to fall within category so made liable under letter of law - Held yes - Whether from perusal of section 3 of FED Act 2005, it is clear that the rates for services have been provided under First Schedule which shall be charged to Federal excise duty as, and at rates, set-forth therein - Held yes - Whether perusal of above section 43 C it is unequivocally provides that FED is applicable on commission earned from clients in respect of purchase or sale of shares in stock exchange - Held yes - Whether perusal of Notification SRO 550(I)/2006 dated 05-06-2006 read with rule 43 C of Federal Excise Rules, 2005 revealed that stock brokers are required to charge and pay FED on their gross commission services only in respect of purchase or sale of share in a Stock Exchange - Held yes - Whether once department has accepted stance of taxpayer while proceeding u/s 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 by Senior Officer in rank and also in subsequent Federal Excise proceedings different view altogether taken by department is nullity in eyes of law and taxpayer cannot be burdened with FED by any stretch of imagination in instant appeal and department cannot blow hot and cold in same breath to ignore favour to taxpayer - Held yes - Whether principles of consistency and certainty occupy a very prominent position in law of precedent which has to be adhered to by Revenue Department in order to maintain discipline in administration of justice - Held yes - Whether late payment charges is not income from business and not part of commission income/brokerage income when department itself\"\" treated it as late payments (mark-up) income from other sources - Held yes - Whether stand point of CIR(A) is upheld and appeal of Department dismissed - Held yes.\nWe do not agree with the Respondent that Order-in-Original is barred by limitation. In the instant case an agreed date of show cause notice is 30-9-2011 and an agreed date of Order-in-Original is 15th June, 2012 meaning thereby consumption of 167 days. The learned AR pleased that the officer was bound to pass the order within 120 days. On the contrary the provisions of Section 31(3) of Federal Excise Act, 2005 permit further extensions of 60 days for reason to be recorded in writing and 30 days in case the adjournments availed by the taxpayer. Hence a total number of 210 days were available to the officer to pass an order-in-Original. The record reveals that case was heard on 07-10-2011, 25-11-2011, 22-02-2012 and 28.02.2012. The hearings and factual grant of opportunities and adjournment fully justified the officer to step in the additional time limits, which is beyond 120 days and also construed valid reason; hence we hold that Order-in-Original is within days statutory time limit. The plea of the taxpayer is rejected on this score. \nFrom perusal of the amended Order u/s. 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 we have found that the while passing the order the department itself treated the late payment charges recovered from its clients in respect of such debts qualify as \"\"profit on debt\"\" u/s. 2(46) and the same qualify u/s.39 as \"\"income from other Source\"\". The above said factual and legal position is fully verifiable from the amended assessment under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 passed by the learned Additional Commissioner-IR (Audit Range-A), Zone II, LTU, Karachi and confirmed and accepted by the department for the tax year 2011 itself and in its order of the subsequent tax year vide order under section 14 of Federal Excise Act dated 27-08-2012. The Deputy Commissioner vide its Order No. DCIR-03/Zone-IV/LTU/2011-2012 dated 27.8.2012 has vacated the show-cause notice dated 19-03-2012 by accepting the treatment of late payment charges not liable to FED.\nFrom perusal of the above extract from the order passed under the FED regime it is manifest that the department has withdrawn the notice issued for the subsequent year and hence accepted the principle stance of the taxpayer. At this juncture we may observe that where departmental practice had followed a particular course in implementation of some rule, whether right or wrong, it would be extremely unfair to make a departure from it and thereby disturb rights that have been settled by a long and consistent course of practice.\nThe Inland Revenue has been established just to facilitate the taxpayers under one roof facility. Had the DCIR scrutinized the record of income tax proceedings and tried to tally it from the Federal Excise / Sales Tax he would not have come to such erratic conclusion.\n\"\"Heads of Income\"\" is not the same as \"\"Sources of Income\"\". For the Same head of income, there can be more than one source of income. By \"\"source\"\" is not the \"\"head of income\"\" but the specific source from which a particular income arose. The source of income is relevant for determining first whether it is assessable or not, and if it is not exempt from tax, the next step is to decide under which head of income it has to be assessed and relevant provisions of law are attracted.\nIt is not open either to the Revenue or to the taxpayer to claim that an income which clearly falls under one head should be dealt with under a different head for the purpose of this Ordinance. For determining under which head an income will fall, its commercial character is a relevant factor. Time or method of book-keeping by the taxpayer is not relevant consideration. This is decided from the nature of the income by applying practical notions and not by reference to treatment by the taxpayer in his books of account. An income wrongly included by the DCIR/OIR/Assessing Officer under one head can be taken out from that head, and included under the correct head, in appeal proceedings. Section 10 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 also provides scope of total income with reference to residential status of the person. Where a person is resident, its total world income (Pakistan source as well as foreign source) is chargeable to tax. In the case of non-resident person, only Pakistan source income is taxable under this Ordinance. Whether an income is Pakistan source is tested on the criteria\ngiven in Section 101 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nA perusal of section 15 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 shows that, the sole criterion to classify the income under section 15, in ordinary course, is the source and/or the nature of activity and conduct wherefrom and /or whereby the particular income is being generated. As long as the sources can be factually found, circumstances seldom have any bearing on the characteristic of income.\nSection 3 is the charging section under this Act and states what excisable goods or excisable services are liable to duty under the Act. This section relates itself of First Schedule and provides that all excisable goods in Pakistan or imported into Pakistan and on such goods, as the Federal Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify, as are produced or manufactured in the non-tariff areas and are brought to the tariff areas, and on all excisable services, provided or rendered, in Pakistan, as and at the rates, set forth in the First Schedule. Section 3(1) contemplates levy of duties as mentioned vide sub-section (1) clause (a) goods produced or manufactured in Pakistan, sub-clauses (b) and (C) provides levy of Federal duties on all such goods imported into Pakistan as notified by the Government in the official gazette and Federal Government may bring such goods into the net of Federal Excise which are produced and manufactured in non-tariff area, and sub-clause (d) of subsection (1) provides rate of fifteen percent ad volarem as mentioned in the First Schedule. Sub-Clause (2) of section 3 ibid provides manner of imposition of Federal Excise on all goods imported into Pakistan, which shall levied and collected in the same manner and at the same time as it was the duty of customs payable under the Custom Act, 1969. Further, Section 3 is the charging section, which creates a charge on all the excisable goods, the moment the goods are manufactured. The charge, however, remains dormant until it is quantified and the payment of the duty is made or enforced under the provisions of the Rules. Section 3 being a charging section creates charge on all the excisable goods and services subject to the conditions laid down in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) discussed supra. The federal excise duty is a levy under section 3 of the Act which is a charging section. The levying of federal excise duty is legislative act and its collection is regulated by the Rules prescribed under the Act. In between levy and collection the process of assessment \"\"adjudication\"\" or duty falls which is determined by the department. This section has prescribed the manner and method under which this duty is collected. The assessment adjudication of federal excise duty is done by the authorized [now OIR]. The collection of duty is an executive act which is the last step. Before the duty is collected its levy must have the sanction of law. It is a basic rule in a democratic form of Government that no tax can be levied or collected except under the constitutional authority of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which reads as under:- \n\"\"Article 77. Tax to be levied by law only.- No tax shall be levied for the purposes of the Federation except by or under the authority of Act of Parliament.\"\" \nAt this juncture if we look at the legislative history of fiscal statute we can say that there are three stages of the enforcement of a fiscal statute. The first stage is the fixation of rate of a duty or tax which is called imposition, the second stage is assessment adjudication and the third stage is the collection and recovery. Section 3 of the Act declares the liability which determines what goods or services are liable to duty. No liability depends on assessment adjudication but it is found on charging section 3 of the Act. The assessment and collection are machinery provision, which enable the liability to be qualified, and when quantified, to be enforced against the person liable to duty. The duty of excise is primarily a duty levied upon goods and services which is payable by any person, whether male or female or company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. A person is liable to pay duty of excise whether or not, he charges it on goods or services. His liability is founded on section 3 of the Act and does not depend on his ability to charge the duty on such goods or services. Therefore, the person is liable to pay duty on goods or services, even if he uses them for his own use or gives them to any person free of cost. The duty is also chargeable on all excisable goods, even if they are used within the factory for the manufacture of other excisable or non-excisable goods. While imposing federal excise duty on goods or services under the FED Act, 2005 the legislature cannot bring within the tax net any transaction or event which otherwise on a plain, ordinary and grammatical meaning of the terms may by no stretch of imagination be construed as \"\"goods\"\" or \"\"services\"\". The excise duty cannot be avoided on the ground that the goods are meant for the producers own consumption.\nBefore a person can be made liable to the payment of a tax or a FED levy he must be shown clearly to fall within the category so made liable under the letter of the law. The law does not intend to bring any and every one or all within its mischief. It is only as prescribed clearly in the Act.\nNow reverting back to the stance taken by the Department in the case in question that late payment charges attract FED as part of its commission income in view of Entry No. 13 of Table II of First Schedule of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 in which services of brokers have been made taxable. \nFrom perusal of the above referred section 3 of FED Act 2005, it is clear that the rates for services have been provided under the First Schedule, which shall be charged to Federal excise duty as, and at the rates, set-forth therein. The rate of FED for services provided under the heading of 98.19 in the said Schedule is also reproduced hereunder:-\nFIRST SCHEDULE TO THE CUSTOMS ACT, 1969\n[For duties on Services (Sections 2(23) & 3)]\nHeading \n\n\nDescription\n98.19 \n\n\nServices provided or rendered by\n9819.1000 \n\nspecified persons or businesses.\nStockbrokers\nA glossary reading of the above, clearly shows that under this heading stock brokers rendering service rendered by specified persons are liable to pay FED. The stock brokers are earning commission income on which they are under the law obliged to pay FED.\nFrom perusal of the above section 43C it is unequivocally provides that FED is applicable on the commission earned from clients in respect of purchase or sale of shares in a stock exchange. The words used \"\"purchase or sale of shares\"\" have significant value, which restrict the activity to the sale and purchase of shares and not other activities.\nA further perusal of Notification SRO 550(I)/2006 dated 05-06-2006 read with rule 43C of the Federal Excise Rules, 2005 revealed that the stock brokers are required to charge and pay FED on their Gross Commission services only in respect of purchase or sale of share in a Stock Exchange.\nThe principal activity of the taxpayer is to earn commission on the sale-purchase of shares. The historical and functional specialization of the taxpayer company is in this field. However, in order to promote the principal activity and ensure its extention in the volume of business, it planned to arrange finances for the intended purchasers of shares. The question arises had the taxpayer performed the task of arranging funds only, would it have attracted any levy on its services as arranger of finances excludings markup? The answer is in negative. Another important fact is that funds were arranged for own client. The taxpayer did not extend this facility to others or clients making their investment through different brokerage house. This also means that by arranging finances, taxpayer promoted his primary business. The details reveals that otherwise exciseable commission would have been on the lower side.\nAnother vital fact worth consideration is the treatment given to particular receipts under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and Federal Excise Act 2005. In the same period, the gross receipts of the taxpayer had been dealt separately, distinctively and different from commission income from sale/purchase of shares for income tax purpose i.e. vide order u/s 122(5A) dated 18-6-2011 for tax year 2010. More so, in the immediately following period, department has accepted the contention of the taxpayer that late payment receipts do not form part of gross commission earned from sale and purchase of shares for the purpose of Federal Excise and Income Tax i.e. vide orders u/s.14 of Federal Excise Act dated 27-8-2012 and under section 122(5A) dated 27-2-2012. \nWe are of the considered opinion that late payment charges is not earned as a part of such systematic or organised course of activity or conduct with a set purpose the said receipt rightly assessed u/s. 39 as income from other sources and not as income from business u/s. 18(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Once the department has accepted the stance of the taxpayer while proceeding u/s. 122 (SA) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 by the Senior Officer in rank and also in the subsequent Federal Excise proceedings. A different view altogether taken by the department is nullity in the eyes of law and the Taxpayer cannot be burden with the FED by any stretch of imagination in the instant appeal and the department cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath to ignore favourable to taxpayer. The Kaleidoscopic assessments are being made by the Revenue Department without knowing or analyzing the exact nature of business and nature and status of Receipt (late payment Receipt). \nIt may be appropriate to observe that taxes are the life-blood of any government, but it cannot be over-emphasized that the blood is taken from the arteries of the taxpayers and, therefore, the transfusion has to be accomplished in accordance with the principles of justice and fair play. More is lost to the State by way of damage to taxpayer's morale, which is a valuable but fragile national asset, than is gained by such arbitrary and whimsical taxation as has been done by the Revenue Department in the case in hands. Although every government has a right to levy taxes but no government has the right, in the process of extracting tax, to cause misery and harassment to the taxpayer and the gnawing feeling that the Department (DCIR) has made the victim of palpable injustice.\nAs the department itself has considered the late payment charges as income from other sources and thus, keeping in view the cardinal principle of law that \"\"Principles of consistency and certainty\"\" occupy a very prominent position in the law of precedent which has to be adhered to by the Revenue Department in order to maintain discipline in the administration of justice. It is very shocking to observe that Tax authorities would not be acting properly and judiciously if they exercise their power in the manner most beneficial to the revenue and consequently most adverse to the taxpayers.\nTherefore, the late payment charges is not income from business and not part of commission income / brokerage income when the department itself treated it as late payments (markup) income from other sources. Subsequently Revenue is not the part of Gross Commission and FED is not levied. \nOur above detailed findings can be summerized as under:- \nBusiness i.e. commission income will continue to accrue if the facility of arranging finances haults.\nLate payment charges were not earned where the borrower complied with terms of repayment but commission was duly earned on normal sale/purchase transaction.\nAs a stock broker, the remuneration consists solely on commission and taxpayer may not be interested in the profits or losses made by its clients/customer. \nThe two activities i.e. commission on sale/purchase of shares and late payment charges are capable of performance independent from each other. \nThe taxpayer as a stock broker does not owe any liability to lenders but he owes duty of care and skill to its clients in respect of sale and purchase of shares. \nLate payment receipt did not spring or emanate from main business activity earning and deriving \"\"commission\"\" on purchase and sales of shares.\nThe I.R. department accepted this distinction in taxpayers own case in its order u/s. 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance for tax year 2010 and 2011.\nLate payment charge /Receipt is not earned as a part of such \"\"Systematic or organized course of main business activity or conduct with a set purpose\"\". The said Receipt [Late Payment charges] rightly assessed under section 39 as \"\"Income from other Sources\"\" and not as \"\"Income from business\"\" u/s 18(2) of the Income Tax ordinance, 2001.\nWhere taxpayer is stock member/broker mainly earning commission on purchase and sale of shares, receipt on \"\"late payment charges\"\" was not in his capacity as stock broker on purchase and sale of shares but as guarantor discharging altogether different nature it cannot be treated as \"\"Commission Income on sale and purchase of shares\"\" hence, not to be treated as \"\"business income.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Further, late payment receipt irrespective of the head under which such receipt/ income falls is not liable to be levied F.E.D being outside purview of excisable services on purchase and sale of shares by stock broker. ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Further, I.R. department accepted the contention of the Taxpayer by passing order u/s. 14 of the Federal Excise Act 2005 for the period ended on 30-06-2011 which still hold ground.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The subject is not to be taxed unless the charging provision clearly imposes the obligation with valid",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "legislative letter of law. ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The same view has also been consistently followed by our Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in a chain of cases like 1989 SCMR 353, PLD 1970 SC 453, 2003 PLC (SC) 1222. PLD 1965 SC 412. The relevant except from one of its  may be reproduced as under:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "\"Where departmental practice had followed a particular course in implementation of some rule, whether right or wrong, it would be extremely unfair to make a departure from it and thereby disturb rights that have been settled by a long and consistent course of practice that had been once settled.\"\".\"\" \nConsequently, we uphold the stand point of CIR(A) and appeal of the department fails.\n(B) Fiscal Statute - Interpretation - Principles - Whether courts have to interpret provisions of fiscal statute strictly so as to give benefit of doubt to litigant - Held yes - Whether subject is not to be taxed unless words of taxing statutes unambiguously impose liability on him - Held yes - Whether if subject falls squarely within letter of law, he must be taxed, however inequitable consequences may appear to judicial mind - Held yes - Whether taxing provisions must receive strict construction at the hands of courts and if there is any ambiguity, benefit of that ambiguity must go to taxpayer, but this is not the same thing as saying that taxing provision should not receive reasonable construction - Held yes - Whether in every case it is duty of judge to consider which is more reasonable view and accept that, which is more reasonable - Held yes. \nThe courts have to interpret the provisions of a fiscal statute strictly so as to give benefit of doubt to the litigant. In fiscal legislation a transaction cannot be taxed on any doctrine of \"\"the substance of the matter\"\" as distinguished from its legal signification, for a subject is not liable to tax on supposed spirit of law or by inference or by analogy. The subject is not to be taxed unless the Words of the taxing statute unambiguously impose the liability on him. The court must interpret the taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed, it cannot import provisions in the statute so as to supply any assumed deficiency. Indisputably while interpreting a taxing statute \"\"literal though pedestrian interpretation must prevail.\"\" One should equally be aware of the fact that whether it is a taxing statute or any other statute, the real object of the interpretation is to find out the true intention of the Legislature and that the words used must be attributed their plan and reasonable meaning. The Courts ought not to strain the language of the Act either against the taxpayer or against the State. It is equally well established that the subject to be taxed must be brought not merely within the spirit but within the letter of the law also. The interpretation, in fiscal statutes, has to be according to strict letter of the law; and not only in case of doubt, but also in case of beneficial interpretation, the rule is to tend in favour of the subject rather the exchequer. There being no equity in matters of taxing statutes, the Court adheres and follows this path to substantially advance the cause of the dispute. \nThe true implication of the principle that a taxing statute must be construed strictly is often misunderstood and the principle is unjustifiably extended beyond the legitimate field of its operation.\nIndeed, the more well express the principle as in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1921) 12 Tax Cas. 358 the greater the reluctance to see its limitations. In that famous passage marked by a happy turn of phrase, Rowlatt, J., said \"\"there is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax\"\". \nThere is no equity about a tax in the sense that a provision, by which a tax is imposed, has to be construed strictly, regardless of the hardship that such a construction may cause either to the treasury or to the tax-payer. If the subject falls squarely within the letter of law, he must be taxed, howsoever inequitable the consequences may appear to the judicial mind. If the Revenue seeking to tax cannot bring the subject within the letter of law, the subject is free, no matter that such a construction may cause serious prejudice to the Revenue. In other Words, though what is called equitable construction may be admissible in relation to other statutes or other provisions of a taxing statute, such a construction is not admissible in the interpretation of a charging or taxing provision of a taxing statute, we may observe without hesitation that the subject is not to be tax unless the charging provision clearly imposes the obligation.\nIt would be wrong to accept the proposition that a Judge, faced with a conflict of precedent, should abdicate his  and accept the view, which is favourable to the taxpayer. It is only where a Judge finds that two equally reasonable views are possible and he is unable to decide which is the better view, that he may adopt the rule of interpretation that the view favourable to the taxpayer might be accepted. It is also true that a taxing provision must receive a strict construction at the hands of the courts and if there is any ambiguity, the benefit of that ambiguity must go to the taxpayer, but this is not the same thing as the saying that a taxing provision should not receive a reasonable construction. In every case it is duty of the Judge to consider which is the more reasonable view and accept that, which is more reasonable. As mentioned above, it is only where a Judge finds that both the views are equally reasonable that he may resort to the rule of interpretation favouring the taxpayer.\nCases Referred to:\n(2003) 88 Tax 38; 2004 PTD (Trib) 2352; [CIT, Karachi v Gelcaps (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi 2009 PTD 331 (Kar. H.C.)], 2012 PTD (Trib) 954; 1989 SCMR 353; PLD 1970 SC 453; 2003 PLC (SC) 1222 and PLD 1965 SC 412.",
    "URL Link:": "FEA No. 77/KB of 2012, decided on 5-11-2013. DATE of hearing: 8-10-2013.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=3,8,14\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Excise Rules, 2005=40A,43C\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND FAHEEMUL HAQ KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER,",
    "Court Name:": "Shafqat Hussain Keehar, DR, for the Appellant. Abdul Qadir Memoir, and Rashid Malik, Advocates, for the Respondent.",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14098",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1F5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1780 = 2015 SLD 1780 = (1978) 111 TAX 39 = 2015 PTD 1614",
    "Key Words:": "Income tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 111(d)(b) - Additions - Purchase of property by taxpayer, but not declaring it in wealth statement - Acquired property exceeding amount of foreign remittances - Addition by ACIR - Time barred action by A.O - Validity - Whether crux of matter is limitation which was not considered by both authorities below - Held yes - Whether action of Assessing officer u/s 111(1)(b) was barred by time, therefore, both orders passed by authorities below were set aside and appeal of tax payer succeeded - Held Yes. \nThe crux of the matter is limitation which was not considered by both the order passed by authorities below. According to the case laws quoted supra, the action of the assessing officer under section 111(1)(b) was barred by time. Therefore both orders passed by the authorities below are set aside and the appeal of the taxpayer succeeded.\nCases Referred to:\nNagina Silk v. Commissioner Income Tax 1936 PLD 322;\n[(2013)108 Tax 185 (Trib)] and [(2013)107 Tax 197 (Trib)].",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(d)(b),111(1)(b)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 826/IB/2013 (Tax Year 2008), decided on 24-3-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD MAJID QURESHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "": "APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE (HEADQUARTER) ISLAMABAD\nMS. INAM PLASTICS STORE\nVS.\nC.I.R. R.T.O. SARGODHA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14099",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1F5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1781 = 2015 SLD 1781 = (1978) 111 TAX 43",
    "Key Words:": "Income tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 161, 205, SRO. 586(1)/1991, dated 30-06-1991 - Failure to pay tax collected or deducted - Initiation of proceedings by DCIR u/s 161 - Charge of default surcharge - Audited accounts containing material information for ascertaining level of compliance with withholding provisions available with Taxation Officer, but she did not examine these accounts and identify transactions on basis of which appellant could be treated as \"\"Tax payer in default\"\" in terms of section 161/205 - DCIR subjected to tax even those payments which were covered by exemption under SRO. 586(1)/1991 dated 30-06-1991 or were otherwise not liable to withholding provisions - remand of case by CIT(A) for de novo consideration - Validity - Whether orders passed u/s 161/205 without examination of record resulted in holding the appellant as a Taxpayer in default even in respect of payment of lease charges made to non-resident lessors, expenses covered under SRO. 586(1)/91 dated 30-06-1991, amounts which had not been paid up to the closing date and non-cash items although a little bit of care could have forestalled the possibility of taxation of such transactions - Held yes - Whether erratic and arbitrary disposal of case of appellant in utter disregard for norms of justice, judicial propriety and disregard for legal procedure to be followed before raising tax liability - Held yes - Whether instead of vacating order of DCIR as was done in cases relied upon by A.R. CIR(A) remanded case exposing appellant again to high handedness exhibited earlier - Held yes - Whether remanding case to DCIR or de novo consideration would tantamount to gross injustice to appellant, therefore it was held by Tribunal that order passed u/s 161/205 for both years was not sustainable in eye of law and was thus vacated - Held Yes.\nOrders passed under section 161/205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without examination of record resulted in holding the appellant as a Taxpayer in default even in respect of payment of lease charges made to non-resident lessors, expenses covered under SRO. 586(1)/91 dated 30-06-1991, amounts which had not been paid up to the closing date and non-cash items although a little bit of care could have forestalled the possibility of taxation of such transactions.\nThe erratic and arbitrary disposal of the case of the appellant in utter disregard of the norms of justice, judicial propriety and disregard for the legal procedure to be followed before raising tax liability. The learned first appellate authority did notice all these shortcomings in the Order of the DCIR but failed to take a decision which the superior courts, in such circumstances, have taken and directed the subordinate forums to take. Instead of vacating the Order as was done in the cases relied upon by the learned AR, the learned CIR(A) remanded the case to the DCIR exposing the appellant again to the high handedness exhibited earlier. Such a dispensation of justice has not been approved by the courts of this country.\nFor reasons discussed supra, we agree with the findings of the learned first appellate authority but only to the extent that the Order passed by the DCIR is ridden with glaring legal flaws. We cannot, however, endorse his decision to remand the case to the DCIR for de novo consideration as doing so would tantamount to gross injustice to the appellant. We, therefore, hold that the Order passed u/s 161/205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for both the years is not sustainable in the eye of law and accordingly vacated.\nCases Referred to:\n(2004) 89 Tax (Trib.) 430 and (2012) 105 Tax 489 (Trib).",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,205\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 139 and 140/IB/2014 (Tax Years 2011 and 2012), decided on 12-3-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRPERSON AND MOHAMMAD RIAZ ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14100",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1F5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1782 = 2015 SLD 1782 = (1978) 111 TAX 51 = 2015 PTD 1678",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 15, 21(c), 21(g), 34(1)(d), 34(3), 34(5), 70, 100, 120, 120(1), 122, 122(4), 122(5A), 122(9), 155, 183(10) 206(2), 214(1), Rule 1(c), 1 ( d ), 6 & 9 of 7/ Schedule - Amendment of assessments - Additions made by Taxation Officer - Annulment of assessment order by CIR(A) and failure to adjudicate grounds regarding (i) Addition on account of provision for employees post retirement benefits, (ii) Recoveries, (iii) Commutation to employees, (iv) Unpaid liability of mark-up, (v) Reversal of amortization of deferred income, (vi) Provision of non-performing loans & advances, (vii) Reversal against provisions (viii) Provision against other assets, (ix) Impairment loss, (x) property income & (xi) Penalty paid to State Bank - Validity - Whether annulment of assessment order by CIR(A) is not justified, therefore, appeal of Deptt. for tax year 2010 against annulment of assessment order is accepted - Held yes - Whether addition under head post-retirement medical benefit made by Assessing officer is not in accordance with law laid down by tribunal reported as (2012) 106 Tax 317 (Trib.)=2013 PTD 246 (Trib), hence same is directed to be deleted for Tax Year 2010 and impugned orders of CIR(A) on this issue for Tax Year 2011 and 2012 are upheld - Held yes - Whether after going through available record and submissions made by parties regarding addition on account of recoveries, it is held that A.O, has made addition on account of recoveries without any evidence/material establishing that recoveries do not relate to period up to tax year 2007, even otherwise this addition does not come under ambit of Seventh Schedule to Ordinance, therefore, same is directed to be deleted for tax year 2010 and 2011 - Held yes - Whether addition made in respect of property income in all three years under appeal, provision against non-performing loans and sub-standard loans and reversal against provision on account of compensated absences being subject matter of appeal for tax year 2011 & 2012 and surcharge for tax year 2011 are remanded back to A.O as these issues require further adjudication, clarification and evidence to be placed on record - Held Yes. \nAnnulment of the assessment order by the learned CIR(A) is not justified therefore appeal of the department for the tax year 2010 against annulment of the assessment order is accepted. \nAddition under the head post-retirement medical benefit made by the assessing officer are not in accordance with law laid down by this Tribunal reported as (2012) 106 Tax 317 (Trib.)=2013 PTD 246 (Trib.) hence the same is directed to be deleted for the Tax Year 2010 and the impugned orders of the learned CIR(A) on this issue for the Tax year 2011 & 2012 are upheld We are of the view that the additions in this respect is also not maintainable for the reason that it does not come under the ambit-of-seventh Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001.\nAfter going through the available record and keeping in view the above submission made by the Parties regarding the addition on account of recoveries, we are of the considered opinion that the assessing officer has made additions under the head recoveries without any evidence/material establishing that recoveries do not relate to the period up to Tax Year 2007 uptill that time income of the taxpayer was exempt). Even otherwise, this addition does not come under the ambit of Seventh Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance 2001, therefore, the same is directed to be deleted for Tax Year 2010 & 2011.\nAssessing officer has been changing his contention time and again (payment has men made by the fund itself expense is a capital nature tax has not been deducted). The assessing officer has been trying to justify addition for one reason or, the other. Addition based on the circumstances is not maintainable under section 122(5A) of Income Tax Ordinance 2001 which requires that assessing officer should establish that order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue therefore the same is directed to be deleted for all the three years.\nAfter considering the rival arguments we are of the view that addition made in this respect is beyond the scope of Seventh Schedule and is not in accordance with the law down by this Tribunal in the case reported as (2013) 107 Tax 473 (Trib.)=2012 PTD 1055 (Trib.) The same is therefore directed to be deleted for all the three years under appeal.\nAddition is not maintainable in view of the referred decision of this Tribunal dated 18-0-2011 in ITA No.112/LB/2011. Even otherwise the addition is beyond the scope of Seventh Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance 2001. The addition made in this regard is therefore deleted for all the three year under appeal.\nProvision on account of Non-Performing Loan Advances has already been added in taxable income in accordance with Rule 1(c) of the Seventh Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 and 1% of the total advances has been claimed as deduction by the taxpayer. The addition made by the assessing officer is not in accordance with law laid down by this tribunal in case law Reported as (2012) 106 Tax 317 (Trib.)=2013 PTD 246 (Trib), hence addition is ordered to be deleted for all the three years.\nRegarding the addition on account of reversals against provisions, we are of the considered opinion that reversal against provisions has not been claimed as deduction by the taxpayer. The addition made by the assessing officer is not in accordance with law by this tribunal in case law reported as (2012) 106 Tax 317 (Trib.)= 2013 PTD 246 (Trib), hence, ordered to be deleted for Tax Year 2010 & 2011. \nWe are of the view that as the learned CIR(A) has deleted the addition in the tax year 2012 in this respect placing reliance on the decision of the Tribunal dated 9-6 201D for the tax year 2006 & 2007 no interference is required in the impugned order on this issue as the leaned DR is unable to distinguish the case from those years. Addition made in this respect for the tax year 2010 in therefore also deleted.\nAddition is not maintainable as the same does not come under the ambit of seventh schedule. Business income has to be computed under the seventh schedule as specifically provided in Rule 6 Seventh-Schedule.\nThe issue of addition made by the taxation officer in respect of Reversal of Provision against has been objected in cross appeals by both the tax payer and the department as the learned CIR(A) has remanded back the matter for fresh consideration in the tax year 2011 & 2012.\nAddition made in respect of property income in all the three years under appeal, provision against non-performing loans and sub-standard loans, and reversal against provision on account of compensated absences being subject matter of appeal for the tax year 2011 & 2012 and the surcharge amounting to Rs.l3l,290,543 for the tax -year -2011 are remanded back to the assessing officer as these issue require further adjudication, clarification and evidence to be placed on record. The assessing officer is directed to pass fresh order in this respect on these four issues after affording the reasonable opportunity of being heard to the tax payer.\nAddition made in respect of the penalty paid to State Bank of Pakistan for the tax year 2011 & 2012 is upheld as it is inadmissible u/s 21(g) of the ordinance. The learned AR of the taxpayer has submitted that there is mistake in total of additions made by the assessing officer amounting to Rs.50,000,000 in Tax Year 2012. \nCases Referred to:\n(2010) 101 Tax 293 (H.C. Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax, Special Zone, Corporate Region, Karachi. v. Shaisla Estate (Pvt. ) Limited.; (2012) 106 Tax 317 (Trib.); (2010) 102 Tax 91 (H.C. 1sl.); (2002) 85 Tax 51 (S.C. Ind.; 2001 PTD 744; (2013) 107 Tax 473 (Trib. ) and 2011 PTR 222 (Trib ).",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=15,21(c),21(g),34(1)(d),34(3),34(5),70,100,120,120(1),122,122(4),122(5A),122(9),155,183(10)206(2),214(1),Rule1(c),1(d),6,9 ofseventh Schedule\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. Nos. 188/IB to 190/IB of 2014 (Tax Years 2010 to 2012), decided on 28-5-2014. I.T.A. Nos. 282/IB to 284/IB of 2014 (Tax Years 2010 to 2012)",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRPERSON AND MOHAMMAD RIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "": "APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE (HEADQUARTER) ISLAMABAD\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LTD.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE LTU, ISLAMABAD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14101",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1F5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1783 = 2015 SLD 1783 = (1978) 111 TAX 87 = 2015 PTD 871",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) - Sections: 33, 34, 36(1) - Offences and penalties - Non-payment of Sales Tax on supply of free electricity to employees and other distribution companies, Non-payment of Sales Tax on scrap sales, non-payment of sales tax on amount received on account of demand notices, input tax apportionment against subsidy received from Govt. - Show Cause Notice - Ex-Parte decision by DCIR raising demand of tax, default surcharge and penalty - Appeal before CIR(A) failed on point of limitation - Validity - Whether impugned order-in-original was admittedly passed on 03-09-2012 and served upon taxpayer through UMS on 12-09-2012, whereas appeal before CIR(A) was filed on 19-08-2013, hence same is grossly time barred - Held yes - Whether as far as limitation is concerned, it does create right in favour of other side and if appeal or proceedings are time barred it becomes duty of person who has approached Court at least to submit application or make explanation but in instant case admittedly no such effect was made knowing well by appellant that appeal was barred by time Held yes - Whether no violation of stay order was by Deptt. as impugned Order-in-original was passed well before stay order of High Court - Held Yes.\nThe impugned order-in-original was admittedly passed on 03-09-2012 and served upon the taxpayer through Urgent Mail Service (UMS) on 12-09-2012, whereas the appeal before the learned CIR(A) was filed on 19-08-2013, hence, the same is grossly time barred. As per the provisions of section 45B(l) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the taxpayer was required to file the appeal before the first appellate authority within 30-days of the receipt of the impugned order which the company had failed to do so. As far as the taxpayer's contention regarding service of impugned order is concerned, we find that Urgent Mail Service (UMS) is a valid service as the same is equivalent to a courier service which had been duly initiated by the recipient. It is further noticed that on the face of the impugned order-in-original provided by the taxpayer before the learned CIR(A) it also bears the initials and date of receipt of order as 12-09-2012 by some official of the company. The same clearly shows that the order was served upon the taxpayer on 12-09-2012. This fact has not been denied by the appellant during hearing of appeal. Further it is to be noted that admittedly no application was moved before the CIR(A) for the purpose of condoning the delay. It is settled law that as far as the limitation is concerned, it does create a right in favour of the other side and if the appeal or proceedings are time barred it becomes the duty of the person who has approached the court at least to submit an application or make an explanation but in the instant case admittedly no such effort was made knowing well by the appellant that the appeal was barred by time. \nFrom the perusal of record, it is also clearly evident that no violation of the stay order was made by the department as the impugned order-in-original was passed well before the stay order of the Hon'ble Islamabad High Court.\"\" \nCases Referred to:\nNida-e-Millar, Lahore v. Commissioner (2007) 96 Tax I] (S.C. Pak. ).",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33,34,36(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 274/IB/13, decided on 7-1-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "": "APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE (HEADQUARTER), ISLAMABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14102",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1NTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1797 = 2015 SLD 1797 = (2015) 111 TAX 122 = 2016 PTD 283",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ord. 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 122(1), 122(9) & 177 - Amendment of assessment - Selection of case for audit- Definite information - Addition out of P&L expenses without issuing Show Cause Notice - Add back out of P&L expenses without pointing out Specific defect s in back of accounts - Remand of case to TO. by CIR(A) in appeal - Validity - whether Taxation officer has [made disallowances E without properly confronting assesses and giving Specific reason for making disallowances and CIR(A) has also remanded back matter without any justification as once he has come to conclusion that disallowances have not been made in proper and judicious manner, he should have 1 deleted disallowances instead of remanding matter back to- Taxation officer - Held yes - Whether disallowances made by Taxation officer are deleted and appeal filed by appellant is allowed - Held yes.\nThat the Taxation Officer has made the disallowances without properly confronting the assessee and giving specific reasons for making the disallowances and the Learned CIR(A) has also remanded hack the matter without any justification as once he has come to conclusion that the disallowances have not been made in a proper and judicious manner he should have deleted the disallowances instead of remanding the matter back to the Taxation Officer. In view of these facts and circumstances of the case the disallowances made by the Taxation Officer are deleted and the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),122(9),177\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 834/IB/2010 (Tax year 2006), decided on 8-2-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.",
    "": "APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE OF PAKISTAN ISLAMABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14103",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1NTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2017 176 = 2017 SLD 176",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=221\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "M.A. No. 132/LB/2015 (Tax year 2012), DATE OF HEARING: 16-06-2015, DATE OF ORDER: 23-07-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. SHAHID IQBAL DHILLON, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD ASIF, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "MS. PUNJAB FOOD & FLOUR MILLS (PVT) LTD., FAISALABAD \nVS.\nTHE CIR, RTO, FAISALABAD \n by: Mrs. Ghazala Hameed, D.R."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14104",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1NTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2017 177 = 2017 SLD 177",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(a),122(1)(d),122(4),182,214C\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "ITA No. 1163/LB/2014 (Assessment Year 2012), DATE of hearing: 07-08-2014, DATE of order: 18-08-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. SHAHID IQBAL DHILLON, JUDICIAL MEMBER, MUHAMMAD AKRAM TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "MS. PUNJAB FOOD & FLOUR MILLS, (PVT, ) LTD., NISHATABAD, MANSOORABAD ROAD, FAISALABAD\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, FAISALABAD\nResponded by: Mrs. Ghazala Hameed Razi, D.R."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14105",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYS1NTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2017 178 = 2017 SLD 178",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(44A),120(1),122(1),122(2),122(5A),210\\n\\r\\n\\rGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=24A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "MA (AG) No. 80/LB/2012, ITA No. 903/LB/2010 (Tax Year 2004) AND ITA No. 653/LB/2010, (TAX YEAR 2004), DATE OF HEARING: 14-12-2016, DATE OF ORDER: 16-01-2017",
    "Judge Name:": "QAMAR UL HAQ BHATTI, JUDICIAL MEMBER, MASOOD AKHTAR SHAHEEDI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "MS. FAISAL ASAD TEXTILE MILLS, LTD., Lahore .........--Applicant\nVS\nTHE CIR, LTU, \n--Applicant BY: Mr. Abdul Sattar, FCA\n BY: Mr. Jibran Masroor, DR (LTU)\nTHE CIR, LTU, Lahore \nVS\nMS. FAISAL ASAD TEXTILE MILLS, LTD., Lahore ............. \n--Applicant BY: Mr. Jibran Masroor, DR (LTU)\n BY: Mr. Abdul Sattar, FCA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14106",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYTFFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2017 179 = 2017 SLD 179",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(A)(a),153(7),161,205\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "ITA No. 1341 /LB/2016 (Tax Year 2012), DATE of hearing: 19-12-2016, DATE of order: 18-01-2017",
    "Judge Name:": "QAMAR UL HAQ BHATTI, JUDICIAL MEMBER, MASOOD AKHTAR SHAHEEDI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "MS. CHENAB STEEL REROLLING MILLS, Lahore\nVS\nTHE CIR, RTO, Lahore \n by: Ms. Ghazala Hameed Razi, DR."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14107",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYTFFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1784 = 2015 SLD 1784 = (2015) 111 TAX 125",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ord: 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections: 111(1)(b), 122(1)(5), 122(9), 122(8) - Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997, Section: 4-A - Amendment of assessments - Filing of return by taxpayer declaring receipts, net income and also agricultural income - DCIR having Bank Statement of taxpayer in his possession, issued Show Cause Notice confronting deficiencies on basis of definite information - Amendment of assessment order on ground that taxpayer did not produce books of accounts - Charge of tax and making additions in the assessment order DCIR - CIR(A), in appeal deleted addition u/s 111(1)(b) and reduced amount of receipts - Validity - Whether Section 4-A of Punjab Agricultural Income tax Act, 1997 allows tax payer to make deductions while computing net agricultural income, but while examining bank statement, A. O. has ignored this aspect of case and presumed that entire credit entries in bank statement are supposed and undisclosed business receipts - Held yes - Whether sub-section (8) of section 122 of Income Tax Ord: 2001 clearly states that definite information includes information of sale or purchases of any goods made by taxpayer, receipt of taxpayer from services rendered or any other receipts that may be chargeable to tax under the Ordinance - Held Yes - Whether any information which creates doubt or provides reason to suspect that income or receipts have been concealed or suppressed does not form part of term 'definition' - Held yes - Whether taxpayer himself declared agricultural income in his return of income and he was not legally required to declare gross agricultural receipts in his return, which was presumed by assessing officer as suppressed business receipts - Held yes - Whether notices for initiation of proceedings u/s 122(5) were void ab-initio and of no legal effect - Held yes - Whether proceedings initiated on the basis of illegal notices and superstructure constructed thereon in shape of amended order u/s 122(1)(5) is nullity in law - Held Yes.\nThere is no column in the income tax return for the tax year 2001 which required the taxpayer to declare gross agricultural receipts. Only a column under the heading \"\"Exempt income/loss\"\" is available in the return for declaring agricultural income and the taxpayer has accordingly declared net agricultural income at Rs.35,00,000/-. By no stretch of imagination it can be held that the net agricultural income can arrive without bearing any expenditure or allowances. Section 4-A of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 also allows a taxpayer to make deductions while computing net agricultural income. The assessing authority while examining the bank statement has ignored this aspect of the case and presumed that the entire credit entries in the bank statement are suppressed and undisclosed business receipts and asked the taxpayer to produce books of accounts and other supporting documents by issuing several notices. Perusal of the order passed u/s 122(1) also reveals that the taxpayer has submitted documents in support of his declared agricultural income as mentioned in last- Para of Page-6 of the order but the assessing officer has discarded the same on the ground that the same are not supported by books of accounts.\nPerusal of the above would reveal that the assessing officer has shown no doubt regarding the receipts from the sale of agricultural produce but he has rejected the same only on the ground that the taxpayer has failed to produce the books of accounts in this regard as well as bifurcation of the bank deposits relatable to agricultural receipts. This type of treatment itself proves that the assessing officer has no \"\"definite information\"\" or any other corroborated evidence showing that the alleged receipts are concealed business receipts instead of exempt agricultural receipts. Sub-section (8) of section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 clearly states that \"\"definite information\"\" includes information on sale or purchases of any goods made by the taxpayer, receipts of the taxpayer from services rendered or any other receipts that may be chargeable to tax under this ordinance\"\". \nSubsequently the learned CIR(A) has affixed the stamp on the doubt, assumption and presumption of the assessing officer by accepting the agricultural receipts and allowing credit thereto and by deleting addition u/s 111(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The prefix of definite with suffix of information makes the terms more strong. Any information which creates doubt or provide reason to suspect that the income or receipts have been concealed or suppressed do not form a part of the term \"\"definite information\"\". \nIn the present case the deemed assessment was amended u/s 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 by presuming that the difference between the declared receipts and of total of credit entries are suppressed business receipts ignoring the fact of declared agricultural income. This does not constitute 'definite information' but more so a departmental opinion evolved on the basis suspicion, presumption and assumption. \nThe assessing officer has issued repeated show cause notices based on suspicion, seeking information, examination of books of accounts, wavering/dithering from one point of view to other. Such type of the fishy inquiries by issuing repeated notices has already been disapproved by the Hon'ble Higher Courts as well as by this Tribunal through various reported s.\nEven otherwise, the assessing officer required books of accounts in respect of agricultural income which is exempt u/s 41 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and the taxpayer was not legally obliged to prepare books of accounts in respect of exempt agricultural income. The taxpayer has voluntarily declared agricultural income in his return of income along with his business income. If the taxpayer earned only agricultural income covered by section 41 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 he was legally not required to file return of income as required u/s 114 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe taxpayer himself declared agricultural income in his return of income and he was not legally required to declare gross agricultural receipts in his return, which was presumed by the assessing officer as suppressed business receipts. Therefore, we hold that the notices for initiation of proceedings u/s 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for the year under appeal were void ab-initio and of no legal effect. The proceedings initiated on the basis of illegal notices and superstructure constructed thereon in the shape of amended order u/s 122(1)/(5) is nullity in law. \nTherefore, the impugned order of the learned CIR(A) is vacated and the amended order passed by the assessing officer u/s 122(1)/(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is annulled by declaring to have been passed against the spirit of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nCases Referred to:\n(2013) 107 Tax 41 (H.C. Lah) CIR v. M/S. Khan CNG and Filling Station & Others, (2012) 106 Tax 158 (Trib.),' (2012) 106 Tax 446 (Trib); 2012 PTD (Trib) 741; (2013) 108 Tax 35 (Trib.); 2010 PTD (Trib.) 111 and (1993) 68 Tax 1 (S.C. Pak).",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b),122(1)(5),122(9),122(8)\\n\\r\\n\\rPunjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 (I of 1997)=4A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 815/IB/2013 (Tax year 2001) decided on 23-01-2014. DATE of hearing 23-01-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND MOHAMMAD RIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14108",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYTFFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1785 = 2015 SLD 1785 = (2015) 111 TAX 139",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Section 122(5A) - Amendment of assessments - Action of Taxation Officer u/s 122(5A) - Found not sustainable by ATIR and thus vacated - Reference application filed by Deptt. disposed of by High Court in terms of Supreme Court's where it was observed that assessment of any income Year ending on or before 30-06-2002 shall be governed by Repealed Ordinance, as if Ordinance had not come into force - Appeal before Tribunal - Whether perusal of provision of section 133 of Ordinance shows that through it requires furnishing of copy of to tribunal, but no further action is called for - Held yes - Whether it seems that copy is required to be sent for the purpose of record only, therefore, proceedings were filed by tribunal - Held Yes.\nPerusal of the above provision shows that though it requires furnishing of a copy of the to the Tribunal but no further action is called for. It seems that the copy is required to be sent for the purposes of record only. Therefore, the proceedings in this case filed.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A),133\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 616/LB/2009. (Assessment Year 2003) decided on 30-10-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMNZAD ASIF ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14109",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYTFFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1786 = 2015 SLD 1786 = (2015) 111 TAX 141",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 122(5), 21(c) - Amendment of assessments - Filing tax return by taxpayer declaring loss in business - Desk audit showing that taxpayer had not declared its income correctly - Initiation of action u/s 122(5) by DCIR confronting taxpayer with disallowance of cost of sales as well as some P&L account expenses for failure to deduct tax u/s 21(c) - Additions made in salaries and wages, Travelling and conveyance etc: Rejection of claim of exemption under clause (126F) of part-I of second schedule by DCIR - CIR(1) deleted disallowance made on account of cost of sales & rest of P&L account disallowances maintained - Rejection of claim of exemption upheld - Validity - Whether directions were issued for deletion of expenses claimed under heads traveling and conveyance, communication, selling expenses and others as they could not be disallowed with reference to provisions of section 21(c) as they do not find any mention in the said provision - Held yes - Whether withholding tax from payments made on account of these expenses did not arise because all payments were not only below threshold, but in case of \"\"rent, rates & taxes\"\" substantial payments were also made to Govt. Departments - Held yes - Whether no notice u/s 122(5) confronting taxpayer with defects, if any, in said details and information was issued although issuance of this notice was mandatory - Held yes - Whether declared version of company which is loss stands restored - Held yes. \nWe feel that there is considerable force in the argument of the learned AR that the expenses claimed under the heads travelling and conveyance, communication, 'selling expenses and others could not be disallowed with reference to provisions of section 21(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as they do not find any mention in the said provision. We, therefore, direct deletion of these expenses holding that for the purpose of making said disallowances, reference to section 21(c) was irrelevant as well as illegal. As regard other expenses claimed under the heads 'rent, rates & taxes', salaries and wages and directors fee, we agree with the arguments of the learned AR that question of withholding tax from payments made on account of these expenses did not arise because all the payments were not only below the threshold but, in the case of 'rent, rates and taxes' substantial payments were also made to the Government Departments. Had the assessing officer bothered to go deeper into the record relating to these expenses, he would have comprehended the reasons of non-deduction of tax by\nthe taxpayer company. We have further noticed from the Order of DCIR that after examination of details and information submitted by the appellant no notice under 122(5) confronting the taxpayer with the defects, if any, in the said details and information was issued although issuance of this notice was mandatory.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "For reasons recorded supra, we accept the appeal of the company to the extent and in the manner referred above and direct deletion of all the disallowance made by the DCIR and upheld by the learned first appellate authority. Resultantly, declared version of the company which is loss, stands restored. Needless to say that in this scenario the benefit of clause (126F) of Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 would not be available to the company as only those companies which earn 'profits and gains' are entitled to exemption under the said clause.\"",
    "URL Link:": "ITA No. 185/IB/2013 (Tax Year 2010), decided on 4-9-2013. DATE of hearing: 4-9-2013.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5),21(c),clause(126F) ofpart-I of Second Schedule\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRPERSON AND MOHAMMAD MAJID QURESHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "Court Name:": "Tahir Razzaque Khan, FCA, for the Applicant. Zia Ullah Khan, Deputy Commissioner, for the Respondent.",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14110",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYTFFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1787 = 2015 SLD 1787 = (2015) 111 TAX 147 = 2015 PTD 1438",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) - Sections; 11, 25, 33, 33(11), 34, 36(1), 38, 36(1) & 45A, Assessment of tax and recovery of tax not levied or short levied or erroneously refunded - Contravention report - Claim of inadmissible input tax on basis of fake zero rated supplies - Show Cause Notice based on second investigative audit - Scope - DCIR observed that appellant had declared zero rated supplies of rexene, manufacture of which required use of fabric as essential ingredient - It was concluded that appellant had manufactured and supplied plastic sheets only, which were not Zero rated and were liable to payment of output tax at standard rates - Show Cause Notice was issued to appellant requiring it to explain as to why sanctioned refund should not be recovered on account of inadmissible input tax/refund on zero rated item along with recovery of output tax and default surcharge u/s 34 with penalty u/s 33(11c) & (13) of Sales Tax Act - During assessment proceedings, appellant #led writ petition before High Court on point of jurisdiction and issuance of show cause notice on which directions were issued to Assessing Officer who passed impugned order directing appellant to deposit Sales Tax along with default surcharge and penalty - Re-audit and re-investigation was confirmed by CIR(A) in appeal and supplies were not refund of zero rated - Before Tribunal, it was contended by appellant that Zero rated supplies were made to dormant units - Appellant further contended that he mistakenly did not mention fabric in its return, that notice u/s 38 had been issued by Directorate Intelligence and Investigation without specific written permission from F.B.R, so notice u/s 38 is without lawful authority, that Show Cause Notice issued by DCIR calling books of accounts from taxpayer and conducting audit in garb of section 11(3) without process of selection of taxpayer u/s 72B by FBR and requisition of record by CIR u/s 25(1) is without lawful authority - Validity - Whether there is no provision in law justifying or allowing any second audit for same period and for same party, therefore, Show Cause Notice based on second investigative audit is illegal and void - Held yes - Whether appellant filed writ petition before High Court on issue of jurisdiction and High Court bound A.O to pass speaking order first before further proceedings - Held yes - Whether Assessing officer on issue of jurisdiction passed order on 10-06-2014 which was appealable - Held yes - Whether as per law he was bound to allow taxpayer 30 days time for filing of appeal, but he finalized assessment within 16 days which shows malafide intention of Assessing officer - Held yes - Whether taxpayer purchased fabric from unregistered persons and declared in column of other local zero rated sales which are verifiable on e-portal of F.B.R - Held yes - Whether Supreme Court decided issue on section 45B wherein it has been held that Board, u/s 45A of Sales Act is empowered to examine decision or order of officer of Inland Revenue, which according to section 2(18) read with section 30 does not include Board itself- Held yes - Whether on plain reading of section 45A of Sales Tax Act read with other relevant provisions, there can be no two opinions that Board does not, under said provision, possess any authority to examine legality or propriety of its own orders - Held yes - Whether taxpayer is manufacturer of Rexene and contravention report was made on basis of conjectures and surmises while on other hand Board does not, under said provision, possess any authority to examine legality or propriety of its own orders - Held yes - Whether order of CIR(A) is vacated and that of DCIR is cancelled - Held Yes. \nEntire case is based on presumptions and is just fishing enquiry to create bogus demand against the taxpayer. The show cause notice under reference is a 2nd show cause notice and according to law the 2nd show cause notice on the same issue and the same basis is legally not possible. This issue has been examined by superior courts and consistently held that is such eventuality the show cause notice and any adjudication based on 2nd show cause notice is illegal and void. The show cause expresses that this is 2nd investigative order for the same party and for the same period of assessment. There is no provision in the law justifying or allowing any 2nd audit for the same period and for the same party. Therefore, the show cause notice based on 2nd investigative audit is illegal and void. In-depth enquiry from a senior officer be got conducted to ascertain the true facts and not to be swayed by the bogus and fabricated contravention report. \nIt is also observed that the appellant filed writ petition before the honourable Lahore High Court Lahore on the issue of jurisdiction. The honourable court vide order dated 26-05-2014 bound the assessing officer to pass a speaking order first before further proceedings. The assessing officer on the issue of jurisdiction pass order on 10-06-2014 which was appealable. As per law he was bound to allow the taxpayer 30 days time for filing of appeal but he finalized the assessment within 16 days which shows the malafide intention of the assessing officer.\nThe entire proceedings and contravention report is malafide based on misstatement of facts and circumstances of the case. Further the CIR (Appeals) ignored the fact while confirming the DCIR action on the issue manufacturing of REXENE. We are also of the view that the taxpayer is a manufacturer of Rexene in the tax period under consideration and used textile fabrics for making of Rexene. The said fabric was poor quality manufactured in KHADIES in the area of KASUR, these manufacturers were not registered with Sales Tax Department, and furthermore the fabric is covered under zero rated schemes. The taxpayer purchased the fabric from the unregistered persons and declared in column of other local zero rated sales. These are also verifiable on the e-portal of FBR. It is further observed that the fabric purchase verified from the factory gate passes, these gate pass reflect the goods entered in the factory with his quantity. The gate pass produced at the time of hearing in the court.\nOn the issue of section 45A of Sales Tax Act, 1990 the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan decided the issue in a reported as (2011) 104 Tax 6 (S.C. Pak.)=2011 PTD 1232 wherein it has been held that the Board, under section 45A of the Sales Tax Act, is empowered to examine the decision or order of an officer of the Inland Revenue, which according to section 2(18) read with section 30 of the Sales Tax Act does not include the Board itself. Further the officer of the Inland Revenue is defined as an officer appointed under section 30 and the later gives a list of such officers. They are appointed in relation to a particular area by the Board of Revenue. For obvious reason the list does not include the Board. On the plain reading of section 45A of the Sales Tax Act read with other relevant provisions, there can be no two opinions that the Board does not, under the said provision, possess any authority to examine the legality or propriety of its own orders\"\". The order of the apex court is on all fours to the facts of instant case, hence keeping in view all the discussion and case law cited supra we hold that the taxpayer is a manufacturer of Rexene and the contravention report was made on the basis of conjectures and surmises while on the other hand the Board does not, under the said provision, possess any authority to examine the legality or propriety of its own orders. In this view of the matter, the order of the learned CIR(A) is vacated and that of the DCIR is hereby cancelled.\nCases Referred to:\n2013 SCMR 85; (1997) 76 Tax 5 (S.C. Pa/.); (2005) 91 Tax 312 (Trib.); (2012) 106 Tax 24 (Trib.); (2005) 91 Tax 75 (H.C. Kar); Abida Rashid v. Secretary PLD 1995 Karachi 587; Rashid Ahmad v. The State PLD 1972 SC 271; Abdul Razzaq v. Muhammad Sharif PLD 1997 Lahore 1; (2011) 104 Tax 6 (S. C. Pak.) and 2003 S CMR 501.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,13,25,33,33(11),33(11c),34,36(1),38,36(1),45A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "STA No. 1107/LB/2014, decided on 11-11-2014. DATE of hearing: 11-11-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "., JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "MS. PAUL LEATHER INDUSTRIES, Lahore\nVS. \nC.I.R., ZONEX, R.T.O., Lahore"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14111",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYTFFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1301 = 2015 SLD 1301 = (2015) 111 TAX 165 = 2015 PTD 1490",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 - Sections 2(37), 2(9), 2(14)(a), 3(1)(a) & (5), 6(1) & (2), 7(1)(2)(i)(ii), 9(1)(61), (ca) & (d), 8A, 21, 22(1), 23(1), 25, 26(1), 11, 33(11), 34, - Assessment of tax and recovery of tax not levied or short, levied or erroneously refunded - Illegal adjustment of inadmissible input tax by appellant against blocked/black-listed suppliers - Tax fraud - Show Cause notice - Assumption of jurisdiction without lawful authority - Passing of order-in-original by DCIR for recovery of Sales Tax, default surcharge and penalty - Action of A.O maintained in appeal by CIR(A) - Validity - It is contended by counsel of appellant that treatment meted out by both authorities below is erroneous and without application of judicial mind and liable to be annulled, that Show Cause notice issued by DCIR was vague and ambiguous in material particulars, that various sections of Sales Tax Act were invoked while adjudicating issue which are not relevant to case and even Assessing officer himself has not discussed or touched any of these sections, that Adjudicating officer failed to prove any collusion or tax fraud on part of appellant and to prove same, onus lay on department and merely on plea that suppliers had become blocked/suspended subsequent to purchases made by appellant cannot prove that transactions were in nature of tax fraud - Scope - Whether DCIR has tried to invoke series of provision of Sales Tax Act as mentioned in Show Cause Notice, bitt without specifying allegations - Held yes - Whether officer was under obligation to mention relevant sub-section out of sub-sections (1),(2), (3) or (4) of section 11 in his Show Cause Notice and impugned order, but instead order has been passed without mentioning any relevant sub-section of assessment u/s 11 of Sales tax Act, I 990 - Held yes - Whether without completion of pre-requisite of Show Cause Notice and supply of grounds/reasons in clear and explicit words to ascertain that under which sub-section, case would fall, demand notice may have no legal consequences and thus failure of authorities issuing Show Cause Notice to disclose such grounds and reasons renders notice invalid - Held yes - Whether order of adjudicating officer issued in consequence of vague Show Cause Notice failing to meet fundamental legal requirements and its subsequent confirmation by CIR(A) in his impugned order is held to be of no legal consequences - Held yes - Whether adjudicating officer has assumed jurisdiction without lawful authority by initiating proceedings through vague and ambiguous Show Cause Notice - Held yes - Whether appellant made purchases while both alleged suppliers were very much active and operating and were blocked/suspended long after purchases and as such appellant cannot be penalized if subsequently parties become non-operative or are blocked - Held yes - Whether provisions of section 8A of Sales Tax Act, 1990 cannot be applied retrospectively - Held yes - Whether imposition of 100% penalty without first establishing that appellant committed anything wrong or contravened any provision of law knowingly and dishonestly is patently illegal, harsh, unjustified and without any logic - Held yes - Whether order-in-original is illegal and void ab-initio and consequently impugned order of CIR(A) is vacated and order passed by DCIR is annulled - Held Yes.\nDCIR has tried to invoke series of provisions of Sales Tax Act, as mentioned in the show cause notice such as 2(37), 2(9), 2(14) (a), 3(1) (21) & (b), 6(1) & (2), 7(1), (2)(i)(ii), 8(1)(a), (ca) & (d), 8A, 21, 22(1),23(1), 25, 26(1) and 73 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 but without specifying the allegations. Perusal of series of sections, as mentioned above, shows that mostly these are just definitions and deals with the scope, time and manner of payment of sales tax and different procedure. The adjudicating officer was required to frame specific allegations based on the above provisions in the show cause notice which has not been done, It is further noted that the impugned order has been passed Without mentioning any section of assessment of tax. The Adjudicating Officer was required to pass the order under specific sub-section of section 11 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 which in this case has not been done. \nFor the purposes of assessment, the officer was under obligation to specify the relevant sub-sections out of sub sections (1), (2), (3) or (4) which deals with the assessment under different situations. Each of these sub-sections deals with a particular situation. It may be mentioned here that sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 11 were earlier part of section 36, which was omitted by the Finance Act, 2012 and sub-sections (1) and (2) of said section 36 were incorporated in section 11 as its sub-sections (3) and (4). The officer was under obligation to mention the relevant sub-section out of sub-sections (1), (2), (3) or (4) of section 11 in his show cause notice and the impugned order, which has not been done. Instead order has been passed without mentioning any relevant sub-section of assessment u/s 11 of Sales Tax Act, 1990. This Tribunal in its decision reported as 2004 PTCL 18 has laid down following distinctions between sections 11(2) and 36(1): \n\"\"The difference between two provisions of law is that section 11(2) and (4) deals with non-payment/short payment of tax by the person from whom it was due on the supplies made by him and also where the claimed input tax credit or refund which was not admissible under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. As far the input tax credit/refund, sub-section (2) of section 11 only covers such input tax credit/refund which had been claimed but was not admissible. On the other hand section 36 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 covers non-levy, short levy of sales tax and such amounts which have already been refunded erroneously. Sub-section (1) of section 36 deals with the situation where non levy/short levy erroneous refund was made due to some collusion or deliberate act and sub-section (2) of section 36 deals with the same situation but where the cause was inadvertence, error or misconstruction. With regard to erroneous refund section 36 is to get invoked where the amount has already been refunded erroneously as against that section 11(2), in addition to non-payment, short payment of tax due on supplies made by a person deals with \"\"input tax credit or refund\"\" which has been \"\"claimed\"\"; \"\"which is not admissible under this Act\"\".\n \nFrom the above s, it is amply clear that sub-section (1) of omitted section 36, is now sub-section (3) of section 11, which deals with the situation, where non levy/short levy or erroneous refund was made due to some collusion or deliberate act of the person who has authority or power to levy sales tax whereas sub-section (2) of omitted section 36 covers the cases in which sales tax was not levied or short levied or erroneously refunded by reason of inadvertence, error or misconstruction. Obviously tax payer/appellant does not possess such power or authority. Therefore, omitted sections 36(1) and 36(2) which are now sub-sections 11(3) and (4) respectively are applicable in a situation where the assessing/adjudicating officer has failed to levy, has short levied or refunded the tax by way of collusion or inadvertence. Likewise section 11(2) deals with non-payment/short payment of tax by the person from whom it was due on the supplies made by him and also where the claimed input tax credit or refund was allowed which was not admissible under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. As far the input tax credit/refund, sub-section (2) of section 11 only covers such input tax credit/refund which had been claimed but was not admissible. However, adjudication officer in his show cause notice has not mentioned any of the relevant sub- sections of section 11. By no stretch of imagination, it could possibly be construed that one would come across the four situations envisaged in section 11 at the same time. Therefore, we fully agree with the contention of the learned A.R. that the show cause notice was vague and ambiguous in material particulars. It needlessly mentioned a series of irrelevant sections of the Act without specifying the allegation or default and when it comes to the sections related to assessment there too confusion continued as no reliance on section 11 of the said Act has been placed. Accordingly, proceedings and the subsequent orders based on such a notice are not sustainable in the eyes of law. It is settled principle of law that without completion of pre-requisite of show-cause notice and supply of the grounds/reasons in clear and explicit words to ascertain that under which sub-section or section, the case would fall, the demand notice may have no legal consequences and thus the failure of the authorities issuing show-cause notice to disclose such grounds and reasons renders the notice invalid. In the instant case, it is not clear as to under which sub-section or section of Sales Tax Act, the show cause notice was issued. The show cause notice carrying the defect of vagueness cannot stand to the test of judicial scrutiny. This Tribunal in its decision reported as (2011) 103 Tax 332 (Trib.)=2011 PTD 808 has held that a vague show cause notice fails to meet foundational legal requirements; therefore, demand created as a result thereof is not sustainable. Accordingly, the order of the adjudicating officer issued in consequence thereof and its subsequent confirmation by the CIR (A) in his impugned order is held to be of no legal consequences. \nFrom the above discussion, it is crystal clear that the adjudication officer has assumed jurisdiction without lawful authority by initiating proceedings through vague and ambiguous show cause notice.\nIt is settled proposition of law that if law prescribes thing to be done in a particular manner, such provision of law is to be followed in letter and spirit. Reliance is placed on the s cited as (2001) 84 Tax 133 (S.C. Pal.)=2001 SCMR 838, 2003 SCMR 1505, 2011 PTD 2480 at 2516, 2006 PTD 2567 (Lahore H.C.), PLD 1997 Lah 692. Similar question also came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case of Izhar Alam Farooqi v. Sheikh Abdul Sattar reported as 2008 SCMR 240 wherein the Hon'ble Court held as under:-\n\"\"if a mandatory condition for the exercise of a jurisdiction before Court, Tribunal or Authority is not fulfilled, then the entire proceedings which follow become illegal and suffer from want of jurisdiction. Any order passed in continuation of these proceedings in appeal or revision equally suffers from illegality and is without jurisdiction.\"\" \nFrom the above, it shows almost after over two year suppliers were blocked for which reasons are also not known, whereas appellant had fulfilled all responsibilities by making compliance of section 73 i.e. all payments were made by payees account through cross-cheques and while filing sales tax returns during months of purchases both parties were active/operative as such the appellant cannot be penalized if subsequently the parties become non-operative or blocked.\nIt was pointed out that both the suppliers were subsequently restored/de-blocked by the FBR, however again suspended/blocked on 18-05-2012 and 03-07-2013 respectively which proves that both the suppliers are genuine, bonafide and existed as such the DCIT point of view that both suppliers were bogus or CIR (Appeals) observation that suppliers did not got restored or came up for de-blocking subsequently, do not carry any weight or substance under the relevant provisions of law.\nSuch acts clearly shows that the appellant had discharged all its legal and moral duties to establish that supplier were active and operative at the time when the transactions were made and also remained active during the investigation carried out by the detecting agency.\nWe observed that the provisions of section 8A of Sales Tax Act, 1990 are not attracted in the appellant's case. To attract such provisions, it is imperative that the department must prove that when the appellant firm received a taxable supply from other registered person, those are, (i) that the registered person was in the knowledge or (ii) has reasonable grounds to suspect that some or all of the tax payable in respect of that supplies or (iii) any previous or (iv) subsequent supply of goods supplied would go unpaid. It is for the respondent to prove the above four ingredients or any one of them as per Article 117 and 118 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984. It is explained that \"\"Qanoon-e-Shahadat order 1984 is applicable to all judicial proceedings in or before any Court including a Court Marshal, a Tribunal or other authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. The provisions of section 8A simply requires that the buyer should have the \"\"knowledge\"\" and \"\"reasonable grounds\"\" to suspect that the supplier will not eventuality deposit the sales tax in the national exchequer paid by him and in order to attract the provisions of section 8A initial burden lies on the department to establish that the taxpayer had prior \"\"knowledge\"\" and \"\"reasonable grounds\"\" to suspect the supplier that the sales tax paid to him shall be remained unpaid in its eventuality and then proceed against the taxpayer. The applicant, in the present case, under the prescribed mechanism of value added tax (VAT), has made payments of input tax to his suppliers and he had no access to confirm that the alleged supplier had made the payments in the Government treasury or not. \nThe applicant receiving taxable supplies was legally obliged to check \"\"Validity and Veracity\"\" of the supplying person through electronic verification which was obviously done at the time of transaction. This was the duty of the tax functionaries to check as to whether the supplier had made payments of tax due to them especially when he was filing his monthly sales tax returns and summaries of sales and purchases with the department. The impugned Show Cause Notice does not disclose that the appellant was in knowledge or had reasonable grounds to suspect that some or all of the tax payable in respect of supply or any previous or subsequent supply of the goods supplies would go unpaid, therefore, liability to pay tax jointly and severally under section 8A of the Act would come into play only when it is established with corroborating material evidences that where registered person receiving taxable supply from another registered person is in the knowledge or has reasonable grounds to suspect that some or all of the tax payable in respect of that supply would go unpaid. The position in the case is very much different due to the reason that the appellant after verifying the status and genuineness of the supplier from e-Portal of FBR, made the payments of in-put tax to them and fulfilled all the responsibilities lies on his shoulders. Mere allegation that the alleged suppliers are blacklisted, suspended and fake is not enough without corroborating evidence for denying the lawful right of input tax of the buyer. Therefore the appellant cannot be evolved as a joint liable and induction of contravention does not quality. \nProvisions of Section 8A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 cannot be applied retrospectively.\nOn the basis of above, the provisions of section SA of the Act are not applicable in the appellant's case.\nThe appellant firm purchased goods from the registered suppliers and paid due tax to the buyer at the time of payment of goods including sales tax. The appellant firm provided record/purchase invoices issued by the suppliers, as an evidence regarding claim of input tax adjustment. Hence, the question of non availability of records did not arise in this case. It is liability of the department to conduct inquiry in order to ascertain the facts that why the registered suppliers not declared correct supplies in their records, why they concealed the supplies and why they did not deposited due tax in the national exchequer and in consequence of this, issued them show cause notice pointing out discrepancies. \nThe check and balance rest with department and not with the third party. In this case, the appellant firm is third party and not responsible of activities of alleged suppliers.\nWe intend to agree with the contention of the learned A.R. that the provisions of section 8(1)(ca) of the Act, are not attracted in the instant case placing reliance on the  of the Hon'ble Lahore High Court in the case of \"\"Messrs D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd. v. The Federation of Pakistan, and others\"\" in Writ Petition No: 3515 of 2012, wherein the provisions of section 8(1)(ca) had already been declared unconstitutional being illogical and absurd, offending Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution, 1973. The relevant part of the said  is reproduced hereunder:- \n\"\"For the reasons elaborated above, section 8(1)(ca) of the Sales Tax Act, .7990 besides being illogical and absurd, offends Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution and is hereby declared to be unconstitutional and therefore, struck down. As a consequence, impugned show-cause notice dated 20-10-2011 and Order-in-Original dated 6-1-2012 arising out of section 8(1)( ca) of the Act are also set aside. For the above reasons, this petition is allowed with no order as to costs.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Any invoice duly issued by a registered supplier cannot be purported to be a fake document, once it is established that the same is duly incorporated in sales shown by the supplier in his summary statement and also declared in his sales tax monthly return for the period in question particularly in the cases where its payment is also transacted through banking channel as prescribed under the Act. Conversely, if a registered person holds a tax invoice which is not incorporated in the supplier's records or in its respect payment is also made clandestinely, it can be said that such person is making a fake business transactions. Any invoice that evidences a fake, fraudulent or shame transaction is known as a \"\"fake invoice\"\" and any distortion in taxable supply tainted with \"\"tax fraud\"\" or \"\"collusion\"\" between buyer and seller renders the tax invoice defective and fake. It is well established principle of law that \"\"a party making an allegation must bring material evidences to prove the irregular, false, collusive and fraudulent transaction.\"\"",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The department has not been able to place on record any evidence by which it can be referred that the invoices issued by the supplier were fake. Any action which is based upon no evidence is not permitted by any law of the land. The appellant, who has admittedly paid the input tax covered by the invoices, cannot be denied the statutory right of claiming its adjustment.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "In view of above, neither the charge of \"\"tax fraud\"\" nor \"\"collusion\"\" has not been established against the appellant with his suppliers to evade sales tax by way of fake invoices. Even the department could not prove and bring on record any evidence for collusion of the applicant with his suppliers without which, the provisions of section 8(1)(d) are not attracted in the instant case. Accordingly, the whole proceedings are infested with inherent legal infirmities and are required to be annulled.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "It is a well-settled principle of law as per latest  reported as 2014 PTD 558 (Trib.) under the titled S.T.A. No.952/LB/2012 dated 29-08-2013, wherein it has been held that: \"\"if blacklisting or suspension of registration of a supplier is effected subsequent to a period in which purchases and bank payments were transacted could not be made a tool to deprive of the buyer of a valuable right accrued in his favour prior to such blacklisting or suspension the registration of any supplier due to subsequent default whatsoever on his part.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Accordingly, the titled taxpayer could not deprive from his valuable right through retrospective application of section 21 for black-listed suppliers.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The penalty proceedings under the fiscal laws are independent proceedings. These have nothing to do with the criminal proceedings that may be pending anywhere else particularly when no evidence relating to such proceedings was ever provided to the appellant during the original or appeal proceedings. The learned CIR (Appeals) has erred in not following the s of superior courts cited by the AR in this regard which were binding on him.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Perusal of the impugned order further shows that the learned CIR (Appeals) has confirmed 100% penalty under section 33 (13) of the Sales Tax Act 1990, as according to him the act of alleged unlawful adjustment comes within the ambit of tax fraud defined in section 2(37) of the Sales Tax Act 1990. The appellant is a duly registered person having STRN. By simply leveling allegation of tax fraud does not make out a case for the Department to subject the appellant to penalty equal to the amount of alleged inadmissible adjustment. Reliance by the assessing officer on the provisions of section 2 (37) to justify levy of penalty is misplaced. ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Section 2 (37) envisages that \"\"tax fraud\"\" means knowingly dishonestly or fraudulently and without any lawful excuse amounts to the commission of tax fraud, if the accused does any act or causes to do any act or omits to take any action or causes to take any action in contravention of duties or obligations imposed under the Sales Tax Act or Rules or instructions there under with the intention of understanding the tax liability or underpaying the tax liability for two consecutive tax periods or overstating the entitlement to the tax credit or tax refund to cause loss of tax. Facts and circumstances of the case elaborately discussed in the foregoing paragraphs clearly show that none of the ingredients constituting tax fraud as stated above have been shown to exist by the assessing office in his show cause or the impugned order. Onus to prove that any of the ingredients of the provisions of section 2(37) were involved in the appellant's case was of the department which has not at all been discharged. A bare perusal of the show cause notice and the impugned order shows that no case of tax fraud is made out whereby the burden of proof could be shifted to the appellant.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "In view of the above, imposition of 100% penalty without first establishing that the appellant committed anything wrong or contravened any provision of law knowingly and dishonestly is patently illegal, harsh, unjustified and without any logic. Therefore, confirmation of the action of the DCIR to impose 100% penalty on the strength of section 2(37) of the Act by the CIR (A) is void ab initio and without any justification.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "It is now settled that no penalty could be imposed without first establishing the mens rea.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Reliance is placed on another  of Hon'ble Sindh High Court reported as (2007) 95 Tax 336 (H.C. Kar.)=2007 PTD 901. The Hon'ble High Court has held that nature of penal provisions being quasi-criminal, existence of mens rea was an essential and mandatory condition for levying penalty and Department must establish mens rea before levying such penalty. ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Reliance is also placed on the ratio of decision of this Tribunal reported as (2010) 102 Tax 566 (Trib.)=2011 PTD 693 wherein in the identical circumstances the Tribunal deleted the penalty with the observations that the penalty has not only been levied in a haste but also without substantiating mens rea, which is an integral part of penalty proceedings.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "In view of the facts and circumstances as discussed above, we hold that Order-in-Original dated 29-03-2012 is illegal and void ab initio. Consequently, the impugned order of learned CIR (Appeals) is vacated and the order passed by the DCIR is hereby annulled. ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(B) Administration of Justice - Things to be clone in particular manner - Philosophy - Whether it is settled proposition of law that if law prescribes thing to be done in particular manner, such provision of law is to be followed in letter and spirit Held Yes.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Respectfully following the above s of Superior Courts and in view of the vague and ambiguous notice containing irrelevant provisions of law with no specific allegations attached thereto as well as finalizing the Order-in-Original and confirmation thereof by the learned CIR (Appeals) under no provision of law in the appellant's case are held to be without lawful authority. ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(C) Words & Pharases - Word \"\"fake\"\" - Meaning of - Whether word \"\"fake\"\" has been defined by black Law Dictionary 8th Edition to be something that is not what it purports to be \"\"and\"\" to make or reconstruct falsely - Held Yes. ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "As for as violation of section 8(1)(d) of the Act is concerned, there is no violation in the appellant's case. These provisions can only be invoked in cases where charge of \"\"Collusion\"\" or \"\"tax fraud\"\" has been leveled and established by the department as the said provision disentitles a registered person from deducting or claiming input tax.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The word \"\"fake\"\" has been defined by the Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edition to be \"\"something that is not what it purports to be \"\"and\"\" to make or.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Cases Referred to:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "2004 PTCL 18; (2008) 97 Tax 29; (2005) 91 Tax 277 (S.C. Pak); (2011) 103 Tax 332 (Trib.); (2001) 84 Tax 133 (S.C. Pak.); 2003 SCMR 1505; 2011 PTD 2480; 006 PTD 2567 (Lahore H. C.); PLD 1997 Lah 692; Izhar Alam Farooqi v. Sheikh Abdul Sattar 2008 SCMR 240; Rain Drop - Lahore v. Commission Inland Revenue (Appeals III)-Lahore 2012 PTD (Trib) 885; D.G. Khan Cement Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan etc (2013) 108 Tax 226; 2010) I02 Tax 240 (Trib.); Fine Packages v. CIR and 2012 PTD (Trib) 946; 2007 PTD 67 (S.C Pak); 2007 CLD 16421; 2007 CLD 1642; 2002 SCMR 134; (PLD) 1994 (H.C. Lah.); 2001 SCMR 11161, PTCL 2002 CL 50; 2014 PTD 558 (Trib.); Government of Pakistan v. Messrs Village Development Organization 2005 SCMR 492; (2004) 90 Tax 130 (H.C. Kar); (2004) 89 Tax 136 (H.C. Lah.); Additional Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Narayandas Ramkishan (1976) 34 Tax 189 (Ind. ); (2007) 95 Tax 336 (H.C. Kar.) and (2010) 102 Tax 566 (Trib.).\"",
    "URL Link:": "STA No. 175/KB/2013, (July, 2009 to February, 2011) decided on 27-11-2014.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),2(9),2(14)(a),3(1)(a),11,31(1)(b),31(5),6(1),6(2),7(1)(2)(i)(ii),9(1)(61),(ca),(d),8A,21,22(1),23(1),25,26(1),33(11),34\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "SIKANDAR ASLAM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND ABDUL QAYYOOM SHEIKH, JUDICIAL MEMBER.",
    "Court Name:": "Abdul Wahid Tejani, ITP, for the Appellant. Hyder Abbas, DR, for the Respondent. Date of hearing. 13-11-2014.",
    "Law and Sections:": "APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE OF PAKISTAN KARACHI\nMADNI PACKAGES (PVT.) LTD.\nVS.\nCOMMISSIONER (I.R.) Zone-IV, RTOII, KARACHI",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14112",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYTFFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1788 = 2015 SLD 1788 = (2015) 111 TAX 231 = 2015 PTD 1422",
    "Key Words:": "(A) Administration of Justice - Principles - Whether it is settled principle, illustrated in number of s of superior judiciary that when law requires something to be done in particular manner then that very thing should be done in that very particular manner - Held yes.\nIt is settled principle, illustrated in a number of s of the superior judiciary that when the law requires some thing to be done in a particular manner then that very thing should be done in that very particular manner.\n(B) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Section 122(a) - Amendment of assessments - Filing of revised return by assessee - Initiation of proceeding against taxpayer - Taxpayer contended that earlier notice issued u/s 122( 9) had become in fructuous, the moment revised return was filed, that non-issuance of fresh notice was fatal rendering impugned order nullity - Validity g- Whether non-issuance of notice u/s 122(9) cannot be simply ignored as procedural irregularity, issuance of notice in fact embodies time honoured maxim of audi alterm parterm - Held yes - Whether provision as contained in said sub-section (9) ensures fundamental right of all citizen including all taxpayers that no one shall be condemned unheard - Held yes - Whether having filed revised return, taxpayer had vested right of being heard through issuance of notice pointing out deficiencies etc: observed by assessing officer in revised return - Held yes - Whether assessing officer laced jurisdiction to proceed with amendment proceedings - Held yes (5) whether Revenue has filed to establish any legal or factual infirmity in impugned order, hence its confirmation - Held Yes. \nThis being so, non-issuance of a notice u/s 122(9) cannot be simply ignored as procedural irregularity. Issuance of notice in fact embodies the time honoured maxim of audi alterm parterm. The provision as contained in said sub section (9) ensures a fundamental right of all the citizen of this country including all the taxpayers that no one shall be condemned unheard. Having filed the revised return, the taxpayer had a vested right of being heard through issuance of a notice pointing out the deficiencies, etc. observed by the assessing officer in the revised return. This having not been done, the assessing officer laced jurisdiction to proceed with the amendment proceedings. \nUpshot of the above discussion is that the Revenue has failed to establish any legal or factual infirmity in the impugned order.\nHence its confirmation.\nCases Referred to:\n(2006) 94 Tax 27 (H. C. Kar).",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(a),122(9)\\n\\r\\n\\rWealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=35\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 724/IB/2011 (Tax Year 2009), decided on 13-12-2011. I.T.A. No. 697/IB/2011 (Tax Year 2009). DATE of hearing: 13-12-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED NADEEM SAQLAIN, CHAIRMAN, MIAN MASOOD AHMAD, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14113",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYTFFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1789 = 2015 SLD 1789 = (2015) 111 TAX 234",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 122, 122(5) & 177 - Amendment of assessments - Definite information - Selection of case for audit - -Calculations or OGRA formula - Additions - Assessment upheld in appeal by CIR(A) - Validity - Whether OGRA provides formula to tax authorities for determining sales per month by converting energy units (MMBTU) into mass units (Kgs), but OGRA has not associated any of appellants or representatives of CNG Stations before making such scientific research or during such scientific research duty - Held yes - Whether despite scientific conversion said formula does not fulfill yardstick/touchstone of definite information and under law assessment can only be amended on basis of definite information - Held yes - Whether amended assessment is annulled and deemed assessment us 120 is restored - Held yes - Whether judicial forums are bound to decide every case as per law and facts of case - Held yes - Whether appellants cannot be forced to follow option available by other taxpayers because it is their inalienable right to be treated in accordance with law - Held Yes. \nOGRA provides a formula to the tax authorities for determining sales per month by convening the energy units (MMBTU) into mass units (kgs) but OGRA has not associated any of the appellants or representatives of the CNG stations before making such scientific research or during such scientific research/study. It only consulted Sui Northern Gas Company Ltd. and Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd. therefore, this formula cannot be used to disadvantage of the appellants because justice should not be done but it should manifestly seem to have been done.\nMoreover, this formula provides a mode of determination and assessment, but in no terms it could be treated as definite information. Needless to observe that the tax authorities have themselves opted for taxation on the basis of 4% tax gas charges instead of this formula and the results mentioned. In earlier part of this order show that tax per MMBTU as per OGRA formula is Rs. 51.8 whereas on basis of gas charges at 4% tax per MMBTU is Rs. 7.49 and each formula depicts result which shows at huge difference between net incomes as well as the tax chargeable. The scheme of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 shows that it has given sanctity to the deemed assessment u/s 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 which is not to be disturbed except in accordance with the provisions of section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Therefore, I agree with learned Judicial Member that despite scientific conversion said formula does not fulfill the yardstick/touchstone of definite information and under the law assessment can only be amended on the basis of definite information. Consequently, the amended assessment is annulled and the deemed assessment u/s 120 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is restored. \nNow I come to the second issue, my brother learned Accountant Member, has proposed that if issue no. 1 is answered in negative even then instead of annulment of amended assessment, should not the taxpayer be asked to avail the facility of concessionary payment of at the rate of 4% as most taxpayers in this line of business have availed this facility. Suffice it to say that judicial forums are bound to decide every case as per law and facts of the case. The appellants cannot be forced to follow the option availed by other taxpayers because it is their inalienable right to be treated in accordance with law. No doubt, this tribunal ought to protect the revenue but strictly in accordance with law. In the instant case, as a result of decision on issue no. 1 the deemed assessment u/s 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 stands restored, therefore, issue no. 2 is answered in negative.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Now it is a decided issue with majority view, which is to be followed onwards in such like cases.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "With these discussions and observations we have been left with no other option except to annul the amended assessment and restore the deemed assessment u/s 120(i)(b) under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\"",
    "URL Link:": "I.T.A. Nos. 155 & 156/IB/2011 (Tax Years 2004 and 2005) decided on 10-1-2012. DATE of hearing: 10-1-2012.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,120(i)(b),122,122(5),177\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "MUNSIF KHAN MINHAS, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND ASAD ALI, JAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "Court Name:": "Atif Waheed, Advocate , for the Appellant. M. Jawad, DR., for the Respondent. -",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14114",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYTFFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1790 = 2015 SLD 1790 = (2015) 111 TAX 244",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Section 122(5A) - Amendment of assessments - Capital borrowed for expansion of plant from Bank - Reduction from taxable income - Show Cause Notice - Reply discarded - Passing of order u/s 122(5A) by Assessing officer - Annulment of assessment by CIR(A) - Validity - Whether in audited accounts entries are recorded on basis of International Account Standards, whereas in Income Tax return entries are recorded in accordance with Income Tax law & procedure - Held yes -Whether under International Accounts Standards mark-up payable to Bank may be capital expenditure, but under Income Tax Law, this can be claimed as revenue expenditure - Held Yes..\nIn the audited accounts the entries are recorded on the basis of international account standards (IAS) whereas in the income tax return the entries are recorded in accordance with Income Tax law & procedure. Under IAS mark-up payable to the bank, in this situation, may be capital expenditure but under the Income Tax law, as held by the Honorable Supreme Court, this can be claimed as a revenue expenditure.\nCases referred to: \n(1989) 60 Tax 55 (S. C. Pak.).\n[The Order was passed by Muhammad Asif, Accountant Member] - This single appeal filed at the instance of revenue/department, against the findings recorded by the learned CIR[Appeals]., Faisalabad passed on 23.06.2010 vide Order No. 3744 pertaining to Tax Year 2007. The single ground as set forth in the memo of appeal before us in respect of Tax Year 2007 is as under:-\n"That the learned CIR[A] was not justified to annul the order passed u/s 122(5A) of the I.T. Ord., 2001".\nThe appellant, a limited company, derives income from manufacturing and sale of Sugar. Briefly stated the relevant facts of the case are that return for Tax Year 2007 was filed declaring loss of (Rs.5,86,52,540). The deemed order passed u/s 120 of I.T. Ord., 2001 was 'found erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. On the ground that the mark up claimed on borrowed capital for expansion of the plant was capital expenditure and hence could not be reduced from taxable income (actually loss). Therefore, show cause notice was issued vide No. 485 dated 27-10-2009, in response to which reply of the taxpayer was discarded. For the reasons recorded in the body of order amended assessment order u/s 122(5A) of I.T. Ord., 2001 was passed.\n2. On first appeal, the learned CIR(A) placing reliance on (1989) 60 Tax 55 (S.C. Pak.)=1989 PTD 500 (SC) annulled the impugned order for the year under consideration with the following observations-\n"The appellant company was expanding the capacity of Sugar production and for that purpose obtained loan from the Bank and financial charges on the said loan were claimed as revenue expenditure. In this regard, arguments advanced by the learned AR are quite convincing. Therefore, considering the facts of the case and by placing reliance the of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan and other case law quoted supra, the impugned order u/s 122(5A) of Income Tax Ord., 2001 is annulled being illegal".\n3. Hence this appeal by the revenue/department.\n4. In response to call notice, Mr. Shahid Pervez Jami, Advocate appeared on behalf of respondent/taxpayer while Mrs. Samia Ejaz, DR appeared on behalf of revenue/department. Both of them were heard.\n5. We have heard the arguments of both the rival parties at length and also perused the available record.\n6. At the time of hearing the learned DR submitted that the appellant himself had declared the mark-up on the loan borrowed for expenditure in the capital account as per the audited accounts. He, therefore, was not entitled to claim its direct deduction while computing the income, as revenue expense.\n7. We are not inclined to accept the contention of the leaned AR, as in our considered opinion, this agreement is misconceived. \nIn the audited accounts the entries are recorded on the basis of international account standards (IAS) whereas in the income tax return the entries are recorded in accordance with Income Tax law & procedure. Under IAS mark-up payable to the bank, in this situation, may be capital expenditure but under the Income Tax law, as held by the Honorable Supreme Court, this can be claimed as a revenue expenditure. The learned DR failed to distinguish the law laid down by the honorable Supreme Court in re: (1989) 60 Tax 55 as under:-\n"Amount of interest paid by the purchaser of an industrial concern to the vendor on the unpaid price being an integral part of the profits earning process as it was related to the carrying on or conduct of business satisfies the test laid down for bringing the case within the fold of section 10(2)(vii)-- Assessee was operating the business and was entitled to appropriate the profits and bear the losses even before the execution of sales-deed which operation continued after the execution of the sale-deed --- Assessee claimed interest on the unpaid balance as revenue expenditure for the subsequent charge years --- Years - Held, such expenditure was not for the acquisition of any property but was so closely related to the business that it could be viewed as an integral part of the conduct of the business and satisfied the test to bring it within the four corners of section 10(2)(xvi) as revenue expenditure laid out Wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business"-\n8. Consequently, the appeal fails.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=10(2)(vii),122(5A)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1230/LB/2010, (Tax Year 2007) decided on 30-10-2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASIF ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14115",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYTFFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1791 = 2015 SLD 1791 = (2015) 111 TAX 246 = 2015 PTD 1425",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ord. 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 177, 121, 122(5), 122(3), 122(9) - Amendment of assessments - Filing of revised returns by taxpayer - Section of case for audit - Rejection of declared version of Taxpayer and framing of amended assessment by Taxation officer - Lump sum addition of 30% out of Profit and loss expenses - Dismissal of appeal by first Appellate Authority - Taxpayer contended that 30% add back out of P&L account were not sustainable as such figure was never confronted to taxpayer - He further argued that section 122(5) does not empower A.O. to estimate sales of any taxpayer, that lump sum addition was also not in conformity with law, hence liable to be reviewed - Validity - Whether whole case of Revenue hinged upon premises that since Taxpayer filed revised returns, hence department was justified to reject declared version of tax payer and frame amended assessment - Held yes - Whether law makes of section 122(3) had allowed taxpayer to file revised returns and no restriction has been imposed with regard to number of times, taxpayer could file revised turn - Held yes - Whether Section 122(5) did not empower Taxation Officer to act whimsically and similarly on basis of add backs out of P&L account too, number of s of higher legal fora as well as Tribunal have categorically held that lump sum addition out of P&L account cannot be made - Held yes - Whether impugned order passed by first Appellate Authority is vacated and amended assessment passed by Taxation officer is directed to be cancelled - Held Yes. \nWhole case of the Revenue hinged upon the premises that since the taxpayer filed revised returns, hence the department was justified to reject the declared version of the taxpayer and to frame an amended assessment. We have no hesitation in holding that the department and the assessing authority failed to appreciate true spirit of law as envisaged under section 122(3) of the Ordinance. It is observed that law makers of section 122(3) had allowed the taxpayer to file revised returns and no restriction has been imposed with regard to the number of times, taxpayer could file the revised return. It is further observed that nowhere it has been postulated by the law that an adverse inference would be drawn in case of revised return is filed more than one time. Besides, further perusal of the impugned order does indicate that while fixing the sales at Rs.88,754,620/- the department/Revenue authorities did not provide any basis whatsoever. In this regard we tend to agree with the arguments of the learned A.R. that section 122(5) did not empower the Taxation Officer to act whimsically. Similarly, on the issue of add backs out of P&L account, too, a number of s of the higher legal fora as well as the Tribunal have categorically held that lumpsum addition out of P&L account cannot be made.\nThis view of the fact, we vacate the impugned order passed by the learned first appellate authority. The amended assessment passed by the Taxation Officer is directed to be cancelled.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177,121,122(5),122(3),122(9)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 441/IB/2011 (Tax year 2007) decided on 29-6-2011. DATE of healing: 29-6-2011.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED NADEEM SAQLAIN, CHAIRMAN AND SOHAIL AFZAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "SHAHEEN CHEMIST SHOP, RAWALPINDI\nVS. \nC.I.R., R.T.O. RAWALPINDI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14116",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYTFFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1792 = 2015 SLD 1792 = (2015) 111 TAX 251 = 2015 PTD 2011",
    "Key Words:": "(A) Words & Pharases - Words \"\"Bank deposits\"\" -\"\" Call deposits\"\" - Meaning of - Whether Bank deposits are made to deposit accounts at banking institution, such as savings accounts, checking accounts and money market accounts - Held yes - Whether the term call deposits refers to specific type of interest bearing investment account that allows person to withdraw their money from account without penalty - Held yes - Whether the term \"\"deposit\"\" general refers to saving account or certificate of deposit which pays fixed rate of profit on maturity of on certain date - Held Yes.\n\"\"Term Deposit (definition):\nTerm deposit is the popular name used for a savings product In Australia, New Zealand and Canada, but they are used throughout the world by both consumers and businesses to store cash for the future. Term deposits are also known as Certificates of Deposit in the United States, Bonds in the United Kingdom and Fixed Deposits in India and some other countries. \n\"\"Term Deposit (meaning)\nIn deposit terminology, the phrase Term deposit refers to a savings account or certificate of deposit that pays a fixed rate of interest until a given maturity date. Funds placed in a Term Deposit usually cannot be withdrawn prior to maturity or they can perhaps only be withdrawn with advanced notice and/or by having a penalty assessed.\n\"\"Bank Deposits\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Money placed into a banking institution for safekeeping. Bank deposits are made to deposit accounts at a banking institution, such as savings accounts, checking accounts and money market accounts. The account holder has the right to withdraw any deposited funds, as set forth in the terms and conditions of the account. The \"\"deposit\"\" itself is a liability owed by the bank to the depositor (the person or entity that made the deposit), and refers to this liability rather than to the actual funds that are deposited. ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "\"Call Deposit/Bank Deposit (meaning)\"",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "In deposit terminology, the term \"\"call deposit\"\" refers to a specific type of interest bearing investment account that allows a person to withdraw their money from the account without a penalty. In many cases the money can be withdrawn from a \"\"call deposit\"\" account without prior notification to the bank.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The phrase \"\"term deposit\"\" generally refers to a saving account or certificate of .deposit which pays a fixed rate of profit on maturity of a certain date. Funds allocated in such term deposit usually cannot be withdrawn prior to maturity otherwise it liable to a certain penalty to be payable. Term deposit being time bound, differ significantly in nature from checking accounts\"\" therefore, it is obvious that funds deposited.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(B) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections: 120(1), 122(5A) - Clause (74) Part 1 of second schedule - WWF. Ordinance, section 4(1) Finance Act, 2006 and 2008 - Amendment of assessments - Taxpayer filed return declaring nil taxable income - ACIR observed that taxpayer claimed inadmissible exemption on debt/interest income and also failed to pay WWF - Show Cause Notice - Exemption claimed clause (74) of first part second schedule disallowed on term deposits/call deposits - Taxable income of taxpayer, subjected to WWF @ 2% by ACIR decision upheld in appeal by CIR(A) - Validity - Whether bare perusal of clause ( 74) of Part 1 shows that profit on debt derived by taxpayer on its banks deposits or accounts is exempt, but same is pre-condition to fact that these deposits/accounts directly connected to project operation of taxpayer - Held yes - Whether interest income earned from term deposits by taxpayer does not cover exemption as provided in clause (74), until same is brought back to regular stream of business operation - Held yes - Whether there is no reason to disturb orders passed by authorities below which is maintained and appeal of taxpayer on this score is rejected - Held yes - whether electricity falls within definition of \"\"goods\"\" \"\"articles\"\" produced, therefore, establishment of appellant company squarely falls within definition of \"\"industrial establishment\"\" as provided in section 2(f) of WWF. Ord: 1971, thus taxpayer - Company is liable to pay WWF on its total income - Held yes - Whether however, taxpayer is not liable to pay WWF in accordance with amendments introduced through Finance Acts 2006 & 2008 but is liable to pay WWF as it is stood prior to these amendments - Held yes.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "From the bare perusal of the above provision of law, it is clear that profit on debt derived by the taxpayer on its banks deposits or accounts is exempt but the same is pre-condition to the fact that these deposits/accounts directly connected to the project operations of the taxpayer.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The interest income earned from such term deposits by the taxpayer does not cover the exemption as provided in Clause (74) ibid, until the same brought back to the regular stream of business operation. Since, the term deposits attract a higher profits compared to the normal deposits due to their long term removal from routine or ordinary course of company's business operation, therefore, the assessing authority was justified not to extend the benefit of exemption on such deposits. The clause (74) provides exemption only to bank deposits relating to routine business operation of the taxpayer and not either long term deposit. It is settled proposition at higher appellate fora that exemption provisions are to be strictly construed. Had the intention of the legislature been to extend exemption to entire profit on debts/interest income, the words \"\"bank deposits\"\" would have not been expressed in Clause (74) ibid.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Proportionate interest income earned by the taxpayer during the tax years under appeal on such time bound call/term deposit are not covered by the exemption provided in clause (74) of Part-I of the Second Schedule of the Ordinance. We find no force in arguments put-forth by the learned AR and the case law cited at the bar which is not strictly relevant to the instant case. Under such circumstances, we find no reason to disturb the orders passed by the authorities below which is hereby maintained. Consequently, the appeal of the taxpayer on this score is rejected.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "It is now settled proposition of law that the electricity falls within the definition \"\"goods\"\", \"\"article\"\" produced, therefore, the establishment of the appellant company squarely fall within the definition of \"\"industrial establishment\"\" as provided in Section 2(1) of the Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971, duly reproduced supra. Accordingly, the taxpayer-company is liable to pay WWF on the its \"\"total income\"\" during the tax years under appeals being an \"\"industrial establishment\"\" within the meaning of WWF Ordinance, 1971. As far as the AR's plea that WWF was charged in the case without firstly confronting it to the taxpayer, we find no force in the contention of the learned AR as the charge of WWF is consequence of the taxable income. If there is some taxable income the provisions of WWF automatically come in operation. ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The taxpayer is not liable to pay WWF in accordance with the amendments introduced through Finance Acts, 2006 & 2008, as the said amendment made in law were declared unconstitutional and were accordingly struck down by the Hon'ble Lahore High Court, Lahore, vide W.P No.8763/2011 in re: E.P.C.T (Pvt. ) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan etc. We accordingly hold that the taxpayer is liable to pay Worker Welfare Fund (WWF) under WWF Ordinance, 1971, as it stood prior to the amendments made through Finance Acts, 2006 and 2008. Order accordingly.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Cases Referred to:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "WT Ramsay Ltd v. CIR [1981] STC 174; 2000 PTD 280 (HC Kar.) CIT v. Muhammad Kassim; (1993) 66 Tax 246 (S. C. Pak.) Mehran Associates v. Commissioner of Income Tax; 2010 PTD 111; 2009 PTD 121; (2010) 101 Tax 293 (H.C. Kar.); PL] 2005 SC 936 and 1987 SCMR 1840.\"",
    "URL Link:": "I.T.A. Nos. 850/IB-854/IB of 2013 (Tax Years 2006 to 2010), decided on 17-6-2014. DATE of hearing: 23-5-2014.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),120(1)(b),122(5A),133(1),Clause74,76(A),Part-I oftheSecond Schedule,Clause132,Part-I oftheSecond Schedule\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "CH ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MOHAMMAD MAJID QURESHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "Court Name:": "Syed Tariq Jameel, FCA and Waqar Zafar, FCA, for the Appellant. Said Minaf DR, for the Respondent.",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14117",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtYTFFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1304 = 2015 SLD 1304 = (2015) 111 TAX 270",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections: 32(4), 113(1), 122(5A), 122(5AA), 113 & 210 - Amendment of assessments - Tax chargeable worked out by taxpayer at nil while he had declared his turnover amounting to Rs.136,165,612 in his sales tax return relevant to tax year 2011 - Declaration of receipt/commission instead of trading results in his income tax return - Taxpayer having turnover above Rs.50 Million failed to pay minimum tax on turnover - Assessment finalized u/s 120 found to be prejudicial to interest of Revenue - Charge of tax @ 2% and surcharge @ 15% - Discarding history of taxpayer - Rejection of appeal by CIR(A) - Validity - (1) Whether as jar as jurisdiction of Addl. Commissioner Inland Revenue to invoke provisions of section 122(5A) is concerned, law on this issue is very clear that after introduction of sub-section (5AA) of section 122 of Ordinance powers are vested with CIR with retrospective effect - Held yes - Whether perusal of chart reveals that amount of sales and purchases are same, meaning thereby that taxpayer only earns fixed commission and nothing else - Held yes - Whether it is established fact that provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 are different from provisions of Income Tax Act, 2001, being two different laws covering different aspects of transactions connected with business of tax payer - Held yes - Whether deemed assessment framed u/s 120 of Income Tax Ord. 2001 is not prejudicial to interest of Revenue as provisions of section 113 of Income Tax Ord. 2001 are not attracted in this case - Held yes - Whether whenever amendment of assessment is required to be made under sub-section (5AA) of section 122, CIR has jurisdiction to amend assessment after conscious application of mind and with examination of available record - Held yes - Whether ACIR while passing order under sub-section (5A) of section 12 by exercising powers u/s 122(5AA) acted beyond his jurisdiction and amendment of assessment framed by him is illegal, void ab-intio and not tenable in this eye of law - Held Yes.\nAs far as jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue to invoke provisions of section 122(5A) is concerned, the law on this issue very clear that after the introduction of sub-section (5AA) of section 122 of the Ordinance powers vested with the learned CIR with retrospective effect.\nDiscarding the history without confrontation to the taxpayer is illegal. In the instant case the taxpayer is distributor of Unilever Pakistan and furnishing his returns of income since the assessment year 2000-2001 and declaring commission receipts under the head other revenue receipts/commission from the principal company. The learned counsel of the taxpayer produced before the court a chart showing detail of tax period, purchases, Sales tax on purchases, supplies and sales tax to supplies. Perusal of the chart reveals that amounts of sales and purchases are same, meaning thereby that the taxpayer only earns fixed commission and nothing else.\nAfter the introduction of sub-section (5AA) of section 122 the powers under section 122(5A) fully vest with the Commissioner of Inland Revenue on the basis of his personal examination and consideration of the facts of the case by himself. It is trite law that certain acts shall be done by a specified person and their performance by any other is impliedly prohibited. In this case the ACIR has acted beyond his powers. There is also no mention of delegation of power in writing by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue in the order of the learned ACIR which is also makes the order illegal. Secondly, as per section 32(4) of the Ordinance, it was the taxpayer who may apply in writing for change of method of accounting and the Commissioner may, by an order in writing approve such an application. However, the learned ACIR on the basis of presumptions acted beyond his jurisdiction while changing the history of the taxpayer. The case law cited supra are on all fours to the case of the taxpayer, hence the order passed by the learned CIR(A) is vacated and the amended assessment order under section 122(5A) is hereby annulled.\nDeemed assessment framed u/s 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (hereinafter referred as the Ordinance) is neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of revenue. It is an admitted fact that the taxpayer is a distributor of M/S Unilever Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited and sells the products of the principal company under an agreement on fixed margin allowed by the said principal company in fixed/assigned territorial jurisdiction under the terms and conditions laid down in the agreement. The taxpayer has rightly declared Margin of Profit/Receipts in the return.\nIt is an established fact that the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 are different from the provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 being two different Laws covering the different aspects of the transactions connected with the business of the taxpayer. Admittedly, the sales declared by the taxpayer are covered under the 3rd Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, meaning thereby Sales Tax up to the retail price has been charged by the principal company and no further sales tax makes sufficient that the taxpayers sales are on behalf of its principal company being selling agent and its margin of profit/receipts are the turnover of the taxpayer/appellant. Deemed assessment framed u/s 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is not prejudicial to the interest of Revenue as the provisions of section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 are not attracted in the present case. It is clear from the definition of turnover; the receipts are not subjected to Turnover Tax being distributor of the Principal Company. \nBy the reading of Sub-section (5AA) of Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 clearly indicates that the jurisdiction to exercise the powers under sub-section (5A) of Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for amendment of assessment vested with the Commissioner Inland Revenue and the same powers are not delegateable u/s 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to any subordinate authority. The intention of the legislation is clear that whenever amendment of assessment is required to be made under sub-section (5AA) of Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the Commissioner Inland Revenue has had jurisdiction to amend the assessment after consciously application of mind and with examination of available record. My learned brother the Chairman Mr. Jawaid Masood Tahir Bhatti also cited s of this Tribunal which are fully give strength to the above point of view. Therefore, I am not hesitate to hold that the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue while passing the order under sub-section (5A) of section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 by exercising powers u/s 122(5AA) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 acted beyond his jurisdiction and amendment of assessment framed by him is illegal, void ab-intio and not tenable in the eye of law. With the above observation I fully agreed with the view point of my learned brother the Chairman and answer the question No.1 in negative and question No.2 in affirmative both in favour of the taxpayer/appellant. Therefore, the findings given by my learned brother the Chairman in the shape of authored by learned Chairman is fully endorsed which are well reasoned and as per facts of the case.\nAs a result the appeal of the taxpayer succeeds.\n[As per Mr. Haroon Muhammad Khan Tareen, Accountant Member]\n(B) Income Tax Ord: 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 120, 122(5A), 113 and 122(5AA) - Amendment of assessments - Failure of taxpayer to pay minimum tax on turnover - Assessment finalized u/s 120 found prejudicial to interest of Revenue - Charge of tax and surcharge by ACIT -Confirmation of assessment by CIR(A) - Validity - Whether ACIR did enjoy jurisdiction u/s 122(5A) vide powers delegated to him by CIR u/s 210, therefore orders passed by CIR(A) and ACIR are maintained - Held Yes.\nAdmittedly the appellant is a \"\"distributor\"\" of M/s Unilever Pakistan Limited and his turnover is squarely liable to minimum tax u/s 113 as the tax paid by the appellant on the taxable income fell short of the minimum tax therefore, the additional CIR was legally bound to invoke provisions of sub-section (5A) of section 122 by treating the deemed assessment u/s 120 as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue.\nThe turnover of the appellant has been simply subjected to minimum tax and no other aspect of the assessment has been touched by the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue. The issue of lack of jurisdiction u/s 122(5A) has adequately been dealt with by the CIR(A) as the Additional CIR did enjoy such power delegated to him by the concerned CIR. u/s 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance. 2001.\nCases Referred to:\n2012 PTD (Trib) 1739; (2010) 102 Tax 554 (Trib.); (2004) 90 Tax 128; (2009 PTD 1392; (2001) 83 Tax 551 (H.C. Lah.) and 1997 SCMR 641.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=32(4),113(1),122(5A),122(5AA),113,210\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 513/LB/2013 (Tax Years 2011) decided on 14-5-2013. DATE of hearing: 14-5-2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN, MUHAMMAD WASEEM CHOUDHRY, JUDICIAL MEMBER, HAROON M. K. TAREEN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.",
    "": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN, \nMUHAMMAD WASEEM CHOUDHRY, JUDICIAL MEMBER\nHAROON M. K. TAREEN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14118",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1FTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2395 = 2014 SLD 2395 = (2014) 110 TAX 249",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Rules, 2002 - Rule: 183(1) & 183(2) - Show Cause Notice - Recovery of Tax - matter already subjudice before Tribunal and stay order granted - Issuance of warrant of arrest by CIR - Validity - Whether respondents have not adopted legal course, which otherwise is provided under provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and Income Tax Rules for recovery of impugned demand, as provided under Chapter XVIC part 1 to part IV) whereas no reasonable opportunity has been provided to petitioner in this regard - Held yes - Whether stay was granted by Appellate Tribunal, whereas, Show Cause notice issued under Rule 183(1) of Income Tax Rules, 2002 was suspended by Appellate Tribunal till decision of main appeal - Held yes - Whether since CIR after having realized legal position has stated that warrants of arrest against petitioners have already been withdrawn and has further assured that he will be careful in future, therefore, his apology is accepted and petition is accordingly disposed of as not\npressed - Held yes. \nStay was granted by the Appellate Tribunal, whereas, the show cause notice issued under Rule 183(1) of the Income Tax Rules, 2002 was suspended by the Appellate Tribunal, till decision of the main appeal. However, in spite of such fact the impugned warrants of arrest under Section 183(2) have been issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, RTO-II, Karachi, even without issuing show cause notice under Rule 183(1) of Income Tax Rules, 2002. It has been further observed that before resorting to such extreme measure for the recovery of the impugned demand, the respondents have not adopted the legal course, which otherwise is provided under the provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and the Income Tax Rules, 2002 for the recovery of the impugned demand, as provided under Chapter XVI (Part I to Part IV) whereas, no reasonable opportunity has been provided to the petitioner in this regard. We may further observe that the public functionaries, particularly Revenue Officers who are responsible to administer taxing laws, are required to perform their duties and administer the revenue laws in such a manner, which may promote the purpose of the statute and not to frustrate the same, Recovery of the impugned demand towards taxes by Revenue Officers during pendency of Appeal(s), Reference(s) or Petitions) before the proper forum as provided under the statute or before the competent Court of jurisdiction, particularly, when such recovery of demand has been stayed, does not only reflects upon the malafides on the part of Revenue Officers but also amounts to showing disrespect to the higher forums provided under the statute as well as to the Courts, which tendency is required to be discontinued.\nSince the Commissioner Inland Revenue in the instant case, after having realized the legal position as stated hereinabove, at the very outset has stated that warrants of arrest against the petitioners have already been withdrawn and has further assured that he will be careful in future, therefore, we have accepted his apology and would restrain ourselves from drawing any adverse inference in the instant matter, and would expect that in future he will be careful and shall act strictly in accordance with law.\nLearned counsel for the petitioners, in view of such candid statement of the Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, RTO-II, Karachi, and withdrawal of impugned warrants of arrest against the petitioners, is satisfied and does not press instant petition, which is accordingly disposed of as not pressed along with listed application.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Const. Petitions 3027 of 2014, decided on 16-6-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JJ.",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ASIM and another\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14119",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1FTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2396 = 2014 SLD 2396 = (2014) 110 TAX 267",
    "Key Words:": "Cantonment Act, 1924 (II of 1924) - Sections 77, 99 (2)(b) & 259 - Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199 - Property tax - Trust property - Charitable activities - Exemption from tax - withdrawal & creation of demand on basis of audit objection - Notice - Validity - Whether perusal of section 90 of Cantonments Act, 1924 reveals that no building other than that used for educational purpose or public libraries which are open to public and no income is derived there from or hospitals and dispensaries maintained wholly by charitable contributions shall be exempted from payment of property tax - Held yes - Whether petitioners were served with notice u/s 259 of Cantonment Act, 1924 and after reply to show cause notice Judicial/Cantonment Magistrate passed order based on audit objection, whereby petitioners were directed to pay tax against outstanding exempted amount - Held yes - Whether claim of respondent No. 1 that being legally competent to withdraw remission granted earlier is not supported by law, rather respondent No. 1 found that petitioner, charitable trust, was served with impugned notice prior to meeting of Departmental Account Committee, it is stated that meeting of Public Accounts Committee was reportedly held but no documentary material against petitioner was brought on record - Held yes - Whether Tax exempted earlier by Cantonment Board could not be claimed retrospectively, otherwise same would amount to re-opening of past, closed and completed transactions affecting vested right - Held yes - Whether petitioners charitable trust is entitled to relief as claimed - Held yes.\nPerusal of section 90 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, reproduced as above, reveals that no building other than that trusted tor educational purpose or the public libraries which are open to public, and no income is derived therefrom or hospitals and dispensaries maintained wholly by charitable contributions shall be exempted from payment of property tax, In the instant case exemption from payment of house tax was granted for property No. 2611, R.A. Lines known as \"\"Sidco Centre\"\" despite the fact that as per respondent No. l the property was being used for sponsoring FDMR and other charitable activities while the hall was often rented out to various parties for arranging program and the income was earned therefrom. Section 77 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 stipulates that no remission or refund of property tax shall be made unless notice in writing of the fact that building had become vacant and unproductive of the rent has been given to the Board/respondent No. 1. It appears that the petitioners were also served with a notice under section 239 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 and after reply to the show-cause notice, Judicial/Cantonment Magistrate, Karachi-South has passed an order dated 4-10-2006, based on audit objection, whereby the petitioners were directed to pay a sum of Rs. 922,449 against outstanding exempted amount for a period with effect from 1-7-1987 to 30-6-2003. Claim of respondent No.1 that being legally competent to withdraw the remission granted earlier is not supported by law, rather respondent No. l has absolutely tailed to produce any material on the record in shape of documentary evidence, showing that petitioners Trust is deriving a reasonable income, is not entitled for exemption, under section 99(2)(b) of the Cantonments Act, 1924.\nWe have examined the legality of withdrawal of remission of tax having been made about 14 years after having been first granted by respondent No.1 and found, that petitioner, a charitable trust, was served by respondent No. 1 with impugned notice dated 21-1-2003, prior to meeting of Departmental Accounts Committee held on 9-10-2003, it is stated that meeting of Public Accounts Committee was reportedly held but no documentary material against the petitioner was brought on the record. Even otherwise, perusal of decision made by DAC during special audit on account of Cantonment Board, copy of which is duly annexed along with annexure H to the petition reveals that in para 5.5 it was held that \"\"The matter is sub-judice in the court, the DAC directed the ALIT &C Department that the case be pursued actively in court and ease of disciplinary action be also expedited.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Undoubtedly, exemption was allowed to the petitioners Trust by the respondent No. 1, who was released from payment of house tax and freed from the liability or obligation to which others are subject, petitioners were set free from liability and tax on normal principle of construction or interpretation of statute or on economic justification of inequitable burden of fiscal provisions intended to augment State revenue, therefore, once exception or exemption becomes applicable.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "It is an admitted position that various notices and correspondence were exchanged between the parties, culminating in letter No. KCB/264/RAL/74 dated 9-1-1992, in respect of which the petitioner was exempted from payment of tax under section 99(2)(b) of the Cantonments Act, 1924, allowing a remission of house tax for the tax period from Financial Year 1987 to Financial Year 1992. (1st July 1987 to 30-7-1992) and subsequent remissions were also granted for FY 1992-1993, FY 1996-1997, FY 1998, FY 2000 to 2001, FY 2001 to 2003 and thereafter the petitioner was asked to pay the exempted tax, based on objection of audit and so-called DAC/PAC. Exemption which was granted for years together can be regarded as a right, that was availed by the petitioners, particularly they acquired vested right in",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "the exemption, to which they remains entitled, even if the exemption itself stood withdrawn.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "On bare readings of the relevant provisions of Cantonments Act, 1924, we are unable to accept the submissions made by learned counsel for the respondent No.1 with regard to recovery of house tax claimed on the basis of audit objections, more particularly prior to these objections, prior to these objections on sound and cogent reasons supported with sufficient documentary proof, the petitioner. a charitable trust was exempted from levy of tax, as there were no allegations of concealment of facts by the petitioners. Furthermore there is no provision in the Cantonments Act to make retrospective claim of the tax which was exempted earlier.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Retrospective demand of exempted tax amounts to reopening of past, closed and completed transactions, affecting accrued vested rights and remedies, unless there is something specifically provided in the enactment. Annulment of exemption certainly shall affect existing rights and liabilities or vested rights, or obligations already acquired under the provisions of law, it does affect the existing right as well. If an enactment expressly provides that it should be deemed to have come into effect on a past-date, it is retrospective in nature, it then operates to affect existing rights and obligations, and is construed to take away a vested right which had been acquired under some existing law. The enactment applicable in this case is having no retrospective operation or implications also, otherwise the legislature must expressly and in clear and unequivocal language say so, in the enactment itself. It is not out of context to say that retrospective operation is not given to the statute. In the case of ITC v. Habibullah (AIR 1962 Supreme Court 918, relevant page 921) it is held that where- the provision is not procedural in character, it affects vested rights and in the absence of compelling reasons, greater retrospectively should not be given to it, then is warranted by the plain words used by the legislature. For the foregoing reasons, we reached at the conclusion that the petitioners charitable Trust is entitled to the relief as, claimed, Accordingly, the petition is allowed as prayed for with no order as to costs. ",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(B) Cantonments Act, 1924 (II of 1924) - Section 77, 99(2)(b) - Property tax - Trust property - Exemption from tax - Retrospective demand of exempted tax - Validity - Whether once exemption or exemption becomes applicable no rule or principle requires it to be construed strictly and against subject and once exemption is granted, then it should be given wider and liberal construction - Held yes. No rule or principle requires it to be construed strictly and against the subject and once exemption is granted, then it should be given a wider and liberal construction. The word \"\"Exemption\"\" in the Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition) is defined as:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(C) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 - Art. 199 - Constitutional petition - Question of public importance - Maintainability - Whether questions of law of public importance could be raised directly before High Court and Constitutional petition was maintainable - Held yes.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Insofar as the ground of non-maintainability of the instant petition is concerned, it is settled that if a petition based on important question of law of general application, then it can be raised directly before the High Court, therefore, the petition is maintainable.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Cases referred to:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Shah Nawaz v. Government of Pakistan (2011) 104 Tax 164 (H.C. Kar.); State Bank of Pakistan v. The Director, Military Lands and Cantonments Rawalpindi and others (PLD 1990 SC 827); Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Government of Punjab, Auqaf department and another v. Cantonment Boards, Bahawalpur through Officer Commanding and 2 others (2001 MLD 1660); Shagufta Begum v. The Income Tax Officer, Circle-XI, Zone-B, Lahore (PLD 1989 SC 360); Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs and others v. Azizuddin Industries Chitagong (PLD 1970 SC 439); Molasses Trading and Export v. Federation of Pakistan (1993 SCMR 1905) and Al-Samrez Enterprize v. Federation of Pakistan (1986 SCMR 1917) and ITC v. Habibullah (AIR 1962.)",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(1986 SCMR 1917) and ITC v. Habibullah (AIR 1962.)\"",
    "URL Link:": "Constitutional Petition No. D-2083 of 2006, decided on 9-9-2013, DATE of hearing 16-8-2013",
    "Citation or Reference:": "=77,99(2)(b),259\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "MASHIR ALAM, CJ AND SYED MUHAMMAD FAROOQ SHAH, J",
    "Court Name:": "Abdul Rehman, for the Petitioners. Sohail H.K. Rana, for the Respondents",
    "Law and Sections:": "RISHAD CHOUDRI and another\nVs\nCANTONMENT BOARD, KARACHI through Chief Executive and another",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14120",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1FTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2397 = 2014 SLD 2397 = (2014) 110 TAX 303",
    "Key Words:": "(A) Income Tax Ord: 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections: 132(7) & 133 - Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199 - Constitutional Petition - Disposal of appeals by Appellate Tribunal - Alternate remedy - Reference to High Court - Scope and Jurisdiction of High Court - Whether Art. 199 of Constitution is limited to the extent provided thereunder - Held yes - Whether where there is alternate remedy available, it is mandate of Constitution that High Court shall not exercise jurisdiction - Held yes - Whether any person aggrieved by order of Tribunal passed under Sub-Section (7) of section 132 may the reference before High Court within time stipulated therein - Held yes. \nThe jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as \"\"Constitution\"\") is limited to the extent as provided thereunder. Where there is an alternate remedy available, it is the mandate of the Constitution that this Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction. Moreover, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the legislative intent of the Statute which in this case is the Ordinance. Under Section 133 of the Ordinance, any person aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal passed under sub-Section 7 of Section 132 may file a \"\"Reference\"\" before this Court within the time stipulated therein. The Reference can raise question(s) of law arising out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal. Furthermore, the Reference is to be heard by a Bench of not less than two Judges of this Court.\nThis Court is not persuaded to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that despite the statutory provisions of Section 133 of the Ordinance, this Court can exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. Firstly, alternate remedy by way of filing a Reference against the impugned order is available to the petitioner and, therefore, the order is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction; secondly, it is the duty of this Court to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance and give effect to the legislative intent.\nHowever, the petitioner has a statutory remedy of filling a reference under Section 133 of the Ordinance against the impugned of the Tribunal, provided a question of law arises out of the of the Tribunal or was raised in the pleadings or before the Tribunal but not adverted to.\n(B) Income Tax Ord: 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections: 122(1), 122(5), 127 & 131(5) - Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, - Art. 199 - Amendment of assessments - Appeal against order along with application seeking interim relief by petitioner - Application dismissed - Appeal against dismissal of application and main appeal disposed off by Tribunal - Constitutional Petition - Maintainability - (1) Whether Sub-section (5) of section 131 relied upon by counsel starts with non-obstante clause and specifically provides that mere filing of appeal before Tribunal cannot be construed as suspension of recovery proceedings, unless recovery has been stayed by Tribunal while appeal is pending - Held yes - Whether there is no ambiguity in language of Sub-section (5) of section 131 and it merely relates to power of Tribunal to grant or refuse\nstay of recovery of Tax, while main appeal is pending - Held yes - Whether only statutory course available to petitioner was to file reference against said order u/s 133 - Held yes - Whether petition is not maintainable under Art. 199 of Constitution, therefore, same is dismissed - Held Yes. \nThe contention raised by the learned counsel that the Tribunal has passed the order under sub-section (5) of Section 131 of the Ordinance is misconceived. The sub-section relied upon by the learned counsel starts with a non-obstante clause and specifically provides that mere filing of an appeal before the Tribunal cannot be construed as suspension of the recovery proceedings, unless the recovery has been stayed by the Tribunal while the appeal is pending. It further makes it mandatory that is the Tribunal refuses to stay the recovery proceedings, the tax shall be payable in accordance with the assessment made in the case. The sub-section contains two provisos. The first proviso empowers the Tribunal to grant a stay of the recovery of tax for a period not exceeding 180 days in aggregate. However, conditions for exercising this power are also enumerated in the proviso. The second proviso relates to computing the period of 180 days. There is no ambiguity in the language of sub-section 5 of Section 131 of the Ordinance and it merely relates to the power of the Tribunal to [grant or refuse stay of the recovery of tax, while the main appeal is pending. \nIn the present case, the main appeal of the petitioner has also been disposed-off by the learned Tribunal. The only statutory course available to the petitioner in the circumstances was to file a Reference against the said order under Section 133 of the Ordinance.\nIt would also give rise to an anomaly that when the Statute provides for a Reference to be filed against the order passed by the Tribunal, restricting it to a question of law arising out of the order and to be heard by a Bench of at least two Judges of the High Court, the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court under Article 199 would defeat the legislative intent and thereby render the statutory provisions as redundant. \nIn the light of the above, the petition is not maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution and, therefore, the same is dismissed in limine.\n(C) Administrator of justice - Principles - Mandate of Law - Whether it is settled law that when law requires act to be done in particular manner, it had to be done in that manner alone and such dictate of law would not be termed technical - Held Yes.\nIt is a settled law that \"\"when law requires an act to be done in a particular manner, it had to be done in that manner alone and such dictate of law would not be termed technical\"\".\nCases referred to:\nZarghoon Zarai Corporation v. Collector of Customs (2006 PTD 534); Z. N. Exports (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax (2003 PTD 1746); Aidy Vee & o. (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director v. Taxation Officer of Income Tax, Lahore & 02 others (2009 PTD 1715); Dawood Textile Printing Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division, etc.\n[(2009) 100 Tax 344 (H. C. Lah.)] and Z. N. Exports (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax (2003 PTD 1746) and Muhammad Anwar & others v. Mst. Ilyas Begum & others (P.L.D. 2013 S.C. 255).",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),122(5),127,131(5),132(7),133\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3869/2014, decided on 1-9-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ATHAR MINALLAH, J.",
    "": "ARSLAN POULTRY (PVT) LIMITED\nVs\nOFFICER INLAND REVENUE, etc"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14121",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1FTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2398 = 2014 SLD 2398 = (2014) 110 TAX 78",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969)......Sections 209(3), 209,,Finance Act, 1999, S. 18(1)(c)(5)......Liability of principal and agent......Import of old and used wheel excavators by Respondent No. 6 from Japan in 1996......Petitioner's Agency, engaged for clearance of said machinery......Delivery to Respondents No. 6 without charging customs duty and sales tax by Respondents No.2 & 4, believing that machinery was exempt in terms of section 18(1)(c)(5) of Finance Act, 1999......Petitioner, however, gave undertaking on behalf of Respondent No. 6 to pay duty and sales tax, if it is found payable at any stage......Subsequently show cause notice was issued to Respondent No.6 alleging therein that excavators were subject to duty and tax as Finance Act, 1999 granting exemption was promulgated on 01-07-1999 while machinery was imported on 28-06-1999 and 30-06-1999 -Respondent No. 6 could not be found and consequently show cause notice was issued to petitioner who had given undertaking on behalf of Respondent No. 6......Exerting pressure and use of coercive measures against petitioner for recovery of tax and duty outstanding against Respondent No. 6......Issuance of attachment order......Validity......Whether Deptt. is entitled to rely upon section 209 of Customs Act, 1969 and recover duties and taxes from petitioner, who was agent of principal......Held yes......Whether where any duty is not levied or short charged or erroneously refunded on account of any reason other than willful act, negligence or default of agent, such duty cannot be recovered from him......Held yes -Whether in absence of any adjudication against petitioner, it is not hard to conclude that such authority power does not and cannot vest in Respondent No. 5......Held yes......Whether attachment order against petitioner is illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect......Held yes.\nThe only question requiring determination by this Court is whether the department is entitled to rely upon Section 209 of the Customs Act, 1969 and recover the duties and taxes from the petitioner, who was admittedly an agent of the principal, who had imported the equipment. On hearing the learned counsel for the parties and examining the record, the answer to the said question is in the negative for the following reasons:-\nI. It is a common ground between the parties that the petitioner filed bills of entry on behalf of respondent No.6. He never claimed exemption from taxes. The bill of entry indicated that he had filled the relevant column to the effect that 25% duty was payable. However, the Customs Authorities on their own volition and following the practice adopted by the Customs House Karachi in terms of Section 18 of the Finance Act, 1999 granted exemption and released the goods without payment of customs duty treating the imported equipment as exempt. It is significant to note that in this regard a letter was issued by the Custom Department, which stated as follows:\n\"\"The above cited importer has imported one unit of Excavator of which the rate of duty is zero percent as per finance Bill 1999-2000 under section 18 of the said Act. The Karachi Customs House is releasing the identical goods under PCT heading 8429-5990 @ 0% rate of duty. However, to be on the safe side we have asked for the undertaking from them as they will be responsible for any change of Customs duty if occurs.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The aforesaid letter clearly indicates that the exemption was not claimed by the petitioner, but was granted by the respondents on the basis of the practice being followed by the Karachi Customs House. Nevertheless, an undertaking on non-judicial stamp paper duly signed by respondent No.6 was obtained, which is also available on the record, whereby respondent No.6 undertook to pay the requisite duties, if they were found due. As an additional measure, the petitioner was also directed to endorse on the bill of entry an undertaking to pay the differential amount of duty and tax, in case some was found due. In the afore-noted situation, the question whether or not the petitioner, who is admittedly an agent is liable to pay the amount of duty, can be determined by perusal of section 209 of the Customs Act. The relevant portion is reproduced below for ease of reference.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "(3) When any customs agent is expressly authorized by the principal to be his agent under sub-section (10) of section 208 in respect of such goods for all or any of the purposes of this Act, such agent shall, without prejudice to the liability of the principal, be deemed to be the principal of such goods for such purpose.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Provided that where any duty is not levied or is short-levied or erroneously refunded on account of any reason other than willful act, negligence or default of the agent, such duty shall not be recovered from the agent.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the provisions to section 209 of the Customs Act are sufficient to clinch the matter. It is clear and obvious that where any duty is not levied or short charged or erroneously refunded on account of any reason other than willful act, negligence or default of the agent, such duty cannot be recovered from him. I am in no manner of doubt that there is neither any willful act nor negligence or default on the part of the petitioner. The benefit of zero tax was given by the appraising officer, as is evident from the language of the letter reproduced above. In these circumstances, the express and un-ambiguous language of the proviso, the amount being claimed from the petitioner is not recoverable from him.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The department itself extended benefit of section 18 of The Finance Act, 1999 on the basis of Finance Bill prior to coming it into force on 01-07-1999 by following the practice adopted by the Customs House Karachi. This cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed as willful act or negligence or default on the part of the petitioner.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The petitioner was never issued a show-cause notice nor was any adjudication made against him. The order of the adjudicating officer is also clear in as much as he has ordered that the petitioner to facilitate the custom staff regarding recovery of legitimate dues of the department. There is enough material on record that the petitioner had been rendering assistance to the department by providing copy of NIC, passport and the address of respondent No.6 available with him. The order of the adjudicating officer dated 10.02.2000 cannot be interpreted to saddle the petitioner with any liability to pay the aforenoted amount.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "In the absence of any adjudication against the petitioner, it is not hard to conclude that such authority/power does not and cannot vest in respondent No.5 in the facts and circumstances narrated above.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The undertaking given by the petitioner would bind him only if there was any willful act, negligence or default on the part of the agent, which led to non-levy, short levy or erroneous refund of any duty of any account for any reason. It is not the case of the respondents that there was any act, negligence or default on the part of the petitioner. As such the proviso is fully attracted and comes to aid of the petitioner by absolving him of any obligation in terms of recovery of the duties in question. Even otherwise, the undertaking cannot override an express provision of law, as incorporated in the proviso to Section 209 of the Customs Act, 1969.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "For the reasons recorded above, the attachment order dated 26-08-2012 issued by respondent No.5 and adoption of coercive measures for recovery of the amounts being claimed by department from the petitioner which were adjudged against the importer by the adjudicating authority vide order dated 10-02-2012 and the direction to the Chairman International Airport for deducting the said amount from the shares or as the case may be profit/dividend of the petitioner, are declared to be illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The respondents are at liberty to recover the said amount in accordance with law from respondent No.6 against whom it was adjudged by the competent authority. This Court is, however, sanguine that the petitioner would provide all necessary information available with him regarding respondent No.6 in order to facilitate recovery of the amounts of duties from respondent No.6.\"",
    "URL Link:": "W.P. No. 21378/2012, decided 10-4-2014. DATE of hearing: 25-3-2014",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Customs Act, 1969=209(3),209\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "IJAZ UL AHSAN, JJ.",
    "Court Name:": "Mian Abdul Ghaffar and Raza Ahmad Cheema, Advocates, for the Appellant. Ch. Zafar Iqbal, Advocate, for the Respondent.",
    "Law and Sections:": "MUHAMMAD AFZAL SHAHEEN\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN etc",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14122",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1FTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2399 = 2014 SLD 2399 = (2014) 110 TAX 52",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) Sections 114, 182(1)......Offences and penalties......Filing of returns by taxpayer for tax year 2010 and 2011 beyond statutory limitation period......Show Cause notice for late submission of returns to levy penalty u/s 182......Explanation submitted by taxpayer rejected by AO and imposition of penalty being unjustified in appeal......Validity......Whether section 182(1) specifically provides that penalty can be charged up to 0.1% of tax payable or Rs.5,000 whichever is higher Held yes......Whether section 182(1) further provides that penalty shall be imposed on basis of tax payable, whereas in instant case no tax has become payable on deemed assessment completed for tax years 2010 and 2011......Held yes......Whether law should not be used to penalize taxpayer unless it can be shown that default on the part of taxpayer had resulted in any loss of revenue......Held yes -Whether CIR(A) has rightly deleted levy of penalty u/s 182 for tax years 2010 and 2011 which action is hereby maintained and appeal filed by Deptt. is rejected......Held yes.\nThe language of the charging section 182(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is very clear. The penalty can be charged up to 0.1% of the tax payable or Rs.5,000 whichever is higher. However, section 182(1) specifically provides that penalty shall be imposed on the basis of the tax payable, whereas in the instant case before me no tax has become payable on deemed assessment completed for tax years 2010 and 2011. For imposing penalty for default u/s 114 of the Ordinance, the pre-requisite is the \"\"tax payable\"\" by a taxpayer which is missing in the instant case, therefore, levy of penalty is illegal and unjustified. Furthermore, the law should not be used to penalize a taxpayer unless it can be shown that the default on the part of the taxpayer had resulted in any loss of revenue. In the present case, no such loss of revenue is evident.\n \nIn view of the above, I am inclined to hold that the learned CIR(A) has rightly deleted the levy of penalty u/s 182 for tax years 2010 and 2011 which action is hereby maintained.\nAppeal of the department being filed without any merit or substance is hereby rejected. \nCases referred to:\n(2010) 102 Tax 199(Trib).",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114,182(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "ITA No. 1386, 1387/LB of 2012 (Tax Years 2010 and 2011), decided on 2-5-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR-UL-HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14123",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1FTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2400 = 2014 SLD 2400 = (2014) 110 TAX 106 = 2015 PTD 1591",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ord: 2001 (XLIX 0f 2001) - Sections: 161, 165 & 205 - Failure to pay tax collected or deducted - Obligation to deduct tax on certain payments under different heads of account, not fulfilled and amount not deposited into national exchequer by taxpayer - Notice issued by A.O asking certain information, documents etc. - Reply of company/taxpayer not found satisfactory and company was treated as \"\"taxpayer in default\"\" - order passed u/s 161 & 205 of Ordinance for recovery of tax together with default surcharge - Tax charged u/s 161 deleted by CIR(A) in appeal and case remanded back to A.O, for denovo decision - Charge of default surcharge also deleted by CIR(A) on ground that same was charged in presence of available refunds of taxpayer - Validity - Whether CIR(A) was not justified to remand to A.O. when payments made by taxpayer were not subjected to withholding tax in terms of clause (46) of Part-IV of Second Schedule - Held yes - Whether taxpayer has duly provided purchase invoices and evidence of payments through crossed cheques, but A.O has charged tax on plea that oil refineries had not declared purchases in their sales tax returns - Held yes (3) Whether objection is not maintainable as taxpayer is not registered sales tax person, there is thus no reason to maintain order of CIR(A) which is vacated and tax charged u/s 161 by assessing officer under this had is deleted being not maintainable in eye of law - Held yes - Whether tax deduction is not liable in case of purchase of POL, diesel, lubricants and LPG Gas, and in light of clear cut statutory stipulation and fact that CIR(A) was also convinced with submissions made before him, therefore, no fruitful purpose will be served by remand order of CIR(A) - Held yes (5) Whether CIR (A) was not justified to remand matter back to A.O in case of parties when all of them were not liable to withholding tax being declared exempt by Department and requisite exemption certificates were duly produced before authorities below and even before tribunal - Held yes - Whether taxpayer also submitted copy of income tax return of supplier company who had discharged its tax liability and under such circumstances there is no reason to charge tax us 161 from said party which amounts to double taxation which is not permissible - Held yes - Whether A.O charged lax u/s 161 under head cost of crush, sandstone, stone dust etc; which action was remanded back by CIR(A) and taxpayers duly provided relevant detail to support their claim that payments made were below threshold limit prescribed under provision of section 153, there is no justification for taking same - Held yes - Whether payments made under head laboratory charges were petty in nature and furthermore same were made to Govt. Institution, there was no justification of remand of matter, therefore, order of CIR(A) is vacated and tax deleted - Held yes. \nCIR(A) was not justified to remand the matter to the assessing officer when the payments made by the taxpayer were not subjected to withholding tax in terms of clause(46) of Part IV of the Second Schedule. Perusal of record and order of the assessing officer is also clear in this regard that the taxpayer has duly provided purchases invoices and evidence of payments through crossed cheques but the assessing officer has charged tax on the plea that the oil refineries had not declared the purchases in their sales tax returns The objection is not maintainable as the taxpayer is not a registered sales tax person. Similarly, some payments were made by the taxpayer to distributors which were also not liable to withholding tax in terms of section 156A of the income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Under such circumstances, we find no reason to maintain the order of the learned CIR(A) which is hereby vacated and the tax charged u/s 161 by the assessing officer under this head is hereby deleted being not maintainable in the eye of law. Order accordingly. \n \nLaw as provided in section 156A of the income Tax Ordinance, 2001, is crystal clear that the tax deduction is not liable in case of purchase of POL Diesel, Lubricants and LPG Gas, in the light of clear cut statutory stipulation and the fact that the CIR(A) was also convinced with the submissions made before him, therefore, we are of the view that no fruitful purpose will be served by remand order of the learned CIR(A). Therefore, we find no reason to maintain the order of the learned CIR(A) in this behalf and tax charged by the assessing officer in this regard is hereby deleted being not tenable in the eye of law. Order accordingly.\nCIR(A) was not justified to remand the matter back to the assessing officer in the case of Parties mentioned at Serial Nos. ii to v, when all these parties were not liable to withholding tax being declared exempt by the department. Perusal of the record reveals that the requisite exemption certificates were duly produced before the authorities below and even before this forum. Under such circumstances, we find no reason to maintain the order of the learned CIR(A) who has remanded the matter to the assessing officer. Therefore, the order of the learned CIR(A) is accordingly vacated and the tax charges from the said parties is hereby deleted. As regard party mentioned at Serial No. i, i.e. M/s. Ittefaq Sons (Pvt.) Limited, we find also here that the taxpayer duly produced the relevant purchase invoices and payments proof from bank, therefore, there was no justification to charge tax in this behalf on the ground that the purchases were not declared by the supplier company in their sales tax returns. Perusal of the record also reveals that the taxpayer also submitted copy of income tax return of the supplier-company who had discharged its tax liability. Under such circumstances, we find no reason to charge tax u/s 161 from the said party which amounts to .double taxation which is not permissible. Therefore, the tax charged u/s 161 in this behalf is hereby deleted and order of the learned CIR(A) in this behalf is vacated.\nThe assessing officer charged tax amounting to Rs. 5,971,880 on payments made by the taxpayer-company at Rs. 236,875,210 towards payment made to daily wages workers. The learned CIR (A) remanded the issue back to the assessing officer for denovo decision. It is contended by the learned AR that the CIR (A) was not justified to remand the matter when he was convinced that the amounts were B'TL and do not fall within the ambit of withholding tax. It is submitted by the learned AR that the payments were made to daily wages workers in respect of 32 projects carried out by the taxpayer in the northern areas of Pakistan. \nWe are in agreement with the submissions made by the learned AR that when the learned CIR (A) was convinced that the payments made were below the threshold limit of taxation, he should have deleted the same. The AR duly produced the relevant documentary evidences that the payments relate to wages of daily wages workers regarding 32-projects carried out by the taxpayer-company in the northern areas, especially the flood affected areas of the Khyber Pakhtunkhawa, Therefore, we find no reason to maintain the order of the learned CIR (A) which is hereby vacated and tax charged under this head is hereby deleted. Order accordingly. \nThe assessing officer charged tax u/s 161 under this head amounting to Rs. 344,377 which action was remanded back by the learned CIR(A). It was the contention of the learned AR that when the assessing officer was convinced that the purchases made from each individual do not exceed the threshold limit of taxation, he should have deleted the same. Since, the taxpayer duly provided the relevant detail to support their claim that the payments made were below the threshold as prescribed under the provisions of section 153 of the Ordinance, there is no justification for taxing the same. Accordingly, the tax charged under this head is deleted and order of the learned CIR (A) in this regard is vacated.\nThe assessing officer charged tax at Rs. 20,000 under this head which action was not approved by the CIR (A) and he accordingly remanded the matter back to the assessing officer for denovo decision. Perusal of the record itself speaks that the payments made under this, head were petty in nature and furthermore the same were made to government institutions. Under such circumstances, there was no justification of the remand of the matter, therefore, the order of the learned CIR (A) in this regards is also vacated and tax charged under this head is deleted. Order accordingly. \nCases referred to:\n2002 PTD 1.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,165,205\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1632/LB of 2013, (Tax year 2011), decided on 14-2-2014. ITA No. 1705/LB OF 2013, (Tax year 2011)",
    "Judge Name:": "FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND, JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRPERSON",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14124",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1FTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2401 = 2014 SLD 2401 = (2014) 110 TAX 116",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ord. 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Section 121(1)(d), 177(10), 214C - Best assessment - Declaration of income by assessee under USAS - Case selected for composite audit - Issuance of notice to taxpayer to produce complete books of accounts along with necessary vouchers/details/documents in support of its declared results, but no compliance was made by taxpayer - AO issues notice u/s 121(1)(d) read with section 177(10) informing him to finalize assessment ex-parte to best of her and also confronted certain proposed additions on failure to make any response, ex-parte order u/s 121(1)(d) was passed by AO - Appeal filed before CIR(A), dismissed - Validity - Whether expression \"\"composite audit\"\" came up for consideration before Sindh High Court wherein their lordships declared composite audit illegal and without lawful authority - Held yes - Whether appeal is accepted and orders of authorities below are vacated, as in instant case Board has also made combined selection under one ballot in terms of section 214C of Income Tax Ord. 2001 read with 72B of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and 42B of Federal Excise Act, 2005 - Held yes.\nThe expression \"\"composite audit\"\" came up for consideration before Hon'ble Sindh High Court, in the above referred case of M/s Shahnawaz (Pvt.) Ltd. wherein their lordships declared the composite audit illegal and without lawful authority in the following manner:\n\"\"23. We now turn to consider the second important aspect of the matter before us, namely, the issue of the \"\"composite audit\"\". This term is not defined or used in either the 2001 Ordinance or the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (\"\"1990 Act\"\"). As noted above, as used by the board, it indicates that the persons selected through the computer ballot will be audited for both their income tax and sales tax affairs. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that this is not legally permissible, and after a review of the relevant provisions, we are inclined to accept this submission. Both the statuts question contain provisions for audit, and those in relation to the 2001 Ordinance have been examined in detail in the paras supra. Sections 25 and 32A deal with audit under the 1990 Act, and these provisions, though sharing some similarities with section 177, are cast in somewhat different terms. There also does not appear to be any equivalent to section 214C in the 1990 Act. The exercise of any statutory powers relating to audit under one law obviously cannot result in action being taken under the other, since each is necessarily governed only be its own provisions. It is to be noted that even the relevant authorities under the two laws are different, being the income tax authorities under the 2001 Ordinance (section 207) and the sales tax authorities under the 1990 Act (see section 30). The concerned authority under each law has to apply its mind independently to the relevant .statutory provisions in order to determine whether, and if so how, an audit is to be called under the concerned law, and how a person is to be selected for such an audit. It is also significant that while section 207 expressly recognizes the Board as the authority at the apex of the income tax authorities, section does not, as such, recognize the Board as part of the sales tax authorities. Furthermore, while the Board has power to call for an audit under both sections 177 and 214C (in the manner as explained above), it has only the power to call ,for a \"\"special audit\"\" under section 32A of the 1990 Act, and no such power at all under section 25 thereof The Board cannot simply therefore apply the provisions of one law to the other, and direct that the taxpayer selected for audit under the 2001 Ordinance by way of computer ballot shall also be called for a sales tax\naudit or vice versa. This last point also has another aspect. Even assuming for the moment that a computer ballot could be held under both laws for selecting person for audit, a combined selection under one ballot would still be unlawful. The reason is that if ballots were held separately under the two laws, it is quite possible that a person could be selected under one, but not the other. The combined ballot exposes a person simultaneously to the \"\"double jeopardy\"\" of an audit of both sales tax affairs as well as income tax affairs, for which there does not appear to be any warrant in law, In this context, it is also to be noted, as pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioners, that the Federal Excise Act, 2005 does provide (in its section 46(5)) for a composite audit, It seems therefore that wherever a composite audit was deemed appropriate, the legislative intent was clearly stated, and the absence of any such provision in either the 2001 Ordinance or the 1990 Act indicates that no such audit is permissible in relation to these two laws. For all of the foregoing reasons, we are therefore of the view that the \"\"composite audit\"\" in the present case was also without lawful authority. \"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Similar question also came before the honourable Lahore High Court, Lahore in the above quoted case of M/s Premier Industrial Chemical Manufacturing Co (2013) 107 Tax 21 (H.C, Lah)=(2013 PTD 398), whereby the consensus arrived among the parties and accordingly the case was decided with certain directions for afresh selection independently under section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, 72B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and 42B of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 The question of delegation of powers of the Board in terms of section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, 72B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and 42B of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 along with the vires of Rule 3 of the Federal Board of Revenue Rules, 2007 in the back ground of section 8 of the Federal Board of Revenue Act, 2007 was also considered in the aforesaid and on the request of the learned counsel for the Board who gave assurance to the Court that as the entire audit process would be conducted afresh, FBR will also reconsider the question of delegation. Relevant portion of the said reads as under:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "\"3. Additionally, the petitioners vehemently argued that the Federal Board of Revenue has not framed the parameters for selection of audit under the aforesaid laws. The parameters reflected in Letter dated 24-I0-2012 issued by the Federal Board of Revenue, Taxpayers Audit Wing has been issued under the signature of M. Majid Qureshi, Chief(Taxpayer's Audit) (who is present in person) but does not have the\napproval of the FBR, In response Dr. Tariq Masood, Additional Commissioner, FBR (HQ) Karachi on behalf of respondent FBR referred to Section 8 of the Federal Board of Revenue Act, 2007, as well as, Rule 3 of the Federal Board of Revenue Rules, 2007 (\"\"Rules\"\") to submit that said powers stand delegated to Member (Audit). He, however, admitted that there is no specific l'l0l'lHC£1ll0Il delegating the powers under the aforementioned audit provisions in favour of the Member (Audit) but justified the same by relying on Rule 3 (3) of the Rules to submit that the said powers can be exercised by the Member (Audit) till delegation takes place. \n4. I was minded to proceed further to consider the question of delegation of the powers of the Board in terms of Section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, Section 72B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and Section 42B of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 along with the vires of Rule 3 in the background of the parent Act i.e., Federal Board of Revenue Act, 2007 and the legality of Letter dated 24.10. 2012 issued by Chief (Taxpayer's Audit). However, at this stage learned counsel for the respondent Federal Board of Revenue, namely Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Khan, Advocate assured the court that as the entire audit process is being initiated afresh, FBR will also reconsider the question of delegation and will proceed in framing the parameters for selection of audit strictly in accordance with law. On this assurance given by the learned counsel for the respondent FBR, the question of delegation does not require further deliberation in this case. \nIn view of what has been discussed hereinabove and on a careful consideration of the legal proposition in the light of law and s quoted supra, the instant appeal is accepted and the orders of authorities below are vacated, as in the instant case the Board has also made a combined selection under one ballot in terms of section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 read with 72B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and 42B of the Federal Excise Act, 2005. Since the present appeal of the appellant has been decided purely on legal grounds, therefore, it is not necessary to dilate upon the other grounds of the appellant.\nCases referred to:\nPremier Industrial Chemical Manufacturing Co v. CIR (2013) 107 Tax 21 (H. C. Lah.) and Shahnawaz (Pvt.) Ltd. v. FOP (2011) 104 Tax 164 (H. C. Kar).",
    "URL Link:": "I.T.A. No. 310/LB of 2013, (Tax year 2010), decided on 31-3-2014. DATE of Hearing 28-2-2014",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121(1)(d),177(10),214C\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "CH. ANWAAR UI HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SIKANDER ASLAM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "Court Name:": "Ikram-ul-Haq, ITP, for the petitioner. Muhammad Asif, DR, for the Respondent",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14125",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1FTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2402 = 2014 SLD 2402 = (2014) 110 TAX 121",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 152, 152(2A), 153, 153(1), 161(1A), 161(1B), 161(2) - Failure to pay tax collected or deducted - Payments to non-residents - Non- deduction of tax from payments made to E&Ps for tax years 2013 and 2014 u/s 152(2A) - Show Cause Notice - Validity - Whether legislative shift failed to make any amendment in clause (46), and exemption thus stood withdrawn due to this legislative lacuna and according to Deptt. obligation was cast upon to deduct tax front payments made to E&P companies from 1st July, 2012 onward - Held yes - Whether in wake of above legislative amendment w.e.f July, 2012 obligation was cast upon SNGPL to deduct tax at source but it failed to do so for tax years 2013, 2014 and first quarter of 2014 - Held yes - Whether if it is established that tax was to be deducted from the payments to payee/deductee and was in meantime paid by that person, no recovery shall be made from SNGPL who failed to collect tax - Held yes - Whether once taxpayer has paid advance tax for quarter and categorically stated that no tax credit has been availed for deduction of tax at source, it will be assumed that amount of tax to be deducted by SNGPL has been duly paid in the meantime u/s 161(1B) of Ord. - Held yes - Whether quantum of advance tax assessed and paid under formula is final for purpose of particular quarter and Constitutes payment for purpose of section 161(1B) - Held yes - Whether impugned recovery made from payee or deductor-assessee, inspite of advance tax having been paid, without deducting allowable tax Credit, in particular quarter, amounts to depriving tax payer (payee) or deductor (Withholding Agent) of their property for year without any plausible explanation - Held yes - Whether impugned notice for recovery promotes unjust enrichment and offends Constitutional principle of economic justice - Held yes -Whether SNGPL is only liable for default surcharge but not or amount of tax as advance tax has been paid by taxpayer - Held yes - Whether petitions are allowed and Show cause notice and subsequent assessment order are set aside as being unconstitutional and without lawful authority - Held yes.\nThe question that requires determination is the co-relation between advance tax and deduction of tax at source, the scope and meaning of section 161(1B) of the Ordinance and, in particular, whether advance tax paid for a quarter amounts to paid in the meanwhile for the purposes of section 161(1B). \nDeduction of Tax at Source under Division III, Part V of Chapter X of the Ordinance is a species of advance tax, withheld at source by the person making the payment (deductor) to the taxpayer (payee or deductee). Section 152 deals with deduction of tax at source of non-residents including Permanent Establishment of Non-resident Petroleum Exploration and Production Companies (E&P). In the present case, SNGPL (deductor) purchases gas from various E&Ps including PKP Explorations Ltd (payee/deductee) and under section 152(2A) deducts income tax at source at the rate of 3.5% of the gross amount payable. Earlier, the said deduction was provided under section 153 but enjoyed exemption under clause (46) of the Part IV of the 2nd Schedule to the Ordinance. However, vide Finance Act, 2012, Permanent Establishments of Non-Residents were moved under section 152 (dealing with non-residents) and as a result taken out of section 153. This legislative shift, however, failed to make any corresponding amendment in clause (46), which even today mentions section 153(1) and the term \"\"permanent establishment of non-residents.\"\" As a consequence, the exemption stood withdrawn due to this legislative lacuna and according to the department an obligation was cast upon SNGPL to deduct tax from the payments made to E&P companies from 1st July, 2012 onwards.\nIn the wake of the above legislative amendment w.e.f. July, 2012 an obligation was cast upon SNGPL to deduct tax at source but it failed to do so for the period in question i.e., Tax Years 2013, 2014 and the first quarter of 2015. It is pointed out that E&Ps enjoy a special tax year under section 74 of the Ordinance which is from 1st January till 31st December of the previous year.\nUnder section 161 of the Ordinance, if a deductor fails to collect tax under section 152 or collects it and fails to deposit it with the Commissioner under section 160, such a person becomes personally liable to pay the amount of tax to the Commissioner, who may pass an order to that effect and proceed to recover the same after granting an opportunity of hearing to the person3. Section 161(IB), however, provides a concession. If it is established that the tax that was to be deducted from the payment to the payee/deductee and was in the meanwhile paid by that person (payee/deductee), no recovery shall be made from (deductor-assesee) who failed to collect the tax. The deductor shall, however, be liable to pay default surcharge at the rate of 18% per annum from the date he failed to collect or deduct the tax to the date the tax was paid. The taxpayer (payee/deductee) whose tax has to be deducted at source avails the benefit of the said deduction at the time of payment of advance tax under section 147, The jurisprudence evolved over the years regarding the liability of a deductor-assesse in default in case of non-deduction is in consonance with the above provision. Reliance is placed on CIT v. Margalla Textile Mills Ltd. (2009) 99 Tax 48 (H.C. Lah.)=2008 PTD 1982=(2008 PTD 1982) wherein it was held:-\nThe question that requires further elaboration in the facts and circumstances of the instant case is the nature and character of Advance Tax to the extent whether it can pass for payment of tax by the payee/deductee in terms of section 161(1B) of the Ordinance, especially when the payee/deductee has not availed any tax credit in the said quarter.\nThe concept of Advance Tax has been explained by Palkhivala in the following manner:\n\"\"Under the basic scheme of this Act, the subject of charge is the income of the previous year and not the income of the assessment year; in other words, the tax is assessed and paid in the next succeeding year upon the results of the year before. These sections mark a departure from that basic scheme. They rest on the principle of 'pay as you earn', i.e. paying tax by installments in respect of the income of the very year in which the tax is paid.\"\" (Reliance Purshottamdas v. CIT 48 ITR (SC) 206, 211) (emphasis supplied.)5\nAdvance tax is paid quarterly and is structured on the basis of the under-mentioned formula:\n(A x B/C)-D\n\"\"A\"\" in the above formula is the taxpayer's turnover for the quarter, while \"\"D\"\" is the tax paid in the quarter for which a tax credit is allowed under section 168 (this includes deduction of tax at source in question under Division III, Part V of Chapter X of the Ordinance). While B and C represent the tax assessed of the taxpayer for the latest tax year and taxpayers turnover for the latest tax year, respectively. Section 147(7) provides that \"\"provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to any advance tax due under this section as if the amount due were tax due Linder an assessment order.\"\" Advance Tax due in a quarter has been equated with an amount of tax due under an assessment order. In other words, the amount of advance tax in a quarter, for all practical purposes, attains the status of final amount of tax due in that quarter as it is a definite amount calculable on the basis of a statutory formula. This view gets reinforced when the Ordinance equates this quarterly payment or intimation of advance tax with an assessment order. In the wake of section 147(7) of the Ordinance, the department is to consider the amount of advance tax due as tax due under an assessment order but has no locus or authority to doubt, suspect or dispute the quantum and the veracity or sanctity of the payment of advance tax paid in a particular quarter for the purposes of section 161(1B). In this background, once the taxpayer (payee/deductee) has paid advance tax for the quarter and categorically stated that no tax credit has been availed for the deduction of tax at source i.e. component D in the abovementioned formula, it will be assumed that the amount of tax to be deducted by SNGPL has been duly paid by the taxpayer and will qualify to be the payment paid in the meanwhile under section 161(1B) of the Ordinance.\nAs discussed above, once the payment has been made by the payee, the amount of tax that SNGPL failed to deduct cannot be recovered from SNGPL, except the imposition of default surcharge penalizing the failure to deduct.\nIn the triangular relationship between the tax regulator (FBR), the payee/deductee and the deductor, after advance tax has been paid by the payee/deductee, the onus of its correctness shifts onto the payee/deductee and the withholding agent (deductor-assesse) exits this triangular equation. Any short or incorrect payment of advance tax will invoke the departmental remedy against the payee/deductee. At the end of the tax year, the department can impose default surcharge under section 205 of the Ordinance if the advance tax reflects less than 90% of the tax due that year.\nThe reasoning of the impugned Show Cause Notice and the subsequent Assessment Orders is based on the assumption that the payment of advance tax, per se, is an estimate and, therefore, it cannot with certainty and exactness reflect the amount of tax to be deducted at source. The concept of estimation which finds mention in sub-sections (4A) and (6) of section 147 is linked with external variables (discussed below) and has no nexus with the calculation of advance tax for the quarter, which is based on a statutory formula with clear and defined components under section 147(4). Therefore, the quantum of advance tax assessed and paid under the formula is final for the purposes of a particular quarter and constitutes payment for the purposes of section 161(1B). Some of the external variables which form the basis of the estimation of advance tax are: i) capital investment during the year due to which the taxpayer is entitled to initial allowance (section 23) thus reducing the income for the year vis-a-vis proportion of tax to turnover of the preceding year; ii) Capital investment generating tax credit (section 65B); iii) reduction of corporate tax rate (like it has happened during last two years during which corporate tax rate has been brought down from 35% to 33%); iv) donations to funds established by Government e.g. earthquakes, IDPs.; v) Adoption of group taxation/group relief during the year for utilization of losses of subsidiaries, etc. Similarly, variables enhancing the tax liability for the year vis-a-vis proportion of tax to turnover: i) increase in tax rate for AOPs whereby highest slab rate taken from 25% to 35%; ii) taxpayer until previous year was paying lower tax (minimum tax u/s 113) due to available losses which are no longer available having been consumed or lapsed and taxpayer now is liable to pay full tax; iii) previously tax liability was lower like on account of payment of donations (unusual item) which is non-existent during current year; iv) last year's liability was exceptionally less on account of tax credit (section 65B) which is not available during current year; etc. etc. These variables, therefore, have no bearing on the sanctity or quantification of advance tax paid in the earlier quarters. More importantly, the amount of tax credit to be deducted from the formula (under component \"\"D\"\"), which includes and mirrors the amount to be deducted at source by the deductor (SNGPL) is not affected by enhancement or reduction of tax due at the end of the year. It is reiterated that the concept of estimation attached to advance tax has no bearing on quarterly payments of advance tax, which on their own are final payments calculated on the basis of a statutory formula. The impugned recovery of the deductible tax from SNGPL after the taxpayer (payee/deductee) has paid the advance tax for that quarter, tarnishes the veracity and sanctity of the concept of advance tax and more importantly the foundational theme of self-assessment on which the Ordinance rests.\nWithout prejudice to the above, impugned recovery made from a payee or the deductor-assessee, inspite of the advance tax having been paid, without deducting allowable tax credit, in a particular quarter, amounts to depriving the taxpayer (payee) or the deductor (withholding agent) of their property for a year without any plausible justification. This deprivation results in unjustly enriching and benefiting the department. Unjust enrichment is retention of a benefit by a person that is unjust or inequitable. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently taken the opportunity of reviewing the law regarding unjust enrichment in Garland v. Consumers Gas Co.6 wherein Iacobucci J held: \"\"As a general matter, the test for unjust enrichment is well established in Canada. The cause of action has three elements: (1) an enrichment of the defendant; (2) a corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff; and (3) an absence of juristic reason for the enrichment ...\"\" Thus, for recovery to lie, something must have been given, whether goods, services or money, The thing which is given must have been received and retained by the defendant, and the retention must be without juristic justification7. One of the more prominent statements of the principle of unjust enrichment includes the early and oft-repeated dictum of Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan8 \"\"the gist of this kind of action is that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money.\"\" Another is that of Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v, Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd.10 \"\"... any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep11.\"\" The American Restatement of the Law of Restitution: Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts, 1937, states the principle of unjust enrichment in the following simple terms: \"\"A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.\"\" And, one of the leading Commonwealth texts on restitution elaborates on the notion as follows: \"\"[The principle of unjust enrichment] presupposes three things. First, the defendant must have been enriched by the receipt of a benefit. Secondly, that benefit must have been gained at the plaintiff's expense. Thirdly, it would be unjust to allow the defendant to retain that benefit...12\"\" \"\"Unjust enrichment occurs when a person retains money or benefits which in justice. equity and good conscience, belong to someone else, The doctrine of unjust enrichment, therefore, is that no person can be allowed to enrich inequitably at the expense of another. A right of recovery under the doctrine of \"\"unjust enrichment\"\" arises where retention of a benefit is considered contrary to justice or against equity. Reliance with advantage is also placed on Messrs Pfizer Laboratories Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1998 SC 64). Unjust enrichment is, inter alia, anchored in our fundamental preambular constitutional value of economic justice. Our constitution abhors any form of economic exploitation. In this case, the prime tax regulator is trying to recover an amount of tax which has already been paid (and this is no reason to suspect the same). In any case if there is shortfall at the end of the year, it can be recovered with a heavy default surcharge from the payee/deductee. FBR has given no plausible or legal justification for suspecting that the amount of advance tax, paid by the payee, is in any way short or insufficient because the enhancement or reduction of advance tax at the end of the tax year has no co-relation with the amount of advance tax paid in a quarter. The impugned notice for recovery promotes unjust enrichment and offends the constitutional principle of economic justice. For reference, reliance is placed on Ikram Bari and 524 others v. National Bank of Pakistan through President and another (2005 SCMR 100) and Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad and 3 others (1999 SCMR 382). \nAnother aspect of assessment under section 161 is the obligation of the department to establish that the deductible amount has not been paid in the meanwhile under section 161(1B). In order to establish this, an opportunity of hearing is required to be provided to the taxpayer (payee) i.e., E&P in this case. This complies with the requirement of Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution and the jurisprudence settled by the superior courts (reliance for Convenience is placed on Mst. Zahida Sattar and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2002 SC 408). The assessment order presented in Court during the proceedings, inter alia, fails to comply with this constitutional requirement.\nIn the present case, SNGPL is only liable for default surcharge but not for the amount of tax as the advance tax has been paid by the taxpayer (payee/deductee). It is noted that as for the Tax Year 2013 the annual return has been filed, the department in the light of the Riaz Bottlers case (supra) have only charged default surcharge but for the remaining tax period has charged the amount of tax from SNGPL because the annual return has yet not been filed but only tax deposit receipts have been furnished. As discussed above, payment of advance tax by taxpayer fully meets the requirement under section 161(1B). \nFor the above reasons both these petitions are allowed and Show Cause Notice and the subsequent Assessment Order dated 9-6-2014 are hereby set aside as being unconstitutional and without lawful authority.\nCases referred to:\n \nCommissioner of Income Tax, Zone-C, Lahore v. Margalla Textile Mills Ltd., Lahore (2009) 99 Tax 48 (H. C. Lah.), Karachi Port Trust, Karachi v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi (2011) 104 Tax 287 (H.C. Kar.); Chairman, Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 3 others v. Messrs Pak-Saudi Fertilizer Ltd. (2001) 83 Tax 119 (S.C. Pak.), Riaz Bottlers Pvt. Ltd. through Tax Manager v. Lahore Electric Supply Company (LESCO) through Chief Executive and 3 others (2010 PTD 1295); CIT v. Margalla Textile Mills Ltd. (2009) 99 Tax 48 (H.C. Lah.), Continental Chemical Co, (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan and others (2001 PTD 570); Karachi Port Trust, Karachi v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi (2011) 104 Tax 287 (H.C. Kar.), Kanga & Palkhivala's, The Law and Practice of Income Tar, Tenth Edition, Volume II p. 2495; Jagran Prakashaii Ltd. v. DCIT 345 ITR 288; Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages P. Ltd. v CIT, AIR 2007 SC 2930); Reliance Purshottamdas v. CIT 48 ITR (SC) 206, 211); Kanga & Palkhivala's The Law And Practice of Income Tax Tenth Edition, Volume II, p. 2525; Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (1992), 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140 (S.C.C.), at p.154, [1558- 1774] All E.R. Rep. 581 (K.B.), [1943] AC. 32(H.L), Golf and Jones. The Law of Restitution, 6th Ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), at p.17, para 1-016; Sahakari Khand Udyog Mandal Ltd. v. CCE & Customs (2005) 3 SCC 738 at 748; Pfizer Laboratories Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others (1998) 77 Tax 172 (SC. Pak. ), Ikram Bari and 524 others v. National Bank of Pakistan through President and another (2005 SCMR 100); Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad and 3 others (1999 SCMR 382) and Mst. Zahida Sattar and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2002 SC 408).",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=152,152(2A),153,153(1),161(1A),161(1B),161(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.P. 14832/2014, decided on 23-6-2014, 24-6-2014. DATE of hearing: 12-5-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, J.",
    "": "SUI NORTHERN GAS PIPELINES\nvs\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, etc"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14126",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1FTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2403 = 2014 SLD 2403 = (2014) 110 TAX 309",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Sections 139 & 140 - Recovery of Tax from persons holding money on behalf of taxpayer - Default in payment of tax - Rented building - Notice to petitioner to remit rent of building to Respondent No.1 against default of tax payable by company - Validity - Whether tax has to be any tax due from taxpayer, notice, therefore, should disclose, how tax is due and tax is being recovered from another person i.e. who is held liable for payment of tax, then notice should also disclose how other person is made liable for payment of tax - Held yes - Whether director/share holder is required to be confronted under section 139 that tax is not recoverable from company, therefore, he is being held liable, otherwise he would be taken to surprise on notice u/s 140 - Held yes - Whether director/share holder is required to be confronted under section 139 that tax is not recoverable from company, therefore, he is being held liable, otherwise he would be taken by surprise on notice u/s 140 - Held yes - Whether before shifting obligation of tax from company to its director u/s 139, director should be confronted and be given opportunity to defend himself - Held yes - Whether no proceedings were undertaken to show, first that tax was not recoverable from company, secondly to hold petitioner as liable to pay tax under section 139, after confronting and providing opportunity of being heard - Held yes - Whether petitioners right of \"\"due process\"\" and fair trial\"\" is found to have been violated, therefore, impugned notice u/s 140 is held as void - Held Yes \nThe tax has to be, \"\"any tax due by a taxpayer\"\". The notice, therefore, should disclose; how the tax is due, If the tax is being recovered from another person i.e., who is held, liable for payment of the tax then notice should also disclose how the other person is made liable for payment of the tax.\nThe Words, cannot be recovered from the company make it obligatory for the Taxation Officer/ Commissioner to show, after employing due process, that tax was not recoverable from the company director or shareholder cannot be proceeded against for the recovery without exhausting all modes of recovery against the company. The director/shareholder is required to be confronted, under this section, that tax is not recoverable from the company, therefore, he is being held liable, otherwise he would be taken by surprise on notice under section 140. Though, this section is a non obstante provision, excluding Companies Ordinance 1984, yet the basic principle that company is a distinct personality, independent of its shareholders/directors could not be ignored.\nAfter insertion of Article 10A in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, fair trial and due process are fundamental rights of every citizen for determination of his civil rights and obligations. Before shifting the obligation of the tax from company to its director under section 139 of the Ordinance, the director should be confronted and be given an opportunity to defend himself.\nNo proceedings were undertaken to show; first that tax was not recoverable from the company, secondly to hold the petitioner as liable to pay tax under section 139, after confronting and providing opportunity of being head. Petitioners right of \"\"due process\"\" and \"\"fair trial\"\" is found to have been violated. Therefore, the impugned notice under section 140 of the Ordinance is held as void.\nCases referred to:\nSarfraz Saleem v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2014 S.C.232); Babar Hussain Shah and another v. Mujeeb Ahmed Khan and another (2012 SCMR 1235) and (PLD 2012 S.C. 553)",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=139,140\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Case No. W.P. No. 1604/2014, decided on 17-6-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, J",
    "": "SULTAN MUHAMMAD KHAN\nVS\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, etc"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14127",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1FTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2404 = 2014 SLD 2404 = (2014) 110 TAX 259 = 2015 PTD 990",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) - Sections: 8(B), 8(B)(1), 11(2), 33, 33(1), 33(5), 34, 73, Federal Excise Act, 2005, Sections 8, 14(1) and 19(1) - Certain transactions not admissible - Violation of provisions of section 73 of Sales Tax Act, non-payment of extra tax by taxpayer on supply of electric appliances/air conditioners, inadmissible adjustments of input tax claimed by taxpayer on purchase of motorcycle, suppression of sales tax, late fling of monthly Sales Tax and Federal Excise returns, violation of section SB of Sales Tax Act, short payment of special excise duty on sales - Recovery of tax default surcharge and penalty - Charges leveled against taxpayer in Show Cause Notice upheld by Assessing officer - CIR(A) upheld action of AO with regard to (i) violation of section 73 of Sales Tax Act, (ii) Non - payment of extra tax (iii) Inadmissible claim of input tax on motorcycle, (iv) Suppression of sales - Validity - (1) Whether taxpayer is engaged in import of air conditioner parts and also purchase of locally manufactured products like PVC cables etc. and all such parts are obviously used in manufacturing of air conditioner - Held yes (2) Whether taxpayers business activity falls in definition of \"\"manufacture\"\" hence taxpayer is under legal obligation to only adjust input tax to extent of ninety percent of output tax - Held yes (3) Whether since taxpayer contravened provision- of law contained in section 8B, A.O has rightly ordered recovery 0fSales,Tax, along with default surcharge and penalty which is upheld. Yes. The Learned DR produced before us a copy of the certificate issued by Central Registration Office where the taxpayer's status appears as \"\"Manufacturer/Importer/Exporter\"\". The Learned DR also produced before us a screen shot of status of application appearing on Registration Management System filed by the taxpayer and perusal of the same reveals that the taxpayer intends to drop its manufacturing category and department required some physical verification. All these prove contrary to the taxpayer's stance that they are commercial importer. Furthermore, perusal of the record shows that the taxpayer is engaged in the import of air-conditioner parts such as compressor, expansion vales and communication cables and also purchased locally manufactured products like PVC cables,-flexible duct, strap rolls, filling gas, cylinder, temperature controller, gate valve, ball valve, MS seam less pipes. All such parts are obviously used in manufacturing of an air conditioner.\nFrom the perusal of above definition of \"\"manufacturer\"\" or \"\"producer\"\" provided in law and in view of the above observation made by us, it is clear that the taxpayer's business activity falls in the definition of \"\"manufacturer\"\", hence, the taxpayer is under legal obligation to only adjust input tax to the extent of ninety percent of the output tax.\nIn view of the clear-cut statutory stipulation, the taxpayer being a manufacturer shall not be allowed to adjust input tax in excess of ninety percent of the output tax for the period under consideration. Since, the taxpayer contravened the said provision of law, the assessing authority has rightly ordered recovery of sales tax amount of Rs.3,207,386/- along with default surcharge and penalty which is hereby upheld. The order of the Learned CIR(A) is accordingly vacated to that extent.\nAs regards short payment of SED on total sales, we have already confirmed the status of the taxpayer as \"\"manufacturer\"\", therefore, they are under legal obligation to pay SED @ l% of their total sales in terms of SRO 655(1)/2007 dated 29.06.2007. Order of the assessing authority for recovery of SED from the taxpayer is\nhereby maintained. Order of the learned CIR(A) in this regard is accordingly vacated.\"\"",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8(B),8(B)(1),11(2),33,33(1),33(5),34,73,\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Excise Act, 2005=8,14(1),19(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 143/IB/11, decided on 20-8-2014. DATE of Hearing: 20-5-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD MAJID QURESHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14128",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1FpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2406 = 2014 SLD 2406 = (2014) 110 TAX 265",
    "Key Words:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005 - Sections 3(1) & 14 - Sales Tax Act, 1990 - Sections 36 & 36(1) Recovery of Excise Duty - Tele communication network - Interconnect charges - Invocation of assessment provisions of Sales Tax Act - Levy of default surcharge and penalty - Show cause Notice Upholding orders of DCIT in appeal by CIR(A) - Validity A Whether bare reading of operative part of of Islamabad High Court in WP. No. 2957/2012 confirms stance of AR of appellant that Islamabad High Court in this case did not decide issue at hand and this is therefore, of no effect on present case - Held yes - Whether since no question of law has been answered by the Court, same is therefore, not binding under Art. 201 of Constitution - Held yes -\nWhether Islamabad High Court did not decide any question of law in above mentioned tax reference, leave granting order in appeal against Pakistan Mobile Telecommunication Tax reference in Civil Petition No. 1829 of 2012 by Supreme Court is therefore, of no help to case of Revenue - Held yes - Whether of single bench of Islamabad high Court in writ Petition No. 2957/2012 holds grounds as binding precedent - Held yes - Whether by following ratio decidendi of this , impugned order of CIR(A) is vacated and Show Cause Notice as order-in-original are cancelled - Held Yes.\nIn rebuttal the learned AR of the appellant stated that the of Division Bench referred to by the learned LA was in a tax reference (FLRA No.01/2012) before the honourable Islamabad High Court in which the Court simply refused to answer the reference by holding that no question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal. Since no question of law was decided by the Court in this , its only consequence is that the of the three member bench of the Tribunal, upon which the tax reference was made, is in the field. On the other hand the single bench of the Honourable Islamabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 2957/2012 specifically deals with the issue of FED on interconnect in which the Court has made a clear decision in favour of the petitioners. The Learned AR contended that in this situation the principle of stare decisis dictates that the single bench of the Honourable Islamabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 2957/2012 must take precedence over the three member of this Tribunal in the case of Pakistan Mobile Telecommunications Limited. Perusal of copy of the decision in the aforesaid tax reference reveals that the operative part of the order reads as under:\n\"\"10. We are of the confirmed view that no question of law in this regard is available to be considered for referring it for onward proceedings. Hence, in view of such our observations, while scrutinizing the record and the material placed before us as well as in view of arguments, present reference is declined to be entertained as required by Section 34 of Federal Excise Act, 2005.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "A bare reading of the above operative part confirms the stance of the learned AR of the appellant that the Honourable Islamabad High Court in this case did not decide the issue at hand and this is therefore of no effect on the present case, in this respect it would not be out of place to refer to Article 201 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which states that any decision of a High Court shall be binding on all courts subordinate to it to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law. Since no question of law has been answered by the Court here the same is not binding under Article 201 of the Constitution.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "As for observations of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the appeal against Pakistan Mobile Telecommunications Limited's tax reference, the apex Court has granted leave to appeal to the said appellant. While granting leave in Civil Petition No. 1829 of 2012 through order dated l5th April 2013 the apex Court has specifically observed, \"\"The Honourable High Court while deciding the said reference has simply narrated the facts of the case and without adverting to any question....\"\" There are no observations favouring the Revenue in this order. In fact, the apex Court's observations support our findings above, that the Honourable Islamabad High Court did not decide any question of law in the above mentioned tax reference. Therefore, the leave granting order of the apex Court is of no help to the case of the Revenue.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Regarding the contention of the Learned D.R that the of the single bench in Writ Petition No. 2957/2012 being relied upon by the appellants has been suspended in Intra Court Appeal by a Division Bench of the Honourable Islamabad High Court. No evidence in this respect has been produced. On the other hand the learned AR of the appellant categorically denied the suspension of the aforesaid . Firstly, there is no evidence of suspension of the single Bench of the Honourable Islamabad High Court. Secondly, even if this was the case, it is trite law that even a suspended continues to hold force as a binding precedent, for persons other than those who are parties in the suspended to the extent of the decision based upon or which enunciate a question of law.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "In view of the above facts and legal position, the of the single bench of the Honourable Islamabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 2957/2012 holds ground as a binding precedent for all lower forums. We must, therefore, follow the ratio decidendi of this which is clearly in favour of the appellant. On the",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "basis of these reasons, the impugned order of the learned CIR(A) is vacated and the show cause notice as well as Order-in-Original are cancelled.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Cases referred to:",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Karachi v. Orix Leasing Pakistan Ltd. (2007) 95 Tax 367 and DPLD 1980 Kar 492; DPLD 1975 Lah 65 and Maiqilas rice Mills v. State of Kerala reported as (2007) 6 VST 403 Ker.\"",
    "URL Link:": "STA No. 195/IB/2012, Tax Period 2005-06 and 2008-09, decided on 5-3-2014, DATE of Hearing 26-2-2014",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=3(1),14\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=36,36(1)\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD MAJID QURESHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "Court Name:": "Khawaja Farooq Saeed. Advocate & Mr. Shaiikat Amin Shah, FCA, for the Appellant. irfan Abbas, DR. & Mr. Saeed Ahmed Zaidi, L.A, for the Respondent",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14129",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1FpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2407 = 2014 SLD 2407 = 2015 PTD 2375 = (2014) 110 TAX 282",
    "Key Words:": "[IN THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE OF PAKISTAN KARACHI BENCH KARACHI]\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of`2001) - Sections 2(46), 4A, 11, 18, 18(2), 39, 67, 122(1), 122(5), 122A, 124, 124A, & 214C - Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 - Section 15 - Companies Ordinance, 1984 - Sections 2(18), 3, 27(1) - Companies Ordinance, 1981, Sections 284 to 287 - Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, Section 5(b)(c) - Amendment of assessment - Change of chamber, nature and source of business of appellant from manufacturing company to holding company - Demerger of business - Taxpayer filed return of income - Case selected for audit by FBR - Show Cause Notice - Amendment of assessment of CIR(A) - Validity - Whether main activity/business of appellant for period under review is only related to management of investments in various group companies as well as arranging of' finances which is activity in accordance with clause 3(19) of Memorandum of Association which reflects affairs of company - Held yes - Whether CIR(A) has restricted the profit on debt only for financial institution, This is incorrect and restrictively construed - Held yes - Whether taxpayer incorporated under Companies Ordinance, 1984 falls under category of \"\"person \"\" such as company, therefore, approach of CIR(A) excluding taxpayer is not conceivable - Held yes - Whether section 39 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 contains provisions about residuary head viz. Income front other sources and it does not come into operation until preceding heads (a), (b), (c) and (d) mentioned in section 11 are excluded - Held yes - Whether it is an undisputed principle that source of income cannot be brought under residuary head if it comes under any of specific heads - Held yes - Whether income of appellant being proj7t on debt, therefore, it is covered under head income from business thus other residuary section would not come to play - Held yes - Whether QWCEVS below have totally failed to appreciate changed circumstances happened in year under consideration whereby status of appellant has been changed from manufacturing to holding company - Held yes -\nWhether it is now well settled that principles of res judicota cannot be applied to cases on assessments under taxing law in same manner as it is applied in civil proceeding - Held yes - Whether section 124A of Ordinance, 200] is not applicable for this particular year in dispute where source is totally changed and profit on debt being business income of appellant falls within parameters of section 18(2) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 - Held yes - Whether amount can be assessed under head \"\"Income from other sources\"\" only if it cannot be brought within one or other of specific head of charge u/s 11 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001- Held yes - Whether order of officers below are vacated and case is remanded back to DCIR for de novo proceeding - Held yes.\nThe principal activity of the Company, consequent to demerger (Note 12 of the accounts), is to manage the investments in subsidiary companies and joint ventures, engaged in fertilizers, PVC resin manufacturing and marketing, control and automation, food, energy, exploration and chemical terminal and storage businesses. From this year, the main activity/business of the appellant for the period under review is only related to the management of investments in the various group companies as well as arranging of finances which is an activity in accordance with clause 3(19) of the Memorandum of Association which reflects the affairs of the company.\nHowever, the CIR (A) has made restrictive approach by observing that since, money is not stock-in-trade of the appellant is not involved in money lending business like financial institution. The CIR(A) has restricted the profit on debt only for financial institution. This is incorrect and restrictively construed. In arriving this conclusion, he maybe apparently, as it seems that he has taken the refuge from section 151.\nCIR (A) has failed to take cognizant of sub-section (3) which in unequivocal terms lays down that this section will operate as final tax regime to financial institutions who are fall other than the company meaning thereby the profit on debt would not fall under the final tax regime in case of the appellant being deriving income from normal business of profit on debt. \nTaxpayer incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 falls under the category of \"\"person\"\" such as [company]. Therefore, approach of the learned CIR (A) excluding the taxpayer is not conceivable. \nUnder section 18(2) \"\"Profit on debt\"\" is chargeable to tax under the head 'Income from business' where the person's main business is to derive such income i.e. interest income/ Profit on debt has been defined in section 2(46) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n\"\"HEADS OF INCOME\"\" is not the same as \"\"SOURCES OF INCOME\"\". For the same head of income, there can be more than one source of income, By \"\"source\"\" is not the \"\"head of income\"\" but the specific source from which a particular income arose. The source of income is relevant for determining first whether it is assessable or not, and if it is not exempt or immune from tax, the next step is to decide under which head of income it has to be assessed and relevant provisions of law are attracted. The various heads under section 11 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and the provisions of the Ordinance applicable to each of such heads of income, are mutually exclusive. Section 39 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 contains provisions about the residuary head viz. \"\"Income from other sources\"\" and it does not come into operation until the preceding heads (a), (b), (c) and (d) mentioned in section 11 are excluded. Where an income can appropriately fall under section 18 as business income or any other specific head of income, no resort can be made to section 39 [income from other sources]. The words, \"\"if it is not chargeable to income-tax under any of the heads of specified in section 11, items (a) to (e) in section 39 refer to income and not to a head of income. Section 39, therefore, deals with income which is not included under any of the preceding heads, Section 39 is residuary head of income. If an income is chargeable to tax and is not covered under other heads of income, its head of income shall be \"\"income from other source\"\". It is an undisputed principle that a source of income cannot be brought under the residuary head if it comes under any of the specific heads. The officers below could not have overlooked that principle it did not say that an income liable to be included in the total income is chargeable to tax as income under the residuary head if it not chargeable under the specific head under which it normally falls. The income of the appellant being profit on debt as enumerated above, is covered under the head income from business, therefore, other residuary section would not come to play. \nIt is not open either to the Revenue or to the taxpayer to claim that an income which clearly falls under one head should be dealt with under a different head for the purpose of this Ordinance. For determining under which head an income will fall, its commercial character is a relevant factor. Time or method and particularly\n\"\"Source of Income\"\" and nature of business of the taxpayer is relevant consideration. This is decided from the nature/source of the income by applying practical notions and not by reference to treatment by the taxpayer in his books of account. An income wrongly included by the DCIR/OIR/CIR/Assessing Officer under one head can be taken out from that head, and included under the correct head, in appeal proceedings. \nPerusal of section 15 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 shows that, the sole criterion to classify the income under section 15, in ordinary course, is the source and/or the nature of activity and conduct wherefrom and /or whereby the particular income is being generated. As long as the sources can be factually found, circumstances seldom have any bearing on the characteristic of income. Ref: [CIT , Karachi v. Gelcaps (Pvt) Ltd. Karachi 2009 PTD 331 [Kar.H.C.]. The quoted by the officer reported as 1999 PTD 708 distinguishable is not applicable, interalia among others as this relates the Repealed Ordinance, where there was no concept of a holding company, nor were any fiscal benefits were made available for formation of group companies under the Ordinance. The CIR(A) on page 4 of the Appellate order gave the remarks as under:\n\"\"Since, money is not stock-in-trade of the appellant as the appellant is not involved in money lending business like financial institution ....... \"\" \nProfit on debt' is not a 'Business income' for the Banking Companies only. The provision is being restrictively construed. \nThe provision does not restrict such application. Hence, it is applicable to any person undertaking such lending business. \nAfter demerger and since the principal activities of the appellant company are different thus section 124A is not applicable for the reason that in tax year 2008 [Financial year ended December 31, 2007, the principal activity was as under: \nNote 1 to the Financial Statements:\n\"\"Engro Chemicals Pakistan Limited (the Company) is a public listed company in Pakistan under Companies Ordinance, 1984 and its shares are quoted on Karachi, Lahore & Islamabad stock exchanges of Pakistan. The principal activity of the Company is manufacturing, purchasing and marketing of fertilizers. The Company also has investments in joint ventures/other entities engaged in chemical terminal storage, PVC resin, manufacturing and marketing, control and automation, food and energy business. \"\" Income from business-\nWhile for the Tax year 2009 accepted facts are that it also needs to be appreciated that in the tax year 2009, the Deputy Commissioner in the order under section 124 dated May 22, 2013, after the matter being remanded back by the CIR(A), had concluded that no financial charges were allocable against the dividend income on the premise that no new investment was made during the year as was also verified from the audited financial statements. We are also of the considered opinion that the learned officers below have totally failed to appreciate the change circumstances happened in the year under consideration whereby the status of the appellant has been changed from manufacturing to holding company. The learned officers below has taken into account and placed reliance on the order of the Tribunal beating No. 144/KB of 2010 dated 1-7-2010 in taxpayer's own case for the previous year when the status of the appellant was that of the manufacturing company. However, for the year under consideration, the status of the appellant has been changed from the manufacturing to holding company, therefore, the reliance on the previous order of the Tribunal seems to be unjustified and not relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue and is not binding in nature as discussed by us hereinabove. \nPrevious decision of an Income Tax Authority will not be a bar in the following case: \nWhere the earlier decision is clearly open to some objection: If it is a decision which is not reached after proper enquiry: and \nIf fresh evidence having a material bearing on the point decided in the previous decision is available.\nIf it is a decision as could not reasonably have been reached on the material before the authority.\nRes-judicata does not apply in income tax proceedings. It has been held by us as well as by the superior courts that each year revolved around its own 'facts and circumstances of the case. Each year has separate and independent unit of assessment, facts, circumstances, status mode, method, character, transaction, nature and activity of source and decisions be given considering the taxpayer's history for the year under consideration. The assessment proceedings under the Income Tax Ordinance, during an assessment year cannot operate as res judicata and thus every assessment has to be finalized on its own merits independent of the previous year assessment. The doctrine of res judicata does not strictly apply to income tax cases. The previous decisions or findings can be reopened if fresh facts come to light which on investigation would lead to a conclusion different from that of his predecessor. CIT, Central Zone B, Karachi v. Farrokh Chemical Industries [(1992) 65 Tax 239 (S.C. Pak) = 1992 PTD 523] It is now well settled that principles of res judicata cannot be applied to\nthe cases on assessments under the taxing law in the same manner as it is applied in civil proceeding. \nIf the taxpayer in a subsequent year is able to satisfy the income tax authority that the previous finding is not correct either because it was not arrived at after due enquiry or because it is arbitrary or if the taxpayer has put before the income tax authority fresh facts/fresh light to the facts from which a different conclusion can be arrived at, then in that case the income tax authority would be justified in arriving at a different conclusion than what was arrived at in the previous proceedings.\nSection 124A of the Ordinance, 2001 is not applicable for this particular year in dispute where source is totally changed and the profit on debt being the business income of the appellant falls within the parameters of section 18(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. In this view of the above recourse we are of the considered opinion that under section 18(2) \"\"Profit on debt\"\" is chargeable to tax under the head 'Income from business' where the person's main business is to derive such income i.e. interest income/profit on debt.\nThe officers below were not justified in placing reliance on the previous year of the Tribunal in appellant's own case which pertained to altogether different situation and different source of income when the appellant enjoyed income from manufacturing. However, the status of the appellant company changed from manufacturing to holding company which fact was not appreciated by the officers below. We also opined that the learned officers below have totally failed to appreciate the changed circumstances and altogether difference scenario happened as contended by the counsel of taxpayer in the year under consideration whose character, nature and source have been changed. In these circumstances, with the consent and agreement of both the contesting parties, we deem it appropriate to remand the case back to the DCIR to consider afresh the nature, mode, method of the appellant's business source and so also decide the following points after providing reasonable opportunity of being heard to the appellant:-\ni) Under section 18(2) \"\"Profit on debt\"\" is chargeable tax under the head 'Income from business' where the\nperson's main source from business is to derive such income i.e. interest income.\nii) Whether 'Profit on debt' is not a 'Business income' for the Banking Companies only and the provision is being restrictively construed? Is the provision restricted such application and it is applicable to any person undertaking such lending business being \"\"Company\"\"? \niii) Whether taxpayer's character, nature and source of deriving income has been changed and the taxpayer company has become holding company for this particular year as also admittedly observed and categorically finding given by DCIR on page 5 of order of u/s.122(1) /(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 [REF: Page 5 Penultimate para (1)] \"\"Thus it is correct to say that taxpayers business is to derive income on profit on debt.?\"\" \nWhere there is a specific head for the income in question and a specific section providing for the head, this residuary section cannot be called in aid. As the Privy Council laid down in CIT v. Basantrai Takhat Singh [IITR 197], the residuary head does not come into operation until the preceding heads are excluded'.\nIt is well settled that an amount can be assessed under the head \"\"1ncome from other sources\"\" only if it cannot be brought within one or the other of the specific head of charge under Section 11 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Assessing Officer/OIR/DCIR must also realise that no human mind is so comprehensive that it can take in all aspects of the problem at one time. In fiscal matters factual arguments often clarify the issues and AO/OIR/DCIR must have intellectual humility to realise that he might have something to learn even from the junior-most counsel/ representative. He must be prepared to receive light from whatever source it come. When AO/OIR is passing/deciding assessment, naturally his own ipsi dixit is not sufficient. He must give convincing reasons and tangible concrete material for his Orders. He should be free from targeted mind. He is also expected to administer justice with an even hand. He is expected to pass speaking, judicial and judicious order with due application of conscious mind after thoroughly analysing the facts of the taxpayer giving adequate and sufficient opportunity of being heard. Lifeless repetition of a mechanical routine assessments without application of conscious and judicious mind of OIR is not expected as enshrined in the constitution or in the judge-made-law. \nIn the back drop of the above case, the orders of the officers below are vacated and the case is remanded back to the DCIR for denovo proceeding as directed in the foregoing paragraphs. \nCases referred to:\nCIT, Karachi v. Gelcaps (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi 2009 PTD 331 [Kar.H.C.],- (1992) 65 Tax 239 (S.C. Pak); 1986) 53 Tax 85 (Tril9.), 1989 PTD (Trib) 318; (2000) 81 Tax 60 (H.C. Lah.); (2009) 100 Tax 343; (2011) 104 Tax 408 (H.C. Kar); (2004) 90 Tax 93 (HC. Lah.); (1962) 5 Tax 262 (S.C.Pak.); (2000) 81 Tax 311 (H.C. Kar); 1999 PTD 780; Kaniram Ganpat Raj v. CIT (1941) 9 ITR (332)], (1941) 22 ITR 208 (Nag); [17 TC 149, 163\n(CA), Absalom v Talbot [26 TC 166, 192 (HL)]; Salisbury House Estate Ltd. v. Fry [15 TC 266]; Nalinikant Mody v. Narayan Row. [61 ITR 428]; 273 ITR 1; AIR 2005 SC 796 and 283 ITR 432.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(46),4A,11,18,18(2),39,67,122(1),122(5),122A,124,124A,&214C\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=15\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "ITA No. 1002/KB/2013, (Tax Year 2011), u/s 122(l)(5) decided on 16-12-2013",
    "Judge Name:": "MR. MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MS. FARZANA, JABEEN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14130",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1NDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2652 = 2001 SLD 2652 = 2001 PLD 63",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Fraud------- Fraud, allegation of---Onus to prove---Person alleging fraud has to prove the same.\n \n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--\n \n----S. 39---Sale of property---Cancellation of document---Allegation of fraud---Onus to prove---Plaintiff simply denied the transaction and raised a plea that the disputed registered sale-deed was executed on her behalf by ' impersonation---Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff--­Lower Appellate Court also upheld the of the Trial Court--­Defendant produced brother-in-law of plaintiff as witness since he remained associated with the bargain and was also present even at the time of execution of the sale-deed---Effect---Plaintiff was to prove that she had been deprived of her property fraudulently---By---simply denying the transaction burden on the plaintiff was not properly discharged---Delivery of possession was never disputed and the plaintiff wanted recovery of possession also--­Where the defendant was in possession of suit property and also had registered sale-deed, the defendant was not supposed to lead any further evidence---Defendant had produced two witnesses, one was close relation of the plaintiff and the other was Lambardar of the village who had identified the plaintiff at the time of registration of sale-deed---Judgments and decrees of both the Courts below were based upon misreading and non-reading of evidence and the same were set aside---Suit was decreed in circumstances.\n \nMohabbat v. Asadullah Khan and others PLD 1989 SC 11 L; Ghulam Muhamamd and others v. Muhammad Aslam and Others PLD 1993 SC 336; Zar Wali Shah v. Yousaf Ali Shah and 9 others 1992 SCMR 1778; Muhammad Shafi and others v. Allah . Dad Khan PLD 1986 SC, 519 and Hassan Ali v. District Judge PLD 1969 SC 167 ref.\n \nMst. Babra and others v. Abdul Akbar ,ad others 1973 SCMR 335 and Nasim Ali and another v. Fazal Hussain and 5 others 1981 CLC 985 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 518 of 1989, .decided on 24th August, 1999. DATE of hearing 9th June, 1999",
    "Judge Name:": "NASIM SIKANDAR, J",
    "": "KHALILUR-REHMAN\nvs\nMst. HALIM KHATOON"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14131",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1NTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2346 = 2002 SLD 2346 = (2002) 85 TAX 81 = (2000) 245 ITR 21",
    "Key Words:": "Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Remission or cessation of trading liability - Assessee had made electricity payment in discharge of its liability to Electricity Board in earlier years - Subsequently, electricity tariff rate was reduced and assessee was given concessional rate resulting in a refund - Whether there would be, to above extent, a cessation or remission of its trading liability - Held, yes - Whether amount received by assessee, even assuming that it was capital receipt, was liable to be taxed under provisions of section 41(1) - Held, yes\nSection 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Income - Assessable as - Whether refund of electricity charges granted to assessee by Electricity Board on ground that it was a small-scale industry could be treated as subsidy and taxed as such - Held, no\nFACTS\nThe assessee, during the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1978-79, obtained a refund of a sum of Rs. 3,00,173 as refund from the Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board out of which a sum of Rs. 2,32,794 related to the earlier accounting years and the balance of Rs. 67,379 related to the accounting year relevant to the assessment year in question. The assessee got a refund as concessional rate of levy was extended to the industrial undertaking of the assessee on the ground that it was a small-scale industry. In the adjustment statement, the assessee claimed that it was a capital receipt but the ITO did not accept the claim of the assessee and held that the amount was taxable under section 41(1). On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the order of the ITO. On appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that there was no cessation of liability because of the receipt of the money from the Electricity Board and the payment received represented cash subsidy of capital nature and it could not be regarded as a payment under section 41(1).\nOn reference:\nHELD\nThe assessee made the electricity payment in discharge of its liability to the Electricity Board in the earlier years and when the electricity tariff rate was reduced and the assessee was given the concessional rate, there was, to that extent, a cessation or remission of its trading liability.\nFor considering the question of applicability of the provisions of section 41(1), the motive of the Tamil Nadu Government or the State Electricity Board or the objective behind the payment was not of much importance and the only relevant question that had to be examined was whether by the grant of the concessional rate of electricity, the assessee was relieved of its liability to pay the electricity charges at the normal rate that was in force during the years in question. All the requirements of section 41(1) were fully satisfied to treat the refund amount as the income of the assessee and, hence, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that it was not a payment falling under section 41(1). Therefore, the assessment of the sum of Rs. 2,32,794 as income of the assessee by the ITO invoking the provisions of section 41(1) was quite justified and called for no interference.\nAs regards the sum of Rs. 67,379, it was seen from the statement of the case that the assessee had adjusted the refund of Rs. 67,379 and debited the balance of Rs. 2,50,773 as electricity charges for the year in question which meant that the assessee did not claim deduction of the sum and was not allowed the deduction of the said sum. Therefore, the requisite conditions for the applicability of section 41(1) were not satisfied.\nThe amount received by the assessee represented the refund of the electricity charges already paid by it and could not be regarded as subsidy at all. The subsidy is granted by the Government in many forms. At times, it may be outright grant; sometime it may be by way of concession. The question whether the subsidy is taxable or not would depend on the facts of the case. The Government provided the concessional rate of electricity to the small-scale industries in the State with a view to promote the industrialisation in the State and, on that account, it could not be held that the difference in the amount between the normal value and the subsidised rate of electricity was the amount received by the assessee as subsidy and was liable to be taxed as income under the provisions of the Act.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nSahney Steel & Press Works Ltd. v. CIT [1997] 228 ITR 253 / 94 Taxman 368 (SC) and Panyam Cements & Mineral Industries Ltd.v. Addl. CIT [1979] 117 ITR 770 (AP).",
    "Court Name:": "Madras High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=41(1),256(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "TAX CASE No. 145 OF 1984, FEBRUARY 17, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "R., JAYASIMHA BABU AND N.V. BALASUBRAMANIAN, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of INCOME TAX\nvs\nVispro Foundry Engineers (P.) Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14132",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1NTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2653 = 2001 SLD 2653 = 2001 PCRLJ 105",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal law-­----Object and purpose of The criminal law is the strongest arm of all the normative systems of the society by which it punishes, controls, curbs and prevents crime in the society. The evil has lived with the mankind from its beginning and the society has to make continuous efforts to keep it at bay and the criminal law keeps undergoing change so as to meet the new challenges posed by the crime culture. The basic purpose of the criminal law and criminal justice administration is to save the society from evil, to free it of crime, or, at least to make crime an unpleasant, detestable, unattractive and unacceptable activity or career. The criminal law, thus, has to be interpreted, applied and enforced in a manner so as to achieve these objectives. A dynamic and progressive approach in the application and enforcement of criminal law is required so as to eliminate the mischief which has crept into the criminal justice administration whereby the accused frustrate its provisions by deceit, cleverness, sham excuses and contrivances or get away from the rigours of law due to loopholes in the law or the procedure. Courts should take a dynamic approach in order to discouraging crime.\n \nZeeshan Kazmi v. The State PLD 1997 SC 267 and Abdul Bari v. Malik Amir Jan and 4 others PLD 1998 SC 50 ref.\n \n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---\n \n----S. 338-F---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.497 & 499---Grant of bail and acceptance of surety bonds---Applicability and scope of S.338-F, P.P.C.---Provisions of S.338-F, P.P.C. make the Islamic Law on the subject applicable not only to cases relating to the offences enumerated in Chap. XVI of Penal Code but also to all matters ancillary or akin thereto---Law of bail is a necessary adjunct of the substantive law. and the Islamic Law is applicable to it and while considering or interpreting the law of bail and other matters relating to it in cases of hurt or homicide, Islamic Law would be followed and it would come into play while considering the questions relating to grant of bail, cancellation of bail, terms of bail, qualifications and liabilities of sureties and consequences which follow due to non-surrender of the accused into judicial custody.\n \n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----Ss. 497 & 499---Grant of bail and acceptance of surety bond--­Considerations to be kept in view by the Court while granting bail to accused and accepting surety bonds---Most important consideration to be kept in view by the Court while allowing bail to an accused is his probability of standing trial at a subsequent stage---Court has to satisfy itself that the accused would stand the trial and he was being given in the custody of a person who was in a position to surrender the accused into the custody of the Court---Suitability of the proposed surety should be determined by the Court at the time of acceptance of his bonds---Financial resources of the prospective surety, his character and the station he occupies in life, besides his relationship with the accused and the influence he could wield over the accused, must be considered at the time of acceptance of surety bonds---Mechanical acceptance of surety bonds from persons who lack the capability to produce the accused before the Court has contributed to a considerable extent in bail jumping.\n \n(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----Ss. 497 & 499---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Chap. XVI [Ss. 299 to 338-H]---Grant of bail and acceptance of surety bond---Procedure to be followed in matters of bail relating to offences contained in Chap. XVI of the . Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 and acceptance of bonds detailed.\n \nThe Court after determining entitlement of the accused to be released on bail or after grant of bail by a superior Court should accept bonds from suitable sureties. When the accused is required by the Court to appears before it to stand trial or for any other purpose the surety/sureties should also be summoned for that date/dates. In case of absence of the accused the bonds should be forfeited and surety called upon to produce the accused on the next date of hearing. The surety should be afforded two or three opportunities, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, to bring the accused before the Court. Police assistance if required may also be provided to the surety. In the event of failure of the surety to surrender the accused into the custody of the Court, the surety would be committed to judicial lock-up (as civil prisoner) for a period not exceeding six months at a time. The surety shall be released from custody whenever the accused surrendered to judicial custody. The surety can be allowed bail as well on the terms of the original bond. After the expiry of terms of confinement, or sooner on the motion of surety, another enquiry should be conducted to ascertain the ability or inability of the surety to bring the accused before the Court and if it is found that the accused has gone beyond the reach of the surety, from where he could not be brought by the surety, the surety should be released from custody after payment of reasonable penalty, allowance being made for the time spent in confinement by the surety.\n \n(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----Ss. 514, 497 & 439---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302/324/148/149--­Forfeiture of bond---Accused after having been allowed bail on the ground of statutory delay had jumped bail---Bonds furnished by the accused and the sureties were forfeited and penalty of Rs.2,50,000 on each surety was imposed---Sureties were given numerous opportunities to locate and bring the accused before the Court, but they failed to discharge their liability---Police assistance was also provided to the sureties and other relatives of the accused to trace him---Trial Court was directed by High Court to give one last opportunity to the sureties (petitioners) to produce the accused before the Court at least within thirty days---Sureties had already deposited a sum of Rupees one lac each in the Trial Court and recovery of remaining amount was directed by High Court to be postponed, but attachment of their movable property was kept intact---Impugned order of Trial Court being valid and in accordance with law, revision petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \nSher Ali v. The State 1998 SCMR 190; Zeeshan Kazmi v. The State PLD 1997 SC 267; Abdul Bari v. Malik Amir Jan and 4 others PLD 1998 SC 50 and Kifala, Vol. V, p.49, Chap.2 of the Urdu Edn. of Fatawa-e­-Alamgiri, published by Qanuni Kutab Khana, Lahore ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Revision No-425 of 1999, decided on 12th December, 2000. DATE of hearing: 27th October, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN CHAUDHRY, J",
    "": "NIAMAT ALI and others\nvs\nTHE STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14133",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1NTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2654 = 2001 SLD 2654 = 2001 PLD 139",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)------Ss. 96---Appeal---Forum of---Determination---Forum is determined according to the valuation of the suit as fixed by the plaintiffs.\n \nSadar Din v. Elahi Bakhsh and another PLD 1976 Lah. 1 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 115---Revision---Administration of justice---Mistake of Court--­Effect---Where a litigant had remained a victim of technicalities of procedure or mistakes of the Court, High Court would not refrain from exercising its revisional jurisdiction---Refusal to exercise such jurisdiction would amount to refusing relief to a litigant at the portal of justice---Acts or omissions of Court not to injure a litigant.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n---Ss. 96 & 115---Revision---Forum of, appeal wrongly determined--­Plaintiff had evaluated his suit at Rs.200---Trial Court decreed the suit and appeal was filed before the Lower Appellate Court---Appeal was returned to the defendant on the ground that the value of the suit property was Rs. 1,50,000 as such the Lower Appellate Court did not have the jurisdiction---Defendant accepted the order of the Lower Appellate Court and preferred appeal before High Court---High Court dismissed the appeal in limine for the reason that the Lower Appellate Court had wrongly decided the matter of jurisdiction and the same lay with the Court below---Defendant after the order of High Court filed instant revision petition before High Court---Validity---Valuation as fixed in the plaint unless modified of corrected by the Court, determined the forum of appeal---Where the valuation was accepted by the Trial Court, the appeal as filed before the Lower Appellate Court was competent---Appeal was erroneously returned by the Lower Appellate Court and although the defendant had accepted the order, yet the same would not make any difference firstly for the reason that the mistake committed by the Court could not injure any litigant; secondly the acceptance of the return could not also estopped the defendants from challenging the order of the Lower Appellate Court---Suitor could not be estopped against the law---Appeal was remitted by High Court to the Lower Appellate Court for decision on merits by allowing the revision.\n \nWater and Power Development Authority and another v. Messrs Pakistan Associated Construction 1992 CLC 771; Muhammad Din v. Muhammad Amin PLD 1995 Lah. 15; Muhammad Aslam and another v. Munshi Muhammad Behram and another 1991 SCMR 1971; Muhammad Yousaf and 3 others v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs 1992 SCMR 2334; Manager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678 and Namdar Khan v. Muhammad Akram Khan and 14 others 1993 SCMR 434 ref.\n \n(d) Act of Court----\n \n---- Mistake of Court---Not to injure a litigant.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 2205 of 1985, decided on 21st November, 2000. DATE of hearing: 2nd October, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIR ALAM KHAN AND SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, JJ",
    "": "SHAFAQAT IQBAL and others\nvs\nGHULAM RASOOL and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14134",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1NTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2655 = 2001 SLD 2655 = 2001 PLD 212",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V bf 1898)--------S. 345(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 311---Compounding of offence---Grant of permission of Court---Intent and import---When a compromise has been reached between all the heirs of a deceased person and the offender, the Courts of law are not permitted to blindly act upon the said compromise and to acquit the culprit---Courts of law are expected to consider all the attending facts and circumstances of the case and then to decide whether, in the given situation, the Court should or should not grant permission for the compounding of the offence---Courts are also obliged to decide whether the case falls within the ambit of the provisions of S.311, P.P.C. and whether the offender, despite the compromise, deserved to be punished by way of \"\"Tazir\"\" under the said provisions of law.\n \n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----\n \n----Ss. 302, 364 & 309---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 345(2)--­Compromise---Accused was an oldish person who was in the habit of abusing children by alluring them and then getting his body massaged from them and by also indulging in sexual affairs with them--Lust of the accused had resulted in the death of three minor children whose bodies had been recovered at his instance---Accused, thus, deserved no sympathy and did not qualify for the grant of any discretionary relief by way of compromise between the parties---Permission for compounding of the offence of Qatl-i­Amd was, therefore, refused by the High Court in terms of S.345(2), Cr.P.C.---Heirs of all the three deceased boys having granted pardon to the accused, punishment of Qisas had ceased to be applicable in view of the provisions of S.309, P.P:C.---Conviction and sentence of accused under S.302, P.P.C. were consequently set aside, but instead he was convicted under S.302(c), P.P.C. and sentenced to suffer twenty years' RJ, on each of the three counts---Offence 'under S.364, P.P.C. being not compoundable, conviction and sentence of accused thereunder were maintained as he deserved no mercy---Sentences of accused were, however, directed to run concurrently.\n \n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----\n \n----Ss. 302(c) & 364---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.345(2) & 439---Compromise---Revisional jurisdiction---Accused had been convicted by the Trial Court under S.302(c), P.P.C. being less than 18 years of age and had been sentenced to undergo 25 years R.I. each---Accused were small children themselves who were misused by the principal accused for alluring other children and they had also been granted pardon by the heirs of all the three deceased boys---Conviction of accused under S.302(c), P.P.C. was maintained, but in the said circumstances sentence of 25 years' R.I, awarded to them thereunder was reduced to six years R.I. on each of the three counts---Offence under S.364, P.P.C. being not compoundable, conviction of accused thereunder was upheld, but due to aforementioned circumstances their sentence of ten years R.I. was reduced to six years' R.I. each on each count with reduction in fine and direction for the sentences to run concurrently---Two accused had not filed any appeals against their convictions and sentences, but they also having been pardoned by the heirs of the deceased persons, their cases were not distinguishable from the case of the aforesaid accused and their sentences were also reduced accordingly by High Court in exercise of its powers under S.439, Cr.P.C.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Appeals Nos. 1292, 1295 of 1999 and Murder Reference No. 53-T of 2000, decided on 21st November, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY AND NAEEM ULLAH KHAN SHERWANI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD NAZIR alias JEERA\nvs\nTHE STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14135",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1NTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2656 = 2001 SLD 2656 = 2001 PLD 224",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--------S. 176---Pawnee's right ---Default made by pawnor---Effect---Pledgee has two courses of action available to him under the provisions of S.176 of Contract Act, 1872---Pawnee may either bring a suit against the pawnor and­ retain the pledged goods as collateral security or he may sell the pledged goods on giving the pawnor reasonable notice of the sale.\n \n(b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)----\n \n----S. 9---Recovery of Bank loan---Leave to defend the suit---Loan was advanced to the defendant company and the same was rescheduled on the terms which were agreed by the defendants---No objection was ever raised to the demand finance facilities, availed by the defendant company---Directors had guaranteed the payment obligations of the defendant company ---Plaintiff ­Bank had placed on record guarantees admittedly signed by the Directors in respect of the facilities---Contention of the defendants was that demand finance agreements were not legally enforceable because the same were without consideration as no finance had been provided to or availed by the defendant company---Validity---Such objection raised for the first time by the defendant company to the demand finance facility was an afterthought and did not show bona tides---No serious or bona fide defence to the claim of the plaintiff-Bank had been raised---Application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed and the suit was decreed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 94 of 1999, heard on 1st February, 2001",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J",
    "": "HABIB BANK LIMITED\nvs\nKASHIF STEEL INDUSTRY and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14136",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1NTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2082 = 2013 SLD 2082 = 2013 PLD 259",
    "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---\n \n----Ss. 409 & 21---Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Criminal breach of trust by public servant, criminal misconduct---Petition for quashing of proceedings, dismissed of---\"\"Public servant\"\"---Definition---Scope---Community Board utilizing public funds provided by Government exchequer---Status of official of such Community Board as public servant---Scope---Officials of Community Board (petitioners) were alleged to have misappropriated a huge amount during the completion of a project, which was partly funded by the District Government---Contention of said officials was that they did not fall under the definition of \"\"public servant\"\", therefore, proceedings before Judge, Anti-Corruption were coram non-judice and were liable to be quashed---Validity---Community Board in question did fall within the definition of S.409, P.P.C. which was triable by Judge, Anti-Corruption---Where funds were provided to any Board by the Government exchequer for use of public purposes, the persons, associated with discharging their functions by using such public funds were deemed to be public servants even though they might not be government employees or were not receiving their salaries/ remuneration from the Government---Officials of Community Board in question also sought to resolve factual controversies through present constitutional petition, which was the job of the Judge, Anti-Corruption---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n PLD 1963 Dhaka 839; PLD 1963 Dhaka 139 and 1991 SCMR 994 ref.\n \nNida-e-Millat, Citizen Community Board, Multan through Chairman v. Director Anti-Corruption Establishment, Multan Region, Multan and 8 others 2010 YLR 643 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Penal Code, 1860=409,21\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rPrevention of Corruption Act, 1947=5(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3446 of 2012, decided on 6th June, 2012",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL SAMI KHAN, J",
    "": "CHAIRMAN, SCACER CITIZEN COMMUNITY BOARD, MULTAN through Abdul Razak and anothers\nVs\nThe STATE and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14137",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1NTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1956 24 = 1956 SLD 24 = 1956 PLD 168",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of India-----Article 136 (Constitution of Pakistan, Article 160)-Appeal to the Supreme Court by special leave of the Court-Whether should be limited to the violation of rules of natural justice or like causes-Income-tax Act, 1922, S. 23 (3)­Whether assessment on a pure guess without reference to any evidence or material valid.\n \nThe limitations on the power conferred by Article 136 cannot be defined with precision. It being an exceptional and overriding power has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible to fetter the exercise of this power by any set formula or rule. The constitution having trusted the wisdom and good sense of the Judges of the Supreme Court that its. If is a sufficient safeguard and- guarantee that the power will only be used to advance the cause of justice and, that its exercise will be governed by well established principles which govern the exercise of overriding constitutional powers When the Court reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a Court or Tribunal within the territory has not given a fair deal to a litigant then no techni­cal hurdles of any kind like the finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of the exercise of this power because the whole intent and purpose of this article is that it is the duty of the Court to see that injustice is not perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of Courts and Tribunals because certain laws have made the decisions of these Courts or tribunals final and conclusive.\n \nIn making the assessment under subsection (3) of section 23 of the Act, the Income-tax Officer is not entitled to make a pure guess and make an assessment without reference to any evidence or any material at all. There must be something more than bare suspicion to support the assessment under section 23 (3).\n \nSeth Gurmukh Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1944) 12 I T R 393 approved.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 217 of 1953, decided on 29th October 1954, from the Judgment and Order dated the 16th day of January 1950 of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta in Income-tax Appeal No. 4658 of 1948-49 and E. P. T. A. No. 1137 of 1948-49.",
    "Judge Name:": "HASAN, BHAGWATI AND VENKATARAMA AYYAR, JJ",
    "": "DHAKESWARI COTTON MILLS, LTD.\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14138",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1NTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1956 25 = 1956 SLD 25 = 1956 PLD 21",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Pedal Code (XLV of 1860)----S. 149--Charjes and con­viction under Ss. 302, 307 and 149 by the trial Court-Conviction under Ss. 302 and 307 by the appellate Court-Prejudice to the accused-Ss. 236 and 237 Criminal Procedure Cole not applic­able-Retrial.\n \nWhere there have been no direct and specific charges against the appellant for the specific offences under sections s02 and 307 of the Penal Code and charges had been framed under sections 302 and 307 read with section 149 of the. Penal Code, can the convictions and sentences under sections 302 and 307 Penal Code be maintained ?\n \nHeld, that a charge as a member of an unlawful assembly four an offence committed by a member thereof in furtherance of the common object is a substantially different one from a charge against a person for an offence committed by him as a member of such assembly. A charge under section 149 puts the person on notice only of' the facts that the offence was committed by a member of the unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object or such as was known to be likely to be committed. Section 149 creates a distinct head of criminal liability commonly known as constructive liability-which is not covered by sections 236 and 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n \n(b) Criminal Trial---Ss. 226 and 342 Criminal Procedure Code--No indication of the part assigned in the charge but in the questioning under S. 342 Criminal Procedure Code-. Prejudice,\n \nThe member of the unlawful assembly responsible for the fatal injury was not named in the charge but the question put to him under section 342 of Code of Criminal Procedure did so indicate.\n \nHeld, that the very fact that inspite of such questioning the charges did not specify the person responsible for causing death is likely to be mis-leading. It may indicate to the person on trial that he was not called upon to defend himself on the footing of his being responsible for causing death. In a case where a death sentence has been awarded by distinguish­ing the person from all other accused on the ground of individual responsibility the person may have been prejudiced by the absence of specific charges under section 302 and 307 of the Penal Code.\n \nSentence and conviction under sections 302 and 307 was set aside and the retrial was not ordered.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 139 of 1954, decided on 1st March 1955. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 29th April 1954, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1101 of 1953 and Referred No. 111 of 1953, arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 3rd September 1953, of the Court of the Sessions Judge at Fatehpur in Sessions Trial No. 50 of 1953.",
    "Judge Name:": "VIVIAN BOSE, JAGANNUDHADAS AND B.P. SINHA, JJ",
    "": "(Criminal Appellate J-UR-isdiction)\nSURAJPAL\nvs\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14139",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1NTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2657 = 2001 SLD 2657 = 2001 PLD 495",
    "Key Words:": "(a) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-------S.9---Suit for maintenance by wife---Written statement ---Purpose--­Defendant, for the purpose of filing a written statement is bound to appear in the Family Court himself and his attendance cannot be dispensed with--­Where the written statement was filed by special attorney of the defendant, the same did not deserve consideration in the eye of law and Court was right in taking the view that the suit remained uncontested.\n \nKhalid Mahmood Syed v. Razi Abbas Bokhari PLD 1979 Lah. 217 and Mst. Saeeda v. Lal Badshah 1981 SCMR 395 distinguished.\n \n(b) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--\n \n----S. 11---Recovery of past maintenance---Statement of wife that she was Ghair Abad for the last three years was not specifically challenged in cross-­examination and thus would be deemed to have been admitted---Wife was rightly found to be entitled to recover past maintenance by the Court, in circumstances.\n \nConstitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art.199---Constitutional petition---Filing of such petition by a person having a Special Power of Attorney---Special Power of Attorney annexed to the petition merely authorised the Special Attorney to defend and pursue the civil suit filed in the Courts of a specific District and to attend lower as well as higher Courts and apply to Courts and officers for copies of documents etc.---Power to attend the Courts merely authorised the attorney to appear on behalf of the petitioner but did not authorise him to engage a counsel and institute a petition in the High Court---Such petition filed by an unauthorised person thus merited dismissal.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 24904 of 2000, decided on 18th December, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN NAZIR AKHTAR, J.",
    "": "MAZHAR IQBAL \nvs\nFALAK NAZ and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14140",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQ1NTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2658 = 2001 SLD 2658 = 2001 PLD 506",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (IV of 1963)-----S. 11---Notification dated 2-10-1986---Exemption from provisions of Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963---Expression 'Location Policy' as appearing in Notification regarding exemption---Object and scope---All industries and areas in the Province were exempted from application of S.3 of Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963, by means of the Notification, except those specified in the Notification itself and as a consequence, border areas, areas prone to flooding and urban areas among other specified locations, were retained within the regulatory ambit of S.3 of Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963, while in the remaining areas of the Province, industries could be set up (subject to certain industry-wise restrictions) without obtaining the prior permission of the Government ---Area-wise restrictions, which find mention in the Notification reflect what is officially termed as the 'Location Policy' of Provincial Government.\n \n(b) Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (IV of 1963)--\n \n----S. 11---Amending Notification dated 3-11-1988---Sugar industry, inclusion in Location Policy---Purpose---Notified Location Policy was made with the object of ensuring that additional sugar manufacturing capacity could be set up in the Province without displacement of cotton crop as the same was considered to be of special significance to the Provincial Government---Location Policy set out in the Amending notification, as such represented a legitimate exercise of the executive authority of the Government and was also consistent with objectives of Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963, to ensure the organized and planned growth of industries in the Province.\n \n(c) Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (IV of 1963)----\n \n----Ss. 3 & 11---Amending Notification dated 3-11-1988---Vires of para. 2(a) of the Notification---Amending Notification dated 3-11-1988, was result of sound and objective considerations---Contents of para.2(a) of the Notification fall within the policy making domain of the executive authority of the Province which was properly exercised and thus could not be struck down.\n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Policy decision of Government---High Court not to sit in over the policy decision of the Government once the Court concludes that the process through which such policy decision was arrived at was not open to exception.\n \n(e) Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (IV of 1963)--\n \n----Ss. 3 & 11---Amending Notification dated 3-11-1988---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court--- Scope ---Vires of para.2(a) of the Notification---Location Policy of Government as stated in the Notification relating to sugar industry was not open to review by the High Court.\n \n(f) Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (IV of 1963)--\n \n----Ss. 3 & 11---Amending Notification dated 3-11-1988---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Shifting of sugar trill from one district to another---Petitioner made such shifting on the basis of \"\"No-Objection Certificate\"\" issued by Federal Government and Central Board of Revenue---Validity---Federal Government and Central Board of Revenue did not have the power nor did they purport to assert any authority or jurisdiction to override the Location Policy set out in the Notification dated 3-11-1988 as the same fell within the domain of Provincial Government--­\"\"No-Objection Certificate\"\" of Central Board of Revenue allowing the petitioner to shift its sugar mill was wholly irrelevant---Where the Government had untrammeled authority to relax any of the provisions of the Notification in case of a particular industrial unit or class of units or industries the same presented potential for abuse of such authority---High Court directed the Provincial Government to incorporate guidelines in the Notification to ensure objectivity and transparency in the exercise of powers and to put procedures in place, or if such procedure already existed, to ensure compliance therewith, to make sure that any future modifications or amendments in its notified policy were subjected to the rigorous process and deliberation.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 15212 of 2000, heard on 18th June, 2001",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J",
    "": "MADINA SUGAR MILLS \nvs \nSECRETARY, MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14141",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2218 = 2014 SLD 2218 = 2014 PLD 394",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---\n \n----S. 302(b)---Qatl-e-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Sentence, reduction in---Death sentence reduced to imprisonment for life---Motive suggesting no deep rooted enmity between parties---Single entry wound on deceased---Effect---Accused allegedly fired at and murdered the deceased---Motive for the occurrence was that deceased hired accused for painting his house and a dispute arose between them over payment of labour---Accused was convicted under S.302(b), P.P.C by Trial Court and was sentenced to death---Validity---Matter was promptly reported to the police, 35 minutes after the occurrence, which ruled out chances of deliberations/consultations---Ocular account was furnished by father and paternal uncle of the deceased, and their testimonies could not be discarded merely because of their relationship inter se and with the deceased as they had no serious enmity or ill will towards the accused for his false implication in the case---Place of occurrence was a shop, wherein father and paternal uncle of deceased worked as partners, therefore, their presence at the spot was quite natural and probable---Present case was a case of single accused as far as firing at the deceased was concerned and substitution in such like cases was a rare phenomenon as kith and kin of deceased would not implicate an innocent person by letting of the real culprit---Motive for the murder was not disputed by the defence, and the accused himself in his statement under Ss.340(2) & 342 Cr.P.C. admitted that deceased had to pay some amount to him regarding services rendered by him for painting his house---Report of Forensic Science Laboratory revealed that empties collected from the spot were fired from the pistol recovered at the instance of the accused---Contradiction between ocular and medical evidence was regarding point of entry and exit of bullet fired by accused, but not regarding the general location of the fire shot, which in the present case was the head of deceased---Eye-witnesses who were themselves in firing range were expected to run for cover in the heat of the moment, therefore, being panic-stricken and shocked their narration of events based on a sudden glance could not be expected to be punctiliously accurate and precise---Possibility of instantaneous turning of head by the deceased in response to a close range fire in the face could not be ruled out, hence variation between ocular and medical evidence regarding point of entry of bullet in the circumstances of the case, did not appear to be a major variation---Evidence against accused was sufficient to maintain his conviction under S.302(b), P.P.C., however present case was not a case for capital punishment because motive set up by the prosecution suggested that there was no deep rooted enmity between the parties and possibility of something else happening at the spot prior to the occurrence could not be ruled out, and because only a single entry wound was observed on the body of deceased during his post mortem examination---Death sentence awarded to accused was altered to imprisonment for life---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n \n Jumma v. The State 2011 SCMR 1428 and Amin Ali and another v. The State 2011 SCMR 323 distinguished.\n \n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---\n \n---S. 302(b)---Qatl-e-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Testimony of eye-witnesses---Eye-witnesses of the occurrence inter-se related with each other and also with the deceased---Testimony of such eye-witnesses could not be discarded merely because of their relationship inter se as well as with the deceased, especially when they had no deep rooted enmity or ill will towards the accused for his false implication.\n \n Haji v. The State 2010 SCMR 650 rel.\n \n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---\n \n---S. 302(b)---Qatl-e-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Contradiction between statements of witnesses (ocular account) and post mortem report (medical evidence) regarding point of entry and exit of bullet---Relevance---Despite such contradiction, general location of fire shot had been identified by witnesses and post mortem report as head of deceased---Eye-witnesses who were themselves in firing range were expected to run for cover in the heat of the moment, therefore, being panic-stricken and shocked their narration of events based on a sudden glance could not be expected to be punctiliously accurate and precise---Variation between ocular and medical evidence to the extent of point of entry of bullet in such circumstances, would not be a major variation to discredit the case set up by the prosecution---Illustration.\n \n Muhammad Afzal and 3 others v. The State 1999 SCMR 1991 rel.\n \n State of Uttar Pradesh v. Naresh and others (2011) 4 SCC 324 ref.\n \n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---\n \n---S. 302(b)---Qatl-e-amd---Quantum of sentence---Benefit of doubt---Accused was entitled to benefit of doubt as an extenuating circumstance, while deciding question of (quantum of) sentence.\n \n Mir Muhammad alias Miro v The State 2009 SCMR 1188 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Penal Code, 1860=302(b)\\n\\r\\n\\rCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=340(2),342\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 340-J and Murder Reference No. 542 of 2010, heard on 21st February, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MANZOOR AHMAD MALIK AND SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JJ",
    "": "BASHIR AHMAD BUTT and others\nVs\nTHE STATE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14142",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2001 2659 = 2001 SLD 2659 = 2001 PLD 1",
    "Key Words:": "National Accountability Bureau Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)-------S. 16-A(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 177, 178, 179 & 180---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition--­Chairman, National Accountability Bureau, exercising lawful option spelling out the reasons, had chosen the venue of Court at Attock for filing Reference against the accused---Petitioner, spouse of the accused, sought transfer of case of the accused from Attock to Lahore on the ground of discrimination viz. lack of any special circumstance or reason for transfer of the case from Lahore to Attock Court and contended that in terms of Ss. 177, 178, 179 & 180, Cr.P.C. the trial should be conducted at Lahore from where majority of the prosecution witnesses and the co-accused hailed and the lis originated, convenience of the accused in preference to that of the complainant and the prosecution and difficulties in hiring professionals of his own choice--­Validity---Constitutional petition had been instituted labouring under an erroneous impression as if the case of accused had been transferred by the NAB Authorities from Lahore to Attock---Documents on record revealed that though arrest of the accused was effected from Lahore but by exercising lawful option with reasons, National Accountability Bureau chose the venue of trial at Attock---Nothing had been canvassed by the petitioner tending to suggest that any extraneous consideration weighed with the Chairman National Accountability Bureau to file the Reference against the accused at Attock---No question of transfer, thus, was involved at the end of the National Accountability Bureau in terms of S.16-A, National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 in circumstances---National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 being a special law in terms of S.17, the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 had been rendered applicable save to the extent of inconsistency---High Court, however, while turning down the Constitutional petition and declining the transfer of the case observed that trial Court seized of the lis was required to finalize the proceedings expeditiously on day-to-day basis, five days a week, within the prescribed statutory period provided no hindrance was caused by the accused side.\n \nChairman, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad v. Mian Muhammad Abbas Sharif and 7 others PLD 2001 Lah. 157 and Khan Asfandyar Wali and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others PLD 2001 SC 607 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 15183 of 2001, decided on 4th October, 2001",
    "Judge Name:": "FALAK SHER, C, J",
    "": "Mrs. AHMAD RIAZ SHAIKH \nVs\nCHAIRMAN, NAB and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14143",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2002 2347 = 2002 SLD 2347 = 2002 PLD 28",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)-------S. 3---Intra-Court Appeal---New plea, raising of---When a person has not pleaded something and has not built up his case on the specific assertion, he is precluded from taking such a plea before the appellate forum.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 24(3)(e)(ii)---Protection of property rights---Compulsory acquisition---Principles---Nothing in Art. 24 of the Constitution affects validity of any law provided for the acquisition of any class of property for the purposes of providing housing and public facilities and services such as road, water supply, sewerage, gas and electric power to all or any specified class of citizens.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Arts. 4 & 24---Expression 'except in accordance with law' and 'save in accordance with law occurring in Art. 24 of the Constitution ---Implication---If a person or Authority is performing the functions and doing the WO in accordance with law, then Arts. 4 & 24 of the Constitution hays' no applicability in the set of circumstances---Necessary implication of the expression is that when a person is deprived of his property under the authority of law and according to the provisions of law, such person has no grievance or ground to complain about the action under the provisions of the Constitution---Right to hold property is subject to reasonable conditions which include restriction of the same being acquired in accordance with law.\n \nSheikh Muhammad Anwar and another v. Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Communication, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 1989 Kar. 45 ref.\n \n(d) Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act (XXXI of 1958)---\n \n----S.14--Electricity Act (IX of 1910), S.12---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---Intra-Court .Appeal---Acquisition of land---Installation of electric poles---Entering upon private land---Dispute was regarding installation of electric poles and towers in the land owned by the appellants--­Constitutional petition filed by the appellant was dismissed by High Court--­Plea of the appellant was that the Authority had no power under the law to enter private land unauthorisedly---Validity---Authority had the power and backing of law for installation of electric poles and also for that purpose had the authority to enter upon the land for erecting poles, lay wires to energize the towers for the supply of electricity and transmit the same---Entry as well as the installation of towers could not be considered to be unauthorized, as the authority had ample powers to undertake all the actions, which were duly protected under the law and no exception could be taken by any person--­Judgment passed by High Court was in accordance with law and intra-Court appeal was dismissed.\n \nMuhammad Aslam Khan v. West Pakistan Province PLD 1962 Lah. 925; Kadir Bakhsh v. WAPDA 1989 CLC 1615; Ghiasuddin v. Executive Engineer, WAPDA 1983 CLC 200 and Nazar Muhammad v. WAPDA PLD 1991 SC 715 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Intra-Court Appeal No. 197 of 1993, heard on 24th May, 2001",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ AND MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "HAKIM ALI\nVs\nMEMBER POWER, WAPDA and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14144",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3253 = 2003 SLD 3253 = 2003 PLD 450",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-------S. 15---Place of sitting of Court---Purpose and philosophy of law--­Accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved otherwise and in accord with this presumption and the canons of justice the Criminal Procedure Code and the Qanun-e-Shahadat, inter alia, include safeguards for a fair trial of the accused, and the provision f- r open trial is one of these safeguards---Trial in the veil of secrecy may offend said canons without which the trial would lose its credibility---.However, there could be a case or a class of cases, trial of which at the ordinary place of sitting may be hazardous to public security--­Section 15 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, empowering the Government or the Special Court to specify the place of trial caters to such kind of cases, but this provision should not, in any manner, compromise with the requirement of fair trial.\n \n(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997.)---\n \n----S. 15---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.324/353/148/149---West Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), S.13---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Order of trial of accused in jail premises, challenged---Trial Court had-granted the approval to the order of the Home Secretary for trial of accused in jail premises vide the impugned order ---Anti Terrorism Court according to subsection (1) of S.15 the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, would sit at such a place which the Government might specify including \"\"Cantonment area\"\" or \"\"Jail Premises\"\" or the Court might direct in terms of subsection (2) of S.15 the said Act for trial of a particular case at such a place which it might specify and finally in terms of subsection (3) thereof even the Anti-Terrorism Court itself was competent to decide the place of trial which it considered expedient or desirable---Order of the Home Secretary did not spell out any reasons, nor such was a mandatory requirement under the law, but a well reasoned and speaking order ensured transparency and inspired greater confidence---High Court in an earlier Constitutional petition, while upholding the detention of accused, had referred to the seriousness of the case---Omission of reasons in such circumstances by itself would not make the order . of the Home Secretary unlawful in absence of any apparent mala fides---Power with the executive to decide the place to trial did not impinge or independence of Judiciary or conscience of a Court---Trial continued to bean open trial which was to be regulated by the Trial Court with due regard to security of the parties, witnesses and the Court itself---Rights of the accused and the principles of appreciation of evidence would continue to remain the same---Apprehensions of accused thus, were misconceived---Impugned order did not suffer from any jurisdictional defect to warrant interference under Art. 199 of the Constitution---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nAsif Ali Zardari v. Special Judge (Offences in Banks) and 10 others PLD 1992 Kar. 437; Muhammad Ashfaq Chief v. Government of Sindh and others PLD 1996 Kar. 326; Mehram Ali and others, v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 1445; Sharaf Faridi and 3 others v. The Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the Prime Minister and another PLD 1989 Kar. 404; 1990 PCr.LJ 1687; Kehar Singh and others v. The State PSC 1989 SC 533; The State v. Islamuddin alias Changha 1984 PCr.LJ 273; Sar Khan v. The State and another PLD 1967 Pesh. 314; Sheikh Hafeez Ahmad v. The State through Secretary (Home), Government of the Punjab, Lahore PLD 1975 Lab 1453 and Inayat Hussain v. The State AIR 1956 All. 448 ref.\n \nPervaiz Inayat Malik for Petitioners.\n \nSyed Shabbar Raza Rizvi, A.-G., Punjab assisted by Syed Muhammad Jalaluddin Khuled for Respondents.\n \nDate of hearing: 5th March, 2003.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2262 of 2003, heard on 5th March, 2003",
    "Judge Name:": "TASSADUQ HUSSAIN, JILANI MUJAHID, JJ",
    "": "Dr. AHMED JAVED KHAWAJA and anothers\nVs\nTHE STATE and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14145",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 616 = 2006 SLD 616 = 2006 PLD 108",
    "Key Words:": "Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)----------S. 11-EEE---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199--Constitutional petition---Detention challenged---Petitioner had already faced the agony of detention of ninety days and no fresh material or evidence was available with the police for his further detention for ninety days---Police Officer present in Court had admitted that no new criminal case had been registered against the petitioner, which had sufficiently proved that the petitioner had been further detained on the basis of the previously collected material which was not relevant for passing the impugned detention order---Representation filed by the petitioner had not so far been decided by the concerned Authority for the reasons best known to him---Provincial Secretary, Home Department in his parawise comments had expressed his view to justify the impugned order and the decision of the representation by him, therefore, would be a futile exercise---In absence of sufficient material or evidence, petitioner's further detention was not justified---Impugned detention order having been passed illegally and without lawful authority, petitioner could invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court and the same was quashed in circumstances---Constitutional petition was accepted accordingly.\n \nAbu Bakar Muhammad Reza v. Secretary to Government of Punjab, Home Department and 3 others PLD 2005 Lah. 370 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=11EEE,6,7\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=10,9\\n\\r\\n\\rPakistan Penal Code, 1860=34,302,465,471,109\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2285 of 2005, decided on 10th November, 2005",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR, J",
    "": "MULAZIM HUSSAIN SHAH\nvs\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Secretary, Home Department, Government of Punjab, Lahore and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14146",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1798 = 2015 SLD 1798 = 2015 PTD 999",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=18,19,27(3),32,156(1),Clauses(1)(104A),194-A\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Rules, 2001=351,359\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-647 of 2013, decided on 28th October, 2014. DATE of hearing: 24th September, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "CHAUDHARY MUHAMMAD TARIQ, CHAIRMAN AND KHALID MAHMOOD, MEMBER TECHNICAL-I",
    "": "Customs Appellate Tribunal \nKhalid Mahmood, Member TechnicalI, \nMessrs SHAIKH PIPE MILLS\nvs\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATIONII) and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14147",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2232 = 2014 SLD 2232 = 2014 PCRLJ 1512",
    "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)------S. 497(5)---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Penal Laws (Enforcement) Act (IX of 1974), S.25---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302, 341, 34, 109, 147, 148 & 149---Pakistan Arms Act (XX of 1965), S.13---Qatl-e-amd, wrongful restraint, common intention, abetment, rioting, common object, possessing unlicensed arms---Bail, cancellation of---Principles---No act of firing was attributed to accused and only his presence was shown at the place of occurrence---Although a .30 bore pistol was shown to have been recovered from accused, but crime empties recovered from the scene of occurrence, did not match with the pistol, recovered---Said recovery, at the bail stage, could not be considered as corroboratory piece of evidence---At bail stage only tentative assessment of the record i.e. F.I.R., statements of the witnesses recorded under S.161, Cr.P.C., the Medico-legal Report and defence plea, raised by accused, had to be considered---Deeper appreciation of evidence , was not permissible at the stage of bail---Supreme Court (AJ&K), normally would not interfere with the discretion exercised by the Shariat Court, unless the discretion was found capricious, against the settled norms governing the bail matter and against the record---Question of cancellation of bail, would not stand on the same pedestral as the rules governing the grant of bail, were different to the one applicable for cancellation of bail---Once the bail was granted by a court of competent jurisdiction, very strong reasons were required for its cancellation---Mere argument, without any record, that accused was tampering with the evidence, could not be believed, bail could not be cancelled on said ground---Order passed by the Shariat Court, having been passed in a legal manner, warranted no interference by the Supreme Court.\n \n Muhammad Faryad and another v. The State 1989 PCr.LJ 214; State v. Muhammad Bahram 1994 SCR 272; Aziz Bi v. Fazal Hussain and another 2007 SCR 138 and 1999 SCR 211(sic.) ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court (AJ&K)",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Revision Petition No. 5 of 2012, decided on 10th January, 2014. (On revision from the order of the Shariat Court dated 9-5-2012 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 422 of 2011). DATE of hearing: 10th February, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, C.J. AND CH. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM ZIA, J",
    "": "ZAFFAR MEHMOOD\nVs\nMUZAFFAR and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14148",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2233 = 2014 SLD 2233 = 2014 PCRLJ 1517",
    "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 489-F---Dishonestly issuing cheques---Appreciation of evidence---Retrospective effect of S.489-F, P.P.C.---Scope---Trial Court acquitted accused on the ground that provision of S.489-F, P.P.C. was not promulgated at the time of commission of offence---Validity---At the time of issuance of disputed cheques, law did not exist for taking cognizance in respect of issuance of negotiable instrument drawn dishonestly and to avoid liability but it existed at the time of availing remedy before the Court, that was why F.I.R. was registered under S.489-F, P.P.C., much after promulgation of law---Lis should be dealt with in accordance with law available at the time of accrual of right to sue in favour of a person---Although right to sue in favour of complainant existed on the date of issuance of cheques yet he did not set into motion the criminal machinery at that time, thus valuable right had accrued in favour of accused, of which he could not be deprived due to indolence of complainant---Trial Court keeping in view the fact that S.489-F, P.P.C. had no retrospective effect and was prospective in nature, did not commit any illegality nor order of acquittal was perverse or against canons of law, therefore, the same was maintained---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Haji Sardar Khalid Saleem v. Muhammad Ashraf and others 2006 SCMR 1192 ref.\n \n Colonial Sugar Mills 1905 Appeal Cases 369 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 1449 of 2011, decided on 19th June, 2013",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED MUHAMMAD KAZIM RAZA SHAMSI, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD YOUSAF\nVs\nMUHAMMAD YOUSAF and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14149",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2234 = 2014 SLD 2234 = 2014 PCRLJ 1519",
    "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)------Ss. 302, 364-A, 201 & 34---Qatl-e-amd, kidnapping or abducting a person under age of ten, causing disappearance of evidence and common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Prosecution witnesses had implicated both accused in the commission of alleged offence---Even real sister of one of accused persons had involved him in the commission of such a heinous offence---Circumstantial evidence had also supported the prosecution case---Ocular account of the complainant and his wife, was corroborated by prosecution witness who was their neighbour---All the witnesses were unanimous on the point that both accused had taken the abductee/child to market for purchasing certain items---Accused persons had made confessional statement which was recorded by Judicial Magistrate, defence did not put any question regarding any irregularity in the process of recording the confessional statement of accused---Said confessional statement appeared to be voluntary, which had corroborated the prosecution case---Prosecution having succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt, accused had rightly been convicted and sentenced---Impugned could not be interfered with by High Court, in circumstances.\n \n 1987 PCr.LJ 676; 1997 PCr.LJ 1; 1993 PCr.LJ 251; 2004 PCr.LJ 30; 1995 PCr.LJ 339; 2004 YLR 206; 2003 YLR 1327; PLD 1998 SC 21; 2002 PCr.LJ 1463; 2000 PCr.LJ 1786; 1973 SCMR 26; 1968 SCMR 18; 2003 YLR 1309; PLJ 1997 SC 352(sic.); PLD 2004 SC 663; PLJ 1870 SC 258(sic.) and 1973 SCMR 12 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Jail Appeals Nos. 248 of 2009 and 102 of 2010, decided on 31st January, 2013. DATE of hearing: 10th December, 2012",
    "Judge Name:": "AFTAB AHMED GORAR, J",
    "": "ALLAH DITTA and another\nVs\nThe STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14150",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2235 = 2014 SLD 2235 = 2014 PCRLJ 1526",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 497(5)---Bail, cancellation of---Principle---Bail once granted by competent Court of law should not be cancelled in ordinary course and there must be strong and exceptional reason for its cancellation---Bail can only be cancelled if bail granting order appears to be perverse and gross illegality has been done.\n \n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 497(5)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302---Qatl-e-amd---Bail, cancellation of---Abscondance of accused---Accused remained absconder till his co-accused was acquitted by Trial Court---Plea raised by complainant was that long standing abscondance for more than two years disentitled him from concession of bail---Validity---Prolong abscondance for more than two years disentitled accused to concession of bail---If accused sought bail on the ground of acquittal of co-accused then he must be treated alike with acquitted accused---Soon after arrest of acquitted accused, he remained behind the bars till the decision of his acquittal passed by Trial Court---Order of Trial Court releasing co-accused on bail amounted to encourage fugitives of law by giving them benefit for showing disrespect to law---High Court set aside bail granting order passed by Trial Court as the same was not correct and legal and had resulted in miscarriage of justice---Application was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Jan Muhammad v. The State and another 1978 SCMR 287; Akhtar Ali v. Azhar Ali Shah and others 1985 SCMR 1166; Atlas Khan v. Mazamullah Khan and another 1989 PCr.LJ 2044; Ibrahim v. Hayat Gul and others 1985 SCMR 382; PLD 1979 Pesh. 16; Awal Gul v. Zawar and others PLD 1985 SC 402; Shah Muhammad Khan and another v. The State 1991 PCr.LJ Pesh. 65; Muhammad Anees and another v. Abdul Qayyum alias Kalla Khan 2013 YLR 720; Muhammad Aslam Bajwa v. The State and others 2013 MLD 280; Khadim Hussain v. State 2013 PCr.LJ 938; The State v. Malik Mukhtar Ahmed Awan 1991 SCMR 322; Raja Zahoor Ahmed v. The State and 2 others 2005 PCr.LJ 1713 and Muhammad Iqbal v. The State and another 2003 MLD 669 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal M/BCA No. 460-A of 2013, decided on 22nd November, 2013",
    "Judge Name:": "MRS. IRSHAD QAISER, J",
    "": "BAZIR\nVs\nThe STATE and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14151",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 571 = 2006 SLD 571 = 2006 PLD 351",
    "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------S. 8---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts. 91 & 120---Suit for possession---Limitation---Execution of sale-deed in year 1972 in favour of defendant by \"\"B\"\" in capacity of plaintiff's attorney---Institution of suit in year 1984---Record failed to show that plaintiff had appointed \"\"B\"\" as his attorney---Effect---Where deed/instrument was found to be null and void, then Arts.91 or 120 of Limitation Act, 1908 would not apply---Such sale-deed was null and void---Plaintiff's suit could not be dismissed on ground of limitation for his being owner of suit land---Plaintiff was entitled to decree for possession.\n \nMst. Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum and others (PLD 1975 SC 624;Mst. Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum PLJ 1976 SC 44; Radhu Ram. v. Mohan Singh (AIR 1915 Lah. 200) Unni v. Kunchi Amma (1891) ILR 14 Mad. 26; Mt.Izhar Fatima Bibi v. Mt.Ansar Fatima Bibi AIR 1939 All. 348; Minalal Shadiram v. Kharsetji Jivajishet (1930) ILR 27 Bom. 560; Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh (1888) ILR 15 Cal. 58; Govindasamy Pillai v.Ramaswamy Pillai (1909) ILR 32 Mad. 72; Mohant Gyan Prakash Das v.Mt. Dukhan Kuar AIR 1938 Pat. 69; Sh. Ibrar Ahmad v. Mt. Kamni Begum AIR 1938 All. 451; Ramchandra Jivaji Kanago v. Laxam Shrini Vas Naik AIR 1945 PC 54; Malik Atta Ullah and another v. Malik Muhammad Akram Khan and others PLD 1956 (W.P.) Lah. 264; Shamshad Ali Shah and others v. Syed Hassan Shah and others PLD 1960 (W.P.) Lah. _300; Abdul Rehman v.Abdul Haq and others PLD 1960 (W.P.) Kar. 625; Mst. Izzat v. Allah Ditta PLD 1981 SC 165; Abdul Majeed and 6 others v. Muhammad Subhan and 2 others 1999 SCMR 1245 and Muhammad Akbar Shah v. Muhamamd Yusuf Shah and others PLD 1964 SC 329 rel.\n \nMuhammad Bashir v. Mst. Sattar Bibi and another PLD 1995 Lah. 321 and Bashir Ahmad v. Partab 1989 MLD 4314 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=35A\\n\\r\\n\\rLimitation Act, 1908=91,120,144\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=189\\n\\r\\n\\rContract Act, 1872=19,19A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Regular Second Appeal No. 81 of 1998, heard on 1st March, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "GHULAM MUHAMMAD through Legal Heirs\nvs\nABDUL REHMAN and 11 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14152",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 558 = 2006 SLD 558 = 2006 PLD 451",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n---S. 12(2) & O.VII, R.11---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Applicant had made out elements of fraud/representation under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. disclosing a cause of action could not be rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n---S. 12(2)---Dispute as to ownership of land---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. with an application for review/recall of order passed by the Court---Order sought to be reviewed was only interlocutory in nature---Such order would automatically stand vacated on decision of the main application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Judgment/decree which was declaratory in nature could not be put to execution, thus 'its suspension would not affect the decree-holder especially when he had claimed to be in possession of the suit-land.\n \n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XL, R.I & S.12(2)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.117---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Allegation of forgery/fraud---Application for appointment of Receiver---Requirements---Applications, one under Art.117, Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 and the other under O.XL, R.1, C.P.C. by the petitioners---Petitioners had to establish their case by producing evidence for appointment of Receiver and by fulfilling the pre-requisites of O.XL, R.1, C.P.C. likewise application praying to require the petitioner to prove his asserted forgery/fraud in associating/making his sister as one of the applicants by inscribing her fake signatures, vanished in view of direction already given by the Trial Court for her appearance in person and to clarify her impleadment or to refute the same---Course adopted by the Trial Court was just/fair and required no interference by the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction.\n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Lower Courts had not committed any illegality amenable to constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court and had decided all the applications by the parties strictly in accordance with the law applicable and the record---Lawful decision could not be substituted under the constitutional jurisdiction---Petition being devoid of any merit was dismissed---Contest in the case being between the real brothers/sister and being pending since the year 2000, High Court directed that in the interest of justice, case be concluded expeditiously within a period of 4 months even by undertaking day to day proceedings.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2),OrderVII,Rule11,OrderXL,Rule1,OrderI,Rule10\\n\\r\\n\\rQanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=117\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 14822 of 2004 and Writ Petition No. 11374 of 2005, decided on 22nd March, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD IQBAL\nvs\nMUHAMMAD SHOAIB and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14153",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 557 = 2006 SLD 557 = 2006 PLD 456",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VI, R.17---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Amendment of pleadings---Suit for declaration and perpetual injunction---Property in question was originally owned by the deceased on whose death the same devolved under Islamic law upon the plaintiffs and the defendants (parties to the suit)---As such the rights to the inheritance of the estate and to share ownership of the assets descended upon the parties because of the paramount title of their deceased propositus---Death extinguished the title of the deceased in their assets and simultaneously created the title of the parties to the suit therein---Flow of rights was from the same source though it streamed into multiple units on devolution as per the legal shares---Unity of title and possession in such a case, therefore, could not be questioned---Trial Court, in circumstances, exercised its jurisdiction properly to permit amendment in the plaint to incorporate the claim of the plaintiffs to separate possession to the extent of their 1/13th share in the property---Amendment so allowed neither changed the nature of the suit nor the complexion of the litigation between the parties which essentially arose from the same unity of title and the actionable cause.\n \nSyed Mohsin Rasa Bukhari and 4 others v. Syeda Azra Zenab Bukhari 1993 CLC 31 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=17 ofOrderVI\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 2281 of 2002, heard on 12th April, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "": "Mian MUHAMMAD SAEED\nvs\nMian ABDUL GHAFOOR and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14154",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFJ5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1801 = 2015 SLD 1801 = 2015 PTD 1058",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=13(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3367 of 2011, heard on 17th February, 2015. DATE of hearing: 17th February, 2015.",
    "Judge Name:": "AAMER FAROOQ, J",
    "": "Messrs BANNU WOOLLEN MILLS LTD.\nvs \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14155",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFJ5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 519 = 2008 SLD 519 = 2008 PLD 414",
    "Key Words:": "Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)---\n \n----S. 17(4)(b)(iii), proviso 3---Ejectment of tenant---Bona fide personal need of landlady---Landlady sought eviction of tenant from non-residential building on the ground of bona fide personal need---Rent Controller accepted the application and passed eviction order---Plea raised by tenant was that application was premature, landlady intended to increase rent and provisions of S.17(4)(b)(iii) proviso 3 of Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, were applicable---Validity---Building was let out to tenant for a period of three years with effect from 22-2-2002, which period was to expire on 21-3-2005 whereas ejectment application was filed on 24-7-2004---Period of agreement had expired during pendency of ejectment petition, which was decided on 15-5.2007 and as such objection of tenant had lost its efficacy---Proviso to S.17(4)(b)(iii) of Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, would apply only if building was let out expressly for such a purpose or which had been converted for such 'purpose with the' consent in writing of landlady---Agreement between the parties did not at all disclose that building was let out expressly for purpose of selling or printing books---Nothing was available on record to prove that the business was started with prior consent in writing of landlady---Landlady had established her bona fide personal requirement and allegation of mala fide with reference to desire for enhancement of rent was not proved---High Court declined to interfere with eviction order passed by Rent Controller---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963=17(4)(b)(iii)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 170 of 2007, heard on 19th May, 2008",
    "Judge Name:": "MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD, BASHARAT\nvs\nMrs. UZMA BHATTI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14156",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 508 = 2008 SLD 508 = 2008 PLD 470",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 497(2)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.22---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 395/412---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Case property, identification of---Farmas (stolen property) were never placed before complainant to ascertain its ownership and establish that recovered Farmas were stolen property---No evidence was available showing participation of accused in the alleged dacoity and that recovered Farmas were stolen property and that the Farmas were owned by complainant---Effect---Investigating Officer was legally required to mix Farmas in some others and had got those identified from complainant but such exercise was never undertaken and thus there was no evidence to establish that recovered Farmas were stolen property---Such was gross negligence on the part of Investigating Officer---High Court noted it with great concern that cases of Qatl-e-Amd, robbery and dacoity were being spoiled by adopting such mode and habitual dacoits or robbers were being let off---High Court further observed that it was a serious affair and senior officers of police department were keeping their eyes shut over such serious matters---Prosecution branch was also silent on such serious matter---Absence of such necessary evidence had put the case against accused within the domain of further inquiry---No reasonable grounds existed to believe that accused had committed offence under Ss. 395/412, P.P.C.---Bail was granted in circumstances.\n \n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---\n \n----Ss. 395 & 412---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22---Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act (III of 2006), Ss.10 & 12---Dacoity and dishonestly receiving property stolen in the commission of dacoity---Identification parade---Procedure of arrangements---Guidelines by High Court---Procedure for making arrangements for identification parade easier was prescribed by High Court for circulation to Prosecutor General, Advocate-General, Additional Inspector General of Police (Investigation) and all the Sessions Judges of the Province, who shall pursue the same and circulate it to all concerned and subordinate courts and offices for appropriate legal action and observance.\n \nFollowing are the guidelines prescribed by the High Court to make the arrangements of identification parade easier and to be sent to Prosecutor-General Punjab, Advocate-General Punjab, Addl. Inspector General of Police (Investigation) Punjab and all Sessions Judges of Punjab, who shall pursue the same and circulate it to all concerned and subordinate courts and offices for appropriate legal action and observe that:\n \n(i) In case of unknown assailant the arrested accused must be put to identification parade.\n \n(ii) Recovered articles must be got identified from the owners.\n \n(iii) Recording of baseless statement mentioning the complainant and eye-witnesses have come to know the names of assailants through reliable source should be avoided.\n \n(iv) The mature and well-versed Investigating Officers should be deputed to investigate the cases. In this respect the educated persons must be given preference.\n \n(v) The process of holding the identification parade in jail should be made easier and in this respect unnecessary hurdles should not be created in the ways of the Investigating Officers.\n \n(vi) The process of scrutinizing the challan should be reformed and cases of deficient evidence should not be forwarded to courts.\n \n(vii) Illegalities and irregularities committed by the Police Officials should be brought to the notice of higher Police Officials and strict departmental as well as criminal action under the relevant provisions of law shall be taken against them.\n \n(viii) The Prosecutor-General and Prosecutors are reminded their powers under sections 10/12 of the Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2006. It is expected that in future they shall make use of these powers effectively to cure above mentioned illegalities/irregularities.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Penal Code, 1860=395,412\\n\\r\\n\\rPunjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2006=10,12\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous No. 4232-B of 2008, decided on 4th June, 2008",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM QURESHI, J",
    "": "WALAYAT\nvs\nTHE STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14157",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFJ5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1799 = 2015 SLD 1799 = 2015 PTD 1074",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(3),33(5),34\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 1136/LB of 2014, decided on 17th September, 2014. DATE of hearing: 17th September, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs AZHAR CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD., FAISALABAD\nvs\nC.I.R.(A), FAISALABAD and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14158",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFJ5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2268 = 2014 SLD 2268 = 2014 PCRLJ 1733",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 516-A & 550--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Superdari---Vehicle suspected to be stolen seized by police---Superdari of vehicle---Tampered chassis and engine number--- Duplicate registration book--- Disputed vehicle did not have its original chassis number and even the engine number was different from the one mentioned in the duplicate registration book produced by the petitioner---Vehicle without specific identification could not be allowed to ply on the roads as the same could not be stamped to be of a particular owner---Such vehicles were a serious security threat, which could be used in criminal activities including smuggling of narcotics and bomb blasts---High Court observed that allowing such vehicles to be given on superdari on the basis of duplicate registration books of stolen or destroyed vehicles should be discouraged---Petitioner was rightly refused superdari of vehicle by courts below--- Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.\n \n 2005 SCMR 735 and 2002 YLR 699 distinguished.\n \n Ch. Maqbool Ahmed v. Customs, Federal Excise and Sales Tax, Appellate Tribunal and 3 others 2009 SCMR 226 rel.\n \n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----Ss. 516-A & 517---Superdari of vehicle---Scope---Last possessor of vehicle---Whether entitled to superdari as of right---Under S.516-A, Cr.P.C. court could pass nay appropriate order regarding the seized property as it thought proper---Last possessor could not claim superdari of the property as of right.\n \n Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Sargodha v. Ahmad Bakhsh PLD 1970 SC 343 and Republic Motors Ltd. v. M. Anwar and others 1980 SCMR 954 ref.\n \n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 516-A---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42---Ownership of vehicle--- Application for superdari--- Civil suit--- In case of failure of an alleged owner of a vehicle to establish his entitlement to superdari in cursory proceedings before the court concerned, he had a right under the relevant law to establish his ownership before the civil court, and if any such suit was filed, the civil court could pass a decree in favour of the actual owner of the property notwithstanding any observation made in the cursory proceedings of superdari.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 9894 of 2014, decided on 27th June, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ANWAARUL HAQ, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SAJJAD\nVs\nThe STATE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14159",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2269 = 2014 SLD 2269 = 2014 PCRLJ 1750",
    "Key Words:": "Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-------Ss. 25 & 27---Conviction of Investigating Officers---Principles of natural justice---Show-cause notice was not issued to the accused persons regarding omissions/commission in investigation---Under S.27 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 delinquent Investigating Officers could be convicted but principles of natural justice required that no one should be punished without giving opportunity of being heard and defended---Conviction of accused violated principles of natural justice enshrined in maxim \"\"audi alteram partem\"\" i.e. no one should be condemned unheard---Appeal was accepted and accused were acquitted.\n \n Chief Commissioner Karachi and another v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak PLD 1959 SC 45 and Mst. Abeda Begum v. Government of Pakistan and others NLR 1985 Civil 167 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 31-D of 2013, decided on 23rd April, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ROOH-UL-AMIN KHAN AND SYED AFSAR SHAH, JJ",
    "": "GHAZI MARJAN and another\nVs\nThe STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14160",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFJ5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 2270 = 2014 SLD 2270 = 2014 PCRLJ 1753",
    "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)------S. 365-B---Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage etc.---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Allegation of \"\"Ziaditi\"\", was not proved in any manner against accused---Victim, never stated that she was compelled during the alleged kidnapping period to marry against her wish with the accused---Prosecution had failed to bring the guilt of accused to hilt; and Trial Court was not justified in convicting accused, basing upon untrustworthy and uncorroborated evidence deposed by interested witnesses, which even otherwise was full of material contradictions---Unreliable story was deposed by the victim, and unexplained delay had taken place in lodging the crime report---Conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court against accused were set aside, extending him benefit of doubt, and he was acquitted of the charges against him and was directed to be released, in circumstances.\n \n Muhammad Shah v. The State 2010 SCMR 1009 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 255 of 2012, heard on 5th November, 2013",
    "Judge Name:": "SADAQAT ALI KHAN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD QASIM\nVs\nThe STATE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14161",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURFJ5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 494 = 2008 SLD 494 = 2008 PLD 568",
    "Key Words:": "Punjab Local Government Elections Rules, 2005---\n \n---Rr. 76 & 2(iv)(v), (xxi)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Declaring of election void---Essentials---Invalid nomination of a returned candidate is valid ground for declaring his election void---Phrase \"\"the other contesting candidates\"\" as referred to in R.76(2)(b), Punjab Local Government Election Rules, 2005 relates to those candidates who contested the election, but were not successful---Viewing the distinction between `candidates', `returned candidates' and `contesting candidates' within the meaning of R.2(iv)(v) and (xxi) of Punjab Local Government Election Rules, 2005, the scope of other contesting candidates cannot be extended too far in its purview of the `returned candidates', more so when the election has been declared and the provisions of law pertain to a matter, subsequent to declaration of result---System of joint candidacy has to be examined in its own spirit---Rejection of nomination of either of Nazim or of Naib Nazim as joint candidates, the nomination as a whole for both the candidates, shall stand rejected, so is the case of disqualification of one of them by the Election Tribunal in election petition, against the returned candidates---Invalid nomination of a candidate on the, nomination day, would not be validated by a subsequent change of the status from candidate to returned candidate---Joint candidates have to sail and sink together---Disqualification would be individual only, when there is a casual vacancy---Casual vacancy would not include vacancy, which becomes vacant as a result of decision of the Election Tribunal, due to disqualification of a candidate. \n \nHaji Alam Sher and another v. Malik Muhammad Nawaz and 6 others PLD 2003 Lah.12 and Mian Ahmad Saeed and others v. Election Tribunal for Kasur and 7 others 2003 SCMR 1611 fol.\n \nChaudhri Maqbool Ahmad and others v. Malik Falak Sher Farooqa Additional District Judge/Election Tribunal and others PLD 2003 Lah. 138; Naveed-ur-Rehman v. Election Tribunal and others 2004 CLC 626; Tahir Mahmood .and another v. Election Tribunal for Rawalpindi. and 6 others 2003 CLC 1381; Asim Butt and others v. Additional District Judge Ferozewala and others 2003 MLD 1168; Chaudhry Nazakat Ali and another v. Manzoor Hussain Malik and 10 others 2004 YLR 421 and Muhammad Hussain Haqqani and another v. Election Tribunal Gujranwala and 3 others 2007 YLR 1764 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Local Government Election Rules 2005=76(1),76(2)(b),76(1)(a)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 9073 of 2008, decided on 25th August, 2008",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J",
    "": "Rana TASSAWAR HUSSAIN\nvs\nMUHAMMAD AHMAD and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14162",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQVF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1800 = 2015 SLD 1800 = 2015 PTD 851 = 2015 PTCL 768",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=3,4,2(s),17,156(9)(90),179,185,185-A,185-B,185-C,185-F\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Criminal Revision No. 51-P with Criminal Miscellaneous No. 147-P of 2014 etc. DATE of hearing: 21st November, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "YAHYA AFRIDI",
    "": "MUZAMMIL HUSSAIN\nvs \nThe STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14163",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQVF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 2119 = 2013 SLD 2119 = 2013 PLD 565",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)---\n \n----S.4---Notification of acquisition---Object, scope and purpose---Notification under S.4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is issued to give notice to public at large that land subject matter of notification is required for public purpose and it further means that there is \"\"an impediment to anyone to encumber land acquired thereunder\"\"---Any encumbrance created after gazette notification is void against State.\n \n(b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)---\n \n----Ss.4, 5-A, 6 & 17---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Acquisition of land---Non-assailing by landowner---Notification of acquisition of land was issued on 28-9-1956 and landowner who was father of petitioner did not receive compensation nor filed any objection---Plea raised by authorities was that petition was suffering from laches---Validity---Issuance of notification showed that in absence of any objection on the part of owner, suit land stood vested in Provincial Government and compensation ascertained and deposited in government treasury became property of landowner---Predecessor-in-interest of petitioner did not challenge acquisition proceedings nor raised any objection against ascertainment of compensation---When landowner died, his estate was compensation money regarding acquired land and after his death his legal heirs only inherited deposited compensation money and not the land---In case the owner or interested person failed to raise objections or to challenge acquisition proceedings after issuance of gazette notification under S.4 read with Ss.17(1) and 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the acquisition proceedings regarding such person were generally neither quashed nor were vitiated regarding owner of land by any error of law---Once land was vested in State free from all encumbrances, it could not be divested and proceedings under Land Acquisition Act, 1894, would not lapse, even if award was not made within statutory stipulated period---Authorities had deposited compensation and right to receive the same was alive as authorities were not denying right of petitioner to receive compensation, hence no question of laches---High Court directed the authorities to pay compensation to petitioner along with 8% interest per annum---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Nadir Khan v. The State PLD 1992 FSC 392; Muhammad lqbal Khan v. Election Tribunal, Zila Council, Muzaffargarh and 5 others 1999 SCMR 1577; Messrs Pfizer Laboratories Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 64; Naeem Hussain Chatha v. Tawakkal Ullah and another 1997 CLC 192; Nazar-ul-Hussain v. The Collector Lahore PLD 1990 Lah.472; Kh. Zubair Ahmed and others v. Collector and others 1990 MLD 1941; Ouadrat Ullah v. Government of West Pakistan and others 1992 CLC 680; Taquer Ahmed Khan v. Government of Pakistan 1994 MLD 1866; Mst.Abida Aman-i-Rehman v. Government of N.-W.F.P. PLD 2012 Pesh. 172; Land Acquisition Officer and Collector v. Muhammad Jumman and others 2004 YLR 1123; Province of Sindh v. Ramzan and others PLD 2004 SC 512; Noor-u-Din v. Government of Pakistan and others 1997 CLC 1971; Rashid-A-Khan v. West Pakistan Railway Board and others PLD 1973 Lah. 733; Pacific Multinational (Pvt.) Limited v. Inspector General Police Sindh PLD 1992 Kar. 283; Zohra and others v. Government of Sindh and others PLD 1966 Kar. 1; Shauket and others v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1977 SC 342; Arif Builders and Developers v. Govenment of Pakistan PLD 1977 Kar.627 and Government of Punjab v. Madina Jute Mills 2010 CLC 812 ref.\n \n Government of A.P. and another v. Sayed Akbar AIR 2005 SC 492; Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman and others (1996) 6 SCC 424 and Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust AIR 1957 SC 344 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=4,5A,6,17,17(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 796 of 1992, decided on 22nd January, 2013. DATE of hearing: 19th December, 2012",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN, J",
    "": "Sardar DILDAR AHMAD CHEEMA \nVs \n through Member (Revenue) and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14164",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQVF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 2664 = 2003 SLD 2664 = (2003) 264 ITR 667",
    "Key Words:": "Section 7 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 - Valuation of assets - Assessing Officer made certain addition to total wealth of assessee by increasing annual rental value of property - Commissioner (Appeals) remanded back matter to Assessing Officer to revalue property after taking into account principles mentioned in Schedule III to Act - Whether Tribunal was right in not interfering with order of Commissioner (Appeals) - Held, yes\nR.V. Desai and P.S. Jetly for the Appellant. P.J. Pardiwala for the Respondent.",
    "Court Name:": "Bombay High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "WT APPEAL Nos. 239, 242 AND 244 OF 2001",
    "Judge Name:": "S.H. KAPADIA AND, J.P. DEVADHAR, JJ.",
    "": "Commissioner of INCOME TAX\nv.\nTraders (P.) Ltd."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14165",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUQVF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2014 396 = 2014 SLD 396 = 2015 PTD 1112 = 2014 PTCL 782",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,8,8(1)(a),11,11(2),13,14,15,16,23,25,25(3),30,34,36,33(5),36(1),36(3),45,45-B,59,70,74\\n\\r\\n\\rFinance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009=32,36,45,46\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.As. Nos. 96/PB, 98/PB of 2013 and 170/PB, 159/PB, 145/PB of 2011 and 8/PB of 2012, decided on 2nd June, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRPERSON AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Inland Revenue Appellate Tribunal \nMessrs PESHAWAR ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY, WAPDA HOUSE, PESHAWAR\nvs \nC.I.R., R.T.O., PESHAWAR"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14166",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1811 = 2015 SLD 1811 = 2015 PTD 911 = (2015) 113 TAX 229",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,147,170,170(3),170(4),171\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,23,24,199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 31284 of 2014, decided on 3rd February, 2015",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ UL AHSAN, J",
    "": "MCB BANK LTD\nVS\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14167",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFF5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1812 = 2015 SLD 1812 = 2015 PTD 919",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(5AC),3,4(c),6,8,8(1)(caa),11,22,23,26,33(5),34,46,73\\n\\r\\n\\rAppellate Tribunal Inland Revenue Rules, 2010=10\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "M.A. (AG) No. 43/LB and S.T.A. No. 482/LB of 2014, decided on 26th November, 2014. DATE of hearing: 23rd October, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIR AHMAD, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs NOON TEXTILE MILLS LTD., BHALWAL\nvs\nC.I.R., R.T.O., SARGODHA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14168",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFF5WT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1813 = 2015 SLD 1813 = 2015 PTD 925",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(33),3,6,10,22,23,33,34,33(4)(f),36,45A,47\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Special Sales Tax Application No. 82 of 2003, decided on 21st January, 2015. DATE of hearing: 26th November, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "NADEEM AKHTAR AND MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO, JJ",
    "": "ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR \nvs\nMessrs SILVER CORPORATION"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14169",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFF5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1814 = 2015 SLD 1814 = 2015 PTD 931",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),3,6,7,8,8A,11(2),14,22,23,25,26,38,45-B,45-B(2),45-B(3),46,73\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 1438/LB of 2014, decided on 1st December, 2014. DATE of hearing: 25th November, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD WASEEM CH., JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD MAJID QURESHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs NIGAR ENTERPRISES, CHAMAN CHAMBERS\nvs\nC.I.R. ZONEVI, R.T.O., Lahore"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14170",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1815 = 2015 SLD 1815 = 2015 PTD 944",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=16,32(1)(2),56(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rImports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=Preamble\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-25 of 2013, decided on 15th May, 2014. DATE of hearing: 7th May, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ADNAN AHMED, MEMBER (JUDICIAL-II) AND KHALID MAHMOOD, MEMBER (TECHNICAL-1)",
    "": "Messrs ALKHIDMAT FOUNDATION (PAKISTAN), Lahore\nvs\nADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMSIV"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14171",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFF5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1816 = 2015 SLD 1816 = 2015 PTD 948",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=29(s),16,18,32,32A,79,121,156\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Agents Licensing Rules, 2001=102(4),340,102(4) ofChapter-VIII\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-4471 of 2014, decided on 23rd December, 2014. DATE of hearing: 23rd December, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JJ",
    "": "Messrs DOCKS PRIVATE LIMITED through Authorize Manager\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Chairman and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14172",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFF5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1817 = 2015 SLD 1817 = 2015 PTD 954 = (2015) 110 TAX 313",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45-B,46,57\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "M.A. (Rect.) No. 51/KB of 2013 in S.T.A. No. 37/KB of 2011, decided on 17th September, 2014. DATE of hearing: 17th September, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL, MEMBER AND FAHEEMUL HAQ KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs PAKISTAN REFINERY LTD., KARACHI\nvs\nDCIR02, LTU, KARACHI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14173",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFF5RT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1818 = 2015 SLD 1818 = 2015 PTD 1165",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),11(3),(5),33,34,46\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 901/LB of 2014, decided on 17th September, 2014. DATE of hearing: 17th September, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs I.A. TEXTILES, MONTGOMERY BAZAR, FAISALABAD \nvs \nC.I.R. (APPEALS), R.T.O., FAISALABAD and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14174",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1819 = 2015 SLD 1819 = 2015 PTD 767",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,5\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 2859, 2860, 2953, 3954, 3086 and Criminal Original No. 395 of 2014, decided on 29th October, 2014. DATE of hearing: 13th October, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": ". NOOR-UL-HAQ N. QURESHI, J",
    "": "Messrs EMAN ENTERPRISES and others\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and Others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14175",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFF5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1820 = 2015 SLD 1820 = 2015 PTD 772",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122,122(1),122(2),122(4),120,133\\n\\r\\n\\rFinance Act, 2009=5(21)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "P.T.R. No. 284 of 2014 in I.T.As. Nos. 216 and 217/LB of 2013, decided on 24th November, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nvs\nMessrs GHAUSIA BUILDERS (PVT.) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14176",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFF5ND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1821 = 2015 SLD 1821 = 2015 PTD 779 = 2015 PTCL 787",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),7,11,33,36,46,73\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=4\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 487/LB of 2013, decided on 18th September, 2014. DATE of hearing: 18th September, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs ENGINEERS ASSOCIATED PRECAST (PVT.) LTD., Lahore\nvs.\nC.I.R., Zone-II, R.T.O., Lahore"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14177",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1822 = 2015 SLD 1822 = 2015 PTD 790 = 2015 PTCL 776",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=13,(3),(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199,10A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3024 of 2014, decided on 23rd June, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "ATHAR MINALLAH, J",
    "": "EUR-O DUTY FREE SHOP (PVT.) LTD. \nVs.\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14178",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1823 = 2015 SLD 1823 = 2015 PTD 796 = 2015 PTCL 756 = (2015) 111 TAX 133 = 2015 PLJ 1",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-----S. 47---Reference to High Court---Factual controversy---Determination---Factual determination is beyond the scope and jurisdiction vested in High Court under S. 47 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---Domain to determine and decide same rests with various rungs of adjudicating authorities culminating before Tribunal under Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n \n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)----Ss. 3 & 65---Sales Tax Rules, 2006, R. 4---Deduction of sales tax---Unregistered persons---Petitioners were coal suppliers to cement company and during scrutiny it was found that they failed to pay sales tax for the supplies made to the company---Demand of sales tax made by Assessing Officer was maintained by Commissioner (Appeals) and also by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue---Validity---All persons mentioned in R. 4 of Sales Tax Rules, 2006, making taxable supplies in furtherance of their business were liable to registration under Sales Tax Act, 1990, and were bound to pay sale tax in accordance with mandate provided therein---Petitioners could not be dislodged from their claim of not being liable to registration and thereby made to pay sales tax on supplies made to the company, as record was silent regarding the fact whether petitioners fell within the categories of persons liable to registration under R. 4 of Sales Tax Rules, 2006---Petitioners could not claim any benefit of the fact that company did not deduct sales tax under Sales Tax Special Procedure Withholding Rules, 2007---High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue as the same was correct on the questions of law it deliberated---High Court set aside the decision of the Tribunal to the extent that it did not decide whether petitioners fell within the categories of person liable to registration under R. 4 of Sales Tax Rules, 2006, and matter was remanded to the Tribunal for decision afresh---Reference was answered accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(25),2(41),3,3(1),47,65\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Rules, 2006=4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No.15-P of 2014, decided on 1st December, 2014. Date of hearing: 1st December, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "Before Yahya Afridi and Lal Jan Khattak, JJ",
    "": "Messrs KHAN AND CO. MANZ KALI, KOWAR MANG, BISHAM\nvs\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER-IR (AUDIT-IX), ZONE-III, R.T.O., PESHAWAR and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14179",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1824 = 2015 SLD 1824 = 2015 PTD 804",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(c),122(5),SecondSched:Part-I,Cl.126,126F\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 185/IB of 2013, decided on 4th September, 2013. DATE of hearing: 4th September, 2013.",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRPERSON AND MUHAMMAD MAJID QURESHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs WASEEM SHARIF INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD.\nvs \nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, ISLAMABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14180",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1825 = 2015 SLD 1825 = 2015 PTD 936",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131,132,132(3)(c),133\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Act, 1969=194\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Excise Act, 2005=34,2(3)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=46\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "FERA No. 1 of 2013, heard on 4th February, 2015. DATE of hearing: 4th February, 2015",
    "Judge Name:": "ATHAR MINALLAH AND AMER FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "Messrs WATEEN TELECOM LTD.\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14181",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1826 = 2015 SLD 1826 = 2015 PTD 963",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194-A,194-C,194-C(4)(a)(c),196,181\\n\\r\\n\\rImport Policy Order, 2013=Paras.9(ii)(5),10(vii)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Applications Nos. 88 to 102 of 2014, decided on 22nd December, 2014, DATE of hearing: 27th August, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JJ",
    "": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS. Through Additional Collector of Customs\nvs \nMesssrs EASTERN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14182",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1827 = 2015 SLD 1827 = 2015 PTD 995",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "l.T.R.A. No. 377 of 2010, decided on 19th August, 2014. DATE of hearing: 19th August, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAJFAR, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, KARACHI.\nVs\nMessrs EASTERN CARGO CENTRE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14183",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 614 = 2006 SLD 614 = 2006 PLD 121",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-------S. 5---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Revision---Provision of S.5, Limitation Act, 1908 does not apply to revision petitions filed beyond time.\n \nAllah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286 ref.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n---S. 115---Suo motu revisional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Courts below, in the present case, had fallen into material error while decreeing the declaratory suit and granting the permanent injunction and if such error in fact existed and was not rectified that would result -in grave miscarriage of justice---Suo motu revisional jurisdiction which was available to High Court must be exercised to ensure that the ends of justice were met---Failure to do so by the High Court would constitute abdication of the important supervisory function with which the High Court was invested---High Court, was to examine the matter in detail and, if material error in the exercise of jurisdiction by the Courts below was established to correct such error in exercise of its suo motu revisional jurisdiction.\n \nHaji Rehmdil v. The Province of Balochistan and another 1999 .SCMR 1060 ref\n \n(c) Administration of justice-\n \n----Adjournments, grant of---Decision in cases should not be delayed simply because a party chooses to assail an interlocutory order before a higher forum or as in the present case, has merely formed an intention of doing so---If adjournments, as a rule, are allowed in every case where counsel intends to impugn an interlocutory order, contentious matters would never be decided which state of affairs cannot be allowed---Postponing the hearing of case by the High Court, in such circumstances, will be binding precedent for subordinate Courts which, potentially, can bring their working to stand still---Delay in adjudication of cases especially when it is without reasons, would itself amount to denial of justice--Frequent adjournments without cause, result in harmful consequences---High Court desired that advocates individually, and their professional bodies collectively, recognize the harmful consequences of unjustified delays and do something to address the problem.\n \n(d) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)---\n \n----S. 45---Mutation entered on the basis of compromise entered in Court---Evedentiary value---Mutation does not create or extinguish any right or interest in the property specified therein---Mutation is merely a record of rights which have been acquired or extinguished by parties through other legally recognized means, prior to the sanctioning of a mutation-Right or interest of parties, in the present case, had come to vest because of the compromise and could be asserted by them regardless of the fact that the same was or was not entered in any mutation---Courts in circumstances would be misdirecting themselves by proceeding on the erroneous premise that mutation in the present case had resulted in the creation of rights in favour of the parties, in the disputed land.\n \n(e) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Arts. 79, 17 & 114---Mere attestation of a document by a marginal witness does not preclude such witness from denying his consent to the transaction incorporated in the documents---Where, however, evidence and circumstances show that the attesting witness was a close family members of a party to the document and was otherwise- aware of the nature and contents of the document, he is bound by the terms of such document to the extent of his rights and such marginal witness was estopped from taking the plea that he was not aware of the transaction incorporated in the document.\n \nTorabaz Khan an another v. Nanak Chand and another AIR 1932 Lah. 566; Feroz Khan and others v. Mst. Waziran Bibi 1987 SCMR 1647 and Pandurang Krishnaji v. M. Tukaram and others AIR 1922 PC 20 ref.\n \n(f) Registration Act (XVI of 1908)---\n \n----S. 17---Compromise---Registration--Document of compromise did not operate to transfer or extinguish title in any part of the land included in the disputed passage---Parties in the compromise did not intend to convey title in the land mentioned in the compromise---Compromise merely stipulated that the property of the parties shall be used as a common passage, which at most, resulted in the creation of an easement over the suit property of the parties in the form of a common right of way--No evidence was available on record to show that parties had put any monetary value to the easement mutually created by, them as incorporated in the document, though right of common use incorporated in the document could have economic value, but value of land in the disputed passage had no relevance and the value as per record did not exceed one hundred rupees---Title to land and the right to pass over it being two separate and distinct legal interests, such document, in circumstances, was not compulsorily registrable under S.17, Registration Act, 1908 and it will be an error to hold to the contrary.\n \n(g) Compromise---\n \n---Document of compromise stipulated that the portions of lands of the parties shall be used as a common passage which created an easement over the land in the form of a common right of way---Common passage was meant to be used jointly by the owners of the land, whether present or future and it was for this reason that the term ghair maalik was expressly used in the compromise by the parties with the object of excluding a ghair maalik from use of the common passage---Compromise implicitly mentioned that a maalik would be entitled to use the passage---One of the parties, by virtue of exchange deed, transferred the title of the land, including the area covered by the passage to some other person---Said other person therefore, had become an owner and could not be considered a ghair maalik and had succeeded the previous owner as a beneficiary to the compromise---Principles.\n \n(h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n---S.2(2)---Decree---Dismissal of suit itself constitutes a decree.\n \n(i) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n---Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Compromise---Common passage was carved out of the respective landholdings of three landowners whose land was included therein for their use and for the use of their successor-in-interest by a compromise---Such landowners, though were entitled to a declaration that legal title in the respective Khasra numbers, owned by them and covered by the passage, continued to vest in them, however, they were not entitled to a declaration that they were full and absolute owners of the said Khasra numbers because their title was encumbered by and was subject to the contractual easement embodied in the compromise deed.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1908=5\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=201\\n\\r\\n\\rRegistration Act, 1908=17\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 1389 of 2004, heard on 21st October, 2005",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J",
    "": "ILAM DIN\nvs\nHASSAN DIN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14184",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 550 = 2006 SLD 550 = 2006 PLD 494",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 115---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.12(2)(3)---Revision---Limitation---Principles---Judgment and decree, in the present case, was passed by the Addl. District Judge on 12-10-1998; application to obtain certified copies of the as well as the decree was made on 22-10-1998; the same were delivered on the same date i.e. 22-10-1998; civil revision was filed against the said and decree dated 12-10-1998 on 18-1-1999 which was beyond the period of limitation---Provision of 5.115, second proviso, C.P.C. was though parallel to the provisions of S.12(2)(3) Limitation Act, 1908 but was not in conflict therewith---Even if the provisions of 5.115, C.P.C. and those of S.12 Limitation, Act, 1908 were read as interwoven, no contradiction arose---Said provisions would only mean that excluding the period consumed in obtaining the certified copies of the decree and the upon which such decree was founded, the civil revision shall be filed within 90 days.\n \nSecond Proviso to subsection 1 of section 115, C.P.C. prescribes that \"\"such application shall be made within 90 days of the decision of the subordinate Courts.\"\" In the present case, the decision by the first appellate Court was made on 12-10-1998 which in fact was challenged through the civil revision on the purported ground of material irregularity committed by the first appellate Court by not accepting petitioner's appeal. The petitioners had filed their appeal against the and decree dated 16-5-1988 passed by the Trial Court. Appeal before the first appellate Court was within time which on consideration and hearing was dismissed by the first appellate Court through and decree dated 12-10-1998. The civil revision against the trial Court's and decree dated 16-5-1988 before High Court was not maintainable because the remedy of appeal was availed of by the petitioners. The civil revision was thus filed by the petitioners against the and decree dated 12-10-1998 of the first appellate Court.\n \nThe provisions of subsection 3 of section 12 of the Limitation Act also do not help the case of the petitioners. Without going into the question of applicability of the provisions of section 12 of the Limitation Act to the civil revisions, cumulative reading of subsections 2 & 3 of section 12 of the Limitation Act shows that the time requisite for obtaining the copy of a decree is excludable as well as the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy of the on which such decree is founded. Subsection 3 of course specifically prescribes that \"\"the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a from which it is founded shall be excluded.\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Petitioners interpret that the referred to in subsection 3 of section 12 of the Limitation Act does not relate to the upon which the decree appealed against or reviewed against or sought to be revised is founded upon but the same relates to the of the Court of first instance against which the appeal was filed and decided. Such interpretation will be defeating of the law of limitation; the object of which is to put a period cap for each available remedy. Subsection (2) talks of the decree appealed against etc. and subsection (3) obviously relates to the upon which such decree is founded. The provisions of subsection (3) cannot be stretched to include the or the decree against which the remedy of appeal was availed.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Furthermore, in the present case, the date of the application for the certified copies and that of the supply of the certified copies respectively of the decree and the were not different therefore excludable period under the provisions of said subsections (2) & (3) will be the same. Subject to the availability of the period of limitation, if separate applications on different dates had been made to obtain the certified copies of the decree and the and the copies thereto had been separately supplied on different dates, the petitioners could have claimed that minus the overlapping period, they were entitled to compute the limitation for civil revision from the later date.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "The application for obtaining a copy of the upon which it is founded, even if made separately, has to be filed within the period of limitation to avail the provisions of section 12(2) & (3) of the Limitation Act.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "This provision does not leave it to the option of a litigant or a petitioner to apply for and obtain a copy as and when he chooses and thus develop a case for the exclusion of time. He cannot be allowed the freedom to apply for and obtain the certified copies of the impugned decree or its on different dates outside the prescribed period of limitation only with the object to save the period of limitation. The petitioner has to restrict himself to the normal statutory requirements in keeping with the provisions of limitation prescribed to seek copies and the consequent exclusion.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "In the present case, the and decree was passed by the Addl. District Judge, on 12-10-1998. The application to obtain certified copies of the as well as the decree was made on 22-10-1998. The same were delivered on the same date i.e. 22-10-1998. The civil revision was filed against the said and decree dated 12-1-1998 on 18-1-1999 which was beyond the period of limitation.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Furthermore, the above referred second proviso to section 115, C.P.C. provides that the decision of the learned subordinate Court is to be availed within \"\"90 days of the decision of the subordinate Court\"\". This provision is though parallel to the provisions of subsections (2) & (3) of S.12 of Limitation Act, 1908 but is not in conflict therewith. Even if the provisions of section 115, C.P.C. and those of section 12 of the Limitation Act are read as interwoven, no contradiction arises. These provisions would only mean that excluding the period consumed in obtaining the certified copies of the decree and the upon which such decree is founded, the civil revision shall be filed within 90 days thereof.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Also that the first proviso to section 115, C.P.C. only requires furnishing of copies of the pleadings and the documents in the civil revision over and above the impugned order/decree/ of the subordinate Court to support the civil revision. This requirement of filing the support pleadings and the documents along with the civil revision cannot by any stretch reinforce the case of the petitioners and justify delayed filing of the civil revision on the pretext of supply of the certified copies of such documents after the prescribed period of limitation for the civil revision.",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Faizullah and others v. Rustam and others PLD 2003 Pesh. 217 ref.\"",
    "URL Link:": "Civil Revision No. 347 of 1999, heard on 24th March, 2006",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115,115(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rLimitation Act, 1908=12,12(3),12(2)\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J",
    "Court Name:": "Malik Noor Muhammad Awan for Petitioners. Naveed Shahryar Sheikh for Respondent. Muhammad Sharif Butt for Respondents Nos.12, 17, 46, 48 and 49",
    "Law and Sections:": "GHULAM HUSSAIN and anothers\nvs\nMUHAMMAD HANIF through Legal Heirs and others",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14185",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 549 = 2006 SLD 549 = 2006 PLD 500 = 2007 PLJ 860",
    "Key Words:": "Educational institution---\n \n----Examination---Candidate appeared in First Professional M.B.B.S. Part-I Examination 2003 but failed; she reappeared in the supplementary. Examination held in 2004 and qualified the examination; she took the First Professional M.B.,B.S. Part-II Annual Examination 2004 but remained unsuccessful; she again appeared in Supplementary Examination held in April, 2005 and Annual Examination in December, 2005 but could not qualify and thus exhausted all the three chances permissible under the rules---Contentions of the candidate were that the First Professional Examination M.B.,B.S. was split into two parts, Part-I and Part-II put together were to be considered as one class and candidate could avail the one chance not used by her in the First Professional M.B.,B.S. Part-I as she had qualified the same in two chances---Candidate further urged the prescribed forty day's time between the two examinations was not provided to her as such she could not properly prepare for the Supplementary Examination held in April, 2005---Validity---Held, relevant Regulations of the University revealed that the First Professional M.B.,B.S. comprised of two independent parts i.e. Part-I and Part-II and for each part three consecutive chances, availed or unavailed, had been provided for qualifying the same---Three chances were part specific and by no stretch of imagination could be carried forward---Language of the said Regulations was unambiguous and left no doubt that the left over chances of the First Part could not be carried over to the Part-II---Candidate had opted to avail the earliest opportunity for clearing the examination, therefore, she could not be allowed to have a volte face to say that she was not provided sufficient time---Right of the candidate to seek education was subject to Statutes/Regulations framed by the University to regulate the studies---If a student failed to clear the examination in the prescribed chances, he ceased to become eligible for further medical education.\n \nSadua Firdous v. Government of Punjab and others C.Ps. Nos.1448, 1459 and 1460-L of 2005 fol.\n \nAlaptagin v. Principal, Saidu Sharif Medical College, Swat and 3 others PLD 2004 Pesh. 307 distinguished\n \nW.P.No.688 of 2006; C.P.L.A. No.1992 of 2004; C. Ps. Nos.1448, 1459 and 1460-L of 2005; C.P. No.45 of 2006 and Muhammad Umar Wahid and others v. University of Health Sciences and others C.P.No.45 of 2006 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1105 of 2006, heard on 12th April, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR AND SYED SAKHI HUSSAIN BOKHARI, JJ",
    "": "ALAMARIA MASOOMA ZAINAB\nvs\nPRINCIPAL, ALAMA IQBAL MEDICAL COLLEGE and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14186",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 540 = 2006 SLD 540 = 2006 PLD 565 = 2007 PLJ 1109",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----S. 12---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell property---Case of the plaintiff was that defendants had initially executed agreements for the sale of suit property for a consideration of Rs.1,04,000 out of which a sum of Rs.75,000 had been received by defendants and possession was delivered and that pending suit it transpired that the suit property had been sold by defendants through a sale-deed---Controversy thus centred around as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to the decree of specific relief and legality of subsequent sale---Before entering into the transaction of subsequent sale, defendants had called upon the plaintiff through notices for payment of balance price and execution of the sale-deed but the plaintiff failed to respond---Held, though time may not be ordinarily of the essence of agreement, yet the owners could not be expected to hold the property and wait for the execution of sale-deed in favour of respective vendee indefinitely; he might be in genuine need of money and each day night have great value for him apart from the fact that there was continuous trend of appreciation in the value of immovable properties---Defendants were right in contending that it was the plaintiff himself who had failed to perform his part of the agreement and was not entitled to the grant of decree for specific performance---Burden of proof of subsequent sale of the property being bona fide was on the defendants who had in circumstances, sufficiently discharged the same and nothing in rebuttal was brought on the record---Subsequent buyer, in circumstances, was proved to have acted in good faith in purchasing the property.\n \nFit. Lt. (Retd.) Mumtaz Khan v. Mst. Amtul Batool 1984 CLC 3462; Iqbal Sultan v. Miss Chand Sultan and 2 others 1990 CLC 366; Muhammad Yasin v. Allah Din 1991 CLC 1457; Mst. Surraya Begum and others v. Mst.Suban Begum and others 1992 SCMR 652; Sher Muhammad v. Qutabu and others 2002 SCMR 1447; Province of Punjab through Collector, Faisalabad and another v. Rana Hakim Ali and another 2003 MLD 67; Sm. Parul Bala Ghosh v. Saroj Kumar Goswami and others AIR (35) 1948 Calcutta 147; Sint. Chand Rani by L.Rs. v.\n \nSmt. Kamal Rani by L.Rs. AIR 1993 SC 1742; Muhammad Ashraf v. All Zaman and others 1992 SCMR 1442; Messrs Pak United Housing Enterprise v. Ramzan and 7 others 1992 CLC 1678; Qazi Muhammad Bukhsh and 20 others v. Ghulam Sarwar and 13 others 2001 CLC 1526; Nadir Shah v. Lal Shah and another PLD 1954 Lah.447; Pathana v. Mst. Wasat and another PLD 1965 SC 134; Muhammad Amin and 5 others v. Muhammad Latif 1987 CLC 2358; Atta Rasool v. Fateh Khan and others 1995 CLC 1321. The Lahore Development Authority v. The Commissioner, Lahore Division and others 1984 SCMR 746 ref.\n \n(b) Registration Act (XVI of 1908)---\n \n----S. 47---Subsequent sale by vendor in a case where vendee of first agreement to sell had failed to discharge his part of agreement to sell---Held, by virtue of S.47, Registration Act, 1908, the date of execution of such a document would be the one on which it was signed by the parties and not the date of execution of subsequent agreement to sell.\n \nThe Lahore Development Authority v. The Commissioner, Lahore Division and others 1984 SCMR 746 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=35A\\n\\r\\n\\rRegistration Act, 1908=47\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "R.S.A. No. 112 of 1999, decided on 5th May, 2006. dates of hearing: 24th April and 5th May, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "MUNIR AHMED and 7 others\nvs\nBASHIR AHMED and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14187",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 539 = 2006 SLD 539 = 2006 PLD 571",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---\n \n----Arts. 79 & 17(2)---Specific Relief Act (1 of 1877), S.12---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell by second vendee of the same property against vendors and first vendee---Execution of document---Proof---Requirements---Plaintiff (Second vendee) was obliged to prove through examining the two attesting witnesses of the instrument and to provide independent proof as to whether amount of advance consideration was paid to the vendor through summoning the record of the bank, in which allegedly the transaction of such payment took place---Plaintiff had neither given any valid reason for non-examination of two witnesses nor provided the independent proof of making payment of advance amount as alleged---Contention of the plaintiff was that vendors, who were the executants of the agreement, had admitted the same and the payment thereof as well, thus it was not required to examine the other marginal witnesses; the summoning/production of the record/registers of the stamp vendor and the scribe, or the bank record for the purposes of proving the advance payment---Validity---Held, admission of co-defendant was not binding upon the others, one defendant in his written statement had disputed the genuineness of the said agreement and had imputed fraud and collusion between the second vendee and vendor, thus in such peculiar situation, it was incumbent upon the second vendee to have proved the agreement in accordance with the mandatory provision of Art.79, Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, besides having corroborated his assertions through the summoning and production of the record of the stamp vendor, the deed writer and the bank documents of the payment of advance transaction but all such requirements were conspicuously missing in the case---Key witness of the plaintiff (one of the vendors) had departed and deviated from the contents of the plaint and had stated that he had entered into the agreement to sell with the defendants, whereas this was not the case set out in the plaint by the plaintiff---Plaintiff; in circumstances, had not proved his case about the execution of the agreement as against the first vendee---However, vendors/defendants having admitted the said document and also the receipt of payment of the advance money, such admission was binding upon them, therefore, decree for the return of the amount of earnest money received by them from the plaintiff was rightly passed.\n \n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---\n \n---Ss. 73 & 74---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.54.---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.12 & 27(b)---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell property---Compensation for loss or damages caused by breach of agreement---Scope---No stipulation with regard to compensation was found in the alleged agreement to sell and plaintiff had failed to lead any evidence about the plea for claiming the compensation which he was bound to prove in terms of Ss.73 & 74, Contract Act, 1872---Effect---Contention of the plaintiff was that he was bona fide purchaser of the property---Held, according to the provisions of S.54, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 an agreement to sell would not create or purport to create any right or interest in an immovable property, except that it conferred upon a party the right to seek the specific enforcement thereof, but when the. plaintiff was not yet the owner of the property, no defence in terms of S.27(b), Specific Relief Act, 1877 could be set out---Plaintiff's claim that he was unaware of the agreement to sell between the first vendee was negated by one of the vendors, by appearing before the Court and deposing that only he had agreed to sell the land to the plaintiff which deal was finished verbally but he had not returned the advance money received from him---Said statement of the vendor had not been subjected to cross-examination by the plaintiff and was enough to show that the plaintiff had the knowledge of the earlier agreement to sell and therefore, it was his responsibility to have made inquiries to find out, about the fate of the earlier agreement to sell---Appeal of the plaintiff claiming compensation from breach of agreement, in circumstances, was dismissed by the High Court.\n \n(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---\n \n----S. 12---Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), S.29---Suit for, specific performance of agreement to sell joint property---Plea raised by one of the executants of the agreements was that when agreements to sell were executed he was minor, therefore such agreements were void---Admittedly said defendant was minor at the relevant time and agreement was entered on his behalf by his real mother; in the agreement, it was specifically stipulated that the mother shall obtain the guardianship certificate and the permission from the Guardian Court for the sale of the minor's share in the joint suit property before the target date; these documents had been produced by the defendants establishing that the mother applied for the permission from the Guardian Court and procured the permission in question---Contention of the plaintiff was that application to the Guardians Court for the permission under S.29, Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 was made pursuant to the agreement to sell and the agreement was mentioned in the application and the permission was accordingly sought and obtained on that account and that any sale agreement between the minor without first obtaining the permission from the Guardian Judge was void---Validity---Held, in the present case, it was not the minor, who had entered into the agreement himself, rather that was through his defecto guardian, the mother---Agreement to sell was not the sale agreement of an immovable property, but it was only a promise to do so in future---If the agreement had been made on behalf of the minor by a close relative, like the mother and prima facie was in the interest of the minor, as in the present case, because the other co-sharers were selling their shares, and it was not in the benefit of the minor to retain his share out of the joint Khata and there was a clear stipulation in the agreement that the permission shall be obtained from the Guardian Court before the sale was made, such agreement shall not be void or invalid, rather the same shall be an agreement, where the competency of the mother to enter into the transaction and enforceability thereof, shall be dependent upon the guardianship certificate and the permission of the Court, if it was granted, the agreement would become enforceable, but otherwise it shall have no legal value---Agreement, in the present case, clearly contained a stipulation about the permission of the Guardian Court, it was on account of said agreement by a specific reference, that the permission was obtained and granted by the Court, when the application was made by the mother wherein it was clearly mentioned that the sale was to the benefit of the minor and was meant to safeguard his interest---Plea propounded by the person who was minor at the time of execution of agreement to sell in circumstances, was void, had no force and was repelled by the High Court in appeal.\n \nGhulam Nabi v. Faisal Naveed and 2 others 2003 SCMR 1794 and Hazraf Khan v. N. Khalid Khan and others 1997 CLC 1765 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=OrderI,rule10\\n\\r\\n\\rContract Act, 1872=73,74\\n\\r\\n\\rTransfer of Property Act, 1882=54\\n\\r\\n\\rQanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=79,17(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos. 462 of 2004 and 31, 36, 61 and 62 of 2005, decided on 19th April, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR AND MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD RAMZAN\nvs\nSAIF NADEEM ELECTRO (PVT.) LTD. through Chairman and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14188",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 536 = 2006 SLD 536 = 2006 PLD 585",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----0. I, Rr.9 & 10, Ss.96 & 115---Appeal/revision---Non-impleading of necessary parties---Effect---Where the petitioners failed to advance any convincing explanation for not impleading necessary parties either in appeal or in revision, such a defect was fatal to the maintenance of appeal/revision.\n \nMuhammad Suleman v. Abdul Rashid and 13 others PLD 1987 Lah. 387 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "Civil Revisions Nos. 1841 and 2367 of 2005, decided on 18th May, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "SUBEH SADIQ\nvs\nMst. RAJAN through Legal Heirs"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14189",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 534 = 2006 SLD 534 = 2006 PLD 589",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XLVII, R.1-Review-Grievance of the applicants was that they received a notice from the High Court that appeal was listed for hearing on 11-6-1998 but when they approached the High Court on the said date, they discovered that the case had actually been heard on 10-6-1998 and thus they were condemned unheard---Validity---Record showed that the case in question appeared in the regular cause list for 11-6-1998 and was heard on the said date and on both the dates i.e. date of hearing (11-6-1998) and date of announcement of the (18-6-1998) the names of the counsel for the parties duly appeared therein---Date mentioned at the top of the i.e. 10-6-1998 as date of hearing of the appeal was merely a typographical error having crept in due to the oversight of the Court official which had no material bearing---Such an assumption that the appeal was heard on 10-6-1998 (which was not the date of hearing) stood belied by the record/entries duly maintained by the Court having sound credibility---Standing and legal efficacy of of High Court, a Court of record, could not be impaired on such assumptions---No advantage could, thus, be taken of such an error which stood corrected accordingly---Predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, in the present case, had been served and had the service of a counsel where his name had also appeared in the cause list---No ground for review of having been made out, application for review was dismissed.\n \nMst. Nigar Bibi and others v. Salahuddin Khan and others PLD 1990 SC 76 and Mst. Fehmida Khatoon v. Additional Deputy Commissioner (Consolidation), Lahore and another PLD 1975 Lah, 942 distinguished.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "R. A. No. 44 of 2000, decided on 11th May, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSIAN AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "Mst. KHURSHID BEGUM through Legal Heirs and others\nvs\nMUHAMMAD SADIQ and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14190",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2006 528 = 2006 SLD 528 = 2006 PLD 609",
    "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Arts. 193, 197 & 199---Appointment of Additional Judges of the High Court--\"\"Appointment\"\", \"\"promotion\"\" and \"\"elevation\"\"---Connotation---Marked distinction existed between `appointment' and 'promotion'-Articles 193 & 197 of the Constitution related to \"\"appointment of the High Court Judges\"\" and \"\"appointment of Additional Judges\"\" of the High Court respectively---Appointment of District and Sessions Judge as Judge of the High Court could not be called promotion---Seniority might be one of the factors while considering suitability and fitness for appointment---Term `elevation' was a misnomer sometimes used for the appointment of the Judge of High Court---Such expression was used to bestow respect and dignity because of the prestigious and exalted position of a Judge of superior Courts but it remained an appointment in the constitutional sense with all its manifestations.\n \nSupreme Court Bar Association through President and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2002 SC 939 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=193,197\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3930 of 2002,. decided on 22nd May, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN AND, JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, JJ",
    "": "WATAN PARTY through President, Lahore\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Law Secretary, Ministry of Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and 7 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14191",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2007 656 = 2007 SLD 656 = 2007 PLD 598 = 2007 PLC 912 = 2007 PLJ 995",
    "Key Words:": "Competitive Examination Regulations, 2004---\n \n----Reglns. 9 & 24---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Medical examination of candidate---Report of Central Medical Board showing petitioner overweight by 25 Kgs.---Public Service Commission declared petitioner unfit due to gaining weight and severe obesity---Validity---Nothing on record to show that overweight was a physical defect likely to interfere with discharge of duties of petitioner or whether or not such defect was likely to interfere with efficient performance of his duties---Nothing on record to show that such defect was remediable or not---High Court directed Board to examine petitioner and record its opinion in terms of Regln. No.24 of Competitive Examination Regulation, 2004. \n \n2003 PLC (C.S.) 1161 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Competitive Examination Regulations, 2004=9,24\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 18092 of 2005, heard on 25th May, 2007",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAYEED AKHTAR, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AJLAL KHAN\nvs\nDIRECTOR, PROGRAMME, CIVIL SERVICES ACADEMY, Lahore and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14192",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 602 = 2008 SLD 602 = 2008 PLD 10",
    "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 12(2)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 189, 190 & 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Judgment of Supreme Court---Finality---Allotment of evacuee property---Reopening of matter---Petitioner was not found entitled for allotment of house in question even by Supreme Court--Subsequently petitioner filed application under S.12(2), C.P.C. before Board of Revenue assailing allotment of the house in favour of respondent---Board of Revenue dismissed the application under S.12(2), C.P.C. on the ground that he was not eligible to file the same---Plea raised by petitioner was that fraud and misrepresentation was committed by respondent in getting allotment in his favour---Validity---Held, it was not possible even to assume for a moment that after dismissal of appeal and review. petition of petitioner by Supreme Court, any scope for re-agitation and reopening of the matter was left open---In the garb of application under S.12(2), C.P.C., petitioner once again launched another attack by abusing and misusing the process of law and of Courts---Import, object and purpose of Arts.189 and 190 of the Constitution could not be defeated by adopting such dubious means, nor it could be permitted to be done by High Court in Constitutional jurisdiction---Contention of petitioner as to alleged fraud/ misrepresentation by any other person had no legs to stand upon---Petitioner could not be allowed to drag others into litigation on flimsy allegations when he had lost his case repeatedly upto Supreme Court---On no discoverable principle or basis, any subordinate functionary could undo or stultify effect of of a superior court---Remedy provided by S.12(2) C.P.C. operated within its own folds as interpreted by superior courts---Executive and State functionaries were duty bound to carry out honour and respect the s of Supreme Court and not to find faults with the same or act as a stumbling block in implementing the same---High Court declined to interfere with the order passed by Board of Revenue dismissing application under S.12(2) C.P.C. filed by petitioner---Petition was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nPir Bakhsh represented by his Legal Heirs and others v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee and others PLD 1987 SC 145 and Abdul Ghafoor and thirty others v. The Rehabilitation Commissioner West Pakistan, Lahore PLD 1958 W.P. Lah. 48 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rEvacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975=2(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=189,190\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 41-R, 51, 75, 82, 83, 84 and 85 of 2007, heard on 23rd October, 2007",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "AMIR FAYAZ ALI KHAN\nvs\nMEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE JUDICIALI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14193",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 569 = 2008 SLD 569 = 2008 PLD 178",
    "Key Words:": "Punjab Local Government Elections Rules, 2005---\n \n--Rr. 35, 36, 75(d) & 78---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Expression \"\"declaring election as a whole to be void\"\"---Scope---Re-election at four polling stations---Jurisdiction of Election Tribunal--- Petitioners sought maximum votes but Election Tribunal declared re-polling at four polling stations out of total eight---Validity---Failure of any person to comply with provisions of Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001 and Rules thereto was sufficient under R.78 of Punjab Local Government Elections Rules, 2005, to declare election \"\"as a whole to be void\"\"---Rule 75(d) of Punjab Local Government Elections Rules, 2005 did not provide declaring such election void at one or two polling stations---To give power to Election Tribunal to declare election \"\"as a whole to be void\"\" meant election of whole constituency---Order passed by Election Tribunal was without lawful authority and of no legal effect hence set aside---Election as a whole to be void meant elections of the whole constituency to be void instead of one or two polling stations only---High Court directed the authorities to make arrangements for a fresh election of the whole constituency---Petition was allowed accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Local Government Election Rules, 2005=75,35(3)(5),36(6),76,77,78,75(d)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 7100 of 2007, heard on 29th January, 2008",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED SHABBAR RAZA RIZVI, J",
    "": "QAISER HAMEED and anothers\nvs\nIMTIAZ AHMAD KHAN and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14194",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1828 = 2015 SLD 1828 = 2015 PTD 1010",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25-B\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 2535 to 2538 of 2001 and 1780 to 1790 of 2002, decided on 14th January, 2015. DATE of hearing: 27th November, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, AMIR HANI MUSLIM AND EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "ALHAMZA SHIP BREAKING CO. and 14 others\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Revenue Division, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14195",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1829 = 2015 SLD 1829 = 2015 PTD 1050",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),11(2),25,38,46,72-B,73\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 1135/LB of 2013, decided on 15th September, 2014. DATE of hearing: 15th September, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND FIZA MUZAFFAR ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Ms. FLAME TREND \nVS \nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (APPEALIII), RTO, Lahore"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14196",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 521 = 2008 SLD 521 = 2008 PLD 405",
    "Key Words:": "Societies Registration Act (XXI of 1860)---\n \n----S. 16-A---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---Intra-Court Appeal---Maintainability---High Court disposed of constitutional petition filed by appellants with direction to approach relevant forum---Validity---If a remedy in form of appeal, review or revision was available under the law and despite such fact remedy was not availed before filing of constitutional petition, the Intra-Court Appeal would not be competent/maintainable against order of Single Judge of High Court---Since remedy under S.16-A of Societies Registration Act, 1860, was available to the appellants, their Intra Court Appeal against order of Single Judge of High Court was not competent---Intra-Court appeal was dismissed in circumstances. \n \nAllah Rakha Chaudhry v. President Officer Vth Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and 2 others 1999 PLC 128, Deputy Commissioner/Administrator, District Council Attock and another v. Lawrencepur Woollen Textile Mills Ltd. 1999 SCMR 1357 and Syed Arif Raza Rizvi v. Messrs Pakistan International Airlines through Chairman/MD PLD 2001 SC 182 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Societies Registration Act, 1860=16A\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=102\\n\\r\\n\\rLaw Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Intra-Court Appeal No. 133 of 2008, in Writ Petition No. 2514 of 2008, decided on 15th May, 2008",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUL SHAKOOR PARACHA AND HAFIZ TARIQ NASIM, JJ",
    "": "Ch. NAZIR AHMAD\nvs\nMoulvi MASOOD -URREHMAN KHAN and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14197",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 513 = 2008 SLD 513 = 2008 PLD 441",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 204---Issue of process---Extent and scope---Requisite conditions listed under S.204, Cr.P.C. are the presence of sufficient grounds and satisfaction of Court to be ascertained from the facts placed before it---Availability of some evidence on the record is not essential before summoning the accused---Section 204, Cr.P.C. provides for formation of \"\"opinion\"\" by Court taking cognizance of offence and availability of \"\"sufficient ground for proceeding\"\"---For recording conviction there must be evidence in support thereof, but no such evidence is required for issuance of process sand summoning of accused person---Expression \"\"sufficient grounds\"\" used in S.204, Cr.P.C. means/requires the presence of facts or evidence prima facie constituting an offence to enable the Court to issue process---When material is placed before the Court in the shape of complaint accompanied by tentative evidence recorded and the Court is satisfied with such material, the Court is vested with discretion o issue process. \n \nNazir Ahmad and others v. The State 1990 MLD 2084; M. S. Khawaja v. The State PLD 1965 SC 287 and Ghulam Muhammad v. The 'fate PLD 1967 SC 317 ref.\n \n(b) Words and phrases---\n \n----\"\"Prima facie case\"\"---Connotation---\"\"Prima facie case\"\" does not mean a case proved to the hilt, but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence led in support of the same is believed. \n \n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- \n \n----S. 203---Dismissal of complaint---Practice and procedure---Delay by itself in filing the complaint may not be fatal to reject the evidence in support thereof, which may otherwise be entitled to credence---No doubt, the longer a complaint is delayed the less becomes the chances of believing in its truth, more particularly when it is based entirely upon oral evidence, but the same has to be decided after recording the evidence of the parties and cannot be rejected straightaway---A complaint cannot be dismissed for the reason that it was filed because the police had delayed submission of challan and the complainant had made the improvements which are in conflict with the case registered earlier---Trial Court is not to comment upon the merits of the case till it has recorded entire evidence which the complainant wishes to produce---Dismissal of complainant in hasty manner is never approved. \n \nKhurshid Anwar v. The State and 3 others 1996 MLD 111 rel.\n \n(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 204---Issue of process---Accused found innocent in successive investigations---Summoning of---Accused found to be innocent by the Investigating Agency in successive investigation can be summoned by Trial Court in a complaint case after recording cursory evidence. \n \nMushtaq Ahmad v. Muhammad Saleem and 2 others 1995 PCr.LJ 1900 ref.\n \n(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----Ss. 204 & 561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302/324/148/149/337-F(iv)/34/109---Quashing of order---Issuance of process by Trial Court against the accused in the private complaint had been challenged on various grounds---Truth or falsehood of complaint in the preliminary inquiry was not to be adjudged at the initial stage and the same had to be adjudged on the basis of evidence subsequently led by the complainant in support of the complaint---Where complainant had approached the Court with a private complaint being dissatisfied with the conduct of the police, Trial Court was required to record the cursory evidence of the complainant and if satisfied it could issue process in the shape of summon or warrant requiring the accused to appear in the Court---Only prima facie case was required for taking cognizance under S.204, Cr.P.C. and Court was not expected to go into the details by conducting the preliminary trial---Impugned order had been passed by Trial Court after taking into account the statement of the complainant made by her in line with the complaint and the same did not warrant any interference---Petition was dismissed accordingly. \n \nNazir Ahmad and others v. The State 1990 MLD 2084; M.S. Khawaja v. The State PLD 1965 SC 287; Ghulam Muhammad v. The State PLD 1967 SC 317; Khurshid Anwar v. The State and 3 others 1996 MLD 111 and Mushtaq Ahmad v. Muhammad Saleem and 2 others 1995 PCr.LJ 1900 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Penal Code, 1860=302,324,148,149,337F(iv),34,109\\n\\r\\n\\rCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=202,265K,204\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous No. 214/M of 2007, decided on 28th May, 2008",
    "Judge Name:": "FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN, J",
    "": "IMTIAZ RUBBANI alias BILLU\nvs\nTHE STATE and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14198",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1830 = 2015 SLD 1830 = 2015 PTD 1068 = 2015 PCTLR 480",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=124(2),133\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "P.T.R. No. 501 of 2010, heard on 8th January, 2015, DATE of hearing: 8th January, 2015.",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nvs\nMessrs AZGARD NINE LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14199",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 502 = 2008 SLD 502 = 2008 PLD 516",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 540---Power to summon material witness or examine persons present---Nature and scope---Section 540, Cr.P.C. is divided into two parts---First part is discretionary in nature, whereas the second part is mandatory---First part provides discretionary power to Court to summon any person as a witness suo motu or on an application of any party---According to second part the powers to summon, examine or recall and re-examine any person as a witness, are to be exercised with due care and caution---Court cannot use these powers to advance the case of prosecution or the defence, rather these powers are only meant to advance the cause of justice---Solitary purpose of judicial proceedings in criminal cases is to find out the truth and to arrive at a correct conclusion and to see that no innocent persons is punished merely because of certain technical omissions on his part or on the part of the Court, if it appears essential to the Court that the evidence is necessary for just decision of the case---Under second part of S.540, Cr.P.C. it becomes obligatory for the Court to examine such a witness ignoring technical and formal objections---Trial Court has been vested with the jurisdiction to re-examine any witness and the only requirement for re-examining the witness is that his examination should be essential for the just decision of the case, but at the same time it is also a settled principle of law that no witness should be summoned or re-examined merely to, fill in the lacuna by the prosecution or the defence. \n \nSaifullah v. The State 1994 PCr.LJ 1499 and Syed Hassan Abbas Rizvi v. The State 1993 PCr.LJ 1630 rel.\n \n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 540---Re-examination of witness---Purpose---Re-examination of a witness can be for the purpose of removing indistinctness in his testimony or to rectify an obvious mistake of omission or commission, or for any reasons which will be, ex facie, useful for arriving at a just decision in the matter---For this the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court for exercising power in its favour shall satisfy the Court about the existence of lacuna or of the circumstances, which palpably justify such action---Mere quoting the words of S.540, Cr.P.C. in the application is not enough for exercising such powers. \n \nSyed Hassan Abbas Rizvi v. The State 1993 PCr.LJ 1630 ref.\n \n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 540---Examination of witness---Intent and import---Whole stress on power for examining any person as a Court witness, whether already examined or not, is that his evidence should appear to be essential for the just decision of the case---Exercise of power under S.540, Cr.P.C. is a matter of discretion which has to be exercised judicially and on sound material keeping in view all aspects of the case---Said discretion is not to be exercised to favour one or the other party---Power can be exercised to know about something which is not present on the record already due to the failure of either party or due to the reasons beyond the control of any of the parties, or on account of something which has come to light during the trial---While exercising the powers under S.540, Cr.P.C. court has to see as to how materially the bringing on record of such evidence will help for coming to a just decision---Said power cannot be exercised as a matter of rule and if used in a routine manner it would tantamount to opening floodgates where parties may start re-examining their witnesses to fill in lacunas in their evidence. \n \nRashid Ahmad v. Ibrahim and another 1996 PCr.LJ 143\"\"9; Khalid Nawaz and another v. The State 1995 PCr.LJ 1932; Abbas and another v. The State 2003 PCr. Li 624 and Tanveer Shahzad v. The State 2003 PCr.LJ 751 rel.\n \n(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n---S. 540---Re-examination of witness---Principles---Witness can be recalled for re-examination in exceptional and special circumstances, where the interest of justice so demands. \n \n(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n---S. 540---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302---Recalling of Doctor for further cross-examination---Application of complainant for resummoning the doctor for his cross-examination had been allowed by Trial Court vide impugned order---Validity---During his cross-examination Doctor did not give a conclusive statement that the five injuries on the person of the deceased were indeed, the result of one fire---Trial Court had watched the interest of the prosecution by putting a Court question to the doctor, who in reply had categorically stated that he had not mentioned the track of the bullet in the post-mortem report-Doctor who obviously was not an eye-witness of the occurrence just on the basis of his professional expertise had refused to rule out the possibility of receipt of all the injuries by the deceased with one bullet---Case, of course, would be decided by Trial Court after considering the whole evidence including ocular testimony, the post-mortem report, the pictorial diagram made thereon, the examination-in-chief of the Doctor, his cross-examination and his answer to the Court's question---Controversial opinion of the Doctor would not be considered by the Trial Court at the relevant time in isolation---Doctor had already made a detailed statement during his examination and cross-examination, and his re-examination would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law and wastage of time---Besides, if such practice was allowed,, no criminal trial would come to an end, because during criminal trials medical experts often make such like statements when cross-examined---Moreover, counsel for the complainant had failed to demonstrate that re-examination of the said witness was required to clarify any point---Trial Court had committed an illegality while accepting the application filed by the complainant---Impugned order was set aside and revision petition was accepted accordingly. \n \nZulfiqar Ali v. Fiaz Bhatti and 6 others 2001 MLD 307; Saifullah. v. The State 1994 PCr.LJ 1499; Syed Hassan Abbas Rizvi v. The State 1993 PCr.LJ 1630; Rashid Ahmad v. Ibrahim and another 1996 PCr.LJ 1439; Khalid Nawaz and another v. The State 1995 PCr.LJ 1932; Abbas and another v. The State 2003 PCr. LJ 624 and Tanveer Shahzad v. The State 2003 PCr.LJ 751 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=540\\n\\r\\n\\rQanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=133\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Criminal Revision No. 193 of 2008, heard on 23rd June, 2008",
    "Judge Name:": "HASNAT AHMAD KHAN, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD BASHIR alias SHANI\nvs\nADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE (II), PATTOKI, DISTRICT KASUR and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14200",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 500 = 2008 SLD 500 = 2008 PLD 533",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---\n \n----S. 363---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.497, Second and Third provisos [as inserted by Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance (XIII of 2006)] & 561-A---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Quashing of F.I.R.---Woman accused---Bailable offences---Refusal of bail---Father of minor prosecuting mother of minor---Molding of relief---Converting bail petition into constitutional petition read with one under S.56-A, Cr.P.C.---Complainant was father of minor children and after divorce, custody of minors was handed over by their mother to the complainant in lieu of dowry articles and maintenance allowance---Later on the ex-wife of complainant along with her parents and other relatives rernoved minor children from custody of complainant, against which F.I.R. was registered---Lower Appellate Court dismissed bail of accused (ex-mother-in-law of complainant) on the ground that punishment for the offence was seven years and the minor children were removed in violation of the decree passed by Family Court---Validity---All offences against women excepting terrorism, financial corruption and murder punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years were bailable-On the day of promulgation of Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2006, the Second and Third provisos to S.497, Cr.P.C. had overriding effect on all laws in force---Offence with which accused stood charged was punishable upto seven years rigorous imprisonment only and under Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2006, all offences against women accused were bailable excepting murder, terrorism and financial corruption---Accused woman made a request for bail before Lower Appellate Court in bailable offence punishable with 7 years of imprisonment and was, therefore, entitled to bail as a right---Mere fact that at one time mother of minors herself passed on custody of her minor children to her ex-husband in lieu of dowry articles and maintenance allowance would not make her liable for the charge of kidnapping punishable under S.363 P..P.C.---High Court converted bail petition into petition under Art.199 of the Constitution, read with S.561-A, Cr.P.C.---Local police could not and should not be allowed to proceed with the investigation of the F.I.R. registered under S.363 P.P.C., as it would amount to abuse of process of law---High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. and under Art.199 of the Constitution, quashed the F.I.R.---High Court directed the authorities to release all the accused if in custody---Petition was allowed in circumstances. \n \n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S.497, Second and Third provisos [as inserted by Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance (XIII of 2006)]---Bailable offences---Object---Legislature regarded liberty of the woman accused as a precious asset to be preserved by the court of law by rendering all offence against the woman as bailable excepting terrorism, murder and financial corruption. \n \n(c) Islamic law---\n \n----Custody of minor---Scope---Sunni law---Dual control of minor children by father and mother has been recognized under Islamic law---Father is a legal and natural guardian of minor, whereas right of Hizanat (custody of minor) vests in the mother of minor---Mother, under the Sunni law, is entitled to custody of male child until he has completed age of seven years and of her female child until she has attained puberty---Such right of Hizanat (custody of minor) of mother continues though she is divorced by the father of minor children. \n \n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---\n \n----S. 361---\"\"Lawful guardian\"\"---Connotation---Prosecution against father or mother of minor---Words \"\"lawful guardian\"\" in S.361 P.P.C. are used in wider sense including any person lawfully interested with the care or custody of the minor---Principle of dual guardianship of minor is by itself not repugnant to Islamic law or law of the land---Under such conception, guardianship of father does not cease while minor is in custody of mother and there is nothing in law to prevent mother to agitate her right of Hizanant (custody of minor) when minor is with father---Father and mother cannot prosecute each other on the charge of kidnapping of their own minor children. \n \n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---\n \n----S. 363---Kidnapping by mother of her own minor children---Family dispute---Role of police---Scope---Father of minor children alleged that his ex-wife had kidnapped their minor children---Police had registered F.I.R. under S. 363 P.P.C. against mother of minor children---Validity---Criminal court or police station were not the competent and proper forums for resolution of any dispute between parents of minor arising out of matrimonial life particularly touching Hizant and custody of minors---No offence whatever including that of kidnapping was made out---Local police unauthorizedly and without any legal or factual justification interfered into a pure family dispute touching custody of minors between their parents---Police official to whom complainant approached for registration of a case against mother of minors on the charge of kidnapping, was under legal obligation to refer him to Guardian Court for determination of dispute of custody---Local Police encroached upon the functions and powers of Guardian Court and such was misconduct which must be deprecated.\n \nBashir Ahmad v. The State 1971 PCr.LJ 252 and Ahmad Nawaz and 3 others v. The State PLD 1968 Lah. 97 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=491,561A,497, Schedule-II\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rGuardians and Wards Act, 1890=25\\n\\r\\n\\rPakistan Penal Code, 1860=363,361\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous No. 4443 of 2008, heard on 1st July, 2008",
    "Judge Name:": "KAZIM ALI MALIK, J",
    "": "KAUSAR PARVEEN\nvs\nTHE STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14201",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUSFJ5Yz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 1831 = 2015 SLD 1831 = 2015 PTD 1078",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(25),21(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Rules, 2001=11\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 1232/LB of 2012, decided on 28th October, 2014. DATE of hearing 23rd October, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD ASIF, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs NEXTEK SERVICES, Lahore\nVs\nC.I.R, R.T.O., Lahore"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14202",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtURlNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2013 91 = 2013 SLD 91 = 2013 PLD 282 = 2013 PTD 1030 = (2014) 109 TAX 57",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance (XXXVI of 1971)---Ss. 4, 2(i), 6 & 11B---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 73, 78, 77 & 199---Constitutional petition---Money Bill---Scope---\"\"Tax\"\" and \"\"Fee\"\", distinction---Contributions made to the Workers' Welfare Fund by industrial undertakings were in the nature of a \"\"fee\"\" and not \"\"tax\"\"---Petitioners impugned amendments made in S. 4 of the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 whereby quantum of industrial contributions to the Workers' Welfare Fund was enhanced---Contention of the petitioners was that under the prescribed scope of Money Bill under Art.73 of the Constitution, provisions of the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 fell beyond the scope of Federal Finance Legislation, and such contributions had the character of a \"\"fee\"\" and not of a \"\"tax; and the impugned amendments were therefore ultra vires the Constitution---Validity---\"\"Tax\"\" was a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes, whereas \"\"fee\"\" was a quid pro quo, and a recompense for services rendered---Contributions to the Fund were made by industrial undertakings, and the beneficiaries of the disbursements from the Workers' Welfare Fund were workers of such undertakings and therefore, such contributions lacked a direct quid pro quo which was considered a classic feature of a fee however still such contributions did contain a collateral recompense in which the contributor-employer's workers were the beneficiaries of disbursements from the Fund---Distinction between a tax and the fee lay primarily in the fact that a tax was levied a part of a common burden, while a fee was a payment for a special benefit or privilege---Tax was levied to raise funds for meeting the \"\"necessary expenses\"\" of the State, therefore, a tax was not co-related to services rendered or special benefit or privilege conferred on the taxpayer and accordingly the taxpayer was sharing/discharging his obligation under a common burden without being a beneficiary of a corresponding benefit, whereas in contrast, a fee was not part of the common burden but was payment made in lieu of a benefit, service or privilege by the payer of such fee---Workers Welfare Fund could not be applied for general requirements of the State and contributions made to it had a specified and restricted purpose and therefore the Fund was not part of a common burden and lacked such essential attribute of a \"\"tax\"\"---Workers' Welfare Fund was body corporate under S.11B of the Ordinance, and contributions made to it did not form part of the general revenues of the Federal Government as envisaged in Art.78(1) of the Constitution---Workers' Welfare Fund did not form part of the Federal Consolidated Fund as it had an independent statutory existence and for the same reason it did not get credited to the Public Account of the Federation---Under Art.73(2) of the Constitution, a financial charge that neither fell within the ambit of the Federal Consolidated Fund or the Public Account of the Federation, could not fall within the scope of a \"\"Money Bill\"\"---High Court observed that neither the Workers' Welfare Fund nor contributions made thereto bore the attributes of a \"\"tax\"\" nor fell within ambit of the Art.73 of the Constitution in order to be levied, modified or enhanced by a Money Bill as had happened in the present case---Impugned amendments to the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 were ultra vires the Constitution and the competence of the Parliament and were accordingly set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.\n \n East Pakistan Chrome Tannesry (Pvt). Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2011 PTD 2643; Collector of Customs and others v. Sheikh Spinning Mills 1999 SCMR 1402; Sheikh Muhammad Ismail and Co. Ltd. v. The Chief Cotton Inspector, Multan PLD 1966 SC 388 and Mathews v. Chicory Marketing Board 60 CLR 263 rel.\n \n Messrs Saif Textile Mills Limited v. Pakistan through Secretary PLD 1998 Pesh. 15 distinguished.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Arts. 73, 77 & 78---Fiscal legislation---Money Bill---Interpretation and Scope---\"\"Tax\"\" and \"\"Fee\"\", distinction---\"\"Tax\"\" was a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public purposes, whereas a \"\"fee\"\" was a quid pro quo, and a recompense for services rendered---Distinction between a tax and the fee lay primarily in the fact that a tax was levied as a part of a common burden, while a fee was a payment for a special benefit or privilege---\"\"Tax\"\" was levied to raise funds for meeting the \"\"necessary expenses\"\" of the State, therefore, a \"\"tax\"\" was not co-related to services rendered or special benefit or privilege conferred on the taxpayer and accordingly the taxpayer was sharing/discharging his obligation under a common burden without being a beneficiary of a corresponding benefit, whereas in contrast, a fee was not part of the common burden but was payment made in lieu of a benefit, service or privilege by the payer of such fee---Under Art.73(2) of the Constitution, a financial charge that neither fell within the ambit of the Federal Consolidated Fund or the Public Account of the Federation, could not fall within the scope of a \"\"Money Bill\"",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "",
    "URL Link:": "",
    "Citation or Reference:": "",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "Collector of Customs and others v. Sheikh Spinning Mills 1999 SCMR 1402 rel.\"",
    "URL Link:": "Writ Petitions Nos. 23393, 23394 of 2009, 27165, 27166 of 2010, 136, 3662, 11988, 15224 of 2011 and 98 of 2012, decided on 21st May, 2012.",
    "Citation or Reference:": "Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971=4,2(i),6,11B\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=73,78,77,199,73(2),78(1)\\n\\r",
    "Key Words:": "UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J",
    "Court Name:": "Dr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem assisted by Munir-uz-Zaman and Wasif Majeed for Petitioners. Imtiaz Rasheed Siddiqui assisted by Messrs Sehriyar Kasuri and Asif-ur-Rehman for Petitioners in connected petitions. Muhammad Arshad and Muhammad Waseem Ch. for Petitioners in connected petitions. Muhammad Naseem Kashmiri, D.A.G. Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi for Respondents Nos. 3 to 7. Nemo for Respondent No. 8",
    "Law and Sections:": "Messrs AZGARD NINE LTD.\nVs\nPAKISTAN through Secretary and others",
    "Case #": "",
    "Judge Name:": "",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14203",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUS1J5OD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 828 = 2015 SLD 828 = (2015) 112 TAX 1 = 2015 PTD 2059",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(c),21(h),21(n),22(13)(a),122(5A),Clause(8)Second Schedule\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1334/LB/2014 (Tax Year 2012) and I.T.A. No. 76/LB/2014 (Tax Year 2011), decided on 10-12-2014. I.T.A. No. 1148/LB/2014 (Tax Year 2012)",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI CHAIRMAN AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "C.I.R, ZONEVIII, R.T.O., Lahore\nVS\nMS. HAIER PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14204",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtUS1NDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2624 = 2008 SLD 2624 = (2008) 98 TAX 267 = (2007) 289 ITR 266",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Punjab and Haryana High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "",
    "Case #": "ITR No. 56 OF 1988, APRIL 26, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND RAJESH BINDAL, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of INCOME TAX\nvs\nOswal Woollen Mills Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14205",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtmQ1F5ST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 169 = 2015 SLD 169 = 2015 PTD 434 = (2014) 109 TAX 127",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.122(5A), 111, 148, 153(1) & 168(3)---Amendment of assessment--Limitation---Tax year 2007---Difference in closing stock and opening stock was added back as income from other sources and adjustment of tax deducted under Ss.148 & 153(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was treated as not allowable under S.168(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Taxpayer contended that in term of subsection (2) of S.122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, amendment could be made till 20-9-2012 within five years as the return was filed for the tax year 2007 as on 29-9-2007---Taxation Officer rejected the plea of the taxpayer for the reason that subsection (2) of S.122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was amended through Finance Act, 2009 and the assessment could not be amended after 29-9-2012---Validity---Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was inserted by the Finance Act 2009 and being substantive in nature was applicable to tax year 2010 and onward and not to tax year 2007---Limitation was to be reckoned from the date of filing of return or issuance of assessment order under S.120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 by the Commissioner---Taxpayer had filed return on 29-9-2007 from which, it emanated that deemed assessment order was passed on 29-9-2007 and it could be reopened under S.122(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 by 28-9-2012 i.e. within five years from the date of filing of return or issuance of deemed assessment order; whereas the Taxation Officer had passed the amended order on 17-1-2013 which was hit by limitation and was liable to cancellation---Tax deducted under Ss.148(1) & 153(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was final liability under S.169(2)(e) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---No credit of the said deduction should be allowed if in future taxpayer claimed any refund with respect of the said deduction as it fell under the Presumptive Tax Regime---Departmental appeal was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal.\n \n 1963 PTD 33 SC ref.\n \n 2013 PTD (Trib.) 1169 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A),111,148,153(1),168(3),122(4),122(2),169(2)(e),148(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 113(PB) of 2013, decided on 29th August, 2013. DATE of hearing: 8th July, 2013",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD PERVEZ ALAM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND, JAVID IQBAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14206",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtmTFNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2625 = 2008 SLD 2625 = (2008) 97 TAX 262 = (2007) 290 ITR 562",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Madhya Pradesh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=4,256(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "ITR No. 184 OF 1997, FEBRUARY 6, 2007",
    "Judge Name:": "DIPAK MISRA AND S.C. SINHO, JJ",
    "": "Eastern Air Products (P.) Ltd\nvs\nCommissioner of INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14207",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtiQVF5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 2626 = 2008 SLD 2626 = (2008) 97 TAX 251 = (2007) 290 ITR 359",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=132\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "WRIT PETITION (C) Nos. 13236 AND 15824 OF 2006, JANUARY 19, 2007",
    "Judge Name:": "VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND DR. S. MURALIDHAR, JJ",
    "": "S.K. Industries (P.) Ltd\nvs\nDirector GENERAL of Income Tax (Inv.)"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14208",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtiQlJpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2000 660 = 2000 SLD 660 = 2000 PLD 20 = 1999 NLR 176",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes--\n \n---- Determination of real field of legislation within which subject-matter of the statute lay --- Principles --- Where Constitution distributes such powers between Federal and Provincial Law-making bodies, an Act enacted by any such body should be examined to ascertain its \"\"pith and substances or its true nature and character for the purposes of determining the real field of legislation within which subject-matter of the Act lay.\n \nSubrahmanyan's case 1940 FCR 188; Atiqa Begum's case AIR 1941 FC 16; Muhammad Yousaf's case PLD 1956 FC 395; Prafullah Kumar Mukher Jee's case AIR 1947 PC 60; Alberta's case AIR 1939 FC 53; Pir Rashid-ud-­Daula's case PLD 1971 SC 401; Province of East Pakistan and others v. Siraj­ul-Haque Patwari and others PLD 1996 SC 854; AIR 1991 Pat. 40 and Understanding Statutes by S.M. Zafar rel.\n \n1989 PTD 488; (1992) 65 Tax 315; Interpretation of Statutes by Bindra 8th Edn., 897; Interpretation of Taxation Statue by D.B. Mettan, p.95; AIR 1~5 PC 98; AIR 1930 SC 173; PLD 1966 Lah. 718; 1994 SCMR 712 and PLD 1992 Pesh. 191 ref.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes-\n \n---- Determination as to whether Act was enacted in accordance with the provisions of Constitution or not --- Principles stated.\n \nFor examining the Act or to see whether it was within the competence of the Legislature that had enacted it or whether it was ultra vires. It was necessary to examine its pith and substance.\n \nIn deciding whether particular Act was ultra vires the Legislature, the Court had to record true nature and character of the legislation to ascertain the class of subject to which it really belonged. The fact that an Act of provincial Legislature may, in some respect, trench upon a Federal subject was not the deciding factor.\n \nPLD 1960 Lah. 407; AIR 1949 All. 513; AIR 1939 Mad. 361; PLD 1961 SC 176; PLD 1977 Kar. 524; PLD 1960 Lah..407, AIR 1949 All. 513; PLD 1953 PC 51; 1975 AJ&K 69; (AIR 1940 All. 272); PLD 1988 Lah. 725; PLD 1971 SC 811; PLD 1982 Kar. 470; PLD 1980 Dhaka LR 201; PLD 1980 Quetta 58; AIR 1946 Nag. 81; PLD- 1958 Pesh. 73; AIR 1942 Lah. 243; 1983 CLC 2923; PLD 1986 PCr.LJ 2994; PLD 1969 Lah. 209; PLD 1958 Lah. 985; PLD 1957 Kar. 320; 1999 SCMR 526 and PLD 1958 SC 499 ref.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-\n \n---- Art. 199---Constitutional petition --- Power of High Court to take notice of events subsequent to the filing of Constitutional petition --- Scope---High Court. can take notice of events subsequent to the filing of Constitutional petition.\n \nPLD 1974 SC 228; PLD 1990 SC 1013,and 1990 CLC 1069 rel.\n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-\n \n---- Art. 4 --- Finance Act (XXII of 1997), Preamble --- Legislation of laws having retrospective effect --- Power of Legislature --- Provision of Art. 4 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973), does not control the power of Legislature to frame laws having retrospective effect --- Only-express limit imposed upon the power of such legislation is that the Legislature cannot make retrospective penal laws, meaning thereby that any other law including taxation law may, therefore, be made with retrospective effect under the Constitution.\n \n1993 SCMR 1905; PLD 1991 SC 546; PLD 1969 SC 623; AIR 1990 SC 1637, AIR 1970 SC 169; AIR 1969 SC 59 and PLD 1969 SC 599 rel.\n \nPLD 1992 Lah. 462; PLD 1993 SC 341; AIR 1961 SC 293; AIR 1989 SC 665; AIR 1968 SC 353 and AIR 1983 SC 130 ref.\n \n(e) Punjab Finance Act (IX of 1997)---\n \n----S. 7---Impostion of tax on luxury vehicles---Validity---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Reasonable classification--­Applicability ---Contention of petitioners was that mentioning of engine capacity in Punjab Finance Act, 1997 was unreasonable classification and same was not permissible under Art.18 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---Contention raised by petitioners was repelled holding that such reasonable classification was permissible.\n \nPLD 1976 SC 57; PLD 1976 SC 713 PLD 1975 SC 506 and AIR 1990 SC 1637 rel.\n \nPLD 1993 SC 341; PLD 1992 SC 563 and 1991 CLC 13 ref.\n \n(f) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n--Colourable legislation, doctrine of---Bona fides or mala fides on the part of Legislature---Determination---Doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any of mala fides or bona tides where the Legislature was competent to pass a particular law, motives which impelled the Legislature to frame the law was irrelevant\n \nAIR 1964 Madh. Pra. 118 and AIR 1953 SC 375 ref.\n \n(g) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Arts. 141, 142 & 199---Constitutional petition---Federal and Provincial Laws---Legislation---Extent---Overlapping of two legislative fields---Judicial review by High Court---Scope---Where legislative powers were distributed between the two legislative bodies and such legislative fields overlapped, High Court could ascertain to what degree and to what extent, the authority to deal with matters falling within such classes of subjects existed in each Legislature, and to define the limits of respective powers---To prevent any conflict between the two provisions, both the provisions be read together and the language of one interpreted and modified by that of the other.\n \nAIR 1990 SC 1367; AIR 1966 SC 1571; AIR 1954 SC 375; AIR 1966\nSC 416; AIR 1957 SC 297; AIR 1977 SC 2279; AIR 1959 SC 308; AIR 1960 \nSC 796; AIR 1962 SC 458; PLD 1983 SC 453 and AIR 1992 SC 580 ref.\n \n(h) Interpretation of statutes--\n \n----Legislation---Limits of Legislature---Duty of Court---Court must presume that the Legislature knows its limits and legislates for those who are actually within its jurisdiction coupled with the principle that the enactment should be interpreted which will make such enactment operative and not inoperative.\n \nAIR 1959 SC 1102 and AIR 1963 SC 853 rel.\n \n(i) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n--Debates of members of the Legislature --- Relevance --- Where debates made at the time when the law was being enacted were available, the Courts could refer to such debates while interpreting that statute --- Where, however, the language of the enactment was clear, such debates were hardly relevant.\n \nPLD 1957 Dhaka 342 ref.,\n \n(j) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)-\n \n---- Preamble, Part 111, Chap. 2 (Arts. 50 to 100] & Part IV, Chap. 2 (Arts 106 to 128] --- Principle of morality---Fundamental duty and obligation of the Legislatures to frame the laws for the welfare of the public --- Principle of morality is of the considerations to see the validity of any Act.\n \nPLD 1993 SC 473 ref.\n \n(k) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--\n \n---- Art. 142(c)---Residuary power of Provincial Legislature --- Scope --- Where any Act was not covered specifically by either of the two lists, then it was the prerogative of the Provincial Legislature to frame the law by virtue of Art. 142(c) of the Constitution being residuary power of Provincial Legislature.\n \n(l) Punjab Finance Act (IX of 1997)--\n \n---- S. 7---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 142(c) --- Imposing tax on luxury vehicles by Provincial Legislature --- Validity --- Imposing of such tax was covered under Item 33, of the Concurrent Legislative List and not in -Item No.50 of the, Federal Legislative List of the Constitution --- Imposition of such tax was the prerogative of the Provincial Legislature.\n \nInterpretation of Statutes by Bindra 8th Edn., p.907, Monogram 15; AIR 1939 PC 53,; AIR 1962 SC 137; AIR 1953 SC 375; 1989 PTD 488; PLD 1983 SC 457; Fauji Foundation's case PLD 1995 SC 66; Sabir Shah's case PLD 1977 SC 11; Zulfiqar Ali's case 1998 SCMR 1156; PLD 1995 SC 432; PLD, 1997 SC 582 and PLD 1977 SC 426 ref.\n \n(m) Punjab Finance Act (IX or 1997)--\n \nS. 7 --- Wealth Tax Act (XV of 1963), S.14-D --- Conflicts between two statutes --- Effect --- Punjab Finance Act, 1997, did not fall in Item No.50 of the 4th Sched of Federal Legislative List of the Constitution --- No inconsistency between S. 14-D of Wealth Tax Act, 1963 and S. 7 of Punjab Finance Act, 1997 existed and provisions of both the statutes could co-exist.\n \nPLD 1995 Lah. 56 rel.\n \n(n) Punjab Finance Act (IX of 1997)-\n \n---Ss. 5 & 7 --- Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199 --- Constitutional petition --- Imposition of one time tax. on luxury vehicles --- Rules framed for imposition of such tax vide Notification dated 23-4-1998 --- Validity --- Rules framed-by Government for recovery of such tax did not provide guidelines--­Rules having not been properly framed to achieve the purpose of Punjab Finance Act, 1997 were, thus, ultra vires --- Constitutional petition was disposed of in the light of the statement made by the Advocate-General clarifying the taxation structure.\n \nPLD 1964-SC 718; PLD 1997 Lah 617; PLD 1988 SC 146; PLD 1966 SC 388; AIR 1981 SC 1824; AIR 1982 SC 149; 1998 CLC 187; PLD 1958 SC 4 1; PLD 1964 SC 673; PLD 1966. Dhaka 472; PLD 1967 SC 554; 1998 CLC 745; AIR 1969 SC 197; AIR 1968 SC 353; AIR 1983 SC 130; 1993 SCMR 1905; PLD 1997 SC 80; PLD 1992 Kar. 470; 1993 SCMR 1905; PLD 1964 Kar. 399; AIR 1980 SC 27 1; AIR 1980 SC 1042; AIR 1978 SC 264, Interpretation of Law, 7th Edn., p.387; PLD 1997 SC 582 and 1986 SCMR 1917 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Wealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=14D\\n\\r\\n\\r=7\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=142(c),Preamble,Part111,Chap.2(Arts,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100,PartIV\\n\\r\\n\\rFinance Act, 1997=Preamble,5,7\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2036, of 1998, decided on 16th April, 1999. dates of hearing: 9th October; 3rd, 20th, 27th and 30th November, 2nd, 91h, 10th, l7th December, 1998; 26th January, 9th February and 10th Match, 1999",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J",
    "": "Messrs SYED BHAIS (PVT.) LTD. Through Company Secretary\nvs\nGOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, EXCISE AND TAXATION DEPARTMENT through Secretary and anothers"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14209",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtiR1F5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2000 616 = 2000 SLD 616 = 2000 PLD 489 = 2000 NLR 519",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--\n \n----Art. 199---Martial Law Order (Zone B) No.86, dated 29-5-1961--­Societies Registration Act (XXI of 1860), S.13---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---College was given under the management and control of Board of Governors constituted under the statutes framed under Martial Law Order (Zone B) No.86, which Order was protected by the Constitution---Status of such statutes, therefore, partook the character of statutory instruments/statutory rules and were to be enforced in the like manner---College, a society, was dissolved and the old statutes were replaced with that of the fresh ones under Martial Law Orders (Zone B) No.86---Such change was brought about as a matter of fact with certain powers and control of the Government which were previously not vested in the Council running the college as a society, nor were available as such under the old statutes--- Very promulgation of said statutory instruments whereby the Board of Governors was set up which had taken over the control and management of the College, was enough to conclude that the control of the college was taken over by the Government---Held, society/college was being managed and governed under the statutes framed in pursuance of a Martial Law Order (Zone B) No.86, which were of legislative nature, guarantees as extended to the employees of every other corporation would also be applicable and -extended to the employees, the students as also the employer vis-à-vis the College and the Principal---Cause, if any, would be justiciable by the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973).\n \nMubjeeb-ur-kehman Shami v. Principal, Aitchison College, Lahore 1994 CLC 342 distinguished.\n \nMuhammad Afzal v. The Commissioner, Lahore Division and the Estate Officer, Lahore Improvement Trust' PLD 1963 SC 401; Gulab Din v. Major A. T. Shaukat and others PLD 1961 (W.P) Lah. 952; Allah Bakhsh v. District Magistrate, Jhang, and 2 others PLD 1978 Lah, 765; Mujeeb-ur­ Rehman Shami v. Principal, Aitchison College, Lahore and 2 others 1994 CLC 342; Black's Law Dictionary; The Deputy Managing Director, National Bank of Pakistan, Principal Office, Jinnah Avenue, Dacca and others v. Ataul Huq PLD 1965 SC 201; The University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmed PLD 1965 SC 90; Salahuddin and 2 others v,. Frontier Sugar Mills & Distillery Ltd., Tokhat Bhai and 10 others PLD 1975 SC 244; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib AIR 1981 SC 487; Humayun\\ ' Khan v, Messrs Ghee Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. and 2 others PLD 1'984 Lah. 35; Muhammad Nazir Khan v. Dr. Muba®har Hasan and others PLD 1974 Lah. 49; Aftab Ahmad Warsi v. Punjab Road Transport Corporation 1991 PLC (C.S.) 484; Huffaz Seamless Pipe Industries Ltd. v. SW Northern Gas Pipelines Limited and others 1988 CLC 1890; Miss Misbah Masood v. Principal, Government College for Women 1997 MLD 239.7; Riaz-ul-Haq v. Selection Committee Constituted for Admission to Bolan Medical College through Secretary, Principal, Bolan Medical College, Quetta and 6 others 1997 SCMR 1845; Abdul Sattar v. Government of Sindh through the Secretary, Karachi and another PLD 1978 Kar. 59; Muhammad Farrukh Fayyaz v. Aitchison College, Lahore and another 1997 MLD 928; Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India and others AIR 1975 SC 1329;. Shamsher Khan & Co v. Karachi Water and Sewerage Board and another 1988 CLC 1891; Muhammad Rafique Tarar v. Justice Mukhtar Ahmad Junejo, The Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan and 6 others PLD 1998 Lah. 461 ref.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--\n \n----Art. 199(5)--Expression \"\"person\"\" occurring in Art. 199(5) of the Constitution---Connotation---College being governed by the Board of Governors and dominative control of said Board, being that of the Provincial Government, fell within the definition of word \"\"person\"\" used in Art.199(5) of the. Constitution and thus, amenable to the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court--[Muhammad Farrukh Fayyaz v. Aitchison College, Lahore and another 1997 MLD 298 overruled].\n \nMuhammad Farrukh Fayyaz v. Aitchison College, Lahore and another 1997 MLD 298 overruled.\n \nSabhajit. Tweary v. Union of India and others AIR 1975 SC 1329 and Shamsher Khan & Co. v. Karachi Water and Sewerage Board and another 1'988 CLC 1891 distinguished.\n \nMubjeeb-ur-Rehman Shami v. Principal, Aitchison College, Lahore 1994 CLC 342; Black's Law Dictionary; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib AIR 1981 SC 487; Muhammad Farrukh Fayyaz v. Aitchison College, Lahore and another 1997 MLD 298; Muhammad Rafique Tarar v. Justice Mukhtar Ahmad Junejo, The Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan and 6 others PLD 1998 Lah. 461; Salahuddin and 2 others v. Fronteir Sugar Mills and 10 others PLD 1975 SC 244 and Messrs Huffaz Seamless Piple Industries Ltd. v. Sui Northern Gas Piplelines Ltd. and others 1998 CLC 1890 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199,199(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rSocieties Registration Act, 1860=13\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 15063 of 1998, decided on 12th May, 2000. dates of hearing: 2Qth and 24th January, 2000",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN ALLAH NAWAZ, AMIR ALAM KHAN AND KARAMAT NAZIR BHANDARI, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ZUBAIR AKRAM\nvs\nAITCHISON COLLEGE, Lahore"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14210",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtiSFJ5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2003 3256 = 2003 SLD 3256 = 2003 PLD 1 = (2003) 87 TAX 232",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Arts. 193 & 203-A---Appointment of non-Muslim as Judge of High Court---Validity---No bar on a person to be appointed as Judge of High Court, if he fulfils qualifications mentioned in Art. 193 of the Constitution--­No specific bar mentioned in Art. 193 of the Constitution preventing a non-­Muslim from becoming a Judge of High Court---Non-Muslim cannot be a Judge of Federal Shariat Court as Art.203-A of the Constitution specifically mentions the Muslim Judges---Where Legislature wanted or framers of Constitution desired that a particular office should be held by a Muslim, they have clearly said so---Where such was not the intention, then there is no mention that the incumbent had to be a Muslim---While deciding a dispute requiring interpretation of Shariah, necessary for a Qazi to be not only well­-versed in the knowledge of Islam, but he should also have full faith in the religion---Question of a Muslim or non-Muslim Judge would be relevant in cases requiring interpretation of Shariah or laws governing Muslims--­Federal Shariat Court has been constituted under Constitution for such type of cases---Legislature in its wisdom has clearly separated the type of Judges, who would be sitting as Judge of High Court and Supreme Court and those, who would be sitting as Judge of Shariat Court---Constitution has emphasised the word \"\"Muslim Judge\"\" for Shariat Court, but has retained the word \"\"Judge\"\" for High Court and Supreme Court. \n \nZaheeruddin v. State 1993 SCMR 1718; Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 324; Hakim Khan's case PLD 1992 SC 595; Haider Iqbal Wahnimal v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan Constitutional Petition No. D-2110 of 1997; PLD 1996 SC 423; Allah Dad v. Mukhtiar and others 1992 SCMR 1273; Munir Ahmad v. Additional District Judge, Kasur PLD 2001 Lah. 149; Haji Rana Muhammad Shabbir Ahmad Khan v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2001 SC 18; Sardar Sultan Ahmad Khan v. Government of Punjab 2001 MLD 1013; Encyclopaedia-II and Encyclopaedia-IV on Fiqh Hazrat Umar (r.a.) and Fiqh Hazrat Ali (r.a.) written by Dr. Muhammad Rawas Qilaji, Professor, University of Natural Resources and Petroleum, Zahran University, Saudi Arab, issued by Idara-e­-Maarif Islami, Mansoora, Lahore, Jama Tirmizi Sharif, Vol. No. 1, written by Maulana Badiuzzaman (r.a); Badaul Senai authored by Allama Abu Bakar Alauddin Alkasani (r.a) and Fatawa-e-Alamgiri, written by Allama Maulana Syed Amir Ali (late) (r.a) ref.\n \n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n---S. 136---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 193 & 199---Constitutional petition---Appeals before High Court, dismissal of---Petitioners did not challenge such order before Supreme Court, but filed Constitutional petition raising objection as to constitution of Bench of High Court on the ground chat one of its Judge being non-Muslim was not qualified to be a Judge of High Court---Validity---Petitioners, if wanted, could have objected to constitution of Bench before proceeding with appeals, but not after their appeals were dismissed. \n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n----Arts. 199 & 2A---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope--­Objectives Resolution---High Court has no jurisdiction to test any law or statute or provision of law on the yardstick of Objectives Resolution. \n \nSharaf Faridi and 3 others v. The Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1989 Kar. 404 and Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada v. Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and 87 others PLD 1990 Kar. 9 fol.\n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)---\n \n---Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---High Court has no authority or power to pass a restraining order against a Judge of Supreme Court.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=2A,193,203A,199\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=136\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-412 of 1998 and D-1069 of 1999, decided on 26th August, 2002. DATE of hearing: 10th December, 2001",
    "Judge Name:": "ZAHID KURBAN ALVI, SHABBIR AHMED AND GHULAM RABBANI, JJ",
    "": "M. SHAFI MUHAMMADI and others\nVs\nISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14211",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtiRVJpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1964 188 = 1964 SLD 188 = (1964) 9 TAX 350 = 1964 PTD 529 = 1964 PLD 377 = 1964 SCC 182",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -- Section 26A -- Registration -- Partnership -- Verbal agreement between two adult partners to form partnership -- Instrument of partnership evidencing that agreement executed subsequently -- Minors admitted by mutual consent to the benefits of partnership -- Factum of contract between adult partners and admission of minors embodied in the same document -- Partnership, whether valid in law -- Held yes -- Written document, whether essential to the validity of partnership -- Held no -- Registration of firm -- Minors admitted to benefits of partnership -- Fact stated in instrument of partnership itself executed between two adult partners -- Firm, held, lawfully registerable -- Verbal consensus between would-be partners always precedes execution of written instrument --Such instrument, in fact, not essential to validity of partnership -- Agreement of partnership may be given retrospective effect -- Partnership Act (IX of 1932), section 30 provides no legal bar to admission of minors to benefits of partnership -- Admissions of minors to benefits of partnership does not render constitution of firm itself invalid -- Section 26A only requires two conditions to be satisfied:\n(1) that firm has been constituted under an instrument of partnership, and (2) that instrument specifies shares of partners --",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=26A,66(1),68(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rPartnership Act, 1932=30\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 29-D of 1963, decided on 10-3-1964",
    "Judge Name:": "A.R. CORNELIUS CHIEF, JUSTICE, S.A. RAHMAN, JUSTICE, FAZLE AKBAR, JUSTICE, B.Z. KAIKAUS, JUSTICE AND HAMOODUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE.",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF Income Tax EAST PAKISTAN, DACCA \nvs\nAMIN MATCH WORKERS, DACCA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14212",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtiS1NDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 1965 191 = 1965 SLD 191 = (1965) 11 TAX 128 = 1965 PTD 120",
    "Key Words:": "Income-tax Act, 1922 -Sections 2(15), 18A(a), 18A(1), 30, 46(1) -- Appeal -Forum of appeal -Penalty -Advance-tax levied on the basis of total income of latest preceding year exceeding Rs. 2 lakhs -Penalty imposed for non-payment of advance-tax -Appeal against order of penalty -Whether lies direct to the Appellate Tribunal -Held no -- Interpretation of statutes -Provision enunciating general principle -Proviso setting out exceptions --- To be strictly interpreted -- Advance tax -\"\"Total income\"\" of previous year basis for determining advance tax -Such income not deemed to be \"\"computed\"\" as envisaged by definition in section 2(15) --\nCorresponding Sections:\nIncome-tax Ordinance, 1979 -Sections 2(44), 53(1), 91(1) --",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=2(15),18A(a),18A(1),30,46(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1582 and 1583 of 1963-64 (Assessment years 1963-64 and 1964-65), decided on 16-9-1964.",
    "Judge Name:": "HAMIDULLAH AND K. SALAHUDDIN, MEMBERS.",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14213",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQVNDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 168 = 2015 SLD 168 = 2015 PTD 2639",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----S. 45A----Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000) S.32----Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition----Power of the Board and Commissioner to call for records ----Finality of recommendations of Federal Tax Ombudsman----Scope----Petitioner's / taxpayer's sales tax refund was sanctioned by the Department whereafter show-cause notice was issued stating that said refund was not admissible; and order-in-original was passed against the petitioner, which was upheld in appeal----Petitioner's complaint against said orders was allowed by Federal Tax Ombudsman and the Federal Tax Ombudsman recommended cancellation of impugned orders---Department, thereafter in exercise of powers under S. 45A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 reopened the order in appeal and issued show-cause notice to the petitioner ----Contention of petitioner was that no representation under S. 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 was filed by the Department before the President, and as such, the order of the Federal Tax Ombudsman attained finality and Department cannot now refer matter for de novo consideration---Held, that the Federal Tax Ombudsman never made any recommendation for reopening the petitioner's case for de novo consideration and even the impugned order under S. 45A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 proceeded on a erroneous premise----Order of the Federal Tax Ombudsman had not been challenged and had attained finality---High Court observed that ex facie, the order under S. 45A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 did not meet the requirements of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the principle of audi alteram partem or S.45A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Impugned order was set aside and matter was sent to the Department to issue notice to the petitioner taxpayer and hear him in the matter and thereafter pass an appropriate order in accordance with law in light of recommendations of the Federal Tax Ombudsman---Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45A\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=32\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.P. No. 11929 of 2006, decision dated: 02-06-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ UL AHSAN, JUSTICE",
    "": "MESSRS CARVAN ENTERPRISES THROUGH MANAGER\nVS\n CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE THROUGH SECOND SECRETARY AND 3 OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14214",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQVNDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 167 = 2015 SLD 167 = 2015 PTD 604",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----S. 131---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 39, 42 & 54---Suit for cancellation of documents, declaration and injunction---Interim injunction, grant of---Clearance of goods for exportation---Plaintiff claimed to be the owner of goods in question which were alleged to be stolen and defendant intended to export to foreign country---Validity---Stolen property which was subject matter of FIR in question might turn out to be belonging to plaintiff and if the same was exported, it would cause irreparable loss to plaintiff's reputation by sole act of export of the same---Plaintiff had made out a prima facie case for grant of injunction and balance of convenience was also in favour of plaintiff, who was likely to suffer irreparable loss if injunction was refused---Application was allowed in circumstances.\n \n PLD 1993 Kar. 90; PLD 1993 Kar. 262; PLD 2012 SC AJ&K page-7; 2001 YLR 327 and PLD 2004 SC 860 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=131\\n\\r\\n\\rSpecific Relief Act, 1877=39,42,54\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Suit No. 340 and C.M.As. Nos. 3183, 3184 of 2013 13951 of 2014, decided on 20th November, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED SAEEDUDIN NASIR, J",
    "": "Messrs SKYWORD (PVT.) LTD. through GENERAL Manager\nvs\nSALAHUDDIN and 9 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14215",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQVNTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 166 = 2015 SLD 166 = 2015 PTD 611",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss. 15, 17, 32, 79, 80, 156(1)(9) & 194-A---Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001), Ss.53, 54, 55, 56 & 57---Confiscation of imported goods on allegation of mis-declaration and infringement of trade mark---Importer, filed Goods Declaration in respect of imported goods; determined his liability of payment of applicable duties and taxes and sought clearance under S.79(1) of Customs Act, 1969---Goods Declaration of the importer was selected for scrutiny in terms of S.80 of Customs Act, 1969---Examination report revealed that importer allegedly had imported an item for which Trade Mark Registration existed in the name of a different company---Consequently, imported goods were confiscated in terms of S.17 & S.156(1)(9) of Customs Act, 1969 by Adjudicating Authority vide order-in-original---Appellate Authority allowed appeal of importer, set aside order-in-original declaring the same to be null and void; and Customs---Validity---Company in its letter/complaint, did not allege any infringement of its trade mark rights; rather highlighted the import in question to be \"\"parallel import\"\"---Such complaint was not a bona fide complaint, nor it should provide occasion to the Customs Authorities to invoke S.15 of the Customs Act, 1969 in isolation or exclusion of other statutory requirements---Said letter/complaint by any account did not appear to be in consonance with the parameters, laid down under Ss.53 & 54 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001---No case of infringement of trade mark rights had been made out---Goods imported were not associated with any mis-declaration, or any other offence under the Customs Act, 1969---Impugned order-in-appeal, being correct, warranted no interference, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Customs and Excise Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=15,17,32,79,80,156(1)(9),194-A,79(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rTrade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)=53,54,55,56,57\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-894 of 2014, decided on 7th November, 2014. DATE of hearing: 6th November, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "KHALID MAHMOOD, MEMBER TECHNICAL",
    "": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS through Assistant Collector\nvs\nMessrs DECENT AUTOS and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14216",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQVNTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 165 = 2015 SLD 165 = 2015 PTD 619",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]---\n \n----Ss. 17 & 32---Interest on securities of the Federal/Provincial Government---Exempted from tax---Method of accounting for computation of income---Method regularly adopted by assessee---Respondent-Banks filed their returns of income tax for the relevant assessment years declaring interest on Government securities on \"\"receipt basis\"\"---Declaration so made was accepted by assessing authority---Assessments were framed and orders were passed treating the same as a past and closed transaction---Subsequently assessing authority issued notices to the banks to show cause as to why the assessments carried out earlier not be opened and revised---Legality---Section 32 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 provided an exception to the computation of income including interest on any securities of the Federal Government or a Provincial Government received by an assessee in any income year---Banks were justified in adopting the method of accounting which was hybrid and had been consistently used by the banks since long---Appeal filed by assessing authority was dismissed accordingly.\n \n(b) Estoppel---\n \n----No estoppel against the law.\n \n(c) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Arts. 189 & 201---Law enunciated by the High Courts and the Supreme Court---Binding precedent---Law enunciated by the High Courts under Art. 201 of the Constitution became a binding precedent for all the forums within the Province---Law enunciated by the Supreme Court under Art. 189 of the Constitution became binding precedent for all forums in the country.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=17,32\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=189,201\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1956 to 1958 of 2006, decided on 14th March, 2014. (Against judgments dated 3-4-2004 and 26-3-2004 of High Court of Sindh at Karachi, passed in C.Ps. Nos. 1600 and D-1727 of 1994)",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, IQBAL HAMEEDUR RAHMAN AND MUSHIR ALAM, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INCOME TAX\nvs\nHABIB BANK LIMITED AND ANZ GRINDLAYS BANK PLC"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14217",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQVNTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 164 = 2015 SLD 164 = 2015 PTD 624",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 122 & 131---Amendment of assessment---Remand of case by Appellate Tribunal---Application for recall of remand orders---Taxpayer had sought recall of orders of Tribunal on the grounds that Tribunal had remanded the case to the Taxation Officer without giving any findings on the objections raised by authorized representative of the taxpayer with regard to legal lacunae in the assessment order---Objections which remained un-adjudicated were that the assessment order was passed without mentioning any specific provisions of S.122 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001; that case-law relied upon in support of acceptance of receipts being subject to sales tax had not been considered, and that no finding had been given with regard to contention that the sales had been estimated without pointing out any defects in the books of accounts---Taxpayer's contention regarding non-consideration of the objections raised in the original appeal were tenable---Tribunal was bound to give findings regarding the issues raised in appeal---Case should not be remanded as a matter of routine so as to allow the Taxation Officer to fill in legal lacunae or to improve its case---Impugned order was recalled, and appeals were restored to their original numbers for fixation as per roster, in circumstances.\n \n 1971 SCMR 681; 2005 PTD 2417 and 2003 PTD 1956 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122,131\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "M.A.(R) Nos. 174/IB and 175/IB of 2008, decided on 13th December, 2008. DATE of hearing: 4th December, 2008",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNSIF KHAN MINHAS, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND CH. NAZIR AHMAD, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs ALKAUSAR HOTEL, DINA\nvs\nC.I.T. (LEGAL) R.T.O., RAWALPINDI"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14218",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQVNTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 163 = 2015 SLD 163 = 2015 PTD 1607",
    "Key Words:": "Import Policy Order, 2013---\n \n----Para 9 (ii)(5)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Post clearance use---Concrete mixer, import of---Petitioners imported old and used concrete transit mixture trucks as construction machinery, which were importable in terms of para 9 (ii)(5) of Import Policy Order, 2013, on fulfillment of certain conditions---Customs authorities withheld clearance of trucks in question on the ground that after clearance the same would be used as transport vehicle / trucks---Validity---Merely on presumption it could not be said at the stage of clearance that imported concrete mixers would not be used for such purposes and rather would be used as truck for transportation of goods---Law did not restrict any such usage and such apprehension was repelled---Petition was allowed in circumstances.\n \nMessrs Baig Enterprises and Engineering and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2015 PTD 181 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Import Policy Order, 2013=9(ii)(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.P. No. D-4898 of 2014, decided on 17th January, 2015, DATE of hearing: 15th January, 2015.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JUSTICE, MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE",
    "": "MESSRS M. YASIN & CO.\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14219",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQVNTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 162 = 2015 SLD 162 = 2015 PTD 1945",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Regulation of Generation, Transmission And Distribution of Electric Powers Act, 1997=7(3),12(b),31(4),31(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rLaw Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=77\\n\\r\\n\\rNational Electric Power Regulatory Authority (Tariff Standards and Procedure) Rules, 1998=17(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.C.A. No. 1068 of 2014, decided on 29th May, 2015",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUSTICE, MRS. AYESHA A. MALIK, JUSTICE",
    "": "FLYING CEMENT COMPANY\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14220",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQVNTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 161 = 2015 SLD 161 = 2015 PTD 637 = 2015 PTCL 745",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss.2(s), 32(1), 32(2), 32(A), 79, 121, 127, 128, 129, 192 & 209---Customs Rules, 2001, Rr. 470 to 484 & 600(vi)---Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, 1965---Smuggling---Misappropriation of goods---Different goods cleared through different goods declarations were checked, loaded on the National Logistic Cell---Containers were sealed in presence of Customs authorities, clearing agents, drivers, co-drivers, conductors and other concerned---Consignments were handed over to National Logistic Cell who were legally bound to ensure safe and secure transportation unto the destination because it was the sole responsibility of the National Carrier to safely transit the goods across Pakistan through designated routes i.e. either via Spin-Boldak (Chaman) or the Torkham borders---Verification from data provided by the Afghanistan Government revealed that all the consignments did not cross over into Afghanistan giving prima facie evidence to the fact that goods were pilfered, misappropriated/smuggled enroute and disposed of in Pakistan by the National Logistic Cell in league with importers and border clearing agents---Declarations statements and documents submitted to customs at the port of clearance and thereafter for the transit consignment were incorrect and false, designed to serve the mere purpose of conceiving and committing the fraudulent activity of smuggling and revenue theft in the garb of transit cargo---Revenue alleged that National Logistic Cell the authorized carrier, had actively facilitated smuggling and fraud in violation of their undertaking for safe transportation of the goods---Carrier, importers and agents had jointly and severally pilfered/smuggled and disposed of the goods in Pakistan in gross violation of the provisions of law and defrauding the Government exchequer of the legitimate duties and taxes---Appellant, National Logistic Cell, contended that National Logistic Cell was not legally, morally or contractually bound to transit goods from Chaman to Afghanistan---No evidence of any violation of Rules had been laid against the appellant---National Logistic Cell could not be held liable on mere presumption that since the goods did not reach Afghanistan, the container was not transported by the National Logistic Cell and pilfered enroute; and order passed was nullity in the eyes of law as the customs clearing security unit was responsible for security from the port of entry to port of exist---Goods were loaded in the National Logistic Cell containers at Karachi port in presence of Customs Officers, clearing agents, drivers, co-drivers, conductors and other concerned, sealed and were handed over to the National Logistic Cell---No documentary evidence or other evidence was available on the files that the goods reached the destination---Verification made from the data provided by Afghanistan Government also confirmed that consignments did not cross over into Afghanistan---National Logistic Cell actively facilitated the misappropriation, pilferage and smuggling of transit goods for their own gain---No cross border certificate as required under the law were produced by the National Logistic Cell at any stage of proceedings---Computerized data maintained for sealing, de-sealing of Afghan Transit Trade containers showed that the consignments were not de-sealed at its destination---Importer was not a Pakistani citizen but he had been granted national treatment under the Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement of 1965, he should not be discriminated vis-à-vis importers of Pakistani citizenship---This privilege was subject to observance of economic and legal sovereignty of Pakistan within its borders---Importing goods in garb of Transit Trade and then disposing them of within Pakistan not only violated the letters of the Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement of 1965, but was also an assault on Pakistani's economy---Crime was committed within Pakistan's territory; all the committers, abettors and beneficiaries of the crime were accountable here---Appeals were without merit and no interference was called for by the Appellate Tribunal---National Logistic Cell and border agents were individually and collectively responsible for making payment determined by adjudicating in all the cases.\n \n PLD 2008 SC 591 rel.\n \n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----S.194-A---Appeal to Appellate Tribunal---Limitation---Appeals were barred by limitation---Condonation of delay---Matter being highly sensitive and of national importance, delay in filing appeals was condoned by the Appellate Tribunal.\n \n PLD 2008 SC 591 rel.\n \n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----S. 2(s)---\"\"Smuggling\"\"---Burden of proof---Misappropriation, pilferage and smuggling of transit goods---National Logistic Cell/ appellant contended that customs authorities were supposed to prove the place where the goods were smuggled, misappropriated or pilfered---Validity---Objection had no footing, because the National Logistic Cell had verbally as well as through documents had admitted a number of times, that the goods were loaded on the containers, the containers were sealed and handed over to the National Logistic Cell for further transportation to the destination---Such consignments did not reach the destination---Onus to prove that the National Carrier delivered the goods at the destination shifted on the National Logistic Cell because definitely the goods were misappropriated but the containers, trucks, the drivers, co-drivers, conductors and their other associates were in Pakistan; they were neither smuggled nor kidnapped--None of the said persons was ever produced by the National Logistic Cell before the Tribunal or forums below.\n \n(d) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----S.2(s)---Smuggling---Misappropriation of goods---National Logistic Cell/appellant contended that goods were misappropriated from Pakistan Railways during transit but no penal action was taken against Pakistan Railways; and National Logistic Cell be given the same treatment---Such statement of National Logistic Cell amounted to admission.",
    "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),32(1),32(2),32(A),79,121,127,128,129,192,209\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Rules, 2001=470,471,472,473,474,475,476,477,478,479,480,481,482,483,484,600(vi)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Customs Appeals Nos. K-146; 148 to 196, K-278 to 288 K-526 to 549, K-457, K-559 of 2012 and K-2199 to 3097 of 2013, decided on 12th August, 2014. DATE of hearing: 4th August, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQ, CHAIRMAN/MEMBER, JUDICIAL, ADNAN AHMED, JUDICIAL MEMBER-II AND KHALID MAHMOOD TECHNICAL MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs NATIONAL LOGISTIC CELL\nvs\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14221",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQVNTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 160 = 2015 SLD 160 = 2015 PTD 649",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n----Ss. 138EE, 138C(2A), 138D & 136---Interpretation of Ss.138EE, 138C, & 138D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Income Tax Settlement Commission, powers of---Scope---Order of Income Tax Settlement Commission to withdraw appeal filed by Department, not binding on Income Tax Appellate Tribunal---Department had filed appeal before Appellate Tribunal whereafter in view of order of Income Tax Settlement Commission; Department sought withdrawal of said appeal, which was denied by the Appellate Tribunal---Contention of Department was that after order of the Income Tax Settlement Commission under S. 138EE of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979; the Appellate Tribunal could not have adjudged the appeal and request to withdraw appeal could not have been declined----Held, that perusal of S. 138EE of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 revealed that the said section envisaged only a direction to the Commissioner/Department to withdraw appeal preferred by it before the Appellate Tribunal; and it was not ascertainable from the same whether such order was binding on the Appellate Tribunal---Provisions of S. 138EE if read in the background of provisions of Ss. 138C & 138D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 revealed that the Income Tax Settlement Commission was empowered to dispose of cases in second appeal by asking Commissioner to withdraw any appeal filed by the Department before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal; however no provisions in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 were found which would make such order of the Income Tax Settlement Commission binding on the Appellate Tribunal---High Court observed that in the present case, the order of the Income Tax Settlement Commission did not disclose whether the taxpayer/assesee had approached the Income Tax Settlement Commission for settlement and therefore, participation of the taxpayer/assessee was found to be not voluntary, since the taxpayer did not request or support the request for withdrawal of appeal before Appellate Tribunal---Order of Appellate Tribunal was therefore, correct---Reference was answered, accordingly.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. XXIII, R 1---Withdrawal of suit---Scope---Order XXIII, R.1 of C.P.C. allowed plaintiff to withdraw a suit, but such right was not absolute---Withdrawal of a suit could not be allowed if it resulted in perpetuating a fraud, injustice, or if such withdrawal would otherwise defeat ends of justice.\n \n Javaid Iqbal Abbasi and Company v. Province of Punjab and\n6 others 1996 SCMR 1433 and Haji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=138EE,138C(2A),138D,136,138C\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.XXIII,R1\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 78 of 2000, heard on 15th April, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SHEZADA MAZHAR AND SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF Income Tax AND WEALTH TAX, RAWALPINDI\nvs\nMessrs ZULFIQAR AHMED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14222",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQVNTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 159 = 2015 SLD 159 = 2015 PTD 654 = (2014) 109 TAX 385",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 161, 205 & 120(1)---Failure to pay tax collected or deducted---"Opportunity of being heard"---Once the First Appellate Authority had categorically recorded that "heavens would not have fallen had the final opportunity on the issue of merits/facts of the case had been provided to the taxpayer and that nothing could be taxed whimsically and arbitrarily but only on definite information", said Authority was under obligation to quash the whole order instead of allowing partial relief on certain issues and to maintain the order.\n \n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 161, 205, 149(1), 153(1), 158 & 120(1)---Failure to pay tax collected or deducted---Accrual basis accounting---Deduction of tax at the time of making actual payment---Contention of the department that taxpayer/company was maintaining accounts on accrual basis and obligation to deduct tax arose only when expenses were recorded and became payable, was patently illegal and was contrary to the provision contained in Ss.149(1), 153(1) & 158 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which explicitly contemplate that tax was required to be deducted at the time of making actual payment---Finding of First Appellate Authority and contention of the department were wholly misconceived and initiating of proceedings under S.161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was outcome of wrong legal presumption and not tenable in the eyes of law.\n \n 2009 PTD 538 rel.\n \n 2002 SCMR 122; 1971 SCMR 681 and PLD 1971 SC 124 ref.\n \n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 161, 205, 149, 153(1)(a)(b) & 120(1)---Failure to pay tax collected or deducted---Levy of tax on consolidated figure without identifying payment, time of payment, amount of tax---Validity---Levy of tax on the allegation of non-deduction of tax under S.149 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 at the flat rate of 10% on the total aggregate salary and wages of all employees for whole of the tax year and on the allegation of non-deduction of tax under S.153(1)(a)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 on the consolidated figure of the expenses and purchases for whole of the year reported in the audited accounts on accrual basis and matching basis without any power of Best Judgment Assessment and identifying payment, time of payment, amount of tax was coram non judice and nullity.\n \n(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 161/205, 177, 120 & 122C---Failure to pay tax collected or deducted---Invoking of S.161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without audit under S.177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Composite reading of Ss.161, 177, 120 & 122C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 clearly revealed that these sections were interconnected---Direct invoking of S.161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without audit under S.177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 constituted fishing and roving inquiry and had the effect of increasing the taxable income assessed under S.120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, being violation of over-riding effect of S.120(1) and (1A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and action under Ss.161/205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was not sustainable---Proceedings initiated under Ss.161/205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and consequential orders based thereupon were void ab initio and suffered from various legal, procedural and factual irregularities---Order of Taxation Officer was vacated and annulled by the Appellate Tribunal.\n \n 2002 SCMR 122; 1971 SCMR 681; PLD 1971 SC 124 and 2008 SCMR 240 ref.\n \n 2012 PTD 122 (Trib.); 2009 PTD 538; PLD 1993 SC 473 and PLD 2003 SC 979 rel.\n \n(e) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 161 & 205---Failure to pay tax collected or deducted---Parameters for initiating proceedings under S.161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Certain parameters were required to be brought on record by the Taxing Authority for holding the taxpayer as "taxpayer in default"---Appellate Tribunal had determined such parameters in a case reported as 2012 PTD (Trib) 122 for initiating proceedings and passing of order under Ss.161/205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n \n 2012 PTD (Trib.) 122; 2004 PTD 880 and 2008 PTD 787 rel.\n \n(f) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 161 & 205---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117 & 118---Failure to pay tax collected or deducted---Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was a charging section and for its invocation no audit, inquiry or investigation was necessary but there was no room for any intendment, presumption and inference in interpretation of application of penal provision---Burden of proof was on the department which assert the default in view of Arts. 117 & 118 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Benefit of doubt, ambiguity or alternative interpretation was right of the taxpayer.\n \n 1973 SCMR 14 and 1977 SCMR 371 rel.\n \n 2002 PTD 1 distinguished.\n \n(g) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 161, 153, 236A & 236C---Failure to pay tax collected or deducted---Purchase of land---Advances from customers---Levy of tax under S.161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 on the purchase of land and in respect of advances received from customer was out of the scope of S.153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as the purchase of land did not fall within the definition of "goods" and taxpayer was also not required to deduct tax at the time of receipt of advance from customers and had been correctly deleted by the First Appellate Authority---Immovable property was subject to collection of tax under independent Ss.236A & 236C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 at the time of sale by the registration/Public authorities and not applicable to the taxpayer.\n \n 1999 PTD 4028; 2008 PTD 1401; 2005 PTD 974 and 2004 PTD 422 rel.\n \n(h) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.205 & 161---Default surcharge---Levy of default surcharge without identifying date of deduction and corresponding date of deposit---Validity---Levy of default surcharge without identifying date of deduction and corresponding date of deposit could not be held justified---In the absence of terminal end and without determination of the default period the levy of default surcharge was not possible as both opening deductible event and terminal end were missing---Levy of default surcharge on hypothetical basis and without establishing wilful default on the part of taxpayer was illegal and nullity in the eye of law.\n \n 1992 PTD 342; 2006 SCMR 626 and PLD 1991 SC 693 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,205,149(1),153(1),158,120(1),177,120,122C,153,236A,236C\\n\\r\\n\\rQanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=117,118\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.As. Nos. 1071/LB and 1337/LB of 2012, decided on 28th January, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. SHAHID IQBAL DHILLON, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAJJAD ALI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14223",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQVNTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 158 = 2015 SLD 158 = 2015 PTD 663",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----Ss.11(3), 11(2), 7, 8(1)(ca), 21(3), 23, 33, 34 & 73---Assessment of Tax---Taxpayer contended that S.11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 would apply only where any person had not paid the tax due on supplies made by him and S.11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 could be invoked in case of his collusion with the tax officials or due to a deliberate act; that since Show-Cause Notice issued was completely silent with regard to collusion or deliberate act, the very acquiring of jurisdiction was fatal and void ab-initio; that goods were procured under the coverage or proper sales tax invoices issued in terms of S.23 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 duly incorporated in supplier's sales registers and summary statements and the suppliers had duly discharged their sales tax liabilities under S.7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 in their monthly sales tax returns, the transactions were not hit by the mischief of S.8(1)(ca) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 as High Court had declared Cl. (ca) of subsection (1) of S.8 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 as ultra virus of the Constitution; that provisions of S.73 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for payments through banking channel had duly been complied with, the refund of input tax against invoices of such suspended or blacklisted person could not be denied and even could not be recovered after insertion of subsection (3) of S.21 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 wherein it had been categorically provided that input tax shall be allowed if payments were made through banking channel irrespective of the fact that the suppliers units were either blacklisted or their registration had been suspended; and that purchases pertained to the period when suppliers were not blacklisted and subsequent inclusion in the list of suspended unit could not be operated retrospectively---Validity---No notice under S.11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 alleging collusion or deliberate act on the part of taxpayer had been issued, the very assumption of jurisdiction was illegal and had no lawful authority---Since the very initiation of proceedings was illegal the whole superstructure had no lawful authority and the action of the authorities below was not sustainable in the eyes of law---Other contentions of the taxpayer were legally valid particularly when the First Appellate Authority had accepted the contention of the taxpayer regarding compliance of S.73 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and High Court had declared Cl.(ca) of subsection (1) of S.8 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 as ultra vires of the Constitution---Charge of sales tax upheld by the First Appellate Authority was not sustainable and merits deletion---Show Cause Notice as well as the order of Adjudication Officer was vacated and the impugned order was annulled by the Appellate Tribunal.\n \n 2007 PTD 2265; Writ Petition No.3515 of 2012; (2014) 109 Tax 313; 2011 PTD (Trib.) 2679, 2009 PTD (Trib.) 2074 and 2008 SCMR 492 ref.\n \n Messrs Wajahat Textile, Faisalabad v. The C.I.R. S.T.A. No.99/LB of 2014 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(3),11(2),7,8(1)(ca),21(3),23,33,34,73\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 525/LB of 2013, decided on 12th May, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. SHAHID IQBAL DHILLON, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD AKRAM TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs SAQIB STAR QUALITY PRINTERS, FAISALABAD \nvs\nC.I.R., Zone-III, R.T.O., FAISALABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14224",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQVNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 157 = 2015 SLD 157 = 2015 PTD 668",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss. 2(s), 156(1)(8) & 185-F---Prevention of Smuggling Act (XII of 1977), S. 46---Import Policy, 2013, para 5 (A) (i)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497(2)---Smuggling of arms---Bail, grant of---Negative list---Case of further inquiry---Accused was arrested for smuggling parts of weapons which were included in negative list of Import Policy, 2013---Judge of High Court as Special Appellate Court constituted under S. 185-F of Customs Act, 1969, dismissed bail application filed by accused---Office raised objection to maintainability of bail application before Division Bench of High Court---Validity---Bail application was maintainable before Division Bench of High Court against rejection order of bail passed by Special Appellate Court---Offence provided under S. 156(1)(8) of Customs Act, 1969, read with S.2(s) of the said Act, and banned items / negative list provided under Import Policy, 2013, had altogether different impact and premise---Items provided under negative list were banned for import while offence for smuggling was separate offence which had nothing to do with banned items or negative list---Offence was to be considered within the parameters of S. 156(1)(8) of Customs Act, 1969, which was directly related to offence of smuggling---Accused was booked and charged under the provisions of Customs Act, 1969, for the offence of smuggling so reference to definition of \"\"arms or ammunition\"\" provided under Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, as given by Special Appellate Court in its order was irrelevant---Accused was entitled to concession of bail even when offence fell within the prohibitory clause of Cr.P.C., provided his case was covered within the purview of further inquiry and benefit of doubt could be extended in favour of accused even at bail stage---Evidence at bail stage could not be appreciated deeply and for the purpose of bail, law was not to be stretched in favour of prosecution---Bail was allowed in circumstances.\n \n Muhammad Tahir's case 1991 PCr.LJ 644; Tariq Bashir's case PLD 1995 SC 34; Syed Amir Ahmed Hashmi's case PLD 2004 Kar. 617; Central Board of Revenue's case PLD 1986 SC 192; Penal Law of India Davey v. Lee (1968) 1 Q B 366; Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law 5th Edn., (1894); Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice quoted; Syed Amanullah Shah's case 2013 YLR 110; Farooq Ahmed's case 2014 YLR 998; Ferozur Rahman Batla's case 1980 PCr.LJ 663; Asif Ayub's case 2010 SCMR 1735; Khalid Javed Gillani's case PLD 1978 SC 256 and Syed Lakhat-e-Hasnain's case 2010 SCMR 855 ref.\n \n Asghar Ali and another 1999 SCMR 654 fol.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),156(1)(8),185-F\\n\\r\\n\\rImport Policy Order, 2013=para5(A)(i)\\n\\r\\n\\rCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rPrevention of Smuggling Act, 1977=46\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Special Criminal Bail Application No. 40 of 2014, decided on 10th November, 2014. DATE of hearing: 28th October, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND NAIMATULLAH PHULPOTO, JJ",
    "": "MUMTAZUDDIN\nvs\nThe STATE"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14225",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFDYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 156 = 2015 SLD 156 = 2015 PTD 2533",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 133(1), 153 & 169(1)(6)---Final Tax Regime---Toll manufacturing receipts---Concurrent findings of fact by the forums below---Plea raised by authorities was that toll manufacturing receipts by assessee were assessable under Final Tax Regime for being contractual in nature and could not be subjected to normal tax regime--Validity---Taxation Officer was not justified to treat toll manufacturing receipts of assessee company for the tax year under reference, to be covered under Final Tax Regime, as the assessee was not engaged in any manufacturing of medicines for its own use and rendered service of toll manufacturing to third party under a contract of service---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue rightly confirmed the order of the appellate authority and dismissed the appeal filed by Inland Revenue on the subject controversy---High Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings recorded by two appellate forums below as the same did not suffer from any factual or legal error---Reference was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance and others v. Haji Muhammad Sadiq and others PLD 2007 SC 133; Federation of Pakistan and others v. Haji Muhammad Sadiq and others 2007 PTD 67 = 2007 CLD 1; Burmah Oil Company Limited v. The Trustees for the Port of Chittagong PLD 1961 SC 452 and Golden Roadways Transport Bus Service v. Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Okara 1986 SCMR 1142 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1),153,153(1)(b),169(1),169(6)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.R.A. No. 251 of 2011, decided on 10th August, 2015, DATE of hearing: 13th May, 2015.",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JUSTICE, MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (Zone-IV)\nVS\nMESSRS MEDICAIDS PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14226",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFDWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 155 = 2015 SLD 155 = 2015 PTD 681",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--Ss.121(1)(d), 120, 177, 122 & 133---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.189---Reference to High Court---Best assessment---Audit proceedings---Failure to produce documents or records required to be maintained---Validity of order for best- assessment under S.121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 in presence of existing assessment order under S.120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001----Scope----Question before the High Court was whether provisions of S.121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 could be invoked for non-submission of documents during audit proceedings, in presence of an assessment order under S.120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001----Contention of department was inter alia that such an order could be passed in light of of Sindh High Court in Messrs Sarah Construction Co. v. Taxation Officer-4, Audit-2 Karachi and others (2013 PTD 682)----Held, that High Court in Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal) v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) and others (2013 PTD 837) had answered the said legal proposition / question of law against the Department and had held that an order under S.121 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for best assessment could not be passed in presence of an assessment order under S.120 of the Ordinance, and said of Lahore High Court had been upheld by the Supreme Court of Pakistan vide order dated 9-5-2013 in Civil Petition No. 526 of 2013; therefore, contention of Department had no force in view of Art.189 of the Constitution---High Court observed that of the Sindh High Court in Messrs Sarah Construction Co. v. Taxation Officer-4, Audit-2 Karachi and others (2013 PTD 682) was per incuriam for having placed reliance on irrelevant provisions of law due to lack of proper assistance---High Court held that order under S.121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, could therefore not be passed in presence of an assessment under S.120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Reference was answered, accordingly.\n \n Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal) v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) and others 2013 PTD 837 and Civil Petition No.526 of 2013 rel.\n \n Messrs Sarah Construction Co., through Partner, Karachi v. Taxation Officer-5, Audit-2, Karachi and others 2013 PTD 682 per incuriam.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121(1)(d),120,177,122,133,\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=189\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "P.T.Rs. Nos. 309, 444 to 446, 590, 610 to 614, 619, 630, 646, 647, 483 of 2010, 45, 48, 114, 152, 155, 171, 181, 231, 233, 236 to 238, 242 of 2011 and 6, 299, 335, 354, 562, 571 of 2012, decided on 3rd December, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX\nvs\nMessr DOABA PLASTICS INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14227",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFDVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 154 = 2015 SLD 154 = 2015 PTD 687",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----S.194-B(2)---Orders of Appellate Tribunal---Application for rectification of order on the ground of error of excess assumption of jurisdiction---Validity---Remedy of review was not provided in Customs Act, 1969, therefore, after signing the /order and announcing the same that could not be re-opened through a rectification application---Judgment could not be re-opened---Judgment signed and announced could not be declared annulled, set-aside or modified by means of rectification under S.194-B(2) of the Customs Act, 1969---Application being without any substance was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal.\n \n 2003 CLC 1189 and Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1981 SC 94 rel.\n \n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----S.194-B(2)---Rectification of order of Appellate Tribunal---Scope---Rectification meant \"\"to make a correction, rectification was confined to exercise the powers to correct only the clerical or arithmetical mistake in the /order which had occurred due to accidental slip or omission---Definition of \"\"rectification\"\" could not be stretched nor its scope could be widened to an extent thereby defeating the manifest intent of the legislature---Once court/judge signs and pronounce , the court ceases to exercise jurisdiction in the matter having become functus officio.\n \n 2003 CLC 1189 rel.\n \n(c) Review---\n \n----Scope---When a is signed and announced, the aggrieved party may assail such order/ before the higher courts in appeal/revision or may file a review application in the same court, if the remedy of review had been provided in such statute because right of review is a substantive right and is always a creation of the relevant statute on the subject.\n \n(d) Review---\n \n----Scope---Review is proceedings which exist by virtue of statute; it is in the nature of new trial of the issue, previously tried between the parties and cause of action being brought into court again for trial by a new petition.\n \n Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1981 SC 94 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Customs and Excise Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194-B(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. Q-402 of 2012, decided on 12th August, 2014. DATE of hearing: 11th August, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQ, CHAIRMAN/MEMBER, JUDICIAL AND KHALID MAHMOOD, MEMBER TECHNICAL",
    "": "NIAZ MUHAMMAD\nvs\nDIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION, FBR, QUETTA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14228",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 153 = 2015 SLD 153 = 2015 PTD 690 = 2015 PTCL 534",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----S. 133(1)---Reference---Jurisdiction of High Court---Factual dispute---Scope---Authorities were aggrieved of decision made by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and preferred reference to High Court---Questions framed in reference did not contain any question of law---Effect---No error or illegality existed in order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue---No substantial question of law had arisen from the order of Tribunal which required any interference by High Court---Reference jurisdiction under S. 133(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was limited to the extent of examining questions of law which could arise from the order passed by Appellate Tribunal---Reference was dismissed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.R.A. No. 309 of 2010, decided on 8th May, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND ABDUL MALIK GADDI, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER (LEGAL) INLAND REVENUE, KARACHI\nvs\nMessrs DIGRI SUGAR MILLS LTD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14229",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 152 = 2015 SLD 152 = 2015 PTD 694",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss. 32(1) (2), 79(1) & 156(1) (14)---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S.33---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), S. 148---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 73---S.R.O. No. 499(I)/2009 dated 13-6-2009---False statement, error etc.---Importer was charged on the ground that he had mis-declared the origin of goods and attempted to clear the goods on lower value for evading legitimate duty and taxes---Importer contended that there was no mis-declaration of origin in presence of certificate of origin issued and duly certified by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and charge of mis-declaration of origin was not viable; that when a charge of mis-declaration was alleged then material terms of charge were to be proved by the prosecution and that mere making a statement did not qualify the charge under the provisions of S.32 of the Customs Act, 1969---Validity---Importer produced Certificate of origin and department failed to prove the same as non-genuine---Department had enough time to get it verified which had not been done and no plausible explanation for the same had been brought on record---Certificate in unequivocal terms denoted the country of origin as China and there was no doubt that the goods had been imported from China and bill of lading was also issued from shipping company of China---Provisions of Art. 73 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 stated that notwithstanding anything contained therein, a court shall presume within the meaning of that Art. that a document specified in Part-I of the Schedule to the Qanun-e-Shahadat had been duly made by or under the appropriate authority, was so made and that the statements contained therein were accurate---Accuracy of Commercial documents produced in support of country of origin was to be presumed and it will be against the principles of law and natural justice to discard commercial documents merely on the basis of unspecific and vague examination report of Customs---Violation of the provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 applicable for the purpose of evidence had been committed by the Department---Adjudicating officer had failed to scrutinize the certificate of origin issued by China Council for Promotion of International Trade, shipment of goods and bill of lading by a shipping company of China---Lower forum also failed to apply its mind inasmuch as that the available evidence was not given due consideration---Appeal was allowed with certain modifications and also remitted the redemption fine and penalty---Appellant would also be entitled for \"\"delay and detention certificate\"\", if so required.\n \n 2003 PTD 2090; 2005 PTD (Trib.) 1321; 2005 PTD (Trib.) 1826; 2006 PTD 651; Customs Appeal No.412 of 2001 and Special Customs Reference Application No.189 of 2012 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32(1)(2),79(1),156(1)(14),32\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=148\\n\\r\\n\\rQanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=73\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Act, 1990=33\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-681 of 2014, decided on 8th September, 2014. DATE of hearing: 19th August, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ADNAN AHMED, MEMBER, JUDICIAL-II",
    "": "Messrs CLASSIC TRADING CORPORATION, KARACHI\nvs\nADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14230",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFDST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 151 = 2015 SLD 151 = 2015 PTD 702 = 2015 PTCL 704",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----S.4---Notification S.R.O. 670(I)/2013, dated 18-7-2013---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Zero rating facility---Applicability---Grievance of petitioners was that Provisional Certificate issued to them was cancelled on the ground that they did not have in-house facility for manufacturing, therefore, they were not entitled for zero rating facility---Validity---Provisions mentioned in Provisional Certificate could not be invoked retrospectively, except in case of some wilful mis-declaration or concealment of material facts at relevant time of seeking such benefit or if documents furnished in such regard were found to be forged and that too after confronting manufacturer-cum-importer through notice after providing an opportunity to explain his position---Provisions of notification S.R.O. 670(I)/2013, dated 18-7-2013, itself did not provide for any retrospective cancellation of Provisional Certificate, merely on allegation that manufacturer-cum-importer did not have manufacturing facility, whereas exemption certificate was issued only after physical verification and complete fulfilment of all codal formalities---Provisional Certificate was issued in terms of notification S.R.O. 670(I)/2013, dated 18-7-2013 and any condition attached or stipulated in Provisional Certificate could not go beyond the mandate of the S.R.O. itself---Commissioner Inland Revenue did not have any power to give retrospective effect to cancellation of a certificate already issued and on the basis of which some vested rights had accrued to petitioners who had already imported raw material and claimed to have consumed the same in manufacturing of goods---Commissioner Inland Revenue was required in law to issue mandatory notice, prior to taking any such adverse action against petitioners---No retrospective effect could be given to any such cancellation letter and such letter by authorities was issued without any show-cause notice or affording opportunity of being heard, therefore, the same was not sustainable in law and was set aside---Petition was allowed accordingly.\n \n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n---S. 4---Notification S.R.O. 670(I)/2013, dated 18-7-2013---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 561-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Quashing of FIR---Inherent jurisdiction of High Court---Zero rating facility---Customs authorities got FIR registered against petitioners alleging that they did not have in-house facility for manufacturing, therefore, they were not entitled for zero rating facility---Validity---Conditions attached to notification S.R.O. 670(I)/2013, dated 18-7-2013, made it clear that entire mechanism and manner provided either for grant of exemption/zero rating or recovery of sales tax in case of any alleged violation was entrusted to concerned Commissioner Inland Revenue having jurisdiction in the matter and not with Customs authorities---Registration of FIR which entailed penal/criminal consequences was not based on proper appreciation of law as well as conditions stipulated in Notification S.R.O. 670(I)/2013, dated 18-7-2013---Customs authorities acted without any lawful authority and jurisdiction while registering FIR wherein different sections and penal clauses of Sales Tax Act, 1990, and Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, had been incorporated---Once it was established that an Authority acted without jurisdiction and in excess of lawful authority, the aggrieved person was well within its right to seek quashment/annulment of FIR and proceedings, from High Court by invoking its Constitutional jurisdiction---Directing petitioners to approach Trial Court for remedy, would only prolong agony of petitioners which could amount to abuse of process of law and justice---High Court while exercising inherent jurisdiction under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. and Art. 199 of the Constitution, quashed FIR and proceedings emanating therefrom---Petition was allowed accordingly.\n \n Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmed and 3 others 2000 SCMR 122; Maqbool Rehman v. The State and others 2002 SCMR 1076; Khurram Farooq Siddiqui v. Department of Customs and Excise, Collectorate of Customs (Export) and another 2009 PTD 992; Messrs Lucky Cement Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others Constitutional Petition No.D-216 of 2013; Zaheer Ahmed v. Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation-IR and others Constitutional Petition No.3337 of 2013; Messrs Yasir Enterprises through Ch. Bsher Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and 7 others 2013 PTD 821; Babar Younus v. The State PTCL 2007 CL 71; Ch.Pervez Ellahi v. The Federation of Pakistan 1995 MLD 615 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=4\\n\\r\\n\\rCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=561-A\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-3830, D-3629, D-3630, D-3950 and D-3693 of 2014, decided on 22nd November, 2014. DATE of hearing: 23rd September, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD MEASUM and others\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14231",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 150 = 2015 SLD 150 = 2015 PTD 729",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss.122(5A), 102, 11(5) & 1(2)---Amendment of assessment---Claim of tax rebate @ 75% as full time teacher/researcher---Matter was re-opened on the ground that taxpayer had also deriving income from private medical practice from Nursing Home, and was not entitled for rebate of full time teacher/researcher; and assessment was amended being erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue---Validity---Taxpayer was teaching in the University situated in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) wherein Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 did not apply as it was clearly mentioned in subsection (2) of S.1 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---As the territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir was a distinct and separate tax jurisdiction, the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was not applicable and the tax affairs of the State of Azad Jammu and Kashmir were governed through Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Board of Revenue---Even otherwise taxpayer was never confronted by way of issuance of Show-Cause Notice---Further, residential status of the taxpayer was that of a \"\"resident person\"\", the income of the resident person under S.11(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to be taken for taxation shall be Pakistan source income/foreign source income---Pakistan source income was from private practice and foreign source income from salary earned in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the question of tax credit of foreign source salary income shall be dealt under S.102 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 which was very clear even if a single rupee tax had been paid to authorities of foreign land as tax from salary then no question of further taxability from salary had to be asked and it shall be taken that resident person had discharged the duty of tax from foreign source salary income---Taxation Officer without issuing any Show-Cause Notice had rejected the version of the taxpayer with the observation that taxpayer was not a full time teacher/ researcher as he was doing private practice and working as Chief Executive and Dean; and also observed that he was not entitled for rebate due to the reason that University was situated in Azad Jammu and Kashmir but he had not considered the relevant S.102 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 in this respect; and no such charge as adjudged in the adjudicating order was primarily levelled in Show-Cause Notice which rendered the amended order null and void in the eyes of law---Charge not framed in Show-Cause Notice could not be adjudged through an adjudication order---Appellate Tribunal upheld the order of First Appellate Authority and dismissed the departmental appeal.\n \n PLD 1997 SC 582 and PLD 1998 Lah. 474 ref.\n \n Collector Central Excise and Land Customs v. Rahim Din 1987 SCMR 1844; GST 2002 CL 210 and 2004 PTD 1449 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=1(2),11(5),102,122(5A)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 916/IB of 2013, decided on 18-02-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRPERSON",
    "": "C.I.R., Zone-II, R.T.O., RAWALPINDI\nvs\nTahir Khan, D.R."
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14232",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFDQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 149 = 2015 SLD 149 = 2015 PTD 734 = 2015 PLJ 19",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----Ss.3 & 13---Notifications S.R.O. 165(I)/2010, dated 10-3-2010---S.R.O. 180(I)/2011, dated 5-3-2011---S.R.O. 283(I)/2011, dated 1-4-2011---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Claim of lower lower rate of sales tax---Petitioners claimed to run their business concerns in the most affected areas in war on terrorism and claimed benefit of notifications (SROs)---Validity---Provisions of notification S.R.O. 180(I)/2011, dated 5-3-2011, extended a 'territory specific benefit' to person engaged in business in 'affected areas', whereas notification S.R.O. 283(I)/2011, dated 1-4-2011, provided a 'sector specific benefit' to textile sector, throughout the country---Petitioners fell within the purview of those entitled to 'benefits' under both the SROs as they were registered and carrying on business in 'affected areas' and that too in 'textile sector'---Provisions of notification S.R.O. 180(I)/2011, dated 5-3-2011, had restricted the 'benefit' to 50% of the rate of sales tax leviable under S. 3(1) of Sales Tax Act, 1990---High Court declared that notification S.R.O. 180(I)/2011, dated 5-3-2011, was illegal being based on 'mala fide in law'---Petitioners being entitled to benefits provided under notification S.R.O. 165(I)/2010, dated 10-3-2010 and notification S.R.O. 283(I)/2011, dated 1-4-2011, and the effect thereto had to be duly extended to petitioners---Petitioners from 1-4-2011 were to be charged 50% of the rate of sales tax provided under notification S.R.O. 283(I)/2011, dated 1-4-2011---Petition was disposed of accordingly.\n \n Abdul Ghani's case PLD 2007 SC 308; Osman Khan's case 2010 CLC 475; Muhammad Naseem Khan's case 2013 PTD 2005; Muhammad Ajmal's case 2009 CLC 647 and Hasnat Ahmad Khan's case 2010 SCMR 354 ref.\n \n Dr. Akhtar Hussain Khan's case 2012 SCMR 455; Saeed Ahmad Khan's case PLD 1974 SC 151 and Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri's case PLD 1969 SC 14 and Messrs Saif Textile Mill's case Writ Petition No.2011 of 2012 rel.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art.199---Constitutional petition---Moulding of relief---Principle---Constitutional Court may mould relief already sought in petition or even grant fresh relief appropriate for just and equitable resolution of dispute pending adjudication.\n \n Salahuddin's case PLD 1975 SC 244; Messrs Facto Belarus Tractors Limited Karachi's case PLD 2006 Kar. 479; All Pakistan Textile Mills Association's case PLD 2009 Lah. 494; Mst. Amina Begum's case PLD 1978 SC 220; Marghub Siddiqi's case 1974 SCMR 519 and Mehrab Khan's case 2005 CLC 441 rel.\n \n(c) Words and phrases---\n \n----\"\"Mala fide\"\"---Import.\n \n True import of mala fide in as under:--\n \n(i) Generally, the term 'mala fide' can be divided into two; 'mala fide in fact' and 'mala fide in law'.\n \n(ii) 'Mala fide in fact' attributes an actual malice upon the \"\"maker\"\" of the impugned action,\n \n(iii) 'Mala fide in law' does not attribute any personal or actual malice upon the \"\"maker\"\" but the action is wrongful or without any reason or justification.\n \n Black's Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition); The Law of Lexicon (Second Edition (Reprint) 2002; Corpus Juris Secundum, A Complete Restatement of The Entire American Law (Volume-54); Mitra's Legal and Commercial Dictionary (Sixth Edition) and Judicial Review of Public Actions rel.\n \n(d) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art.199---Constitutional petition---Judicial review---Scope---In order to maintain balance in trichotomy of power' of a State, 'legislature' through legislation vests authority in the 'executive' and while exercising its vested jurisdiction it has to proceed in a lawful, 'bona fide' and fair manner---Never is the 'executive' given authority under any statute to exercise its jurisdiction in a colourable 'manner excessively on 'mala fide'---Any action or order passed by even a competent authority, without essential attributes of fairness or 'bona fide', would render such action justiciable and can be struck down by the 'judiciary' (Constitutional Court) in judicial review.\n \n Abdul Rauf's case PLD 1965 SC 671; Begum Agha Shoraish Kashmiri's case PLD 1965 SC 623; Ziaur Rehman's case PLD 1973 SC 49 and Saeed Ahmad's case PLD 1973 SC 151 rel.\n \n(e) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Fiscal statute---Grant of benefits---Principle---Interpreting fiscal provisions relating to grant of 'benefits' that the same have to be positively and liberally construed in order to ensure that the benefits' intended to be granted are actually given effect to in a meaningful manner.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,13,3(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3036 of 2011, decided on 23rd December, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "YAHYA AFRIDI AND IKRAMULLAH KHAN, JJ",
    "": "Messrs ALIMDAD GENERAL TRADING CO. through Proprietor\nvs\nPAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad and 5 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14233",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFDOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 148 = 2015 SLD 148 = 2015 PTD 753",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss. 15, 16, 17, 82, 179(3), 193 & 194-A---Failure of importer to get clearance of imported goods from the port within prescribed period---Order of confiscation of goods---Appeal---Limitation---Importer having failed to get clearance of imported goods from the Port within prescribed period, Adjudicating Authority, vide order-in-original confiscated the goods---Validity---Appeal filed by importer against order of Adjudicating Authority, which under S.193(3) of Customs Act, 1969, was to be decided by Appellate Authority within 120 days from the date of filing of appeal, was decided after 11 months and 8 days i.e. 344 days---Order-in-appeal passed by Appellate Authority below, was illegal void and against the settled law and was liable to be set aside---Importer, could not be refused to get released the goods against payment of duty and taxes---Appeal filed by importer was allowed by the Appellate Tribunal with the directions to importer to file Goods Declaration, get the goods released after payment of duty and taxes, in circumstances.\n \n 2006 PTD 340; PTCL 2005 CL 848 and Javed Hassan v. Central Board of Revenue 1975 Law Notes Lahore 85 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Customs and Excise Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=15,16,17,82,179(3),193,194-A,193(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-680 of 2104, decided on 3rd October, 2014. DATE of hearing: 22nd September, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ADNAN AHMED, MEMBER, JUDICIAL-II",
    "": "Messrs NIMIR INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS LTD., SHEIKHUPurA\nvs\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (APPEALS), KARACHI and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14234",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFDND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 147 = 2015 SLD 147 = 2015 PTD 884",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 113, 169, 120 & 133---Finance Act (I of 2008) S. 18(8)---Reference to High Court---Minimum tax on turnover---Phrase \"\"Turnover from all sources\"\" occurring in S.113, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Scope---Final Tax Regime under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Interpretation of S. 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 [as it stood before omission by S. 18(8) of the Finance Act, 2008]---Question before the High Court was whether receipts and tax paid under the Final Tax Regime under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 could be included in \"\"aggregate turnover from all sources\"\" for charging of minimum tax under S. 113 [as it stood before omission vide S. 18(8) of the Finance Act, 2008] of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001----Held, that provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 when examined under the principle that \"\"statute should be read as a whole\"\" or that \"\"textual interpretation should match the contextual\"\", then while there was no cavil that taxation under Normal Tax Regime and Final Tax Regime were different in nature and mutually exclusive, however it could not be ignored that income charged to tax under the Final Tax Regime in lieu of income tax arrived through the conventional way (through assessment) was an independent source of income and it was also not ignorable that after being taxed under the Final Tax Regime, in an unconventional way, an assessment order was treated as passed under Normal Tax Law---Under S. 169(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 a statement filed under S. 115(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was treated as an assessment order under S. 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and source of such income was not found to have been excluded specifically from \"\"turnover from all sources\"\"----Argument that phrase \"\"turnover from all sources\"\" used in S. 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 meant only the source of income determined under normal law was misconceived, and had the Legislature intended it to be so, it could have been done by use of clear words---Finality of the Final Tax Regime was not compromised by inclusion of its receipts in \"\"turnover from all sources\"\" because minimum tax was charged under S. 113(2)(2a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 also through presumption of treating the aggregate of a person's turnover as income---Held further that S. 113 was a charging provision, which did not exclude receipts relating to the Final Tax Regime from \"\"turnover from all sources\"\" in clear words and had Legislature intended to charge minimum tax on final tax regime, it could have been done by clear words---Reference was answered accordingly.\n \n Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax Companies Zone, Faisalabad v. Messrs Masood Textile Mills Ltd., Faisalabad 2009 PTD 1707; Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd., and others v. Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary M/o Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582 = 1997 PTD 1555; Highway Petroleum Service (Regd.), Lahore v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another 1977 PTD 183 and Partington v. A.G., (1869) LR 4 HL 100, p.122, referred to in IRC v. Duke of Westminster, (1936) AC 1, P. 24 (HL) rel.\n \n Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioner 1921 K.B. 69; The Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone 'B', Karachi v. Messrs Asbestos Cement Industries Limited, Karachi 1993 SCMR 1276 and Messrs Rijaz (Pvt.) Ltd., through Chief Executive Riaz A. Gul, Lahore v. The Wealth Tax Officer, Circle III, Lahore and another 1996 PTD 489 distinguished.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Tax statute---Charging provision---Charging provisions were to be interpreted strictly and literally and while construing such provisions, courts were not to be overwhelmed by principles of equity and only those could be charged to tax who were caught by clear words of the charging provisions---If two interpretations of such changing provisions were possible, one favoring the subject was to be embraced---Principles of interpretation in light of case-law, examined.\n \n Highway Petroleum Service (Regd.), Lahore v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another (1977) 36 Tax 8 (H.C. Lah.) and Partington v. A.G., (1869) LR 4 HL 100, p.122, referred to in IRC v. Duke of Westminster, (1936) AC 1, P. 24 (HL) rel.\n \n(c) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----\"\"Amendment\"\" to a statute and \"\"insertion\"\" in a statute---Distinction---Effect---Retrospective application of an amendment or insertion---Scope---Marked difference existed between an \"\"insertion\"\" and an \"\"amendment\"\"---Amendment was made of an existing provision, therefore question of retrospectivity could arise; however an insertion was always of a new provisions, which if created a liability or took away a vested right, could not be applied retrospectively.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113,169,120,133,115(4),113(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rFinance Act, 2008=18(8)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "PTRs Nos. 147, 152, 242, 372, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 205, 213, 241, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 421, 422 of 2012, decided on 19th November, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nvs\nIMPERIAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (PVT.) LTD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14235",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFTYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 146 = 2015 SLD 146 = 2015 PTD 981",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss. 156, 187 & 196---Reference to High Court---Registration of vehicle---Lawful import---Proof---Onus---Vehicle in question was detained by authorities on the plea that same was not legally imported---Plea raised by applicant was that vehicle in question was lawfully registered, which was sufficient proof of lawful import---Validity---Valid registration book could be a strong corroborative piece of evidence to support weak documentary evidence of lawful import in absence of any import document primary or secondary whatsoever and lack of any attempt on the part of applicant to secure those import documents from relevant quarters---Registration book alone, could not be treated as prima facie evidence of import and payment of customs duty and taxes to discharge evidentiary burden of proof under Ss.156(2) & 187 of Customs Act, 1969---High Court answered question pertaining to registration book as proof of lawful import of vehicle, in affirmative, while remaining questions did not involve warranting interference of High Court---Reference was disposed of accordingly.\n \n Collector of Customs v. Ghulam Muhammad (Preventive), Karachi 2008 PTD 525; Collector, Customs, Sales Tax and Central Excise, Custom House, Quetta v. Naimtullah 2003 PTD 2118; Kamran Industries v. Collector of Customs (Exports) PLD 1996 Kar. 68; Akbar Ali and 4 others v. Ehsan Ellahi PLD 1980 Lah. 145; Government of Pakistan and others v. Maulvi Ahmad Saeed 1983 CLC 414; Sardar Ghulam Nabi Khan v. Azad Government of State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary 1984 CLC 325; Barkat Ali and another v. The State and others PLD 1973 Kar. 659; S.M Anwar Sathi v. South British Insurance Co. Limited Karachi PLD 1975 Kar. 458 and Abdur Rauf Khan v. Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs, Peshawar and 3 others 1980 SCMR 114 distinguished.\n \n Muhammad Aijaz v. Director Customs and others 2007 YLR 1071; Hakeen-u-Din and another v. Director General of Intelligence and Investigation (Customs and Excise) and 4 others 2010 PTD 1060; Collector of Customs v. Muhammad Tasleem, Multan 2002 MLD 296 and Agha Masihuddin v. Additional Collector of Customs, Preventive Collectorate, Karachi and 2 others 2009 PTD 523 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=156,187,196\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Custom Reference Application No. 12 of 2012, heard on 1st December, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "KAMRAN AYUB CHUGHTAI\nvs\nSUPERINTENDENT CUSTOMS and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14236",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFTWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 145 = 2015 SLD 145 = 2015 PTD 1080",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss. 194C, 194 & 196---Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2006, R. 4---Procedure of Appellate Tribunal---Interpretation of S. 194C of the Customs Act, 1969---Judicial and administrative powers of the Chairman---Constitution of Benches---Exercise of discretion by Chairman---Cases of urgency / exigency---Scope---Question before the High Court was \"\"whether Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal, without constituting a two-member bench in terms of S. 194C of the Customs Act, 1969 had the jurisdiction to decide the matter as a Single Member bench in cases of urgency\"\"---Held, that while S. 194 of the Customs Act, 1969 postulated and defined the powers of the Federal Government for constituting the \"\"Appellate Tribunal, the appointment of judicial and technical Members and appointment of one of them as Chairman, thereof\"\"; thereafter constituting benches was the prerogative of the Chairman of the Tribunal and procedure for distributing work among the benches had been provided under R.4 of the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2006---Federal Government had no authority to constitute benches and distributing business among benches----While it was the sole discretion of the Chairman to distribute business among members of the Tribunal, but before doing so, he shall record reasons and after application of a judicial mind, entrust a case to any single member, subject to condition that only those matters shall be entrusted which have already been allotted to a bench of two members and said member / assignee was part of such a bench---Provision of S. 194C of the Customs Act, 1969 and Rules framed thereunder were silent about the discretion of the Chairman, as he was only empowered to the extent of administrative measures, but as far as judicial proceedings were concerned, powers of the Chairman and Member were equal, therefore, the Chairman could not himself retain a case without constituting a bench of two or more Members and in case if any Member due to any reason was not available; only then, before adjudicating the lis, the Chairman with reference to exigency and urgency of the matter and after recording reasons thereof, may hear the case, otherwise the order passed by him would be presumed to have been passed by a Single Member, which was not permissible in law---Impugned order passed by the Chairman was therefore coram non judice and not sustainable in law, and was set side---High Court directed the Chairman to reconstitute the bench and fix the matter for de novo hearing---Reference was answered, accordingly.\n \nDirector, Intelligence and Investigation (Customs and Excise), Faisalabad and another v. Bagh Ali 2010 PTD 1024 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194C,194,196\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2006=4\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Custom Reference Application No. 7 of 2013, decided on 10th March, 2015. DATE of hearing: 18th December, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD KAMRAN KHAN MULAKHAIL AND MRS. SYEDA TAHIRA SAFDAR, JJ",
    "": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, through Additional Collector of Customs\nvs\nMessrs HAJI BALLOW KHAN and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14237",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFTVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 144 = 2015 SLD 144 = 2015 PTD 1087",
    "Key Words:": "Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000)---\n \n----Ss. 2(3)(ii) & 10---Sales Tax General Order No.3 of 2004 dated 12-6-2004---Sales Tax General Order No.35 of 2012 dated 30-6-2012---Suspension of Sales Tax Registration Number and National Tax Number (NTN)---Maladministration---Complainant alleged that his Sales Tax Registration Number and National Tax Number were suspended without any show-cause notice and without communicating any reason, which constituted \"\"maladministration\"\" as defined in S.2(3)(ii) of Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000---Record had shown that department suspended the status of the registered person (complainant) without passing written order and failed to issue show-cause notice within 7 days of suspension, as required under Sales Tax General Orders Nos.3/2004 and 35/2012---Departmental Representative also admitted that no show-cause notice and opportunity of being heard was provided to the complainant---Such action of the department tantamount to maladministration in terms of S.2(3)(ii) of Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000---Proceedings required under the law having not been initiated by the department, action in question was without any legal authority---Federal Board of Revenue was recommended to direct the Chief Commissioner to restore registration of the complainant within a week and any further action required to be taken against the complainant, could be taken after affording him proper opportunity of hearing and report compliance within two weeks.",
    "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman",
    "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3)(ii),10\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Complaint No. 182/FSD/ST(59)/1270 of 2014, decided on 27th February, 2015",
    "Judge Name:": "ABDUR RAUF CHAUDHRY, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HAFEEZ\nvs\nSECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14238",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFTUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 143 = 2015 SLD 143 = 2015 PTD 1090",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss. 194-B & 17---Confiscation of vehicle---Application for rectification of Tribunal's order---Scope---Applicant having failed to produce any document to substantiate payment of duty/taxes levied against vehicle recovered from him, Adjudicating Authority vide order-in-original confiscated the vehicle; and appeal filed by applicant against order-in-original was dismissed by the Tribunal---Applicant filed application praying that said order be rectified; and order of confiscation be set aside; and vehicle be released to him unconditionally---Rectification, would mean to make a correction, and the Tribunal would confine itself to exercise the powers to correct only the clerical or arithmetical mistake in such order/ which had occurred due to accidental slip or omission---Rectification, could not be stretched nor its scope could be widened to an extent thereby defeating the manifest intent of the Legislature---Once court/judge signed and pronounced , thereafter, court would cease to exercise jurisdiction in the same matter as court would become functus officio---When a was signed and announced, aggrieved party could assail impugned order/ before the higher courts in appeal, revision, or could file a revision application in the same court, if the remedy of revision had been provided in the relevant statute as right of revision was a substantive right, and was always a creation of statute on the subject---Except said remedies, a previous , could not be re-opened---Remedy of revision, having not been provided in Customs Act, 1969, after signing the /order, and announcing, same could not be reopened through a rectification application---Judgment signed and announced, could not be annulled, set aside any modified by means of an application for rectification under S.194-B of the Customs Act, 1969---Application, was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n 2003 CLC 1189 rel.\n \n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----S. 114---Review---Meaning and scope---Review was proceeding which existed by virtue of statute---Revision, was in the nature of new trial of the issue, previously tried between the parties and cause of action having been brought to the court again for trial by a new petition.\nMuzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1981 SC 94 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Customs and Excise Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194-B,17\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=114\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Miscellaneous Application No. 9/CU/IB of 2013, decided on 7th July, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CHAUDHRY MUHAMMAD TARIQ, CHAIRMAN",
    "": "MUHAMMAD SHAFI\nvs\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MCC, ISLAMABAD and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14239",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFTTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 142 = 2015 SLD 142 = 2015 PTD 1094 = (2014) 110 TAX 330",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----Ss. 33, 34, 36 & 46---Inadmissible input adjustment, and suppression of sales---Recovery---Limitation---Assessee was alleged to have inadmissible input adjustment against purchase invoices and suppression of sales, and was served with a show-cause notice---Adjudicating Officer vide order-in-original, ordered recovery of alleged wrong adjustment, suppressed sale, along with additional tax and penalty---Validity---Impugned order, which under provisions of S.36(3) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, was to be passed within ninety days of issuance of show-cause notice, was passed after a period of more than one year, which was much beyond the limitation prescribed under the law, especially when Adjudicating Authority had not sought extention of limitation period---Order-in-original which had wrongly been passed, was vacated, in circumstances.\n \n 2004 PTD 1614; 2008 PTD (Trib.) 541; 2009 PTD (Trib.) 966; S.T.A. No.515/LB of 2012; 2011 PTD (Trib.) 2216; 2010 PTD (Trib.) 2670; 2010 PTD (Trib.) 2117; 2009 PTD (Trib.) 1263; 2008 PTD 2025 and 2008 PTD 60 ref.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Where basic action/order was without lawful authority, superstructure built on the same had to fall on the ground automatically.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33,34,36,46,36(3)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 358/LB of 2009, decided on 22nd August, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR-UL-HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD RAZA BAQIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs ALHASEEB CORPORATION, FAISALABAD\nvs\nADDITIONAL COLLECTOR CUSTOMS, FAISALABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14240",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 141 = 2015 SLD 141 = 2015 PTD 1100 = 2015 PTD 630 = (2015) 112 TAX 84",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss. 25 & 25-B---S.R.O. 356(KE) dated 29-10-1991---Fixation of value of imports---Principles---Customs authorities---Discretion in valuation of goods, exercise of--- Scope--- "Import Trade Price"--- Appellant-company entered into a contract with a foreign-company for the importation of sugar from Thailand at a price of US $ 292.50 per metric ton---Customs Department issued a notification, S.R.O. 356(KE) dated 29-10-1991 purportedly fixing the "Import Trade Price" (ITP) of sugar imported from Thailand at US $ 331 per metric ton---On arrival of the consignment the appellant-company filed Bill of Entry declaring the value of the consignment at the contract price---Customs authorities disregarded the claim that the duty should be fixed on the contract price and imposed duty on the "Import Trade Price" value of US $ 331 per metric ton---Legality---Section 25-B of the Customs Act, 1969 (as was in force then) authorized the Central Board of Revenue, or an officer authorized by it, to fix the price of imported goods at such rate as it deemed fit---On basis of said section, Customs Department had issued the notification in question purportedly fixing the "Import Trade Price" (ITP) of sugar imported from Thailand---Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969 provided the basis on which the value of goods which were imported or exported had to be fixed---Said section (as was in force then) was based on the concept of "normal value" which, as defined, was the value of goods denoted by contracts between buyers and sellers which reflected arm's length transactions between independent buyers and sellers operating in the open market---Notwithstanding the very wide language used in S. 25-B of the Customs Act, 1969, the powers exercisable by the Central Board of Revenue thereunder were to be limited and constrained by S. 25 of the Customs Act, 1969, which was the substantive section of law for the fixation of prices---Central Board of Revenue did not have and could not be allowed to have unfettered discretion---Exercise of any discretionary power must be rational and have a nexus with the objective of the underlying legislation---Customs authorities had fixed the "Import Trade Price" of sugar imported from Thailand by relying on an invoice for sugar imported from another country of origin---For carrying out valuation of imports on a realistic basis it must be founded on the prevalent price at the place of origin of the goods, and not on the basis of prices prevalent in another country---Said criterion had clearly been violated in the facts of the present case---Determination of the "Import Trade Price" should have nexus not merely with the price at the place of the origin of goods but also with the relevant time---International prices of commodities varied hugely with the passage of time---Customs authorities in the present case had based the "Import Trade Price" of sugar based on prices prevailing nine months prior to the arrival of the consignment, which was clearly defective---More realistic and reasonable time period should have been utilized for such purpose---Impugned notification, S.R.O. 356(KE) dated 29-10-1991 purportedly fixing the "Import Trade Price" (ITP) of sugar imported from Thailand at US $ 331 per metric ton was not valid in such circumstances and was struck down---Supreme Court remanded the case to the concerned department for fixation of price afresh in terms of S. 25-B of the Customs Act, 1969 as it was prevalent at the relevant time---Appeal was disposed of accordingly.\n \n Phassco Hardware Company v. The Government of Pakistan PLD 1989 Kar. 621 approved.\n \n(b) Legislation---\n \n----Delegated legislation---Principles---Discretion, exercise of---Scope---Delegated legislation entitled the delegate to carry out the mandate of the legislature, either by framing rules, or regulations, which translated and applied the substantive principles of law set out in the parent legislation or by recourse to detailed administrative directions and instructions for the implementation of the law---Delegated legislation was intended to enforce the law, not override it, and it could be used to fill in details but not vary the underlying statutory principles---In case of conflict delegated legislation must yield to the legislative will, as it was below and not above the law---Minutiae could be filled in but the basic law could neither be added to nor subtracted from.\n \n(c) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---\n \n----S. 24A---Executive authority---Discretion, exercise of---Scope---When legislature conferred a wide ranging power, it must be deemed to have assumed that the power would be, firstly, exercised in good faith, secondly, for the advancement of the objects of the legislation, and, thirdly in a reasonable manner---Where the authorities failed to regulate their discretion by the framing of rules, or policy statements or precedents, it became mandatory for the courts to intervene in order to maintain the requisite balance for the exercise of statutory power.\n \n Amanulla Khan and others v. The Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 1990 SC 1092 and Abid Hasan v. PIAC 2005 SCMR 25 ref.\n \n(d) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----S. 25-B---Fixation of value of imports by customs authorities---Principles.\n \n Following are the principles applicable when customs authorities fixed the value of imported goods at such rates as they deemed fit:--\n \n(i) The first principle which could be laid down was that the exercise of power by customs authorities in fixing value of imports had to be based on concrete evidence. In other words there had to be evidence relating to the import of goods on the basis of which the valuation process was to be carried out. It was not open to the (erstwhile) Central Board of Revenue or the Controller of Valuation to exercise arbitrary power of valuation which were not rooted in hard evidence, or were essentially speculative in nature;\n \n(ii) the second principle was that the evidence must be based, and linked, with the country of origin of the goods. This also was obvious as there were countries in which price levels were substantially higher or lower than those of other countries. Similar or apparently similar goods could be sold at widely different prices depending on, for example, the country of origin. If the valuation was to be carried out on a realistic basis it must be founded on the prevalent price at the place of origin of the goods;\n \n(iii) the third principle was based on a recognition of the inherent fluctuation of prices of commodities, which varied sharply from time to time. Prices prevailing many months earlier could hardly be considered to be determinative of the current market price. Since prices may vary, not merely from month to month, but even day to day, it should be recognized that it may not be practicable to lay down a strictly applicable time frame. The general principle, however, could be enunciated that if market conditions had changed substantially then it was mandatory for the price fixing authority to take due notice of the same. Valuation of imported goods should be a good faith valuation which was based on factual evidence prevalent at the relevant time. Although it may not be possible or practicable to have an exact correspondence with the price at the precise time in question but there should be a reasonable correspondence or nexus with the relevant time. What such reasonable time would be was difficult to state in the abstract since it would vary depending on the nature of the goods in question. It could be one month or perhaps two or three months. The point was it should be a reasonable period given the facts and circumstances of the case, and;\n \n(iv) the fourth principle was that the decision should be based on relevant facts and data and not on extraneous circumstances. Just as a decision which disregarded relevant data was liable to be struck down, similarly a decision based on irrelevant data would be equally open to objection.\n \n Messrs Latif Brothers v. Deputy Collector Customs Lahore 1992 SCMR 1083 ref.\n \n(e) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Arts. 184(3) & 199---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Part VII [Ss.96-112]---"Judicial review" and "appeal"--- Distinction--- Appellate court essentially stood in the shoes of a Trial Court and re-examined the evidence as a whole---Nature of the jurisdiction in cases of judicial review was completely different, in that a constitutional court examined not merely the decision, but the decision making process in order to determine whether that was appropriate or not.\n \n(f) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---\n \n----S. 24A---Interpretation---Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, reiterates the principle that statutory power is to be exercised "reasonably, fairly, justly and for the advancement of the purposes of the enactment" and further clarifies that an executive authority must give reasons for its decision---Any action by an executive authority which is violative of said principles is liable to be struck down.",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25-B\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=184(3),199\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=PartVII,96-112\\n\\r\\n\\rGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=24A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 214 of 2005, decided on 24th November, 2014. DATE of hearing: 24th November, 2014. (Against the judgment dated 14-9-2004 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No. D-511 of 1992)",
    "Judge Name:": "MIAN SAQIB NISAR, AMIR HANI MUSLIM AND EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, JJ",
    "": "MUHAMMAD AMIN MUHAMMAD BASHIR LIMITED\nvs\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Central Secretariat, Islamabad and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14241",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 140 = 2015 SLD 140 = 2015 PTD 1169 = 2015 PTD 2067 = 2015 PTCL 818 = (2016) 113 TAX 54",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n----Ss. 163 & 24---S.R.O. 438(I)/76 dated 6-5-1976---Agreement between Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Polish People's Republic for avoidance of double taxation, Art. 7(3)---Double taxation agreements to prevail over local income tax laws in accordance with S.163 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Interpretation of S. 163 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Question before the High Court was whether in the light of S. 163 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, the Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement between Pakistan and Poland, notified vide. S.R.O 438(I)/76 dated 6-5-1976 would take precedence over local income tax provisions---Held, that examination of provisions of S. 163 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 made it clear that the Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement took precedence over local income tax laws with respect to the issues provided in S. 163 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 provided that Agreement was made as required in S. 163(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and was notified---Section 163(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 contained a non-obstante clause as it stated that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the provisions of the Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement shall prevail----In the present case, therefore, Art. 7(3) of the Avoidance of Double-Taxation Agreement entered between Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Polish People's Republic would prevail over S. 24 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Reference was answered accordingly.\n \n(b) Interpretation of statutes---\n \n----Non-obstante clause---Concept, scope and purpose---Non-obstante clause was usually used in a provision to show the intention of the Legislature that the provision in question should prevail despite anything to the contrary---Purpose of non-obstante clauses was that the Legislature intended that a particular provision which started with the word \"\"notwithstanding\"\", should prevail over any other inconsistent provision(s).\n \n Muhammad Mohsin Ghaman and others v. Government of Punjab through Home Secretary Lahore and others 2013 SCMR 85 and Arif Hussain Shah v. Operation Director PLD 1979 Lah. 603 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=163,24\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 16 of 2005, decided on 16th February, 2015. DATE of Decision : 16th February, 2015",
    "Judge Name:": "ATHAR MINALLAH AND AAMER FAROOQ, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES ZONE, ISLAMABAD\nvs\nMessrs GEOFIZYKA KRAKOW PAKISTAN LTD., ISLAMABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14242",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 139 = 2015 SLD 139 = 2015 PTD 1174 = 2016 PTCL 630",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----Ss. 2(14), 7 & 8---Input tax---Making input tax adjustment---Condition of physical transfer of goods---Law required no proof of physical transfer of goods from supplier to buyer as a pre-condition for making an input tax adjustment or refund.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----Past and closed transaction, could not be re-opened especially when a beneficiary had no role in the irregularity committed by the other party.\n \n(c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----S. 8-A---Deposit of sales tax in national exchequer---Scope of S.8-A, Sales Tax Act, 1990---Provisions of S.8-A of Sales Tax Act, 1990, simply required that the buyer should have the prior knowledge and reasonable grounds to suspect that the supplier would not deposit the sales tax paid by him in the national exchequer---In order to attract the provisions of S.8-A of Sales Tax Act, 1990, initial burden would lay on the department to establish that the taxpayer had such prior \"\"knowledge\"\" and \"\"reasonable grounds\"\" to suspect the supplier that Sales Tax paid to him would remain unpaid and then proceed against the taxpayer.\n \n(d) Administration of justice---\n \n----No one would suffer for the act of another, and no body could be punished for the wrong of others.\n \n Messrs Zahidjee Textile Mills Ltd., Faisalabad v. The Collector (Appeals), Faisalabad 2011 PTD (Trib.) 2619 ref.\n \n(e) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----Ss. 3, 7, 8 & 11---Liability and obligation of taxpayer---Retrospective effect of notification, executive order and instruction---Notification, executive order and instruction, could not be given retrospective effect, if it would go to the benefit of the taxpayer, but if it was detrimental or prejudicial to the interest of a taxpayer imposing liability or obligation, same would always operate prospectively.\n \n Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd., and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1992 SCMR 1652; Messrs Anoud Power Generation Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2001 SC 340 and Government of Pakistan v. Messrs Village Development Organization 2005 SCMR 492 ref.\n \n(f) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----Ss. 45, 45-A & 46---Duty of adjudicating authority and Appellate Authority---Both, adjudicating authority and the First Appellate Authority, had turned a deaf ear to the assertions and grounds made by the appellant; and had failed to take notice of the departmental illegalities; and had not given findings on the issues separately; rather in just one sentence in summary manner, which rendered their whole exercise of adjudication, illegal and ab initio void---Adjudicating authority and the first Appellate Authority were obliged to weigh conflicting evidence; and to draw their own inferences and conclusion in order to administer substantial justice---Onerous duty was on the part of Adjudicating authority and Appellate Authority to discuss all issues and dispose of what had been argued.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(14),7,8,8-A,11,3,45,45-A,46\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 769/LB of 2014, decided on 17th September, 2014. DATE of hearing: 17th September, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND FIZA MUZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "AMTEX LIMITED KHUR-RIANWALA, FAISALABAD\nvs\nC.I.R.(A), R.T.O., FAISALABAD and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14243",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 138 = 2015 SLD 138 = 2015 PTD 1183",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss. 2(s), 16, 17, 168, 171 & 194-A---Seizure and confiscation of vehicle alleged to be smuggled---Adjudicating Authority vide order-in-original, outrightly confiscated vehicle in question on allegation that same was smuggled---Appellant, who claimed to be bona fide purchaser of vehicle filed appeal against order-in-original---Two Forensic Science Laboratories, after examination and re-examination, confirmed that chassis of vehicle in question was cut, welded and refitted---Vehicle in question was fully proved to be smuggled one, which was got registered after changing its chassis number through cut and weld---Appellant, who could not prove himself to be bona fide purchaser of vehicle in question, had failed to point out any illegality or infirmity in impugned orders---Appeal against said orders being without merits, was dismissed, in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Customs and Excise Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,17,168,171,194-A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Appeal No. 2/CU/IB of 2012, decided on 30th June, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CHAUDHARY MUHAMMAD TARIQ, CHAIRMAN",
    "": "JAVED KHAN and others\nvs\nSUPERINTENDENT CUSTOMS PREVENTIVE, MCC, ISLAMABAD and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14244",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 137 = 2015 SLD 137 = 2015 PTD 1186",
    "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---\n \n----Ss. 11, 33, 34, 46 & 73---Illegal input tax adjustment---Recovery of such amount---Registered person, was charged with getting illegal input tax adjustment against fake/bogus invoices---Proceedings were initiated by issuing show-cause notice---Adjudicating Authority through order-in-original directed registered person to deposit amount of alleged input tax adjustment---Order-in-original passed by Adjudicating Authority was upheld by Appellate Authority below---Validity---Registered person, was neither involved in tax fraud nor had committed any irregularity, and compliance of S.73 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 had been adhered to and had made all payments through Banking Channels---Claim of Registered person was fully supported by documentary evidence and had produced copies of bank statements, along with verification letters, party ledger of the supplier, Sales Tax returns of buyer/supplier for the relevant period, purchase registers, bank payment challan and inward gate passes, in proof of his claim---All said documents proved that goods were purchased by registered person from the respective supplier; and payments relating thereto were made through Banking Channel in accordance with law---Impugned orders passed by authorities below being not maintainable in the eyes of law as well as facts of the case, were set aside, in circumstances.\n \n 2010 PTD (Trib) 2406; 2010 PTD (Trib.) 1631; 2011 PTD (Trib.) 633; 2011 PTD (Trib.) 773; 2011 PTD (Trib.) 866; 2004 PTD 868; 2012 PTD (Trib.) 619; 2012 PTD (Trib.) 350; 2012 PTD (Trib.) 885; PTCL 1991 SC 963(sic); PTCL 1995 CL 415; 2006 PTR 78 (S.C. Pak) and 2007 PTD (Trib.) 445 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,33,34,46,73\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 662/LB of 2014, decided on 16th October, 2014. DATE of hearing: 16th October, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. SHAHID IQBAL DHILLON, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD AKRAM TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs FINE CRYSTOPLAST (PVT.) LTD., KOT LAKHPAT, Lahore\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, Lahore"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14245",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 136 = 2015 SLD 136 = 2015 PTD 1190",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---\n \n----O. VII, R. 11---Customs Act (IV of 1969), S.47---Suit for recovery of damages on the basis of mental torture, humiliation and disrespect---Maintainability---Scope---Rejection of plaint---Scope---Appeal---Competency---Plaintiff filed suit wherein defendants moved an application for rejection of plaint which was accepted by the Trial Court---Validity---Defendants-Customs and Excise Department received information that plaintiff-company which was recorded as closed was in production and was supplying the goods/cigarettes in the market without payment of Central Excise duty and sales tax---Factory of plaintiff was visited by the Customs officials and record was taken into possession which was involved in the production of cigarettes---Plaintiff-company had evaded central excise duty and sales tax and complaint was lodged against the same---Present suit was barred under S.217 of Customs Act, 1969---During pendency of appeal plaintiff had died before getting any decree in his favour and his legal heirs had been impleaded who could not continue to persue the suit after his death as right to sue in such case being personal to the deceased did not survive---Suit for compensation on the basis of wrong done was personal to the person wronged---No mala fide could be alleged in presence of such strong evidence against the official who were bound to protect the interest of the State---Plaint was rightly rejected by the Trial Court---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n A. Majid Sama v. The Asbestos Cement Industry Ltd. 1996 MLD 803 and Mercantile Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Habib and Co. and others PLD 1967 Kar. 755 rel.\n \n(b) Maxim---\n \n----\"\"Actio personalis moritur cum persona\"\"---Meaning---Personal right of action dies with the person.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.VII,11\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Act, 1969=47,217\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 3 of 2004, decided on 3rd February, 2014. DATE of hearing: 3rd February, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MALIK MANZOOR HUSSAIN, J",
    "": "SAEEDURREHMAN\nvs\nCENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE, through Director GENERAL Intelligence, Islamabad and 2 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14246",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 135 = 2015 SLD 135 = 2015 PTD 1193",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n----S.122(5A)---Amendment of assessment---Fishing inquiries---Scope---Assessing Officer launched a fishing expedition to dig evidence by use of revisional jurisdiction under S.122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---To move under S.122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the assessment should be erroneous resulting in prejudice to interest of revenue.\n \n Glaxo Laboratories Ltd. v. Inspecting A.C. PLD 1992 SC 549 and CIT v. Nusrat Corporation 2006 PTD 2660 ref.\n \n 2013 PTD 1557 and 2010 PTD 111 rel.\n \n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n----S. 122(5A)---Amendment of assessment---Power to make enquires---Scope---Power to make or cause to be made enquires under S.122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 [as amended by Finance Act, 2012] was not retrospective and not applicable to tax year 2012---Amendment in law was not applicable retrospectively.\n \n 106 Tax 85(sic) rel.\n \n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n----S. 122(5A)---Amendment of assessment---Un-earned development revenue---Addition---Audited accounts clearly mentioned that Assessing Officer misled himself in making addition on the basis of incorrect correlation---Fact that same represented the development charges instalments received over the years and was only recognized on percentage of completion and charging the same in one year was illegal was ignored---Assessing Officer had issued 'sine qua non' order on such count, which was illegal.\n \n(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n----S. 122(5A)---Amendment of assessment---Deferred participation fee---Addition---Assessing Officer had added to income an amount of advance fee in one year, whereas that related to the services to be provided over a period of 25 year and the same had been disclosed properly in audited financial statements---To recognize the income on cash basis in a company and recognize cost as and when incur, which certainly would give distorting results was illegal---Remanding the matter for de novo consideration by commissioner was not necessary as it required the First Appellate Authority to firstly see whether the addition made any sense under the provisions of law and only if yes, he had the right to call further information and cause inquires to arrive at any decision rather than remanding it back.\n \n(e) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n----Ss. 122(5A) & 88A---Amendment of assessment---Advance from JV Project---Addition---Obtaining such facility from JV Project, taxpayer was able to repay its heavy bank loans which had a burden on the income and was beneficial to the revenue---Assessing Officer added said amount without correctly understanding the transaction, detail of which had been provided in audited accounts filed along with the return---If said amount was recognized as income of the year, no benefit of tax credit could be obtained under S.88A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and would lead to absurd results---Share from income of an Association of Persons (JV) could only be recognized by the taxpayer after it was declared/offered/appropriated by the Association of Persons---Addition was illegal on this count.\n \n(f) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 25---Equality of citizens---Discrimination---Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass discriminatory order.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=122(5A)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=25\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 431/IB of 2014, decided on 22nd May, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRPERSON AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "Messrs DEFENCE HOUSING AUTHORITY, ISLAMABAD\nVs\nC.I.R., LTU, ISLAMABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14247",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 134 = 2015 SLD 134 = 2015 PTD 1207 = 2015 PCTLR 453",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss. 181, 15, 16 & 196---S.R.O 577(I)/2006 dated 5-6-2006---Interpretation of S. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969---Import of vehicle by foreign Embassy---Sale of vehicle by the Embassy---Confiscation of vehicle---Option to pay fine in lieu of confiscated goods---Exercise of discretion by Adjudicating Officer---Scope---Contention of petitioner was that he purchased vehicle from foreign Embassy after three years from date of import, therefore no duties and taxes were leviable on the same per S.R.O 577(I)/2006 dated 5-6-2006---Contention of Department was that said vehicle was sold by the Embassy without obtaining permission from Ministry of Foreign Affairs as required under S.R.O 577(I)/2006 dated 5-6-2006, therefore the same was rightly confiscated---Held, that per plain reading of S. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969, the Adjudicating Officer enjoyed discretion to offer an option to the owner of goods to pay fine in lieu of confiscation of goods---Use of the word \"\"may\"\" in S. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969 could not be read for \"\"shall\"\" but at the same time the concerned officer in absence of compelling reasons, must not withhold the exercise of his discretion for giving an option to owner of goods under S. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969 for redemption of goods in lieu of payment of fine, except in cases in which goods were specifically excluded by the Board----In the present case, vehicle in question was not covered under the goods which were specially excluded and the Department was not claiming that the said vehicle was imported by the Embassy in violation of Ss. 15 or 16 of the Customs Act, 1969---Even though permission from the Ministry under S.R.O. 577(I)/2006 dated 5-6-2006 could not be proved, however, the Department had admitted before the Court that no recovery of revenue was involved in the matter---No doubt that power of Adjudicating Officer to offer option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation under S. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969 was discretionary; however, when law vests a discretion in a public functionary, there was always a corresponding obligation to exercise the same fairly and justly, and where the Authority did not find it appropriate to exercise its discretion, it still had to provide reasons for inaction on its part---Discretion must be exercised to advance the cause of justice in a fair and reasonable manner---Failure to exercise discretionary power under a statute without legal justification was not acceptable---Confiscation of vehicle, in the present case, without giving option of redemption subject to payment of fine under S. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969 was not a reasonable exercise of discretion---High Court directed Adjudicating Officer to give an option to the petitioner under S. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969 to pay fine in lieu of confiscated vehicle---Reference was answered, accordingly.\n \n Abu Bakar Siddique v. Collector of Customs 2006 SCMR 705; Haji Abdul Razzak v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance Islamabad and another PLD 1974 SC 5; Irfan Naseer Baig and another v. Province of Punjab through Secretary, S & GAD and 2 others 2011 PLC (CS) 1537; Raz Muhammad v. Inspector-General Frontier Corps. Balochistan, Quetta and others 1999 MLD 3414; Sherzada v. Collector Customs, Peshawar 2011 PTD 301 and Muhammad Hussain and another v. Province of Sindh through Home Secretary and 4 others 2014 MLD 174 rel.\n \n(b) Administration of justice---\n \n----All judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authorities while exercising mandatory or discretionary jurisdiction must follow the rule of fair exercise of power in a reasonable and just manner.\n \n(c) Public Functionary---\n \n----Duties of---Exercise of discretion by a public functionary---Principles---When the law vested a discretion in a public functionary, there was always a corresponding obligation to exercise the same fairly, and justly, and where an Authority did not find it appropriate to exercise its discretion, it still had to provide reasons for inaction on its part---Discretion must be exercised to advance the cause of justice in a fair and reasonable manner---Failure to exercise discretionary power under a statute without legal justification was not acceptable.\n \n Abu Bakar Siddique v. Collector of Customs 2006 SCMR 705 rel.\n \n(d) Discretion---\n \n----Exercise of---Principles.\n \n Abu Bakar Siddique v. Collector of Customs 2006 SCMR 705 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=15,16,191,196,181\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Customs Reference Application No. 109 of 2013, decided on 29th October, 2014. DATE of hearing: 29th October, 2014.",
    "Judge Name:": "SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "WANG XIAOWEI\nvs\nASSISTANT COLLECTOR CUSTOMS, FAISALABAD and 6 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14248",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 133 = 2015 SLD 133 = 2015 PTD 1214",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----Ss 16, 17, 168, 193 & 194-A---Seizure and confiscation of vehicle---Vehicle having cut and welded chassis, was intercepted from appellant who claimed to be owner thereof---Appellant could not produce any document to substantiate payment of duty/taxes leviable against said vehicle---Vehicle was detained for requisition of the import documents and verification thereof and notice was also served upon the appellant---Forensic Science Laboratory, after Chemical/Laboratory test, intimated that the chassis number frame of vehicle had been cut, and other iron piece, had been welded on its chassis number place which had confirmed that vehicle was brought unlawfully into the country, without payment of duty and taxes levied thereon---Adjudicating Authority, vide order-in-original outrightly confiscated the vehicle---Appellate Authority dismissed appeal against order-in-original---Validity---Appellant, could not point out any illegality in the impugned orders, appeal, which otherwise was time barred, was dismissed, on merits and limitation, in circumstances.\n \n2005 PTD 712; 2003 PTD 2594 and 2010 PTD 1418 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Customs and Excise Appellate Tribunal",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=16,17,168,193,194-A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Appeal No. 9/CU/IB of 2012, decided on 17th July, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CHAUDHRY MUHAMMAD TARIQ, CHAIRMAN",
    "": "Malik ASHIQ HUSSAIN\nvs\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MCC, ISLAMABAD and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14249",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 132 = 2015 SLD 132 = 2015 PTD 1219 = 2015 PTCL 815",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 122(9) & 122A----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Show-cause notice for amendment/revision in assessment---Petitioner/taxpayer impugned issuance of show-cause notice under S. 122(9), read with S. 122A, of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 on the ground, inter alia, that the question raised in the show-cause notice had already been settled, therefore, it would be a waste of time for the petitioner to join the proceedings---Held, that contention of petitioner was not tenable as the petitioner had neither filed its reply to the show cause notice nor had appeared before the issuing authority---Jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution could not be exercised in case of a show-cause notice, merely on basis of assumptions and speculations---High Court could not assume any mala fide on part of the authority which had issued the show cause notice and the power of the authority was vested in it by legislation and it was expected that a statutory authority would exercise its powers in accordance with the law and principles---Constitutional petition was therefore, not maintainable.\n \n1990 PTD 155 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(9),122A\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1826 of 2012, C.M. Nos. 2 of 2012 and 618 of 2015, decided on 24th March, 2015",
    "Judge Name:": "ATHAR MINALLAH, J",
    "": "Messrs PUNJAB OIL MILLS LTD\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14250",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 131 = 2015 SLD 131 = 2015 PTD 1221",
    "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 114, 120 & 122(5-A)---Amendment of assessment---Revenue expenditure---Determination---Scope---Assessee/company, filed Income Tax return declaring loss---Assessment made by Assessing Officer was found erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue, on the ground that the mark-up claimed on borrowed capital for expansion of the plant, was capital expenditure, and could not be reduced from taxable income---Such assessment order was annulled by Appellate Authority below, and department had filed appeal before Appellate Tribunal---Contention of Departmental representative was, that as assessee company had itself declared the mark-up on the loan borrowed for expenditure in the capital account, as per audited accounts, company was not entitled to claim its direct deduction while computing the income as revenue expense---Contention was repelled, as in the audited accounts, the entries were recorded on the basis of \"\"International Account Standards (IAS)\"\", whereas in the income tax return, the entries were recorded in accordance with income tax law and procedure---Under International Account Standards, mark-up payable to the bank, could be capital expenditure, but under the Income Tax Law, that could be claimed as a revenue expenditure.\n \n1989 PTD 500 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114,120,122(5-A)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1230/LB of 2010, decided on 30th October, 2014. DATE of hearing: 29th October, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "CH. ANWAAR UL HAQ, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD ASIF, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "C.I.R., (LEGAL DIVISION), R.T.O., FAISALABAD\nVS\nMessrs KAMALIA SUGAR MILLS, LTD., FAISALABAD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14251",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 130 = 2015 SLD 130 = 2015 PTD 1223",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---\n \n----Ss. 111(1)(b), 122(1), 122(5), 120 & 41---Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act (I of 1997), S.4-A---Unexplained income or assets---Definite information---Agricultural income---Issuance of repeated notices for produce-books of accounts---Total of credit entries in bank relating to agriculture receipts---Addition---Validity---Taxpayer had declared net agricultural income as Rs.35,00,000 being exempt income under S.41 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 along with information regarding his bank accounts---Said declared information was filed well before the initiation of proceedings under S.122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Net agricultural income could only be arrived at after deducting expenditure, allowances and deductions from the gross receipts of the sale of agricultural produce on the same way as the net business income was arrived at after deducting expenses from the gross receipts---No column existed in the income tax return for the tax year 2001 which required the taxpayer to declare gross agricultural receipts but only a column under the heading \"\"Exempt income/loss\"\" was available in the return for declaring agricultural income and the taxpayer had accordingly declared net agricultural income therein---By no stretch of imagination it could be held that the net agricultural income could be arrived at without bearing any expenditure or allowances---Section 4-A of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 allowed a taxpayer to made deductions while computing net agricultural income---Assessing authority while examining the bank statement had ignored such aspect of the case and presumed that the entire credit entries in the bank statement were suppressed and were undisclosed business receipts---Assessing Authority asked the taxpayer to produce books of accounts and other supporting documents by issuing several notices---Assessing Officer had not shown any doubt with regard to the receipts from the sale of agricultural produce, but had rejected the same only on the ground that the taxpayer had failed to produce the books of accounts in that regard and bifurcation of the bank deposits relatable to agricultural receipts---Such type of treatment itself proved that the Assessing Officer had no \"\"definite information\"\" or any other corroborated evidence showing that the receipts were concealed business receipts instead of \"\"exempt agricultural receipts\"\"---First Appellate Authority had affixed the stamp on the doubt assumption and presumption of the Assessing Officer---Any information which created doubt or provided reason to suspect that the income or receipts had been concealed or suppressed did not form part of the term \"\"definite information\"\"---Deemed assessment was amended by presuming that the difference between the declared receipts and of total of credit entries were suppressed business receipts ignoring the fact of declared agricultural income which did not constitute 'definite information' but was a departmental opinion evolved on the basis suspicion, presumption and assumption---Taxpayer having declared agricultural income in his return of income was not legally required to declare gross agricultural receipts in his return---Notices for initiation of proceedings under S.122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 were void ab initio and of no legal effect---Proceedings initiated on the basis of illegal notices and superstructure constructed thereon in the shape of amended order under S.122(1)/(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 were nullity in law---Order of First Appellate Authority was vacated and amended order passed by the Assessing Officer was annulled by the Appellate Tribunal by declaring to have been passed against the spirit of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n \n CIR v. Messrs Khan CNG and Filling Station and others 2013 PTD 884; 2012 PTD (Trib.) 1593; 2012 PTD (Trib.) 1775; 2012 PTD (Trib.) 741; 2013 PTD (Trib.) 900 and 1993 SCMR 1108 = 1993 PTD 1108 rel.\n \n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----S.122 (5A)---Amendment of assessment---Issuance of notice repeatedly---Legality---Assessing Officer had issued repeated Show Cause Notices based on suspicion seeking information, examination of books of accounts, wavering/dithering from one point of view to other---Such type of fishy inquiries by issuing repeated notices were disapproved by the Appellate Tribunal.\n \n 1993 SCMR 1108 = 1993 PTD 1108 rel.\n \n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 122(5A) & 177---Amendment of assessment---Call for books of accounts and conducting inquiries---Validity---Additional Commissioner was not empowered under S.122 (5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to call for books of accounts and conduct inquiries---Power to call for accounts books of the taxpayer could be exercised only while conducting audit under S.177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n \n 2013 PTD (Trib.) 900 rel.\n \n(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---\n \n----Ss. 41, 114 & 122(5A)---Agricultural income---Amendment of assessment---Books of accounts---Assessing Officer required books of accounts in respect of agricultural income which was exempt income under S.41 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and taxpayer was not legally obliged to prepare books of accounts in respect of exempt agricultural income---Taxpayer had voluntarily declared agricultural income in his return of income along with his business income---If the taxpayer earned only agricultural income covered by S.41 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 he was legally not required to file return of income under S.114 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=111(1)(b),122(1),122(5),120,41\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A),177,41,114\\n\\r\\n\\rPunjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 (I of 1997)=4A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 815/IB of 2013, decided on 23rd January, 2014. DATE of hearing: 23rd January, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND MUHAMMAD RIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ZEESHAN\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, SBTBUNIT, RTO, SARGODHA"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14252",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIQlFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 129 = 2015 SLD 129 = 2015 PTD 1236",
    "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)---\n \n----S.196---Reference to High Court---Question of fact---Scope---Exemption certificate---Importer was aggrieved of order passed by authorities whereby they disallowed benefit of exemption certificate issued by Income Tax Department---Validity---Advisory jurisdiction of High Court under S. 196 of Customs Act, 1969, was clearly distinguishable from its appellate or revisional jurisdiction---Purpose of reference was not to get a decision for or against a party before Tribunal but it was for resolution of a problematic or debatable legal question---Unless there was perversity, the question of fact could not be examined by High Court---Exemption certificate was issued under the impression that importer was a manufacturer---Importer was not engaged in manufacturing process, therefore, on the face of it importer did not fulfil condition of exemption certificate, therefore, Customs authorities had acted lawfully---Order passed by Customs Appellate Tribunal was well reasoned and grounded on correct principle of law relevant to the facts of the case---Reference was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nCommissioner of Income Tax Zone-C, Lahore v. Messrs Margalla Textile Mills Limited, Lahore 2008 PTD 1982 and Messrs Best Buy Computers, Lahore and another v. Director, Intelligence and Investigation (Customs and Excise), Lahore and others 2009 SCMR 19 ref.\n \nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Messrs Multan Fabrics (Pvt.) Ltd. 2013 PTD 2077 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Customs Reference No. 1 of 2006, heard on 20th March, 2014. DATE of hearing: 20th March, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ UL AHSAN AND ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JJ",
    "": "Messrs INFOTECH (PVT.) LTD\nvs\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS and 3 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14253",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFTST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 23 = 2015 SLD 23 = (2015) 111 TAX 405 = 2015 PTD 2256 = 2016 PTCL 449",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),3,7,8,8A,11,21,33\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Rules, 2006=12(5)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "STR No. 98 of 2014, decided on 12-3-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID KARIM, JJ",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nvs\nTARIQ POLY PACK (PVT) LTD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14254",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFTRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 22 = 2015 SLD 22 = (2015) 111 TAX 429 = 2015 PTD 1749",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=202\\n\\r\\n\\rCustoms Rules, 2001=102\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.P. No. D-449 of 2014, decided 15-01-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JJ",
    "": "VS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14255",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFTQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 21 = 2015 SLD 21 = (2015) 111 TAX 432",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=33\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=15,15(d),22,22(a),26(c),30,Part-IIof5thSchedule\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "PTR No. 67 of 2004, decided 10-3-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID KARIM, JJ",
    "": "PUNJAB MINERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD\nVs \nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14256",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFTOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 20 = 2015 SLD 20 = (2015) 111 TAX 443 = 2015 PTD 2202",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=16,32(1)(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Custom Ref. No. 14/2012, decided on 23-2-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID KARIM, JJ",
    "": "SWERA TRADERS\nVs\nTHE CUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND OTHERS"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14257",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 19 = 2015 SLD 19 = (2015) 111 TAX 455 = 2015 PTD 2368",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,113,113(2),113(2)(c),114,122(1),122(5A)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=264\\n\\r\\n\\rGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=6\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "PTR No. 209 of 2014, decided on 19-3-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JJ.",
    "": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVs\nSHAFI SPINNING MILLS LTD"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14258",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFpYz0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 18 = 2015 SLD 18 = (2015) 111 TAX 466 = 2015 PTD 1520",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=40\\n\\r\\n\\rFederal Board of Revenue Act, 2007=4(1)(i),(2)\\n\\r\\n\\rCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=84,94,98,103\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W. P.No. 4532 of 2009, decided on 14-4-2015. DATE of hearing: 24-2-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "AYESHA A. MALIK, J.",
    "": "PAKISTAN CHIPBOARD (PVT.) LTD\nVs \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN etc"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14259",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFpWT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 17 = 2015 SLD 17 = (2015) 111 TAX 473 = 2015 PTD 1417",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25D,194-B,194C\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.P. No. D-4900 OF 2014, decided 15-1-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAJFAR, JJ",
    "": "AHSAN BROTHERS\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14260",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFpVT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 16 = 2015 SLD 16 = (2015) 111 TAX 509",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(c),111(1)(b),120,122(5A),122(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "I T.A. Nos. 2133 to 2137/LB of 2014, (Tax Years 2008 to 2012), decided on 11-11-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAWAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRMAN AND FIZA MUZAJFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14261",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 15 = 2015 SLD 15 = (2015) 111 TAX 528 = 2016 PTD 445",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(4),11,25,33(13),40B\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "STA No. 815/LB/2012, decided on 3-6-2014. DATE of hearing: 11-2-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZIR AHMAD AND MUHAMMAD WASEEM CHAUDHARY, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD AKRAM A TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": "MS. SARHAD RESTAURANT, Lahore\nVS\nC.I.R. (APPEALS-III), Lahore"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14262",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 14 = 2015 SLD 14 = (2015) 111 TAX 543",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue",
    "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(28)3,25(2),38,2(47),57\\n\\r\\n\\rSales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007=5(3),50,3\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 1444 to 1448/LB OF 2014, (Tax Years 2010 to 2014), decided on 9-12-2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JAVAID MASOOD TAHIR BHATTI, CHAIRPERSON, FIZA MUZZAFFAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER",
    "": ""
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14263",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFpST0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 255 = 2015 SLD 255 = 2015 CLD 719",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss. 9, 152 & 290---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 120---High Court, jurisdiction of--- Limitation--- Petitioner assailed fraudulent transfer of his shares in the names of other persons---Objection raised by respondents was that petition was barred by limitation---Validity---Petitioner first approached Civil Court on 2-5-2012 and High Court on 20-3-2014 which would bring the petition within six years, the time prescribed under Art. 120 of Limitation Act, 1908---Petitioner was also claiming legacy of his late father, which could be claimed by him even beyond six years period prescribed under Art. 120 of Limitation Act, 1908---Petition was within limitation---Objection was overruled in circumstances.\n \n Mrs. Saeeda Mehmood's case 2007 CLD 637 rel.\n \n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 290---Affairs of company---Complaint---Maintainability---Official record did not depict petitioner as member of company---Claim of petitioner for seeking directions of High Court under S.290 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, was not maintainable as he lacked locus standi to seek the same.\n \n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----S. 152---Rectification of Members' Register---Locus standi---No condition precedent has been provided in S. 152 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, of having requisite share capital to invoke jurisdiction of High Court for seeking correction of Members' Register of company---Single shareholder seeking correction of a single share in company can seek his remedy under S. 152 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, even if his name was not recorded in Members' Register of company.\n \n(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---\n \n----Ss. 9 & 265---Affairs of company---Fraudulent transfer of shares---Conversion of proceedings---Petitioner assailed transfer of his shares in the names of other persons alleging commission of fraud---Validity---Claim of petitioner was based on serious allegations of fraud against respondent and his denial thereof warranted deeper probe---Essential documents to support respective claims of parties were not available on record---Regulator, the custodian of record, in its counter affidavit was silent about affairs of company between relevant period of time---Such was crucial period when petitioner's shares were stated to have been transferred in favour of predecessor-in-interest of parties---High Court treated petition under S. 9 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, as petition under S. 265 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, seeking investigation of the company---Mention of wrong provisions of law in a petition could not deter court from exercising its proper authority and appropriate jurisdiction vested under law---High Court directed Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan to appoint an Inspector to investigate affairs of company in question and also to investigate validity of transfer of shares---Petition was disposed of accordingly.\n \nLahore Race Club v. Raja Khushbakht-ur-Rehman 2008 CLD 1117; Mst. Saifa Bibi's case 1982 SCMR 494; Multan Electric Power Company Ltd's case PLD 2006 SC 382; Brothers Steel Limited's case PLD 1995 SC 320 and Messrs Light Metal and Rubber Industries's case 2011 CLD 1485 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=9,152,290,265\\n\\r\\n\\rLimitation Act, 1908=120\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Company Case No. 1-P of 2014, decided on 31st October, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "YAHYA AFRIDI, J",
    "": "ABDUL KAREEM KHAN\nvs\nMessrs HAROONUR-RASHEED TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 13 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14264",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFpRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 256 = 2015 SLD 256 = 2015 CLD 786",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)---\n \n----Ss. 2(lxv) & 121---Insurance Tribunal---Scope---Insurance Tribunal is an adjudicatory forum within the framework of Insurance Ordinance, 2000.\n \n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)---\n \n----S. 122(1)(a)(d)---Insurance Tribunal--- Powers vested with Civil Court under Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Applicability---Scope---Intention of Legislature is not that the Tribunal which is a 'persona designata' has become a \"\"Civil Court\"\"---Provisions of S. 122(1)(a)(d) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, are meant to facilitate Insurance Tribunal to get its decision/mandate implemented by adopting coercive mechanism provided in Civil Procedure Code, 1908.\n \n(c) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)---\n \n----Ss. 121, 122, 123 & 124---Insurance Tribunal---Execution of order---Non-drawing of decree sheet---Claim against insurance company was accepted by Insurance Tribunal and the decision was not challenged in appeal---Tribunal, on the application of respondent, initiated proceedings to execute its decision---Plea raised by insurance company was that without drawing a formal decree sheet, Insurance Tribunal could not execute its decision---Validity---Insurance Tribunal was vested with powers of \"\"Civil Court\"\" under S. 122 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 but the decision made by the Tribunal was capable of being executed without there being formal decree drawn by Insurance Tribunal---Original decision dated 21-3-2013 passed by Insurance Tribunal was not challenged in appeal under S. 122(2) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, and the same had attained finality---Objection petition filed by insurance company to the effect that no execution proceedings could be carried out without there being a formal decree had also been dismissed on 19-3-2014, and the same had also not been challenged--- After order dated 19-3-2014, insurance company had been appearing before Insurance Tribunal and seeking time to adjust the claim but no positive step was taken to satisfy claim of respondent---Insurance Tribunal was left with no other option but to resort to coercive mechanism provided in Civil Procedure Code, 1908, in exercise of powers conferred upon it under S. 122(1)(a) and (d) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000---Filing of appeal by Insurance company was again an attempt to wriggle out of its liability in pursuance to decision made by Insurance Tribunal on 21-3-2013, which had attained finality as the same was not challenged in terms of S. 124(2) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\n \n Zahur Din v. Anjuman Himayat-i-Islam 1989 MLD 480 and Muhammad Muzaffar v. Maqsood-ul-Hassan 2006 SCMR 1157 distinguished.\n \n State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another v. Javaid Iqbal 2011 SCMR 1013; Ranjit Singh Hazari and others v. Juman Meah and another PLD 1961 Dacca 842 and Khavir Saeed Raza v. Wajahat Iqbal 2003 CLC 1306 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=2(lxv),121,122(1)(a)(d),122,123,124,122(2),124(2)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Insurance Appeal No. 962 of 2014, heard on 30th October, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND M. SOHAIL IQBAL BHATTI, JJ",
    "": "Messrs CRESCENT STAR INSURANCE through Assistant GENERAL Manager\nvs\nALREHMAN TRADERS through Proprietor and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14265",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFpQT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 257 = 2015 SLD 257 = 2015 CLD 745",
    "Key Words:": "Public Procurement Rules, 2004---\n \n----R. 26---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction--- Interim injunction, grant of--- Plaintiff-company, manufacturer of pipes was the lowest bidder in tender invited by defendant, a gas company---Grievance of plaintiff-Company was that defendant-company could not revoke its bid and relied upon R.26 of Public Procurement Rules, 2004---Validity---Private entity calling for bids under a tender for its own purposes had a right to cancel the tender without assigning any reason or even without having one---Such option was not open to public sector entity which was a procuring agency within the meaning of Public Procurement Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---All public sector actions must be taken for a valid legally defensible reason---Concerned entity or authority must have a lawful reason for action that it had taken (or refused to take, as the case might be) even if it might be able to assert a right not to make that reason public (i.e. to 'assign' it), the fundamental obligation of having lawful reason was not thereby annulled---Court, in appropriate circumstances, could insist that reason be given, i.e. disclosed, so that it could satisfy itself as to the lawfulness of the same---Pipes were lying with plaintiff and it was best placed being the lowest bidder in terms of the tender to coat the pipes---Plaintiff had to bear substantial inconvenience, both physical arid financial of keeping pipes at its factory for a long period entirely as a result of defendant's inaction and it had significantly interfered with plaintiff's other business operations---Balance of convenience was in favour of plaintiff and against defendant company---Plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury if the contract for coating pipes was awarded to some other party---High Court granted interim injunction as all ingredients for interim relief were in place---Application was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "C.M.A. No. 7151 of 2013 in Suit No. 754 of 2013, decided on 10th April, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUNIB AKHTAR, J",
    "": "CRESCENT STEEL AND ALLIED PRODUCT LIMITED\nvs\nSUI SOUTHERN GAS CO. LIMITED"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14266",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFpOD0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 258 = 2015 SLD 258 = 2015 CLD 88",
    "Key Words:": "Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968 )---\n \n----S.O. 14---Factories Act (XXV of 1934), S.4---Appeal---Termination of seasonal workers---Effect---Preferential right of re-employment---Scope---Contention of the appellants (seasonal workers) was that they were permanent seasonal workers, therefore, they had preferential right of re-employment---Plea of the establishment (Sugar Mill) was that appellants were not \"\"seasonal workers\"\", rather they were temporary workers deployed only for a season vide their appointment letter and their employment was only current season and they were not entitled for re-employment in subsequent crushing season and they were relieved after clearance of their dues in full and final settlement---Validity---Employer Mill was exclusively engaged in manufacturing sugar which came within the definition of \"\"seasonal factory\"\" under the provision of the Factories Act, 1934; Appellants (seasonal workers) were employed for a particular season and at the end of season their services were terminated by issuing written order and after giving them legal emoluments---Expression word \"\"re-employment\"\" in the Standing Order 14 meant fresh employment and not the reinstatement and previous service of the worker on re-employment could not be taken into account for determining their right, emoluments and even privileges for their re-employment---Appellants were deployed as seasonal/temporary workers and they could not claim reinstatement of their services as a matter of right---Terms and conditions of previous service could not be allowed to be counted as a right for re-employment---Seasonal workers had been given right of preference for re-employment, but that right of re-employment was contingent upon employer proposing to take into employment any other new person or juniors to the appellants in the employment and such right was not absolute, but was depend upon the needs of the employer, because preference could only be claimed when the employer proposed to take into the employment any retrenched worker on availability of vacancy---Labour Court's findings appeared to be well reasoned and appellants had failed to point out any illegality to upset the findings of the Labour Court, therefore, of the Labour Court was maintained and all the appeals were dismissed in circumstances.\n \n 1993 CLC 1029; 1998 PLC 83; 1989 PLC 1013 and SBLR 2006 SC 95 distinguished.\n \n 1992 PLC 572; 1990 PLC 325; 2003 SCMR 74; 2000 PLC 636; 1996 CLC 1119; AIR 1996 SC 632 and Ghulam Mustafa v. Shahmurad Sugar Mills 2009 PLC 83 ref.\n \n Pakistan International Airlines v. Chairman, Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal 1980 PLC 975; Abdul Sattar and others v. Sui Northern Gas Pipe Line Limited 2001 SCMR 1935 and Iqbal Ahmed v. Second Sindh Labour Court and others 1980 PLC 316 rel.",
    "Court Name:": "Labour Appellate Tribunal, Sindh",
    "Law and Sections:": "Factories Act, 1934=4\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Appeals Nos. HYD-193 L.A.83/2006) to HYD-236 (L.A.126/2006) of 2010, decided on 2nd September, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "JUSTICE (RTD.) ALI MUHAMMAD BALOCH, MEMBER",
    "": "MUHAMMAD HASSAN and 43 others\nvs\nMessrs SHAHMURAD SUGAR MILLS LTD. through GENERAL Manager"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14267",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRVFpND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 259 = 2015 SLD 259 = 2015 CLD 155",
    "Key Words:": "Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936)---\n \n----Ss. 3(b) & 15---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Payment of wages---Responsibility, determination of---Petitioner assailed warrant of arrest on the plea that he was not employer from whom the recovery was to be made---Validity---Held, it was obligatory upon Commissioner Compensation/Authority under Payment of Wages Act, 1936, to determine as a threshold question against whom proceedings for recovery had to be initiated and set into motion---For such purpose the Commissioner was to make inquiries regarding current ownership and shareholders of industrial establishment in question---Either the employer or other person responsible for payment of wages could be proceeded against and it had to be determined as a fact before embarking upon recovery proceedings under S.15(5) of Payment of Wages Act, 1936, which provision had given power of attachment and sale of immovable property of employer---High Court set aside the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner and matter was remanded to Authorities for determination of the issue regarding identity of employer or other person responsible for payment of wages of the company---Petition was allowed in circumstances.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Payment of Wages Act, 1936=3(b),15,15(5)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 6996 of 2014, decided on 22nd January, 2015",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAHID KARIM, J",
    "": "SHAHREZ ABDULLAH KHAN ROKHRI through Traffic Manager\nvs\nSUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, CIVIL LINE, Lahore and 7 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14268",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRlFpTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 283 = 2011 SLD 283 = (2011) 103 TAX 137",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Wealth Tax Act, (XV of 1963)=2(5),3,4,27\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W.T.A. 19 of 1999, decided on 23-12-2008. DATE of hearing: 12-10-2010",
    "Judge Name:": "IJAZ-UL-AHSAN AND MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, JJ",
    "": "KHALID MEHMOOD KHAN\nVs\nINCOME TAXWEALTH TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, Lahore"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14269",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRlF5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2011 284 = 2011 SLD 284 = (2011) 103 TAX 371",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(5),16,32,139,181\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "S.A. O. No. 25 of 2005, decided on 9-12-2010",
    "Judge Name:": "EJAZ AFZAL KHAN",
    "": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, PESHAWAR\nVs\nGUL JAN"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14270",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRlJ5QT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 286 = 2009 SLD 286 = (2009) 99 TAX 9 = (2007) 288 ITR 1",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=36(1)(iii)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 5811 AND 5812 OF 2006, DECEMBER 14, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ",
    "": "S.A. Builders Ltd\nvs\nCommissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Chandigarh"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14271",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRlNDRT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2009 272 = 2009 SLD 272 = (2009) 100 TAX 272 = 2009 PTD 1054 = 2009 PTCL 734",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 659 of 2009, decided on 6th April, 2009",
    "Judge Name:": "KHAWAJA FAROOQ SAEED, J.",
    "": "Messrs EJAZ SPINNING MILLS LTD. through COMPANY SECRETARY \nvs\nTAXATION OFFICERADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, Lahore and ANOTHER"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14272",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIRlNTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 422 = 2015 SLD 422 = 2015 CLC 641 = 2015 PLJ 140 = 2015 CLD 307",
    "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---\n \n----Ss. 29 & 29-A---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10 & O.XXXVII, Rr.2, 3---Summary suit against the legal heir of executant of negotiable instrument---Maintainability---Plaintiff filed suit for recovery of money on the basis of cheque whose maker died before encashment of the same---Suit was dismissed by the Trial Court---Validity---Maker of cheque had died before the same could be presented for encashment---Said cheque had ceased to have any effect as a \"\"bill of exchange\"\" on the death of its maker---Summary suit could only be filed against the executants of bill of exchange, hundies or promissory notes and not otherwise---Party who was not a drawer or maker of a cheque/bill of exchange was not liable thereon and he could not be sued under O.XXXVII, Rr.2 & 3, C.P.C.---Legal representatives of deceased must sign the instruments in order to make them liable thereunder---Defendants had not signed the disputed cheque, they were not liable to the plaintiff against the cheque issued by their predecessor---Present suit was not maintainable---Trial Court was directed to return the plaint---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Ashraf and another v. Nadeem Shahid and another 1998 SCMR 804 and Tanveer Mehboob and another v. Haroon and others 2003 SCMR 480 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=29,29-A\\n\\r\\n\\rCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.VII,R.10,O.XXXVII,R.2,3\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 288 of 2010, decided on 5th June, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ABAID ULLAH\nvs\nATEEQ-UR-REHMAN and 8 others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14273",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIS1FpUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 479 = 2008 SLD 479 = (2008) 98 TAX 240 = (2007) 288 ITR 585",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=37(1),271(1)(c)\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT APPEAL No. 809 OF 2006 SEPTEMBER 8, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "T.S. THAKUR AND SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of INCOME TAX\nvs\nBacardi Martini India Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14274",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIS1F5VT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 488 = 2008 SLD 488 = (2007) 288 ITR 345 = (2008) 98 TAX 349",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1961=158BD\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "IT APPEAL No. 1221 OF 2006, AUGUST 29, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "MADAN B. LOKUR AND VIPIN SANGHI, JJ",
    "": "Commissioner of INCOME TAX, Delhi\nvs\nSMC Share Brokers Ltd"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14275",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIS1F5UT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 456 = 2015 SLD 456 = 2015 PCRLJ 185",
    "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 497---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), Ss.9(b) & 26---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Corruption and corrupt practices---Bail, grant of---Tender of pardon, withdrawal of---Delay in filing of reference---Case of further inquiry---Petitioners were arrested by National Accountability Bureau for committing offence of corruption and corrupt practices by taking illegal gratification from students---National Accountability Bureau granted pardon to co-accused persons and their statements were recorded under S. 164, Cr.P.C. by Judicial Magistrate but after their statements, their pardon was cancelled---In letter of withdrawing pardon, it was written that pardon was granted on condition of making full disclosure relating to offence and both the persons failed to comply with the condition, therefore, pardon was withdrawn---Effect---National Accountability Bureau itself was not satisfied with confessional statements made in lieu of pardon---Co-accused persons in their statements did not specifically target petitioners but they implicated many other persons also some of them were already on bail---Incident was committed in year, 2001, inquiry was started in year, 2005 and inquiry report was submitted in year, 2010 while the reference was moved in year, 2014---No justification was placed by National Accountability Bureau for its inactive attitude for such a long delay which had made out case of petitioners of further inquiry---Petition was allowed in circumstances.\n \nAbdul Kahliq v. State 1996 SCMR 1553; Abdullah Khan v. Abdul Qayoom and another 1996 SCMR 493; Sardar Amin Farooqui's case 2014 PCr.LJ 186 and Muhammad Ismail v. Muhammad Rafiq and another PLD 1989 SC 585 ref.",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199\\n\\r\\n\\rCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=164\\n\\r\\n\\rNational Accountability Bureau Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)=9(b),26\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-2632 of 2014, decided on 17th July, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND SHAHNAWAZ TARIQ, JJ",
    "": "ABDUL HADI SIDDIQUI\nvs\nNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB)"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14276",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIS1F5TT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2008 489 = 2008 SLD 489 = (2008) 98 TAX 352 = (2007) 288 ITR 393",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Delhi High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Police Order (22 of 2002)=80HH\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "W. P. (C) No. 2765 OF 2001, FEBRUARY 21, 2006",
    "Judge Name:": "MARKANDEYA KATJU, C.J. MADAN B. LOKUR, J",
    "": "Kajaria Ceramics Ltd\nvs\nUnion of India"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14277",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtIS1JDTT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 466 = 2015 SLD 466 = 2015 PCRLJ 224 = 2015 PLJ 10",
    "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---\n \n----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.406 & 75---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.10-A---Criminal breach of trust---Bail, grant of---Principles---Further inquiry---Registration of other F.I.Rs.---Conviction in other cases---Effect---Habitual offender---Determination of---Alleged offence not falling under prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.---Where offence did not fall within prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C. grant of bail had to be considered favourably as a rule and could only be declined in exceptional cases, namely, where accused was likely to abscond, tamper with prosecution evidence, repeat the offence if released and/or where accused was a previous convict---F.I.R. was registered by delay of 3 months---Story narrated in F.I.R. did not constitute alleged offence---Whether the alleged breach constituted offence would be determined by Trial Court---Case of accused was one of further inquiry---Investigation had been completed---Further custody of accused would serve no beneficial purpose---Amount involved in the case would not influence the grant of bail as offences in Penal Code were of criminal nature, proceedings related to such offences could not be treated as recovery proceedings---Presumption of innocence was basic pillar of criminal law---Every person had to be presumed innocent until proved guilty---Presumption of innocence was basis of right to defence of an accused and key to fair trial---Under Art.10-A of the Constitution right to fair trial was a fundamental right---Fair trial and due process essentially envisaged being free from bias of every kind---Person facing trial in multiple F.I.Rs. had independent right to defend himself in each case---Registration of other cases would not influence/bias court as such bias would deprive accused of his right to fair trial---Justice should not only be done but also should be seen to have been done---Conviction in other case would only be relevant for specific purpose of enhancement of punishment under S.75, P.P.C.---Mere factum of registration of cases was not sufficient to form opinion that accused was a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal in terms of fourth proviso to subsection (1) of S.497, Cr.P.C.---Mere registration of a case by itself was not sufficient to declare an accused habitual offender unless accused had been convicted of any of such offences---Court could not allow itself to be prejudiced or influenced by registration of another case/multiple cases or even conviction as any such influence would deny accused the right to fair trial and due process---Discretion to grant bail could not be exercised in arbitrary, fanciful or perverse manner---Where accused had made out a case for grant of bail on reasonable grounds, refusal of bail on ground of conviction in some other case would give rise to factor of bias which would deprive accused of the right to defence, due process and fair trial---Bias resulting from conviction in another case would lead to an absurd situation wherein conviction in one case would be deemed conviction in every case, resultantly, accused will not be able to get bail in other cases and would remain incarcerated without trial---Accused was admitted to bail.\n \n Muhammad Naeem v. The State PLD 2003 Kar. 76 and Faisal Khawaja v. The State 2001 MLD 1237 ref.\n \n Shameel Ahmed v. The State 2009 SCMR 174 distinguished.\n \n Zafar Iqbal v. Muhammad Anwar and others 2009 SCMR 1488; Mounder v. The State PLD 1990 SC 934 and Jafar alias Jafari v. The State 2012 SCMR 606 rel.\n \n(b) Constitution of Pakistan---\n \n----Art. 10-A--- Fair trial---Scope---Constituents/requirements/ essentials---Presumption of innocence was basis of right to defence of an accused and key to fair trial---Under Art.10-A of the Constitution fair trial was a Fundamental Right---Fair trial and due process essentially envisaged being free from bais of every kind---Court could not allow itself to be prejudiced or influenced by registration of another case/multiple cases or even conviction of a person, as any such influence would deny accused right to fair trial and due process.",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497,497(1)\\n\\r\\n\\rConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A\\n\\r\\n\\rPakistan Penal Code, 1860=406,75\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous No. 514-B of 2014, decided on 9th September, 2014",
    "Judge Name:": "ATHER MINALLAH, J",
    "": "MUHAMMAD ABID FAROOQ\nvs\nThe STATE and another"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14278",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtITFFDUT0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 790 = 2015 SLD 790 = (2015) 111 TAX 247 = 2015 PTD 1308",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=18,18(3),30\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Suit Nos. 83 & 84 2015, decided 27-1-2015. DATE of hearing: 21-1-2015 & 23-1-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "NAZAR AKBAR, J",
    "": "NAWAB BRothersTEEL MILL (PVT.) LTD. and other\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others"
  },
  {
    "Case No.": "14279",
    "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=cWtITFJTND0",
    "Citation or Reference:": "SLD 2015 794 = 2015 SLD 794 = (2015) 111 TAX 329",
    "Key Words:": "",
    "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court",
    "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,133(4)\\n\\r\\n\\rIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=12(18),59A,66A\\n\\r",
    "Case #": "Case No. Tax Reference No. 66 of 2004, Decided on 12-02-2015",
    "Judge Name:": "AAMER FAROOQ AND ATHAR MINALLAH",
    "": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAXWEALTH TAX COMPANIES ZONE\nvs\nMs FAHMIDA HAMID"
  }
]