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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.
Judge: Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That is correct.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.
Judge: Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109.
Petitioner: That is correct.
Judge: So we're pretty far removed from the language of the statute, I guess.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>But, again, ever since 1908, that's a standard that this Court has not accepted. And this is based on the provision, the well-settled provision, that an earlier Congress cannot bind a later Congress.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.
Judge: Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109.
Petitioner: That is correct.
Judge: So we're pretty far removed from the language of the statute, I guess.
Petitioner: But, again, ever since 1908, that's a standard that this Court has not accepted. And this is based on the provision, the well-settled provision, that an earlier Congress cannot bind a later Congress.
Judge: Oh, and I understand that. But presumably -- we also have the proposition that Congress, when it enacts legislation, knows the law. They would have known section 109 required an express statement if they wanted to apply the change retroactively. So why shouldn't we hold them to that standard?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>The answer is no, I don't believe that Congress felt that that was the standard. Again relying on this Court's jurisprudence that said you give us text and if we are able to find that the fair implication and the intent of Congress through that fair implication is that this new statute applies, because an earlier Congress cannot bind the newer Congress--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.
Judge: Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109.
Petitioner: That is correct.
Judge: So we're pretty far removed from the language of the statute, I guess.
Petitioner: But, again, ever since 1908, that's a standard that this Court has not accepted. And this is based on the provision, the well-settled provision, that an earlier Congress cannot bind a later Congress.
Judge: Oh, and I understand that. But presumably -- we also have the proposition that Congress, when it enacts legislation, knows the law. They would have known section 109 required an express statement if they wanted to apply the change retroactively. So why shouldn't we hold them to that standard?
Petitioner: The answer is no, I don't believe that Congress felt that that was the standard. Again relying on this Court's jurisprudence that said you give us text and if we are able to find that the fair implication and the intent of Congress through that fair implication is that this new statute applies, because an earlier Congress cannot bind the newer Congress--
Judge: Well, on your statement that the--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Oh, absolutely, the Court is, Your Honor. And we acknowledge--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--
Judge: But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--This case?<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--
Judge: But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case?
Petitioner: --This case?
Judge: Yes.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, since -- I think since this is not a prison breakout case, I don't know whether data about breakouts--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--
Judge: But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case?
Petitioner: --This case?
Judge: Yes.
Petitioner: Well, since -- I think since this is not a prison breakout case, I don't know whether data about breakouts--
Judge: Do we look to the crime to see generally whether or not it involves violence and serious risk of harm?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I think you -- I think the categorical rule does require you to look at--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--
Judge: But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case?
Petitioner: --This case?
Judge: Yes.
Petitioner: Well, since -- I think since this is not a prison breakout case, I don't know whether data about breakouts--
Judge: Do we look to the crime to see generally whether or not it involves violence and serious risk of harm?
Petitioner: --I think you -- I think the categorical rule does require you to look at--
Judge: So that, in my hypothetical, it would be a more difficult case than the case we have here or would it be the same?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I think in your hypothetical, where a prison breakout -- where a prison breakout is involved--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>this mo- Do you...<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...
Judge: I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...
Judge: I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence.
Petitioner: Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott.
Judge: what happens in Alabama if if a a criminal defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor and placed on probation and then violates probation? Does that enable the State to impose the original sentence for violation of the probation?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Our reading of of Scott is that th- that we cannot activate the suspended sentence.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...
Judge: I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence.
Petitioner: Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott.
Judge: what happens in Alabama if if a a criminal defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor and placed on probation and then violates probation? Does that enable the State to impose the original sentence for violation of the probation?
Petitioner: Our reading of of Scott is that th- that we cannot activate the suspended sentence.
Judge: Well, then we're jumping probably ahead into wh- what you're going to tell us, but while we're at this point,<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, ordinarily it would.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...
Judge: I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence.
Petitioner: Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott.
Judge: what happens in Alabama if if a a criminal defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor and placed on probation and then violates probation? Does that enable the State to impose the original sentence for violation of the probation?
Petitioner: Our reading of of Scott is that th- that we cannot activate the suspended sentence.
Judge: Well, then we're jumping probably ahead into wh- what you're going to tell us, but while we're at this point,
Petitioner: Yes, ordinarily it would.
Judge: It It It seems to me that if i- if you say that the s- sentence cannot be reim- im- imposed, you're saying that the State courts are in the position of imposing a sentence th- th- that is s- s- s- s- s- s- s- s- something of a ruse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Right...<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.
Judge: If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.
Judge: If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually?
Petitioner: Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment.
Judge: What's your answer simply to the very simple argument that because the floor was set on the assumption of a 100 to 1 ratio, set by Congress, that any other sentencing assumption, regardless of the particular justifications in a given case, is simply incoherent with the statutory scheme and for that reason should be regarded as unreasonable?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Your Honor.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.
Judge: If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually?
Petitioner: Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment.
Judge: What's your answer simply to the very simple argument that because the floor was set on the assumption of a 100 to 1 ratio, set by Congress, that any other sentencing assumption, regardless of the particular justifications in a given case, is simply incoherent with the statutory scheme and for that reason should be regarded as unreasonable?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: It is the coherence problem that is bothering us.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes. There are several answers to that question, Justice Souter. The first is that this Court has recognized with the same statute which has the same structure that the government argues can only logically be understood one way, that with regard to the weight for LSD in the case of Neal versus United States, it is perfectly appropriate for there to be two different methods of calculating weight for purposes of punishment. The Guidelines calculate weight based on a presumed weight of the combination of the LSD and the blotter paper or the carrier medium. And the statute defines the method for calculating the mandatory minimum by the combined weight of the LSD and the blotter paper, regardless of whether it is heavy or whether it is light.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.
Judge: If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually?
Petitioner: Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment.
Judge: What's your answer simply to the very simple argument that because the floor was set on the assumption of a 100 to 1 ratio, set by Congress, that any other sentencing assumption, regardless of the particular justifications in a given case, is simply incoherent with the statutory scheme and for that reason should be regarded as unreasonable?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: It is the coherence problem that is bothering us.
Petitioner: Yes. There are several answers to that question, Justice Souter. The first is that this Court has recognized with the same statute which has the same structure that the government argues can only logically be understood one way, that with regard to the weight for LSD in the case of Neal versus United States, it is perfectly appropriate for there to be two different methods of calculating weight for purposes of punishment. The Guidelines calculate weight based on a presumed weight of the combination of the LSD and the blotter paper or the carrier medium. And the statute defines the method for calculating the mandatory minimum by the combined weight of the LSD and the blotter paper, regardless of whether it is heavy or whether it is light.
Judge: But is that an argument for saying, well, in the LSD case, you approved of incoherence and irrationality, therefore, you want to do it across the board? I mean, there is still an argument here on the merits regardless of Neal that there is an incoherence between the minimum and the kind of discretion that you're talking about.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, Your Honor, I think what Neal reflects is that there's no implicit binding policy directive in 841 itself that requires either the Commission or sentencing courts to follow in lock step on a graduated proportionate scheme, whatever it is that Congress decided with respect to two specific triggers should be the case.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.
Judge: Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Okay.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.
Judge: Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Petitioner: Okay.
Judge: Those are exactly equivalent. Now, if they were to say the latter, would a conviction under this statute potentially qualify under the Armed Career Criminal Act?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I don't believe it would, because I don't believe possessory interest equates to Taylor definition.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.
Judge: Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Petitioner: Okay.
Judge: Those are exactly equivalent. Now, if they were to say the latter, would a conviction under this statute potentially qualify under the Armed Career Criminal Act?
Petitioner: Well, I don't believe it would, because I don't believe possessory interest equates to Taylor definition.
Judge: No, but they -- they set out alternative elements, either breaking into the structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, if -- if the elements are shown, and if that's the definition, then yes. But I don't think California possessory interest is the same thing.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.
Judge: Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Petitioner: Okay.
Judge: Those are exactly equivalent. Now, if they were to say the latter, would a conviction under this statute potentially qualify under the Armed Career Criminal Act?
Petitioner: Well, I don't believe it would, because I don't believe possessory interest equates to Taylor definition.
Judge: No, but they -- they set out alternative elements, either breaking into the structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Petitioner: Well, if -- if the elements are shown, and if that's the definition, then yes. But I don't think California possessory interest is the same thing.
Judge: But they have said -- do you dispute the fact that saying A, an element is the violation of the possessory interest, and B, the elements are breaking or the violation of the possessory interest in same other way, are exactly the same substantively?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I don't, Your Honor, because in the Taylor sense you have to have an unlawful trespass, actually a trespass, or an invasion of a person's -- well, unlawful trespass. In California you don't have to have a trespass. And as the Court indicated in the Taylor decision, it talked about shoplifting in the State of California. So is a shoplifter someone who should be subject to an Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement?<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.
Judge: Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.
Judge: Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line.
Petitioner: Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake.
Judge: Well, I'm -- I'm not sure that that's quite correct. It has said it often, but always in context where it is well understood that speech can injure. Defamation, Gertz. At page 12 of your brief, you make this point, and it's what Justice Sotomayor is indicating. You think there's no value to falsity. But I -- I simply can't find that in our cases, and I -- I think it's a sweeping proposition to say that there's no value to falsity. Falsity is a way in which we contrast what is false and what is true.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I want to be--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.
Judge: Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line.
Petitioner: Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake.
Judge: Well, I'm -- I'm not sure that that's quite correct. It has said it often, but always in context where it is well understood that speech can injure. Defamation, Gertz. At page 12 of your brief, you make this point, and it's what Justice Sotomayor is indicating. You think there's no value to falsity. But I -- I simply can't find that in our cases, and I -- I think it's a sweeping proposition to say that there's no value to falsity. Falsity is a way in which we contrast what is false and what is true.
Petitioner: I want to be--
Judge: And--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I want to respond with precision, Justice Kennedy, that the -- I think what this Court -- and Gertz is a good example -- has done is to draw a line, and that line -- and I think it is Gertz itself that contains this Court's statement that false statements of fact have no First Amendment value. That doesn't automatically mean that a false statement of fact lacks First Amendment protection.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.
Judge: Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line.
Petitioner: Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake.
Judge: Well, I'm -- I'm not sure that that's quite correct. It has said it often, but always in context where it is well understood that speech can injure. Defamation, Gertz. At page 12 of your brief, you make this point, and it's what Justice Sotomayor is indicating. You think there's no value to falsity. But I -- I simply can't find that in our cases, and I -- I think it's a sweeping proposition to say that there's no value to falsity. Falsity is a way in which we contrast what is false and what is true.
Petitioner: I want to be--
Judge: And--
Petitioner: --I want to respond with precision, Justice Kennedy, that the -- I think what this Court -- and Gertz is a good example -- has done is to draw a line, and that line -- and I think it is Gertz itself that contains this Court's statement that false statements of fact have no First Amendment value. That doesn't automatically mean that a false statement of fact lacks First Amendment protection.
Judge: --But that's in the context of a defamation case.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--
Judge: They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--
Judge: They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying?
Petitioner: --Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And--
Judge: Mr. Coad, how are... how are civil rights which have been taken away typically restored? What is... what is the process for restoring them? Just if you don't commit another offense within a certain number of years?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It depends on the State. In the NACDL lodging that the Court has... I believe 29 States were identified as having some type of restoration procedures. The majority of those, it is by automatic operation of law. So there's no subsequent conditions met by the offender.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--
Judge: They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying?
Petitioner: --Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And--
Judge: Mr. Coad, how are... how are civil rights which have been taken away typically restored? What is... what is the process for restoring them? Just if you don't commit another offense within a certain number of years?
Petitioner: --It depends on the State. In the NACDL lodging that the Court has... I believe 29 States were identified as having some type of restoration procedures. The majority of those, it is by automatic operation of law. So there's no subsequent conditions met by the offender.
Judge: Well, but even... even there I assume the law waits for a certain passage of time, and I would assume that there can be no felony committed during that interim period or the person's sentence has to be served or something? It's ongoing, it's prospective. And so restoration has a real component, in that... that is not present in the statute that we're faced with here.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I think that there really isn't a difference between... by operation of law, a State taking away someone's rights and giving it back or allowing a offender to retain civil rights--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--
Judge: They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying?
Petitioner: --Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And--
Judge: Mr. Coad, how are... how are civil rights which have been taken away typically restored? What is... what is the process for restoring them? Just if you don't commit another offense within a certain number of years?
Petitioner: --It depends on the State. In the NACDL lodging that the Court has... I believe 29 States were identified as having some type of restoration procedures. The majority of those, it is by automatic operation of law. So there's no subsequent conditions met by the offender.
Judge: Well, but even... even there I assume the law waits for a certain passage of time, and I would assume that there can be no felony committed during that interim period or the person's sentence has to be served or something? It's ongoing, it's prospective. And so restoration has a real component, in that... that is not present in the statute that we're faced with here.
Petitioner: Well, I think that there really isn't a difference between... by operation of law, a State taking away someone's rights and giving it back or allowing a offender to retain civil rights--
Judge: Well, it is of... maybe no difference if the operation of law is 24 hours later.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It could be a matter--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?
Petitioner: No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case--
Judge: It has to be raised by the defendant, right?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It does have to be raised initially--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?
Petitioner: No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case--
Judge: It has to be raised by the defendant, right?
Petitioner: --It does have to be raised initially--
Judge: Which means it's not an element. It doesn't have to be charged in the indictment. Now, how can something that goes to the existence or non-existence of an affirmative defense be an element?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, I don't -- it is not an element, I agree with that; but it is -- I would say that it's engrafted onto every Federal criminal statute by statute. This is not the common law, but by Congress's decision. I would also say that even though it's not an element of defense -- of the offense, in Winship, this Court referred to the fact that the government must prove every fact necessary to prove a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It's a fact necessary--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?
Petitioner: No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case--
Judge: It has to be raised by the defendant, right?
Petitioner: --It does have to be raised initially--
Judge: Which means it's not an element. It doesn't have to be charged in the indictment. Now, how can something that goes to the existence or non-existence of an affirmative defense be an element?
Petitioner: --Well, I don't -- it is not an element, I agree with that; but it is -- I would say that it's engrafted onto every Federal criminal statute by statute. This is not the common law, but by Congress's decision. I would also say that even though it's not an element of defense -- of the offense, in Winship, this Court referred to the fact that the government must prove every fact necessary to prove a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It's a fact necessary--
Judge: But you could prove the crime without a reasonable -- beyond a reasonable doubt if you never raised the statute of limitations. And statutes of limitations exist for civil claims as well as criminal claims. And in -- on the civil side, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and it's up to the plaintiff to plead and prove -- both plead and prove it, both the burden of production and persuasion. Why should it be different on the criminal side?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I think several reasons. First of all, obviously, the burden of proof is different in criminal cases as the court said in Mullaney v. Wilbur. It has been suggested that because of the difficulties in negating an argument that a homicide was committed in the heat of passion, the burden of proof should rest on the defendant. And they said the same may be said of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many controverted facts, but this is the traditional burden which our criminal justice system applies. I also thin k that the Court has distinguished on some grounds and is the civil statute of limitations from the criminal statute. In fact, in the number of cases, this Court has talked about the criminal statute of limitations. It has never referred to it as an affirmative defense. It has said it's a defense, but it has never said that the defendant is required to prove it. In fact, the Quick case said it's part of the merits of the case; although it doesn't have to be pleaded in the indictment, and the -- that it has to be -- the Government has to present evidence of it and proof of it.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?
Petitioner: No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case--
Judge: It has to be raised by the defendant, right?
Petitioner: --It does have to be raised initially--
Judge: Which means it's not an element. It doesn't have to be charged in the indictment. Now, how can something that goes to the existence or non-existence of an affirmative defense be an element?
Petitioner: --Well, I don't -- it is not an element, I agree with that; but it is -- I would say that it's engrafted onto every Federal criminal statute by statute. This is not the common law, but by Congress's decision. I would also say that even though it's not an element of defense -- of the offense, in Winship, this Court referred to the fact that the government must prove every fact necessary to prove a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It's a fact necessary--
Judge: But you could prove the crime without a reasonable -- beyond a reasonable doubt if you never raised the statute of limitations. And statutes of limitations exist for civil claims as well as criminal claims. And in -- on the civil side, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and it's up to the plaintiff to plead and prove -- both plead and prove it, both the burden of production and persuasion. Why should it be different on the criminal side?
Petitioner: --I think several reasons. First of all, obviously, the burden of proof is different in criminal cases as the court said in Mullaney v. Wilbur. It has been suggested that because of the difficulties in negating an argument that a homicide was committed in the heat of passion, the burden of proof should rest on the defendant. And they said the same may be said of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many controverted facts, but this is the traditional burden which our criminal justice system applies. I also thin k that the Court has distinguished on some grounds and is the civil statute of limitations from the criminal statute. In fact, in the number of cases, this Court has talked about the criminal statute of limitations. It has never referred to it as an affirmative defense. It has said it's a defense, but it has never said that the defendant is required to prove it. In fact, the Quick case said it's part of the merits of the case; although it doesn't have to be pleaded in the indictment, and the -- that it has to be -- the Government has to present evidence of it and proof of it.
Judge: But you -- I think you -- you recognized that -- that the defendant has the burden of production, not the Government, the burden -- burden of coming forward with this defense and producing some evidence of the withdrawal.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Justice Ginsburg, we do accept that there is a burden of production as with several other things that are not affirmative defenses like entrapment or alibi, also have a burden of production before the Government has to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. So, it's not--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence--
Judge: How do you explain -- I mean, I think that is a principal point, whether Blake and Brieva changed the law. How do you explain the language in Matter of Wadud, which antedates by a good deal those two cases, 1984, which says: "Section 212(c) can only be invoked in a deportation hearing where the ground of deportation charged is also a ground of inadmissibility. " It seems to me that that's the basic point.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Two responses to that, Justice Scalia. I agree, Matter of Wadud is the principal response that the government has, and it does not help them at all. Wadud was deportable for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546, and the BIA had held in a case called Matter of RG in 1958 that that conviction did not render him excludable. And that is confirmed later in the case of Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, which also involved a 1546 conviction, where the BIA says that if Mr. Jimenez had left of the country and returned it appears that he would not have been inadmissible and compares that situation to someone convicted of a firearms offense, which the board and the Attorney General had always said were not waivable. To the extent there is any ambiguity in the language that Your Honor read, it could not have survived the Attorney General's decision in Hernandez-Casillas, which I just quoted at the beginning of the presentation, which said that what one looks to is whether alien in exclusion proceedings would be able to invoke section 212(c) relief. And when the board then addressed the case of the aggravated felony in Matter of Meza, it did not even address Wadud or view it as binding at all. It looked to the conviction and whether it formed a basis for excludability. And the BIA then followed up with no fewer than eight decisions in crime of violence cases indistinguishable from this case where the BIA cited, not Wadud, not any of the other cases that the government is relying on, but cited Meza as articulating the doctrine that the focus of analysis is on the conviction. And the Court has the briefs of several former immigration officials, including two INS general counsel and several INS trial attorneys, confirming that that was the position and the basis on which the government litigated these cases--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence--
Judge: How do you explain -- I mean, I think that is a principal point, whether Blake and Brieva changed the law. How do you explain the language in Matter of Wadud, which antedates by a good deal those two cases, 1984, which says: "Section 212(c) can only be invoked in a deportation hearing where the ground of deportation charged is also a ground of inadmissibility. " It seems to me that that's the basic point.
Petitioner: --Two responses to that, Justice Scalia. I agree, Matter of Wadud is the principal response that the government has, and it does not help them at all. Wadud was deportable for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546, and the BIA had held in a case called Matter of RG in 1958 that that conviction did not render him excludable. And that is confirmed later in the case of Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, which also involved a 1546 conviction, where the BIA says that if Mr. Jimenez had left of the country and returned it appears that he would not have been inadmissible and compares that situation to someone convicted of a firearms offense, which the board and the Attorney General had always said were not waivable. To the extent there is any ambiguity in the language that Your Honor read, it could not have survived the Attorney General's decision in Hernandez-Casillas, which I just quoted at the beginning of the presentation, which said that what one looks to is whether alien in exclusion proceedings would be able to invoke section 212(c) relief. And when the board then addressed the case of the aggravated felony in Matter of Meza, it did not even address Wadud or view it as binding at all. It looked to the conviction and whether it formed a basis for excludability. And the BIA then followed up with no fewer than eight decisions in crime of violence cases indistinguishable from this case where the BIA cited, not Wadud, not any of the other cases that the government is relying on, but cited Meza as articulating the doctrine that the focus of analysis is on the conviction. And the Court has the briefs of several former immigration officials, including two INS general counsel and several INS trial attorneys, confirming that that was the position and the basis on which the government litigated these cases--
Judge: Mr.--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--And in fact -- yes, Justice Kagan?<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence--
Judge: How do you explain -- I mean, I think that is a principal point, whether Blake and Brieva changed the law. How do you explain the language in Matter of Wadud, which antedates by a good deal those two cases, 1984, which says: "Section 212(c) can only be invoked in a deportation hearing where the ground of deportation charged is also a ground of inadmissibility. " It seems to me that that's the basic point.
Petitioner: --Two responses to that, Justice Scalia. I agree, Matter of Wadud is the principal response that the government has, and it does not help them at all. Wadud was deportable for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546, and the BIA had held in a case called Matter of RG in 1958 that that conviction did not render him excludable. And that is confirmed later in the case of Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, which also involved a 1546 conviction, where the BIA says that if Mr. Jimenez had left of the country and returned it appears that he would not have been inadmissible and compares that situation to someone convicted of a firearms offense, which the board and the Attorney General had always said were not waivable. To the extent there is any ambiguity in the language that Your Honor read, it could not have survived the Attorney General's decision in Hernandez-Casillas, which I just quoted at the beginning of the presentation, which said that what one looks to is whether alien in exclusion proceedings would be able to invoke section 212(c) relief. And when the board then addressed the case of the aggravated felony in Matter of Meza, it did not even address Wadud or view it as binding at all. It looked to the conviction and whether it formed a basis for excludability. And the BIA then followed up with no fewer than eight decisions in crime of violence cases indistinguishable from this case where the BIA cited, not Wadud, not any of the other cases that the government is relying on, but cited Meza as articulating the doctrine that the focus of analysis is on the conviction. And the Court has the briefs of several former immigration officials, including two INS general counsel and several INS trial attorneys, confirming that that was the position and the basis on which the government litigated these cases--
Judge: Mr.--
Petitioner: --And in fact -- yes, Justice Kagan?
Judge: --Please finish.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>If I may, I was just going to say that a number of these cases, crime of violence cases, reached the merits in both the BIA and the courts of appeals without the government even suggesting that there was a statutory counterpart problem. In fact, when it has suited its purposes the government and the BIA have admitted that Blake was a change, including in a brief filed in the Ninth Circuit less than a year ago.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence--
Judge: How do you explain -- I mean, I think that is a principal point, whether Blake and Brieva changed the law. How do you explain the language in Matter of Wadud, which antedates by a good deal those two cases, 1984, which says: "Section 212(c) can only be invoked in a deportation hearing where the ground of deportation charged is also a ground of inadmissibility. " It seems to me that that's the basic point.
Petitioner: --Two responses to that, Justice Scalia. I agree, Matter of Wadud is the principal response that the government has, and it does not help them at all. Wadud was deportable for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546, and the BIA had held in a case called Matter of RG in 1958 that that conviction did not render him excludable. And that is confirmed later in the case of Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, which also involved a 1546 conviction, where the BIA says that if Mr. Jimenez had left of the country and returned it appears that he would not have been inadmissible and compares that situation to someone convicted of a firearms offense, which the board and the Attorney General had always said were not waivable. To the extent there is any ambiguity in the language that Your Honor read, it could not have survived the Attorney General's decision in Hernandez-Casillas, which I just quoted at the beginning of the presentation, which said that what one looks to is whether alien in exclusion proceedings would be able to invoke section 212(c) relief. And when the board then addressed the case of the aggravated felony in Matter of Meza, it did not even address Wadud or view it as binding at all. It looked to the conviction and whether it formed a basis for excludability. And the BIA then followed up with no fewer than eight decisions in crime of violence cases indistinguishable from this case where the BIA cited, not Wadud, not any of the other cases that the government is relying on, but cited Meza as articulating the doctrine that the focus of analysis is on the conviction. And the Court has the briefs of several former immigration officials, including two INS general counsel and several INS trial attorneys, confirming that that was the position and the basis on which the government litigated these cases--
Judge: Mr.--
Petitioner: --And in fact -- yes, Justice Kagan?
Judge: --Please finish.
Petitioner: If I may, I was just going to say that a number of these cases, crime of violence cases, reached the merits in both the BIA and the courts of appeals without the government even suggesting that there was a statutory counterpart problem. In fact, when it has suited its purposes the government and the BIA have admitted that Blake was a change, including in a brief filed in the Ninth Circuit less than a year ago.
Judge: You cite some cases. You say there was a dramatic change in the law. The government cites some cases and it says there was no change in the law. What if the truth lies someplace in the middle. What if, in fact, when you look before Blake what you see is some amount of confusion; that the board sometimes was following the Blake rule, but that at other times individual judges or maybe the board itself were doing something different, because the individual circumstances suggested that they should, or just because they weren't so clear on the difference between these two approaches. And then Blake comes along, and what Blake does is neither to change something dramatically nor to just reaffirm what was there, but in some sense to create a little bit of order out of chaos. What would that do to your argument if that's the way one understood Blake?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Obviously, Justice Kagan, we don't think that is the proper way to understand Blake. But to answer the question, for purposes of the retroactivity analysis, the Court uses what the Court in St. Cyr called "considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations. " And we would submit that reliance was more than reasonable and expectations more than settled as to how the board was addressing crime of violence aggravated felony convictions prior to Blake, as is shown by the evidence that I cited a minute ago, namely the position that the government itself was taking in these cases and the way that immigrants would have been advised by both criminal defense counsel and immigration counsel, including, for that matter, INS trial counsel.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence--
Judge: How do you explain -- I mean, I think that is a principal point, whether Blake and Brieva changed the law. How do you explain the language in Matter of Wadud, which antedates by a good deal those two cases, 1984, which says: "Section 212(c) can only be invoked in a deportation hearing where the ground of deportation charged is also a ground of inadmissibility. " It seems to me that that's the basic point.
Petitioner: --Two responses to that, Justice Scalia. I agree, Matter of Wadud is the principal response that the government has, and it does not help them at all. Wadud was deportable for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546, and the BIA had held in a case called Matter of RG in 1958 that that conviction did not render him excludable. And that is confirmed later in the case of Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, which also involved a 1546 conviction, where the BIA says that if Mr. Jimenez had left of the country and returned it appears that he would not have been inadmissible and compares that situation to someone convicted of a firearms offense, which the board and the Attorney General had always said were not waivable. To the extent there is any ambiguity in the language that Your Honor read, it could not have survived the Attorney General's decision in Hernandez-Casillas, which I just quoted at the beginning of the presentation, which said that what one looks to is whether alien in exclusion proceedings would be able to invoke section 212(c) relief. And when the board then addressed the case of the aggravated felony in Matter of Meza, it did not even address Wadud or view it as binding at all. It looked to the conviction and whether it formed a basis for excludability. And the BIA then followed up with no fewer than eight decisions in crime of violence cases indistinguishable from this case where the BIA cited, not Wadud, not any of the other cases that the government is relying on, but cited Meza as articulating the doctrine that the focus of analysis is on the conviction. And the Court has the briefs of several former immigration officials, including two INS general counsel and several INS trial attorneys, confirming that that was the position and the basis on which the government litigated these cases--
Judge: Mr.--
Petitioner: --And in fact -- yes, Justice Kagan?
Judge: --Please finish.
Petitioner: If I may, I was just going to say that a number of these cases, crime of violence cases, reached the merits in both the BIA and the courts of appeals without the government even suggesting that there was a statutory counterpart problem. In fact, when it has suited its purposes the government and the BIA have admitted that Blake was a change, including in a brief filed in the Ninth Circuit less than a year ago.
Judge: You cite some cases. You say there was a dramatic change in the law. The government cites some cases and it says there was no change in the law. What if the truth lies someplace in the middle. What if, in fact, when you look before Blake what you see is some amount of confusion; that the board sometimes was following the Blake rule, but that at other times individual judges or maybe the board itself were doing something different, because the individual circumstances suggested that they should, or just because they weren't so clear on the difference between these two approaches. And then Blake comes along, and what Blake does is neither to change something dramatically nor to just reaffirm what was there, but in some sense to create a little bit of order out of chaos. What would that do to your argument if that's the way one understood Blake?
Petitioner: Obviously, Justice Kagan, we don't think that is the proper way to understand Blake. But to answer the question, for purposes of the retroactivity analysis, the Court uses what the Court in St. Cyr called "considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations. " And we would submit that reliance was more than reasonable and expectations more than settled as to how the board was addressing crime of violence aggravated felony convictions prior to Blake, as is shown by the evidence that I cited a minute ago, namely the position that the government itself was taking in these cases and the way that immigrants would have been advised by both criminal defense counsel and immigration counsel, including, for that matter, INS trial counsel.
Judge: Well, reliance on confused law is certainly not reasonable reliance. I mean, if you accept the -- the premise that Justice Kagan operates from, how can you say that -- that you're reasonably relying on confused law?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I don't accept the premise at all, Justice Scalia, that the law was confused.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: We will now hear argument in Brown against Payton. Ms. Cortina.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: In this case, the Ninth Circuit violated AEDPA by reversing the California Supreme Court's decision affirming Payton's 1982 death sentence. The California Supreme Court applied the exact right case, namely Boyde v. California, in the very manner contemplated that... by that decision when assessing Payton's claim that his jury misunderstood the court's instructions and, in particular, factor (k) so as to unconstitutionally preclude consideration of his mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court's application of Boyde is precisely the type of good faith application of Federal constitutional law to which AEDPA demands deference. It is manifestly not objectively unreasonable, and this can be demonstrated in three aspects of the decision. The first is that the California Supreme Court recognized Boyde's specific holding that factor (k) facially comported with the Eighth Amendment. The second is--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: We will now hear argument in Brown against Payton. Ms. Cortina.
Petitioner: Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: In this case, the Ninth Circuit violated AEDPA by reversing the California Supreme Court's decision affirming Payton's 1982 death sentence. The California Supreme Court applied the exact right case, namely Boyde v. California, in the very manner contemplated that... by that decision when assessing Payton's claim that his jury misunderstood the court's instructions and, in particular, factor (k) so as to unconstitutionally preclude consideration of his mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court's application of Boyde is precisely the type of good faith application of Federal constitutional law to which AEDPA demands deference. It is manifestly not objectively unreasonable, and this can be demonstrated in three aspects of the decision. The first is that the California Supreme Court recognized Boyde's specific holding that factor (k) facially comported with the Eighth Amendment. The second is--
Judge: Well, I thought the holding was that factor (k), standing alone, does... does not raise a... does... does not, standing alone, raise a question of reasonable probability of... of misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. And that's not what they're claiming here. They're claiming here that there was something much more than (k) standing alone. As I understand it, they're claiming that the difference between this and Boyde and why this is not a standalone kind of case is that the prosecutor deliberately argued or argued law that was in fact wrong and... and continued to do so even after the court interrupted the argument and that the court never gave an instruction that corrected the erroneous statements of law that the prosecutor had made. So that's... that's why they're... they're saying this is not a Boyde situation.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Your Honor, Boyde has two specific components to its decision, which is, first, what factor (k) means standing alone, and you need to resolve that issue, which California did, in deciding the impact of the prosecutor's misstatements concerning factor (k). So that, first, you start from the premise, as the California Supreme Court did, in following Boyde, that factor (k) facially directed for consideration of Payton's mitigating evidence.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: We will now hear argument in Brown against Payton. Ms. Cortina.
Petitioner: Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: In this case, the Ninth Circuit violated AEDPA by reversing the California Supreme Court's decision affirming Payton's 1982 death sentence. The California Supreme Court applied the exact right case, namely Boyde v. California, in the very manner contemplated that... by that decision when assessing Payton's claim that his jury misunderstood the court's instructions and, in particular, factor (k) so as to unconstitutionally preclude consideration of his mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court's application of Boyde is precisely the type of good faith application of Federal constitutional law to which AEDPA demands deference. It is manifestly not objectively unreasonable, and this can be demonstrated in three aspects of the decision. The first is that the California Supreme Court recognized Boyde's specific holding that factor (k) facially comported with the Eighth Amendment. The second is--
Judge: Well, I thought the holding was that factor (k), standing alone, does... does not raise a... does... does not, standing alone, raise a question of reasonable probability of... of misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. And that's not what they're claiming here. They're claiming here that there was something much more than (k) standing alone. As I understand it, they're claiming that the difference between this and Boyde and why this is not a standalone kind of case is that the prosecutor deliberately argued or argued law that was in fact wrong and... and continued to do so even after the court interrupted the argument and that the court never gave an instruction that corrected the erroneous statements of law that the prosecutor had made. So that's... that's why they're... they're saying this is not a Boyde situation.
Petitioner: --Your Honor, Boyde has two specific components to its decision, which is, first, what factor (k) means standing alone, and you need to resolve that issue, which California did, in deciding the impact of the prosecutor's misstatements concerning factor (k). So that, first, you start from the premise, as the California Supreme Court did, in following Boyde, that factor (k) facially directed for consideration of Payton's mitigating evidence.
Judge: Well, no, no. The... the mitigating evidence that Boyde held could be considered without a... (k) being a bar, was mitigating evidence about the... the character of the individual prior to or at least up to the moment of the crime. So this is... this is different kind of evidence, and I... I mean, this is post-crime evidence. And... and I don't see that... that Boyde's holding is so broad as obviously to cover this at all. It might be a... it would be a... a closer question if it hadn't been for the prosecutor's argument and the judge's failure to correct it. But even... even without those elements, there would be a serious question whether Boyde covered this at all.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Your Honor, the... respectfully I disagree. I believe that the California Supreme Court correctly and... and reasonably determined that Boyde's holding encompassed Payton's character mitigating... Payton's mitigating character evidence because the holding in Boyde... or the issue directly presented by Boyde was whether factor (k) limited consideration to circumstances related to the crime or allowed for non-crime related mitigating evidence in deciding the appropriate penalty.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: We will now hear argument in Brown against Payton. Ms. Cortina.
Petitioner: Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: In this case, the Ninth Circuit violated AEDPA by reversing the California Supreme Court's decision affirming Payton's 1982 death sentence. The California Supreme Court applied the exact right case, namely Boyde v. California, in the very manner contemplated that... by that decision when assessing Payton's claim that his jury misunderstood the court's instructions and, in particular, factor (k) so as to unconstitutionally preclude consideration of his mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court's application of Boyde is precisely the type of good faith application of Federal constitutional law to which AEDPA demands deference. It is manifestly not objectively unreasonable, and this can be demonstrated in three aspects of the decision. The first is that the California Supreme Court recognized Boyde's specific holding that factor (k) facially comported with the Eighth Amendment. The second is--
Judge: Well, I thought the holding was that factor (k), standing alone, does... does not raise a... does... does not, standing alone, raise a question of reasonable probability of... of misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. And that's not what they're claiming here. They're claiming here that there was something much more than (k) standing alone. As I understand it, they're claiming that the difference between this and Boyde and why this is not a standalone kind of case is that the prosecutor deliberately argued or argued law that was in fact wrong and... and continued to do so even after the court interrupted the argument and that the court never gave an instruction that corrected the erroneous statements of law that the prosecutor had made. So that's... that's why they're... they're saying this is not a Boyde situation.
Petitioner: --Your Honor, Boyde has two specific components to its decision, which is, first, what factor (k) means standing alone, and you need to resolve that issue, which California did, in deciding the impact of the prosecutor's misstatements concerning factor (k). So that, first, you start from the premise, as the California Supreme Court did, in following Boyde, that factor (k) facially directed for consideration of Payton's mitigating evidence.
Judge: Well, no, no. The... the mitigating evidence that Boyde held could be considered without a... (k) being a bar, was mitigating evidence about the... the character of the individual prior to or at least up to the moment of the crime. So this is... this is different kind of evidence, and I... I mean, this is post-crime evidence. And... and I don't see that... that Boyde's holding is so broad as obviously to cover this at all. It might be a... it would be a... a closer question if it hadn't been for the prosecutor's argument and the judge's failure to correct it. But even... even without those elements, there would be a serious question whether Boyde covered this at all.
Petitioner: Your Honor, the... respectfully I disagree. I believe that the California Supreme Court correctly and... and reasonably determined that Boyde's holding encompassed Payton's character mitigating... Payton's mitigating character evidence because the holding in Boyde... or the issue directly presented by Boyde was whether factor (k) limited consideration to circumstances related to the crime or allowed for non-crime related mitigating evidence in deciding the appropriate penalty.
Judge: What do we make of the Chief Justice's fear statement, not once but twice, in Boyde? The prosecutor never suggested that background and character evidence could not be considered. So mustn't we take Boyde with that qualification when we have a case where the prosecutor, indeed, suggested that this information could not be taken into consideration as a mitigating factor?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>No, Justice Ginsburg. First, you must assess factor (k) facially and that's what Boyde did. Then the next question is did the prosecutor's misstatements concerning factor (k) mislead the jury to believe that they could no longer consider Payton's mitigating character evidence. And that would be the second component of Boyde which is a general test for assessing the reasonable likelihood a jury misunderstood the instructions in the context of the proceedings. And the particularly relevant and important inquiry in this case is the California Supreme Court's application of Boyde's reasonable likelihood test in the context of the proceedings.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: We will now hear argument in Brown against Payton. Ms. Cortina.
Petitioner: Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: In this case, the Ninth Circuit violated AEDPA by reversing the California Supreme Court's decision affirming Payton's 1982 death sentence. The California Supreme Court applied the exact right case, namely Boyde v. California, in the very manner contemplated that... by that decision when assessing Payton's claim that his jury misunderstood the court's instructions and, in particular, factor (k) so as to unconstitutionally preclude consideration of his mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court's application of Boyde is precisely the type of good faith application of Federal constitutional law to which AEDPA demands deference. It is manifestly not objectively unreasonable, and this can be demonstrated in three aspects of the decision. The first is that the California Supreme Court recognized Boyde's specific holding that factor (k) facially comported with the Eighth Amendment. The second is--
Judge: Well, I thought the holding was that factor (k), standing alone, does... does not raise a... does... does not, standing alone, raise a question of reasonable probability of... of misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. And that's not what they're claiming here. They're claiming here that there was something much more than (k) standing alone. As I understand it, they're claiming that the difference between this and Boyde and why this is not a standalone kind of case is that the prosecutor deliberately argued or argued law that was in fact wrong and... and continued to do so even after the court interrupted the argument and that the court never gave an instruction that corrected the erroneous statements of law that the prosecutor had made. So that's... that's why they're... they're saying this is not a Boyde situation.
Petitioner: --Your Honor, Boyde has two specific components to its decision, which is, first, what factor (k) means standing alone, and you need to resolve that issue, which California did, in deciding the impact of the prosecutor's misstatements concerning factor (k). So that, first, you start from the premise, as the California Supreme Court did, in following Boyde, that factor (k) facially directed for consideration of Payton's mitigating evidence.
Judge: Well, no, no. The... the mitigating evidence that Boyde held could be considered without a... (k) being a bar, was mitigating evidence about the... the character of the individual prior to or at least up to the moment of the crime. So this is... this is different kind of evidence, and I... I mean, this is post-crime evidence. And... and I don't see that... that Boyde's holding is so broad as obviously to cover this at all. It might be a... it would be a... a closer question if it hadn't been for the prosecutor's argument and the judge's failure to correct it. But even... even without those elements, there would be a serious question whether Boyde covered this at all.
Petitioner: Your Honor, the... respectfully I disagree. I believe that the California Supreme Court correctly and... and reasonably determined that Boyde's holding encompassed Payton's character mitigating... Payton's mitigating character evidence because the holding in Boyde... or the issue directly presented by Boyde was whether factor (k) limited consideration to circumstances related to the crime or allowed for non-crime related mitigating evidence in deciding the appropriate penalty.
Judge: What do we make of the Chief Justice's fear statement, not once but twice, in Boyde? The prosecutor never suggested that background and character evidence could not be considered. So mustn't we take Boyde with that qualification when we have a case where the prosecutor, indeed, suggested that this information could not be taken into consideration as a mitigating factor?
Petitioner: No, Justice Ginsburg. First, you must assess factor (k) facially and that's what Boyde did. Then the next question is did the prosecutor's misstatements concerning factor (k) mislead the jury to believe that they could no longer consider Payton's mitigating character evidence. And that would be the second component of Boyde which is a general test for assessing the reasonable likelihood a jury misunderstood the instructions in the context of the proceedings. And the particularly relevant and important inquiry in this case is the California Supreme Court's application of Boyde's reasonable likelihood test in the context of the proceedings.
Judge: Well, do we take... do we take the case on the assumption that the trial court erred in not giving a curative instruction and in saying, well, this is a matter for the attorneys to argue? You... you don't argue about what a statute means. That's a question of law. You don't argue that. You can argue the facts, that it's mitigating or not mitigating or that it's extenuating or not extenuating, which is I think how you can interpret a lot of this. But it... it seems to me that the trial judge does make a mistake when he says, well, well, this is for the... this is for them to argue when the... the point of the objection was that there was a misinterpretation of the instruction. That's a legal point.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>And that is a fact that was expressly considered by the California Supreme Court in appropriately applying Boyde's general test for whether the jury misunderstood the court's instructions and an instruction that facially called for consideration--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: We will now hear argument in Brown against Payton. Ms. Cortina.
Petitioner: Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: In this case, the Ninth Circuit violated AEDPA by reversing the California Supreme Court's decision affirming Payton's 1982 death sentence. The California Supreme Court applied the exact right case, namely Boyde v. California, in the very manner contemplated that... by that decision when assessing Payton's claim that his jury misunderstood the court's instructions and, in particular, factor (k) so as to unconstitutionally preclude consideration of his mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court's application of Boyde is precisely the type of good faith application of Federal constitutional law to which AEDPA demands deference. It is manifestly not objectively unreasonable, and this can be demonstrated in three aspects of the decision. The first is that the California Supreme Court recognized Boyde's specific holding that factor (k) facially comported with the Eighth Amendment. The second is--
Judge: Well, I thought the holding was that factor (k), standing alone, does... does not raise a... does... does not, standing alone, raise a question of reasonable probability of... of misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. And that's not what they're claiming here. They're claiming here that there was something much more than (k) standing alone. As I understand it, they're claiming that the difference between this and Boyde and why this is not a standalone kind of case is that the prosecutor deliberately argued or argued law that was in fact wrong and... and continued to do so even after the court interrupted the argument and that the court never gave an instruction that corrected the erroneous statements of law that the prosecutor had made. So that's... that's why they're... they're saying this is not a Boyde situation.
Petitioner: --Your Honor, Boyde has two specific components to its decision, which is, first, what factor (k) means standing alone, and you need to resolve that issue, which California did, in deciding the impact of the prosecutor's misstatements concerning factor (k). So that, first, you start from the premise, as the California Supreme Court did, in following Boyde, that factor (k) facially directed for consideration of Payton's mitigating evidence.
Judge: Well, no, no. The... the mitigating evidence that Boyde held could be considered without a... (k) being a bar, was mitigating evidence about the... the character of the individual prior to or at least up to the moment of the crime. So this is... this is different kind of evidence, and I... I mean, this is post-crime evidence. And... and I don't see that... that Boyde's holding is so broad as obviously to cover this at all. It might be a... it would be a... a closer question if it hadn't been for the prosecutor's argument and the judge's failure to correct it. But even... even without those elements, there would be a serious question whether Boyde covered this at all.
Petitioner: Your Honor, the... respectfully I disagree. I believe that the California Supreme Court correctly and... and reasonably determined that Boyde's holding encompassed Payton's character mitigating... Payton's mitigating character evidence because the holding in Boyde... or the issue directly presented by Boyde was whether factor (k) limited consideration to circumstances related to the crime or allowed for non-crime related mitigating evidence in deciding the appropriate penalty.
Judge: What do we make of the Chief Justice's fear statement, not once but twice, in Boyde? The prosecutor never suggested that background and character evidence could not be considered. So mustn't we take Boyde with that qualification when we have a case where the prosecutor, indeed, suggested that this information could not be taken into consideration as a mitigating factor?
Petitioner: No, Justice Ginsburg. First, you must assess factor (k) facially and that's what Boyde did. Then the next question is did the prosecutor's misstatements concerning factor (k) mislead the jury to believe that they could no longer consider Payton's mitigating character evidence. And that would be the second component of Boyde which is a general test for assessing the reasonable likelihood a jury misunderstood the instructions in the context of the proceedings. And the particularly relevant and important inquiry in this case is the California Supreme Court's application of Boyde's reasonable likelihood test in the context of the proceedings.
Judge: Well, do we take... do we take the case on the assumption that the trial court erred in not giving a curative instruction and in saying, well, this is a matter for the attorneys to argue? You... you don't argue about what a statute means. That's a question of law. You don't argue that. You can argue the facts, that it's mitigating or not mitigating or that it's extenuating or not extenuating, which is I think how you can interpret a lot of this. But it... it seems to me that the trial judge does make a mistake when he says, well, well, this is for the... this is for them to argue when the... the point of the objection was that there was a misinterpretation of the instruction. That's a legal point.
Petitioner: And that is a fact that was expressly considered by the California Supreme Court in appropriately applying Boyde's general test for whether the jury misunderstood the court's instructions and an instruction that facially called for consideration--
Judge: Not that... that the jury misunderstood the judge's instruction, that there was no instruction. I mean, the... the picture that's given here is the defense attorney says, I can use this to mitigate. The prosecutor says this is not legitimate mitigating evidence, and he said that several times. And the judge said, well, you could both argue it, and the judge never instructed the jury. He left it to the prosecutors to argue the law to the jury and for the jury to make that legal determination. It... it seems to me that that... that is surely an error. Now, you could still say, well, even so, it was harmless. But... but I don't think... can there be any doubt when the judge tells the attorneys, you argue the law to the jury and let the jury decide what the law is?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Yes. There... there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did not take the prosecutor's statements so as to preclude consideration of Payton's mitigating evidence because the prosecutor's statements cannot--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-9526, McGirt versus Oklahoma. Mr. Gershengorn.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case is resolved by the fundamental proposition that decisions about sovereign rights are for Congress to make and Congress makes those decisions by speaking clearly in the text. The decision below must be reversed because the text makes clear that Congress never terminated the Creek reservation and never transferred federal criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. I have four basic points to make this morning. First, the Creek Nation had a reservation. The relevant treaties reserved the lands from sale and solemnly guaranteed the lands for the Creek to govern. The text of both treaties and statutes expressly identified the Creek land as a reservation. Nothing more was needed. Second, Congress did not establish -- disestablish that reservation. Indeed, Congress considered hallmark language of disestablishment and rejected it. Congress initially sought cession yet instead provided only for allotment. Then, when congressional inaction would have dissolved the tribe, Congress instead preserved the tribe and its government for all purposes authorized by law, and it did so against the backdrop of existing tribal authority to legislate over reservation land. Those congressional judgments should be respected. Third, Congress did not transfer criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. At statehood, the Major Crimes Act established exclusive federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes in "any state of the United States." When Congress overrides the Major Crimes Act and transfers jurisdiction to a state, it does so expressly, and it did not do so here. Finally, Oklahoma's rhetoric about disruption does not change the result. On the criminal side, this Court's decision in Ramos is a complete answer, and on the civil side, the main issues are tax and other regulatory issues that are routinely resolved by tribal-state agreements. In any event, Parker makes clear that questions of sovereignty are distinct from claims of reservation status. This Court should resolve the reservation question, leaving jurisdictional disputes to Congress, the relevant sovereign, and then for this Court to resolve if and when they arise.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-9526, McGirt versus Oklahoma. Mr. Gershengorn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case is resolved by the fundamental proposition that decisions about sovereign rights are for Congress to make and Congress makes those decisions by speaking clearly in the text. The decision below must be reversed because the text makes clear that Congress never terminated the Creek reservation and never transferred federal criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. I have four basic points to make this morning. First, the Creek Nation had a reservation. The relevant treaties reserved the lands from sale and solemnly guaranteed the lands for the Creek to govern. The text of both treaties and statutes expressly identified the Creek land as a reservation. Nothing more was needed. Second, Congress did not establish -- disestablish that reservation. Indeed, Congress considered hallmark language of disestablishment and rejected it. Congress initially sought cession yet instead provided only for allotment. Then, when congressional inaction would have dissolved the tribe, Congress instead preserved the tribe and its government for all purposes authorized by law, and it did so against the backdrop of existing tribal authority to legislate over reservation land. Those congressional judgments should be respected. Third, Congress did not transfer criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. At statehood, the Major Crimes Act established exclusive federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes in "any state of the United States." When Congress overrides the Major Crimes Act and transfers jurisdiction to a state, it does so expressly, and it did not do so here. Finally, Oklahoma's rhetoric about disruption does not change the result. On the criminal side, this Court's decision in Ramos is a complete answer, and on the civil side, the main issues are tax and other regulatory issues that are routinely resolved by tribal-state agreements. In any event, Parker makes clear that questions of sovereignty are distinct from claims of reservation status. This Court should resolve the reservation question, leaving jurisdictional disputes to Congress, the relevant sovereign, and then for this Court to resolve if and when they arise.
Judge: Counsel, the --<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>So let me start this --<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-9526, McGirt versus Oklahoma. Mr. Gershengorn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case is resolved by the fundamental proposition that decisions about sovereign rights are for Congress to make and Congress makes those decisions by speaking clearly in the text. The decision below must be reversed because the text makes clear that Congress never terminated the Creek reservation and never transferred federal criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. I have four basic points to make this morning. First, the Creek Nation had a reservation. The relevant treaties reserved the lands from sale and solemnly guaranteed the lands for the Creek to govern. The text of both treaties and statutes expressly identified the Creek land as a reservation. Nothing more was needed. Second, Congress did not establish -- disestablish that reservation. Indeed, Congress considered hallmark language of disestablishment and rejected it. Congress initially sought cession yet instead provided only for allotment. Then, when congressional inaction would have dissolved the tribe, Congress instead preserved the tribe and its government for all purposes authorized by law, and it did so against the backdrop of existing tribal authority to legislate over reservation land. Those congressional judgments should be respected. Third, Congress did not transfer criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. At statehood, the Major Crimes Act established exclusive federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes in "any state of the United States." When Congress overrides the Major Crimes Act and transfers jurisdiction to a state, it does so expressly, and it did not do so here. Finally, Oklahoma's rhetoric about disruption does not change the result. On the criminal side, this Court's decision in Ramos is a complete answer, and on the civil side, the main issues are tax and other regulatory issues that are routinely resolved by tribal-state agreements. In any event, Parker makes clear that questions of sovereignty are distinct from claims of reservation status. This Court should resolve the reservation question, leaving jurisdictional disputes to Congress, the relevant sovereign, and then for this Court to resolve if and when they arise.
Judge: Counsel, the --
Petitioner: So let me start this --
Judge: -- State argues that the territory should be analyzed as a dependent Indian community under 1151 and not as a reservation. They base this argument on our decisions in Sandoval and Creek Nation and 1151 itself and the fact that the Creeks have always maintained, have been adamant about the fact that they are not reservation Indians. Now you refer, of course, to the many times in which the treaty is referred to as a reservation, but what is your answer to the State's analysis of our precedent?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>So, Your Honor, I think both the precedent and the language support the idea that this is not a dependent Indian community. What this Court said in Venetie and what Judge -- then Judge Gorsuch said in Hydro Resources is that the dependent Indian community label is a catchall for tribes that did not have a reservation and are not on restricted lands. The best evidence of what Congress thought about whether Creek lands were a reservation under the statute is that Congress referred to those lands as a reservation under the statute. With respect to Sandoval and the other cases, it is crystal-clear that when Sandoval and those cases are using the term "dependent Indian community" that they are describing tribes and other groups that are within Congress's broad power to legislate for -- for tribes broadly. They are not excluding the -- the Creek. Indeed, and --<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-9526, McGirt versus Oklahoma. Mr. Gershengorn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case is resolved by the fundamental proposition that decisions about sovereign rights are for Congress to make and Congress makes those decisions by speaking clearly in the text. The decision below must be reversed because the text makes clear that Congress never terminated the Creek reservation and never transferred federal criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. I have four basic points to make this morning. First, the Creek Nation had a reservation. The relevant treaties reserved the lands from sale and solemnly guaranteed the lands for the Creek to govern. The text of both treaties and statutes expressly identified the Creek land as a reservation. Nothing more was needed. Second, Congress did not establish -- disestablish that reservation. Indeed, Congress considered hallmark language of disestablishment and rejected it. Congress initially sought cession yet instead provided only for allotment. Then, when congressional inaction would have dissolved the tribe, Congress instead preserved the tribe and its government for all purposes authorized by law, and it did so against the backdrop of existing tribal authority to legislate over reservation land. Those congressional judgments should be respected. Third, Congress did not transfer criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. At statehood, the Major Crimes Act established exclusive federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes in "any state of the United States." When Congress overrides the Major Crimes Act and transfers jurisdiction to a state, it does so expressly, and it did not do so here. Finally, Oklahoma's rhetoric about disruption does not change the result. On the criminal side, this Court's decision in Ramos is a complete answer, and on the civil side, the main issues are tax and other regulatory issues that are routinely resolved by tribal-state agreements. In any event, Parker makes clear that questions of sovereignty are distinct from claims of reservation status. This Court should resolve the reservation question, leaving jurisdictional disputes to Congress, the relevant sovereign, and then for this Court to resolve if and when they arise.
Judge: Counsel, the --
Petitioner: So let me start this --
Judge: -- State argues that the territory should be analyzed as a dependent Indian community under 1151 and not as a reservation. They base this argument on our decisions in Sandoval and Creek Nation and 1151 itself and the fact that the Creeks have always maintained, have been adamant about the fact that they are not reservation Indians. Now you refer, of course, to the many times in which the treaty is referred to as a reservation, but what is your answer to the State's analysis of our precedent?
Petitioner: So, Your Honor, I think both the precedent and the language support the idea that this is not a dependent Indian community. What this Court said in Venetie and what Judge -- then Judge Gorsuch said in Hydro Resources is that the dependent Indian community label is a catchall for tribes that did not have a reservation and are not on restricted lands. The best evidence of what Congress thought about whether Creek lands were a reservation under the statute is that Congress referred to those lands as a reservation under the statute. With respect to Sandoval and the other cases, it is crystal-clear that when Sandoval and those cases are using the term "dependent Indian community" that they are describing tribes and other groups that are within Congress's broad power to legislate for -- for tribes broadly. They are not excluding the -- the Creek. Indeed, and --
Judge: Thank you, counsel. Justice Thomas?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>So, Your Honor, I think the key point on -- the -- the -- the key point on the Parker/Solem analysis is, as your -- as Your Honor pointed out in that opinion, that those are not -- that that analysis doesn't derive from anything special about -- about how much work Congress is doing. The reason the Court has always required plain text is because treaty rights are at issue and plain text is required to abrogate treaty rights and because sovereign rights are at issue and plain text is required to abrogate sovereign rights. So there's nothing magic about Parker and Solem in terms of whether they're dealing with surplus lands or not. The key point in Parker and Solem is that plain text is required to do the kinds of transfers that are at issue here. And when you look at the plain text, I think this is a -- this case is even stronger than Your Honor's opinion in Parker for three main reasons. First, of course, is that the tribe was not absent from the land in the same way that the tribe was in Parker. Second, the land here was allotted in -- almost entirely to the tribe -- to tribal members themselves, to Indians. And, third, Congress took steps in 1906 to preserve the tribe. And I guess the thing I would point to, Your Honor, when you ask about whether there are cases like this, I think this is stronger than case -- other cases because the question isn't just what did Congress fail to do but how much --<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-9526, McGirt versus Oklahoma. Mr. Gershengorn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case is resolved by the fundamental proposition that decisions about sovereign rights are for Congress to make and Congress makes those decisions by speaking clearly in the text. The decision below must be reversed because the text makes clear that Congress never terminated the Creek reservation and never transferred federal criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. I have four basic points to make this morning. First, the Creek Nation had a reservation. The relevant treaties reserved the lands from sale and solemnly guaranteed the lands for the Creek to govern. The text of both treaties and statutes expressly identified the Creek land as a reservation. Nothing more was needed. Second, Congress did not establish -- disestablish that reservation. Indeed, Congress considered hallmark language of disestablishment and rejected it. Congress initially sought cession yet instead provided only for allotment. Then, when congressional inaction would have dissolved the tribe, Congress instead preserved the tribe and its government for all purposes authorized by law, and it did so against the backdrop of existing tribal authority to legislate over reservation land. Those congressional judgments should be respected. Third, Congress did not transfer criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. At statehood, the Major Crimes Act established exclusive federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes in "any state of the United States." When Congress overrides the Major Crimes Act and transfers jurisdiction to a state, it does so expressly, and it did not do so here. Finally, Oklahoma's rhetoric about disruption does not change the result. On the criminal side, this Court's decision in Ramos is a complete answer, and on the civil side, the main issues are tax and other regulatory issues that are routinely resolved by tribal-state agreements. In any event, Parker makes clear that questions of sovereignty are distinct from claims of reservation status. This Court should resolve the reservation question, leaving jurisdictional disputes to Congress, the relevant sovereign, and then for this Court to resolve if and when they arise.
Judge: Counsel, the --
Petitioner: So let me start this --
Judge: -- State argues that the territory should be analyzed as a dependent Indian community under 1151 and not as a reservation. They base this argument on our decisions in Sandoval and Creek Nation and 1151 itself and the fact that the Creeks have always maintained, have been adamant about the fact that they are not reservation Indians. Now you refer, of course, to the many times in which the treaty is referred to as a reservation, but what is your answer to the State's analysis of our precedent?
Petitioner: So, Your Honor, I think both the precedent and the language support the idea that this is not a dependent Indian community. What this Court said in Venetie and what Judge -- then Judge Gorsuch said in Hydro Resources is that the dependent Indian community label is a catchall for tribes that did not have a reservation and are not on restricted lands. The best evidence of what Congress thought about whether Creek lands were a reservation under the statute is that Congress referred to those lands as a reservation under the statute. With respect to Sandoval and the other cases, it is crystal-clear that when Sandoval and those cases are using the term "dependent Indian community" that they are describing tribes and other groups that are within Congress's broad power to legislate for -- for tribes broadly. They are not excluding the -- the Creek. Indeed, and --
Judge: Thank you, counsel. Justice Thomas?
Petitioner: So, Your Honor, I think the key point on -- the -- the -- the key point on the Parker/Solem analysis is, as your -- as Your Honor pointed out in that opinion, that those are not -- that that analysis doesn't derive from anything special about -- about how much work Congress is doing. The reason the Court has always required plain text is because treaty rights are at issue and plain text is required to abrogate treaty rights and because sovereign rights are at issue and plain text is required to abrogate sovereign rights. So there's nothing magic about Parker and Solem in terms of whether they're dealing with surplus lands or not. The key point in Parker and Solem is that plain text is required to do the kinds of transfers that are at issue here. And when you look at the plain text, I think this is a -- this case is even stronger than Your Honor's opinion in Parker for three main reasons. First, of course, is that the tribe was not absent from the land in the same way that the tribe was in Parker. Second, the land here was allotted in -- almost entirely to the tribe -- to tribal members themselves, to Indians. And, third, Congress took steps in 1906 to preserve the tribe. And I guess the thing I would point to, Your Honor, when you ask about whether there are cases like this, I think this is stronger than case -- other cases because the question isn't just what did Congress fail to do but how much --
Judge: Yes, counsel. In Solem and in Parker, those cases only involved the disposition of surplus land. And, here, of course, there's much, much more being done in a whole series of statutes involving both sovereignty and the allotment of land. Can you point to any case in which we've applied the Solem fact framework to a case that does as much as this -- as being -- as is being done in this case?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>So I understand that, Your Honor. And I think the critical point is that Congress actually preserved the tribe when it had the chance when inaction would have dissolved the tribe. And so, actually, I think that makes this stronger than in other cases because Congress took --<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-9526, McGirt versus Oklahoma. Mr. Gershengorn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case is resolved by the fundamental proposition that decisions about sovereign rights are for Congress to make and Congress makes those decisions by speaking clearly in the text. The decision below must be reversed because the text makes clear that Congress never terminated the Creek reservation and never transferred federal criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. I have four basic points to make this morning. First, the Creek Nation had a reservation. The relevant treaties reserved the lands from sale and solemnly guaranteed the lands for the Creek to govern. The text of both treaties and statutes expressly identified the Creek land as a reservation. Nothing more was needed. Second, Congress did not establish -- disestablish that reservation. Indeed, Congress considered hallmark language of disestablishment and rejected it. Congress initially sought cession yet instead provided only for allotment. Then, when congressional inaction would have dissolved the tribe, Congress instead preserved the tribe and its government for all purposes authorized by law, and it did so against the backdrop of existing tribal authority to legislate over reservation land. Those congressional judgments should be respected. Third, Congress did not transfer criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. At statehood, the Major Crimes Act established exclusive federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes in "any state of the United States." When Congress overrides the Major Crimes Act and transfers jurisdiction to a state, it does so expressly, and it did not do so here. Finally, Oklahoma's rhetoric about disruption does not change the result. On the criminal side, this Court's decision in Ramos is a complete answer, and on the civil side, the main issues are tax and other regulatory issues that are routinely resolved by tribal-state agreements. In any event, Parker makes clear that questions of sovereignty are distinct from claims of reservation status. This Court should resolve the reservation question, leaving jurisdictional disputes to Congress, the relevant sovereign, and then for this Court to resolve if and when they arise.
Judge: Counsel, the --
Petitioner: So let me start this --
Judge: -- State argues that the territory should be analyzed as a dependent Indian community under 1151 and not as a reservation. They base this argument on our decisions in Sandoval and Creek Nation and 1151 itself and the fact that the Creeks have always maintained, have been adamant about the fact that they are not reservation Indians. Now you refer, of course, to the many times in which the treaty is referred to as a reservation, but what is your answer to the State's analysis of our precedent?
Petitioner: So, Your Honor, I think both the precedent and the language support the idea that this is not a dependent Indian community. What this Court said in Venetie and what Judge -- then Judge Gorsuch said in Hydro Resources is that the dependent Indian community label is a catchall for tribes that did not have a reservation and are not on restricted lands. The best evidence of what Congress thought about whether Creek lands were a reservation under the statute is that Congress referred to those lands as a reservation under the statute. With respect to Sandoval and the other cases, it is crystal-clear that when Sandoval and those cases are using the term "dependent Indian community" that they are describing tribes and other groups that are within Congress's broad power to legislate for -- for tribes broadly. They are not excluding the -- the Creek. Indeed, and --
Judge: Thank you, counsel. Justice Thomas?
Petitioner: So, Your Honor, I think the key point on -- the -- the -- the key point on the Parker/Solem analysis is, as your -- as Your Honor pointed out in that opinion, that those are not -- that that analysis doesn't derive from anything special about -- about how much work Congress is doing. The reason the Court has always required plain text is because treaty rights are at issue and plain text is required to abrogate treaty rights and because sovereign rights are at issue and plain text is required to abrogate sovereign rights. So there's nothing magic about Parker and Solem in terms of whether they're dealing with surplus lands or not. The key point in Parker and Solem is that plain text is required to do the kinds of transfers that are at issue here. And when you look at the plain text, I think this is a -- this case is even stronger than Your Honor's opinion in Parker for three main reasons. First, of course, is that the tribe was not absent from the land in the same way that the tribe was in Parker. Second, the land here was allotted in -- almost entirely to the tribe -- to tribal members themselves, to Indians. And, third, Congress took steps in 1906 to preserve the tribe. And I guess the thing I would point to, Your Honor, when you ask about whether there are cases like this, I think this is stronger than case -- other cases because the question isn't just what did Congress fail to do but how much --
Judge: Yes, counsel. In Solem and in Parker, those cases only involved the disposition of surplus land. And, here, of course, there's much, much more being done in a whole series of statutes involving both sovereignty and the allotment of land. Can you point to any case in which we've applied the Solem fact framework to a case that does as much as this -- as being -- as is being done in this case?
Petitioner: So I understand that, Your Honor. And I think the critical point is that Congress actually preserved the tribe when it had the chance when inaction would have dissolved the tribe. And so, actually, I think that makes this stronger than in other cases because Congress took --
Judge: I don't mean to interrupt you, but I do want to get this point in, that in -- in Parker, we were only dealing with one allotment statute that was disposing of surplus land. Here, we're dealing with a series of statutes that go both to land, the allotment of land, and to the reduction in the authority of the tribe. That's what I mean.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>-- deliberate action when this action dissolved --<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 12-7515, Burrage v. United States. Ms. Campbell.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Marcus Burrage is serving a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for selling heroin that, according to the jury instruction that was given to the jury at the time of the trial, was not the primary cause of the death, but, rather, merely played a part in the death. This lesser standard of contributing causation was neither articulated by Congress within the words of the statute, nor was it generally accepted at the time the statute was passed, as an acceptable version of causation. Congress's selection of the word “ results ” instead should be interpreted to mean the traditional notions of causation; those of factual cause or but-for cause and proximate cause. Now, the parties don't disagree that “ results in ” means causation. That it's a causation analysis. And regardless of whether you look to the common law or the treatises or the legal commentators, causation triggers, at the very minimum, a but-for causation analysis. In this particular case, but for the use of the heroin, the victim would not have died. Now, the Solicitor General suggests a lesser causation standard, one that expands the notion of but-for causation. But if we instead look to the case law and this Court's precedent, we are not actually trying to expand but-for causation in most cases, we are trying to limit it. Because but-for causation can be extrapolated beyond what we are willing to give liability for.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 12-7515, Burrage v. United States. Ms. Campbell.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Marcus Burrage is serving a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for selling heroin that, according to the jury instruction that was given to the jury at the time of the trial, was not the primary cause of the death, but, rather, merely played a part in the death. This lesser standard of contributing causation was neither articulated by Congress within the words of the statute, nor was it generally accepted at the time the statute was passed, as an acceptable version of causation. Congress's selection of the word “ results ” instead should be interpreted to mean the traditional notions of causation; those of factual cause or but-for cause and proximate cause. Now, the parties don't disagree that “ results in ” means causation. That it's a causation analysis. And regardless of whether you look to the common law or the treatises or the legal commentators, causation triggers, at the very minimum, a but-for causation analysis. In this particular case, but for the use of the heroin, the victim would not have died. Now, the Solicitor General suggests a lesser causation standard, one that expands the notion of but-for causation. But if we instead look to the case law and this Court's precedent, we are not actually trying to expand but-for causation in most cases, we are trying to limit it. Because but-for causation can be extrapolated beyond what we are willing to give liability for.
Judge: How would you respond to the hypothetical that the government poses on 24 of its brief, that it's the three drops of poison, each defendant puts in one drop, one drop will not do it, three drops will, and none of them would be chargeable because it takes three drops?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I would disagree with the premise that they are not chargeable. Each individual person that put the drop of poison in that cup could be charged with attempted murder if they were trying to kill a person. But under standard causation analysis, you -- you do not have but-for causation. Each individual drop of poison was not the but-for causation and so you -- you don't have causation.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 12-7515, Burrage v. United States. Ms. Campbell.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Marcus Burrage is serving a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for selling heroin that, according to the jury instruction that was given to the jury at the time of the trial, was not the primary cause of the death, but, rather, merely played a part in the death. This lesser standard of contributing causation was neither articulated by Congress within the words of the statute, nor was it generally accepted at the time the statute was passed, as an acceptable version of causation. Congress's selection of the word “ results ” instead should be interpreted to mean the traditional notions of causation; those of factual cause or but-for cause and proximate cause. Now, the parties don't disagree that “ results in ” means causation. That it's a causation analysis. And regardless of whether you look to the common law or the treatises or the legal commentators, causation triggers, at the very minimum, a but-for causation analysis. In this particular case, but for the use of the heroin, the victim would not have died. Now, the Solicitor General suggests a lesser causation standard, one that expands the notion of but-for causation. But if we instead look to the case law and this Court's precedent, we are not actually trying to expand but-for causation in most cases, we are trying to limit it. Because but-for causation can be extrapolated beyond what we are willing to give liability for.
Judge: How would you respond to the hypothetical that the government poses on 24 of its brief, that it's the three drops of poison, each defendant puts in one drop, one drop will not do it, three drops will, and none of them would be chargeable because it takes three drops?
Petitioner: Well, I would disagree with the premise that they are not chargeable. Each individual person that put the drop of poison in that cup could be charged with attempted murder if they were trying to kill a person. But under standard causation analysis, you -- you do not have but-for causation. Each individual drop of poison was not the but-for causation and so you -- you don't have causation.
Judge: But you would if -- if you knew that there were two drops in and you added the third drop after the two drops. Right?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Then--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 12-7515, Burrage v. United States. Ms. Campbell.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Marcus Burrage is serving a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for selling heroin that, according to the jury instruction that was given to the jury at the time of the trial, was not the primary cause of the death, but, rather, merely played a part in the death. This lesser standard of contributing causation was neither articulated by Congress within the words of the statute, nor was it generally accepted at the time the statute was passed, as an acceptable version of causation. Congress's selection of the word “ results ” instead should be interpreted to mean the traditional notions of causation; those of factual cause or but-for cause and proximate cause. Now, the parties don't disagree that “ results in ” means causation. That it's a causation analysis. And regardless of whether you look to the common law or the treatises or the legal commentators, causation triggers, at the very minimum, a but-for causation analysis. In this particular case, but for the use of the heroin, the victim would not have died. Now, the Solicitor General suggests a lesser causation standard, one that expands the notion of but-for causation. But if we instead look to the case law and this Court's precedent, we are not actually trying to expand but-for causation in most cases, we are trying to limit it. Because but-for causation can be extrapolated beyond what we are willing to give liability for.
Judge: How would you respond to the hypothetical that the government poses on 24 of its brief, that it's the three drops of poison, each defendant puts in one drop, one drop will not do it, three drops will, and none of them would be chargeable because it takes three drops?
Petitioner: Well, I would disagree with the premise that they are not chargeable. Each individual person that put the drop of poison in that cup could be charged with attempted murder if they were trying to kill a person. But under standard causation analysis, you -- you do not have but-for causation. Each individual drop of poison was not the but-for causation and so you -- you don't have causation.
Judge: But you would if -- if you knew that there were two drops in and you added the third drop after the two drops. Right?
Petitioner: Then--
Judge: I'm sorry. I've lost sight of this. Is this each drop is enough or--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--In the government's -- in the government's hypothetical, each person individually puts in one drop and you need three drops in order to -- to kill the person.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 12-7515, Burrage v. United States. Ms. Campbell.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Marcus Burrage is serving a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for selling heroin that, according to the jury instruction that was given to the jury at the time of the trial, was not the primary cause of the death, but, rather, merely played a part in the death. This lesser standard of contributing causation was neither articulated by Congress within the words of the statute, nor was it generally accepted at the time the statute was passed, as an acceptable version of causation. Congress's selection of the word “ results ” instead should be interpreted to mean the traditional notions of causation; those of factual cause or but-for cause and proximate cause. Now, the parties don't disagree that “ results in ” means causation. That it's a causation analysis. And regardless of whether you look to the common law or the treatises or the legal commentators, causation triggers, at the very minimum, a but-for causation analysis. In this particular case, but for the use of the heroin, the victim would not have died. Now, the Solicitor General suggests a lesser causation standard, one that expands the notion of but-for causation. But if we instead look to the case law and this Court's precedent, we are not actually trying to expand but-for causation in most cases, we are trying to limit it. Because but-for causation can be extrapolated beyond what we are willing to give liability for.
Judge: How would you respond to the hypothetical that the government poses on 24 of its brief, that it's the three drops of poison, each defendant puts in one drop, one drop will not do it, three drops will, and none of them would be chargeable because it takes three drops?
Petitioner: Well, I would disagree with the premise that they are not chargeable. Each individual person that put the drop of poison in that cup could be charged with attempted murder if they were trying to kill a person. But under standard causation analysis, you -- you do not have but-for causation. Each individual drop of poison was not the but-for causation and so you -- you don't have causation.
Judge: But you would if -- if you knew that there were two drops in and you added the third drop after the two drops. Right?
Petitioner: Then--
Judge: I'm sorry. I've lost sight of this. Is this each drop is enough or--
Petitioner: --In the government's -- in the government's hypothetical, each person individually puts in one drop and you need three drops in order to -- to kill the person.
Judge: Three -- three drops.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That would be correct, that there would be but-for causation.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 12-7515, Burrage v. United States. Ms. Campbell.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Marcus Burrage is serving a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for selling heroin that, according to the jury instruction that was given to the jury at the time of the trial, was not the primary cause of the death, but, rather, merely played a part in the death. This lesser standard of contributing causation was neither articulated by Congress within the words of the statute, nor was it generally accepted at the time the statute was passed, as an acceptable version of causation. Congress's selection of the word “ results ” instead should be interpreted to mean the traditional notions of causation; those of factual cause or but-for cause and proximate cause. Now, the parties don't disagree that “ results in ” means causation. That it's a causation analysis. And regardless of whether you look to the common law or the treatises or the legal commentators, causation triggers, at the very minimum, a but-for causation analysis. In this particular case, but for the use of the heroin, the victim would not have died. Now, the Solicitor General suggests a lesser causation standard, one that expands the notion of but-for causation. But if we instead look to the case law and this Court's precedent, we are not actually trying to expand but-for causation in most cases, we are trying to limit it. Because but-for causation can be extrapolated beyond what we are willing to give liability for.
Judge: How would you respond to the hypothetical that the government poses on 24 of its brief, that it's the three drops of poison, each defendant puts in one drop, one drop will not do it, three drops will, and none of them would be chargeable because it takes three drops?
Petitioner: Well, I would disagree with the premise that they are not chargeable. Each individual person that put the drop of poison in that cup could be charged with attempted murder if they were trying to kill a person. But under standard causation analysis, you -- you do not have but-for causation. Each individual drop of poison was not the but-for causation and so you -- you don't have causation.
Judge: But you would if -- if you knew that there were two drops in and you added the third drop after the two drops. Right?
Petitioner: Then--
Judge: I'm sorry. I've lost sight of this. Is this each drop is enough or--
Petitioner: --In the government's -- in the government's hypothetical, each person individually puts in one drop and you need three drops in order to -- to kill the person.
Judge: Three -- three drops.
Petitioner: That would be correct, that there would be but-for causation.
Judge: --It takes three.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Ayers versus Belmontes. Mr. Johnson.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case concerns the constitutional sufficiency of California's catchall factor (k) instruction, which was given in the penalty-phase portion of California capital cases, and which directed the jurors to consider any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this instruction violates the Eighth Amendment because it allegedly misled the jurors to believe they could not consider so-called forward-looking evidence that did not relate directly to the defendant's actual culpability for the crime itself. In the State's view, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is fundamentally flawed, because it rests on an illusory distinction between different forms of character evidence in a way that is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions in California... or Boyde versus California and Brown versus Payton. In Boyde, this Court addressed, and rejected, a virtually identical challenge to the factor (k), and concluded that this instruction did, in fact, allow jurors to consider non-crime-related evidence; specifically, it allowed the jurors to consider evidence of the defendant's background and character. There was nothing in the Boyde decision to support the Ninth Circuit's distinction between different forms of character evidence. In fact, Boyde implicitly acknowledged that the factor (k) would, in fact, be understood to encompass Belmontes' good character evidence, in this case, because, for all practical purposes, there is no meaningful distinction between the nature of the background and character offered in Boyde and the nature of the background--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Ayers versus Belmontes. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case concerns the constitutional sufficiency of California's catchall factor (k) instruction, which was given in the penalty-phase portion of California capital cases, and which directed the jurors to consider any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this instruction violates the Eighth Amendment because it allegedly misled the jurors to believe they could not consider so-called forward-looking evidence that did not relate directly to the defendant's actual culpability for the crime itself. In the State's view, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is fundamentally flawed, because it rests on an illusory distinction between different forms of character evidence in a way that is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions in California... or Boyde versus California and Brown versus Payton. In Boyde, this Court addressed, and rejected, a virtually identical challenge to the factor (k), and concluded that this instruction did, in fact, allow jurors to consider non-crime-related evidence; specifically, it allowed the jurors to consider evidence of the defendant's background and character. There was nothing in the Boyde decision to support the Ninth Circuit's distinction between different forms of character evidence. In fact, Boyde implicitly acknowledged that the factor (k) would, in fact, be understood to encompass Belmontes' good character evidence, in this case, because, for all practical purposes, there is no meaningful distinction between the nature of the background and character offered in Boyde and the nature of the background--
Judge: Mr. Johnson, would you comment on the footnote on the... on the... drawing the distinction with regard to the dance contest that the defendant won in that case, between... it's over here; I'm asking the question... between facts that occurred before the crime and facts that might have occurred after.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Yes, Your Honor. In footnote 5, this Court addressed a contention, raised for the first time in argument, that Boyde's evidence might be admissible under Skipper versus South Carolina, and this Court distinguished Boyde from Skipper, for a couple of reasons. First, as the... as Your Honor pointed out, the evidence in this case related to good-character evidence, events that occurred before the crime itself, unlike in Skipper, which dealt with post-crime events. The Court also pointed out that the evidence in Boyde... his dancing achievement, his good character evidence in that case... was not offered for the specific inference that the evidence in Skipper was offered. The Court, in footnote 5... and in the opinion, in general, in Boyde... nonetheless found that this evidence did, in fact, constitute good... character evidence of the... of the defendant's present good character, because it showed that his crime was an aberration from otherwise good character. Or, as Justice Marshall put it in his dissenting opinion, that Boyde had redeeming qualities, which is a decidedly forward-looking consideration. And, as I was saying, the evidence in this case, and in Boyde--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Ayers versus Belmontes. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case concerns the constitutional sufficiency of California's catchall factor (k) instruction, which was given in the penalty-phase portion of California capital cases, and which directed the jurors to consider any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this instruction violates the Eighth Amendment because it allegedly misled the jurors to believe they could not consider so-called forward-looking evidence that did not relate directly to the defendant's actual culpability for the crime itself. In the State's view, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is fundamentally flawed, because it rests on an illusory distinction between different forms of character evidence in a way that is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions in California... or Boyde versus California and Brown versus Payton. In Boyde, this Court addressed, and rejected, a virtually identical challenge to the factor (k), and concluded that this instruction did, in fact, allow jurors to consider non-crime-related evidence; specifically, it allowed the jurors to consider evidence of the defendant's background and character. There was nothing in the Boyde decision to support the Ninth Circuit's distinction between different forms of character evidence. In fact, Boyde implicitly acknowledged that the factor (k) would, in fact, be understood to encompass Belmontes' good character evidence, in this case, because, for all practical purposes, there is no meaningful distinction between the nature of the background and character offered in Boyde and the nature of the background--
Judge: Mr. Johnson, would you comment on the footnote on the... on the... drawing the distinction with regard to the dance contest that the defendant won in that case, between... it's over here; I'm asking the question... between facts that occurred before the crime and facts that might have occurred after.
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor. In footnote 5, this Court addressed a contention, raised for the first time in argument, that Boyde's evidence might be admissible under Skipper versus South Carolina, and this Court distinguished Boyde from Skipper, for a couple of reasons. First, as the... as Your Honor pointed out, the evidence in this case related to good-character evidence, events that occurred before the crime itself, unlike in Skipper, which dealt with post-crime events. The Court also pointed out that the evidence in Boyde... his dancing achievement, his good character evidence in that case... was not offered for the specific inference that the evidence in Skipper was offered. The Court, in footnote 5... and in the opinion, in general, in Boyde... nonetheless found that this evidence did, in fact, constitute good... character evidence of the... of the defendant's present good character, because it showed that his crime was an aberration from otherwise good character. Or, as Justice Marshall put it in his dissenting opinion, that Boyde had redeeming qualities, which is a decidedly forward-looking consideration. And, as I was saying, the evidence in this case, and in Boyde--
Judge: It doesn't have to be forward... looking, does it? I mean, I thought we've said "so long as it can be taken into account in any manner. " whether backward-looking or forward-looking. Haven't we said that, explicitly?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Yes Your Honor. The... and, in fact, the Court has, in Franklin versus Linite, said that they have not distinguished between different forms of character evidence. And I understand that, in the past, we've always discussed background and character evidence as sort of the same thing. In this case, however, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion does, in fact, rest on a distinction between different forms of backward-looking and forward-looking character--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Ayers versus Belmontes. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case concerns the constitutional sufficiency of California's catchall factor (k) instruction, which was given in the penalty-phase portion of California capital cases, and which directed the jurors to consider any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this instruction violates the Eighth Amendment because it allegedly misled the jurors to believe they could not consider so-called forward-looking evidence that did not relate directly to the defendant's actual culpability for the crime itself. In the State's view, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is fundamentally flawed, because it rests on an illusory distinction between different forms of character evidence in a way that is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions in California... or Boyde versus California and Brown versus Payton. In Boyde, this Court addressed, and rejected, a virtually identical challenge to the factor (k), and concluded that this instruction did, in fact, allow jurors to consider non-crime-related evidence; specifically, it allowed the jurors to consider evidence of the defendant's background and character. There was nothing in the Boyde decision to support the Ninth Circuit's distinction between different forms of character evidence. In fact, Boyde implicitly acknowledged that the factor (k) would, in fact, be understood to encompass Belmontes' good character evidence, in this case, because, for all practical purposes, there is no meaningful distinction between the nature of the background and character offered in Boyde and the nature of the background--
Judge: Mr. Johnson, would you comment on the footnote on the... on the... drawing the distinction with regard to the dance contest that the defendant won in that case, between... it's over here; I'm asking the question... between facts that occurred before the crime and facts that might have occurred after.
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor. In footnote 5, this Court addressed a contention, raised for the first time in argument, that Boyde's evidence might be admissible under Skipper versus South Carolina, and this Court distinguished Boyde from Skipper, for a couple of reasons. First, as the... as Your Honor pointed out, the evidence in this case related to good-character evidence, events that occurred before the crime itself, unlike in Skipper, which dealt with post-crime events. The Court also pointed out that the evidence in Boyde... his dancing achievement, his good character evidence in that case... was not offered for the specific inference that the evidence in Skipper was offered. The Court, in footnote 5... and in the opinion, in general, in Boyde... nonetheless found that this evidence did, in fact, constitute good... character evidence of the... of the defendant's present good character, because it showed that his crime was an aberration from otherwise good character. Or, as Justice Marshall put it in his dissenting opinion, that Boyde had redeeming qualities, which is a decidedly forward-looking consideration. And, as I was saying, the evidence in this case, and in Boyde--
Judge: It doesn't have to be forward... looking, does it? I mean, I thought we've said "so long as it can be taken into account in any manner. " whether backward-looking or forward-looking. Haven't we said that, explicitly?
Petitioner: --Yes Your Honor. The... and, in fact, the Court has, in Franklin versus Linite, said that they have not distinguished between different forms of character evidence. And I understand that, in the past, we've always discussed background and character evidence as sort of the same thing. In this case, however, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion does, in fact, rest on a distinction between different forms of backward-looking and forward-looking character--
Judge: Well it was--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--evidence.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Ayers versus Belmontes. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case concerns the constitutional sufficiency of California's catchall factor (k) instruction, which was given in the penalty-phase portion of California capital cases, and which directed the jurors to consider any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this instruction violates the Eighth Amendment because it allegedly misled the jurors to believe they could not consider so-called forward-looking evidence that did not relate directly to the defendant's actual culpability for the crime itself. In the State's view, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is fundamentally flawed, because it rests on an illusory distinction between different forms of character evidence in a way that is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions in California... or Boyde versus California and Brown versus Payton. In Boyde, this Court addressed, and rejected, a virtually identical challenge to the factor (k), and concluded that this instruction did, in fact, allow jurors to consider non-crime-related evidence; specifically, it allowed the jurors to consider evidence of the defendant's background and character. There was nothing in the Boyde decision to support the Ninth Circuit's distinction between different forms of character evidence. In fact, Boyde implicitly acknowledged that the factor (k) would, in fact, be understood to encompass Belmontes' good character evidence, in this case, because, for all practical purposes, there is no meaningful distinction between the nature of the background and character offered in Boyde and the nature of the background--
Judge: Mr. Johnson, would you comment on the footnote on the... on the... drawing the distinction with regard to the dance contest that the defendant won in that case, between... it's over here; I'm asking the question... between facts that occurred before the crime and facts that might have occurred after.
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor. In footnote 5, this Court addressed a contention, raised for the first time in argument, that Boyde's evidence might be admissible under Skipper versus South Carolina, and this Court distinguished Boyde from Skipper, for a couple of reasons. First, as the... as Your Honor pointed out, the evidence in this case related to good-character evidence, events that occurred before the crime itself, unlike in Skipper, which dealt with post-crime events. The Court also pointed out that the evidence in Boyde... his dancing achievement, his good character evidence in that case... was not offered for the specific inference that the evidence in Skipper was offered. The Court, in footnote 5... and in the opinion, in general, in Boyde... nonetheless found that this evidence did, in fact, constitute good... character evidence of the... of the defendant's present good character, because it showed that his crime was an aberration from otherwise good character. Or, as Justice Marshall put it in his dissenting opinion, that Boyde had redeeming qualities, which is a decidedly forward-looking consideration. And, as I was saying, the evidence in this case, and in Boyde--
Judge: It doesn't have to be forward... looking, does it? I mean, I thought we've said "so long as it can be taken into account in any manner. " whether backward-looking or forward-looking. Haven't we said that, explicitly?
Petitioner: --Yes Your Honor. The... and, in fact, the Court has, in Franklin versus Linite, said that they have not distinguished between different forms of character evidence. And I understand that, in the past, we've always discussed background and character evidence as sort of the same thing. In this case, however, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion does, in fact, rest on a distinction between different forms of backward-looking and forward-looking character--
Judge: Well it was--
Petitioner: --evidence.
Judge: --it was addressing itself to the fact... to the words of the factor (k) instruction. How does post-crime prison conduct reduce the seriousness of a previous crime?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It does not... it does not relate to the seriousness of the... of the crime at all. The... Boyde's dancing--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Ayers versus Belmontes. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case concerns the constitutional sufficiency of California's catchall factor (k) instruction, which was given in the penalty-phase portion of California capital cases, and which directed the jurors to consider any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this instruction violates the Eighth Amendment because it allegedly misled the jurors to believe they could not consider so-called forward-looking evidence that did not relate directly to the defendant's actual culpability for the crime itself. In the State's view, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is fundamentally flawed, because it rests on an illusory distinction between different forms of character evidence in a way that is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions in California... or Boyde versus California and Brown versus Payton. In Boyde, this Court addressed, and rejected, a virtually identical challenge to the factor (k), and concluded that this instruction did, in fact, allow jurors to consider non-crime-related evidence; specifically, it allowed the jurors to consider evidence of the defendant's background and character. There was nothing in the Boyde decision to support the Ninth Circuit's distinction between different forms of character evidence. In fact, Boyde implicitly acknowledged that the factor (k) would, in fact, be understood to encompass Belmontes' good character evidence, in this case, because, for all practical purposes, there is no meaningful distinction between the nature of the background and character offered in Boyde and the nature of the background--
Judge: Mr. Johnson, would you comment on the footnote on the... on the... drawing the distinction with regard to the dance contest that the defendant won in that case, between... it's over here; I'm asking the question... between facts that occurred before the crime and facts that might have occurred after.
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor. In footnote 5, this Court addressed a contention, raised for the first time in argument, that Boyde's evidence might be admissible under Skipper versus South Carolina, and this Court distinguished Boyde from Skipper, for a couple of reasons. First, as the... as Your Honor pointed out, the evidence in this case related to good-character evidence, events that occurred before the crime itself, unlike in Skipper, which dealt with post-crime events. The Court also pointed out that the evidence in Boyde... his dancing achievement, his good character evidence in that case... was not offered for the specific inference that the evidence in Skipper was offered. The Court, in footnote 5... and in the opinion, in general, in Boyde... nonetheless found that this evidence did, in fact, constitute good... character evidence of the... of the defendant's present good character, because it showed that his crime was an aberration from otherwise good character. Or, as Justice Marshall put it in his dissenting opinion, that Boyde had redeeming qualities, which is a decidedly forward-looking consideration. And, as I was saying, the evidence in this case, and in Boyde--
Judge: It doesn't have to be forward... looking, does it? I mean, I thought we've said "so long as it can be taken into account in any manner. " whether backward-looking or forward-looking. Haven't we said that, explicitly?
Petitioner: --Yes Your Honor. The... and, in fact, the Court has, in Franklin versus Linite, said that they have not distinguished between different forms of character evidence. And I understand that, in the past, we've always discussed background and character evidence as sort of the same thing. In this case, however, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion does, in fact, rest on a distinction between different forms of backward-looking and forward-looking character--
Judge: Well it was--
Petitioner: --evidence.
Judge: --it was addressing itself to the fact... to the words of the factor (k) instruction. How does post-crime prison conduct reduce the seriousness of a previous crime?
Petitioner: It does not... it does not relate to the seriousness of the... of the crime at all. The... Boyde's dancing--
Judge: Well, I mean, it has to relate to the gravity of the crime, under the words of factor (k), doesn't it?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It would relate to the gravity... to circumstances that extenuate the gravity of the crime, for purposes of a jury's sentencing determination. And the point I'd like to make on that point is this, Your Honor. In California, jurors are well aware what their task is at a sentencing determination. In California, the guilt and the death eligibility determinations are made during the guilt-phase trial and the jurors are expressly told, during the penalty-phase trial, that their lone determination, their one concern, is to decide between a sentence of death or a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. And, in that light, the jurors are very well aware that their only determination in a California case is to make a moral, normative determination, a single normal... moral normative determination, as to whether this man, this defendant standing before them in this Court today, deserves death or life without possibility--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in No. 02-809, Maryland v. Joseph Jermaine Pringle. Mr. Bair.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When the officer stopped the car respondent was riding in and found drugs packaged for distribution in the rear seat armrest, and then also found a large amount of cash in the glove compartment--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in No. 02-809, Maryland v. Joseph Jermaine Pringle. Mr. Bair.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When the officer stopped the car respondent was riding in and found drugs packaged for distribution in the rear seat armrest, and then also found a large amount of cash in the glove compartment--
Judge: What... the rear seat armrest was pushed up--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Yes, Your Honor.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in No. 02-809, Maryland v. Joseph Jermaine Pringle. Mr. Bair.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When the officer stopped the car respondent was riding in and found drugs packaged for distribution in the rear seat armrest, and then also found a large amount of cash in the glove compartment--
Judge: What... the rear seat armrest was pushed up--
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: --and then the drugs were behind the... the armrest?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. The rear seat armrest was pushed up against the rear seat. The officer merely folded it down and then the drugs appeared, and these are drugs that were packaged in five separate individual packages that were packaged for distribution at $20 a bag. The officer also found $763 in a rolled-up ball of cash in the glove compartment, and there... at that time there was individualized probable cause that focused on all three people in that car, and this is so for three principal reasons. First--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in No. 02-809, Maryland v. Joseph Jermaine Pringle. Mr. Bair.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When the officer stopped the car respondent was riding in and found drugs packaged for distribution in the rear seat armrest, and then also found a large amount of cash in the glove compartment--
Judge: What... the rear seat armrest was pushed up--
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: --and then the drugs were behind the... the armrest?
Petitioner: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. The rear seat armrest was pushed up against the rear seat. The officer merely folded it down and then the drugs appeared, and these are drugs that were packaged in five separate individual packages that were packaged for distribution at $20 a bag. The officer also found $763 in a rolled-up ball of cash in the glove compartment, and there... at that time there was individualized probable cause that focused on all three people in that car, and this is so for three principal reasons. First--
Judge: At the end of the day, what happened?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--At the end of the day, all three were arrested, respondent confessed, and said the--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in No. 02-809, Maryland v. Joseph Jermaine Pringle. Mr. Bair.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When the officer stopped the car respondent was riding in and found drugs packaged for distribution in the rear seat armrest, and then also found a large amount of cash in the glove compartment--
Judge: What... the rear seat armrest was pushed up--
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: --and then the drugs were behind the... the armrest?
Petitioner: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. The rear seat armrest was pushed up against the rear seat. The officer merely folded it down and then the drugs appeared, and these are drugs that were packaged in five separate individual packages that were packaged for distribution at $20 a bag. The officer also found $763 in a rolled-up ball of cash in the glove compartment, and there... at that time there was individualized probable cause that focused on all three people in that car, and this is so for three principal reasons. First--
Judge: At the end of the day, what happened?
Petitioner: --At the end of the day, all three were arrested, respondent confessed, and said the--
Judge: And respondent was a front seat passenger?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Yes, Justice O'Connor.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in No. 02-809, Maryland v. Joseph Jermaine Pringle. Mr. Bair.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When the officer stopped the car respondent was riding in and found drugs packaged for distribution in the rear seat armrest, and then also found a large amount of cash in the glove compartment--
Judge: What... the rear seat armrest was pushed up--
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: --and then the drugs were behind the... the armrest?
Petitioner: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. The rear seat armrest was pushed up against the rear seat. The officer merely folded it down and then the drugs appeared, and these are drugs that were packaged in five separate individual packages that were packaged for distribution at $20 a bag. The officer also found $763 in a rolled-up ball of cash in the glove compartment, and there... at that time there was individualized probable cause that focused on all three people in that car, and this is so for three principal reasons. First--
Judge: At the end of the day, what happened?
Petitioner: --At the end of the day, all three were arrested, respondent confessed, and said the--
Judge: And respondent was a front seat passenger?
Petitioner: --Yes, Justice O'Connor.
Judge: He's the one who confessed?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in 06-5618, Claiborne versus United States. Mr. Dwyer.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The district court's 15-month sentence combined with 3 years of supervised release conditioned on drug treatments and the acquisition of a GED was a reasonable sentence. In the uniform and constant tradition of Federal criminal sentencing, the district judge in this case treated Mario Claiborne as an individual. She considered the guidelines and after doing so turned to the judgment that 3553(a) demands in every case. She issued a sentence to avoid unwarranted disparity, to impose just punishment, and to ensure that deterrence did not throw away Mario Claiborne's chances to resume his responsibilities to himself, to his family, and to his community. The court of appeals, in contrast to the district court's careful attention to the 3553(a) factors, focused solely on the guidelines. The court of appeals applied its extraordinary circumstances rule. That rule re-tethers sentencing to the guideline.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in 06-5618, Claiborne versus United States. Mr. Dwyer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The district court's 15-month sentence combined with 3 years of supervised release conditioned on drug treatments and the acquisition of a GED was a reasonable sentence. In the uniform and constant tradition of Federal criminal sentencing, the district judge in this case treated Mario Claiborne as an individual. She considered the guidelines and after doing so turned to the judgment that 3553(a) demands in every case. She issued a sentence to avoid unwarranted disparity, to impose just punishment, and to ensure that deterrence did not throw away Mario Claiborne's chances to resume his responsibilities to himself, to his family, and to his community. The court of appeals, in contrast to the district court's careful attention to the 3553(a) factors, focused solely on the guidelines. The court of appeals applied its extraordinary circumstances rule. That rule re-tethers sentencing to the guideline.
Judge: What would be your test of reasonableness for appellate review?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I think a sentence would be reasonable if a reasonable judge on the facts and circumstances of that case would find that the sentence imposed was sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy 3553(a) standards.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in 06-5618, Claiborne versus United States. Mr. Dwyer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The district court's 15-month sentence combined with 3 years of supervised release conditioned on drug treatments and the acquisition of a GED was a reasonable sentence. In the uniform and constant tradition of Federal criminal sentencing, the district judge in this case treated Mario Claiborne as an individual. She considered the guidelines and after doing so turned to the judgment that 3553(a) demands in every case. She issued a sentence to avoid unwarranted disparity, to impose just punishment, and to ensure that deterrence did not throw away Mario Claiborne's chances to resume his responsibilities to himself, to his family, and to his community. The court of appeals, in contrast to the district court's careful attention to the 3553(a) factors, focused solely on the guidelines. The court of appeals applied its extraordinary circumstances rule. That rule re-tethers sentencing to the guideline.
Judge: What would be your test of reasonableness for appellate review?
Petitioner: I think a sentence would be reasonable if a reasonable judge on the facts and circumstances of that case would find that the sentence imposed was sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy 3553(a) standards.
Judge: It seems to me that gives very little weight to the goal, which I think is a congressional goal, of nationwide consistency in eliminating the disparities in the sentencing system which cause great disrespect to the justice system.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I think that the statute speaks of unwarranted disparity and does not speak in terms of uniformity. And there is necessarily a tension between the individualized sentencing that 3553(a) requires and concerns about nationwide uniformity. But I think that what distinguishes sentencing under the advisory guidelines system from the Presentencing Reform Act system are several. One is now we explicitly have purposes of sentencing and factors the judge must consider. 3553 didn't exist before that time. Secondly, in every case, as a practical matter, the guidelines are going to exert a gravitational weight because they are there. They must be considered as part of the statute.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in 06-5618, Claiborne versus United States. Mr. Dwyer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The district court's 15-month sentence combined with 3 years of supervised release conditioned on drug treatments and the acquisition of a GED was a reasonable sentence. In the uniform and constant tradition of Federal criminal sentencing, the district judge in this case treated Mario Claiborne as an individual. She considered the guidelines and after doing so turned to the judgment that 3553(a) demands in every case. She issued a sentence to avoid unwarranted disparity, to impose just punishment, and to ensure that deterrence did not throw away Mario Claiborne's chances to resume his responsibilities to himself, to his family, and to his community. The court of appeals, in contrast to the district court's careful attention to the 3553(a) factors, focused solely on the guidelines. The court of appeals applied its extraordinary circumstances rule. That rule re-tethers sentencing to the guideline.
Judge: What would be your test of reasonableness for appellate review?
Petitioner: I think a sentence would be reasonable if a reasonable judge on the facts and circumstances of that case would find that the sentence imposed was sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy 3553(a) standards.
Judge: It seems to me that gives very little weight to the goal, which I think is a congressional goal, of nationwide consistency in eliminating the disparities in the sentencing system which cause great disrespect to the justice system.
Petitioner: I think that the statute speaks of unwarranted disparity and does not speak in terms of uniformity. And there is necessarily a tension between the individualized sentencing that 3553(a) requires and concerns about nationwide uniformity. But I think that what distinguishes sentencing under the advisory guidelines system from the Presentencing Reform Act system are several. One is now we explicitly have purposes of sentencing and factors the judge must consider. 3553 didn't exist before that time. Secondly, in every case, as a practical matter, the guidelines are going to exert a gravitational weight because they are there. They must be considered as part of the statute.
Judge: Can I substitute "substantial" for "gravitational" without offending your position or affecting your position?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I don't... my position would be that 3553(a)(4) is the correct place for consideration of the guidelines. It's just one of seven factors. As a practical matter, I think it's going to get--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in 06-5618, Claiborne versus United States. Mr. Dwyer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The district court's 15-month sentence combined with 3 years of supervised release conditioned on drug treatments and the acquisition of a GED was a reasonable sentence. In the uniform and constant tradition of Federal criminal sentencing, the district judge in this case treated Mario Claiborne as an individual. She considered the guidelines and after doing so turned to the judgment that 3553(a) demands in every case. She issued a sentence to avoid unwarranted disparity, to impose just punishment, and to ensure that deterrence did not throw away Mario Claiborne's chances to resume his responsibilities to himself, to his family, and to his community. The court of appeals, in contrast to the district court's careful attention to the 3553(a) factors, focused solely on the guidelines. The court of appeals applied its extraordinary circumstances rule. That rule re-tethers sentencing to the guideline.
Judge: What would be your test of reasonableness for appellate review?
Petitioner: I think a sentence would be reasonable if a reasonable judge on the facts and circumstances of that case would find that the sentence imposed was sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy 3553(a) standards.
Judge: It seems to me that gives very little weight to the goal, which I think is a congressional goal, of nationwide consistency in eliminating the disparities in the sentencing system which cause great disrespect to the justice system.
Petitioner: I think that the statute speaks of unwarranted disparity and does not speak in terms of uniformity. And there is necessarily a tension between the individualized sentencing that 3553(a) requires and concerns about nationwide uniformity. But I think that what distinguishes sentencing under the advisory guidelines system from the Presentencing Reform Act system are several. One is now we explicitly have purposes of sentencing and factors the judge must consider. 3553 didn't exist before that time. Secondly, in every case, as a practical matter, the guidelines are going to exert a gravitational weight because they are there. They must be considered as part of the statute.
Judge: Can I substitute "substantial" for "gravitational" without offending your position or affecting your position?
Petitioner: I don't... my position would be that 3553(a)(4) is the correct place for consideration of the guidelines. It's just one of seven factors. As a practical matter, I think it's going to get--
Judge: Kind of a weak law of gravity like the Moon. It's only at one-seventh. [Laughter]<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--As a legal matter weak. As a practical matter, I think unfortunately it's going to be very strong. And I think one of the real dangers of an advisory guideline--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in 06-5618, Claiborne versus United States. Mr. Dwyer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The district court's 15-month sentence combined with 3 years of supervised release conditioned on drug treatments and the acquisition of a GED was a reasonable sentence. In the uniform and constant tradition of Federal criminal sentencing, the district judge in this case treated Mario Claiborne as an individual. She considered the guidelines and after doing so turned to the judgment that 3553(a) demands in every case. She issued a sentence to avoid unwarranted disparity, to impose just punishment, and to ensure that deterrence did not throw away Mario Claiborne's chances to resume his responsibilities to himself, to his family, and to his community. The court of appeals, in contrast to the district court's careful attention to the 3553(a) factors, focused solely on the guidelines. The court of appeals applied its extraordinary circumstances rule. That rule re-tethers sentencing to the guideline.
Judge: What would be your test of reasonableness for appellate review?
Petitioner: I think a sentence would be reasonable if a reasonable judge on the facts and circumstances of that case would find that the sentence imposed was sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy 3553(a) standards.
Judge: It seems to me that gives very little weight to the goal, which I think is a congressional goal, of nationwide consistency in eliminating the disparities in the sentencing system which cause great disrespect to the justice system.
Petitioner: I think that the statute speaks of unwarranted disparity and does not speak in terms of uniformity. And there is necessarily a tension between the individualized sentencing that 3553(a) requires and concerns about nationwide uniformity. But I think that what distinguishes sentencing under the advisory guidelines system from the Presentencing Reform Act system are several. One is now we explicitly have purposes of sentencing and factors the judge must consider. 3553 didn't exist before that time. Secondly, in every case, as a practical matter, the guidelines are going to exert a gravitational weight because they are there. They must be considered as part of the statute.
Judge: Can I substitute "substantial" for "gravitational" without offending your position or affecting your position?
Petitioner: I don't... my position would be that 3553(a)(4) is the correct place for consideration of the guidelines. It's just one of seven factors. As a practical matter, I think it's going to get--
Judge: Kind of a weak law of gravity like the Moon. It's only at one-seventh. [Laughter]
Petitioner: --As a legal matter weak. As a practical matter, I think unfortunately it's going to be very strong. And I think one of the real dangers of an advisory guideline--
Judge: Well, I guess the question is how strong should we say or can we say, or can Congress say it is?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I think that the strength should be no more than one of the 3553(a) factors, because I think the danger, particularly after 20 years of guideline sentencing, is that courts will routinely and mechanistically apply the guidelines instead of exercising their discretion, which now runs to the full limit of 3553(a).<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Mr. Ingram.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The petitioner in this case is asking the Court to rule that the brandish clause of 18 United States Code, Section 924(c) is an element to be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely a sentencing enhancement, based on two separate and independent bases. The first is the statutory analysis under Jones v. United States, and the second basis is the constitutional analysis under Apprendi v. New Jersey. And I will address the Jones argument first. The carjacking statute in Jones v. United States had, as additional elements, serious injury and death, which the Court held to be additional elements after the statutory analysis was completed. And the carjacking statute in that case and 18 United States Code, section 924(c) in this case are virtually mirror images of each other structurally and grammatically. The Court looked at the text of the statute, the legislative history behind those facts, and how legislatures historically had treated those facts in determining that serious injury and death were, in fact, elements to be proved and not merely sentencing enhancements. Likewise, we contend that brandish, based on the... the text of the statute, the... how legislatures have typically treated that fact and the fact that it involves a mens rea element... that is, brandish is... is defined as displaying or making the presence known of a firearm in order to intimidate and... and mens rea has traditionally been an element... and then based on the legislative history that those statutes would lead the Court to conclude, based on the statutory analysis, that brandish is in fact an element to be proved and not merely a sentencing enhancement.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Mr. Ingram.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The petitioner in this case is asking the Court to rule that the brandish clause of 18 United States Code, Section 924(c) is an element to be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely a sentencing enhancement, based on two separate and independent bases. The first is the statutory analysis under Jones v. United States, and the second basis is the constitutional analysis under Apprendi v. New Jersey. And I will address the Jones argument first. The carjacking statute in Jones v. United States had, as additional elements, serious injury and death, which the Court held to be additional elements after the statutory analysis was completed. And the carjacking statute in that case and 18 United States Code, section 924(c) in this case are virtually mirror images of each other structurally and grammatically. The Court looked at the text of the statute, the legislative history behind those facts, and how legislatures historically had treated those facts in determining that serious injury and death were, in fact, elements to be proved and not merely sentencing enhancements. Likewise, we contend that brandish, based on the... the text of the statute, the... how legislatures have typically treated that fact and the fact that it involves a mens rea element... that is, brandish is... is defined as displaying or making the presence known of a firearm in order to intimidate and... and mens rea has traditionally been an element... and then based on the legislative history that those statutes would lead the Court to conclude, based on the statutory analysis, that brandish is in fact an element to be proved and not merely a sentencing enhancement.
Judge: But it's not so... it seems to me that... I understand your argument, but it's not so clear as it was in Jones. I mean, the difference between use and brandish is... is a... is a smaller difference in degree. The difference in the penalties are smaller differences. It's just a couple of years, the difference between 5 and... and 7, for example. And... and I understand how you can make the argument, but I don't see the argument as being sort of a slam dunk in the case.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Your Honor, if I may address each of those concerns. The... first of all, the... the fact that the increase under the brandish statute goes from a mandatory minimum of 5 to a mandatory minimum of... of 7 not being a steep increase, first of all, it does take the defendant 40 percent higher for brandishing from 5 to 7, and... and it doubles the penalty 100 percent higher for discharging the firearm, which cannot be divorced from the brandishing element. There are cases from this Court in the context of ex post facto challenges to application of sentences that were enacted after the defendant committed the crime, most particularly Miller v. Florida, the leading case which we cite in our brief, where the Court held that an increase in a sentence of anywhere from two to two and a half years substantially disadvantaged the defendant and foreclosed the defendant from asking for a lower sentence. Likewise, in the case of Glover v. United States, which we do not cite in our brief... that is at 531 U.S. 198... the Court held, in the context of a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel, that an additional guideline sentence under the Federal sentencing guidelines of anywhere from 6 to 21 months meets the substantial prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. So, we contend that the increase from 5 to 7 years is in fact a... a substantial difference. The elements in question, comparing serious bodily injury and death to brandishing, are somewhat different in that the serious bodily injury and death are results, whereas brandish and discharge are conduct of the defendant. But we contend that the brandish and discharge being treated more seriously are seeking to address the same possible results; that is, if a defendant merely carries a firearm or possesses a firearm, it is far less likely that serious bodily injury or death will result than if the defendant brandishes or discharge... discharges--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Mr. Ingram.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The petitioner in this case is asking the Court to rule that the brandish clause of 18 United States Code, Section 924(c) is an element to be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely a sentencing enhancement, based on two separate and independent bases. The first is the statutory analysis under Jones v. United States, and the second basis is the constitutional analysis under Apprendi v. New Jersey. And I will address the Jones argument first. The carjacking statute in Jones v. United States had, as additional elements, serious injury and death, which the Court held to be additional elements after the statutory analysis was completed. And the carjacking statute in that case and 18 United States Code, section 924(c) in this case are virtually mirror images of each other structurally and grammatically. The Court looked at the text of the statute, the legislative history behind those facts, and how legislatures historically had treated those facts in determining that serious injury and death were, in fact, elements to be proved and not merely sentencing enhancements. Likewise, we contend that brandish, based on the... the text of the statute, the... how legislatures have typically treated that fact and the fact that it involves a mens rea element... that is, brandish is... is defined as displaying or making the presence known of a firearm in order to intimidate and... and mens rea has traditionally been an element... and then based on the legislative history that those statutes would lead the Court to conclude, based on the statutory analysis, that brandish is in fact an element to be proved and not merely a sentencing enhancement.
Judge: But it's not so... it seems to me that... I understand your argument, but it's not so clear as it was in Jones. I mean, the difference between use and brandish is... is a... is a smaller difference in degree. The difference in the penalties are smaller differences. It's just a couple of years, the difference between 5 and... and 7, for example. And... and I understand how you can make the argument, but I don't see the argument as being sort of a slam dunk in the case.
Petitioner: Your Honor, if I may address each of those concerns. The... first of all, the... the fact that the increase under the brandish statute goes from a mandatory minimum of 5 to a mandatory minimum of... of 7 not being a steep increase, first of all, it does take the defendant 40 percent higher for brandishing from 5 to 7, and... and it doubles the penalty 100 percent higher for discharging the firearm, which cannot be divorced from the brandishing element. There are cases from this Court in the context of ex post facto challenges to application of sentences that were enacted after the defendant committed the crime, most particularly Miller v. Florida, the leading case which we cite in our brief, where the Court held that an increase in a sentence of anywhere from two to two and a half years substantially disadvantaged the defendant and foreclosed the defendant from asking for a lower sentence. Likewise, in the case of Glover v. United States, which we do not cite in our brief... that is at 531 U.S. 198... the Court held, in the context of a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel, that an additional guideline sentence under the Federal sentencing guidelines of anywhere from 6 to 21 months meets the substantial prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. So, we contend that the increase from 5 to 7 years is in fact a... a substantial difference. The elements in question, comparing serious bodily injury and death to brandishing, are somewhat different in that the serious bodily injury and death are results, whereas brandish and discharge are conduct of the defendant. But we contend that the brandish and discharge being treated more seriously are seeking to address the same possible results; that is, if a defendant merely carries a firearm or possesses a firearm, it is far less likely that serious bodily injury or death will result than if the defendant brandishes or discharge... discharges--
Judge: Can I... can I go to Apprendi? Because the... I want to just focus you a little bit, assuming you lose on this argument. I want to know... and this is hard for me because I dissented in Apprendi. I want to know how you, as a person living with the case, understands it. Imagine two statutes. I just want to know if you think Apprendi applies to the second of the two statutes. The first statute says the sentence is up to 10 years for robbery, but if a gun is discharged, up to 15. There's no question that Apprendi applies to that second. Doesn't it?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I agree with that.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Mr. Ingram.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The petitioner in this case is asking the Court to rule that the brandish clause of 18 United States Code, Section 924(c) is an element to be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely a sentencing enhancement, based on two separate and independent bases. The first is the statutory analysis under Jones v. United States, and the second basis is the constitutional analysis under Apprendi v. New Jersey. And I will address the Jones argument first. The carjacking statute in Jones v. United States had, as additional elements, serious injury and death, which the Court held to be additional elements after the statutory analysis was completed. And the carjacking statute in that case and 18 United States Code, section 924(c) in this case are virtually mirror images of each other structurally and grammatically. The Court looked at the text of the statute, the legislative history behind those facts, and how legislatures historically had treated those facts in determining that serious injury and death were, in fact, elements to be proved and not merely sentencing enhancements. Likewise, we contend that brandish, based on the... the text of the statute, the... how legislatures have typically treated that fact and the fact that it involves a mens rea element... that is, brandish is... is defined as displaying or making the presence known of a firearm in order to intimidate and... and mens rea has traditionally been an element... and then based on the legislative history that those statutes would lead the Court to conclude, based on the statutory analysis, that brandish is in fact an element to be proved and not merely a sentencing enhancement.
Judge: But it's not so... it seems to me that... I understand your argument, but it's not so clear as it was in Jones. I mean, the difference between use and brandish is... is a... is a smaller difference in degree. The difference in the penalties are smaller differences. It's just a couple of years, the difference between 5 and... and 7, for example. And... and I understand how you can make the argument, but I don't see the argument as being sort of a slam dunk in the case.
Petitioner: Your Honor, if I may address each of those concerns. The... first of all, the... the fact that the increase under the brandish statute goes from a mandatory minimum of 5 to a mandatory minimum of... of 7 not being a steep increase, first of all, it does take the defendant 40 percent higher for brandishing from 5 to 7, and... and it doubles the penalty 100 percent higher for discharging the firearm, which cannot be divorced from the brandishing element. There are cases from this Court in the context of ex post facto challenges to application of sentences that were enacted after the defendant committed the crime, most particularly Miller v. Florida, the leading case which we cite in our brief, where the Court held that an increase in a sentence of anywhere from two to two and a half years substantially disadvantaged the defendant and foreclosed the defendant from asking for a lower sentence. Likewise, in the case of Glover v. United States, which we do not cite in our brief... that is at 531 U.S. 198... the Court held, in the context of a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel, that an additional guideline sentence under the Federal sentencing guidelines of anywhere from 6 to 21 months meets the substantial prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. So, we contend that the increase from 5 to 7 years is in fact a... a substantial difference. The elements in question, comparing serious bodily injury and death to brandishing, are somewhat different in that the serious bodily injury and death are results, whereas brandish and discharge are conduct of the defendant. But we contend that the brandish and discharge being treated more seriously are seeking to address the same possible results; that is, if a defendant merely carries a firearm or possesses a firearm, it is far less likely that serious bodily injury or death will result than if the defendant brandishes or discharge... discharges--
Judge: Can I... can I go to Apprendi? Because the... I want to just focus you a little bit, assuming you lose on this argument. I want to know... and this is hard for me because I dissented in Apprendi. I want to know how you, as a person living with the case, understands it. Imagine two statutes. I just want to know if you think Apprendi applies to the second of the two statutes. The first statute says the sentence is up to 10 years for robbery, but if a gun is discharged, up to 15. There's no question that Apprendi applies to that second. Doesn't it?
Petitioner: --I agree with that.
Judge: That's what Apprendi is about. Now, suppose I take that same statute and I just rewrite the words as follows. The maximum for this crime of robbery is 15, but unless a gun is discharged, you shall not sentence to more than 10. Now, is that second statute treated identically to the first in your understanding and the understanding of the bar? That's what I'm trying to get at.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes. My understanding is that Apprendi would cover the--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Mr. Ingram.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The petitioner in this case is asking the Court to rule that the brandish clause of 18 United States Code, Section 924(c) is an element to be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely a sentencing enhancement, based on two separate and independent bases. The first is the statutory analysis under Jones v. United States, and the second basis is the constitutional analysis under Apprendi v. New Jersey. And I will address the Jones argument first. The carjacking statute in Jones v. United States had, as additional elements, serious injury and death, which the Court held to be additional elements after the statutory analysis was completed. And the carjacking statute in that case and 18 United States Code, section 924(c) in this case are virtually mirror images of each other structurally and grammatically. The Court looked at the text of the statute, the legislative history behind those facts, and how legislatures historically had treated those facts in determining that serious injury and death were, in fact, elements to be proved and not merely sentencing enhancements. Likewise, we contend that brandish, based on the... the text of the statute, the... how legislatures have typically treated that fact and the fact that it involves a mens rea element... that is, brandish is... is defined as displaying or making the presence known of a firearm in order to intimidate and... and mens rea has traditionally been an element... and then based on the legislative history that those statutes would lead the Court to conclude, based on the statutory analysis, that brandish is in fact an element to be proved and not merely a sentencing enhancement.
Judge: But it's not so... it seems to me that... I understand your argument, but it's not so clear as it was in Jones. I mean, the difference between use and brandish is... is a... is a smaller difference in degree. The difference in the penalties are smaller differences. It's just a couple of years, the difference between 5 and... and 7, for example. And... and I understand how you can make the argument, but I don't see the argument as being sort of a slam dunk in the case.
Petitioner: Your Honor, if I may address each of those concerns. The... first of all, the... the fact that the increase under the brandish statute goes from a mandatory minimum of 5 to a mandatory minimum of... of 7 not being a steep increase, first of all, it does take the defendant 40 percent higher for brandishing from 5 to 7, and... and it doubles the penalty 100 percent higher for discharging the firearm, which cannot be divorced from the brandishing element. There are cases from this Court in the context of ex post facto challenges to application of sentences that were enacted after the defendant committed the crime, most particularly Miller v. Florida, the leading case which we cite in our brief, where the Court held that an increase in a sentence of anywhere from two to two and a half years substantially disadvantaged the defendant and foreclosed the defendant from asking for a lower sentence. Likewise, in the case of Glover v. United States, which we do not cite in our brief... that is at 531 U.S. 198... the Court held, in the context of a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel, that an additional guideline sentence under the Federal sentencing guidelines of anywhere from 6 to 21 months meets the substantial prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. So, we contend that the increase from 5 to 7 years is in fact a... a substantial difference. The elements in question, comparing serious bodily injury and death to brandishing, are somewhat different in that the serious bodily injury and death are results, whereas brandish and discharge are conduct of the defendant. But we contend that the brandish and discharge being treated more seriously are seeking to address the same possible results; that is, if a defendant merely carries a firearm or possesses a firearm, it is far less likely that serious bodily injury or death will result than if the defendant brandishes or discharge... discharges--
Judge: Can I... can I go to Apprendi? Because the... I want to just focus you a little bit, assuming you lose on this argument. I want to know... and this is hard for me because I dissented in Apprendi. I want to know how you, as a person living with the case, understands it. Imagine two statutes. I just want to know if you think Apprendi applies to the second of the two statutes. The first statute says the sentence is up to 10 years for robbery, but if a gun is discharged, up to 15. There's no question that Apprendi applies to that second. Doesn't it?
Petitioner: --I agree with that.
Judge: That's what Apprendi is about. Now, suppose I take that same statute and I just rewrite the words as follows. The maximum for this crime of robbery is 15, but unless a gun is discharged, you shall not sentence to more than 10. Now, is that second statute treated identically to the first in your understanding and the understanding of the bar? That's what I'm trying to get at.
Petitioner: Yes. My understanding is that Apprendi would cover the--
Judge: Both.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--latter statute that you have described.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Mr. Ingram.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The petitioner in this case is asking the Court to rule that the brandish clause of 18 United States Code, Section 924(c) is an element to be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely a sentencing enhancement, based on two separate and independent bases. The first is the statutory analysis under Jones v. United States, and the second basis is the constitutional analysis under Apprendi v. New Jersey. And I will address the Jones argument first. The carjacking statute in Jones v. United States had, as additional elements, serious injury and death, which the Court held to be additional elements after the statutory analysis was completed. And the carjacking statute in that case and 18 United States Code, section 924(c) in this case are virtually mirror images of each other structurally and grammatically. The Court looked at the text of the statute, the legislative history behind those facts, and how legislatures historically had treated those facts in determining that serious injury and death were, in fact, elements to be proved and not merely sentencing enhancements. Likewise, we contend that brandish, based on the... the text of the statute, the... how legislatures have typically treated that fact and the fact that it involves a mens rea element... that is, brandish is... is defined as displaying or making the presence known of a firearm in order to intimidate and... and mens rea has traditionally been an element... and then based on the legislative history that those statutes would lead the Court to conclude, based on the statutory analysis, that brandish is in fact an element to be proved and not merely a sentencing enhancement.
Judge: But it's not so... it seems to me that... I understand your argument, but it's not so clear as it was in Jones. I mean, the difference between use and brandish is... is a... is a smaller difference in degree. The difference in the penalties are smaller differences. It's just a couple of years, the difference between 5 and... and 7, for example. And... and I understand how you can make the argument, but I don't see the argument as being sort of a slam dunk in the case.
Petitioner: Your Honor, if I may address each of those concerns. The... first of all, the... the fact that the increase under the brandish statute goes from a mandatory minimum of 5 to a mandatory minimum of... of 7 not being a steep increase, first of all, it does take the defendant 40 percent higher for brandishing from 5 to 7, and... and it doubles the penalty 100 percent higher for discharging the firearm, which cannot be divorced from the brandishing element. There are cases from this Court in the context of ex post facto challenges to application of sentences that were enacted after the defendant committed the crime, most particularly Miller v. Florida, the leading case which we cite in our brief, where the Court held that an increase in a sentence of anywhere from two to two and a half years substantially disadvantaged the defendant and foreclosed the defendant from asking for a lower sentence. Likewise, in the case of Glover v. United States, which we do not cite in our brief... that is at 531 U.S. 198... the Court held, in the context of a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel, that an additional guideline sentence under the Federal sentencing guidelines of anywhere from 6 to 21 months meets the substantial prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. So, we contend that the increase from 5 to 7 years is in fact a... a substantial difference. The elements in question, comparing serious bodily injury and death to brandishing, are somewhat different in that the serious bodily injury and death are results, whereas brandish and discharge are conduct of the defendant. But we contend that the brandish and discharge being treated more seriously are seeking to address the same possible results; that is, if a defendant merely carries a firearm or possesses a firearm, it is far less likely that serious bodily injury or death will result than if the defendant brandishes or discharge... discharges--
Judge: Can I... can I go to Apprendi? Because the... I want to just focus you a little bit, assuming you lose on this argument. I want to know... and this is hard for me because I dissented in Apprendi. I want to know how you, as a person living with the case, understands it. Imagine two statutes. I just want to know if you think Apprendi applies to the second of the two statutes. The first statute says the sentence is up to 10 years for robbery, but if a gun is discharged, up to 15. There's no question that Apprendi applies to that second. Doesn't it?
Petitioner: --I agree with that.
Judge: That's what Apprendi is about. Now, suppose I take that same statute and I just rewrite the words as follows. The maximum for this crime of robbery is 15, but unless a gun is discharged, you shall not sentence to more than 10. Now, is that second statute treated identically to the first in your understanding and the understanding of the bar? That's what I'm trying to get at.
Petitioner: Yes. My understanding is that Apprendi would cover the--
Judge: Both.
Petitioner: --latter statute that you have described.
Judge: Both. So, the wording of it doesn't matter.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>No. I contend that it... it does not.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-1211, Vartelas v. Holder. Mr. Bibas.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As the government concedes, INA subsection 101(a)(13)(C)(v) added by IIRIRA does not expressly mandate retroactivity. Under Landgraf, applying that new provision would attach new legal consequences to pre-IIRIRA offenses, penalizing both those who travel and those who don't. Covered lawful permanent residents could not visit their parents abroad without being forced to abandon their children here. They would be removed from the country or else confined here. Either way, they would lose an ability they had under pre-IIRIRA law based on pre-IIRIRA offenses. Thus applying the subsection to them would be impermissibly retroactive. The settled expectations at issue here are those of round trips by lawful permanent residents, not, as the government would put it, one-way tickets or first-time entrants. These are people who have structured their lives here. They have homes, spouses, children, and careers here, and yet have a settled expectation that they will be able to maintain ties to visit aged and ailing parents abroad, to go to funerals and wakes and visit them in the hospital and surgeries. Our amici, the NACDL brief, and the Asian American--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-1211, Vartelas v. Holder. Mr. Bibas.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As the government concedes, INA subsection 101(a)(13)(C)(v) added by IIRIRA does not expressly mandate retroactivity. Under Landgraf, applying that new provision would attach new legal consequences to pre-IIRIRA offenses, penalizing both those who travel and those who don't. Covered lawful permanent residents could not visit their parents abroad without being forced to abandon their children here. They would be removed from the country or else confined here. Either way, they would lose an ability they had under pre-IIRIRA law based on pre-IIRIRA offenses. Thus applying the subsection to them would be impermissibly retroactive. The settled expectations at issue here are those of round trips by lawful permanent residents, not, as the government would put it, one-way tickets or first-time entrants. These are people who have structured their lives here. They have homes, spouses, children, and careers here, and yet have a settled expectation that they will be able to maintain ties to visit aged and ailing parents abroad, to go to funerals and wakes and visit them in the hospital and surgeries. Our amici, the NACDL brief, and the Asian American--
Judge: As far as going forward is concerned, that's -- that's just the way it is, right?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Yes, because Congress has expressly changed the law post-IIRIRA. The question is for those before IIRIRA, whether those settled expectations are being disrupted.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-1211, Vartelas v. Holder. Mr. Bibas.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As the government concedes, INA subsection 101(a)(13)(C)(v) added by IIRIRA does not expressly mandate retroactivity. Under Landgraf, applying that new provision would attach new legal consequences to pre-IIRIRA offenses, penalizing both those who travel and those who don't. Covered lawful permanent residents could not visit their parents abroad without being forced to abandon their children here. They would be removed from the country or else confined here. Either way, they would lose an ability they had under pre-IIRIRA law based on pre-IIRIRA offenses. Thus applying the subsection to them would be impermissibly retroactive. The settled expectations at issue here are those of round trips by lawful permanent residents, not, as the government would put it, one-way tickets or first-time entrants. These are people who have structured their lives here. They have homes, spouses, children, and careers here, and yet have a settled expectation that they will be able to maintain ties to visit aged and ailing parents abroad, to go to funerals and wakes and visit them in the hospital and surgeries. Our amici, the NACDL brief, and the Asian American--
Judge: As far as going forward is concerned, that's -- that's just the way it is, right?
Petitioner: --Yes, because Congress has expressly changed the law post-IIRIRA. The question is for those before IIRIRA, whether those settled expectations are being disrupted.
Judge: Could they -- could they -- the -- the person who -- who is here and then the new law is passed, could that person have petitioned for discretionary relief before traveling?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Your Honor, that is a possibility. That is not the same as the automatic ability to travel, and in fact in this case the discretionary relief was denied. It depends on a different set of factors from the automatic pre-IIRIRA ability to travel. But it is a theoretical possibility in some cases.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-1211, Vartelas v. Holder. Mr. Bibas.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As the government concedes, INA subsection 101(a)(13)(C)(v) added by IIRIRA does not expressly mandate retroactivity. Under Landgraf, applying that new provision would attach new legal consequences to pre-IIRIRA offenses, penalizing both those who travel and those who don't. Covered lawful permanent residents could not visit their parents abroad without being forced to abandon their children here. They would be removed from the country or else confined here. Either way, they would lose an ability they had under pre-IIRIRA law based on pre-IIRIRA offenses. Thus applying the subsection to them would be impermissibly retroactive. The settled expectations at issue here are those of round trips by lawful permanent residents, not, as the government would put it, one-way tickets or first-time entrants. These are people who have structured their lives here. They have homes, spouses, children, and careers here, and yet have a settled expectation that they will be able to maintain ties to visit aged and ailing parents abroad, to go to funerals and wakes and visit them in the hospital and surgeries. Our amici, the NACDL brief, and the Asian American--
Judge: As far as going forward is concerned, that's -- that's just the way it is, right?
Petitioner: --Yes, because Congress has expressly changed the law post-IIRIRA. The question is for those before IIRIRA, whether those settled expectations are being disrupted.
Judge: Could they -- could they -- the -- the person who -- who is here and then the new law is passed, could that person have petitioned for discretionary relief before traveling?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, that is a possibility. That is not the same as the automatic ability to travel, and in fact in this case the discretionary relief was denied. It depends on a different set of factors from the automatic pre-IIRIRA ability to travel. But it is a theoretical possibility in some cases.
Judge: So your expectations argument is that somebody trying to figure out whether to go ahead and rob the bank is going to say, well, if I do and I am caught and I am found guilty, I won't be able to take temporary trips abroad, so I'm not going to rob the bank?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>No, Your Honor. First of all, you phrased it specifically as a reliance argument, which is an alternative. Even the government concedes it is not a prerequisite. Second, the right time to look at expectations is the moment before the law is enacted: Does one have an expectation at that point that one will be able to continue--<|eot_id|>
|
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