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Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10-- | Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus. | Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.
Judge: Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109.
Petitioner: That is correct. | So we're pretty far removed from the language of the statute, I guess. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.
Judge: Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109.
Petitioner: That is correct.
Judge: So we're pretty far removed from the language of the statute, I guess.
Petitioner: But, again, ever since 1908, that's a standard that this Court has not accepted. And this is based on the provision, the well-settled provision, that an earlier Congress cannot bind a later Congress. | Oh, and I understand that. But presumably -- we also have the proposition that Congress, when it enacts legislation, knows the law. They would have known section 109 required an express statement if they wanted to apply the change retroactively. So why shouldn't we hold them to that standard? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism. | I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake-- | But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--
Judge: But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case?
Petitioner: --This case? | Yes. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--
Judge: But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case?
Petitioner: --This case?
Judge: Yes.
Petitioner: Well, since -- I think since this is not a prison breakout case, I don't know whether data about breakouts-- | Do we look to the crime to see generally whether or not it involves violence and serious risk of harm? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address... | do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you... | I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...
Judge: I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence.
Petitioner: Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott. | what happens in Alabama if if a a criminal defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor and placed on probation and then violates probation? Does that enable the State to impose the original sentence for violation of the probation? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...
Judge: I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence.
Petitioner: Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott.
Judge: what happens in Alabama if if a a criminal defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor and placed on probation and then violates probation? Does that enable the State to impose the original sentence for violation of the probation?
Petitioner: Our reading of of Scott is that th- that we cannot activate the suspended sentence. | Well, then we're jumping probably ahead into wh- what you're going to tell us, but while we're at this point, |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1). | Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive. | If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.
Judge: If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually?
Petitioner: Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment. | What's your answer simply to the very simple argument that because the floor was set on the assumption of a 100 to 1 ratio, set by Congress, that any other sentencing assumption, regardless of the particular justifications in a given case, is simply incoherent with the statutory scheme and for that reason should be regarded as unreasonable? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.
Judge: If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually?
Petitioner: Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment.
Judge: What's your answer simply to the very simple argument that because the floor was set on the assumption of a 100 to 1 ratio, set by Congress, that any other sentencing assumption, regardless of the particular justifications in a given case, is simply incoherent with the statutory scheme and for that reason should be regarded as unreasonable?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor. | It is the coherence problem that is bothering us. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act. | You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that. | Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.
Judge: Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Petitioner: Okay. | Those are exactly equivalent. Now, if they were to say the latter, would a conviction under this statute potentially qualify under the Armed Career Criminal Act? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.
Judge: Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Petitioner: Okay.
Judge: Those are exactly equivalent. Now, if they were to say the latter, would a conviction under this statute potentially qualify under the Armed Career Criminal Act?
Petitioner: Well, I don't believe it would, because I don't believe possessory interest equates to Taylor definition. | No, but they -- they set out alternative elements, either breaking into the structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized-- | General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability. | Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.
Judge: Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line.
Petitioner: Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake. | Well, I'm -- I'm not sure that that's quite correct. It has said it often, but always in context where it is well understood that speech can injure. Defamation, Gertz. At page 12 of your brief, you make this point, and it's what Justice Sotomayor is indicating. You think there's no value to falsity. But I -- I simply can't find that in our cases, and I -- I think it's a sweeping proposition to say that there's no value to falsity. Falsity is a way in which we contrast what is false and what is true. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.
Judge: Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line.
Petitioner: Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake.
Judge: Well, I'm -- I'm not sure that that's quite correct. It has said it often, but always in context where it is well understood that speech can injure. Defamation, Gertz. At page 12 of your brief, you make this point, and it's what Justice Sotomayor is indicating. You think there's no value to falsity. But I -- I simply can't find that in our cases, and I -- I think it's a sweeping proposition to say that there's no value to falsity. Falsity is a way in which we contrast what is false and what is true.
Petitioner: I want to be-- | And-- |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life. | So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation-- | They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--
Judge: They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying?
Petitioner: --Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And-- | Mr. Coad, how are... how are civil rights which have been taken away typically restored? What is... what is the process for restoring them? Just if you don't commit another offense within a certain number of years? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--
Judge: They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying?
Petitioner: --Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And--
Judge: Mr. Coad, how are... how are civil rights which have been taken away typically restored? What is... what is the process for restoring them? Just if you don't commit another offense within a certain number of years?
Petitioner: --It depends on the State. In the NACDL lodging that the Court has... I believe 29 States were identified as having some type of restoration procedures. The majority of those, it is by automatic operation of law. So there's no subsequent conditions met by the offender. | Well, but even... even there I assume the law waits for a certain passage of time, and I would assume that there can be no felony committed during that interim period or the person's sentence has to be served or something? It's ongoing, it's prospective. And so restoration has a real component, in that... that is not present in the statute that we're faced with here. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense. | Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?
Petitioner: No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case-- | It has to be raised by the defendant, right? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?
Petitioner: No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case--
Judge: It has to be raised by the defendant, right?
Petitioner: --It does have to be raised initially-- | Which means it's not an element. It doesn't have to be charged in the indictment. Now, how can something that goes to the existence or non-existence of an affirmative defense be an element? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?
Petitioner: No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case--
Judge: It has to be raised by the defendant, right?
Petitioner: --It does have to be raised initially--
Judge: Which means it's not an element. It doesn't have to be charged in the indictment. Now, how can something that goes to the existence or non-existence of an affirmative defense be an element?
Petitioner: --Well, I don't -- it is not an element, I agree with that; but it is -- I would say that it's engrafted onto every Federal criminal statute by statute. This is not the common law, but by Congress's decision. I would also say that even though it's not an element of defense -- of the offense, in Winship, this Court referred to the fact that the government must prove every fact necessary to prove a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It's a fact necessary-- | But you could prove the crime without a reasonable -- beyond a reasonable doubt if you never raised the statute of limitations. And statutes of limitations exist for civil claims as well as criminal claims. And in -- on the civil side, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and it's up to the plaintiff to plead and prove -- both plead and prove it, both the burden of production and persuasion. Why should it be different on the criminal side? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence-- | How do you explain -- I mean, I think that is a principal point, whether Blake and Brieva changed the law. How do you explain the language in Matter of Wadud, which antedates by a good deal those two cases, 1984, which says: "Section 212(c) can only be invoked in a deportation hearing where the ground of deportation charged is also a ground of inadmissibility. " It seems to me that that's the basic point. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence--
Judge: How do you explain -- I mean, I think that is a principal point, whether Blake and Brieva changed the law. How do you explain the language in Matter of Wadud, which antedates by a good deal those two cases, 1984, which says: "Section 212(c) can only be invoked in a deportation hearing where the ground of deportation charged is also a ground of inadmissibility. " It seems to me that that's the basic point.
Petitioner: --Two responses to that, Justice Scalia. I agree, Matter of Wadud is the principal response that the government has, and it does not help them at all. Wadud was deportable for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546, and the BIA had held in a case called Matter of RG in 1958 that that conviction did not render him excludable. And that is confirmed later in the case of Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, which also involved a 1546 conviction, where the BIA says that if Mr. Jimenez had left of the country and returned it appears that he would not have been inadmissible and compares that situation to someone convicted of a firearms offense, which the board and the Attorney General had always said were not waivable. To the extent there is any ambiguity in the language that Your Honor read, it could not have survived the Attorney General's decision in Hernandez-Casillas, which I just quoted at the beginning of the presentation, which said that what one looks to is whether alien in exclusion proceedings would be able to invoke section 212(c) relief. And when the board then addressed the case of the aggravated felony in Matter of Meza, it did not even address Wadud or view it as binding at all. It looked to the conviction and whether it formed a basis for excludability. And the BIA then followed up with no fewer than eight decisions in crime of violence cases indistinguishable from this case where the BIA cited, not Wadud, not any of the other cases that the government is relying on, but cited Meza as articulating the doctrine that the focus of analysis is on the conviction. And the Court has the briefs of several former immigration officials, including two INS general counsel and several INS trial attorneys, confirming that that was the position and the basis on which the government litigated these cases-- | Mr.-- |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence--
Judge: How do you explain -- I mean, I think that is a principal point, whether Blake and Brieva changed the law. How do you explain the language in Matter of Wadud, which antedates by a good deal those two cases, 1984, which says: "Section 212(c) can only be invoked in a deportation hearing where the ground of deportation charged is also a ground of inadmissibility. " It seems to me that that's the basic point.
Petitioner: --Two responses to that, Justice Scalia. I agree, Matter of Wadud is the principal response that the government has, and it does not help them at all. Wadud was deportable for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546, and the BIA had held in a case called Matter of RG in 1958 that that conviction did not render him excludable. And that is confirmed later in the case of Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, which also involved a 1546 conviction, where the BIA says that if Mr. Jimenez had left of the country and returned it appears that he would not have been inadmissible and compares that situation to someone convicted of a firearms offense, which the board and the Attorney General had always said were not waivable. To the extent there is any ambiguity in the language that Your Honor read, it could not have survived the Attorney General's decision in Hernandez-Casillas, which I just quoted at the beginning of the presentation, which said that what one looks to is whether alien in exclusion proceedings would be able to invoke section 212(c) relief. And when the board then addressed the case of the aggravated felony in Matter of Meza, it did not even address Wadud or view it as binding at all. It looked to the conviction and whether it formed a basis for excludability. And the BIA then followed up with no fewer than eight decisions in crime of violence cases indistinguishable from this case where the BIA cited, not Wadud, not any of the other cases that the government is relying on, but cited Meza as articulating the doctrine that the focus of analysis is on the conviction. And the Court has the briefs of several former immigration officials, including two INS general counsel and several INS trial attorneys, confirming that that was the position and the basis on which the government litigated these cases--
Judge: Mr.--
Petitioner: --And in fact -- yes, Justice Kagan? | --Please finish. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence--
Judge: How do you explain -- I mean, I think that is a principal point, whether Blake and Brieva changed the law. How do you explain the language in Matter of Wadud, which antedates by a good deal those two cases, 1984, which says: "Section 212(c) can only be invoked in a deportation hearing where the ground of deportation charged is also a ground of inadmissibility. " It seems to me that that's the basic point.
Petitioner: --Two responses to that, Justice Scalia. I agree, Matter of Wadud is the principal response that the government has, and it does not help them at all. Wadud was deportable for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546, and the BIA had held in a case called Matter of RG in 1958 that that conviction did not render him excludable. And that is confirmed later in the case of Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, which also involved a 1546 conviction, where the BIA says that if Mr. Jimenez had left of the country and returned it appears that he would not have been inadmissible and compares that situation to someone convicted of a firearms offense, which the board and the Attorney General had always said were not waivable. To the extent there is any ambiguity in the language that Your Honor read, it could not have survived the Attorney General's decision in Hernandez-Casillas, which I just quoted at the beginning of the presentation, which said that what one looks to is whether alien in exclusion proceedings would be able to invoke section 212(c) relief. And when the board then addressed the case of the aggravated felony in Matter of Meza, it did not even address Wadud or view it as binding at all. It looked to the conviction and whether it formed a basis for excludability. And the BIA then followed up with no fewer than eight decisions in crime of violence cases indistinguishable from this case where the BIA cited, not Wadud, not any of the other cases that the government is relying on, but cited Meza as articulating the doctrine that the focus of analysis is on the conviction. And the Court has the briefs of several former immigration officials, including two INS general counsel and several INS trial attorneys, confirming that that was the position and the basis on which the government litigated these cases--
Judge: Mr.--
Petitioner: --And in fact -- yes, Justice Kagan?
Judge: --Please finish.
Petitioner: If I may, I was just going to say that a number of these cases, crime of violence cases, reached the merits in both the BIA and the courts of appeals without the government even suggesting that there was a statutory counterpart problem. In fact, when it has suited its purposes the government and the BIA have admitted that Blake was a change, including in a brief filed in the Ninth Circuit less than a year ago. | You cite some cases. You say there was a dramatic change in the law. The government cites some cases and it says there was no change in the law. What if the truth lies someplace in the middle. What if, in fact, when you look before Blake what you see is some amount of confusion; that the board sometimes was following the Blake rule, but that at other times individual judges or maybe the board itself were doing something different, because the individual circumstances suggested that they should, or just because they weren't so clear on the difference between these two approaches. And then Blake comes along, and what Blake does is neither to change something dramatically nor to just reaffirm what was there, but in some sense to create a little bit of order out of chaos. What would that do to your argument if that's the way one understood Blake? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: We will now hear argument in Brown against Payton. Ms. Cortina.
Petitioner: Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: In this case, the Ninth Circuit violated AEDPA by reversing the California Supreme Court's decision affirming Payton's 1982 death sentence. The California Supreme Court applied the exact right case, namely Boyde v. California, in the very manner contemplated that... by that decision when assessing Payton's claim that his jury misunderstood the court's instructions and, in particular, factor (k) so as to unconstitutionally preclude consideration of his mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court's application of Boyde is precisely the type of good faith application of Federal constitutional law to which AEDPA demands deference. It is manifestly not objectively unreasonable, and this can be demonstrated in three aspects of the decision. The first is that the California Supreme Court recognized Boyde's specific holding that factor (k) facially comported with the Eighth Amendment. The second is-- | Well, I thought the holding was that factor (k), standing alone, does... does not raise a... does... does not, standing alone, raise a question of reasonable probability of... of misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. And that's not what they're claiming here. They're claiming here that there was something much more than (k) standing alone. As I understand it, they're claiming that the difference between this and Boyde and why this is not a standalone kind of case is that the prosecutor deliberately argued or argued law that was in fact wrong and... and continued to do so even after the court interrupted the argument and that the court never gave an instruction that corrected the erroneous statements of law that the prosecutor had made. So that's... that's why they're... they're saying this is not a Boyde situation. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: We will now hear argument in Brown against Payton. Ms. Cortina.
Petitioner: Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: In this case, the Ninth Circuit violated AEDPA by reversing the California Supreme Court's decision affirming Payton's 1982 death sentence. The California Supreme Court applied the exact right case, namely Boyde v. California, in the very manner contemplated that... by that decision when assessing Payton's claim that his jury misunderstood the court's instructions and, in particular, factor (k) so as to unconstitutionally preclude consideration of his mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court's application of Boyde is precisely the type of good faith application of Federal constitutional law to which AEDPA demands deference. It is manifestly not objectively unreasonable, and this can be demonstrated in three aspects of the decision. The first is that the California Supreme Court recognized Boyde's specific holding that factor (k) facially comported with the Eighth Amendment. The second is--
Judge: Well, I thought the holding was that factor (k), standing alone, does... does not raise a... does... does not, standing alone, raise a question of reasonable probability of... of misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. And that's not what they're claiming here. They're claiming here that there was something much more than (k) standing alone. As I understand it, they're claiming that the difference between this and Boyde and why this is not a standalone kind of case is that the prosecutor deliberately argued or argued law that was in fact wrong and... and continued to do so even after the court interrupted the argument and that the court never gave an instruction that corrected the erroneous statements of law that the prosecutor had made. So that's... that's why they're... they're saying this is not a Boyde situation.
Petitioner: --Your Honor, Boyde has two specific components to its decision, which is, first, what factor (k) means standing alone, and you need to resolve that issue, which California did, in deciding the impact of the prosecutor's misstatements concerning factor (k). So that, first, you start from the premise, as the California Supreme Court did, in following Boyde, that factor (k) facially directed for consideration of Payton's mitigating evidence. | Well, no, no. The... the mitigating evidence that Boyde held could be considered without a... (k) being a bar, was mitigating evidence about the... the character of the individual prior to or at least up to the moment of the crime. So this is... this is different kind of evidence, and I... I mean, this is post-crime evidence. And... and I don't see that... that Boyde's holding is so broad as obviously to cover this at all. It might be a... it would be a... a closer question if it hadn't been for the prosecutor's argument and the judge's failure to correct it. But even... even without those elements, there would be a serious question whether Boyde covered this at all. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: We will now hear argument in Brown against Payton. Ms. Cortina.
Petitioner: Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: In this case, the Ninth Circuit violated AEDPA by reversing the California Supreme Court's decision affirming Payton's 1982 death sentence. The California Supreme Court applied the exact right case, namely Boyde v. California, in the very manner contemplated that... by that decision when assessing Payton's claim that his jury misunderstood the court's instructions and, in particular, factor (k) so as to unconstitutionally preclude consideration of his mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court's application of Boyde is precisely the type of good faith application of Federal constitutional law to which AEDPA demands deference. It is manifestly not objectively unreasonable, and this can be demonstrated in three aspects of the decision. The first is that the California Supreme Court recognized Boyde's specific holding that factor (k) facially comported with the Eighth Amendment. The second is--
Judge: Well, I thought the holding was that factor (k), standing alone, does... does not raise a... does... does not, standing alone, raise a question of reasonable probability of... of misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. And that's not what they're claiming here. They're claiming here that there was something much more than (k) standing alone. As I understand it, they're claiming that the difference between this and Boyde and why this is not a standalone kind of case is that the prosecutor deliberately argued or argued law that was in fact wrong and... and continued to do so even after the court interrupted the argument and that the court never gave an instruction that corrected the erroneous statements of law that the prosecutor had made. So that's... that's why they're... they're saying this is not a Boyde situation.
Petitioner: --Your Honor, Boyde has two specific components to its decision, which is, first, what factor (k) means standing alone, and you need to resolve that issue, which California did, in deciding the impact of the prosecutor's misstatements concerning factor (k). So that, first, you start from the premise, as the California Supreme Court did, in following Boyde, that factor (k) facially directed for consideration of Payton's mitigating evidence.
Judge: Well, no, no. The... the mitigating evidence that Boyde held could be considered without a... (k) being a bar, was mitigating evidence about the... the character of the individual prior to or at least up to the moment of the crime. So this is... this is different kind of evidence, and I... I mean, this is post-crime evidence. And... and I don't see that... that Boyde's holding is so broad as obviously to cover this at all. It might be a... it would be a... a closer question if it hadn't been for the prosecutor's argument and the judge's failure to correct it. But even... even without those elements, there would be a serious question whether Boyde covered this at all.
Petitioner: Your Honor, the... respectfully I disagree. I believe that the California Supreme Court correctly and... and reasonably determined that Boyde's holding encompassed Payton's character mitigating... Payton's mitigating character evidence because the holding in Boyde... or the issue directly presented by Boyde was whether factor (k) limited consideration to circumstances related to the crime or allowed for non-crime related mitigating evidence in deciding the appropriate penalty. | What do we make of the Chief Justice's fear statement, not once but twice, in Boyde? The prosecutor never suggested that background and character evidence could not be considered. So mustn't we take Boyde with that qualification when we have a case where the prosecutor, indeed, suggested that this information could not be taken into consideration as a mitigating factor? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: We will now hear argument in Brown against Payton. Ms. Cortina.
Petitioner: Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: In this case, the Ninth Circuit violated AEDPA by reversing the California Supreme Court's decision affirming Payton's 1982 death sentence. The California Supreme Court applied the exact right case, namely Boyde v. California, in the very manner contemplated that... by that decision when assessing Payton's claim that his jury misunderstood the court's instructions and, in particular, factor (k) so as to unconstitutionally preclude consideration of his mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court's application of Boyde is precisely the type of good faith application of Federal constitutional law to which AEDPA demands deference. It is manifestly not objectively unreasonable, and this can be demonstrated in three aspects of the decision. The first is that the California Supreme Court recognized Boyde's specific holding that factor (k) facially comported with the Eighth Amendment. The second is--
Judge: Well, I thought the holding was that factor (k), standing alone, does... does not raise a... does... does not, standing alone, raise a question of reasonable probability of... of misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. And that's not what they're claiming here. They're claiming here that there was something much more than (k) standing alone. As I understand it, they're claiming that the difference between this and Boyde and why this is not a standalone kind of case is that the prosecutor deliberately argued or argued law that was in fact wrong and... and continued to do so even after the court interrupted the argument and that the court never gave an instruction that corrected the erroneous statements of law that the prosecutor had made. So that's... that's why they're... they're saying this is not a Boyde situation.
Petitioner: --Your Honor, Boyde has two specific components to its decision, which is, first, what factor (k) means standing alone, and you need to resolve that issue, which California did, in deciding the impact of the prosecutor's misstatements concerning factor (k). So that, first, you start from the premise, as the California Supreme Court did, in following Boyde, that factor (k) facially directed for consideration of Payton's mitigating evidence.
Judge: Well, no, no. The... the mitigating evidence that Boyde held could be considered without a... (k) being a bar, was mitigating evidence about the... the character of the individual prior to or at least up to the moment of the crime. So this is... this is different kind of evidence, and I... I mean, this is post-crime evidence. And... and I don't see that... that Boyde's holding is so broad as obviously to cover this at all. It might be a... it would be a... a closer question if it hadn't been for the prosecutor's argument and the judge's failure to correct it. But even... even without those elements, there would be a serious question whether Boyde covered this at all.
Petitioner: Your Honor, the... respectfully I disagree. I believe that the California Supreme Court correctly and... and reasonably determined that Boyde's holding encompassed Payton's character mitigating... Payton's mitigating character evidence because the holding in Boyde... or the issue directly presented by Boyde was whether factor (k) limited consideration to circumstances related to the crime or allowed for non-crime related mitigating evidence in deciding the appropriate penalty.
Judge: What do we make of the Chief Justice's fear statement, not once but twice, in Boyde? The prosecutor never suggested that background and character evidence could not be considered. So mustn't we take Boyde with that qualification when we have a case where the prosecutor, indeed, suggested that this information could not be taken into consideration as a mitigating factor?
Petitioner: No, Justice Ginsburg. First, you must assess factor (k) facially and that's what Boyde did. Then the next question is did the prosecutor's misstatements concerning factor (k) mislead the jury to believe that they could no longer consider Payton's mitigating character evidence. And that would be the second component of Boyde which is a general test for assessing the reasonable likelihood a jury misunderstood the instructions in the context of the proceedings. And the particularly relevant and important inquiry in this case is the California Supreme Court's application of Boyde's reasonable likelihood test in the context of the proceedings. | Well, do we take... do we take the case on the assumption that the trial court erred in not giving a curative instruction and in saying, well, this is a matter for the attorneys to argue? You... you don't argue about what a statute means. That's a question of law. You don't argue that. You can argue the facts, that it's mitigating or not mitigating or that it's extenuating or not extenuating, which is I think how you can interpret a lot of this. But it... it seems to me that the trial judge does make a mistake when he says, well, well, this is for the... this is for them to argue when the... the point of the objection was that there was a misinterpretation of the instruction. That's a legal point. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-9526, McGirt versus Oklahoma. Mr. Gershengorn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case is resolved by the fundamental proposition that decisions about sovereign rights are for Congress to make and Congress makes those decisions by speaking clearly in the text. The decision below must be reversed because the text makes clear that Congress never terminated the Creek reservation and never transferred federal criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. I have four basic points to make this morning. First, the Creek Nation had a reservation. The relevant treaties reserved the lands from sale and solemnly guaranteed the lands for the Creek to govern. The text of both treaties and statutes expressly identified the Creek land as a reservation. Nothing more was needed. Second, Congress did not establish -- disestablish that reservation. Indeed, Congress considered hallmark language of disestablishment and rejected it. Congress initially sought cession yet instead provided only for allotment. Then, when congressional inaction would have dissolved the tribe, Congress instead preserved the tribe and its government for all purposes authorized by law, and it did so against the backdrop of existing tribal authority to legislate over reservation land. Those congressional judgments should be respected. Third, Congress did not transfer criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. At statehood, the Major Crimes Act established exclusive federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes in "any state of the United States." When Congress overrides the Major Crimes Act and transfers jurisdiction to a state, it does so expressly, and it did not do so here. Finally, Oklahoma's rhetoric about disruption does not change the result. On the criminal side, this Court's decision in Ramos is a complete answer, and on the civil side, the main issues are tax and other regulatory issues that are routinely resolved by tribal-state agreements. In any event, Parker makes clear that questions of sovereignty are distinct from claims of reservation status. This Court should resolve the reservation question, leaving jurisdictional disputes to Congress, the relevant sovereign, and then for this Court to resolve if and when they arise. | Counsel, the -- |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-9526, McGirt versus Oklahoma. Mr. Gershengorn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case is resolved by the fundamental proposition that decisions about sovereign rights are for Congress to make and Congress makes those decisions by speaking clearly in the text. The decision below must be reversed because the text makes clear that Congress never terminated the Creek reservation and never transferred federal criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. I have four basic points to make this morning. First, the Creek Nation had a reservation. The relevant treaties reserved the lands from sale and solemnly guaranteed the lands for the Creek to govern. The text of both treaties and statutes expressly identified the Creek land as a reservation. Nothing more was needed. Second, Congress did not establish -- disestablish that reservation. Indeed, Congress considered hallmark language of disestablishment and rejected it. Congress initially sought cession yet instead provided only for allotment. Then, when congressional inaction would have dissolved the tribe, Congress instead preserved the tribe and its government for all purposes authorized by law, and it did so against the backdrop of existing tribal authority to legislate over reservation land. Those congressional judgments should be respected. Third, Congress did not transfer criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. At statehood, the Major Crimes Act established exclusive federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes in "any state of the United States." When Congress overrides the Major Crimes Act and transfers jurisdiction to a state, it does so expressly, and it did not do so here. Finally, Oklahoma's rhetoric about disruption does not change the result. On the criminal side, this Court's decision in Ramos is a complete answer, and on the civil side, the main issues are tax and other regulatory issues that are routinely resolved by tribal-state agreements. In any event, Parker makes clear that questions of sovereignty are distinct from claims of reservation status. This Court should resolve the reservation question, leaving jurisdictional disputes to Congress, the relevant sovereign, and then for this Court to resolve if and when they arise.
Judge: Counsel, the --
Petitioner: So let me start this -- | -- State argues that the territory should be analyzed as a dependent Indian community under 1151 and not as a reservation. They base this argument on our decisions in Sandoval and Creek Nation and 1151 itself and the fact that the Creeks have always maintained, have been adamant about the fact that they are not reservation Indians. Now you refer, of course, to the many times in which the treaty is referred to as a reservation, but what is your answer to the State's analysis of our precedent? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-9526, McGirt versus Oklahoma. Mr. Gershengorn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case is resolved by the fundamental proposition that decisions about sovereign rights are for Congress to make and Congress makes those decisions by speaking clearly in the text. The decision below must be reversed because the text makes clear that Congress never terminated the Creek reservation and never transferred federal criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. I have four basic points to make this morning. First, the Creek Nation had a reservation. The relevant treaties reserved the lands from sale and solemnly guaranteed the lands for the Creek to govern. The text of both treaties and statutes expressly identified the Creek land as a reservation. Nothing more was needed. Second, Congress did not establish -- disestablish that reservation. Indeed, Congress considered hallmark language of disestablishment and rejected it. Congress initially sought cession yet instead provided only for allotment. Then, when congressional inaction would have dissolved the tribe, Congress instead preserved the tribe and its government for all purposes authorized by law, and it did so against the backdrop of existing tribal authority to legislate over reservation land. Those congressional judgments should be respected. Third, Congress did not transfer criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. At statehood, the Major Crimes Act established exclusive federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes in "any state of the United States." When Congress overrides the Major Crimes Act and transfers jurisdiction to a state, it does so expressly, and it did not do so here. Finally, Oklahoma's rhetoric about disruption does not change the result. On the criminal side, this Court's decision in Ramos is a complete answer, and on the civil side, the main issues are tax and other regulatory issues that are routinely resolved by tribal-state agreements. In any event, Parker makes clear that questions of sovereignty are distinct from claims of reservation status. This Court should resolve the reservation question, leaving jurisdictional disputes to Congress, the relevant sovereign, and then for this Court to resolve if and when they arise.
Judge: Counsel, the --
Petitioner: So let me start this --
Judge: -- State argues that the territory should be analyzed as a dependent Indian community under 1151 and not as a reservation. They base this argument on our decisions in Sandoval and Creek Nation and 1151 itself and the fact that the Creeks have always maintained, have been adamant about the fact that they are not reservation Indians. Now you refer, of course, to the many times in which the treaty is referred to as a reservation, but what is your answer to the State's analysis of our precedent?
Petitioner: So, Your Honor, I think both the precedent and the language support the idea that this is not a dependent Indian community. What this Court said in Venetie and what Judge -- then Judge Gorsuch said in Hydro Resources is that the dependent Indian community label is a catchall for tribes that did not have a reservation and are not on restricted lands. The best evidence of what Congress thought about whether Creek lands were a reservation under the statute is that Congress referred to those lands as a reservation under the statute. With respect to Sandoval and the other cases, it is crystal-clear that when Sandoval and those cases are using the term "dependent Indian community" that they are describing tribes and other groups that are within Congress's broad power to legislate for -- for tribes broadly. They are not excluding the -- the Creek. Indeed, and -- | Thank you, counsel. Justice Thomas? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-9526, McGirt versus Oklahoma. Mr. Gershengorn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case is resolved by the fundamental proposition that decisions about sovereign rights are for Congress to make and Congress makes those decisions by speaking clearly in the text. The decision below must be reversed because the text makes clear that Congress never terminated the Creek reservation and never transferred federal criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. I have four basic points to make this morning. First, the Creek Nation had a reservation. The relevant treaties reserved the lands from sale and solemnly guaranteed the lands for the Creek to govern. The text of both treaties and statutes expressly identified the Creek land as a reservation. Nothing more was needed. Second, Congress did not establish -- disestablish that reservation. Indeed, Congress considered hallmark language of disestablishment and rejected it. Congress initially sought cession yet instead provided only for allotment. Then, when congressional inaction would have dissolved the tribe, Congress instead preserved the tribe and its government for all purposes authorized by law, and it did so against the backdrop of existing tribal authority to legislate over reservation land. Those congressional judgments should be respected. Third, Congress did not transfer criminal jurisdiction to Oklahoma. At statehood, the Major Crimes Act established exclusive federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes in "any state of the United States." When Congress overrides the Major Crimes Act and transfers jurisdiction to a state, it does so expressly, and it did not do so here. Finally, Oklahoma's rhetoric about disruption does not change the result. On the criminal side, this Court's decision in Ramos is a complete answer, and on the civil side, the main issues are tax and other regulatory issues that are routinely resolved by tribal-state agreements. In any event, Parker makes clear that questions of sovereignty are distinct from claims of reservation status. This Court should resolve the reservation question, leaving jurisdictional disputes to Congress, the relevant sovereign, and then for this Court to resolve if and when they arise.
Judge: Counsel, the --
Petitioner: So let me start this --
Judge: -- State argues that the territory should be analyzed as a dependent Indian community under 1151 and not as a reservation. They base this argument on our decisions in Sandoval and Creek Nation and 1151 itself and the fact that the Creeks have always maintained, have been adamant about the fact that they are not reservation Indians. Now you refer, of course, to the many times in which the treaty is referred to as a reservation, but what is your answer to the State's analysis of our precedent?
Petitioner: So, Your Honor, I think both the precedent and the language support the idea that this is not a dependent Indian community. What this Court said in Venetie and what Judge -- then Judge Gorsuch said in Hydro Resources is that the dependent Indian community label is a catchall for tribes that did not have a reservation and are not on restricted lands. The best evidence of what Congress thought about whether Creek lands were a reservation under the statute is that Congress referred to those lands as a reservation under the statute. With respect to Sandoval and the other cases, it is crystal-clear that when Sandoval and those cases are using the term "dependent Indian community" that they are describing tribes and other groups that are within Congress's broad power to legislate for -- for tribes broadly. They are not excluding the -- the Creek. Indeed, and --
Judge: Thank you, counsel. Justice Thomas?
Petitioner: So, Your Honor, I think the key point on -- the -- the -- the key point on the Parker/Solem analysis is, as your -- as Your Honor pointed out in that opinion, that those are not -- that that analysis doesn't derive from anything special about -- about how much work Congress is doing. The reason the Court has always required plain text is because treaty rights are at issue and plain text is required to abrogate treaty rights and because sovereign rights are at issue and plain text is required to abrogate sovereign rights. So there's nothing magic about Parker and Solem in terms of whether they're dealing with surplus lands or not. The key point in Parker and Solem is that plain text is required to do the kinds of transfers that are at issue here. And when you look at the plain text, I think this is a -- this case is even stronger than Your Honor's opinion in Parker for three main reasons. First, of course, is that the tribe was not absent from the land in the same way that the tribe was in Parker. Second, the land here was allotted in -- almost entirely to the tribe -- to tribal members themselves, to Indians. And, third, Congress took steps in 1906 to preserve the tribe. And I guess the thing I would point to, Your Honor, when you ask about whether there are cases like this, I think this is stronger than case -- other cases because the question isn't just what did Congress fail to do but how much -- | Yes, counsel. In Solem and in Parker, those cases only involved the disposition of surplus land. And, here, of course, there's much, much more being done in a whole series of statutes involving both sovereignty and the allotment of land. Can you point to any case in which we've applied the Solem fact framework to a case that does as much as this -- as being -- as is being done in this case? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 12-7515, Burrage v. United States. Ms. Campbell.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Marcus Burrage is serving a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for selling heroin that, according to the jury instruction that was given to the jury at the time of the trial, was not the primary cause of the death, but, rather, merely played a part in the death. This lesser standard of contributing causation was neither articulated by Congress within the words of the statute, nor was it generally accepted at the time the statute was passed, as an acceptable version of causation. Congress's selection of the word “ results ” instead should be interpreted to mean the traditional notions of causation; those of factual cause or but-for cause and proximate cause. Now, the parties don't disagree that “ results in ” means causation. That it's a causation analysis. And regardless of whether you look to the common law or the treatises or the legal commentators, causation triggers, at the very minimum, a but-for causation analysis. In this particular case, but for the use of the heroin, the victim would not have died. Now, the Solicitor General suggests a lesser causation standard, one that expands the notion of but-for causation. But if we instead look to the case law and this Court's precedent, we are not actually trying to expand but-for causation in most cases, we are trying to limit it. Because but-for causation can be extrapolated beyond what we are willing to give liability for. | How would you respond to the hypothetical that the government poses on 24 of its brief, that it's the three drops of poison, each defendant puts in one drop, one drop will not do it, three drops will, and none of them would be chargeable because it takes three drops? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 12-7515, Burrage v. United States. Ms. Campbell.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Marcus Burrage is serving a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for selling heroin that, according to the jury instruction that was given to the jury at the time of the trial, was not the primary cause of the death, but, rather, merely played a part in the death. This lesser standard of contributing causation was neither articulated by Congress within the words of the statute, nor was it generally accepted at the time the statute was passed, as an acceptable version of causation. Congress's selection of the word “ results ” instead should be interpreted to mean the traditional notions of causation; those of factual cause or but-for cause and proximate cause. Now, the parties don't disagree that “ results in ” means causation. That it's a causation analysis. And regardless of whether you look to the common law or the treatises or the legal commentators, causation triggers, at the very minimum, a but-for causation analysis. In this particular case, but for the use of the heroin, the victim would not have died. Now, the Solicitor General suggests a lesser causation standard, one that expands the notion of but-for causation. But if we instead look to the case law and this Court's precedent, we are not actually trying to expand but-for causation in most cases, we are trying to limit it. Because but-for causation can be extrapolated beyond what we are willing to give liability for.
Judge: How would you respond to the hypothetical that the government poses on 24 of its brief, that it's the three drops of poison, each defendant puts in one drop, one drop will not do it, three drops will, and none of them would be chargeable because it takes three drops?
Petitioner: Well, I would disagree with the premise that they are not chargeable. Each individual person that put the drop of poison in that cup could be charged with attempted murder if they were trying to kill a person. But under standard causation analysis, you -- you do not have but-for causation. Each individual drop of poison was not the but-for causation and so you -- you don't have causation. | But you would if -- if you knew that there were two drops in and you added the third drop after the two drops. Right? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 12-7515, Burrage v. United States. Ms. Campbell.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Marcus Burrage is serving a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for selling heroin that, according to the jury instruction that was given to the jury at the time of the trial, was not the primary cause of the death, but, rather, merely played a part in the death. This lesser standard of contributing causation was neither articulated by Congress within the words of the statute, nor was it generally accepted at the time the statute was passed, as an acceptable version of causation. Congress's selection of the word “ results ” instead should be interpreted to mean the traditional notions of causation; those of factual cause or but-for cause and proximate cause. Now, the parties don't disagree that “ results in ” means causation. That it's a causation analysis. And regardless of whether you look to the common law or the treatises or the legal commentators, causation triggers, at the very minimum, a but-for causation analysis. In this particular case, but for the use of the heroin, the victim would not have died. Now, the Solicitor General suggests a lesser causation standard, one that expands the notion of but-for causation. But if we instead look to the case law and this Court's precedent, we are not actually trying to expand but-for causation in most cases, we are trying to limit it. Because but-for causation can be extrapolated beyond what we are willing to give liability for.
Judge: How would you respond to the hypothetical that the government poses on 24 of its brief, that it's the three drops of poison, each defendant puts in one drop, one drop will not do it, three drops will, and none of them would be chargeable because it takes three drops?
Petitioner: Well, I would disagree with the premise that they are not chargeable. Each individual person that put the drop of poison in that cup could be charged with attempted murder if they were trying to kill a person. But under standard causation analysis, you -- you do not have but-for causation. Each individual drop of poison was not the but-for causation and so you -- you don't have causation.
Judge: But you would if -- if you knew that there were two drops in and you added the third drop after the two drops. Right?
Petitioner: Then-- | I'm sorry. I've lost sight of this. Is this each drop is enough or-- |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 12-7515, Burrage v. United States. Ms. Campbell.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Marcus Burrage is serving a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for selling heroin that, according to the jury instruction that was given to the jury at the time of the trial, was not the primary cause of the death, but, rather, merely played a part in the death. This lesser standard of contributing causation was neither articulated by Congress within the words of the statute, nor was it generally accepted at the time the statute was passed, as an acceptable version of causation. Congress's selection of the word “ results ” instead should be interpreted to mean the traditional notions of causation; those of factual cause or but-for cause and proximate cause. Now, the parties don't disagree that “ results in ” means causation. That it's a causation analysis. And regardless of whether you look to the common law or the treatises or the legal commentators, causation triggers, at the very minimum, a but-for causation analysis. In this particular case, but for the use of the heroin, the victim would not have died. Now, the Solicitor General suggests a lesser causation standard, one that expands the notion of but-for causation. But if we instead look to the case law and this Court's precedent, we are not actually trying to expand but-for causation in most cases, we are trying to limit it. Because but-for causation can be extrapolated beyond what we are willing to give liability for.
Judge: How would you respond to the hypothetical that the government poses on 24 of its brief, that it's the three drops of poison, each defendant puts in one drop, one drop will not do it, three drops will, and none of them would be chargeable because it takes three drops?
Petitioner: Well, I would disagree with the premise that they are not chargeable. Each individual person that put the drop of poison in that cup could be charged with attempted murder if they were trying to kill a person. But under standard causation analysis, you -- you do not have but-for causation. Each individual drop of poison was not the but-for causation and so you -- you don't have causation.
Judge: But you would if -- if you knew that there were two drops in and you added the third drop after the two drops. Right?
Petitioner: Then--
Judge: I'm sorry. I've lost sight of this. Is this each drop is enough or--
Petitioner: --In the government's -- in the government's hypothetical, each person individually puts in one drop and you need three drops in order to -- to kill the person. | Three -- three drops. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Ayers versus Belmontes. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case concerns the constitutional sufficiency of California's catchall factor (k) instruction, which was given in the penalty-phase portion of California capital cases, and which directed the jurors to consider any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this instruction violates the Eighth Amendment because it allegedly misled the jurors to believe they could not consider so-called forward-looking evidence that did not relate directly to the defendant's actual culpability for the crime itself. In the State's view, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is fundamentally flawed, because it rests on an illusory distinction between different forms of character evidence in a way that is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions in California... or Boyde versus California and Brown versus Payton. In Boyde, this Court addressed, and rejected, a virtually identical challenge to the factor (k), and concluded that this instruction did, in fact, allow jurors to consider non-crime-related evidence; specifically, it allowed the jurors to consider evidence of the defendant's background and character. There was nothing in the Boyde decision to support the Ninth Circuit's distinction between different forms of character evidence. In fact, Boyde implicitly acknowledged that the factor (k) would, in fact, be understood to encompass Belmontes' good character evidence, in this case, because, for all practical purposes, there is no meaningful distinction between the nature of the background and character offered in Boyde and the nature of the background-- | Mr. Johnson, would you comment on the footnote on the... on the... drawing the distinction with regard to the dance contest that the defendant won in that case, between... it's over here; I'm asking the question... between facts that occurred before the crime and facts that might have occurred after. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Ayers versus Belmontes. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case concerns the constitutional sufficiency of California's catchall factor (k) instruction, which was given in the penalty-phase portion of California capital cases, and which directed the jurors to consider any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this instruction violates the Eighth Amendment because it allegedly misled the jurors to believe they could not consider so-called forward-looking evidence that did not relate directly to the defendant's actual culpability for the crime itself. In the State's view, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is fundamentally flawed, because it rests on an illusory distinction between different forms of character evidence in a way that is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions in California... or Boyde versus California and Brown versus Payton. In Boyde, this Court addressed, and rejected, a virtually identical challenge to the factor (k), and concluded that this instruction did, in fact, allow jurors to consider non-crime-related evidence; specifically, it allowed the jurors to consider evidence of the defendant's background and character. There was nothing in the Boyde decision to support the Ninth Circuit's distinction between different forms of character evidence. In fact, Boyde implicitly acknowledged that the factor (k) would, in fact, be understood to encompass Belmontes' good character evidence, in this case, because, for all practical purposes, there is no meaningful distinction between the nature of the background and character offered in Boyde and the nature of the background--
Judge: Mr. Johnson, would you comment on the footnote on the... on the... drawing the distinction with regard to the dance contest that the defendant won in that case, between... it's over here; I'm asking the question... between facts that occurred before the crime and facts that might have occurred after.
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor. In footnote 5, this Court addressed a contention, raised for the first time in argument, that Boyde's evidence might be admissible under Skipper versus South Carolina, and this Court distinguished Boyde from Skipper, for a couple of reasons. First, as the... as Your Honor pointed out, the evidence in this case related to good-character evidence, events that occurred before the crime itself, unlike in Skipper, which dealt with post-crime events. The Court also pointed out that the evidence in Boyde... his dancing achievement, his good character evidence in that case... was not offered for the specific inference that the evidence in Skipper was offered. The Court, in footnote 5... and in the opinion, in general, in Boyde... nonetheless found that this evidence did, in fact, constitute good... character evidence of the... of the defendant's present good character, because it showed that his crime was an aberration from otherwise good character. Or, as Justice Marshall put it in his dissenting opinion, that Boyde had redeeming qualities, which is a decidedly forward-looking consideration. And, as I was saying, the evidence in this case, and in Boyde-- | It doesn't have to be forward... looking, does it? I mean, I thought we've said "so long as it can be taken into account in any manner. " whether backward-looking or forward-looking. Haven't we said that, explicitly? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Ayers versus Belmontes. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case concerns the constitutional sufficiency of California's catchall factor (k) instruction, which was given in the penalty-phase portion of California capital cases, and which directed the jurors to consider any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this instruction violates the Eighth Amendment because it allegedly misled the jurors to believe they could not consider so-called forward-looking evidence that did not relate directly to the defendant's actual culpability for the crime itself. In the State's view, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is fundamentally flawed, because it rests on an illusory distinction between different forms of character evidence in a way that is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions in California... or Boyde versus California and Brown versus Payton. In Boyde, this Court addressed, and rejected, a virtually identical challenge to the factor (k), and concluded that this instruction did, in fact, allow jurors to consider non-crime-related evidence; specifically, it allowed the jurors to consider evidence of the defendant's background and character. There was nothing in the Boyde decision to support the Ninth Circuit's distinction between different forms of character evidence. In fact, Boyde implicitly acknowledged that the factor (k) would, in fact, be understood to encompass Belmontes' good character evidence, in this case, because, for all practical purposes, there is no meaningful distinction between the nature of the background and character offered in Boyde and the nature of the background--
Judge: Mr. Johnson, would you comment on the footnote on the... on the... drawing the distinction with regard to the dance contest that the defendant won in that case, between... it's over here; I'm asking the question... between facts that occurred before the crime and facts that might have occurred after.
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor. In footnote 5, this Court addressed a contention, raised for the first time in argument, that Boyde's evidence might be admissible under Skipper versus South Carolina, and this Court distinguished Boyde from Skipper, for a couple of reasons. First, as the... as Your Honor pointed out, the evidence in this case related to good-character evidence, events that occurred before the crime itself, unlike in Skipper, which dealt with post-crime events. The Court also pointed out that the evidence in Boyde... his dancing achievement, his good character evidence in that case... was not offered for the specific inference that the evidence in Skipper was offered. The Court, in footnote 5... and in the opinion, in general, in Boyde... nonetheless found that this evidence did, in fact, constitute good... character evidence of the... of the defendant's present good character, because it showed that his crime was an aberration from otherwise good character. Or, as Justice Marshall put it in his dissenting opinion, that Boyde had redeeming qualities, which is a decidedly forward-looking consideration. And, as I was saying, the evidence in this case, and in Boyde--
Judge: It doesn't have to be forward... looking, does it? I mean, I thought we've said "so long as it can be taken into account in any manner. " whether backward-looking or forward-looking. Haven't we said that, explicitly?
Petitioner: --Yes Your Honor. The... and, in fact, the Court has, in Franklin versus Linite, said that they have not distinguished between different forms of character evidence. And I understand that, in the past, we've always discussed background and character evidence as sort of the same thing. In this case, however, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion does, in fact, rest on a distinction between different forms of backward-looking and forward-looking character-- | Well it was-- |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Ayers versus Belmontes. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case concerns the constitutional sufficiency of California's catchall factor (k) instruction, which was given in the penalty-phase portion of California capital cases, and which directed the jurors to consider any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this instruction violates the Eighth Amendment because it allegedly misled the jurors to believe they could not consider so-called forward-looking evidence that did not relate directly to the defendant's actual culpability for the crime itself. In the State's view, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion is fundamentally flawed, because it rests on an illusory distinction between different forms of character evidence in a way that is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions in California... or Boyde versus California and Brown versus Payton. In Boyde, this Court addressed, and rejected, a virtually identical challenge to the factor (k), and concluded that this instruction did, in fact, allow jurors to consider non-crime-related evidence; specifically, it allowed the jurors to consider evidence of the defendant's background and character. There was nothing in the Boyde decision to support the Ninth Circuit's distinction between different forms of character evidence. In fact, Boyde implicitly acknowledged that the factor (k) would, in fact, be understood to encompass Belmontes' good character evidence, in this case, because, for all practical purposes, there is no meaningful distinction between the nature of the background and character offered in Boyde and the nature of the background--
Judge: Mr. Johnson, would you comment on the footnote on the... on the... drawing the distinction with regard to the dance contest that the defendant won in that case, between... it's over here; I'm asking the question... between facts that occurred before the crime and facts that might have occurred after.
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor. In footnote 5, this Court addressed a contention, raised for the first time in argument, that Boyde's evidence might be admissible under Skipper versus South Carolina, and this Court distinguished Boyde from Skipper, for a couple of reasons. First, as the... as Your Honor pointed out, the evidence in this case related to good-character evidence, events that occurred before the crime itself, unlike in Skipper, which dealt with post-crime events. The Court also pointed out that the evidence in Boyde... his dancing achievement, his good character evidence in that case... was not offered for the specific inference that the evidence in Skipper was offered. The Court, in footnote 5... and in the opinion, in general, in Boyde... nonetheless found that this evidence did, in fact, constitute good... character evidence of the... of the defendant's present good character, because it showed that his crime was an aberration from otherwise good character. Or, as Justice Marshall put it in his dissenting opinion, that Boyde had redeeming qualities, which is a decidedly forward-looking consideration. And, as I was saying, the evidence in this case, and in Boyde--
Judge: It doesn't have to be forward... looking, does it? I mean, I thought we've said "so long as it can be taken into account in any manner. " whether backward-looking or forward-looking. Haven't we said that, explicitly?
Petitioner: --Yes Your Honor. The... and, in fact, the Court has, in Franklin versus Linite, said that they have not distinguished between different forms of character evidence. And I understand that, in the past, we've always discussed background and character evidence as sort of the same thing. In this case, however, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion does, in fact, rest on a distinction between different forms of backward-looking and forward-looking character--
Judge: Well it was--
Petitioner: --evidence. | --it was addressing itself to the fact... to the words of the factor (k) instruction. How does post-crime prison conduct reduce the seriousness of a previous crime? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in No. 02-809, Maryland v. Joseph Jermaine Pringle. Mr. Bair.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When the officer stopped the car respondent was riding in and found drugs packaged for distribution in the rear seat armrest, and then also found a large amount of cash in the glove compartment-- | What... the rear seat armrest was pushed up-- |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in No. 02-809, Maryland v. Joseph Jermaine Pringle. Mr. Bair.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When the officer stopped the car respondent was riding in and found drugs packaged for distribution in the rear seat armrest, and then also found a large amount of cash in the glove compartment--
Judge: What... the rear seat armrest was pushed up--
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor. | --and then the drugs were behind the... the armrest? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in No. 02-809, Maryland v. Joseph Jermaine Pringle. Mr. Bair.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When the officer stopped the car respondent was riding in and found drugs packaged for distribution in the rear seat armrest, and then also found a large amount of cash in the glove compartment--
Judge: What... the rear seat armrest was pushed up--
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: --and then the drugs were behind the... the armrest?
Petitioner: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. The rear seat armrest was pushed up against the rear seat. The officer merely folded it down and then the drugs appeared, and these are drugs that were packaged in five separate individual packages that were packaged for distribution at $20 a bag. The officer also found $763 in a rolled-up ball of cash in the glove compartment, and there... at that time there was individualized probable cause that focused on all three people in that car, and this is so for three principal reasons. First-- | At the end of the day, what happened? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in No. 02-809, Maryland v. Joseph Jermaine Pringle. Mr. Bair.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When the officer stopped the car respondent was riding in and found drugs packaged for distribution in the rear seat armrest, and then also found a large amount of cash in the glove compartment--
Judge: What... the rear seat armrest was pushed up--
Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: --and then the drugs were behind the... the armrest?
Petitioner: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. The rear seat armrest was pushed up against the rear seat. The officer merely folded it down and then the drugs appeared, and these are drugs that were packaged in five separate individual packages that were packaged for distribution at $20 a bag. The officer also found $763 in a rolled-up ball of cash in the glove compartment, and there... at that time there was individualized probable cause that focused on all three people in that car, and this is so for three principal reasons. First--
Judge: At the end of the day, what happened?
Petitioner: --At the end of the day, all three were arrested, respondent confessed, and said the-- | And respondent was a front seat passenger? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in 06-5618, Claiborne versus United States. Mr. Dwyer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The district court's 15-month sentence combined with 3 years of supervised release conditioned on drug treatments and the acquisition of a GED was a reasonable sentence. In the uniform and constant tradition of Federal criminal sentencing, the district judge in this case treated Mario Claiborne as an individual. She considered the guidelines and after doing so turned to the judgment that 3553(a) demands in every case. She issued a sentence to avoid unwarranted disparity, to impose just punishment, and to ensure that deterrence did not throw away Mario Claiborne's chances to resume his responsibilities to himself, to his family, and to his community. The court of appeals, in contrast to the district court's careful attention to the 3553(a) factors, focused solely on the guidelines. The court of appeals applied its extraordinary circumstances rule. That rule re-tethers sentencing to the guideline. | What would be your test of reasonableness for appellate review? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in 06-5618, Claiborne versus United States. Mr. Dwyer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The district court's 15-month sentence combined with 3 years of supervised release conditioned on drug treatments and the acquisition of a GED was a reasonable sentence. In the uniform and constant tradition of Federal criminal sentencing, the district judge in this case treated Mario Claiborne as an individual. She considered the guidelines and after doing so turned to the judgment that 3553(a) demands in every case. She issued a sentence to avoid unwarranted disparity, to impose just punishment, and to ensure that deterrence did not throw away Mario Claiborne's chances to resume his responsibilities to himself, to his family, and to his community. The court of appeals, in contrast to the district court's careful attention to the 3553(a) factors, focused solely on the guidelines. The court of appeals applied its extraordinary circumstances rule. That rule re-tethers sentencing to the guideline.
Judge: What would be your test of reasonableness for appellate review?
Petitioner: I think a sentence would be reasonable if a reasonable judge on the facts and circumstances of that case would find that the sentence imposed was sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy 3553(a) standards. | It seems to me that gives very little weight to the goal, which I think is a congressional goal, of nationwide consistency in eliminating the disparities in the sentencing system which cause great disrespect to the justice system. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in 06-5618, Claiborne versus United States. Mr. Dwyer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The district court's 15-month sentence combined with 3 years of supervised release conditioned on drug treatments and the acquisition of a GED was a reasonable sentence. In the uniform and constant tradition of Federal criminal sentencing, the district judge in this case treated Mario Claiborne as an individual. She considered the guidelines and after doing so turned to the judgment that 3553(a) demands in every case. She issued a sentence to avoid unwarranted disparity, to impose just punishment, and to ensure that deterrence did not throw away Mario Claiborne's chances to resume his responsibilities to himself, to his family, and to his community. The court of appeals, in contrast to the district court's careful attention to the 3553(a) factors, focused solely on the guidelines. The court of appeals applied its extraordinary circumstances rule. That rule re-tethers sentencing to the guideline.
Judge: What would be your test of reasonableness for appellate review?
Petitioner: I think a sentence would be reasonable if a reasonable judge on the facts and circumstances of that case would find that the sentence imposed was sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy 3553(a) standards.
Judge: It seems to me that gives very little weight to the goal, which I think is a congressional goal, of nationwide consistency in eliminating the disparities in the sentencing system which cause great disrespect to the justice system.
Petitioner: I think that the statute speaks of unwarranted disparity and does not speak in terms of uniformity. And there is necessarily a tension between the individualized sentencing that 3553(a) requires and concerns about nationwide uniformity. But I think that what distinguishes sentencing under the advisory guidelines system from the Presentencing Reform Act system are several. One is now we explicitly have purposes of sentencing and factors the judge must consider. 3553 didn't exist before that time. Secondly, in every case, as a practical matter, the guidelines are going to exert a gravitational weight because they are there. They must be considered as part of the statute. | Can I substitute "substantial" for "gravitational" without offending your position or affecting your position? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in 06-5618, Claiborne versus United States. Mr. Dwyer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The district court's 15-month sentence combined with 3 years of supervised release conditioned on drug treatments and the acquisition of a GED was a reasonable sentence. In the uniform and constant tradition of Federal criminal sentencing, the district judge in this case treated Mario Claiborne as an individual. She considered the guidelines and after doing so turned to the judgment that 3553(a) demands in every case. She issued a sentence to avoid unwarranted disparity, to impose just punishment, and to ensure that deterrence did not throw away Mario Claiborne's chances to resume his responsibilities to himself, to his family, and to his community. The court of appeals, in contrast to the district court's careful attention to the 3553(a) factors, focused solely on the guidelines. The court of appeals applied its extraordinary circumstances rule. That rule re-tethers sentencing to the guideline.
Judge: What would be your test of reasonableness for appellate review?
Petitioner: I think a sentence would be reasonable if a reasonable judge on the facts and circumstances of that case would find that the sentence imposed was sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy 3553(a) standards.
Judge: It seems to me that gives very little weight to the goal, which I think is a congressional goal, of nationwide consistency in eliminating the disparities in the sentencing system which cause great disrespect to the justice system.
Petitioner: I think that the statute speaks of unwarranted disparity and does not speak in terms of uniformity. And there is necessarily a tension between the individualized sentencing that 3553(a) requires and concerns about nationwide uniformity. But I think that what distinguishes sentencing under the advisory guidelines system from the Presentencing Reform Act system are several. One is now we explicitly have purposes of sentencing and factors the judge must consider. 3553 didn't exist before that time. Secondly, in every case, as a practical matter, the guidelines are going to exert a gravitational weight because they are there. They must be considered as part of the statute.
Judge: Can I substitute "substantial" for "gravitational" without offending your position or affecting your position?
Petitioner: I don't... my position would be that 3553(a)(4) is the correct place for consideration of the guidelines. It's just one of seven factors. As a practical matter, I think it's going to get-- | Kind of a weak law of gravity like the Moon. It's only at one-seventh. [Laughter] |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Mr. Ingram.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The petitioner in this case is asking the Court to rule that the brandish clause of 18 United States Code, Section 924(c) is an element to be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely a sentencing enhancement, based on two separate and independent bases. The first is the statutory analysis under Jones v. United States, and the second basis is the constitutional analysis under Apprendi v. New Jersey. And I will address the Jones argument first. The carjacking statute in Jones v. United States had, as additional elements, serious injury and death, which the Court held to be additional elements after the statutory analysis was completed. And the carjacking statute in that case and 18 United States Code, section 924(c) in this case are virtually mirror images of each other structurally and grammatically. The Court looked at the text of the statute, the legislative history behind those facts, and how legislatures historically had treated those facts in determining that serious injury and death were, in fact, elements to be proved and not merely sentencing enhancements. Likewise, we contend that brandish, based on the... the text of the statute, the... how legislatures have typically treated that fact and the fact that it involves a mens rea element... that is, brandish is... is defined as displaying or making the presence known of a firearm in order to intimidate and... and mens rea has traditionally been an element... and then based on the legislative history that those statutes would lead the Court to conclude, based on the statutory analysis, that brandish is in fact an element to be proved and not merely a sentencing enhancement. | But it's not so... it seems to me that... I understand your argument, but it's not so clear as it was in Jones. I mean, the difference between use and brandish is... is a... is a smaller difference in degree. The difference in the penalties are smaller differences. It's just a couple of years, the difference between 5 and... and 7, for example. And... and I understand how you can make the argument, but I don't see the argument as being sort of a slam dunk in the case. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Mr. Ingram.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The petitioner in this case is asking the Court to rule that the brandish clause of 18 United States Code, Section 924(c) is an element to be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely a sentencing enhancement, based on two separate and independent bases. The first is the statutory analysis under Jones v. United States, and the second basis is the constitutional analysis under Apprendi v. New Jersey. And I will address the Jones argument first. The carjacking statute in Jones v. United States had, as additional elements, serious injury and death, which the Court held to be additional elements after the statutory analysis was completed. And the carjacking statute in that case and 18 United States Code, section 924(c) in this case are virtually mirror images of each other structurally and grammatically. The Court looked at the text of the statute, the legislative history behind those facts, and how legislatures historically had treated those facts in determining that serious injury and death were, in fact, elements to be proved and not merely sentencing enhancements. Likewise, we contend that brandish, based on the... the text of the statute, the... how legislatures have typically treated that fact and the fact that it involves a mens rea element... that is, brandish is... is defined as displaying or making the presence known of a firearm in order to intimidate and... and mens rea has traditionally been an element... and then based on the legislative history that those statutes would lead the Court to conclude, based on the statutory analysis, that brandish is in fact an element to be proved and not merely a sentencing enhancement.
Judge: But it's not so... it seems to me that... I understand your argument, but it's not so clear as it was in Jones. I mean, the difference between use and brandish is... is a... is a smaller difference in degree. The difference in the penalties are smaller differences. It's just a couple of years, the difference between 5 and... and 7, for example. And... and I understand how you can make the argument, but I don't see the argument as being sort of a slam dunk in the case.
Petitioner: Your Honor, if I may address each of those concerns. The... first of all, the... the fact that the increase under the brandish statute goes from a mandatory minimum of 5 to a mandatory minimum of... of 7 not being a steep increase, first of all, it does take the defendant 40 percent higher for brandishing from 5 to 7, and... and it doubles the penalty 100 percent higher for discharging the firearm, which cannot be divorced from the brandishing element. There are cases from this Court in the context of ex post facto challenges to application of sentences that were enacted after the defendant committed the crime, most particularly Miller v. Florida, the leading case which we cite in our brief, where the Court held that an increase in a sentence of anywhere from two to two and a half years substantially disadvantaged the defendant and foreclosed the defendant from asking for a lower sentence. Likewise, in the case of Glover v. United States, which we do not cite in our brief... that is at 531 U.S. 198... the Court held, in the context of a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel, that an additional guideline sentence under the Federal sentencing guidelines of anywhere from 6 to 21 months meets the substantial prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. So, we contend that the increase from 5 to 7 years is in fact a... a substantial difference. The elements in question, comparing serious bodily injury and death to brandishing, are somewhat different in that the serious bodily injury and death are results, whereas brandish and discharge are conduct of the defendant. But we contend that the brandish and discharge being treated more seriously are seeking to address the same possible results; that is, if a defendant merely carries a firearm or possesses a firearm, it is far less likely that serious bodily injury or death will result than if the defendant brandishes or discharge... discharges-- | Can I... can I go to Apprendi? Because the... I want to just focus you a little bit, assuming you lose on this argument. I want to know... and this is hard for me because I dissented in Apprendi. I want to know how you, as a person living with the case, understands it. Imagine two statutes. I just want to know if you think Apprendi applies to the second of the two statutes. The first statute says the sentence is up to 10 years for robbery, but if a gun is discharged, up to 15. There's no question that Apprendi applies to that second. Doesn't it? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Mr. Ingram.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The petitioner in this case is asking the Court to rule that the brandish clause of 18 United States Code, Section 924(c) is an element to be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely a sentencing enhancement, based on two separate and independent bases. The first is the statutory analysis under Jones v. United States, and the second basis is the constitutional analysis under Apprendi v. New Jersey. And I will address the Jones argument first. The carjacking statute in Jones v. United States had, as additional elements, serious injury and death, which the Court held to be additional elements after the statutory analysis was completed. And the carjacking statute in that case and 18 United States Code, section 924(c) in this case are virtually mirror images of each other structurally and grammatically. The Court looked at the text of the statute, the legislative history behind those facts, and how legislatures historically had treated those facts in determining that serious injury and death were, in fact, elements to be proved and not merely sentencing enhancements. Likewise, we contend that brandish, based on the... the text of the statute, the... how legislatures have typically treated that fact and the fact that it involves a mens rea element... that is, brandish is... is defined as displaying or making the presence known of a firearm in order to intimidate and... and mens rea has traditionally been an element... and then based on the legislative history that those statutes would lead the Court to conclude, based on the statutory analysis, that brandish is in fact an element to be proved and not merely a sentencing enhancement.
Judge: But it's not so... it seems to me that... I understand your argument, but it's not so clear as it was in Jones. I mean, the difference between use and brandish is... is a... is a smaller difference in degree. The difference in the penalties are smaller differences. It's just a couple of years, the difference between 5 and... and 7, for example. And... and I understand how you can make the argument, but I don't see the argument as being sort of a slam dunk in the case.
Petitioner: Your Honor, if I may address each of those concerns. The... first of all, the... the fact that the increase under the brandish statute goes from a mandatory minimum of 5 to a mandatory minimum of... of 7 not being a steep increase, first of all, it does take the defendant 40 percent higher for brandishing from 5 to 7, and... and it doubles the penalty 100 percent higher for discharging the firearm, which cannot be divorced from the brandishing element. There are cases from this Court in the context of ex post facto challenges to application of sentences that were enacted after the defendant committed the crime, most particularly Miller v. Florida, the leading case which we cite in our brief, where the Court held that an increase in a sentence of anywhere from two to two and a half years substantially disadvantaged the defendant and foreclosed the defendant from asking for a lower sentence. Likewise, in the case of Glover v. United States, which we do not cite in our brief... that is at 531 U.S. 198... the Court held, in the context of a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel, that an additional guideline sentence under the Federal sentencing guidelines of anywhere from 6 to 21 months meets the substantial prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. So, we contend that the increase from 5 to 7 years is in fact a... a substantial difference. The elements in question, comparing serious bodily injury and death to brandishing, are somewhat different in that the serious bodily injury and death are results, whereas brandish and discharge are conduct of the defendant. But we contend that the brandish and discharge being treated more seriously are seeking to address the same possible results; that is, if a defendant merely carries a firearm or possesses a firearm, it is far less likely that serious bodily injury or death will result than if the defendant brandishes or discharge... discharges--
Judge: Can I... can I go to Apprendi? Because the... I want to just focus you a little bit, assuming you lose on this argument. I want to know... and this is hard for me because I dissented in Apprendi. I want to know how you, as a person living with the case, understands it. Imagine two statutes. I just want to know if you think Apprendi applies to the second of the two statutes. The first statute says the sentence is up to 10 years for robbery, but if a gun is discharged, up to 15. There's no question that Apprendi applies to that second. Doesn't it?
Petitioner: --I agree with that. | That's what Apprendi is about. Now, suppose I take that same statute and I just rewrite the words as follows. The maximum for this crime of robbery is 15, but unless a gun is discharged, you shall not sentence to more than 10. Now, is that second statute treated identically to the first in your understanding and the understanding of the bar? That's what I'm trying to get at. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Mr. Ingram.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The petitioner in this case is asking the Court to rule that the brandish clause of 18 United States Code, Section 924(c) is an element to be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely a sentencing enhancement, based on two separate and independent bases. The first is the statutory analysis under Jones v. United States, and the second basis is the constitutional analysis under Apprendi v. New Jersey. And I will address the Jones argument first. The carjacking statute in Jones v. United States had, as additional elements, serious injury and death, which the Court held to be additional elements after the statutory analysis was completed. And the carjacking statute in that case and 18 United States Code, section 924(c) in this case are virtually mirror images of each other structurally and grammatically. The Court looked at the text of the statute, the legislative history behind those facts, and how legislatures historically had treated those facts in determining that serious injury and death were, in fact, elements to be proved and not merely sentencing enhancements. Likewise, we contend that brandish, based on the... the text of the statute, the... how legislatures have typically treated that fact and the fact that it involves a mens rea element... that is, brandish is... is defined as displaying or making the presence known of a firearm in order to intimidate and... and mens rea has traditionally been an element... and then based on the legislative history that those statutes would lead the Court to conclude, based on the statutory analysis, that brandish is in fact an element to be proved and not merely a sentencing enhancement.
Judge: But it's not so... it seems to me that... I understand your argument, but it's not so clear as it was in Jones. I mean, the difference between use and brandish is... is a... is a smaller difference in degree. The difference in the penalties are smaller differences. It's just a couple of years, the difference between 5 and... and 7, for example. And... and I understand how you can make the argument, but I don't see the argument as being sort of a slam dunk in the case.
Petitioner: Your Honor, if I may address each of those concerns. The... first of all, the... the fact that the increase under the brandish statute goes from a mandatory minimum of 5 to a mandatory minimum of... of 7 not being a steep increase, first of all, it does take the defendant 40 percent higher for brandishing from 5 to 7, and... and it doubles the penalty 100 percent higher for discharging the firearm, which cannot be divorced from the brandishing element. There are cases from this Court in the context of ex post facto challenges to application of sentences that were enacted after the defendant committed the crime, most particularly Miller v. Florida, the leading case which we cite in our brief, where the Court held that an increase in a sentence of anywhere from two to two and a half years substantially disadvantaged the defendant and foreclosed the defendant from asking for a lower sentence. Likewise, in the case of Glover v. United States, which we do not cite in our brief... that is at 531 U.S. 198... the Court held, in the context of a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel, that an additional guideline sentence under the Federal sentencing guidelines of anywhere from 6 to 21 months meets the substantial prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. So, we contend that the increase from 5 to 7 years is in fact a... a substantial difference. The elements in question, comparing serious bodily injury and death to brandishing, are somewhat different in that the serious bodily injury and death are results, whereas brandish and discharge are conduct of the defendant. But we contend that the brandish and discharge being treated more seriously are seeking to address the same possible results; that is, if a defendant merely carries a firearm or possesses a firearm, it is far less likely that serious bodily injury or death will result than if the defendant brandishes or discharge... discharges--
Judge: Can I... can I go to Apprendi? Because the... I want to just focus you a little bit, assuming you lose on this argument. I want to know... and this is hard for me because I dissented in Apprendi. I want to know how you, as a person living with the case, understands it. Imagine two statutes. I just want to know if you think Apprendi applies to the second of the two statutes. The first statute says the sentence is up to 10 years for robbery, but if a gun is discharged, up to 15. There's no question that Apprendi applies to that second. Doesn't it?
Petitioner: --I agree with that.
Judge: That's what Apprendi is about. Now, suppose I take that same statute and I just rewrite the words as follows. The maximum for this crime of robbery is 15, but unless a gun is discharged, you shall not sentence to more than 10. Now, is that second statute treated identically to the first in your understanding and the understanding of the bar? That's what I'm trying to get at.
Petitioner: Yes. My understanding is that Apprendi would cover the-- | Both. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-1211, Vartelas v. Holder. Mr. Bibas.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As the government concedes, INA subsection 101(a)(13)(C)(v) added by IIRIRA does not expressly mandate retroactivity. Under Landgraf, applying that new provision would attach new legal consequences to pre-IIRIRA offenses, penalizing both those who travel and those who don't. Covered lawful permanent residents could not visit their parents abroad without being forced to abandon their children here. They would be removed from the country or else confined here. Either way, they would lose an ability they had under pre-IIRIRA law based on pre-IIRIRA offenses. Thus applying the subsection to them would be impermissibly retroactive. The settled expectations at issue here are those of round trips by lawful permanent residents, not, as the government would put it, one-way tickets or first-time entrants. These are people who have structured their lives here. They have homes, spouses, children, and careers here, and yet have a settled expectation that they will be able to maintain ties to visit aged and ailing parents abroad, to go to funerals and wakes and visit them in the hospital and surgeries. Our amici, the NACDL brief, and the Asian American-- | As far as going forward is concerned, that's -- that's just the way it is, right? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-1211, Vartelas v. Holder. Mr. Bibas.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As the government concedes, INA subsection 101(a)(13)(C)(v) added by IIRIRA does not expressly mandate retroactivity. Under Landgraf, applying that new provision would attach new legal consequences to pre-IIRIRA offenses, penalizing both those who travel and those who don't. Covered lawful permanent residents could not visit their parents abroad without being forced to abandon their children here. They would be removed from the country or else confined here. Either way, they would lose an ability they had under pre-IIRIRA law based on pre-IIRIRA offenses. Thus applying the subsection to them would be impermissibly retroactive. The settled expectations at issue here are those of round trips by lawful permanent residents, not, as the government would put it, one-way tickets or first-time entrants. These are people who have structured their lives here. They have homes, spouses, children, and careers here, and yet have a settled expectation that they will be able to maintain ties to visit aged and ailing parents abroad, to go to funerals and wakes and visit them in the hospital and surgeries. Our amici, the NACDL brief, and the Asian American--
Judge: As far as going forward is concerned, that's -- that's just the way it is, right?
Petitioner: --Yes, because Congress has expressly changed the law post-IIRIRA. The question is for those before IIRIRA, whether those settled expectations are being disrupted. | Could they -- could they -- the -- the person who -- who is here and then the new law is passed, could that person have petitioned for discretionary relief before traveling? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-1211, Vartelas v. Holder. Mr. Bibas.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As the government concedes, INA subsection 101(a)(13)(C)(v) added by IIRIRA does not expressly mandate retroactivity. Under Landgraf, applying that new provision would attach new legal consequences to pre-IIRIRA offenses, penalizing both those who travel and those who don't. Covered lawful permanent residents could not visit their parents abroad without being forced to abandon their children here. They would be removed from the country or else confined here. Either way, they would lose an ability they had under pre-IIRIRA law based on pre-IIRIRA offenses. Thus applying the subsection to them would be impermissibly retroactive. The settled expectations at issue here are those of round trips by lawful permanent residents, not, as the government would put it, one-way tickets or first-time entrants. These are people who have structured their lives here. They have homes, spouses, children, and careers here, and yet have a settled expectation that they will be able to maintain ties to visit aged and ailing parents abroad, to go to funerals and wakes and visit them in the hospital and surgeries. Our amici, the NACDL brief, and the Asian American--
Judge: As far as going forward is concerned, that's -- that's just the way it is, right?
Petitioner: --Yes, because Congress has expressly changed the law post-IIRIRA. The question is for those before IIRIRA, whether those settled expectations are being disrupted.
Judge: Could they -- could they -- the -- the person who -- who is here and then the new law is passed, could that person have petitioned for discretionary relief before traveling?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, that is a possibility. That is not the same as the automatic ability to travel, and in fact in this case the discretionary relief was denied. It depends on a different set of factors from the automatic pre-IIRIRA ability to travel. But it is a theoretical possibility in some cases. | So your expectations argument is that somebody trying to figure out whether to go ahead and rob the bank is going to say, well, if I do and I am caught and I am found guilty, I won't be able to take temporary trips abroad, so I'm not going to rob the bank? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-1211, Vartelas v. Holder. Mr. Bibas.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As the government concedes, INA subsection 101(a)(13)(C)(v) added by IIRIRA does not expressly mandate retroactivity. Under Landgraf, applying that new provision would attach new legal consequences to pre-IIRIRA offenses, penalizing both those who travel and those who don't. Covered lawful permanent residents could not visit their parents abroad without being forced to abandon their children here. They would be removed from the country or else confined here. Either way, they would lose an ability they had under pre-IIRIRA law based on pre-IIRIRA offenses. Thus applying the subsection to them would be impermissibly retroactive. The settled expectations at issue here are those of round trips by lawful permanent residents, not, as the government would put it, one-way tickets or first-time entrants. These are people who have structured their lives here. They have homes, spouses, children, and careers here, and yet have a settled expectation that they will be able to maintain ties to visit aged and ailing parents abroad, to go to funerals and wakes and visit them in the hospital and surgeries. Our amici, the NACDL brief, and the Asian American--
Judge: As far as going forward is concerned, that's -- that's just the way it is, right?
Petitioner: --Yes, because Congress has expressly changed the law post-IIRIRA. The question is for those before IIRIRA, whether those settled expectations are being disrupted.
Judge: Could they -- could they -- the -- the person who -- who is here and then the new law is passed, could that person have petitioned for discretionary relief before traveling?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, that is a possibility. That is not the same as the automatic ability to travel, and in fact in this case the discretionary relief was denied. It depends on a different set of factors from the automatic pre-IIRIRA ability to travel. But it is a theoretical possibility in some cases.
Judge: So your expectations argument is that somebody trying to figure out whether to go ahead and rob the bank is going to say, well, if I do and I am caught and I am found guilty, I won't be able to take temporary trips abroad, so I'm not going to rob the bank?
Petitioner: No, Your Honor. First of all, you phrased it specifically as a reliance argument, which is an alternative. Even the government concedes it is not a prerequisite. Second, the right time to look at expectations is the moment before the law is enacted: Does one have an expectation at that point that one will be able to continue-- | You are concerned under Landgraf, I think, with whether or not it disrupts settled expectations, and it just doesn't seem to me that this issue enters into the expectations at all when the pertinent act, which is the commission of the crime, not the pleading guilty, takes place. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Erik Hughes pleaded guilty to drug and firearm offenses and entered into a plea agreement with the government under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court accepted the agreement and sentenced Hughes accordingly. Hughes then sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which permits defendants who have been “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court relied on Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) in determining that Hughes was ineligible for a sentence reduction because he was not sentenced “based on a sentencing range,” but on a plea agreement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.
Judge: We'll hear first this morning Case 17-155, Hughes versus the United States. Mr. Shumsky.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The plurality and the concurrence in Freeman recognized two ways that a sentence following a C-type agreement can be based on the guidelines. Both are correct. Now those opinions differed in their reasoning, such that Freeman itself has no precedential effect under Marks, but the two approaches can be united under a common umbrella, namely, long-standing principles of proximate and multiple causation. And that's because each form of guidelines reliance bears a close connection to the sentence. The first -- | Mr. Shumsky, could you address one issue for me on this question? In a (C) agreement, the government is giving up, often, certain things. Sometimes they dismiss additional charges. Sometimes, as here, they give up filing a persistent felony certificate. Sometimes they agree not to prosecute someone important to the defendant. There are many things that go into that bargain. How is a district court judge to determine whether a departure from the guideline range is justified? In what circumstances is what the government given up valuable enough to keep the original deal and when is it not? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Erik Hughes pleaded guilty to drug and firearm offenses and entered into a plea agreement with the government under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court accepted the agreement and sentenced Hughes accordingly. Hughes then sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which permits defendants who have been “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court relied on Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) in determining that Hughes was ineligible for a sentence reduction because he was not sentenced “based on a sentencing range,” but on a plea agreement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.
Judge: We'll hear first this morning Case 17-155, Hughes versus the United States. Mr. Shumsky.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The plurality and the concurrence in Freeman recognized two ways that a sentence following a C-type agreement can be based on the guidelines. Both are correct. Now those opinions differed in their reasoning, such that Freeman itself has no precedential effect under Marks, but the two approaches can be united under a common umbrella, namely, long-standing principles of proximate and multiple causation. And that's because each form of guidelines reliance bears a close connection to the sentence. The first --
Judge: Mr. Shumsky, could you address one issue for me on this question? In a (C) agreement, the government is giving up, often, certain things. Sometimes they dismiss additional charges. Sometimes, as here, they give up filing a persistent felony certificate. Sometimes they agree not to prosecute someone important to the defendant. There are many things that go into that bargain. How is a district court judge to determine whether a departure from the guideline range is justified? In what circumstances is what the government given up valuable enough to keep the original deal and when is it not?
Petitioner: Justice Sotomayor, let me answer the question in two parts if I can. First of all, those conditions, the way Your Honor describes C-type agreements, are true also for B-type agreements and for the sort of C-type agreements that the government concedes open the door to eligibility for relief under 3582(c)(2). So this particular category of C-type agreement that the government is proposing to carve out is not different in that way than all of these other categories of agreements. This -- | Except that -- let's take -- dismissing charges, I -- I think it could be seen as relatively easy. How different were the charges and the exposure from what was kept and what was the strength of the government's evidence? And the government could talk about that at sentencing on those charges. But the persistent felony offender certificate is a different judgment, which is: I, the government, think that a sentence of X amount justifies giving up that certificate. How would a district court make up for the loss of that belief by the government? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Erik Hughes pleaded guilty to drug and firearm offenses and entered into a plea agreement with the government under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court accepted the agreement and sentenced Hughes accordingly. Hughes then sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which permits defendants who have been “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court relied on Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) in determining that Hughes was ineligible for a sentence reduction because he was not sentenced “based on a sentencing range,” but on a plea agreement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.
Judge: We'll hear first this morning Case 17-155, Hughes versus the United States. Mr. Shumsky.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The plurality and the concurrence in Freeman recognized two ways that a sentence following a C-type agreement can be based on the guidelines. Both are correct. Now those opinions differed in their reasoning, such that Freeman itself has no precedential effect under Marks, but the two approaches can be united under a common umbrella, namely, long-standing principles of proximate and multiple causation. And that's because each form of guidelines reliance bears a close connection to the sentence. The first --
Judge: Mr. Shumsky, could you address one issue for me on this question? In a (C) agreement, the government is giving up, often, certain things. Sometimes they dismiss additional charges. Sometimes, as here, they give up filing a persistent felony certificate. Sometimes they agree not to prosecute someone important to the defendant. There are many things that go into that bargain. How is a district court judge to determine whether a departure from the guideline range is justified? In what circumstances is what the government given up valuable enough to keep the original deal and when is it not?
Petitioner: Justice Sotomayor, let me answer the question in two parts if I can. First of all, those conditions, the way Your Honor describes C-type agreements, are true also for B-type agreements and for the sort of C-type agreements that the government concedes open the door to eligibility for relief under 3582(c)(2). So this particular category of C-type agreement that the government is proposing to carve out is not different in that way than all of these other categories of agreements. This --
Judge: Except that -- let's take -- dismissing charges, I -- I think it could be seen as relatively easy. How different were the charges and the exposure from what was kept and what was the strength of the government's evidence? And the government could talk about that at sentencing on those charges. But the persistent felony offender certificate is a different judgment, which is: I, the government, think that a sentence of X amount justifies giving up that certificate. How would a district court make up for the loss of that belief by the government?
Petitioner: Well, so -- Justice Sotomayor, let me push back a little bit still -- | Okay. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Erik Hughes pleaded guilty to drug and firearm offenses and entered into a plea agreement with the government under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court accepted the agreement and sentenced Hughes accordingly. Hughes then sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which permits defendants who have been “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court relied on Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) in determining that Hughes was ineligible for a sentence reduction because he was not sentenced “based on a sentencing range,” but on a plea agreement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.
Judge: We'll hear first this morning Case 17-155, Hughes versus the United States. Mr. Shumsky.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The plurality and the concurrence in Freeman recognized two ways that a sentence following a C-type agreement can be based on the guidelines. Both are correct. Now those opinions differed in their reasoning, such that Freeman itself has no precedential effect under Marks, but the two approaches can be united under a common umbrella, namely, long-standing principles of proximate and multiple causation. And that's because each form of guidelines reliance bears a close connection to the sentence. The first --
Judge: Mr. Shumsky, could you address one issue for me on this question? In a (C) agreement, the government is giving up, often, certain things. Sometimes they dismiss additional charges. Sometimes, as here, they give up filing a persistent felony certificate. Sometimes they agree not to prosecute someone important to the defendant. There are many things that go into that bargain. How is a district court judge to determine whether a departure from the guideline range is justified? In what circumstances is what the government given up valuable enough to keep the original deal and when is it not?
Petitioner: Justice Sotomayor, let me answer the question in two parts if I can. First of all, those conditions, the way Your Honor describes C-type agreements, are true also for B-type agreements and for the sort of C-type agreements that the government concedes open the door to eligibility for relief under 3582(c)(2). So this particular category of C-type agreement that the government is proposing to carve out is not different in that way than all of these other categories of agreements. This --
Judge: Except that -- let's take -- dismissing charges, I -- I think it could be seen as relatively easy. How different were the charges and the exposure from what was kept and what was the strength of the government's evidence? And the government could talk about that at sentencing on those charges. But the persistent felony offender certificate is a different judgment, which is: I, the government, think that a sentence of X amount justifies giving up that certificate. How would a district court make up for the loss of that belief by the government?
Petitioner: Well, so -- Justice Sotomayor, let me push back a little bit still --
Judge: Okay.
Petitioner: -- on the first part of my answer and then -- and then get to the second part. Again, that's no different than in a C-type agreement in which there is a range defined by the guidelines, and the government agrees that those sentences are eligible for relief under 3582(c)(2). The only difference there is that, rather than a number potentially moving a bit, a range will move a bit. So, again, I don't think it's categorically different in that way. But to answer the second part of the question, the district court judge, exercising her or his discretion, will apply the 3553(a) factors just like they do in any other case where there's a request for discretionary relief under 3582(c)(2). Remember that this is only a question of eligibility. It's not a guarantee of relief. It just enables the case ordinarily to go back to the very same district court judge who is the one who approved the agreement in the first place and determine whether under the circumstances, again, the 3553(a) circumstances, some adjustment is appropriate. | When wouldn't any -- what would disqualify a defendant from eligibility? The plurality said this determination has to be made on a case-by-case basis. But as I read your brief, I can't -- what are the scenarios where you think someone would not be eligible? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Carlo J. Marinello II owned and operated a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada. Between 1992 and 2010, Marinello did not keep an accounting of his business, nor did he file personal or corporate income tax returns. Indeed, he shredded bank statements and business records. After an investigation by the IRS, Marinello was indicted by a grand jury on nine counts of tax-related offenses, and a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison, one year of parole, and was ordered to pay over $350,000 to the IRS in restitution.
One of the counts of which Marinello was charged and convicted was violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who "in any . . . way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title." Marinello appealed his conviction on the grounds that the phrase "the due administration of this title" requires the defendant be aware of IRS action, and the government provided no evidence at trial that Marinello knew of a pending IRS investigation against him. Finding that knowledge of a pending investigation is not an element of the offense of which Marinello was convicted, the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 16-1144, Marinello versus United States. Mr. Hellman.
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When Congress made it a felony to obstruct the due administration of the tax code, it was not creating an all-purpose tax crime; it was borrowing from a statute that prohibited the obstruction of a pending proceeding. This Court normally presumes that borrowed language carries its meaning with it. And that has to be the case here, for without that limitation, obstruction would swallow up the other crimes that Congress simultaneously enacted and, in particular, it would obliterate the careful line that Congress drew between misdemeanors and felonies. Indeed, the government's interpretation is so broad that it would chill entirely legitimate conduct that Congress never intended to penalize. | What -- what -- what lawful conduct would the government's reading put at risk? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Carlo J. Marinello II owned and operated a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada. Between 1992 and 2010, Marinello did not keep an accounting of his business, nor did he file personal or corporate income tax returns. Indeed, he shredded bank statements and business records. After an investigation by the IRS, Marinello was indicted by a grand jury on nine counts of tax-related offenses, and a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison, one year of parole, and was ordered to pay over $350,000 to the IRS in restitution.
One of the counts of which Marinello was charged and convicted was violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who "in any . . . way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title." Marinello appealed his conviction on the grounds that the phrase "the due administration of this title" requires the defendant be aware of IRS action, and the government provided no evidence at trial that Marinello knew of a pending IRS investigation against him. Finding that knowledge of a pending investigation is not an element of the offense of which Marinello was convicted, the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 16-1144, Marinello versus United States. Mr. Hellman.
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When Congress made it a felony to obstruct the due administration of the tax code, it was not creating an all-purpose tax crime; it was borrowing from a statute that prohibited the obstruction of a pending proceeding. This Court normally presumes that borrowed language carries its meaning with it. And that has to be the case here, for without that limitation, obstruction would swallow up the other crimes that Congress simultaneously enacted and, in particular, it would obliterate the careful line that Congress drew between misdemeanors and felonies. Indeed, the government's interpretation is so broad that it would chill entirely legitimate conduct that Congress never intended to penalize.
Judge: What -- what -- what lawful conduct would the government's reading put at risk?
Petitioner: Certainly. There's a whole range because obstruction, on their definition, is so broad. For example, you could imagine a situation -- I'll take an everyday taxpayer, someone who pays their gardener, say, in cash, which is one of the predicate acts in this case as well. Paying in cash isn't necessarily illegal under the tax laws, but the test that the government would have is, by paying someone in cash, you're -- you're making it harder for the IRS to assess perhaps your tax liability or perhaps the tax liability of the person that you are paying. And at that question -- at that point, the only question that remains is mens rea, why did you do it? Did you do it for the purpose of obtaining an unlawful benefit? And even -- that benefit need not even be your own under the government's reading; it could be the benefit of the gardener. Or to take another example, imagine a taxpayer who says I'm going to keep every document the law requires under the code. I'll keep every document but no documents more. If the IRS ever came back and looked at that person's tax position, they might say your failure to keep these documents that -- that aren't otherwise required hindered us in our ability to assess your taxes. At that point, again, the only question becomes the why, the mens rea. And with a felony prosecution on the line and with so many acts, the actus reus being so broad, anything that hinders the IRS's ability to carry out a code, obstructs -- | My problem is that I have -- a second question. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Carlo J. Marinello II owned and operated a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada. Between 1992 and 2010, Marinello did not keep an accounting of his business, nor did he file personal or corporate income tax returns. Indeed, he shredded bank statements and business records. After an investigation by the IRS, Marinello was indicted by a grand jury on nine counts of tax-related offenses, and a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison, one year of parole, and was ordered to pay over $350,000 to the IRS in restitution.
One of the counts of which Marinello was charged and convicted was violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who "in any . . . way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title." Marinello appealed his conviction on the grounds that the phrase "the due administration of this title" requires the defendant be aware of IRS action, and the government provided no evidence at trial that Marinello knew of a pending IRS investigation against him. Finding that knowledge of a pending investigation is not an element of the offense of which Marinello was convicted, the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 16-1144, Marinello versus United States. Mr. Hellman.
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When Congress made it a felony to obstruct the due administration of the tax code, it was not creating an all-purpose tax crime; it was borrowing from a statute that prohibited the obstruction of a pending proceeding. This Court normally presumes that borrowed language carries its meaning with it. And that has to be the case here, for without that limitation, obstruction would swallow up the other crimes that Congress simultaneously enacted and, in particular, it would obliterate the careful line that Congress drew between misdemeanors and felonies. Indeed, the government's interpretation is so broad that it would chill entirely legitimate conduct that Congress never intended to penalize.
Judge: What -- what -- what lawful conduct would the government's reading put at risk?
Petitioner: Certainly. There's a whole range because obstruction, on their definition, is so broad. For example, you could imagine a situation -- I'll take an everyday taxpayer, someone who pays their gardener, say, in cash, which is one of the predicate acts in this case as well. Paying in cash isn't necessarily illegal under the tax laws, but the test that the government would have is, by paying someone in cash, you're -- you're making it harder for the IRS to assess perhaps your tax liability or perhaps the tax liability of the person that you are paying. And at that question -- at that point, the only question that remains is mens rea, why did you do it? Did you do it for the purpose of obtaining an unlawful benefit? And even -- that benefit need not even be your own under the government's reading; it could be the benefit of the gardener. Or to take another example, imagine a taxpayer who says I'm going to keep every document the law requires under the code. I'll keep every document but no documents more. If the IRS ever came back and looked at that person's tax position, they might say your failure to keep these documents that -- that aren't otherwise required hindered us in our ability to assess your taxes. At that point, again, the only question becomes the why, the mens rea. And with a felony prosecution on the line and with so many acts, the actus reus being so broad, anything that hinders the IRS's ability to carry out a code, obstructs --
Judge: My problem is that I have -- a second question.
Petitioner: Sure. | I have a lot of hypotheticals under your definition of what this section means that wouldn't be covered. So how about if an individual knows that the IRS is in the presence of -- press -- in the process of assessing his taxes and he in some way obstructs that process, or an agent -- the agent in 2004 called the defendant and said: You know, I'm deciding whether to open an investigation. I haven't, but I'm just thinking about it. I understand you have this business, and I don't see any tax returns. And your client answered the way he first did: I make less than $1,000. I don't have to file. And the agent closes the investigation -- closes the file and says: I'm not going to investigate this. Under your theory, that direct obstruction would not be actionable? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Carlo J. Marinello II owned and operated a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada. Between 1992 and 2010, Marinello did not keep an accounting of his business, nor did he file personal or corporate income tax returns. Indeed, he shredded bank statements and business records. After an investigation by the IRS, Marinello was indicted by a grand jury on nine counts of tax-related offenses, and a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison, one year of parole, and was ordered to pay over $350,000 to the IRS in restitution.
One of the counts of which Marinello was charged and convicted was violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who "in any . . . way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title." Marinello appealed his conviction on the grounds that the phrase "the due administration of this title" requires the defendant be aware of IRS action, and the government provided no evidence at trial that Marinello knew of a pending IRS investigation against him. Finding that knowledge of a pending investigation is not an element of the offense of which Marinello was convicted, the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 16-1144, Marinello versus United States. Mr. Hellman.
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When Congress made it a felony to obstruct the due administration of the tax code, it was not creating an all-purpose tax crime; it was borrowing from a statute that prohibited the obstruction of a pending proceeding. This Court normally presumes that borrowed language carries its meaning with it. And that has to be the case here, for without that limitation, obstruction would swallow up the other crimes that Congress simultaneously enacted and, in particular, it would obliterate the careful line that Congress drew between misdemeanors and felonies. Indeed, the government's interpretation is so broad that it would chill entirely legitimate conduct that Congress never intended to penalize.
Judge: What -- what -- what lawful conduct would the government's reading put at risk?
Petitioner: Certainly. There's a whole range because obstruction, on their definition, is so broad. For example, you could imagine a situation -- I'll take an everyday taxpayer, someone who pays their gardener, say, in cash, which is one of the predicate acts in this case as well. Paying in cash isn't necessarily illegal under the tax laws, but the test that the government would have is, by paying someone in cash, you're -- you're making it harder for the IRS to assess perhaps your tax liability or perhaps the tax liability of the person that you are paying. And at that question -- at that point, the only question that remains is mens rea, why did you do it? Did you do it for the purpose of obtaining an unlawful benefit? And even -- that benefit need not even be your own under the government's reading; it could be the benefit of the gardener. Or to take another example, imagine a taxpayer who says I'm going to keep every document the law requires under the code. I'll keep every document but no documents more. If the IRS ever came back and looked at that person's tax position, they might say your failure to keep these documents that -- that aren't otherwise required hindered us in our ability to assess your taxes. At that point, again, the only question becomes the why, the mens rea. And with a felony prosecution on the line and with so many acts, the actus reus being so broad, anything that hinders the IRS's ability to carry out a code, obstructs --
Judge: My problem is that I have -- a second question.
Petitioner: Sure.
Judge: I have a lot of hypotheticals under your definition of what this section means that wouldn't be covered. So how about if an individual knows that the IRS is in the presence of -- press -- in the process of assessing his taxes and he in some way obstructs that process, or an agent -- the agent in 2004 called the defendant and said: You know, I'm deciding whether to open an investigation. I haven't, but I'm just thinking about it. I understand you have this business, and I don't see any tax returns. And your client answered the way he first did: I make less than $1,000. I don't have to file. And the agent closes the investigation -- closes the file and says: I'm not going to investigate this. Under your theory, that direct obstruction would not be actionable?
Petitioner: It would be several other crimes. As -- as you describe it, it sounds like tax evasion, if there's a deficiency and an evasive act in connection with it. It could be a false statement to the IRS. But Congress knows how to write a pending proceeding requirement. If you think back to the statute at issue in Arthur Andersen, Section 1512, another obstruction statute that applies in cases of corruption to proceedings, that 1512(f), which Congress enacted as part of Sarbanes-Oxley, says the proceeding need not be pending or even about to be instituted. Now, this Court -- | Well, wait a minute, yes, it can do that sometimes. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman (with whom he was in a domestic relationship) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family or household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend’s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
Voisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes do not constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “recklessness” is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the “physical force” requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine’s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 14-10154, Voisine and Armstrong v. United States. Ms. Villa.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: There are three reasons to exclude reckless misdemeanors from the phrase "use... of physical force" as occurs in 921(a)(33). The first is that it's consistent with the definition of use that this Court has implemented in other cases. Second, it is consistent with the common-law definition of battery. And, third, it is consistent with the intentionality inherent in domestic violence. | But it's inconsistent with the treatment of bodily injury. I mean, I think you agree, because the Court so held, that either bodily injury or offensive touching is the act -- satisfies the act requirement. And you say if there's bodily injury, then reckless is enough, but if it's only offensive touching, then you need a higher mental state, intentional or knowing? Why -- if -- if both acts qualify equally, why shouldn't the same state of mind attach to each? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman (with whom he was in a domestic relationship) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family or household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend’s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
Voisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes do not constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “recklessness” is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the “physical force” requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine’s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 14-10154, Voisine and Armstrong v. United States. Ms. Villa.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: There are three reasons to exclude reckless misdemeanors from the phrase "use... of physical force" as occurs in 921(a)(33). The first is that it's consistent with the definition of use that this Court has implemented in other cases. Second, it is consistent with the common-law definition of battery. And, third, it is consistent with the intentionality inherent in domestic violence.
Judge: But it's inconsistent with the treatment of bodily injury. I mean, I think you agree, because the Court so held, that either bodily injury or offensive touching is the act -- satisfies the act requirement. And you say if there's bodily injury, then reckless is enough, but if it's only offensive touching, then you need a higher mental state, intentional or knowing? Why -- if -- if both acts qualify equally, why shouldn't the same state of mind attach to each?
Petitioner: The same state of mind should attach to each, and that is why intentionality is the state of mind that under the common law can attach to each. Because intentional battery covered both the offensive physical contact as well as the physical injury, whereas recklessness covers only bodily injury. | I'm sorry. Intentionality, in my mind, is misperceived, because you think -- you're talking about intentionality as the act of causing the injury. But I understood common-law battery to be the intentional act that causes the injury; i.e., if a husband threw a bottle at a wife, doesn't intend to hit her, but the bottle smashes against the wall and the glass embeds itself in her face, under the common law that would have been a battery because the act, the intentional act, was to throw the bottle. It wasn't -- it wasn't to cause the injury, but the act caused the injury. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman (with whom he was in a domestic relationship) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family or household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend’s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
Voisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes do not constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “recklessness” is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the “physical force” requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine’s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 14-10154, Voisine and Armstrong v. United States. Ms. Villa.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: There are three reasons to exclude reckless misdemeanors from the phrase "use... of physical force" as occurs in 921(a)(33). The first is that it's consistent with the definition of use that this Court has implemented in other cases. Second, it is consistent with the common-law definition of battery. And, third, it is consistent with the intentionality inherent in domestic violence.
Judge: But it's inconsistent with the treatment of bodily injury. I mean, I think you agree, because the Court so held, that either bodily injury or offensive touching is the act -- satisfies the act requirement. And you say if there's bodily injury, then reckless is enough, but if it's only offensive touching, then you need a higher mental state, intentional or knowing? Why -- if -- if both acts qualify equally, why shouldn't the same state of mind attach to each?
Petitioner: The same state of mind should attach to each, and that is why intentionality is the state of mind that under the common law can attach to each. Because intentional battery covered both the offensive physical contact as well as the physical injury, whereas recklessness covers only bodily injury.
Judge: I'm sorry. Intentionality, in my mind, is misperceived, because you think -- you're talking about intentionality as the act of causing the injury. But I understood common-law battery to be the intentional act that causes the injury; i.e., if a husband threw a bottle at a wife, doesn't intend to hit her, but the bottle smashes against the wall and the glass embeds itself in her face, under the common law that would have been a battery because the act, the intentional act, was to throw the bottle. It wasn't -- it wasn't to cause the injury, but the act caused the injury.
Petitioner: I respectfully disagree, Your Honor. Under -- | I know. If we end up disagreeing because the government points to many examples where this is the case, how do you win? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman (with whom he was in a domestic relationship) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family or household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend’s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
Voisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes do not constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “recklessness” is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the “physical force” requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine’s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 14-10154, Voisine and Armstrong v. United States. Ms. Villa.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: There are three reasons to exclude reckless misdemeanors from the phrase "use... of physical force" as occurs in 921(a)(33). The first is that it's consistent with the definition of use that this Court has implemented in other cases. Second, it is consistent with the common-law definition of battery. And, third, it is consistent with the intentionality inherent in domestic violence.
Judge: But it's inconsistent with the treatment of bodily injury. I mean, I think you agree, because the Court so held, that either bodily injury or offensive touching is the act -- satisfies the act requirement. And you say if there's bodily injury, then reckless is enough, but if it's only offensive touching, then you need a higher mental state, intentional or knowing? Why -- if -- if both acts qualify equally, why shouldn't the same state of mind attach to each?
Petitioner: The same state of mind should attach to each, and that is why intentionality is the state of mind that under the common law can attach to each. Because intentional battery covered both the offensive physical contact as well as the physical injury, whereas recklessness covers only bodily injury.
Judge: I'm sorry. Intentionality, in my mind, is misperceived, because you think -- you're talking about intentionality as the act of causing the injury. But I understood common-law battery to be the intentional act that causes the injury; i.e., if a husband threw a bottle at a wife, doesn't intend to hit her, but the bottle smashes against the wall and the glass embeds itself in her face, under the common law that would have been a battery because the act, the intentional act, was to throw the bottle. It wasn't -- it wasn't to cause the injury, but the act caused the injury.
Petitioner: I respectfully disagree, Your Honor. Under --
Judge: I know. If we end up disagreeing because the government points to many examples where this is the case, how do you win?
Petitioner: That's only on injury cases, and so you don't have that same confirmation or that same organization of the law with respect to offensive physical contact. And so my clients were convicted of offensive physical contact under a -- under the categorical approach. And so at that point, you can't say that they were convicted of anything that caused physical injury. | But -- but the point is that the contact was in -- was -- some contact had to have occurred. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: A federal grand jury indicted Sila Luis for her alleged role in a Medicare fraud scheme that involved giving kickbacks to patients who enrolled with her home healthcare companies. Because federal law allows the government to file a pretrial motion to restrain the assets of defendants accused of particular types of fraud, including substitute assets not directly related to the fraud, the government did so in this case. Luis objected to the motion and argued that she needed those funds in order to pay for her criminal defense lawyer, and therefore granting the motion would violate her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The district court granted the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 14-419, Luis v. United States. Mr. Srebnick.
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Sixth Amendment has always recognized the individual's right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of counsel. At the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, that was the core right, a time when the right to appointed counsel had not yet been established by this Court. We submit that the right to representation by private counsel must allow a defendant to use assets which she rightfully owns, assets over which there is no dispute that she has good title, so that she may be represented by the lawyer that she prefers. | What do you do about Monsanto? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: A federal grand jury indicted Sila Luis for her alleged role in a Medicare fraud scheme that involved giving kickbacks to patients who enrolled with her home healthcare companies. Because federal law allows the government to file a pretrial motion to restrain the assets of defendants accused of particular types of fraud, including substitute assets not directly related to the fraud, the government did so in this case. Luis objected to the motion and argued that she needed those funds in order to pay for her criminal defense lawyer, and therefore granting the motion would violate her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The district court granted the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 14-419, Luis v. United States. Mr. Srebnick.
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Sixth Amendment has always recognized the individual's right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of counsel. At the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, that was the core right, a time when the right to appointed counsel had not yet been established by this Court. We submit that the right to representation by private counsel must allow a defendant to use assets which she rightfully owns, assets over which there is no dispute that she has good title, so that she may be represented by the lawyer that she prefers.
Judge: What do you do about Monsanto?
Petitioner: In Monsanto and in Caplin & Drysdale, those were cases involving tainted funds, drug money. | Right. So what is the logic that says it doesn't violate the Sixth Amendment if it's tainted funds, but it does if it's untainted funds? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: A federal grand jury indicted Sila Luis for her alleged role in a Medicare fraud scheme that involved giving kickbacks to patients who enrolled with her home healthcare companies. Because federal law allows the government to file a pretrial motion to restrain the assets of defendants accused of particular types of fraud, including substitute assets not directly related to the fraud, the government did so in this case. Luis objected to the motion and argued that she needed those funds in order to pay for her criminal defense lawyer, and therefore granting the motion would violate her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The district court granted the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 14-419, Luis v. United States. Mr. Srebnick.
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Sixth Amendment has always recognized the individual's right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of counsel. At the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, that was the core right, a time when the right to appointed counsel had not yet been established by this Court. We submit that the right to representation by private counsel must allow a defendant to use assets which she rightfully owns, assets over which there is no dispute that she has good title, so that she may be represented by the lawyer that she prefers.
Judge: What do you do about Monsanto?
Petitioner: In Monsanto and in Caplin & Drysdale, those were cases involving tainted funds, drug money.
Judge: Right. So what is the logic that says it doesn't violate the Sixth Amendment if it's tainted funds, but it does if it's untainted funds?
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, the -- the logic is that no one has a rightful claim to drug money. No one can claim a valid property right in drug proceeds. Ms. Luis is wanting to use assets that are not drug money. They are her lawful assets. They are not connected to any crime at all. | But, Mr. Srebnick, I mean, compare two situations. One is the one that Monsanto talked about where, yeah, a bank robber goes in and he has a pile of money now. And Monsanto says, you know, even though he wants to use that money to pay for an attorney, too bad. Now a bank robber goes in, he has a pile of money, he puts it into a separate bank account, he uses that bank account to pay his rent, to pay other expenses, and he uses the money that would have gone for the rent and other expenses to pay a lawyer. Why should the two cases be treated any differently for Sixth Amendment purposes? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: A federal grand jury indicted Sila Luis for her alleged role in a Medicare fraud scheme that involved giving kickbacks to patients who enrolled with her home healthcare companies. Because federal law allows the government to file a pretrial motion to restrain the assets of defendants accused of particular types of fraud, including substitute assets not directly related to the fraud, the government did so in this case. Luis objected to the motion and argued that she needed those funds in order to pay for her criminal defense lawyer, and therefore granting the motion would violate her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The district court granted the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 14-419, Luis v. United States. Mr. Srebnick.
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Sixth Amendment has always recognized the individual's right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of counsel. At the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, that was the core right, a time when the right to appointed counsel had not yet been established by this Court. We submit that the right to representation by private counsel must allow a defendant to use assets which she rightfully owns, assets over which there is no dispute that she has good title, so that she may be represented by the lawyer that she prefers.
Judge: What do you do about Monsanto?
Petitioner: In Monsanto and in Caplin & Drysdale, those were cases involving tainted funds, drug money.
Judge: Right. So what is the logic that says it doesn't violate the Sixth Amendment if it's tainted funds, but it does if it's untainted funds?
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, the -- the logic is that no one has a rightful claim to drug money. No one can claim a valid property right in drug proceeds. Ms. Luis is wanting to use assets that are not drug money. They are her lawful assets. They are not connected to any crime at all.
Judge: But, Mr. Srebnick, I mean, compare two situations. One is the one that Monsanto talked about where, yeah, a bank robber goes in and he has a pile of money now. And Monsanto says, you know, even though he wants to use that money to pay for an attorney, too bad. Now a bank robber goes in, he has a pile of money, he puts it into a separate bank account, he uses that bank account to pay his rent, to pay other expenses, and he uses the money that would have gone for the rent and other expenses to pay a lawyer. Why should the two cases be treated any differently for Sixth Amendment purposes?
Petitioner: Because no amount of so-called dissipation, as the government would suggest, negates petitioner's lawful interest in the property she owns apart from any alleged criminal activity. | Well, but is -- doesn't it make sense the -- the sort of substitution rule? I mean, if you've got $10 million in drug activity -- money and you had $5 million, and you spent $10 million, you can't say, you know, oh, I spent the drug money, you can't touch the $5 million. It seems to me that's what the statute is doing when it says whatever it's a reasonable substitute or assets substituted for. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: John Thompson sued the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, the District Attorney, Harry Connick, in his official and individual capacities, and several assistant district attorneys in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C § 1983 in a Louisiana federal district court. Mr. Thompson served fourteen years on death row for a crime he did not commit because prosecutors failed to turn over blood work in a related case. The jury awarded Mr. Thompson $14 million against Mr. Connick in his official capacity. On appeal, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a tie vote and; thus by rule, affirmed the district court.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 09-571, Connick v. Thompson. Mr. Duncan.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case asks when a district attorney's office may be liable under section 1983 for inadequately training prosecutors. The Petitioner, Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, was found liable for the terrible injuries caused to Mr. Thompson by a Brady violation on the theory the office was deliberately indifferent to Brady training, this despite the fact that there was proved no pattern of previous misconduct by office prosecutors. The district court exempted this case from the ordinary pattern requirement by making a flawed analogy to a hypothetical in this Court's City of Canton opinion. There, the Court suggested that a city may be liable, absent a pattern, if it fails to inform police officers of the basic constitutional standard for deadly force. Extending that hypothetical to this case was error. It misunderstood Canton's distinction between a single incident and pattern liability, nullifying Canton's stringent standards of fault and causation. | Isn't there something in between? Because in Canton, the hypothetical was one rookie police officer. Here, it wasn't one rogue prosecutor. There were four prosecutors who knew of this blood evidence and there were multiple opportunities for them to disclose it, but four of them apparently thought it was okay under Brady to keep this quiet. Now, if we were just talking about -- what was his name, Deegan? it would be a different case. But we have the three other prosecutors. So I think it's questionable to characterize this as a single incident. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: John Thompson sued the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, the District Attorney, Harry Connick, in his official and individual capacities, and several assistant district attorneys in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C § 1983 in a Louisiana federal district court. Mr. Thompson served fourteen years on death row for a crime he did not commit because prosecutors failed to turn over blood work in a related case. The jury awarded Mr. Thompson $14 million against Mr. Connick in his official capacity. On appeal, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a tie vote and; thus by rule, affirmed the district court.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 09-571, Connick v. Thompson. Mr. Duncan.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case asks when a district attorney's office may be liable under section 1983 for inadequately training prosecutors. The Petitioner, Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, was found liable for the terrible injuries caused to Mr. Thompson by a Brady violation on the theory the office was deliberately indifferent to Brady training, this despite the fact that there was proved no pattern of previous misconduct by office prosecutors. The district court exempted this case from the ordinary pattern requirement by making a flawed analogy to a hypothetical in this Court's City of Canton opinion. There, the Court suggested that a city may be liable, absent a pattern, if it fails to inform police officers of the basic constitutional standard for deadly force. Extending that hypothetical to this case was error. It misunderstood Canton's distinction between a single incident and pattern liability, nullifying Canton's stringent standards of fault and causation.
Judge: Isn't there something in between? Because in Canton, the hypothetical was one rookie police officer. Here, it wasn't one rogue prosecutor. There were four prosecutors who knew of this blood evidence and there were multiple opportunities for them to disclose it, but four of them apparently thought it was okay under Brady to keep this quiet. Now, if we were just talking about -- what was his name, Deegan? it would be a different case. But we have the three other prosecutors. So I think it's questionable to characterize this as a single incident.
Petitioner: I understand your question, Justice Ginsburg. Our argument does not turn on whether it was one or three or four prosecutors. What our argument does turn on is that the theory from the Canton hypothetical, which does not require a pattern, was clearly at issue in this case. The district court analogized to Canton in order to allow the jury to find liability absent a pattern. There is no question that, whether it was one or four prosecutors, this is a single incident of a Brady violation. | Counsel, this is a single incident, and Canton said if you know that a tort is likely to happen without training then one incident is enough. Every prosecutor knows that there can be Brady violations if people are not taught what Brady means, because it's not self-evident in every situation. Correct? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: John Thompson sued the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, the District Attorney, Harry Connick, in his official and individual capacities, and several assistant district attorneys in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C § 1983 in a Louisiana federal district court. Mr. Thompson served fourteen years on death row for a crime he did not commit because prosecutors failed to turn over blood work in a related case. The jury awarded Mr. Thompson $14 million against Mr. Connick in his official capacity. On appeal, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a tie vote and; thus by rule, affirmed the district court.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 09-571, Connick v. Thompson. Mr. Duncan.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case asks when a district attorney's office may be liable under section 1983 for inadequately training prosecutors. The Petitioner, Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, was found liable for the terrible injuries caused to Mr. Thompson by a Brady violation on the theory the office was deliberately indifferent to Brady training, this despite the fact that there was proved no pattern of previous misconduct by office prosecutors. The district court exempted this case from the ordinary pattern requirement by making a flawed analogy to a hypothetical in this Court's City of Canton opinion. There, the Court suggested that a city may be liable, absent a pattern, if it fails to inform police officers of the basic constitutional standard for deadly force. Extending that hypothetical to this case was error. It misunderstood Canton's distinction between a single incident and pattern liability, nullifying Canton's stringent standards of fault and causation.
Judge: Isn't there something in between? Because in Canton, the hypothetical was one rookie police officer. Here, it wasn't one rogue prosecutor. There were four prosecutors who knew of this blood evidence and there were multiple opportunities for them to disclose it, but four of them apparently thought it was okay under Brady to keep this quiet. Now, if we were just talking about -- what was his name, Deegan? it would be a different case. But we have the three other prosecutors. So I think it's questionable to characterize this as a single incident.
Petitioner: I understand your question, Justice Ginsburg. Our argument does not turn on whether it was one or three or four prosecutors. What our argument does turn on is that the theory from the Canton hypothetical, which does not require a pattern, was clearly at issue in this case. The district court analogized to Canton in order to allow the jury to find liability absent a pattern. There is no question that, whether it was one or four prosecutors, this is a single incident of a Brady violation.
Judge: Counsel, this is a single incident, and Canton said if you know that a tort is likely to happen without training then one incident is enough. Every prosecutor knows that there can be Brady violations if people are not taught what Brady means, because it's not self-evident in every situation. Correct?
Petitioner: That's true, Justice Sotomayor. Yes. | All right. So if you know that rookie prosecutors -- and most prosecutors' offices are filled with young ADA's who have just come out of law school. If you know that they are going to meet some situations where the answer is not intuitively known, like that if you get a lab report, you should turn it over, don't you have an obligation, isn't that what the jury said, to train them to turn over lab reports? Now, I know you claim you had that policy. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: John Thompson sued the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, the District Attorney, Harry Connick, in his official and individual capacities, and several assistant district attorneys in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C § 1983 in a Louisiana federal district court. Mr. Thompson served fourteen years on death row for a crime he did not commit because prosecutors failed to turn over blood work in a related case. The jury awarded Mr. Thompson $14 million against Mr. Connick in his official capacity. On appeal, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a tie vote and; thus by rule, affirmed the district court.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 09-571, Connick v. Thompson. Mr. Duncan.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case asks when a district attorney's office may be liable under section 1983 for inadequately training prosecutors. The Petitioner, Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, was found liable for the terrible injuries caused to Mr. Thompson by a Brady violation on the theory the office was deliberately indifferent to Brady training, this despite the fact that there was proved no pattern of previous misconduct by office prosecutors. The district court exempted this case from the ordinary pattern requirement by making a flawed analogy to a hypothetical in this Court's City of Canton opinion. There, the Court suggested that a city may be liable, absent a pattern, if it fails to inform police officers of the basic constitutional standard for deadly force. Extending that hypothetical to this case was error. It misunderstood Canton's distinction between a single incident and pattern liability, nullifying Canton's stringent standards of fault and causation.
Judge: Isn't there something in between? Because in Canton, the hypothetical was one rookie police officer. Here, it wasn't one rogue prosecutor. There were four prosecutors who knew of this blood evidence and there were multiple opportunities for them to disclose it, but four of them apparently thought it was okay under Brady to keep this quiet. Now, if we were just talking about -- what was his name, Deegan? it would be a different case. But we have the three other prosecutors. So I think it's questionable to characterize this as a single incident.
Petitioner: I understand your question, Justice Ginsburg. Our argument does not turn on whether it was one or three or four prosecutors. What our argument does turn on is that the theory from the Canton hypothetical, which does not require a pattern, was clearly at issue in this case. The district court analogized to Canton in order to allow the jury to find liability absent a pattern. There is no question that, whether it was one or four prosecutors, this is a single incident of a Brady violation.
Judge: Counsel, this is a single incident, and Canton said if you know that a tort is likely to happen without training then one incident is enough. Every prosecutor knows that there can be Brady violations if people are not taught what Brady means, because it's not self-evident in every situation. Correct?
Petitioner: That's true, Justice Sotomayor. Yes.
Judge: All right. So if you know that rookie prosecutors -- and most prosecutors' offices are filled with young ADA's who have just come out of law school. If you know that they are going to meet some situations where the answer is not intuitively known, like that if you get a lab report, you should turn it over, don't you have an obligation, isn't that what the jury said, to train them to turn over lab reports? Now, I know you claim you had that policy.
Petitioner: Correct. | We can talk later about whether or not there was sufficient evidence for the jury to disbelieve that you had that policy or not. That's a sufficiency of the evidence question. But if you know that lab reports have to be turned over, you've conceded it's a Brady violation not to do it, and there was sufficient -- and you had no policy -- I know you are disputing that -- and you had no policy of turning it over, why aren't you responsible for a Canton-like violation? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Bureau of Indian Affairs officials arrested Billy Jo Lara on the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation for public intoxication (though Lara is not a member of the reservation). During the arrest Lara attacked an officer.
A tribal court convicted Lara of assault. The federal government then indicted Lara for assaulting a federal officer. Lara moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the federal charges violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeapordy (being charged twice for the same crime). The district court denied Lara's motion. Lara then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his Fifth Amendment motion.
A panel of the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling. However, the Eight Circuit reversed when it reviewed the case en banc (with the full court), ruling that Lara's federal charges violated the double jeapordy clause. The court reasoned that the only source of authority for Spirit Lake Nation to prosecute a nonmember (like Lara) came from the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (1968). Because the federal government delegated this prosecutorial authority to Indian Tribes, charging Lara for the same crime in tribal and federal courts was essentially trying Lara twice under federal authority.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in No. 03-107, the United States v. Billy Jo Lara. Mr. Kneedler.
Petitioner: I think the answer lies in... in the longstanding jurisdictional regime on Indian reservations. Going back to 1817, the general Indian crimes statute has authorized prosecutions by the Federal Government over crimes committed by non-Indians, including misdemeanor crimes, and so there was not a jurisdictional void. The difficulty came... the... the most acute difficulty came from the fact that that statute, again since the earliest times, had... has exempted crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another. | Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: 14 years ago in the Duro decision this Court held that under the state of Indian law, as it then stood, and Indian tribe could not prosecute an Indian who was not a member of that tribe. The Court recognized, though, that its decision might create a jurisdictional gap on many reservations, but the Court concluded that if the present jurisdictional regime proves insufficient to meet the needs of reservation law enforcement, the proper body to address that concern is Congress, which has plenary power over Indian affairs. Congress responded immediately to this Court's decision. It... it conducted an extensive inquiry and heard hearings about the consequences of the Court's decision and heard strong expressions of concern by many Indian tribes, by the Federal Government, and by numerous States about the law enforcement vacuum that would be created over many misdemeanor offenses on Indian reservations. And there was widespread support for Congress to restore the power to Indian tribes to exercise their sovereign power to prosecute non-member Indians. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Bureau of Indian Affairs officials arrested Billy Jo Lara on the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation for public intoxication (though Lara is not a member of the reservation). During the arrest Lara attacked an officer.
A tribal court convicted Lara of assault. The federal government then indicted Lara for assaulting a federal officer. Lara moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the federal charges violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeapordy (being charged twice for the same crime). The district court denied Lara's motion. Lara then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his Fifth Amendment motion.
A panel of the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling. However, the Eight Circuit reversed when it reviewed the case en banc (with the full court), ruling that Lara's federal charges violated the double jeapordy clause. The court reasoned that the only source of authority for Spirit Lake Nation to prosecute a nonmember (like Lara) came from the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (1968). Because the federal government delegated this prosecutorial authority to Indian Tribes, charging Lara for the same crime in tribal and federal courts was essentially trying Lara twice under federal authority.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in No. 03-107, the United States v. Billy Jo Lara. Mr. Kneedler.
Petitioner: I think the answer lies in... in the longstanding jurisdictional regime on Indian reservations. Going back to 1817, the general Indian crimes statute has authorized prosecutions by the Federal Government over crimes committed by non-Indians, including misdemeanor crimes, and so there was not a jurisdictional void. The difficulty came... the... the most acute difficulty came from the fact that that statute, again since the earliest times, had... has exempted crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another.
Judge: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: 14 years ago in the Duro decision this Court held that under the state of Indian law, as it then stood, and Indian tribe could not prosecute an Indian who was not a member of that tribe. The Court recognized, though, that its decision might create a jurisdictional gap on many reservations, but the Court concluded that if the present jurisdictional regime proves insufficient to meet the needs of reservation law enforcement, the proper body to address that concern is Congress, which has plenary power over Indian affairs. Congress responded immediately to this Court's decision. It... it conducted an extensive inquiry and heard hearings about the consequences of the Court's decision and heard strong expressions of concern by many Indian tribes, by the Federal Government, and by numerous States about the law enforcement vacuum that would be created over many misdemeanor offenses on Indian reservations. And there was widespread support for Congress to restore the power to Indian tribes to exercise their sovereign power to prosecute non-member Indians.
Petitioner: Congress could have done so, but Congress, with the plenary power over Indian affairs, chose... decided that the proper course or the most appropriate course was to have that jurisdiction exercised by the Indian tribes. And Congress heard considerable... considerable evidence that that power had long, in fact, been exercised by Indian tribes over other Indians who were not members of the particular tribe. | Why didn't... why didn't they extend it to non-Indians? I mean, if it's a problem when a... a non-member Indian commits an offense on an Indian reservation, why isn't it an equivalent problem when a... a white man commits the same crime on an Indian reservation? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Bureau of Indian Affairs officials arrested Billy Jo Lara on the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation for public intoxication (though Lara is not a member of the reservation). During the arrest Lara attacked an officer.
A tribal court convicted Lara of assault. The federal government then indicted Lara for assaulting a federal officer. Lara moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the federal charges violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeapordy (being charged twice for the same crime). The district court denied Lara's motion. Lara then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his Fifth Amendment motion.
A panel of the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling. However, the Eight Circuit reversed when it reviewed the case en banc (with the full court), ruling that Lara's federal charges violated the double jeapordy clause. The court reasoned that the only source of authority for Spirit Lake Nation to prosecute a nonmember (like Lara) came from the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (1968). Because the federal government delegated this prosecutorial authority to Indian Tribes, charging Lara for the same crime in tribal and federal courts was essentially trying Lara twice under federal authority.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in No. 03-107, the United States v. Billy Jo Lara. Mr. Kneedler.
Petitioner: I think the answer lies in... in the longstanding jurisdictional regime on Indian reservations. Going back to 1817, the general Indian crimes statute has authorized prosecutions by the Federal Government over crimes committed by non-Indians, including misdemeanor crimes, and so there was not a jurisdictional void. The difficulty came... the... the most acute difficulty came from the fact that that statute, again since the earliest times, had... has exempted crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another.
Judge: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: 14 years ago in the Duro decision this Court held that under the state of Indian law, as it then stood, and Indian tribe could not prosecute an Indian who was not a member of that tribe. The Court recognized, though, that its decision might create a jurisdictional gap on many reservations, but the Court concluded that if the present jurisdictional regime proves insufficient to meet the needs of reservation law enforcement, the proper body to address that concern is Congress, which has plenary power over Indian affairs. Congress responded immediately to this Court's decision. It... it conducted an extensive inquiry and heard hearings about the consequences of the Court's decision and heard strong expressions of concern by many Indian tribes, by the Federal Government, and by numerous States about the law enforcement vacuum that would be created over many misdemeanor offenses on Indian reservations. And there was widespread support for Congress to restore the power to Indian tribes to exercise their sovereign power to prosecute non-member Indians.
Petitioner: Congress could have done so, but Congress, with the plenary power over Indian affairs, chose... decided that the proper course or the most appropriate course was to have that jurisdiction exercised by the Indian tribes. And Congress heard considerable... considerable evidence that that power had long, in fact, been exercised by Indian tribes over other Indians who were not members of the particular tribe.
Judge: Why didn't... why didn't they extend it to non-Indians? I mean, if it's a problem when a... a non-member Indian commits an offense on an Indian reservation, why isn't it an equivalent problem when a... a white man commits the same crime on an Indian reservation?
Petitioner: It... generally, it has been understood to require a tribal affiliation. First of all, the definition under... under the Indian Civil Rights Act for tribal power, Congress adopted the same meaning of Indian that is applied under the Federal criminal statutes for the purpose of having the two mesh completely. | Well, why couldn't they have changed that? They could have solved the problem by simply treating non-member Indians the same way they treat non-Indians. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: Bureau of Indian Affairs officials arrested Billy Jo Lara on the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation for public intoxication (though Lara is not a member of the reservation). During the arrest Lara attacked an officer.
A tribal court convicted Lara of assault. The federal government then indicted Lara for assaulting a federal officer. Lara moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the federal charges violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeapordy (being charged twice for the same crime). The district court denied Lara's motion. Lara then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his Fifth Amendment motion.
A panel of the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling. However, the Eight Circuit reversed when it reviewed the case en banc (with the full court), ruling that Lara's federal charges violated the double jeapordy clause. The court reasoned that the only source of authority for Spirit Lake Nation to prosecute a nonmember (like Lara) came from the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (1968). Because the federal government delegated this prosecutorial authority to Indian Tribes, charging Lara for the same crime in tribal and federal courts was essentially trying Lara twice under federal authority.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in No. 03-107, the United States v. Billy Jo Lara. Mr. Kneedler.
Petitioner: I think the answer lies in... in the longstanding jurisdictional regime on Indian reservations. Going back to 1817, the general Indian crimes statute has authorized prosecutions by the Federal Government over crimes committed by non-Indians, including misdemeanor crimes, and so there was not a jurisdictional void. The difficulty came... the... the most acute difficulty came from the fact that that statute, again since the earliest times, had... has exempted crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another.
Judge: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: 14 years ago in the Duro decision this Court held that under the state of Indian law, as it then stood, and Indian tribe could not prosecute an Indian who was not a member of that tribe. The Court recognized, though, that its decision might create a jurisdictional gap on many reservations, but the Court concluded that if the present jurisdictional regime proves insufficient to meet the needs of reservation law enforcement, the proper body to address that concern is Congress, which has plenary power over Indian affairs. Congress responded immediately to this Court's decision. It... it conducted an extensive inquiry and heard hearings about the consequences of the Court's decision and heard strong expressions of concern by many Indian tribes, by the Federal Government, and by numerous States about the law enforcement vacuum that would be created over many misdemeanor offenses on Indian reservations. And there was widespread support for Congress to restore the power to Indian tribes to exercise their sovereign power to prosecute non-member Indians.
Petitioner: Congress could have done so, but Congress, with the plenary power over Indian affairs, chose... decided that the proper course or the most appropriate course was to have that jurisdiction exercised by the Indian tribes. And Congress heard considerable... considerable evidence that that power had long, in fact, been exercised by Indian tribes over other Indians who were not members of the particular tribe.
Judge: Why didn't... why didn't they extend it to non-Indians? I mean, if it's a problem when a... a non-member Indian commits an offense on an Indian reservation, why isn't it an equivalent problem when a... a white man commits the same crime on an Indian reservation?
Petitioner: It... generally, it has been understood to require a tribal affiliation. First of all, the definition under... under the Indian Civil Rights Act for tribal power, Congress adopted the same meaning of Indian that is applied under the Federal criminal statutes for the purpose of having the two mesh completely.
Judge: Well, why couldn't they have changed that? They could have solved the problem by simply treating non-member Indians the same way they treat non-Indians.
Petitioner: And under that, obviously, someone who is an enrolled... formally enrolled member would be an Indian, but as this Court pointed out in footnote 7 of its Antelope decision, the... that provision has not been construed to require that strictly, that ordinarily someone who is an Indian and has a tribal affiliation and is recognized by the tribe is also regarded as an Indian. In this case, though, we have a situation where someone who is an enrolled member of another tribe. So questions about the... about the... how the statute should be construed or applied in situations where there's not one... someone who's formally a member are... are not present in this case. | What's-- --There's some ambiguity about what Indian refers to. Is it... must it be someone who is enrolled in an Indian tribe or can it be anyone who is the child of Indian parents? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Judge: Mr. Chinn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The City of Indianapolis operates roadway checkpoints comprised of conduct that in other relevant contexts this Court has approved. The Court of Appeals declined to apply this Court's Brown versus Texas balancing test to evaluate that conduct because the checkpoints primarily investigate crimes, but the city's checkpoints are constitutional for two independent reasons. First, this Court used the balancing test in upholding other roadway checkpoints where the government's interests was to investigate crimes. Second, the city's checkpoints serve sobriety checking and driving regulation interests that this Court has approved and the city's drug checking conduct adds no additional intrusion to these procedures. The roadway checkpoints this Court has previously upheld-- | I have just one question about that. I guess on the checkpoints to check for drunk drivers, that's at least related to the condition of the driver of the car, and the Court applied a balancing test and upheld it. Now, is this search more to find drugs being transported in vehicles or is it looking for drivers who are impaired by drug use? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Judge: Mr. Chinn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The City of Indianapolis operates roadway checkpoints comprised of conduct that in other relevant contexts this Court has approved. The Court of Appeals declined to apply this Court's Brown versus Texas balancing test to evaluate that conduct because the checkpoints primarily investigate crimes, but the city's checkpoints are constitutional for two independent reasons. First, this Court used the balancing test in upholding other roadway checkpoints where the government's interests was to investigate crimes. Second, the city's checkpoints serve sobriety checking and driving regulation interests that this Court has approved and the city's drug checking conduct adds no additional intrusion to these procedures. The roadway checkpoints this Court has previously upheld--
Judge: I have just one question about that. I guess on the checkpoints to check for drunk drivers, that's at least related to the condition of the driver of the car, and the Court applied a balancing test and upheld it. Now, is this search more to find drugs being transported in vehicles or is it looking for drivers who are impaired by drug use?
Petitioner: --It's to do both, Your Honor, but primarily to look for drug possession and trafficking in cars. | What do the statistics show or do they show about the percentage of people that were arrested that were using drugs and were therefore driving under the influence of drugs? Do the statistics show us that? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Judge: Mr. Chinn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The City of Indianapolis operates roadway checkpoints comprised of conduct that in other relevant contexts this Court has approved. The Court of Appeals declined to apply this Court's Brown versus Texas balancing test to evaluate that conduct because the checkpoints primarily investigate crimes, but the city's checkpoints are constitutional for two independent reasons. First, this Court used the balancing test in upholding other roadway checkpoints where the government's interests was to investigate crimes. Second, the city's checkpoints serve sobriety checking and driving regulation interests that this Court has approved and the city's drug checking conduct adds no additional intrusion to these procedures. The roadway checkpoints this Court has previously upheld--
Judge: I have just one question about that. I guess on the checkpoints to check for drunk drivers, that's at least related to the condition of the driver of the car, and the Court applied a balancing test and upheld it. Now, is this search more to find drugs being transported in vehicles or is it looking for drivers who are impaired by drug use?
Petitioner: --It's to do both, Your Honor, but primarily to look for drug possession and trafficking in cars.
Judge: What do the statistics show or do they show about the percentage of people that were arrested that were using drugs and were therefore driving under the influence of drugs? Do the statistics show us that?
Petitioner: Not in this case. On this record there is no evidence that any driver was arrested because he or she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Our statistics show that 4.7 percent of the drivers stopped possessed some sort of narcotics. | But does that make this akin to a checkpoint, for instance, to catch burglars in an area or a murderer or something of that kind? Is this more for typical law enforcement purposes? And does that affect the balance in some way? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Judge: Mr. Chinn.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The City of Indianapolis operates roadway checkpoints comprised of conduct that in other relevant contexts this Court has approved. The Court of Appeals declined to apply this Court's Brown versus Texas balancing test to evaluate that conduct because the checkpoints primarily investigate crimes, but the city's checkpoints are constitutional for two independent reasons. First, this Court used the balancing test in upholding other roadway checkpoints where the government's interests was to investigate crimes. Second, the city's checkpoints serve sobriety checking and driving regulation interests that this Court has approved and the city's drug checking conduct adds no additional intrusion to these procedures. The roadway checkpoints this Court has previously upheld--
Judge: I have just one question about that. I guess on the checkpoints to check for drunk drivers, that's at least related to the condition of the driver of the car, and the Court applied a balancing test and upheld it. Now, is this search more to find drugs being transported in vehicles or is it looking for drivers who are impaired by drug use?
Petitioner: --It's to do both, Your Honor, but primarily to look for drug possession and trafficking in cars.
Judge: What do the statistics show or do they show about the percentage of people that were arrested that were using drugs and were therefore driving under the influence of drugs? Do the statistics show us that?
Petitioner: Not in this case. On this record there is no evidence that any driver was arrested because he or she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Our statistics show that 4.7 percent of the drivers stopped possessed some sort of narcotics.
Judge: But does that make this akin to a checkpoint, for instance, to catch burglars in an area or a murderer or something of that kind? Is this more for typical law enforcement purposes? And does that affect the balance in some way?
Petitioner: No, Your Honor, I think it's different than the hypotheticals that you described for this important reason. The relationship between smuggling drugs in cars, of course, and the roadway itself is close. We have found that, obviously, with our high hit rate in Indianapolis. Carrying drugs in cars is important to foster the drug trade in our neighborhoods, both in terms of possession amounts and smuggling amounts, traffic amounts. The ease with which the drugs can be concealed and moved about very easily and enter our neighborhoods is a problem. | Well, if there were a high crime area with lots of thefts and burglaries and it was believed that the burglars typically made their getaway in cars, is it appropriate to have roadblocks and check people for that purpose? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In September 2003, James Benjamin Puckett agreed to a plea bargain with the United States on counts of bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. In exchange for his guilty plea, the government agreed to recommend a reduced sentence. However at sentencing, the government reneged arguing that because Mr. Puckett admittedly aided a fellow inmate in another crime while awaiting sentencing, he was no longer eligible for the reduction. The district court agreed. On appeal, Mr. Puckett maintained that the government's breach of agreement disqualified his guilty plea.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Puckett's guilty plea was not disqualified. It recognized that the government breached its plea agreement at sentencing. However, it reasoned that Mr. Puckett failed to prove his substantial rights were affected when the district court was unlikely to have imposed a different sentence, even if the government had recommended a reduction.
Judge: We will hear argument first today in Case 07-9712, Puckett v. United States. Mr. Isaacson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: This case is framed by two major facts: Jimmy Puckett pled guilty and waived his fundamental right to trial in exchange for a promise by the government that they agreed he was qualified for a three-level reduction in his offense level; and the government of the United States breached this promise. The teachings of this Court in this situation are instructive. For a plea to be valid, it must be voluntary and intelligent. | Mr. Isaacson, you said there were two facts. Aren't there three? Isn't it a fact that after the plea bargain the defendant in essence broke his side of the bargain by committing a crime while he was in jail? |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In September 2003, James Benjamin Puckett agreed to a plea bargain with the United States on counts of bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. In exchange for his guilty plea, the government agreed to recommend a reduced sentence. However at sentencing, the government reneged arguing that because Mr. Puckett admittedly aided a fellow inmate in another crime while awaiting sentencing, he was no longer eligible for the reduction. The district court agreed. On appeal, Mr. Puckett maintained that the government's breach of agreement disqualified his guilty plea.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Puckett's guilty plea was not disqualified. It recognized that the government breached its plea agreement at sentencing. However, it reasoned that Mr. Puckett failed to prove his substantial rights were affected when the district court was unlikely to have imposed a different sentence, even if the government had recommended a reduction.
Judge: We will hear argument first today in Case 07-9712, Puckett v. United States. Mr. Isaacson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: This case is framed by two major facts: Jimmy Puckett pled guilty and waived his fundamental right to trial in exchange for a promise by the government that they agreed he was qualified for a three-level reduction in his offense level; and the government of the United States breached this promise. The teachings of this Court in this situation are instructive. For a plea to be valid, it must be voluntary and intelligent.
Judge: Mr. Isaacson, you said there were two facts. Aren't there three? Isn't it a fact that after the plea bargain the defendant in essence broke his side of the bargain by committing a crime while he was in jail?
Petitioner: No, Your Honor. He did not breach the plea agreement by doing that. He-- | Well, I used to teach contract law and I'll tell you that would have been a breach of contract. That would have been a breach on his part. Now, the government has conceded the breach of the plea agreement. I don't -- I can't understand why they did that, but they apparently have conceded it. Does that mean that we have to ignore it for purposes of deciding what the -- what the remedy is? Ignore the reality that there was a breach? I mean, you know, if the government said, we will ask the court to sentence at the lower end because of the -- the remorse that the defendant has shown, and the defendant then demonstrates that he has no remorse by -- you know, suppose he comes and stabs the judge -- is the government really supposed to have to go before the judge and say, "Your Honor, this man is really remorseful and you should sentence him at the lower end? " It seems to me it's a basic principle of contract law that a party to a contract cannot take action which makes it impracticable for the other side to carry out his part of the bargain, and that's what your client did. The government couldn't practicably go in and make that argument when he had demonstrated himself to be an unremorseful criminal. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In September 2003, James Benjamin Puckett agreed to a plea bargain with the United States on counts of bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. In exchange for his guilty plea, the government agreed to recommend a reduced sentence. However at sentencing, the government reneged arguing that because Mr. Puckett admittedly aided a fellow inmate in another crime while awaiting sentencing, he was no longer eligible for the reduction. The district court agreed. On appeal, Mr. Puckett maintained that the government's breach of agreement disqualified his guilty plea.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Puckett's guilty plea was not disqualified. It recognized that the government breached its plea agreement at sentencing. However, it reasoned that Mr. Puckett failed to prove his substantial rights were affected when the district court was unlikely to have imposed a different sentence, even if the government had recommended a reduction.
Judge: We will hear argument first today in Case 07-9712, Puckett v. United States. Mr. Isaacson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: This case is framed by two major facts: Jimmy Puckett pled guilty and waived his fundamental right to trial in exchange for a promise by the government that they agreed he was qualified for a three-level reduction in his offense level; and the government of the United States breached this promise. The teachings of this Court in this situation are instructive. For a plea to be valid, it must be voluntary and intelligent.
Judge: Mr. Isaacson, you said there were two facts. Aren't there three? Isn't it a fact that after the plea bargain the defendant in essence broke his side of the bargain by committing a crime while he was in jail?
Petitioner: No, Your Honor. He did not breach the plea agreement by doing that. He--
Judge: Well, I used to teach contract law and I'll tell you that would have been a breach of contract. That would have been a breach on his part. Now, the government has conceded the breach of the plea agreement. I don't -- I can't understand why they did that, but they apparently have conceded it. Does that mean that we have to ignore it for purposes of deciding what the -- what the remedy is? Ignore the reality that there was a breach? I mean, you know, if the government said, we will ask the court to sentence at the lower end because of the -- the remorse that the defendant has shown, and the defendant then demonstrates that he has no remorse by -- you know, suppose he comes and stabs the judge -- is the government really supposed to have to go before the judge and say, "Your Honor, this man is really remorseful and you should sentence him at the lower end? " It seems to me it's a basic principle of contract law that a party to a contract cannot take action which makes it impracticable for the other side to carry out his part of the bargain, and that's what your client did. The government couldn't practicably go in and make that argument when he had demonstrated himself to be an unremorseful criminal.
Petitioner: --The government in this case drafted a plea agreement, and most plea agreements -- I've practiced in the Northern District of Texas quite often, and virtually every plea agreement has a provision in it that says if the defendant does some type of criminal activity, thus it will render it void. This plea agreement did not have that in it. | Oh. |
Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the judge | Fact: In September 2003, James Benjamin Puckett agreed to a plea bargain with the United States on counts of bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. In exchange for his guilty plea, the government agreed to recommend a reduced sentence. However at sentencing, the government reneged arguing that because Mr. Puckett admittedly aided a fellow inmate in another crime while awaiting sentencing, he was no longer eligible for the reduction. The district court agreed. On appeal, Mr. Puckett maintained that the government's breach of agreement disqualified his guilty plea.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Puckett's guilty plea was not disqualified. It recognized that the government breached its plea agreement at sentencing. However, it reasoned that Mr. Puckett failed to prove his substantial rights were affected when the district court was unlikely to have imposed a different sentence, even if the government had recommended a reduction.
Judge: We will hear argument first today in Case 07-9712, Puckett v. United States. Mr. Isaacson.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: This case is framed by two major facts: Jimmy Puckett pled guilty and waived his fundamental right to trial in exchange for a promise by the government that they agreed he was qualified for a three-level reduction in his offense level; and the government of the United States breached this promise. The teachings of this Court in this situation are instructive. For a plea to be valid, it must be voluntary and intelligent.
Judge: Mr. Isaacson, you said there were two facts. Aren't there three? Isn't it a fact that after the plea bargain the defendant in essence broke his side of the bargain by committing a crime while he was in jail?
Petitioner: No, Your Honor. He did not breach the plea agreement by doing that. He--
Judge: Well, I used to teach contract law and I'll tell you that would have been a breach of contract. That would have been a breach on his part. Now, the government has conceded the breach of the plea agreement. I don't -- I can't understand why they did that, but they apparently have conceded it. Does that mean that we have to ignore it for purposes of deciding what the -- what the remedy is? Ignore the reality that there was a breach? I mean, you know, if the government said, we will ask the court to sentence at the lower end because of the -- the remorse that the defendant has shown, and the defendant then demonstrates that he has no remorse by -- you know, suppose he comes and stabs the judge -- is the government really supposed to have to go before the judge and say, "Your Honor, this man is really remorseful and you should sentence him at the lower end? " It seems to me it's a basic principle of contract law that a party to a contract cannot take action which makes it impracticable for the other side to carry out his part of the bargain, and that's what your client did. The government couldn't practicably go in and make that argument when he had demonstrated himself to be an unremorseful criminal.
Petitioner: --The government in this case drafted a plea agreement, and most plea agreements -- I've practiced in the Northern District of Texas quite often, and virtually every plea agreement has a provision in it that says if the defendant does some type of criminal activity, thus it will render it void. This plea agreement did not have that in it.
Judge: Oh.
Petitioner: So it's different than most plea agreements. | So you want to us make the inference that the impermissible or criminal activity was permitted by the absence of this specific clause. You say there is no implied condition, no implied covenant? |
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