[ { "chunk_id": "566fc50a9e432b4225adb9554171c8f0", "text": "Premier ministre \nAgence nationale de la sécurité \ndes systèmes d’information\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud)\n\nréférentiel d’exigences\n\nVersion 3.2 du 8 mars 2022\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 2/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-346b4170b390", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 88 }, { "chunk_id": "c5139a80533017cb7f16322d661e83de", "text": "HISTORIQUE DES VERSIONS \nDATE VERSION EVOLUTION DU DOCUMENT REDACTEUR \n30/07/2014 1.3 Version publiée pour commentaires. ANSSI \n20/03/2015 2.0 Version intermédiaire utilisée pour la procédure expérimentale ANSSI \n08/12/2016 3.0 \nPremière version applicable. \nModifications principales : \n création d’un référentiel par niveau de qualification ; \n clarifications apportées à certaines exigences ; \n refonte des chapitres 9, 10, 13 et des annexes ; \n intégration plus précise des labels PASSI, PRIS et PDIS. \nANSSI \n11/06/2016 3.1 \nVersion prenant en compte le Règlement général sur la protection des \ndonnées (RGPD). \nModifications principales : \n mise en conformité avec le RGPD ; \n retrait de la mention d’un niveau de qualification avancé. \n précision concernant l’hébergement externe partagé \nANSSI \n08/03/2022 3.2 \nVersion intégrant principalement des critères de p rotection vis -à-vis du \ndroit extra-européen. \nModifications apportées aux chapitres 1.3.1, 3.2, 3.3.2, 4, 5.3, 6.1,7.1, 7.2, \n8.1, 9.1, 9.5, 9.7, 10.2, 11.2.1, 11.5, 12.10, 12.13, 12.14, 17.1, 18.2.3, 19.1, \n19.6, Annexes 1 et 2.\n\nANSSI\n\nLes commentaires sur le présent document sont à adresser à :\n\nAgence nationale de la sécurité des \nsystèmes d’information \nSGDSN/ANSSI \n51 boulevard de La Tour-Maubourg \n75700 Paris 07 SP \nqualification@ssi.gouv.fr\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 3/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-346b4170b390", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 374 }, { "chunk_id": "f1a5dd9a17a22f8905f5086bc7becee3", "text": "SOMMAIRE \n1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 7 \n1.1. PRESENTATION GENERALE ............................................................................................................................... 7 \n1.1.1. Contexte ........................................................................................................................................... 7 \n1.1.2. Objet du document .......................................................................................................................... 7 \n1.1.3. Structure du présent document ....................................................................................................... 8 \n1.2. IDENTIFICATION DU DOCUMENT ........................................................................................................................ 8 \n1.3. ACRONYMES ET DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................ 8 \n1.3.1. Acronymes ....................................................................................................................................... 8 \n1.3.2. Définitions ........................................................................................................................................ 8 \n1.3.3. Rôles ............................................................................................................................................... 10 \n2. ACTIVITES VISEES PAR LE REFERENTIEL ..................................................................................................... 11 \n2.1. FOURNITURE DE SERVICES SAAS ..................................................................................................................... 11 \n2.2. FOURNITURE DE SERVICES PAAS ..................................................................................................................... 11 \n2.3. FOURNITURE DE SERVICES CAAS ..................................................................................................................... 11 \n2.4. FOURNITURE DE SERVICES IAAS ...................................................................................................................... 11 \n3. QUALIFICATION DES PRESTATAIRES DE SERVICES D’INFORMATIQUE EN NUAGE ...................................... 13 \n3.1. MODALITES DE LA QUALIFICATION ................................................................................................................... 13 \n3.2. PORTEE DE LA QUALIFICATION ........................................................................................................................ 13 \n3.3. AVERTISSEMENTS ........................................................................................................................................ 13 \n3.3.1. Risques liés à l’absence de qualification ........................................................................................ 13 \n3.3.2. Risques liés à la protection des informations ................................................................................. 13 \n4. NIVEAU DE SECURITE ................................................................................................................................ 14 \n5. POLITIQUES DE SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION ET GESTION DU RISQUE .................................................... 15 \n5.1. PRINCIPES .................................................................................................................................................. 15 \n5.2. POLITIQUE DE SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION ...................................................................................................... 15 \n5.3. APPRECIATION DES RISQUES ........................................................................................................................... 15 \n6. ORGANISATION DE LA SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION ............................................................................... 17 \n6.1. FONCTIONS ET RESPONSABILITES LIEES A LA SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION ............................................................... 17 \n6.2. SEPARATION DES TACHES............................................................................................................................... 17 \n6.3. RELATIONS AVEC LES AUTORITES ..................................................................................................................... 17 \n6.4. RELATIONS AVEC LES GROUPES DE TRAVAIL SPECIALISES ....................................................................................... 17 \n6.5. LA SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION DANS LA GESTION DE PROJET .............................................................................. 18 \n7. SECURITE DES RESSOURCES HUMAINES .................................................................................................... 19 \n7.1. SELECTION DES CANDIDATS ............................................................................................................................ 19 \n7.2. CONDITIONS D’EMBAUCHE ........................................................................................................................... 19 \n7.3. SENSIBILISATION, APPRENTISSAGE ET FORMATIONS A LA SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION ............................................... 19 \n7.4. PROCESSUS DISCIPLINAIRE ............................................................................................................................. 20 \n7.5. RUPTURE, TERME OU MODIFICATION DU CONTRAT DE TRAVAIL ............................................................................. 20 \n8. GESTION DES ACTIFS ................................................................................................................................. 21 \n8.1.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-346b4170b390", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 1469 }, { "chunk_id": "7e314708eed54c798ec07775dcfccfc9", "text": "INVENTAIRE ET PROPRIETE DES ACTIFS .............................................................................................................. 21 \n8.2. RESTITUTION DES ACTIFS ............................................................................................................................... 21\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 4/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-346b4170b390", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 116 }, { "chunk_id": "a21cf17276d46b905d54cebbf3dcc63d", "text": "8.3. IDENTIFICATION DES BESOINS DE SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION ............................................................................. 21 \n8.4. MARQUAGE ET MANIPULATION DE L’INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 21 \n8.5. GESTION DES SUPPORTS AMOVIBLES ................................................................................................................ 21 \n9. CONTROLE D’ACCES ET GESTION DES IDENTITES ....................................................................................... 22 \n9.1. POLITIQUES ET CONTROLE D’ACCES .................................................................................................................. 22 \n9.2. ENREGISTREMENT ET DESINSCRIPTION DES UTILISATEURS ..................................................................................... 22 \n9.3. GESTION DES DROITS D’ACCES ........................................................................................................................ 22 \n9.4. REVUE DES DROITS D’ACCES UTILISATEURS ........................................................................................................ 23 \n9.5. GESTION DES AUTHENTIFICATIONS DES UTILISATEURS .......................................................................................... 23 \n9.6. ACCES AUX INTERFACES D’ADMINISTRATION ...................................................................................................... 23 \n9.7. RESTRICTION DES ACCES A L’INFORMATION ....................................................................................................... 24 \n10. CRYPTOLOGIE ........................................................................................................................................... 26 \n10.1. CHIFFREMENT DES DONNEES STOCKEES ............................................................................................................ 26 \n10.2. CHIFFREMENT DES FLUX ................................................................................................................................ 26 \n10.3. HACHAGE DES MOTS DE PASSE ....................................................................................................................... 26 \n10.4. NON REPUDIATION ...................................................................................................................................... 27 \n10.5. GESTION DES SECRETS................................................................................................................................... 27 \n10.6. RACINES DE CONFIANCE ................................................................................................................................ 27 \n11. SECURITE PHYSIQUE ET ENVIRONNEMENTALE .......................................................................................... 28 \n11.1. PERIMETRES DE SECURITE PHYSIQUE ................................................................................................................ 28 \n11.1.1. Zones publiques ............................................................................................................................. 28 \n11.1.2. Zones privées.................................................................................................................................. 28 \n11.1.3. Zones sensibles ............................................................................................................................... 28 \n11.2. CONTROLE D’ACCES PHYSIQUE ........................................................................................................................ 28 \n11.2.1. Zones privées.................................................................................................................................. 28 \n11.2.2. Zones sensibles ............................................................................................................................... 29 \n11.3. PROTECTION CONTRE LES MENACES EXTERIEURES ET ENVIRONNEMENTALES ............................................................. 29 \n11.4. TRAVAIL DANS LES ZONES PRIVEES ET SENSIBLES ................................................................................................. 30 \n11.5. ZONES DE LIVRAISON ET DE CHARGEMENT ......................................................................................................... 30 \n11.6. SECURITE DU CABLAGE .................................................................................................................................. 30 \n11.7. MAINTENANCE DES MATERIELS ....................................................................................................................... 30 \n11.8. SORTIE DES ACTIFS ....................................................................................................................................... 30 \n11.9. RECYCLAGE SECURISE DU MATERIEL ................................................................................................................. 30 \n11.10. MATERIEL EN ATTENTE D’UTILISATION ......................................................................................................... 31 \n12. SECURITE LIEE A L’EXPLOITATION ............................................................................................................. 32 \n12.1. PROCEDURES D’EXPLOITATION DOCUMENTEES................................................................................................... 32 \n12.2. GESTION DES CHANGEMENTS ......................................................................................................................... 32 \n12.3. SEPARATION DES ENVIRONNEMENTS DE DEVELOPPEMENT, DE TEST ET D’EXPLOITATION ............................................. 32 \n12.4. MESURES CONTRE LES CODES MALVEILLANTS..................................................................................................... 32 \n12.5.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-346b4170b390", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 1483 }, { "chunk_id": "c1eb9e1ff0ac9b2d33159f21c6b3d4bf", "text": "SAUVEGARDE DES INFORMATIONS ................................................................................................................... 32 \n12.6. JOURNALISATION DES EVENEMENTS ................................................................................................................. 33 \n12.7. PROTECTION DE L’INFORMATION JOURNALISEE .................................................................................................. 33 \n12.8. SYNCHRONISATION DES HORLOGES .................................................................................................................. 34 \n12.9. ANALYSE ET CORRELATION DES EVENEMENTS ..................................................................................................... 34 \n12.10. INSTALLATION DE LOGICIELS SUR DES SYSTEMES EN EXPLOITATION ..................................................................... 34\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 5/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-346b4170b390", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 262 }, { "chunk_id": "6793b15b5ccce0623c15cd809f695f4f", "text": "12.11. GESTION DES VULNERABILITES TECHNIQUES .................................................................................................. 35 \n12.12. ADMINISTRATION .................................................................................................................................... 35 \n12.13. TELEDIAGNOSTIC ET TELEMAINTENANCE DES COMPOSANTS DE L’INFRASTRUCTURE ............................................... 35 \n12.14. SURVEILLANCE DES FLUX SORTANTS DE L’INFRASTRUCTURE .............................................................................. 36 \n13. SECURITE DES COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................................................................... 37 \n13.1. CARTOGRAPHIE DU SYSTEME D'INFORMATION. .................................................................................................. 37 \n13.2. CLOISONNEMENT DES RESEAUX ...................................................................................................................... 37 \n13.3. SURVEILLANCE DES RESEAUX .......................................................................................................................... 38 \n14. ACQUISITION, DEVELOPPEMENT ET MAINTENANCE DES SYSTEMES D’INFORMATION ............................. 39 \n14.1. POLITIQUE DE DEVELOPPEMENT SECURISE ......................................................................................................... 39 \n14.2. PROCEDURES DE CONTROLE DES CHANGEMENTS DE SYSTEME ............................................................................... 39 \n14.3. REVUE TECHNIQUE DES APPLICATIONS APRES CHANGEMENT APPORTE A LA PLATEFORME D’EXPLOITATION ..................... 39 \n14.4. ENVIRONNEMENT DE DEVELOPPEMENT SECURISE ............................................................................................... 39 \n14.5. DEVELOPPEMENT EXTERNALISE ....................................................................................................................... 39 \n14.6. TEST DE LA SECURITE ET CONFORMITE DU SYSTEME ............................................................................................. 39 \n14.7. PROTECTION DES DONNEES DE TEST ................................................................................................................. 40 \n15. RELATIONS AVEC LES TIERS ....................................................................................................................... 41 \n15.1. IDENTIFICATION DES TIERS ............................................................................................................................. 41 \n15.2. LA SECURITE DANS LES ACCORDS CONCLUS AVEC LES TIERS.................................................................................... 41 \n15.3. SURVEILLANCE ET REVUE DES SERVICES DES TIERS ............................................................................................... 41 \n15.4. GESTION DES CHANGEMENTS APPORTES DANS LES SERVICES DES TIERS.................................................................... 41 \n15.5. ENGAGEMENTS DE CONFIDENTIALITE ............................................................................................................... 41 \n16. GESTION DES INCIDENTS LIES A LA SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION ............................................................ 42 \n16.1. RESPONSABILITES ET PROCEDURES .................................................................................................................. 42 \n16.2. SIGNALEMENTS LIES A LA SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION ....................................................................................... 42 \n16.3. APPRECIATION DES EVENEMENTS LIES A LA SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION ET PRISE DE DECISION ................................... 42 \n16.4. REPONSE AUX INCIDENTS LIES A LA SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION ........................................................................... 42 \n16.5. TIRER DES ENSEIGNEMENTS DES INCIDENTS LIES A LA SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION ................................................... 43 \n16.6. RECUEIL DE PREUVES .................................................................................................................................... 43 \n17. CONTINUITE D’ACTIVITE ........................................................................................................................... 44 \n17.1. ORGANISATION DE LA CONTINUITE D’ACTIVITE ................................................................................................... 44 \n17.2. MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA CONTINUITE D’ACTIVITE .................................................................................................. 44 \n17.3. VERIFIER, REVOIR ET EVALUER LA CONTINUITE D’ACTIVITE .................................................................................... 44 \n17.4. DISPONIBILITE DES MOYENS DE TRAITEMENT DE L’INFORMATION ........................................................................... 44 \n17.5. SAUVEGARDE DE LA CONFIGURATION DE L’INFRASTRUCTURE TECHNIQUE ................................................................ 44 \n17.6. MISE A DISPOSITION D’UN DISPOSITIF DE SAUVEGARDE DES DONNEES DU COMMANDITAIRE ........................................ 44 \n18. CONFORMITE ............................................................................................................................................ 45 \n18.1. IDENTIFICATION DE LA LEGISLATION ET DES EXIGENCES CONTRACTUELLES APPLICABLES ............................................... 45 \n18.2. REVUE INDEPENDANTE DE LA SECURITE DE L’INFORMATION .................................................................................. 45 \n18.2.1. Revue continue ............................................................................................................................... 45 \n18.2.2. Revue initiale .................................................................................................................................. 46 \n18.2.3.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-346b4170b390", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 1495 }, { "chunk_id": "6250d739d34fd81d836895cff53bdef6", "text": "Revue des changements majeurs ................................................................................................... 46 \n18.3. CONFORMITE AVEC LES POLITIQUES ET LES NORMES DE SECURITE .......................................................................... 46 \n18.4. EXAMEN DE LA CONFORMITE TECHNIQUE .......................................................................................................... 47\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 6/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-346b4170b390", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 145 }, { "chunk_id": "01ff473025bcdb6197840f64408615ea", "text": "19. EXIGENCES SUPPLEMENTAIRES ................................................................................................................. 48 \n19.1. CONVENTION DE SERVICE .............................................................................................................................. 48 \n19.2. LOCALISATION DES DONNEES .......................................................................................................................... 49 \n19.3. REGIONALISATION. ...................................................................................................................................... 49 \n19.4. FIN DE CONTRAT .......................................................................................................................................... 50 \n19.5. PROTECTION DES DONNEES A CARACTERE PERSONNEL ......................................................................................... 50 \n19.6. PROTECTION VIS-A-VIS DU DROIT EXTRA-EUROPEEN ............................................................................................ 50 \nANNEXE 1 REFERENCES DOCUMENTAIRES ........................................................................................................ 52 \nI. CODES, TEXTES LEGISLATIFS ET REGLEMENTAIRES .................................................................................................... 52 \nII. NORMES ET DOCUMENTS TECHNIQUES ................................................................................................................. 52 \nIII. AUTRES REFERENCES DOCUMENTAIRES ................................................................................................................. 53 \nANNEXE 2 RECOMMANDATIONS AUX COMMANDITAIRES ................................................................................ 55\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 7/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-346b4170b390", "chunk_index": 8, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 493 }, { "chunk_id": "15290d1a39cd56dab363095a91a57586", "text": "1.1.1. Contexte\n\nL’informatique en nuage (cloud computing) peut être définie comme un modèle de gestion informatique \npermettant l’accès via un réseau à des ressources informatiques partagées et configurables. Ces ressources \nsont attribuées à la demande et parfois en libre-service. \nLa différence entre un hébergement externe partagé classique et un hébergement de type informatique en \nnuage réside dans le fait que ce dernier se distingue parfois par la mise à disposition de ressources de \nmanière dynamique ou automatique, sans intervention humaine de l’hébergeur. \nLe présent référentiel s’applique aussi bien aux contextes d’hébergements externes classiques qu’aux \ncontextes d’hébergements de type informatique en nuage. \nLes hébergements partagés tendent aujourd’hui à utiliser des plateformes d’informatique en nuage plutôt \nque des plateformes d’hébergement classique : c’est pourquoi le présent référentiel utilisera le terme « \ninformatique en nuage » pour désigner tout type d’hébergement externe partagé. \nLe présent référentiel couvre les services d’informatique en nuage et vise la qualification de prestataires \nproposant de tels services. \nLes prestataires de services d’informatique en nuage fournissent différents services habituellement classés \nen quatre types d’activité : infrastructure en tant que service (IaaS), conteneur en tant que service (CaaS), \nplateforme en tant que service (PaaS) et logiciel en tant que service (SaaS). Ces activités sont détaillées \ndans le chapitre 2. \nL’approche consistant à cont ractualiser spécifiquement la sécurité dans chaque projet d’hébergement \nexterne a montré ses limites : les offres sont le plus souvent intégrées, de sorte qu’une négociation a \nposteriori par chaque commanditaire est peu envisageable ; de plus, il peut s’av érer délicat d’inciter \nchaque commanditaire à procéder à des audits réguliers des services offerts. \nUne approche centralisée, définissant un référentiel favorisant l’émergence de services qualifiés, a été \nretenue : elle permet de traiter la problématique sécurité de manière globale et efficace, les prestataires \ndisposant d’un cadre stable dans lequel s’inscrire pour aller vers la qualification et les usagers pouvant \nfonder leur confiance sur cette qualification. \nLe présent référentiel s’appuie notamm ent s ur la norme internationale [ISO27001] dont il reprend \nd’ailleurs la structure de l’annexe A. Néanmoins, ce référentiel comporte des exigences additionnelles qui \nle différencient du standard existant et n’induisent pas l’équivalence entre les deux ensembles de règles.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-72b7daf1ffad", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "1.1.1. Contexte", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 1.1.1. Contexte", "token_count": 648 }, { "chunk_id": "c9e4166b8326f42902429fa7aadd000c", "text": "1.1.2. Objet du document\n\nCe document constitue le référentiel d’exigences applicables à un prestataire de services d’informatique \nen nuage (SecNumCloud), ci-après dénommé le « prestataire ». \nIl a vocation à permettre la qu alification de cette famille de prestataires selon les modalités décrites au \nchapitre 3. \nIl permet au commanditaire de disposer de garanties sur les compétences du prestataire et de son \npersonnel, sur la qualité de sa prestation et sur la confiance que le commanditaire peut accorder au \nprestataire. \nIl peut également être utilisé, à titre de bonnes pratiques, en dehors de tout contexte réglementaire. \nIl n’exclut ni l’application de la législation et de la réglementation nationale, ni l’application des règ les \ngénérales imposées aux prestataires en leur qualité de professionnels et notamment leur devoir de conseil \nvis-à-vis de leurs commanditaires. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 8/55 \n \nCe référentiel est conçu sans présomption des technologies qui peuvent être utilisées pour implémenter \nles services. En particulier, l’expression « informatique en nuage » utilisée au sein de ce référentiel ne \nsous-entend pas forcément l’utilisation de solutions de virtualisation.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-894e98039512", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "1.1.2. Objet du document", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 1.1.2. Objet du document", "token_count": 335 }, { "chunk_id": "3d0275d517ef9b36cb13d05bf771c332", "text": "1.1.3. Structure du présent document\n\nLe chapitre 1 correspond à l’introduction du présent référentiel. \nLe chapitre 2 décrit les activités visées par le présent référentiel. \nLe chapitre 3 présente les modalités de la qu alification, qui atteste de la conformité des prestataires de \nservices d’informatique en nuage aux exigences qui leur sont applicables. \nLe chapitre 4 présente les niveaux de qualification qui font l’objet de la qualification des prestataires de \nservices d’informatique en nuage. \nLes chapitres 5 à 19 présentent les exigences que les prestataires qualifiés doivent respecter. \nL’Annexe 1 présente les références des textes législatifs, réglementaires, normatifs et autres mentionnés \ndans le présent référentiel. \nL’Annexe 2 présente des recommandations aux commanditaires de prestations de services d’informatique \nen nuage.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-a9ae0b6066f0", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "1.1.3. Structure du présent document", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 1.1.3. Structure du présent document", "token_count": 213 }, { "chunk_id": "d4b6dd4898a357413f03f8da19e65518", "text": "1.2. Identification du document\n\nLe présent référentiel est dénommé « Prestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – \nréférentiel d’exigences ». Il peut être identifié par son nom, numéro de version et sa date de mise à jour.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-f7bd71392a27", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "1.2. Identification du document", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 1.2. Identification du document", "token_count": 60 }, { "chunk_id": "0a5dc473a0d63a44ae2366ffec700d5e", "text": "1.3.1. Acronymes\n\nLes acronymes utilisés dans le présent référentiel sont : \n ANSSI Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information \n CaaS Container as a service \n CNIL Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés \n EBIOS Expression des besoins et identification des objectifs de sécurité \n IaaS Infrastructure as a service \nPaaS Platform as a service \nPASSI Prestataire d’audit de la sécurité des systèmes d’information \n PDIS Prestataire de détection des incidents de sécurité \n PRIS Prestataire de réponse aux incidents de sécurité \n SaaS Software as a service \nSDN Software Defined Network", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-bae90b1ebe06", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "1.3.1. Acronymes", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 1.3.1. Acronymes", "token_count": 156 }, { "chunk_id": "f8664180d82fd93238022064003d5d5d", "text": "1.3.2. Définitions\n\nActions d’administration – Ensemble des actions d’installation, de suppression, de modification et de \nconsultation de la configuration d’un système participant au système d’information du service et \nsusceptibles de modifier le fonctionnement ou la sécurité de celui-ci. \nAudit – processus systématique, indépendant et documenté en vue d'obtenir des preuves et de les évaluer \nde manière objective pour déterminer dans quelle mesure les exigences d’un référentiel sont satisfaites. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 9/55 \n \nBien – tout élément représentant de la valeur pour le service à qualifier. \nChangement majeur - Toute action planifiée par le prestataire et susceptible, par sa nature ou sa portée, \nde compromettre la sécurité du service ( exemple : modification de l’organisation, modification d’une \nprocédure, ajout, modification ou suppression d’un composant de l’infrastructure technique). \nCloud computing (informatique en nuage) – modèle permettant un accès aisé, généralement à la \ndemande, et au travers d’un réseau, à un ensemble de ressources informatiques partagées et configurables. \nCommanditaire – entité faisant appel à un prestataire de services d’informatique en nuage. \nConteneur (Container) - instance d’exécution en espace utilisateur, isolée des autres instances par des \nmécanismes d’abstraction fournis par le noyau d’un système d’exploitation. \nÉtat de l’art - ensemble des bonnes pratiques, des technologies et des documents de référence relatifs à \nla sécurité des systèmes d’information publiquement accessibles, et des informations qui en découlent de \nmanière évidente. Ces documents peuvent être mis en ligne sur Internet par la communauté de la sécurité \ndes systèmes d’information, diffusés par des organismes de référence ou encore d’origine réglementaire. \nHébergement externe partagé - modèle permettant un accès aisé et au travers d’un réseau, à un ensemble \nde ressources informatiques partagées et configurables. \nIncident lié à la sécurité de l’information – un ou plusie urs événement(s) liés à la sécurité de \nl’information, indésirable(s) ou inattendu(s) présentant une probabilité forte de compromettre les \nopérations liées à l’activité de l’organisme ou de menacer la sécurité de l’information. \nInfrastructure technique – ensemble des composants matériels et logiciels nécessaires à la fourniture \nd’un service d’informatique en nuage (IaaS, CaaS, PaaS, SaaS, etc.). \nInterface d’administration – interface logicielle permettant à une entité disposant des privilèges requis \n(un admi nistrateur, un compte de service, un développeur « DevOps », etc.) de réaliser des actions \nd’administration d’un système d’information. \nIntergiciel (Middleware) - logiciel qui se trouve entre un système d’exploitation et les applications qui \ns’exécutent sur celui-ci, afin de faciliter les interactions entre elles. \nMenace – cause potentielle d’un incident indésirable pouvant nuire à un système ou à un organisme. \nMesure de sécurité – mesure qui modifie la vraisemblance ou la gravité d’un risque. Elle comprend la \npolitique, les procédures, les lignes directrices, et les pratiques ou structures organisationnelles, et peut \nêtre de nature administrative, technique, managériale ou juridique. \nPolitique – intentions et orientations d’un organisme telles que formalisées par sa direction. \nPrestataire – organisme proposant un service d’informatique en nuage et visant la qualification. \nPrestataire d’audit de la sécurité des systèmes d’inform ation – organisme réalisant des prestations \nd’audit de la sécurité des systèmes d’information. Il est dit qualifié si un organisme de qualification a \nattesté de sa conformité au Référentiel d’exigences des prestataires d’audit de la sécurité des systèmes \nd’information. \nRessources virtualisées – abstraction des ressources matérielles d’un système (CPU, RAM, etc.) qui sont \nmises à disposition par l’infrastructure technique. \nRisque – effet de l’incertitude sur l’atteinte des objectifs. Il est exprimé en term es de combinaison des \nconséquences d’un événement et de sa vraisemblance. \nSécurité d’un système d’information – ensemble des moyens techniques et non -techniques de \nprotection permettant à un système d’information d’assurer la disponibilité, l’intégrité et la confidentialité \ndes données, traitées ou transmises, et des services connexes que ces systèmes offrent ou rendent \naccessibles. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 10/55 \n \nSupervision – surveillance du bon fonctionnement d’un système d’information ou d’un service. Elle \nconcerne la collecte de données (mesures, alarmes, etc.) mais elle ne permet pas d’agir sur l’élément \nsurveillé (ce qui relève des tâches d’administration). \nSupport (technique) – ensemble des actions de diagnostic ayant pour finalité la résolution des problèmes \nrencontrés par les commanditaires. Par défaut, aucun accès aux données des commanditaires n’est autorisé \ndans le cadre de ces tâc hes. Si la résolution du problème nécessite une action de la part du prestataire, \ncette dernière relève dès lors de l’administration et doit être effectuée dans les conditions idoines. \nSystème d’information – ensemble organisé de ressources (matériels, logiciels, personnels, données et \nprocédures) permettant de traiter et de diffuser de l’information. \nVulnérabilité – faiblesse d’un bien ou d’une mesure pouvant être exploitée par une menace ou un groupe \nde menaces.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-df95043f2f3c", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "1.3.2. Définitions", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 1.3.2. Définitions", "token_count": 1423 }, { "chunk_id": "ee7902ccd23c45964c1ea0286d6ff00d", "text": "1.3.3. Rôles\n\nAdministrateur – utilisateur disp osant de droits privilégiés lui permettant de réaliser les tâches \nd’administration qui lui sont attribuées. \nAdministrateur d’infrastructure – administrateur en charge de la gestion et du maintien en conditions \nopérationnelles et en condition de sécurité de l’infrastructure technique du service. \nUtilisateur – Toute personne disposant d’un compte dans le périmètre du service. Ce terme générique \nenglobe les utilisateurs finaux et les administrateurs. \nUtilisateur final – personne jouissant in fine du service mis en œuvre. Il peut s’agir du personnel du \ncommanditaire dans le cas d’un service interne, ou de ses propres commanditaires dans le cas d’un service \nproposé à l’extérieur. \n \nLe rôle d’administrateur d’infrastructure est toujours sous la responsabilité du prestataire. \n \nSelon le mode de partage des responsabilités entre le prestataire et le commanditaire décrit dans la \nconvention de service, des rôles d’administrateur de sécurité, d’administrateur système, d’administrateur \nréseau... peuvent se trouver sous la responsabilité du prestataire ou celle du commanditaire. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 11/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-5e7b306bd9d7", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "1.3.3. Rôles", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 1.3.3. Rôles", "token_count": 326 }, { "chunk_id": "66f9e41866dec9fc7971acc00eaa0b63", "text": "2. Activités visées par le référentiel\n\nCe chapitre présente les différentes activités traitées dans le référentiel.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-10c5992a6012", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "2. Activités visées par le référentiel", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 2. Activités visées par le référentiel", "token_count": 29 }, { "chunk_id": "205d7b63d32034e7e98c76d0ce0a8203", "text": "2.1. Fourniture de services SaaS\n\nCe service concerne la mise à disposition par le prestataire d’applications hébergées sur une plateforme \nd’informatique en nuage. Le commanditaire n’a pas la maîtrise de la plateforme en nuage sous-jacente. \nLe prestataire gère de façon transparente pour le commanditaire l’ensemble des aspects techniques \nrequérant des compétences informatiques. Le commanditaire garde la possibilité d’effectuer quelques \nparamétrages métier dans l’application. \nExemples : « CRM », outils collaboratifs, messagerie, Business Intelligence, « ERP », etc.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-992c5711104f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "2.1. Fourniture de services SaaS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 2.1. Fourniture de services SaaS", "token_count": 143 }, { "chunk_id": "c8cb77f639a6c56beb6c862f286d9876", "text": "2.2. Fourniture de services PaaS\n\nCe service concerne la mise à disposition par le prestataire de plateformes d’hébergement d’applications. \nLe commanditaire n’a pas la maîtrise de l’infrastructure technique sous-jacente, gérée et contrôlée par le \nprestataire (réseau, serveurs, OS, stockage, etc.). Le commanditaire a cependant la maîtrise des \napplications déployées sur cette plateforme. Il peut aussi avoir la maîtrise de certains services composant \ncette plateforme ou de certains éléments de configuration suivant la répartition des rôles définie dans le \nservice. \nExemple : framework de type Apache, Tomcat, PHP et MySQL permettant de développer des applications \nweb.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-07711bffacfa", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "2.2. Fourniture de services PaaS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 2.2. Fourniture de services PaaS", "token_count": 169 }, { "chunk_id": "dae1e63f67efd835b738ba3018194ff6", "text": "2.3. Fourniture de services CaaS\n\nCe service concerne la mise à disposition d’ outils permettant le déploiement et l’orchestration de \nconteneurs. Le commanditaire n’a pas la maîtrise de l’infrastructure technique sous -jacente (réseau, \nstockage, serveurs, système d’exploit ation), gérée et contrôlée par le prestataire. Le commanditaire a \ncependant la maîtrise des outils systèmes, bibliothèques, intergiciels, et du code de l’application.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-fe50244bb4ca", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "2.3. Fourniture de services CaaS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 2.3. Fourniture de services CaaS", "token_count": 110 }, { "chunk_id": "71fd86f957547220f755f55f60511d91", "text": "2.4. Fourniture de services IaaS\n\nCe service concerne la mise à disposition de ressources infor matiques abstraites (puissance CPU, \nmémoire, stockage etc.). Le modèle IaaS permet au commanditaire de disposer de ressources \nexternalisées, potentiellement virtualisées. Ce dernier garde le contrôle sur le système d’exploitation (OS), \nle stockage, les applications déployées ainsi que sur certains composants réseau (pare-feu, par exemple). \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 12/55 \n \nStockage\nRéseau\nMachines \nphysiques\nCouche \nd abstraction\nRessources \nvirtualisées\nSystèmes \nd exploitation\nIntergiciels et \nautres logiciels de \nbase\nApplications\nDonnées\nParamétrages \nmétiers\nUtilisation métier\nStockage\nRéseau\nMachines \nphysiques\nCouche \nd abstraction\nRessources \nvirtualisées\nSystèmes \nd exploitation\nIntergiciels et \nautres logiciels de \nbase\nApplications\nDonnées\nParamétrages \nmétiers\nUtilisation métier\nStockage\nRéseau\nMachines \nphysiques\nCouche \nd abstraction\nRessources \nvirtualisées\nSystèmes \nd exploitation\nIntergiciels et \nautres logiciels \nde base\nApplications\nDonnées\nParamétrages \nmétiers\nUtilisation métier\nIaaS PaaS SaaS\nPrestataire objet de la \nqualification Commanditaire\nStockage\nRéseau\nMachines \nphysiques\nCouche \nd abstraction\nRessources \nvirtualisées\nSystèmes \nd exploitation\nIntergiciels et \nautres logiciels de \nbase\nApplications\nDonnées\nParamétrages \nmétiers\nUtilisation métier\nCaaS\n \nFigure 1 – Modèle1 de répartition des responsabilités par type de service \n \n \n \n1 D’autres modèles de répartition existent dépendant de l’implémentation technique et pouvant ne pas mettre en œuvre l’intégralité des briques de service \nidentifiées ici (ex : CaaS Baremetal). \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 13/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3189ce639845", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "2.4. Fourniture de services IaaS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 2.4. Fourniture de services IaaS", "token_count": 492 }, { "chunk_id": "d1324cb027b7b411bf1d65b7d1a7f037", "text": "3.1. Modalités de la qualification\n\nLe référentiel contient les exigences et les recommandations à destination des prestataires de services \nd’informatique en nuage. \nLa qualification d’un prestataire est réalisée conformément au processus de qualification d’un prestataire \nde services de confiance [PROCESS_QUALIF] et permet d’attester de la conformité du prestatair e aux \nexigences du référentiel. \nLes exigences doivent être respectées par les prestataires pour obtenir la qualification. \nLes recommandations sont données à titre de bonnes pratiques et ne font pas l’objet de vérification pour \nobtenir la qualification.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-f886129e1f67", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "3.1. Modalités de la qualification", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 3.1. Modalités de la qualification", "token_count": 156 }, { "chunk_id": "ee2d9cfa63bde88d030bdadddb819f5d", "text": "3.2. Portée de la qualification\n\nPour être qualifié, un prestataire doit répondre à toutes les exigences du présent référentiel sur la portée \nchoisie. La portée est définie par tout ou partie des activités décrites au chapitre 2. \nLes prestataires qualifiés gardent la faculté de réaliser des prestations en dehors du périmètre pour lequel \nils sont qualifiés, mais ne peuvent, dans ce cas, se prévaloir de la qualification sur ces prestations. \nUne prestation de services d’informatique en nuage qualifiée peut être associée à la réalisation d’au tres \nprestations complémentaires (développement, intégration de produits de sécurité, etc.) sans perdre le \nbénéfice de la qualification.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-64746cc3d991", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "3.2. Portée de la qualification", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 3.2. Portée de la qualification", "token_count": 172 }, { "chunk_id": "5e8615e7a92621bb38e15e8cf7470199", "text": "3.3.1. Risques liés à l’absence de qualification\n\nUne prestation de services d’informatique en nuage non quali fiée peut potentiellement augmenter \nl’exposition du commanditaire à certains risques et notamment la fuite d’informations confidentielles, la \ncompromission, la perte ou l’indisponibilité de son système d’information. \nAinsi, dans le cas d’une prestation non qualifiée, il est recommandé au commanditaire d’exiger de la part \nde son prestataire un document listant l’ensemble des exigences de ce référentiel non couvertes dans le \ncadre de sa prestation, afin de connaître les risques auxquels il s’expose.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-2b45a97d1ae3", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "3.3.1. Risques liés à l’absence de qualification", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 3.3.1. Risques liés à l’absence de qualification", "token_count": 154 }, { "chunk_id": "d84fb557fcbe8e517195921e45343607", "text": "3.3.2. Risques liés à la protection des informations\n\nLa conformité au référentiel SecNumCloud ne se substitue pas aux exigences légales ou réglementaires \napplicables à certaines données spécifiques telles que les données de niveau Diffusion Restreinte ou les \ndonnées de santé. \nLes clauses de ce référentiel faisant référence à des produits qualifiés sont applicables dans la mesure où \nces produits existent. \nPar ailleurs, ce référentiel repose sur un objectif de protection des données du commanditaire, mais \nn’apporte pas de garanties techniques fortes contre un accès du prestataire aux données traitées sur le \nsystème d’information du service, uniquement des engagements contractuels. Les commanditaires \nsouhaitant assurer la protection, sur le plan technique, de leurs données contre un accès par le prestataire, \ndevront par conséquent mettre en œuvre des moyens complémentaires de chiffrement, sous leur maîtrise, \nde leurs données. \nEnfin, il est rappelé que la virtualisation généralement utilisée dans les services d’informatique en nuage \nne doit pas être considérée comme un mécanisme de cloisonnement équivalent à une séparation physique. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 14/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-f01af5ab2e1d", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "3.3.2. Risques liés à la protection des informations", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 3.3.2. Risques liés à la protection des informations", "token_count": 330 }, { "chunk_id": "c1fd58627a48af065a7c0f2a1acee6e7", "text": "4. Niveau de sécurité\n\nLe respect des exigences du référentiel SecNumCloud a pour objectif l’atteinte d’un niveau de sécurité \npermettant le stock age et le traitement de données pour lesquelles un incident de sécurité aurait une \nconséquence significative pour le commanditaire. Il assure notamment le respect des bonnes pratiques de \nsécurité relevant de l’hygiène informatique, telles que décrites dans le guide [HYGIENE] de l’ANSSI. \nLa conformité d’un service d’informatique en nuage à ce référentiel n’atteste pas de sa conformité à la \nPolitique de sécurité des systèmes d’information de l’État [PSSIE]. \nLe recours, par le commanditaire, à un service qualifié SecNumCloud pour l’hébergement de données \nsoumises à des exigences légales ou réglementaires (telles que les données de niveau Diffusion Restreinte, \nles données de santé, etc.) nécessite le respect d’exigences complémentaires, qui doivent être déterminées \ndans le cadre d’une démarche d’homologation comprenant notamment une appréciation des risques (voir \nchapitre 3.3.2). \n \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 15/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-da43821a74af", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "4. Niveau de sécurité", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 4. Niveau de sécurité", "token_count": 302 }, { "chunk_id": "481a9e0f76f1515104ff9184d28ad495", "text": "5.1. Principes\n\na) Le prestataire doit opérer la prestation à l’état de l’art pour le type d’activité retenu : utiliser des \nlogiciels stables bénéficiant d’un suivi des correctifs de sécurité et paramétrés de façon à obtenir \nun niveau de sécurité optimal. \nb) Le prestataire doit appliquer le guide d’hygiène informatique de l’A NSSI [HYGIENE], niveau \nrenforcé, au système d’information du service.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-67de7bfbfcc0", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "5.1. Principes", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 5.1. Principes", "token_count": 100 }, { "chunk_id": "ba24529961d88ce607f57583147cdc69", "text": "5.2. Politique de sécurité de l’information\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une politique de sécurité de l’information \nrelative au service. \nb) La politique de sécurité de l’information doit identifier les engagements du prestataire quant au \nrespect de la législation et réglementation nationale en vigueur selon la nature des informations \nqui pourraient être confiées par le commanditaire au prestataire ; il revient en revanche in fine au \ncommanditaire de s’assurer du respect des contraintes légales et réglementaires applicables aux \ndonnées qu’il confie effectivement au prestataire. \nc) La politique de sécurité de l’information doit notamment couvrir les thèmes abordés aux chapitres \n6 à 19 du présent référentiel. \nd) La direction du prestataire doit approuver formellement la politique de sécurité de l’information. \ne) Le prestataire doit réviser annuellement la politique de sécurité de l’information et à chaque \nchangement majeur pouvant avoir un impact sur le service.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-2493b0a081fd", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "5.2. Politique de sécurité de l’information", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 5.2. Politique de sécurité de l’information", "token_count": 252 }, { "chunk_id": "b7a3af524a7240e3fe6b054c9ad75bdb", "text": "5.3. Appréciation des risques\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter une appréciation des risques couvrant l’ensemble du périmètre du \nservice. \nb) Le prestataire doit réaliser son appréciation de risques en utilisant une méthode documentée \ngarantissant la reproductibilité et comparabilité de la démarche. \nc) Le prestataire doit prendre en compte dans l’appréciation des risques : \n- la gestion d’informations du commanditaire ayant des besoins de sécurité différents ; \n- les risques ayant des impacts sur les droits et libertés des personnes concernées en cas d’accès \nnon autorisé, de modification non désirée et de disparition de données à caractère personnel ; \n- les risques de défaillance des mécanismes de cloisonnement des ressources de l’infrastructure \ntechnique (mémoire, calcul, stockage, réseau) partagées entre les commanditaires ; \n- les risques liés à l’effacement incomplet ou non sécurisé des données stockées sur les espaces \nde mémoire ou de stockage partagés entre commanditaires, en particulier lors des \nréallocations des espaces de mémoire et de stockage ; \n- les risques liés à l’exposition des interfaces d’administration sur un réseau public ; \n- les risques d’atteinte à la confidentialité des données des commanditaires par des tiers \nimpliqués dans la fourniture du service (fournisseurs, sous-traitants, etc.) : \n- les risques liés aux évènements naturels et sinistres physiques ; \n- les risques liés à la séparation des tâches (voir 6.2.a) ; \n- les risques liés aux environnements de développement (voir 14.4.b). \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 16/55 \n \nd) Le prestataire doit lister, dans un document spécifique, les risques résiduels liés à l’existence de \nlois extra -européennes ayant pour objectif la collecte de données ou m étadonnées des \ncommanditaires sans leur consentement préalable. \ne) Le prestataire doit mettre à la disposition du commanditaire, sur demande de celui-ci, les éléments \nd’appréciation des risques liés à la soumission des données du commanditaire au droit d’un état \nnon-membre de l’Union Européenne. \nf) Lorsqu’il existe des exigences légales, réglementaires ou sectorielles spécifiques liées aux types \nd’informations confiées par le commanditaire au prestataire, ce dernier doit les prendre en compte \ndans son appréciation des risques en s’assurant de respecter l’ensemble des exigences du présent \nréférentiel d’une part et de ne pas abaisser le niveau de sécurité établi par le respect des exigences \ndu présent référentiel d’autre part. \ng) La direction du prestataire doit accepter formellement les risques résiduels identifiés dans \nl’appréciation des risques. \nh) Le prestataire doit réviser annuellement l’appréciation des risques et à chaque changement majeur \npouvant avoir un impact sur le service. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 17/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-b0e4abb11c3b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "5.3. Appréciation des risques", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 5.3. Appréciation des risques", "token_count": 765 }, { "chunk_id": "dcbe453a0709c519b17812dba231efe2", "text": "6.1. Fonctions et responsabilités liées à la sécurité de l’information\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une organisation interne de la sécurité po ur \nassurer la définition, la mise en place et le suivi du fonctionnement opérationnel de la sécurité de \nl’information au sein de son organisation. \nb) Le prestataire doit désigner un responsable de la sécurité des systèmes d’information et un \nresponsable de la sécurité physique. \nc) Le prestataire doit définir et attribuer les responsabilités en matière de sécurité de l’information \npour le personnel impliqué dans la fourniture du service. \nd) Le prestataire doit s’assurer après tout changement majeur pouvant avoir un impact sur le service \nque l’attribution des responsabilités en matière de sécurité de l’information est toujours \npertinente. \ne) Le prestataire doit définir et attribuer les responsabilités en matière de protection de données à \ncaractère personnel, en cohér ence avec son rôle dans les traitements de données à caractère \npersonnel (responsable de traitement, sous-traitant ou co-responsable). \nf) Le prestataire doit, lorsqu’il traite un grand nombre de données parmi lesquelles figurent des \ncatégories particulières de données à caractère pers onnel telles que définies dans [RGPD], \ndésigner un délégué à la protection des données. \ng) Il est recommandé que le prestataire, quel que soit le volume de données à caractère personnel \nqu’il traite, désigne un délégué à la protection des données. \nh) Le prestataire doit réaliser ou contribuer à la réalisation d’une analyse d’impact relative à la \nprotection des données à caractère personnel lorsque le traitement est susceptible d’engendrer un \nrisque élevé pour l es droits et libertés des personnes concernées (traitement de catégories \nparticulières de données à caractère personnel telles que définies dans [RGPD], traitement de \ndonnées à grande échelle, etc.). Cette analyse doit comporter une évaluation juridique du respect \ndes principes et droits fondamentaux, ainsi qu’une étude plus technique des mesures techniques \nmises en œuvre pour protéger les personnes des risques pour leur vie privée.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-16bf5cc3d5c7", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "6.1. Fonctions et responsabilités liées à la sécurité de l’information", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 6.1. Fonctions et responsabilités liées à la sécurité de l’information", "token_count": 541 }, { "chunk_id": "3c8d9b3309fe1980b356ee134608d852", "text": "6.2. Séparation des tâches\n\na) Le prestataire doit identifier les risques associés à des cumuls de responsabilités ou de tâches, \nles prendre en compte dans l’appréciation des risques et mettre en œuvre des mesures de \nréduction de ces risques.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-754a06ceecd2", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "6.2. Séparation des tâches", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 6.2. Séparation des tâches", "token_count": 61 }, { "chunk_id": "16c2329adae6386be55cbf3ef67f853e", "text": "6.3. Relations avec les autorités\n\na) Il est recommandé que le prestataire mette en place des relations appropriées avec les autorités \ncompétentes en matière de sécurité de l’information et de données à caractère personnel et, le cas \néchéant, avec les aut orités sectorielles selon la nature des informations confiées par le \ncommanditaire au prestataire.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-e0aa017dfbc2", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "6.3. Relations avec les autorités", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 6.3. Relations avec les autorités", "token_count": 89 }, { "chunk_id": "3628d387455003fd347c80a403ac31cc", "text": "6.4. Relations avec les groupes de travail spécialisés\n\na) Il est recommandé que le prestataire entretienne des contacts appropriés avec des groupes de \nspécialistes ou des sources reconnues, notamment pour prendre en compte de nouvelles menaces \net les mesures de sécurité appropriées pour les contrer. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 18/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-7cbee5d11d4a", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "6.4. Relations avec les groupes de travail spécialisés", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 6.4. Relations avec les groupes de travail spécialisés", "token_count": 116 }, { "chunk_id": "f09ee0eaf550a4669460621f5b95d1de", "text": "6.5. La sécurité de l’information dans la gestion de projet\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter une estimation des risques préal ablement à tout projet pouvant \navoir un impact sur le service, et ce quelle que soit la nature du projet. \nb) Dans la mesure où un projet affecte ou est susceptible d’affecter le niveau de sécurité du service, \nle prestataire doit avertir le commanditaire et l’ informer par écrit des impacts potentiels, des \nmesures mises en place pour réduire ces impacts ainsi que des risques résiduels le concernant. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 19/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-7234a6b6ac66", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "6.5. La sécurité de l’information dans la gestion de projet", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 6.5. La sécurité de l’information dans la gestion de projet", "token_count": 173 }, { "chunk_id": "8a9898d71136307fb659d07f145728da", "text": "7.1. Sélection des candidats\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure de vérification des informations \nconcernant son personnel conforme aux lois et règlements en vigueur. \nCes vérifications s’appliquent à toute personne impliquée dans la fourniture du service et doivent \nêtre proportionnelles à la sensibilité ou à la s pécificité des informations du commanditaire \nconfiées au prestataire ainsi qu’aux risques identifiés. \nb) Pour les personnels disposant de privilèges d’administration élevés sur les composants logiciels \net matériels de l’infrastructure, l e prestataire doit ren forcer les vérifications destinées à vérifier \nque les antécédents de ceux-ci ne sont pas incompatibles avec l’exercice de leurs fonctions. I \nIl est entendu par des privilèges d’administration élevés, des actions permettant l’élévation de \nprivilèges ou la possibilité de réaliser des actions sans traces techniques ou de désactiver, altérer \nles traces techniques.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-daf0bcd01b11", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "7.1. Sélection des candidats", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 7.1. Sélection des candidats", "token_count": 245 }, { "chunk_id": "36d58cfabe3b3363b9357a9c255f5e69", "text": "7.2. Conditions d’embauche\n\na) Le prestataire doit disposer d’une charte d’éthique intégrée au règlement intérieur, prévoyant \nnotamment que : \n- les prestations sont réalisées avec loyauté, discrétion et impartialité et dans des conditions de \nconfidentialité des informations traitées ; \n- les personnels ne recourent qu’aux méthodes, outils et techniques validés par le prestataire ; \n- les personnels s’engagent à ne pas divulguer d’informations à un tiers, même anonymisées et \ndécontextualisées, obtenues ou générées dans le cadre de la prestation sauf autorisation \nformelle et écrite du commanditaire ; \n- les personnels s’engagent à signaler au prestataire tout c ontenu manifestement illicite \ndécouvert pendant la prestation ; \n- les personnels s’engagent à respecter la législation et la réglementation nationale en vigueur \net les bonnes pratiques liées à leurs activités. \nb) Le prestataire doit faire signer la charte d’éthique à l’ensemble des personnes impliquées dans la \nfourniture du service. \nc) Le prestataire doit introduire, dans le contrat de travail des personnels disposant de privilèges \nd’administration élevés sur les comp osants et matériels de l’infrastructure du service, un \nengagement de responsabilité avec un renvoi aux clauses du code du travail sur la protection du \nsecret des affaires et de la propriété intellectuelle. Il est entendu par des privilèges \nd’administration élevés, des actions permettant l’élévation de privilèges ou la possibilité de \nréaliser des actions sans traces techniques ou de désactiver, altérer les traces techniques. \nd) Le prestataire doit, sur demande d’un commanditaire, lui rendre accessible le règlement intérieur \net la charte d’éthique.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-0369a1c67549", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "7.2. Conditions d’embauche", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 7.2. Conditions d’embauche", "token_count": 427 }, { "chunk_id": "a48fa104e6e2157b6ae294ae823010dc", "text": "7.3. Sensibilisation, apprentissage et formations à la sécurité de\n\nl’information \na) Le prestataire doit sensibiliser à la sécurité de l’information et aux risques liés à la protection des \ndonnées l’ensemble des personne s impliquées dans la fourniture du service. Il doit leur \ncommuniquer les mises à jour des politiques et procédures pertinentes dans le cadre de leurs \nmissions. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 20/55 \n \nb) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre un plan de formation concernant la sécurité de \nl’information adapté au service et aux missions des personnels. \nc) Le responsable de la sécurité des systèmes d’information du prestataire doit valider formellement \nle plan de formation concernant la sécurité de l’information.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-835f578c6475", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "7.3. Sensibilisation, apprentissage et formations à la sécurité de", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 7.3. Sensibilisation, apprentissage et formations à la sécurité de", "token_count": 220 }, { "chunk_id": "f8c71e4df4f2e809a483609aeecb016a", "text": "7.4. Processus disciplinaire\n\na) Le p restataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre un processus disciplinaire applicable à \nl’ensemble des personnes impliquées dans la fourniture du service ayant enfreint la politique de \nsécurité. \nb) Le prestataire doit, sur demande d’un commanditaire, lui rendre accessible les sanctions \nencourues en cas d’infraction à la politique de sécurité.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-4660bfc8cba6", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "7.4. Processus disciplinaire", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 7.4. Processus disciplinaire", "token_count": 96 }, { "chunk_id": "50c534b5d5e6008dcec9c42236a3d5cd", "text": "7.5. Rupture, terme ou modification du contrat de travail\n\na) Le prestataire doit définir et attribuer les rôles et les responsabilités relatives à la rupture, au terme \nou à la modification de tout contrat avec une personne impliquée dans la fourniture du service. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 21/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-73860334e5c8", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "7.5. Rupture, terme ou modification du contrat de travail", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 7.5. Rupture, terme ou modification du contrat de travail", "token_count": 106 }, { "chunk_id": "01090ae58ef1e0df4de373638f11b483", "text": "8.1. Inventaire et propriété des actifs\n\na) Le prestataire doit tenir à jour l’inventaire de l’ensemble des équipements mettant en œuvre le \nservice. Cet inventaire doit préciser pour chaque équipement : \n- les informations d’identification de l’équipement (noms, adresses IP, adresses MAC, etc.) ; \n- la fonction de l’équipement ; \n- le modèle de l’équipement ; \n- la localisation de l’équipement ; \n- le propriétaire de l’équipement ; \n- le besoin de sécurité des informations (au sens du chapitre 8.3). \nb) Le prestataire doit tenir à jour l’inventaire de l’ensemble des logiciels mettant en œuvre le service. \nCet inventaire doit identifier pour chaque logiciel, sa version et les équipements sur lesquels le \nlogiciel est installé. \nc) Le prestataire doit s’assurer de la validité des licences des logiciels tout au long de la prestation.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-8fd6068ab4c5", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "8.1. Inventaire et propriété des actifs", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 8.1. Inventaire et propriété des actifs", "token_count": 210 }, { "chunk_id": "e65e07cc03e5509abe8230a3603f58bd", "text": "8.2. Restitution des actifs\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure de restitution des actifs \npermettant de s’assurer que chaque personne impliquée dans la fourniture du service restitue \nl’ensemble des actifs en sa possession à la fin de sa période d’emploi ou de son contrat.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-5737f59464ef", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "8.2. Restitution des actifs", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 8.2. Restitution des actifs", "token_count": 76 }, { "chunk_id": "d3df46d393877983e387e4fa2e56f0c0", "text": "8.3. Identification des besoins de sécurité de l’information\n\na) Le prestataire doit identifier les différents besoins de sécurité des informations relatives au \nservice. \nb) Lorsque le commanditaire confie au prestataire des données soumises à des co ntraintes légales, \nréglementaires ou sectorielles spécifiques, le prestataire doit identifier les besoins de sécurité \nspécifiques associés à ces contraintes.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-abc3828d631b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "8.3. Identification des besoins de sécurité de l’information", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 8.3. Identification des besoins de sécurité de l’information", "token_count": 102 }, { "chunk_id": "118220433646bc9631f9fafe1cadfc63", "text": "8.4. Marquage et manipulation de l’information\n\na) Il est recommandé que le prestataire documente et mett e en œuvre une procédure pour le \nmarquage et la manipulation de toutes les informations participant à la délivrance du service, \nconformément à son besoin de sécurité défini au chapitre 8.3.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-204037f3f5ea", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "8.4. Marquage et manipulation de l’information", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 8.4. Marquage et manipulation de l’information", "token_count": 74 }, { "chunk_id": "ce5a3b12815ce66f4001fbbcef569ece", "text": "8.5. Gestion des supports amovibles\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure pour la gestion des supports \namovibles, conformément au besoin de sécurité défini au chapitre 8.3. \nLorsque des supports amovibles sont utilisés sur l’infrastructure technique ou pour des tâches \nd’administration, ces supports doivent être dédiés à un usage. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 22/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-6859b68ca2cc", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "8.5. Gestion des supports amovibles", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 8.5. Gestion des supports amovibles", "token_count": 131 }, { "chunk_id": "5f73a8fec410671a3b13d64a81115c98", "text": "9. Contrôle d’accès et gestion des identités\n\nSauf mention explicite, ce chapitre concerne le contrôle d’accès et la gestion des identités des utilisateurs : \n- placés sous la responsabilité du prestataire (ses employés et éventuellement des tiers \nparticipant à la fourniture du service) ; \n- placés sous la responsabilité du commanditaire, mais pour lesquels le prestataire met en \nœuvre les moyens de contrôle d’accès (en fournissant notamment au commanditaire une \ninterface de gestion des comptes et des droits d’accès). \nLes utilisateurs pour lesquels le commanditaire met en œuvre les moyens de contrôle d’accès et de gestion \ndes identités sont hors du champ d’application de ce référentiel.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-c577815fd074", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "9. Contrôle d’accès et gestion des identités", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 9. Contrôle d’accès et gestion des identités", "token_count": 174 }, { "chunk_id": "cfbc5060dd5e6d0715f113a2a95ce119", "text": "9.1. Politiques et contrôle d’accès\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une pol itique de contrôle d’accès sur la base \ndu résultat de son appréciation des risques et du partage des responsabilités. \nb) Le prestataire doit réviser annuellement la politique de contrôle d’accès et à chaque changement \nmajeur pouvant avoir un impact sur le service.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-741d3bc7dc33", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "9.1. Politiques et contrôle d’accès", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 9.1. Politiques et contrôle d’accès", "token_count": 91 }, { "chunk_id": "ef6f22b26c07592a90f80aae3cc7fce7", "text": "9.2. Enregistrement et désinscription des utilisateurs\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure d’enregistrement et de \ndésinscription des utilisateurs s’appuyant sur une interface de gestion des comptes et des droits \nd’accès. Cette procédure doit indiquer quelles données doivent être supprimées au départ d’un \nutilisateur. \nb) Le prestataire doit attribuer des comptes nominatifs lors de l’enregistrement des utilisateurs placés \nsous sa responsabilité. \nc) Le prestataire doit mettre en œuvre des moyens permettant de s’assurer que la désinscription d’un \nutilisateur entraîne la suppression de tous ses accès aux ressources du système d’information du \nservice, ainsi que la suppression de ses données conformément à la procédure d’enregistrement \net de désinscription (voir exigence 9.2 a)).", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-7e11e84df820", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "9.2. Enregistrement et désinscription des utilisateurs", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 9.2. Enregistrement et désinscription des utilisateurs", "token_count": 206 }, { "chunk_id": "d3eb71681f5995fea828dbe1b0c97bc2", "text": "9.3. Gestion des droits d’accès\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure permettant d’assurer \nl’attribution, la modification et le retrait de droits d’accès aux ressources du système \nd’information du service. \nb) Le prestataire doit mettre à la disposition de ses command itaires les outils et les moyens qui \npermettent une différenciation des rôles des utilisateurs du service, par exemple suivant leur rôle \nfonctionnel. \nc) Le prestataire doit tenir à jour l’inventaire des utilisateurs sous sa responsabilité disposant de \ndroits d’administration sur les ressources du système d’information du service. \nd) Le prestataire doit être en mesure de fournir, pour une ressource donnée mettant en œuvre le \nservice, la liste de tous les utilisateurs y ayant accès, qu’ils soient sous la responsabi lité du \nprestataire ou du commanditaire ainsi que les droits d’accès qui leurs ont été attribués. \ne) Le prestataire doit être en mesure de fournir, pour un utilisateur donné, qu’ils soient sous la \nresponsabilité du prestataire ou du commanditaire, la liste de tous ses droits d’accès sur les \ndifférents éléments du système d’information du service. \nf) Le prestataire doit définir une liste de droits d’accès incompatibles entre eux. Il doit s’assurer, \nlors de l’attribution de droits d’accès à un utilisateur qu’il ne possède pas de droits d’accès \nincompatibles entre eux au titre de la liste précédemment établie. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 23/55 \n \ng) Le prestataire doit inclure dans la procédure de gestion des droits d’accès les actions de révocation \nou de suspension des droits de tout utilisateur.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-0d92903e106d", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "9.3. Gestion des droits d’accès", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 9.3. Gestion des droits d’accès", "token_count": 441 }, { "chunk_id": "c642c275716f596204d88e65fa249553", "text": "9.4. Revue des droits d’accès utilisateurs\n\na) Le prestataire doit réviser annuellement les droits d’accès des utilisateurs sur son périmètre de \nresponsabilité. \nb) Le prestataire doit mettre à disposition du commanditaire un outil facilitant la revue des droits \nd’accès des utilisateurs placés sous la responsabilité de ce dernier. \nc) Le prestataire doit réviser trimestriellement la liste des utilisateurs sur son périmètre de \nresponsabilité pouvant utiliser les comptes techniques mentionnés dans l’exigence 9.2 b).", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-156c7886a7b8", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "9.4. Revue des droits d’accès utilisateurs", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 9.4. Revue des droits d’accès utilisateurs", "token_count": 130 }, { "chunk_id": "28f2755362e7e5a391c058ef02388a13", "text": "9.5. Gestion des authentifications des utilisateurs\n\na) Le prestataire doit formaliser et mettre en œuvre des procédures de gestion de l’authentification \ndes utilisateurs. En accord avec les exigences du chapitre 10, celles-ci doivent notamment porter \nsur : \n- la gestion des moyens d’authentification (émission et réinitialisation de mot de passe, mise à \njour des CRL et import des certificats racines en cas d’utilisation de certificats, etc.). \n- la mise en place des moyens perme ttant une authentification à multiples facteurs afin de \nrépondre aux différents cas d’usage du référentiel. \n- les systèmes qui génèrent des mots de passe ou vérifient leur robustesse, lorsqu’une \nauthentification par mot de passe est utilisée. Ils doivent sui vre les recommandations de \n[G_AUTH]. \nb) Tout mécanisme d’authentification doit prévoir le blocage d’un compte après un nombre limité \nde tentatives infructueuses. \nc) Dans le cadre d’un service SaaS, le prestataire doit proposer à ses commanditaires des moyens \nd’authentification à multiples facteurs pour l’accès des utilisateurs finaux. \nd) Lorsque des comptes techniques, non nominatifs, sont nécessaires, le prestataire doit mettre en \nplace des mesures obligeant les utilisateurs à s’authentifier avec leur compte nominatif avant de \npouvoir accéder à ces comptes techniques.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-b6738a217c1b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "9.5. Gestion des authentifications des utilisateurs", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 9.5. Gestion des authentifications des utilisateurs", "token_count": 333 }, { "chunk_id": "db5f794913933d4c125f91ec84e71330", "text": "9.6. Accès aux interfaces d’administration\n\na) Les comptes d’administration sous la responsabilité du prestataire doivent être gérés à l’aide \nd’outils et d’annuaires distincts de ce ux utilisés pour la gestion des comptes utilisateurs placés \nsous la responsabilité du commanditaire. \nb) Les interfaces d’administration mises à disposition des commanditaires doivent être distinctes des \ninterfaces d’administration utilisées par le prestataire. \nc) Les interfaces d’administration mises à disposition des commanditaires ne doivent permettre \naucune connexion avec des comptes d’administrateurs sous la responsabilité du prestataire. \nd) Les interfaces d’administration utilisées par le prestataire ne doivent pas être accessibles à partir \nd’un réseau public et ainsi ne doivent permettre aucune connexion des utilisateurs sous la \nresponsabilité du commanditaire. \ne) Si des interfaces d’administration sont mises à disposition des commanditaires avec un accès via \nun réseau public, les flux d’administration doivent être authentifiés et chiffrés avec des moyens \nen accord avec les exigences du chapitre 10.2. \nf) Le prestataire doit mettre en place un système d’authentification multifacteur fort pour l’accès : \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 24/55 \n \n- aux interfaces d’administration utilisées par le prestataire ; \n- aux interfaces d’administration dédiées aux commanditaires. \ng) Dans le cadre d’un service SaaS, les in terfaces d’administration mises à disposition des \ncommanditaires doivent être différenciées des interfaces permettant l’accès des utilisateurs \nfinaux. \nh) Dès lors qu’une interface d’administration est accessible depuis un réseau public, le processus \nd’authentification doit avoir lieu avant toute interaction entre l’utilisateur et l’interface en \nquestion. \ni) Lorsque le prestataire utilise un service de type IaaS comme socle d’un autre type de service \n(CaaS, PaaS ou SaaS), les ressources affectées à l’usage du prestataire ne doivent en aucun cas \nêtre accessibles via l’interface publique mise à disposition des autres commanditaires du service \nIaaS. \nj) Lorsque le prestataire utilise un service de type CaaS comme s ocle d’un autre type de service \n(PaaS ou SaaS), les ressources affectées à l’usage du prestataire ne doivent en aucun cas être \naccessibles via l’interface publique mise à disposition des autres commanditaires du service CaaS. \nk) Lorsque le prestataire utilise un service de type PaaS comme socle d’un autre type de service \n(typiquement SaaS), les ressources affectées à l’usage du prestataire ne doivent en aucun cas être \naccessibles via l’interface publique mise à disposition des autres commanditaires du service PaaS.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-335dcd6197eb", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "9.6. Accès aux interfaces d’administration", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 9.6. Accès aux interfaces d’administration", "token_count": 703 }, { "chunk_id": "c2177556ef2548e7abd6b179175ec31a", "text": "9.7. Restriction des accès à l’information\n\na) Le prestataire doit mettre en œuvre des mesures de cloisonnement appropriées entre ses \ncommanditaires. \nb) Le prestataire doit mettre en œuvre des mesures de cloisonnement appropriées entre le système \nd’information du service et ses autres systèmes d’information (bureautique, informatique de \ngestion, gestion technique du bâtiment, contrôle d’accès physique, etc.). \nc) Le prestataire doit concevoir, développer, configurer et déployer le système d’information du \nservice en assurant au moins un cloisonnement entre d’une part l’infrastructure technique et \nd’autre part les équipements nécessaires à l’administration des services et des ressources qu’elle \nhéberge. \nd) Dans le cadre du support technique, si les actions nécessaires au diagnostic et à la résolution d’un \nproblème rencontré par un commanditaire nécessitent un accès aux données du commanditaire, \nalors le prestataire doit : \n- n’autoriser l’accès aux données du commanditaire qu’après consentement explicite du \ncommanditaire ; \n- vérifier que la personne à qui l’accès doit être autorisé a satisfait aux vérifications de \nl’exigence 7.1.b ; \n- dans le cas d'une intervention réalisée à distance par une personne localisée hors de l’Union \nEuropéenne, mettre en œuvre une passerelle sécurisée (poste de rebond) par laquelle la \npersonne devra se connecter et permettant une supervision (autorisation ou interdiction des \nactions, demandes d’explications, etc..) en temps réel, par une personne ayant elle -même \nsatisfait aux vérifications de l’exigence 7.1.b. La passerelle sécurisée devra répondre aux \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 25/55 \n \nobjectifs de sécurité 2 spécifiés dans [G_EXT] adaptés au contexte des actions du support \ntechnique ; \n- considérer les actions menées, une fois l’accès autorisé, comme des actions d’administration \net les journaliser comme telles ; \n- supprimer l’autorisation d’accès aux données du commanditaire au terme de ces actions.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-b2b40782a8f3", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "9.7. Restriction des accès à l’information", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 9.7. Restriction des accès à l’information", "token_count": 528 }, { "chunk_id": "d9969fd8acb1a2713f1ddbe668874eab", "text": "2 Objectifs de sécurité de la passerelle sécurisée [G_EXT] :\n\n- Authentifier la machine distante et la personne en charge du support ; \n- Prévenir l’exploitation de vulnérabilités ou de portes dérobées sur le dispositif de télémaintenance ; \n- Garantir la confidentialité et l’intégrité des données sur le SI ; \n- Assurer une traçabilité de confiance des actions effectuées par le technicien du centre de support ; \n- Garantir l’innocuité de la fonction de télémaintenance vis-à-vis du système faisant l’objet du télédiagnostic ainsi que \ndes systèmes connexes ; \n- Garantir l’absence de fuite d’informations vers l’extérieur. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 26/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-b33503161c3c", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "2 Objectifs de sécurité de la passerelle sécurisée [G_EXT] :", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 2 Objectifs de sécurité de la passerelle sécurisée [G_EXT] :", "token_count": 196 }, { "chunk_id": "f9f2282ca6686eeab9219950f5bee0b6", "text": "10.1. Chiffrement des données stockées\n\na) Le prestataire doit définir et mettre en œuvre un mécanisme de chiffrement empêchant la \nrécupération des données des commanditaires en cas de réallocation d’une ressource ou de \nrécupération du support physique. \n- dans le cas d’un service IaaS ou CaaS, cet objectif pourra par exemple être atteint : \n- par un chiffrement du disque ou du système de fichier, lorsque le protocole d’accès \nen mode fichiers garantit que seuls des blocs vides peuvent être alloués (par exemple \nstockage de type NAS dans lequel un bloc physique n’est effectivement affecté qu’au \nmoment de l’écriture), \n- par un chiffrement par volume dans le cas d’un accès en mode bloc (par exemple \nstockage de type SAN ou stockage local), avec au moins une clé par commanditaire ; \n- dans le cas d’un servic e PaaS ou SaaS, cet objectif pourra être atteint en utilisant un \nchiffrement applicatif dans le périmètre du prestataire, avec au moins une clé par \ncommanditaire. \nb) Le prestataire doit utiliser une méthode de chiffrement des données respectant les règles de \n[CRYPTO_B1]. \nc) Il est recommandé d’utiliser une méthode de chiffrement des données respectant les \nrecommandations de [CRYPTO_B1]. \nd) Le prestataire doit mettre en place un chiffrement des données sur le s supports amovibles et les \nsupports de sauvegarde amenés à quitter le périmètre de sécurité physique du système \nd’information du service (au sens du chapitre 10), en fonction du besoin de sécurité des données \n(voir chapitre 8.3).", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-21b3862c81e2", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "10.1. Chiffrement des données stockées", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 10.1. Chiffrement des données stockées", "token_count": 381 }, { "chunk_id": "e8e0f692f516a3374a5a9ce5e43952af", "text": "10.2. Chiffrement des flux\n\na) Lorsque le prestataire met en œuvre un mécanisme de chiffrement des flux réseau, celui -ci doit \nrespecter les règles de [CRYPTO_B1]. \nb) Lorsque le prestataire met en œuvre un mécanisme de chiffrement des flux réseau, il est \nrecommandé que celui-ci respecte les recommandations de [CRYPTO_B1]. \nc) Si le protocole TLS est mis en œuvre, le prestataire doit appliquer les recommandations de \n[NT_TLS]. \nd) Si le protocole IPsec est mis e n œuvre, le prestataire doit appliquer les recommandations de \n[NT_IPSEC]. \ne) Si le protocole SSH est mis en œuvre, le prestataire doit appliquer les recommandations de \n[NT_SSH].", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-a47f0163446a", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "10.2. Chiffrement des flux", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 10.2. Chiffrement des flux", "token_count": 163 }, { "chunk_id": "7fede0d0ee985352c9610f3e15ec17d5", "text": "10.3. Hachage des mots de passe\n\na) Le prestataire ne doit stocker que l’empreinte des mots de passe des utilisateurs et des comptes \ntechniques. \nb) Le prestataire doit mettre en œuvre une fonction de hachage respectant les règles de \n[CRYPTO_B1] \nc) Il est recommandé que le prestataire mette en œuvre une fonction de hachage respectant les \nrecommandations de [CRYPTO_B1]. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 27/55 \n \nd) Le prestataire doit générer les empreintes des mots de passe avec une fonction de hachage \nassociée à l’utilisation d’un sel cryptographique respectant les règles de [CRYPTO_B1].", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-ffda704e8540", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "10.3. Hachage des mots de passe", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 10.3. Hachage des mots de passe", "token_count": 180 }, { "chunk_id": "83e47b973ce9c3092294e38729439bc2", "text": "10.4. Non répudiation\n\na) Lorsque le prestataire met en œuvre un mécanisme de signature électronique, celui -ci doit \nrespecter les règles de [CRYPTO_B1] \nb) Lorsque le prestataire met en œuvre un mécanisme de signature électronique, il est recommandé \nque celui-ci respecte les recommandations de [CRYPTO_B1].", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3509b588fcbc", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "10.4. Non répudiation", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 10.4. Non répudiation", "token_count": 77 }, { "chunk_id": "accd90cb55610ed50aa577d135c567ce", "text": "10.5. Gestion des secrets\n\na) Le prestataire doit mettre en œuvre des clés cryptograp hiques respectant les règles de \n[CRYPTO_B2]. \nb) Il est recommandé que le prestataire mette en œuvre des clés cryptographiques respectant les \nrecommandations de [CRYPTO_B2]. \nc) Le prestataire doit protéger l’accès aux clés cryptographiques et autres secrets utilisés pour le \nchiffrement des données par un moyen adapté : conteneur de sécurité (logiciel ou matériel) ou \nsupport disjoint. \nd) Le prestataire doit protéger l’accès aux clés cryptographiques et autres s ecrets utilisés pour les \ntâches d’administration par un conteneur de sécurité adapté, logiciel ou matériel.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-848113fa3d01", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "10.5. Gestion des secrets", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 10.5. Gestion des secrets", "token_count": 167 }, { "chunk_id": "cc1ee75126149624020c83b6265d4245", "text": "10.6. Racines de confiance\n\na) Sur l’infrastructure technique, le prestataire doit utiliser exclusivement des certificats de clé \npublique issus d’une autorité de certification d’un État membre de l’Union Européenne (les \ncérémonies de génération des clés maîtresses doivent avoir lieu dans un pays membre de l’Union \nEuropéenne et en présence du prestataire). \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 28/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-51f0d268e5be", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "10.6. Racines de confiance", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 10.6. Racines de confiance", "token_count": 130 }, { "chunk_id": "090afef8ffb4fa4331f2cdd8782610f8", "text": "11.1. Périmètres de sécurité physique\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre des périmètres de sécurité, incluant le marquage \ndes zones et les différents moyens de limitation et de contrôle des accès. \nb) Le prestataire doit distinguer des zones publiques, des zones privées et des zones sensibles.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-7d119a87a610", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.1. Périmètres de sécurité physique", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.1. Périmètres de sécurité physique", "token_count": 78 }, { "chunk_id": "2355df7cc90e6bf8c02883f19c8b41e2", "text": "11.1.1. Zones publiques\n\na) Les zones publiques sont accessibles à tous dans les limites de la propriété du prestataire. Le \nprestataire ne doit héberger aucune ressource dévolue au service ou permettant d’accéder à des \ncomposantes de celui-ci dans les zones publiques.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-edafd81a1bc4", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.1.1. Zones publiques", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.1.1. Zones publiques", "token_count": 67 }, { "chunk_id": "65a5f46f2c929c94d67518e48adcefea", "text": "11.1.2. Zones privées\n\na) Les zones privées peuvent héberger : \n- les plateformes et moyens de développement du service ; \n- les postes d’administration, d’exploitation et de supervision ; \n- les locaux à partir desquels le prestataire opère.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-cd33f035bc69", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.1.2. Zones privées", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.1.2. Zones privées", "token_count": 60 }, { "chunk_id": "2f56d602aedb6f7b097f9537644b0f72", "text": "11.1.3. Zones sensibles\n\na) Les zones sensibles sont réservées à l’hébergement du système d’information de production du \nservice hors postes d’administration, d’exploitation et de supervision.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-6c1bde37bd98", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.1.3. Zones sensibles", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.1.3. Zones sensibles", "token_count": 48 }, { "chunk_id": "01cfe3fd5a83dce5d3d0a2ca20f629ba", "text": "11.2.1. Zones privées\n\na) Le prestataire doit protéger les zones privées contre les accès non autorisés. Pour ce faire, il doit \nmettre en œuvre un contrôle d’accès physique reposant au moins sur un facteur personnel : la \nconnaissance d’un secret, la détention d’un objet ou la biométrie. \nb) Il est recommandé que le prestataire respecte les recommandations de [G_CVAP] pour mettre en \nœuvre du contrôle d’accès physique. \nc) Le prestataire doit définir et documenter des mesures d’accès physique dérogatoires en cas \nd’urgence. \nd) Le prestataire doit afficher à l’ entrée des zones privées un avertissement relatif aux limites et \nconditions d’accès à ces zones. \ne) Le prestataire doit définir et documenter les plages horaires et conditions d’accès aux zones \nprivées en fonction des profils des intervenants. \nf) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre les moyens permettant de s’assurer que les \nvisiteurs sont systématiquement accompagnés par le prestataire lors de leurs accès et séjours en \nzone privée. Le prestataire doit conserver une trace de l’identité des visiteurs conformément à la \nlégislation et réglementation en vigueur. \ng) En cas d’intervention (actions de diagnostic, de maintenance, ou d’administration) en zone privée \npar un tiers visiteur, le prestataire doit faire superviser (suivre, autoriser, interdire, questionner) \nles actions par un personnel ayant satisfait aux vérifications de l’exigence 7.1.b . \nh) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre des mécanismes de surveillance et de détection \ndes accès non autorisés aux zones privées. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 29/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-b7f32a455d03", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.2.1. Zones privées", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.2.1. Zones privées", "token_count": 438 }, { "chunk_id": "0f643d9838764d3e934bf7d2fdbbcef3", "text": "11.2.2. Zones sensibles\n\na) Le prestataire doit protéger les zones sensibles contre les accès non autorisés. Pour ce faire, il doit \nmettre en œuvre un contrôle d’accès physique reposant au moins sur deux facteurs personnels : \nla connaissance d’un secret, la détention d’un objet ou la biométrie. \nb) Il est recommandé que le prestataire respecte les recommandations de [G_CVAP] pour la mise \nen œuvre du contrôle d’accès physique. \nc) Le prestataire doit définir et documenter des mesures d’accès physique dérogatoires en cas \nd’urgence. \nd) Le prestataire doit afficher à l’entrée des zones sensibles un avertissement relatif aux limites et \nconditions d’accès à ces zones. \ne) Le prestataire doit définir et documenter les plages horaires et conditions d’accès aux zones \nsensibles en fonction des profils des intervenants. \nf) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre les moyens permettant de s’assurer que les \nvisiteurs sont systématiquement accompagnés par le prestataire lors de leurs accè s et séjours en \nzone sensible. Le prestataire doit conserver une trace de l’identité des visiteurs conformément à \nla législation et réglementation en vigueur. \ng) En cas d’intervention (actions de diagnostic, de maintenance , ou d’administration) en zone \nsensible par un tiers visiteur, le prestataire doit faire superviser (suivre, autoriser, interdire, \nquestionner) les actions par un personnel ayant satisfait aux vérifications aux vérifications de \nl’exigence 7.1.b . \nh) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre des mécanismes de surveillance et de détection \ndes accès non autorisés aux zones sensibles. \ni) Le prestataire doit mettre en place une journalisation des accès physiques aux zones sensibles. Il \ndoit effectuer une revue de ces journaux au moins mensuellement. \nj) Le prestataire doit mettre en œuvre les moyens garantissant qu’aucun accès direct n’existe entre \nune zone publique et une zone sensible.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-1dc60e71e95e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.2.2. Zones sensibles", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.2.2. Zones sensibles", "token_count": 486 }, { "chunk_id": "cd378a2a25a70aeba12524d1faffaceb", "text": "11.3. Protection contre les menaces extérieures et environnementales\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre les moyens permettant de minimiser les risques \ninhérents aux sinistres physiques (incendie, dégât des eaux, etc.) et naturels (risques climatiques, \ninondations, séismes, etc.). \nb) Le prestataire doit documenter e t mettre en œuvre les mesures permettant de limiter les risques \nde départ et de propagation de feu ainsi que les risques de dégât des eaux. \nc) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre les mesures permettant de prévenir et limiter \nles conséquences d’u ne coupure d’alimentation électrique et permettre une reprise du service \nconformément aux exigences de disponibilité du service définies dans la convention de service. \nd) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre les moyens permettant de maintenir des \nconditions de température et d’humidité adaptées aux équipements. De plus, il doit mettre en \nœuvre des mesures permettant de prévenir les pannes de climatisation et d’en limiter les \nconséquences. \ne) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre des contrôles et tests réguliers des équipements \nde détection et de protection physique. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 30/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-ab8551fe7921", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.3. Protection contre les menaces extérieures et environnementales", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.3. Protection contre les menaces extérieures et environnementales", "token_count": 342 }, { "chunk_id": "171d00930c4edb2e3d1dde4fba13d395", "text": "11.4. Travail dans les zones privées et sensibles\n\na) Le prestataire doit intégrer les éléments de sécurité physique dans la politique de sécurité et \nl’appréciation des risques conformément au niveau de sécurité requis par la catégorie de la zone. \nb) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre des procédures relatives au travail en zones \nprivées et sensibles. Il doit communiquer ces procédures aux intervenants concernés.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-6e443a6702d5", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.4. Travail dans les zones privées et sensibles", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.4. Travail dans les zones privées et sensibles", "token_count": 108 }, { "chunk_id": "6cff000df2cf401dd32f420076d05a1b", "text": "11.5. Zones de livraison et de chargement\n\na) Les zones de livraison et de chargement et les autres points par lesquels des personnes non \nautorisées peuvent pénétrer dans les locaux sans être accompagnées sont considérées comme des \nzones publiques. \nb) Le prestataire doit isoler les points d’accès de ces zones vers les zones privées et sensibles, de \nfaçon à éviter les accès non autorisés, ou à défaut, implémenter des mesures compensatoires \npermettant d’assurer le même niveau de sécurité.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-84f014ea0c86", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.5. Zones de livraison et de chargement", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.5. Zones de livraison et de chargement", "token_count": 124 }, { "chunk_id": "b5c8c3f841f3219da9e926652f3009d3", "text": "11.6. Sécurité du câblage\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre des mesures permettant de protéger le câblage \nélectrique et de télécommunication des dommages physiques et des possibilités d’interception. \nb) Le prestataire doit établir et tenir à jour un plan de câblage. \nc) Il est recommandé que le prestataire mette en œuvre des mesures permettant d’identifier les câbles \n(par exemple code couleur, étiquette, etc.) afin d'en faciliter l'exploitation et limiter les erreurs de \nmanipulation.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-2e00a8804458", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.6. Sécurité du câblage", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.6. Sécurité du câblage", "token_count": 128 }, { "chunk_id": "aa0eb14a324e6adc028828b5aeddebf5", "text": "11.7. Maintenance des matériels\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre des mesures permettant de s’assurer que les \nconditions d’installation, de maintenance et d’entretien des équipements du système \nd’information du service hébergés en zones privés et sensibles sont compatibles avec les \nexigences de confidentialité et de disponibilité du service définies dans la convention de service. \nb) Le prestataire doit souscrire des contrats de maintenance permettant de disposer des mises à jour \nde sécurité des logiciels installés sur les équipements du système d’information du service. \nc) Le prestataire doit s’assurer que les supports ne peuvent être retournés à un tiers que si les données \ndu commanditaire y sont stockées chiffrées conformément au chapitre 10.1 ou ont préalablement \nété détruites à l’aide d’un mécanisme d’effacement sécurisé par réécriture de motifs aléatoires. \nd) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre des mesures permettant de s’assurer que les \nconditions d’ installation, de maintenance et d’entretien des équipements techniques annexes \n(alimentation électrique, climatisation, incendie, etc.) sont compatibles avec les exigences de \ndisponibilité du service définies dans la convention de service.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-775f4505645e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.7. Maintenance des matériels", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.7. Maintenance des matériels", "token_count": 314 }, { "chunk_id": "c16e29c8d1ff23998a3e1f51c7d42c08", "text": "11.8. Sortie des actifs\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure de transfert hors site de données \ndu commanditaire, équipements et logiciels. Cette procédure doit nécessiter que la direction du \nprestataire donne son autorisation écrite. Dans tous les cas, le prestataire doit mettre en œuvre les \nmoyens permettant de garantir que le niveau de protection en confidentialité et en intégrité des \nactifs durant leur transport est équivalent à celui sur site.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-7ee70e98d71f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.8. Sortie des actifs", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.8. Sortie des actifs", "token_count": 121 }, { "chunk_id": "4fa3bb29b7508417e7865fa7d6b71613", "text": "11.9. Recyclage sécurisé du matériel\n\na) Le prestataire doit d ocumenter et mettre en œuvre des moyens permettant d’effacer de manière \nsécurisée par réécriture de motifs aléatoires tout support de données mis à disposition d’un \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 31/55 \n \ncommanditaire. Si l’espace de stockage est chiffré dans le cadre de l’exigence 10.1.a), \nl’effacement peut être réalisé par un effacement sécurisé de la clé de chiffrement.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-e61db9e90ec8", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.9. Recyclage sécurisé du matériel", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.9. Recyclage sécurisé du matériel", "token_count": 141 }, { "chunk_id": "85394474cd9ceeac04c2e16fed7de1f6", "text": "11.10. Matériel en attente d’utilisation\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure de protection du matériel en \nattente d’utilisation. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 32/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-a7fb7e420ce3", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "11.10. Matériel en attente d’utilisation", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 11.10. Matériel en attente d’utilisation", "token_count": 80 }, { "chunk_id": "2a6f9c70c53fcb683fba2d2ecfb1103c", "text": "12.1. Procédures d’exploitation documentées\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter les procédures d’exploitation, les tenir à jour et les rendre \naccessibles au personnel concerné.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-51b5125a1a2e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.1. Procédures d’exploitation documentées", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.1. Procédures d’exploitation documentées", "token_count": 44 }, { "chunk_id": "150325a3044c6e5442cae52c11b507ae", "text": "12.2. Gestion des changements\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure de gestion des changements \napportés aux systèmes et moyens de traitement de l’information. \nb) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure permettant, en cas d’opérations \nréalisées par le prestataire et pouvant avoir un impact sur la sécurité ou la disponibilité du service, \nde communiquer au plus tôt à l’ensemble de ses commanditaires les informations suivantes : \n- la date et l’heure programmées du début et de la fin des opérations; \n- la nature des opérations ; \n- les impacts sur la sécurité ou la disponibilité du service ; \n- le contact au sein du prestataire. \nc) Dans le cadre d’un service PaaS, le prestataire doit informer au plus tôt le commanditaire de toute \nmodification à venir sur des éléments logiciels sous sa responsabilité dès lors que la compatibilité \ncomplète ne peut être assurée. \nd) Le prestataire doit informer au plus tôt le commanditaire de toute modification à venir sur les \néléments du service dès lors qu’elle est susceptible d’occasionner une perte de fonctionnalité pour \nle commanditaire.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-0ecddfad3e4f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.2. Gestion des changements", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.2. Gestion des changements", "token_count": 287 }, { "chunk_id": "c07d36b80fcd4b94bcbaf2679557af8e", "text": "12.3. Séparation des environnements de développement, de test et\n\nd’exploitation \na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre les mesures permettant d e séparer \nphysiquement les environnements liés à la production du service des autres environnements, dont \nles environnements de développement.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-2322d272851b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.3. Séparation des environnements de développement, de test et", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.3. Séparation des environnements de développement, de test et", "token_count": 76 }, { "chunk_id": "1a4df38283d582f977cdaad86e587a8d", "text": "12.4. Mesures contre les codes malveillants\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre les mesures de détection, de prévention et de \nrestauration pour se protéger des codes malveillants. Le périmètre d’application de cette exigence \nsur le système d’information du service doit nécessairement contenir les postes utilisateurs sous \nla responsabilité du prestataire et les flux entrants sur ce même système d’information. \nb) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une sensibilisation de ses employés aux risques \nliés aux codes malveillants et aux bonnes pratiques pour réduire l’impact d’une infection.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-2a8f782a71da", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.4. Mesures contre les codes malveillants", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.4. Mesures contre les codes malveillants", "token_count": 156 }, { "chunk_id": "b918abf26185951385fefdc9c67ee362", "text": "12.5. Sauvegarde des informations\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une politique de sauvegarde et de restauration \ndes données sous sa responsabilité dans le cadre du service. Cette politique doit prévoir une \nsauvegarde quotidienne de l’ensemble des données (informations, logiciels, configurations, etc.) \nsous la responsabilité du prestataire dans le cadre du service. \nb) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre des mesures de protection des sauvegardes \nconformément à la politique de contrôle d’accès (voir chapitre 9). Cette politique doit prévoir une \nrevue mensuelle des traces d’accès aux sauvegardes. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 33/55 \n \nc) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre un e procédure permettant de tester \nrégulièrement la restauration des sauvegardes. \nd) Le prestataire doit localiser les sauvegardes à une distance suffisante des équipements principaux \nen cohérence avec les résultats de l’appréciation de risques et permettant de faire face à des \nsinistres majeurs. Les sauvegardes sont assujetties aux mêmes exigences de localisation que les \ndonnées opérationnelles. Le ou les sites de sauvegarde sont assujettis aux mêmes exigences de \nsécurité que le site principal, en particulier c elles listées aux chapitres 8 et 11. Les \ncommunications entre site principal et site de sauvegarde doivent être protégées par chiffrement, \nconformément aux exigences du chapitre 10.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-47bbded8c0db", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.5. Sauvegarde des informations", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.5. Sauvegarde des informations", "token_count": 392 }, { "chunk_id": "ba8257dd9e105d4bd93dc784721fadb0", "text": "12.6. Journalisation des événements\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une politique de journalisation incluant au \nminimum les éléments suivants : \n- la liste des sources de collecte ; \n- la liste des événements à journaliser par source ; \n- l’objet de la journalisation par événement ; \n- la fréquence de la collecte et base de temps utilisée ; \n- la durée de rétention locale et centralisée ; \n- les mesures de protection des journaux (dont chiffrement et duplication) ; \n- la localisation des journaux. \nb) Le prestataire doit générer et collecter les événements suivants : \n- les activités des utilisateurs liées à la sécurité de l’information ; \n- la modification des droits d’accès dans le périmètre de sa responsabilité ; \n- les événements issus des mécanismes de lutte contre les codes m alveillants (voir chapitre \n12.4); \n- les exceptions ; \n- les défaillances ; \n- tout autre événement lié à la sécurité de l’information. \nc) Le prestataire doit conserver les événements issus de la journalisation pendant une durée \nminimale de six mois sous réserve du respect des exigences légales et réglementaires. \nd) Le prestataire doit fournir, sur demande d’un commanditaire, l’ensemble des évé nements le \nconcernant. \ne) Il est recommandé que le système de journalisation mis en place par le prestataire respecte les \nrecommandations de [NT_JOURNAL].", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3474e52543b5", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.6. Journalisation des événements", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.6. Journalisation des événements", "token_count": 344 }, { "chunk_id": "198149b66b7072600f2c772b88f0a817", "text": "12.7. Protection de l’information journalisée\n\na) Le prestataire doit protéger les équipements de journalisation et les événements journalisés contre \nles atteintes à leur disponibilité, intégrité ou confidentialité, conformément au chapitre 3.2 de \n[NT_JOURNAL]. \nb) Le prestataire doit gérer le dimensionnement de l’espace de stockage de l’ensemble des \néquipements hébergeant une ou plusieurs sources de collecte afin de permettre la conservation \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 34/55 \n \nlocale des événements journalisés prévue par la politique de journalisation des événements. Cette \ngestion du dimensionnement doit prendre en compte les évolutions du système d’information. \nc) Le prestataire doit transférer les événements journalisés en assurant leur protection en \nconfidentialité et en intégrité, sur un ou plusieurs serveurs centraux dédiés et doit les stocker sur \nune machine physique distincte de celle qui les a générés. \nd) Le prestataire doit mettre en place une sauvegarde des événements collectés suivant une politique \nadaptée. \ne) Le prestataire doit exécuter les processus de journalisation et de collecte des évènements avec des \ncomptes disposant de privilèges nécessaires et suffisants et doit limiter l’accès aux événements \njournalisés conformément à la politique de contrôle d’accès (voir chapitre 9.1).", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-ee345030dbca", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.7. Protection de l’information journalisée", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.7. Protection de l’information journalisée", "token_count": 364 }, { "chunk_id": "ab5255753603581c5332471c0689a38e", "text": "12.8. Synchronisation des horloges\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une synchronisation des horloges de l’ensemble \ndes équipements sur une ou plusieurs sources de temps internes cohérentes entre elles. Ces \nsources pourront elles-mêmes être synchronisées sur plusieurs sources fiables externes, sauf pour \nles réseaux isolés. \nb) Le prestataire doit mettre en place l’horodatage de chaque événement journalisé.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-bde151163e97", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.8. Synchronisation des horloges", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.8. Synchronisation des horloges", "token_count": 108 }, { "chunk_id": "45a08895dd8ac4685a454ad6911d1ce5", "text": "12.9. Analyse et corrélation des événements\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une infrastructure permettant l’analyse et la \ncorrélation des événements enregistrés par le système de journalisation afin de détecter les \névénements susceptibles d’affecter la sécurité du système d’information du service, en temps réel \nou a posteriori pour des événements remontant jusqu’à six mois. \nb) Il est recommandé de s’appuyer sur le référentiel d’exigences des prestataires de détection \nd’incidents de sécurité [PDIS] pour la mise en place et l’exploitation de l’infrastructure d’analyse \net de corrélation des événements. \nc) Le prestataire doit acquitter les alarmes remontées par l’infrastructure d’analyse et de corrélation \ndes événements au moins quotidiennement.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-e69f72f4804f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.9. Analyse et corrélation des événements", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.9. Analyse et corrélation des événements", "token_count": 195 }, { "chunk_id": "f347d066162acddb6a932caaa35efb43", "text": "12.10. Installation de logiciels sur des systèmes en exploitation\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure permettant de contrôler \nl’installation de logiciels sur les équipements du système d’information du service. \nb) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure de gestion de la configuration \ndes environnements logiciels mis à la disposition du commanditaire, notamment pour leur \nmaintien en condition de sécurité. \nc) Le prestataire doit fournir une capacité d'inspection et de suppression, si nécessaire, des entrants3 \n(contrôle de l’authenticité et de l'innocuité des mises à jour, contrôle de l’innocuité des outils \nfournis, etc.) relatifs au périmètre de l’infrastructure technique : \n \n \n \n3 Les entrants sont ici constitués des éléments nécessaires et spécifiques à l’installation de logiciel considérée : éléments logiciels à installer, outils d’installation \nfournis, etc. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 35/55 \n \n- cette capacité d'inspection et de suppression doit générer des journaux d'activité et doit \npouvoir faire l'objet d'un audit de code, \n- les entrants doivent être traités sur des dispositifs spécifiques opérés et maintenus par le \nprestataire et hébergés dans une zone cloisonnée du reste de l’infrastructure (du type zone \ndémilitarisée telle que définie dans [G_INT]).", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-0ebd37356436", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.10. Installation de logiciels sur des systèmes en exploitation", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.10. Installation de logiciels sur des systèmes en exploitation", "token_count": 369 }, { "chunk_id": "e5f0fc8865f5bf02a42945034cdb0f45", "text": "12.11. Gestion des vulnérabilités techniques\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre un processus de veille permettant de gérer les \nvulnérabilités techniques des logiciels et des systèmes utilisés dans le système d’information du \nservice. \nb) Le prestataire doit évaluer son exposition à ces vulnérabilités en les incluant dans l’appréciation \ndes risques et appliquer les mesures de traitement du risque adaptées.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-f540793a8674", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.11. Gestion des vulnérabilités techniques", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.11. Gestion des vulnérabilités techniques", "token_count": 107 }, { "chunk_id": "f0a18d251b98d463c0641a60259c575e", "text": "12.12. Administration\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure obligeant les administrateurs \nsous sa responsabilité à utiliser des terminaux dédiés pour la réalisation exclusive des tâches \nd’administration, en accord avec le chapitre 4.1 intitulé « poste et réseau d’administration » de \n[NT_ADMIN]. Il doit les maîtriser et les maintenir à jour. \nb) Le prestataire doit mettre en place des mesures de durcissement de la configuration des terminaux \nutilisés pour les tâches d’administration, notamment celles du chapitre 4.2 intitulé « sécurisation \ndu socle » de [NT_ADMIN]. \nc) Lorsque le prestataire autorise une situation de mobilité pour les administrateurs sous sa \nresponsabilité, il doit l’encadrer par une politique documentée. La solution mise en œuvre doi t \nassurer que le niveau de sécurité de cette situation de mobilité est au moins équivalent au niveau \nde sécurité hors situation de mobilité (voir chapitres 9.6 et 9.7). Cette solution doit notamment \ninclure : \n- l’utilisation d’un tunnel chiffré, non débrayable et non contournable, pour l’ensemble des flux \n(voir chapitre 10.2) ; \n- le chiffrement intégral du disque (voir chapitre 10.1).", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-ce5a98390e29", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.12. Administration", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.12. Administration", "token_count": 298 }, { "chunk_id": "52f984b87175550dbd9dfa047b215486", "text": "12.13. Télédiagnostic et télémaintenance des composants de l’infrastructure\n\na) Dans le cadre du télédiagnostic ou de la télémaintenance de composants de l’infrastructure , \nconsidérant les risques d’atteinte à la confide ntialité des données des commanditaires, le \nprestataire doit : \n- vérifier que la personne à qui l’accès doit être autorisé a satisfait aux vérifications de \nl’exigence 7.1.b ; \n- dans le cas d'une intervention réalisée par une personne n’ayant pas satisfait aux vérifications \nde l’exigence 7.1.b, mettre en œuvre une passerelle sécurisée (poste de rebond) par laquelle \nla personne devra se connecter et permettant une supervision des actions (autorisation ou \ninterdiction des actions, demande d’explications, etc..) en temps réel, par une personne ayant \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 36/55 \n \nelle-même satisfait aux vérifications de l’exigence 7.1.b . La passerelle sécurisée devra \nrépondre aux objectifs de sécurité4 spécifiés dans [G_EXT] ; \n- considérer les actions menées, une fois l’accès autorisé, comme des actions d’administration \net les journaliser comme telles ; \n- supprimer l’autorisation d’accès à l’issue de l’intervention.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-f991c931732e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.13. Télédiagnostic et télémaintenance des composants de l’infrastructure", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.13. Télédiagnostic et télémaintenance des composants de l’infrastructure", "token_count": 324 }, { "chunk_id": "78de1f11eb1e639e6d2e0b6b9727caf0", "text": "12.14. Surveillance des flux sortants de l’infrastructure\n\na) Le prestataire doit fournir une capacité d'inspection et de suppression des sortants de \nl’infrastructure technique relatifs au périmètre du service (informations de facturation, les \néventuels journaux nécessaires au traitement d'incidents, etc.) : \n- les sortants doivent pouvoir être expurgés des données pouvant porter atteinte à la \nconfidentialité des données des commanditaires ; \n- cette capacité d'inspection et de suppression doit générer des journaux d'activité et doit \npouvoir faire l'objet d'un audit de code ; \n- les sortants sont traités sur des dispositifs spécifiques opérés et maintenus par le prestataire, \net hébergés dans une zone cloisonnée du reste de l’infrastructure (du type zone démilitarisée \ntelle que définie dans [G_INT]). \n \n \n \n \n4Objectifs de sécurité de la passerelle sécurisée [G_EXT] : \n- Authentifier la machine distante et la personne en charge du support ; \n- Prévenir l’exploitation de vulnérabilités ou de portes dérobées sur le dispositif de télémaintenance ; \n- Garantir la confidentialité et l’intégrité des données sur le SI ; \n- Assurer une traçabilité de confiance des actions effectuées par le technicien du centre de support ; \n- Garantir l’innocuité de la fonction de télémaintenance vis-à-vis du système faisant l’objet du télédiagnostic ainsi que \ndes systèmes connexes ; \n- Garantir l’absence de fuite d’informations vers l’extérieur. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 37/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-76305ff8a3f3", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "12.14. Surveillance des flux sortants de l’infrastructure", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 12.14. Surveillance des flux sortants de l’infrastructure", "token_count": 403 }, { "chunk_id": "e5ca6b7621377ddc545161bf87dd8ae4", "text": "13.1. Cartographie du système d'information.\n\na) Le prestataire doit établir et tenir à jour une cartographie du système d’information du service, en \nlien avec l’inventaire des actifs (voir chapitre 8.1), comprenant au min imum les éléments \nsuivants : \n- la liste des ressources matérielles ou virtualisées ; \n- les noms et fonctions des applications, supportant le service ; \n- le schéma d’architecture réseau au niveau 3 du modèle OSI sur lequel les points névralgiques \nsont identifiés : \n- les points d’interconnexions, notamment avec les réseaux tiers et publics, \n- les réseaux, sous-réseaux, notamment les réseaux d’administration, \n- les équipements assurant des fonctions de sécurité (filtrage, authentification, chiffrement, \netc.), \n- les serveurs hébergeant des données ou assurant des fonctions sensibles ; \n- la matrice des flux réseau autorisés en précisant : \n- leur description technique (services, protocoles et ports) ; \n- la justification métier ou d’infrastructure technique ; \n- le cas échéant, lorsque des services, protocoles ou ports réputés non sûrs sont utilisés, les \nmesures compensatoires mises en place, dans la logique de défense en profondeur. \nb) Le prestataire doit réviser au moins annuellement la cartographie.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-a11c681cbc2d", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "13.1. Cartographie du système d'information.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 13.1. Cartographie du système d'information.", "token_count": 312 }, { "chunk_id": "6f20a01ffe70f4ce81d00acf2afb10cb", "text": "13.2. Cloisonnement des réseaux\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre, pour le système d’information du service, les \nmesures de cloisonnement (logique, physique ou par chiffrement) pour séparer les flux réseau \nselon : \n- la sensibilité des informations transmises ; \n- la nature des flux (production, administration, supervision, etc.) ; \n- le domaine d’appartenance des flux (des commanditaires – avec distinction par \ncommanditaire ou ensemble de commanditaires, du prestataire, des tiers, etc.) ; \n- le domaine technique (traitement, stockage, etc.). \nb) Le prestataire doit cloisonner, physiquement ou par chiffrement, tous les flux de données internes \nau système d’information du service vis -à-vis de tout autre système d’information. Lorsque ce \ncloisonnement est réalisé par chiffrement, il est réalisé en accord avec les exigences du chapitre \n10.2. \nc) Dans le cas où le réseau d’administration de l’infrastructure technique ne fait pas l’objet d’un \ncloisonnement physique, les flux d’administration doivent transiter dans un tunnel chiffré, en \naccord avec les exigences du chapitre 10.2. \nd) Le prestataire doit mettre en place et configurer un pare-feu applicatif pour protéger les interfaces \nd’administration destinées à ses commanditaires et exposées sur un réseau public. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 38/55 \n \ne) Le prestataire doit mettre en œuvre sur l’ensemble des interfaces d’administration et de \nsupervision de l’infrastructure technique du service un mécanisme de filtrage n’autorisant que les \nconnexions légitimes identifiées dans la matrice des flux autorisés.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-e304ff41783f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "13.2. Cloisonnement des réseaux", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 13.2. Cloisonnement des réseaux", "token_count": 434 }, { "chunk_id": "76395dd49e28fa4c70a75345a5401367", "text": "13.3. Surveillance des réseaux\n\na) Le prestataire doit disposer une ou plusieurs sondes de détecti on d’incidents de sécurité sur le \nsystème d’information du service. Ces sondes doivent notamment permettre la supervision de \nchacune des interconnexions du système d’information du service avec des systèmes \nd’information tiers et des réseaux publics. Ces s ondes doivent être des sources de collecte pour \nl’infrastructure d’analyse et de corrélation des événements (voir chapitre 12.9). \n \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 39/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-e66e6558cd33", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "13.3. Surveillance des réseaux", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 13.3. Surveillance des réseaux", "token_count": 163 }, { "chunk_id": "9bb5b0415963e1c2f006c54a38092906", "text": "14.1. Politique de développement sécurisé\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre des règles de développement sécurisé des \nlogiciels et des systèmes, et les appliquer aux développements internes. \nb) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une formation adaptée en développement \nsécurisé aux employés concernés.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-91e21184f28b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "14.1. Politique de développement sécurisé", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 14.1. Politique de développement sécurisé", "token_count": 84 }, { "chunk_id": "1d27b39512bdccf60c3e881f9a196734", "text": "14.2. Procédures de contrôle des changements de système\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure de contrôle des changements \napportés au système d’information du service. \nb) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure de validation des changements \napportés au système d’information du service sur un environnement de pré-production avant leur \nmise en production. \nc) Le prestataire doit conserver un historique des versions des logiciels et des systèmes \n(développements internes ou externes, produits commerciaux) mis en œuvre pour permettre de \nreconstituer, le cas échéant dans un environnement de test, un environnement complet tel qu’il \nétait mis en œuvre à une date donnée. La durée de conservation de cet historique doit êt re en \naccord avec celle des sauvegardes (voir chapitre 12.5).", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-dd9b8f511b2b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "14.2. Procédures de contrôle des changements de système", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 14.2. Procédures de contrôle des changements de système", "token_count": 211 }, { "chunk_id": "26e881a744d109439fa682db5adcccb4", "text": "14.3. Revue technique des applications après changement apporté à la\n\nplateforme d’exploitation \na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure permettant de tester, \npréalablement à leur mise en production, l’ensemble des applications afin de vérifier l’absence \nde tout effet indésirable sur l’activité ou sur la sécurité du service.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-cdd2a389a777", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "14.3. Revue technique des applications après changement apporté à la", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 14.3. Revue technique des applications après changement apporté à la", "token_count": 89 }, { "chunk_id": "d62c6fe61a75fd37e9e0731e6f948cfd", "text": "14.4. Environnement de développement sécurisé\n\na) Le prestataire doit mettre en œuvre un environnement sécurisé de développement permettant de \ngérer l’intégralité du cycle de développement du système d’information du service. \nb) Le prestataire doit prendre en compte les environnements de développement dans l’appréciation \ndes risques et en assurer la protection conformément au présent référentiel.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-cd4b481f64d9", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "14.4. Environnement de développement sécurisé", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 14.4. Environnement de développement sécurisé", "token_count": 100 }, { "chunk_id": "02d9f811b72e917c10bf80e799757175", "text": "14.5. Développement externalisé\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure permettant de superviser et de \ncontrôler l’activité de développement externalisé des logiciels et des systèmes. Cette procédure \ndoit s’assurer que l’activité de développement externalisé soit conforme à la politique de \ndéveloppement sécurisé du prestataire et permette d’atteindre un niveau de sécurité du \ndéveloppement externe équivalent à celui d’un développement interne (voir exigence 14.1 a).", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-fa937ba7777c", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "14.5. Développement externalisé", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 14.5. Développement externalisé", "token_count": 125 }, { "chunk_id": "f97a2216ef36e14bb08c17a81850493e", "text": "14.6. Test de la sécurité et conformité du système\n\na) Le prestataire doit soumettre les systèmes d’information, nouveaux ou mis à jour, à des tests de \nconformité et de fonctionnalité de sécurité pendant le développement. Il doit documenter et mettre \nen œuvre une procédure de test qui identifie : \n- les tâches à réaliser ; \n- les données d’entrée ; \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 40/55 \n \n- les résultats attendus en sortie.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-284b4606fe3a", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "14.6. Test de la sécurité et conformité du système", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 14.6. Test de la sécurité et conformité du système", "token_count": 138 }, { "chunk_id": "59116fee73a3684c85ab5d9419274fcb", "text": "14.7. Protection des données de test\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure permettant d’assurer l’intégrité \ndes données de tests utilisés en pré-production. \nb) Si le prestataire souhaite utiliser des données du commanditaire issues de la production pour \nréaliser des tests, le prestataire doit préalablement obtenir l’accord du commanditaire et les \nanonymiser. Le prestataire doit assurer la confidentialité des données lors de leur anonymisation. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 41/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-f360e404c863", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "14.7. Protection des données de test", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 14.7. Protection des données de test", "token_count": 160 }, { "chunk_id": "442ac53bfa2d3e206a6ac6b0fc548d94", "text": "15.1. Identification des tiers\n\na) Le prestataire doit tenir à jour une liste exhaustive des tiers participa nt à la mise en œuvre du \nservice (hébergeur, développeur, intégrateur, archiveur, sous -traitant opérant sur site ou à \ndistance, fournisseurs de climatisation, etc.). Cette liste doit préciser la contribution du tiers au \nservice et au traitement des données à caractère personnel. Elle doit tenir compte des cas de sous-\ntraitance à plusieurs niveaux. \nb) Le prestataire doit tenir à disposition du commanditaire la liste de l’ensemble des tiers qui peuvent \naccéder aux données et l’informer de tout changement de sous-traitants au sens de l’article 28 du \n[RGPD] afin que le commanditaire puisse émettre des objections à cet égard.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3a43c8f483fc", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "15.1. Identification des tiers", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 15.1. Identification des tiers", "token_count": 186 }, { "chunk_id": "168de985fb1e83381556ea8d2226e7ac", "text": "15.2. La sécurité dans les accords conclus avec les tiers\n\na) Le prestataire doit exiger des tiers participant à la mise en œuvre du service, dans leur contribution \nau service, un niveau de sécurité au moins équivalent à celui qu’il s’engage à maintenir dans sa \npropre politique de sécurité. Il doit le faire au travers d’exigences, adaptées à chaque tiers et à sa \ncontribution au service, dans les cahiers des charges ou dans les clauses de sécurité des accords \nde partenariat. Le prestataire doit inclure ces exigences dans les contrats conclus avec les tiers. \nb) Le prestataire doit contractualiser, avec chacun des tiers participant à la mise en œuvre du service, \ndes clauses d’audit permettant à un organisme de qualification de vérifier que ces tiers respectent \nles exigences du présent référentiel. \nc) Le prestataire doit définir et attribuer les rôles et les responsabilités relatives à la modification ou \nà la fin du contrat le liant à un tiers participant à la mise en œuvre du service.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-b86fcb2492b7", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "15.2. La sécurité dans les accords conclus avec les tiers", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 15.2. La sécurité dans les accords conclus avec les tiers", "token_count": 251 }, { "chunk_id": "8d44f82aea92484051393a0bd24fbece", "text": "15.3. Surveillance et revue des services des tiers\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure permettant de contrôler \nrégulièrement les mesures mises en place par les tiers participant à la mise en œuvre du service \npour respecter les exigences du présent référentiel, conformément au chapitre 18.3.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-044ed9bdbbe5", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "15.3. Surveillance et revue des services des tiers", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 15.3. Surveillance et revue des services des tiers", "token_count": 81 }, { "chunk_id": "ed58d9d5d5f823b488e2b54cc9575307", "text": "15.4. Gestion des changements apportés dans les services des tiers\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure de suivi des changements \napportés par les tiers participant à la mise en œuvr e du service susceptibles d’affecter le niveau \nde sécurité du système d’information du service. \nb) Dans la mesure où un changement de tiers participant à la mise en œuvre du service affecte le \nniveau de sécurité du service, le prestataire doit en informer l’ensemble des commanditaires sans \ndélais conformément au chapitre 12.2 et mettre en œuvre les mesures permettant de rétablir le \nniveau de sécurité précédent.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-31324c956db9", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "15.4. Gestion des changements apportés dans les services des tiers", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 15.4. Gestion des changements apportés dans les services des tiers", "token_count": 158 }, { "chunk_id": "37d29db8cbd5d97c1064b47adf06ed78", "text": "15.5. Engagements de confidentialité\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure permettant de réviser au moins \nannuellement les exigences en matière d’engagements de confidentialité ou de non -divulgation \nvis-à-vis des tiers participant à la mise en œuvre du service. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 42/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-bf5018e86c4f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "15.5. Engagements de confidentialité", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 15.5. Engagements de confidentialité", "token_count": 113 }, { "chunk_id": "6258e647731789ca555a9f603a64d7da", "text": "16.1. Responsabilités et procédures\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure permettant d’apporter des \nréponses rapides et efficaces aux incidents de sécurité. Ces procédures doivent définir les moyens \net délais de communication des incidents de sécurité à l’ensemble des commanditaires concernés \nainsi que le niveau de confidentialité exigé pour cette communication. \nb) Le prestataire doit informer ses empl oyés et l’ensemble des tiers participant à la mise en œuvre \ndu service de cette procédure. \nc) Le prestataire doit documenter toute violation de données à caractère personnel et en informer \nson commanditaire. La violation doit être notifiée à la CNIL 5 si elle présente un risque pour les \ndroits et libertés des personnes concernées. Elle doit faire l’objet d’une information auprès des \npersonnes concernées lorsque le risque pour leur vie privée est élevé.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-4b2fa52857c8", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "16.1. Responsabilités et procédures", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 16.1. Responsabilités et procédures", "token_count": 225 }, { "chunk_id": "22b2b6cbd89216511adf3153faeb0ff6", "text": "16.2. Signalements liés à la sécurité de l’information\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure exigeant de ses employés et des \ntiers participant à la mise en œuvre du service qu’ils lui rendent compte de tout incident de \nsécurité, avéré ou suspecté ainsi que de toute faille de sécurité. \nb) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure permettant à l’ensemble des \ncommanditaires de signaler tout incident de sécurité, avéré ou suspecté et toute faille de sécurité. \nc) Le prestataire doit communiquer sans délai aux commanditaires les incid ents de sécurité et les \npréconisations associées pour en limiter les impacts. Il doit permettre au commanditaire de choisir \nles niveaux de gravité des incidents pour lesquels il souhaite être informé. \nd) Le prestataire doit communiquer les incidents de sécuri té aux autorités compétentes \nconformément aux exigences légales et réglementaires en vigueur.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-fea55469fc7f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "16.2. Signalements liés à la sécurité de l’information", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 16.2. Signalements liés à la sécurité de l’information", "token_count": 237 }, { "chunk_id": "0d5bd647fb5ca3df5804fad32284dcaa", "text": "16.3. Appréciation des événements liés à la sécurité de l’information et prise\n\nde décision \na) Le prestataire doit apprécier les événements liés à la sécurité de l’information et décider s’il faut \nles qualifier en incidents de sécurité. Pour l’appréciation, il doit s’appuyer sur une ou plusieurs \néchelles (estimation, évaluation, etc.) partagées avec le commanditaire. \nNote : Les incidents de sécurité incluent les violations de données à caractère personnel. \nb) Le prestataire doit utiliser une classification permettant d’identifier clairement les incidents de \nsécurité touchant des données relatives aux commanditaires, conformément aux résultats de \nl’appréciation des risques. Cette classification doit inclure les violations de données à caractère \npersonnel.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-ff9989638ba4", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "16.3. Appréciation des événements liés à la sécurité de l’information et prise", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 16.3. Appréciation des événements liés à la sécurité de l’information et prise", "token_count": 193 }, { "chunk_id": "e1457ed08bde37c8e947698e950f412c", "text": "16.4. Réponse aux incidents liés à la sécurité de l’information\n\na) Le prestataire doit traiter les incidents de sécurité jusqu’à leur résolution et doit informer les \ncommanditaires conformément aux procédures.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-521e2f00c3e4", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "16.4. Réponse aux incidents liés à la sécurité de l’information", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 16.4. Réponse aux incidents liés à la sécurité de l’information", "token_count": 52 }, { "chunk_id": "14746fddf1c7c559d0591ca03ec9072d", "text": "5 Notification en ligne : https://notifications.cnil.fr/notifications/index\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 43/55 \n \nb) Le prestataire doit archiver les documents détaillant les incidents de sécurité. \nc) Il est recommandé que le prestataire fasse appel à un prestataire de réponse aux incidents de \nsécurité [PRIS] qualifié pour t raiter les incidents de sécurité nécessitant une expertise \nsupplémentaire.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-bde118075237", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "5 Notification en ligne : https://notifications.cnil.fr/notifications/index", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 5 Notification en ligne : https://notifications.cnil.fr/notifications/index", "token_count": 132 }, { "chunk_id": "d053e4cbdf540d543d4cb14eeb0b6763", "text": "16.5. Tirer des enseignements des incidents liés à la sécurité de l’information\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre un processus d’amélioration continue afin de \ndiminuer l’occurrence et l’impact de types d’incidents de sécurité déjà traités.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3dac52449de7", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "16.5. Tirer des enseignements des incidents liés à la sécurité de l’information", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 16.5. Tirer des enseignements des incidents liés à la sécurité de l’information", "token_count": 65 }, { "chunk_id": "791fd1892168f2db2330973efed6015e", "text": "16.6. Recueil de preuves\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure permettant d’enregistrer les \ninformations relatives aux incidents de sécurité et pouvant servir d’éléments de preuve. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 44/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-44109dc67e69", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "16.6. Recueil de preuves", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 16.6. Recueil de preuves", "token_count": 93 }, { "chunk_id": "115a1cae4cb372d5c8b7167a4a3fed5c", "text": "17.1. Organisation de la continuité d’activité\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre œuvre un plan de continuité d’activité prenant en compte \nla sécurité de l’information. \nb) Le prestataire doit réviser annuellement le plan de continuité d’activité du service et à chaque \nchangement majeur pouvant avoir un impact sur le service.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-a89774f1bf98", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "17.1. Organisation de la continuité d’activité", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 17.1. Organisation de la continuité d’activité", "token_count": 84 }, { "chunk_id": "1f25b0bbe9aaa1e9012e91a8e88aca8e", "text": "17.2. Mise en œuvre de la continuité d’activité\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre des procédures permettant de maintenir ou de \nrestaurer l’exploitation du service et d’assurer la disponibilité des informations au niveau et dans \nles délais pour lesquels le prestataire s’est engagé vis-à-vis du commanditaire dans la convention \nde service.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-2f9e0a28a9ea", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "17.2. Mise en œuvre de la continuité d’activité", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 17.2. Mise en œuvre de la continuité d’activité", "token_count": 90 }, { "chunk_id": "5e2582298a4c5986bc5f1134b8a5bf6d", "text": "17.3. Vérifier, revoir et évaluer la continuité d’activité\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure permettant de tester le plan de \ncontinuité d’activités afin de s’assurer qu’il est pertinent et efficace en situation de crise.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-9ef47d9c9ff5", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "17.3. Vérifier, revoir et évaluer la continuité d’activité", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 17.3. Vérifier, revoir et évaluer la continuité d’activité", "token_count": 63 }, { "chunk_id": "29f78fd22fdbac64078b21ff6bd68efd", "text": "17.4. Disponibilité des moyens de traitement de l’information\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre les mesures qui lui permettent de répondre au \nbesoin de disponibilité du service défini dans la convention de service (voir chapitre 19.1).", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-a5901a8a2601", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "17.4. Disponibilité des moyens de traitement de l’information", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 17.4. Disponibilité des moyens de traitement de l’information", "token_count": 64 }, { "chunk_id": "376056ff7931569da519e64031c5b60d", "text": "17.5. Sauvegarde de la configuration de l’infrastructure technique\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une procédure de sauvegarde hors-ligne de la \nconfiguration de l’infrastructure technique.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-6414d52bcbf0", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "17.5. Sauvegarde de la configuration de l’infrastructure technique", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 17.5. Sauvegarde de la configuration de l’infrastructure technique", "token_count": 52 }, { "chunk_id": "0f46a1431adfe0b167ed0b8d38137711", "text": "17.6. Mise à disposition d’un dispositif de sauvegarde des données du\n\ncommanditaire \na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre à disposition du commanditaire un service de sauvegarde \nde ses données. \n \n \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 45/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-0ce7b60a6cac", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "17.6. Mise à disposition d’un dispositif de sauvegarde des données du", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 17.6. Mise à disposition d’un dispositif de sauvegarde des données du", "token_count": 91 }, { "chunk_id": "cb71daa76951cd3ea2c0a67d4e1ffc38", "text": "18.1. Identification de la législation et des exige nces contractuelles\n\napplicables \na) Le prestataire doit identifier les exigences légales, réglementaires et contractuelles en vigueur \napplicables au service. En France, le prestataire doit considérer au minimum les textes suivants : \n- les données à caractère personnel [LOI_IL], [RGPD] ; \n- le secret professionnel [CP_ART_226_13], le cas échéant sans préjudice de l’application de \nl’article 40 alinéa 2 du Code de procédure pénale relatif au signalement à une autorité \njudiciaire ; \n- l’abus de confiance [CP_ART_314-1] ; \n- le secret des correspondances privées [CP_ART_226-15] ; \n- l’atteinte à la vie privée [CP_ART_226-1] ; \n- l’accès ou le maintien frauduleux à un système d’information [CP_ART_323-1]. \nb) Le prestataire doit, selon son rôle dans les traitements de données à caractère personnel \n(responsable de traitement, sous-traitant ou co-responsable) justifier et documenter les choix de \nmesures techniques et organisationnelles réalisés en vue de répondre aux exigences de protection \ndes données à caractère personnel du présent référentiel (voir partie 19.5). \nc) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre les procédures permettant de respecter les \nexigences légales, réglementaires et contractuelles en vigueur applicables au service, ainsi que \nles besoins de sécurité spécifiques (voir exigence 8.3b)). \nd) Le prestataire doit, sur demande d’un commanditaire, lui rendre accessible l’ensemble de ces \nprocédures. \ne) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre un processus de veille actif d es exigences \nlégales, réglementaires et contractuelles en vigueur applicables au service.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-31f5d6b85f91", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "18.1. Identification de la législation et des exige nces contractuelles", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 18.1. Identification de la législation et des exige nces contractuelles", "token_count": 419 }, { "chunk_id": "0b7ae5139808669e68bc92c9f18dfcc2", "text": "18.2.1. Revue continue\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre un programme d’audit sur trois ans définissant \nle périmètre et la fréquence des audits en accord avec la gestion du changement, les politiques, et \nles résultats de l’appréciation des risques. \nLe prestataire doit inclure dans le programme d’audit un audit qualifié par an réalisé par un \nprestataire d’audit de la sécurité des systèmes d’information [PASSI] qualifié. L’ensemble du \nprogramme d’audit doit notamment couvrir : \n- l’audit de la configuration de l’infrastructure technique du service. Cet audit est réalisé par \néchantillonnage et doit inclure tous types d’équipements et de serveurs présents dans l e \nsystème d’information du service ; \n- le test d’intrusion des interfaces d'administration exposées sur un réseau public ; \n- le test d'intrusion de l'interface utilisateur pour les services SaaS ; \n- si le service bénéficie de développements internes, l’audit de code source portant sur les \nfonctionnalités de sécurité implémentées (l'approche en continue doit être privilégiée). \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 46/55 \n \nb) Il est recommandé que le prestataire mette en œuvr e des mécanismes automatisés d'audit de la \nconfiguration adaptés à l’infrastructure technique du service.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-7c2fa7744139", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "18.2.1. Revue continue", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 18.2.1. Revue continue", "token_count": 352 }, { "chunk_id": "9801a56d31877b84ad885e3221acc046", "text": "18.2.2. Revue initiale\n\na) Préalablement à l’évaluation pour qualification du service, le prestataire doit faire réaliser une \nrevue indépendante initiale de la sécurité de l’information par un prestataire d’audit de la sécurité \ndes systèmes d’information [PASSI] qualifié. Cette revue initiale doit notamment couvrir6 : \n- pour les services autres que IaaS (CaaS, PaaS, SaaS, etc.), un audit de la configuration des \nressources virtuelles ou physiques, des systèmes d'exploitation et logiciels de base (OS, \nmiddlewares, bases de données,...) dans le périmètre du service ; \n- un test d’intrusion portant sur les interfaces d'administration du service m ises à disposition \ndes commanditaires; \n- pour un service de type SaaS, un test d'intrusion portant sur l'interface mise à disposition des \nutilisateurs finaux ainsi qu'un audit du code source portant sur les fonctionnalités de sécurité \nimplémentées (authentification, gestion des sessions, gestion du cloisonnement en cas de \nmode multi-tenant). Si le SaaS rend un service de sécurité de l'information, une certification7 \nproduit dédiée est nécessaire.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-7bde887d836e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "18.2.2. Revue initiale", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 18.2.2. Revue initiale", "token_count": 279 }, { "chunk_id": "f8fb6392ec9daf35dd20c7def93f70c1", "text": "18.2.3. Revue des changements majeurs\n\na) En cas de changement majeur pouvant affecter le service, le prestataire doit faire réaliser une \nrevue indépendante de changement par un prestataire d’audit de la sécurité des systèmes \nd’information [PASSI] qualifié. Cette revue ind épendante de changement doit couvrir en \nparticulier les activités d’audit suivantes : \n- audit d’architecture ; \n- audit organisationnel et physique ; \n- audit de la configuration de l’infrastructure technique du service ; \n- un test d’intrusion portant sur les inter faces d'administration du service mises à disposition \ndes commanditaires; \n- pour un service de type SaaS, un test d'intrusion portant sur l'interface mise à disposition des \nutilisateurs finaux dans le cadre du catalogue de services, ainsi qu'un audit du code source \nportant sur les fonctionnalités de sécurité implémentées (authentification, gestion des \nsessions, gestion du cloisonnement en cas de mode multi-tenant). Si le SaaS rend un service \nde sécurité de l'information, une certification produit dédiée est nécessaire.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-c1a3ff43caee", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "18.2.3. Revue des changements majeurs", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 18.2.3. Revue des changements majeurs", "token_count": 269 }, { "chunk_id": "800b0914043db0281b88c3035ebc583c", "text": "18.3. Conformité avec les politiques et les normes de sécurité\n\na) Le prestataire via le responsable de la sécurité de l’information doit s’assurer régulièrement de \nl’exécution correcte de l’ensemble des procédures de sécurité placées sous sa responsabil ité en \nvue de garantir leur conformité avec les politiques et normes de sécurité. \n \n \n \n6 L’audit d’architecture, de la sécurité physique et de l’organisation de la sécurité de l’information n’est pas utile dans le cadre de la revue initiale car traité par \nailleurs dans le référentiel. \n7 La délivrance du certificat est subordonnée à la correction des vulnérabilités critiques identifiées lors de la revue initial e. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 47/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-1598c3f4436a", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "18.3. Conformité avec les politiques et les normes de sécurité", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 18.3. Conformité avec les politiques et les normes de sécurité", "token_count": 209 }, { "chunk_id": "e6a60af58f17baf7fd92ef704804c0c5", "text": "18.4. Examen de la conformité technique\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et mettre en œuvre une politique permettant de vérifier la \nconformité technique du service aux exigences du présent référentiel. Cette politique doit définir \nles objectifs, méthodes, fréquences, résultats attendus et mesures correctrices. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 48/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-0d30f7e768f9", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "18.4. Examen de la conformité technique", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 18.4. Examen de la conformité technique", "token_count": 119 }, { "chunk_id": "f6ec65ee1612327ce40ae6a7d27b3c65", "text": "19.1. Convention de service\n\na) Le prestataire doit établir une convention de service avec chacun des commanditaires du service. \nToute modification de la convention de service doit être soumise à acceptation du commanditaire. \nb) Le prestataire doit identifier dans la convention de service : \n- les obligations, droits et responsabilités de chacune des parties : prestataire et tiers impliqués \ndans la fourniture du service, commanditaires, etc. ; \n- les éléments explicitement exclus des responsabilités du prestataire dans la limite de ce que \nprévoient les exigences légales et réglementaires en vig ueur, notamment l’article 28 du \n[RGPD] ; \n- la localisation du service. La localisation du support doit être précisée lorsqu’il est réalisé \ndepuis un État hors l’Union Européenne, comme le permet l’exigence 19.2.e. \nc) Le prestataire doit proposer une convention de service appliquant le droit d’un État membre de \nl’Union Européenne. Le droit applicable doit être identifié dans la convention de service. \nd) La convention de service doit indiq uer que la collecte, la manipulation , le stockage , et plus \ngénéralement le traitement des données faits dans le cadre de l’avant-vente, de la mise en œuvre, \nde la maintenance et l’arrêt du service sont réalisés conformément aux exigences édictées par la \nlégislation en vigueur. \ne) La convention de service doit indiquer que le prestataire doit mettre à la disposition du \ncommanditaire, sur demande de celui -ci, les éléments d’appréciation des risques liés à la \nsoumission des données du commanditaire au droit d’un état non-membre de l’Union Européenne \n(voir 5.3.e). \nf) Le prestataire doit décrire dans la convention de service les moyens techniques et organisationnels \nqu’il met en œuvre pour assurer le respect du droit applicable. \ng) Le prestataire doit inclure dans la convention de service une clause de révision de la convention \nprévoyant notamment une résiliation sans pénalité pour le commanditaire en cas de perte de la \nqualification octroyée au service. \nh) Le prestataire doit inclure dans la convention de service une clause de réversibilité permettant au \ncommanditaire de récupérer l’ensemble de ses données (fournies directement par le \ncommanditaire ou produites dans le cadre du service à partir des données ou des actions du \ncommanditaire). \ni) Le prestataire doit assurer cette réversibilité via l’une des modalités techniques suivantes : \n- la mise à disposition de fichiers suivant un ou plusieurs formats documentés et exploitables \nen dehors du service fourni par le prestataire ; \n- la mise en place d’interfaces techniques perm ettant l’accès aux données suivant un schéma \ndocumenté et exploitable (API, format pivot, etc.). \nLes modalités techniques de la réversibilité figurent dans la convention de service. \nj) Le prestataire doit indiquer dans la convention de service le niveau de disponibilité du service. \nk) Le prestataire doit indiquer dans la convention de service qu’il ne peut disposer des données \ntransmises et générées par le commanditaire, leur disposition étant réservée au commanditaire. \nl) Le prestataire doit indiquer dans la conve ntion de service qu’il ne divulgue aucune information \nrelative à la prestation à des tiers, sauf autorisation formelle et écrite du commanditaire. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 49/55 \n \nm) Le prestataire doit indiquer dans la convention de service si les données du commanditaire sont \nautomatiquement sauvegardées ou non. Dans la négative, le prestataire doit sensibiliser le \ncommanditaire aux risques encourus et clairement indiquer les opérations à mener par le \ncommanditaire pour que ses données soient sauvegardées. \nn) Le prestataire doit indiquer dans la convention de service s’il autorise l’accès distant pour des \nactions d’administration ou de support au système d’information du service. \no) Le prestataire doit préciser dans la convention de service que : \n- le service est qualifié et inclure l’attestation de qualification ; \n- le commanditaire peut déposer une réclamation relative au service qualifié auprès de \nl’ANSSI ; \n- le commanditaire autorise l’ANSSI et l’organisme de qualification à auditer le service et son \nsystème d’information du service afin de vérifier qu’ils respectent les exigences du présent \nréférentiel. \np) Le prestataire doit préciser dans la convention de service que le commanditaire autorise, \nconformément au présent référentiel (voir chapitre 18.2, un prestataire d’audit de la sécurité des \nsystèmes d’information [PASSI] qualifié mandaté par le prestataire à auditer le service et son \nsystème d’information dans le cadre du plan de contrôle. \nq) Le prestataire doit préciser dans la convention de service qu’il s’engage à mettre à disposition \ntoutes les informations nécessaires à la réalisation d’audits de conformité aux dispositions de \nl’article 28 du [RGPD], menés par le commanditaire ou un tiers mandaté. \nr) Il est recommandé que le tiers mandaté pour les audits soit un prestataire d’audit de la sécurité \ndes systèmes d’information [PASSI] qualifié.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-5f39f39c8d33", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.1. Convention de service", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.1. Convention de service", "token_count": 1298 }, { "chunk_id": "f67fd06b17812462d86454ebcc7b7e05", "text": "19.2. Localisation des données\n\na) Le prestataire doit documenter et communiquer au commanditaire la localisation du stocka ge et \ndu traitement des données de ce dernier. \nb) Le prestataire doit stocker et traiter les données du commanditaire au sein de l’Union Européenne. \nc) Les opérations d’administration et de supervision du service doivent être réalisées depuis l’Union \nEuropéenne. \nd) Le prestataire doit stocker et traiter les données techniques (identités des bénéficiaires et des \nadministrateurs de l’infrastructure technique, donn ées manipulées par le Software Defined \nNetwork, journaux de l’infrastructure technique, annuaire, certificats, configuration des accès, \netc.) au sein de l’Union Européenne. \ne) Le prestataire peut réaliser des opérations de support aux commanditaires depuis un État hors de \nl’Union Européenne. Il doit documenter la liste des opérations qui peuvent être effectuées par le \nsupport au commanditaire depuis un État hors de l’Union Européenne, et les mécanismes \npermettant d’en assurer le contrôle d’accès et la supervision depuis l’Union Européenne.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-197de2717176", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.2. Localisation des données", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.2. Localisation des données", "token_count": 274 }, { "chunk_id": "7fbdec6e6ed86c662ea78d96e0d417ae", "text": "19.3. Régionalisation.\n\na) Le prestataire doit s’assurer que les interfaces du service accessibles au commanditaire soient au \nmoins disponibles en langue française. \nb) Le prestataire doit fournir un support de premier niveau en langue française. \n \nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 50/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-117264709e58", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.3. Régionalisation.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.3. Régionalisation.", "token_count": 102 }, { "chunk_id": "519abc7104906fdbd6969d0993fb85de", "text": "19.4. Fin de contrat\n\na) À la fin du contrat liant le prestataire et le commanditaire, que le contrat soit arrivé à son terme \nou pour toute autre cause, le prestataire doit assurer un effacement sécurisé de l’intégralité des \ndonnées du commanditaire. Cet effacement doit faire l’ob jet d’un préavis formel au \ncommanditaire de la part du prestataire respectant un délai de vingt et un jours calendaires. \nL’effacement peut être réalisé suivant l’une des méthodes suivantes, et ce dans un délai précisé \ndans la convention de service : \n- effacement par réécriture complète de tout support ayant hébergé ces données ; \n- effacement des clés utilisées pour le chiffrement des espaces de stockage du commanditaire \ndécrit au chapitre 10.1 ; \n- recyclage sécurisé, dans les conditions énoncées au chapitre 11.9. \nb) À la fin du contrat, le prestataire doit supprimer les données techniques relatives au \ncommanditaire (annuaire, certificats, configuration des accès, etc.).", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-46ab3a855cd7", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.4. Fin de contrat", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.4. Fin de contrat", "token_count": 242 }, { "chunk_id": "7ba97adad7b7e6cb37fc029914353021", "text": "19.5. Protection des données à caractère personnel\n\na) Le prestataire doit justifier du respect des principes de protection des données pour les traitements \nde données à caractère personnel mis en œuvre pour son propre compte. Il doit justifier au \nminimum les points suivants : \n- les finalités des traitements déterminées, explicites et légitimes ; \n- la traçabilité des activités de traitement pour son compte et celui de son commanditaire ; \n- le fondement licite des traitements ; \n- l’interdiction du détournement de finalité des traitements ; \n- les données u tilisées respectent le principe du minimum nécessaire et suffisant pour les \ntraitements ; ainsi sont adéquates, pertinentes et limitées ; \n- la qualité des données utilisées pour les traitements maintenue : données exactes et tenues à \njour ; \n- les durées de conservation définies et limitées. \nb) Le prestataire doit justifier, pour les traitements de données à caractère personnel mis en œuvre \npour son propre compte, du respect des droits des personnes concernées. Il doit justifier au \nminimum les points suivants : \n- l’information des usagers via un traitement loyal et transparent ; \n- le recueil du consentement des usagers : exprès, démontrable et retirable ; \n- la possibilité pour les usagers d’exercer les droits d’accès, de rectification et d’effacement ; \n- la possibilité pour les usagers d’exercer les droits de limitation du traitement, de portabilité \net d’opposition. \nc) Lorsqu’il agit en qualité de sous -traitant au sens de l’article 28 de [RGPD], le prestataire doit \napporter assistance et conseil au commanditaire en l’informant si une instruction de ce dernier \nconstitue une violation des règles de protection des données.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3b7bb3e9cb3b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.5. Protection des données à caractère personnel", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.5. Protection des données à caractère personnel", "token_count": 433 }, { "chunk_id": "757ae9b759a8ef0ee3dbe928a7caec52", "text": "19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen\n\na) Le siège statutaire, administration centrale et principal établissement du prestataire doi vent être \nétablis au sein d'un État membre de l'Union Européenne.\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 51/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3727f87902df", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "token_count": 92 }, { "chunk_id": "8697ee18014477df5a58d47fd60e7085", "text": "b) Le capital social et les droits de vote dans la société du prestataire ne doivent pas être, directement \nou indirectement : \n- individuellement détenus à plus de 24% ; \n- et collectivement détenus à plus de 39% ; \npar des entités tierces possédant leur siège statutaire, administration centrale ou principal \nétablissement au sein d’un État non membre de l’Union européenne.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3727f87902df", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "token_count": 95 }, { "chunk_id": "467fe29d26b9d269b6c283d2dfa3fa20", "text": "Si le capital détenu par ces entités tierces se présente sous la forme d’actions admises aux \nnégociations sur un marché réglementé, ces susdites entités tierces sont celles déclarées \nconformément au I de l’article L.233-7 du code de commerce.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3727f87902df", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "token_count": 61 }, { "chunk_id": "1103a285a93f29a64387ed84207aed42", "text": "Ces entités tierces susmentionnées ne peuvent pas individuellement ou collectivement : \n- en vertu d’un contrat ou de clauses statutaires, disposer d’un droit de véto ; \n- en vertu d’un contrat ou de clauses statutaires, désigner la majorité des membres des organes \nd’administration, de direction ou de surveillance du prestataire. \nc) En cas de recours par le prestataire, dans le cadre des services fournis au commanditaire, aux \nservices d’une société tierce - y compris un sous -traitant - possédant son siège statutaire, \nadministration cent rale ou principal établissement au sein d'un État non membre de l'Union \nEuropéenne ou appartenant ou étant contrôlée par une société tierce domiciliée en dehors l'Union \nEuropéenne, cette susdite société tierce ne doit pas avoir la possibilité technique d’o btenir les \ndonnées opérées au travers du service. Ces données visées sont celles qui sont confiées au \nprestataire par les commanditaires ainsi que toutes données techniques (identités des bénéficiaires \net des administrateurs de l’infrastructure technique, données manipulées par le Software Defined \nNetwork, journaux de l’infrastructure technique, annuaire, certificats, configuration des accès, \netc.) comprenant des informations sur les commanditaires.\n\nPour les besoins du présent article, la notion de contrôle est entendue comme étant celle \nmentionnée au II de l’article L233-3 du code de commerce.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3727f87902df", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "token_count": 354 }, { "chunk_id": "aa38e59e4ebbb32f39c56a48914afe87", "text": "d) Dans le cadre de l’exigence 19.6.c, toute société tierce à laquelle le prestataire recourt pour fournir \ntout ou partie du service rendu au commanditaire, doit garantir au prestataire une autonomie \nd’exploitation continue dans la fourniture des services d’informatique en nuage qu’il opère ou \ndoit être qualifié SecNumCloud.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3727f87902df", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "token_count": 82 }, { "chunk_id": "44f73b562a8c20b2fb854a2426b3b45a", "text": "Pour les besoins du présent article, la notion d’autonomie d’exploitation est entendue comme \nétant la capacité de maintenir la fourniture du service d’informatique en nuage en faisant appel \naux compétences propres du prestataire ou en recourant à des prestations disponibles auprès d’au \nmoins deux sociétés tierces.", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3727f87902df", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "token_count": 79 }, { "chunk_id": "67ed89afa931263f03a71d5f4334e68f", "text": "e) Le service fourni par le prestataire doit respecter la législation en vigueur en matière de droits \nfondamentaux et les valeurs de l’Union relatives au respect de la dignité humaine, à la liberté , à \nl’égalité, à la démocratie et à l’État de droit. Il peut être pris en considération pour l’appréciation \nde la conformité susmentionnée, le fait que le prestataire entretienne des liens avec un \ngouvernement ou un organisme public étrangers. \nf) Le prestataire doit informer formellement le commanditaire, et dans un délai d’un mois, de tout \nchangement juridique, organisationnel ou technique pouvant avoir un impact sur la conformité de \nla prestation aux exigences du chapitre 19.6.\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 52/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3727f87902df", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "token_count": 212 }, { "chunk_id": "b5a9527acb7d8acf927ed55594ef853d", "text": "Annexe 1 Références documentaires \nI. Codes, textes législatifs et réglementaires \nRenvoi Document \n[LOI_IL] Loi du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés. \nDisponible sur http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr \n[RGPD] \nRèglement (UE) 2016/679 du parlement européen et du conseil du 27 avril \n2016 relatif à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement \ndes données à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données. \nDisponible sur https://eur-lex.europa.eu \n[CP_ART_314-1] Article 334-1 du Code pénal relatif à l’abus de confiance. \nDisponible sur http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr \n[CP_ART_226-1] Article 226-1 du Code pénal relatif à l’atteinte à la vie privée. \nDisponible sur http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr \n[CP_ART_226-13] Article 226-13 du Code pénal relatif au secret professionnel. \nDisponible sur http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr \n[CP_ART_226-15] Article 226-15 du Code pénal relatif au secret des correspondances. \nDisponible sur http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr \n[CP_ART_323-1] \nArticle 323-1 du Code pénal relatif à l’accès ou au maintien frauduleux dans \nun système de traitement automatisé de données. \nDisponible sur http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr \n[IGI_1300] \nInstruction générale interministérielle n° 1300/SGDSN/PSE/PSD du 9 août \n2021 sur la protection du secret de la défense nationale. \nDisponible sur http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr \n[II_910] Instruction interministérielle relative aux articles contrôlés d e la sécurité des \nsystèmes d’information (ACSSI), n°910/SGDSN/ANSSI, 22 octobre 2013. \nDisponible sur http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr \n[PSSIE] Politique de sécurité des systèmes d’information de l’État (PSSIE), portée par \nla circulaire du Premier ministre n°5725/SG du 17 juillet 2014. \nDisponible sur http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr \nII. Normes et documents techniques \nRenvoi Document \n[AUTHENTIFICATION] \nRecommandations relatives à l’authentification multifacteur et aux mots de \npasse, Guide ANSSI n° ANSSI-PG-078 du 08 février 2021, ANSSI. \nDisponibles sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[CRYPTO_B1] \nRègles et recommandations concernant le choix et le dimensionnement des \nmécanismes cryptographiques, ANSSI, version en vigueur. \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[CRYPTO_B2] \nRègles et recommandations concernant la gestion des clés utilisées dans de s \nmécanismes cryptographiques, ANSSI, version en vigueur. \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[HOMOLOGATION] \nL’homologation de sécurité en neuf étapes simples, ANSSI, version en \nvigueur. \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[HYGIENE] Guide d’Hygiène Informatique, ANSSI, version en vigueur. \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[INTERNET] \nRecommandations relatives à l’interconnexion d’un système d’information à \nInternet, Guide ANSSI n° ANSSI-PA-066 du 19 juin 2020, ANSSI. \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 53/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3727f87902df", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "token_count": 753 }, { "chunk_id": "75c58559504d3371c3f057215d3e0256", "text": "Renvoi Document \n[NT_IPSEC] \nRecommandations de sécurité relatives à IPsec, note tec hnique n° DAT-NT-\n003/ANSSI/SDE/NP du 3 août 2015, ANSSI. \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[NT_TLS] \nRecommandations de sécurité relatives à TLS, note technique \nn° SDE-NT-35/ANSSI/SDE/NP du 19 août 2016, ANSSI. \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[NT_SSH] \nRecommandations pour un usage sécurisé d’(Open)SSH, note technique n° \nDAT-NT-007/ANSSI/SDE/NP du 17 août 2015, ANSSI. \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[NT_JOURNAL] \nRecommandations de sécurité pour la mise en œuvre d’un système de \njournalisation, note technique n° DAT -NT-012/ANSSI/SDE/NP du 2 \ndécembre 2013, ANSSI. \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[NT_ADMIN] \nRecommandations relatives à l’administration sécurisée des systèmes \nd’information, Guide ANSSI n° ANSSI-PA-022 du 11 mai 2021, ANSSI \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[G_AUTH] \nRecommandations relatives à l’authentification multifacteur et aux mots de \npasse, Guide ANSSI n° ANSSI-PG-078 du 8 octobre 2021, ANSSI \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[G_CVAP] \nRecommandations sur la sécurisation des systèmes de contrôle d’accès \nphysique et de vidéoprotection, Guide ANSSI n° ANSSI -PA-72 du 04 mars \n2020, ANSSI \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[G_EXT] Guide de l’externalisation, Guide ANSSI du 03 décembre 2010, ANSSI \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[G_INT] \nRecommandations relatives à l’interconnexion d’un système d’information \nsur Internet, Guide ANSSI n°ANSSI-PA-066 du 16 juin 2020, ANSSI \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[PASSI] \nRéférentiel d’exigences applicables à un prestataire d’audit de la sécurité des \nsystèmes d’information, ANSSI, version en vigueur \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[PDIS] \nRéférentiel d’exigences applicables à un prestataire de détection des incidents \nde sécurité, ANSSI, version en vigueur \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[PRIS] \nRéférentiel d’exigences applicables à un prestataire de réponse aux incidents \nde sécurité, ANSSI, version en vigueur \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[ISO27001] \nNorme internationale ISO/IEC 27001:2013 : Technologies de l'information – \nTechniques de sécurité – Systèmes de management de la sécurité de \nl'information – Exigences. \nDisponible sur http://www.iso.org \nIII. Autres références documentaires \nRenvoi Document \n[PROCESS_QUALIF] Processus de qualification d’un service, version en vigueur. \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr \n[GUIDE_ACHAT] \nGuide d’achat de produits de sécurité et de services de confiance qualifiés, \nversion en vigueur. \nDisponible sur http://www.ssi.gouv.fr\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 54/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3727f87902df", "chunk_index": 8, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "token_count": 704 }, { "chunk_id": "c6f6b94ab2e71ff5095b656280b65c77", "text": "Renvoi Document \n[GUIDE_CNIL] \nRecommandations pour les entreprises qui envisagent de souscrire à des \nservices de cloud computing. \nDisponible sur https://www.cnil.fr/fr/cloud-computing-les-conseils-de-la-\ncnil-pour-les-entreprises-qui-utilisent-ces-nouveaux-services\n\nPrestataires de services d’informatique en nuage (SecNumCloud) – référentiel d’exigences \nVersion Date Critère de diffusion Page \n3.2 08/03/2022 Public 55/55", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3727f87902df", "chunk_index": 9, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "token_count": 107 }, { "chunk_id": "fc0f78b5c8a1ca5c6d2691d1cafc5d08", "text": "Annexe 2 Recommandations aux commanditaires \nCette annexe liste les recommandations de l’ANSSI aux commanditaires de prestations d’informatique \nen nuage. \na) Le commanditaire peut, lorsqu’il est une autorité administrative ou un opérateur d’importance vitale, \ndemander à l’ANSSI de participer à la définition du cahier des charges faisant l’objet d’un appel \nd’offres ou d’un contrat. \nb) Il est recommandé que le commanditaire choisisse son prestataire dans le catalogue des prestataires \nqualifiés publié sur le site de l’ANSSI, la qualification d’un prestataire d’informatique en nuage \nattestant de sa conformité à l’ensemble des exigences du présent référentiel. \nc) Pour bénéficier d’une prestation qualifiée, c’est -à-dire conforme à l’ensemble des exigences du \nprésent référentiel, le commanditaire doit : \n- choisir le prestataire dans le catalogue des prestataires qualifiés publié sur le site de l’ANSSI ; \n- exiger du prestataire de stipuler dans la convention de service que la prestation réalisée est \nune prestation qualifiée. \nEn effet, un prestataire qualifié garde la faculté de réaliser des prestations non qualifiées. Le recours \nà un prestataire issu du catalogue des prestataires qualifiés est donc une condition nécessaire mais pas \nsuffisante pour bénéficier d’une prestation qualifiée, le commanditaire doit donc également exiger \nune prestation qualifiée. \nd) Il est recomm andé que le commanditaire utilise le guide d’achat des produits de sécurité et des \nservices de confiance [GUIDE_ACHAT] qui a pour vocation à accompagner la fonction achat des \ncommanditaires lors des appels d’offres. \ne) Le commanditaire peut, conformément au processus de qualification des prestataires de service de \nconfiance [PROCESS_QUALIF], déposer auprès de l’ANSSI une réclamation contre un prestataire \nqualifié pour lequel il estime que ce dern ier n’a pas respecté une ou plusieurs exigences du présent \nréférentiel dans le cadre d’une prestation qualifiée. \nS’il s’avère après instruction de la réclamation que le prestataire n’a pas respecté une ou plusieurs \nexigences du présent référentiel dans le cadre d’une prestation qualifiée, et selon la gravité, la \nqualification du prestataire peut être suspendue, retirée ou sa portée de qualification réduite. \nf) La qualification d’un prestataire n’atteste pas de sa capacité à accéder ou à détenir des information s \nclassifiées de défense [IGI_1300] \ng) La qualification d’un prestataire n’atteste pas de sa capacité à accéder ou à détenir des articles \ncontrôlés de la sécurité des systèmes d’information (ACSSI) [II_910]. \nh) La conformité du service du prestataire au référentiel SecNumCloud ne se substitue pas aux exigences \nlégales ou réglementaires applicables à certaines données spécifiques telles que les données de niveau \nDiffusion Restreinte ou les données de santé. \ni) Pour l’accès aux interfaces de gestion du service, il est recommandé que le commanditaire utilise des \nmoyens (terminaux, serveurs) dédiés aux tâches d’administration et conformes aux recommandations \ndu guide [NT_ADMIN].", "article_id": "PDF-ANSSI-SecNumCloud-3727f87902df", "chunk_index": 10, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI)", "titre_article": "19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ANSSI-SecNumCloud", "context_prefix": "SecNumCloud v3.2 — Référentiel d'exigences (ANSSI) > 19.6. Protection vis-à-vis du droit extra-européen", "token_count": 768 }, { "chunk_id": "6531efa2d1c49765c4368bd9258d76c2", "text": "EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY \nFOR CYBERSECURITY\n \n \n \n \nTECHNICAL \nIMPLEMENTATION \nGUIDANCE \nOn Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 of 17 October 2024 \nlaying down rules for the application of NIS2 Directive as regards technical and \nmethodological requirements of cybersecurity risk -management measures \nJUNE 2025, VERSION 1.0 \n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-76fa5412fbdf", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 99 }, { "chunk_id": "da725f4f8431031fa44401a652cce3e5", "text": "1 \n \nABOUT ENISA\n\nThe European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, is the Union’s agency dedicated to achieving a high common \nlevel of cybersecurity across Europe. Established in 2004 and strengthened by the EU Cybersecurity Act, the \nEuropean Union Agency for Cybersecurity contributes to EU cyber policy, enhances the trustworthiness of ICT \nproducts, services and processes with cybersecurity certification schemes, cooperates with Member States and EU \nbodies and helps Europe prepare for the cyber challenges of tomorrow. Through knowledge sharing, capacity building \nand awareness raising, the agency works together with its key stakeholders to strengthen trust in the connected \neconomy, to boost the resilience of the Union’s infrastructure and, ultimately, to keep Europe’s society and citizens \ndigitally secure. More information about ENISA and its work can be found here: www.enisa.europa.eu. \nCONTACT \nTo contact the authors, use ENISA-NIS-Directive@enisa.europa.eu. \nFor media enquiries about this paper, use press@enisa.europa.eu. \nAUTHORS \nKonstantinos Moulinos, Marianthi Theocharidou, ENISA \nACKNOWLEDGEMENTS \nThis publication was developed by ENISA, in collaboration with the European Commission and the Network and \nInformation Systems Cooperation Group. ENISA would like to thank for their efforts the Network and Information \nSystems Cooperation Group, along with the ENISA European Competent Authorities for Trust Services Expert Group \nand the European Competent Authorities for Secure Electronic Communications. Moreover, ENISA would like to \nrecognise the valuable feedback of the individuals, private organisations, associations and members of the open \nsource software community that contributed to the open consultation. \nLEGAL NOTICE \nThis publication represents the views and interpretations of ENISA, unless stated otherwise. It does not endorse a \nregulatory obligation of ENISA or of ENISA bodies pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/881. \nENISA has the right to alter, update or remove the publication or any of its contents. It is intended for information \npurposes only and must be accessible free of charge. All references to it or its use as a whole or in part must mention \nENISA as its source. \nThird-party sources are quoted as appropriate. ENISA is not responsible or liable for the content of the external \nsources, including external websites, referenced in this publication. \nNeither ENISA nor any person acting on its behalf is responsible for the use that might be made of the information \ncontained in this publication. \nENISA maintains its intellectual property rights in relation to this publication. \n \nLuxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025 \n \nCOPYRIGHT NOTICE \n© European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), 2025 \nUnless otherwise noted, the reuse of this document is authorised under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 \nInternational (CC BY 4.0) licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This means that reuse is allowed, \nprovided appropriate credit is given and any changes are indicated. For any use or reproduction of elements that are \nnot owned by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, permission may need to be sought directly from the \nrespective rights holders. \n \nISBN 978-92-9204-704-7, doi:10.2824/2702548 \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-8793dd4dc327", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1 \n \nABOUT ENISA", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1 \n \nABOUT ENISA", "token_count": 846 }, { "chunk_id": "4e7bf2d89e85da0e55771f680debe29f", "text": "2 \nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nUnder the NIS2 Directive, EU member states set requirements for cybersecurity risk management measures at national \nlevel in critical sectors, for example digital infrastructures, energy, transport or health. However, for several subsector s \nof the digital infrastructures and the ICT service management sectors, these requirements are set at European Union \nlevel due to their cross -border nature. For this purpose, the European C ommission published the Implementing \nRegulation (EU) 2024/2690 on 17 October 2024 (1), which lays down the technical and methodological requirements of \nthe measures referred to in Article 21(2) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555. The technical and methodological requirements \nare set out in Article 2 and in the Annex to this implementing regulation. \nT\nhis technical guidance supports this implementing regulation by providing: \n• gui\ndance, that is, indicative and actionable advice on parameters to consider when implementing a\nrequirement;\n• examples of evidence, that is, the types of evidence that a requirement is in place; and\n• mappings from security requirements to industry good practices, European and international standards, and\nnational frameworks.\nT\nhe document, as well as the implementing regulation, refers to the following type of entities: \n• domain name system service providers,\n• top-level domain name registries,\n• cloud computing service providers,\n• data centre service providers,\n• content delivery network providers,\n• managed service providers and managed security service providers,\n• providers of online marketplaces, online search engines and social networking services platforms and\n• trust service providers.\nT\nhe document covers the following technical and methodological requirements: \n1.\npolicy on the security of network and information systems,\n2. risk management policy,\n3. incident handling,\n4. business continuity and crisis management,\n5. supply chain security,\n6. security in network and information systems acquisition, development and maintenance,\n7. policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk-management measures,\n8. basic cyber hygiene practices and security training,\n9. cryptography,\n10. human resources security,\n11. access control,\n12. asset management and\n13. environmental and physical security.\nT\no develop this technical guidance, ENISA worked closely with the European Commission and the Network and \nInformation Systems Cooperation Group, and ENISA held a public consultation to get input from the private sector. This \nguidance is a living document because it maps the technical and methodological requirements referred to in Article 2 \n(1) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R2690&qid=1729254262885. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n3 \nand \nthe Annex to the implementing regulation, to European and international standards and to national cybersecurity \nmanagement frameworks. Both the standards and the management frameworks are constantly subject to change. \nTherefore, a review process should be initiated at regular intervals by ENISA in collaboration with the European \nCommission and the Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group, for instance to add additional mappings \nindustry good practices, international standards and national frameworks. \nDISCLAIMER \nThis document is not legally binding and is only of an advisory character. It is not intended to replace the \nframeworks, guidance, tools or other mechanisms provided by Member States at national level. \nIt should be clarified that the Member States retain the freedom to determine their approach to the \nsupervision of the requirements under this implementing regulation. Therefore, this ENISA technical \nguidance is not able to define whether an entity needs to have all or just some of the ‘evidence’ listed \n(although requiring all the ‘evidence’ listed here would be a very strict approach to supervision). This \ndocument also does not determine the appropriateness of such measures or evidence. However, it can \nhelp the national competent authorities develop their approach to the supervision of the requirements. \nEntities in scope of the regulation should check under whose jurisdiction they fall and they should follow \nany guidance by national competent authorities (see recital 7 of the implementing regulation). \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-c03ba8ceb6e7", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2 \nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2 \nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY", "token_count": 1114 }, { "chunk_id": "96577f81c4e427e61e5f7f3f5ff9070a", "text": "5.2 DIRECTORY OF SUPPLIERS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS 73\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n5", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-33322e22230c", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "5.2 DIRECTORY OF SUPPLIERS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS 73", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 5.2 DIRECTORY OF SUPPLIERS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS 73", "token_count": 29 }, { "chunk_id": "7d5d1b04a62d8e5768f17e6bb8b9c47d", "text": "6. SECURITY IN NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS\n\nACQUISITION, DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE 76", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-2edc6e7ebc78", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6. SECURITY IN NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6. SECURITY IN NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "token_count": 22 }, { "chunk_id": "75ae32f7ff84b933818abc04b1a65bf5", "text": "7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF\n\nCYBERSECURITY RISK-MANAGEMENT MEASURES 107", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d0e10bb45b04", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF", "token_count": 25 }, { "chunk_id": "c4814826f843dc80ee722fa45d7c415d", "text": "11.3 PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS AND SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNTS 135\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n6\n \n11.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d373f715d657", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.3 PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS AND SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNTS 135", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.3 PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS AND SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNTS 135", "token_count": 32 }, { "chunk_id": "b050120379a4d16b2794db2555244a3e", "text": "12.5 DEPOSIT, RETURN OR DELETION OF ASSETS UPON TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 154\n\n13.ENVIRONMENTAL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY 157", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-b393451148f1", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "12.5 DEPOSIT, RETURN OR DELETION OF ASSETS UPON TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 154", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 12.5 DEPOSIT, RETURN OR DELETION OF ASSETS UPON TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 154", "token_count": 30 }, { "chunk_id": "1f8afc1774d25d4b8e8b7de049cc7c5a", "text": "13.3 PERIMETER AND PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL 161\n\nANNEX I NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS 165\nANNEX II GLOSSARY 167\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-c1719b357eda", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.3 PERIMETER AND PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL 161", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.3 PERIMETER AND PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL 161", "token_count": 39 }, { "chunk_id": "4c169a41efccd293acfaa6d081bc889a", "text": "7 \n \nINTRODUCTION\n\nBACKGROUND \nOn 18 October 2024, the European Commission published Commission Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 of \n17 October 2024, hereafter the regulation, pursuant to Articles 21(5), first subparagraph and 23(11), second \nsubparagraph, of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (hereafter the NIS2 Directive). Article 2 of this regulation specifies that, for \nthe essential and important entities in scope of the regulation (hereafter ‘relevant entities’), the technical and \nmethodological requirements of cybersecurity risk-management measures referred to in Article 21(2), points (a) to (j), \nof the NIS2 Directive are set out in the Annex to the regulation. \nAccording to recital 7, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) can support relevant entities by \nproviding guidance on the implementation of the technical and methodological requirements referred to in the Annex \nto the regulation. This implementation guidance was developed by ENISA is collaboration with the Network and \nInformation Systems Cooperation Group (NIS CG) and the European Commission. ENISA published an early draft of \nthis guidance as part of a public consultation, to solicit feedback and input from the private sector. ENISA also \nconsulted with various relevant workstreams of the NIS Cooperation group, as well as the ENISA expert group for \nEuropean Competent Authorities for Trust Services (ECATS) and the ENISA expert group for European Competent \nAuthorities for Secure Electronic Communications (ECASEC). \nGOAL \nThe document provides non-binding guidance for relevant entities to the regulation on the technical and \nmethodological requirements of the cybersecurity risk management measures. \nTARGET AUDIENCE \nBeyond the relevant entities to the regulation, this guidance may provide indications on the technical and \nmethodological requirements of the cybersecurity risk management measures of the NIS2 Directive, which may be \nconsidered useful by other public or private bodies for improving their cybersecurity. \nSTRUCTURE \nThe Annex to the regulation consists of 13 titles with a varying number of technical and methodological requirements \n(see Figure 1). Each technical and methodological requirement is highlighted (blue font and grey background) and is \nincluded in this document for readability. \nEach requirement is followed by three elements: guidance, examples of evidence and tips (2). This part of the \ndocument is not legally binding and is only recommendations (3). \n1. The guidance section contains indicative and actionable advice on parameters to consider when \nimplementing a technical and methodological requirement or further explanation of concepts found in the \nlegal text. \n2. Examples of evidence are indicative types of evidence showing that a technical and methodological \nrequirement is in place. \n \n \n(2) A few requirements might not have one or more of these elements because their implementation was considered straightforward. \n(3) A recommendation is defined as an ‘expression, in the content of a document, that conveys a suggested possible choice or course of action \ndeemed to be particularly suitable without necessarily mentioning or excluding others’. \nA requirement is defined as an ‘expression, in the content of a document, that conveys objectively verifiable criteria to be fulfilled and from which no \ndeviation is permitted if conformance with the document is to be claimed’ (ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 – Principles and rules for the structure and \ndrafting of ISO and IEC documents, 9th edition, 2021). \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n8 \n \n3. In some technical and methodological requirements, extra general tips are also offered for additional \nconsideration by the entity. \n \nFigure 1: Technical and methodological requirements of the cybersecurity risk-management measures \n(Annex to Commission Implementing Regulation 2024/2690) \n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-5e2b207033de", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "7 \n \nINTRODUCTION", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 7 \n \nINTRODUCTION", "token_count": 995 }, { "chunk_id": "27a49b274198b6af12858ccaf7fad19f", "text": "9 \n \n \nFigure 2: Technical and methodological measures structure\n\nThe guidance, examples of evidence and tips are non-exhaustive. Their partial or complete implementation does \nnot assume compliance or conformity with the requirements of the regulation. Relevant entities may choose \nalternative methods to fulfil a requirement or use different evidence to demonstrate compliance. Moreover, a single \npiece of evidence may support various requirements; for example, an organisational chart can demonstrate both ‘roles \nand responsibilities’ and ‘segregation of duties’. Consequently, evidence may appear multiple times within the text. \nFinally, each requirement is mapped to (a) requirements of European and international standards or frameworks \n(International Organization for Standardization (ISO) / International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 27001:2022, \n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n10 \n \nISO/IEC 27002:2022 (4), NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, ETSI EN 319 401 V3.1.1 (2024–06), European \nCommittee for Standardization Technical Specification (CEN/TS) 18026:2024) and (b) to the NIS2 national \nframeworks (5). The mapping to standards and frameworks is available on the ENISA website in Excel format (6). \nIt should be noted that the mapping was done only to horizontal standards and for specific topics. Detailed standards \nor technical specifications are referenced in footnotes, where available. These standards are included as examples, \nas they are commonly used. The choice of which standards and good practices to apply should be made by the entity, \nas they may relate to the context of the entity’s activities and characteristics. \nTo implement the requirements, the relevant entities may build upon their current usage of standards or frameworks, if \navailable. Annex I of this document provides details for each national framework submitted to ENISA during the \nconsultation phases, while some terms are explained in Annex II. The document does not aim to establish a new \nstandard or to duplicate existing ones (e.g. ISO, IEC and CEN). The guidance is written in a technology-neutral and \nstandards-neutral way. \nThe mapping should not be interpreted as a measure of equivalency among different standards or frameworks. It \nsimply refers to relevant requirements in these standards or frameworks without assessing whether these fully cover \nthe requirements of the regulation. Cybersecurity standards or frameworks often address the same cybersecurity \nconcerns but use different language, structures or levels of specificity or detail. Understanding these relationships may \nhelp relevant entities use and integrate multiple standards or frameworks efficiently, to maintain compliance, reduce \nduplication and streamline audits. \nRelevant entities subject to the regulation can use national frameworks, guidance, standards or other mechanisms \nequivalent to the requirements of the regulation to demonstrate their compliance to national competent authorities. \nDepending on the national framework, compliance with the requirements set out by the regulation could be \ndemonstrated by means of assessment or certification by relevant accredited conformity assessment bodies or by \nindependent auditors authorised by the national competent authorities or certification bodies authorised by the \nnational competent authorities, against the national frameworks, guidelines, standards or other mechanisms \nequivalent to technical and methodological requirements for cybersecurity risk-management measures. To keep the \ncurrent guidance up to date, Member States can inform ENISA of those equivalent national frameworks, guidance, \nstandards or other mechanisms, if available. \nTOPIC-SPECIFIC POLICIES \nAs described in preamble 9 of the regulation, the policy on the security of network and information systems (7) \n(Annex to the regulation, point 1.1) should be the highest-level document setting out the relevant entities’ overall \napproach to the security of their network and information systems and should be approved by the management bodies \nof the entities. \n \n \n \n(4) The information security controls listed in Table A.1 of Annex A to this standard are directly derived from and aligned with those listed in ISO/IEC \n27002:2022. Clauses 5 to 8 are to be used in context with clause 6.1.3 (information security risk treatment) of ISO/IEC 27001:2022. \n(5) The mapping is based on the information that the representatives of the Member States in the NIS Cooperation Group work stream on security \nmeasures have provided to ENISA. \n(6) ENISA Technical implementation guidance mapping table (Excel file), https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/nis2-technical-implementation-\nguidance \n(7) Article 21(2), point (a) of the NIS2 Directive. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n11 \n \nIn addition to this overarching corporate policy, the following topic-specific, documented policies (8) are required.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-5a8f74495514", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "9 \n \n \nFigure 2: Technical and methodological measures structure", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 9 \n \n \nFigure 2: Technical and methodological measures structure", "token_count": 1247 }, { "chunk_id": "bd5d7334520d43056dad324abf67ab85", "text": "4. Security testing policy (Annex to the regulation, point 6.5.1).\n\n5. Policy to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk management measures (Annex to the regulation, \npoint 7.1.1).", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3db5aab1d0ad", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4. Security testing policy (Annex to the regulation, point 6.5.1).", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4. Security testing policy (Annex to the regulation, point 6.5.1).", "token_count": 47 }, { "chunk_id": "ec1b159f6022b542e78cae2d6d65761a", "text": "7. Access control policy (Annex to the regulation, point 11.1.1).\n\n8. Policies for the management of privileged accounts and system administration accounts (Annex to the \nregulation, point 11.3) \n9. Handling of information and assets policy (Annex to the regulation, point 12.2.1).", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-ed55a01d69cb", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "7. Access control policy (Annex to the regulation, point 11.1.1).", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 7. Access control policy (Annex to the regulation, point 11.1.1).", "token_count": 70 }, { "chunk_id": "45cafe7f7234681f9697a99a60620858", "text": "10. Removable media policy (Annex to the regulation, point 12.3.1).\n\nDocumenting the aforementioned topic-specific policies is mandatory. However, the relevant entity should use its \ndiscretion to determine the format of documentation, whether it be through separate documents, updates to existing \npolicies or a single comprehensive document. \n \n \n \n \n(8) According to ISO/IEC 27002:2022, topic-specific policy includes ‘intentions and direction on a specific subject or topic, as formally expressed by the \nappropriate level of management’. \nPOLICY ON THE \nSECURITY OF \nNETWORK AND \nINFORMATION \nSYSTEMS\nChapter I\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n13", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0a15ed66ecd3", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "10. Removable media policy (Annex to the regulation, point 12.3.1).", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 10. Removable media policy (Annex to the regulation, point 12.3.1).", "token_count": 170 }, { "chunk_id": "07ae22139f29d81875f764e5f0a5b392", "text": "1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS\n\n1.1.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2), point (a) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the policy on the security of network and \ninformation systems shall: \n(a) set out the relevant entities’ approach to managing the security of their network and information systems; \n(b) be appropriate to and complementary with the relevant entities’ business strategy and objectives; \n(c) set out network and information security objectives; \n(d) include a commitment to continual improvement of the security of network and information systems; \n(e) include a commitment to provide the appropriate resources needed for its implementation, including the necessary \nstaff, financial resources, processes, tools and technologies; \n(f) be communicated to and acknowledged by relevant employees and relevant interested external parties; \n(g) lay down roles and responsibilities pursuant to point 1.2; \n(h) list the documentation to be kept and the duration of retention of the documentation; \n(i) list the topic-specific policies; \n(j) lay down indicators and measures to monitor its implementation and the current status of relevant entities’ maturity \nlevel of network and information security; \n(k) indicate the date of the formal approval by the management bodies of the relevant entities (the ‘management bodies’). \nGUIDANCE \n• Set a policy on the security of network and information systems, covering all systems, assets and \nprocedures that fall within the scope of the policy. \n• Make sure that relevant personnel and relevant interested external parties, acknowledge the policy on the \nsecurity of network and information systems, typically through a signed document or digital \nacknowledgement, where applicable. \no Depending on the context, external parties may mean suppliers, service providers, shareholders, \nauthorities, visitors, external interest groups or forums. \no The acknowledgement may be included in other contracts, such as employment contracts or \nservice provision contracts. \no The policy should be communicated to relevant personnel and interested external parties in a \nform that is relevant, accessible and understandable to the intended reader. \no Relevant personnel and relevant interested external parties may not be made aware of the full \ntext of the policy. Depending on their role, an extract or a summary containing only relevant \ninformation should be communicated and acknowledged. If the policy is distributed outside the \nentity, care should be taken not to disclose confidential information. \no For contractual requirements of direct suppliers and service providers, point 5.1.4 of the Annex \nto the regulation. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n14", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-71c8aa227474", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "token_count": 692 }, { "chunk_id": "ca08d28bb46ca504f1d45e582bdee1be", "text": "• Make sure that personnel are aware of their responsibilities for the security of network and information \nsystems. \n• Make sure that the policy on the security of network and information systems is approved by the \nmanagement bodies. \n• Make sure that the topic-specific policies are approved by an appropriate level of management. \n• Make sure that the policy includes detailed guidance on the procedures for managing policy exceptions. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented policy on the security of network and information systems which contains the elements \nrequired by points 1.1.1 (a) to 1.1.1 (k) of the Annex to the regulation. \n• The date of the formal approval by the management bodies of the relevant entities, indicated in the policy \non the security of network and information systems. \n• Where applicable, acknowledgement forms or employment contracts, signed by personnel, which confirm \nthey have read and understood the security policies. \n• Where applicable, acknowledgement forms, service provision contracts or other contracts, signed by \nrelevant interested external parties, which confirm they have read and understood the security policies. \n• Evidence that the management bodies understand their role, responsibilities and authorities regarding \nnetwork and information security. This can include but is not limited to: \no a llocation of resources for policy implementation; \no requests (e.g. announcements, emails and documents) to personnel to apply network and \ninformation security in accordance with the established policies and procedures; and \no any initiatives that indicate that management bodies promote improvement in the area of network \nand information security.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-71c8aa227474", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "token_count": 426 }, { "chunk_id": "484abc3b5d7d079fa4660beeefaae359", "text": "1.1.2. The network and information system security policy shall be reviewed and, where appropriate, updated by \nmanagement bodies at least annually and when significant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks occur. \nThe result of the reviews shall be documented. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review the policy on the security of network and information systems at least annually, taking into account \n(indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no updates to the risk assessment results and the risk treatment plan ( Annex to the regulation, \npoint 2.1.4); \no relevant changes in legislation (laws, regulations and other measures imposed by national \ncompetent authorities); \no recommendations provided by relevant authorities; \no relevant changes in industry good practices; \no feedback from interested parties; \no findings of compliance monitoring ( section 2.2) and of independent reviews (Annex to the \nregulation, point 2.3), including policy violations or policy exceptions; \no incidents, even those affecting similar entities in the sector. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n15", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-71c8aa227474", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "token_count": 276 }, { "chunk_id": "5bc00776cc58c9a4db38f8713951e471", "text": "• Update the policy on the security of network and information systems and topic-specific policies, in line \nwith new findings that could affect the entity’s approach to managing information security, including (9): \no updates to the risk assessment results and the risk treatment plan ( Annex to the regulation, \npoint 2.1.4); \no changes to the network and information systems; \no changes to the environment of operation; \no problems identified during the implementation of the policy; \no findings of compliance monitoring (Annex to the regulation, point 2.2.1) and of independent \nreviews (Annex to the regulation, point 2.3), including policy violations or policy exceptions; \no the status of preventive and corrective actions; \no trends related to threats and vulnerabilities; and \no known reported security incidents. \n• All updates to the policy should be based on the covered entity's unique security risks identified through \nits risk assessment. \n• Obtain approval for the revised policy and the policy exceptions by the management bodies. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Review comments or change logs for the policy on the security of network and information systems and \ntopic-specific policies. \n• Documentation of the review process of the requirements listed in point 1.1.1 of the Annex to the \nregulation. \n• Up-to-date policy on the security of network and information systems and topic-specific policies. \n• Evidence that any updates to the policy on the security of network and information systems and any policy \nexceptions, are approved by management bodies and a record is kept. \n• Evidence that any updates to the topic -specific policies are approved by an appropriate level of \nmanagement and a record is kept. \n• Records of the management review.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-71c8aa227474", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "token_count": 442 }, { "chunk_id": "bd16df5f6e60768802782ca969cfc818", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Analyse the policy on the security of network and information systems for compliance with: \no legislative, regulatory and contractual requirements; \no awareness and training requirements (Annex to the regulation, points 8.1 and 8.2); and \no business continuity requirements (Annex to the regulation, point 4.1). \n• Define procedures to facilitate the implementation of the policy on the security of network and information \nsystems and associated measures. \n• Examine documentation of post-incident reviews for significant incidents (10) that include participation and \ninput from management bodies. \n• Ensure that the policy is:", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-71c8aa227474", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "token_count": 161 }, { "chunk_id": "964b29b860df039064bb361cf49688e4", "text": "(9) The occurrence of the indicative events provided does not automatically require a covered entity to update its policy. Instead, the occurrence of \nsuch events should be considered through the risk-assessment process, allowing the entity to determine whether new policy updates are \nnecessary to address its unique security risks identified by the risk assessment. \n(10) In accordance with Articles 3 and 5-14 of the regulation. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n16", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-71c8aa227474", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "token_count": 123 }, { "chunk_id": "29666dca33d714b1c9e7a3e3a85b2b79", "text": "o protected in terms of confidentiality (on a need-to -know basis), integrity , availability and \nauthenticity; \no managed properly so the information is complete, correct, understandable, easily identifiable and \nretrievable. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented policy on the security of network and information systems, including networks and services \nin scope, assets supporting them and the security objectives, including applicable laws and regulations, \naccessible to personnel. \n• Documented topic -specific policies, including applicable laws and regulations, accessible to relevant \npersonnel. \n• Evidence of cybersecurity training of management, for instance: \no training records; \no workshop and seminar attendance; and \no continuous learning materials. \n• Internal communication logs, ad hoc reports or communication policy or records showing regular briefings \nor updates provided to management bodies regarding cybersecurity matters or during significant incidents.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-71c8aa227474", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.1 POLICY ON THE SECURITY OF NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS", "token_count": 245 }, { "chunk_id": "c54e4e2749c018e132b679f160208899", "text": "1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES\n\n1.2.1. As part of their policy on the security of network and information systems referred to in point 1.1, the relevant \nentities shall lay down responsibilities and authorities for network and information system security and assign them to \nroles, allocate them according to the relevant entities’ needs and communicate them to the management bodies. \nGUIDANCE \n• Write job descriptions in a way that clearly outlines rights and responsibilities. \n• Assign security roles and responsibilities to personnel and include these roles in the organisational chart. \n• Describe roles and assign corresponding responsibilities (e.g. chief information security officer), based on \nthe guidance of international frameworks and standards, including the European cybersecurity skills \nframework (ECSF) (11). \n• Ensure that the roles allocated are suitable for the size and business needs of the entity. \n• Formally appoint competent personnel in security roles. Ensure that these assigned persons are \ncompetent on the basis of appropriate education, training or experience. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Job descriptions. \n• List of security roles, who occupies them and contact information. \n• Formal appointment of the key security roles and responsibilities , for example, listed in the company \norganigram or management decision, etc. \n• List of appointments and description of responsibilities and tasks for security roles. \n• Evidence of competence of the assigned persons.\n\n(11) https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/skills-and-competences/skills-development/european-cybersecurity-skills-framework-ecsf. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n17", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-35ae8499f8e3", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES", "token_count": 426 }, { "chunk_id": "079279fe09445a9cbc84cea8f2ae68e3", "text": "1.2.2. The relevant entities shall require all personnel and third parties to apply network and information system security \nin accordance with the established network and information security policy, topic-specific policies and procedures of the \nrelevant entities. \nGUIDANCE \n• Make personnel aware of the security roles in the entity and when each role should be contacted. \n• Make personnel aware of their network and information system security obligations, according to their \nrole. For the disciplinary process, see point 10.4 in the Annex to the regulation. \n• Make relevant interested external parties aware of their network and information system security \nobligations. \no For contractual requirements of direct suppliers and service providers, see point 5.1.4 in the \nAnnex to the regulation. \no Consider third parties, which means external entities or organisations not directly involved in the \noperations of the entity in scope but that may still affect its network and information security. For \nexamples of relevant interested external parties, consider the guidance in section 1.1. \n• The requirement that all personnel and third parties apply network and information system security should \nbe communicated in a form that is relevant, accessible and understandable to the intended reader. \no The network and information security policy, topic-specific policies and procedures of the relevant \nentities do not necessarily need to be communicated in their entirety. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Awareness/dissemination material for personnel, explaining security roles and when/how they should be \ncontacted. \n• Service level agreements (SLAs), contracting contracts, data-processing agreements or other types of \ncontracts or agreements with third parties. \n• Acknowledgement from third parties in various forms (letters , emails, portals or other online options) \nconfirming that they have received and understand their obligations related to network and information \nsystem security, where such requirements are not covered by contractual arrangements.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-35ae8499f8e3", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES", "token_count": 519 }, { "chunk_id": "27e9023af56f916d1e38818ffbaed7ea", "text": "1.2.3. At least one person shall report directly to the management bodies on matters of network and information system \nsecurity. \nGUIDANCE \n• Appoint a person (e.g. chief information security officer or information security manager) responsible for \noverseeing network and information security matters. \n• Make sure that this role is recognized and duly authorized by management bodies. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Up-to-date documentation of the structure of security role assignments and responsibilities. \n• Minutes from meetings with the management. \n• Evidence of business decisions made (e.g. investments in cybersecurity).\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n18", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-35ae8499f8e3", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES", "token_count": 172 }, { "chunk_id": "a91398560cf21072a97a452fcae119f1", "text": "1.2.4. Depending on the size of the relevant entities, network and information system security shall be covered by \ndedicated roles or duties carried out in addition to existing roles. \nGUIDANCE \n• It is often practical to have dedicated information security roles (e.g. a chief information security officer or \nsecurity analysts) who focus solely on protecting the entity’s data and systems. \n• In entities with limited resources, information security responsibilities may be distributed among existing \nroles. For instance, information technology (IT) staff mi ght take on security duties alongside their regular \ntasks. However, the persons assigned should have relevant experience and training to perform the roles \nand to exercise their responsibilities. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Verify the presence of dedicated security roles in larger entities. \n• Check if security responsibilities are assigned to existing roles in smaller entities.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-35ae8499f8e3", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES", "token_count": 235 }, { "chunk_id": "32ad75ea87f77f821408622ae29a9585", "text": "1.2.5. Conflicting duties and conflicting areas of responsibility shall be segregated, where applicable. \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider segregating conflicting duties and areas of responsibility to reduce opportunities for unauthorized \nor unintentional modification or misuse of the entity’s asset. As a minimum, consider that the reviewer \n(auditor) must be different from the personnel or the line of authority of the area under review. \n• The results of the risk assessment or the business impact analysis (BIA) could be used to identify potential \nconflicting duties and areas of responsibility. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Up-to-date documentation of the structure of security role assignments and responsibilities.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-35ae8499f8e3", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES", "token_count": 177 }, { "chunk_id": "293f2bce8c2c7c941314507a3eb87bb0", "text": "1.2.6. Roles, responsibilities and authorities shall be reviewed and, where appropriate, updated by management bodies \nat planned intervals and when significant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks occur. \nGUIDANCE \n• Regularly review and revise the structure of security roles and responsibilities, based on (indicative, non-\nexhaustive list): \no significant incidents, if any; \no changes to the environment of operation, including changes to the network and information \nsystems; \no organisational changes. \n• Where appropriate, updates should be approved by management bodies. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Up-to-date documentation of the structure of security role assignments and responsibilities , including \nversion history. \n• Documentation of the review process, taking into account changes and past incidents.\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-35ae8499f8e3", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 1.2 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES", "token_count": 223 }, { "chunk_id": "fa697dea651701b7789bb113b6cea768", "text": "19 \n \nTIPS\n\nGUIDANCE \n• Make sure that the roles responsible for security roles are contactable in case of incidents. \n• Make sure that each role has its deputy or that measures ensuring continuity in the event of the role \nrepresentative’s absence are in place, where possible. \n• Establish a clear reporting line from the designated security officer to senior management. \n• Ensure that security reporting is integrated into the entity’s overall risk management framework. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented incident response procedures (Annex to the regulation, point 3.5.1) includ ing clear \nprocedures for contacting security roles during an incident. \n• Logs and records of past incidents to check if the security roles were contacted promptly and effectively. \n• Crisis management process and incident response records to check the involvement of the management. \n• Up-to-date organisational chart to check if it clearly shows the reporting structure, including the designated \nsecurity officer and their direct line to senior management. The organisational chart should be dated and \nthe person making the update should be noted. \n \n \n \nRISK \nMANAGEMENT \nPOLICY\nChapter 2\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n21", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-f17fd77805bb", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "19 \n \nTIPS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 19 \n \nTIPS", "token_count": 312 }, { "chunk_id": "479b79ec5415ae291f5571183b171812", "text": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK\n\n2.1.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2), point (a) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall establish and \nmaintain an appropriate risk management framework to identify and address the risks posed to the security of network \nand information systems. The relevant entities shall perform and document risk assessments and, based on the results, \nestablish, implement and monitor a risk treatment plan. Risk assessment results and residual risks (12) shall be accepted \nby management bodies or, where applicable, by persons who are accountable and have the authority to manage risks, \nprovided that the relevant entities ensure adequate reporting to the management bodies. \nGUIDANCE \n• The entity can use its current risk management framework or adopt a new one (13). A risk management \nframework is the structured approach used by an entity to identify, assess, manage and mitigate its \ncybersecurity risks. \n• Create a risk treatment plan that associates the identified risks with assets and the measures mitigating \nthe associated risks and takes into account, at least, elements (g) to (h) in point 2.1.2 of the Annex to the \nregulation. The plan should at least include: \no a description of the identified risk and how it can negatively affect security objectives; \no a risk treatment option (for example risk avoidance, risk mitigation, risk transfer or sharing or risk \nacceptance); \no the assets associated with the risk; \no the measures which mitigate the risk; \no a procedure for assessing the effectiveness of implementation of the measure(s); \no implementation timelines; and \no responsible roles. \n• Consider residual risks from third parties, for example, data breaches, unaddressed vulnerabilities, \nregulatory non-compliance from the from the third-party side and over-reliance on a single third party. \n• Ensure residual risks are accepted by management bodies or, where applicable, persons who are \naccountable and have the authority to manage risks, in line with the acceptable residual risk levels of the \nentity. \n• Make sure that management bodies or, where applicable, persons who are accountable and have the \nauthority to manage risks approve the risk-assessment results and risk-treatment plan. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented risk management framework. \n• Documented results from previous risk assessments. \n• Documented risk treatment plan.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d4bf089aee80", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "token_count": 604 }, { "chunk_id": "0b8a5e3ecb7c677216dea6517ccf5f0e", "text": "(12) The remaining risk after management has implemented a risk response. Source: ISACA Glossary, https://www.isaca.org/resources/glossary. \n(13) For example, ISO/IEC 27005:2022 – Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection – Guidance on managing information security risks. \nA collection of frameworks and methodologies that provide high-level guidelines for risk-management processes that can be applied in all types of \norganisations is available at https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/compendium-of-risk-management-frameworks. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n22", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d4bf089aee80", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "token_count": 153 }, { "chunk_id": "50515caab2a3eb21fad65e2ffab73429", "text": "• Record of approval of risk assessment results by management bodies or by persons who are accountable \nand have the authority to manage risks. \n• Record of approval of residual risks by management bodies or, where applicable, by persons who are \naccountable and have the authority to manage risks.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d4bf089aee80", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "token_count": 74 }, { "chunk_id": "88afc2067a67017bde4424e3ce904cb9", "text": "2.1.2. For the purpose of point 2.1.1, the relevant entities shall establish procedures for identification, analysis, \nassessment and treatment of risks (‘cybersecurity risk management process’). The cybersecurity risk management \nprocess shall be an integral part of the relevant entities’ overall risk management process, where applicable. As part of \nthe cybersecurity risk management process, the relevant entities shall: \n(a) follow a risk management methodology; \n(b) establish the risk tolerance level in accordance with the risk appetite of the relevant entities; \n(c) establish and maintain relevant risk criteria; \n(d) in line with an all-hazards approach, identify and document the risks posed to the security of network and information \nsystems, in particular in relation to third parties and risks that could lead to disruptions in the availability, integrity, \nauthenticity and confidentiality of the network and information systems, including the identification of single point of \nfailures; \n(e) analyse the risks posed to the security of network and information systems, including threat, likelihood, impact and \nrisk level, taking into account cyber threat intelligence and vulnerabilities; \n(f) evaluate the identified risks based on the risk criteria; \n(g) identify and prioritise appropriate risk treatment options and measures; \n(h) continuously monitor the implementation of the risk treatment measures; \n(i) identify who is responsible for implementing the risk treatment measures and when they should be implemented; \n(j) document the chosen risk treatment measures in a risk treatment plan and the reasons justifying the acceptance of \nresidual risks in a comprehensible manner. \nGUIDANCE \n• Select a risk management methodology (14). \n• Establish the entity's risk appetite, that is the amount of risk that the entity is strategically willing to accept \nto achieve its objectives. Criteria may include (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no b usiness strategic objectives; \no stakeholder expectations; \no regulatory requirements; and \no o rganizational culture. \n• Define the risk tolerance level, which refers to the level of risk that an entity is willing to accept in pursuit \nof its long-term objectives. Examples may include (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no acceptable downtime for systems for which critical ity is high (e.g. up to two hours of downtime \nper month); \no tolerance for data loss (e.g. loss of data with low criticality within a 24-hour window); \no maximum financial loss that can be absorbed without jeopardizing operations ( e.g. up to EUR \n100,000 in recovery costs);", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d4bf089aee80", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "token_count": 656 }, { "chunk_id": "f05d84469db8b95ad379df328f3b13a1", "text": "(14) There are many risk-management standards, frameworks and methodologies. A non-exhaustive list of them can be found in the ENISA publication \nCompendium of risk-managements frameworks with potential interoperability, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/compendium-of-risk-\nmanagement-frameworks. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n23", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d4bf089aee80", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "token_count": 91 }, { "chunk_id": "e72bf9a78b4eefb55306ba8f27d5fde3", "text": "o willingness to invest a certain percentage of revenue in measures (e.g. 5% of annual revenue); \no adherence to regulatory obligations with specific penalties or fines influencing risk acceptance; \no acceptable level of customer dissatisfaction or negative media exposure from a data breach (e.g. \ntolerating one major incident every few years); \no acceptance of certain vulnerabilities based on risk mitigation measures in place (e.g. outdated \nsoftware provided that it is monitored and patched regularly); \no time frame for responding to and recovering from incidents (e.g. a maximum of 48 hours for \ncontainment); and \no acceptance of minor incidents as part of normal operations while prioritizing major threats. \n• Define risk acceptance criteria, which may include (indicative, non-exhaustive list) (15): \no accepting risks categorized as low severity, such as minor data leaks that don't expose sensitive \ninformation; \no accepting risks assessed as having a low likelihood of occurrence ( e.g. certain rare types of \ncyberattacks); \no accepting risks if the cost of mitigation exceeds the potential impact ( e.g. not upgrading legacy \nsystems if the upgrade cost is significantly higher than potential losses); \no accepting specific compliance risks if there is a plan in place to address them within a defined \ntimeframe (e.g. temporarily accepting minor non-compliance with a commitment to remediate \nwithin six months); \no allowing certain risks in low-criticality systems or departments that do not affect core business \noperations (e.g. accepting a risk in a test environment); \no accepting certain vulnerabilities for a defined period while planning for remediation ( e.g. \naccepting the risk of outdated software for three months until a full upgrade can be completed); \no accepting risks where the expected incident impact falls below a predetermined financial \nthreshold (e.g. losses under EUR 50,000 accepted without further action); \no accepting risks after informing stakeholders and receiving their agreement, particularly if they \nunderstand the trade-offs involved; and \no accepting residual risks where existing measures reduce the likelihood or impact to an acceptable \nlevel (e.g. using encryption for sensitive data but accepting risks of loss due to user error). \n• Define risk criteria, that is, how the entity evaluates the significance of the risks that it identifies and makes \ndecisions concerning risks. Risk criteria may include (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no alignment with risk appetite: accepting risks that align with the organization's overall risk appetite, \nsuch as delays in internal reporting processes that do not impact customer service or compliance; \no regulatory and l egal exposure: prioritizing risks based on potential legal or regulatory \nconsequences, such as treating violations of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) \ninvolving customer data as high-risk due to potential fines and reputational damage; \no reputational impact: escalating risks that could significantly harm the organization's public image, \nsuch as incidents likely to attract media attention; \no risk velocity: giving higher priority to risks with high velocity, such as zero- day exploits that can \nbe weaponised before patches are available;", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d4bf089aee80", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "token_count": 822 }, { "chunk_id": "a655bca97758944eb7cbf740b5ec069c", "text": "(15) More information on risk criteria can be found in ISO/IEC 27005:2022, paragraph 6.4. It is important to understand that risk appetite, defined as the \namount of risk an entity is willing to pursue or accept, can vary considerably from entity to entity. For instance, factors affecting an entity’s risk \nappetite include size, complexity and sector. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n24", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d4bf089aee80", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "token_count": 104 }, { "chunk_id": "ea57abee93c2f8810989eb68e3f0bf38", "text": "o recov ery complexity: treating risks as critical if they involve complex or time-consuming recovery, \nsuch as cyber-attacks on legacy systems with limited vendor support; \no e merging technology risks: Considering risks involving emerging technologies as higher priority, \nsuch as AI systems producing unexplainable or non-compliant decisions due to lack of \ntransparency; \no stakeholder sensitivity: re-evaluating risks that concern key stakeholders, such as risks flagged \nby the board, regulators or major customers, even if the assessed technical risk is low. \n• Criteria for performing cybersecurity risk assessments refer to consequences, likelihood or level of risk. \nThese may refer to (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no t he importance of assets; \no the severity of threats; \no the vulnerability of network and information systems (16); \no i mpact analysis; \no e xisting measures; and \no stakeholders concerns or requirements . \n• Make a list of the main risks for the security of network and information systems, taking into account the \nmain threats to the assets in scope. \n• Make sure that each risk is associated with at least one: \no of the risk treatment options or a combination of them, in line with the results of the risk \nassessment and in accordance with the entity’s policy on the security of network and information \nsystems (recital 11 of the regulation); and \no specific risk treatment measure. \n• Develop risk-treatment plans to address the elements in points (i) and (j) in point 2.1.2 of the Annex to the \nregulation. \n• Assign responsibilities to appropriate individuals or teams for executing these risk treatment plans. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented cybersecurity risk -management process that takes into account elements referred to in \npoint 2.1.2 of the Annex to the regulation. \n• Documented risk-management methodology and/or tools that take into account at least elements (a) to (f) \nin point 2.1.2 of the Annex to the regulation. \n• List of the main risks described at a high level, including underlying threat(s) and unaddressed \nvulnerabilities and their potential impact on the security of networks and services. \n• Make sure that the entity follows an all -hazards approach (check that the risk -assessment approach \naddresses a wide range of potential threats and risks, not just the cyber ones, but natural or man-made, \naccidental or intentional threats and risks). \n• Evidence that residual risks resulting from dependencies on third parties are listed and mitigated.\n\n(16) Vulnerabilities of network and information systems may also arise from human, organizational, and procedural weaknesses. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n25", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d4bf089aee80", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "token_count": 679 }, { "chunk_id": "98abf6497e30d37baf4f366433177d03", "text": "2.1.3. When identifying and prioritising appropriate risk treatment options and measures, the relevant entities shall take \ninto account the risk assessment results, the results of the procedure to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk-\nmanagement measures, the cost of implementation in relation to the expected benefit, the asset classification referred \nto in point 12.1 and the business impact analysis referred to in point 4.1.3. \nGUIDANCE \n• Make sure that personnel take into account the elements referred to in point 2.1.3 of the Annex to the \nregulation. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Guidance for personnel on assessing risks that takes into account the elements referred to in point 2.1.3 \nof the Annex to the regulation.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d4bf089aee80", "chunk_index": 8, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "token_count": 184 }, { "chunk_id": "ef4f71bde19cffba7b0ff6df1a6bc94b", "text": "2.1.4. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update the risk assessment results and the risk \ntreatment plan at planned intervals and at least annually and when significant changes to operations or risks or \nsignificant incidents occur. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review risk assessment results and risk treatment at least annually taking into account: \no results of audits and previous reviews, \no status of implementation of the measures described in the risk treatment plan (see the policy on \nthe assessment of the effectiveness of measures in line with the Annex to Regulation, \npoint 7.1.1); \no changes to the information systems; \no changes to the environment of operation; \no post-incident review findings (section 3.6); and \no trends and changes related to threats and vulnerabilities, as they may affect risks. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documentation of the review process. \n• Review comments or change logs for the risk assessment and risk treatment plan.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d4bf089aee80", "chunk_index": 9, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "token_count": 243 }, { "chunk_id": "231a6b16b4de694abcdfc47fcebdaef8", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Ensure that key personnel use the risk management methodology and tools. \n• Overall, the entity has four risk treatment options associated with each risk. Each option should be \naccompanied by specific risk treatment measures (indicative, non-exhaustive list of examples): \no Risk avoidance: as a measure to treat this risk, the entity might choose to eliminate activities or \nconditions that expose the entity to this risk, for example, discontinuing the use of a vulnerable \nsoftware application. \no Risk mitigation: as a measure to treat this risk , the entity might choose to implement measures \nto reduce the likelihood or impact of such a risk. This can include installing firewalls, using \nencryption and conducting regular security training for employees. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n26", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d4bf089aee80", "chunk_index": 10, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "token_count": 211 }, { "chunk_id": "f31fedb4921c33f66fd7fc64d596f5d8", "text": "o Risk transfer or sharing: as a measure to treat this risk , the entity might choose to shift parts of \nthe risk impact to another party, typically through insurance or outsourcing certain functions to \nthird-party providers. However, it is important to note that such arrangements do not eliminate \nthe entity’s overall accountability or legal obligations regarding the risk. For instance, purchasing \ncyber insurance may cover potential data breach costs , but the entity remains responsible for \nimplementing appropriate security measures and complying with data protection regulations. \no Risk acceptance: as a measure to treat this risk, the entity might choose to acknowledge the risk \nand decide to accept it without taking any specific action, often because the cost of mitigation is \nhigher than the potential impact. This approach is usually accompanied by a contingency plan to \nmanage the risk if it materiali ses. The approach should be clearly documented, supported by a \nrealistic estimation of potential costs and including financial provisions to address the impact \nshould the risk materialise. \n• Make sure that the risk from vulnerabilities assigned to the highest classification (e.g. ‘critical’ in the \ncommon vulnerability scoring system (CVSS)) or equivalent is not accepted, if possible (section 6.10). \n• Concerning the risk treatment plans, the entity might additionally take into account: \no findings of the review; \no implementation steps; and \no resources needed. \n• Manage any exceptions in the risk treatment plans’ implementation. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented action plans developed in response to review findings. \n• Key personnel knowing the main risks (e.g. evidence from emails, interviews and awareness -raising \nsessions). \n• Documented risk treatment plan implementation exceptions. \n• Risk register.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d4bf089aee80", "chunk_index": 11, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK", "token_count": 463 }, { "chunk_id": "d986a6ac467cf637346dc22eff7dfff4", "text": "2.2 COMPLIANCE MONITORING\n\n2.2.1. The relevant entities shall regularly review the compliance with their policies on network and information system \nsecurity, topic-specific policies, rules and standards. The management bodies shall be informed of the status of network \nand information security on the basis of the compliance reviews by means of regular reporting. \nGUIDANCE \n• Develop a standardized report format for reporting to management bodies. Consider the following \nelements (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no key metrics, \no compliance status, including policy exceptions, \no identified risks and \no recommended actions. \n• Reports are generated and presented to management bodies at least annually. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Recent compliance review reports. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n27 \n \n• Logs of policy exceptions. Examples of such exceptions include, among others, the situations mentioned \nin the second paragraph of Article 2(2) and those under recital 5 of the regulation. Other examples include \n(indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no software updates: if a system relies on an older version of software that is incompatible with the \nlatest update, an exception might be granted to delay the update until a compatible solution is \nfound; \no access control: if a particular user or system cannot support an authentication mechanism (e.g. \nmulti-factor authentication ( MFA)) due to technical limitations, an exception might be granted \nwhile alternative measures are implemented; and \no encryption: if a legacy system does not support encryption, an exception might be granted until \nthe system is replaced. \n• Records of the exception request and approval, along with details of the compensatory controls \nimplemented. \n \n2.2.2. The relevant entities shall put in place an effective compliance reporting system which shall be appropriate to \ntheir structures, operating environments and threat landscapes. The compliance reporting system shall be capable to \nprovide to the management bodies an informed view of the current state of the relevant entities’ management of risks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Set up procedures for compliance monitoring, including (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no objectives and a high-level approach to compliance monitoring; \no relevant security policies that are subject to compliance monitoring; \no the frequency of compliance reviews; \no who should carry out compliance reviews (internal or external); and \no templates for compliance review reports. \n• Analyse and evaluate the results of the compliance review. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented procedures for monitoring compliance. \n• Documented analysis and evaluation of the results, including the current state of the entity’s risk \nmanagement. \n• Detailed compliance monitoring plans, including long-term, high-level objectives and planning. \n \n2.2.3. The relevant entities shall perform the compliance monitoring at planned intervals and when significant incidents \nor significant changes to operations or risks occur. \nGUIDANCE \n• Compliance monitoring should take place at least annually, taking into account: \no significant incidents, if any; \no changes to the environment of operation; \no changes to the threat landscape and cybersecurity legal and regulatory requirements; \no changes to standards; and \no changes to the policy on the security of network and information systems and/or topic -specific \npolicies. \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-883683a3ae84", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.2 COMPLIANCE MONITORING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.2 COMPLIANCE MONITORING", "token_count": 881 }, { "chunk_id": "8fca7011e9e9489dc4ae54e079aea4de", "text": "28 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE\n\n• Any corrective actions resulting from the assessments and tests, including changes to the measures made \nby the entity once the effectiveness of the measures has been assessed in line with the Annex to the \nregulation, point 7.1.1. \n• Evidence that reports of lessons learned or root cause analysis of past incidents, if any, were taken into \naccount.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-1341cd1bcf15", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "28 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 28 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "token_count": 95 }, { "chunk_id": "06d88dd8037fd425454356505072d252", "text": "2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY\n\n2.3.1. The relevant entities shall review independently their approach to managing network and information system \nsecurity and its implementation including people, processes and technologies. \nGUIDANCE \n• Make sure that the independent review is conducted by a person or persons with the appropriate \ncompetences (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no cybersecurity technical knowledge, for example cybersecurity frameworks (ISO/IEC 27001, \nNational Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) cybersecurity framework, etc.), \no industry knowledge, \no risk assessment skills, \no compliance and regulatory knowledge, for example the NIS2 Directive, the GDPR and the Digital \nOperational Resilience Act, \no good understanding of good practices in auditing and \no good understanding of when technical certification and conformance are required and must be \ndocumented in the conformance and compliance report, to ensure that global standards are \nimplemented correctly. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented results of the review or audit. \n• Evidence of the competences of the independent reviewers, for example professional experience and \nacademic qualifications, certifications such as certified information systems auditor, certified information \nsystems security professional, certified information security manager, etc.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-54e9517d8157", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "token_count": 346 }, { "chunk_id": "a9a91d0c3b9ea92f10cb2212fc645e74", "text": "2.3.2. The relevant entities shall develop and maintain processes to conduct independent reviews which shall be carried \nout by individuals with appropriate audit competence. Where the independent review is conducted by staff members of \nthe relevant entity, the persons conducting the reviews shall not be in the line of authority of the personnel of the area \nunder review. If the size of the relevant entities does not allow such separation of line of authority, the relevant entities \nshall put in place alternative measures to guarantee the impartiality of the reviews. \nGUIDANCE \n• Set up a process for independent review of information and network security, including (indicative and \nnon-exhaustive list): \no scope and purpose of the independent reviews ( e.g. compliance, risk assessment, policy \nadherence); \no methodology of the reviews (e.g. standardised checklist, standard based, ad hoc, how it \naddresses processes that will be tested in real time for conformance (e.g. cloud service) or those \nthat will be periodically evaluated); \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n29", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-54e9517d8157", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "token_count": 277 }, { "chunk_id": "e80eaea4aa84b7e2440813313aeb9f7a", "text": "o review committee’s role; \no frequency of the independent reviews; \no who should carry out independent reviews (internal or external); and \no templates for independent review reports. \n• Maintain independence in line with point 2.3.2 of the Annex to the regulation; \n• Where appropriate, consider alternative measures to the separation of line of authority (indicative and non-\nexhaustive list): \no review personnel rotation; \no set up a review committee with members from different departments; \no external third-party review service provider. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented process for independent review of information and network security. \n• Conflict of interest declarations. \n• Contracts with external third-party review service providers. \n• Detailed independent review plans.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-54e9517d8157", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "token_count": 197 }, { "chunk_id": "0359705f476f28248a5fcce854b10c82", "text": "2.3.3. The results of the independent reviews, including the results from the compliance monitoring pursuant to point \n2.2. and the monitoring and measurement pursuant to point 7, shall be reported to the management bodies. Corrective \nactions shall be taken or residual risk accepted according to the relevant entities’ risk acceptance criteria. \nGUIDANCE \n• Analyse and evaluate the results of the independent review. \n• Report results to management bodies. \n• Use a standardized report format for reporting to the management bodies. Consider the following elements \n(indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no executive summary, including the scope and key findings, \no methodology, \no detailed findings, including gaps identified and non-compliance issues, \no recommendations and \no conclusions. \n• Reports are generated and presented to management bodies at least annually. \n• Take corrective actions or justify, accept and document residual risks. \n• The outcomes of independent reviews should be systematically reflected in the risk assessment results \nand risk treatment plans (Annex to the regulation, point 2.1). Specifically, when a risk is identified or \nreassessed through an independent review, the corresponding risk assessment should be updated \naccordingly. This ensures that the risk profile remains accurate and that any emerging or evolving risks \nare adequately captured and addressed in the overall risk management framework. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented analysis and evaluation of the results, including any residual risks. \n• Minutes from past reviews. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n30", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-54e9517d8157", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "token_count": 410 }, { "chunk_id": "adf11971c866ed9ecfc8bc94076ee092", "text": "• Any corrective actions resulting from the assessments and tests, including changes to the measures made \nby the entity once the effectiveness of the meas ures has been assessed in line with the Annex to the \nregulation, point 7.1.1. \n• Documentation of any corrective actions. \n• Budget approval for any corrective actions. \n• The most recent results of compliance monitoring and auditing. \n• Records from updated risk register.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-54e9517d8157", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "token_count": 107 }, { "chunk_id": "2b907c62a3373108e3c62b6bf662e7f1", "text": "2.3.4. The independent reviews shall take place at planned intervals and when significant incidents or significant \nchanges to operations or risks occur. \nGUIDANCE \n• Independent reviews should take place at least annually, taking into account: \no significant incidents, if any; \no changes to the environment of operation; \no changes to the threat landscape and cybersecurity legal and regulatory requirements; and \no changes to the policy on the security of network and information systems and/or topic-specific \npolicies. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Independent review reports documenting findings, recommendations and actions taken in response. \n• Summaries of previous independent reviews, highlighting the scope and frequency. \n• Records of significant incidents that occurred in the past year, along with any corresponding review or \nanalysis documentation. \n• Annual independent review plans or schedules that outline the scope of independent reviews and the \nspecific measures being evaluated.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-54e9517d8157", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "token_count": 249 }, { "chunk_id": "babc7aa7c50f2140d2ac1b2e65291a9c", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Make sure that the independent review process is approved by management bodies. \n• Make sure that the results of the review are approved by management bodies. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented procedures approved by management bodies. \n• Approval of the residual risks by management bodies.\n\nINCIDENT \nHANDLING\nChapter 3\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n32", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-54e9517d8157", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 2.3 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY", "token_count": 100 }, { "chunk_id": "a977b81ab6eb922ed7349c74bf7e7f93", "text": "3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY\n\n3.1.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2), point (b) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall establish and \nimplement an incident handling policy laying down the roles, responsibilities and procedures for detecting, analysing, \ncontaining or responding to, recovering from, documenting and reporting of incidents in a timely manner. \nGUIDANCE \n• Define clear objectives for the incident handling policy. \n• Ensure the policy complies with relevant laws, regulations and industry standards (17). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented incident handling policy that contains, at least, the elements referred to in point 3.1.2 of the \nAnnex to the regulation. \n• Documented standards and/or good practices that are taken into consideration for this policy.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-78f2f759b7d5", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "token_count": 199 }, { "chunk_id": "2a072e3e8d32891cef7f35cfb29e1169", "text": "3.1.2. The policy referred to in point 3.1.1 shall be coherent with the business continuity and disaster recovery plan \nreferred to in point 4.1. The policy shall include: \n(a) a categorisation system for incidents that is consistent with the event assessment and classification carried out \npursuant to point 3.4.1; \n(b) effective communication plans including for escalation and reporting; \n(c) assignment of roles to detect and appropriately respond to incidents to competent employees; \n(d) documents to be used in the course of incident detection and response such as incident response manuals, \nescalation charts, contact lists and templates. \nGUIDANCE \n• Align the incident handling policy with the business continuity and disaster recovery plan (Annex to the \nregulation, point 4.1) by (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no ensuring that they aim to minimise disruptions, protect assets and ensure a swift return to normal \noperations; \no identifying interfaces between the incident handling policy and business continuity management; \no describing workflows which trigger business continuity (Annex to the regulation, point s 4.1, 4.2 \nor 4.3) during an incident; and \no developing scenarios that test the interaction between these processes and describe the result \nof this interaction in the incident handling policy.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-78f2f759b7d5", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "token_count": 333 }, { "chunk_id": "655749b89cd654010749ab67149658f5", "text": "(17) In addition, consider the ‘Incident response recommendations and considerations for cybersecurity risk management’ from NIST, \nhttps://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r3.pdf. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n33", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-78f2f759b7d5", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "token_count": 67 }, { "chunk_id": "bac80cb8620380063d7ba109f0a69578", "text": "• Set up a categorisation system for incidents, which refers to the scheme that the entity uses to identify the \nconsequences and the priority of an incident, together with the criteria for categorising events as incidents \n(18). An indicative, non-exhaustive list of criteria might include one or more of the following: \no impact on business operations, \no data sensitivity in accordance with risk management, \no legal and regulatory impact , including reporting timelines stemming from regulatory framework \ne.g. GDPR, national regulations, \no scope and scale meaning the evaluation of how widespread the event is, \no type of attack (19), \no malicious software/vulnerability exploitation, \no criticality of the systems affected, \no incident containment urgency, \no potential of data exfiltration or corruption, such as in the case of ransomware, \no likelihood of recovery, \no impact on human lives and safety and \no other criteria on what constitutes a significant incident as per this regulation. \n• Ensure that the incident handling policy refers to different types of incidents such as (indicative, non-\nexhaustive list): \no system failures and loss of service availability; \no malicious code; \no denial of service; \no errors; \no breaches of confidentiality and integrity; and \no misuse of network and information systems. \n• Communicate the incident to relevant stakeholders and personnel according to a communication plan. \nThe communication plan should consider the event reporting mechanism ( Annex to the regulation, \npoint 3.3) and may include (indicative, non-exhaustive list) the following: \no purpose and scope of the plan, \no roles and responsibilities for communication tasks, \no list of internal and external stakeholders to be informed, \no reporting timelines stemming from regulatory framework, e.g. GDPR, national regulations, \no conditions and procedures for escalation of incidents, \no channels to be used for communication ( e.g. email, intranet, phone calls, social media, press \nreleases), \no channels of com munication need to be tailored based on the target audience ( that is internal, \nclient or general public, etc.), \no methods for stakeholders to provide feedback or ask questions and", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-78f2f759b7d5", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "token_count": 555 }, { "chunk_id": "d65555c0334d32b732f94799f05000d3", "text": "(18) The ISO/IEC 27035 series provides further guidance on incident management: ISO/IEC 27035-1:2023(en) Information technology – Information \nsecurity incident management – Part 1: Principles and process. For the categorisation of incidents, please also consult the ENISA guidelines \nrelated to Article 23(9) summary reporting for the NIS2 Directive or information provided by the national computer security incident response teams \n(CSIRTs). \n(19) A cyberattack involves deliberate and malicious attempts to compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored, \ntransmitted or processed data or of the services offered by or accessible via, network and information systems. The attack can be due to insider \nactivity or external perpetrators. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n34", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-78f2f759b7d5", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "token_count": 209 }, { "chunk_id": "62fa113d9313847d0343758bffa766b2", "text": "o guidelines for when to communicate and the frequency of updates, along with pre-drafted \nmessage templates for various scenarios and the core messages to be communicated. \n• Identify the necessary roles and responsibilities to be assigned for incident handling. The entities can use \nalready established skills frameworks, for example the ECSF, to assist them in identifying the necessary \nskills and knowledge. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Cross references between the incident handling policy and the business continuity and disaster recovery \nplan, if available. \n• R ecords of testing and drills that involve both incident handling and business continuity / disaster recovery. \n• I nterviews with key personnel involved in incident response, business continuity and disaster recovery. \n• An incident categorisation system. \n• Evidence that the incident handling policy is in place and communicated to employees. \n• Evidence that a communication plan for incident handling is in place. \n• Procedures for how to communicate the incident to relevant authorities and the computer security incident \nresponse team (CSIRT) are in place. \n• Procedures for how to communicate the incident to customers or how and when to involve a supplier (if \napplicable).", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-78f2f759b7d5", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "token_count": 313 }, { "chunk_id": "c45fa6eea5dca203852bd560cc6e3259", "text": "3.1.3. The roles, responsibilities and procedures laid down in the policy shall be tested and reviewed and, where \nappropriate, updated at planned intervals and after significant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider one or more of the following to test the entity’s incident handling policy ( indicative, non-\nexhaustive list): \no tabletop exercise, \no simulation of an incident, preferably based on a selected attack scenario based on identified risks \nand the current threat landscape, \no red team/blue team exercise and \no past incident walk-through. \n• Test the roles, responsibilities and procedures laid down in the policy at least annually. \n• Review and update roles, responsibilities and procedures laid down in the policy at least annually, taking \ninto account the following, in addition to the elements referred to in point 3.1.3 of the Annex to the \nregulation: \no results from the policy tests, \no changes to the threat landscape and cybersecurity legal and regulatory requirements and \no changes to the policy on the security of network and information systems and/or topic-specific \npolicies. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Periodic simulations and awareness raising activities to assess the readiness of personnel and the \nadequacy of the procedures. \n• Incident handling policy testing plans or schedules. \n• Incident handling policy review plans or schedules. \n• Procedure updates (version history), if available. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-78f2f759b7d5", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.1 INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY", "token_count": 382 }, { "chunk_id": "6b18acf533f6430bc5aade0b65f787e3", "text": "35 \n \nTIPS\n\nGUIDANCE \n• Identify and consider all internal and external resources required in the event of an incident and ensure \ntheir availability at any time: \no make sure that personnel are properly trained to handle and manage incidents ; \no i dentify and consider all external stakeholders (e.g. operators, technology suppliers , free and \nopen source ( 20) project contacts, national competent authorities or CSIRTs ) necessary for \nincident handling. \n• Changes in the policy should be communicated to the relevant personnel. \n• Ensure a clear overview of the various incident reporting obligations that the entity must fulfil under \ndifferent reporting regimes. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Detailed procedures for the incident handling policy communicated to personnel as appropriate. \n• A list of reporting obligations and deadlines, which may cover both legal and contractual obligations.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0505b30ba017", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "35 \n \nTIPS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 35 \n \nTIPS", "token_count": 224 }, { "chunk_id": "453ba43a75ccccbef0188bc51acb0893", "text": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING\n\n3.2.1. The relevant entities shall lay down procedures and use tools to monitor and log activities on their network and \ninformation systems to detect events that could be considered as incidents and respond accordingly to mitigate the \nimpact. \nGUIDANCE \n• Identify one or more objectives of monitoring and logging (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no t hreat detection, \no compliance assurance, \no i ncident response support, \no p erformance optimisation, \no a nomaly detection, \no monitor for new vulnerability reports issued for any free and open source software \ncomponents (21) used by the entity, \no d ata loss prevention, \no forensic investigations support and \no n etwork health monitoring. \n• Procedures should describe (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no objectives, \no data for collection and relevant tools, \no description of data algorithms and \no mechanisms for notifying the relevant personnel.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 235 }, { "chunk_id": "8a317b7b8c900ab8ec6921951cc1e19e", "text": "(20) Most software today builds on the rich foundation of infrastructure that has been provided freely by free and open source software (FOSS) projects \nand communities. In line with the approach to FOSS in Regulation (EU) 2024/2487, this document includes guidance on the responsible use of free \nand open source software in relevant sections, for example in sections 5.1 and 6.1. \n(21) Article 3(6) of the Cyber Resilience Act. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n36", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 123 }, { "chunk_id": "fe0ae7a80626e374b286df2dac1c7f5e", "text": "• Select tools that serve the objectives of monitoring and logging according to specific criteria (indicative, \nnon-exhaustive list): \no ease of use, \no integration with the existing network and information system, including cross-border operations \nand the associated regulatory, security and performance considerations, \no minimisation of manual intervention, \no capability of collecting data from various sources, for example networks, syste ms and \napplications, \no security features offered, for example encryption and access control and \no costs and licencing. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Procedures in place. \n• Tools in place. \n• C onfiguration settings of the logging function that serve the identified objectives. \n• C onfiguration settings of the logging function in line with documented standards and/or good practices. \n• Safeguards to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of logs.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 227 }, { "chunk_id": "f7e12725df17a925859608954742673d", "text": "3.2.2. To the extent feasible, monitoring shall be automated and carried out either continuously or in periodic intervals, \nsubject to business capabilities. The relevant entities shall implement their monitoring activities in a way which minimises \nfalse positives and false negatives. \nGUIDANCE \n• To minimise false positives and false negatives, to the extent feasible, consider one or more of the \nfollowing (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no establish network traffic patterns; \no use analytics and machine learning algorithms; \no continuously update the automated monitoring tools to adapt to new threats and changes in the \nenvironment; and \no f ine-tune the parameters and thresholds based on the latest data and feedback. \n• Where appropriate, ensure that all potential risks are properly covered by relevant use cases, for example \nuse case for access to critical data, use case for data exfiltration or use case for ransomware infection, so \nthat no critical threat goes undetected. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Acceptable log monitoring, collection, storage and analysis tools, in line with the state of the art. \n• Security Incident and Event Management (SIEM) systems used to analyse data and identify deviations \nfrom established patterns. \n• Endpoint detection and response (EDR) and Extended Detection and Response (XDR) tools in place. \n• Mechanisms that aim to minimise false positives and false negatives are in place. \n• Where appropriate, mapping use cases to potential risks to ensure comprehensive and effective \nmonitoring.\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n37", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 402 }, { "chunk_id": "e4aa953c03dd8009b017556577e4614f", "text": "3.2.3. Based on the procedures referred to in point 3.2.1., the relevant entities shall maintain, document and review \nlogs. The relevant entities shall establish a list of assets to be subject to logging based on the results of the risk \nassessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1. Where appropriate, logs shall include: \n(a) relevant outbound and inbound network traffic; \n(b) creation, modification or deletion of users of the relevant entities’ network and information systems and extension of \nthe permissions; \n(c) access to systems and applications; \n(d) authentication-related events; \n(e) all privileged access to systems and applications and activities performed by administrative accounts; \n(f) access or changes to critical configuration and backup files; \n(g) event logs and logs from security tools, such as antivirus, intrusion detection systems or firewalls; \n(h) use of system resources, as well as their performance; \n(i) physical access to facilities; \n(j) access to and use of their network equipment and devices; \n(k) activation, stopping and pausing of the various logs; \n(l) environmental events. \nGUIDANCE \n• With regard to critical configuration, consider the settings and parameters that are vital for the proper \nfunctioning, security and performance of the entity’s network and information system. These configurations \nare vital because any changes or misconfigurations might have a significant impact, including system \noutages, security vulnerabilities or reduced performance of the entity’s network and information system. \n• Consult the risk assessment results to determine which network traffic needs to be logged. For example, \nif certain assets are identified as high risk (e.g. due to being potentially vulnerable or crucial to the business \noperation) their inbound and outbound traffic should be logged for monitoring and analysis. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Samples of log files containing the elements referred to in point 3.2.3 of the Annex to the regulation. \n• Samples of log files containing current and historical domain name system (DNS) and dynamic host \nconfiguration protocol (DHCP) logs.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 535 }, { "chunk_id": "ea170152108bf2d94affd35e1da65a99", "text": "3.2.4. The logs shall be regularly reviewed for any unusual or unwanted trends. Where appropriate, the relevant entities \nshall lay down appropriate values for alarm thresholds. If the laid down values for alarm threshold are exceeded, an \nalarm shall be triggered, where appropriate, automatically. The relevant entities shall ensure that, in case of an alarm, \na qualified and appropriate response is initiated in a timely manner. \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider the use of anomaly detection or adaptive alarm thresholds to complement traditional static rules. \n• Make sure that procedures are designed to detect network-based attacks based on anomalous inbound \nand outbound ingress or egress traffic patterns and/or denial of service (DoS) attacks, in a timely manner. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n38", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 206 }, { "chunk_id": "b5a35fbecd04a0f6378c4b5c9f87220f", "text": "• Make sure that alarm thresholds, where appropriate, have been set in alignment with the results of the \nrisk assessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1, covering at least the situations in point 3.2.3 of the \nAnnex to the regulation. An indicative, non-exhaustive list of examples with thresholds (22) follows: \no relevant outbound and inbound network traffic: t raffic volume spikes exceeding 50% of normal \ntraffic in a 10-minute period on a specific port; \no a ccess to systems and applications: three or more account lockouts within 15 minutes; \no p rivileged access: two or more instances of privilege escalation (e.g. normal user to admin) within \n24 hours (23); \no a ntivirus: malware is detected on multiple endpoints within a short timeframe; \no u se of system resources: installations of unauthorised software within a short timeframe. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• R egular reports that summarize log data and highlight any anomalies detected. \n• Alarm thresholds set. \n• Records from past alarm triggers when thresholds were exceeded. \n• Existing workflows that trigger event reporting (section 3.3).", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 278 }, { "chunk_id": "0d3503e82306d5b56d0c21d26c6b57b1", "text": "3.2.5. The relevant entities shall maintain and back up logs for a predefined period and shall protect them from \nunauthorised access or changes. \nGUIDANCE \n• Make sure that the log retention period is defined in accordance with business needs, the risk assessment \nresults and legal requirements/obligations. \n• The backup logs’ maintenance period shouldn’t be shorter than the logs’ review period, referred to in \npoint 3.2.4 of the Annex to the regulation. \n• The retention period should be in line with what is referred to in point 4.2.2 (f) of the Annex to the \nregulation. \n• Delete data when the retention period ends. \n• Consider mechanisms to protect logs from unauthorised access or changes (indicative, non-exhaustive \nlist): \no e ncryption, \no access control, \no hashing (section 9.2) and \no logging of all access and changes to log files. \n• The access control should be in line with what is referred to in point 4.2.2 (d) of the Annex to the regulation. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• A retention period is set.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 255 }, { "chunk_id": "26765c5384357611499632a311cb05a1", "text": "(22) The thresholds are subject to the operational environment. There are several assumptions about the environment that would need to be true for \nthese controls/thresholds to be relevant. For certain entities, we expect that these entities will be under constant attack by bad actors and, \naccordingly, should be permitted to leverage continuous, automated and immediate responses. \n(23) Privileged access alarms shall distinguish between (a) administrative privilege assignment events (e.g. creation or promotion of accounts to \nprivileged status) and (b) the use of existing privileged accounts by authorized personnel. The system shall generate an immediate alert upon \ndetection of unauthorized or unexpected privilege assignments and a behavioural threshold alert (e.g. ≥2 privilege elevations within 24 hours) for \nmonitoring legitimate administrative access patterns. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n39", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 8, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 235 }, { "chunk_id": "2dc770d121b45b979778b177a1262b6f", "text": "• The retention period is in line with what is referred to in point 4.2.2 (f) of the Annex to the regulation and \nis shorter than the logs’ review period, referred to in point 3.2.4 of the Annex to the regulation. \n• L og management is in place. \n• Logs do not contain data about which retention periods have expired. \n• Access control mechanisms are in place. \n• Access control is in line with what is referred to in point 4.2.2 (d) of the Annex to the regulation.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 9, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 116 }, { "chunk_id": "e537f07166d8d339fb5609d9ccd901ac", "text": "3.2.6. To the extent feasible, the relevant entities shall ensure that all systems have synchronised time sources to be \nable to correlate logs between systems for event assessment. The relevant entities shall establish and keep a list of all \nassets that are being logged and ensure that monitoring and logging systems are redundant. The availability of the \nmonitoring and logging systems shall be monitored independent of the systems they are monitoring. \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider the following for time synchronisation: \no U tilize Network Time Protocol (NTP) servers or Precision Time Protocol (PTP) for accurate and \nreliable time synchronization (24). \no U se authenticated NTP to prevent malicious entities from tampering with your time \nsynchronization. \no C onfigure a central time server within the entity (25). This server should synchronize with a \nreliable external time source and then distribute the time to all other systems within the network. \no U se multiple time sources to avoid a single point of failure. \no Plan how time synchronization is handled across on-premises systems (for example servers in a \ncompany's own data centre), cloud services, and software-as -a-service (SaaS ) platforms - \nespecially if the organization uses a hybrid environment (a mix of on-premises and cloud-based \nsystems). \n• Assets being logged should be marked as such in the asset inventory, in line with what is referred to in \npoint 12.4 of the Annex to the regulation. \n• Implement measures to protect log data against loss, including but not limited to redundant storage across \nmultiple locations (e.g. cloud, secondary servers), retention of processed log events in structured systems \nand preservation of derived security insights (e.g. alerts, metrics) in line with what is referred to in point 4.2 \nof the Annex to the regulation. These complementary approaches ensure both data integrity and \noperational continuity in security monitoring and incident response. \n• Deploy separate tools to monitor the capacity and availability of the entity’s primary monitoring and logging \nsystems. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Mechanisms for logs’ time synchronisation. \n• Mechanisms for logs’ redundant storage. \n• Logs from the activity of the tools that monitor the capacity and availability of the entity’s primary monitoring \nand logging systems.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 10, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 586 }, { "chunk_id": "49703208de407e93ca70c6b5dfabdf37", "text": "(24) For public NTP servers, see https://ntp.org/. \n(25) Entity risk analysis should include definition on the stratum level required for the chosen sources of time synchronisation. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n40", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 11, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 61 }, { "chunk_id": "3a552fc27a70c3c5470b2874e288dd01", "text": "3.2.7. The procedures as well as the list of assets that are being logged shall be reviewed and, where appropriate, \nupdated at regular intervals and after significant incidents. \nGUIDANCE \n• Determine the frequency of reviews based on the risk assessment results related to the criticality of the \nassets, ensuring that reviews are conducted at least annually. \n• Include the testing of monitoring and logging procedures in security testing (section 6.5). \n• Review a random sample of logs to verify that all the assets that should be subject to the log are actually \nconsidered. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Review plans or schedules. \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• In addition to the elements mentioned in point 3.2.3 of the Annex to the regulation, last login for every \naccount should be logged. \n• Document monitoring and logging procedures. \n• Assess the frequency of monitoring activities to ensure they are sufficient to support risk -based security \ndecisions for adequately protecting the entity’s network and information systems. \n• Make sure that personal data that are included in the logs is not processed unnecessarily. When required, \nan additional level of protection is deployed after performing a data protection impact assessment. \n• Determine the log baselines in line with the needs and the capabilities of the business (indicative, non-\nexhaustive list): \no structured or semi-structured, if possible, instead of unstructured format; \no consistent data format in line with the selected tools and well-known standards, for example \nJavaScript Object Notation and extensible markup language (XML); \no log level in line with the classification level of the asset being logged – the entity should assign a \nhigher log level, for example ‘error’/‘fatal’, to highly classified assets while the lower log levels, for \nexample ‘info’/‘debug’, should be used for assets with a lower classification; and \no the standard for the timestamps, for example ISO-8601 (\n26), RFC 3339 (27) or RFC 9557 (28). \n• Each log entry should contain necessary metadata such as (indicative, no n-exhaustive list): \no log level; \no timestamp; \no source identifier, for example the application or the device relevant to the entry; and \no a unique identifier for the entry. \n• C orrelate data from different sources, if applicable. \n• Select tools that monitor and protect end point devices. \n• Select tools that can collect and analyse network traffic in real time to detect anomalies, data exfiltration \nand even the most advanced threats, while offering the option of automatic remediation.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 12, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 643 }, { "chunk_id": "9b89a70e95e2e596c32d6ab291d5be8e", "text": "(26) ISO 8601-1:2019/Amd 1:2022 Date and time – Representations for information interchange, 2022 edition. \n(27) RFC3339, Date and time on the internet: Timestamps, July 2002, https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC3339. \n(28) RFC9557, Date and time on the internet: Timestamps with additional information, April 2024, https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC9557. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3d97bd8426aa", "chunk_index": 13, "total_chunks": 14, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.2 MONITORING AND LOGGING", "token_count": 100 }, { "chunk_id": "c19de8d773f1c80a4dd0904f75b1cedf", "text": "41 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE\n\n• Documented procedures. \n• Log baselines in place. \n• Logs (samples) containing necessary metadata. \n• EDR tools. \n• Network detection and response (NDR) tools.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-d9235a2573b4", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "41 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 41 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "token_count": 47 }, { "chunk_id": "57e20161368b1d3adb79b758bfb9a2d9", "text": "3.3 EVENT REPORTING\n\n3.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a simple mechanism allowing their employees, suppliers and customers to \nreport suspicious events. \nGUIDANCE \n• Define what constitutes a suspicious event based on criteria (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no if the confidentiality or the integrity or the availability of the network or the information system has \nbeen affected; \no persistence, meaning whether the event is ongoing or not; \no impact, for example. the number of assets (potentially) affected; and \no compliance violation of a regulation or the entity’s policies. \n• Develop clear and concise guidelines for what information should be included in a report. Align this \ninformation with the information that might be submitted to the CSIRT or, where applicable to the \ncompetent authority, if the event is notified in accordance with the NIS2 Directive Articles 23 or 30. As \ngood practice, the following should be reported as a minimum (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no d ate and time of the event, \no d escription of the event, \no a ny relevant screenshots, logs or other evidence, \no contact information for follow -up if necessary. \n• Provide multiple channels for reporting, such as email, a web form, a dedicated phone line or a mobile \napp. Ensure that these channels are easily accessible and intuitive to use. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented mechanism that outlines the process for reporting security events. \n• Examples of templates for reporting (29). \n• Personnel aware of the mechanism and who to contact if they notice something suspicious. \n• Existence of multiple reporting channels such as email addresses, web forms, phone numbers or \ndedicated reporting portals. \n \n \n \n(29) Seek consistency with the reporting templates required by the national CSIRT or, where applicable, the competent authority. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n42 \n \n3.3.2. The relevant entities shall, where appropriate, communicate the event reporting mechanism to their suppliers and \ncustomers and shall regularly train their employees how to use the mechanism. \nGUIDANCE \n• Make appropriate means for reporting available to personnel and the entity’s suppliers and customers. \n• Consider anonymous reporting to encourage individuals to report security events without fear of reprisal. \n• Take into account legal obligations to report an incident to the competent authorities (and CSIRTs) in line \nwith the NIS2 Directive Articles 23 and 30, including any obligations about when the incident should be \nreported. \n• Regularly remind stakeholders of the reporting mechanism through email newsletters, posters and other \ncommunication channels. \n• Conduct regular exercises or simulations to test the effectiveness of the reporting mechanism. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Evidence of past communications and event reporting. \n• Documented procedures for communicating about events, describing (indicative, non-exhaustive list: \no reasons/motivations for communicating or reporting (business reasons and legal reasons, etc.), \no the type of events in scope, \no the required content of communications, \no notifications or reports, \no the channels to be used and \no the roles responsible for communicating, notifying and reporting. \n• Training materials provided to employees, suppliers and customers regarding the reporting mechanism. \n• Periodic simulati ons and awareness raising activities to assess the readiness of personnel and the \nadequacy of the mechanism for reporting an event. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Maintain a record of all reported events. \n• Ensure compliance with other relevant regulations and laws regarding data privacy, confidentiality and \nincident reporting. \n• Ask for legal advice, if necessary, to understand any legal implications of the reporting mechanism. \n• Evaluate past communications and reporting about events. \n• Review and update the reporting mechanism and the communication plans (Annex to the regulation, \npoint 3.3), based on changes or past events. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Record of events and, for each event, the impact, cause, actions taken and lessons learnt. \n• Summaries of previous reviews, if any. \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n43", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-c3b70e05aafe", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.3 EVENT REPORTING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.3 EVENT REPORTING", "token_count": 1071 }, { "chunk_id": "cee50c74905607338095fd6b2eb0660c", "text": "3.4 EVENT ASSESSMENT AND CLASSIFICATION\n\n3.4.1. The relevant entities shall assess suspicious events to determine whether they constitute incidents and, if so, \ndetermine their nature and severity. \nGUIDANCE \n• Use criteria to assess whether a suspicious event is an incident or not. The guidance in s ection 3.1.2 \nprovides an indicative, non-exhaustive list of such criteria. \n• Determine the nature and severity of the event based on a categorisation system referred to in \npoint 3.1.2 (a) of the Annex to the regulation. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Defined criteria in place. \n• A categorisation system referred to in point 3.1.2 (a) of the Annex to the regulation. \n \n3.4.2. For the purpose of point 3.4.1, the relevant entities shall act in the following manner: \n(a) carry out the assessment based on predefined criteria laid down in advance and on a triage to determine prioritisation \nof incident containment and eradication; \n(b) assess the existence of recurring incidents as referred to in Article 4 of this Regulation on a quarterly basis; \n(c) review the appropriate logs for the purposes of event assessment and classification; \n(d) put in place a process for log correlation and analysis and \n(e) reassess and reclassify events in case of new information becoming available or after analysis of previously available \ninformation. \nGUIDANCE \n• In the procedures defined in points 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of the Annex to the regulation, include activities for \nassessing suspicious events to determine their nature and severity. These activities should include steps \nsuch as: \no g athering relevant information and evidence related to the event. \no a nalysing the potential impact on the entity’s systems, data and operations. \no d etermining the severity of the incident based on predefined criteria. \n• Implement playbooks (30) or runbooks to guide initial assessment actions for common types of incidents , \nfor example ransomware, phishing, data or device loss, or fire. \n• Classify events based on their nature, severity and potential impact. Common classifications may include: \no l ow, medium, high or critical severity; \no i ncident types (e.g. malicious software infection or unauthorized access); \no regulatory or compliance implications. \n• Prioritise the event according to specific criteria, as defined in the categorisation system included in the \nincident handling policy referred to in point 3.1.2 of the Annex to the regulation. \n• By performing root cause analysis (31), determine recurring instances (32) of an incident. \n \n \n(30) An example of good practice for such playbooks is the OASIS Collaborative Automated Course of Action Operations (CACAO) Security Playbooks \nVersion Specification, v2.0, https://docs.oasis-open.org/cacao/security-playbooks/v2.0/security-playbooks-v2.0.html. \n(31) More information on information security incident root cause analysis can be found in Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, ‘FIRST \nCSIRT services framework’, Version 2.1, ‘6.2.4 Function: Information security incident root cause analysis’, \nhttps://www.first.org/standards/frameworks/csirts/csirt_services_framework_v2.1#6-Service-Area-Information-Security-Incident-Management. \n(32) For the criteria on recurring incidents, see Article 4 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 of 17 October 2024. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n44 \n \no Consider that the root cause of an incident may be challenging to determine during the early \nstages of incident handling, so the assessment of the existence of recurring incidents may be \ndelayed. \n• Review and correlate the logs in line with what is referred to in point 3.2 of the Annex to the regulation. \n• Assess past events and their classification to improve processes, procedures and thresholds. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented procedures or guidelines related to event assessment , including steps for gathering \ninformation, analysing impact and determining severity. \n• Existence of documented criteria or guidelines for prioritizing events based on severity and potential \nimpact. \n• Existence of a process for triaging incoming alerts or reports of suspicious events. \n• Playbooks for common types of incidents. \n• Periodic reviews of assessment and classification of past events to improve processes, procedures and \nthresholds. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider deploying SIEM, EDR, XDR or similar system that will allow and facilitate the correlation and \nanalysis of data. \n• Where possible, utilise automation to triage incoming alerts and prioritise them based on severity and \npotential impact. \n• Integrate security events into the central SIEM or EDR/XDR solution, where available. \n• Take into account the confidentiality of the data stored, especially when correlating and analysing log files, \nby (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no minimising data collected, meaning only collecting and analysing logs that fit the purpose – avoid \nretaining unnecessary personal or sensitive data; \no anonymising or pseudonymising the collected data, when possible; \no applying good security practices where appropriate and relevant, such as access control, \nencryption, regular audits and monitoring; \no applying the data retention policy in alignment with GDPR requirements and regularly purging \ndata that is no longer needed; and \no considering data protection and relevant legal and compliance obligations other than the NIS2 \nDirective. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• SIEM, EDR/XDR or similar system. \n• Tools supporting incident triage. \n• Measures to protect the security of information during log analysis and correlation. \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n45", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-51ada5dd691b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.4 EVENT ASSESSMENT AND CLASSIFICATION", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.4 EVENT ASSESSMENT AND CLASSIFICATION", "token_count": 1430 }, { "chunk_id": "8a8d4fbb809fdb7f84710fee3b3a37b0", "text": "3.5 INCIDENT RESPONSE\n\n3.5.1. The relevant entities shall respond to incidents in accordance with documented procedures and in a timely \nmanner. \nGUIDANCE \n• Establish a dedicated incident response team comprising employees with the necessary technical \nexpertise and authority to respond effectively to incidents, where appropriate. \n• Define roles and responsibilities within the incident response team, such as incident coordinators, analysts \nand communication liaisons, where appropriate. \n• Take into account industry-recognised standards when developing the incident response procedures (33). \n• Implement playbooks or runbooks to guide incident response actions for common types of incidents. \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Assignment of roles within the incident response team. \n• Documented standards and/or good practices that are taken into account. \n• Playbooks or incident response plans for common types of incidents.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-2e6ec48e2ffc", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.5 INCIDENT RESPONSE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.5 INCIDENT RESPONSE", "token_count": 232 }, { "chunk_id": "95ee4f2311dbaa39f2bb6fe1616c423a", "text": "3.5.2. The incident response procedures shall include the following stages:\n\n(a) incident containment, to prevent the consequences of the incident from spreading; \n(b) eradication, to prevent the incident from continuing or reappearing, \n(c) recovery from the incident, where necessary. \nGUIDANCE \n• Create incident response procedures outlining the steps referred to in point 3.5.2 of the Annex to the \nregulation. \n• Ensure that the handling of cybersecurity incidents takes into account the entity’s priorities and the impact \nof the incident. \no Recognize and address potential conflicts between the following objectives during incident \nhandling: \n f orensic activities – preserving and securing evidence for legal, compliance or \ninvestigative purposes, \n i ncident response activities – mitigating and removing current threats to prevent further \ndamage and \n o perational continuity – minimizing disruption to IT services and maintaining critical \noperations. \no Where these objectives conflict, establish a clear decision-making process that: \n p rioritises based on the accepted risk tolerance levels, business impact and legal \nobligations, \n \n \n(33) In addition to those mentioned in the mapping table at the end of this section, consider the following: \n• ISO/IEC 27035-1:2023, Information technology – Information security incident management, Part 1: Principles and process; \n• ISO/IEC 27035-2:2023, Information technology – Information security incident management, Part 2: Guidelines to plan and prepare for \nincident response; \n• NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2, ‘Computer security incident handling guide’, https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/61/r2/final. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n46 \n \n i nvolves coordination between cybersecurity, legal/compliance and operational teams \nand \n d ocuments the rationale for prioriti sation decisions to ensure transparency and \naccountability. \no Develop incident response playbooks that incorporate decision making and escalation paths for \nmanaging trade-offs between evidence preservation, threat containment and operational \ncontinuity. \n• Keep the management bodies informed. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Procedures for incident response, including types of incidents that could occur, objectives, roles and \nresponsibilities. Detailed description, for each incident type, of how to manage the incident and when to \nescalate to management bodies (e.g. chief information security officer), etc. \n• Records from resolution of conflicting objectives during response to past incidents.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-760cfa969bc0", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.5.2. The incident response procedures shall include the following stages:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.5.2. The incident response procedures shall include the following stages:", "token_count": 644 }, { "chunk_id": "ab07765ca19ebc374bba3f18c0b17601", "text": "3.5.3. The relevant entities shall establish communication plans and procedures:\n\n(a) with the Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) or, where applicable, the competent authorities, \nrelated to incident notification; \n(b) with relevant internal and external stakeholders. \nGUIDANCE \n• Ensure that the communication plan (Annex to the regulation, point 3.1.2) includes procedures for how to \ncommunicate the incident to the relevant authorities , the national CSIRT and internal and external \nstakeholders, including , where applicable, customers, direct suppliers, service providers and, if open \nsource is used, contacts for free and open source software projects. \n• Include contact information for key personnel, external stakeholders and relevant authorities. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Procedures for how to communicate the incident to the relevant authorities and the CSIRT. \n• Procedures for how to communicate the incident to customers or how and when to involve a supplier (if \napplicable). \n \n3.5.4. The relevant entities shall log incident response activities in accordance with the procedures referred to in point \n3.2.1. and record evidence. \nGUIDANCE \n• Log incident response information which contains (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no t ime of detection, containment and eradication; \no w hen the systems recovered; \no indicators of compromise; \no root cause; \no actions taken during each phase namely, detection, containment and eradication; \no assessment of the scope and the level of impact of the incident; \no communications when responding to the incident; \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n47 \n \no post incident lessons learnt and recommendations; and \no whether the CSIRT or the competent authority was notified of the incident according to the NIS2 \nDirective Articles 23 and 30. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Logs from incident response. \n• Use of a system (e.g. SIEM, EDR/XDR or ticket system). \n \n3.5.5. The relevant entities shall test at planned intervals their incident response procedures. \nGUIDANCE \n• Test the entity’s incident response procedures at least annually. \n• Test different types of incidents, for example ransomware, phishing, data breach and DoS. \n• Ensure that test scenarios involve employees from different departments as well as external stakeholders, \nfor example suppliers and service providers. \no Where necessary, include management bodies in the tests so that they understand their role \nduring an incident. \n• Conduct post-test reviews for possible lessons learnt. \n• Update the incident response procedures based on the lessons learnt from the test, if applicable. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented plans or schedules for future incident response tests. \n• Records from tests of different types of incidents. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Issue instructions on how to respond to the most common types of incidents (ransomware, phishing, data \nbreach, DoS, etc.) including containment, eradication and recovery steps. \n• Include guidelines for preserving evidence and maintaining chain of custody to support forensic analysis \nand legal proceedings if necessary. \n• Consider the use of automated solutions for incident response, for example security orchestration, \nautomation and response technologies or similar systems. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Up-to-date incident response procedures based on tests conducted and/or change logs. \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n48", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-a6813a4b8374", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.5.3. The relevant entities shall establish communication plans and procedures:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.5.3. The relevant entities shall establish communication plans and procedures:", "token_count": 873 }, { "chunk_id": "be0d84acd01abedae5a2304c0370da4c", "text": "3.6 POST-INCIDENT REVIEWS\n\n3.6.1. Where appropriate, the relevant entities shall carry out post -incident reviews after recovery from incidents. The \npost-incident reviews shall identify, where possible, the root cause of the incident and result in documented lessons \nlearned to reduce the occurrence and consequences of future incidents. \nGUIDANCE \n• Conduct root cause analysis (34) and identify the root cause of the incident, where possible. \n• Identify contributing factors and areas for improvement in incident detection, response and recovery \nprocesses. \n• I nvestigate significant incidents and write final incident reports, including actions taken and \nrecommendations to mitigate future occurrence of this type of incident. \n• Document lessons learnt, accompanied by recommendations and their owners, based on logs from \nincident response referred to in point 3.5.4 of the Annex to the regulation. \n• Share any relevant findings in the post-incident review with affected stakeholders, for example suppliers, \nservice providers, free and open source component maintainers. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Results of root cause analysis. \n• Individual reports of the handling of significant incidents. \n• Documented lessons learnt from incidents. \n \n3.6.2. The relevant entities shall ensure that post-incident reviews contribute to improving their approach to network and \ninformation security, to risk treatment measures and to incident handling, detection and response procedures. \nGUIDANCE \n• Analyse the post-incident review findings to identify gaps and weaknesses in the entity’s network and \ninformation security status. \n• Make sure that the identified gaps and weaknesses feed back to the risk assessment and risk treatment \nplan (Annex to the regulation, point 2.1). \n• Assess whether existing risk treatment measures were effective in preventing or mitigating the incident. \n• Document the findings and lessons learnt from each post-incident review comprehensively. \n• Consider whether information security requirements have been met throughout the handling of a \ncybersecurity incident or whether measures may need to be taken to restore them (e.g. resetting \npasswords for emergency administrative access). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Post-incident review reports that detail findings, lessons learnt and recommendations for improvement \nfollowing security incidents. \n• Analysis, resolution and mitigation measures taken, communicated to all relevant personnel. \n• Updated risk assessment and risk treatment plan, which includes findings of the post-incident reviews. \n \n \n(34) More information on information security incident root cause analysis can be found in Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, ‘FIRST \nCSIRT services framework’, Version 2.1, ‘6.2.4 Function: Information security incident root cause analysis’, \nhttps://www.first.org/standards/frameworks/csirts/csirt_services_framework_v2.1#6-Service-Area-Information-Security-Incident-Management. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n49 \n \n3.6.3. The relevant entities shall review at planned intervals if incidents led to post-incident reviews. \nGUIDANCE \n• Conduct an annual review or a review after significant incidents, to determine if an incident has led to a \npost-incident review. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented plans or schedules for future reviews. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Determine the composition of the review team, including members from relevant departments such as IT, \nsecurity, legal and management bodies. \n• Review existing network and information security policies, topic -specific policies relevant to the incident, \nincident handling procedures and policy and incident response procedures in light of the lessons learnt \nfrom post-incident reviews. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Minutes of the post-incident review team. \n• Evidence of updates to network and information security or topic-specific policies and procedures based \non the lessons learnt from post-incident reviews. \n \nBUSINESS\nCONTINUITY \nAND CRISIS \nMANAGEMENT\nChapter 4\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n51", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-c8da865c47c2", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3.6 POST-INCIDENT REVIEWS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 3.6 POST-INCIDENT REVIEWS", "token_count": 1034 }, { "chunk_id": "1203fb48ce314ddf149a4823add82e01", "text": "4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN\n\n4.1.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2), point (c) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall lay down and \nmaintain a business continuity and disaster recovery plan to apply in the case of incidents. \nGUIDANCE \n• Take into account industry -recognised standards when developing the business continuity ( 35 ) and \ndisaster recovery plan. \n• Create a list of natural disasters (e.g. hurricane, fire, flooding) and other occurrences (e.g. human error) \nthat could affect the services together with a list of disaster recovery capabilities (e.g. backups , tests, \nrecovery objectives, etc.). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Business continuity plan. \n• Disaster recovery plan. \n• Business continuity and disaster recovery plans are in line with documented standards and/or good \npractices. \n• L ist of natural and/or major disasters that could affect the services and a list of disaster recovery \ncapabilities (either those available internally or provided by third parties).", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e7f9d554e72c", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "token_count": 259 }, { "chunk_id": "e4e4a87925be7665724f707add0eea5a", "text": "4.1.2. The relevant entities’ operations shall be restored according to the business continuity and disaster recovery plan. \nThe plan shall be based on the results of the risk assessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1 and shall include, where \nappropriate, the following: \n(a) purpose, scope and audience; \n(b) roles and responsibilities; \n(c) key contacts and (internal and external) communication channels; \n(d) conditions for plan activation and deactivation; \n(e) order of recovery for operations; \n(f) recovery plans for specific operations, including recovery objectives; \n(g) required resources, including backups and redundancies; \n(h) restoring and resuming activities from temporary measures. \nGUIDANCE \n• Keep logs of activation and execution of the business continuity plan, including:", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e7f9d554e72c", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "token_count": 201 }, { "chunk_id": "9dc07435d1037444409d4a3aece7fd08", "text": "(35) For example, \n• ISO 22301:2019 - Security and resilience — Business continuity management systems — Requirements, \n• I SO 22313:2020 - Security and resilience — Business continuity management systems — Guidance on the use of ISO 2230 and \n• NIST SP 800-34 Rev. 1 – Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n52", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e7f9d554e72c", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "token_count": 98 }, { "chunk_id": "22d52195529269b73b6bee383587f81d", "text": "o decisions taken; \no steps followed; and \no final recovery time. \n• Determine the order of recovery based on criteria, including (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no the asset classification level; \no the importance of the service for the entity; \no dependencies (services or assets that are essential for others are restored first); \no recovery objectives (Annex to the regulation, point 4.1.3); \no resource availability; and \no regulatory requirements. \n• Conduct capacity planning so that necessary capacity for information processing, telecommunications and \nenvironmental support exists after business continuity plan activation. \n• Consider primary and alternate telecommunications service providers , section 13.1, to properly maintain \ndisaster recovery plans (for the services provided). \no For remote work, employees handling critical operations should: \n h ave access to backup internet solutions (e.g. mobile broadband, tethering capabilities) \nand \n p articipate in regular testing of failover options, including VPN access and voice \ncommunications (e.g. VoIP or cloud telephony) over backup networks. \n• Prepare for recovery and restoration of services after a disaster by identifying measures such as: \no f ailover sites in other regions; \no backups of data with high criticality to remote locations; and \no t ested restore procedures with regular validation cycles. \n• Make sure that third party services (e.g. hot site) will be available in case of disaster, where appropriate. \n• Implement advanced measures for disaster recovery capabilities, where appropriate, for example: \no full redundancy; \no failover mechanisms; and \no alternative site. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Measures in place for dealing with disasters, such as failover sites in other regions and backups of data \nto remote locations. \n• Up-to-date organisational structures widely communicated. \n• Inventory of sectors and services essential for and/or dependent on the continuity of the network and \nservice operation, and contingency plans for mitigating the impact related to dependent and \ninterdependent sectors and services.\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n53", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e7f9d554e72c", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "token_count": 546 }, { "chunk_id": "5cd99bcd66ae7016d34a393548c65da0", "text": "4.1.3. The relevant entities shall carry out a business impact analysis to assess the potential impact of severe disruptions \nto their business operations and shall, based on the results of the business impact analysis, establish continuity \nrequirements for the network and information systems. \nGUIDANCE \n• Based on the results of the BIA (36) and risk assessment, the entity should establish appropriate recovery \nobjectives, referred to in point 4.1.2 (f) of the Annex to the regulation (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no Recovery time objectives (RTOs) to determine the maximum amount of time allowed for the \nrecovery of business resources and functions (e.g. information and communications technology \n(ICT) systems and processes, respectively) after a disaster occurs, for example maximum \ndowntime of the entity’s website, enterprise resource planning (ERP) system or email system. \no Recovery point objective (RPO) to determine how much data it is acceptable for specific ICT \nactivities or applications to lose. Typically, they are measured in maximum time needed to \nrecover data without causing unacceptable, according to the risk assessment, damage to the \nentity’s activities, for example maximum recovery time for an e -commerce website, an ERP \nsystem or an email server. \no Service delivery objective (SDO) to determine the minimum level of performance that needs to \nbe reached by business functions during the alternate processing mode. An indicative and non-\nexhaustive list of examples includes: \n the percentage of inbound calls to be answered by a call centre within a specific \ntimeframe; \n the level of availability of ordering and payment systems of an e-commerce website \nwithin a specific timeframe; \n the restoration time for accessing essential shared folders via a cloud file access \nsystem; and \n the timeframe within which the full functionality of the remote work infrastructure is \nrestored. \no Maximum a cceptable outage (MAO) or maximum tolerable period of disruption (MTPD ) to \ndetermine the time it would take for the potential impacts of not providing a product/service or \nperforming an activity to become unacceptable or significant, in accordance with the risk \nassessment. Typically they are longer than RTOs. MAOs focus on service availability while RPOs \nfocus on data loss. An indicative and non-exhaustive list of examples: \n the period of time beyond which the customer service would be severely impacted and \nreputation risk increases quickly; \n the longest period of time that extended outage of an e-commerce website might result \nto major loss of sales and customer trust; \n the longest period of time that shared access to project files may halt collaboration or \ndecision-making in case that data is stored in cloud; and \n the maximum acceptable outage for remote work infrastructure beyond which business \nfunctions are significantly impaired and productivity losses begin to escalate. \n• RTOs, RPOs and SDOs may be used to determine backup and redundancy procedures.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e7f9d554e72c", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "token_count": 760 }, { "chunk_id": "8c2cf2ece184c5185ed507a99d94b029", "text": "(36) Consider the following standards: ISO/TS 22317:2021 and NIST special publication 800-34. For definitions of terms, refer to ISO 22300:2021. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n54", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e7f9d554e72c", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "token_count": 51 }, { "chunk_id": "5333740e921958c39ce02ebed253e0dc", "text": "• Document disaster recovery plan, taking into account: \no the RTOs, RPOs and SDOs; and \no compliance with applicable regulations and legislation. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented BIA with specific recovery objectives. \n• Processes, procedures and measures to ensure the required level of continuity in disruptive situations.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e7f9d554e72c", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "token_count": 82 }, { "chunk_id": "12d7c5d28cf229b83394ff385e672f52", "text": "4.1.4. The business continuity plan and disaster recovery plan shall be tested, reviewed and, where appropriate, \nupdated at planned intervals and following significant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks. The relevant \nentities shall ensure that the plans incorporate lessons learnt from such tests. \nGUIDANCE \n• Test, review and, if necessary, update the business continuity and disaster recovery plans at least \nannually. \n• Choose and combine method(s) to test the business continuity and disaster recovery plans, such as: \no alternative locations for personnel; \no disaster recovery locations – hot sites; \no digital twins; \no simulations; \no table top exercises. \n• Test business continuity and disaster recovery plans regularly, taking into account: \no change logs; \no past incidents; and \no results of previous tests. \n• Where appropriate, test the disaster recovery plan at an alternate processing site to: \no familiarize related personnel with the facility and available resources; and \no evaluate the capabilities of the alternate processing site to support operations. \n• Test data centre infrastructure for: \no availability; \no auto failover; \no power failover between power providers and/or power provider to backup (for example \ngenerators or batteries); and \no resilience to maintain service to customers. \n• Define full recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known state as part of the disaster \nrecovery plan testing. \n• Update business continuity and disaster recovery plans and related measures based on: \no change logs; \no past incidents; \no documented results of the continuity of operations test activities; and \no records of individual training activities. \n• Review change logs and documented results from past tests on business continuity and disaster recovery \nplans to ensure that the plans incorporate lessons learnt from such tests. \n• Review and, if necessary, update roles and responsibilities. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n55", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e7f9d554e72c", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "token_count": 508 }, { "chunk_id": "6d3a8be5d9a78ad2a63e2bca128cb617", "text": "• Review dependent third parties’ disaster recovery plans to ensure that the plans meet entity’s business \ncontinuity requirements. \n• Communicate changes to business continuity and disaster recovery plans to related key personnel. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented plans or schedules for future tests. \n• Records from previous tests, reviews and possible updates. \n• Logs of activation and execution of business continuity and disaster recovery plans, including decisions \ntaken, steps followed and final recovery time. \n• Communications, for example emails, documents and intranet announcements, concerning changes to \nthe business continuity and disaster recovery plans. \n• Evidences that lessons learnt from past tests are incorporated into the plans, for example workflow \nchanges and updated plans.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e7f9d554e72c", "chunk_index": 8, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "token_count": 201 }, { "chunk_id": "6f9e7e00ff5dff7e916d7d138a192f8e", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• In addition to the elements referred to in point 4.1.2 of the Annex to the regulation, the business continuity \nplan might address: \no management commitment; \no coordination among organisational units; \no communication plan; \no compliance with laws; \no metrics for measuring the successful implementation of the plan. \n• Protect the business continuity and disaster recovery plans from unauthorized disclosure and modification. \n• Ensure that business continuity and disaster recovery plans are easily accessible during a system outage. \nAn indicative, non-exhaustive list of options to achieve this: \no p hysical copies; \no cloud storage; \no e xternal drives; \no mobile access. \n• Distribute copies of the business continuity plan to the related key personnel. \n• Monitor the activation and execution of the business continuity plan registering successful and failed \nrecovery times. \n• Add a reference or a description / connection with the incident handling policy, plan and procedures into \nthe business continuity plan. \n• Coordinate the business continuity plan with the respective plans of external service providers to ensure \nthat continuity requirements are satisfied \n• Train key personnel involved in continuity operations. \n• Set up procedures in regard to the appropriate communication channels with the (inter)national competent \nauthorities, including disaster management organisations and disaster-relief teams. \n• R egularly train the responsible personnel in disaster recovery operations. \n• Implement contingency plans for systems based on scenarios. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n56", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e7f9d554e72c", "chunk_index": 9, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "token_count": 414 }, { "chunk_id": "bec78a340739aa70dc278dae371fe0e6", "text": "• Monitor the activation and execution of contingency plans, registering successful and failed RTOs, RPOs \nand SDOs. \n• Implement contingency plans for high criticality dependent and inter-dependent sectors and services. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Measures, for example encryption and access control , for protecting business continuity and disaster \nrecovery plans from unauthorized disclosure and modification. \n• Up-to-date organisational structures widely communicated. \n• Decision process for activating contingency plans. \n• Contingency plans for systems, including clear steps and procedures for common threats, triggers for \nactivation, steps and defined RTOs, RPOs and SDOs. \n• Logs of activation and execution of contingency plans, including decisions taken, steps followed and final \nrecovery time.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e7f9d554e72c", "chunk_index": 10, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.1 BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN", "token_count": 202 }, { "chunk_id": "7f7021c7f1f4b6fd33d4c69ff1d3a3cc", "text": "4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT\n\n4.2.1. The relevant entities shall maintain backup copies of data and provide sufficient available resources, including \nfacilities, network and information systems and staff, to ensure an appropriate level of redundancy. \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider whether to invest in own redundancy or to engage third parties, for example cloud providers, to \nprovide such redundancy, in alignment with the BIA (Annex to the regulation, point 4.1.3). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Backups are physically separated from the systems that generated them. \n• I f the service is offered by a third party, SLAs.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-ac8c516e0004", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 155 }, { "chunk_id": "942cde588f0943f04ac0706f20434045", "text": "4.2.2. Based on the results of the risk assessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1 and the business continuity plan, \nthe relevant entities shall lay down backup plans which include the following: \n(a) recovery times; \n(b) assurance that backup copies are complete and accurate, including configuration data and data stored in cloud \ncomputing service environment; \n(c) storing backup copies (online or offline) in a safe location or locations, which are not in the same network as the \nsystem and are at sufficient distance to escape any damage from a disaster at the main site; \n(d) appropriate physical and logical access controls to backup copies, in accordance with the asset classification level; \n(e) restoring data from backup copies; \n(f) retention periods based on business and regulatory requirements. \nGUIDANCE \n• Recovery times should not exceed the recovery objectives referred to in 4.1.2 (f) of the Annex to the \nregulation. \n• Concerning retention periods consider what is referred to in point 3.2.5 of the Annex to the regulation. \n• If an entity engages third parties to ensure an appropriate level of redundancy, it should be clearly decided \nwhether it is the entity's responsibility to compile the backup plans or if the third parti es have any \ninvolvement in the process. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n57", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-ac8c516e0004", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 347 }, { "chunk_id": "6c7843072900c65cd713cc0de3de8465", "text": "• Backup plans. \n• Logs from backup software that show regular backups are being performed. \n• Backups physically separated and with an appropriate level of protection, including encryption. \n• L ogs or reports confirming that one copy of the backup is stored off-site, such as in a cloud storage service \nor a remote data centre. \n• C onfiguration settings of backup software to verify that it is set up to create copies of data and store them \non different media. \n• Clear and concise restoration procedures that cover all relevant systems and services. \n• If applicable, settings of the cloud storage service to ensure it is configured to receive and store backup \ncopies.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-ac8c516e0004", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 168 }, { "chunk_id": "bef33f7de9dfb689141552c0a7622b79", "text": "4.2.3. The relevant entities shall perform regular integrity checks on the backup copies. \nGUIDANCE \n• Check the integrity of the backup copies. An indicative, non- exhaustive list of good practices is the \nfollowing: \no u se checksums or hashing algorithms to verify that the data in your backups matches the original \ndata (section 9.2); \no i mplement automated scripts to run these checks regularly, reducing the risk of human error; \no schedule regular tests to restore data from backups to ensure they are complete, functional and \nvalidated by business users to confirm the accuracy and usability of the restored data; \no t est various recovery scenarios, including full system restores and indiv idual file recoveries, to \nensure all aspects of your backup system are reliable; and \no consider using cloud storage solutions for off -site backups, which often include built -in integrity \nchecks and redundancy. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Logs or reports showing that checksum or hashing algorithms are used. \n• Settings in backup software or scripts that specify the use of checksums or hashing algorithms. \n• Records of regular tests in which data is restored from backups. \n• Evidence of tests of different recovery scenarios, including full system restores and individual file \nrecoveries. \n• Logs or reports from actual incidents in which recovery procedures were implemented (Annex to the \nregulation, points 3.2 and 3.5). \n• If the service is offered by a third party, SLAs.\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n58", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-ac8c516e0004", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 388 }, { "chunk_id": "3957f1eb3dfcbbca47c6248ccb0174ae", "text": "4.2.4. Based on the results of the risk assessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1 and the business continuity plan, \nthe relevant entities shall ensure sufficient availability of resources by at least partial redundancy of the following: \n(a) network and information systems; \n(b) assets, including facilities, equipment and supplies; \n(c) personnel with the necessary responsibility, authority and competence; \n(d) appropriate communication channels. \nGUIDANCE \n• Define minimum resources needed to ensure at least partial redundancy for each of points (a), (b), (c) and \n(d). These may include the following: \no network and information systems: one or more of the following (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \n multiple internet service providers, \n load balancing, \n mi rrored servers, \n virtualisation, \n redundant array of independent disks; \no assets: one or more of the following (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \n shared workspaces, \n backup locations, \n spare equipment, \n multiple suppliers for the same categories of products; \no personnel: one or more of the following (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \n job rotation, \n backup assignments, \n emergency drills; \no multiple communication platforms, for example social media, messaging apps and email; and \no multiple methods to power a site, either through multiple electrical providers or with a combination \nof electrical providers and backup mechanisms, such as generators. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• One or more of the above mechanisms are in place.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-ac8c516e0004", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 383 }, { "chunk_id": "3bff066c373941a8a955168273e077e3", "text": "4.2.5. Where appropriate, the relevant entities shall ensure that monitoring and adjustment of resources, including \nfacilities, systems and personnel, is duly informed by backup and redundancy requirements. \nGUIDANCE \n• Decisions about resource allocation and adjustments should be guided by the need for backups and \nredundancy. To this end, the entity might consider one or more of the following (indicative, non-exhaustive \nlist): \no prioritisation of resources based on the results of the risk analysis; \no partial redundancy; \no diverse backup locations; and \no continuous monitoring of the resources where redundancy is necessary.\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-ac8c516e0004", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.2 BACKUP AND REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 174 }, { "chunk_id": "5c091f1701b7ba82a1a1ae2ab1e1fcf9", "text": "59 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE\n\n• Evidence of elements referred to in point 4.2.4 of the Annex to the regulation. \n• Evidence from periodic simulations and awareness raising activities to assess the readiness of personnel \nand the adequacy of the procedures. \n \n4.2.6. The relevant entities shall carry out regular testing of the recovery of backup copies and redundancies to ensure \nthat, in recovery conditions, they can be relied upon and cover the copies, processes and knowledge to perform an \neffective recovery. The relevant entities shall document the results of the tests and, where needed, take corrective \naction. \nGUIDANCE \n• Tailor the frequency of the backup checks to the data criticality based on the risk assessment (section 2.1). \nAs an example: \no D ata with high criticality might be checked on a weekly basis. \no D ata with moderate and low criticality might be checked on a monthly basis. \no Significant changes should be checked immediately after the change. \n• Make sure that the issues and lessons learnt from exercises are addressed by the responsible people and \nthat the relevant processes and systems are updated accordingly. \n• Involve suppliers and other third parties, such as business partners or customers in tests. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Reports/logs of regular testing of backup status, processes and procedures. \n• Test programme for backup plans, including types of contingencies, frequency, roles and responsibilities, \ntemplates and procedures for conducting tests, and templates for post-test reports. \n• Reports of past tests of backup and contingency plans. \n• Reports about tests and drills showing the execution of the plans, including evidence that recovery times \nwere met and lessons learnt from the tests. \n• Issues and lessons learnt from past tests addressed by the responsible people. \n• Updated test plans, review comments and/or change logs. \n• Input from suppliers and other third parties involved about how to improve test scenarios. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Protect backup and restoration hardware and software. \n• Ensure that encrypted backups remain accessible by securely maintaining the associated encryption keys. \nEncryption keys should be stored separately from the backup data to prevent unauthorized access and \nensure recoverability. \n• Before systems or configurations are restored, a ‘patient zero (\n37)’ may need to be identified so that t he \nrestoration does not restore any vulnerabilities or infections that have sometimes been cleaned up. \n \n \n(37) This term is usually used to identify the first system affected by an attack. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n60 \n \n• Consider the 3-2-1 backup rule: \no keep three copies of the data (the original plus two backups), \no on two different types of storage media (e.g. hard drives, cloud storage), \no with one copy stored offsite. \n• Ensure the integrity of backups , that is, prevent any modification or deletion, such as ransomware \nencryption or tampering, within a defined retention period. Ways to ensure this include (indicative, non-\nexhaustive list): \no malware and ransomware scanning of backups before backups are stored; \no use of immutable backups; \no o ffline storage of backups. \n• Integrate business continuity and disaster recovery plans with incident response (Annex to the regulation, \npoint 3.5) and crisis management processes (Annex to the regulation, point 4.3). \n• When available cloud services: \no b ackups will be replicated across multiple availability zones or stored in an alternate region to \nensure resilience against zone-level failures; \no will be configured with cross-zone replication to minimise downtime; \no all backup data will be encrypted at rest using cloud-native key management systems and \nencrypted during transfer using TLS 1.2+; \no regular backup testing will be performed to validate cross-zone recovery capabilities. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Measures in place to protect backup and restoration hardware and software, for example physical access \ncontrols, surveillance systems, encryption, integrity checks and failover mechanisms. \n• Review of the backup plan which mentions the 3-2-1 rule. \n• L ogs from backup software that show regular backups are being performed. \n• C onfiguration settings of backup software to verify that it is set up to create three copies of data and store \nthem on different media. \n• If applicable, settings of the cloud storage service ensuring it is configured to receive and store backup \ncopies.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-4d9198ad3f28", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "59 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 59 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "token_count": 1132 }, { "chunk_id": "913a7fa16b7cfa5cd55a204731e3c746", "text": "4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.\n\nGUIDANCE \n• Take into account industry-recognised standards when developing the crisis management process (38). \no Be aware that each crisis may be different and further analysis may be required on an ad hoc \nbasis. \no Consider the various aspects (e.g. technical, operational, communication and remediation) of \ncrisis management, including processes, roles and responsibilities.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-77b41ecda8f0", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "token_count": 116 }, { "chunk_id": "6738c402100ad3e6bedeb20d780e3565", "text": "(38) Additionally, consider: \n• ISO 22361:2022, Security and resilience – Crisis management – Guidelines; \n• ENISA Best Practices for Cyber Crisis Management, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/best-practices-for-cyber-crisis-\nmanagement; \n• NIST Special Publication 800-61 Revision 2. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n61", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-77b41ecda8f0", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "token_count": 88 }, { "chunk_id": "35e0107cb7ed5bf41b95e97407975927", "text": "• Because the escalation of an incident to crisis status depends on an entity’s risk appetite and incident \nhandling capabilities, the entity should define criteria on when a crisis is declared (39). This may refer to \nincidents that cause serious impact, beyond a certain threshold of tolerance. These criteria may include \nthe following (indicative and non-exhaustive list): \no the incident poses significant risk to critical assets or operations with high criticality, for example \nhigh-severity incidents (e.g. data breaches involving sensitive information); \no the incident disrupts business operations significantly, for example prolonged downtime, \nwidespread loss of services or significant impact on customer service; \no the breadth of the incident, that is, whether it affects multiple systems, departments or geographic \nlocations, indicating a wider threat; \no the potential impact on the entity’s reputation – incidents that could lead to public scrutiny or loss \nof customer trust should be escalated; \no the potential impact of the cybersecurity incident on the confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and \navailability of data; \no the sophistication and motivations of the threat actors involved. Incidents linked to advanced \npersistent threats or organi sed cybercrime may req uire a higher -level response, beyond the \ncapabilities of the entity; \no the potential to escalate further ( e.g. if vulnerabilities could be exploited again or if malware is \nspreading). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Crisis management process is in line with documented standards and/or good practices.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-77b41ecda8f0", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "token_count": 399 }, { "chunk_id": "44d78e401b34148187746db457ac7572", "text": "4.3.2. The relevant entities shall ensure that the crisis management process addresses at least the following elements: \n(a) roles and responsibilities for personnel and, where appropriate, suppliers and service providers, specifying the \nallocation of roles in crisis situations, including specific steps to follow; \n(b) appropriate communication means between the relevant entities and relevant competent authorities; \n(c) application of appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of network and information system security in crisis \nsituations. \nFor the purpose of point (b), the flow of information between the relevant entities and relevant competent authorities \nshall include both obligatory communications, such as incident reports and related timelines and non-obligatory \ncommunications. \nGUIDANCE \n• For crisis communication, consider (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no legal obligations for communication, such as timing of communication, in particular referring to \nrequirements for notification; \no how information will be disseminated to internal and external stakeholders (employees, \ncustomers, direct suppliers and service providers, emergency services, etc.) during a crisis; \no templates for communication; \no communication channels to be used for each type of stakeholder, considering that:", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-77b41ecda8f0", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "token_count": 331 }, { "chunk_id": "5a7a4e8f19200acb02adf861ab988d84", "text": "(39) According to ISO 22361, a crisis is an ‘abnormal or extraordinary event or situation which threatens an organisation or community and requires a \nstrategic, adaptive and timely response in order to preserve its viability and integrity’. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n62", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-77b41ecda8f0", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "token_count": 76 }, { "chunk_id": "b0ac6ef2070fe72e7602fa8807f5775c", "text": " internal and external stakeholders may use different communication channels; \n normal communication channels might not be safe in crisis mode; \n channels used to notify and communicate with competent authorities should also be \nindicated; \no up-to-date contact information for internal and external stakeholders. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented crisis management process. \n• List of members of the crisis management team, including their roles, contact information and alternatives.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-77b41ecda8f0", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "token_count": 122 }, { "chunk_id": "10effbb9dc963adcde25c9ccc9978069", "text": "4.3.3. The relevant entities shall implement a process for managing and making use of information received from the \nCSIRTs or, where applicable, the competent authorities, concerning incidents, vulnerabilities, threats or possible \nmitigation measures. \nGUIDANCE \n• Implement a process for managing and making use of information received from the CSIRTs. Consider \nthe following steps (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no d esignate a point of contact with the CSIRT; \no e nsure that the point of contact has sufficient knowledge concerning incidents and threat \nintelligence. \no classify incoming information into categories such as incidents, vulnerabilities, threats and \nmitigation measures. \no assi gn priority levels based on severity and potential impact on the entity , if the information is \nrelevant or applicable \no h ave the CSIRT contact point review the information for relevance and urgency. \no validate information against internal logs, threat intelligence feeds and existing security policies. \no for vulnerabilities and threats, if applicable, collaborate with relevant teams (IT, security, \noperations) to develop a mitigation strategy; \no u pdate or create incident response plans based on the nature of the threats or incidents reported \nin accordance with point 3.5 of the Annex to the regulation. \no w here appropriate, implement the mitigation measures and communicate with the relevant \nstakeholders in accordance with point 3.5 of the Annex to the regulation. \no share insights and feedback on incidents and mitigations with the CSIRT on a voluntary basis . \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Previous communications with CSIRTs or, where applicable, the competent authorities, for example \nemails, correspondence and meeting minutes. \n• Evidences that the point of contact has sufficient knowledge concerning incidents and threat intelligence.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-77b41ecda8f0", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "token_count": 466 }, { "chunk_id": "94418af4a00d59296333329cd3bb0d3c", "text": "4.3.4. The relevant entities shall test, review and, where appropriate, update the crisis management plan on a regular \nbasis or following significant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Test the crisis management process annually. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n63", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-77b41ecda8f0", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "token_count": 82 }, { "chunk_id": "f69d9730315a8b378c02da1205bccc65", "text": "• Test the crisis management process through, for example, an exercise or simulation, by (indicative, non-\nexhaustive list): \no t aking into account past crisis situations; \no comparing the results of the tests to the objectives defined, for instance the recovery objectives \nin point 4.1.2 (f) of the Annex to the regulation (e.g. RTOs, RPOs and SDOs); and \no using the results of the comparison to update and improve the crisis management procedure. \n• Review and update, if necessary, the crisis management process after a test or following significant \nincidents or significant changes to operations or risks. \n• Review and update the policy on the security of network and information systems and crisis management \norganisational measures after a test or following significant incidents or significant changes to operations \nor risks. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documentation showing how crisis management integrates with the entity’s incident response plans \n(Annex to the regulation, point 3.5), particularly for ICT-related incidents. \n• Documents identifying any previous crises and assessing their likelihood of recurrence and potential \nimpact on business operations. \n• Documentation of previous crisis management tests, including the scenarios tested, participants involved \nand outcomes. \n• After-action reports or evaluations from crisis management tests , identifying strengths, weaknesses and \nareas for improvement. \n• Records of internal or external reviews and audits of the crisis management plan, including any findings \nand corrective actions taken.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-77b41ecda8f0", "chunk_index": 8, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "token_count": 393 }, { "chunk_id": "07706cbf9536a00d11d01b08853dac18", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Management bodies should approve the crisis management process and, where appropriate, their roles \nand responsibilities during a crisis should be defined. \n• In addition to the elements referred to in point 4.3.2 of the Annex to the regulation the crisis management \nprocess might identify (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no procedures for declaring a crisis; \no activation of the crisis management team; \no escalation paths; \no emergency procedures, which describe the actions in the event of a crisis; and \no fall back procedures that describe the actions to be taken to protect essential activities or support \nservices (e.g. alternative temporary locations for bringing the process back to normal operation, \nrecovery or restoration). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Inventory of resources required for crisis management, including backup systems, alternative \ncommunication tools and emergency supplies. \n• Approved crisis management process. \n• A crisis communication plan documented and approved by the management bodies in place and \ncommunicated to all personnel. In addition to the elements referred to in point 4.3.2 of the Annex to the \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n64", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-77b41ecda8f0", "chunk_index": 9, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "token_count": 307 }, { "chunk_id": "280f43e062a5dc40cb1a857714d3b32f", "text": "regulation and the elements of the above guidance, the plan includes at least (indicative, non-exhaustive \nlist): \no how information will be disseminated to stakeholders during a crisis; \no templates for communication; and \no up-to-date contact information for internal and external stakeholders, including employees, \ncustomers, suppliers and emergency services. \n• Evidence that personnel are aware of the processes and who to contact in the event of a crisis. \n• Records from periodic simulations and awareness raising activities to assess the readiness of personnel \nand the adequacy of the procedures for managing a crisis.\n\nSUPPLY CHAIN\nSECURITY\nChapter 5\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n66", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-77b41ecda8f0", "chunk_index": 10, "total_chunks": 11, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 4.3.1. The relevant entities shall put in place a process for crisis management.", "token_count": 180 }, { "chunk_id": "143436d02f60189323aee0d8fde97efc", "text": "5.1 SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY POLICY\n\n5.1.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2), point (d) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall establish, \nimplement and apply a supply chain security policy which governs the relations with their direct suppliers and service \nproviders to mitigate the identified risks to the security of network and information systems. In the supply chain security \npolicy, the relevant entities shall identify their role in the supply chain and communicate it to their direct suppliers and \nservice providers. \nGUIDANCE \n• T ake into account industry -recognised standards or good practices when developing the supply chain\npolicy (40).\n• The role of a supplier or service provider might be one or more of the following (41):\no ICT supplier (including software and hardware supplier),\no Manufacturer,\no managed service provider,\no managed security service provider and\no cloud computing provider.\n• In the case of free and open source software (FOSS), communities and projects that openly develop,\nmaintain and distribute software may not be considered direct suppliers or service providers where no\ncontractual relationship exists between the relevant entity and the open source project, beyond adherence\nto a standardised copyright licence, or where the contractual relationship is with an open source software\nsteward (Regulation 2024/2847, Article 3(14) ‘provides support on a sustained basis for the development\nand ensures the viability of those products’).\nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• S upply chain security policy in place and is in line with industry -recognised standards and/or good\npractices.\n• Evidence (e.g. email, contract or announcements) of the communication of the role of the entity to the\ndirect suppliers and service providers, where possible.\n5.1.2. As part of the supply chain security policy referred to in point 5.1.1, the relevant entities shall lay down criteria to \nselect and contract suppliers and service providers. Those criteria shall include the following: \n(a) the cybersecurity practices of the suppliers and service providers, including their secure development procedures;\n(40) In addition, consider the following: \n• ISO/IEC 27036-1:2021, Cybersecurity – Supplier relationships Part 1: Overview and concepts; \n• ISO/IEC 27036-2:2022, Cybersecurity – Supplier relationships Part 2: Requirements; \n• NIST SP 800-161 Rev. 1, ‘Cybersecurity supply chain risk management practices for systems and organizations’,\nhttps://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/161/r1/upd1/final;\n• ENISA, Good Practices for Supply Chain Cybersecurity, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/good- practices-for-supply-chain-\ncybersecurity. \n(41) The list aligns with the draft EU ICT Supply Chain Toolbox from the NIS Cooperation Group workstream on supply chain, as of February 2025. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n67 \n \n(b) the ability of the suppliers and service providers to meet cybersecurity specifications set by the relevant entities; \n(c) the overall quality and resilience of ICT products and ICT services and the cybersecurity risk-management measures \nembedded in them, including the risks and classification level of the ICT products and ICT services; \n(d) the ability of the relevant entities to diversify sources of supply and limit vendor lock-in, where applicable. \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider criteria such as: \no the legal jurisdiction of the supplier or service provider, for example whether the supplier is \nregulated under the NIS2 Directive or the Cyber Resilience Act and in which jurisdiction(s); \no if available, compliance statements from the supplier in relation to the NIS2 Directive; \no the corporate ownership of the supplier or service provider; \no the supplier’s or service provider’s ability to ensure supply (e.g. size, reliance on other suppliers \nor service providers and degree of control over its own supply chain); \no the cybersecurity practices of the supplier or service provider, and whether adequate prioritisation \nis given to cybersecurity practices, attested by: \n industry standard certifications for cybersecurity; \n vendor risk-management software reports or other provider assessment reports (e.g. \nStandardized Information Gathering, vendor security assessment or consensus \nassessment initiative questionnaire), if available; \no notices or advice issued by national authorities on the selection of suppliers or service providers, \nif available; \no the sensitivity of the use of the products and services acquired; \no the supplier or service provider’s history in relation to cybersecurity events and breaches; \no t he possibility of vendor lock -in, if the supplier or service provider is selected. Parameters to \nconsider are the use of open and interoperable standards, the use of open data formats, existing \ncontracts with the supplier or service provider, the use of proprietary software features, etc. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• A policy containing the elements referred to in point 5.1.2 of the Annex to the regulation. \n \n5.1.3. When establishing their supply chain security policy, relevant entities shall take into account the results of the \ncoordinated security risk assessments of critical supply chains carried out in accordance with Article 22(1) of Directive \n(EU) 2022/2555, where applicable. \n \nGUIDANCE \n• Take into account any recommendations or guidance on supply chain security, published by the NIS \nCooperation Group, established by the NIS2 Directive, Ar ticle 14 (42) and by the national competent \nauthorities. \n \n \n \n(42) ‘NIS Cooperation Group’, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis-cooperation-group. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-9eb26e0fcb32", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "5.1 SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY POLICY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 5.1 SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY POLICY", "token_count": 1431 }, { "chunk_id": "37e86b2c4479451e111c539f1ab7288a", "text": "68 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE\n\n• Evidence that scenarios and the recommendations of the NIS Cooperation Group have been taken into \naccount in the supply chain policy, relevant to the entity’s business objectives. \n \n5.1.4. Based on the supply chain security policy and taking into account the results of the risk assessment carried out \nin accordance with point 2.1. of this Annex, the relevant entities shall ensure that their contracts with the suppliers and \nservice providers specify, where appropriate through service level agreements, the following, where appropriate: \n(a) cybersecurity requirements for the suppliers or service providers, including requirements as regards the security in \nacquisition of ICT services or ICT products set out in point 6.1.; \n(b) requirements regarding awareness, skills and training and where appropriate certifications, required from the \nsuppliers’ or service providers’ employees; \n(c) requirements regarding the verification of the background of the suppliers’ and service providers’ employees; \n(d) an obligation on suppliers and service providers to notify, without undue delay, the relevant entities of incidents that \npresent a risk to the security of the network and information systems of those entities; \n(e) the right to audit or right to receive audit reports; \n(f) an obligation on suppliers and service providers to handle vulnerabilities that present a risk to the security of the \nnetwork and information systems of the relevant entities; \n(g) requirements regarding subcontracting and, where the relevant entities allow subcontracting, cybersec urity \nrequirements for subcontractors in accordance with the cybersecurity requirements referred to in point (a); \n(h) obligations on the suppliers and service providers at the termination of the contract, such as retrieval and disposal \nof the information obtained by the suppliers and service providers in the exercise of their tasks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Ensure that , in all relevant new and renewed contracts, the requirements from point 5.1.4 of the Annex to \nthe regulation are included. \n• W hen dealing with large suppliers and service providers consider one or more of the following measures \n(indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no collective bargaining by teaming up with similar size organisations for purchasing products or \nservices in bulk; \no representation by an association of which the entity is a member of; \no legal advice for reviewing and negotiating a contract; \no negotiating specific clauses such as exit, pricing and SLAs (43); \no suppliers that publicly publish their security, privacy or reliability commitments; \no providers with standard certifications (e.g. ISO 27001, SOC 2); \no trusted platforms or marketplaces that vet suppliers (e.g. app stores, SaaS directories, partner \nnetworks); \no contract templates or free legal checklists from small business associations, NGOs or \ngovernment sites; \no tools/services that allow easy data export, monthly payments or no lock-in; \no a voiding long-term commitments or vendor lock-in without clear exit strategies; and \n \n \n(43) The entity remains fully accountable for the integrity, availability and confidentiality of services provided by suppliers. SLAs must be clearly defined, \nactively managed and aligned with the entity’s business continuity, security and compliance obligations. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n69 \n \no a short list of alternatives in case the supplier becomes unavailable. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Contracts that contain the elements referred to in point 5.1.4 of the Annex to the regulation. \n \n5.1.5. The relevant entities shall take into account the elements referred to in point 5.1.2 and 5.1.3. as part of the \nselection process of new suppliers and service providers, as well as part of the procurement process referred to in point", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-02a25430270e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "68 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 68 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "token_count": 967 }, { "chunk_id": "cf1bda239f4c682d62ec187c94a03d54", "text": "6.1. \nGUIDANCE\n\n• Perform a risk analysis before entering into any agreement with suppliers and service providers related to \ninformation security , taking into account the elements referred to in point 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, where \nappropriate (44). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Evidence that contracts with new suppliers and service providers or the procurement guidelines take into \naccount the elements referred to in points 5.1.2 and 5.1.3. \n• Comparison between selected c ontracts and the associated tenders to check whether the secure \nacquisition of ICT systems, products and service processes and particularly the elements referred to in \npoint 6.1.2 of the Annex to the regulation, are taken into consideration. \n• Risk analysis results from supplier and service provider evaluations. \n \n5.1.6. The relevant entities shall review the supply chain security policy and monitor, evaluate and, where necessary, \nact upon changes in the cybersecurity practices of suppliers and service providers, at planned intervals and when \nsignificant changes to operations or risks or significant incidents related to the provision of ICT services or having impact \non the security of the ICT products from suppliers and service providers occur. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review the supply chain policy at least annually. \n• Create and maintain a process to monitor suppliers and service providers over the life cycle. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Supply chain policy review plans or schedules. \n• Records from previous reviews. \n• List of security incidents related to or caused by engagement with a supplier or service provider. \n• Evidence that the policy was reviewed and possibly updated, after significant changes to operations or \nrisks or significant incidents related to the provision of ICT services or having an impact on the security of \nthe ICT products from suppliers and service providers. \n• Evidence from evaluations of suppliers and service providers. \n \n \n \n \n(44) For example, for procuring security services or for recurring purchases in large quantities. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n70", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-33e2fd1a7c64", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.1. \nGUIDANCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.1. \nGUIDANCE", "token_count": 528 }, { "chunk_id": "1d41932728f8b68f1a5c2b573ef67c29", "text": "5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) regularly monitor reports on the implementation of the service level agreements, where applicable; \n(b) review incidents related to ICT products and ICT services from suppliers and service providers; \n(c) assess the need for unscheduled reviews and document the findings in a comprehensible manner; \n(d) analyse the risks presented by changes related to ICT products and ICT services from suppliers and service \nproviders and, where appropriate, take mitigating measures in a timely manner. \nGUIDANCE \n• Set up a regular review (e.g. as part of a regular supplier meeting) and follow up on deviations from the \nagreed SLAs. \n• Define and assign responsibilities regarding maintenance, operation and ownership of assets. \n• Make sure that monitoring encompasses periodic reassessment of supplier and service provider \ncompliance, and monitor supplier and service provider release notes. \n• Periodically ensure that product configuration is aligned with vendor recommendations, with increasing \nfrequency as products age. \n• Keep track of security incidents related to or caused by suppliers and service providers as they might \ntrigger an unscheduled review of the suppliers and service providers. Other circumstances for such an \nunscheduled review include to suppliers and service providers (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no material changes in their operations; \no changes in their risk exposure; \no failure to meet their contractual obligations; and \no emergence of new threats or vulnerabilities affecting the provided ICT products or services. \n• Monitoring frequency should be aligned with supply chain policy (Annex to the regulation, point 5.1.1) and \nthe r eview of the secure acquisition of ICT services, systems or products processes (Annex to the \nregulation, point 6.1.3). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Records showing that service levels are monitored in accordance with established SLA). \n• Incident response records which confirm whether the entity takes into account incidents related to ICT \nservices, systems or products from suppliers and service providers; \n• Evidence that signed contracts with third parties (e.g. contractors and suppliers) are in line with the policy \non the security of network and information systems, for example contract ual clauses, references to key \nsecurity-relevant roles and responsibilities, and requirements for the contractor to report incidents. \n• Supplier and service provider exit process, meaning documentation outlining how the entity manages the \nexit of suppliers and service providers. This includes transitioning services, data and access rights when \nterminating a supplier and service provider relationship. \n• List of security incidents related to or caused by engagement with third parties.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0026630bba67", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 708 }, { "chunk_id": "dfb90ae10ca383d15edbb4f9d29dba09", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• In addition to the elements referred to point 5.1.4 of the Annex to the regulation, c onsider the following \nadditional elements for contract clauses (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no a clear and complete description of ICT products and services; \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n71", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0026630bba67", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 83 }, { "chunk_id": "3f80cc1d04770d5be22712a58d040594", "text": "o service level descriptions, including uptime guarantees or target service levels, response times \nfor service issues and updates to the service level descriptions thereof; \no locations (regions or countries) where the ICT products are to be produced and ICT services are \nto be provided and where data is to be processed, including the storage location and the \nrequirement for the supplier and service provider to notify the entity in advance if it envisages \nchanging such locations; \no provisions on availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality in relation to the protection of \ndata, including personal data; \no non-disclosure agreements; \no obligations on the suppliers and service providers, such as r etrieval and disposal of the \ninformation obtained by the suppliers and service providers in the exercise of their tasks, in the \nevent of the insolvency, resolution, termination or discontinuation of the business operations of \nthe supplier or service provider; \no obligations of the supplier or service provider to provide assistance to the entity at no additional \ncost or at a cost that is determined ex ante, in the event of a cyber incident that presents a risk \nand was caused by the ICT product or the ICT service contracted; \no roles and responsibilities; \no contacts and reporting lines; \no the obligation of the supplier or service provider to fully cooperate with the competent authorities; \no termination rights and related minimum notice periods for the termination of the contractual \narrangements; \no notice periods and reporting obligations of the supplier or service provider to the entity, including \nnotification of any development that might have a material impact on the supplier’s or service \nprovider’s ability to effectively provide the ICT products or services in line with agreed service \nlevels; \no the right to audit by the entity or an appointed third party and by the competent authority and the \nobligation of the supplier and the service provider to fully cooperate during onsite inspections and \naudits performed by competent authorities and the obligation to provide details on the scope, \nprocedures to be followed and frequency of such inspections and audits; \no exit strategies, in particular the establishment of a mandatory adequate transition period, \nprovisions on intellectual property and responsibilities of the supplier during the exit period, for \nexample to provide relevant documentation and historical logs. \n• In addition to the elements referred to in point 5.1.5 of the Annex to the regulation, consider the following \n(indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no country-specific information (e.g. threat assessment from national security services), if available; \no restrictions or exclusions posed by a relevant national authority, for example equipment with high \ncriticality for the entity or for high-risk suppliers; \no information stemming from known incidents or cyber threat intelligence; and \no the characteristics of each supplier, such as the quality of its security practices, the legal \nframework and the level of transparency. \n• Make sure that secure decommissioning service providers consider issues such as deactivating user and \nservice accounts, terminating data flows and ensuring secure disposal of the entity’s data within supplier \nor service provider systems. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n72", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0026630bba67", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 857 }, { "chunk_id": "9f7f1c7eb9800a2537617b0df0170549", "text": "• Awareness training regarding rules of engagement and behaviour should be delivered to the entity’s and \nthe suppliers or service providers’ personnel, where appropriate, based on the level of access to the \nentity’s assets and information assets. \n• Include relevant personnel of suppliers and service providers and their relevant responsibilities, in crisis \nmanagement tests, where appropriate. \n• Make sure that contracts with suppliers and service providers are in line with the policy on the security of \nnetwork and information systems. \n• When implementing a supply chain security policy , consider the following elements regarding the use of \nfree and open source software (FOSS) supply chain: \no When using FOSS without purchasing a related software product or entering into a service \nagreement for development with the originator of the FOSS , obligations for compliance cannot \nbe imposed beyond the adherence to the terms of the open source software licence (45). \no Consider supporting the communities developing and maintaining FOSS and invest in a mutually \nbeneficial relationship with them. Where effective, this could involve relationships with the \nrelevant OSS steward that ‘provid[es] support on a sustained basis for the development and \nensures the viability of those products’ (46). Such a relationship should not qualify the steward as \na direct supplier or service provider, as imposing technical or methodological requirements might \nnot be appropriate, applicable or feasible considering their role. \no Consider steps to mitigate the identified risks to the security of network and information systems \nas it relates to free and open source software dependencies: \n before integrating free and open source components , require the direct supplier or \nservice provider to conduct a risk assessment and communicate the results to \nunderstand potential vulnerabilities and their impact on the entity’s systems; \n• where feasible, the risk assessment should be done in coordination with its \nopen source project or associated OSS Steward, at the expense of the supplier \nor service provider using the component and in such a way that subsequent \nrisk assessments done by third parties benefit from this work; \n require suppliers or service providers to provide evidence of their engagement with the \nOSS community to ascertain whether adequate resources are available to support \nsustainable maintenance efforts and contribute such resources where appropriate, \nincluding to guarantee future availability of security patches; \n ensure that free and open source components are regularly updated by the supplier or \nthe service provider to address all known and patched security vulnerabilities;", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0026630bba67", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 681 }, { "chunk_id": "43ff380e9224e22c3363a4b468b4a40d", "text": "(45) OSS, also known as free software or FOSS, guarantees its users the essential four freedoms: use, study, share and improve. OSS can be used for \nany purpose and is free of restrictions such as licence expiry or geographic limitations. Its software code can be studied by anyone, without non‐\ndisclosure agreements or similar restrictions. It can be shared and copied at virtually no cost. It be modified by anyone, and these improvements \ncan be shared publicly. The absence or weakening of at least one of these freedoms means an application is proprietary, so non‐OSS. The four \nfreedoms are given by a software licence. Software licences define the conditions under which a programme can be used and reused. For it to be \nfree software, the licence text must contain at least the four freedoms. The Free Software Foundation and the Open Source Initiative maintain lists \nof reviewed and approved licences. An application can usually not be considered OSS if its licence does not appear in one of these lists. \n(46) Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Art. 3(14). \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n73", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0026630bba67", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 280 }, { "chunk_id": "e98ac69ec8d3275ab0392265ccf16564", "text": " require the supplier or service provider to perform regular code reviews and security \ntesting on free and open source components to identify and address any security \nissues (47); \n require the supplier or service provider to provide information on tools to manage \nsoftware dependencies (e.g. Dependabot, Yarn, Gradle and Pip) and ensure that all \ncomponents and their dependencies are secure and up to date; \n require the supplier or service provider to provide clear documentation and policies for \nusing free and open source components, including guidelines for evaluati on an d \nintegration, along with evidence of efforts to ensure the sustainable maintenance of their \ndependencies by nurturing the open source projects they rely on, such as by referencing \ntheir public (code) contributions. \no Engage with relevant open source communit ies to stay informed about significant updates, \npatches and best practices for using and updating their FOSS component. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Contract clauses that include, in addition to the elements referred to in point 5.1.4 of the A nnex to the \nregulation, one or more of the above lists with additional elements. \n• Evidence of awareness trainings. \n• Records from crisis management tests (Annex to the regulation, point 4.3.4), if available or written \nconfirmations by the supplier or provider after crisis management tests , which demonstrate the \nparticipation of relevant personnel of suppliers and service providers. \n• For FOSS (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no results from risk assessments of the FOSS, \no dependency monitoring tools, \no documentation.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0026630bba67", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 5.1.7. For the purpose of point 5.1.6., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 408 }, { "chunk_id": "733b9d89ddcc625c77beaf0cd4062819", "text": "5.2 DIRECTORY OF SUPPLIERS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS\n\nThe relevant entities shall maintain and keep up to date a registry of their direct suppliers and service providers, \nincluding: \n(a) contact points for each direct supplier and service provider; \n(b) a list of ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes provided by the direct supplier or service provider to the \nrelevant entities. \nGUIDANCE \n• Keep the registry up to date to ensure all information is current and accurate, that is, add, update and \nremove suppliers and service provider from the registry in the event of changes. \n \n \n(47) Suppliers do not necessarily need to perform security audits (and the resulting remediation efforts) themselves, but they can fund existing initiatives \nthat perform open source security audits at scale (e.g. Sovereign Tech Agency, Alpha-Omega and the Open Source Technology Improvement \nFund) or upstream (e.g. by funding a maintainer or by establishing contractual relationships with relevant Open Source Software Stewards to do \nthat work). Additionally, suppliers and service providers should make any code reviews reusable for others to align with manufacturer obligations \nunder Article 13(6) of the Cyber Resilience Act. \n The term ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ denotes whether a component is being depended on (is upstream of) or is a dependent of (is downstream \nof) a component. \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n74 \n \n• Conduct reviews of the registry, at least annually or when significant changes occur to ensure all \ninformation is current and accurate. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Registry of direct suppliers and service providers. \n• Evidence of registry updates following direct supplier and service provider changes. \n• Review plans or schedules. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• In addition to the elements referred to in point 5.2 of the Annex to the regulation consider the start and \nend dates of the contract and the region of each direct supplier and service provider. \n• Classify direct suppliers and service providers. The classification may include one or more characteristics \n(indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no sensitivity of assets purchased, \no volume of assets purchased, \no availability requirements, \no applicable regulations, \no inherent risk and mitigated risk. \n• Update and review classifications annually or when significant changes occur. Examples of categories \nmay be: \no critical – those with a significant impact on the entity’s operations; \no strategic – high-value partners who contribute to information assets, for example cloud providers, \ndata analytic providers, software developers and telecommunication providers; \no routine – those with minimal impact on the entity. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• List of relevant contracts or SLAs that are in line with the documented supply chain policy. \n• Evidence that the entity has categorised its direct suppliers and service providers based on criteria. \n• A clear description of how direct suppliers and service providers are grouped and managed based on \ntheir importance and risk level. \n• Evidence that the entity assesses risks associated with each direct supplier and service provider \ncategory, and that it tailors measures accordingly. For instance, ‘critical’ direct suppliers and service \nproviders receive more attention and customised policies. \n \n \nSECURITY \nIN NETWORK AND \nINFORMATION \nSYSTEMS\nACQUISITION, \nDEVELOPMENT \nAND MAINTENANCE\nChapter 6\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n76", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-89efe7815807", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "5.2 DIRECTORY OF SUPPLIERS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 5.2 DIRECTORY OF SUPPLIERS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS", "token_count": 885 }, { "chunk_id": "e2ea0d72c0df6348acf68e591598d6a9", "text": "6. SECURITY IN NETWORK AND\n\nINFORMATION SYSTEMS \nACQUISITION, DEVELOPMENT AND \nMAINTENANCE", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-f0de6672d5b9", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6. SECURITY IN NETWORK AND", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6. SECURITY IN NETWORK AND", "token_count": 22 }, { "chunk_id": "e829f1794a22582eb9dbbffe0c6e8c80", "text": "6.1 SECURITY IN ACQUISITION OF ICT SERVICES OR ICT PRODUCTS\n\n6.1.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2), point (e) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall set and implement \nprocesses to manage risks stemming from the acquisition of ICT services or ICT products for components that are \ncritical for the relevant entities’ security of network and information systems, based on the risk assessment carried out \npursuant to point 2.1, from suppliers or service providers throughout their life cycle. \nGUIDANCE \n• Integrate cybersecurity as a permanent component of the purchase process by dedicating a specific \nsection to addressing it. This includes any acquisition processes for selecting FOSS (48). \n• Document the process for secure acquisition of ICT services, systems or products and describe relevant \nprocedures that support the process. \n• Take into account industry-recognised standards when developing the process (\n49). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Tender templates for the acquisition of ICT services, systems or products which address cybersecurity. \n• Documented process which is based on relevant standards and good practices. \n \n6.1.2. For the purpose of point 6.1.1., the processes referred to in point 6.1.1. shall include: \n(a) security requirements to apply to the ICT services or ICT products to be acquired; \n(b) requirements regarding security updates throughout the entire lifetime of the ICT services or ICT products or \nreplacement after the end of the support period; \n(c) information describing the hardware and software components used in the ICT services or ICT products; \n(d) information describing the implemented cybersecurity functions of the ICT services or ICT products and the \nconfiguration required for their secure operation; \n(e) assurance that the ICT services or ICT products comply with the security requirements according to point (a); \n(f) methods for validating that the delivered ICT services or ICT products are compliant to the stated security \nrequirements, as well as documentation of the results of the validation. \n \n \n(48) See section 5.1 (Tips), for additional guidance on the use of free and open source software supply chain. \n(49) In addition, to those mentioned in the mapping table at the end of this section, consider the following: \n• https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/indispensable-baseline-security-requirements-for-the-procurement-of-secure-ict-products-and \nservices; \n• Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, ‘Guidelines on cyber security specifications (ICT procurement for public \nservice bodies)’, https://www.ncsc.gov.ie/pdfs/Guidelines_on_Cyber_Security_Specifications.pdf. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-83508c25f570", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.1 SECURITY IN ACQUISITION OF ICT SERVICES OR ICT PRODUCTS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.1 SECURITY IN ACQUISITION OF ICT SERVICES OR ICT PRODUCTS", "token_count": 686 }, { "chunk_id": "cab71871879a8ab0e52a3018c635a981", "text": "77\n\nGUIDANCE\n\n• The security requirements must include at least the means to detect, monitor and protect against \nunauthorized changes of software and information. \n• Ensure that support contracts cover the system life cycle and obsolescence management requirements, \nincluding the date until which the system must be supported and include continuous alerting. \n• Favour vendors that provide clear end-of-life information and that plan to provide separate critical security \nfixes. \n• Make sure that tenders request that suppliers or service providers provide tested solutions for security \nissues in legacy or new technologies free of charge and as soon as a relevant security issue becomes \nknown. \n• Consider also the following information describing implemented cybersecurity functions such as \n(indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no the potential risks that could arise from acquiring the specific ICT service, system or product. This \nmight involve penetration testing to identify threats, vulnerabilities and the potential impact on the \nentity’s operations; \no potential security tools that already need to be in place, for example a firewall, an intrusion \ndetection system, a SIEM or a EDR/XDR; \no a specific security mechanism that might need to be in place, such as a specific encryption \nalgorithm or a particular access control mechanism (e.g. MFA); \no cybersecurity standards for the ICT service , system or product that the entity needs to comply \nwith; \no where appropriate, the required assurance level of the ICT product, system or service and the \nexistence of a relevant certificate following the European Cybersecurity Scheme for ICT products \nbased on Common Criteria (EUCC). \n• Consider evaluating the security of an ICT service, system or product before acquisition (50). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Past or ongoing tenders for acquiring ICT services, systems or products, that address cybersecurity by \nreferring, as a minimum, to the elements outlined in point 6.1.2 of the Annex to the regulation. \n• Comparison between selected c ontracts and the associated tenders to check whether the supply chain \npolicy and particularly the elements referred to in points 5.1.4 and 5.1.5 of the Annex to the regulation, are \ntaken into consideration. \n• Records from security tests before acquiring an ICT system or product. \n• Certificates, test reports or other supporting information for the ICT products or systems from suitably \naccredited conformity assessment bodies.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-8a97d89a22a4", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "77 \n \nGUIDANCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 77 \n \nGUIDANCE", "token_count": 622 }, { "chunk_id": "cef6edb8c3bba3e4211c92cd56e7730e", "text": "(50) Criteria for open source components should take into account the voluntary nature of open source projects. Acquirers of such components must \nconstructively engage with project maintainers in addressing Identified security requirements and introducing mitigations and/or improvements. These \nimprovements should be shared with the open source project under their license and terms. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n78", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-8a97d89a22a4", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "77 \n \nGUIDANCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 77 \n \nGUIDANCE", "token_count": 112 }, { "chunk_id": "1ffda78303d0f0a56a389ccb92e4126f", "text": "6.1.3. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update the processes at planned intervals and when \nsignificant incidents occur. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review the processes for secure acquisition of ICT services, systems or products, and the procedures \nbased on them, at least annually. \n• R eview logs or records of all changes made to the processes for secure acquisition of ICT services, \nsystems or products, and the procedures based on them, including details of the changes, approvals and \nimplementation dates. \n• Align the t enders and contracts with the entity’s supply chain security policy (Annex to the regulation, \npoint 5.1). \n• For ICT services, systems or products that are not provided by a supplier ( e.g. open source projects), \nentities should share relevant results from internal assessments with them. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Review plans or schedules for processes for secure acquisition of ICT services, systems or products, and \nthe procedures based on them. \n• Minutes from reviews or possible changes made to the processes for ICT services, system or product \nacquisition, and the procedures based on them, including actions taken to enhance security in future \nacquisitions. \n• Documented results of possible auditing activities, indicating compliance with internal secure acquisition \nof ICT services, systems or products processes and external regulations. \n• Change management records of changes made to the processes for secure acquisition of ICT services, \nsystems or products, and the procedures based on them, including documentation of the review and \napproval process. \n• Incident response records that confirm whether the entity takes into account significant incidents when \nreviewing and updating the processes and procedures for secure acquisition of ICT services, systems or \nproducts.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-8a97d89a22a4", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "77 \n \nGUIDANCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 77 \n \nGUIDANCE", "token_count": 460 }, { "chunk_id": "1eaa27a13df9425be62f8ca84120fa53", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Apply the secure acquisition of ICT system s or product processes and relevant procedures to both \nsoftware and hardware products, regardless of whether they were developed in-house or acquired. \n• Continuously monitor suppliers or service providers with regard to points 5.1.6 and 5.1.7 of the Annex to \nthe regulation so that they are aligned with the supply chain security policy. \n• In addition to the elements referred to in point 6.1.2 of the Annex to the regulation, consider the following \nwhen formulating tenders with cybersecurity in mind (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no ensure continuous alerting, patching and mitigation proposals if vulnerabilities in the system or the \nproduct are discovered; \no clarify the supplier’s or service provider’s liability in the event of cyber-attacks or incidents relevant to \nthe service, system or product; and \no consider cybersecurity during project implementation and before handover including (indicative, non-\nexhaustive list): \n design reviews; \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n79", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-8a97d89a22a4", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "77 \n \nGUIDANCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 77 \n \nGUIDANCE", "token_count": 272 }, { "chunk_id": "cb5d4b9d55d92617a2a80d178d59a84c", "text": " acceptance tests; \n commissioning tests; \n site acceptance tests; and \n documentation. \n• Make sure that secure decommissioning service providers involve considerations such as deactivating \nuser and service accounts, terminating data flows and ensuring the secure disposal of the entity’s data \nwithin supplier or service provider systems. \n• Free and open-source software is often obtained free of charge from communities and projects developing, \nmaintaining and distributing software, as opposed to purchased from suppliers or service providers. When \nusing such software without purchase, relevant entities cannot impose obligations for compliance beyond \nthe adherence to the terms of the open source software license. Beyond that, it is good practice to apply \nthe guidance of section 6.1. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Evidence that internal (in- house) projects consider and prioritize security when acquiring ICT services, \nsystems or product processes. \n• Evidence that points 5.1.6 and 5.1.7 of the Annex to the regulation are implemented. \n• Tenders that contain elements in addition to those referred to in point 6.1.2 of the Annex to the regulation.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-8a97d89a22a4", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "77 \n \nGUIDANCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 77 \n \nGUIDANCE", "token_count": 291 }, { "chunk_id": "816c71c691a161e01f5130f9f8445e59", "text": "6.2 SECURE DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE\n\n6.2.1. Before developing a network and information system, including software, the relevant entities shall lay down rules \nfor the secure development of network and information systems and apply them when developing network and \ninformation systems in-house or when outsourcing the development of network and information systems. The rules shall \ncover all development phases, including specification, design, development, implementation and testing. \nGUIDANCE \n• Take into account the entity’s policies and norms (if available) and industry-recognised standards when \ndeveloping the rules for the secure development of network and information systems (51). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented rules for the secure development of network and information systems which align with the \nentity’s policies and norms and are based on relevant standards and good practices.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-f0948039ce48", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.2 SECURE DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.2 SECURE DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE", "token_count": 225 }, { "chunk_id": "f18ffd8e2f5dca6357630b40717007b6", "text": "6.2.2. For the purpose of point 6.2.1., the relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) carry out an analysis of security requirements at the specification and design phases of any development or \nacquisition project undertaken by the relevant entities or on behalf of those entities; \n(b) apply principles for engineering secure systems and secure coding principles to any information system development \nactivities such as promoting cybersecurity-by-design, zero-trust architectures; \n(c) lay down security requirements regarding development environments;", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0b63b3279255", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.2.2. For the purpose of point 6.2.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.2.2. For the purpose of point 6.2.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 136 }, { "chunk_id": "37cb3a2f06b867a3a70b1f8a5fc48f0b", "text": "(51) In addition, to those mentioned in the mapping table at the end of this section, consider the following: \n• ‘OWASP ASVS (Application Security Verificati on Standard)’, https://owasp.org/www-project-application-security-verification-standard/ , as \nupdated from time to time. \n• ISO/IEC 27034 family, Information technology - Security techniques - Application security. \n• NIST SP 800-53, https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final, as updated from time to time. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n80", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0b63b3279255", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.2.2. For the purpose of point 6.2.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.2.2. For the purpose of point 6.2.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 134 }, { "chunk_id": "e31dcef7d2358b025a3851e79b5cd2d2", "text": "(d) establish and implement security testing processes in the development life cycle; \n(e) appropriately select, protect and manage security test data; \n(f) sanitise and anonymise testing data according to the risk assessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1. \nGUIDANCE \n• A secure software development life cycle (SSDLC ) process should be implemented by all entities . \nHowever, smaller entities can use a less demanding process such as implementing secure-by -design \npractices and security-testing processes. \n• Depending on the type of requirement, the rules for the secure development of software and systems \nshould include appropriate software testing methods (e.g. black-box, ad-hoc testing, static versus dynamic \napplication security testing). \n• Test security by design at various stages of the secure development of the SSDLC prior to go-live, utilising \nindependent tools and a self-service testing platform throughout the SSDLC. \n• When real production data - or derived variations of it - is used for testing, ensure that such data is properly \nsanitised or anonymised. An indicative, non-exhaustive list of techniques: \no masking or pseudonymization on fields like names, emails, IDs ; \no d eletion or redaction of identifiers (e.g. personal IDs, birth dates, \nZIP codes); and \no non-irreversible or one-way anonymisation. \n• When using Free and Open Source Software components, entities should take into account the voluntary \nnature of open source projects (see guidance of section 5.1). Where possible, entities should assist the \nopen source projects that they depend on in adopting secure systems and secure coding principles (such \nas introducing SSDLC processes suited to the project’s way of working). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Evidence that secure development rules have been adopted (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no documentation for each phase of the life cycle, \no process and workflow diagrams, \no audit and testing reports, \no version control, \no change management logs, \no code reviews, and \no project management tools. \n• Evidence of the test results from secure development environments, including that measures for protecting \ntest data are maintained. \n• Evidence of the software-testing methods chosen for a particular test scenario and an explanation of the \nchoice. \n• Test results of each phase of the SSDLC maintained and up to date. \n• Test results maintained and, where appropriate, approved by management bodies. \n• Evidence that a software-testing method is chosen at each stage of the software development life cycle.\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n81", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0b63b3279255", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.2.2. For the purpose of point 6.2.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.2.2. For the purpose of point 6.2.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 659 }, { "chunk_id": "d44e434be501b6dc8ac515cb5cd019ab", "text": "6.2.3 For outsourced development of network and information systems, the relevant entities shall also apply the policies \nand procedures referred to in points 5 and 6.1. \nGUIDANCE \n• Align the secure development rules with the security testing policy (Annex to the regulation, point 6.5) and \nprocedures and with the secure acquisition of ICT services, systems or product processes (Annex to the \nregulation, point 6.1). \n• C ommunicate the internal development rules with the relevant personnel from outsourced development. \n• Hold regular cross-organisational unit meetings during all phases of the development life cycle. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Comparison of the secure development rules with the security -testing policy and with the secure \nacquisition of ICT services, systems or product processes, checking whether the security requirements \nare set consistently in all these documents. \n• Evidence of communicating the internal development rules with relevant personnel from outsourced \ndevelopment. \n• Records or minutes from cross organisational unit meetings where the development of a network and \ninformation system, including software, was discussed.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0b63b3279255", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.2.2. For the purpose of point 6.2.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.2.2. For the purpose of point 6.2.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 292 }, { "chunk_id": "20b065a72f27655adece3a35b2f00909", "text": "6.2.4 The relevant entities shall review and, where necessary, update their secure development rules at planned \nintervals. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review the rules for the secure development of network and information systems at least once every two \nyears. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documentation that outlines the schedule and frequency for reviewing secure development rules. \n• Documented evidence of the process for reviewing the patch development process and secure-by design \nsoftware configurations. \n• Meeting minutes, review findings and actions taken to improve the development rules. \n• Version history or change log of secure development procedures showing updates made as a result of \nreviews. \no Specific sections in the documents highlighting what changes were made and the rationale behind \nthem. \n• Reports from internal and external audits that evaluate the process for reviewing secure development \nrules. \n• Documentation of change requests related to secure development rules, including those arising from \nreview findings. \n• Logs or records tracking the implementation of changes to ensure they are applied throughout the \ndevelopment process.\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0b63b3279255", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.2.2. For the purpose of point 6.2.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.2.2. For the purpose of point 6.2.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 304 }, { "chunk_id": "99fd62e30e50d5a5247303640e6782a9", "text": "82 \n \nTIPS\n\nGUIDANCE \n• Consider threat modelling as part of the security requirements analysis. \n• Keep separate environments for development purposes, testing purposes and production. \n• Ensure the use of results of application assessments to regularly enhance developer training and the \nSSDLC process. \n• Defined methods and tooling for performing analysis and tracking of usage of third party libraries should \nbe in place. \n• Consider integrating root cause analysis results into SSDLC process changes, if any. \n• In addition to the regular reviews, t he entity should review and, where necessary, update its secure \ndevelopment rules when there are significant changes to technology, operations or risks or in the event of \nsignificant incidents. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Evidence of the use of threat modelling (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no documentation of the process used for example STRIDE or DREAD, \no data flow diagrams, and \no meeting minutes. \n• Evidence of separate environments for development, testing and production, for example different network \nsegments, servers, databases, existence of accounts used for this purpose and change management \nrecords. \n• Relevant personnel aware of the secure development rules. \n• Meeting minutes, logs, reports , etc. showing that the secure development rules were reviewed and \npossibly changed following significant changes to technology , operations or risks or in the event of \nsignificant incidents.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-184b55d90c14", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "82 \n \nTIPS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 82 \n \nTIPS", "token_count": 368 }, { "chunk_id": "551eafa5ab835638628a779f2e2b14c8", "text": "6.3 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT\n\n6.3.1. The relevant entities shall take the appropriate measures to establish, document, implement and monitor \nconfigurations, including security configurations of hardware, software, services and networks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Establish documented processes based on best practices and information security standards (52). \n• Maintain and document detailed configuration settings for the following operating procedures (indicative, non-\nexhaustive list): \no processing and handling of information, \no backup, \no scheduling requirements, including interdependencies with other systems, \no handling errors or other exceptional conditions, \no system restart and recovery procedures, \n \n \n(52) In addition to the standards in the mapping table, consider the following: \n• ISO/IEC 20000, which is the international standard for IT service management and consists of 17 parts; \n• Information Technology Infrastructure Library; \n• Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 828, Standard for configuration management in systems and software engineering. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n83 \n \no cryptographic mechanisms and settings, and \no audit trail and system log information. \n• Consider the following security -related parameters for the configuration settings (indicative, non-exhaustive \nlist): \no registry settings, \no account, file and directory permission settings, and \no settings for functions, ports, protocols, services and remote connections. \n• Employ automated mechanisms to centrally manage, apply and verify configuration settings for software and \nhardware, including mobile devices and the entity’s connected vehicles. \no Where appropriate, implement a configuration management database to catalogue and classify \nall configuration items (CIs), including their security attributes (e.g. patch level, firewall rules and \nencryption status) \n• Ensure that all network, software and system configurations adhere to established security and operational \nstandards for functions, ports, protocols and services. \n• Monitor and control changes to the configuration settings in accordance with the entity’s policy on the security \nof network and information systems and topic-specific policies and procedures. \n• Identify software not authorised to run on the information systems. \n• Where appropriate, regularly review and update software configurations. \n• Where appropriate, identify software programs authorised to run on the information system. \n• Employ a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow authorised software to run. \n• Set up procedures for network service usage to restrict access to necessary services or applications only. \n• Manage a secure baseline configuration for development and test environments separately from the \noperational baseline configuration, where appropriate. \n• Identify, document and approve any deviations from established configuration settings based on defined \nexceptions on operational requirements. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• System configuration process, based on good practices and standards, in place and maintained. \n• System configuration tables containing configurations of hardware, software, services and networks. \n• Documented secure baseline configuration containing at least (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no e ssential capabilities of operation; \no restricted use of functions; \no security by default; \no p orts, protocols and/or services allowed. \n• Documented and approved exceptions to the configuration baseline containing the alternative measures in \nplace to ensure the confidentiality, availability and integrity of the CI. \n• Documented secure baseline configuration for development and test environments. \n \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n84", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-884f49131f39", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.3 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.3 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 957 }, { "chunk_id": "c2b91dd44a698227da61f04370fe2bad", "text": "6.3.2. For the purpose of point 6.3.1., the relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) lay down and ensure security in configurations for their hardware, software, services and networks; \n(b) lay down and implement processes and tools to enforce the laid down secure configurations for hardware, software, \nservices and networks, for newly installed systems as well as for systems in operation over their lifetime. \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider hardening guides/best practices and general cybersecurity principles ( e.g. least functionality and \nleast privilege) as a basis for deriving the defined security configurations. \n• Establish, document and maintain configuration settings respecting the access control policy. \n• Where applicable, test the configuration before implementation. \n• Employ security safeguards to detect and respond to unauthorised changes to defined configuration settings. \n• Establish a configuration management plan containing: \no roles, responsibilities and configuration management processes and procedures; \no a process for identifying CIs throughout the system development life cycle; and \no a process for managing the configuration of the CIs throughout their life cycle. \n• Protect the configuration management plan from unauthorised disclosure and modification. \n• I mplement enhanced controls, including regular vulnerability scanning, strict configuration hardening, isolation \nwhere feasible and continuous monitoring to compensate for products which lack official updates after the end \nof supplier support. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Configuration management plan. \n• Comparison of the configuration plan with the access control lists. \n• Mechanisms, for example logical and physical access controls, encryption and audit logs in place. \n• Documented and approved exceptions to the configuration baseline containing the alternative measures in \nplace to ensure the confidentiality, availability and integrity of the CI. \n \n6.3.3. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update configurations at planned intervals or when \nsignificant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks occur. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review and, where appropriate update (53) configurations at least monthly to ensure that patches have been \napplied, that the backup has been executed according to the plan and that monitoring is in place to identify and \nalert to fatal server/device/disk errors without delay. \n• Regularly produce, keep and review change logs regarding the security configuration of information systems. \n• Review and update the configurations after major changes (e.g. software updates) and past incidents. \n• Where feasible, obtain baseline configuration files for key systems and devices to compare against current \nconfigurations. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Up-to-date configuration management plan, review comments and/or change logs. \n \n \n(53) The decision about the update should be based on the actual technical capabilities and specific needs of the entity, taking into account the results \nof a risk assessment before implementing the update. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n85 \n \n• Documented results of the review activities. \n• Configuration snapshots taken before and after changes or at regular intervals to verify that reviews are \nconducted and documented. \n• Audit logs from systems and devices that track configuration changes and reviews. \n• Alerts from monitoring systems that notify administrators of unexpected configurations or changes or deviations \nfrom the baseline in critical systems. \n• Audit trails and compliance records from internal and external audits. \n• Minutes from team meetings where configuration reviews and changes are discussed and documented. \n• Records of notifications or reminders sent to relevant employees about upcoming configuration reviews. \n• Records from the configuration management tools to ensure they are kept up to date with accurate \nconfiguration information. \n• Incident response records that confirm whether the entity takes into account incidents related the \nconfigurations.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-95213d6ef80e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.3.2. For the purpose of point 6.3.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.3.2. For the purpose of point 6.3.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 1026 }, { "chunk_id": "42602df65e1a6ca6146765e6714e36e1", "text": "6.4 CHANGE MANAGEMENT, REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE\n\n6.4.1. The relevant entities shall apply change management procedures to control changes of network and information \nsystems. Where applicable, the procedures shall be consistent with the relevant entities’ general policies concerning \nchange management. \nGUIDANCE \n• Take into account industry-recognised and national standards when developing the change management \nprocedures (54). \n• Consider the following elements for the procedures (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no request for change, \no risk assessment , \no criteria for categori sation and prioritisation of changes: \n associated requirements for the type and scope of the tests to be carried out and \n the approvals to be obtained; \no requirements for performing rollbacks; and \no d ocumentation of the changes and approval of changes. \n• The change management procedures may allow different workflows depending on the criticality of the system, \nthe scope of the change and the urgency (e.g. put in place an ‘emergency intervention workflow’). \n• F or each change, record the steps of the procedure followed. \n• Review and approve changes following the change management procedures, prior to implementing them. \n• Implement and test change management procedures to make sure that changes to networks and information \nsystems are always done in a predefined way. \n• Where appropriate, establish a change advisory board (CAB) to oversee and approve changes. The CAB \nshould evaluate change requests based on risk, impact, resource requirements and alignment with business \nobjectives. \n \n \n(54) In addition to those mentioned in the mapping table at the end of this section, consider the following: \n• ISO 21500:2021, Project, programme and portfolio management - Context and concepts; \n• ISO 21502:2020, Project, programme and portfolio management - Guidance on project management. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-a4e1679edc49", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.4 CHANGE MANAGEMENT, REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.4 CHANGE MANAGEMENT, REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE", "token_count": 490 }, { "chunk_id": "77f38d0b78d29ae2f7a39fc053309373", "text": "86\n\nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE\n\n• Documented change management procedures for network and information systems t hat are based on \nstandards or good practices. \n• For each relevant change, a record describing the steps and the result of the change. \n• A system maintenance procedure that addresses: \no purpose; \no scope; \no roles; \no responsibilities; \no management commitment, if applicable; \no coordination among different organisational units; and \no compliance. \n• Logs that record the dates and outcomes of the periodic reviews of the change, repair and maintenance \nprocedures.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-b71794219b4e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "token_count": 144 }, { "chunk_id": "580be0c07e97cfb8f3919320515d9ebd", "text": "6.4.2. The procedures referred to in point 6.4.1. shall be applied for releases, modifications and emergency changes of \nany software and hardware in operation and changes to the configuration. The procedures shall ensure that those \nchanges are documented and, based on the risk assessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1, tested and assessed in \nview of the potential impact before being implemented. \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider a mandatory integrity check before installing and deploying new software. \n• Ensure , where appropriat e, that changes are done in an authenticated, authori sed and non-repudiating \nmanner. \n• Test and validate changes before they are implemented in operational systems, where applicable. Where \nappropriate, a security impact analysis may be performed in a separate test environment before \nimplementation in an operational environment. \n• Take all necessary precautions before making changes (back up images, for instance). \n• Schedule, perform, document and review records of maintenance and repairs on system components in \naccordance with the supplier’s specifications and/or the entity’s requirements. \n• Ensure that changes are only allowed with approved tools and that their execution is documented. \n• Restrict the use of maintenance tools to authorised personnel only. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• L ogs and records of past (new) software installations. \n• Evidence that MFA is in place for activating change, repair and maintenance procedures, where applicable. \n• Test plans and results that demonstrate the implementation and effectiveness of the change, repair and \nmaintenance procedures. \n• If the entity utilises change management tools, evidence that these tools enforce the use of approved resources \nonly and mandate documentation for each change. \n• Access control lists (ACLs) to verify that access to the tools is in line with the access control policy.\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n87", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-b71794219b4e", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "token_count": 491 }, { "chunk_id": "5907298acb27409ab40e68c715273fcc", "text": "6.4.3. In the event that the regular change management procedures could not be followed due to an emergency, the \nrelevant entities shall document the result of the change and the explanation for why the procedures could not be \nfollowed. \nGUIDANCE \n• Where appropriate, integrate the pullback scenario (55) into the change management procedures. \n• Assess the risks from legacy systems and upgrade existing legacy systems to include secu rity mitigating \nmeasures in case appropriate security cannot be achieved. \n• Make sure that regular change control procedures that could not be followed due to an emergency change are \napplied immediately after the emergency change. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documentation with specific pullback plans. \n• L ogs and records of past change requests with details of (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no the change, \no reason for emergency, \no approval, \no reason for delay, \no follow up actions and \no how to revert the system to a previous stage if the change fails. \n• Logs and records from past legacy system upgrade that contain risk assessments and the reasoning for the \nchange.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-b71794219b4e", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "token_count": 281 }, { "chunk_id": "dbd5685f0d22d8505eb60e277707cc37", "text": "6.4.4. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update the procedures at planned intervals and when \nsignificant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review the change management procedures at least once every two years. \n• Make sure that the management procedures cover planned and unplanned changes and the development \nphase, when applicable. \n• Ensure that the process is not bypassed. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Review plans or schedules. \n• Up to date change management procedures, review comments and/or change logs. \n• Evidence of approval and monitoring of maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely and \nwhether the equipment is serviced on site or removed to another location. \n• Logs of all changes made to the procedures, including details, approvals and implementation dates. \n• Audit trails and compliance records from internal and external audits. \n• Logs of significant incidents to confirm whether they include documentation of reviews and updates to the \nchange, repair and maintenance procedures.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-b71794219b4e", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "token_count": 271 }, { "chunk_id": "3fe1ba4b1ed1be74a5fdae5498ff3230", "text": "(55) Also known as a roll-back or backout plan, it refers to a set of pre-planned actions or procedures designed to revert a system or a service to a \nprevious, stable, state in case the change does not work as expected. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n88", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-b71794219b4e", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "token_count": 71 }, { "chunk_id": "38e7fe030b355b2141f9e0c24d1e5be1", "text": "• Reports from post -incident reviews that document any necessary adjustments to the procedures following \nsignificant incidents. \n• Records showing how changes and updates to the procedures were implemented and reviewed.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-b71794219b4e", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "token_count": 55 }, { "chunk_id": "f3efe4acb199fd0d5a914fe1d94965b0", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Perform and log: (a) changes to, (b) maintenance of and (c) repairs to network and information systems, with \napproved and controlled tools. \n• Put change management procedures in place according to licensing agreements. \n• Upon changes to assets, update the asset inventory (Annex to the regulation, point 12.4) and documentation. \n• U pon changes to risk management measures, update the risk treatment plan (Annex to the regulation, \npoint 2.1.1). \n• Inform the customer of significant changes to network and information systems that affect the services offered. \nThis information only needs to be provided if it is beneficial for customers. \n• Ensure availability of the required maintenance skills, resources and spare parts, including external support. \n• Prevent the unauthori sed removal of maintenance equipment containing information related to the entity by \n(indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no verifying that no information related to the entity is contained in the equipment; \no sanitising or destroying the equipment; \no retaining the equipment within the facility; or \no obtaining an exemption from authorised personnel or roles explicitly authori sing removal of the \nequipment from the facility. \n• Provide remote access via out-of-band (OOB) connection in the event that the standard connection does not \nwork. \n• Regularly test OOB connections to ensure they function as expected during an outage. \n• If an incident, in the sense of Article 23 of the NIS2 Directive, involves subsequent actions that entail system \nchanges, then notify the competent authorities of these changes in accordance with the national reporting \nprocedure. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Evidence that MFA is in place for remote change, repair and maintenance procedures. \n• Logs and records that prove the use of approved tools. \n• Evidence that the procedures mention the licencing agreement. \n• Up-to-date asset inventory. \n• Up-to-date risk-treatment plan. \n• Documentation of a customer update on significant changes. \n• Evidence of previous training on change management and system maintenance. \n• Evidence of sanitisation procedures. \n• Evidence that the entity maintains a spare parts for key components of its network and information system. \n• Notifications to defined personnel or roles of the date and time of planned maintenance. \n• Network architecture diagram that proves the existence of OOB connections.\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n89", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-b71794219b4e", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 86 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "token_count": 624 }, { "chunk_id": "c56c795abe7fa079bd602455ad04fc23", "text": "6.5 SECURITY TESTING\n\n6.5.1. The relevant entities shall establish, implement and apply a policy and procedures for security testing. \nGUIDANCE \n• Take into account industry-recognised standards when developing the testing policy (56). \n• Establish and maintain a testing programme appropriate to the entity’s size, complexity and maturity (57). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented security testing and procedures based on relevant standards and good practices. \n• Guidelines and standards that the entity adheres to for conducting security tests.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0e50cfe1e710", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.5 SECURITY TESTING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.5 SECURITY TESTING", "token_count": 137 }, { "chunk_id": "2668cf334bca3a52340d9a6b97d61ad1", "text": "6.5.2. The relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) establish, based on the risk assessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1, the need, scope, frequency and type of \nsecurity tests; \n(b) carry out security tests according to a documented test methodology, covering the components identified as relevant \nfor secure operation in a risk analysis; \n(c) document the type, scope, time and results of the tests, including assessment of criticality and mitigating actions for \neach finding; \n(d) apply mitigating actions in case of critical findings. \nGUIDANCE \n• Make sure that network and information systems undergo continuous testing, particularly in environments \nutilizing continuous integration / continuous deployment practices. Regular testing should be conducted at set-\nup, after significant upgrades or modifications and following maintenance, to maintain robust security and \nperformance. \n• Consider a range of security tests (e.g. vulnerability assessments, penetration testing, code review, ethical \nhacking, bug bounty programmes, cyber attack simulations, red teaming, protocol conformance testing or cyber \nresponse exercises) and select the most appropriate one (or more) to test the specific procedure, service or \ntool over time. \n• Entity-wide scoped tests should be carried out at planned intervals or when significant incidents or changes \noccur. \n• Conduct internal and/or external audits throughout the entity’s networks, systems and processes in an ad-hoc \nmanner. \n• Record evidence while testing. The need, scope, frequency, type and results are to be documented in a manner \nthat is comprehensible to an expert third party. \n• Use criteria to assess the results of the tests similar to the criteria for performing cybersecurity risk assessments \n(guidance on point 2.1.2 of the Annex to the regulation). \n• Assess, follow up and remediate high-criticality findings with respect to the confidentiality, integrity, authenticity \nor availability of the service provided. \n \n \n(56) In addition to the standards in the mapping table, consider the following: \n• ISO/IEC 27034 series of standards on application security. \n• OWASP Web Security Testing Guide, https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/. \n• Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM), https://www.isecom.org/OSSTMM.3.pdf. \n(57) CyberFundamentals, ID.RA-1, Centre for Cyber Security Belgium, https://atwork.safeonweb.be/sites/default/files/2024-12/cyfun_basic_v2023-03-\n01_e_update_2024.pdf. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n90 \n \n• Document the assessment of criticality and mitigating actions for each finding. Ensure that risk assessment \nresults and risk treatment plans are updated accordingly (Annex to the regulation, point 2.1). \n• When testing reveals an underlying security issue in a free and open source component, these findings must \nbe shared with the relevant open source project. If a patch is developed to address the issue, the relevant code \nshould also be shared with the relevant open source project, in a manner suitable for integration. \n• Where appropriate, any automated security tests written by entities for open source components that they use, \nshould be shared with the relevant open source projects. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented security testing policy and procedures that include the elements referred to in point 5.2 (a) of the \nAnnex to the regulation. \n• Documentation defining the roles and responsibilities of personnel involved in security testing. \n• Plans or schedules for upcoming or completed regular or ad hoc tests. \n• List of reports from past security tests This should cover various types of testing ( e.g. vulnerability \nassessments, penetration testing and code reviews). \n• Internal or external audit reports. \n \n6.5.3. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update their security testing policies at planned \nintervals. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review the security testing policy and procedures at least once every two years. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Updated security-testing policy and procedures, review comments, and/or change logs. \n• Security-testing policy and procedures, including when tests must be carried out, test plans, test cases and \ntest report templates. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• For systems with external integrations (e.g. cloud services) beyond the organization’s control, ensure that all \nexternal application programming interface endpoints are thoroughly tested. \n• Determine the auditable security events that are adequate for supporting investigations of security incidents. \n• Implement tools for automated testing, such as code analysis tools or vulnerability scanners. \n• Ensure the policy is approved by, communicated to and acknowledged by relevant personnel and third parties. \n• Ensure that the development and testing environment(s) is/are separate from the production environment. \n• Review the security-testing policy and procedures when significant incidents or major changes to the network \nand information system occur. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• In addition to the elements referred to in point 6.5.2 (c) of the Annex to the regulation, documented policy that \nincludes at least (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no approved parties (internal or third); \no confidentiality levels for assessment; and \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n91 \n \no test results and the objectives of security assessments and tests. \n• Relevant staff aware of the security-testing procedures and tools. \n• Documented audit requirements. \n• A list of tools used for security testing, including their purpose and how they are maintained and updated. \n• Valid licences for commercial testing tools or subscriptions to security services. \n• Review showing that the security tools are in use and configured to perform the actions intended. \n• Records showing updates to the security policy and procedures based on lessons learnt and new threats.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-b5b3b2d05cab", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.5.2. The relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.5.2. The relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 1497 }, { "chunk_id": "fddabe16c0eb28c740a4c2536691c461", "text": "6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT\n\n6.6.1. The relevant entities shall specify and apply procedures, coherent with the change management procedures \nreferred to in point 6.4.1. as well as with vulnerability management, risk management and other relevant management \nprocedures, for ensuring that: \n(a) security patches are applied within a reasonable time after they become available; \n(b) security patches are tested before being applied in production systems; \n(c) security patches come from trusted sources and are checked for integrity; \n(d) additional measures are implemented and residual risks are accepted in cases where a patch is not available or not \napplied pursuant to point 6.6.2. \nGUIDANCE \n• Take into account well known standards when developing the security patch management procedures (58). \n• Actions may vary, depending on the network and information system (e.g. mandatory patching for all exposed \nsystems or internet -connected devices such as f irewalls or routers, and limited patching only in specific \ncircumstances, for instance in isolated or legacy systems where regular patching may not be feasible or \navailable). \n• Establish a process, in combination with the asset inventory, for being informed when a new security patch is \npublished and schedule patch roll-outs accordingly. \n• Patching should be a standard activity in normal maintenance and outage planning of services. Nonetheless, \nsome failures may require immediate patching depending on their criticality. \n• Prioritise and apply patches based on risk. Evaluate the severity of the vulnerability, exposure of the affected \nsystem and likelihood of exploitation. \n• Deploy vulnerability management technologies to identify unpatched and misconfigured software. \n• Define your relevant security information sources considering your assets and continuously monitor them for \npatch announcements, patch and non-patch remediation, and general threats. \n• Verify the patch sources through (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no d igital certificates to verify the vendor; \no digital signatures of the patches \no change logs provided by the vendor; and \no feedback from the community concerning the reliability of the vendor. \n• Consider a strategy for applying patches after approval or testing following the change management procedure \n(indicative, non exhaustive list):", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-6da8e899cde5", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 590 }, { "chunk_id": "b2840528fff73b9c18b659d65097b74d", "text": "(58) NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, ‘Guide to enterprise patch management planning: preventive maintenance for technology’, \nhttps://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/40/r4/final. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n92", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-6da8e899cde5", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 56 }, { "chunk_id": "9cb0daac14724c02972b79a9dd12024a", "text": "o Blue/ green allows the patches to be applied first in an isolated environment identical to the \nproduction environment, and then in the production environment . This ensures zero downtime \nand an immediate rollback option. \no R olling (59) deployment allows gradual updates of parts of the production environment, one set \nof servers or instances at a time, rather than deploying a patch all at once. It is ideal for large and \ndistributed environments. \no F eature toggles allow new features or patches to be deployed to production but keep them \ndisabled until they are ready to be used. They are suitable for control over new features or \npatches when they are turned on, making it easy to test and release. \no Shadow deployment allows new code or patches to be deployed directly to production but it \nshadows live traffic by mirroring user requests to both the current and new systems to observe \nhow the new version behaves without affecting the user experience. It is i deal for testing new \nfeatures in production without affecting users. \no H otfix deployments are used for critical patches that need to be applied immediately to address \nsevere issues. \n• Where appropriate and to reduce risks related to significant updates in important dependencies, consider \nperforming a trial using release candidates ( 60 ) of these components, to get an early indication of \nincompatibilities or breaking changes, so they may be remedied. If any of these components are open \nsource software, offer feedback about any issues found during this trial. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Detailed procedures and guidelines for how patches are identified, evaluated, tested, deployed and verified. \n• Logs or records showing the history of patch deployments across various systems. These may include \n(indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no t imestamps; \no responsible personnel; and \no affected systems. \n• Evidence that the asset inventory (Annex to the regulation, point 12.4) is updated after a new security patch is \nannounced, if possible accompanied by the time plan for applying it. \n• Evidence of testing patches before deployment in a controlled environment. This should include results of \ntesting and any issues encountered and resolved. \n• Documentation of test plans and results for patches before deployment to production environments. \n• Documentation of change requests for deploying patches, including approvals and impact assessments. \n• Detailed audit trails showing the steps taken from patch identification to deployment. \n• Checks for the latest patches. \n• Approved documented actions for applying patches. \n• Records of changes logged, reviewed and approved. \n• Evidence of vendor verification mechanisms for example digital certificates and digital signatures. \n• Reports from internal and external audits evaluating the effectiveness of the patch management processes.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-6da8e899cde5", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 721 }, { "chunk_id": "37ea346faffc2d7e012cc7851fd3dbf9", "text": "(59) ‘Canary deployment’ is an example of this and refers to a gradual rollout strategy for software updates or patches. To minimise the risk of the patch \nintroducing new problems, the entity might apply the patch to a small number (e.g. 5%) of servers or systems and then gradually apply it to the \nentire system. It is ideal for rolling out changes slowly and monitoring for problems without affecting many users. \n(60) A release candidate is a ‘pre-publication’ or ‘trial publication’ of a software component, usually done in preparation before the publication of a \nsoftware update with significant changes. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n93", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-6da8e899cde5", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 169 }, { "chunk_id": "63c9c82ab83cecf10b388c32331f4d63", "text": "6.6.2. By way of derogation from point 6.6.1.(a), the relevant entities may choose not to apply security patches when \nthe disadvantages of applying the security patches outweigh the cybersecurity benefits. The relevant entities shall duly \ndocument and substantiate the reasons for any such decision. \nGUIDANCE \n• Make an effort, proportionate to the entity’s size and importance, to ensure that security patches do no t \nintroduce additional vulnerabilities or instabilities. Examples of information supporting such a decision may \ninclude (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no vendor documentation on the patch: \n what specific vulnerabilities or bugs are addressed, \n w hether the patch fixes a security issue, improves performance, adds features or \nresolves stability concerns, \n system requirements or any specific configurations required or changes to system \nsettings, \n i nstallation instructions on How to apply the patch and whether it requires a restart or \nadditional configuration; \no severity rating - patches that address critical vulnerabilities are more likely to apply; and \no security blogs, forums and mailing lists for any known issues or incompatibilities introduced by \nthe patch. \n• If patching is not feasible, consider alternative measures such as strict configuration hardening, intrusion \ndetection systems, regular vulnerability scanning, network segmentation or isolation where feasible, access \ncontrol and monitoring. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Evidence of patch prioritisation for example emphasis is placed on patches assessed as critical. \n• Evidence that residual risks resulting from non-patching are listed and mitigated. \n• Incident reports related to unpatched vulnerabilities to check the effectiveness of the mitigation measures \nduring the entity’s response. \n• Logs of changes made to systems, including patches applied, rollback procedures and any issues \nencountered. \n• Documented decisions no to patch accompanied by relevant alternative measures. \n• Up-to-date risk-treatment plan.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-6da8e899cde5", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 510 }, { "chunk_id": "0d76cf3b02ff12d70e995762aa6215a8", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Patch management procedures should indicate scope, roles and responsibilities. \n• Perform operating system and application updates on enterprise assets through automated patch \nmanagement. \n• Use appropriate patch management tools to fulfil the elements referred to in point 6.6.1 of the Annex to the \nregulation. \n• Since patches can sometimes cause issues, it is recommended to back up the system before applying them. \n• Have a rollback plan to ensure that the system reverts to a safe previous state if patching does not work or \nfixing the problem is not feasible. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n94", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-6da8e899cde5", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 163 }, { "chunk_id": "a09a40a9979138e452a61f148aec490a", "text": "• Remove unsupported hardware and software from the network in a reasonable and accepted time in line with \nthe entity’s risk assessment. \n• Include patch and update requirements in the supply chain policy (Annex to the regulation, point 5.1) and in \nthe contracts, bid evaluation and selection criteria for new ICT services, systems or products ( section 6.1), \nconsidering the system life span among other aspects. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documentation of regular meetings where patch management processes are reviewed. This should include \nagendas, attendance records, actions taken to improve the process and minutes from the meetings. \n• Checks of the latest patches for evidence of who performed each step and when and fo r documentation \noutlining the roles and responsibilities of staff involved in the patch management process. \n• Patch management tools. \n• Configuration and logs from these tools demonstrating regular use. \n• Rollback plan. \n• C ontract, bid and documented evaluation and selection criteria for new systems which consider the patch \nmanagement requirements and the system life span.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-6da8e899cde5", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.6 SECURITY PATCH MANAGEMENT", "token_count": 278 }, { "chunk_id": "b92c301f4c73423bc71435205879a09d", "text": "6.7 NETWORK SECURITY\n\n6.7.1. The relevant entities shall take the appropriate measures to protect their network and information systems from \ncyber threats. \nGUIDANCE \n• Take into account well-known standards when implementing measures for network security (61). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented network security measures that are based on relevant standards and good practices.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-70b5df9e2e3c", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.7 NETWORK SECURITY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.7 NETWORK SECURITY", "token_count": 95 }, { "chunk_id": "5f794d7eb2f3f11cfc59e28638b7a079", "text": "6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) document the architecture of the network in a comprehensible and up to date manner; \n(b) determine and apply controls to protect the relevant entities’ internal network domains from unauthorised access; \n(c) configure controls to prevent accesses and network communication not required for the operation of the relevant \nentities; \n(d) determine and apply controls for remote access to network and information systems, including access by service \nproviders; \n(e) not use systems used for administration of the security policy implementation for other purposes; \n(f) explicitly forbid or deactivate unneeded connections and services; \n(g) where appropriate, exclusively allow access to the relevant entities’ network and information systems by devices \nauthorised by those entities;", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-cddfcefec607", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 214 }, { "chunk_id": "18febfc05b302bf4d0364bba11c3a6b2", "text": "(61) In addition to those mentioned in the mapping table at the end of this section, consider the following: \na) NIST Special Publication NIST SP 800-215, Guide to a Secure Enterprise Network Landscape, https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-215, \naccessed 7 May 2025. \nb) ISO/IEC 27033 series of standards on network security. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n95", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-cddfcefec607", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 97 }, { "chunk_id": "4103379accdbf5883c274b344fbea78f", "text": "(h) allow connections of service providers only after an authorisation request and for a set time period, such as the \nduration of a maintenance operation; \n(i) establish communication between distinct systems only through trusted channels that are isolated using logical, \ncryptographic or physical separation from other communication channels and provide assured identification of their end \npoints and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure; \n(j) adopt an implementation plan for the full transition towards latest generation network layer communication protocols \nin a secure, appropriate and gradual way and establish measures to accelerate such transition; \n(k) adopt an implementation plan for the deployment of internationally agreed and interoperable modern e-mail \ncommunications standards to secure e-mail communications to mitigate vulnerabilities linked to e-mail -related threats \nand establish measures to accelerate such deployment; \n(l) apply best practices for the security of the DNS and for Internet routing security and routing hygiene of traffic \noriginating from and destined to the network. \nGUIDANCE \n• Implement secure-by-design principles by integrating security at every layer of network design including \nthe physical, data link, network, transport and application layers. \n• I mplement secure configurations for wireless networks. \n• Where appropriate, consider zero-trust (62) network access. \n• Identify the technical measures for the transition to the latest network layer communication protocols (e.g. \ntransition to Internet Protocol version 6). \n• Define roles , responsibilities and timelines for the transition to latest -generation network layer \ncommunication protocols. \n• Approve, log and perform remote maintenance of network and information systems in a manner that \nprevents unauthorised access. \n• Consider the following for email communications (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no standards such as Start t ransport layer security (STARTTLS ), DNS-based authentication of \nnamed entities (DANE), domain-based message authentication, reporting and& conformance \n(DMARC), DomainKeys identified mail (DKIM) and sender policy framework (63), \no internal spam/scam/virus filtering and \no URL rewriting, URL scanning and URL detonation in a sandbox. \n• Consider DNS security good practices (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no deploying DNS security extensions (DNS SEC) (64),", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-cddfcefec607", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 612 }, { "chunk_id": "d295165008ec8402a7d42618113641c0", "text": "(62) Zero-trust is a security model that assumes no user, device, application or network is trusted by default — even if it's inside the corporate \nperimeter. It's particularly relevant to remote access, service provider access, network segmentation and device control. Key components to \nimplement zero trust are (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \n- Identity and access management supported by MFA (11.6.1), role based access control (11.1.3) and just in time access; \n- Device security supported by a policy which allows only known devices and EDR (6.9.2); \n- Network microsegmentation supported by logical segmentation (6.8), Next Generation Firewalls and a policy which prevents lateral movement; \n- Zero trust network access (ZTNA) supported by replacement of VPNs by ZTNA platforms, monitoring off all access requests and a policy which \ngrants access to resources based on the combination of identity/device trust/context; \n- Application and data protection supported by cloud access security brokers (CASBs), data loss prevention (DLP) and encryption as well as \nmonitoring of user activity; and \n- Continuous monitoring supported by a SIEM, user and entity behaviour analytics. \n(63) https://ec.europa.eu/internet-standards/email.html. \n(64) ‘Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide’, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-81-2.pdf, as updated \nfrom time to time; \n Olaf Kolkman, ‘DNSSEC HOWTO, a tutorial in disguise’, https://www.dns-school.org/Documentation/dnssec_howto.pdf, as updated from time to \ntime. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n96", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-cddfcefec607", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 405 }, { "chunk_id": "72bd3a934922b236fde4179c856311f1", "text": "o deploying protective DNS, wherever technically feasible, to provide additional network -wide \nsecurity capabilities, \no encrypting DNS traffic, both internal and external, wherever feasible, \no deploying dedicated DNS servers to reduce attack surface and \no following all technical guidance on ensuring that DNS deployments and the DNS protocol are as \nsecure and resilient as possible. \n• Consider Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) (65) for internet routing. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Up-to-date network diagrams, including OOB connections. \n• Firewall(s) configured in accordance with the network traffic rules of the entity’s policies. \n• Configuration files and rulesets for firewalls and routers, showing how traffic is filtered and managed. \n• Secure configurations for wireless networks for example use of WPA3 (encryption), 802.1X with EAP \n(authentication), firmware updates. \n• Configuration files for switches, including virtual local access network (VLAN) settings and ACLs. \n• Documentation of ACLs implemented on network devices to control traffic flow. \n• Documented correct usage of mobile devices, including the entity’s connected vehicles that can store data \nlocally on the vehicle and/or share data externally by means of telematics and other remote accesses (e.g. \nteleworking and OOB connections). \n• Evidence of controls over privileged accounts, including logs and policies. \n• A list of all devices used (network components), if any, that cannot receive security patches and are not \nup to date. \n• Access logs to confirm that only authorised personnel make changes and conduct reviews of the network \nsecurity rules. \n• Transition to the latest generation plan for implementing network layer communication protocols.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-cddfcefec607", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 435 }, { "chunk_id": "b4438c72f5dc292024811e4dd89f479c", "text": "6.7.3. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update these measures at planned intervals and when \nsignificant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks occur. \nGUIDANCE \n• Although the frequency of reviews of network security measures depends on the entity’s risk assessment \nas a general rule the entity might (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no continuously monitor the networks for real time threats; \no perform scans for new vulnerabilities weekly; \no review and possibly update the rules of the firewall and other tools monthly; and \no thoroughly assess the entire network annually. \n• Review logs or records of all changes made to the network security rules, including details of the changes, \napprovals and implementation dates. \n• Ensure that these reviews are conducted regularly and documented comprehensively.\n\n(65) ENISA, 7 Steps to shore up the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/7-steps-to-shore-up-bgp. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-cddfcefec607", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.7.2. For the purpose of point 6.7.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 262 }, { "chunk_id": "c7045045782f6882de8f0b02fe90d385", "text": "97 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE\n\n• Plans or schedules for upcoming or completed, regular or ad hoc reviews. \n• List of reports from past reviews. This should cover various types of reviews. \n• Logs from firewalls, routers and other network devices showing access attempts, configuration changes \nand other relevant activities. \n• Reports from SIEM and EDR/XDR systems showing aggregated and analysed security events. \n• Virtual private network (VPN) and remote access l ogs showing remote access, including OOB \nconnections, access attempts, successful connections and any anomalies. \n• Evidence of network access control (NAC) or other similar and/or alternative solutions, in place, including \nlogs and configuration settings. \n• Logs or records showing the dates and results of regular reviews of the network security rules. \n• Logs or records of all changes made to the network security rules. \n• Logs or records of firewall and ACL reviews. \n• D ocumentation showing regular reviews of user and administrative access to network devices. \n• Audit logs from network security devices (e.g. firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS)) \nto ensure that changes and reviews are logged. \n• Backup files of network device configurations to ensure that changes and reviews are reflected in the \nbackups. \n• Logs of network security incidents to see if they include documentation of rule set reviews following \nsignificant incidents. \n• Post i ncident review reports to see if they document reviews and any necessary adjustments to the \nnetwork security rules. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Communicate to personnel the correct usage of mobile devices, including the entity’s connected vehicles \nand other remote accesses. \n• Where appropriate, apply solutions capable of collecting, anal ysing and detecting all anomalies, \nexfiltrations, intrusions and the most sophisticated threats. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• The correct usage of mobile devices and other remote accesses (e.g. teleworking and VPN) has been \ncommunicated to personnel. \n• Existence of IDS/IPS. \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n98", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-5f0641a81838", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "97 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 97 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE", "token_count": 532 }, { "chunk_id": "e3e71b5e9ddc029cdf7d3830bfa7e8c9", "text": "6.8 NETWORK SEGMENTATION\n\n6.8.1. The relevant entities shall segment systems into networks or zones in accordance with the results of the risk \nassessment referred to in point 2.1. They shall segment their systems and networks from third parties’ systems and \nnetworks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Take into account well known standards when segmenting networks (66). \n• Integrate the segmentation derived from the risk assessment into the network diagram. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented network segmentation rules based on relevant standards and good practices.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-bcacf064aeb3", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.8 NETWORK SEGMENTATION", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.8 NETWORK SEGMENTATION", "token_count": 138 }, { "chunk_id": "d4da34d3785ceaaa0303a6cdb7bf6c52", "text": "6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) consider the functional, logical and physical relationship, including location, between trustworthy systems and \nservices; \n(b) grant access to a network or zone based on an assessment of its security requirements; \n(c) keep systems that are critical to the relevant entities operation or to safety in secured zones; \n(d) deploy a demilitarised zone within their communication networks to ensure secure communication originating from \nor destined to their networks; \n(e) restrict access and communications between and within zones to those necessary for the operation of the relevant \nentities or for safety; \n(f) separate the dedicated network for administration of network and information systems from the relevant entities’ \noperational network; \n(g) segregate network administration channels from other network traffic; \n(h) separate the production systems for the relevant entities’ services from systems used in development and testing, \nincluding backups. \nGUIDANCE67, 68 \n• Make sure that the segments are in line with the results of the risk assessment (Annex to the regulation, \npoint 2.1). \n• Apply a graduated set of measures in different logical network domains to further segregate the network \nsecurity environments, including: \no publicly accessible systems; \no internal networks; \no OOB connections; and \no assets with high criticality.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-9e3a98c647a9", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 355 }, { "chunk_id": "eea8e4f5876da321e4cb81dd9858515b", "text": "(66) In addition to those mentioned in the mapping table at the end of this section, consider the following: \n• NIST, ‘Guide to a Secure Enterprise Network Landscape’, NIST SP 800-215, https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/215/final. \n• ISO/IEC 27033 series of standards on network security. \n• NIST SP 800-215 and 1800-35 propose a zero-trust model, which assumes that no part of the network is trusted. \n(67) Different organisations use different terminology for the term ‘operational network’, for example ‘enterprise network’, ‘corporate network’, ‘IT \nnetwork’, ‘OT network’ and ‘administration network’. However, the fundamental concept remains focused on the interconnectedness and \nfunctionality of components working together towards common objectives set by the management of the entity. \n(68) The network for administration of a network and information system, often referred to as network administration, involves managing, monitoring and \nmaintaining an entity’s network infrastructure to ensure its optimal performance and security. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n99", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-9e3a98c647a9", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 276 }, { "chunk_id": "b230974fdd033e87e11f57c9241d9501", "text": "• Implement subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are physically and/or logically \nseparate from internal organisational networks. \n• Determine the degree of physical separation of system components from physically distinct components: \no in separate racks in the same room, \no in separate rooms for the components with high criticality and \no more significant geographical separation of the components with high criticality. \n• Implement separate network addresses ( that is,, different subnets) to connect to systems in different \nsecurity domains. \n• Monitor and control communications at the external boundary of the system as well as at key internal \nboundaries within the system, including segmentation violations. \n• Where appropriate, isolate information security tools, mechanisms and support components from other \ninternal information system components, where appropriate (69), by implementing physically separate \nsubnetworks with managed interfaces to other components of the system. \n• Route all networked, privileged accesses through a dedicated, managed interface for the purposes of \naccess control and auditing. \n• Implement a managed interface for each external telecommunication service. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Risk assessments that justify the segmentation decisions. \n• Interviews with IT and security staff to understand the rationale behind network segmentation. \n• Up-to-date network diagrams showing segmentation into different networks or zones ( e.g. DMZ (70), \ninternal networks and guest networks). \n• Verif ication that the diagrams align with business functions and risk profiles. \n• Documented criteria for creating and maintaining different network zones. \n• VLAN configurations on network switches and routers. \n• VLANs corresponding to different security zones and business functions. \n• Measures ( e.g. IDS/IPS and monitoring systems) tailored to each network zone. \n• Configurations of network devices ( e.g. routers, switches and firewalls) for appropriate segmentation \nsettings. \n• Configuration settings that match documented segmentation rules and diagrams. \n• ACLs that consider segregation of duties. \n• F irewall configurations.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-9e3a98c647a9", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 550 }, { "chunk_id": "9fb56eac542ffe644647de8d688d7083", "text": "(69) Technical method for segmentation should be considered, the usage of VLAN, physical separate switches or other methods should be defined. \nHowever physically separating subnets is not feasible in entirely software-defined environments (container clusters, cloud environments, etc.). \n(70) A perimeter network, also known as a demilitarised zone (DMZ), is a subnetwork that separates an entity’s internal network from untrusted external \nnetworks, such as the internet. The primary purpose of a perimeter network is to add an extra layer of security by isolating external-facing services \nfrom the internal network. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n100", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-9e3a98c647a9", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 171 }, { "chunk_id": "1fb62ab4b24fa3df4e00199f625fb4b7", "text": "6.8.3. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update network segmentation at planned intervals and \nwhen significant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review and, if necessary, update the process for network segmentation rules at least annually. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Reports from recent penetration tests and/or vulnerability scans. \n• Plans or schedules for reviewing network segmentation rules. \n• Logs or records confirming that the reviews have been conducted in accordance with the schedule. \n• Change management documentation for network segmentation changes , in line with risk -assessment \nresults and business needs. \n• Incident response documentation to verify that network segmentation rules are reviewed following \nsignificant security incidents. \n• Post-incident analysis reports that include assessments of segmentation rule effectiveness and any \nnecessary adjustments. \n• Internal or external audit logs and reports that cover network segmentation rule reviews. \n• Reviews performed periodically and in response to network changes or incidents. \n• Minutes from security or IT operations meetings where network segmentation rules are discussed. \n• Penetration tests and vulnerability assessments that include evaluations of network segmentation. \n• T ests conducted periodically and after major changes or incidents and findings leading to rule reviews.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-9e3a98c647a9", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 357 }, { "chunk_id": "ca548d9c8eafb5c6b1510807749f0377", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Limit the data traffic between the different segments to the operationally required extent by means of data \nflow control for example a firewall. \n• Connect to external networks or information systems only through managed interfaces consisting of \nboundary protection devices arranged in accordance with the entity’s security architecture such as: \no gateways; \no routers; \no firewalls; \no network-based malicious code analysis; \no virtualisation systems; and \no encrypted tunnels. \n• Prevent discovery of specific system components composing a managed interface. \n• Monitor exceptions. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Network isolation and implementation of segmented network security zones that limit the impact of a \nmalicious software incident. \n• L ogging and monitoring active for each zone. \n• Alerts for segmentation rule violations. \n• Reviews triggered by alerts to segmentation violations. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n101", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-9e3a98c647a9", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 6, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.8.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 244 }, { "chunk_id": "771ef0955272235dc45297368738c24b", "text": "6.9 PROTECTION AGAINST MALICIOUS AND UNAUTHORISED SOFTWARE\n\n6.9.1. The relevant entities shall protect their network and information systems against malicious and unauthorised \nsoftware. \n6.9.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall in particular implement measures that detect or prevent the use of \nmalicious or unauthorised software. The relevant entities shall, where appropriate, ensure that their network and \ninformation systems are equipped with detection and response software, which is updated regularly in accordance with \nthe risk assessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1 and the contractual agreements with the providers. \nGUIDANCE \n• Employ mechanisms for detecting and protecting against malicious and unauthorised software at system \nentry and exit points and at workstations, servers and mobile computing devices on the network to detect \nand eradicate malicious code transported by electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, web accesses \nor removable media or inserted through the exploitation of system vulnerabilities. \n• Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to: \no be active all the time; \no perform periodic scans of the system regularly and real-time scans of files from external sources \nas the files are downloaded, opened or executed; \no generate notifications when suspected malicious and unauthorised software is detected; \no d isinfect and quarantine infected files; and \no restore system settings and ensure that critical settings cannot be disabled or restricted. \n• Apply application whitelisting and monitor unauthori sed activities and system behaviour , where \nappropriate. \n• Make sure that the malicious and unauthorised protection mechanisms are centrally managed, where \nappropriate. \n• Make sure that there are mechanisms that prevent users from circumventing malicious and unauthorised \nsoftware protection capabilities. \n• Make sure that spam protection mechanisms are employed at system entry points such as workstations, \nservers or mobile computing devices on the network. \n• Update malicious code protection mechanisms (including signature definitions) whenever new releases \nare available in accordance with configuration rules and the entity’s patch management procedures. \n• Address issues related to false positives during malicious code detection and eradication and the resulting \npotential impact on system availability. \n• Align rules for monitoring and logging malicious and unauthorised detection and repair software with the \nentity’s monitoring and logging tools and procedures (Annex to the regulation, point 3.2) and with the \nentity’s access control (Annex to the regulation, point 11.1) and asset-handling policy. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Endpoint protection systems (EPS), such as endpoint protection platform (EPP) and e ndpoint detection \nand response (EDR), across the network. \n• Malware detection system present and up to date. \n• Tools for monitoring unauthorised software is in place and up to date. \n• Firewall configurations, IDS/IPS and secure web gateways containing malicious and unauthorised \nsoftware protection measures. \n• Use of whitelisting solutions, which restrict the execution of non-approved software and code. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n102 \n \n• Rules and configurations related to application whitelisting up to date. \n• Documented description of centrally managed tools. \n• Records of recent updates of mechanisms for detecting and protecting against malicious /unauthorised \nsoftware showing that they are regularly patched and updated to protect against known vulnerabilities. \n• Records of periodic scans. \n• Monitoring and logging of network and information systems, at intervals to identify malicious code and \nunauthorized code execution. \n• Logs of blocked or detected threats. \n• Logs recorded and maintained covering: \no user activities; \no exceptions; and \no information security incidents. \n• Documented spam protection mechanism. \n• R isk assessment to determine the level of logs monitoring required. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider that the use of malicious and unauthorised detection and repair software alone is not usually \nadequate or may not be available, so it should be complemented by additional measures such as \n(indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no implementing rules and measures that prevent or detect the use of unauthorised software; \no implementing measures that prevent or detect the use of known or suspected malicious websites; \no reducing vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious software; \no co ntrolling the running of applications on user workstations or user end devices (including \nsmartphones or tablets); \no employing web application filters to reduce exposure to malicious content. \n• Consider email filters as essential tools for detecting and blocking malicious and unauthori sed software. \nDifferent types of filter are (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no content filter; \no b locklist filter; \no a ntivirus filter; \no p hishing filters; and \no machine learning filters. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented alternative countermeasures such as: \no securing all physical and logical data interfaces; \no n etwork isolation and implementation of segmented network security zones that limit the impact of a \nmalicious software incident; \no comprehensive system -hardening measures to minimise the risk of malicious software incidents. \no l ogs confirming that administrative privileges are controlled and monitored. \n• Logs from email filters. \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n103", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-43282186e446", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.9 PROTECTION AGAINST MALICIOUS AND UNAUTHORISED SOFTWARE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.9 PROTECTION AGAINST MALICIOUS AND UNAUTHORISED SOFTWARE", "token_count": 1405 }, { "chunk_id": "26e46d022dfbe68d58c2b240fbbed7e3", "text": "6.10 VULNERABILITY HANDLING AND DISCLOSURE\n\n6.10.1. The relevant entities shall obtain information about technical vulnerabilities in their network and information \nsystems, evaluate their exposure to such vulnerabilities and take appropriate measures to manage the vulnerabilities. \nGUIDANCE \n• Adopt a framework for assessing the severity of vulnerabilities based on models (e.g. CVSS, exploit prediction \nscoring system (EPSS) or SANS vulnerability assessment framework) and supplemented by environmental \nand threat metrics as appropriate. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documentation of a risk -assessment framework used to evaluate the severity, impact and probability of \nexploitation of identified vulnerabilities (e.g. CVSS scores).", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-bff1d2d326f5", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.10 VULNERABILITY HANDLING AND DISCLOSURE", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.10 VULNERABILITY HANDLING AND DISCLOSURE", "token_count": 184 }, { "chunk_id": "7fef10bf0cac9b108a362ec0f52a1649", "text": "6.10.2. For the purpose of point 6.10.1., the relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) monitor information about vulnerabilities through appropriate channels, such as announcements of CSIRTs, \ncompetent authorities or information provided by suppliers or service providers; \n(b) perform, where appropriate, vulnerability scans and record evidence of the results of the scans, at planned intervals; \n(c) address, without undue delay, vulnerabilities identified by the relevant entities as critical to their operations; \n(d) ensure that their vulnerability handling is compatible with their change management, security patch management, \nrisk management and incident management procedures; \n(e) lay down a procedure for disclosing vulnerabilities in accordance with the applicable national coordinated \nvulnerability disclosure policy. \nGUIDANCE \n• As a minimum, address vulnerabilities assigned to higher classifications (e.g. ‘critical’ and ‘high’ in the CVSS) \nor equivalent (e.g. as defined by the national CSIRT) without undue delay. Where possible, accepting the risk \nof such vulnerabilities and not addressing them is not advisable. \n• Share information obtained from technical vulnerability scans with designated personnel throughout the entity \nand with authorities to help eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other information systems. \n• Disclose as yet unknown vulnerabilities to designated CSIRTs in accordance with national coordinated \nvulnerability disclosure (CVD) policies, where applicable. \n• Identify a single point of contact and channels for communication with suppliers and service providers about \nissues related to network and information security. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Logs of a vulnerability assessed as critical to check if it was addressed. \n• Licences or subscriptions for vulnerability-scanning tools. \n• Configuration files of the vulnerability -scanning tools to ensure they are set up to scan the entire relevant \ninfrastructure and are updated with the latest vulnerability definitions. \n• Logs from vulnerability management tools showing scan schedules, results and follow-up actions. \n• Documented technical vulnerability scan reports. \n• SIEM and EDR/XDR logs for records of detected vulnerabilities and related alerts from monitoring channels. \n• Reports from third-party security assessments or penetration tests. \n• For vulnerabilities assessed as critical, evidence that findings from these assessments have been addressed. \n• Records of any vulnerabilities disclosed, in accordance with the national CVD policy. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n104\n\n• Interview with the single point of contact and channels for communication with suppliers and service providers \nabout information-security-related issues.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-17e005dacd31", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.10.2. For the purpose of point 6.10.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.10.2. For the purpose of point 6.10.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 692 }, { "chunk_id": "68c667ce2e1b008377a2ee6c24a76ca2", "text": "6.10.3. When justified by the potential impact of the vulnerability, the relevant entities shall create and implement a plan \nto mitigate the vulnerability. In other cases, the relevant entities shall document and substantiate the reason why the \nvulnerability does not require remediation. \nGUIDANCE \n• Ensure comprehensive documentation of identified vulnerabilities, the associated risk assessments and any \nmitigation plans developed. \n• Define and establish the roles and responsibilities associated with vulnerability management. \n• Mitigation plans should include clear timelines, assigned responsibilities and follow-up procedures. \n• All mitigation plans, along with the rationale for non-remediation decisions, should be reviewed and validated \nby the management body responsible for risk oversight \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Records showing timelines and responsible employees for each remediation effort and verification of fixes. \n• Records or logs of past vulnerability mitigation plans or schedules. \n• Records of any vulnerability that was not addressed and the justification for not addressing it.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-17e005dacd31", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.10.2. For the purpose of point 6.10.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.10.2. For the purpose of point 6.10.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 278 }, { "chunk_id": "9447b08dd3dd7c50e333afb2ffcb12d0", "text": "6.10.4. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update at planned intervals the channels they use for \nmonitoring vulnerability information. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review the information from the technical-vulnerability-monitoring channels at least biannually. \n• Consider inventorying sources likely to report technical vulnerabilities in the identified components and \ndistribute updates (software publisher websites, CERT website and ENISA website) (\n71). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• List of monitoring channels for technical vulnerabilities, including suppliers and service providers’ single points \nof contact. \n• Records of past reviews and plans for future reviews of technical vulnerability channels. \n• Subscriptions to relevant vulnerability notification services, mailing lists and alert systems (e.g. CERT, vendor \nadvisories and security forums). \n• Logs that document periodic reviews of the monitoring channels to verify that they are up to date and effective. \n• Records of alerts or notifications received from monitoring channels about new vulnerabilities, including how \nthese alerts were handled and any subsequent actions taken. \n• Logs that record the monitoring activities for vulnerability information, including dates and sources monitored \n(e.g. security advisories, vendor bulletins, threat intelligence feeds).", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-17e005dacd31", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.10.2. For the purpose of point 6.10.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.10.2. For the purpose of point 6.10.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 336 }, { "chunk_id": "edc639d4ae35fb5bd5a9d653b3138a7f", "text": "(71) Cyber fundamentals, PR.IP-12, Centre for Cyber Security Belgium, available at: https://atwork.safeonweb.be/sites/default/files/2024-\n12/cyfun_basic_v2023-03-01_e_update_2024.pdf. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n105", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-17e005dacd31", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.10.2. For the purpose of point 6.10.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.10.2. For the purpose of point 6.10.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 62 }, { "chunk_id": "ce3b7db9834520a862b83f8e9aab67c3", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Create and maintain procedures for identifying, assessing, prioritising and remediating vulnerabilities. \n• Make sure that suppliers and service providers report vulnerabilities in their systems or products or services \nthat present a risk to the security of the network and information systems of the entity. \n• Perform vulnerability scans and record evidence of the results of the scans, when significant incidents or \nsignificant changes to operations or risks occur. \n• Where possible, consider authenticated vulnerability or an alternative method to perform in depth scans. \n• R eview and, where appropriate, update the channels for monitoring vulnerability information when significant \nincidents or significant changes to operations or risks occur. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented procedures for identifying, assessing, prioritising and remediating vulnerabilities. \n• Contracts with suppliers and service providers that require technical vulnerability reporting, handling and \ndisclosure. \n• Vulnerability-related communications or reports from suppliers and service providers. \n• Records of ad -hoc scans performed in response to significant incidents or changes to the infrastructure, \nincluding the dates and reasons for these scans. \n• Change management logs to verify that vulnerability scans are conducted following significant incident s or \nchanges to the infrastructure or to the threat landscape. \n• Records of internal audits or reviews of the vulnerability management procedures. \n• Findings and corrective actions taken from these audits.\n\nPOLICIES\nAND PROCEDURES TO \nASSESS THE \nEFFECTIVENESS OF\nCYBERSECURITY \nRISK-MANAGEMENT \nMEASURES\nChapter 7\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n107", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-17e005dacd31", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6.10.2. For the purpose of point 6.10.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 6.10.2. For the purpose of point 6.10.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 439 }, { "chunk_id": "0dabaac2a88483a18b3d133c1be49546", "text": "7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO\n\nASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF \nCYBERSECURITY RISK-\nMANAGEMENT MEASURES \n7.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2), point (f) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall establish, implement \nand apply a policy and procedures to assess whether the cybersecurity risk -management measures taken by the \nrelevant entity are effectively implemented and maintained. \nGUIDANCE \n• Take into account industry -recognised standards when developing the policy and procedures for \nassessing the efficient implementation of the measures (72). \n• Implement a policy for assessing the effectiveness of implementation of measures that is proportionate to \nthe risk posture of the entity in line with the risk assessment. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented policy and procedures for effectiveness assessments based on good practices and \nstandards (73).", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-27efef2f2bba", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "token_count": 219 }, { "chunk_id": "e8bd7a2a70f676c9a28b188dd537650a", "text": "7.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 7.1. shall take into account results of the risk assessment pursuant \nto point 2.1. and past significant incidents. The relevant entities shall determine: \n(a) what cybersecurity risk-management measures are to be monitored and measured, including processes and \ncontrols; \n(b) the methods for monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation, as applicable, to ensure valid results; \n(c) when the monitoring and measuring is to be performed; \n(d) who is responsible for monitoring and measuring the effectiveness of the cybersecurity risk-management measures; \n(e) when the results from monitoring and measurement are to be analysed and evaluated; \n(f) who has to analyse and evaluate these results. \nGUIDANCE \n• When selecting measures for assessing effectiveness of implementation take into account the cost of their \nimplementation. \n• Consider one or more of the following indicative methods for assessing the effectiveness of \nimplementation of a measure, according to the risk-treatment plan (section 2.1):", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-27efef2f2bba", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "token_count": 266 }, { "chunk_id": "a39ea83e710400afd342c72c2e0ad1dc", "text": "(72) In addition to those mentioned in the mapping table at the end of this section, consider the following: \n• ISO/IEC 27004:2016, Information technology - Security techniques - Information security management - Monitoring, measurement, analysis \nand evaluation. \n• Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL). \n(73) For example, NIST SP 800-53A available at: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/a/r5/final. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n108", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-27efef2f2bba", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "token_count": 121 }, { "chunk_id": "99de809b7fed7cb648562862a0772a14", "text": "o self-assessment, \no benchmarking against a measure’s checklist or a standard, \no vulnerability assessment, \no penetration testing (e.g. internal, external, red/blue team), \no secure code review, \no audit (e.g. internal, external, compliance) and \no performance monitoring. \n• The assessment service can be provided by an external entity or by specially authorised employees of the \nentity. \no In the case of external entities, confidentiality and non-disclosure terms should be included in the \ncontract. \no Internal employees should be suitably trained, based on the skills required for the objective of \ntheir role and the entity should consider their objectivity and impartiality , where possible. The \nentity should pay particular attention to the elements of point 2.3. of the Annex to the regulation \nconcerning the impartiality of the employees. For instance, employees should not come from the \ndepartment or division whose systems are being inspected and should not have been involved \nin developing the code or in installing or operating the system being audited for this purpose. \n• Define key performance indicators (KPIs) to measure the effectiveness of measures including, one or \nmore, notable examples such as (indicative, non-exhaustive list) (74): \no the cost of implementation and maintenance, for example capital expenditure (CAPEX) / \noperational expenditure (OPEX); \no the number of employees who have attended cybersecurity trainings (75); \no the number of vulnerabilities detected; \no time to remediation; \no the number of incidents; \no the number of incidents related to a change; \no incident response times; and \no number of non -compliances (consider the elements in point 2.2 of the Annex to the regulation \nconcerning compliance monitoring). \n• If possible, use the same KPIs for each assessment and utilize standardized templates and checklists to \nensure consistency and thoroughness. \n• Although the frequency of monitoring and measurement of measures, addressed in point 7.2.1 (a) of the \nAnnex to the regulation, depends on the entity's risk assessment, the entity may follow this indicative, non-\nexhaustive guideline: \no continuously monitor and measure the effectiveness of mitigating measures designed to address \nreal-time threats (e.g. firewalls, IDS/IPS); \no monitor and measure the effectiveness of security measures related to the threat landscape \nbiannually (e.g. vulnerability management and incident response plans); \no assess the overall effectiveness of all measures annually; \no assess the effectiveness of measures related to a specific incident following that incident; and", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-27efef2f2bba", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "token_count": 658 }, { "chunk_id": "41078c36897ef603421c8c0fd0f2d56b", "text": "(74) ENISA’s cybersecurity investment reports offer a good reference for measuring effectiveness of measures, for example the 2023 NIS investments \nreport, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/nis-investments-2023. \n(75) The security culture framework (CSF) is an example source of KPIs for measuring the effectiveness of training. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n109", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-27efef2f2bba", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "token_count": 100 }, { "chunk_id": "ebaaf67a45d63a79a6d907e696da8bb7", "text": "o assess the effectiveness of measures related to a specific system or one of its components \nfollowing significant changes to this system or this component. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Evidence that management has received reporting on the effective implementation of the measures. \n• Evidence that monitoring and measurement results are reported to the management bodies (Annex to the \nregulation, point 2.3.3 concerning compliance monitoring). \n• Documented objectives and KPIs for the implementation of the measures. \n• Documented analysis and evaluation of the results from previous evaluations. \n• Logs or records from previous effectiveness assessments. \n• Plans or schedules for future effectiveness assessments. \n• Documented roles and responsibilities.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-27efef2f2bba", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "token_count": 190 }, { "chunk_id": "94a62ebda6ea543b73841de9545ff18a", "text": "7.3. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update the policy and procedures at planned intervals \nand when significant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review policy and procedures for the assessment of the effectiveness of the measures at least every two \nyears, taking into account: \no changes to the information systems; \no changes to the environment of operation; and \no trends related to threats and vulnerabilities (take into account root cause analysis) (76). \n• Update the policy and procedures based on findings from security tests (Annex to the regulation, point 6.5.2 (c)) \nand the independent review of the policy on the security of the network and information systems (Annex to the \nregulation, point 2.3.3), if applicable. \n• Take into account the results of the assessment and consider them when identifying and prioritising appropriate \nrisk-treatment options and measures (Annex to the regulation, point 2.1.3). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Logs or records from previous policy reviews. \n• Plans or schedules for future effectiveness assessment reviews. \n• Risk-treatment plan that takes into account the results of the effectiveness assessments. \n• Minutes from meetings where security -testing results are discussed and the effectiveness of other policies is \nreviewed and improvements to them are discussed based on these results. \n• Records showing updates to other policies and procedures with a view to assessing their effectiveness.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-27efef2f2bba", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "token_count": 378 }, { "chunk_id": "7a3774979fafedd256a0db203495bf6d", "text": "(76) More information on information security incident root cause analysis can be found in Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, ‘FIRST \nCSIRT services framework’, Version 2.1, ‘6.2.4 Function: Information security incident root cause analysis’, \nhttps://www.first.org/standards/frameworks/csirts/csirt_services_framework_v2.1#6-Service-Area-Information-Security-Incident-Management \nBASIC CYBER \nHYGIENE \nPRACTICES\nAND SECURITY \nTRAINING\nChapter 8\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n111", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-27efef2f2bba", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 7. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO", "token_count": 130 }, { "chunk_id": "3c13888e4cdd6c4282e630802b53164a", "text": "8.1 AWARENESS RAISING AND BASIC CYBER HYGIENE PRACTICES\n\n8.1.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2), point (g) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall ensure that their \nemployees are aware of risks, are informed of the importance of cybersecurity and apply cyber hygiene practices. \nGUIDANCE \n• I mplement cybersecurity awareness programmes: \no u se various formats, such as workshops, webinars and e-learning modules; \no use multiple communication channels (emails, newsletters and intranet) to keep employees \ninformed about cybersecurity updates, risks and cyber hygiene practices for users. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Awareness raising program me, fo r example a comprehensive outline of the program me, detailing its \nobjectives, content, frequency, syllabus and schedule. \n \n8.1.2. For the purpose of point 8.1.1., the relevant entities shall offer to all employees, including members of \nmanagement bodies, as well as to direct suppliers and service providers where appropriate in accordance with point \n5.1.4, an awareness raising programme, which shall: \n(a) be scheduled over time, so that the activities are repeated and cover new employees; \n(b) be established in line with the network and information security policy, topic-specific policies and relevant procedures \non network and information security; \n(c) cover cybersecurity risk-management measures in place, contact points and resources for additional information and \nadvice on cybersecurity matters, as well as cyber hygiene practices for users. \nGUIDANCE \n• Include cyber hygiene practices (77) for relevant users (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no clear desk and screen policy, \no use of relevant strong authentication means and methods, multi factor passwords etc, \no event reporting, \no safe email use and web browsing, \no protection from phishing and social engineering, \no secure use of mobile devices, \no secure use of the entity’s connected-vehicles, \no secure connection practices, \n \n \n(77) Refer to recitals 49, 50 and 89 of the NIS2 Directive for clarifications of the term ‘cyber hygiene’. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n112 \n \no backup practices, \no zero-trust concept, \no software updates, \no secure device configuration, \no network segmentation, \no secure teleworking practices. \n• Include the following in the programme (indicative, non-exhaustive list). \no Train personnel on the policy on the security of network and information systems. \no Train personnel to recognize social engineering attacks, such as phishing, pre-texting and \ntailgating. \no Train personnel to be aware of causes of unintentional data exposure. Example topics include \nthe erroneous delivery of sensitive data, losing a portable end- user device, providing \nunauthorized access to an entity’s connected-vehicle and the data stored on it and publishing \ndata to unintended audiences. \no Train personnel on the dangers of connecting to and transmitting data via insecure networks for \nthe entity’s activities. If the entity has remote workers, training should include guidance to ensure \nthat all users securely configure their home network infrastructure. \no Train personnel in understanding malicious and unauthorised software, on the importance of \nmalicious software detection and on the risks and consequences of using unauthorised software. \n• Offer employees contact points and resources for additional advice. \n• To implement the awareness raising programme, consult available sources, such as those from national \nor international cybersecurity organisations , ENISA’s AR-in-a-Box ( 78 ) and the Cybersecurity Skills \nAcademy (79). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Awareness raising programme, that is, a comprehensive outline of the programme, detailing its objectives, \ncontent, frequency, syllabus and schedule. \n• Copies of the awareness-raising materials distributed to employees, including handouts, emails, \npresentations and online modules. \n• Logs, sign-in sheet, certificates of completion or acknowledgements given to employees upon completing \nthe programme, showing which employees have taken part in the awareness-raising programme. \n \n8.1.3. The awareness raising programme shall, where appropriate, be tested in terms of effectiveness. The awareness \nraising programme shall be updated and offered at planned intervals taking into account changes in cyber hygiene \npractices, and the current threat landscape and risks posed to the relevant entities. \nGUIDANCE \n• Offer cybersecurity awareness raising programmes periodically. \n \n \n(78) https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/awareness-and-cyber-hygiene/ar-in-a-box. \n(79) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Closing the cybersecurity talent gap to boost the EU’s \ncompetitiveness, growth and resilience ('The Cybersecurity Skills Academy'), COM(2023) 207 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-\ncontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A207%3AFIN. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n113 \n \n• Test the effectiveness of the awareness raising programme for example by using quizzes or real \nscenarios. \n• Consider c ommon KPIs (Annex to the regulation, point 7.2) to measure the effectiveness of the \nawareness-raising programme. \n• Review and update the awareness-raising programme at least annually. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Logs, sign-in sheets, certificates of completion or acknowledgements given to employees upon completing \nthe programme showing which employees have taken part in the awareness-raising programme. \n• Results from any quizzes or assessments conducted to measure the employees’ understanding of the \ntopics covered. \n• Employee feedback forms on the awareness raising program me, which can provide insight into the \neffectiveness of the programme and areas for improvement. \n• Reviewed and update d records showing that the program me is reviewed regularly and updated as \nnecessary.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-07a0495e905f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "8.1 AWARENESS RAISING AND BASIC CYBER HYGIENE PRACTICES", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 8.1 AWARENESS RAISING AND BASIC CYBER HYGIENE PRACTICES", "token_count": 1488 }, { "chunk_id": "806d749825f9c6b1692e3fa658932997", "text": "8.2 SECURITY TRAINING\n\n8.2.1. The relevant entities shall identify employees, whose roles require security relevant skill sets and expertise and \nensure that they receive regular training on network and information system security. \nGUIDANCE \n• Assess which roles within the entity require security-relevant skills and expertise. \n• Offer training that focuses on the specific security skills required by the identified roles. \n• Consider globally recognized qualifications and certifications, and the ECSF (80). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• A comprehensive outline of the training programme, detailing the objectives for different roles and how to \nreach them, content and frequency of the training.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-46189233e86e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "token_count": 174 }, { "chunk_id": "e877374dbc8916fbba114277af0aee66", "text": "8.2.2. The relevant entities shall establish, implement and apply a training program in line with the network and \ninformation security policy, topic -specific policies and other relevant procedures on network and information security \nwhich lays down the training needs for certain roles and positions based on criteria. \nGUIDANCE \n• Provide role-specific network and information security training (81). \n• Consider various training methods, such as online courses, workshops, hands-on labs and simulations. \n• Consider various types of training, such as courses, certifications or attending security conferences or \nwebinars, and the maintenance of certifications.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-46189233e86e", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "token_count": 166 }, { "chunk_id": "b164f65a1a0459094255ede73c2191a8", "text": "(80) https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/skills-and-competences/skills-development/european-cybersecurity-skills-framework-ecsf. \n(81) https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/skills-and-competences/skills-development/european-cybersecurity-skills-framework-ecsf. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n114", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-46189233e86e", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "token_count": 80 }, { "chunk_id": "efbb3c279e971b6f0f4ed009f6277500", "text": "• Examples of training may include secure system administration courses for IT professionals, Open \nWorldwide Application Security Project® awareness and prevention training for web application developers \nand advanced social engineering awareness training for high-profile roles. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• A comprehensive outline of the training programme, detailing the objectives for different roles and how to \nreach them, content and frequency of the training. \n• Assessment of effect and feedback from trainings.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-46189233e86e", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "token_count": 129 }, { "chunk_id": "d84c3035db3a08e821583b6214b8e011", "text": "8.2.3. The training referred to in point 8.2.1. shall be relevant to the job function of the employee and its effectiveness \nshall be assessed. Training shall take into consideration security measures in place and cover the following: \n(a) instructions regarding the secure configuration and operation of the network and information systems, including \nmobile devices; \n(b) briefing on known cyber threats; \n(c) training of the behaviour when security-relevant events occur. \nGUIDANCE \n• Topics to include in the programme may include the following (indicative, non-exhaustive list). \no Train personnel in authentication best practices, such as MFA, password creation and credential \nmanagement. \no Train personnel in how to identify and properly store, transfer, archive and destroy sensitive data. \no Train personnel to recognise a potential incident, such as unusual email attachments, unexpected \nsystem behaviour and suspicious network traffic. \no Train personnel in how to report events promptly and accurately, including the use of designated \ncommunication channels. \no Train personnel to understand how to verify and report out -of-date software or any failures in \nautomated processes and tools. Part of this training should include notifying IT personnel of any \nfailures in automated processes and tools. \no Train relevant personnel in crisis management and business continuity procedures. Incorporate \nsimulated events (\n82 ) into crisis management training to facilitate an effective response by \npersonnel in crisis situations. \no Train relevant personnel (e.g. system administrators and software developers) in the secure \nconfiguration and operation of the network and information systems. Provide regular updates on \nthe latest cyber threats. \n• Test the security knowledge of employees to make sure that it is sufficient and up to date. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Comprehensive outline of the training programme, detailing the objectives of different roles and how to \nreach them, and the content and frequency of the training. \n• Results from any quizzes or assessments conducted to measure the employees’ understanding of the \ntopics covered.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-46189233e86e", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "token_count": 540 }, { "chunk_id": "0cc0b69a113730845e6e95554feb06f9", "text": "(82) In its simplest form, the exercise can mean simulating the continuity and recovery procedures through discussion (known as a tabletop exercise). \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n115", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-46189233e86e", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "token_count": 53 }, { "chunk_id": "bdc8d558885bad187339b75ce10c66ad", "text": "8.2.4. The relevant entities shall apply training to staff members who transfer to new positions or roles which require \nsecurity relevant skill sets and expertise. \nGUIDANCE \n• Examine whether the new position or role of an employee requires role-specific network and information \nsecurity training. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Logs, sign-in sheets, certificates of completion or acknowledgements given to employees upon completing \nthe training, showing that employees who transferred to new positions or roles attended training sessions \nrelevant to the new position or role. \n• Evidence of maintenance of certifications obtained.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-46189233e86e", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "token_count": 157 }, { "chunk_id": "47307f62fa997f4a9e3eec2c4814103a", "text": "8.2.5. The program shall be updated and run periodically taking into account applicable policies and rules, assigned \nroles, responsibilities, as well as known cyber threats and technological developments. \nGUIDANCE \n• Provide cybersecurity training periodically. \n• Review and update the training programme at least annually. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Logs, sign-in sheets, certificates of completion or acknowledgements given to employees upon completing \nthe training, showing which employees attended the training sessions. \n• Information materials distributed to employees, including handouts, presentations and online modules. \n• U pdates showing that the training programme is reviewed and updated regularly to keep up with the latest \ncybersecurity threats and best practices. \n• Employee feedback forms on the training sessions, which can provide insight into the effectiveness of the \ntraining and areas for improvement.\n\nTIP \nGUIDANCE \n• Encourage participation in threat -intelligence-sharing communities to stay informed about emerging \nthreats.\n\nCRYPTOGRAPHY\nChapter 9\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n117", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-46189233e86e", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 8.2 SECURITY TRAINING", "token_count": 286 }, { "chunk_id": "97dc1e80169bf8ca7607366d46e72105", "text": "9. CRYPTOGRAPHY\n\n9.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2), point (h) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall establish, \nimplement and apply a policy and procedures related to cryptography, with a view to ensuring adequate and effective \nuse of cryptography to protect the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of data in line with the relevant entities’ asset \nclassification and the results of the risk assessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1. \nGUIDANCE \n• Ensure that the comprehensive policy and procedures related to cryptography are in line with relevant \nregulations and state-of-the-art standards (83). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented policy on cryptography and procedures related to cryptography.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-b92652e2137c", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "9. CRYPTOGRAPHY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 9. CRYPTOGRAPHY", "token_count": 183 }, { "chunk_id": "78908e80c03cb1652ae13d291e8dba75", "text": "9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:\n\n(a) in accordance with the relevant entities’ classification of assets, the type, strength and quality of the cryptographic \nmeasures required to protect the relevant entities’ assets, including data at rest and data in transit; \n(b) based on point (a), the protocols or families of protocols to be adopted, as well as cryptographic algorithms, cipher \nstrength, cryptographic solutions and usage practices to be approved and required for use in the relevant entities, \nfollowing, where appropriate, a cryptographic agility approach; \n(c) the relevant entities’ approach to key management, including, where appropriate, methods for the following: \n(i) generating different keys for cryptographic systems and applications; \n(ii) issuing and obtaining public key certificates; \n(iii) distributing keys to intended entities, including how to activate keys when received; \n(iv) storing keys, including how authorised users obtain access to keys; \n(v) changing or updating keys, including rules on when and how to change keys; \n(vi) dealing with compromised keys; \n(vii) revoking keys including how to withdraw or deactivate keys; \n(viii) recovering lost or corrupted keys; \n(ix) backing up or archiving keys; \n(x) destroying keys; \n(xi) logging and auditing of key management-related activities; \n(xii) setting activation and deactivation dates for keys ensuring that the keys can only be used for the specified period \nof time according to the organization's rules on key management.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3fc4c0aafdb6", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "token_count": 390 }, { "chunk_id": "db565641e0c4befc7413f85ee3d9071c", "text": "(83) Non-exhaustive list of standards: \n• NIST special publications: SP 800-175A, SP 800-175B, SP 800-56A/B, SP 800-57; \n• Federal Information Processing Standards 197, 202, 186-4; \n• ISO/IEC: 19790, 18033; \n• BSI TR-02102-1 ‘Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key Lengths’, Version: 2025-1, January 31, 2025. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n118", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3fc4c0aafdb6", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "token_count": 96 }, { "chunk_id": "9769dc684ef0355079a4f04a1d383336", "text": "GUIDANCE \n• Ensure that the policy and procedures cover cryptographic mechanisms , such as digital signatures (84) \nand hashes (85), to: \no protect the confidentiality and integrity of data in transit and at rest; \no detect unauthorized changes to data at rest marked as critical; and \no ensure secure disposal of the data after its lawful use. \n• Set up a mechanism (either manual or automated) for the selection, establishment and management \n(including updating) of cryptographic keys. \n• Apply encryption in sensitive information transfer (e.g. key generation and key management). \n• Consider the encryption of electronic media that contain confidential/sensitive information. \n• Ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the data with cryptographic mechanisms, when, for example \n(indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no sharing information; \no scanning network traffic; \no using secure online (e.g. client-side cloud encryption) and offline storage; and \no removing sensitive data from storage media. \n• Maintain availability of information in the event of the loss of cryptographic keys, for example by escrowing \nencryption keys. \n• Produce, control and distribute symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic keys using key management \ntechnology and processes. \n• Consider automated cryptographic key management mechanisms to: \no generate keys for different cryptographic systems and different applications; \no generate and obtaining public key certificates; \no distribute keys to intended users; and \no deal with compromised keys. \n• Keep logs of cryptographic key management activities to ensure accountability, traceability and support \nfor incident response and audit activities. As a minimum, logging should include key generation or renewal, \nkey transmission and key destruction or revocation. \n• Where applicable, key retrieval, archiving and storage activities should also be logged, particularly in \nenvironments where manual handling or high-assurance key protection is required. \n• Ensure the protection of cryptographic keys against modification and loss. \n• Ensure the protection of secret and private keys against unauthorized use and disclosure. \n• Ensure the authenticity of public keys. \n• Physically protect equipment used to generate, store and archive keys. \n• Limit the use of ad hoc cryptographic processes. \n• Consider, where appropriate, a cryptographic agility approach (\n86). Key features of this approach are: \no flexibility in algorithm selection;", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3fc4c0aafdb6", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "token_count": 621 }, { "chunk_id": "70a16748de0b14eb0ef8b90081722c77", "text": "(84) Key digital signature use case areas are (indicative, non-exhaustive list): document/software code signing, authentication, data integrity and \nworkflow automation and compliance. \n(85) Use cases for the use of secure hash algorithms are (indicative, non-exhaustive list): backup integrity, secure password storage, log integrity. \n(86) Cryptographic agility, or crypto-agility, is the ability of a system to quickly and seamlessly switch between different cryptographic algorithms and \nprotocols without significant changes to the system’s infrastructure. For example, the X.509 public key certificate system demonstrates crypto-\nagility by allowing the use of different cryptographic parameters, such as key types and hash algorithms. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n119", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3fc4c0aafdb6", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "token_count": 201 }, { "chunk_id": "49575da605ddaa6c30968de804c36df5", "text": "o modular design of the architecture whereby cryptographic components can be changed or updated \nindependently without affecting the entire system; \no regular updates and patching; \no compliance with the legislative frameworks and governance of the use of cryptography within the \nentity’s networks and information systems; \no future-proofing by considering quantum cryptographic algorithms. \n• Consider evaluating the chosen encryption methods to verify that they meet industry standards for secure \nmethods (\n87). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented policy on cryptography in line with relevant regulations and state-of-the-art standards. \n• Documented guidelines for encryption. \n• Acceptable encryption algorithms, key lengths, protocols (88) or family of protocols (89) in line with the state \nof the art. \n• Safeguards to protect the secrecy of secret (private) key(s) in place. \n• Evidence of the existence of cryptographic mechanisms that support ensuring the confidentiality and \nintegrity of the data at rest and in transit. \n• Evidence of the existence of a mechanism (either manual or automated) for the establishment and \nmanagement of cryptographic keys. \n• Evidence of encryption implementation on various systems (e.g. databases, files, communications). \n• Access control mechanisms for cryptographic keys and encrypted data. \n• Verification that access is restricted to authorized personnel and that actions related to cryptographic keys \nare logged and monitored. \n• Assessments of cryptographic measures for protecting data privacy. \n• Evidence of secure key generation. \n• Internal or external audit reports focusing on cryptographic measures. \n• Evidence that the entity follows cryptographic best practices, including documentation of how new best \npractices are identified and incorporated.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3fc4c0aafdb6", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "token_count": 453 }, { "chunk_id": "b79ba3cdeb62b68d00b2d9eecf301785", "text": "9.3. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update their policy and procedures at planned intervals, \ntaking into account the state of the art in cryptography. \nGUIDANCE \n• Ensure the cryptography policy aligns with relevant industry standards and with advancements in the field. \n• Review the cryptography policy and procedures at least annually. \n• Maintain a procedure that specifies how reviews of the cryptography policy and procedures are conducted, \nincluding responsible personnel and review intervals.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3fc4c0aafdb6", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "token_count": 132 }, { "chunk_id": "1b15f3c77b0208c1837a448ff4e299f2", "text": "(87) For example NIST 800-175 and 800-57. \n(88) A cryptographic protocol is a set of rules and procedures that use cryptographic algorithms to achieve specific security objectives in communication \nand data exchange. Examples of such protocols are secure sockets layer / transport layer security (SSL/TLS) and secure shell protocol (SSH). \n(89) A family of cryptographic protocols is a group of related protocols that share common cryptographic techniques and principles to achieve various \nsecurity objectives. Examples are (a) key establishment (e.g. Diffie-Helman and RSA), (b) identification (e.g. Kerberos), (c) message authentication \n(e.g. hash-based message authentication code), (d) secret sharing (e.g. Shamir’s Secret Sharing) and (e) zero knowledge proof (e.g. Schnorr) \nprotocols. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n120", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3fc4c0aafdb6", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "token_count": 214 }, { "chunk_id": "286d79726a42423340e644278f98568c", "text": "• Ensure that changes to the cryptographic measures are tested before being applied. \n• Ensu re that changes to the cryptographic measures are communicated to employees. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Logs of changes made to the cryptography policy and procedures \n• Test plans and results that demonstrate the implementation and effectiveness of updated cryptographic \nmeasures. \n• Records of notifications or reminders sent to relevant personnel about upcoming reviews of the \ncryptography policy and procedures. \n• Communication records informing personnel about updates to the cryptography policy following \nadvancements in the field or significant changes. \n• Evidence that the entity remains up to date with the latest developments in cryptography (e.g. member of \ncryptographic bodies or consortia (e.g. Internet Engineering Task Force and cryptographic research \ngroups) and subscriptions to cryptographic journals/feeds, mailing lists or news feeds).", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3fc4c0aafdb6", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "token_count": 238 }, { "chunk_id": "c752d869ca6e9a20649ca70286d363df", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Train employees and make them aware of the use of cryptographic measures in the entity. \n• Make sure network and information systems automatically encrypt and secure all portable and removable \nmedia. \n• Where appropriate, consider implementing a k ey management system to ensure the secure handling of \ncryptographic keys. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Records of training programmes related to cryptography for employees. \n• Employees aware of the confidentiality and integrity of data , communications and procedures and what \nthey imply for their work. \n• Employees handling sensitive information aware of and understanding the cryptography policies and \nprocedures. \n• Key management system in place.\n\nHUMAN \nRESOURCES \nSECURITY\nChapter 10\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n122", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3fc4c0aafdb6", "chunk_index": 8, "total_chunks": 9, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 9.2. The policy and procedures referred to in point 9.1 shall establish:", "token_count": 205 }, { "chunk_id": "56807f8eb23dc801ec95d570c46b8528", "text": "10.1 HUMAN RESOURCES SECURITY\n\n10.1.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2), point (i) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall ensure that their \nemployees and direct suppliers and service providers, wherever applicable, understand and commit to their security \nresponsibilities, as appropriate for the offered services and the job and in line with the relevant entities’ policy on the \nsecurity of network and information systems. \nGUIDANCE \n• Define clear security roles and responsibilities for employees, aligned with the entity’s security policies \nand each employee’s functional role. Define relevant security responsibilities for direct suppliers and \nservice providers, within the scope of contractual obligations, ensuring they are appropriate to the nature \nof the services provided and aligned with the entity’s overall security requirements. \n• Establish onboarding and continuous education program mes that include both security awareness and \nrole-specific cybersecurity training tailored to different risk exposures. \n• Implement periodic assessments to evaluate understanding of security responsibilities, supported by \nmandatory refresher training as needed. \n• Ensure that security responsibilities are formally documented and integrated into job descriptions, \ncontractual agreements and performance review processes. Incorporate relevant security responsibilities \ninto contractual agreements or service-level agreements (SLA), for direct suppliers and service providers \nwith clear language regarding expectations and compliance requirements. \n• Promote a culture of accountability by requiring formal acknowledgement of security obligations and by \nlinking compliance to incentives and disciplinary measures, where appropriate. \n• Develop and maintain a centralized repository of training records, acknowledgements, certifications and \ncontractual clauses to demonstrate compliance and facilitate audits. \n• Require suppliers and service providers to designate responsible contacts for cybersecurity and \nencourage or mandate participation in relevant security briefings or training programmes provided by the \nentity. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• List of employees whose roles require specific security skills and their assignment to roles. \n• Documented evidence of regular training sessions on security of network and information system s for \nemployees, direct suppliers and service providers, wherever applicable. This includes attendance records, \ntraining materials and feedback forms. \n• Signed acknowledgements from employees, direct suppliers and service providers, wherever applicable, \nconfirming they have read, understood and agreed to comply with the policy. \n• Reports from internal or external audits assessing the understanding and implementation of security \nresponsibilities among employees, direct suppliers and service providers, wherever applicable. \n• Inclusion of security responsibilities, where relevant, in employee performance reviews and evaluations. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n123 \n \n• Contracts with direct suppliers and service providers that include clauses on security responsibilities and \ncompliance with the entity’s policies or written justifications by the direct supplier or service provider in \ncases where these clauses do not exist in the contract. \n• Certifications or attestations of cybersecurity skills from nationally recognized or accredited bodies \nconfirming that a person fulfils specific requirements regarding cybersecurity knowledge and skills.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-c993fbeda506", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "10.1 HUMAN RESOURCES SECURITY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 10.1 HUMAN RESOURCES SECURITY", "token_count": 894 }, { "chunk_id": "4d21a2b786d9b062393e291f42b0c02f", "text": "10.1.2. The requirement referred to in point 10.1.1. shall include the following:\n\n(a) mechanisms to ensure that all employees, direct suppliers and service providers, wherever applicable, understand \nand follow the standard cyber hygiene practices that the entities apply pursuant to point 8.1.; \n(b) mechanisms to ensure that all users with administrative or privileged access are aware of and act in accordance \nwith their roles, responsibilities and authorities; \n(c) mechanisms to ensure that members of management bodies understand and act in accordance with their role, \nresponsibilities and authorities regarding network and information system security; \n(d) mechanisms for hiring personnel qualified for the respective roles, such as reference checks, vetting procedures, \nvalidation of certifications or written tests. \nGUIDANCE \n• I mplement regular awareness raising on cyber hygiene practices for users, tailored to different roles and \nresponsibilities (Annex to the regulation, point 8.1). Wherever applicable, r equire employees of direct \nsuppliers and service providers, to follow similar awareness raising on cyber hygiene via contractual \nclauses. \n• Communicate clear and concise cyber hygiene practices for users to all employees, suppliers and service \nproviders. Require acknowledgement of receipt and understanding (Annex to the regulation, point 8.1). \n• Consider specialised training for users with administrative or privileged access, focusing on their specific \nresponsibilities (Annex to the regulation, point 8.2). \n• Establish performance metrics related to security responsibilities and include them in management \nevaluations. \n• Hold regular briefings for members of management bodies on the importance of network and information \nsystem security, their specific responsibilities and the potential impact of incidents (section 8.2). \n• Conduct thorough reference checks, where appropriate, to verify the candidate’s previous experience and \nperformance in similar roles. \n• Consider vetting procedures , i ncluding background checks (section 10.2), to ensure the candidate’s \nsuitability for the role. \n• Validate any relevant certifications claimed by the candidate, to ensure they are current and legitimate. \n• Use written tests or practical assessments to evaluate the candidate’s knowledge and skills related to \nnetwork and information system security. \n• Use interview panels , where appropriate, that also include security experts, to assess the candidate’s \ntechnical and behavioural competencies. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Training and awareness raising material such as videos, slides, emails, newsletters, posters and intranet \nannouncements. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n124 \n \n• Documented records showing that all users with administrative or privileged access were properly \ninformed and are aware of and are following their network and information security roles, responsibilities \nand authorities. \n• Contractual agreements, the policy on the security of network an d information systems, terms and \nconditions, code of conduct and other documentation confirming that all users have understood and are \nfollowing the standard cyber hygiene practices for users (signed employment contracts and any proof of \nemployees having been informed of their responsibilities relating to network and information security). \n• Records of security training sessions provided to employees, including attendance logs and training \nschedules. \n• Evidence, for example attendance certificates where relevant, that suppliers and service providers receive \nsecurity training relevant to their roles. \n• Mechanisms for hiring qualified personnel (e.g. reference check, validation of certifications and written \ntests) in place. \n• U se of relevant cybersecurity frameworks and standards along with widely recognised quality \nmanagement and capability maturity models and standards. \n \n10.1.3. The relevant entities shall review the assignment of personnel to specific roles as referred to in point 1.2., as \nwell as their commitment of human resources in that regard, at planned intervals and at least annually. They shall update \nthe assignment where necessary. \nGUIDANCE \n• Set up a formal schedule for reviewing personnel assignments and resource commitments. This should \noccur at least annually. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Up-to-date list of employees and their assignment to roles. \n• Records of the review process, including the criteria used, the findings and any changes made.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e82d983b7139", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "10.1.2. The requirement referred to in point 10.1.1. shall include the following:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 10.1.2. The requirement referred to in point 10.1.1. shall include the following:", "token_count": 1138 }, { "chunk_id": "942d812a17d43689b5ed1c5f808a98dc", "text": "10.2 VERIFICATION OF BACKGROUND\n\n10.2.1. The relevant entities shall ensure to the extent feasible verification of the background of their employees and \nwhere applicable of direct suppliers and service providers in accordance with point 5.1.4, if necessary for their role, \nresponsibilities and authorisations. \nGUIDANCE \n• Identify which roles, responsibilities and authorities require verification of background, based on the criteria \nin point 10.2.2 (a) of the Annex to the regulation. \n• Perform background verification on employees and, where applicable, direct suppliers and service \nproviders in accordance with point 5.1.4 (c) of the Annex to the regulation. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented background verification process. \n• Results of background verification on employees and, where applicable, direct suppliers and service \nproviders in accordance with point 5.1.4 (c). \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n125", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-e0e1095a2445", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "10.2 VERIFICATION OF BACKGROUND", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 10.2 VERIFICATION OF BACKGROUND", "token_count": 240 }, { "chunk_id": "39ef7e5cb8ea9b5f9724c2171eadc0d7", "text": "10.2.2. For the purpose of point 10.2.1., the relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) put in place criteria, which set out which roles, responsibilities and authorities shall only be exercised by persons \nwhose background has been verified; \n(b) ensure that verification referred to in point 10.2.1 is performed on these persons before they start exercising these \nroles, responsibilities and authorities, which shall take into consideration the applicable laws, regulations and ethics in \nproportion to the business requirements, the asset classification as referred to in point 12.1. and the network and \ninformation systems to be accessed and the perceived risks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Where applicable, define criteria for roles, responsibilities and authorities that will be exercised only by \npersons who have undergone background verification. An indicative, non-exhaustive list is the following: \no executives and senior management, \no roles with access to sensitive information, \no roles with financial responsibilities, \no roles involving procurement and vendor management, \no roles that grant access to physical assets or are responsible for physical security. \n• Define criteria and limitations for background verification (e.g. who is eligible to screen people, and how, \nwhen and why verification reviews are carried out). \n• For background verification, consider checking the criminal records of the person concerned with regard \nto offences that would be relevant to a specific position. \n• Ensure that checks of criminal records align with legal and regulatory requirements (e.g. national (labour) \nlaws and the GDPR). \n• Collect and handle information on job candidates, taking into consideration any applicable laws, \nregulations and ethics, including the protection of personal data. This may include collecting professional \nreferences. \n• Consider screening requirements in the contractual agreements between the entity and the direct \nsuppliers and service providers in cases of personnel contracted with an external supplier. \n• Periodically repeat verification to confirm the ongoing suitability of personnel, depending on the criticality \nof a person’s role, responsibilities and authorities. \n• Entities should be permitted to rely on background checks of contractors employed by a third-party talent \nagency with which the entity covered has contracts for performing services. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Records of an analysis conducted to determine which roles, responsibilities and authorities require \nbackground verification. \n• Guidance for employees about when/how to perform background verification. \n• Records of completed verifications of professional references for employees or, where applicable, for \ndirect suppliers and service providers. \n• Signed consent forms from employees or job candidates, confirming their agreement to undergo \nbackground verification. \n• Documentation of follow -up actions taken in response to any issues or discrepancies identified during \nbackground verification. \n• Agreements with third-parties that perform background verification services, if used, to ensure they comply \nwith legal and policy requirements. \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n126 \n \n10.2.3. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update the policy at planned intervals and update it \nwhere necessary. \nGUIDANCE \n• Where necessary, review and update background verification procedure at least annually. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Records of background verification for roles requiring ongoing clearance. \n• Review comments or change logs of the procedure.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-5f21bff454f0", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "10.2.2. For the purpose of point 10.2.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 10.2.2. For the purpose of point 10.2.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 907 }, { "chunk_id": "9903870d9ce6b256b582eafd83ba691f", "text": "10.3 TERMINATION OR CHANGE OF EMPLOYMENT PROCEDURES\n\n10.3.1. The relevant entities shall ensure that network and information system security responsibilities and duties that \nremain valid after termination or change of employment of their employees are contractually defined and enforced. \nGUIDANCE \n• Include specific clauses in employment contracts that outline the ongoing security responsibilities and \nduties of employees after their employment ends or their role changes. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documents, such as terms and conditions of employment, contracts or agreements, outlining \nresponsibilities and duties still valid after termination of employment or contract. \n \n10.3.2. For the purpose of point 10.3.1., the relevant entities shall include in the individual’s terms and conditions of \nemployment, contract or agreement the responsibilities and duties that are still valid after termination of employment or \ncontract, such as confidentiality clauses. \nGUIDANCE \n• Ensure these clauses cover the protection of confidential information, return of company property and \nrestrictions on accessing the entity’s network and information systems. \n• R evoke access to network and information systems in a timely manner upon termination or role change. \n• Identify and document all assets to be returned upon termination or change of employment. \n• After a change of employment, brief and inform personnel on the procedures in place. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Records confirming the timely return of the entity’s assets. \n• Records confirming the timely revocation of access rights. \n• Copies of written notifications to the employee about the termination of or change in employment status. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Identify and transfer to another individual network and information security roles and responsibilities held \nby any individual who leaves the organisation. \n• W here deemed reasonably necessary , conduct thorough exit interviews to remind departing employees \nof their ongoing security responsibilities. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n127 \n \n• C ollect company property and revoke access to systems. \n• Monitor for any unauthorized access attempts by former employees. Use security tools to detect and \nrespond to suspicious activities. Maintain logs of access attempts and investigate any anomalies. \n• Regularly review and update policies related to post -employment security responsibilities to ensure they \nremain effective and aligned with current legal and regulatory requirements. Keep a record of changes \nand ensure that it is up to date. \n• Take into account changes or past incidents when reviewing the process \n• Involve legal and human resources ( HR) departments in the review process to ensure comprehensive \ncoverage. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• R ecords of all contractual agreements, non- disclosure agreements, exit interviews and access \nrevocations, and any legal action taken. \n• Documentation showing that the process is reviewed regularly and updated as necessary. \n• Evidence that the employee’s access to the entity’s systems and facilities has been revoked or altered in \naccordance with a process. \n• Documentation of the process for personnel changes, including responsibilities for managing changes, \ndescription of rights of access and possession of assets for each role, and procedures for briefing and \ntraining personnel in new roles (e.g. standardised checklists used during the termination process to ensure \nall necessary steps are taken).", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-db508b0a4c3b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "10.3 TERMINATION OR CHANGE OF EMPLOYMENT PROCEDURES", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 10.3 TERMINATION OR CHANGE OF EMPLOYMENT PROCEDURES", "token_count": 883 }, { "chunk_id": "2de68009a534a4575ff9f45d5f6427a6", "text": "10.4 DISCIPLINARY PROCESS\n\n10.4.1. The relevant entities shall establish, communicate and maintain a disciplinary process for handling violations of \nnetwork and information system security policies. The process shall take into consideration relevant legal, statutory, \ncontractual and business requirements. \nGUIDANCE \n• Make sure that the process holds employees accountable for violations of the network and information \nsystem security policies. \n• Involve human resources in implementing the disciplinary process, ensuring it aligns with legal and \nregulatory requirements (e.g. national labour laws and the GDPR). \n• Communicate and raise awareness of the process among employees. \n• Protect the identity of individuals subject to disciplinary action , where possible, in line with applicable \nrequirements. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Disciplinary process documentation outlining the types of violations that may be subject to disciplinary \nactions, and what steps to take when a violation occurs. \n• Evidence that the policy has been communicated to all employees, which could include email records, \nmeeting minutes or training session materials. \n• Records of any violations of the network and information system security policies that have occurred and \nthe corresponding disciplinary actions taken, demonstrating adherence to the disciplinary process. \nExamples of such records may include interviews with employees, witness statements, e-mails, \npaperwork, digital records, system logs and phone records. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n128 \n \n10.4.2. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update the disciplinary process at planned intervals \nand when necessary due to legal changes or significant changes to operations or risks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Regularly review and update the disciplinary process at planned intervals and promptly when legal \nchanges or significant operational or risk changes occur. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Records of reviews and updates showing that the disciplinary process is reviewed regularly and updated \nas necessary. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• I nclude the disciplinary process for handling violations of network and information system security policies \nin the entity’s overall disciplinary process, if available. \n• Recognize that deliberate violations of the policy on the security of network and information systems may \nrequire immediate actions. \n• Do not initiate the disciplinary process without verifying that a violation of network and information system \nsecurity policies has occurred. \n• Consider the following factors for the process: \no the nature (who, what, when, how) and gravity of the violation and its consequences; \no whether the offence was intentional (malicious) or unintentional (accidental); \no whether this is a first or repeated offence; \no whether or not the employee who committed the violation was properly trained. \n• Use the process as a deterrent to prevent employees from violating the network and information system \nsecurity policies. \n• Reward individuals who demonstrate excellent behaviour regarding network and information security as a \nmeans of promoting and encouraging good behaviour. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Disciplinary process documentation outlining the types of violations that may be subject to disciplinary \nactions, and what steps to take when a violation occurs. \nACCESS \nCONTROL \nChapter 11\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n130", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-5aeaaf281410", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "10.4 DISCIPLINARY PROCESS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 10.4 DISCIPLINARY PROCESS", "token_count": 876 }, { "chunk_id": "70bd448d77744476243b4ec548d270d1", "text": "11.1 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY\n\n11.1.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2), point (i) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall establish, \ndocument and implement logical and physical access control policies for the access to their network and information \nsystems, based on business requirements as well as network and information system security requirements. \nGUIDANCE \n• Implement and maintain logical and physical access restrictions to network and information system \nbased on access-control policies that take into account industry good practices. \n• Ensure that these policies are documented, communicated to all relevant stakeholders and include clear \nguidelines on the appropriate use of access privileges. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Access control policy document or documents outlining the access control requirements, procedures and \nresponsibilities.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-7241ae406c6d", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.1 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.1 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY", "token_count": 218 }, { "chunk_id": "db264e059bdde1a465d70d9257fb77e8", "text": "11.1.2. The policies referred to in point 11.1.1. shall:\n\n(a) address access by persons, including staff, visitors and external entities such as suppliers and service providers; \n(b) address access by network and information system processes; \n(c) ensure that access is only granted to users that have been adequately authenticated. \nGUIDANCE \n• Implement access control rules by defining and mapping appropriate access rights and restrictions to \nhuman users or network and information system processes (e.g. a machine, device or a service). To \nsimplify access control management, assign specific roles to groups. \no Access control rules can be implemented in different granularit ies, ranging from covering whole \nnetworks or systems to specific data fields and can also consider properties , such as user \nlocation or the type of network connection that is used for access. \no Use business requirements and risk assessment results to define which access control rules are \napplied and which granularity is required. \n• Take into account the following when defining and implementing access control rules: \no consistency between access rights and asset classification; \no consistency between access rights and physical perimeter security needs and requirements; \no consideration of all types of available connections in distributed environments so entities are only \nprovided with access to associated assets, including networks and network services, that they \nare authorized to use; \no consideration of how elements or factors relevant to dynamic access control can be reflected. \n• Develop documented procedures and defined responsibilities to support the access control rules. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Access control policy document outlining the access control requirements, procedures and \nresponsibilities. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n131 \n \n• User access records showing the list of users and their corresponding levels of access to various network \nand information systems. \n• Authentication protocols, meaning documentation of the authentication methods in place, such as MFA. \n• Authorization mechanisms with details on how permissions are granted, reviewed and revoked, ensuring \nthat access rights are in line with users’ roles, responsibilities and authorities. \n• Access logs that record user access activities, which can be used to track and audit user behaviour within \nthe system in the event of suspected misconduct. \n• Access rights review records showing alignment with asset classifications. \n• Records of access control assessments that align access rights with physical security requirements. \n• Network diagrams showing access control measures for different connection types and network access \ncontrol policies. \n• Logs showing dynamic access control decisions based on user behaviour or environment factors \n \n11.1.3. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update the policies at planned intervals and when \nsignificant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks occur. \nGUIDANCE \n• R eview the policies at least annually. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Past incident reports with records of any security incidents related to access control, including \nunauthorized access attempts and the responses to such events. \n• Change management records of any changes made to access rights, showing adherence to the policy \nduring modifications. \n• R ecords of reviews and updates showing that the policies are reviewed regularly and updated as \nnecessary. \n• Reports from internal or external audits that assess the effectiveness of and compliance with the access \ncontrol policy. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider the two overarching principles most frequently used in the context of access control: \no need-to-know: an entity is only granted access to the information that it requires to perform its \ntasks and in line with the asset classification levels of point 12.1 of the Annex to the regulation \n(different tasks or roles mean different need-to -know information and hence different access \nprofiles); \no need-to-use: an entity is only assigned access to information technology infrastructure where a \nclear need is present. \n• Consider the following when specifying access control rules: \no establishing rules based on the premise of least privilege ( ‘everything is generally forbidden \nunless expressly permitted’) rather than the weaker rule (‘everything is generally permitted unless \nexpressly forbidden’); \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n132 \n \no changes in user permissions that are initiated automatically by the network and information \nsystem and those initiated by a system administrator; \no when to define and regularly review the approval. \n• Consider ways to implement access control, such as mandatory access control (MAC), discretionary \naccess control (DAC), role-based access control (RBAC ) and attribute- based access control (ABAC) \ndepending on the business needs of the organisation. \n• Take into account the fact that access control rules can also contain dynamic elements ( e.g. a function \nthat evaluates past accesses or specific environmental values). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Access control policy document outlining the access control requirements, procedures and \nresponsibilities. \n• Access reviews showing adherence to need-to-know and need-to-use principles. \n• Change management records of any changes made to access rights, showing adherence to the policy \nduring modifications. \n• Access control system configurations showing the adoption of MAC, DAC, RBAC or ABAC depending on \nbusiness needs.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-bd9192b586e6", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.1.2. The policies referred to in point 11.1.1. shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.1.2. The policies referred to in point 11.1.1. shall:", "token_count": 1416 }, { "chunk_id": "7e2f2f2ed0d935940465506147509324", "text": "11.2 MANAGEMENT OF ACCESS RIGHTS\n\n11.2.1. The relevant entities shall provide, modify, remove and document access rights to network and information \nsystems in accordance with the access control policy referred to in point 11.1.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-cc6267757405", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.2 MANAGEMENT OF ACCESS RIGHTS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.2 MANAGEMENT OF ACCESS RIGHTS", "token_count": 57 }, { "chunk_id": "533f9dcbc0ad892d9a13768e3f5afab8", "text": "11.2.2. The relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) assign and revoke access rights based on the principles of need-to-know, least privilege and separation of duties; \n(b) ensure that access rights are modified accordingly upon termination or change of employment; \n(c) ensure that access to network and information systems is authorised by the relevant persons; \n(d) ensure that access rights appropriately address third-party access, such as visitors, suppliers and service providers, \nin particular by limiting access rights in scope and in duration; \n(e) maintain a register of access rights granted; \n(f) apply logging to the management of access rights. \nGUIDANCE \n• Ensure each user only has access to information necessary for their role (‘need-to-know’). \n• Restrict user permissions to the minimum necessary for their duties (‘least privilege’). Regularly review \nand adjust access rights as needed. \n• D etermine which duties and areas of responsibility need to be segregated. Establish and follow a process \nfor requesting and approving access, preferably automated. The process should: \no cover granting access rights to assets upon the new hire or role change of a user; \no obtain authorization from the owner of the asset , s eparate approval for access rights by \nmanagement bodies can also be appropriate; \no ensure that access rights are activated (e.g. by service providers) only after authorization \nprocedures are successfully completed; \no consider the business requirements and the entity’s access control policy; \no consider segregation of duties, including segregating the roles of approval and implementation \nof the access rights and separation of conflicting roles; \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n133", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-00c18994197e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.2.2. The relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.2.2. The relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 437 }, { "chunk_id": "52ce0b3161b14b1e40bd9d9614b0d6fa", "text": "o verify that the level of access granted is in accordance with the access control policy and is \nconsistent with other information security requirements such as segregation of duties; \no consider giving temporary access rights for a time and revoking them at the expir y date, in \nparticular for temporary personnel or temporary access required by personnel. \n• Establish and follow a process, preferably automated, for revoking access to assets. The process should: \no timely d isable accounts upon the termination, rights revocation or role change of a user, as \nneeded; disabling accounts, instead of deleting accounts, may be necessary to preserve audit \ntrails; \no modify the access rights of users who have changed roles or jobs; \no remove or adjust access rights, which can be done by remov ing, revoking or replacing keys, \nauthentication information, identification cards or subscriptions. \no where feasible, enable different components or services to share information (signals) about \naccess revocation in a timely manner. \n• Limit third-party access based on need and duration. Use temporary access accounts with expiry dates \nand regularly review third-party access rights. \n• Ensure third parties acknowledge their access responsibilities and obligations. \n• Where appropriate (90), keep a detailed and up-to-date central record (register or database) of all granted \naccess rights, including user names, roles, permissions and dates of access changes. \n• Establish and maintain an inventory of the authentication and authorization systems, including those \nhosted on-site or with a remote service provider. \n• Implement logging for all access rights management activities. Logs should include details of who granted \nor modified access, when and what changes were made. \n• Minimise the use of generic and shared accounts and ensur e users can always be identified for their \nactions within ICT systems. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Clear definitions of user roles and their corresponding access rights. \n• A central record (register or database) detailing all granted access rights, including user names, roles, \naccess levels and dates of access changes. \n• Approved access request forms supporting entries in the access rights register. Granting, withdrawals and \nchanges of access should be appropriately documented and visible in the register and consistent with the \nprocess for granting and withdrawing access rights (Annex to the regulation, point 11.2.2). It is also \nimportant that archived backups are properly secured to prevent unauthorised access. It should be \nremembered that in the case of these copies, excessive permissions should be limited and controlled. \n• Periodic access reviews meaning evidence of regular reviews of user access rights to ensure they remain \nappropriate over time. \n• System logs showing all access rights management activities (creation, modification and deletion). \n• Audit trail logs demonstrating access rights management, including timestamps, user IDs and actions \nperformed. \n• Records of incidents related to access rights management, including unauthorized access attempts and \ncorrective actions.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-00c18994197e", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.2.2. The relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.2.2. The relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 791 }, { "chunk_id": "b15235b85ec05dfba24e3be87e57c415", "text": "(90) Implementing a unique centralised database would require major interfacing work with systems that, in many cases, were not designed for it. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n134", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-00c18994197e", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.2.2. The relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.2.2. The relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 52 }, { "chunk_id": "45a8dd4a740cf874ff33f672dec5484b", "text": "• Evidence of systems enforcing access controls, such as identity and access management (IAM) solutions. \n• Reports from internal or external compliance audits verifying alignment with the access control policy. \n• Results of physical inspections of access control systems and their use, if applicable.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-00c18994197e", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.2.2. The relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.2.2. The relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 75 }, { "chunk_id": "3aad2cbdbe2d8adcfbe6dfae641628ac", "text": "11.2.3. The relevant entities shall review access rights at planned intervals and shall modify them based on \norganisational changes. The relevant entities shall document the results of the review including the necessary changes \nof access rights. \nGUIDANCE \n• Regularly review physical and logical access rights, taking into account: \no users’ access rights after termination or change of employment; \no authorisations for privileged access rights. \n• Review and update the inventory of the authentication and authorization systems regularly. \n• Perform access control reviews of assets to verify that all privileges are authorised on a recurring schedule \nat least annually. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• A central record (register or database) detailing all granted access rights, including user names, roles, \naccess levels and dates of access changes. \n• Approved access request forms supporting entries in the access rights register. \n• Periodic access reviews meaning evidence of regular reviews of user access rights to ensure they remain \nappropriate over time. \n• System logs showing all access rights management activities (creation, modification and deletion). \n• Audit trail logs demonstrating access rights management, including timestamps, user IDs and actions \nperformed. \n• Records of incidents related to access rights management, including unauthorized access attempts and \ncorrective actions. \n• Reports from internal or external compliance audits verifying alignment with the access control policy. \n• Physical inspection results of access control systems and their use, if applicable. \n• R ecords of r eviews and updates showing that access rights are reviewed regularly and updated as \nnecessary. \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Centralize access control for all assets through a directory service or single sign on (SSO) provider, where \nsupported. \n• Implement a segregation of duties matrix and ensure that it is updated dynamically by automating how \nchanges are handled in response to role assignments or task changes (e.g. integration with access control, \nIAM or enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Evidence of a centralized directory service or SSO provider to manage access control , supported by \ndocumentation, logs, audit reports and records. \n• Segregation of duties matrix .\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n135", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-00c18994197e", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.2.2. The relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.2.2. The relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 598 }, { "chunk_id": "1ea33c336ea1d74e0adb7d623977b4ca", "text": "11.3 PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS AND SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNTS\n\n11.3.1. The relevant entities shall maintain policies for management of privileged accounts and system administration \naccounts as part of the access control policy referred to in point 11.1. \nGUIDANCE \n• Allocate privileged access rights to users as needed and, on an event -by-event basis in line with the \naccess control policy referred to in point 11.1 of the Annex to the regulation (that is, only to individuals with \nthe necessary authority to carry out activities that require privileged access and based on the minimum \nrequirement for their functional roles). \n• Identify users who need privileged access (91) to a network and information system (e.g. operating \nsystems, database management systems and applications). This should include any privileged physical \naccess to, e.g. cryptographic codes, keys or devices and in line with point 13.3 of the Annex to the \nregulation. \n• Where appropriate, maintain an authorization process and a record of all allocated privileged access \nrights, consistent with the process for granting and revoking access rights (Annex to the regulation, \npoint 11.2.2). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Clear policy on privileged account usage and access rules for privileged accounts. \n• List of users with privileged access and what systems they can access. \n• Documented approval records for granting privileged access. \n• Logs or records of access reviews and revocations. \n• Role-based access matrix showing who needs what access.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-10c2f265aa5b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.3 PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS AND SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNTS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.3 PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS AND SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNTS", "token_count": 383 }, { "chunk_id": "7f843e954ac91fa56cf88da6469524a7", "text": "11.3.2. The policies referred to in point 11.3.1. shall:\n\n(a) establish strong identification, authentication such as multi -factor authentication and authorisation procedures for \nprivileged accounts and system administration accounts; \n(b) set up specific accounts to be used for system administration operations exclusively, such as installation, \nconfiguration, management or maintenance; \n(c) individualise and restrict system administration privileges to the highest extent possible, \n(d) provide that system administration accounts are only used to connect to system administration systems. \nGUIDANCE \n• Introduce higher authentication requirements for privileged access rights, such as re-authentication or \nauthentication step-up before using privileged access rights. \n• Define and implement expiry requirements for privileged access rights, where appropriate. \n• I n the absence of a system that allows all uses to be attributed to an individual with certainty , establish \nspecific rules to avoid the use of generic administration user IDs (e.g. ‘root’) and manage and protect the \nauthentication information of such identities. \n• Grant temporary privileged access only for the time necessary to implement approved changes or activities \n(e.g. for maintenance activities), rather than permanently granting privileged access rights. \n \n \n91 “Privileged access rights are access rights provided to an identity, a role or a process that allows the performance of activities that typical users or \nprocesses cannot perform. System administrator roles typically require privileged access rights.” ISO/IEC 27002, 8.2. Privileged access rights. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n136 \n \no C onsider the frequency of system administration operations: daily tasks (e.g. backups and email \nrouting) versus weekly or monthly tasks (e.g. reviewing memory and disk space). \n• Log all privileged access for audit purposes; \n• Assign separate identities with privileged access rights to individual users, rather than sharing or linking \nidentities. Group identities for easier management if needed. \n• Use identities with privileged access rights exclusively for administrative tasks, not for day-to-day general \ntasks such as checking email or accessing the web. Where feasible ( 92), separate privileged identities \nshould be assigned for administrative tasks. \n• Ensure users are aware of their privileged access rights or when they are in privileged access mode, for \nexample using specific user identities, user interface settings or equipment. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Measures for privileged access control and monitoring for privileged accounts, including granting and \nrevoking privileged access rights. \n• Access assignment records showing how access rights are initially granted, based on job roles and \nresponsibilities. \n• Clear definitions of user roles and the corresponding access rights associated with each role. \n• Audit trail and monitoring logs that capture the use of access rights, including any unauthorized access \nattempts and actions taken in response. \n \n11.3.3. The relevant entities shall review access rights of privileged accounts and system administration accounts at \nplanned intervals and be modified based on organisational changes and shall document the results of the review, \nincluding the necessary changes of access rights. \nGUIDANCE \n• Verify whether the duties, roles, responsibilities and competences of system administrators still qualify \nthem for working with privileged access rights. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• R ecords of r eviews and updates showing that access rights are reviewed regularly and updated as \nnecessary. \n• Periodic access reviews meaning evidence of regular reviews of user access rights to ensure they remain \nappropriate over time. \n• Change management logs of changes to access rights, reflecting any alterations due to role changes or \ntermination of employment. \n• Compliance audits with reports from internal or external audits verifying that the management of access \nrights aligns with the policy and regulatory requirements. \n \n \n \n(92) I n environments such as Microsoft 365 where enforcing separate identities may conflict with Conditional Access, device compliance or session \ncontrols, privileged users may use a single identity provided that some additional compensating measures are in place e.g. MFA, just-in-time \naccess, session logging, context-aware controls (e.g. location, device compliance, app enforcement) etc. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n137", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-de12d7ec0e0b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.3.2. The policies referred to in point 11.3.1. shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.3.2. The policies referred to in point 11.3.1. shall:", "token_count": 1150 }, { "chunk_id": "9ab8624e4ac7a7e63f83ff6cc7e3839c", "text": "11.4 ADMINISTRATION SYSTEMS\n\n11.4.1. The relevant entities shall restrict and control the use of system administration systems in accordance with the \naccess control policy referred to in point 11.1. \nGUIDANCE \n• Access to system administration systems must be strictly controlled in line with the access control policy. \nOnly authorized personnel should be granted such access and all activity must be logged and regularly \nreviewed. \n• Measures should be in place to detect unauthorized access and ensure accountability through audit trails \nand periodic security assessments. \n• Access logs from system administration systems should be integrated into the entity's centralized log \nmanagement or SIEM solution. Automated alerts must be configured to detect and notify of any suspicious \nor unauthorized access attempts, ensuring a timely response and ongoing compliance with security \npolicies. \n• The retention period for logs must be clearly defined based on business needs, legal requirements and \nnetwork and information security objectives. \n• Logs should capture relevant events necessary for security monitoring, incident detection and forensic \nanalysis, such as access attempts, administrative actions and system changes. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Regularly maintained logs that track access to system administration systems (93). \n• Audit reports from internal or external security audits that assess compliance with the policy.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-1775089b00ec", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.4 ADMINISTRATION SYSTEMS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.4 ADMINISTRATION SYSTEMS", "token_count": 361 }, { "chunk_id": "375fa87ed234ffd502dcb689012d3a5d", "text": "11.4.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) only use system administration systems for system administration purposes and not for any other operations; \n(b) separate logically such systems from application software not used for system administrative purposes, \n(c) protect access to system administration systems through authentication and encryption. \nGUIDANCE \n• Implement strict access controls to ensure that administrative systems are used exclusive ly for their \nintended purpose. For instance, only allow authorised personnel with specific roles ( e.g. system \nadministrators and IT staff) access to system administration systems. \n• Physically or logically isolate administrative systems from other application servers , for example use \nnetwork segmentation to create separate zones for system administration systems and other systems, \nsuch as application servers. If applicable, physically inspect server racks to ensure separation. \n• Require strong authentication mechanisms such as MFA for accessing system administration systems. \n• Encrypt communication channels (e.g. secure shell protocol, hypertext transfer protocol secure) to protect \ndata in transit to and from system administration systems. \n• Encrypt sensitive configuration files and credentials stored on system administration systems. \n \n \n(93) Administration systems refer to the tools and processes used to manage, monitor and maintain the hardware, software and network components of \nan entity’s IT infrastructure. Typical key functions of administration systems include (indicative, non-exhaustive list): system monitoring, \nconfiguration management, security management, user management and back-up and recovery. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n138 \n \n• Ensure that application protocols are securely implemented. In addition, verify that any SSO or federation \nprotocols are correctly implemented and conform to their specifications. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Regularly maintained logs that track access to system administration systems. \n• Network segmentation documentation indicating how system administration systems are logically or \nphysically separated from other systems. \n• Documented authentication methods used to secure access to administration systems. \n• Information on encryption protocols applied to protect data transmitted to and from system administration \nsystems. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider using a centralized privileged access management (PAM) solution. \n• Consider using a cloud access security broker (CASB) to enhance the visibility of, control over and the \nsecurity of cloud service usage. \n• Regularly audit system logs to monitor usage patterns and identify any unauthorised activities. \n• Train personnel in the proper use of system administration systems. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Regularly maintained logs that track access to administration systems. \n• Incident response records of any incidents related to system administration system misuse or \nunauthorized access. \n• User training records meaning evidence that personnel have been trained in the proper use of system \nadministration systems, for example training materials, attendance records or completion certificates.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3041e56f092c", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.4.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.4.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 813 }, { "chunk_id": "54ffee57bea5f433f4a7c5cdc3b2ced8", "text": "11.5 IDENTIFICATION\n\n11.5.1. The relevant entities shall manage the full life cycle of identities of network and information systems and their \nusers. \nGUIDANCE \n• Establish and maintain an inventory of all identities managed in the entity. \no The inventory should include both user and privileged or system admini strator identities. The \ninventory should contain, as a minimum, the person’s name, username, start/stop dates and the \nlevel of privileges for each identity. \no The inventory should also include all service identities and have these identity records as a \nminimum including department owner, review date, purpose and the level of privileges for each \nservice identity. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented policy or procedure related to identity management, if available. \n• Reports from internal or external audits v erifying that the management of identities aligns with the policy \nand regulatory requirements. \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n139", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-c85f5aef195b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.5 IDENTIFICATION", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.5 IDENTIFICATION", "token_count": 250 }, { "chunk_id": "e7ec18299567f682de5a826765d2347e", "text": "11.5.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) set up unique identities for network and information systems and their users; \n(b) link the identity of users to a single person; \n(c) ensure oversight of identities of network and information systems; \n(d) apply logging to the management of identities. \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider that providing or revoking access to assets is usually a multi-step procedure: \no confirming the business requirements for an identity to be established; \no verifying the identity of an entity before allocating them a logical identity; \no establishing an identity; \no configuring and activating the identity, which also includes configuration and initial setup of \nrelated authentication services; and \no providing or revoking the identity’s specific access rights, based on appropriate authorization or \nentitlement decisions (section 11.2). \n• Make sure that identities assigned to network and information systems (non-human users) are subject to \nappropriately segregated approval and independent ongoing oversight. \n• Apply logging to the management of identities in cooperation with human resource security (section 10.1) \nwhere possible. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Identity records, for example user profiles with unique identifiers (e.g. usernames and employee IDs) and \nevidence of linking these identities to specific individuals (e.g. HR records). \n• Logs of reviews or approvals for identities for network and information systems and their users. \n• Logs or reports related to identity management. \n• Evidence of the systems in place that enforce access control, such as IAM solutions. \n \n11.5.3. The relevant entities shall only permit identities assigned to multiple persons, such as shared identities, where \nthey are necessary for business or operational reasons and are subject to an explicit approval process and \ndocumentation. The relevant entities shall take identities assigned to multiple persons into account in the cybersecurity \nrisk management framework referred to in point 2.1. \nGUIDANCE \n• Shared identities should be avoided unless strictly necessary for business or operational reasons (94). In \nsuch cases, their use must be formally justified, ex plicitly approved and properly documented. Examples \nof technical, procedural and governance controls to enhance their protection include (indicative, non-\nexhaustive list): \no MFA enforcement; \no Least privilege concept enforcement; \no Time-bound or just-in-time access; \n \n \n(94) Wherever possible, the organization shall implement Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to assign privileges to individual identities based on \ndefined business or operational functions. RBAC must be used to avoid the creation of shared accounts unless a technical or operational constraint \nmakes their use unavoidable. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n140 \n \no Checking out the shared credentials through a tool which logs who accessed the identity and \nwhen. If check-out is not possible, consider using privileged session recording or proxy -based \naccess auditing; \no Session attribution techniques to link shared identity use back to individual users ; \no Logging; \no Credential vaulting with auto-rotation; \no Prohibition of storing shared credentials in personal files, emails or messaging platforms; \no Network segmentation so that shared account use is limited to isolated network segments or \nvirtual environments; and \no Mandatory training on acceptable use and accountability. \n• These identities should be clearly recorded in the cybersecurity risk management framework, with \nappropriate controls in place to mitigate associated risks, including enhanced monitoring and \naccountability measures. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Approval records for exceptions. \n \n11.5.4. The relevant entities shall regularly review the identities for network and information systems and their users \nand, if no longer needed, deactivate them without delay. \nGUIDANCE \n• Verify that all active identities are reviewed . This can be done on a recurring schedule, as a minimum \nquarterly, or more frequently. However, for micro-sized entities, this can be done annually. \n• Disable or remove, in a timely fashion, identities that they are no longer required, for example delete or \ndisable any dormant identities after a predefined period of days of inactivity, where supported. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• R ecords of reviews and updates showing that identities are reviewed regularly and updated as necessary. \n• Records of changes to identities, reflecting any alterations due to role changes or termination of \nemployment or inactivity. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Centralize identity management through a directory or identity service. \n• Where appropriate, define different levels of identification required based on role, use or need. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Evidence of the systems in place, such as IAM solutions. \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n141", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0fe99a9c051d", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.5.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.5.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 1250 }, { "chunk_id": "3ccc522f9ff08829054ab297163e8bfd", "text": "11.6 AUTHENTICATION\n\n11.6.1. The relevant entities shall implement secure authentication procedures and technologies based on access \nrestrictions and the policy on access control. \nGUIDANCE \n• Authentication technologies are methods used to verify the identity of users, devices or systems before \ngranting access to resources. Here are some common authentication technologies (indicative, non-exhaustive \nlist): \no password-based authentication, \no passkeys, \no two-factor authentication, \no MFA ( 95), \no biometric authentication, \no token-based authentication, such as a one-time passcode (OTP), \no smart cards, \no Fast Identity Online 2 security keys, \no certificate-based authentication, \no SSO, \no OpenID Connect. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Access control policy documents outlining secure authentication procedures and technologies. \n• Logs from authentication systems showing successful and failed authentication attempts, which \ndemonstrate secure implementation. \n• Evidence of the systems in place that enforce access controls, such as IAM solutions. \n• Internal or external audit reports verifying the implementation of secure authentication procedures aligned \nwith the access control policy. \n• D ocumentation that shows the use of secure authentication and authorization protocols and demonstrates \nthat these have been tested to confirm that they are implemented in a secure fashion.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-7c7ac678ccfb", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.6 AUTHENTICATION", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.6 AUTHENTICATION", "token_count": 350 }, { "chunk_id": "e8031b9e647cec01e5feb9692cd0197b", "text": "11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) ensure the strength of authentication is appropriate to the classification of the asset to be accessed; \n(b) control the allocation to users and management of secret authentication information by a process that ensures the \nconfidentiality of the information, including advising personnel on appropriate handling of authentication information; \n(c) require the change of authentication credentials initially, at predefined intervals and upon suspicion that the \ncredentials were compromised; \n(d) require the reset of authentication credentials and the blocking of users after a predefined number of unsuccessful \nlog-in attempts; \n(e) terminate inactive sessions after a predefined period of inactivity; and \n(f) require separate credentials to access privileged access or administrative accounts.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-70f8366dd938", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 214 }, { "chunk_id": "8a7512139bf912093134e599f89f1b59", "text": "(95) When implementing, the entity should take into account MFA fatigue, which can occur when users are overwhelmed when they receive numerous \nauthentication prompts. Consider techniques to mitigate this, such as adaptive MFA, passkeys, MFA combined with SSO and short session \ntimeouts. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n142", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-70f8366dd938", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 88 }, { "chunk_id": "1944b04d42c845bbc07f4af111f3a0a8", "text": "GUIDANCE \n• Use unique authentication credentials for all the entity’s assets. Best-practice implementation includes, as \na minimum, an 8-character password for accounts using MFA and a 14-character password for accounts \nnot using MFA. \n• Consider that the allocation and management process for authentication information should ensure that: \no passwords or PINs generated automatically during enrolment processes as temporary secret \nauthentication information are non- guessable and unique for each user; and that users are \nrequired to change them after the first use; \no procedures are established to verify the identity of a user prior to providing new, replacement or \ntemporary authentication information; \no authentication information, including temporary authentication information, is transmitted to users \nin a secure manner (e.g. via an authenticated and protected channel), and the use of unprotected \n(clear text) electronic mail messages is avoided; \no users acknowledge receipt of authentication information; \no default authentication information as predefined or provided by suppliers is changed immediately \nfollowing installation of systems or software; \no records of significant events concerning allocation and management of authentication information \nare kept and their confidentiality granted, and that the record keeping method is approved (e.g. \nusing an approved password vault tool). \n• When passwords are used as authentication information, the password management system should: \no allow users to select and change their own passwords and include a confirmation procedure to \naddress input errors; \no enforce strong passwords (\n96); \no force users to change their passwords at first login, if relevant; \no enforce password changes as necessary, for example after a security incident or upon \ntermination or change of employment when a user has known passwords for identities that \nremain active (e.g. shared identities); \no prevent the use of commonly used passwords, and compromised combinations of usernames \nand password from hacked systems; \no not display passwords on the screen when they are being entered; and \no store and transmit passwords in protected form. \n• The use of phishing-resistant MFA is recommended. Below is a list of currently available solutions ordered \nfrom strongest to weakest. \no ‘Strong’: \n phishing-resistant: \n- no shared secrets, not vulnerable to attacker-in-the-middle; \n- protected cryptographic private key that can be securely registered to: \no a domain, in accordance with Fast Identity Online (FIDO) and W3C \nWebAuthn standards;", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-70f8366dd938", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 650 }, { "chunk_id": "dd5e1db878967561110be01ddd7c2691", "text": "(96) Password complexity can be a good cybersecurity practice, but it is not the only factor to consider. Recent guidelines, such as those from NIST, \nemphasise password length over complexity; see https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63B-4.2pd.pdf, line 725. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n143", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-70f8366dd938", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 88 }, { "chunk_id": "408e11c056bc551daec98b70b9a3f378", "text": "o a trust provider, following public key infrastructure and International \nTelecommunication Union X.509 standards. \no ‘Medium’ MFA, for example: \n push notification, number matching or application based. \no ‘ Last resort’ MFA, for example: \n text message or email OTP. \n• Perform password encryption and hashing in accordance with approved cryptographic techniques for \npasswords (section 9.2). \n• Generate an alert when a potential attempted or successful breach of login controls is detected. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Logs or reports related to authentication. \n• Compliance audits from internal or external audits verifying that the management of identities aligns with \nthe policy and regulatory requirements. \n• Documentation showing that the identities are reviewed regularly and updated as necessary. \n• Records of changes to identities, reflecting any alterations due to role changes or termination of \nemployment.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-70f8366dd938", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 232 }, { "chunk_id": "2d371f6794687b6f44aaee340cabf2a8", "text": "11.6.3. The relevant entities shall to the extent feasible use state-of-the-art authentication methods, in accordance with \nthe associated assessed risk and the classification of the asset to be accessed and unique authentication information. \nGUIDANCE \n• Adjust authentication methods based on the associated assessed risk. For example, require additional \nauthentication for high-risk transactions or access to assets of higher criticality. \n• Use more stringent authentication methods for assets of higher criticality. \n• Ensure each user has unique credentials. Avoid shared accounts and implement strict policies for \ncredential management. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Access control policy documents outlining secure authentication procedures and technologies.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-70f8366dd938", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 190 }, { "chunk_id": "85b1dd49e4a797ba45e7c5d89a661979", "text": "11.6.4. The relevant entities shall regularly review the authentication procedures and technologies at planned intervals. \nGUIDANCE \n• Conduct periodic audits of authentication procedures and technologies to ensure they remain up to date, \nwhere appropriate and effective against emerging threats. \n• Stay up to date on advancements in authentication technology and integrate new methods as they become \navailable. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Internal or external audit reports detailing the results of periodic audits of authentication procedures and \ntechnologies. \n• L ogs showing the implementation of new authentication technologies and methods as they become \navailable \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n144", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-70f8366dd938", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 184 }, { "chunk_id": "ec70e18c23527a13e3c864506cae8c72", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Advise any user with access to or using authentication information to comply with the following. \no Secret authentication information, such as passwords , is kept confidential. Personal secret \nauthentication information is not to be shared with anyone. Secret authentication information used in \nthe context of identities linked to multiple users or linked to non-personal entities is solely shared with \nauthorised persons. \no Affected or compromised authentication information is changed immediately upon notification of or \nany other indication of a compromise. \no When passwords are used as authentication information, strong passwords according to bes t \npractice recommendations are selected. For example, passwords are not based on anything \nsomebody else can easily guess or obtain using person-related information (e.g. names, telephone \nnumbers and dates of birth); passwords are not based on dictionary words or combinations thereof; \nuse easy to remember passphrases and try to include alphanumerical and special characters; \npasswords should have a minimum length. \no The same credentials are not used across different network and information systems. \no The obligation to follow these rules is also included in the terms and conditions of employment. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documentation of training sessions for employees on secure authentication practices and technologies. \n• Records of awareness program mes or communications to employees about the importance of secure \nauthentication.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-70f8366dd938", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.6.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 381 }, { "chunk_id": "6c75caf64e92aac6babc8ff18d2957f2", "text": "11.7 MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION\n\n11.7.1. The relevant entities shall ensure that users are authenticated by multiple authentication factors or continuous \nauthentication mechanisms for accessing the entities’ network and information systems, where appropriate, in \naccordance with the classification of the asset to be accessed. \nGUIDANCE \n• Select appropriate MFA (97 ) methods and continuous authentication mechanisms based on the entity’s \nsecurity needs and depending on the classification of the asset. It is also good practice to consider user \nconvenience when selecting and implementing a solution: \no test-message-based OTP: simple but less secure due to risks such as SIM swapping; \no authenticator apps: generate time-based OTPs; \no push notifications: send an approval request to a user’s device; \no hardware tokens: for example physical devices generating OTPs, smart cards; \no passkeys; \no Fast Identity Online 2 security keys; \no biometrics: fingerprints, facial recognition, etc. \n \n \n(97) Some types of MFA are vulnerable to phishing attacks, and the relevant entities should select MFA that can stand up to these attacks. For more \ninformation (indicative), see https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-implementing-phishing-resistant-mfa-508c.pdf and \nhttps://doubleoctopus.com/blog/general/phishing-resistant-mfa-guide/. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n145 \n \n• Consider continuous authentication (98) for avoiding specific threats such as session hijacking, credential \ntheft and insider threats. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Logs showing MFA being used to access network and information systems. \n• C onfiguration of authentication solutions implementing MFA. \n• Access control policy outlining how different MFA methods are assigned, including whether phishing-resistant \nMFA is used. \n \n11.7.2. The relevant entities shall ensure that the strength of authentication is appropriate for the classification of the \nasset to be accessed. \nGUIDANCE \n• Determine which network and information systems require the use of MFA protection based on the \nclassification of the asset to be accessed. Wherever possible, use phishing-resistant MFA. \n• Analyse user roles and the level of access required by each role to determine appropriate MFA methods. \n• Consider MFA, in particular when accessing systems from a remote location, accessing system administration \nsystems, access to sensitive information, etc. \n• Enforce MFA on internet-facing systems, such as email, remote desktop and VPNs (99). \n• Define when and how MFA is required (e.g. every login, once per session or for high-risk actions). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documentation detailing the classification of assets and the associated requirement for MFA protection. \n• Risk assessment results justifying the need for MFA on certain network and information systems. \n• List of user roles, associated access rights and the analysis conducted to determine appropriate MFA methods. \n• Configuration files and logs showing MFA enabled on specific network and information systems. \n• Settings from authentication systems reflecting the defined MFA requirements. \n• Logs from authentication systems showing enforcement of these MFA requirements. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Integrate MFA with SSO solutions for seamless access. Wherever possible, use phishing-resistant MFA. \n• Implement secure fallback methods for users who lose access to their MFA methods. \n• Educate users about the importance of MFA and how to use it. \n• Regularly monitor MFA logs for suspicious activity. \n• Keep the MFA system and associated devices updated. \n \n \n(98) Unlike traditional authentication, which verifies users only at the time of login, continuous authentication dynamically assesses developing risk \nfactors such as location, device status and behavioural patterns throughout the session. Different authentication methods (see section 11.6.1) can \nbe combined during continuous authentication. \n(99) CyberFundamentals, PR.AC-3, Centre for Cyber Security Belgium, https://atwork.safeonweb.be/sites/default/files/2024-12/cyfun_basic_v2023-03-\n01_e_update_2024.pdf. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n146 \n \n• Combine MFA with other techniques to require additional factors under specific circumstances, based on \npredefined rules and patterns, such as access from an unusual location, from an unusual device or at an \nunusual time. \n• Evaluate and choose an MFA provider that fits the entity’s requirements: \no ease of integration: ensure the MFA solution integrates well with the existing systems; \no user experience: aim for a balance between security and user convenience; \no scalability: choose a solution that can grow with the entity; \no support and reliability: ensure the provider offers robust support and high reliability. \n• Pilot test the MFA solution with a small group of users. \n• Ensure that MFA implementation meets legal requirements (e.g. the GDPR). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Manuals, configuration files or screenshots demonstrating the successful integration of MFA with an SSO \nprovider. \n• Records of training sessions, attendance lists and training materials provided to users about the importance \nand usage of MFA. \n• Regularly generated reports from MFA systems showing log monitoring activities and any suspicious activities \ndetected. \n• Configuration files showing the implementation of additional authentication factors based on predefined rules. \n \n \nASSET \nMANAGEMENT \nChapter 12\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n148", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-14b4db1aaafa", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11.7 MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 11.7 MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION", "token_count": 1404 }, { "chunk_id": "6278ea88f7875cd015ce32e004c47d19", "text": "12.1 ASSET CLASSIFICATION\n\n12.1.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2), point (i) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall lay down \nclassification levels of all assets, including information, in scope of their network and information systems for the level \nof protection required. \nGUIDANCE \n• Create and document classification levels for the assets, including conventions for classification. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented classification levels for the assets.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-94a4f8b26aad", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "12.1 ASSET CLASSIFICATION", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 12.1 ASSET CLASSIFICATION", "token_count": 120 }, { "chunk_id": "6d68c869913e0b012dd0c36066cf2f2a", "text": "12.1.2. For the purpose of point 12.1.1., the relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) lay down a system of classification levels for assets; \n(b) associate all assets with a classification level, based on confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability \nrequirements, to indicate the protection required according to their sensitivity, criticality, risk and business value; \n(c) align the availability requirements of the assets with the delivery and recovery objectives set out in their business \ncontinuity and disaster recovery plans. \nGUIDANCE \n• Ensure that classifications and associated protective measures for assets consider business needs , \nincluding: \no sharing or restricting information; \no protecting the integrity and authenticity of information; \no ensuring availability (100); and \no complying with legal requirements concerning the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the \ninformation. \n• Define and communicate a classification for sensitive information, such as (indicative example): \no p ublic - freely accessible to all, even externally; \no i nternal - accessible only to members of the entity; \no confidential - accessible only to those whose duties require access. \n• Use classifications derived from national law, international agreements or international ly accepted \nstrategies for sharing information, such as the traffic light protocol. \n• Align the classification with the access control policy (section 11.1). \n• Classify assets in accordance with the identified classification levels. \n• Classify assets other than information in accordance with the classification of the information they store, \nprocess, handle or protect. \n \n \n(100) For example, the entity could assess the direct replacement cost associated with an asset and, where possible, the known indirect cost of total \nloss. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n149 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• The latest, updated record of the entity’s assets and their classification based on the identified \nclassification levels. \n \n12.1.3. The relevant entities shall conduct periodic reviews of the classification levels of assets and update them, where \nappropriate. \nGUIDANCE \n• Define criteria for reviewing the classification over time. \n• Review the classification at least annually, taking into account: \no regulatory changes; and \no changes in the value, sensitivity and criticality of the assets throughout their life cycle. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• D ocumentation showing the schedule for reviews. \n• R ecords of the most recent review and logs detailing changes made during the last review, including \nreclassifications and the addition/removal of assets. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Ensure that owners of the assets are responsible for their classification. \n• Communicate to personnel the classification of assets and associated protection requirements. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Personnel knowing classification levels and protection requirements for each level.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-8a238c0c26d9", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "12.1.2. For the purpose of point 12.1.1., the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 12.1.2. For the purpose of point 12.1.1., the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 748 }, { "chunk_id": "467b9994d63bc71f2533fea90aed2dd1", "text": "12.2 HANDLING OF ASSETS\n\n12.2.1. The relevant entities shall establish, implement and apply a policy for the proper handling of assets, including \ninformation, in accordance with their network and information security policy and shall communicate the policy on proper \nhandling of assets to anyone who uses or handles assets. \nGUIDANCE \n• Ensure that employees, direct suppliers, service providers and any other third parties who use or handle \nthe entity’s assets (101) are aware of the policy. \n• Consider mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, and determine a strategy for mobile device \nmanagement, including Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) (102). \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Policy on the proper handling of assets. \n \n \n(101) Vehicles that can store data locally on the vehicle and/or share data externally by means of telematics are included. \n(102) BSI, ‘SYS.3.2.1 Mobile Device Management, IT-Grundschutz-Compendium’, English version, 1 February 2022, \nhttps://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Grundschutz/International/bsi_it_gs_comp_2022.html. \n NIST Special Publication 800-46, ‘Guide to Enterprise Telework, Remote Access and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Security’, \nhttps://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-46r2.pdf. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n150 \n \n• User manuals or instructions provided to employees, direct suppliers, service providers and any other third \nparties who use or handles the entity’s assets. \n• Documentation showing that employees have completed training sessions on the asset handling policy. \n• F orms or electronic records that employees, direct suppliers , service providers and third parties have \nsigned to acknowledge they have read and understood the policy.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-240124af005d", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "12.2 HANDLING OF ASSETS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 12.2 HANDLING OF ASSETS", "token_count": 444 }, { "chunk_id": "2ab95687b0838b41fb8b0d988b9c1bb2", "text": "12.2.2. The policy shall:\n\n(a) cover the entire life cycle of the assets, including acquisition, use, storage, transportation and disposal; \n(b) provide instructions on the safe use, safe storage, safe transport and the irretrievable deletion and destruction of the \nassets; \n(c) provide that the transfer shall take place in a secure manner, in accordance with the type of asset or information to \nbe transferred. \nGUIDANCE \n• Identify, document and implement a policy for handling assets (103) throughout their life cycle (acquisition, \nuse, storage, transportation and disposal). \n• Ensure that the policy includes at least safe storage, safe transport; and irretrievable deletion and \ndestruction. For example: \no create user manuals and training materials on the correct and secure use of assets; \no establish guidelines for secure storage, taking into account backup management (section 4.2); \no define protocols for secure transfer, including consider secure migration processes, when \ntransferring data to a cloud service; \no outline methods for data wiping and physical destruction, ensuring complete and irretrievable \ndeletion. \n• Ensure that the policy covers the proper usage of all in-scope assets, both on-premises and off-premises \n(e.g. mobile devices, data in the cloud, transient data (104) or sensitive information). \n• Ensure that assets may be transferred to external premises only after approval by authorized management \nbodies, in accordance with the policy. \n• Link the asset handling policy with the asset classification by providing handling details for each \nclassification level. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented policy for handling assets. \n• User access lists, access request forms and approval records. \n• Incident reports related to asset handling (e.g. loss, theft or damage). \n \n12.2.3. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update the policy at planned intervals and when \nsignificant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks occur. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review and update the policy for asset handling at least annually. \n \n \n(103) Vehicles that can store data locally on the vehicle and/or share data externally by means of telematics are included. \n(104) D ata that moves between systems, users, or devices, often temporarily or for processing purposes. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n151 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Up-to date policy for asset handling \n• R ecords of reviews or history of changes.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-3a0191aacdd0", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "12.2.2. The policy shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 12.2.2. The policy shall:", "token_count": 626 }, { "chunk_id": "3ad21745e84453dbc384492b1dbd0416", "text": "12.3 REMOVABLE MEDIA POLICY\n\n12.3.1. The relevant entities shall establish, implement and apply a policy on the management of removable storage \nmedia and communicate it to their employees and third parties who handle removable storage media at the relevant \nentities’ premises or other locations where the removable media is connected to the relevant entities’ network and \ninformation systems. \nGUIDANCE \n• Define, document and implement a policy on the management of removable media (105). \n• Communicate the policy to employees and third parties who handle removable storage media to ensure \nthat they are aware of the policy. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented policy on the management of removable media, including at least the items in point 12.3.2 \nof the Annex to the regulation. \n• User manuals or instructions provided to employees and third parties concerning the correct usage of the \nremovable media. \n• Documentation showing that employees and third parties have completed training sessions on the polic y \nor forms or electronic records that employees and third parties have signed to acknowledge they have \nread and understood the policy. \n• Evidence of ongoing awareness campaigns, such as posters, emails or intranet posts, reminding \nemployees about the risks and policies associated with removable media.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-5ec3711fc11f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "12.3 REMOVABLE MEDIA POLICY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 12.3 REMOVABLE MEDIA POLICY", "token_count": 332 }, { "chunk_id": "f2f07b33151d08d9640001b708855cfc", "text": "12.3.2. The policy shall:\n\n(a) provide for a technical prohibition of the connection of removable media unless there is an organisational reason for \ntheir use; \n(b) provide for disabling self -execution from such media and scanning the media for malicious code before they are \nused on the relevant entities’ systems; \n(c) provide measures for controlling and protecting portable storage devices containing data while in transit and in \nstorage; \n(d) where appropriate, provide measures for the use of cryptographic techniques to protect data on removable storage \nmedia. \nGUIDANCE \n• Align the policy with the asset classification (section 12.1) and include at least the following: \no definitions and scope of removable media, \no authorization requirements, \no usage guidelines, \n \n \n(105) Including ‘bring your own device’, if personal devices are used to store corporate data. Vehicles that can store data locally on a vehicle and/or \nshare data externally by means of telematics are also included. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n152 \n \no measures for control and protection of removable media while in storage and in transit;, \no techniques to protect information on removable storage media and \no incident response procedures for lost or compromised media. \n• Configure network and information systems to disable the autorun feature for all removable media, to \nprevent the automatic execution of potentially malicious software. \n• If connection of removable media is not prohibited for an organisational (business) reason, removable \nmedia should be scanned for malicious code, where appropriate, with up-to -date software against \nmalicious code before being connected to the entity’s network and information systems and/or in real time. \n• Encrypt sensitive data stored on removable media using strong cryptographic algorithms to protect against \nunauthorized access \n• Use encryption to protect data stored on portable storage devices, ensuring that unauthorized users \ncannot access the data if the device is lost or stolen. \n• I mplement physical security measures, where appropriate, such as secure storage locations and tracking \nlogs for portable storage devices. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Configuration settings of endpoint protection software, if any. \n• Audit logs that track the use of removable media, including insertion, removal and data transfer activities. \n• Reports of incidents involving removable media, if any. \n \n12.3.3. The relevant entities shall review and, where appropriate, update the policy at planned intervals and when \nsignificant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks occur. \nGUIDANCE \n• Regularly monitor and audit the use of removable media to ensure compliance with the policy. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Up-to date removable media policy. \n• Records of reviews or history of changes.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0a3521a92354", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "12.3.2. The policy shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 12.3.2. The policy shall:", "token_count": 719 }, { "chunk_id": "85e0767e79a3edb4c61600c7296d5107", "text": "12.4 ASSET INVENTORY\n\n12.4.1. The relevant entities shall develop and maintain a complete, accurate, up-to -date and consistent inventory of \ntheir assets. They shall record changes to the entries in the inventory in a traceable manner. \nGUIDANCE \n• Ensure that all assets, including hardware, software, data and services, are listed in the inventory. \n• Regularly verify the accuracy of the inventory entries. \n• Update the inventory promptly to reflect any changes, such as new assets, decommissioned assets or \nchanges in asset status (section 6.4) \n• Use standardised naming conventions and categorization methods to maintain consistency across the \ninventory. \n• Make sure that inventory entries contain the data in the guidance below (sampling). \n• Implement validation rules within the inventory to ensure data entered is complete and consistent. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n153 \n \n• Documentation for the inventory of assets \n• Up to date inventory of assets \n• Records of reviews or history of changes. \n• Records of key metrics tracked, such as the number of assets, types of assets, compliance with inventory \npolicies and the timeliness of updates. \n \n12.4.2. The granularity of the inventory of the assets shall be at a level appropriate for the needs of the relevant entities. \nThe inventory shall include the following: \n(a) the list of operations and services and their description, \n(b) the list of network and information systems and other associated assets supporting the relevant entities’ operations \nand services. \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider adding one or more of the following to the inventory (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no asset unique ID, \no asset type, for example software including virtual machines (version), hardware (operating \nsystem / firmware), services, supporting utilities, facilities, heating, ventilation and air conditioning \n(HVAC) systems, personnel and physical records, \no asset owner and contact information, \no operational unit responsible for the asset, either internal department name or external provider \nname (106), \no asset description, \no asset location, \no date of asset’s last update/patch, \no asset classification consistent with the risk assessment, \no type of information and its classification processed in the basset, \no asset end of life, where applicable, \no relation to other assets and \no logging requirements. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Configuration of the asset inventory tool, if any. \n \n12.4.3. The relevant entities shall regularly review and update the inventory and their assets and document the history \nof changes. \nGUIDANCE \n• Conduct regular reviews to verify the accuracy and completeness of the inventory. \n• Maintain history of changes. \n \n \n \n(106) In the case of external provider(s), a reference to the SLA covering this relation will also be useful. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n154 \n \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Up-to-date inventory of assets including history of changes. \n• Regular reports generated on inventory status, changes and audit findings. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Use tools that support the comprehensive tracking and management of assets. \n• Ideally, consider the use of tools for automated discovery and asset tracking to continuously discover, \ncategorize, and monitor both on-premises and cloud assets, ensuring comprehensive, up-to-date visibility \nand security. Alternatively, consider manual update procedures. \n• Configure the chosen tool to capture the defined attributes and categories, ensuring it supports relevant \nfunctionalities such as tagging, searching and reporting. \n• Set up automated alerts for missing or incomplete data, discrepancies and anomalies detected in the \ninventory. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Configuration settings of the asset management tool.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-c2ee95dcaf27", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "12.4 ASSET INVENTORY", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 12.4 ASSET INVENTORY", "token_count": 966 }, { "chunk_id": "8058552f87a4879f520464cb0b08fb1d", "text": "12.5 DEPOSIT, RETURN OR DELETION OF ASSETS UPON TERMINATION OF\n\nEMPLOYMENT \nThe relevant entities shall establish, implement and apply procedures which ensure that their assets which are under \ncustody of personnel are deposited, returned or deleted upon termination of employment and shall document the \ndeposit, return and deletion of those assets. Where the deposit, return or deletion of assets is not possible, the relevant \nentities shall ensure that the assets can no longer access the relevant entities’ network and information systems in \naccordance with point 12.2.2. \nGUIDANCE \n• Define procedures to ensure that assets are deposited, returned or irrevocably deleted on termination of \nemployment or contractual relationships. \n• Make sure that the procedures clearly identify all assets to be returned, according to the asset inventory \n(Annex to the regulation, point 12.4.1), which can include (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no user endpoint devices, e.g. computers, tablets and phones etc and/or portable storage devices, \nincluding vehicles, that can store data locally on the vehicle and/or share data externally by \nmeans of telematics. Identify where the user process, transfer or store entity data to determine \nthe scope of user endpoint devices; \no specialised equipment; \no authentication hardware (e.g. access cards, mechanical keys, physical tokens and smart cards); \no physical copies of information. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented procedures for the timely return of assets upon termination of employment. \n• Logs or records indicating that data on returned assets was deleted according to the procedures. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n155 \n \n• Completed exit checklist forms that include asset return and data deletion steps, signed by the departing \nemployee and relevant supervisors. \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• In cases where employees (and other third parties) use their own personal equipment, follow procedures \nto ensure that all relevant information is traced and transferred to the entity and securely deleted from the \nequipment. \n• Keep a record of the implementation of the policy (list of employees who have left or contractors whose \ncontracts have ended and list of the assets they returned, including return date). \n• Make sure that relevant terms are part of the employment or service contract. \n• Communicate the procedures to employees during the induction process and during the exit process. \n• Check that there is an employee exit interview process and the return of the assets is linked with it. \n• Where the deposit, return or deletion of assets is not possible (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no ensure that any credentials associated with the assets are revoked or disabled; \no isolate the assets by placing them in a separate network segment; \no use access control lists to restrict access to and from the isolated assets; \no ensure that only authorised personnel can interact with these assets; \no configure firewalls to block any traffic to and from the isolated assets; \no physically or logically disable the network interfaces of the assets; \no continuously monitor the isolated assets and log any access attempts. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Personnel aware of the procedures. \n• Communication materials, such as emails or intranet posts, that remind employees of their obligations \nupon termination. \n• Statements confirming that data was irrevocably deleted, especially for external employees or contractors. \n• Documentation of the termination process, including coordination between HR and IT departments. \n• Sample checks of lists of employees/contractors and the assets they were assigned and those they \nreturned. \n \nENVIRONMENTAL \nAND PHYSICAL \nSECURITY \nChapter 13\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n157", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-ca25a4e1c0c4", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "12.5 DEPOSIT, RETURN OR DELETION OF ASSETS UPON TERMINATION OF", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 12.5 DEPOSIT, RETURN OR DELETION OF ASSETS UPON TERMINATION OF", "token_count": 959 }, { "chunk_id": "3e831d11ef32da614817481c494cbc16", "text": "13.1 SUPPORTING UTILITIES\n\n13.1.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2)(c) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall prevent loss, damage \nor compromise of network and information systems or interruption to their operations due to the failure and disruption \nof supporting utilities. \nGUIDANCE \n• C onsider supporting utilities, where relevant (107), that ensure the continuous operation of network and \ninformation systems, such as (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no power supply – electricity to keep systems running; \no water for cooling and other operational needs; \no gas for heating or backup power generation; \no HVAC to maintain optimal operating conditions; \no telecommunications – internet and network connectivity. \n• Include the potential failure and disruption of supporting utilities in the risk assessment. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• List of supporting utilities and associated risk assessment results. \n• Measures to protect against the failure and disruption of supporting utilities .", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-0be3009f6c4f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.1 SUPPORTING UTILITIES", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.1 SUPPORTING UTILITIES", "token_count": 253 }, { "chunk_id": "802678ad140d6f829d46fb300c92d4a9", "text": "13.1.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall, where appropriate:\n\n(a) protect facilities from power failures and other disruptions caused by failures in supporting utilities such as electricity, \ntelecommunications, water supply, gas, sewage, ventilation and air conditioning; \n(b) consider the use of redundancy in utilities services; \n(c) protect utility services for electricity and telecommunications, which transport data or supply network and information \nsystems, against interception and damage; \n(d) monitor the utility services referred to in point (c) and report to the competent internal or external personnel events \noutside the minimum and maximum control thresholds referred to in point 13.2.2(b) affecting the utility services; \n(e) conclude contracts for the emergency supply with corresponding services, such as for the fuel for emergency power \nsupply; \n(f) ensure continuous effectiveness, monitor, maintain and test the supply of the network and information systems \nnecessary for the operation of the service offered, in particular the electricity, temperature and humidity control, \ntelecommunications and Internet connection. \n \n \n(107) In cases where an entity operates with a fully remote workforce and does not maintain any on-premises servers or infrastructure, the requirement \nfor supporting utility services at a centralized location may be rendered unnecessary. Remote work inherently introduces geographical and \ninfrastructural diversification, thereby reducing the overall utility-related risk. By distributing operations across various locations, the organization \nbenefits from a decentralized utility dependency, which enhances resilience against localized disruptions. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n158 \n \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider the availability of supporting utilities in the business continuity plan (section 4.1). \n• Consider the availability of supporting utilities, when implementing backup management (section 4.2). \n• Consider implementing measures for the protection of supporting utilities, such as (indicative, non-\nexhaustive list): \no active/passive cooling; \no automatic restart after power interruption; \no battery backup power; \no diesel generators; \no backup fuel; \no uninterruptable power supply, hot standby power generators; \no sufficient fuel delivery SLA; \no delivery companies; \no redundant cooling; \no spare parts for components of network and information systems; and \no power backup systems. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Description of different types of supporting utilities. \n• Measures to protect against the failure and disruption of supporting utilities . \n \n13.1.3. The relevant entities shall test, review and, where appropriate, update the protection measures on a regular \nbasis or following significant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks. \nGUIDANCE \n• C onduct routine tests of protection measures. \n• Set up periodic reviews to evaluate the effectiveness of current protection measures. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Updated measures to protect against the failure and disruption of supporting utilities, review comments \nand/or change logs. \n• Evidence that the measures that protect supporting utilities against failures and disruptions are deployed \nand regularly tested. \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• I nclude a simulated total power failure in the verification of the testing procedure for power generators. \n• Make employees aware of dependencies on supporting utilities. \n• Train staff in how to respond effectively to failures and disruptions of supporting utilities. \n• Set up monitoring systems to detect utility failures or disruptions. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Records of internal communications, emails or newsletters highlighting the importance of supporting \nutilities and their impact on operations. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n159 \n \n• Logs demonstrating detection and recording of any utility failures or disruptions.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-5f7d58cd5c37", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.1.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall, where appropriate:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.1.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall, where appropriate:", "token_count": 999 }, { "chunk_id": "6963f89d5d824f8b73ef3c4ed1947b09", "text": "13.2 PROTECTION AGAINST PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS\n\n13.2.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2)(e) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall prevent or reduce the \nconsequences of events originating from physical and environmental threats, such as natural disasters and other \nintentional or unintentional threats, based on the results of the risk assessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1. \nGUIDANCE \n• C onsider risks associated with current and forecasted physical and environmental threats to the network \nand information systems, where relevant (108). \no Include in the assessment the (physical) locations of the entity’s facilities. \n• Based on the results of the risk assessment determine the assets that need to be protected from physical \nand environmental threats. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Risk assessment report that includes: \no identification and evaluation of physical locations, such as data centres, offices and server rooms, \no analysis of potential physical and environmental threats and \no mapping of critical assets to physical locati ons.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-ce00314ff989", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.2 PROTECTION AGAINST PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.2 PROTECTION AGAINST PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS", "token_count": 271 }, { "chunk_id": "1c4cdf7d6d0c8a0ac4b5648245dac72d", "text": "13.2.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall, where appropriate:\n\n(a) design and implement protection measures against physical and environmental threats; \n(b) determine minimum and maximum control thresholds for physical and environmental threats; \n(c) monitor environmental parameters and report to the competent internal or external personnel events outside the \nminimum and maximum control thresholds referred to in point (b). \nGUIDANCE \n• Implement measures against physical and environmental threats. Parameters to consider are (indicative, \nnon-exhaustive list): \no purpose and scope; \no network and information systems in scope; \no description of facilities; \no roles and responsibilities; \no management commitment; \no coordination among organisational units; \no compliance with national and EU law, including personal data protection. \n \n \n(108) Where a company operates with a fully remote workforce and lacks centralized on-premises infrastructure, traditional physical and environmental \nthreat protections at a single location may be less critical. The distributed nature of remote work inherently provides resilience by diversifying \nexposure to localized physical and environmental risks. Consequently organizations should focus on ensuring that remote employees’ home work \nenvironments meet minimum security and safety standards and consider leveraging cloud service providers’ robust physical security controls. This \ndistributed operational model reduces dependency on any single physical site, thereby mitigating the impact of localized environmental or physical \nincidents. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n160 \n \n• C onsider potential physical and environmental threats relevant to the context, location and operational \nenvironment. The following list offers examples (indicative and non-exhaustive) to support risk -based \nplanning: \no fire, flood or natural events (e.g. earthquakes, storms), \no p ublic disturbances or unauthorized access, theft or vandalism, \no h azardous material incidents (e.g. chemical spills), \no l ong-term environmental changes (e.g. climate trends, air quality). \n• Consider measures against physical and environmental threats such as (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no physical access control measures (e.g. IDs, badges, logs; visitor management system and \nphysical barriers); \no surveillance systems (e.g. CCTV, entry points, exits, locking mechanisms and security \npersonnel); \no climate control (e.g. temperature and humidity controls and HVAC systems); \no fire prevention and response measures (e.g. fire alarms, smoke detectors, sprinkler systems and \nfire extinguishers); \n• Consider enhanced (maximum) measures to be activated during heightened threat levels or specific \nscenarios. Examples of such measures include (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no Increased security personnel, advanced biometric access controls and lockdown procedures. \no Enhanced monitoring systems, redundant power supplies and advanced environmental sensors. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Detailed documentation showing the design and implementation of measures against physical and \nenvironmental threats. \n• Reports outlining the defined minimum and maximum control thresholds for various threats. \n• L ogs from environmental monitoring systems showing continuous tracking of parameters , such as \ntemperature, humidity and security breaches. \n• Records of incidents where parameters fell outside the defined thresholds, including the actions taken and \nnotifications sent to relevant personnel. \n \n13.2.3. The relevant entities shall test, review and, where appropriate, update the protection measures against physical \nand environmental threats on a regular basis or following significant incidents or significant changes to operations or \nrisks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Schedule and perform regular tests, such as quarterly fire drills and annual assessments of physical \nsecurity measures. \no Conduct both announced and unannounced tests \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Detailed reports of the tests conducted, including objectives, procedures, results and any issues identified. \n• Minutes from review meetings detailing discussions, findings and decisions regarding protection \nmeasures. \n \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0 \n \n \n161 \n \nTIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Consider creating a topic-specific policy for protection against physical and environmental threats. \n• Deploy periodic simulations and awareness raising activities to assess the readiness of personnel and the \nadequacy of the procedures \n• Consider implementing physically secure storage facilities for high-criticality assets of. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented physical and environmental security policy, including a description of facilities and network \nand information systems in scope. \n• Results of periodic simulations and awareness raising activities.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-042838514c8d", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.2.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall, where appropriate:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.2.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall, where appropriate:", "token_count": 1230 }, { "chunk_id": "03cef7e924b7d8c3ed7921bf6d0b32bc", "text": "13.3 PERIMETER AND PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL\n\n13.3.1. For the purpose of Article 21(2)(i) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the relevant entities shall prevent and monitor \nunauthorised physical access, damage and interference to their network and information systems. \nGUIDANCE \n• I mplement perimeter physical access control, where relevant (109), taking into account the measures for \nprotection against physical and environmental threats (section 13.2). \n• Ensure that physical access control is integrated with logical and network access control , in line with \nhuman resources security procedures (section 10.1) to support the detection of irregular activities and \nenhance overall organisational security. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Documented policy for physical security measures, including a description of facilities and network and \ninformation systems in scope.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-6ea7fcc0ab59", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.3 PERIMETER AND PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.3 PERIMETER AND PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL", "token_count": 216 }, { "chunk_id": "ee2dd89ea99dcc32e50a7dd0ae5369f5", "text": "13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:\n\n(a) on the basis of the risk assessment carried out pursuant to point 2.1, lay down and use security perimeters to protect \nareas where network and information systems and other associated assets are located; \n(b) protect the areas referred to in point (a) by appropriate entry controls and access points; \n(c) design and implement physical security for offices, rooms and facilities, \n(d) continuously monitor their premises for unauthorised physical access. \nGUIDANCE \n• In the risk assessment, consider risks associated with unauthorised physical access to, damage to and \ninterference with network and information systems.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-401198e80432", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 10, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 171 }, { "chunk_id": "d965c5d52e27eaea4e9e9639ac6e72c4", "text": "(109) In a fully remote operating model where the organization does not maintain centralized office spaces or on-premises infrastructure, traditional \nperimeter and physical access control measures (e.g. badge systems, mantraps, on-site security personnel) may not be applicable. Instead, the \nfocus should shift to ensuring that access to corporate resources is governed through strong logical access controls, such as multi-factor \nauthentication (MFA), endpoint compliance checks and secure connectivity (e.g. VPN or Zero Trust Network Access). For personnel working from \nhome organizations should provide guidance on securing home workspaces—such as restricting unauthorized physical access to work devices and \nusing locked rooms or cabinets when necessary. Where third-party cloud or co-location facilities are used, physical access controls should be \nreviewed and enforced contractually through SLAs and verified via audit reports (e.g. ISO 27001, SOC 2). \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n162", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-401198e80432", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 10, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 257 }, { "chunk_id": "c3ec125fc06fdaec6047df5568ba680a", "text": "• Based on the results of the risk assessment, determine high-criticality assets and the impact of their \nbeing compromised. This will help in identifying the perimeter for such assets. \n• Prevent unauthorised physical access to facilities and set up adequate measures. \no Physical access control measures designed to protect the entity as a whole will also protect \nindividual assets. \no Consider introducing further specific access control measures for specific assets or facilities. \n• Consider physical security measures (indicative, non-exhaustive list): \no physical access controls such as key cards, biometric scanners, locks and security personnel to \nrestrict access to high-criticality areas, \no electronic control of entry, with an audit trail, \no segmentation of spaces or creation of zones according to authorization levels and their contents, \no CCTV cameras and monitoring systems to continuously observe sensitive areas, \no fencing, barriers and security patrols for securing physical perimeters, \no guards and/or alarms to monitor every physical access point to the facility where the information \nsystem resides, 24 hours per day, seven days per week. \n• Develop and enforce procedures for granting, reviewing and revoking physical acces s rights \n(section 11.2). \no Identify a designated official within the entity to review and approve the list of personnel with \nauthorized physical access. \no Maintain a list of personnel with authorized access to facilities, and their authorization levels. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Risk assessment results \n• Existence of physical security measures \n• Procedures for granting, reviewing and revoking physical access rights in accordance with point 11.2 in \nthe Annex to the regulation.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-401198e80432", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 10, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 436 }, { "chunk_id": "3bb6ed0d80f59bbd8a10e5a62d3c4ad2", "text": "13.3.3. The relevant entities shall test, review and, where appropriate, update the physical access control measures on \na regular basis or following significant incidents or significant changes to operations or risks. \nGUIDANCE \n• Review physical access lists. \n• Employ intrusion tests that include, where applicable, unannounced attempts to bypass or circumvent \nmeasures associated with physical access points to the facility. \n• At the physical boundary of the facility or network and information system, perform securit y checks for \nunauthorised exfiltration of information or removal of information system components. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Periodic simulations and awareness -raising activities to assess the readiness of personnel and the \nadequacy of the procedures for physical access control. \n• Schedule and results of tests and security checks. \n• Up-to-date list of personnel with authorised physical access to facilities.\n\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n163", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-401198e80432", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 10, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 251 }, { "chunk_id": "82d10d82c030b36da269e1432916639d", "text": "TIPS \nGUIDANCE \n• Enforce authorisation for physical access to network and information systems in addition to the physical \naccess controls for the facility. \n• Remove individuals from the facility access list when their access is no longer required. \n• Document procedures for emergencies. \n• Log and monitor personnel physical access (entry and exit) through an entry control system. \n• Authenticate visitors before authorizing access to the facility. Escort visitors in accordance with security \npolicies and procedures. Maintain records of visitors’ access to the facility. \n• Employ automated mechanisms to facilitate the maintenance and review of visitor access records. \n• Make sure that employees are aware of the existence of a secure area on a need-to-know basis. \n• Define and communicate to personnel an intruder response process or emergency procedures. \n• Communicate physical access control measures to employees. \n• Separate facilities managed by the entity from those managed by third parties. \n• Employ automated mechanisms to recognize types of intrusions and initiate defined response actions. \n• Employ video surveillance of operational areas and retain video recordings for a defined period, in \naccordance with the GDPR. \n• Keep physical access records as dictated by applicable regulations or based on an entity -defined period \nin accordance with the entity’s policy. Keep and store physical access records in case of an audit or \ninvestigation. \n• Take heed of risk -assessment results before doing anything with damaged devices containing sensitive \ndata. \nEXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE \n• Perimeter incident response procedures in place. \n• Personnel clearly displaying their ID.\n\nANNEX I \nNATIONAL \nFRAMEWORKS \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n165", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-401198e80432", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 10, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 449 }, { "chunk_id": "d8a450c5d1daa0080e2761a6b53cbce4", "text": "ANNEX I NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS \nBelgium \nBelgium has completed the incorporation of the NIS2 Directive into national legislation. In that legislation, a special role \nis reserved for the CyberFundamentals framework (CyFun®, www.cyfun.eu). \nFinland \nTraficom (the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency) has issued a national recommendation on \ncybersecurity risk-management measures for supervisory authorities. The Cybermeter/Kybermittari is a maturity \nmodel developed by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-FI) and based on the Cybersecurity Capability \nMaturity Model and the NIST cybersecurity framework. They are the two instrumental documents for the national \nregulatory framework. The recommended cybersecurity risk-management measures are mapped to the \nCybermeter/Kybermittari’s objectives and practices that enable organisations to self-assess their cybersecurity \ncapabilities and optimise their security investments. Voluntarily sharing quantitative self-assessment data to NCSC-FI \nenables the creation of benchmarking data and improves situational awareness of NCSC-FI. \nGermany \nIn Germany, there is an advisory on what requirements should be seen as state of the art. The document is available \nat https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/408936\n. \nFor information on BSI standards and certification, see https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/it-grundschutz-en. \nGreece \nGreece has incorporated the NIS2 Directive into national legislation with Law 5160/2024. Furthermore, regarding \ncybersecurity measures, the Greek national framework consists of the following: \n• ministerial decision 1689/2025 ‘National framework of cybersecurity requirements for essential and \nimportant entities’; \n• the Cybersecurity Handbook, available at https://cyber.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Cybersecurity-\nHandbook-English-version-1.pdf; \n• the self -assessment tool, available at https://cyber.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Cybersecurity-\nSelf-Assessment-Tool-English-version-1.zip. \nThe Cybersecurity Handbook and the self-assessment tool are based on globally accepted international standards and \nguidelines (Center for Internet Security Controls, ISO 27002, NIST 800-53, Open Worldwide Application Security \nProject, etc.) and will be dynamically modified to follow changes in standards, the current threat landscape and the legal \nand regulatory framework. \nSpain \nRoyal Decree 311/2022, of 3 May 2022, regulates the national security framework, which is a legal regulation that is \nmandatory for all entities in the Spanish public sector to comply with and is mandatory to apply to the information \nsystems used by private companies to provide services to the abovementioned public entities. \nThe full text of the framework is available at https://ens.ccn.cni.es/es/docman/documentos-publicos/39-boe-a-2022-\n7191-national-security-framework-ens/file.\n\nANNEX II \nGLOSSARY\nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n167\n\nANNEX II GLOSSARY", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-401198e80432", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 10, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 739 }, { "chunk_id": "a5dd7d9117a25eaf32c757cb4cc2411c", "text": "Asset: anything that is of value to the entity, including information. Overall, the assets of a network and information \nsystem are personnel, processes, information, software and hardware. \nCrisis: an abnormal or extraordinary event or situation that threatens an organisation or community and requires a \nstrategic, adaptive and timely response to preserve its viability and integrity (110). \nCritical: one of the classification levels assigned to the entity’s assets following an assessment of their criticality, \nincluding the asset classification (Annex to the regulation, point 12.1). \nCyber hygiene practices (111): \n• Cyber hygiene practices for essential and important entities are a common baseline set of network and \ninformation security practices, which are already covered by the technical and methodological requirements \nof the cybersecurity risk-management measures outlined in the Annex to the regulation. Therefore, no \nadditional guidance on cyber hygiene practices for essential and important entities is deemed necessary. \n• Cyber hygiene practices relating to users are a set of routine, proactive practices and behaviours that the \nentity’s users follow to maintain the network and information security of the entity’s systems. These practices \nare explicitly mentioned in the guidance of section 8.1. \nDirect suppliers and service providers: any entity providing ICT products, ICT systems or ICT services that an \nessential or important entity relies on. When this guidance refers to direct suppliers and service providers, it includes \ntheir personnel. \nEntity: one of the relevant entities in the scope of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690. In other \nstandards or good practice guides, the term ‘organisation’, ‘enterprise’ or ‘business’ may be used. \nEvent: in reference to an information security event, an identified occurrence indicating a possible information security \nbreach or failure of controls (112). \nFacilities: the physical location housing the entity’s network and information systems. \nIncident handling: any actions and procedures aiming to prevent, detect, analyse and contain, or to respond to and \nrecover from, an incident (NIS2 Directive Article 6(8)). \nIncident: an event compromising the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored, transmitted or \nprocessed data or of the services offered by, or accessible through, network and information systems (NIS2 Directive \nArticle 6(6)). \nInformation: data in context. In the text, we primarily use ‘information’, unless we refer specifically to data (‘data breach’ \netc.). \nManagement bodies: the highest-level leadership within essential and important entities as in the context of Article 20 \nof the NIS2 Directive. \nMeasure: a cybersecurity risk-management measure as referred to in the NIS2 Directive. The word is used similarly to \n‘control’, which denotes a measure that modifies risk (\n113). In addition, the terms ‘measure’ and ‘protection measure’ are \nused interchangeably.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-401198e80432", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 10, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 755 }, { "chunk_id": "51f1fe2ea26fcb9151ebfdad8dca71e5", "text": "(110) ISO 22361: 2022, 3.2. \n(111) Recital 20 of the regulation addresses cyber hygiene practices for two target groups under Directive 2022/2555: essential and important entities; \nand their users. \n(112) ISO/IEC 27002:2022, 3.1.14. \n(113) ISO/IEC 27002:2022, 3.1.8. \nTECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE \nJune 2025, version 1.0\n\n168", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-401198e80432", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 10, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 82 }, { "chunk_id": "b72e796ce491037832cd8729ece38ddf", "text": "Personnel: persons doing work under the entity’s direction ( 114 ). The concept of personnel includes the entity’s \nmembers, such as the governing body, management bodies, employees, temporary staff, contractors and volunteers. \nIn this document it is used interchangeably with the term ‘employees’. \nPolicy: intentions and direction of an organisation, as formally expressed by its management bodies. \nPrivileged access: the necessary permissions granted to specific users of the network and the information system of \nthe entity, in order for them to perform tasks that regular users cannot. \nProcedure: a specified way to carry out an activity or a process (115). The entity can document its needs for more \ndetailed information in a way that is efficient for it beyond the policy. These are mainly procedures and processes. \nProcess: an activity that transforms input into output. \nRule: accepted principle or instruction that states t he entity’s expectations of what is required to be done and what is \nallowed or not allowed. Rules can be formally expressed in topic-specific policies and in other types of documents (116). \nSignificant incident: an incident that meets the criteria of Article 3 of the regulation. \nSuspicious event: an event that appears unusual or a previously unknown situation that might be a potential security \nthreat. To make clearer the difference between an event and a suspicious event, consider an example where a legitimate \nuser fails to log in once due to a typing error. This is an event. However, a situation where a user fails to log in after five \nattempts might be considered a suspicious event. \nTopic-specific policy: a policy on a specific subject or topic, as formally expressed by the management bodies relevant \nto the topic. \nUser: all legal and natural persons that have access to the entity’s network and information systems (recital 10 of the \nregulation).\n\n(114) ISO/IEC 27002:2022, 3.1.20. \n(115) ISO 30000:2009, 3.12. \n(116) ISO/IEC 27002:2022, 3.1.32.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-401198e80432", "chunk_index": 8, "total_chunks": 10, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 502 }, { "chunk_id": "460a63e15afafa8617bc4a21bc3003ae", "text": "ABOUT ENISA \nThe European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, is the Union’s agency dedicated to \nachieving a high common level of cybersecurity across Europe. Established in 2004 and \nstrengthened by the EU Cybersecurity Act, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity \ncontributes to EU cyber policy, enhances the trustworthiness of ICT products, services and \nprocesses with cybersecurity certification schemes, cooperates with Member States and EU \nbodies and helps Europe prepare for the cyber challenges of tomorrow. Through knowledge \nsharing, capacity building and awareness raising, the Agency works together with its key \nstakeholders to strengthen trust in the connected economy, to boost resilience of the \nUnion’s infrastructure and, ultimately, to keep Europe’s society and citizens digitally secure. \nMore information about ENISA and its work can be found here: www.enisa.europa.eu.\n\nTP-01-25-012-EN-N\n\nISBN 978-92-9204-704-7 \ndoi: 10.2824/2702548", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-NIS2-TIG-401198e80432", "chunk_index": 9, "total_chunks": 10, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-NIS2-TIG", "context_prefix": "NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance v1.0 (ENISA) > 13.3.2. For that purpose, the relevant entities shall:", "token_count": 241 }, { "chunk_id": "3656394fbdb6c2ceeb8c99649ef719b3", "text": "European Union Agency for Network and Information Security\n\nwww.enisa.europa.eu\n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \nApril 2015\n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-fc93b94f6ba7", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 70 }, { "chunk_id": "79f0da308a5f2dcaa7edf4c116ed5c9d", "text": "Page ii \nAbout ENISA \nThe European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is a centre of network and \ninformation security expertise for the EU, its member states, the private sector and Europe’s citizens. \nENISA works with these groups to develop advice and recommendations on good practice in \ninformation security. It assists EU member states in implementing relevant EU legislation a nd works \nto improve the resilience of Europe’s critical information infrastructure and networks. ENISA seeks to \nenhance existing expertise in EU member states by supporting the development of cross -border \ncommunities committed to improving network and info rmation security throughout the EU. More \ninformation about ENISA and its work can be found at www.enisa.europa.eu. \nAuthors \nDr. M.A.C. Dekker, Dimitra Liveri \nContact \nFor contacting the authors please use cloud.security@enisa.europa.eu \nFor media enquires about this paper, please use press@enisa.europa.eu \nAcknowledgements \nThanks to Antti Vaha- Sipila and Janne Jarvinen from F-Secure Corporation for their help with this document. \nMany thanks also to the experts of the ENISA Cloud Security and Resilience expert group who provided useful \ncomments and feedback. Listing them in no particular order : Frank van Dam (Ministry of Economic Affairs, NL), \nArjan de Jong (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, NL), Tuija Kuusisto (Ministry of Finance, FI), Jesper \nLaursen (Agency for Digitisation, DK), Steve Agius (MCA, MT), Vangelis Floros (GRNET, GR), Aleida Alcaide (SEAP, \nES), Tobias Höllwarth (EuroCloud), Aljosa Pasic (Atos), Roxana Banica (RO), Fritz Bollmann (BSI, DE), Marko \nAmbroz (MJPA,SI), Boggio Andrea ( HP Enterprise Security ), Tjabbe Bos (DG CONNECT, EC), Daniele Catteddu \n(CSA), Peter Dickman (Google, UK), Paul Costelloe (EuroCIO), Olivier Perrault (Orange, FR), Paul Davies (Verizon, \nUK), Raj Samani (McAfee), Jan Neutze (Microsoft, BE), Antonio Ramos (Leet Security) , Jens Jensen (STFC, UK) , \nBrian Honan (BH Counsulting, IE)", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-fc93b94f6ba7", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 510 }, { "chunk_id": "2ee1d211458ac78a120e697c36ab8a3f", "text": "Legal notice \nNotice must be taken that this publication represents the views and interpretations of the authors and \neditors, unless stated otherwise. This publication should not be construed to be a legal action of ENISA or the \nENISA bodies unless adopted pursuant to the Regulation (EU) No 526/2013. This publication does not \nnecessarily represent state-of the-art and ENISA may update it from time to time. \nThird-party sources are quoted as appropriate. ENISA is not responsible for the content of the external \nsources including external websites referenced in this publication. \nThis publication is intended for information purposes only. It must be accessible free of charge. Neither ENISA \nnor any person acting on its behalf is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained \nin this publication. \nCopyright Notice \n© European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), 201 5 \nReproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. \nISBN: 978-92-9204-122-9, doi 10.2824/508412 \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-fc93b94f6ba7", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 286 }, { "chunk_id": "0c1b1e06479d4bae44897f0995ed4c14", "text": "Page iii \nExecutive summary \nSmall and medium size en terprises (SMEs) are an important driver for innovation and growth in the \nEU. SMEs also stand to gain the most from cloud computing, because it is complicated and costly for \nthem to set-up and run ICT in the traditional way. SMEs do not always understand all the information \nsecurity risks and opportunities of cloud computing. This document aims to provide guidance for small \nand medium size enterprises (SMEs) about the network information security of cloud computing. It is \nimportant that SMEs do not only look at the network and information security risks of cloud computing \nbut also at the opportunities to improve their network and information security. This document \ncontains 3 main parts: \n First, we highlight 11 security opportunities, explaining why certain features of cloud \ncomputing could present an opportunity for SMEs. We make a brief comparison also with \ntraditional IT deployments. \n Secondly, we list 11 security risks SMEs should take into account when adopting cloud \ncomputing. We compare also the risks with typical traditional IT deployments. \n Thirdly, we provide a list of the 12 most important security questions SMEs could use to \nunderstand better what are the security aspects of a cloud service when procuring a cloud \nservice or when assessing differen t options in the market. The security questions address \nboth the risks and the opportunities. \nIn an annex the SME can find empty forms to use for assessing risks, assessing opportunities and \ncollecting relevant information about the security aspects of a cloud service: a security cheat sheet. \nRisks and opportunities can be very different for different SMEs. A lot depends on the type of cloud \nservice, the kind of data and processes involved, and other. Still to provide some practical examples \nwe elaborate two specific scenarios where an SME is a cloud customer: \n● ConsultLess, a 20 people consultancy firm, which wants to implement email and document \nmanagement as a SaaS cloud service. \n● EasyAgriSelling, a 10 people technology startup, which wants to run their webshop platform \n(for farmers to create e-shops to sell their produce) on top of a IaaS/PaaS cloud service. \nAlthough not the focus of this document we address the issue of legal compliance briefly. We touch \nupon the main concepts of EU personal data protection legislation and we provide some pointers to \nrelevant information. \nThis guide for SMEs updates the 2009 ENISA Cloud Computing Risk Assessment for SMEs and the 2009 \nENISA Assurance Framework. We have deliberately consolidated the risks and reduced the number of \nsecurity questions to make it more suitable for SMEs, with limited time and resources to go into a lot \nof details. It is important to stress that this guideline should not be seen as a replacement for the \nSME’s own risk assessment. Security meas ures should be appropriate to the risks; not always gold -\nplated solutions are necessary. \nSince 2009 the cloud computing market has changed significantly. There are now many SMEs, \nenterprises and government organizations who use some form of cloud computing. Cloud computing \nhas now become the backbone of the EU’s digital economy. Cloud services offered by providers are \nmore mature, there is more choice, there is more information for customers and customers are more \naware of the possibilities and limitations of cloud computing. \nAt the same time a number of issues have remained problematic, such as personal data protection \nlegislation and the impact of foreign jurisdiction. In 2012, the European Commission issue d the EU \ncloud strategy aiming to address a number of these issues. The strategy is an important initiative and \nthe first results are currently being delivered. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-fc93b94f6ba7", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 979 }, { "chunk_id": "5dc7ce2efb3f62c5941af05d70057db0", "text": "Page iv \nTable of Contents \nExecutive summary ......................................................................................................... iii \n1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 \n2 Cloud Computing Basics ............................................................................................. 3 \n3 Network and information security opportunities ....................................................... 5 \n4 Network and information security risks ................................................................... 12 \n5 Security questions ................................................................................................... 20 \n6 Conclusions and Outlook ......................................................................................... 26 \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015\n\nPage 1", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-fc93b94f6ba7", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "Introduction / Préambule", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > Introduction / Préambule", "token_count": 246 }, { "chunk_id": "a94e312d283060b3c4e5afe1dda92b6f", "text": "1 Introduction\n\nThis guide aims to help SMEs understand the network and information security risks and opportunities \nthey should take into account when using cloud computing. This guide contains a list of 11 se curity \nopportunities for network and information security (see Section 3) and a list of 11 network and \ninformation security risks SMEs (see Section 4) . These lists of opportunities and risks can be used \ndirectly by SMEs when they procure cloud services. For two specific fictitious scenarios we rate the \nrisks and opportunities: An SME using SaaS for email and documents (see Annex B) and an SME using \nIaaS/PaaS for running a webshop platform (see Annex C). This guide also contain s a list of security \nquestions SMEs can use to understand the main features of the cloud service most relevant for \nnetwork and informations security (see Section 5) . Annex D contains empty forms for use during \nprocurement. Although not the focus of the this guide, we address legal compliance and provide some \npointers to information about personal data protection legislation in Annex A. \nScope \nNetwork and information security \nThis document focusses on network and information security risks and opportunities; not other issues \nlike legal compliance, legislation, contractual issues. In the annexes we briefly address personal data \nprotection legislation, just to point to some relevant concepts and information. \nCloud relevant \nThis document focuses on the risks and opportunities which are relevant for an SME to consider. These \nopportunities and risks are not specific for cloud computing but may pertain to other types of ICT. \nCloud customers \nWe focus on SMEs in the role of customers of cloud services, not on providers. \nTarget audience \nThis guide is aimed at micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs )1. SMEs often have few IT or \ninformation security experts and it is infeasible for SMEs to negotiate with providers about custom \nfeatures or custom contracts. SMEs typically buy standardized (off the shelf) services under fixed \n(boilerplate) contracts and SLAs. This document will be useful also for other small organisations, like \ngovernment agencies. \nMethodology \nThis guide has been created in close collaboration with the ENISA Cloud Security and Resilience expert \ngroup (public sector, private sector and industry association) , based on the 2009 ENISA risk \nassessment guide. The risks and opportunities have been extensively cross checked and reviewed by \nsubject matter experts. \nDisclaimer about examples \nIn this document we sometimes give examples of past incidents. It is not our intention to single out \nspecific services or specific providers for praise or criticism. \n \n1 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 2 \nPolicy Context: the European Cloud Strategy \nIn 2012, the European Commission (EC) published its cloud computing strategy2, called \"Unleashing \nthe potential of cloud computing in Europe”. The EU cloud strategy is designed to support the uptale \nof cloud computing across the EU. It centres around three key actions:", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-0f6bef956fe0", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1 Introduction", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 1 Introduction", "token_count": 831 }, { "chunk_id": "07097700085515566e837101ef73bdcf", "text": "2. Safe and fair contract terms and SLAs, and a\n\n3. Setting up a European cloud partnership to promote cloud computing adoption in the EU. \nThe EU Cloud strategy and the vision produced by the European Cloud Partnership both stress the \nimportance of facilitating the adoption of cloud computing by SMEs, because they stand to gain most \nfrom cloud computing and they are an important driver for innovation and growth in the EU. \nThe ex-vice president of the EU’s Digital Agenda, Miss Kroes, said explicitly: “These issues [blocking \nadoption of cloud computing] are particularly troublesome for smalle r companies, which stand to \nbenefit the most from the Cloud, but do not have a lot of spending power, nor resources for individual \nnegotiations with Cloud suppliers”. \nENISA has supported several actions under the EU cloud strategy: ENISA participated in the working \ngroup on cloud standardisation led by ETSI3. ENISA works with the EC and industry to create a list of \ncloud certification schemes4. ENISA also works in a working group which aims to clarify and harmonize \nCloud SLAs5. \nEarlier drafts of this document have been developed as part of the activities of the European Cloud \nPartnership, by F-Secure Corporation (http://www.f-secure.com). \nPast ENISA work \nSince 2009 ENISA has engaged with the cloud industry and potential cloud customers and published a \nseries of reports on cloud computing. Generally speaking ENISA supports the uptake of cloud \ncomputing because of the many opportunities the technology offers to improve network and \ninformation security. These are particularly relevant for SMEs which do not always have the resources \nand/or skills to implement state-of-the-art network and information security. Explaining the security \nopportunities (and the risks) of cloud computing is therefore an important objective for ENISA. \nThis document is based on previous ENISA work. In particular it updates two previous documents: \n● The 2009 ENISA Cloud computing risk assessment, which lists opportunities and risks when \nadopting cloud computing6. \n● The 2009 ENISA Assurance framework for cloud computing, which provides a list of questions \nfor SMEs to ask when procuring cloud services7. \nWe have consolidated the risks and reduced the number of security questions in the 2009 publications \nto make it more suitable for SMEs, with limited time and resources to go into a lot of details. \n \n \n2 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/european-cloud-computing-strategy \n3 http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/standards-cloud-neelie-kroess-blog \n4 http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kroes/en/content/making-cloud-more-transparent-boost-secure-trustworthy-services \n5 https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2014/07/articles/european-commission-issues-cloud-service-level-agreement-standardization-\nguidelines/ \n6 https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/risk-management/files/deliverables/cloud-computing-risk-assessment \n7 https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/risk-management/files/deliverables/cloud-computing-information-assurance-framework \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 3", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-1252f0b33ab9", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2. Safe and fair contract terms and SLAs, and a", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 2. Safe and fair contract terms and SLAs, and a", "token_count": 818 }, { "chunk_id": "dff766e395b9653ede3b7f21ec67fdc9", "text": "2 Cloud Computing Basics\n\nIn this section the three basic types of cloud services are introduced and the different division of \nsecurity tasks is explained. \nOne can distinguish among three different types of cloud services, each involving different types of \nassets: \n \nFigure 1: Asset in cloud computing \nWe go over the diagram from left to right: \n● Infrastructure as a Service : In IaaS the provider delivers computing resources (virtual \nhardware), accessible online. The software providing access to the resources is called the \nhypervisor. Generally speaking there are two types of resources: processing power (including \nnetwork resources) , and (block) storage (memory resou rces). Examples include Amazon’s \nElastic Compute Cloud, Google’s Compute Engine, Amazon Simple Storage Service, Dropbox, \nRackspace, etc. Note that object storage services (e.g. Dropbox) are often considered a SaaS. \n● Platform as a Service: In PaaS, the provider delivers a platform, or more precisely, application \nservers, for customers to run applications on . PaaS providers sometimes provide a software \ndevelopment tool for the platform. Examples of applications running on these platforms are \nscripts (PHP, Py thon, e.g.) or byte code (Java servlets, C#). Examples include Google App \nengine, Microsoft Azure, Amazon Elastic Beanstalk, etc. \n● Software as a Service: In SaaS, the provider delivers full-fledged software or applications, via \nthe internet. Applications range from email servers, document editors, customer relationship \nmanagement systems, and so on. SaaS services can often be accessed with a browser or a web \nservices client. Note that it is not uncommon for SaaS providers to run their applications on \nan IaaS or PaaS from another provider. An example is the video streaming site Netflix (SaaS) \nwhich runs on Amazon AWS computing services (PaaS/IaaS). \n● Facilities denote the physical structures and supplies such as networks, cooling, power, etc. \n● Organisation denotes the human resources, the policies and procedures for maintaining the \nfacilities and supporting the delivery of the services. \n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 4 \nIn cloud computing delivery of ICT resources is, to some extent, outsourced to the cloud provider. Also \nsome of the security tasks (such as monitoring, pa tching, incident response) are outsourced. \nDepending on the type of cloud service some tasks remain under the responsibility of the customer, \nwhile other tasks remain under the responsibility of the provider. Division of responsibilities can some \ntimes be a major source of problems as it was based on assumptions and poorly documented, leading \nto overlaps and gaps. This however seem to become extinct since SLAs have become more \nsophisticated documents and specify this information . For example, in IaaS/PaaS the customers run \ntheir own code on top of the cloud service, and often remain responsible for this (application) \nsoftware. In SaaS, on the other hand, the application software is usually8 under control of the provider. \nIn the d iagram below we illustrate how the division of certain security tasks can be different for \ndifferent cloud services (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS). \n \nSaaS\nPaaS\nIaaS\nCustomerProvider\nManage user accounts, user permissions, etc.\nManage and protect supplies and facilities (power, cooling, cabling, guards, etc. ) \nDeploy, update and \npatch application \nsoftware. \nDeploy and maintain hardware (server racks, disks, routers, cables, etc. )\nDeploy, update and patch application software.\nDeploy, update and \npatch OS\nDeploy, update and patch application server\nDeploy, update and patch OS \nFigure 2: Outsourcing of tasks is different for different types of services \nNote that this diagram is for illustration and does not provide an exhaustive list of security processes \nat the providers side or the customers side. In specific settings there may be specific agreements about \nthe outsourcing of security tasks. An IaaS provider, for example, might have a service for patching the \nOperating System (OS) of customers. Sometimes such services are offered by a third-party (and this is \nalso known as SECurity-As-A-Service). See the next section about opportunities. See also the annex for \nexamples of security tasks in two fictitious scenarios. \nIn practice for SMEs , it is important to carefully assess which security tasks are outsourced to the \nprovider and which security tasks remain under their own responsibility. It is not uncommon for SMEs \nto be confused about their responsibilities concerning security, for example, who makes backups of \ndata or software, which type of failover/redundancy is offered by the provider and what needs to be \ndone still by the customer. \n \n \n8 Barring cases where customers have some liberty to run additional software, on top -of-the service, like third-\nparty apps, add-ons, or self-created code. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 5", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-49b5c508c5f2", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2 Cloud Computing Basics", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 2 Cloud Computing Basics", "token_count": 1292 }, { "chunk_id": "034b1f708824d062d0cb6068e541fdd5", "text": "3 Network and information security opportunities\n\nCloud computing can be used by SMEs for a range of different applications (email, corporate website, \nCRM, CMS, internal payroll processing, archiving of internal corporate documents , etc). Fo r SMEs \ncloud computing can offer many business advantages: Cloud services are typically “pay as you go”, \nwhich may be an attractive cost structure for an SME, avoiding an upfront investment in hardware, \nsoftware and IT experts . The overall costs when implementing are often lower than the cost when \ngoing with traditional IT solutions . Online collaboration is often easier in the cloud case as access is \nwarranted to users from various physical locations, and various end-user devices etc. \nThere are also opportunities for netwo rk and information security. Generally speaking large cloud \ncomputing providers can of fer advanced security measures, while spreading the associated costs \nacross several customers. In some cases this means that fundamental security settings might be \n‘shared’ between costumers and might not be customisable but it also translates to a number of \nspecific security opportunities . Below we highlight 11 specific opportunities for the network and \ninformation security of SMEs:", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-85d097a2a5fc", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3 Network and information security opportunities", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3 Network and information security opportunities", "token_count": 315 }, { "chunk_id": "8ffaea3fd2cb5aeeab169f8eaebd96ac", "text": "Network and information security opportunities \nO1: Geographic spread \nO2: Elasticity \nO3: Standard formats and interfaces \nO4: Physical security \nO5: Incident response around-the-clock \nO6: Software development \nO7: Patching and updating \nO8: Backups \nO9: Server-side storage \nO10: Security-as-a-service and security add-ons \nO11: Certification and compliance", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-85d097a2a5fc", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3 Network and information security opportunities", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3 Network and information security opportunities", "token_count": 90 }, { "chunk_id": "ca81c5f73dc075f4a4ad4dde923593d4", "text": "The rest of this section goes over each opportunity, explaining briefly why this could present an \nopportunity for an SME. For each opportunity a comparison with traditional IT deployments exists and \npoints the reader to the relevant security questions in Section 6, which can be used in a procurement \nprocess. \nAs every SME is different, not all of these security opportunities are important to the same degree for \nall customers. Note that this report does not provide a rating or a ranking of the opportunities. In \nannex two specific (fictitious) scenarios , are examined and rating of the opportunities takes place \nusing the following scale: \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-85d097a2a5fc", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3 Network and information security opportunities", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3 Network and information security opportunities", "token_count": 188 }, { "chunk_id": "5cedcbaf9f57a2f7651127c39e0c3f16", "text": "Page 6 \n- Small opportunity: Customer could exploit this opportunity, but benefits would be limited. \n- Medium opportunity: Customer should exploit this \nopportunity, because benefits would be significant. \n- Large opportunity: Customer must exploit this \nopportunity, as there would be crucial benefits.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-85d097a2a5fc", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3 Network and information security opportunities", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3 Network and information security opportunities", "token_count": 77 }, { "chunk_id": "b1f4b99b2fb2346394f8816443d9bb49", "text": "O1: Geographic spread \nCloud computing datacentres are often spread out across different geographic regions, nationally or \nglobally. Geographic spread can provide resiliency against regional issues and local disasters such as \nstorms, earthquakes, or cable cuts. It can also be used \nto mitigate certain Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, \nallowing customers to get access at other locations. \nGeographic spread can help reduce network latency, \nbecause the services are provided from sites closer to \nthe customer. This could improve the overall \navailability and performance of the service. \nIt should be stressed here that not all cloud services \ncome with geographic spread , and that sometimes it is available but needs to be first \nconfigured/requested by the customer specifically. Depending on the settings this might involve extra \ncosts, because data synchronization across two remote sites requires network bandwidth, computing \npower and storage. \nSee security question SQ 3 (in Section 6). \nO2: Elasticity \nCloud computing providers can use la rge data centres \nwith large amounts of spare resources, to be able to \nrespond to rapid changes in resource usage, peak usage, \nand Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. \nIt should be noted here that not all cloud services offer \nthe same kind of elasticity. There may be limits on \nresource consumption set by the provider or the \ncustomer. In some settings elasticity may need to be \nconfigured/requested specifically by the customer , and \nmay increase costs. \nSee SQ11. \nCloud versus traditional IT: In traditional \nIT deployments an SME would have to set \nup an additional remote site, sometimes \neven doubling the costs for IT facilities. \nCloud versus traditional IT: In \ntraditional IT deployments a SME \nwould need to invest in spare resources \nto accommodate peak usage, yielding \nhigh costs and inefficiency (because \nthese resources would be unused most \nof the time).\n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-85d097a2a5fc", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3 Network and information security opportunities", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3 Network and information security opportunities", "token_count": 512 }, { "chunk_id": "2bd86fbcad4b7b3f2f86bea7733f4aad", "text": "Page 7 \nO3: Standard formats and interfaces \nThe idea of cloud computing is to offer one service to \nmany customers at once. This means that in practice \ncloud services are often compliant with industry-wide \nstandards. For example, most PaaS providers offer \nstandard PHP application servers and many SaaS \nproviders implement standard interfaces based on \nstandards like XML and JSON (JavaScript Object \nNotation). This means that cloud services can be more \neasily integrated with other services, or ported to other \nplatforms. This is a security opportunity because it \nfacilitates backup, failover, and integration with existing \nsecurity tools the customer may use, for example monitoring tools. \nIt should be noted here that while most cloud providers use standard interfaces and data formats, this \nis not always the case. Customers should ask which standards are used. \nSee SQ 10, SQ 11. \nO4: Physical security \nIn case the business model of the SME includes shared \nresources requirements then physical security is indeed \nan opportunity when using cloud. Resource \nconcentration makes physical security relatively cheap. If \nthe costs of physical security measures, such as perimeter \nprotection, 24/7 guards, alarm systems, camera \nsurveillance, automated fire extinguishers etc., can be \nshared with many customers then the cost per customer \nis low. In practice this means that cloud providers can \noffer state-of-the-art physical security measures which drastically reduce the risk of physical theft of \nservers, disks and equipment, fires, floods, etc. \nSee SQ 1, SQ 3, SQ 6. \nO5: Incident response around-the-clock \nSecurity incidents can happen at any time of the day or \nnight. To ensure continuity most cloud providers \ncontinuously monitor their services around-the-clock and \nhave response capabilities standing by to react to failures \nor attacks. Having personnel ready 24/7 is costly, but i n \ncloud computing these security measures become \naffordable for customers because the costs are shared \nwith many customers. \nNote that cloud providers do not always monitor and respond to all types of security incidents which \ncould affect a cloud service or a cloud c ustomer. Customers should check which kind of security \nincidents are monitored and responded to, and what kind of response actions will be undertaken by \nthe provider, to understand what remains to be done by the customer. \nSee SQ 1, SQ 2, SQ 3. \nCloud versus traditional IT: In \ntraditional IT deployments SMEs often \nuse non -standard custom \nconfigurations and proprietary \nprotocols, because of a lack of expertise \nand the ( sometimes) higher costs of \nimplementing standards. \nCompared with traditional IT: In \ntraditional IT deployments even a \nstandard security measure like a guard \non premise 24/7, would be too costly \nfor an SME. \nCloud versus traditional IT: In \ntraditional IT deployments, an SME \nwould have to invest a lot to have a \n24/7 incident response capability. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-85d097a2a5fc", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3 Network and information security opportunities", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3 Network and information security opportunities", "token_count": 773 }, { "chunk_id": "a73af761566b9ad3e62ebff886806599", "text": "Page 8 \nO6: Secure software development \nSecure software development is not easy and \nrequires a lot of time and investment in people, \ntools, and processes. Even building a simple \nwebsite is rife with security pitfalls. A sec ure \nsoftware development pipeline ( unit tests, \ncontinuous integration, penetration and security \ntests, load tests, and most importantly, skilled and \ntrained software programmers) is not easy to set -\nup and maintain. To build custom software, securely, is expensive, and outsourcing software coding is \nnot always cheap or easy either. \nBecause of their scale, cloud providers can afford to invest in secure software development, spreading \nthese high costs across many customers. Customers may lose some flexibility in terms of \ncustomization, but they reduce the risk of software vulnerabilities in code they developed. \nNote that not all cloud software is developed securely . Some providers may have bad development \npractices. Other providers may use third-party software (proprietary or open source), over which they \nhave limited control. Customers should assess which software is developed by the provider and how \nthe provider ensures secure software development. \nSee SQ 1, SQ 7, SQ 8. \nO7: Patching and updating \nTimely patching and updating of software is crucial for security as attackers need only a small window \nto attack and exploit a discovered vulnerability. Particularly when standard, off-the-shelf software is \nused, cyber criminals pay particular attention to \nprovider patches and often try to reverse engineer \na patch in order to exploit the underlying \nvulnerability; and this can happen in a matter of \nhours. In fact, many cyber-attacks exploit the fact \nthat organisations are slow to update and patch \nsystems. Due to their scale, and because they \ndeliver the same software to all customers, c loud \nproviders can automate patching and updating to \na high degree. They can set up procedures and \ntools which automatically 9 deploy timely patches \nand updates, reducing the window in which \nsystems can be exploited by attackers. \nNote that not all the software relevant to the customer is always patched and updated by the provider. \nParticularly in IaaS and PaaS, the customer runs its own software on top of the cloud infrastructure \nand the customer usually remains responsible for patching and updating it. Customers should ask who \npatches and updates the relevant software in their setting. \nSee SQ 7, SQ 8, SQ 9.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-85d097a2a5fc", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3 Network and information security opportunities", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3 Network and information security opportunities", "token_count": 623 }, { "chunk_id": "546f2ac208607478f64c91ca58f4ad9d", "text": "9 Note that in some settings automated patching and updating might break functionality, especially when customers are \nusing services or APIs in a non-standard way, or when customers run their code on top of a cloud services, like in IaaS/PaaS. \nOf course this is also an issue in traditional IT deployments, and often the reason for delays in patching and updating. \nCloud versus traditional IT: In traditional IT \ndeployments, if off -the-shelf software \ncannot be used, then an SME would need to \ninvest significant resources in a secure \nsoftware development. \nCloud versus traditional IT: In traditional IT \ndeployments, SMEs often need to dedicate a \nlot of time and resources to patch and update \ntheir software. Even then they are often late. \nThe fact that traditional IT deployments are \noften not industry -standard further \ncomplicates updating/patching because of \nincompatibility issues. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-85d097a2a5fc", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3 Network and information security opportunities", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3 Network and information security opportunities", "token_count": 251 }, { "chunk_id": "bcc85e8c6537620740c1c55c10803eaa", "text": "Page 9 \nO8: Backups \nFor an SME, m aking backups, across a range of applications and d evices, and restoring them when \nneeded, can be difficult and time -consuming. Cloud providers can implement tools to automate \ncreation and testing of backupsand offer advanced backup \nrestore solutions, allowing customers to roll -back mistakes \nand errors qui ckly. Additionally, i n many cloud usage \nscenarios software applications are implemented as online \n(client-server) applications (as opposed to running stand -\nalone on clients). This reduces the amount of data that is on \nthe end-user device, simplifying backups. \nBackups in the cloud (between cloud data centres) require \nboth storage and network bandwidth and in some settings cloud providers do not provide backups \nautomatically of all data, for free. Customers should assess which backups are made by the provide r \nand if they need to implement or request additional back-up mechanisms. \nSee SQ 3. \nO9: Server-side storage \nIn many settings, SMEs have a range of mobile (and less mobile) end-user devices which are relatively \nvulnerable to theft, loss, physical damage, etc. These threats can easily have a big impact on the assets \nof an SME. Especially when dealing with mobile devices, it is \nnot always easy to keep timely backups of data ( due to \nconnectivity andbandwidth issues), nor to cryptographically \nprotect the device components, from physical acc ess to \ndevice storage (i.e. after loss or theft), nor to control access \nto devices with strong authentication etc. Cloud computing \ncan mitigate some of these risks. Using cloud services SMEs \ncan reduce the amount of data on the end-user devices. For \nexample, using cloud -based email, SMEs can reduce the \namount of corporate data on end-user devices, meaning that \nless data is at stake when something goes wrong with end-user devices. \nCustomers should assess which data is stored server-side, and client-side. \nSee SQ 8. \nO10: Security-as-a-service and security add-ons \nAs discussed in the previous section, some security tasks \nremain with the customer, particularly in the case of IaaS \nand PaaS. In cloud computing it is often more easy to \noutsource some of these security tasks to third -parties or \nthe provider (if it offers such services). For example, an SME \nrunning custom software on an IaaS platform, could get a \nthird-party to patch its OS regularly detect and respond to \nsecurity incidents by isolating and replacing infected hosts \ninstantly. Such security-as-a-service would be much harder \nto implement in a traditional IT deployment , typically \nrequiring physical access to the premises. \nCloud versus traditional IT: In a \ntraditional IT deployment, an SME \nneed to dedicate time and resources \nto backups leading to high costs. \nCloud versus traditional IT: In \ntraditional IT deployments it is often \nharder for an SME to use security-as-\na-service because often in such \nsettings access to the SME’s \npremises would be needed, or at the \nvery least a high -bandwidth \nconnection. \nCloud versus traditional IT: Often in \ntraditional IT there is a significant \namount of data on end -user \ndevices, which further complicates \nback-ups. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015\n\nPage 10", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-85d097a2a5fc", "chunk_index": 8, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3 Network and information security opportunities", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3 Network and information security opportunities", "token_count": 829 }, { "chunk_id": "cee752e748620bf3972f6f6cbbd3e603", "text": "There are cloud providers who provide a range of additional security services (such as patching \nsoftware), sometimes partnering with specialized (third-party) firms, enabling customers to procure \nadditional security services in an easy way. \nSee SQ 2. \nO11: Certification and compliance \nIn cloud computing one cloud service is offered to many \ncustomers at on ce. Certification, by independent auditors, \nagainst network and information security standards (like \nISO27001 certification 10), could be used by customers to \nfulfil their own compliance obligation. An aud itor, when \nassessing compliance of an SME, would not have to check all \nthe assets underlying the cloud services , by using existing \ncompliance certificates for the cloud services they use. \nNote that there may be standards or compliance processes \nwhich are not cloud-ready. For example there may be settings where auditors need physical access to \nICT assets, which (in a cloud computing scenario) might be impossible or infeasible because cloud \nproviders may not always allow all sorts of audits of and visits to their datacentres11. \nUse SQ 1. \nUnderstanding opportunities with security questions \nFor each opportunity we point the reader to relevant security questions in Section 6, which can be \nused in a procurement process, to understand if and how opportunities can be used.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-85d097a2a5fc", "chunk_index": 9, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3 Network and information security opportunities", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3 Network and information security opportunities", "token_count": 341 }, { "chunk_id": "6228424044e1d1c61d7b1dbae899880c", "text": "Network and information security opportunities Relevant security questions \nO1: Geographic spread SQ 3 \nO2: Elasticity SQ 11 \nO3: Standard formats and interfaces SQ 10, SQ 11 \nO4: Physical security SQ 1, SQ 3, SQ 5, SQ 6 \nO5: Incident response around-the-clock SQ 1, SQ 2, SQ 3 \nO6: Software development SQ 1, SQ 7, SQ 8 \nO7: Patching and updating SQ 7, SQ 8, SQ 9 \nO8: Backups SQ 3 \nO9: Server-side storage SQ 8", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-85d097a2a5fc", "chunk_index": 10, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3 Network and information security opportunities", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3 Network and information security opportunities", "token_count": 103 }, { "chunk_id": "e2edf195340b4931443dada52a218619", "text": "10 As one of the actions under the EU cloud strategy, an expert working group (C-SIG), together with the EC and \nENISA developed an overview of, for potential cloud computing customers, relevant certification schemes, which \ncan be found at https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/cloud-computing-certification.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-85d097a2a5fc", "chunk_index": 11, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3 Network and information security opportunities", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3 Network and information security opportunities", "token_count": 76 }, { "chunk_id": "7cee098bf147130986c87b22681272b6", "text": "11 For reasons of security or logistics.\n\nCloud versus traditional IT: In \ntraditional IT deployments, an \nauditor would have to cover all the \nICT assets and check comp liance to \nstandards or policies from scratch, \nyielding high costs for SMEs. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 11 \nO10: Security-as-a-service and security add-ons SQ 2 \nO11: Certification and compliance SQ 1 \n \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 12", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-a9506a60f0a3", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11 For reasons of security or logistics.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 11 For reasons of security or logistics.", "token_count": 145 }, { "chunk_id": "d7b2189628e85c6aad0c54797e2bdbbd", "text": "4 Network and information security risks\n\nIn this section we look at 11 important security risks which should be taken into account by SMEs: \n \nNetwork and information security risks \nR1: Software security vulnerabilities \nR2: Network attacks \nR3: Social engineering attacks \nR4: Management GUI and API compromise \nR5: Device theft/loss \nR6: Physical hazards \nR7: Overloads \nR8: Unexpected costs \nR9: Vendor lock-in \nR10: Administrative or legal outages \nR11: Foreign jurisdiction issues \nFor each ri sk we refer the reader to relevant security questions (section 5) to answer during \nprocurement of a cloud service. Th ese questions should help customers understand if certain risks \nneed to be addressed. \nIn this section the risks are are not ranked or rated, because risks depend on the specific setting (the \ntype of SME, the type of cloud service, the data or processes involved, and other). \nIn annex two (fictitious) scenarios are analysed, rating the risks using the product of likelih ood and \nthe impact of a threat (following the ISO 27005 12 standard on risk management). The scale used is \ndepicted in the figure below, and ranges from 1 to 5: very low (1), low (2), medium (3), high (4), very \nhigh (5). \nBlack is used to \nindicate threats \nwhich are rare but \ncould have high \nimpact. These risks \n(also called “black \nswans”) should be \nhandled with care \nbecause the \norganisation often \nhas little hands -on \nexperience in \ndealing with these \nincidents. \n \n12 http://www.iso27001security.com/html/27005.html \n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 13 \nR1: Software security vulnerabilities \nSoftware vulnerabilities in cloud software could have a major impact on customers. For example if an \nSME uses a SaaS email service, which is vulnerable to SQL injection, then this vulnerability could lead \nto a breach of confidentiality of the customer’s emails, severely damaging the SME’s reputation. \nIt is important to understand who is responsible for which \nsoftware component. In the case of SaaS, all the \nresponsibility for preventing software vulnerabilities is \nwith the provider. In IaaS/PaaS, however, the customer is \nresponsible for the software it runs on top of IaaS/PaaS, \nbarring any special arrangements13. \nRemark on isolation failures 14: Certain types of software \nvulnerabilities could lead to one customer getting access to \nanother customer’s data, eithe r directly or via a side -\nchannel: these vulnearbilities are called isolation failures15. \nIn non-cloud settings, isolation failures are less of an issue \nsince there is no co-tenancy. \nEspecially if sensitive data is involved, it is important to ask \nthe right questions regarding softwar e security. Some well -known SaaS providers are among the \nlargest companies in the world, and they boost a great track record and advanced security measures. \nBut this does not imply that all SaaS providers always do a great job at software security . One \ncomplicating factor is that cloud software vulnerabilities become more attractive to attackers/hackers \nto exploit, because this would allow them to attack many customers at once. \nSee security question SQ 7 (in Section 6). \nExample: In 2011 a large SaaS provider deployed new software, which had unknown for the \ntime vulnerabilities causing an isolation failure that was effectively allowing users to log into \naccounts using any password. The bug was alive for approximately 4 hours16. \nR2: Network attacks \nCloud computing services are consumed and managed \nvia internet connections. This means that customers \nneed to be aware of the risk of network attacks, like \nspoofing websites, sniffing/eavesdropping network \ntraffic, Denial -of-Service attacks, man-in-the-middle \nattacks, pharming, wiretapping, etc., on the normal end-\nuser interfa ces, as well management/administrator \ninterfaces, application programming interfaces ( APIs), \nwebservices. \nSee SQ 8.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-257c9fdf0c5e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4 Network and information security risks", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 4 Network and information security risks", "token_count": 1016 }, { "chunk_id": "8dff26fbd1985196bb5be7f251af1de1", "text": "13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.\n\n14 This type of failure (Isolation failure) was separately mentioned in ENISA’s 2009 risk assessment. \n15 An example of an isolation failure is described at : http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2011/06/21/dropbox-\nlets-anyone-log-in-as-anyone/ \n16 http://techcrunch.com/2011/06/20/dropbox-security-bug-made-passwords-optional-for-four-hours/ \nCloud versus traditional IT: Cloud \nservice providers (using economies of \nscale) can implement advanced \nprocesses to develop, deploy and \nmaintain software, which reduces the \nlikelihood of software vulnerabilities. \nIn traditional IT deployments it is \nexpensive for an SME to set up s tate-\nof-the-art processes for software \ndevelopment and maintenance. \nCloud versus traditional IT: In \ntraditional IT, key systems like servers \nare typic ally managed locally, on -\npremise, which reduces the risk of \nnetwork attacks on administrative \ninterfaces. Many organisations \nprovide online access to services, so a \nnumber of these network attacks are \nalso a risk in traditional IT. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-1f9101bdad48", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "token_count": 303 }, { "chunk_id": "c89c16fbe84059b63bf7e9f408f76982", "text": "Page 14 \nExample: DDoS attacks on one customer of a large (SaaS) reverse proxy and DNS service, had a \nsevere impact on the internet connections for many other users , affecting their use of cloud \nservices. 17 \nR3: Social engineering attacks \nIn cloud computing, some administrative processes, like issuing user credentials, do not happen face-\nto-face between colleagues, but online via emails and websites . This increases the risk of social \nengineering attacks, in which an attacker fakes communication or information so it appears to come \nfrom a trusted source, like the cloud provider, etc. For example an attacker might try to impersonate \na customer and initiate a “credential recovery ” \nprocess, which eventually allows the attacker to \naccess the customer’s account, and access or delete \nall the customer data. Or, vice versa, attackers might \ntry to impersonate the provider and in this way \nobtain the customer’s credentials (aka phishing). \nAttackers may target normal users, or users with \nhigh-privilege rol es, such as software developers, \nsystem administrators, managers, both on the cloud \nprovider’s and the customer’s side. \nSMEs should take into account the risk of social \nengineering, such a s phishing/spear-phishing, \nspoofing, etc. and assess the potential impact on the \ndata and processes. \nSee SQ 8 \nExample: Famously a journalist from Wired (a technology magazine) wrote about his ordeal when, \nan attacker, using a social engineering attack, managed to access his (SaaS) email account. Using \nthe email account, the attacker hacked also other accounts of the victim and wiped data from his \ndevices.18 \nR4: Management interface compromise \nMost cloud services offer the customer a management interface, which give administrators access to \na a large number of assets; in the case of SaaS, all the user accounts of the SMEs employees for \nexample, or in the case of Iaa S/PaaS, all the different virtual machines and applications of the SME. \nSometimes the cloud service. If an attacker can get access to this interface then damage can be big for \nan SME. \nCustomers should verify that providers offer secure \ninterfaces with goo d authentication and \nauthorization mechanisms, particularly for high -\nprivilege role like administrators. Additionally, \ncustomers should take into account the security of \nPCs and browsers used by administrators and high -\nprivilege roles, because if attackers get control of", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-1f9101bdad48", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "token_count": 614 }, { "chunk_id": "bed493b31f412834dfba340461b60130", "text": "17 http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-ddos-that-almost-broke-the-internet/ \n18 http://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/all/ \nCloud versus traditional IT: Social \nengineering is an issue also in traditional IT \ndeployments. In a way social engineering is \ntechnology-agnostic. However, it must be \nsaid that in traditional IT a number of \ncritical processes (like credential recovery, \netc) are often carried o ut face -to-face. So \ncustomer should take extra care, \nparticularly to prevent attacks on \nadministrator’s interfaces. \nCloud versus traditional IT: In traditional \nIT interfaces are often only accessible \nfrom the local company network and from \nlocal workstati ons, which provides some \nprotection against phishing and spoofing. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-1f9101bdad48", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "token_count": 216 }, { "chunk_id": "c34b600a3a3363065ae31edad2e2d8c3", "text": "Page 15 \nthose, then they could by-pass some protection measures taken by the provider \nSee SQ7, SQ 8, SQ 9. \nExample: A company, offering code backup and code repositories (as a SaaS) for software \ndevelopers, stopped its operations permanently when an attacker had deleted virtual machines, \nstorage volumes and backup data via the cloud management interface 19. \nR5: Device theft or loss \nOne of the defining characteristics of cloud computing, and key advantages, is accessibility from both \nfixed and mobile devices, PCs, tablets, smartphones, and so on. This introduces also some new risks. \nMobile devices are relatively vulnerable to theft and loss. Theft and loss could mean data and/or \nauthentication credentials on the devices could get stolen by attackers. \nA complicating factor, for SMEs, is the trend bring -\nyour-own-device (BYOD), which means that \nemployees use different types of devices , not fully \nunder control of the SME’s IT experts. Features like \nscreenlock, disk and storage media encryption, and \nmany more may work differently on different types \nof devices. \nCloud customer s should assess which data and \nauthentication credentials are stored on end -user \ndevices, and ensure that device theft/loss is \nmitigated, by using backups, encryption, data minimization, etc. \nSee SQ 3, SQ 8 \nR6: Physical hazards \nNatural disasters like floods, earthquakes, or fires, can affect the customer’s ICT asset, or the data \ncentres and infrastructure of a cloud provider. In cloud computing, customers might be affected by \nnatural disasters occurring far away from their own premises. \nNote that IaaS/PaaS cus tomers might need to \nspecify if and which data centres will be used as \nfailover. \nSMEs should have a business continuity strategy \nwhich addresses the risk of physical hazards. As \npart of this strategy, customers should ask which \nmeasures are in place to protect the cloud service \nfrom physical hazards. C ustomers might need to \nconsider backing up their data regularly, in a \nstandard format, to be able to migrate to another \ndatacenter or another provider when needed. \nSee SQ 1, SQ 2, SQ 3, SQ 5, SQ 10.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-1f9101bdad48", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "token_count": 539 }, { "chunk_id": "1c41403595863b9f0e0d3c6a537a6e9c", "text": "19 http://www.networkcomputing.com/cloud-infrastructure/code-spaces-a-lesson-in-cloud-backup/a/d-\nid/1279116 \nCloud versus traditional IT: In traditional \nICT deployments the impact of device \ntheft/loss is typically higher, because there \nis more code and data on end-user devices. \nAt the same time mobile devices are less \ncommon in traditional IT settings. \nCloud versus traditional IT: Cloud providers \ncan invest in state -of-the-art perimeter \ndefence, because the associated costs are \nspread across many customers. In cloud \ncomputing natural disasters are often \nmitigated by using multiple geographic ally \nspread datacentres. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015\n\nPage 16 \nExample: Thousands of customers of two major cloud providers were affected by a lightning struck \nin the Dublin region in summer 2011. The outage lasted 2 days20.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-1f9101bdad48", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "token_count": 230 }, { "chunk_id": "ad1d83efdf6243c3133de261fa072a75", "text": "Example: A large scale electrical storm caused an outage in a large cloud provider affecting the \ndatacentre facilities. The outcome was that 3 major public services were out for more than 8 hours \naffecting thousand customers that didn’t have access and, in some cases, lost data.21 \nR7: Overloads \nSharing infrastructure offers great cost-savings and economies of scale - allowing customers to get \nmore value for less costs. Logical isolation ensure s that tenants cannot access each other’s data, but \ncloud tenants still use the same physical \ninfrastructure, so customers may be affected by \npeaks in r esource usage by other tenants or DoS \nattacks on other tenants. \nCloud customers should ask if and how their cloud \nservice handles peaks in demand or increased usage. \nCloud customers should also check the service level \nagreements (SLA) which should guarantee \navailability of their service (or penalty fees or refunds \nin the case of outages). \nSee SQ 3, SQ 11. \nExample: A cloud provider suffered an outage that seemed managable in the beginning, but lasted \nlonger than expected. During the outage, there was a large number of reboot requests from \ncustomers, which caused a bottleneck, and caused outages for customers22. \nR8: Unexpected costs \nCloud computing is often pay-as-you-go, which means costs are not always fixed. This also means that \ncosts could unexpectedly become very high. For example, customer may get a high bill because one \nof their websites becomes very popular, because employees upload and store a lot of data, or because \nattackers mount a DoS attack, consuming all the \nresources. One could argue the risk of unexpected \ncosts is not purely an information security risk (but \nrather a business risk) but we nevertheless discuss \nit here briefly , because unexpected costs could \nquickly lead to financial issues which could result in \nan outage. \nCustomers should check how their service scales \nwith increased usage and what are the associated \ncosts. \nSee SQ 11.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-1f9101bdad48", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "token_count": 503 }, { "chunk_id": "0e22b139ceb4a2afe9c7070bce0a6c9c", "text": "20 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/08/08/bpos_amazon_power_outages/ \n21 https://aws.amazon.com/message/67457/ \n22 http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Cloud-Computing/Amazon-Cloud-Outage-Caused-by-Storms-Worsened-by-\nSoftware-Glitches-280060/ \nCloud versus traditional IT: In cloud \ncomputing overloads are often mitigated by \nproviding customers with elasticity, using \nspare resources, while in traditional IT it is \noften muc h more expensive for customers \nto have large amount of spare resources. \nCloud versus traditional IT: In traditional IT \ncosts are often fixed, although it should be \nsaid they are usually higher than in cloud \ncomputing, especially for smaller \norganisations. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-1f9101bdad48", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "token_count": 197 }, { "chunk_id": "5c8ad68b4661c56df4de5a7195968602", "text": "Page 17 \nExample: An engineering team in an SME forgot to shut down a cluster of 250 servers over a \nweekend — a $23,000 mistake since the servers were idle during that period. A marketing group \ndecided to run analysis on data collected in the cloud on their local servers — after downloading", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-1f9101bdad48", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 8, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 13 The different assets supporting cloud services are explained in Section 2.", "token_count": 73 }, { "chunk_id": "5fe3b8ae655d458b1f5799a3ec4495a4", "text": "10 TBs of data, they racked up $1000 dollars in unexpected data transfer fees23.\n\nR9: Vendor lock-in \nVendor lock-in (also called customer lock-in) is a situation \nwhere it is hard for the customer to migrate to another \ncloud provider . For SMEs vendor lock -in can become a \nfinancial issue but it can also become a security risk, for \nexample when circumstances force a customer to migrate \nto another provider, for example in case of a legal conflict, \nissues about billing, major outages, etc. If the customer \ndoes not use standard data formats and interfaces, then \nmigration may become difficult and/or time-consuming. \nCustomers should have a business continuity strategy, \nwhich includes migration/exit plans for moving data and/or processes to another provider. As part of \nthis strategy, customers should consider backing up their data regularly, in a standard format, to be \nable to migrate when needed, and test regularly if migration works. \nSee SQ 10. \nExample: A cloud storage pioneer, closed its doors and left over 1,000 customers with only two \nweeks to save their data that was hosted on the cloud storage provider24. \n \nR10: Administrative or legal aspects \nAdministrative and/or legal conflicts ( even if no technology breaks or gets hacked) could have an \nimpact on the availability of a cloud service. For example when a provider goes bankrupt and creditors \ncould threaten to confiscate assets belonging to the supplier, then backups may become unavailable, \nbefore customers can migrate out. Service may also be interrupted when the cloud provider gets a \nlegal court -order to cease operations , for example \nbecause of legal proceedings against the provider or \nagainst one of their customers/tenants. Cloud \ncustomers could also end up in an administrative \ndispute about billing for example. \nThe obligations of the provider are described in the \ncontract the two parties counter sign; the contract \nshould address SLA issues, juri sdiction, liability, \nindemnity etc. The contract need to be negotiated carefully and fully understood especially by SMEs. \nCustomers should assess the risk of outages caused by ad ministrative or legal issues and assess \nwhether security measures need to be taken to mitigate this risk. \nSee SQ 4. \n \n23 http://formtek.com/blog/cloud-computing-companies-worry-about-unexpected-costs-and-fees/ \n24 http://www.infoworld.com/article/2612299/cloud-storage/cloud-storage-provider-nirvanix-is-closing-its-\ndoors.html \nCloud versus traditional IT: Cloud \ncomputing is often more standard than \nlegacy IT (using standard XML/HTML \ninterfaces, standard data formats, standard \nVM images, etc), which reduces vendor \nlock-in. \nCloud versus traditional IT: In traditional IT \nthere is often is less dependence on third -\nparties, hence administrative or legal issues \nusually have less impact. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 18 \nExample: A cloud provider went bankrupt without giving notice to their customers, leaving them \non the spot with their data non reachable. I n the aftermath, no data was lost thanks to the quick \nresponse of other vendors to support the customers’ needs.25 \n \nR11: Foreign law issues \nCloud services sometimes involves the use of cloud \nproviders or datacenters abroad, which means that \nto a certain extent foreign jurisdictions may have an \nimpact on the security and privacy of the cloud \nservice. For example, violations of the law by the \nother customers (co -tenants) may lead to services \nbeing ordered shut (for example as part of a criminal prosecution), without taking proper care of the \nother customers. It has been argued by legal experts that e ven if the physical location of supporting \nequipment or datacenters are not in a foreign country there could still be an impact26. \nCloud computing customers should ask which foreign jurisdictions may play a role and if there are \nincompatibilities with their own national legislation. \nSee SQ 12. \nExample: a European governmental body (for similar reasons) restricted their employees from \nusing widely used cloud services to share documents and exchange emails27. \n \nUnderstanding risks with security questions \nFor each risk we point the reader to relevant security questions in Section 6, which can be used in a \nprocurement process, to understand if and how risks can be mitigated. \n \nNetwork and information security risks Relevant security questions \nR1: Software security vulnerabilities SQ7 \nR2: Network attacks SQ8 \nR3: Social engineering attacks SQ8 \nR4: Management GUI and API compromise SQ7, SQ8, SQ9 \nR5: Device theft/loss SQ3, SQ8 \nR6: Physical hazards SQ1, SQ2, SQ3, SQ5, SQ6, SQ10 \nR7: Overloads SQ3, SQ11 \nR8: Unexpected costs SQ11 \n \n25 http://gcn.com/Articles/2013/09/26/avoid-cloud-shutdown.aspx?Page=2 \n26 IVIR has issued an analysis in which it argues that the US FISA legislation makes the use of cloud services from US providers by Dutch \neducational organisations unconstitutional, regardless of the physical location of datacenters. \n27 http://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/59c8f721-ba27-4397-99a1-72f6b554820e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/655d6df2-\nb7ec-4f8c-917f-58efd20fb862/Cloud_Computing_02_12.pdf \nCloud versus traditional IT: In traditional IT \ndata and processes remain on-premises, so \nforeign jurisdictions are hardly an issue. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 19 \nR9: Vendor lock-in SQ10 \nR10: Administrative or legal outages SQ4 \nR11: Foreign jurisdiction issues SQ12 \n \n \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 20", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-a207236aeb5d", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "10 TBs of data, they racked up $1000 dollars in unexpected data transfer fees23.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 10 TBs of data, they racked up $1000 dollars in unexpected data transfer fees23.", "token_count": 1475 }, { "chunk_id": "eaf6e5705b10970bd033192fbc9e2f2a", "text": "5 Security questions\n\nIn this section we address the risks (see Section 5) and opportunities (see Section 4) with a list of 12 \nsecurity questions. Customers can use these questions to get the most relevant information about the \nsecurity of their cloud service, and to understand if more needs to be done to use certain opportunities \nor to mitigate certain risks. The table below shows the main topics and how they relate to the \nopportunities and risks: \nSecurity questions Related \nopportunities \nRelated \nrisks \nSQ1: Organizational security, governance and risk management O4, O5, O6, O11 R6 \nSQ2. Responsibilities and liabilities O5, O10 R6 \nSQ3. Contingencies and backups O1, O4, O5, O8 R5, R6, R7 \n SQ4. Legal and administrative issues - R10 \nSQ5. Human resources security O4 R6 \nSQ6. Access Control O4, O9 R6 \nSQ7. Software security O6, O7 R1, R4 \nSQ8. User, management and application programming interfaces O6, O7, O9 R3, R4, R5 \nSQ9. Monitoring and logging O7 R4 \nSQ10. Interoperability and portability O3 R6, R9 \nSQ11. Scaling, sizing and costs O2 R7, R8 \nSQ12. Compliance with national/international legislation - R11 \nFor each question, an indication of the kind of information customers might need to get an answer is \nincluded. It should be stressed that not all providers will respond to customer qu estion-forms about \none particular service they may offer. A defining characteristic of cloud computing is that one provider \noffers the same service to many customers, so answering questionnaires for all customers may be \ninfeasible and/or too costly. Customers may find some of the answers on the websites of providers or \nin other material (for example via cloud certification schemes28). \nFor each question below examples of possible supporting evidence or guarantees are included, which \ncould back up or support claims made by the provider. Typically supporting evidence or guarantees \nmay be clauses in a contract or SLAs, audit reports from third parties 29, self -assessments by the \nprovider, a track record of past performance, statements from past customers etc. \nAnnex D includes empty question forms for use during procurement. \nSQ1: Organizational security, governance and risk management \nBefore procuring a cloud service from a provider the customer should have an idea about the quality \nand effectiveness of the organizational structure and risk management processes at the provider. It is \n \n28 ENISA, EC, together with industry, has developed a list of certification schemes relevant for cloud customers: \nhttps://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/cloud-computing-certification \n29 At the same time formal compliance certification and audits by 3rd parties carry a cost and are not always the \nmost appropriate or the only way to provide evidence. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 21 \nalso important for the customer to know which parts of the provider’s organization will be dealing \nwith security incidents , how key roles can be carried out by the customer , how to fin d security -\nrelevant information, security advisories, information about outages. \nQuestion Possible answers", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-b04b032c528e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "5 Security questions", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 5 Security questions", "token_count": 816 }, { "chunk_id": "413141896004af8a0d91d2ae0ef6aa2f", "text": "1. How does the cloud provider manage\n\nnetwork and information security risks \nrelated to the cloud service? \n- General policy and approach to managing \nsecurity risks. \n- Contact point for security incidents. \n- Presentation of critical dependencies of the \nCloud Service Provider on third parties. \n- Compliance with best practice or industry \nstandard on governance or risk management. \n \n(Supporting evidence/guarantees) - Audit reports by independent auditors. \n- Certification against information security risk \nmanagement standards (for ex ample ISO \n27001), including scope statement. \n- Self-assessment against an industry standard \nor best practice. \n- \nSQ2. Security responsibilities \nIt is important to apportion responsibilities for security tasks and responsibilities/liabilities for security \nincidents. As explained in Section 2, the division of security tasks, and the division of \nresponsibilities/liabilities for incidents is different for different types of cloud services. \nQuestion Possible answers", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-f34818f88c47", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1. How does the cloud provider manage", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 1. How does the cloud provider manage", "token_count": 257 }, { "chunk_id": "515e73167eaea4407e4946de7173e44c", "text": "2. Which security tasks are carried out by\n\nthe provider, which type of security \nincidents are mitigated by the provider \n(and which tasks and incidents remain \nunder the responsibility of the customer)? \n- Assets under control of the provider. \n- Key security tasks carried out by the provider \n(patching, updating, etc). \n- Examples of incidents under the \nresponsibility of the provider. \n- Tasks and responsibilities under the \nresponsibility of the customer. \n \n(Supporting evidence/guarantees) - Relevant s ecurity tasks mentioned in \ncontract or SLA, \n- Incident classification and response/recovery \ntime objectives, \n- Liability clauses in contracts or SL A i.e. \nfinancial compensation \nSQ3. Contingencies and backups \nAn earthquake, a power cut or a thunder storm could affect facilities, supplies, an entire datacentre \nor power or network cables . For customers i t is important to understand how the cloud service is \nresilient in the face of disasters and how data is backed up. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 22 \nQuestion Possible answers", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-11c36dc2d6dc", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2. Which security tasks are carried out by", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 2. Which security tasks are carried out by", "token_count": 285 }, { "chunk_id": "ab89a5115b7cc8e56f0e2f29f40bebbf", "text": "3. How does the cloud service sustain\n\ndisasters affecting datacentres or \nconnections and which data is backed up \nwhere? \n- Physical security policy/ measures (backup \npower, fire extinguishers, etc.), \n- Network red undancy, g eographic spread, \navailability zones, access control, \n- Backups and failover mechanisms, \n- Disaster recovery plans. \n \n(Supporting evidence/guarantees) - Relevant c lauses included in contract and \nSLA, \n- Recovery time objectives. \n \nSQ4. Legal, regulatory and administrative issues \nLegal, regulatory and administrative issues can cause outages (for example, issues about contracts, \nbilling, legal procedures against co -tenants). Customers should understand how the security of their \ndata and processes is guaranteed in the event of legal issues or administrative disputes. \nQuestion Possible answers", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-f51d8c6498de", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3. How does the cloud service sustain", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3. How does the cloud service sustain", "token_count": 210 }, { "chunk_id": "f30d22adeb4b88e0829e010207bb3b02", "text": "4. How is security of the cloud service\n\nguaranteed when there are legal issues or \nadministrative disputes? \n- Service continuity in case of legal issues, \nadministrative d isputes, bankruptcy, \nconfiscation by law enforcement, etc. \n- Guaranteed data export. \n \n(Supporting evidence/guarantees) - Contract and SLA relevant clauses about \naccess to data. \n- Disclaimers addressing legal issues or \nadministrative disputes , guaranteeing \naccess to customer data and backups. \n \nSQ5. Personnel security \nPersonnel at the provider could have an impact on security of services or data processing. Customers \nshould ask how the provider ensures that personnel works securely. \nQuestion Possible answers", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-10566a1ddc4f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4. How is security of the cloud service", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 4. How is security of the cloud service", "token_count": 176 }, { "chunk_id": "d8dbc598cbc7c16df6399ec6cd7d23ea", "text": "5. How does the provider ensure that\n\npersonnel works securely? \n- Training/certification for key roles. \n- Recruitment policies. \n- Penetration tests/social engineering testing. \n- Compliance to ISMS standard or best \npractice (SQ1). \n- Security vetting procedures fo r highly \nsensitive posts (handling sensitive data) \n \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 23 \n(Supporting evidence/guarantees) - Certification or self-assessment against ISMS \nstandard or practice (see SQ1). \n \nSQ6. Access Control \nData and processes of customers should be protected from unauthorized access. Customers should \nask how access control is implemented to protect their data and processes. \nQuestions Possible answers", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-ce3f8608cd07", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "5. How does the provider ensure that", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 5. How does the provider ensure that", "token_count": 195 }, { "chunk_id": "fb743a15118c9a4b7fccc00dae83fa93", "text": "6. How is customer data or processes\n\nprotected from unauthorized physical and \nlogical access? \n- Physical access control protection measures. \n- Logical a ccess control protection ( roles, \npermissions, privilege minimization, privilege \nsegregation). \n- Authentication mechanisms used. \n- Compliance to ISMS standard or best practice \n(SQ1). \n \n(Supporting evidence/guarantees) - Certification or self-assessment against ISMS \nstandard or practice (see SQ1). \nSQ7. Software security \nSoftware vulnerabilities could have a big impact on the customer’s data or processes . Customers \nshould ask which measures are in place to make sure software underpinning the cloud service is kept \nsecure and which software is not under control of the provider, and should be kept secure by the \ncustomer. \nQuestion Possible answers", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-f2af290ca206", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6. How is customer data or processes", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6. How is customer data or processes", "token_count": 207 }, { "chunk_id": "2b97c159302828cf10cafd0c43df04da", "text": "6. How does provider ensure software\n\nsecurity and which software remains \ncustomers responsibility? \n- Secure software development method. \n- Vulnerability management process (contact \npoints for vulnerabilities, time to report etc.), \n- Training for developers, \n- Patch and update procedures. \n- Standards or best practices used (such as ISO \n27034). \n \n(Supporting evidence/guarantees) - Information about past vulnerabilities of \nrelevant software. \n- Vulnerability scan reports. \n- Third-party audits of software, \n- Measures of software security activities e.g. \nBSIMM or OpenSAMM. \nSQ8. User, management and application programming interfaces \nCloud services are typically accessible via online web-based user interfaces and APIs. These interfaces \nshould be protected from unauthorized access, p articularly the management interfaces for \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 24 \nadministrators and high -privilege roles s hould be protected carefully because via these interfaces \nattackers could gain access to a large number of customer data and processes. \nQuestions Possible answers \nSQ8. How is access to the GUI’s and API’s \nprotected, and are their additional \nmeasures for administrators/high privilege \nroles (under the customer’s side)? \n- Authentication methods at GUIs and APIs, \n- Protection measures for administrator \ninterfaces. \n- Authentication for administration interface, \n- IP restrictions, administrator roles and privileges. \n \n \n(Supporting evidence/guarantees) - Technical description of interfaces and \nprotection methods. \n \nSQ9. Monitoring and logging \nCustomers should be able to monitor the performance and security of the service, via alerts, periodic \nreports, dashboards. Customers should also be able to analyse issues by analysing transaction logs, \neither via automatic interface or upon request, for example in the case of an incident. \nQuestions Possible answers", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-eac39c4c1b86", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6. How does provider ensure software", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6. How does provider ensure software", "token_count": 500 }, { "chunk_id": "ffc1ea02c0fe56612a84317bdc6ff529", "text": "9. How can t he customer monitor the\n\nservice, which logs are kept , and how can \nthey be accessed for example when the \ncustomer needs to analyse an incident? \n- Dashboard with acce ss to performance \nmonitoring. \n- Transactions logs, performance logs. \n- Alerts and triggers for notification. \n \n(Supporting evidence/guarantees) - Relevant clause of the SLA on retrieval of \ntransaction logs. \n \nSQ10. Interoperability and portability \nInteroperability makes it easier for customers to integrate a cloud service with other, existing , \nsolutions, and portability makes it easier for customers to migrate to a new provider (if needed in an \nexit scenario, for example). Customers should ask which standards are used for data and interfaces \n(and maybe one step further to hardware and devices) , or if export functions and backup data uses \nstandard formats. \nQuestions Possible answers", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-430019705fe4", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "9. How can t he customer monitor the", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 9. How can t he customer monitor the", "token_count": 224 }, { "chunk_id": "bec1701147c74c608e95aa2a143ab565", "text": "10. Which standards make the cloud service\n\nportable and interoperable? \n- Interface standards and data formats for \nGUIs, APIs, export, application s and code , \nvirtual machines, etc. \n(Supporting evidence/guarantees) - Relevant clauses in contract or SLA, \n- Audit reports, certifications, self-assessment \nreport indicating compliance. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 25 \nSQ11. Scaling, sizing and costs \nCloud services often provide elasticity in terms of resource usage, on the basis of a pay -as-you-go \npayment model. Customers should clarify how peak usage or increased usage is dealt with, and how \nthe additional costs are handled. \nQuestions Possible answers", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-70f37d5bdf33", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "10. Which standards make the cloud service", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 10. Which standards make the cloud service", "token_count": 189 }, { "chunk_id": "63bc21fff577527d75a7556ccf22ff2d", "text": "11. How is increase of usage or peaks\n\nhandled, and what are the corresponding \ncosts? \n- Examples of elasticity s cenarios, cost \ncalculation, and so on \n- Cost alerts and billing limitations. \n \n(Supporting evidence/guarantees) - Relevant clauses in contract or SLA, \n- Performance track record. \n \nSQ12. Compliance with national/foreign legislation \nCloud computing changes the way IT resources are delivered and there may be compliance issues with \nnational legislation. In cloud computing customers sometimes work with providers and/or datacenters \nacross borders, so also foreign legislation might be relevant to take into account. Customers ask which \njurisdiction is relevant to take into account and which legislation applies to their cloud service \n(national, international etc). \nNote that often personal data protection legislation is applicable (see Annex A). \nQuestions Possible answers \n12. Which national legislation applies? - Relevant national legislation (including national \nbodies that have jurisdiction to impose \nprovisions). \n- Relevant foreign jurisdiction and applicable \nforeign legislation. \n- Location of datacentres. \n- Applicable personal data protection legislation. \n(Supporting evidence/guarantees) - References and links to legislation \n \n \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 26", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-ba39a31c9087", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "11. How is increase of usage or peaks", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 11. How is increase of usage or peaks", "token_count": 350 }, { "chunk_id": "9f5ed7c86db523f67e750efbdccdfeb0", "text": "6 Conclusions and Outlook\n\nIn this document we highlight 11 important security risks and 11 important security opportunities \nSMEs should take into acc ount when procuring a cloud service. We also provide a list of 12 security \nquestions SMEs can use to understand the security features of cloud services in the market. \nSince 2009 the market has evolved: Providers offer products which are more mature, they offer more \ninformation about security, customers understand cloud computing better, and know better what are \nthe risks and opportunities of cloud computing. Also policy makers have taken action. In 2012 the \nEuropean Commission issued an EU Cloud strategy aimed at removing remaining barriers to a wide r \nuptake of cloud computing. Also national governments in the EU are adopting policies (such as cloud-\nfirst policies) to improve the use of cloud computing in the private and public sector. \nAt the same time work still needs to be done to ensure a single digital market in the EU . C loud \ncomputing exasperates the differences between different countries and different jurisdictions. Some \nof these issues may be addressed by technological solutions (such as encryption), but not all. \nENISA believes security should be a driver fo r cloud computing, and that, when organization need \nbetter network and information security, then cloud computing (in different forms) becomes an \nopportunity to meet those requirements (sharing resources, sharing costs, sharing expertise). \nWe look forward to helping SMEs in the EU as well as other customers, like government agencies, to \nadopt cloud computing in a secure way and make full use of its opportunities. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-328fe6a29581", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6 Conclusions and Outlook", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6 Conclusions and Outlook", "token_count": 444 }, { "chunk_id": "9d301eee39a51fbac75fc822d83661dc", "text": "Page 27 \nAnnex A: Legal compliance \nCloud computing changes radically the way ICT resources are delivered and consumed. Customers \nshould assess which cloud computing services are compatible with applicable legislation. Depending \non the setting a range of laws could apply: for example legislation on the protection of personal data \n(DP), legislation on sector -specific data like financial data or medical records, legislation for critical \ninformation systems, like energy, water supply or transport, legislation on the handling of state \nclassified data, criminal law, administrative law etc. \nDepending on the setting there may be different requirements, which could have an important \nbearing on the way cloud computing can be used by SMEs and which are security measures which \nmust be taken by the customer. Legal co mpliance is not only about personal data protection \nlegislation. \nWe give some examples of different types of legal requirements which could have an impact: \n On-site audits – Legislation might require the customer to facilitate on-site audits of ICT \nsystems. Cloud providers might not always be able to subject to all sorts of on-site audits. \n Physical separation –Legislation might require the use of physically separated systems for \ncertain functions. Cloud providers might not offer physically separated systems. \n Outsourcing – Legislation might allow outsourcing to third -parties only under certain \nconditions, for example, if customers are notified. \n National borders – Legislation might prohibit transfer/ processing of dat a outside the \ncountry’s border. Cloud providers might operate abroad or use data-centres abroad. \n Certified products – Legislation might require use of specific (tested/certified) hardware for \ncertain (for example, cryptographic) operations. Cloud providers might be using different \nhardware and/or products. \nLegislation is different from sector to sector, from country to country, and compliance depends on the \ntype of service, how the service is implemented technically, the type of processes or data involved etc. \nGenerally speaking customers should take into account first their national legislation and secondly, \nwhen needed, foreign legislation in the provider’s country and/or other countries involved with the \nservice, for example countries hosting datacenters or subsidiaries. It should be noted that legislation \nis constantly changing and the need to keep up with it is something the customer should do or for the \ncloud provider to take up and notify clients. \nOne type of legislation which often has an impact on how SMEs can use cloud computing i s national \npersonal data protection legislation. In the rest of this section we provide the reader with some \nexplanation of relevant concepts and pointers to relevant documents on personal data protection \nlegislation in the EU, because many SMEs have questions about this type of legislation. Another type \nof legislation would be the specific regulatory law that could impact on top of national legislation; this \ncould include inter alia finance, telecommunications, healthcare etc. While SMEs may not be directly \nregulated they may be legally required to comply with sector specific regulation if they are a supplier \nto that industry sector. \nNote that ENISA does NOT aim to give legal recommendat ion or advice on legal matters: \nApplicable legislation might be comp lex so SMEs might need to use legal advice for their \nanalysis. This report doesn’t substitute any legal analysis provided by experts.\n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-328fe6a29581", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6 Conclusions and Outlook", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6 Conclusions and Outlook", "token_count": 919 }, { "chunk_id": "f75b93673f18e4f622bbc9c759337bb6", "text": "Page 28 \nA.1 EU personal data protection legislation \nSMEs often have concerns about compliance with personal data protection legisla tion30. Given the \nbroad definition of personal data 31, in a lot of settings DP legislation plays a role. As with other \nlegislation, data protection requirements differ from country to country, sector to sector. This \ncomplicates the use of cloud computing acr oss borders and the development of a single market for \nonline services; which is why the European Union made it one of its priorities (under the Digital \nagenda, the EU cloud strategy, and the Data protection reform initiative) to harmonize national DP \nlegislation across the EU (see below). \nA.1.1 Covered organisations and individuals \nThe goal of the EU’s personal data protection legislation is to protect the privacy of EU citizens. T he \nlegislation affects cloud providers based in the EU, cloud customers based in the EU, and organisations \noffering cloud services directed at EU citizens. \nThe main EU-wide data-protection legislation is the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. It is currently \nbeing reformed into a new Data Protection Regulation32. \nA.1.2 Personal data and processing \nKey definitions used in the EU personal data protection legislation are: \n● Personal Data means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person \n('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in \nparticular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his \nphysical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity33. \n● Sensitive (personal) data means personal data revealing racial or ethn ic origin, religious, \nphilosophical or other beliefs, political opinions, membership of parties, trade unions, \nassociations or organizations of a religious, philosophical, political or trade-unionist character, \nas well as personal data disclosing health and sex life. \n● Processing of personal data (processing) means any operation or set of operations which is \nperformed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, \nrecording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieva l, consultation, use, \ndisclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or \ncombination, blocking, erasure or destruction. \nA.1.3 Roles: Data controllers and data processors \nThe EU personal data protection legislation distinguishes different roles: \n● Data-controllers: The individual or organization who collects the personal data and who", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-328fe6a29581", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6 Conclusions and Outlook", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6 Conclusions and Outlook", "token_count": 654 }, { "chunk_id": "c453391bc4986ef2bebef7ab39522563", "text": "30 For instance, in Quantitative Estimates of the Demand for Cloud Computing in Europe and the Likely Barriers \nto Up-take, 2012, p. 42-43, available at: \nhttp://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/cloudcomputing/docs/quantitative_estimates.pdf \n31 Business email addresses may be considered personal data and some (the European Court of Justice, e.g.) \nhave argued that even IP addresses are personal data. \n32 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/ \n33 For the notion of personal data see also Article 29 Working Party Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal \ndata and the recent Opinion 8/2012 providing further input on the data protection reform discussions, where \nthe notion of personal data is further explained with regard to “identifiability” (legal term for the notion of \nbeing indirectly identified) in terms of singling out the individuals \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-328fe6a29581", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6 Conclusions and Outlook", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6 Conclusions and Outlook", "token_count": 244 }, { "chunk_id": "1b47f3e600a372183dd47955e387b916", "text": "Page 29 \ncontrols how the data is subsequently used and processed. \n● Data-processors: The individual or organization processing the personal data (which might \ninclude storage, computing, sharing, etc.). \n● Data-subject: The citizen whose personal data is involved. \nThe EU legislation mostly targets data-controllers, and only indir ectly targets data -processors (only \nwhen they process data on behalf of data-controllers). \nA.1.4 Appropriate security measures and due-diligence \nThe requirement most relevant to network and information security is the obligation for the data -\ncontroller to ensure that appropriate security measures are in place to protect the security of the \nprocessing of personal data. This means that the data -controller should carry out a risk assessment \nabout security measures as needed. Risk assessment, on network and information systems, is a central \npart of information security governance and information security risk management. For SMEs this \nmeans that they need to carry out a due-diligence on the setup of the cloud service and the security \nmeasures in place to protect the security of the processing of personal data (initially during \nprocurement). \nIn this guide, in Section 3 (Risks) and Section 4 (Security questions), we provide SMEs a tool for \nassessing, if appropriate, security measures in place to protect security of the cloud service and the \nsecurity of the processing of the customer data. Note tha t the national Data Protection Authority \nmight have specific and detailed recommendation about which are “appropriate security measures.” \nA.1.5 Security breach notification \nIn the Data Protection Reform provisions for breach notification obligations are includ ed, for those \nsecurity breaches which have an impact on personal data. In practice this would mean that SMEs, as \ndata controllers, whenever personal data is involved, should be in a position to investigate breaches \nand communicate about them to data -subjects or authorities, in a timely manner. This is still under \nconsultation and does comprise a formal requirement for the data controller. The security question \nSQ 12 in Section 4 addresses security breaches and security breach reports34. \nA.1.6 National guidance on data protection legislation \nMany Data Protection Authorities across the EU have developed excellent information, in local \nlanguages, about compliance to the applicable personal data protection legislation in their country. \nWe list some of the guidance below, in no particular order35: \n The UK data protection authority, ICO, issued guidance on cloud computing36. \n The French data protection authority, CNIL, published recommendations for companies \nplanning to use Cloud computing services37 \n The Swedish DPA, Datainspektionen, issued guidance on use of cloud services and the \nSwedish personal data protection legislation38 \n The Italian DPA, Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, issued a guide on personal data \nand cloud computing39", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-328fe6a29581", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6 Conclusions and Outlook", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6 Conclusions and Outlook", "token_count": 755 }, { "chunk_id": "1387663a18ae768425ef3be6e3b78969", "text": "34 More details can be found in the Art29 WP opinion 5/2012 on personal data breach reporting. \n35 This list is not exhaustive. Feel free to send us additions via email to cloud.security@enisa.europa.eu. \n36 http://ico.org.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/topic_guides/online/cloud_computing \n37 http://www.cnil.fr/linstitution/actualite/article/article/cloud-computing-cnils-recommandations-for-\ncompanies-using-these-new-services/ \n38 http://www.datainspektionen.se/in-english/cloud-services/ \n39 http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/1906143 \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-328fe6a29581", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6 Conclusions and Outlook", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6 Conclusions and Outlook", "token_count": 173 }, { "chunk_id": "38065bf9e6553096b3b911bdff97e761", "text": "Page 30 \n The Irish DPA, called Data Protection Commissioner, issued guidelines on cloud computing40 \n The German DPA issued guidance on cloud, called Entschliessung und Orientierungshilfe \nCloud Computing41 \nThe Article 29 Working party, a forum of national DPAs across the EU, has issued several opinions \nabout cloud computing and on the concept of processors and controllers: \n Opinion 5/2012 on Cl oud Computing, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-\nprotection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/index_en.htm \n Opinion 1/2010 the definition of processor and controller, available at: \nhttp://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp169_en.pdf \nA.1.7 Personal data protection in the EU Cloud Strategy \nThe EU Cloud Strategy recognizes that personal data protection legislation across the EU is currently \na barrier to the adoption of cloud computing. Under the cloud strategy the EC has worked jointly with \nindustry on a code of conduct on personal data protection for cloud computing providers , to be \nsubmitted for approval by the Article 29 Working party . The code of conduct aims t o make it easier \nfor customers to be compliant with data protection legislation while using cloud computing. The \nprogress of that work can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/cloud-select-industry-\ngroup-code-conduct", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-328fe6a29581", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6 Conclusions and Outlook", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6 Conclusions and Outlook", "token_count": 344 }, { "chunk_id": "2a1540d425f7d52f20517ce226a95787", "text": "40 http://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/03-07-12-Cloud-Computing/1221.htm \n41 https://www.datenschutz-bayern.de/technik/orient/oh_cloud.pdf \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-328fe6a29581", "chunk_index": 7, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6 Conclusions and Outlook", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6 Conclusions and Outlook", "token_count": 60 }, { "chunk_id": "45d776c5dd7db259f828928e0093d2a1", "text": "Page 31 \nAnnex B: Example scenario: ConsultLess, SME using SaaS \nB.1 Introduction \nConsultLess is a small consultancy firm in the EU that has 20 employees (mostly legal and management \nexperts). One of th e employees is partner and also the Chief Information Officer (CIO) of the firm. \nOccasionally the CIO pays consultants for IT advice or support. ConsultLess decides to procure office \nsoftware as a service (SaaS) for use by its employees: the cloud service offers document \nstorage/editing, email and calendar. This cloud service should replace an internal mail -server and \noffice software installed on computers. The setup is depicted below. \nIT manager \nat ConsultLess\nConsultLess SME\nConsultLess \nemployees\nCloud service provider\nOffice software \nSaaS", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-328fe6a29581", "chunk_index": 8, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6 Conclusions and Outlook", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6 Conclusions and Outlook", "token_count": 191 }, { "chunk_id": "07bc5c2e33ab82ca40641ac505f60cd3", "text": "B.1.1 Business drivers \nFor ConsultLess the re are many reasons to use a SaaS cloud service are many: better collaborative \nfeatures, lower hardware costs, lower management and maintenance costs. Compliance is a key issue \n- and the CIO of the firm (the only employee with specialized IT expertise) wants to understand which \nstandard (boilerplate) services to choose, and also which issues remain to be addressed by specific \nmitigating measures, custom features, etc. Some (not all) of the data stored and processed is sensitive, \nand data leaks could have a severe impact on the reputation of the firm - and/or possibly even expose \nthe firm to legal actions by affected customers (which will have great reputation impact for such a \nsmall firm). \nB.1.2 Outsourcing information security tasks \nIn this fictitious scenario the security tasks which will be carried out by the cloud provider are: \n- Managing of hardware and facilities, including physical security, power, cooling, etc.; \n- Managing of server operating systems and the application server, including development, \ndeployment, p atching, updating, monitoring, checking logs, etc. For example, it is the \nresponsibility of the provider to patch the server operating systems in time; \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-328fe6a29581", "chunk_index": 9, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6 Conclusions and Outlook", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6 Conclusions and Outlook", "token_count": 337 }, { "chunk_id": "38afa74331f45df641dddb061a934266", "text": "Page 32 \n- Managing the application software, including development, patching, updating, monitoring, \nand checking logs, and so on. For example, it is the responsibility of the provider to fix software \nflaws in the office software; \n- Managing updates of software and data. \nThe customer, ConsultLess, is merely responsible 42 for handing out accounts to its employees, \nrevoking accounts when employees leave, resetting passwords, etc. \nIn this scenario most security tasks are outsourced to the provider. The customer, once the service \nhas been procured and is up and running, will have few security tasks left to perform. It should be \nstressed that the responsibility for security cannot be “outsourced”. If something goes wrong with the \noffice software ConsultLess has procured, causing sensitive data about its clients to leak, then \nConsultLess will in the first place be held responsible for the damages. For ConsultLess, hence, clarity \nabout security tasks and responsibilities is a crucial consideration in the procurement process. \nB.2 Opportunities and risks \nB.2.1 Assessing the security opportunities \nLet’s look at the security opportunities for ConsultLess (SME uses SaaS).", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-328fe6a29581", "chunk_index": 10, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6 Conclusions and Outlook", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6 Conclusions and Outlook", "token_count": 299 }, { "chunk_id": "ed59b55b076c18b5d9cc5bf87a88e103", "text": "OPPORTUNITY RATING REMARKS \nO1. GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD Medium No need for making backups and bringing them to a \nremote site. \nO2. ELASTICITY Small At Consultless usage of resources is quite stable. No \npeaks. \nO3. STANDARD FORMATS AND \nINTERFACES \nMedium Consultless plan on keeping documents, communications \nlong term in archives. Standard data formats are \nimportant. \nO4. PHYSICAL SECURITY Large ConsultLess only secures laptops with disk encryption and \npincodes, and does not need to handle physical security \nof servers, backup disks, etc. \nO5.INCIDENT RESPONSE \nAROUND THE CLOCK \nSmall Downtime overnight is not a major issue for ConsultLess. \nO6. SECURE SOFTWARE \nDEVELOPMENT \nSmall For ConsultLess the alternative would be off-the-shelf \nsoftware, so secure software development is only a small \nopportunity in this setting. \nO7. PATCHING AND \nUPDATING \nLarge ConsultLess have only one IT manager, and patching and \nupdating servers would take away a lot of time. \nO8. BACKUPS Large ConsultLess has only one IT manager, and keeping \nbackups would take up a lot of time. \nO9: SERVER-SIDE STORAGE Large ConsultLess has employees which are mobile working \nfrom home and at clients. Server-side storage mitigates \nthe risk of employees losing their devices.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-328fe6a29581", "chunk_index": 11, "total_chunks": 12, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6 Conclusions and Outlook", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6 Conclusions and Outlook", "token_count": 317 }, { "chunk_id": "872c11394f23b6915b49475075f5a008", "text": "42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.\n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015\n\nPage 33 \nO10. SECURITY AS A SERVICE \nAND SECURITY ADD-ONS \nLarge ConsultLess will use an add-on for scanning emails and \ndocuments for malware. \nO11. CERTIFICATION AND \nCOMPLIANCE \nLarge ConsultLess can refer to certification of the provider \nmaking it much easier to fulfil their own compliance \nobligations.\n\nB.2.2 Assessing the security risks \nLet’s look at the different risks in more detail.\n\nRISK TYPE LIKELIHOOD IMPACT RISK REMARKS \nR1. SOFTWARE SECURITY \nVULNERABILITIES \nMedium High Significant", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-5c51e662410b", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "token_count": 164 }, { "chunk_id": "261bf79b45dde21a4dc4dcb52c155419", "text": "ConsultLess uses the cloud \nservice for sensitive data so \nthe impact of vulnerabilities \nis high. ConsultLess will \nselect a vendor with a good \ntrack record. \nR2. NETWORK ATTACKS Medium High Significant ConsultLess has employees \nwhich are not tech -savvy, so \nit is possible tha t spoofing, \nsniffing and pharming \nattacks are successful. \nConsultLess will secure its \ninternal wifi network and \nraise awareness about \ninsecure network \nconnections, rogue hotspots, \netc. \nR3. SOCIAL ENGINEERING \nATTACKS \nMedium High Significant", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-5c51e662410b", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "token_count": 134 }, { "chunk_id": "ab48abe63aac568370f7474394504aab", "text": "ConsultLess h as employees \nwhich are not tech -savvy, so \nit is possible that phishing \nattacks are successful. \nConsultLess will raise \nawareness about fake emails \nasking for credentials etc. \nR4. MANAGEMENT GUI AND \nAPI COMPROMISE \nLow High Minor For ConsultLess the main risk \nis the management portal. It \nwill select a cloud service \nwhich has 2-factor \nauthentication for the \nadministrative user account. \nIt will also set a policy which \nrequires the administrative \nuser to use a liveCD for \nadministrative tasks. \nR5. DEVICE THEFT/LOSS Medium High Significant ConsultLess uses the cloud \nservice for sensitive data so \ndevice loss can be an issue. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-5c51e662410b", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "token_count": 191 }, { "chunk_id": "47e5393bb86b920243a06d2293ab5535", "text": "Page 34 \nUsing a cloud service \nmitigates some issue \nbecause less emails and \ndocuments are on user \ndevices. ConsultLess will set \na policy requiring employees \nto secure their devices from \nunauthorized access. \nR6. PHYSICAL HAZARDS Low Medium Minor ConsultLess use the cloud \nservice for its business data , \nwhich can not be lost . It will \nselect a cloud provider with \ngood physical security on its \nsites and backups to multiple \nsites to avoid data loss. \nR7. OVERLOADS Low Medium Minor ConsultLess does not have \nhigh availability \nrequirements. Outages are \nacceptable. \nR8. UNEXPECTED COSTS Low Medium Minor ConsultLess does not expect \ndramatic usage patte rns. It \nwill select a cloud provider \nwhich warns about cost \nincreases. \nR9. VENDOR LOCK-IN High High Significant For ConsultLess this is a \nsignificant risk. ConsultLess \nwill use the cloud service \nonly for emails and \ndocuments stored in widely \nused data -formats to \nprevent lockin. \nR10. ADMINISTRATIVE OR \nLEGAL OUTAGES \nMedium High Minor ConsultLess does not foresee \nmajor issues around \nadministrative or legal \ndisputes. \nR11. FOREIGN JURISDICTION \nISSUES \nMedium High Significant\n\nConsultLess is not subject to \nany specific legal \nrequirements about cross -\nborder processing or data \ntransfers.\n\nThe risks can be plotted in a matrix, showing what are key issues. \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015\n\nPage 35\n\nFigure 3: Risks for ConsultLess (SME using SaaS)\n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-5c51e662410b", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "token_count": 408 }, { "chunk_id": "dd1be187038bb596c26a285ee2352371", "text": "Page 36 \nAnnex C: Example scenario: EasyAgriSelling, SME using IaaS/PaaS \nC.1 Introduction \nEasyAgriSelling is a small tech start-up in the EU, which developed an online web shop software (as a \nservice) for farmers who would like to start direct -selling their vegetables and other products. Their \nslogan is: “Selling your agricultural produce to consumers, made easy”. Farmers can set up an online \nshop in a few clicks - customizing their shop with a logo, colours and a description of their farm. \nEasyAgriSelling operates a pay -as-you-go model, chargin g no monthly fee, but only charging their \ncustomers when products are sold. EasyAgriSelling is a SaaS provider and they are a cloud services \ncustomer building services on a cloud provider who offers them IaaS and PaaS on which to build their \nproduct. In this document we are assessing risks and opportunities from both their roles as a service \nprovider and as a service customer. The SaaS platform runs on top of the IaaS/PaaS platform. The \nsetup is depicted below. \nDeveloper\nEasyAgriSelling SME\nCloud service provider\nApplication servers, DBs, etc\nIaaS/PaaS\nFarmer A\nConsumers\nHelpdesk\nAdministration\nFarmer B\nFarmer C\nWebshop platform\nSaaS", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-5c51e662410b", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "token_count": 303 }, { "chunk_id": "0c9970b4813075815c536b49dcc6af2c", "text": "C.1.1 Business drivers \nFor EasyAgriSelling there are many reasons for using an IaaS/PaaS cloud service: IaaS/PaaS computing \nresources are elastic, so once their service takes off, they can easily scale up, without having to make \nan upfront investment. A start-up with limited capital, they need to make the right investments into \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-5c51e662410b", "chunk_index": 5, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "token_count": 108 }, { "chunk_id": "5ea033732b0de47d9b4f9d4357e32d39", "text": "Page 37 \nbuilding their product and respond ing to increasing demand. Cloud computing fits their long term \nplan. Moreover, employees at EasyAgriSelling are web design specialists, while running and \nmaintaining the nuts and bolts of hardware and networks is not their competence. Key concerns are \navailability, security and privacy of the payment data and some of t he personal data of consumers \n(home address, billing address etc. ). EasyAgriSelling is responsible for the software security of the \nonline web shop software, the web interfaces used by the farmers (customers of EasyAgriSelling) and \nthe personal data and payment data of the consumers buying from the farmers. \nC.1.2 Outsourcing information security tasks \nEasyAgriSelling is a customer of an IaaS/PaaS service which it uses for running its web shop software \nfor farmers. \nIn this setting the security tasks the IaaS/PaaS provider carries out are: \n Managing hardware and facilities, including physical security, power, cooling, etc.; \n Managing the server operating systems and the application server, including development, \ndeployment, patching, updating, monitoring, checking logs, and so on. For example, it is the \nresponsibility of the provider to patch the server operating systems in time. \nEasyAgriSelling, the customer, remains responsible43 for: \n Managing the application software, including development, patching, updating, monitoring, \nand checking logs, and so on. For example, it is the responsibility of EasyAgriSelling to fi x \nsoftware flaws in the deployed web shop software; \n Managing the accounts of the farmers using their web shop software, as well as the consumer \naccounts, including resetting passwords, troubleshooting issues with payments etc.; \n Managing backups of application software and data. \nIn this scenario some security tasks are outsourced to the provider, but many security tasks still have \nto be carried out by the customer ( EasyAgriSelling). Security considerations in the procurement \nprocess really only regard secu rity of the facilities, the operating system and the application servers \nwhich are under control of the provider. \nC.2 Risks and opportunities \nC.2.1 Assessing security opportunities \nWe look at the different opportunities for “EasyAgriSelling” in more detail in the table below: \nOPPORTUNITY RATING EXPLANATION \nO1. GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD Medium For EasyAgriSelling geographic spread means more \nresilience and it makes it easier to keep SLAs with the \nfarmers. \nO2. ELASTICITY Large For EasyAgriSelling elasticity means it is ea sier to keep \nSLAs with the farmers, even if one farmer has a peak in \ndemand. \nO3. STANDARD FORMATS \nAND INTERFACES \nMedium For EasyAgriSelling it is important to be able to have the \ncheapest cloud provider, so standard formats for code \nand virtual machines are important to be able to migrate \nif a better offer is found on the market.", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-5c51e662410b", "chunk_index": 6, "total_chunks": 7, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 42 Refer to the Cloud model visual in section 2.", "token_count": 730 }, { "chunk_id": "1ea0cf9f33c9ecc2eeb62bb7bf831785", "text": "43 Refer to the cloud responsibilities model in section 2\n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015\n\nPage 38 \nO4. PHYSICAL SECURITY Medium For EasyAgriSelling it is important to outsource p hysical \nsecurity of the datacentre to a cloud provider. \n“EasyAgriSelling” still needs to secure its employees’ \nend-user devices, but this is relatively easy. \nO5. INCIDENT RESPONSE \nAROUND THE CLOCK \nLarge For EasyAgriSelling 24/7 response means it is easier to \nkeep SLAs with the farmers. \nO6. SECURE SOFTWARE \nDEVELOPMENT \nSmall For EasyAgriSelling the main issue is security of its own \napplication software. \nO7. PATCHING AND \nUPDATING \nMedium For EasyAgriSelling automated patching and updating of \nthe underlying application servers and operating \nsystems can be time-consuming. \nO8. BACKUPS Large For EasyAgriSelling backing up to a remote site can be \ntime-consuming, so it is very convenient to outsource \nthis. \nO9 SERVER-SIDE STORAGE Small N/A – EasyAgriSelling is using IaaS/PaaS. \nO10. SECURITY AS A \nSERVICE AND SECURITY \nAD-ONS \nSmall N/A – EasyAgriSelling just needs barebone virtual \nhardware. \nO11. CERTIFICATION AND \nCOMPLIANCE \nMedium It is very important for EasyAgriSelling to show \ncompliance to industry standards. EasyAgriSelling will \nselect a vendor with a certification so its own compliance \nobligation regard only the application software and the \nprocesses around managing the famers’ webshops .", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-9c0e237c73cb", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "43 Refer to the cloud responsibilities model in section 2", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 43 Refer to the cloud responsibilities model in section 2", "token_count": 372 }, { "chunk_id": "ee5fcb96b3a80dfb851a8473f3640f66", "text": "C.2.2 Assessing the risks \nWe look at the different risks in more details and rate them individually for this fictitious scenario: \nRISK TYPE LIKELIHOOD IMPACT RISK REMARKS \nR1. SOFTWARE \nSECURITY \nVULNERABILITIES \nHigh Very high Major For EasyAgriSelling software \nvulnerabilities are a big risk \n(because the payment and \npersonal data of consumers is at \nstake). EasyAgriSelling will look \nclosely at how the IaaS/PaaS is \npatched and updated. \nR2. NETWORK \nATTACKS \nMedium High Significant For EasyAgriSelling network \nattacks are not a major issue, \nbecause its employees are rather \nsavvy when it comes to using the \nIaaS/PaaS. \nR3. SOCIAL \nENGINEERING \nATTACKS \nMedium High Significant For EasyAgriSelling network \nattacks is an issue, because its \nemployees have access to a lot of \nassets, and such attacks could \nruin the SME. EasyAgriSelling will \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-9c0e237c73cb", "chunk_index": 1, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "43 Refer to the cloud responsibilities model in section 2", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 43 Refer to the cloud responsibilities model in section 2", "token_count": 243 }, { "chunk_id": "8729e2e3f12393fa84714c68fa98aaae", "text": "Page 39 \nraise awareness on social \nengineering with staff. \nR4. MANAGEMENT \nINTERFACE AND API \nCOMPROMISE \nMedium Very high Major For EasyAgriSelling network \nattacks is an issue, because its \nemployees have access to a lot of \nassets, and such attacks could \nruin the SME. EasyAgriSelling will \nselect a service which has two -\nfactor authentication. \nR5. DEVICE \nTHEFT/LOSS \nLow Medium Minor For EasyAgriSelling this is a limited \nissue because most sensitive data \n(e.g. the payment data of \nconsumers) is not on their \nemployees’ end-user devices. \nR6. PHYSICAL \nHAZARDS \nLow Medium Minor For EasyAgriSelling physic al \nhazards are an important \nrisk,because it has SLAs to uphold \nwith the farmers. \nR7. OVERLOADS Low Medium Minor For EasyAgriSelling overloads are \nan important risk,because it has \nSLAs to uphold with the farmers. \nR8. UNEXPECTED \nCOSTS \nMedium Medium Minor For EasyAgriSelling this is not a \nmajor risks because increased \ncosts are billed to farmers (pay -\nas-you-go) also. \nR9. VENDOR LOCK IN High Very high Major For EasyAgriSelling it is important \nnot to be tied to one provider, so \nit can always go to th e cheapest \ncloud provider. EasyAgriSelling \nwill select a provider which \nsupports standard formats for \ncode and virtual machines. \nR10. ADMINISTRATIVE \nOR LEGAL OUTAGES \nMedium High Minor For EasyAgriSelling administrative \nand legal outages are an \nimportant risk, because it has \nSLAs to uphold with the farmers. \nR11. FOREIGN \nJURISDICTION ISSUES \nMedium High Significant EasyAgriSelling works with \nfarmers and consumers from \nseveral countries. T he data and \nprocesses are about simple e -\ncommerce and there are no \nspecific legal requirements that \ncould cause issues with foreign \njurisdiction.\n\nWe show the different risks in a matrix (see below). \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015\n\nPage 40\n\nFigure 4: Risks for EasyAgriSelling (SME using IaaS/PaaS)\n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-9c0e237c73cb", "chunk_index": 2, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "43 Refer to the cloud responsibilities model in section 2", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 43 Refer to the cloud responsibilities model in section 2", "token_count": 524 }, { "chunk_id": "ef8a88547f268950b605ddb5f9e28d3b", "text": "Page 41 \nAnnex D: Comparison with the 2009 cloud risk assessment risks \nFor the interested reader we show the relation with the risks in the 2009 ENISA cloud computing risk \nassessment: \n Risk 1 Lock-in: See R9 Vendor lock-in. \n Risk 2 Lack of control: Not in this guide. \n Risk 3 Compliance challenges: Certification against standards is addressed as an opportunity. \n Risk 4 Loss of business reputation due to co-tenant activities: Not in this guide. \n Risk 5 Cloud service termination: See R10 Adminstrative or legal outage. \n Risk 6 Cloud provider acquisition: Not in this guide. \n Risk 7 Supply chain failure: Not in this guide. \n Risk 8 Resource exhaustion: See R7 Overloads. \n Risk 9 Isolation failure: See R1 Software vulnerabilities. \n Risk 10 Cloud provider malicious insider: Not in this guide. \n Risk 11 Management interface compromise: See R4 Management interface compromise. \n Risk 12 Intercepting data in traffic: See R2 network attacks \n Risk 13 Data leakage on up/download: See R2 network attacks \n Risk 14 Insecure deletion of data: Not in this guide. \n Risk 15 Distributed denial of service attacks: See R2 Network attacks \n Risk 16 Economic denial of service: See R8 Unexpected costs. \n Risk 17 Loss of encryption keys: Not in this guide \n Risk 18 Undertaking malicious probes: Not in this guide. \n Risk 19 Compromise service engine: See R1 Software vulnerabilities. \n Risk 20 Conflicts between customer hardening and cloud environment: Not in this guide. \n Risk 21 Subpoena and legal risks: See R12 Foreign jurisdiction issues. \n Risk 22 Risk from changes of jurisdiction: See R11 Foreign jurisdiction issues. \n Risk 23 Data protection risks: See annex Legal compliance. \n Risk 24 Licensing risks: Not in this guide. \n Risk 25 Network breaks: See R6 Physical hazards. \n Risk 26 Network management: Not in this guide. \n Risk 27 Modifying network traffic: See R2 Network attacks. \n Risk 28 Privilege escalation: See R1 Software security vulnerabilities. \n Risk 29 Social engineering attacks: See R3 Social engineering attacks. \n Risk 30 Loss or compromise of logs: Not in this guide. \n Risk 31 Loss or compromise of security logs: Not in this guide. \n Risk 32 Backups lost: Not in this guide. \n Risk 33 Unauthorized access to premises: See R6 Physical hazards. \n Risk 34 Theft of computer equipment: See R6 Physical hazards. \n Risk 35 Natural disasters: See R6 Physical hazards.\n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015\n\nPage 42", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-9c0e237c73cb", "chunk_index": 3, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "43 Refer to the cloud responsibilities model in section 2", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 43 Refer to the cloud responsibilities model in section 2", "token_count": 645 }, { "chunk_id": "bf1ad44593cf47341e69eca7ef38c980", "text": "Annex E: Procurement cheat sheets \nIn this annex we provide empty forms SMEs can use directly in their procurement. \nE.1 Assessing security opportunities \nOPPORTUNITY RATING EXPLANATION \nO1. GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD \nO2. ELASTICITY \nO3. PORTABILITY \nO4. PHYSICAL SECURITY \nO5.INCIDENT RESPONSE \nAROUND-THE-CLOCK\n\nO6. SECURE SOFTWARE \nDEVELOPMENT\n\nO7. PATCHING AND \nUPDATING\n\nO8. BACKUPS \nO9 SERVER-SIDE STORAGE \nO10. SECURITY AS A \nSERVICE AND SECURITY \nADD-ONS\n\nO11. CERTIFICATION AND \nCOMPLIANCE\n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015\n\nPage 43 \nE.2 Assessing security risks\n\nRISK LIKELIHOOD IMPACT REMARKS \nR1. SOFTWARE SECURITY \nVULNERABILITIES\n\nR2. NETWORK ATTACKS \nR3. SOCIAL ENGINEERING \nATTACKS\n\nR4. MANAGEMENT GUI \nAND API COMPROMISE\n\nR5. DEVICE THEFT/LOSS \nR6. PHYSICAL HAZARDS \nR7. OVERLOADS \nR8. UNEXPECTED COSTS \nR9. VENDOR LOCK-IN \nR10. ADMINISTRATIVE OR \nLEGAL OUTAGES\n\nR11. FOREIGN \nJURISDICTION ISSUES\n\nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs\n\nApril 2015\n\nPage 44 \nE.3 Security questions form\n\nQuestion Relevant information", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-9c0e237c73cb", "chunk_index": 4, "total_chunks": 5, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "43 Refer to the cloud responsibilities model in section 2", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 43 Refer to the cloud responsibilities model in section 2", "token_count": 295 }, { "chunk_id": "fdf2d550c97db9d43fe4aee2079170c9", "text": "1. How does the cloud provider manage\n\nnetwork and information security risks? \n \n(Supporting evidence or guarantee?)", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-0dd391b9d90a", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "1. How does the cloud provider manage", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 1. How does the cloud provider manage", "token_count": 29 }, { "chunk_id": "51ad9f9a45d49b74552f18c00597f379", "text": "2. Which security tasks are carried out by\n\nthe provider, which type of security \nincidents are mitigated by the provider? \n \n(Supporting evidence or guarantee?)", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-ee9a0ab2f553", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "2. Which security tasks are carried out by", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 2. Which security tasks are carried out by", "token_count": 40 }, { "chunk_id": "74a3b0f6b65abc7cdb7d7ebe6c159aa6", "text": "3. How does the cloud service s ustain\n\nnatural disasters affecting datacentres or \nconnections? \n \n(Supporting evidence or guarantee?)", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-5622242f7c3e", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "3. How does the cloud service s ustain", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 3. How does the cloud service s ustain", "token_count": 34 }, { "chunk_id": "3402739d762467b19a8061a202629a84", "text": "4. How does the provider ensure that\n\npersonnel works securely? \n \n(Supporting evidence or guarantee?)", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-03fe2190e353", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "4. How does the provider ensure that", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 4. How does the provider ensure that", "token_count": 26 }, { "chunk_id": "5feb1146612eaf89843af11d1a6c3a23", "text": "5. How is the physical and logical access to\n\ncustomer data or processes protected? \n \n(Supporting evidence or guarantee?)", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-cb62b0a5a63f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "5. How is the physical and logical access to", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 5. How is the physical and logical access to", "token_count": 30 }, { "chunk_id": "dc364166770ca6ca2c19fab91458ebc8", "text": "6. How do you ensure software security?\n\n(Supporting evidence or guarantee?) \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 45", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-d2d1450d2c29", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "6. How do you ensure software security?", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 6. How do you ensure software security?", "token_count": 48 }, { "chunk_id": "7a79348aef2cc50ad0b305d367d19881", "text": "7. How does the provider ensure that\n\npersonnel works securely? \n \n(Supporting evidence or guarantee?)", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-c96ba275a7c3", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "7. How does the provider ensure that", "hierarchie": [], "date_publication": "", "etat": "VIGUEUR", "categorie": "certifications_securite", "celex": null, "source_tag": "ENISA-Cloud-SME", "context_prefix": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA) > 7. How does the provider ensure that", "token_count": 26 }, { "chunk_id": "2819f631f6ba2c07b1fd35a04ed1550c", "text": "8. How is the physical and logical access to\n\ncustomer data or processes protected? \n \n(Supporting evidence or guarantee?)", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-165e2c1b7b6f", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "8. 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Which national legisla tion is applicable\n\nand which foreign jurisdictions are involved, \nfor instance due to the physical location of \ndatacentres or cables? \n \n \nCloud Security Guide for SMEs \nCloud computing security risks and opportunities for SMEs \n \nApril 2015 \n \nPage 46 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPO Box 1309, 710 01 Heraklion, Greece \nTel: +30 28 14 40 9710 \ninfo@enisa.europa.eu \nwww.enisa.europa.eu \n \n \n \n \n \n \ndoi: 10.2824/508412 \n \nTP-01-15-227-EN-N \nENISA \nEuropean Union Agency for Network and Information Security \nScience and Technology Park of Crete (ITE) \nVassilika Vouton, 700 13, Heraklion, Greece \n \nAthens Office", "article_id": "PDF-ENISA-Cloud-SME-c4aee8e4ec31", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "source": "pdf", "code_source": "Cloud Security Guide for SMEs (ENISA)", "titre_article": "12. 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