File size: 115,330 Bytes
6fa4bc9 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 1044 1045 1046 1047 1048 1049 1050 1051 1052 1053 1054 1055 1056 1057 1058 1059 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064 1065 1066 1067 1068 1069 1070 1071 1072 1073 1074 1075 1076 1077 1078 1079 1080 1081 1082 1083 1084 1085 1086 1087 1088 1089 1090 1091 1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1098 1099 1100 1101 1102 1103 1104 1105 1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1182 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 1188 1189 1190 1191 1192 1193 1194 1195 1196 1197 1198 1199 1200 1201 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 1213 1214 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1237 1238 1239 1240 1241 1242 1243 1244 1245 1246 1247 1248 1249 1250 1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 1256 1257 1258 1259 1260 1261 1262 1263 1264 1265 1266 1267 1268 1269 1270 1271 1272 1273 1274 1275 1276 1277 1278 1279 1280 1281 1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1291 1292 1293 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 1299 1300 1301 1302 1303 1304 1305 1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 1318 1319 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328 1329 1330 1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 1336 1337 1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367 1368 1369 1370 1371 1372 1373 1374 1375 1376 1377 1378 1379 1380 1381 1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 1484 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1492 1493 1494 1495 1496 1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1506 1507 1508 1509 1510 1511 1512 1513 1514 1515 1516 1517 1518 1519 1520 1521 1522 1523 1524 1525 1526 1527 1528 1529 1530 1531 1532 1533 1534 1535 1536 1537 1538 1539 1540 1541 1542 1543 1544 1545 1546 1547 1548 1549 1550 1551 1552 1553 1554 1555 1556 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 1562 1563 1564 1565 1566 1567 1568 1569 1570 1571 1572 1573 1574 1575 1576 1577 1578 1579 1580 1581 1582 1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 1590 1591 1592 1593 1594 1595 1596 1597 1598 1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 1606 1607 1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 1613 1614 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 | {
"paper_id": "P85-1007",
"header": {
"generated_with": "S2ORC 1.0.0",
"date_generated": "2023-01-19T09:39:16.587031Z"
},
"title": "Speech Acts and Rationality",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Philip",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Cohen",
"suffix": "",
"affiliation": {
"laboratory": "",
"institution": "Stanford University",
"location": {}
},
"email": ""
},
{
"first": "Hector",
"middle": [
"J"
],
"last": "Levesque",
"suffix": "",
"affiliation": {
"laboratory": "",
"institution": "University of Toronto\"",
"location": {}
},
"email": ""
}
],
"year": "",
"venue": null,
"identifiers": {},
"abstract": "This pallet derives the ha.sis of a theory, of communication from a formal theov,.' of rational interaction. The major result is a <h, mon~t fallen t hat. ilh,c,tionary acts need not I)e primitive, and .ee, I uot he reco~'nized..\\s a t,'st case. we derive Searle's condit ions on reqt,est in~ from pri,ciples of ralionality coupled with a ~;ric~,an theory of iml~erativ,.s. The theory is shown to distingui.~h insincere or nonserious imperatives from tr~le requests. ['~xlensions to indirect .~peech acts. and ramifications for natural language ~ystcms are also brieily discussed. 2 \"F, ll~,w ,,I' th~ Canadian lr, sti~,~t~-f~)r A,'.wanc~d R-search. ~This re~,.areh was mad-W,~sdde ;n part hy a gilt from ~he Systems Dew.l-opm~.n~ [\"~.md:~ti,,n. and in part t,y suFport fr-m ti~e r)efens~ Advanced R~.se~rrh ['roje.rts .Ag,ncy un.h'r C,~n~ra.ct Nf~I)t)3D.8.I-K-0078 wilh the .N~v:~| ['~lec~ronic Systems C,,mm~nd. The views and om\u00a2lusions eon-tain~'d in thls document ~re ~hos~\" of the ~uthor~ and should not be interpreted ;~ representa, tive of the. omci~.| policies, ~ither expre~ed or implied, oi\" the Defense ~dvanced Research Projects Agency or the United States (Jovernment. Mu~h nf this rrsearrh was done when the second a.uthor wa~ employed at the Falrehild ('~m,r~ and Instrument Corp. emerges as a consequence of principles of action. 2.1 Speech Act Theory Speech act theory was originally conceived a~s part of action theory. Many of Austin's [.l] insights about the nature of ~peech acts, felicity conditions, anti modes of lath,re apply equally well to non-communicative actions. Searle [2G] repeatedly mentions lhat many of the conditions he attributes to variol,s illocutionary acls (such as requests anti qm,stions) apply more ~e:.,rally to non-communicative action. ]lowever, re~earcher~ have ~radually lost ~ight of their roots. In recent work [3~ I illoc,ltior,a~\" acts are formalized, antl a logic is proposed, in which propertie~ of IA's (e.g., \"preparatory conditions\" and \"mode~ of achievement') are primitively stip.laled, rather than derived front more h~ic principles of action. We helieve this approach misses significant generalities. \"['hm paper ~hows how to derive properties of illocutionary acts from principh,s of rationality, .pdating the formalism of [10J. Work in Artificial Intelligence provided the first forntal gro.nding of speech act theory in terms of plannin~ and plan rerog~nitmn, cldminalin~ in Perra.h and \\lh.n'~ [:2:~ I I I...ry of indirect speech acts. Xhwh ~,I\" o~0r re~earch i~. in.~lfir~'d I,~ lhrir analyses, llowe~er, one major ingredien! ~I\" their the.ry r:m be shown to he redundant in01 illocutionary acts. All do. inferential power nf the recolfnition of their dloc~itionary acts wa.s already available in other \"operators'. Nevertheless, the natural langlnage systems based on this approach [I. ,-3] always had to recognize which illocutionary act was performed in order to respond to a tnser's utterance. Since the illocutionary acts were unnecessary for achieving their ell'errs, so too wa.~ their re~'n~nition. The stance that illocutionary arts are not primitive, and need not he re;og'nize(l, is a lih..ratmg one. ()nee taken, it l)ecomes apparent that many of the (lifl~cuhies in applying ~l),,ech act theory to discourse, or to computer systems, stem from taking these acts too seriously-i.e., too primitively. 3 Form of the argument We show that illocutionary acts need not be primitive hy deriving Searle's conditions on requesting from an independentlymotivated theory of action. The realm of communicative action is entered following Grice [13i-by postulating a correlation between the ,ntterance of a sentence with a certain syntactic feature (e.g., its dominant clause is an imperative) and a complex",
"pdf_parse": {
"paper_id": "P85-1007",
"_pdf_hash": "",
"abstract": [
{
"text": "This pallet derives the ha.sis of a theory, of communication from a formal theov,.' of rational interaction. The major result is a <h, mon~t fallen t hat. ilh,c,tionary acts need not I)e primitive, and .ee, I uot he reco~'nized..\\s a t,'st case. we derive Searle's condit ions on reqt,est in~ from pri,ciples of ralionality coupled with a ~;ric~,an theory of iml~erativ,.s. The theory is shown to distingui.~h insincere or nonserious imperatives from tr~le requests. ['~xlensions to indirect .~peech acts. and ramifications for natural language ~ystcms are also brieily discussed. 2 \"F, ll~,w ,,I' th~ Canadian lr, sti~,~t~-f~)r A,'.wanc~d R-search. ~This re~,.areh was mad-W,~sdde ;n part hy a gilt from ~he Systems Dew.l-opm~.n~ [\"~.md:~ti,,n. and in part t,y suFport fr-m ti~e r)efens~ Advanced R~.se~rrh ['roje.rts .Ag,ncy un.h'r C,~n~ra.ct Nf~I)t)3D.8.I-K-0078 wilh the .N~v:~| ['~lec~ronic Systems C,,mm~nd. The views and om\u00a2lusions eon-tain~'d in thls document ~re ~hos~\" of the ~uthor~ and should not be interpreted ;~ representa, tive of the. omci~.| policies, ~ither expre~ed or implied, oi\" the Defense ~dvanced Research Projects Agency or the United States (Jovernment. Mu~h nf this rrsearrh was done when the second a.uthor wa~ employed at the Falrehild ('~m,r~ and Instrument Corp. emerges as a consequence of principles of action. 2.1 Speech Act Theory Speech act theory was originally conceived a~s part of action theory. Many of Austin's [.l] insights about the nature of ~peech acts, felicity conditions, anti modes of lath,re apply equally well to non-communicative actions. Searle [2G] repeatedly mentions lhat many of the conditions he attributes to variol,s illocutionary acls (such as requests anti qm,stions) apply more ~e:.,rally to non-communicative action. ]lowever, re~earcher~ have ~radually lost ~ight of their roots. In recent work [3~ I illoc,ltior,a~\" acts are formalized, antl a logic is proposed, in which propertie~ of IA's (e.g., \"preparatory conditions\" and \"mode~ of achievement') are primitively stip.laled, rather than derived front more h~ic principles of action. We helieve this approach misses significant generalities. \"['hm paper ~hows how to derive properties of illocutionary acts from principh,s of rationality, .pdating the formalism of [10J. Work in Artificial Intelligence provided the first forntal gro.nding of speech act theory in terms of plannin~ and plan rerog~nitmn, cldminalin~ in Perra.h and \\lh.n'~ [:2:~ I I I...ry of indirect speech acts. Xhwh ~,I\" o~0r re~earch i~. in.~lfir~'d I,~ lhrir analyses, llowe~er, one major ingredien! ~I\" their the.ry r:m be shown to he redundant in01 illocutionary acts. All do. inferential power nf the recolfnition of their dloc~itionary acts wa.s already available in other \"operators'. Nevertheless, the natural langlnage systems based on this approach [I. ,-3] always had to recognize which illocutionary act was performed in order to respond to a tnser's utterance. Since the illocutionary acts were unnecessary for achieving their ell'errs, so too wa.~ their re~'n~nition. The stance that illocutionary arts are not primitive, and need not he re;og'nize(l, is a lih..ratmg one. ()nee taken, it l)ecomes apparent that many of the (lifl~cuhies in applying ~l),,ech act theory to discourse, or to computer systems, stem from taking these acts too seriously-i.e., too primitively. 3 Form of the argument We show that illocutionary acts need not be primitive hy deriving Searle's conditions on requesting from an independentlymotivated theory of action. The realm of communicative action is entered following Grice [13i-by postulating a correlation between the ,ntterance of a sentence with a certain syntactic feature (e.g., its dominant clause is an imperative) and a complex",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Abstract",
"sec_num": null
}
],
"body_text": [
{
"text": "Introduction ']'he tlnifyin~ tilt'me of m,wh c-trent pragmatics antl discourse re~earrh is that the c.herence .f dialogue is to he folnnd in tile iuleraclinn of the cottver~alll'~' 1~61rI.I. Thal is, a speaker is regarded a~s planning his ,lllcrance,~ re achieve his goals, which n,ay involve in{h..lwing a hean'r by the ,,se of comm,micative or \"speech\" acts. (-)u receiving an lltler~tnce realizing such an action, the hearer altempls Io infer the ~peaker's goal(s) anti to qndeffland how the 11llerat|rv fnrthcrs them. The hearer then adopts new goals (e.~.. to re-pond to a reqllest, to clarify the previous ~peaker'~ lllll'r~ince or ~.:f,al) and plan~ his r~wn utterances to acl,ie:'e those. :\\ cotl,cel'?~alion enslle~, I",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "This view of language a.~ p.rposefid art ion has pervaded ('omputational I,inzui-~ics re~carch, and ha.~ re~,lted in numerous protoCyl~e systems [I, 2, 3..',. 9. 25, 27] . llowever, the formal foundations underlying 01n... %v~l.ems haw\" heen unspecified or .nder~peril'ied. In this ,. propositional attitude expressing the speaker's goal. This attitude becomes true as a result of uttering a sentence with that feature. Because of certain general principles governing beliefs and goals, other causal consequences of the speaker's having the expressed goal can be derived. Such derivations will be \"summarized\" as lemmas of the form \"If (conditions) are true, then any action making (antecedent) true also makes (consequent) true] These lemmas will be used to characterize illocutionary acts. though they are not themselves acts. For example, the lemma called REQUEST will characterize a derivation that shows how a heater's knowing that the speaker has certain goals can cause the hearer to act. The conditions licensing that chain will be collected in the REQUEST lemma, and will be shown to subsume those stipulated by Searle [261 as felicity conditions. However, they have been derived here from first principles, and without the need for a primitive action of requesting.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 162,
"end": 165,
"text": "25,",
"ref_id": null
},
{
"start": 166,
"end": 169,
"text": "27]",
"ref_id": null
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The benefits of this approach become clearer as other illocutionary arts are derived. We have derived a characterization of the speech act of informing, and have used it in deriving the speech act of questioning. The latter derivation also allows us to disting~tish real questions from teacher/student questions, and rhetorical questions. However. for brevity, the discussion of the.,e speech acts has been omitted.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Indirect speech acts can be handled within the framework. although, again, we cannot present the analyses here. Briefly, axioms similar to those of Perrauh and Allen {22] can be supplied enabling one to reason that an agent has a goal that q, ~iven that he also has a goal p. When the p's and q's are themselves goals of the hearer (i.e.. the speaker is trying to get the hearer to do something), then we can derive a set of lemmas for i,,lirect requests. Many of these indirect request lemmas correspond to what have been called %herr-circuited\" implicatures. which, it was suggested [211 underlie the processing of utterances of the form \"Can you do X?'. \"Do you know y?\", etc. l,emma formation and lemma application thus provide a familiar model of-herr-circuiting. Furthermore. this approach shows how one ran use general purpose reasoning in concert with conventionalized b~rms (e.g., how one can reason that \"Can you reach the salt\" is a request to pass the salt), a problem that has plagnwd most theories of speech acts.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The plan for the paper is to construct a formalism based on a theory of action that is sufficient for characterizing a request. Most of the work is in the theory of action, as it should be.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "To achieve these goals we need a carefl:lly worked out (though perhaps, incomplete) theory of rational action and interaction. \"!'he theory wil~ be expressed in a logic whose mndet theory is ba.,ed (loosely) on a possible-worlds semantics. We shall propose a logic with four primary modal operators --BELief, BMB, ~,f)AL. and AFTER. W~th these, we shall characterize what agents need to know to perform actions that art, intended to achieve their ~oals. The .zgents do so with Ihe knowledge that other agents operate similarly. Thus, agents have beliefs about .'her'~ gcals, and they have goals to influence others' beliefs and goals. The integration of these operators follows that of Moore {20l, who analyzes how an agent's knowledge affects and is affected by his actions, by meshing a possible-worlds model of knowledge with a situation calculus model of action [18] . By adding GOAL, we can begin to talk about an agent's plans, which can include his plans to influence the beliefs and goals of others.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 866,
"end": 870,
"text": "[18]",
"ref_id": "BIBREF18"
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "The Formalism",
"sec_num": "4"
},
{
"text": "Intuitively, a model for these operators includes courses of events (i.e., sequences of primitive acts) \" that characterize what has happened. Courses of events (O.B.e.'s) are paths through a tree of possible future primitive acts, and after any primitive act has occurred, one can recover the course of events that led up to it. C.o.e.'s can also be related to one another via accessiblity relations that partake in the semantics of BEL and GOAL. Further details of this semantics must await our forthcoming paper",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "The Formalism",
"sec_num": "4"
},
{
"text": "As a general strategy, the formalism will be too strong. First, we have the usual consequential closure problems that plague possible-worlds models for belief. These, however, will be accepted for the time being. Second, the formalism will describe agents as satisfying certain properties that might generally he true, but for which there might be exceptions. Perhaps a process of non-monotonic reasoning could smooth over the exceptions, but we will not attempt to specify such reasoning here. Instead, we assemble a set of basic principles and examine their consequences for speech act use. Third, we are willing to live with the difficulties of the situation calculus model of action -e.g., the lack of a way to capture tnse parallelism, and the frame problem. Finally. the formalism should be regarded as a de,~eription or specification Bran agent, rather than one that any agent could or should use.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "[17].",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Our approach will be to ground a theory of communication in a theory of rational interaction, itself supported by a theory, of rational action, which is finally grounded in mental states. Accordingly, we first need to describe the_behavior of BEL, BMB. GOAL and AFTER. Then, these operators will be combined to describe how agents' goals and plans influence their actions. Then. we characterize how having beliefs about the beliefs and goals of othe~ can affect one's own beliefs and goals. Finally, we characterize a request.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "[17].",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "To be more spe~iflc, here are the primitives that will be used, with a minimal explanation.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "[17].",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Assume p, q, ... are schema variables ranging over wffs, and a, b \u2022 \u2022 are schematic variables ranging over acts. Then the following are wlfs. :P'w chls paper, the only events that will be considered &re primitive acts. The recta-symbol \"1-' will prefix formulas that are theorems, i.e.. that are derivable. Properties of the formal system that will be assumed to hold will be termed Propositions. Propositions will be both formulas that should always be valid, for our forthcoming ~emantics, and rules of inference that should be sound. No attempt to prove or validate these propositions here, but we do so in It 7].",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4,1 Primitives",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "We adop! ,In' ,Isual axioms characterizing how complex actions behave .mh'r AFTER, a.s treated in a dynamic logic (e.g., [20] ) Our treatment of acts requires that we deal somehow with the \"frame problem\" [18] . That is, we must characterize not only what changes as a resuh of doing an action, but also what does not change. To approach this problem, the following notation will he convenient:",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 121,
"end": 125,
"text": "[20]",
"ref_id": "BIBREF20"
},
{
"start": 205,
"end": 209,
"text": "[18]",
"ref_id": "BIBREF18"
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Properties of Acts",
"sec_num": "4.2"
},
{
"text": "Definition t (PRESERVES a p) d.f P ~ (AFTER a p)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Properties of Acts",
"sec_num": "4.2"
},
{
"text": "Of co.rse, all theorems are preserved.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Properties of Acts",
"sec_num": "4.2"
},
{
"text": "Temporal concepts are introduced will DONE (for past happenings) and <> (read \"eventually'}. To say that p was true at ~(,me point in the past, we use 3a (DONE p?:a). <> is to he regarded in the \"branching time* sense [I 1], and will be defined more rigorously in !17]. Essentially, OP is true iff for all infinite extensions of any course of events there is a finite prefix satisfying p. OP and O~p are jointly satisfiable. Since OP starts \"now \", the following property is also true, *(AFTER t (DONE t)), where t is term denoting a primitive act (or a sequence of primitive actsl, is ant always true since aft ;~t '~ay change the values of terms (e.g., an election changes the value of the term (PRESIDENT U.S.))",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Properties of Acts",
"sec_num": "4.2"
},
{
"text": "Also, we have the following rule of inference: Proposition 10 (BMB y x pDq) 3",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Proposition 7 t-p 30P",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Proposition 8 I/I-a ~ fl then O(a v p) ~ O(3 v",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Proposition 7 t-p 30P",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Proposition 11 1/I-,~ 3 # then ~-(BMB y x ~) :3 (BMB y x J)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "((BMD y x p) 3 (BMB y x q))",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Also, we characterize mutual knowledge as:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "((BMD y x p) 3 (BMB y x q))",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Definition 3 (MK x y p)d.=f P ^ (BMB x y p) ^ (BMD y x p)r",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "((BMD y x p) 3 (BMB y x q))",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "5For an exploration of the issues involved in explicit vs. implicit belief, see",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "((BMD y x p) 3 (BMB y x q))",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "SNotice that (BMB y x p) $ (BMB x y p).",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "ilel.",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "~This definition is not entirely correct, but is adequate for present purposes.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "ilel.",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "For GOAL, we have the following properties:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Goals",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Proposition 12 {GOAL x {GOAL x p)) ~ (GOAL x p)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Goals",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "If an agent thinks he has a goal, then he does.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Goals",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Proposition 13 {BEL x {GOAL x p}} -{GOAL x p} Proposition 14 {GOAL x p} ^ {GOAL x p~q) {GOAL x q)8",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Goals",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The following two derived rules are also useful:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Goals",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Proposition 15 If i\" o D ~ then ~'(GOAL x a) D (GOAL x ~) Proposition t0 Ilk-a A ;1 D \"7 then I-{BMB y x (GOAL x ~)) ^ (BMB y x {GOAL x ~)} :~ (BMB y x {GOAL x \"~))",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Goals",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "More properties of GOAL follow.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Goals",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Next. we must characterize how beliefs, goals, and actions are related. \"the interaction of BEL anti AFTER will be patterned after Moore's analysis ['20l. In particular, we have:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Attitudes and Rational Action",
"sec_num": "4.4"
},
{
"text": "Proposition IT v x. act (AGT a x) D (AFTER act (KNOW x (DONE act)))",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Attitudes and Rational Action",
"sec_num": "4.4"
},
{
"text": "Agents know what they have done. Moreover, they think certain effects of their own actions are achieved:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Attitudes and Rational Action",
"sec_num": "4.4"
},
{
"text": "Proposition 18 (BEL x {RESULT x a p)) 3 (RESULT x a (BEL x p)). tvhere def Definition 4 (RESULT x a p) = (AFTER a p) ^ (AGT a x)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Attitudes and Rational Action",
"sec_num": "4.4"
},
{
"text": "The major addition we have made is GOAL. which interacts tightly with the other operators.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Attitudes and Rational Action",
"sec_num": "4.4"
},
{
"text": "We will say a rational agent only adopts goals that are achievable, and accepts as \"desirable\" those states of the world that are inevitable. To characterize inevitabiJities, we have That is, theorems are believed to be always true.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Attitudes and Rational Action",
"sec_num": "4.4"
},
{
"text": "Another property we want is that no sequence of primitive acts is forever ruled out from happening. A u:~eful instance of ALWAYS Is (ALWAYS pDq) ill which no matter what happens, p still implies q. We can now distinguish between p :~ q's being logically valid, its being true in all courses of events, and its merely being true after some event happens.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Attitudes and Rational Action",
"sec_num": "4.4"
},
{
"text": "SNotice that it pDq is true (or even believed} but (GOAL x pDq) is not true, we should not reach this conclusion since some act could make it laise.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Attitudes and Rational Action",
"sec_num": "4.4"
},
{
"text": "What an agent believes to be inevitable is a goal (he accepts what he cannot change).",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Goals and Inevitabilities",
"sec_num": "4.4.1"
},
{
"text": "and conversely (almost), agents do not adopt goals that they believe to be impossible to achieve --",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Proposition 21 (BEL x {ALWAYS p)) ~ (GOAL x p)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Proposition 22 No futility --(GOAL x p) ~(BEL x (ALWAYS ~p))",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Proposition 21 (BEL x {ALWAYS p)) ~ (GOAL x p)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "This gives the following useful lemma:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Proposition 21 (BEL x {ALWAYS p)) ~ (GOAL x p)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Lemma I Inevitable Consequences (GOAL x p) A (BEL x (ALWAYS p~q )) D (GOAL x q)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Proposition 21 (BEL x {ALWAYS p)) ~ (GOAL x p)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Proof: By Proposition 21, if an agent believes pDq is always true, he has it as a goal. Hence by Proposition 14, q follows from his goals, This lemma states that if one's goal is ac.o.e, in which p holds, and if one thinks that no matter what happens, pDq, then one's goal is a c.o.e, in which q holds. Two aspects of this property are crucially important to its plausibility. First, one must keep in mind the \"follows from* interpretation of our propositional attitudes. Second, the key aspect of the connection between p and q is that no one can achieve p without achieving q. If someone could do so, then q need not be true in a c.o.e, that satisfies the agent's goals. Now, we have the following as a lemma that will be used in the speech act derivations:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Proposition 21 (BEL x {ALWAYS p)) ~ (GOAL x p)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Lemma 2 Shared Recoqnition (BMB y x {GOAL x p)} A (BMB y x (BEL x (ALWAYS p~q))) 3 (BMB y x (GOAL x q))",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Proposition 21 (BEL x {ALWAYS p)) ~ (GOAL x p)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The proof is a straightforward application of Lemma I and Propositions 9 and 10.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Proposition 21 (BEL x {ALWAYS p)) ~ (GOAL x p)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "In this formalism, we are attempting to capture a number of properties of what might be called \"intention\" without postulating a primitive concept for \"intend\". Instead, we will combine acts, beqiefs, goals, and a notion of commitment built out of more primitive notions. To capture ,me grade of commitment than an agent might have towards his goals, we define a persistent goal. P-GOAL, to be one that the agent will not give up until he thinks it has been an:(stied, or until he thinks he cannot achieve it. Now, in order to state constraints on c.o.e.'s we define:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Persistent goals",
"sec_num": "4.4.2"
},
{
"text": "d*f Definition T (PREREQ x p q) = Vc (RESULT x \u00a2 q) ~ 3 a (a ~ c) A (RESULT x a p}",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Persistent goals",
"sec_num": "4.4.2"
},
{
"text": "This definition states that p is a prerequisite for x's achieving q if all ways for x to bring about q result in a course of events in which p has been true. Now, we are ready for persistent goals: Persistent goals are ones the agent will replan to achieve if his earlier attempts to achieve it fail to do so. Our definition does not say that an agent must give up his goal when he thinks it is satisfied, since goals of maintenance are allowed. All this says is that somewhere along the way to giving up the persistent goal, the agent had to think it was true (or belie~,e it was impossible for him to achieve).",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Persistent goals",
"sec_num": "4.4.2"
},
{
"text": "Though an agent may be persistent, he may be foolishly so beca,se he ha.~ no competence to achieve his goals. We characterize competence below.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Persistent goals",
"sec_num": "4.4.2"
},
{
"text": "I'e.ple are ~omet imes experls in certain fiehts, as well as in their own bodily movements. For example, a competent electrician will form correct plans to achieve world states in which \"electrical\" .-tares of affairs obtain. Most aduhs are competent in achievimz worhl states in which their teeth are brushed, etc. We will say an agent is COMPETENT with respect to p if, whenever he thinks p will tnJe after some action happens, he is correct: That is. any person is always competent to do the acts of which he is the agent. ~ Of course, he is not always competent to achieve any particular effect.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Competence",
"sec_num": "4.4.3"
},
{
"text": "Finally. ~iven all these properties we are ready to describe rational agents.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Competence",
"sec_num": "4.4.3"
},
{
"text": "Rational Agents i~elow are properties of ideally rational agents who adopt per-~i.~tent gnals. First. a~ents are carefuh they do not knowingly and deliberately make their persistent goals impossible for them achieve. in other words, no deliberately shooting onessetf in the foot. Now, agents are cautious in adopting\" persistent goats, since they must eventually come to some decision about their feasibility. We require an agent to either come up with a \"plan ~ to Sl}ecause of Proposition 2. all Proposition 23 says is that if a competent agen,, believes his own primitiw act halts, it will.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "~nNotice *hat tt is eruciad that p be true in ~he sane world in which the agent does act, hence the use ,if \"p?;aet*.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "achieve them --a belief of some act (or act sequence) that it achieves the persistent goal --or to believe he cannot bring the goal about. That is, agents do not adopt persistent goals they could never give up. The next Proposition will characterize this property of P-GOAL. But, even with a correct plan and a persistent goal. there is still the possibility that the competent agent never executes the plan in the right circumstances --some other agent has changed the circumstances, thereby making the plan incorrect.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "[f the agent is competent, then if he formulates another plan. it will be correct for the new circumstances. But again, the world could change out from under him. Now, just as with operating systems, we want to say that the world is \"fair\" -the agent will eventually get a chance to execl,te his plans. This property is also characterized in the following Proposition:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Proposition 25 fa,r EzecuHon --The agent u,dl prentually form a plan and ezeeute *t. believing it achieves his persistent goal in e,rcumstanees he believes to be appropriate for its sucees.~.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "V x (P-GOAL x q) 2) 0[3 act' (DONE x p?;act')] v [BEL x (ALWAYS x ~ql[}, where p 4=*\u00a2 (nEL x (RESULT x act' q))",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "We now give a crucial theorem:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Theorem I Consequences of a pers,stent goal --If .~omeone has a pers*stent goal of bringing about p, and brmgm 9 ~l~ut p is usffhin his area of competence, then eventually either p becomes true or he wall believe there is nothing that can be done to achiet, e P \u00a5 y (P.GOAL y p) A (ALWAYS (COMPETENT y p)) D (> (p v (BEL y (ALWAYS y ~p}))",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Proof sketch:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Since the agent has a persistent goal. he eventually will either find and execute a plan. or will believe there is nothing he can do to achieve the goal. Since he is competent with respect to p, the plans he forms will be correct. Since his plan act' is correct, and since any other plans he forms for bringing about p are also correct, and since the world is \"fair', eventually either the agt,nt executes his correct plan, making p true, or the agent comes to believe he cannot achieve p. A more rigorous proof can be found in the Appendix.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "This theorem is a major cornerstone of the formalism, telling us when we can conclude \u2022p, given a plan and a ~oal. and is used throughout the speech act analyses. [f an agent who is not COMPETENT with respect to p adopts p a.s a persistent goal, we cannot conclude that eventually either p will be true (or the agent will think he cannot bring it about), since the agent could forever create incorrect plans. [f the goal is not persistent, we also cannot conclude OP since the agent could give it up without achieving it.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The use of ~ opens the formalism to McDermott's \"Little Nell* paradox [19l. tt In our context, the problem arises as follows: First, since an agent has a persistent goal to achieve p, and we assume here he is always competent with respect to p, ~p is true. But, when p is of the form Oq (eg., <>(SAVED LITTLE-NELL)), <><>q is true, so <>q is true ~ well. Let us assume the agent knows all this. Hence, by the definition of P-GOAL, one might expect the agent to give up his persistent goal that <>q, since it is already satisfied! On the other hand, it would appear that Proposition 25 is sufficient to prevent the agent from giving up his goal too soon, since it states that the agent with a persistent goal must act on it, and, moreover, the definition of P-GOAL does not require the agent to give up his goal immediately. For persistent goals to achieve <>q. within someone's scope of competence, one might think the agent need \"only\" maintain <>q as a goal, and then the other properties of rationality force the agent to perform a primitive act.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Unfortunately, the properties given so far do not yet rule out Little Nell's being mashed, and for two reasons. First, NIL denotes a primitive act --the empty sequence, llence, doing it would satisfy Proposition 25, but the agent never does anything substantive. Second, doing anything that does not affect q also satisfies Proposition 25, since after doing the unrelated act, <>q is still true. We need to say that the agent eventually acts on q! To do so, we have the following property:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Proposition 26 (P-GOAL y Oq) 3 O[(P-GOAL y q) v (rtgL y (ALWAYS y ~q))],",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "That is. eventually the agent will have the persistent goal that q, and by Proposif ion 25. will act on it. If he eventually comes to believe he cannot bring about q, he eventually comes to believe he cannot bring about eventually q as well, allowing him to give up his persistent goal that eventually q.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.5",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "This ends our discussion of single agents. We now need to characterize rational interaction sufficiently to handle a simple reqt,?st. First, we ,.liscuss cooperative agents, and then the effects of uttering sentences.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Rational Interaction",
"sec_num": "4.6"
},
{
"text": "We describe agents as sincere, helpful, and more knowledgeable than others about the t~lth of some ~tate of affairs. An agent is HELPFUL to another if he adopts as his own persistent goal another agent's goal that he eventually do something (provided that potential goal does not conflict with his own I.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Properties of Cooperative Agents",
"sec_num": "4.6.1"
},
{
"text": "'Ca (BEL x (GOAL y (}(DONE y a) )))))))",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [
{
"start": 4,
"end": 31,
"text": "(BEL x (GOAL y (}(DONE y a)",
"ref_id": null
}
],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Definition 12 (HELPFUL x y) a,\u00a2=",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The ac: !IMPER speaker hearer 'p] stands for \"make p t r~w\" Proposition 27 states that if it is mutually known that y is attending to x, is then tile result of uttering an imperative to y to make it the case that y has done action act is that y thinks it is mutitally believed that the speaker*s goal is that y should think his goal is foe y to form the persistent goal of doing act.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Definition 12 (HELPFUL x y) a,\u00a2=",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "We also need to a~sert that IMPER preserves sincerity about the speak,'r's coals and helpfulness. These restrictions c,~uld be loosened, but maintaining them is simpler.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Definition 12 (HELPFUL x y) a,\u00a2=",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "(BMB y x (SINCERE y (GOAL y p))))",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Proposition 28 {PRESERVES [IMPER x y \"do y act']",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Proposition 29 (PRESERVES [IMPER x y \"rio y ;Jet'] (HELPFUL y xt) All t ',ricean \"feature'-based theories of communication need to acco,mt for cases in which a speaker uses an utterance with a feat'tre, but does not have the attitudes (e.g.. beliefs, and goals) usually attributed to someone uttering sentences with that feature. Thus, the attribution of the attitudes needs to be contextdependent. Specifically, proposition 28 needs to be weak enough to prevent nonserious utterances such as \"go jump in the lake ~ from being automatically interpreted as requests even though the utterance is an imperative. On the other hand, the formula must be strong enough that requests are derivable.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Proposition 28 {PRESERVES [IMPER x y \"do y act']",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "In making a request, the speaker is trying to get the hearer to do an act. We will show how the speaker's uttering an imperative to do the act leads to its eventually being done. What we need to prove is this: We will give the major steps of the proof in Fi~lre I, and point In their justifications. The full-fled~'ed proofs are h'ft to Ihe ,,nergetic reader. All formula.s preceded by a * are supposed t,, be Irue just prior to performing the IMPER, are preserved by il. an,I thus are implicitly conjoined to formulas 2 -9. By their placement in the proof, we indicate where they are necessary for making t he deductions.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Deriving a Simple Request",
"sec_num": "5"
},
{
"text": "E~entially. the proof proceeds as follows: If it is mutually known that y is attending to x. and y thinks it i~ mutually believed Ihat Ihe e-conditions hohl. then x's ,lltering an imlwrative to y to do some action results in formula (2) . Since h i~ mutually believed x is sincere about his goals, then (:~) it is miltually believed his goal tndy is that y form a persistent goal to ,Io the act. Since everyone is always competent to do acts of which they are the agent. (.1) it is mutltally believed that the act will eventually be done, or y will think it is forever impossible to do. But since no halting act is forever impossible to do, it is (.3) mutually believed that x's goal is that y eventually do it. Ih, nee, 16) y thinks x's ~oa] is that y eventually do the act. Now, ~ince y is helpfillly disposed towards x, and has no objections Io doing the act. 17) y takes it on as a persistent goal. Since he is alwa.w competent about doing his own arts, 18) eventually it ~ill I,.,Ione or he will think it impossible to do. Again. since it is n(,I f~)rever impossible. (3) he v, ill eventually do it. W,. have shown how the p,.rforming of an imperative to do an act leads to the act's evemually being done. We wish to create a number of lemmas from this proof (and others like it) to characterize iilocutionary acts.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 233,
"end": 236,
"text": "(2)",
"ref_id": null
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Deriving a Simple Request",
"sec_num": "5"
},
{
"text": "A plan for agent \"x\" to achieve some goal \"q\" is an action term ~a\" and two sequences of wits \".no', ~Pl\".... \"pt,\" and \"q0\", \"qz\", ... ~qk\" where \"qk\" is ~q\" and satisfying In other words, given a state where \"x\" believes the \"pi ~, he will believe that if he does ~a\" then \"q0\" will hold and moreover. given that the act preserves pi, and he believes his making \"qi-i ~ true in the presence ofpi will also make \"qi* tale. Consequently, a plan is a special kind of proof that There are two main points to be made about the~e corollaries. First of all, since they are theorems, the implications can be taken to be believed by the agent \"x\" in every, state. In this sense, these wits express general methods believed to achieve certain effects provided the assumptions are satisfied. The second point is that these corollaries are in precisely the form that is required in a plan and therefore can be used as justification for a step in a filture plan in much the same way a lemma becomes a single step in the proof of a theorem.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "t Plans",
"sec_num": "6."
},
{
"text": "We therefore propose a notation for describing many ~t,.p~ of a plan as a single summarizing operator. A 3ummary consists of a name, a list of free variables, a distingafished free variable called the agent of the summary (who will always be list,,d tirst), an Effect which is a wff, a optional Body which is either an action or a wff and finally, an optional Gate which is a wff. The understanding here is that summaries are associated with agent and for an agent \"x\" to have summary \"u\". then there are three cases depending on the body of \"u':",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Summaries",
"sec_num": "6.2"
},
{
"text": "I. If the Bodyof \"u\" is a wff, then llowever, this need not be the ca,~e and different agents could have different summaries (even with the same name). Saying that an agent has a summary is no more than a convenient way of saying that the agent always believes an implication of a certain kind.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Summaries",
"sec_num": "6.2"
},
{
"text": "The following is a summary named REQUEST that captures steps 2 through steps 5 of the proof of Theorem 2.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Summarization of a Request",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "[REQUEST x y act]: This summary allows us to conclude that any action preserving the Gate and making the Bod!/true makes the Effect true.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Summarization of a Request",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Conditions (2) and 3are theorems and hence are always preserved. Condition (1) was preserved by assumption.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 11,
"end": 14,
"text": "(2)",
"ref_id": null
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Summarization of a Request",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Searle's conditions for requesting are captured by the above. Specifically, his \"propositional content\" condition, which states that one requests a future act, is present as the Effect because of Theorem 2. Searle's first \"preparatory\" condition --that the hearer be able to do the requested act, and that the speaker think so is satisfied by condition (2). Searle's second prepara* tory condition --that it not be obvious that the hearer was going to do the act anyway --is captured by our conditions on persistence, which state when an agent can give up a persistent goal, that is not one of maintenance, when it has been satisfied.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Summarization of a Request",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Grice's \"recognition of intent* condition [12, 13] is satisfied since the endpoint in the chain (step 9) is a goal. Hence, the speaker's goal is to get the hearer to do the act hy means, in part, of the (mutual) recognition that the speaker's goal is to get the hearer to do it. Thus, according to Grice, the speaker has meant,,,, that the hearer should do the act. Searle's revised Gricean condition, that the hearer should \"understand\" the literal meaning of the utterance, and what illocutionary act the utterance \"counts as* are also satisfied, provided the summary is mutually known, le",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 42,
"end": 46,
"text": "[12,",
"ref_id": null
},
{
"start": 47,
"end": 50,
"text": "13]",
"ref_id": "BIBREF13"
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Summarization of a Request",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Two questions now arise. First, is this not overly complicated? The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is \"No'. By applying this REQUEST theorem, we can prove that the utterance of an imperative in the circumstances specified by the Gate results in the Effect, which is as simple a propositional attitude as anyone would propose for the effect of uttering an imperative --namely that it is mutually believed that the speaker's goal is that the hearer eventually do the act. The Bod V need never be considered 16~'he further elaboration of this point that it deserves is outside the ~cope . ot this paper.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "T. 1 Nonserious Requests",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "unless one of the gating conditions fails.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "T. 1 Nonserious Requests",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Then, if the Body is rarely needed, when is the \"extra\" embedding (GOAL speaker (BEL hearer ...)} attitude of use? The answer is that these embeddings are essential to preventing nonserious or insincere imperatives from being interpreted unconditionally as requests. In demonstrating this, we will show how Searle's \"Sincerity ~ condition is captured by our SINCERE predicate.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "T. 1 Nonserious Requests",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The formula (SINCERE speaker p) is false when the speaker does something to get the hearer to believe he, the speaker, has the goal of the bearer's believing p, when he in fact does not have the goal of the heater's knowing that p Let us see see how this would he applied for \"Go jump in the lake', uttered idiomatically. Notice that it could be uttered and meant as a request, and we should be able to capture the distinction between serious and nonserious uses. In the case of uttering this imperative, the content of SINCERE. p p =((:OAL speaker (P-GOAL hearer (DONE hearer/JUMP-INTO Laker]))).",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "T. 1 Nonserious Requests",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Assume that it is mutually known/believed that the lake is frigidly cold (any other conditions leading to -,.{GOAL x p) would do as well. e.g., that the hearer is wearing his best suit, or that there is no lake around). So, by a reasonable axiom of goal formation, no one has goals to achieve states of affairs that are objectionable (assume what is \"objectionable\" involves a weighing of alternatives). ~o, it is mutually known/believed that ~(GOAL speaker (DONE hearer [JUMP-INTO Laket])), and so the speaker does not believe he has such a goal. l'l The consequent to the implication defining SINCERE is false, and because tile result of tile imperative is a mutual belief that the speaker's goal is that the hearer think he has the goal of the bearer's jumping into the lake, the antecedent of the implication is true. Hence, the speaker is insincere or not serious, and a request interpretation is blocked, is",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "T. 1 Nonserious Requests",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "In the case of there not being a lake around, the speaker's goal cannot be that the hearer form the persistent goal of jumping in some non-existent lake. since by the 3/0 Futility property, the hearer will not adopt a goal if it is unachievable, and hence the speaker will not form his g~al to achieve the unachievable state of affairs (that the hearer adopt a goal he cannot achieve). }tence, since all this is mutually believed, using the same argument, the speaker must be insincere.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "T. 1 Nonserious Requests",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The ability conditions for requests are particularly simple, since as long as the hearer knows what action the speaker is referring to. he can always do it. He cannot, however, always bring about some goal world. An important variation of requesting is one in which the speaker does not specify the act to be performed; he merely expresses his goal that some p be made true. This will be captured by the action lIMPER y 'p] for ~make p true*. Here, tTThe speaker's expressed goat is that the hearer form t persistent gold to jump in the lake. But. by the /neeitails Coassqasaees lemma, given that a c.o.e, satisfying the speaker's goal also hu the heater's eventually jumping in (since the hearer knows what to do), the speaker's goal is also \u2022 c.o.e, in which the hearer eventually jumps in. In the same way, the speaker's goal would also be that the hearer eventually gets wet.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Nonspecific requests",
"sec_num": "8"
},
{
"text": "goals may have more to do with the manner of his action (e.g., tone of voice), than with the content. All we have done is demoasnurata formally how \u2022 hearer could determine the utterance is not to be talteo ~r, face value.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "I*11owever, we do not say what else might be derivable. The speaker's true",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "in planning this act, the speaker need only believe the hearer thinks it is mutually believed that it is always the case that the hearer will eventually find a plan to bring about p. Ahhough we cannot present the proof that performing an [IMPER x y \"p] will make Op true, the following is the illocutionary summary of that proof: [NONSPECIFIC-REQUEST x y p]:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "I*11owever, we do not say what else might be derivable. The speaker's true",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Gate: (BMB y x (SINCERE x (GOAL x (BEL y (GOAL x (P-GOAL y p)))))) A (BMB y x (ALWAYS (COMPETENT y p))) (BMB y x (ALWAYS ~-7 act' (DONE y q?;act'), where q ~( (BEL y (RESULT y act' p)))) Body:.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "I*11owever, we do not say what else might be derivable. The speaker's true",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "(GOAL x (BEL y (GOAL x (P-GOAL y p)))))",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(IJMB y x",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Effect:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(IJMB y x",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "(nMB y x (GOAL x OPt)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(IJMB y x",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Since the speaker only asks the hearer to make p true. the ability conditions are that the hearer think it is mutually believed that it is always true that eventually there will be some act such that the hearer believes of it that it achieves p (or he will believe it is impossible for him to achieve). The speaker need not know what act the hearer might choose.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(IJMB y x",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Just as mathematicians have the leeway to decide which proofs are useful enough to be named a.s lemmas or theorems, so too does the language user. linguist, computer system, and speech act theoretician have great leeway in deciding which summaries to name and form. Grounds for making such decisions range from the existence of ilfocutionary verbs in a particular language, to efficiency. However. summaries are flexible --they allow for different languages and different agents to carve up the same plans differently. ,o Furthermore, a summary formed for efficiency may not correspond to a verb in the language.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "On summarization",
"sec_num": "9"
},
{
"text": "Philosophical considerations may enter into how much of a plan to summarize for an illocutionary verb. For example, most illocutionary acts are considered successful when the speaker has communicated his intentions, not when the intended effect has taken hold, This acgues for labelling as Effects of summaries intended to capture illocutionary acts only formulas that are of the form (BMI3 hearer speaker (GOAL speaker p)), rather than those of the form (BMB hearer speaker p) or (BEL hearer p), where p is not a GOAL-dominated formula. Finally, summaries may be formed as conversations progress.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "On summarization",
"sec_num": "9"
},
{
"text": "The same ability to capture varying amounts of a chain of inference will allow us to deal with muhi-utterance or muhiagent acts, such as, betting, complying, answering, etc., in which there either needs to be more than one act (a successful bet r.quires an offer and an acceptance), or one act is defined to require the presence of another (complying makes sense only in the presence of a previous directive). For example, where REQUEST captured the chain of inference from step 2 to step 5, one called COMPLY could start at 5 and stop at step 9.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "On summarization",
"sec_num": "9"
},
{
"text": "tSRemember, summaries are actually beliefs of agents, and those beliefs need oct be shared.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "On summarization",
"sec_num": "9"
},
{
"text": "Thus, the notion of characterizing illocutionary acts as lemmalike summaries, i.e., as chains of inference subject to certain conditions, buys us the ability to encapsulate distant inferences at \"one-shot'.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "On summarization",
"sec_num": "9"
},
{
"text": "The use of these summaries provides a way to prove that various short-cuts that a system might take in deriving a speaker's goals are correct. Furthermore, the ability to index summaries by their Bodies or from the utterance types that could lead to their application (e.g., for utterances of the form \"(.',an you do <X> ~) allows for fast retrieval of a lemma tlmt is likely to result in goal recognition. By an appropriate organization of summaries [5] , a system can attempt to apply the most comprehensive summaries first, and if inapplicable, can fall back on less comprehensive ones, eventuMly relying on first principles of reasoning about actions. Thus. the apparent difficulty of reasoning about speaker-intent can be tamed for tile \"short-circuhed ~ cases, but more general-purpose reasoning can deployed when necessary. IIowever. the conil)lexities of rea.~oning about others' beliefs and goals remains. [\"(}r examllh \", ((;OAL BILL OHAVE BILL HAM-MERI))) and (GOAL BILL <~(HAVE JOHN HAMMERI)) could both be part of a description of Bill's plan for John to get a hammer and give it to him. Such a plan could be triggered by Bill's merely saying \"C, et tile ilammer\" in the right circumstances, such as when Bill is on a ladder plainly holding a nail. :0 A subsequent paper will demonstrate the conditions under which such reasoning is ~ound.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 451,
"end": 454,
"text": "[5]",
"ref_id": "BIBREF5"
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Ramifications for Computational Models of Language Use",
"sec_num": "9.1"
},
{
"text": "I1 Concluding Remarks rhi~ i)alier tia.~ demonstrated tilat all illocutionary acts ne,'d ant t),' primitive. At least some can be derived from more basic priuciph.s of rational lotion, and an account of tile propositional attitudes affected by the uttering of sentences wittl decl.'u-ative, interrogative, and imperative moods. This account satisfies a number of criteria for a good theory of illocutionary acts. * Most elements of :he theory are independently motivated.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Ramifications for Computational Models of Language Use",
"sec_num": "9.1"
},
{
"text": "The ~heory of rational action is motivated independently from any notions of communication. Similarly, the properties of cooperative agents are also independent of communication.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Ramifications for Computational Models of Language Use",
"sec_num": "9.1"
},
{
"text": "l\u00b0Notice thllt molt theoritqt Ot Ipeech gta would treat the above utterance u Bed I I direct request. We do not.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Ramifications for Computational Models of Language Use",
"sec_num": "9.1"
},
{
"text": "The characterization of the result of uttering sentences with certain syntactic moods is justified by the results we derive for illocutionary acts. as well as the results we cannot derive (e.g.. we cannot derive a request under conditions of insincerity ).",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Ramifications for Computational Models of Language Use",
"sec_num": "9.1"
},
{
"text": "Summaries need not correspond to illocutionary verbs in a language. Different languages could capture different parts of the same chain of reasoning, and an agent might have formed a summary for purposes of efficiency, but that summary need not correspond to any other agent's summary.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Ramifications for Computational Models of Language Use",
"sec_num": "9.1"
},
{
"text": "The rules of combination of illocutionary acts (characterizing, for example, how mnltiple assertions could constitute the performance of a request) are now reduced to nlles for combining propositional contents and attitudes. Thus, multi-utterance illocutionary acts can be handled by accumulating the speaker's goals expressed in multiple titterantes, to allow an illocutionary theorem to be applied.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Ramifications for Computational Models of Language Use",
"sec_num": "9.1"
},
{
"text": "Multi-act utterances are also a natural outgrowth of l|liS approach. There is no rea.~on why one cannot apply mulliple illocutionary sunlniaries tO tile res0ill of utlt, ring a S\u00a2'lllen\u00a2\u00a2'. Those sllmmaries, however, need not \u00a2'orre~pond Io illoc0f tionary verbs.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Ramifications for Computational Models of Language Use",
"sec_num": "9.1"
},
{
"text": "The theory is naturally extensible to indirection (to lie argued for hi another paper), to other illoc.tio.ary act, such u questions, commands, informs, a~sertions, and to tile act of referring [gl.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Ramifications for Computational Models of Language Use",
"sec_num": "9.1"
},
{
"text": "Finally. allllougti illocutionary act rerog'nition may h,, ~lricily unntwcssary, given the complexily of o01r proofs, it is likely to he loser011. I']~s,.nliallv. s01etl rec~l~nilhm would ;lillOlill~ to lh(. application (if ill,lc01tl*lnary Sllnlllllries llleort'nl.~ Io di.~cover the speaker'~ I~(ml(s L",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Ramifications for Computational Models of Language Use",
"sec_num": "9.1"
},
{
"text": "~lLittle Nell is tied to the railroad tracks, and will be muhed by the neXt train. Dudley Doright is planning to save her. McDermott claims that, according to various A[ theories of planning, he never will, even though he always knows just what to do.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "'2llowever, #e can only present the analysis of imperatives here.tall it is not mutually known that y is attending, for example, if the speaker i~ not speaking to an ~udience, then we do not say what the result of uttering an imperative is.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "",
"sec_num": null
}
],
"back_matter": [
{
"text": "We wo.ld like to thank Tom Blenko, Ih. ",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Acknowledgements",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Proof of Theorem l:First, we need a lemma:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Appendix",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Q.E.D. I, P25, MP L3, P8, :2 Impl. Intr., 3",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "5.",
"sec_num": null
}
],
"bib_entries": {
"BIBREF0": {
"ref_id": "b0",
"title": "A llhin-lla-'~ed atll)roa~'h I(i Sll,0.ch act rrc.~nh.ion. \"r,.,ctinic:ll I~.,.port 17.1. Di'p;lrtnit'!it of ('ornpill.('r ~cil'nce. llilivei~ity ()f 'r,)roiito",
"authors": [
{
"first": "",
"middle": [
"! F"
],
"last": "Aih'n.",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": null,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "AIh'n..!. F. A llhin-lla-'~ed atll)roa~'h I(i Sll,,0.ch act rrc.~nh.ion. \"r,.,ctinic:ll I~.,.port 17.1. Di'p;lrtnit'!it of ('ornpill.('r ~cil'nce. llilivei~ity ()f 'r,)roiito, January. ll.)]'\u00a2.).",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF2": {
"ref_id": "b2",
"title": "iT: The Rochester dialogue system. Proceedings of the .Vat,..,d Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Phtsh,r~h, I),'nn~yl-vanla",
"authors": [
{
"first": "I",
"middle": [],
"last": "Art",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1982,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "I. ARt ;(iT: The Rochester dialogue system. Proceedings of the .Vat,..,d Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Phtsh,r~h, I),'nn~yl- vanla, 1982. \u00a2I,-70.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF3": {
"ref_id": "b3",
"title": "Planning Natural Language Utterances to S(itisfy Multiple Goals",
"authors": [
{
"first": "D",
"middle": [],
"last": "Appelt",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1981,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Appelt, D. Planning Natural Language Utterances to S(itisfy Multiple Goals. Ph.D. Th.. Stanford University, Stanford, California, December 1981.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF4": {
"ref_id": "b4",
"title": "//ol. to do thinfs ~ith wo,da",
"authors": [
{
"first": "J",
"middle": [
"L"
],
"last": "Austin",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1962,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Austin, J. L.//ol. to do thinfs ~ith wo,da. Oxford University Press, London, 1962.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF5": {
"ref_id": "b5",
"title": "Research in natural language understanding",
"authors": [
{
"first": "",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Bracbman",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "R",
"middle": [],
"last": "Bobrow",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "P",
"middle": [],
"last": "Cohen",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "J",
"middle": [],
"last": "Klovatad",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "B",
"middle": [
"L"
],
"last": "Wel>-Bet",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "W",
"middle": [
"A"
],
"last": "Woods",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1979,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Bracbman. R., Bobrow, R., Cohen, P., Klovatad, J., Wel>- bet, B. L., & Woods, W. A. Research in natural language understanding. Technical Report 4274, Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc., August, 1979.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF6": {
"ref_id": "b6",
"title": "Interacting plans",
"authors": [
{
"first": "B",
"middle": [
"C"
],
"last": "Bruce",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "D",
"middle": [],
"last": "Newman",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1978,
"venue": "CognRiee Science ~",
"volume": "3",
"issue": "",
"pages": "195--233",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Bruce, B. C., & Newman, D. Interacting plans. CognRiee Science ~, 3, 1978, pp. 195-233.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF7": {
"ref_id": "b7",
"title": "Definite reference and mutual knowledge",
"authors": [
{
"first": "T",
"middle": [
"H H"
],
"last": "Clark",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "C",
"middle": [],
"last": "Marshall",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1981,
"venue": "Elements of Discourse Understanding",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "T. Clark. H. H., & Marshall, C. Definite reference and mutual knowledge. In Elements of Discourse Understanding, Aca- demic Press, Joshi, A. K., Sag, !. A., & Webber, B., Eds., New York. 1981.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF8": {
"ref_id": "b8",
"title": "The Pragmatics of Referring and the Modality of Communication",
"authors": [
{
"first": "P",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Cohen",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": null,
"venue": "Computational LinquMtics lO",
"volume": "2",
"issue": "1",
"pages": "97--98",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Cohen, P. R. The Pragmatics of Referring and the Modality of Communication. Computational LinquMtics lO, 2, 198,1, pp. 97-1.16.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF9": {
"ref_id": "b9",
"title": "On Knowin 9 what to Say: Plannin 9 Speech Acts",
"authors": [
{
"first": "P",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Cohen",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1978,
"venue": "Dept. of Computer Science",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Cohen, P. R. On Knowin 9 what to Say: Plannin 9 Speech Acts. Ph.D. Th., University of Toronto. Toronto, January 1978. Technical Report No. 118, Dept. of Computer Sci- ence.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF11": {
"ref_id": "b11",
"title": "Speech Acts and the Rerognition of Shared Plans. Proe. ,[ the Third Iliennial Conference, Canadian Society for (~omputa!ional Studies of Intelligence",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Ii",
"middle": [
"J"
],
"last": "Levesque",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1980,
"venue": "Victoria. B",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "263--271",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "& Levesque, II. J. Speech Acts and the Rerog- nition of Shared Plans. Proe. ,[ the Third Iliennial Con- ference, Canadian Society for (~omputa!ional Studies of In- telligence, Victoria. B. (;., May. 1980, 263-271.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF12": {
"ref_id": "b12",
"title": "Revisited: On Branching versus",
"authors": [
{
"first": "",
"middle": [],
"last": "Ii",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "E",
"middle": [
"A"
],
"last": "Emerson",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "Ilalpern",
"middle": [
"J"
],
"last": "",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1957,
"venue": "inear Time. ACM Sympa.~ium on Prinr~ple.~ of t)rt~jrammin9 Lanquaqes, 1983. 12. (;rice. l{. I'..\\|caning. Phdo,ophiral Ret",
"volume": "66",
"issue": "",
"pages": "377--380",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "II. Emerson, E. A., and Ilalpern. J. Y. \"Sometimes\" and \"Not Never\" Revisited: On Branching versus [.inear Time. ACM Sympa.~ium on Prinr~ple.~ of t)rt~jrammin9 Lanquaqes, 1983. 12. (;rice. l{. I'..\\|caning. Phdo,,ophiral Ret,ietp 66, 1957, pp. 377-3,g8.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF13": {
"ref_id": "b13",
"title": "Utterer'.~ Meaning anti Intentions. t'hilo.~ophi-cal Reriew",
"authors": [
{
"first": "",
"middle": [
"Ii"
],
"last": "Grice",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1969,
"venue": "",
"volume": "63",
"issue": "",
"pages": "1--17",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Grice. II. 1'. Utterer'.~ Meaning anti Intentions. t'hilo.~ophi- cal Reriew 63, 2. 1969, pp. 1.17-177.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF14": {
"ref_id": "b14",
"title": "Logic and conversation",
"authors": [
{
"first": "T|",
"middle": [
"P"
],
"last": "Grice",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1975,
"venue": "Syntaz and Semantics: Speech Acts",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Grice, t|. P. Logic and conversation. In t:ole., P. and Mar gan, J. [,., Eds.,Syntaz and Semantics: Speech Acts , Ace. demic Press, New York,1975.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF15": {
"ref_id": "b15",
"title": "A tluide to the Modal Logics of Knowledge anti Belief",
"authors": [
{
"first": "J",
"middle": [
"Y"
],
"last": "Halpern",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "Moses",
"middle": [
"Y O"
],
"last": "",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": null,
"venue": "Pr~. a/the Ninth Inter. national Joint",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Halpern, J. Y., and Moses. Y. O. A tluide to the Modal Logics of Knowledge anti Belief. Pr~. a/the Ninth Inter. national Joint (;on[erenre on .4rtl]ir:al intelligence, J.J( :AI, Los Angeles, ('alif..",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF17": {
"ref_id": "b17",
"title": "Proceedings of the National t,'ofl/erence a/ the American As-~ciation for Artificial Intelligence, ~ustin, Texan, 198.1. esque, H",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Tlector",
"middle": [],
"last": "Levesque",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "J",
"middle": [
"; J"
],
"last": "Cohen",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "P",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": null,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Levesque, tlector, J. A logic of implicit and explicit belief. Proceedings of the National t,'ofl/erence a/ the American As- ~ciation for Artificial Intelligence, ~ustin, Texan, 198.1. esque, H. J., & Cohen, P. R. A Simplified I,ogic of In- ~eraction. in preparation",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF18": {
"ref_id": "b18",
"title": "A: Ilayes. P..1. ~ome Philo~.phical ['rnhlems from the :-;tandpoint of ..\\rtifi\u00a2ial l.h'lli~,ehce",
"authors": [
{
"first": "",
"middle": [
"J"
],
"last": "Mccarthy",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": null,
"venue": "",
"volume": "9",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "McCarthy. J.. A: Ilayes. P..1. ~ome Philo~.phical ['rnhlems from the :-;tandpoint of ..\\rtifi\u00a2ial l.h'lli~,ehce, In 3t\u00a2~rhl,e intelh'fence .i American El.~evier, B. Mehzer & D. Michh'. Eds., New York. 1~;9.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF19": {
"ref_id": "b19",
"title": "A temporal logic for reasoning about processes and plans",
"authors": [
{
"first": "",
"middle": [],
"last": "I9",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "D",
"middle": [],
"last": "Mcdermott",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1982,
"venue": "Cognitive Science ~",
"volume": "2",
"issue": "",
"pages": "101--55",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "I9. McDermott, D. A temporal logic for reasoning about pro- cesses and plans. Cognitive Science ~, 2, 1982, pp. 101-|55.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF20": {
"ref_id": "b20",
"title": "Reasoning about Knowledge and Action",
"authors": [
{
"first": "R",
"middle": [
"C"
],
"last": "Moore",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1980,
"venue": "Artificial Intelligence Center, SR! International",
"volume": "191",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Moore, R. C. Reasoning about Knowledge and Action. Technical Note 191, Artificial Intelligence Center, SR! In- ternational, October, 1980.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF21": {
"ref_id": "b21",
"title": "Two types o[ convention in indirect speech acts",
"authors": [
{
"first": "J",
"middle": [
"L"
],
"last": "Morgan",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1978,
"venue": "Syntaz and Semantics",
"volume": "9",
"issue": "",
"pages": "261--280",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Morgan, J. L. Two types o[ convention in indirect speech acts. In Syntaz and Semantics, Volume 9: Pragmaties, Academic Press, P. Cole. Ed., New York, 1978, 261-280.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF22": {
"ref_id": "b22",
"title": "A Plan-Based Analysis of Indirect Speech Acts",
"authors": [
{
"first": "C",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Perrault",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "J",
"middle": [
"F"
],
"last": "Allen",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1980,
"venue": "American Journal of Computational LinguiaticJ",
"volume": "6",
"issue": "",
"pages": "167--182",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Perrault, C. R.. & Allen, J. F. A Plan-Based Analysis of Indirect Speech Acts. American Journal of Computational LinguiaticJ 6, 3, 1980, pp. 167-182.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF23": {
"ref_id": "b23",
"title": "It's for your own good: A note on inaccurate reference",
"authors": [
{
"first": "C",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Perrauit",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "P",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Cohen",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1981,
"venue": "Elements of Discourse Understandin9",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Perrauit, C. R., & Cohen, P. R. It's for your own good: A note on inaccurate reference. In Elements of Discourse Understandin9, Cambridge University Press, Joshi, A., Sag, i., & Webber, B., Eds., Cambridge, Mass., 1981.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF25": {
"ref_id": "b25",
"title": "The plan recognition problem: An intersection of artificial intelligence ant| psychology",
"authors": [
{
"first": "D",
"middle": [
"F"
],
"last": "Schmidt",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "N",
"middle": [
"S"
],
"last": "Sridharaa",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "J",
"middle": [
"L"
],
"last": "Goodson",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1979,
"venue": "Artificial Intelligence",
"volume": "10",
"issue": "",
"pages": "45--83",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Schmidt, D. F., Sridharaa, N.S., & Goodson, J. L. The plan recognition problem: An intersection of artificial intel- ligence ant| psychology. Artificial Intelligence 10, 1979. pp. 45-83.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF26": {
"ref_id": "b26",
"title": "Speech acts: ..In essay in the philosophy of language",
"authors": [
{
"first": "J",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Searle",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1969,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Searle, J. R. Speech acts: ..In essay in the philosophy of language. (?ambridge University Pre~s, (:ambridge, 1969.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF28": {
"ref_id": "b28",
"title": "Research in knowledge representation for natural language undecstaz,liog. Annual R,'p~)rt .1785, Bolt, Beranek and",
"authors": [
{
"first": "D",
"middle": [
"J"
],
"last": "Israel",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": ".",
"middle": [
"B"
],
"last": "Wehber",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "W",
"middle": [
"A"
],
"last": "Woods",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1981,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Israel, D. J., Wehber. B. l,., & Woods, W. A. Research in knowledge representation for natural language undecstaz,liog. Annual R,'p~)rt .1785, Bolt, Beranek and Newman Inc., November, 1981.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF29": {
"ref_id": "b29",
"title": "A Model-Theoretic Semantics ['or illocutionary Force",
"authors": [
{
"first": "",
"middle": [],
"last": "Vanderveken",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": null,
"venue": "Logique et ,4n,dy.~e ~'6",
"volume": "10",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Vanderveken. I). A Model-Theoretic Semantics ['or illocu- tionary Force. Logique et ,4n,dy.~e ~'6, 10::-I0.l, 19~q'l, pp. 3,~9-39.~.",
"links": null
}
},
"ref_entries": {
"FIGREF0": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "late ,~[' affairs, one cannot characterize what a ~,y.',tem .~llould ih~ independently from what it does. This paper hl,gins to rectify this sit-ation by presenting a fl~rmalizalinn of rational interaction. ~pon which is erected tile he~itmin~'-r,f a theory of rein m~miralion attd ~peech acts. Inter-;wtion is d~.riv~,d fr~,m prmcil~h,.~ of rational action for indivi,h,al a~enas. ~.. well as lwinciph's -[ helief and goal adoption among a~enls. The h~sis of a theory nf purposefi,l communication thus"
},
"FIGREF1": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "~. a p} -p is true in all courses of events that obt,-,in from act a's happening';, (if a denotes a halting act). (DONI:'. a) -The event denoted by a has just happened. (AGTa x) -Agent xistheonly agent of act a a ~ b --Art a I)r~cedes act b in the current course of events. 3 z p ,~here p contains a free occurrence of variable z. x-~.y True. False (BEL x p) -p foUows from X'S beliefs."
},
"FIGREF2": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "{~OALx p) --p fotlotps from x's goals.{BMB x y p} .-p/~llows from x's beliefs about what is mutually believed by x and y."
},
"FIGREF3": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "3Th&t is. p is true in ~.11 c.o e.'s resulting from concatenating the current c.o.e, with the c.o.e, denoted by a."
},
"FIGREF4": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "b, c, d range over sequences of primitive acts, and p is a wff. then the following are complex act descriptions: a:b --sequential action a [ b --non-deterministic choice (a or b) action p? --action of positively testing p. def (IF p a b) --conditional action = (p?:a) 1 (~pT;b), as in dynamic logic. (UNTIL p a) --iterative action d*~ (~p:a)';~p? (again, as in dynamic logic)."
},
"FIGREF5": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "Propert*es o/complez aet~ --~ p) ---(AFTER a (AFTER b p)). a]b p) -= (AFTER a p) ^ (AFTER b p). p't q) -= p ^ q. DONE will have ~he following additional proper. 2 V act (AFTER act (DONE x act)) Va [{DONE (AFTER a p)?:a) ~ p] 4 [lb. ~D,q then (DONE ~?:a) :~ (DONE ,')?;a) ,5 p -= {DONE p?} 6 (DONE [(p 3 q) ^ p]?} .~ (DONE q?)"
},
"FIGREF6": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "ALWAYS p) 4.~ Va (AFTER a p) This says that no matter what happens, p is true. Clearly, we want Proposition 19 lf~-r~ then ~-(BEL x (ALWAYS ,~))"
},
"FIGREF7": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "\" Va (ACT a) ~ ~(ALWAYS ~(DONE a)), where (ACT a) ~f ~(AFTER a --(DONE a)) One important variant of ALWAYS is (ALWAYS x p) (relative to an agent), which indicates that no matter what that aqent does, p is true. The definition of this version is: d~f Definition 6 (ALWAYS x p) = Va {RESULT x a p)"
},
"FIGREF8": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "P-GOAL x p) = (GOAL x p) ^ [PREREQ x ((BEL x p) v {BEL x (ALWAYS x ~p))) ~(GOAL x p)l"
},
"FIGREF9": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "COMPETENT x p} = Va (BEL x (AFTER x p)) 2) (AFTER a p} One property of competence we will want is: Proposition 23 Vx. a (AGT x a) (ALWAYS (COMPETENT x (DONE x a))), where Definltlon I0 (DONE x a) a---'f (DONE a) .'~ (AGT a x)"
},
"FIGREF10": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "DONE x act) 2) {DONE x p?;act), where p %'J (P-GOAL x q) ~ ~(DEL x (AFTER act (ALWAYS x ~p))) v ~(COAL x (DONE x act)) l0"
},
"FIGREF11": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": ")) ^ ~(GOAL x ~(DONE x a)) D (P-GOAL x (DONE x a)) Agent x thinks agent y is more EXPERT about the true of p than x if he always adopts x's beliefs about p as his own. def Definition 13 (EXPERT y x p) : (BEL x (BEL y p)) :3 (BEL x p)"
},
"FIGREF12": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "Result o[ an Imperative --(DONE [(MK x y (ATTEND y x)) ^ (BMB y x (SINCERE x (GOAL x (P-GOAL y (DONE y act)))))^ (HELPFUL y x)l?; lIMPER x y \"do y act']) :3 O(DONE y act)"
},
"FIGREF13": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": ". I-(BEL x (poApt A ...Ap~} (RESULTxa qoaptA...APk ))) 2. h (BEL x (ALWAYS (p~a Ch-t) D q,))) i=l,e....k"
},
"FIGREF14": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "I-(BEL x ((Po^.-. A Pk) ~ (RESULT x a q))) and therefore, since (BEL x p) D (BEL x (BEL x p)) and (BEL x (p ~ q)) D ((BEL x p) D (BEL x q)). are axioms of belief, a plan is a proof that h (BEL x (p. A ...^ p~)) ~ (BEL x (RESULT x a 'l)) Among tile corollaries to a plan are }-(BEL x ( (Po a ... ^ p,) ~ (RESULT x a q,))) i=[ .... k and }-(BEL x ( (p,\" a ... a Pi) ~ (ALWAYS q~-i D qi))) i: 1 .... k ]=l\" .... k"
},
"FIGREF15": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "BEL x (ALWAYS (Gate ^ Bod~) ~ {Gate ^ Effect})) Is 2. If the Body of \"u\" is an action term, then I-(BEL x (Gate ~ (RESULT agent Bod~ (Gate A Effect}))) :60f course, many actions change the truth of their preconditions. H~ndllng such actions and preconditions i$ straightforward. DONE [(MK x y (ATTEND y x)) A (.conditions)]?; lIMPER x y \"do y act*]) (BMB y x (GOAL x (BEL y (GOAL x (P-GOAL y (DONE y act)))))) A *(BMB y x (SINCERE x (GOAL x (P-GOAL y (DONE y act))))) (BMB y x (GOAL x (P-GOAL y (DONE y act)))) ^ *(BMB y x (ALWAYS (COMPETENT y (DONE y act)))} (BMB y x (GOAL x O[(DONE y act) v 4. (BEL y (ALWAYS ~(DONE y aet)))l)) ^ TX, Plf, 3 ,(BMB y x ~(ALWAYS ~(DONE y act))) 5. (BMB y x (GOAL x O(DONE y act))) A P160 P20, P8, 4 6. (BEL y x (GOAL x O(DONE y act))) ^ Def. BMB (HELPFUL y x) T. (P-GOAL y x (DONE y act)) ^ Def. of HELPFUL, MP \u2022 (ALWAYS (COMPETENT y (DONE y act))) 8. <>[(DONE y act) v (BEL y (ALWAYS ~(DONE y act)})l ^ T1 \u2022 ~(ALWAYS ~(DONE y act)) 9.<>(DONE y act} P20, P8 Q.E.D."
},
"FIGREF16": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "Proof of Theorem 2 --An imperative to do an act result~ in its eventually bein 9 done. 14 One thing worth noting about summaries is that normally the wiTs used above ~\" (BEL x (Ga:e D ...)) will follow from the more general wff I-(;ate D ..."
},
"FIGREF17": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "Gate: it) (BMB y x (SINCERE x (GOAL x (P-GOAL y (DONE y act))))) ^ (2) (BMB y x (ALWAYS (COMPETENT y (DONE y act)))) (3) (BMB y x ~(ALWAYS ~(DONE y act))) (GOAL x (P-GOAL y {DONE y act))))})Effect:(BMB y x (GOAL x O(DONE y act)))"
},
"FIGREF18": {
"uris": null,
"num": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"text": "Extensions: Indirection Indireciion will be modeh'd ill tills framework a.s tile derivation of propositions (lUlling with the speaker's goals that are not stated as such by tile initial propositional attitude. For example, if we can conchlde from IBMB y x (GOAL x (GOAL y Nil that (BMB y x (GOAL x (GOAL y 0 q))), where pdoes not entail q, then. \"loosely', we will say an indirect request has been made by x. (;iven the properties of O. (GOAL x p) D (GOAL x <C>P) is a dworcm. (GOAL x p) an(l ((;()At, x -li) ar~\" mutually un-~ati~[ial)le, hilt (COAL x OP) and (GOAL x O~p) are jointly ~ali~liahh'."
}
}
}
} |