File size: 93,667 Bytes
6fa4bc9 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 1044 1045 1046 1047 1048 1049 1050 1051 1052 1053 1054 1055 1056 1057 1058 1059 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064 1065 1066 1067 1068 1069 1070 1071 1072 1073 1074 1075 1076 1077 1078 1079 1080 1081 1082 1083 1084 1085 1086 1087 1088 1089 1090 1091 1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1098 1099 1100 1101 1102 1103 1104 1105 1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1182 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 1188 1189 1190 1191 1192 1193 1194 1195 1196 1197 1198 1199 1200 1201 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 1213 1214 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1237 1238 1239 1240 1241 1242 1243 1244 1245 1246 1247 1248 1249 1250 1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 1256 1257 1258 1259 1260 1261 1262 1263 1264 1265 1266 1267 1268 1269 1270 1271 1272 1273 1274 1275 1276 1277 1278 1279 1280 1281 1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1291 1292 1293 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 1299 1300 1301 1302 1303 1304 1305 1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 1318 1319 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328 1329 1330 1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 1336 1337 1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367 1368 1369 1370 1371 1372 1373 1374 1375 1376 1377 1378 1379 1380 1381 1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 1484 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1492 1493 1494 1495 1496 1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1506 1507 1508 1509 1510 1511 1512 1513 1514 1515 1516 1517 1518 1519 1520 1521 1522 1523 1524 1525 1526 1527 1528 1529 1530 1531 1532 1533 1534 1535 1536 1537 1538 1539 1540 1541 1542 1543 1544 1545 1546 1547 1548 1549 1550 1551 1552 1553 1554 1555 1556 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 1562 1563 1564 1565 1566 1567 1568 1569 1570 1571 1572 1573 1574 1575 1576 1577 1578 1579 1580 1581 1582 1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 1590 1591 1592 1593 1594 1595 1596 1597 1598 1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 | {
"paper_id": "P86-1035",
"header": {
"generated_with": "S2ORC 1.0.0",
"date_generated": "2023-01-19T09:12:56.001787Z"
},
"title": "COMMONSENSE METAPHYSICS AND LEXICAL SEMANTICS",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Jerry",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Hobbs",
"suffix": "",
"affiliation": {},
"email": ""
},
{
"first": "William",
"middle": [],
"last": "Croft",
"suffix": "",
"affiliation": {},
"email": ""
},
{
"first": "Todd",
"middle": [],
"last": "Davies",
"suffix": "",
"affiliation": {},
"email": ""
}
],
"year": "",
"venue": null,
"identifiers": {},
"abstract": "",
"pdf_parse": {
"paper_id": "P86-1035",
"_pdf_hash": "",
"abstract": [],
"body_text": [
{
"text": "In the TACITUS project for using commonsense knowledge in the understanding of texts about mechanical devices and their failures, we have been developing various commonsense theories that are needed to mediate between the way we talk about the behavior of such devices and causal models of their operation. Of central importance in this effort is the axiomatization of what might be called \"commonsense metaphysics\". This includes a number of areas that figure in virtually every domain of discourse, such as scalar notions, granularity, time, space, material, physical objects, causality, functionality, force, and shape. Our approach to lexical semantics is then to construct core theories of each of these areas, and then to define, or at least characterize, a large number of lexical items in terms provided by the core theories. In the TACITUS system, processes for solving pragmatics problems posed by a text will use the knowledge base consisting of these theories in conjunction with the logical forms of the sentences in the text to produce an interpretation. In this paper we do not stress these interpretation processes; this is another, important aspect of the TACITUS project, and it will be described in subsequent papers.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Introduction",
"sec_num": "1"
},
{
"text": "This work represents a convergence of research in lexical semantics in linguistics and efforts in AI to encode commonsense knowledge. Lexical semanticists over the years have developed formalisms of increasing adequacy for encoding word meaning, progressing from simple sets of features (Katz and Fodor, 1963) to notations for predicateargument structure (Lakoff, 1972; Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976 ), but the early attempts still limited access to world knowledge and assumed only very restricted sorts of processing. Workers in computational linguistics introduced inference (Rieger, 1974; Schank, 1975 ) and other complex cognitive processes (Herskovits, 1982) into our understanding of the role of word meaning. Recently, linguists have given greater attention to the cognitive processes that would operate on their representations (e.g., Talmy, 1983; Croft, 1986) . Independently, in AI an effort arose to encode large amounts of commonsense knowl-edge (Hayes, 1979; Hobbs and Moore, 1985; Hobbs et al. 1985) . The research reported here represents a convergence of these various developments. By developing core theories of several fundamental phenomena and defining lexical items within these theories, using the full power of predicate calculus, we are able to cope with complexities of word meaning that have hitherto escaped lexical semanticists, within a framework that gives full scope to the planning and reasoning processes that manipulate representations of word meaning.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 287,
"end": 309,
"text": "(Katz and Fodor, 1963)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF14"
},
{
"start": 355,
"end": 369,
"text": "(Lakoff, 1972;",
"ref_id": "BIBREF15"
},
{
"start": 370,
"end": 400,
"text": "Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976",
"ref_id": "BIBREF17"
},
{
"start": 579,
"end": 593,
"text": "(Rieger, 1974;",
"ref_id": "BIBREF18"
},
{
"start": 594,
"end": 606,
"text": "Schank, 1975",
"ref_id": "BIBREF19"
},
{
"start": 647,
"end": 665,
"text": "(Herskovits, 1982)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF7"
},
{
"start": 845,
"end": 857,
"text": "Talmy, 1983;",
"ref_id": "BIBREF22"
},
{
"start": 858,
"end": 870,
"text": "Croft, 1986)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF1"
},
{
"start": 960,
"end": 973,
"text": "(Hayes, 1979;",
"ref_id": "BIBREF6"
},
{
"start": 974,
"end": 996,
"text": "Hobbs and Moore, 1985;",
"ref_id": "BIBREF12"
},
{
"start": 997,
"end": 1015,
"text": "Hobbs et al. 1985)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF12"
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Introduction",
"sec_num": "1"
},
{
"text": "In constructing the core theories we are attempting to adhere to several methodological principles. I. One should aim for characterization of concepts, rather than definition. One cannot generally expect to find necessary and sufficient conditions for a concept. The most we can hope for is to find a number of necessary conditions and a number of sufficient conditions. This amounts to saying that a great many predicates are primitive, but primitives that are highly interrelated with the rest of the knowledge base.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Introduction",
"sec_num": "1"
},
{
"text": "2. One should determine the minimal structure necessary for a concept to make sense. In efforts to axiomatize some area, there are two positions one may take, exemplified by set theory and by group theory. In axiomatizing set theory, one attempts to capture exactly some concept one has strong intuitions about. If the axiomatization turns out to have unexpected models, this exposes an inadequacy. In group theory, by contrast, one characterizes an abstract class of structures. If there turn out to be unexpected models, this is a serendipitous discovery of a new phenomenon that we can reason about using an old theory. The pervasive character of metaphor in natural language discourse shows that our commonsense theories of the world ought to be much more like group theory than set theory. By seeking minimal structures in axiomatizing concepts, we optimize the possibilities of using the theories in metaphorical and analogical contexts. This principle is illustrated below in the section on regions. One consequence of this principle is that our approach will seem more syntactic than semantic. We have concentrated more on specifying axioms than on constructing models. Our view is that the chief role of models in our effort is for proving the consistency and independence of sets of axioms, and for showing their adequacy. As an example of the last point, many of the spatial and temporal theories we construct are intended at least to have Euclidean space or the real numbers as one model, and a subclass of graph-theoretical structures as other models.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Introduction",
"sec_num": "1"
},
{
"text": "3. A balance must be struck between attempting to cover all cases and aiming only for the prototypical cases. In general, we have tried to cover as many cases as possible with an elegant axiomatization, in line with the two previous principles, but where the formalization begins to look baroque, we assume that higher processes will suspend some inferences in the marginal cases. We assume that inferences will be drawn in a controlled fashion. Thus, every outr~, highly context-dependent counterexample need not be accounted for, and to a certain extent, definitions can be geared specifically for a prototype.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Introduction",
"sec_num": "1"
},
{
"text": "Where competing ontologies suggest themselves in a domain, one should attempt to construct a theory that accommodates both. Rather than commit oneself to adopting one set of primitives rather than another, one should show how each set of primitives can be characterized in terms of the other. Generally, each of the ontologies is useful for different purposes, and it is convenient to be able to appeal to both. Our treatment of time illustrates this.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "5. The theories one constructs should be richer in axioms than in theorems. In mathematics, one expects to state half a dozen axioms and prove dozens of theorems from them. In encoding commonsense knowledge it seems to be just the opposite. The theorems we seek to prove on the basis of these axioms are theorems about specific situations which are to be interpreted, in particular, theorems about a text that the system is attempting to understand. 6. One should avoid falling into \"black holes\". There are a few \"mysterious\" concepts which crop up repeatedly in the formalization of commonsense metaphysics. Among these are \"relevant\" (that is, relevant to the task at hand) and \"normative\" (or conforming to some norm or pattern). To insist upon giving a satisfactory analysis of these before using them in analyzing other concepts is to cross the event horizon that separates lexical semantics from philosophy. On the other hand, our experience suggests that to avoid their use entirely is crippling; the lexical semantics of a wide variety of other terms depends upon them. Instead, we have decided to leave them minimally analyzed for the moment and use them without scruple in the analysis of other commonsense concepts. This approach will allow us to accumulate many examples of the use of these mysterious concepts, and in the end, contribute to their successfill analysis. The use of these concepts appears below in the discussions of the words \"immediately\", \"sample\", and \"operate\".",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "We chose as an initial target problem to encode the commonsense knowledge that underlies the concept of \"wear\", as in a part of a device wearing out. Our aim was to define \"wear\" in terms of predicates characterized elsewhere in the knowledge base and to infer consequences of wear. For something to wear, we decided, is for it to lose imperceptible bits of material from its surface due to abrasive action over time. One goal,which we have not yet achieved, is to be able to prove as a theorem that since the shape of a part of a mechanical device is often functional and since loss of material can result in a change of shape, wear of a part of a device can result in the failure of the device as a whole. In addition, as we have proceded, we have characterized a number of words found in a set of target texts, as it has become possible.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "We are encoding the knowledge as axioms in, what is for the most part a first-order logic, described in ttobbs (1985a), although quantification over predicates is sometimes convenient. In the formalism there is a nominalization operator \" ' \" for reifying events and conditions, as expressed in the following axiom schema:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "(\u00a5x)p(x) -(3e)p'(e, x) A Exist(e)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "That is, p is true of x if and only if there is a condition e of p being true of z and e exists in the real world.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "In our implementation so far, we have been proving simple theorems from our axioms using the CG5 theoremprover developed by Mark Stickel (1982) , but we are only now beginning to use the knowledge base in text processing.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 129,
"end": 143,
"text": "Stickel (1982)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF21"
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "4.",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "There is a notational convention used below that deserves some explanation. It has frequently been noted that relational words in natural language can take only certain types of words as their arguments. These are usually described as selectional constraints. The same is true of predicates in our knowledge base. They are expressed below by rules of the form",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Requirements on Arguments of Predicates",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "This means that for p even to make sense applied to x and y, it must be the case that r is true of x and y. The logical import of this rule is that wherever there is an axiom of the form (Vx, y)p(x, y) ~ q(x, y)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "p(x, y) : ~(x, ~)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "this is really to be read as",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "p(x, y) : ~(x, ~)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "(Vx, y)p(x,y) A r(x,y) D q(x,y)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "p(x, y) : ~(x, ~)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The checking of selectional constraints, therefore, falls out as a by-product of other logical operations: the constraint r(z, y) must be verified if anything else is to be proven from p(x, y).",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "p(x, y) : ~(x, ~)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The simplest example of such an r(:L y) is a conjunction of sort constraints rl (x) ^ re(y). Our approach is a generalization of this, because much more complex requirements can be placed on the arguments. Consider, for example, the verb \"range\". If z ranges from y to z, there must be a scale s that includes y and z, and z must be a set of entities that are located at various places on the scale: This can be represented as follows:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "p(x, y) : ~(x, ~)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Az E e A set(x)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "range(x, y, z) : (3 s)scate(e) ^ y G s",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "A(Vu)[u G z D (qv)v E s A at(u,v)]",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "range(x, y, z) : (3 s)scate(e) ^ y G s",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "3 The Knowledge Base",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "range(x, y, z) : (3 s)scate(e) ^ y G s",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "At the foundation of the knowledge base is an axiomatization of set theory. It follows the standard Zermelo-Frankel approach, except that there is no Axiom of Infinity.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Sets and Granularity",
"sec_num": "3.1"
},
{
"text": "Since so many concepts used in discourse are graindependent, a theory of granularity is also fundamental (see Hobbs 1985b) . A grain is defined in terms of an indistinguishability relation, which is reflexive and symmetric, but not necessarily transitive. One grain can be a refinement of another with the obvious definition. The most refined grain is the identity grain, i.e., the one in which every two distinct elements are distinguishable. One possible relationship between two grains, one of which is a refinement of the other, is what we call an ~Archimedean relation\", after the Archimedean property of real numbers. Intuitively, if enough events occur that are imperceptible at the coarser grain g2 but perceptible at the finer grain gl, then the aggregate will eventually be perceptible at the coarser grain. This is an important property in phenomena subject to the Heap Paradox. Wear, for instance, eventually has significant consequences.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 110,
"end": 122,
"text": "Hobbs 1985b)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF11"
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Sets and Granularity",
"sec_num": "3.1"
},
{
"text": "A great many of the most common words in English have scales as their subject matter. This includes many prepositions, the most common adverbs, comparatives, and many abstract verbs. When spatial vocabulary is used metaphorically, it is generally the scalar aspect of space that carries over to the target domain. A scale is defined as a set of elements, together with a partial ordering and a granularity (or an indistinguishability relation). The partial ordering and the indistinguishability relation are consistent with each other:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Scales",
"sec_num": "3.2"
},
{
"text": "(Vx, y,z)x < y A y~ z D x < z V z ,~ z",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Scales",
"sec_num": "3.2"
},
{
"text": "It is useful to have an adjacency relation between points on a scale, and there are a number of ways we could introduce it. We could simply take it to be primitive; in a scale having a distance function, we could define two points to be adjacent when the distance between them is less than some ~; finally, we could define adjacency in terms of the grain-size:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Scales",
"sec_num": "3.2"
},
{
"text": "(V x, y, e)adj(x, y, e) --- (3 z)z ~ z ^ z ~ y ^ ~[x ~ y],",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Scales",
"sec_num": "3.2"
},
{
"text": "Two important possible properties of scales are connectedness and denseness. We can say that two elements of a scale are connected by a chain of adj relations:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Scales",
"sec_num": "3.2"
},
{
"text": "A scale is connected (econneeted) if all pairs of elements are connected. A scale is dense if between any two points there is a third point, until the two points are so close together that the grain-size won't let us tell what the situation is. Cranking up the magnification could well resolve the continuous space into a discrete set, as objects into atoms.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(v~, y, s)co.nected(z, y, e)adj(x, y, e) V (3 z)adj(x, z, e) ^ connected(z, y, e)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "(Ys)dense(s) = (Vz, y,<)x E s A y E s A order(<,s) A z < y (3 z)(~ < z ^ z < y) v(3z)(z ~ z ^ z~y)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(v~, y, s)co.nected(z, y, e)adj(x, y, e) V (3 z)adj(x, z, e) ^ connected(z, y, e)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "This captures the commonsense notion of continuity.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(v~, y, s)co.nected(z, y, e)adj(x, y, e) V (3 z)adj(x, z, e) ^ connected(z, y, e)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "A subscale of a scale has as its elements a subset of the elements of the scale and has as its partial ordering and its grain the partial ordering and the grain of the scale. An interval can be defined as a connected subseale:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(v~, y, s)co.nected(z, y, e)adj(x, y, e) V (3 z)adj(x, z, e) ^ connected(z, y, e)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "(V i)interval(i) -(3 s)ecale(s) A subseale(i, e) ^ econnected(i)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(v~, y, s)co.nected(z, y, e)adj(x, y, e) V (3 z)adj(x, z, e) ^ connected(z, y, e)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The relations between time intervals that Allen and Kautz (1985) have defined can be defined in a straightforward manner in the approach presented here, applied to intervals in general.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(v~, y, s)co.nected(z, y, e)adj(x, y, e) V (3 z)adj(x, z, e) ^ connected(z, y, e)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "A concept closely related to scales is that of a \"cycle\". This is a system which has a natural ordering locally but contains a loop globally. Examples include the color wheel, clock times, and geographical locations ordered by \"east of\". We have axiomatized cycles i~ terms of a ternary between relation, whose axioms parallel the axioms for a partial ordering.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(v~, y, s)co.nected(z, y, e)adj(x, y, e) V (3 z)adj(x, z, e) ^ connected(z, y, e)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The figure-ground relationship is of fundamental importance in language. We encode this with the primitive predicate at. The minimal structure that seems to be necessary for something to be a ground is that of a scale; hence, this is a selectional constraint on the arguments of at. at(z, y) : (B s)y E s ^ scale (s) At this point, we are already in a position to define some fairly complex words. As an illustration, we give the example of \"range\" as in \"x ranges from y to z\": (Vz, y, z)range{x, y, z) - (3 s, s,, u,, u2) A very important scale is the linearly ordered scale of numbers. We do not plan to reason axiomatically about numbers, but it is useful in natural language processing to have encoded a few facts about numbers. For example, a set has a cardinality which is an element of the number scale.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 313,
"end": 316,
"text": "(s)",
"ref_id": null
},
{
"start": 506,
"end": 523,
"text": "(3 s, s,, u,, u2)",
"ref_id": null
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(v~, y, s)co.nected(z, y, e)adj(x, y, e) V (3 z)adj(x, z, e) ^ connected(z, y, e)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Verticality is a concept that would be most properly analyzed in the section on space, but it is a property that many other scales have acquired metaphorically, for whatever reason. The number scale is one of these. Even in the absence of an analysis of verticality, it is a useful property to have as a primitive in lexical semantics.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(v~, y, s)co.nected(z, y, e)adj(x, y, e) V (3 z)adj(x, z, e) ^ connected(z, y, e)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The word \"high\" is a vague term that asserts an entity is in the upper region of some scale. It requires that the scale be a vertical one, such as the number scale. The verticality requirement distinguishes \"high\" from the more general term \"very\"; we can say \"very hard\" but not \"highly hard\". The phrase \"highly planar\" sounds all right because the high register of \"planar\" suggests a quantifiable, scientific accuracy, whereas the low register of \"fiat\" makes \"highly fiat\" sound much worse. The test of any definition is whether it allows one to draw the appropriate inferences. In our target texts, the phrase \"high usage\" occurs. Usage is a set of using events, and the verticality requirement on \"high\" forces us to coerce the phrase into \"a high or large number of using events\". Combining this with an axiom that says tb~t the use of a mechanical device involves the likelihood of abrasive events, as defined below, and with the definition of \"wear\" in terms of abrasive events, we should be able to conclude the likelihood of wear.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(v~, y, s)co.nected(z, y, e)adj(x, y, e) V (3 z)adj(x, z, e) ^ connected(z, y, e)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Time: Two Ontologies There are two possible ontologies for time. In the first, the one most acceptable to the mathematically minded, there is a time line, which is a scale having some topological structure. We can stipulate the time line to be linearly ordered (although it is not in approaches that build ignorance of relative times into the representation of time (e.g., Hobbs, 1974) nor in approaches using branching futures (e.g., McDermott, 1985) ), and we can stipulate it to be dense (although it is not in the situation calculus). We take before to be the ordering on the time line:",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 373,
"end": 385,
"text": "Hobbs, 1974)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF9"
},
{
"start": 435,
"end": 451,
"text": "McDermott, 1985)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF16"
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "3.3",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "(V ti, t2)be f ore(t~, tz) - (3 ",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 29,
"end": 31,
"text": "(3",
"ref_id": "BIBREF3"
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "3.3",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "We allow both instants and intervals of time. Most events occur at some instant or during some interval. In this approach, nearly every predicate takes a time argument.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "T, <)Time-line(T) ^ order(<, T) Atl ET A t2ET A tl <t2",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "In the second ontology, the one that seems to be more deeply rooted in language, the world consists of a large number of more or less independent processes, or histories, or sequences of events. There is a primitive relation change between conditions. Thus,",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "T, <)Time-line(T) ^ order(<, T) Atl ET A t2ET A tl <t2",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "says that there is a change from the condition el of p being true of z to the condition e2 of q being true of x.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "change(el, ez) ^ p'(el, x) A q'(ez, x)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The time line in this ontology is then an artificial construct, a regular sequence of imagined abstract events-think of them as ticks of a clock in the National Bureau of Standards--to which other events can be related. The change ontology seems to correspond to the way we experience the world. We recognize relations of causality, change of state, and copresence among events and conditions. When events are not related in these ways, judgments of relative time must be mediated by copresence relations between the events and events on a clock and change of state relations on the clock.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "change(el, ez) ^ p'(el, x) A q'(ez, x)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The predicate change possesses a limited transitivity.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "change(el, ez) ^ p'(el, x) A q'(ez, x)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "There has been a change from Reagan being an actor to Reagan being President, even though he was governor in between. But we probably do not want to say there has been a change from Reagan being an actor to Margaret That is, if z is p at time tl and q at a later time t2, then there has been a change of state from one to the other. Time arguments in predications can be viewed as abbreviations:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "change(el, ez) ^ p'(el, x) A q'(ez, x)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "(Vx, t)p(z,t) =-(qe)p'(e,x) ^ at(e,t)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "change(el, ez) ^ p'(el, x) A q'(ez, x)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The word \"move\", or the predicate move, (as in \"x moves from y to z') can then be defined equivalently in terms of change (Vx, y, z)move(x, y, z) -(3 el, e2)change(el , e2) A at'(e,, z, y) A at '(e2, x, z) or in terms of the time line",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 194,
"end": 205,
"text": "'(e2, x, z)",
"ref_id": null
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "change(el, ez) ^ p'(el, x) A q'(ez, x)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "(V x, y, z)move(x, y, z) =-- (3 tl, t2)at(x, y, tl) A at(x, z, 12) A before(ti, t2)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "change(el, ez) ^ p'(el, x) A q'(ez, x)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "In English and apparently all other natural languages, both ontologies are represented in the lexicon. The time line ontology is found in clock and calendar terms, tense systems of verbs, and in the deictic temporal locatives such as \"yesterday\", \"today\", \"tomorrow\", \"last night\", and so on. The change ontology is exhibited in most verbs, and in temporal clausal connectives. The universal presence of both classes of lexical items and grammatical markers in natural languages requires a theory which can accommodate both ontologies, illustrating the importance of methodological principle 4.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "change(el, ez) ^ p'(el, x) A q'(ez, x)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Among temporal connectives, the word \"while\" presents interesting problems. In \"el while e~', e2 must be an event occurring over a time interval; el must be an event and may occur either at a point or over an interval. One's first guess is that the point or interval for el must be included in the interval for e2. However, there are cases, such as or It rained while I was in Philadelphia.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "change(el, ez) ^ p'(el, x) A q'(ez, x)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The electricity should be off while the switch is being repaired.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "change(el, ez) ^ p'(el, x) A q'(ez, x)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "which suggest the reading \"ez is included in el\". We came to the conclusion that one can infer no more than that el and ez overlap, and any tighter constraints result from implicatures from background knowledge. The word \"immediately\" also presents a number of problems. It requires its argument e to be an ordering relation between two entities x and y on some scale s.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "change(el, ez) ^ p'(el, x) A q'(ez, x)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "It is not clear what the constraints on the scale are. Temporal and spatial scales are okay, as in \"immediately after the alarm\" and \"immediately to the left\", but the size scale isn't: * John is immediately larger than Bill. However, this will only work if we restrict z to be a relevant entity. For example, in the sentence",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "immediate(e) : (3 x, y, s)less-than'(e, x, y, s)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "We disengaged the compressor immediately after the alarm.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "immediate(e) : (3 x, y, s)less-than'(e, x, y, s)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "the implication is that no event that could damage the compressor occurred between the alarm and the disengagement, since the text is about equipment failure.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "immediate(e) : (3 x, y, s)less-than'(e, x, y, s)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The notion of dimension has been made precise in linear algebra. Since the concept of a region is used metaphorically as well as in the spatial sense, however, we were concerned to determine the minimal structure that a system requires for it to make sense to call it a space of more than one dimension. For a two-dimensional space, l~re must be a scale, or partial ordering, for each dimension. Moreover, the two scales must be independent, in that the order of elements on one scale can not be determined from their order on the other. Formally,",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Structure",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "A(3z)(3y,)(z <, y, A z <2 Y,)",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "(Vsp)spaee(sp) =--(3 sl, s2, <1, <2)scalel(sl, sp) A scalez(s2, sp) ^ order(<1, sl) h order(<2, sz)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Note that this does not allow <2 to be simply the reverse of <1. An unsurprising consequence of this definition is that the minimal example of a two-dimensional space consists of three points {three points determine a plane), e.g., the points A, B, and C, where A<IB, A<IC, C<2A, A<2B. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . The dimensional scales are apparently found in all natural languages in relevant domains. The familiar threedimensional space of common sense is defined by the three scale pairs \"up-down\", \"front-back\", and \"left-right\"; the two-dimensional plane of the commonsense conception of the earth's surface is represented by the two scale pairs \"north-south\" and \"east-west\".",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [
{
"start": 309,
"end": 317,
"text": "Figure 1",
"ref_id": "FIGREF1"
}
],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "A (3 ~)(z <, y~ A y~ <2 z)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "The simplest, although not the only, way to define adjacency in the space is as adjacency on both scales:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "A (3 ~)(z <, y~ A y~ <2 z)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "(Vz, y, sp)adi(z , y, sp) =- ( By picking the scales and defining adjacency right, we can talk about points of contact between communicational networks, systems of knowledge, and other metaphorical domains. By picking the scales to be the real line and defining adjacency in terms of e-neighborhoods, we get Euclidean space and can talk about contact between physical objects.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 29,
"end": 30,
"text": "(",
"ref_id": null
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "A (3 ~)(z <, y~ A y~ <2 z)",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Physical objects and materials must be distinguished, just as they are apparently distinguished in every natural language, by means of the count noun -mass noun distinction. A physical object is not a bit of material, but rather is comprised of a bit of material at any given time. Thus, rivers and human bodies are physical objects, even though their material constitution changes over time. This distinction also allows us to talk about an object losing material through wear and still being the same object. We will say that an entity b is a bit of material by means and contact between bits in terms of contact between their regions. We can then state as follows the Principle of Non-Joint-Occupancy that two bits of material cannot occupy the same place at the same time:",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Material",
"sec_num": "3.5"
},
{
"text": "(Vb~, b2)(disjointbit(b~, bz) D (Vx, y, bs, b4)interior(bs, b~) A interior(b4, bz) ^ particle(z, bs) A particle(y, b4) D ~(Ez)(at(z, z) ^ at(y, z))",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Material",
"sec_num": "3.5"
},
{
"text": "At some future point in our work, this may emerge as a consequence of a richer theory of cohesion and force. The cohesion of materials is also a primitive property, for we must distinguish between a bump on the surface of an object and a chip merely lying on the surface. Cohesion depends on a primitive relation bond between particles of material, paralleling the role of adj in regions. The relation attached is defined as the transitive closure of bond. A topology of cohesion is built up in a manner analogous to the topology of regions. In addition, we have encoded the relation that bond bears to motion, i.e. that bonded bits remain adjacent and that one moves when the other does, and the relation of bond to force, i.e. that there is a characteristic force that breaks a bond in a given material.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Material",
"sec_num": "3.5"
},
{
"text": "Different materials react in different ways to forces of various strengths. Materials subjected to force exhibit or fail to exhibit several invariance properties, proposed by linger (1985) . If the material is shape-invariant with respect to a particular force, its shape remains the same. If it is topologically invariant, particles that are adjacent remain adjacent. Shape invariance implies topological invariance. Subject to forces of a certain strength or degree dl, a material ceases being shape-invariant. At a force of strength dz _> dl, it ceases being topologically invariant, and at a force of strength ds >_ dz, it simply breaks. Metals exhibit the full range of possibilities, that is, 0 < dl < d2 < ds < co. For forces of strength d < dr, the material is \"hard\"; for forces of strength d where d~ < d < d~, it is \"flexible\"; for forces of strength d where d2 < d < ds, it is \"malleable\". Words such as \"ductile\" and \"elastic\" can be defined in terms of this vocabulary, together with predicates about the geometry of the bit of material. Words such as \"brittle\" (all = d2 = ds) and \"fluid\" (d2 = 0, d3 = ~) can also be defined in these terms. While we should not expect to be able to define various material terms, like \"metal\" and \"ceramic\", we can certainly characterize many of their properties with this vocabulary.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 182,
"end": 188,
"text": "(1985)",
"ref_id": null
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Material",
"sec_num": "3.5"
},
{
"text": "Because of its invariance properties, material interacts with containment and motion. The word \"clog\" illustrates this. The predicate clog is a three-place relation: z clogs y against the flow of z. It is the obstruction by z of z's motion through y, but with the selectional restriction that z must be something that can flow, such as a liquid, gas, or powder. If a rope is passing through a hole in a board, and a knot in the rope prevents it from going through, we do not say that the hole is clogged. On the other hand, there do not seem to be any selectional constraints on z. In particular, x can be identical with z: glue, sand, or molasses can clog a passageway against its own flow. We can speak of clogging where the obstruction of flow is not complete, but it must be thought of as \"nearly\" complete.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Material",
"sec_num": "3.5"
},
{
"text": "Other Domains",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "3.6",
"sec_num": null
},
{
"text": "Attachment within materials is one variety of causal connection. In general, if two entities x and y are causally connected with respect to some behavior p of x, then whenever p happens to x, there is some corresponding behavior q that happens to y. In the case of attachment, p and q are both move. A particularly common variety of causal connection between two entities is one mediated by the motion of a third entity from one to the other. (This might be called a \"vector boson\" connection.) Photons mediating the connection between the sun and our eyes, rain drops connecting a state of the clouds with the wetness of our skin and clothes, a virus being transmitted from one person to another, and utterances passing between people are all examples of such causal connections. Barriers, openings, and penetration are all with respect to paths of causal connection.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Causal Connection",
"sec_num": "3.6.1"
},
{
"text": "The concept of \"force\" is axiomatized, in a way consistent with Talmy's treatment (1985) , in terms of the predications force(a, b, dz) and resist(b, a, d2)--a forces against b",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 64,
"end": 88,
"text": "Talmy's treatment (1985)",
"ref_id": null
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Force",
"sec_num": "3.6.2"
},
{
"text": "with strength dl and b resists a's action with strength d2. We can infer motion from facts about relative strength. This treatment can also be specialized to Newtonian force, where we have not merely movement, but acceleration. In addition, in spaces in which orientation is defined, forces can have an orientation, and a version of the Parallelogram of Forces Law can be encoded. Finally, force interacts with shape in ways characterized by words like \"stretch\", \"compress\", \"bend\", \"twist\", and \"shear\".",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Force",
"sec_num": "3.6.2"
},
{
"text": "An important concept is the notion of a \"system\", which is a set of entities, a set of their properties, and a set of relations among them. A common kind of system is one in which the entities are events and conditions and the relations are causal and enabling relations. A mechanical device can be described as such a system--in a sense, in terms of the plan it executes in its operation. The function of various parts and of conditions of those parts is then the role they play in this system, or plan.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Systems and Functionality",
"sec_num": "3.6.3"
},
{
"text": "The intransitive sense of \"operate\", as in",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Systems and Functionality",
"sec_num": "3.6.3"
},
{
"text": "The diesel was operating.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Systems and Functionality",
"sec_num": "3.6.3"
},
{
"text": "involves systems and functionality. If an entity x operates, then there must be a larger system s of which x is a part. The entity x itself is a system with parts. These parts undergo normative state changes, thereby causing x to undergo normative state changes, thereby causing x to produce an effect with a normative function in the larger system s. The concept of \"normative\" is discussed below.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Systems and Functionality",
"sec_num": "3.6.3"
},
{
"text": "We have been approaching the problem of characterizing shape from a number of different angles. The classical treatment of shape is via the notion of \"similarity\" in Euclidean geometry, and in Hilbert's formal reconstruction of Euclidean geometry (Hilbert, 1902) the key primitive concept seems to be that of \"congruent angles\". Therefore, we first sought to develop a theory of \"orientation\". The shape of an object can then be characterized in terms of changes in orientation of a tangent as one moves about on the surface of the object, as is done in vision research (e.g., Zahn and Roskies, 1972) . In all of this, since \"shape\" can be used loosely and metaphorically, one question we are asking is whether some minimal, abstract structure can be found in which the notion of \"shape\" makes sense. Consider, for instance, a graph in which one scale is discrete, or even unordered. Accordingly, we have been examining a number of examples, asking when it seems right ~.o say two structures have different shapes.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 247,
"end": 262,
"text": "(Hilbert, 1902)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF8"
},
{
"start": 577,
"end": 600,
"text": "Zahn and Roskies, 1972)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF24"
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Shape",
"sec_num": "3.6.4"
},
{
"text": "We have also examined the interactions of shape and functionality (cf. Davis, 1984) . What seems to be crucial is how the shape of an obstacle constrains the motion of a substance or of an object of a particular shape (cf. Shoham, 1985) . Thus, a funnel concentrates the flow of a liquid, and similarly, a wedge concentrates force. A box pushed against a ridge in the floor will topple, and a wheel is a limiting case of continuous toppling.",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 71,
"end": 83,
"text": "Davis, 1984)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF4"
},
{
"start": 223,
"end": 236,
"text": "Shoham, 1985)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF20"
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Shape",
"sec_num": "3.6.4"
},
{
"text": "For x to hit y is for x to move into contact with y with some force. , b, s, bo, el, e,, es) It is necessary to state this explicitly since objects and bits of material can be discontinuous. An abrasion is a large number of abrasive events widely distributed through some nonpointlike region on the surface of an object: Wear can occur by means of a large collection of abrasive events distributed over time as well as space (so that there may be no time at which enough abrasive events occur to count as an abrasion). Thus, the link between wear and abrasion is via the common notion of abrasive events, not via a definition of wear in terms of abrasion. The concept \"widely distributed\" concerns systems. If z is distributed in y, then y is a system and z is a set of entities which are located at components of y. For the distribution to be wide, most of the elements of a partition of y determined independently of the distribution must contain components which have elements of x at them.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [
{
"start": 69,
"end": 92,
"text": ", b, s, bo, el, e,, es)",
"ref_id": null
}
],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Hitting, Abrasion, Wear, and Related Concepts",
"sec_num": "3.7"
},
{
"text": "The word \"w~ar\" is one of a large class of other events involving cumulative, gradual loss of material -events described by words like \"chip\", \"corrode\", \"file\", \"erode\", \"rub\", \"sand\", \"grind\", \"weather\", \"rust\", \"tarnish\", \"eat away\", \"rot\", and \"decay\". All of these lexical items can now be defined as variations on the definition of \"wear\", since we have built up the axiomatizations underlying \"wear\". We are now in a position to characterize the entire class. We will illustrate this by defining two different types of variants of \"wear\" -\"chip\" and \"corrode\".",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Hitting, Abrasion, Wear, and Related Concepts",
"sec_num": "3.7"
},
{
"text": "\"Chip\" differs from \"wear\" in three ways: the bit of material removed in one abrasive event is larger {it need not be point-like}, it need not happen because of a material hitting against the object, and \"chip\" does not require (though it does permit} a large collection of such events: one can say that some object is chipped if there is only one chip in it. Thus, we slightly alter the definition of abr-event to accommodate these changes: \"Corrode\" differs from \"wear\" in that the bit of material is chemically transformed as well as being detached by the contact event; in fact, in some way the chemical transformation causes the detachment. This can be captured by adding a condition to the abrasive event which renders it a (single} corrode event: \"Corrode\" itself may be defined in a parallel fashion to \"wear\", substituting corrode-event for abr-event.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Hitting, Abrasion, Wear, and Related Concepts",
"sec_num": "3.7"
},
{
"text": "corrode-event(m, o,",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Hitting, Abrasion, Wear, and Related Concepts",
"sec_num": "3.7"
},
{
"text": "All of this suggests the generalization that abrasive events, chipping and corrode events all detach the bit in question, and that we may describe all of these as detaching events. We can then generalize the above axiom about abrasive events resulting in loss of material to the following axiom about detaching: ",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Hitting, Abrasion, Wear, and Related Concepts",
"sec_num": "3.7"
},
{
"text": "Many of the concepts we are investigating have driven us inexorably to the problems of what is meant by \"relevant\" and by \"normative\". We do not pretend to have solved these problems. But for each of these concepts we do have the beginnings of an account that can play a role in analysis, if not yet in implementation. Our view of relevance, briefly stated, is that something is relevant to some goal if it is a part of a plan to achieve that goal. [A formal treatment of a similar view is given in Davies and Russell, 1986.) We can illustrate this with an example involving the word \"sample\". If a bit of material z is a sample of another bit of material y, then x is a part of y, and moreover, there are relevant properties p and q such that it is believed that if p is true of x then q is true of y. That is, looking at the properties of the sample tells us something important about the properties of the whole. Frequently, p and q are the same property. In our target texts, the following sentence occurs:",
"cite_spans": [
{
"start": 499,
"end": 525,
"text": "Davies and Russell, 1986.)",
"ref_id": "BIBREF3"
}
],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Relevance and the Normative",
"sec_num": "4"
},
{
"text": "We retained an oil sample for future inspection.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Relevance and the Normative",
"sec_num": "4"
},
{
"text": "The oil in the sample is a part of the total lube oil in the lube oil system, and it is believed that a property of the sample, such as \"contaminated with metal particles\", will be true of all of the lube oil as well, and that this will give information about possible wear on the bearings. It is therefore relevant to the goal of maintaining the machinery in good working order.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Relevance and the Normative",
"sec_num": "4"
},
{
"text": "We have arrived at the following provisional account of what it means to be \"normative\". For an entity to exhibit a normative condition or behavior, it must first of all be a component of a larger system. This system has structure in the form of relations among its components. A pattern is a property of the system, namely, the property of a subset of these stuctural relations holding. A norm is a pattern which is established either by conventional stipulation or by statistical regularity. An entity is behaving in a normative fashion if it is a component of a system and instantiates a norm within that system. The word \"operate\" given above illustrates this. When we say that an engine is operating, we have in mind a larger system, the device the engine drives, to which the engine may bear various possible relations. A subset of these relations is stipulated to be the norm--the way it is supposed to work. We say it is operating when it is instantiating this norm.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Relevance and the Normative",
"sec_num": "4"
},
{
"text": "The research we have been engaged in has forced us to explicate a complex set of commonsense concepts. Since we have done it in as general a fashion as possible, we may expect that it will be possible to axiomatize a large number of other areas, including areas unrelated to mechanical devices, building on this foundation. The very fact that we have been able to characterize words as diverse as \"range\", \"immediately\", \"brittle\", \"operate\" and \"wear\" shows the promise of this approach.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Conclusion",
"sec_num": "5"
}
],
"back_matter": [
{
"text": "The research reported here was funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under Omce of Naval Research contract N00014-85-C-0013. It builds on work supported by NIH Grant LM03611 from the National Library of Medicine, by Grant IST-8209346 from the National Science Foundation, and by a gift from the Systems Development Foundation.",
"cite_spans": [],
"ref_spans": [],
"eq_spans": [],
"section": "Acknowledgements",
"sec_num": null
}
],
"bib_entries": {
"BIBREF0": {
"ref_id": "b0",
"title": "A model of naive temporal reasoning",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Ill",
"middle": [],
"last": "Allen",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "James",
"middle": [
"F"
],
"last": "",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "Henry",
"middle": [
"A"
],
"last": "Kautz",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1985,
"venue": "Formal Theories of the Commonsense World",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "251--268",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Ill Allen, James F., and Henry A. Kautz. 1985. \"A model of naive temporal reasoning.\" Formal Theories of the Commonsense World, ed. by Jerry R. Hobbs and Robert C. Moore, Ablex Publishing Corp., 251-268.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF1": {
"ref_id": "b1",
"title": "Categories and Relations in Syntax: The Clause-Level Organization of Information",
"authors": [
{
"first": "William",
"middle": [],
"last": "Croft",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1986,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Croft, William. 1986. Categories and Relations in Syn- tax: The Clause-Level Organization of Information.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF3": {
"ref_id": "b3",
"title": "A logical approach to reasoning by analogy",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Todd",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Davies",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "Stuart",
"middle": [
"J"
],
"last": "Russell",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1986,
"venue": "Submitted to the AAAI-86 Fifth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Davies, Todd R., and Stuart J. Russell. 1986. \"A logi- cal approach to reasoning by analogy.\" Submitted to the AAAI-86 Fifth National Conference on Artificial Intel- ligence, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF4": {
"ref_id": "b4",
"title": "Shape and Function of Solid Objects: Some Examples",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Ernest",
"middle": [],
"last": "Davis",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1984,
"venue": "Computer Science Technical Report",
"volume": "137",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Davis, Ernest. 1984. \"Shape and Function of Solid Ob- jects: Some Examples.\" Computer Science Technical Report 137, New York University. October 1984.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF5": {
"ref_id": "b5",
"title": "Naive physics of materials: A recon mission",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Greg",
"middle": [],
"last": "Hager",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1985,
"venue": "Commonsense Summer",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Hager, Greg. 1985. \"Naive physics of materials: A re- con mission.\" In Commonsense Summer.\" Final Report, Report No. CSLI-85-35, Center for the Study of Lan- guage and Information, Stanford University.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF6": {
"ref_id": "b6",
"title": "Expert Systems in the Micro-electronic Age",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Patrick",
"middle": [
"J"
],
"last": "Hayes",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1979,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "242--270",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Hayes, Patrick J. 1979. \"Naive physics manifesto.\" Ex- pert Systems in the Micro-electronic Age, ed. by Donald Michie, Edinburgh University Press, pp. 242-270.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF7": {
"ref_id": "b7",
"title": "Space and the Prepositions in English: Regularities and Irregularities in a Complex Domain",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Annette",
"middle": [],
"last": "Herskovits",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1982,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Herskovits, Annette. 1982. Space and the Prepositions in English: Regularities and Irregularities in a Complex Domain. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Linguistics, Stanford University.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF8": {
"ref_id": "b8",
"title": "The Foundatiov~ of Geometry",
"authors": [
{
"first": "David",
"middle": [],
"last": "Hilbert",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1902,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Hilbert, David. 1902. The Foundatiov~ of Geometry. The Open Court Publishing Company.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF9": {
"ref_id": "b9",
"title": "A Model for Natural Language Semantics, Part I: The Model",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Jerry",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Hobbs",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1974,
"venue": "Research Report #",
"volume": "36",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Hobbs, Jerry R. 1974. \"A Model for Natural Language Semantics, Part I: The Model.\" Research Report #36, Department of Computer Science, Yale University. Oc- tober 1974.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF10": {
"ref_id": "b10",
"title": "Ontological promiscuity",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Jerry",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Hobbs",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1985,
"venue": "Proceedings, 23rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "61--69",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Hobbs, Jerry R. 1985a. \"Ontological promiscuity.\" Proceedings, 23rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pp. 61-69.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF11": {
"ref_id": "b11",
"title": "Granularity",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Jerry",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Hobbs",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1985,
"venue": "Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "432--435",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Hobbs, Jerry R. 1985b.\"Granularity.\" Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Los Angeles, California, August 1985, 432- 435.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF12": {
"ref_id": "b12",
"title": "Forreal Theories of the Commonsense World",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Jerry",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Hobbs",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "Robert",
"middle": [
"C"
],
"last": "Moore",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1985,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Hobbs, Jerry R. and Robert C. Moore, eds. 1985. For- real Theories of the Commonsense World, Ablex Pub- lishing Corp.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF13": {
"ref_id": "b13",
"title": "Commonsense Summer: Final Report",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Jerry",
"middle": [
"R"
],
"last": "Hobbs",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1985,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Hobbs, Jerry R. et al. 1985. Commonsense Summer: Final Report, Report No. CSLI-85-35, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford Univer- sity.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF14": {
"ref_id": "b14",
"title": "Tile struture of a semantic theory",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Jerrold",
"middle": [
"J"
],
"last": "Katz",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "Jerry",
"middle": [
"A"
],
"last": "Fodor",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1963,
"venue": "Language",
"volume": "39",
"issue": "",
"pages": "170--210",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Katz, Jerrold J. and Jerry A. Fodor. 1963. \"Tile stru- ture of a semantic theory.\" Language, Vol. 39 (April- June 1963), 170-210.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF15": {
"ref_id": "b15",
"title": "Linguistics and natural logic",
"authors": [
{
"first": "G",
"middle": [],
"last": "Lakoff",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1972,
"venue": "Semantics of Natural Language",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "545--665",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Lakoff, G. 1972. \"Linguistics and natural logic\". Se- mantics of Natural Language, ed. by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, 545-665.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF16": {
"ref_id": "b16",
"title": "Reasoning about plans",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Drew",
"middle": [],
"last": "Mcdermott",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1985,
"venue": "Formal Theories of the Commonsense World",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "269--318",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "McDermott, Drew. 1985. \"Reasoning about plans.\" Formal Theories of the Commonsense World, ed. by Jerry R. Hobbs and Robert C. Moore, Ablex Publishing Corp., 269-318.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF17": {
"ref_id": "b17",
"title": "Language and Pereeption",
"authors": [
{
"first": "George",
"middle": [
"A"
],
"last": "Miller",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "N",
"middle": [],
"last": "Philip",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "",
"middle": [],
"last": "Johnson-Laird",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1976,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Miller, George A. and Philip N. Johnson-Laird. 1976. Language and Pereeption, Belknap Press.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF18": {
"ref_id": "b18",
"title": "Conceptual memory: A theory and computer program for processing and meaning content of natural language utterances",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Charles",
"middle": [
"J"
],
"last": "Rieger",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1974,
"venue": "Stanford AIM-233",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Rieger, Charles J. 1974. \"Conceptual memory: A the- ory and computer program for processing and meaning content of natural language utterances.\" Stanford AIM- 233, Department of Computer Science, Stanford Univer- sity.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF19": {
"ref_id": "b19",
"title": "Conceptual Information Processing",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Roger",
"middle": [],
"last": "Schank",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1975,
"venue": "",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Schank, Roger. 1975. Conceptual Information Pro- cessing. Elsevier Publishing Company.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF20": {
"ref_id": "b20",
"title": "Naive kinematics: Two aspects of shape",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Yoav",
"middle": [],
"last": "Shoham",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1985,
"venue": "Commonsense Summer: Final Report",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Shoham, Yoav. 1985. \"Naive kinematics: Two aspects of shape.\" In Commonsense Summer: Final Report, Re- port No. CSLI-85-35, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF21": {
"ref_id": "b21",
"title": "A nonclausal connection-graph resolution theorem-proving program",
"authors": [
{
"first": "M",
"middle": [
"E"
],
"last": "Stickel",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1982,
"venue": "Proceedings of the AAAI-82 National Conference on Artificial Intelligence",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "229--233",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Stickel, M.E. 1982. \"A nonclausal connection-graph resolution theorem-proving program.\" Proceedings of the AAAI-82 National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 229-233.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF22": {
"ref_id": "b22",
"title": "How language structures space",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Leonard",
"middle": [],
"last": "Talmy",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1983,
"venue": "Spatial Orientation: Theory, Research, and Application",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Talmy, Leonard. 1983. \"How language structures space.\" Spatial Orientation: Theory, Research, and Ap- plication, ed. by Herbert Pick and Linda Acredolo, Plenum Press.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF23": {
"ref_id": "b23",
"title": "Force dynamics in language and thought",
"authors": [
{
"first": "Leonard",
"middle": [],
"last": "Talmy",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1985,
"venue": "Proceedings from the Parasession on Causatives and Agentivity, 21st Regional Meeting",
"volume": "",
"issue": "",
"pages": "",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Talmy, Leonard. 1985. \"Force dynamics in lan- guage and thought.\" Proceedings from the Parasession on Causatives and Agentivity, 21st Regional Meeting, Chicago Linguistic Society, ed. by William H. Eilfort, Paul D. Kroeber, and Kareu L. Peterson.",
"links": null
},
"BIBREF24": {
"ref_id": "b24",
"title": "Fourier descriptors for plane closed curves",
"authors": [
{
"first": "C",
"middle": [
"T"
],
"last": "Zahn",
"suffix": ""
},
{
"first": "R",
"middle": [
"Z"
],
"last": "Roskies",
"suffix": ""
}
],
"year": 1972,
"venue": "IEEE Transactions on Computers",
"volume": "",
"issue": "3",
"pages": "269--281",
"other_ids": {},
"num": null,
"urls": [],
"raw_text": "Zahn, C. T., and R. Z. Roskies. 1972. \"Fourier de- scriptors for plane closed curves.\" IEEE Transactions on Computers, Vol. C-21, No. 3, 269-281. March 1972.",
"links": null
}
},
"ref_entries": {
"FIGREF0": {
"uris": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"num": null,
"text": "Vs,, <, ,..)order(<, e,) A grain(~, e,) (Vs~)[subscate(ee, e,) = subset(sz, el) A order(<, ez) A grain(~, sz)]"
},
"FIGREF1": {
"uris": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"num": null,
"text": "Etymologically, it means that there are no intermediate entities between x and y on s. Thus, (V e, x, y, s)immediate(e) A less-than'(e, x, y, s) D -.(3 z)less-than(x, z, s) A less-than(z, y, s) The simplest space."
},
"FIGREF2": {
"uris": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"num": null,
"text": "of the expression material(b). Bits of material are characterized by both extension and cohesion. The primitive predication occupies(b, r, t} encodes extension, saying that a bit of material b occupies a region r at time t. The topology of a bit of material is then parasitic on the topology of the region it occupies. A part bl of a bit of material b is a bit of material whose occupied region is always a subregion of the region occupied by b. Point-like particles (particle} are defined in terms of points in the occupied region, disjoint bits {disjointbit) in terms of disjointness of regions,"
},
"FIGREF3": {
"uris": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"num": null,
"text": "The basic scenario for an abrasive event is that there is an impinging bit of material m which hits an object o and by doing so removes a pointlike bit of material b0 from the surface of o: abr-event'(e, m, o, b0) : material(m) A topologieally.invariant(o) (re, m, o, bo)abr-event'(e, m, o, bo) =---(3 t"
},
"FIGREF4": {
"uris": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"num": null,
"text": "Ve, m, o}abrade'(e, m, o) -(:lbs)[(\u00a5e,)[e, e e ::) (3 bo)bo e bs ^ abr-evenr(el, m, o, bo)] ^(Vb, s,t)[at(e,t) ^ consists-of(o, b, t) A surface(s, b) D (B r)subregion(r, s) A widely-distributed(bs, r)]]"
},
"FIGREF5": {
"uris": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"num": null,
"text": "re, m, o)wear'(e, z, o) =--(3bs)(VeO[el E e D (3 b0}b0 E bs) A abr-event'(el, m, o, b0)] A (3 i)[interval(i) A widely-distributed(e, i)]"
},
"FIGREF6": {
"uris": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"num": null,
"text": "re, m, o, bo)chip'(e, m, o, bo) ----(3 t, b, s, b0, el, e2, es)at(e, t) A consists-of(o, b, t) A surface(s, b) Apart(bo, s) A change'(e, el, ez) A attached'(e~, bo, b) A not'(e2, el)"
},
"FIGREF7": {
"uris": null,
"type_str": "figure",
"num": null,
"text": "re, m, o, bo, bz, el, ez, tz)detach'(e, m, o, b0) ^ change'(e, el, ez) ^ attached'(el, bo, b) ^not'(e2, el) A at(ez, tz) A consists-of(o, bz, tz) D ~(part(bo, b2))"
},
"TABREF1": {
"num": null,
"content": "<table><tr><td>(Vel, ez)change(el, e2) D</td></tr><tr><td>(3 tl, tz)at(el, t~)</td></tr><tr><td>A at(e2, t2) A before(q, t2)</td></tr><tr><td>(Vet, e:, t,, t2, z)p'(el, z) ^ at(e,, t,)</td></tr><tr><td>^q'(e2, x) A at(ez, tz) ^ before(q, tz)</td></tr><tr><td>D change(el, ez)</td></tr></table>",
"type_str": "table",
"text": "Thatcher being Prime Minister, even though the second comes after the first.We can say that times, viewed in this ontology as events, always have a change relation between them.(Vtl, tz)before(tl, tz) D change(tl, t2)The predicate change is related to before by the axiom This does not allow us to derive change of state from temporal succession. For this, we need axioms of the form",
"html": null
}
}
}
} |