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| "paper_id": "J78-3016", |
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| "date_generated": "2023-01-19T03:04:10.883458Z" |
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| "title": "Some Psycholinguistic Constraints on the Constructfon and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f D e f i n i t e ~d s c r i p t -i o n s 1 Andrew Ortony Center f o r the Study of Readlng University o f I l l i n o i s a t Urbana-Champaign", |
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| "text": "It J s a curious and important f a c t about natural languages t h a t they can be and o f ten are used n o n l i t e r a l l y . Whereas i n a r t t f f c i a l languages I t 1s normally impossjble t o d i s t i n g u i s h between the mean lbg o f an express ion on the one hand, and the ,in,ttended meaning the user wishes t o tonvey w i t h t h a t expression on the other ( t h e two are i d e n t i c a l ) , In natural languages a para 1 1 eel d i s t l nc t 1 on be tween sentence mean i ng and speaker meaning (see, f o r example, Searle, 1975, i n press) under1 l e s a1 1 n o n l i t e r a l uses. One o f the c e n t r a l concepts i n the analysis of non-1 i t e r a l uses o f 1 anguage i s t h a t o f i ndi rectness. The main problem w l t h which I am concerned i s a m u l t i -l e v e l one. A t the mBst general l e y e l i t concerns the way i n wh-ich people determine the referents o f d e f i n i t e descript\\ons, andchow language users choo,se the def i n i t e descr i p t i ons they do. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , I am concerned w i t h the question o f the constraints that e x i s t upon how a t h i n g can be r,eferred to. What makes t h i s an i n t e r e s t i n g problem i s the f a c t t h a t i t seems not t o be necessary f o r a r e f e r r i n g expression t o be based on e i t h e r tnformation t h a t has already been made e x p l i c i t I n the preceding discourse, nor even on information t h a t i s e n t a i l e d by what has. Yet clearby, there are conktrbints on the expressions t h a t can be used i f there i s t o be a rea l is t f c -hope o f comrnun i c a t i ve success. a dredicate t h a t i s not l i t e r a l l y ' t r u e of the intended r e f e r e n t but t h a t i s metaphorically appl icable t o i t . As one thinks about the ptocgsses t h a t might be involved i n the productlon o r comprehension-of such an expression they appear t o be very complex, y e t however complex they may be, people u s u a l l y engage i n them without any apparent d i f f i c u l t y . A t present there appears t o e x f s t no adequate theoret fcal account o f what these processes are l i k e , perhaps because a comprehens i v e treatment o f d e f i n i t e d e s c t l p t i o~s has as a p r e r e q u i s i t e a theory o f Indirectness, and t h a t i n t u r n seems t o hfnge on a more comprehensive theory o f speech acts than i s c u r r e n t l y avai lable. ", |
| "cite_spans": [ |
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| "start": 540, |
| "end": 553, |
| "text": "Searle, 1975,", |
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| "text": "I s h a l l take i t as axiomatic t h a t every d e f i n i t e description i s bqsed upon a predicate t h a t i s supposed t o be unlquedy applicable ( a t l e a s t w i t h i n the context o f the discourse) t o some e n t l t y relevant t o the discourse. Thus.", |
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| "section": "D e f i n i t e Descriptions and t h e i r Textual Relations", |
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| "text": "the d e f i n i t e description The f i r s t ' man on th; .noon i s based on the predicate ;$/was the f i r S t 'man on t h e moon, and i t 1 s assumed t a be am1 i cab 1 e t o -. some en t i ty (e .g . Ne i 1 Arms t rong) r; i evan t t o -t h e discourse.", |
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| "section": "D e f i n i t e Descriptions and t h e i r Textual Relations", |
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| "text": "It 1s important t o note a t the outset t h a t c o r e f e r e n t i a l expressions cannot always be, s u b s t i t u t e d f o r one another without a change. o f meaning. For instance, i f , on a r r i v i n g i n a strange unfami f i a r h o t e l i n a foreign land one were t o u t t e r ( l a ) , i t hardly makes sense t o say t h a t i t i s equivalent t o uttering' ( l b ) .", |
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| "section": "D e f i n i t e Descriptions and t h e i r Textual Relations", |
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| "text": "( l a ) I f e e l l i k e the f i r s t man on the moon. ( l b ) I f e e l l i k e N e i l Armsarong.", |
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| "section": "D e f i n i t e Descriptions and t h e i r Textual Relations", |
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| "text": "However, i f the speaker can safely assume t h a t h i s audience-knows t h a t NeJ 1 Armstrqng was the f i r s t man on the w n , ( l b ) could be used as an i nd C rec t way o f achieving the comnun i ca t i ve i n t e n t o f ( l a ) .", |
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| "section": "D e f i n i t e Descriptions and t h e i r Textual Relations", |
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| "text": "Notice, i t i s not necessary t o know who the f i r s t man on the moon was i n order t o f u l l y understand ( l a ) , whereas. i t i s necessary t o know t h a t N e i l Armstrong wgs the f i r s t man on the moon i n order t o properly understand.", |
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| "section": "D e f i n i t e Descriptions and t h e i r Textual Relations", |
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| "text": "( l b ) (although one might not understand why'the speaker used (I b) with i t s unnecessary demands an add 1 t iona l know1 edge and l nferences i n preference t o ( l a ) .) I n any event, i t seems t h a t even the r e l a t i o n s h i p between def i n l t e descr l p t i ons and proper names may somet i mes depend on a notion o f l n d i rectness (see Orrany 6 Anderson,", |
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| "text": "The I n t e r p r e t a t t a n of d e f i n i t e descriptions o f t e n r e l i e s h g a v i l y on the establishment o f inf e r e n t i a l relationships o f various kinds i n order t o determine which e n t i t y i s being r e f e r r e d to. Such Inferences tend t o be forced j o i n t l y by the des i r e o f thg hearer o r reader (hereafter r e f e r r e d t o simply as \"the hearer\") t o make sense of the discourse, and the assumption t h a t th; speaker o r w r i tsr (hereafter, slmply, 'Ithe speakerH) i s communicating i n accordance w i t h the cooperative p r i n c i p l e (see Grfce, 1975) . This l a t t e r assumpt i o n i s c r i t i c a l l y important i n cases where the predicate underlying the d e f i n f t e d e s c r i p t i o n i s not obviously t r u e o f the intended referent--and since these cases appear, a t l e a s t on the surface. (2) A we1 l-dressed man entered the room and greeted the hostess. A1 though everyone e l s e was d r i n k i n g sherry, he asked the waiter f o r a scotch.", |
| "cite_spans": [ |
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| "start": 598, |
| "end": 610, |
| "text": "Grfce, 1975)", |
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| "section": "1977) 6", |
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| "text": "The waiter gave him one. The man w i t h the scotch walked over t o ' h i s Ian t h i s case, i f the waiter gave the man a scotch, i t e n t a i 1s that the man had the scotch, and so, w i t h i p the constraints imposed by the context, he can be uniquely i d e n t i f i e d by the d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n the man w i t h the scotch.", |
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| "section": "1977) 6", |
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| "text": "With d e f i n i t e descriptions o f inference, as /GP I with comnunication i n general, success o f t e n depends on the speaker and the hearer sharing a common background o f knowl edge (see, f o r example, Stalnaker, 1974) . D e f i n i t e d e s c r l p t ions o f inference are more com~lex. For example, suppose t h a t i n (2) the sentence The wai t e r -ga;e him one i s omitted. Then, the d e f i n i t e noun phrase The man w i t h the scotch only succeeds i n ref e r r i n g t o the r i g h t man i f i t i s assumed that the man who asked f o r a scotch was given one. (4) The hostess asked the man where h i s wife! was. He rep1 l e d t'Mtnd your own business, you o l d bag.\" The hostess was furtous t h a t the man who had insulted her had been i n v i red t o her party.", |
| "cite_spans": [ |
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| "start": 210, |
| "end": 226, |
| "text": "Stalnaker, 1974)", |
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| "text": "The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f (3) requires not only semantic and general world knowledge i n the way that (2) does, i t a l s o requires the knowledge that saying that one i s on a d l e t can count as r e j e c t i n g c a n o f f e r t o eat something. T e l l i n g someone t h a t one has j u s t eaten I s an appropriate, relevant, piece of information for p e r m i t t i n g the inference t h a t one i s not hungry, I ' and/or t h a t one does not want the offered food. ", |
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| "section": "1977) 6", |
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| "text": "From the perspective o f t h e man, (9) i s true. 14, and between 14and 15 A number o f Important observations have t o be made about the chai n o f reasoni ng--obserua t i~n s t h a t amount \u20ac0 constraints on what i t normally I s . F i r s t , there are no unnecessary premises i n it. Every premise i s needed f o r the establishment o f the f f r$t subcon~lusion, (13), which i n i t s turn i s needed f o r establishing the f i n a l conclusion. Second, a1 though the order of the pwmises that are Introduced from the speaker's general knowledge can be mafiipulated, the most natural order i s one i n which each premise invokes a concept t h a t has been foregrounded (h the sense of Chafe, 1972 ) by the preceding one.", |
| "cite_spans": [ |
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| "start": 690, |
| "end": 701, |
| "text": "Chafe, 1972", |
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| "section": "h a t p l a u s i b l y r e l a t e s the event t h a t i n i t i a t e s i t t o i t s i p e n d e d i l l o c ut i o n a r y force. To see the f u l l i r n p l~c a t i o n s o f t h i s proposal, l e t us see how i t works w i t h the example. The man i s o f f e r e d s M e cake, and t h i s o f f e r I s the event t h a t i n i t i a t e s h i s response.", |
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| "text": "I f t h i s were not the case, the p o s s i b i l i t y o f introducing i r r e l e v a n t premises would arise--a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t could serve no useful purpose i n the present context. I n fact, t h i s constraint p'robdbly needs t o be a l i t t l e more l f b e r a l than I have described, but f o r the reasons I have indicated, something close t o i t needs-t o operate. Third, the conclusion o f the chain contains the information appropriate f o r a d i r e c t response t o the, I n i t i a t i n g event, an event t h a t need not i t s e l f be a l i n g u i s t i c one (as It i s i n the present example). The i n i t i a t i n g event might be an observed event t o which an appropriate response might be a description o f i t , o r o f a react ion t o i t. Consequently, i n t h e aeneral case, \"response\" should not be taker, t o mean '!rep1 y .I1", |
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| "section": "h a t p l a u s i b l y r e l a t e s the event t h a t i n i t i a t e s i t t o i t s i p e n d e d i l l o c ut i o n a r y force. To see the f u l l i r n p l~c a t i o n s o f t h i s proposal, l e t us see how i t works w i t h the example. The man i s o f f e r e d s M e cake, and t h i s o f f e r I s the event t h a t i n i t i a t e s h i s response.", |
| "sec_num": null |
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| "text": "There are doubtless other constraints that a more detailed analysfs would reveal, but f o t the moment I want only t o suggest t h a t the conJuhction o f these (or some comparable set o f ) constraints constitutes what I mean by llplausibilityl' i n the context of my requirement t h a t the chain of reasoning -be a psycho-logically p l a u s i b l e one. For example, he can, w i t h one utterance, not only refuse the o f f e r , but also s a t i s f y c e r t a i n social conventions by prov i d i n g a good reason f o r h i s refusal,,or a t least h l n t i n g a t one. As Searie (197'5) points out, i n an i n d i r e c t speach act'thp speaker intends both the sentence me-g and the speaker meaning t o be recognized b w h e hearer. So, indirectness affords economy-well as, often, politeness and s e n s i t i v i t y .", |
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| "section": "h a t p l a u s i b l y r e l a t e s the event t h a t i n i t i a t e s i t t o i t s i p e n d e d i l l o c ut i o n a r y force. To see the f u l l i r n p l~c a t i o n s o f t h i s proposal, l e t us see how i t works w i t h the example. The man i s o f f e r e d s M e cake, and t h i s o f f e r I s the event t h a t i n i t i a t e s h i s response.", |
| "sec_num": null |
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| "text": "There remai ns .,le quest ion of why a spwaker should s e l e c t w e form over ahother. The answer again l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t the communication o f the l i t e r a l meaning o f the i n d i r e c t language act i s intended, Some o f the knowledge t h a t i s needed t o construct the reasonlng chain may be more p u b l i c l y a v a i l a b l e than other knowledge reqdired. Thus, most people know that\\peopld on d i e t s ought not t o eat f a t t e n i n g things (depending on the purpose of the d i e t , o f course).", |
| "cite_spans": [], |
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| "section": "h a t p l a u s i b l y r e l a t e s the event t h a t i n i t i a t e s i t t o i t s i p e n d e d i l l o c ut i o n a r y force. To see the f u l l i r n p l~c a t i o n s o f t h i s proposal, l e t us see how i t works w i t h the example. The man i s o f f e r e d s M e cake, and t h i s o f f e r I s the event t h a t i n i t i a t e s h i s response.", |
| "sec_num": null |
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| "text": "Consequently i t can be assumed that a hearer has more ready access t o that f a c t than t o the f a c t that the speaker i s on a d i e t (which possibly very few people know). Thus, the speaker's selection o f the p a r t i c u l a r language act can teke advantage o f h i s b e l i e f s about what the hearer i s l i k e l y t o know.", |
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| "section": "h a t p l a u s i b l y r e l a t e s the event t h a t i n i t i a t e s i t t o i t s i p e n d e d i l l o c ut i o n a r y force. To see the f u l l i r n p l~c a t i o n s o f t h i s proposal, l e t us see how i t works w i t h the example. The man i s o f f e r e d s M e cake, and t h i s o f f e r I s the event t h a t i n i t i a t e s h i s response.", |
| "sec_num": null |
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| "text": "I t can also take advantage o f the f a c t that some of the choices seem t o have a stronger force than others. This i s a complex issue. My i n t u i t i o n s are that 13leaves open the p o s s i b i li t y o f u l t i m a t e l y accepting some cake rather more readi l y than does (10) , perhaps because once 10i s used i t must be r e h v a n t t o the chain o f reasoning, whereas if (13) i s used, i t could be used t speech act be?\" I have suggested that i t cannot be so i n d i r e c t t h a t i t could not p a r t i c i p a t e i n a chain of plausible reasoning r e l a t i n g a representation of the i n i t i a t i n g event t o an appropriate d i r e c t response t o that event. I have also suggested t h a t the i l l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t o f a l l steps w i t h i n such a chain w i l l be appropriate f o r that i n i t i a t i n g event.", |
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| "section": "h a t p l a u s i b l y r e l a t e s the event t h a t i n i t i a t e s i t t o i t s i p e n d e d i l l o c ut i o n a r y force. To see the f u l l i r n p l~c a t i o n s o f t h i s proposal, l e t us see how i t works w i t h the example. The man i s o f f e r e d s M e cake, and t h i s o f f e r I s the event t h a t i n i t i a t e s h i s response.", |
| "sec_num": null |
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| "text": "When speakers and w r i t e r s produce, and hearers and readers comprehend d e f i n i t e descript ions, they do so against a background o f knowledge t h a t includes t h e i r t a c i t knowledge about indirectness. This knowledge i s o f t e n brought t o bear i n dealing w i t h d e f i n i t e descriptions o f inference-descr i p t ions, t h a t i s , i n whi ch the underlying predicate could appear on the reasoning chain and that could c o n s t i t u t e a d i r e c t o r rndirect speech act. Thus, f o r example,", |
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| "section": "D e f i n i t e Destriptions o f Inference", |
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| "text": "(3) and 4 meaningful components of I t must be. This i s the sense i n which 1 claim that the cons t r a i n t s t h a t govern what d e f i n i t e descrlptions can be used by a speaker who hopes t o be understood are the same as those t h a t govern what a speaker can i n general say, 1 f he has those same aspirations. There i s no doubt t h a t a detailedC t r a n s l a t i o n of my proposals about i n d i rectness i n t o comparable ones about d e f i n i t e descriptions I s no easy matter. One reasen i s t h a t the reasonlng process that underlies the determinat i o n o f a referent may be from a conclusion t o an i n i t i a t i n g event, as i n (3). Another i s t h a t not a l l the steps i n the chaln can be employed, but only those t h a t contain information applicable t o the referent--not, f o r example, generalizations l i k e (11). I n such cases, i f the premise i s t o be incorporated, i t has t o be embedded as the complement o f an appropriate verb o f propositional a t t i t u d e . -Now, f o r a hearer t o determine t h a t the Cautious one and the navigator'are coreferential, i t i s necessary for'him t o invoke general knowledge about what constitutes a cautious act (contrast t h i s w i t h an offensive act). This i n t u r n requires inferences t o be math abouR human actions and intentions. To be sure, the actions i n question are n o t l i n g u i s t i c a l l y performed acts, but t h a t appears t o be the only difference. o n i s r e a l l y no more than the a n a l y t i c / synthetic d i s t f n c t l o n i n disguise. Maybe a l l t h a t needs t o be said i s t h a t some inferences (e.g. ones based str,ictly on the rules o f l o g i c ) are generally easier t o make than others.", |
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| "text": "I f t h i s i s r i g h t then i t merely means t h a t some relationships between descriptions and t h e i r intended referents are more transparent than others.", |
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| "text": "Nobody could object t o that. reasoning. My claim i s only t h a t i t should be possible t o do so--there has t o e x i s t some determinable connection between the predicate underlying the d e f i n i t e description and the d i scourse i n which the description occurs.", |
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| "text": "But, being determinable and being determined are d i ff e r e n t things. As a matter o f f a c t , there are o f ten other clues t h a t w i 11 permit the hearer t o make a good guess about the r e f e r e n t ' s i d e n t i t y , distpurse t o p i c being one o f them.", |
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| "text": "I t i s almost q e r t a l n l y the case t h a t people sometimes do go through some such reason; ng process as I have outlined, and i f and when they do not, they could probably be induced t o do so by being asked suitable questions about what they took the ref e r e n t t o be, and why i t was reasonabte o r plausible t o do so.", |
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| "text": "I t i s import a a t i n the present context because i t represents the case i n which some predicate i s l i t e r a l l y transformed i n t o the body o f 9 d e f i n i t e descript i o n . More camplex cases are s t i l l based on the usual r u l e s o f propositional l o g i c such as modus ponens, ( (P a q ) .-q) 3 q ) .3~a u t ton i s needed here. Some cases o f g i v i n g do not e n t a i l having. One Carl give somebody a pat on the back, o r a k i c k i n the teeth; the r e c i p i e n t gets i t a l r i g h t , but he doesn't have it! However, i f we specify the appropriate constraints on the o b j e c t the entailment w i l l hold.Grice, H. P.Logic and tonversation. I n P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (~d s .) , Syntax and semantics", |
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| "text": "Morgan (~d s", |
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| "ref_entries": { |
| "FIGREF0": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "a t t e n t i o n of l i n g u i s t s , philosophers, ,sycholog j s t s , and computer s c i e n t i s t s I n t h e i r various e f f o r t s t o come t o a b e t t e r understanding o f natural languages and o f human l i n g u i s t i c performance. One o f my purposes i n thi-s paper i s t o show how central a concept Indirectness i s with respect t o the production and comprehension of d e f i n i t e descriptions.", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF1": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "The quest ion o f what i s t o count as a reasonable nay o f r e f e r r i n g t o something i n p a r P depends f o r i t s answer on what counts as a reasooable i n d i r e c t use o f language. When, f o r example, one r e f e r s t o the 1977/78 Seattle basketball team as The Clnderella of the #BA one i s using a d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n based on", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF2": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "My own proposals are not intended t o f i l l a l l these gaps, but they are Intended t o sketch a possible d i r e c t i o n f o r doing so. The matn goal t h a t I have i s t o suggest a way o f imposing l i m i t s on indirectness, and then, t o shoy how those same l i m i t s are needed t o account f o r some important constraints on successful d e f i n i t e descriptions.", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF3": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "t o constitute the most d i f f i c u l t ones, I s h a l l concentrate on t h e i r analysis, t o some exfent a t the expense o f simpler examples.", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF4": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "s h a l l c a l l such cases lldeftnite descriptions o f inference.\" The overriding l o g i c o f the determination o f the referents of such d e f l n i t e descriptions i s that i f the speaker i s communicating i n accordance w i t h the cooperative p r i n c i p l e c e r t a i n assumptions have t o be recognized fn order f o r the expression i n questfon t o successfully i d e n t i f y the intended referent. These assumptions o f t e n serve t o \"sneak inla new i-nformation about the referent ( i n much the same way as appos i t i ve r e l a t i v e clauses introduce neQ informa$ ion). The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f these assumptions i s based on inferences o f various kinds. D e f i n i t e descriptions o f inference can be contrasted w i t h d e f i n i t e descriptions based on entailment r e l a t i o n s . D e f i h i t e descriptions based on entai lment are those f o r which the referent can be determined e i t h e r by transforming a predicate t h a t has already'appeared i n the d i scourse i n t o a def i n i t e description (descriptions based on the p r i n c i p l e o f i d e n t i t y ) , o r by rel a t i n g the d e s c r i p t i o n t o predicates t h a t have appeared e a r l i e r , on the basis o f r u l e s o f formal logic (e.g. modus ponens) applied t o them,2 The important d i f f e r e n c e between a d e f i n i t e descript i o n o f entailment and-a d e f i n i t e description o f inference i s t h a t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the former does not depend on the provision o f suppressed premises drawn from the comprehender's general world knowledge. I n a d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n o f Inference i t does. A n example o f a d e f i n i t e description o f entailment can be found i n (2), where the underlined expression i s e n t a i l e d by the content.", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF5": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "Unfortunately, only In b i b l i c a l c l r c l e s i s i t true t h a t asking f o r something guarantees being given t h a t thing. So, Ip order f o r the hearer t o i d e n t i f y the intended r e f e r e n t he has t o assume t h a t the man got h i s scotch. Of course, t h i s assumption comes e a s i l y f o r i t can be made on the basis o f a p l a u s i b l e inference r e q u i r i n g only the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f p l a u s i b l e suppressed premises, such as t h a t when a guest asks a waiter for a p a r t i c u l a r kind o f d r i n k a t a cockt a i l party, the waiter normally obliges i f that d r i n k i s available. This c o n s t i t u t e s a simple example o f a d e f i n i t e description a f inference. On encountering a d e f i n i t e description, the hearer has t o assume that the d e s c r i p t i o n does indeed r e f e r t o some already mentioned person o r thing, i n t h i s case, say, the guest. I n doing so, he makes inferences t h a t f i l l i n what went before--that i s he makes inferences about what might have been asserted t o enable the predicate underlying the descript,on t o be both applicable and relevant. The comprehender might reason as f o l lows i n the present example: \" l f t h i s expression r e f e r s t o the guest, then i t must be the case t h a t the waiter qave him a scotch. Thls i s q u i t e p l a u s i b l e since i t I S customary f o r waiters a t c o c k t a i l p a r t i e s t o g i v e guests the drinks they request i f thsse d r i n k s are available. It i s p l a u s i b l e t h a t scotch was available, since i t i s a frequently served d r i n k a t such occasions. So I s h a l l assume that t h i s i s what happened and t h a t i s why the guest was r e f e r r e d t o as I t h e man w i t h the scotch' I ' Whether o r not people normally construct such chains o f reasoning i n ordpr t o i d e n t i f y the antecedents of d e f i n i t e descriptions i s n o t the issue here. What i s the issue, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , i s t h a t i t be p o s s i b l e t o cons t r u c t such a chain. Certainly, one has t o suppo t h a t the k i nd o f gendral wor 1 d kdowlvdge requ i r,ed t o do so i s normally a v a i l a b l e during the comprehension process. The relevant frames, s c r i p t s , schemata, o r whatever other knowledge structures are supposed, are presumably activated. D e f i n i t e descriptions o f inference involving i n d i rectness, 1 i ke (3) and (4) below, tend t o be more complex. They are characterized by the f a c t t h a t the a p p l i c a b i l i t y 6f the predicates underl y i n g them o f t e n depends on the u t i l i z a t i o n o f knowledge t h a t Morgan (1978) c a l l s knowl edge about the language, as opposed t o knowledge o f the language. These t u r n out t o be cases o f i nferences i n v o l v i n g howledge about i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces and perlocutionary e f f e c t s (see Austin, 1964).(3) The hostess offered the guest some cake. He t o l d her t h a t he was on a d i e t . H i s brother, who was w i t h him, t o l d her t h a t he personally was not on a d i e t . The man who had refused the cake walked over t o h i s host.", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF6": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "I n the case o f (4) i t requires the knowledge t h a t the v i o l a t i o n of c e r t a i n language-use conventions can count as offensive behavior, O f course, i n a sense, t h~s k~n d o f knowledge about the conventions o f language use and the s o c i a l / communicative consequences o f t h e i r v i o l a t i o n i s knowledge o f the world, j u s t as knoytng t h a t waiters normal l y serve the drinks they are asked t o is. But, insofar as i t i s knowledge o f conventions about the use o f language, and insofar as t h i s i s an area which has been singled out as being o f core concern i n pragmatics, i t i s worth separating such cases f rm the other kinds o f cases, l i k e (2). In fact, I think, the d i s t i n ct i o n I s d i f f i c u l t t o uphold because the mechanism requi red t o deal w i t h i n d i rectness i s the same k i r d o f i n f e r e n t i a l mechanism as i s required t o deal w i t h ltordinary\" knowledge o f the world. The question t h a t eventually has t o be answered concerns the constralnts t h a t there are on the predicates employed i n d e f i n i t e descriptions. My view I s t h a t the answer t o t h i s quest i o n depends g p f indlng an answer t o a more gpreral quest i o n about t h e pragmatics o f language, namely the question: what constraints are there on what i s relevant ( i n t h e sense used by Grice, 1975 and others). Staying, f o r t h e moment, w i t h d e f~n i t e descriptions, compare (5) and (6) below (5) The hostess offered the guest some cake. He t o l d h e r t h a t he was on a d i e t . His brother, who was w i t h him, t o l d her t h a t he p e r s~n a l l y was n o t on a d jet. The man who walked over t o h i s host. 4 (6) The hostess o f f e r e d the guest some cake, He t o l d her t h a t he was on a d i e t . His brother, who was w i t h him, t o l d her t h a t he personally was n o t on a d i e t . The man who was not hungry walked over t o h i s host.", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF7": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "It seems t o me t h a t whereas (5) i s p e r f e c t l y coherent, (6) i s not. I t becomes coherent, hoH-6 ever, i f the context i s changed so t h a t instead af (he) t o l d her t h a t he per;onal ly was on a d i e t i t r (2) told her t h a t he .personal l y had -'ust eaten; tljen both (3) and ( 6 ) seem p e r f e c t l y icceptable. I t seems, then, t h a t the appropriateness o f the d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n depends on the appropriateness o f i t s underlying predicates.", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF8": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "By contrast, &I 1 ing sameone t h a t one i s on a dlet i s an appropriate piece o f h f o r m a t i o n f o r perifti t t i ng the ihference t h a t one does not want what i s being offered, but i t i s not appropriate f o r the inference that one t s n o t hungry.l ndi r e c t Speech ActsA major p a r t o f my thesis i s that the predicate underlylng a d e f i n i t e description o f inference i s constrained by t h e relevance r e l a t i o n i n j u s t the same way as t h a t r e l a t i o n canstrains what counts as an i n d i r e c t speech act i n a d i scourse.If t h i s i s so, then I t w i l l help t o have a working hypothesis about the constraints t h a t e x i s t on i n d i r e c t speech acts,Suppose the s i t u a t i o n i s t h a t described i n( 3 ) , namely, one i n which someone i s o f f e r e d some cake and In u t t e r i n g (7) intends t o refuse the cake.(7) 1 am on a d i e t . The question we have t o answer i s t h i s . Since i t does n o t f o l l o w l o g i c a l l y from (7) t h a t the i ntention was t o refuse the cake, on what basis does a l i s t e n e r come t o the conclusion t h a t indeed t h a t was the i n t e n t i o n ? Furthermore, why does, f o r example, (8) not succeed i n comrnun i c a t i ng the r e f u s a l ? (8) MY mother i s an opera singer.Perhaps one should r e j e c t (8) on some very general grounds.For example, on the grounds t h a t one cannot randomly assign a sentence t o an i n t e n t~o n and expect t o be understood. But the same o l d question ,arises aoout what c o n s t i t u t e s a random versus a non-random assignment as arises about appropriateness and relevance.The s o l u t t o n I propose I s based on the n o t i o n of a \"plausible chain o f reason~ng.\" It i s t h i s . For an i n d i r e c t speech a c t t o be understood as being relevant, ar appropriate, i t must be able t o p a r t i c i p a t e as a premise, o r as a sub-concluston, i n a quasi-logical, o r b e t t e r , p s y c h o -l o g i~a l , chain o f reasoning t", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF9": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "C am being offe'red some cake. Such an event c a l l s for one o f two responses, an acceptance o r a refusal, a p p r o~r i d t e l y modifled b y politeness conventions. Lek assume t h a t I1Yes, please\" and \"No, thank you tount as d i r e c t , 1 i t e r a l speech acts f o r accepting and refusing, respectively, They c e r t a i n l y are conventionally regqrded as d i r e c t ways of acceprfng and refusing. Now we can see t h a t i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, the proposal i s t h i s f o r (7) t o be understood as a refusal, i t must be able t o p a r t i c i p a t e as a premise, o r as a subconclusion, i n a psychol o g i c a l chain of rea$oning t h a t p l a u s i b l y r p l a t e s the or1 glnal o f f e r t o I t s acceptance o r rejection. Such a chain o f reasoning might look something l i k e (9) -(15). ( 9 ) 1 am being o f tered some cake (10) 1 am on a d i e t (11) People on d7ets ought not t o eat f a t t e n l n g things (12) Cake i s fattening (13) (It follows l o g i c a l l y that) I ought not t o eat any cake (14) ( I t f o l lows deont i c a l l y that) I w i l l not eat any cake (15) ( I t f o l lows conventional l y that) I w l l l refuse the cake This chain of reasoning, including the intermediate and f i n a l conclusions does not c o n s t i t u t e a deduct i v e l y v a l i d argument i n the usual l o g i c a l sense. The refationships that t w i s t betyeen (13) and", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF10": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "are not entailment relations, but they are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f human reasoning.", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF11": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "are now i n a p o s i t i o n t o consider what happens from the perspective o f the hearer. The most important t h i n g i s that the hearer assumes t h a t the speaker 1s constrained i n what he says i n j u s t the k i n d o f way t h a t I have indicated. The hearer, therefore, a t t r i b u t e s t o the speaker some plausf b l e chain o f reasoning. However, the hearer may not have a l l the knowledge t h a t i s available t o the speaker (he may not know t h a t he i s on a d i e t , f o r example). Cbnsequently, he may have t o make inferences o f h i s own i n order t o reach some of the premises required. This would be t r u e i f , for example, the response t o the o f f e r o f cake had been (12) rather than (10).Sometimes these inferences are incorrect and one understands c o r r e c t l y what was intended, but f o r the wrong reasons, o r one misunderstands I t a ltogether. As we shall see, t h i s f a c t , that the hearer's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s only p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y determined, has some impbrtant consequences f o r the speaker's selection of h i s utterance. The most c r u c i a l clalm that I wish to make about the t h a i n of reasoning i s t h i s . Assuming that the speaker does not choose t o express hlms e l f d i r e c t l y ( f o r Whatever reason), then wf t h i n the l i m i t s o f the context, any o f the premises o r subconclusions i n the chain from the I n i t i a t i n g event t o the (dtrect). conclusion can function as more o r less easi4y Ifiterpretable surrogates f o r the conclusidn--any o f the steps can c o n s t i t u t e an i n d i r e c t speech act appropriate t o the d i r e c t sp3ech act t h a t constitutes the conclusion. Thus, ?ny o f ( l o ) , ( l l ) , (12), (13), and (14) can serve as I n d i r e c t response t o the o f f e r . And, if some other response i s made, i t must be able t o serve as a step i n a s i m i l a r chain o f plausible reasaning. If i t cannot, i t i s an inappropria t e response. I t i s p~e c i s e l y these constraints t h a t prevent (8) from be-~ng a possible i n d i r e c t response t o t h e o f f e r , since there i s no basis o f shared knowledge t h a t w i l l normally permif a hearer t o reconstruct an argument i n which (8) figures t o be relevant on the chbin from i n i t ia t i n g event t o conclusion. An important question t h a t now needs t o be answered i s why do people use language i n d i r e c t l y i n the f i r s t place, and why, given t h a t they can choose from a r e s t r i c t e d range o f i n d i r e c t comnunicative acts, do they select the ones they do. Why, f o r example, would a speaker choose (10) instead o f , say (12)? The answer t o the f i r s t p a r t o f the question depends on exactly what k i n d o f i n d i r e c t language a c t i s being used. For example, metaphors may be used f o r purposes o f communicative economy, comnunicative v i v i dness, o r even comnunicative possi b i 1 i t y (see Ortnny, 1975). With i n d i r e c t speech acts, the answer i s very often that the speaker gets ''two f o r the p r i c e o f one.\"", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF12": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "t o reach a d i f f e r e n t conclusion. A f t e r a1 1, most people occasionally do things that they oJght not t o do, and that p o s s i b i l i t y seems wide open i f the response t o the o f f e r i s (13). This i s not the place t o explore these issues further, but i t i s worth noting that man# jokes c a p i t a l i z e on expectations of plausible reasoning chains o f the kind I have been discussingmathe t r i c k i s t o make them go awry! My proposal shares c e r t a i n characteristics w i t h t h a t o f Searle (1975) i n t h a t i t s u g e s t s a not necessarily c~n s c i o u s chain o f reasoning. I t d r f f e r s from Searle's account insofar as i t makes claims about the constraints on what can be said and understood . Sear 1 e t s cha i n o f reason i ng contains many metal inguist i c premises about ind i rec tness that I have trea tqd as background a~sumptions. My focus, by contrast, i s on the content o f the chain. What I have proposed i s a possible answer t o the quest ion \"How i n d i r e c t can an i n d i r e c", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF13": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "are cases i n which the undbrlying predicate could c o n s t i t u t e the 4;onclusion of a chain of reasoning--i.e. a d i r e c t language act, while (5) i s a case i n which the underlying predicate could c o n s t i t u t e a premise i p a plaus i b l e chain o f reasoning--i.e, an i n d i r e c t Ianwage act. I n a sense, what I have proposed i s a p a r t i a l account o f ,relevance i n G r i ce ' s (1 975) sense, o r perhaps b e t t e r yet, a p a r t i a l account o f when apparent v i o l a t i o n s o f relevance are indeed only apparent, and why, It i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t the predicates underlying d e f i n i t e descriptions have t o be relevant t o the discourse j u s t as any other", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF14": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "comparable", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF15": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "Nevertheless, i t seems t o me t h a t some o f the m t l o n s t h a t I have l a i d out might prove h e l p f u l , i f -o n l y by v i r t u e o f the fact that they may eventua'l l y lead t o b e t t e r proposals by others.Earl l e r , I suggested t h a t perhaps descr lptions of inference involving i n d i r e c t speech acts and those not involving them, r e a l l y hinge on fundamentally the same k i n d o f processes. On the surface, the basic difference concerns whether o r not they involve the addition o f pragmatic knowledge. I t turns out, however, not t o be an easy matter t o decide what i s pragmatic knowledge and what i s merely semantic or factual. For example, (16) i s a description o f inference: (16) The navigator had heard that the weather might be unpleasant. He had always been concerned f o r the comfort o f the passengers. He proposed taking a more indi r e c t route t o avoid the possible storms. The captai n d f sag reed. He f e l t t h a t the sooner they arrived a t t h e i r d e s t i n a t i o n the better--he wanted a d r i n k and a decent meal. A f t e r a long argument the cautious one got h i s way.", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF16": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "Furthermore, had the p i l o t asserted that he wanted t o take the shortest route because o f h i s f r i v olous desi res, would he not, thereby have been i n d i r e c t l y recommending a (possibly) reckless act? Surely, what i s pragmatic and what i s n o t cannot come down t o performative verbs. Yet, i f i t i s t o be broader than that, what c r i t e r i a are t o be used t o separate the semantic from the pragmatic? The o l d n o t i o n o f semantics as entailment i s c e r t a i n l y to@ r e s t r i c t i v e t o be useful as a model o f natural language processing, but the new notion o f pragmatics seems t o amount t o l i t t l e more than the notion t h a t language processors are* r a t i o n a l beings who engage t h e i r reasoning processes i n language comprehension and production j u s t as they do i n perception and actfon. Even the not ion of a speech act seems t o have very fuzzy boundaries unless f t i s t r i v i a l f t e d by Invoki ng psychologl c a l I y *ininterest ing surface s t r u c t u r a l aspects l i k e the presence o t absence o f perforhat i v e verbs. D i s t i n c t i o n s between d i f f e r e n t cJasses o f l i n g u i s t i c ~henomena are usually d i f f i c u l t t o maintain i n a n y -r i g i d way, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f they are supposed t o have psychological correlates. This i s true o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between syntax and semantics, o f t h a t between semantics and pragmatics, of t h a t between l i t e r a l and n o n l i t e r a l , and o f that between descriptions o f entailment, and descriptions of Inference. As usual, clear cases are easy t o recognize, but there I s always a large grey, undecided area i n the middle where the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n Seems s t e r i l e . I n the case o f the d i s t i n c t i o n bemebn descriptions o f entailment and descriptions o f itlference, the problem i s exactly the same as the c l a s s i c a l philosophical one that plagues the analytic/synthetlc d i s t i n ction. This i s hardly an accident since my d i st i n c t i", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| }, |
| "FIGREF17": { |
| "num": null, |
| "text": "The l a s t question I want t o deal w i t h i s the psychological status o f my claims, p a r t i c u l a r l yw i t h respect t o the inference patterns t h a t I have proposed. My p o s i t i o n i s not t h a t i t i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r the comprehension o r production o f a d e f i n i t e description o f inference t h a t a person a c t u a l l y construct such a chain of", |
| "uris": null, |
| "type_str": "figure" |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
