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| "paper_id": "T75-2032", |
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| "date_generated": "2023-01-19T07:43:14.731733Z" |
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| "title": "REPRESENTATION OF KNOWLEDGE: NON-LINGUISTIC FORMS DO WE NEED IMAGES AND ANALOGUES?", |
| "authors": [ |
| { |
| "first": "Zenon", |
| "middle": [ |
| "W" |
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| "last": "Pylyshyn", |
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| "affiliation": { |
| "laboratory": "", |
| "institution": "University of Western Ontario London", |
| "location": { |
| "country": "Canada" |
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| "email": "" |
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| "abstract": "", |
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| "text": "It is no accident that inside most psychological theories of representation we can, if we look closely enough, discern a small person with his eyes on a screen and his hands on the controls.", |
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| "text": "The metaphor is so seductive that almost all theories of perception succumb to it (as Kaufman, 1974 has noted in his recent review of theories in perception).", |
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| "text": "True, we try to deliver the homonculus a better and more stable picture than falls on the eye of the larger person he is controlling --in fact we usually go to the trouble of presenting him with a three-dimensional model (often holographic), hoping to lighten his load, but the little man seems so friendly and familiar that we can't imagine how we could do without him. The dilemma this places us in goes back several millenia.", |
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| "text": "It runs something like this.", |
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| "text": "We need to have some internal representation of the world in order to think about it (indeed, in order to apprehend it at all).", |
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| "text": "But if this internal representation is too similar to the world itself it cannot help us to apprehend it since it merely moves the same problem inside.", |
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| "text": "On the other hand if it is too dissimilar then how can it represent the world at all? Epistemologists have squirmed under the horns of this dilemma trying by various means to make the problem disappear. Psychologists on the other hand have by and large dismissed the problem as old-fashioned (which it is) and have proceeded to be rigorous in their experimental analysis of the \"functional role of images\", Where images are not merely \"pictures\" but are artfully becoming much more fleeting and sketchy.", |
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| "text": "Sometimes they are referred to as perceptual schemas, sometimes as \"the activation of perceptual processes\", and more recently as a~alo~ues. The little man for his part has been put in a black box where he continues to live under such guises as \"the visual system\" or as something which responds to the analogues by moving limbs or uttering sentences as required. This account is admittedly unfair to the many investigators who understand the basic problem quite well and are struggling to develop representation systems adequate to the task.", |
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| "text": "But I believe that the caricature adequately characterizes the vast majority of psychological approaches to the phenomenon of so-called \"non-verbal representation\". Primarily what I will try to do is 160 to point out that many of the ways of casting the problem of \"alternative forms of representation ,, are misguided and that by blurring certain distinctions and emphasizing others we may be burying the significant problems in a mire of catchwords (e.g., procedural embedding, analogical, holistic and even propositional --which I now regret using because of the sentential connotations which, despite all It is these processes which define the semantics of the representation: we may speak of the structure of a representation relative to a Semantic Interpretation Function (SIF). Thus the two distinct strings of symbols \"not (P and q)\" and \"not-p or not-q\" are identical structures from the point of view of a theorem prover and the distinct strings ,w +, and \"(LEFT-OF STAR PLUS)\" may be identical structures from the point of view of some other SIF. Neglect of the SIF represents one of the most ubiquitous sources of confusion in discussions about representation.", |
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| "start": 302, |
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| "text": ",, are misguided and that by blurring certain distinctions and emphasizing others we may be burying the significant problems in a mire of catchwords (e.g., procedural embedding, analogical, holistic and even propositional --which I now regret using because of the sentential connotations which, despite all", |
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| "text": "It leads some people, for example, to assert that non-llngulstic representations \"preserve the structure of that which they represent\".", |
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| "text": "They do so of course only to the extent that the \"same I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I structure\" is extracted bysome appropriate SIF.", |
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| "start": 55, |
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| "text": "I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I", |
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| "text": "In that sense the sentence \"the book is on the table\" can be said to preserve part of the structure of a scene containing a book on a table.", |
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| "text": "To be sure the latter has a lot more structure as well but so does the sentence (it has order, length, color, etc.).", |
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| "text": "It is up to the SIF to pick out those aspects which are signifying from those that are not and to process the string (in the appropriate contexts) as it would the scene.", |
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| "text": "Without knowing what the SIF did we could not speak of structural similarity. I don't mean to imply by this example that sentences provide an adequate representation of scenes (they don't for other reasons) but only that the differences are more subtle than captured in the simple claim that the scene and the sentence have different structures.", |
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| "text": "At this level all we can say is that they don't \"resemble\" one another. Furthermore, I have argued elsewhere (Pylyshyn, 1973 ) that there are many conceptual traps awaiting those who talk in terms of storing and using images. , 1969; Simon, 1972) .", |
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| "start": 109, |
| "end": 124, |
| "text": "(Pylyshyn, 1973", |
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| { |
| "start": 226, |
| "end": 233, |
| "text": ", 1969;", |
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| "start": 234, |
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| "text": "Simon, 1972)", |
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| "text": "The reason ~hat it never occurred to many of us that there was a problem is that when we interact with the environment (as opposed to thinking about it) the laws of physics take care of all the relevant interactions among events --we don't have to worry about overlooking what will happen to evrything else in the world when we carry out some action on a part of it. Such relations are given to us free by the environment.", |
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| "section": "III. ANALOGICAL AGAIN", |
| "sec_num": null |
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| "text": "In the case of reasoning, however, the relations are not free. We must in some way explicitly build in the knowledge regarding what effects do and don't follow from any action.", |
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| "section": "III. ANALOGICAL AGAIN", |
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| "text": "Now it seems to me that the notion of an analogue representation is in part an attempt to get this information for free again.", |
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| "section": "III. ANALOGICAL AGAIN", |
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| "text": "Thus the claim that data on the time-course of mental rotation (c.f., Cooper and Shepard, 1973) the laws of physics and optics assure us that, as in the frame problem, the right things will happen (e.g., the object sizes will remain fixed as they are moved, the smaller object will partially occlude the larger, etc.).", |
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| "start": 70, |
| "end": 95, |
| "text": "Cooper and Shepard, 1973)", |
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| "text": "But in the mental comparison case we somehow feel that the analogues will \"do the right thing\" because of intrinsic properties of the analogue medium, just as in the mental rotation example we feel that analogues will intrinsically maintain their form in a rigid manner during rotation.", |
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| "section": "III. ANALOGICAL AGAIN", |
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| "text": "In the mental comparison case the assumption is that if the process is analogue, the SIF does not need to \"know\" the rules of transformation nor does it need to \"know\" about order relations --e.g., that such relations are asymmetric and transitive --since it has merely to \"read off\" the answer from the analogue. The representation again seems to have the answer \"written on its sleeve\". Thus by attributing such properties to the intrinsic nature of the representation we beg the very question of how magnitudes are encoded and compared.", |
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| "section": "III. ANALOGICAL AGAIN", |
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| "text": "The phenomenon of attributing to the intrinsic nature of a representation some of the crucial aspects that need to be taken into account (because these are so intuitively obvious to the theorist) is not confined to analogical representations. Woods (1975) has recently shown that we frequently commit the same oversight in the case of semantic networks. This is why it is important to attempt to simulate a significant portion of cognition by machine (although even here the existence of such built-in functions as an arithmetic processor may create the illusion that we get magnitudes for free --i.e., we need not model them in detail). I I I I I I I I I i I I I I i i i i I are so far from understanding the semantics of discrete data structures (as Woods has cogently argued) that any mass movement to abandon them (or even augment them with something radically different) is at the very least premature.", |
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| "start": 243, |
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| "text": "Woods (1975)", |
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| "start": 638, |
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| "text": "I I I I I I I I I i I I I I i i i i I", |
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| "back_matter": [ |
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| "text": "An empirical investigation of visual mental imagery.(Doctoral dissertation, Carnegie-Mellon University) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms 1972. No. 72-13, 699. Block, N.J., & Foder, J.A., Cognitivism and the analog/digital distinction, Mimeo, MIT, 1973. Cooper, L.A., & Shepard, R.N ", |
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| "start": 122, |
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| "text": "University Microfilms 1972. No. 72-13, 699. Block, N.J., &", |
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| }, |
| { |
| "start": 181, |
| "end": 209, |
| "text": "Foder, J.A., Cognitivism and", |
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| }, |
| { |
| "start": 210, |
| "end": 275, |
| "text": "the analog/digital distinction, Mimeo, MIT, 1973. Cooper, L.A., &", |
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| { |
| "start": 276, |
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| "text": "Shepard, R.N", |
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| "section": "annex", |
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